

Buddhist Logic and Epistemology

Studies in the Buddhist Analysis of Inference and Language

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WAS ŚĀNTARAKṢITA A "POSITIVIST"?

Early in *Apoḥasiddhi*¹ Ratnakīrti states, "What is held by the positivist--that there being the cognition, 'the cow is not other than itself', exclusion is apprehended by a consequent apperception--and what is held by the negativist--that there being the cognition of the exclusion of the other, what is excluded from the other is apprehended indirectly--that is not right" (*AS* 3.8-12). Modern scholarship has tended to identify Śāntarakṣita as the positivist (*vidhivādin*) and Dinnāga as the negativist (*prastīṣedhavadin*) had in mind by Ratnakīrti.² I shall here be concerned with only the first identification. What I wish to ascertain is whether there is any sense in which it is accurate to contrast the theories of Śāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti as "positivist" and "neither positivist nor negativist" respectively.

Ratnakīrti's own view is that the meaning of a word is a positive entity qualified by the exclusion of the other (*AS* 3.6-8). In this respect his position resembles that of such Naiyāyikas as Jayanta, who holds that the meaning of a word is the individual qualified by a universal (*jātivīśiṣṭavyakti*).³ Ratnakīrti and Jayanta disagree, of course, on the nature of the qualifier: Where Jayanta puts a real universal, Ratnakīrti posits a mental fiction which is negative in function. But they agree on the point that the meaning of a word can be neither the particular which is ordinarily the referent of a token of the word, nor that general character which is shared in by the members of the word's extension. When one uses the word "cow," one generally intends to refer to a particular cow, but this can only be achieved by making use of the class character of the cow. Thus the meaning of the word must be the particular as qualified by this class character.

Ratnakīrti does not, however, fault previous formulations of the *apoha* theory on the point of focusing exclusively on either the particular or the general element in word meaning. As we have seen, he characterizes both positivist and negativist as making room for both aspects of meaning in their theories. (In the context of Ratnakīrti's discussion of the *apoha* theory, the positive element in word meaning is the particular, the negative element is the class character.) What he objects to, rather, is the predominance which these theories give to one or another of these elements. The positivist is said to hold that verbal comprehension brings about cognition

of the positive aspect of meaning directly, the negative aspect indirectly and only by implication. His criticism is this: "We do not find a succession of (stages of) grasping. No one ever, having first grasped something positive, goes on to cognize an exclusion by inference" (AS 3.13-14). Thus he takes the positivist to be making a certain claim about the psychology of linguistic cognition, namely that by means of such cognition one is made immediately aware of the particular, and becomes aware of the negative or excluding element of meaning only subsequently, indirectly, and by performing a certain inference. Let us see if this is a proper characterization of Śāntarakṣita's position.

Śāntarakṣita tells us that what is directly expressed by a word is the representation (*pratibhāsa*) which is caused, in one familiar with the relevant linguistic convention, by an utterance of the word.⁴ The occurrence of this representation is also caused by the perception of any of those external particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*) which constitute the (indirect) extension of the word, and in fact it is regularly mistaken for these.⁵ What a word primarily expresses, then, is a mental content which is taken for the object referred to by the word.

This representation is also characterized as a type of exclusion, however, namely a nominally bound exclusion (*paryudāsāpoha*). We are told that it is so characterized principally because of its difference from the images which are caused by the cognition of other words (*TS, TSP* p. 391). Here the analogy of the anti-febrile plants is helpful: Just as the various plants *abhayā*, *dhātṛ*, etc., though mutually distinct, are each capable upon ingestion of combating fever, so the black cow, brindled cow, etc., though mutually distinct, are each capable of causing images which differ from those caused by sheep, goats, etc. It is important to note that Śāntarakṣita does not state that the images caused by different cows resemble one another. Each simply differs from those images which are caused by words other than "cow." The exclusion class of the image caused by the black cow does not include the image caused by the brindled cow.

