

THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IN YOGĀCĀRA BUDDHISM

CHHOTE LAL TRIPATHI



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ORIENTAL PUBLISHERS & BOOKSELLERS
B 28/15, DURGAKUND
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Published by :

SRI SURESH PANDEY

BHARAT-BHARATI

B 28/15 Durgakund

VARANASI-5 (India)

First Published : 1972

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Printed at :

ARUN PRESS

B 17/2 Tilbhandeswar

VARANASI-1.

समर्पण

परम श्रद्धेय पिता एवं स्नेहमयी जननी के पूज्य चरणों में— जिनकी वात्सल्यमयी छाया में लेखक ने निश्चिन्तता और निरुद्विग्नता के प्रशान्त वातावरण में जीवन के पूर्वांश को मां भारती की सेवा में समर्पित किया—

सादर सभक्ति समर्पित ।

७ मार्च, १९७२

छोटेलाल त्रिपाठी
प्रवक्ता दर्शन विभाग
प्रयाग विश्वविद्यालय
प्रयाग ।

FOREWORD

I have made a thorough study of Dr. C. L. Tripathi's excellent monograph entitled 'The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism'. This work is emendation and enlargement of his D. Phil thesis. Dr. Tripathi's enquiry into the Yogācāra theory of knowledge is a piece of original research work. His study of the subject from Sanskrit sources is commendable indeed. I express my whole-hearted appreciation of this work. The Western as well as Indian reader is bound to profit by Dr. C. L. Tripathi's dissertation.

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7. 3. 1972

P R E F A C E

The present work 'The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism' is the published form of my thesis 'An Appraisal of Yogācāra Epistemology' which was approved for the Degree of the Doctor of Philosophy by the University of Allahabad in 1966. It aims to draw a vivid and true picture of Yogācāra epistemology by presenting its critical exposition along with its western parallels. It wants to clear up the misunderstanding caused by the biased and unbalanced criticism of Yogācāra epistemology from Indian and Western philosophers.

The work took long four years of toil and turmoil. During these years I received support both moral and material from many great men without whose encouragement I would not have been able to reach the goal.

First of all I want to pay my homage to the sacred memory of late Professor R. N. Kaul, the Head of the Department of Philosophy, University of Allahabad. The paternal love and affection which have been bestowed upon me by him are valuable treasure which will remain always fresh in my memory and remind me the ideal relationship between the teachers and students of ancient India. Further I want to express my gratitude to Dr. Balbhadra Prasad the ex Vice-Chancellor of Allahabad University who has been a great patron of scholars and students and whose reign as the Vice-Chancellor of this University shall be remembered by all the students who come to University to study and prepare themselves as the soldiers of free India in all walks of life. I am grateful to Dr. Umesh Mishra the ex Vice-Chancellor of the Darbhanga Sanskrit University, Bihar and Pandit Raghuvara Miṭṭhū Lal Śāstri who always encouraged and explained me the problems of philosophy. Dr. S. Datta, the ex-Head of the Department of Philosophy, Allahabad University has always been kind enough to help me and solve my difficulties.

The award of scholarship by him had been a great help to me during my research days. He always advised me to take precautions against my frequent illness. Shri S. S. Roy the present Head of the Department of Philosophy always asked me regarding the progress of my research work and inspired me to work hard and not to lose patience by reminding me the famous line of Shelley—‘if winter comes, can spring be far behind’. Dr. S. C. Biswas at present U. G. C. Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad University always encouraged me to complete the thesis, Late Dr. Chou Hsiang Kuang and Mrs. Chou Hsiang Kuang (Chinese teachers, Sanskrit Department, Allahabad University) who taught me Chinese with great love and affection—always encouraged me to study Buddhism prevalent in China and Japan through the medium of Chinese and thus restore the old bonds of friendship between India and China. Professor T. R. V. Murti the ex Head of the Department of Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, Dr. Rama Kant Tripathi, Dr. Ashoka Kumar Chatterji assistant Professors Banaras Hindu University and Pandit Jagannath Upadhyaya Head of the Department of the Buddhist Studies Vārāṇaṣeya Sanskrit Viśvavidyālaya took keen interest in my work and appreciated my aim to gain profound knowledge of Buddhism, I am extremely grateful to all these scholars of philosophy and religion.

Further I want to express my gratitude to Pandit Sangam Lal Pande Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Allahabad University under whose supervision the work has been accomplished. The fraternal affection, valuable suggestions, the solace, inspiration, encouragement and support which I received from him are beyond words. I do not know how to express my gratitude to my parents who readily agreed to my plan of joining research though it was a great retreat on my part from bearing family liabilities and a heavy burden to them for an indefinite period of time. Further I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to Saudāminī Sanskrit Mahāvīdyālaya, Allahabad whose every nook and corner had become a study-room for

me. The teachers and students of this institution rendered invaluable services to me. I am grateful to all of them. Further I want to express my gratitude to my revered friend Pandit K. Shankar Sharma, the librarian Ganga Nath Jhā Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyāpīṭha. The entire credit of the publication of this work goes to him. Without his effort the thesis would not have seen the light of the day so soon. Finally, I want to express my indebtedness to Pandit Suresh Pandey, the Proprietor Bharat Bharti, Durga Kund, Vārāṇasi who readily accepted the proposal of Sharmaji to publish the thesis. I am highly obliged for his kindness.

March 7, 1972

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INTRODUCTION

I

I am glad to find that Dr. C. L. Tripathi's thesis entitled 'An Appraisal of Yogācāra Epistemology' is being published under the title 'The Problem of Knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism.' Dr. Tripathi is my student and friend. He has patiently worked under me for several years and has tried to incorporate in his work all the views and arguments I told him from time to time. Whatever criticisms of modern