While the mental image represents the primary force of a word, there is also a secondary meaning which is implied by the force of a word, namely a verbally bound exclusion (*prasaṅgyapratīśedhāpoha*). Kamalaśīla explains this as follows: "The self-nature of that which is the 'itself' of the image of the cow, etc., is not the 'itself' of the other, the image of the horse, etc." (*TS, TSP* p. 393). This is to be considered the secondary meaning of a word because it occurs to one only after the image is cognized. Thus Kamalaśīla replies in the following way to the objection that one word cannot have two results:

If it were intended that there is directly and simultaneously a double result of one word--a positive as well as a negative cognition--that would be contradictory. When, however, the view is that, as with "not eating during the day," the one result is obtained directly, the other by implication, then there is no contradiction. (*TSP* p. 395)

The sentence, "Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day," is understood directly to express a certain state of affairs, namely that fat Devadatta does not eat during the day. When one has understood that the sentence expresses this state of affairs, one may then go on to work out the implication that Devadatta eats at night. By the same token, Kamalaśīla claims, when one understands a word one first cognizes a certain image, and only subsequently cognizes that this is not the image associated with various other words.

Is, then, Ratnakīrti's characterization of the positivist position an accurate depiction of Śāntarakṣita's formulation of the *apoha* theory? It will be recalled that Ratnakīrti faults the positivist for supposing that linguistic cognition involves two distinct stages of apprehension. The passage just quoted suggests that this is indeed Śāntarakṣita's view of linguistic cognition. Ratnakīrti also describes the positivist as holding that the first stage of linguistic cognition involves the apprehension of something positive, while the second stage involves the apprehension of something negative. Here we are on somewhat more slippery terrain. For Ratnakīrti, the positivist element in linguistic cognition is the apprehension of the particular which is ordinarily denoted by the use of a token of a term (*AS* 6.11-12). Now it is true that for Śāntarakṣita what one first apprehends in linguistic cognition is that representation which is mistaken for the external particular. But this representation is also characterized as a type of nominally bound exclusion; one cognizes the image caused by "cow" as different from the images caused by "horse," etc. If one is aware of this aspect of the image in the first stage of linguistic cognition, it would seem wrong to speak of this stage of linguistic cognition as apprehending only the positive.

Yet we have already seen that Kamalaśīla describes the first stage of such cognition as positive. And in another passage (*TSP* p. 392) he uses the claim that this first stage is the apprehension of a mental image to reply to the objection (*TS* 909-10) that what is manifested in linguistic cognition is not mere negation. Śāntarakṣita's account of the primary force of a word, Kamalaśīla argues, shows that the apohist position is not that linguistic meaning is merely

negative. The difficulty here is that Śāntarākṣita and Ratnakīrti mean different things by "positive" and "negative". For Ratnakīrti the positive is the particular real denoted by a token of a term, the negative is the exclusion which qualifies the particular. For Śāntarākṣita, however, "positive" and "negative" are, at least in this context, psychological terms. Not only the image which does duty for the particular, but the exclusion which qualifies it as well, may be thought of as psychologically positive in that the apprehension of either is more nearly like the apprehension of a paradigmatically positive entity, such as a pot, than it is like the apprehension of a paradigmatically negative entity, such as the absence of Devadatta from the house.

That the mental image is psychologically positive in this sense should be obvious, but the case of the exclusion which qualifies it requires comment. This is a nominally bound exclusion, that is, its linguistic representation is best achieved by prefixing a negative particle to a noun or adjective. Thus in the case of "cow" the image is qualified by an exclusion which may be represented as "non-(image produced by words other than "cow")." It is generally held that the primary force of nominally bound negation is positive, its negative aspect playing only a subsidiary role. This may best be understood in terms of the notion of commitment to the existence of properties. When we characterize an action as impolite, we are not simply refusing to attribute the property of being polite to the action. Rather, we are attributing to the action a quality which is opposed to that of being polite; we may say that "impolite" is a sort of linguistic "poseur." The term thus involves commitment to the existence of a property which qualifies the class of actions to which it is applied. And so it is that "impolite" comes to be thought of as the name of a property every bit as real, as directly cognizable, as the quality of being white. By the same token, the exclusion which qualifies the image produced by a word is apprehended not as the absence of a property which qualifies other images, but rather as a property which is distinctive of that image, its own-form. It is this which makes the cognition of this exclusion psychologically positive.

It would appear, then, that it is in the main accurate to speak of Śāntarākṣita as a positivist. For he does employ the notion that there are two stages of linguistic cognition, the first positive, the second negative. Only "in the main," however, since his first stage is positive in the psychological sense, not in Ratnakīrti's sense of being the cognition of a particular as opposed to the cognition of a negative qualifier. And this qualification should alert us to an important point about the present dispute. That Śāntarākṣita intends his two stages to be thought of as positive and negative in the psychological sense shows that his two-stage account is

meant as a way of squaring a formal theory with our pre-critical intuitions about the psychology of linguistic cognition. The heart of the theory, I want to suggest, lies elsewhere than in the story of succeeding cognitions. In this case it is at best unhelpful, and possibly misleading, to follow Ratnakīrti's classification.

This claim requires elucidation and defense. In what follows I shall attempt to provide both. In the first place, it is worth remarking that Śāntarakṣita's two-stage account is offered in response to the objection that the apohist thesis contradicts experience. This raises an interesting question: What sort of experience is there which could contradict a theory of meaning? The answer is to be found in Kamalaśīla's explication of the objection.

The idea produced by a word is perceived as functioning just by determining something of the form of a real. And that is not a part of linguistic meaning which is not manifested in linguistic cognition (*TSP* p. 359).

What the objector seems to be claiming is that we can introspect that mental content which arises when we apprehend a word, and moreover that when we do so we find that this mental content is the representation of a positive entity like a pot or the quality of being white, not the representation of something negative like the absence of Devadatta. For my own part, I must confess that I am not sure this is correct; but perhaps this is because my intuitions have been corrupted by engaging in philosophy. What I am sure of is that the second claim of the objection--that intuitions of this sort are decisive for the theory of meaning--is false. Introspection is simply not an appropriate tool for the construction of an account of linguistic meaning. It is generally recognized that the evidence of introspection is colored by the theory one holds. If one begins the task of constructing a theory of meaning by attempting to introspect those mental states associated with verbal apprehension, one's intuitions will be colored by one's naive semantic theory. And naive semantics is a bad theory. If one asks the cowherd what the word "cow" means, he will almost invariably reply that the meaning is just those things to which the word refers, namely particular cows. If we start with introspection, the Sāṃkhyaans will have the last word on the problem of meaning.

Oddly enough it is Ratnakīrti who comes closest to an explicit recognition of this problem. In reviewing the difficulties faced by previous formulations of the *apoha* theory, he considers the objection that one would not ordinarily describe what one was aware of when one understood the meaning of a word as negative in nature ("the making manifest of a mere

denial"). A possible reply to this objection is that while one does not report, "I perceive negation," still there is a negative element in verbal cognition in that negation is a qualifier of that entity which is excluded (AS 1.15). The situation here is compared to that faced by the Naiyāyika, who must agree that one does not ordinarily report apprehension of a universal in describing one's linguistic cognition. This does not by itself rule out the Naiyāyika's claim that universals are involved in word meaning, however, since we still require an account of how a word may be correctly applied to a potentially infinite number of particulars; thus it may well be that the individual referents of the various tokens of a term are all qualified by a common form, and that this is part of the meaning of the term (AS 2.1). To this suggestion, Ratnakīrti has the opponent reply that such an approach is of no avail to the *apohavādin*, since it is clear that a horse does not figure in the meaning of the word "cow" (AS 2.6-11). This reply is apposite, since the proposal under consideration is that the meaning of the word "cow" is those things which are not cows as qualified by negation. What is important about this exchange is that the counsels of our pre-critical intuitions have been shown to be of less importance than certain more formal constraints on a theory of meaning.

What constraints are these, that is, what is it that a theory of word meaning should accomplish? Dīhṅāga took the task of such a theory to be the construction of a satisfactory account of the manner in which words bring about apprehension of sentence meaning,⁶ and Śāntarakṣita follows Dīhṅāga in this.⁷ One important component of this program is the provision of an adequate account of our use of class terms in sentences, and this is the problem to which Ratnakīrti devotes his greatest efforts. But the basic problem remains the explanation of our ability to understand and act in conformity with novel sentences. Now in this task it is clear that, other things being equal, the theory which employs the more plausible psychological model enjoys a distinct advantage over its competitors. For instance, a model which required that humans have infinite memory capacity would obviously be defective. A semantic theory must not be confused with this model, however. A semantic theory is itself just a formal representation of those computations which mediate between verbal input and behavioral output. And the elements employed in this representation need have no status whatever in our ontology. A psychological model of a semantic theory provides an account of how human beings might actually carry out the required computations. This suggests that the model must have some degree of psychological reality, that it be conceivable that it is actually instantiated in the causal capacities of the human mind, if the model is to have any degree of plausibility. But just as the symbols employed in a formal

representation of linguistic meaning need not be construed as referring to any elements in our ontology, so the psychological characteristics of those mental states or events involved in the causal processes posited by the model are irrelevant to the model itself. What matters is just that the causal processes function in the right way, that they issue in the sort of behavior we expect from the input.

It is for this reason that introspective reports concerning the "feel" of linguistic cognition can play no role in the construction of a semantic theory. This is not to say that such reports can play no role in the evaluation of such a theory, however. The ideally complete psychological theory would provide an explanation of all mental phenomena--including those cases in which the results of introspection disagree with the theory itself. The psychological model of a semantic theory is not meant to be an ideally complete psychological theory; its scope is restricted to those mental phenomena connected with linguistic cognition. It is nonetheless desirable that the model provide some explanation of those areas where it diverges from the evidence of introspection. Other things being equal, the theory which can explain more of its counter-intuitive features is to be preferred. Such considerations can hardly be decisive on their own, however. What count most are such features as the theory's predictive power, economy, and elegance, along with the compatibility of its psychological model with what we know about human mental capacities.

Let us now see how Śāntarakṣita's and Ratnakīrti's theories fare under this interpretation of their project. The formal theories of word meaning which they provide appear to be essentially equivalent, and can be represented as follows. Associated with each term t is some one particular p_c . Then with p ranging over the domain D of particulars, the meaning of a term t is $\hat{p}(\sim p_c p)$ (read: p such that it is not non- p_c ; for reasons to be noted below, the expression " $\sim p_c$ " names a predicate). The \sim - function yields a pseudo-predicate when it takes particulars as arguments. This function may be analyzed in terms of the two types of negation of which it is composed--verbally bound (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*) and nominally bound (*paryudāsa*). For each p in the domain D , $\sim p$ yields an ordered pair of sets, $\langle S_1, S_2 \rangle$ with S_1 the extension of $\sim p$ and S_2 the anti-extension of $\sim p$ (i.e., $S_1 \cup S_2$ is a proper subset of D ; cf. choice negation). For each p_i , S_2 is a set with just one member, namely p_i . Application of verbally bound negation to this pair yields a pseudo-predicate whose extension S_3 is the complement of S_1 (i.e., $S_1 \cup S_3 = D$; cf. exclusion negation). We call this a pseudo-predicate because its extension has been determined in such a way as to avoid commitment to the existence of any characteristic or set of characteristics common to the members of S_3 .

Śāntarakṣita provides the following psychological model of the theory. The variable p ranges over *pratibhāsas* or mental images. A mental image may be caused by an external particular (*svalakṣaṇa*); the external particular is the object of perceptual cognition, but it can also give rise to a mental representation which is the direct object of linguistic or inferential cognition. Such an image may also be caused in another fashion, however, namely through cognition of the appropriate word once the conventions governing the use of that word have been learned. Given that both external particulars and mental images are absolutely unique and devoid of resemblance relations, one wonders how such conventions could be learned in the case of class terms. Consider the term "cow," and suppose its extension to consist of images p_1, \dots, p_i , each of these images being the sort of representation that would be caused were one in the right type of cognitive relation to what is commonly called a cow. Now an image, say p_1 , manifests itself to consciousness in such a way as to be incompatible with or exclude the occurrence of a certain set of images which might otherwise occur, say the set (p_{i+1}, \dots, p_k) . (Here $D = (p_1, \dots, p_k)$.) Assume that the particular *pratibhāsa* p_c associated with the term "cow" is p_1 . This association comes about through p_1 having been the representation produced on the occasion of learning the term.⁸ Now $\neg p_1 = \langle (p_{i+1}, \dots, p_k), (p_1) \rangle$. But it was noted above that the nominally bound negation of an image yields a qualifier which is apprehended not as the absence of a property which qualifies other images, but as a qualifier which is distinctive of that image itself, its own-form. This means that the extension of $\neg p_1$ is determined by a predicate which qualifies just p_1 , not the set (p_{i+1}, \dots, p_k) . The point may be made in the following way: To say that a given image has the causal capacity to exclude a certain set of images is to commit oneself to the existence of some property, but this property should be thought of as just a dispositional property of the given particular image, not as a property which characterizes the various images in the set of excluded images. For the overall strategy to work, we need some way of determining the set (p_{i+1}, \dots, p_k) ; the present point is that this may be done without commitment to the existence of a real property which is common to the members of this set.

Verbally bound negation is to be interpreted as absolute rejection of a set of images as a qualifier of a given image without commitment to the existence of some alternative qualifier as qualifying the given image. Thus to say of some representation p that it satisfies not non- p_1 is just to deny that it is a member of the set (p_{i+1}, \dots, p_k) . But given that verbally bound negation functions like exclusion negation, this also means that the image in question must belong to the set (p_1, \dots, p_i) . Thus the expression " $\neg p_1$ " is a way of

characterizing all those representations which belong to the (direct) extension of the term "cow," a way which does not make use of the notion of a real property of cowness.

How, then, does one respond to the command, "Fetch a cow"? Having learned the relevant convention for "cow," one knows that the word refers to anything which satisfies the pseudo-predicate $-p_1$. Now when we stand in the right cognitive relation to a real cow-particular (i.e., a cow-*svalakṣaṇa*), this causes the occurrence of a representation which satisfies the pseudo-predicate, since each cow-representation is endowed with the causal capacity to exclude the set of images (p_{i+1}, \dots, p_i) . Thus we can recognize any representation from the set (p_2, \dots, p_i) as belonging to the (direct) extension of "cow" simply by noting that the recollected image p_1 (which in effect serves as a paradigm) does not exclude that representation. It is worth pointing out that this version of the *apoha* theory differs significantly from Dharmakīrti's. According to the latter's account, we pick out the correct image from among those presented to consciousness by means of a real resemblance relation between that image and a paradigm. On the present theory, on the other hand, real resemblance relations are replaced by the machinery of twofold negation.

With one exception to be noted below, Ratnakīrti does not appear to have provided an explicit formulation of his psychological model. Virtually all of his remarks about the psychology of linguistic apprehension fall under the heading of what I would call accommodations to conflicting intuitions. Since all of these remarks are consonant with the model just sketched, however, it seems fair to take his silence to mean that he accepts it, at least in the main.

Let us now see how Śāntarakṣita tries to answer objections to the *apoha* theory based on pre-critical intuitions about linguistic cognition. I have already claimed that his two-stage account should be taken as just such an attempt. The opponent argues that the object of linguistic cognition feels psychologically positive, and takes this to refute the apohist thesis. Śāntarakṣita replies that what one is first aware of in such cognition, namely the image as qualified by its difference from certain other images, is psychologically positive. The psychologically negative element in linguistic cognition, the exclusion of those other images as a characterization of the given image, is cognized only subsequently and by implication. In fact, Śāntarakṣita seems committed, on independent grounds, to the position that the causal processes involved in cognition of word meaning are not amenable to introspection;⁹ thus it would be surprising if he were claiming that these processes can be known to occur in a certain order. I take this rather as the suggestion that the opponent go back and look again at the testimony of introspection. To

be sure, what comes to mind first when one reflects on the psychology of linguistic apprehension is some positive content. But subsequent reflection discloses a negative element as well: One seems to have become aware of this positive content by virtue of having excluded certain other positive contents. In other words, I am suggesting that the presumptive apprehension which Kamalaśīla describes at *TSP* p. 395 is not part of the psychological model of the theory, but is rather intended as showing a way of obtaining more accurate introspective data concerning the psychological feel of word apprehension. Of course if I am correct in saying that Śāntaraḥṣita distrusts the testimony of introspection, then such data cannot be used directly to support the theory. There is, however, a well known sense in which our intuitions can be used if not to support a theory then at least to motivate it. I think that Śāntaraḥṣita is here seeking more balanced intuitions about linguistic cognition in order simply to show that the *apoha* theory is not as counter-intuitive as it seems at first blush.

Ratnakīrti would seem to place more confidence in the ability of introspection to capture the nature of linguistic cognition. Thus as we have already seen, he takes as a decisive objection to Śāntaraḥṣita's theory the fact that we are not ordinarily aware of two distinct stages of cognition of word meaning. This leads him to propose that the particular and its qualifier are apprehended simultaneously (*AS* 6.8; strictly speaking this claim would seem to belong to his psychological model). But now consider how he seeks to counter the intuition that one is not aware of excluding anything when one apprehends the positive content of linguistic cognition. He argues that in the cognition of a blue lotus the qualifier "blue" operates not by causing the manifestation of a representation of blue but by bringing it about that the manifestation of blue is not excluded from one's mental representations. By the same token, when as a result of linguistic apprehension one cognizes a particular cow, one simultaneously apprehends its qualifier the exclusion of non-cow, not in the form of the performance of an exclusion of non-cow, but rather by way of not excluding the manifestation of the exclusion of non-cow (*AS* 3.19-4.3). That is, to say that one is aware of the exclusion of non-cow at the same time one is aware of the particular cow, is not to say one is aware at that time of performing the exclusion of non-cow; it means merely that one among a number of possible qualifiers of the particular remains before one's mind at that time, namely the mental representation of such an exclusion. Ratnakīrti is making two distinct points here: that an act of exclusion--viz., the exclusion of qualifiers other than not non-cow--can occur while our attention is focused elsewhere and thus prove invisible to introspection; and that the mental representation of

an exclusion is not itself the performance of a mental act of exclusion.

This suggests that Ratnakīrti shares Śāntarakṣita's reluctance to place much weight on the evidence of introspection in formulating and criticizing semantic theories. A difficulty for this interpretation arises, however, out of his discussion of a point of logic. It is objected that the exclusion of the other and what is excluded from the other could not be cognized simultaneously, since they are contradictory. He replies that a contradiction is brought about not by absence of the other (which is what we find in linguistic cognition) but by absence of the entity itself. He argues that qualifier and qualified are not in fact distinct, since they have the same locus, like the (cognition of) the ground and the absence of a pot (*AS* 5.13-16). It is a doctrine of Yogācāra-Sautrāntika epistemology that absences are not perceived but inferred: one perceives the ground, realizes that if a pot were on the ground then it would have been perceived, and infers that a pot is not on the ground.¹⁰ Is Ratnakīrti not here saying that we can confirm by introspection one element of his psychological model, namely its requirement that we are able simultaneously to cognize a positive entity and its negative qualifier?

In fact he is not, for if this were his intention then the example would backfire. One cannot be said to perceive the ground and infer the absence of the pot simultaneously; these are distinct mental acts, and must occur at distinct times. In fact his point here must be that one can stand in some cognitive relation to both a positive entity and a negative entity at the same time. When one is aware of the absence of a pot, one is simultaneously related in some epistemically significant way to the substratum of this absence, the ground. Of course one is not aware of being so related to the ground when one is cognizing the absence. But this simply confirms our suspicion that introspection cannot tell us all there is to know about the psychology of cognition. In fact introspection can be positively misleading here, for there is a sense in which what one is really aware of, when one cognizes the absence of the pot, is the ground; introspection tells us the object is negative when it is actually positive.

What emerges from this is the suggestion that we view Ratnakīrti's claim about the simultaneity of the two aspects of linguistic cognition in a different light. In particular it suggests we should not see him as asserting that we are at one moment of such cognition fully aware, in a way which is open to introspection, of both the particular and the exclusion which is its qualifier. His claim is rather that whenever we are fully aware of one aspect, we are also epistemically related (by way of some causal relation) to the other. The causal processes responsible for linguistic cognition are

such that full awareness of either element could not be achieved unless both elements had been employed in the computation of the meaning of the term. With respect to these processes it makes no sense to speak of "before" and "after."

If all this is correct, however, one wonders why Ratnakīrti takes such strong exception to Śāntarakṣita's theory, for there seems to be little that divides them. I suspect that Ratnakīrti has simply mistaken the intent of the latter's two-stage account, taking it as a part of the psychological model which is meant to be verifiable by introspection. If that were the actual status of this account, Ratnakīrti would be justified in rejecting it. I argued that it should instead be seen as an attempt to school our intuitions so that these might motivate the theory proper. Ratnakīrti engages in the same task when he analyzes the sentence, "This path leads to Śrughna." He points out that "leads," for instance, contributes the sense, "precisely leads, without a break such as is found in forest paths." He concludes that words produce apprehension of something positive in a form qualified by an exclusion (*AS* 6.1-4). Of course the considerations he brings forth prove no such thing. They simply help us acquire a new intuition about word meaning, one that makes the *apoha* theory seem somewhat less counter-intuitive. In fact this attempt at schooling our intuitions dovetails rather nicely with Śāntarakṣita's. What Ratnakīrti gives us are instances where our first intuition is that meaning is apprehended as something positive, but where subsequent reflection suggests the presence of a differentiative element as well. It must be admitted, though, that Ratnakīrti's efforts in this direction are much less likely to be misunderstood than Śāntarakṣita's.

In sum, Śāntarakṣita and Ratnakīrti share essentially the same formal theory, psychological model, and methodological principles. One can view Śāntarakṣita as a positivist only if one takes his two-stage account as part of the psychological model of his theory. I have argued that to do so is to view that account outside its proper context, namely as a reply to an objection based on pre-critical intuitions. If I am correct in this, then Śāntarakṣita is not a positivist. Even if I am wrong on this point, however, it is still singularly unhelpful to employ Ratnakīrti's classification, given how little separates the two theories.¹¹

NOTES

1. Ratnakīrti, *Apoḥasiddhi (AS)*, in *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, ed. Hara Prasad Shastri, Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta, 1910). Subsequent citations will be given in the text in parentheses.
2. Cf. Satkari Mookerji, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1935), p. 132; also Raja Ram Dravid, *The Problem of Universals in Indian Philosophy* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1972), p. 306.
3. Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*, Kashi Sanskrit Series 106 (1936), pp. 297-8.
4. *Tattvasaṃgraha (TS) of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' (TSP) of Śrī Kamalaśīla*, ed. Dwarkidass Shastri (Varanasi, 1968), v. 1010. Subsequent citations to *TS* will be given, by verse number, in parentheses in the text.
5. *TSP* p. 393. Subsequent citations of *TSP* will be given, by page number, in the text.

Diñnāga claims in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* that the object of perception is the *svalakṣaṇa*, the object of inference (and thus of verbal cognition as well) is the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. The *svalakṣaṇa* is said to be momentary, unique, causally efficacious, and real, while the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* is permanent, shared by many particulars, non-efficacious, and fictive. A good deal of confusion is engendered by attempting to fit Śāntarakṣita's account of word meaning into this framework. It is true that Kamalaśīla quotes with approval Diñnāga's remark that the *anyāpoha* possesses all the properties of the realist's universal (*TSP* p. 389). This suggests that we may identify as the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* whatever Śāntarakṣita identifies as the *anyāpoha*. But such a strategy will not work, since for Śāntarakṣita there is no entity, real or fictive, that may be called the *anyāpoha*. One source of difficulty here is that Diñnāga seems to have followed Bhartṛhari in claiming that the meaning of a word is the universal or class character, whereas Śāntarakṣita, like Ratnakīrti, holds that the meaning of a word is a particular qualified by the universal or class character. It is far from clear how we might prise apart the particular and universal elements in Śāntarakṣita's account so as to get something we might call the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. We are told that the *pratibhāsa* is a representation of the external particular which is ordinarily referred to through the use of a token of a word.

Moreover, the *pratibhāsa* is itself a *svalakṣaṇa*, at least when considered as part of the mental stream of an individual. This might be taken to show that everything else in Śāntarakṣita's account besides the *pratibhāsa* can be thought of as the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*. But as we shall see in more detail below, it is the distinctive causal capacity of the *pratibhāsa* to exclude other *pratibhāsas* which serves as the basis for determining the class character of the particular. Thus particular and universal elements appear to be inextricably bound up with each other in this account.

6. On this point cf. Hattori Masaaki, "Apoḥa and Pratibhā," in *Sanskrit and Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Daniel H. H. Ingalls*, ed. M. Nagatomi et al. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1980), pp. 61-73.
7. I discuss Śāntarakṣita's account of the relation between word meaning and sentence meaning in "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Apoḥa," in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 13, no. 2 (June 1985):133-151.
8. We are here assuming that learning comes about through ostension, but only for the sake of simplifying our account. In fact, Śāntarakṣita, as an *anvitābhīdhānavādin*, would deny that one ordinarily learns new terms by ostension.
9. Cf. my "More Things in Heaven and Earth," *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, 10 (1982):205-6. This point is also discussed in "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Apoḥa."
10. Jayanta provides a good discussion of the Buddhist position on non-perception at *Nyayamañjarī*, pp. 54 ff.
11. An earlier version of this paper was delivered to the Seminar on Buddhist Logic and Epistemology held under the auspices of the IABS at Oxford University on August 17-18, 1982. I wish to thank the following individuals for helpful comments and criticisms: Douglas Daye, Harry Deutsch, Brendan Gillon, Richard Hayes, Hans Herzberger, Radhika Herzberger, Katsura Shoryu and B. K. Matilal.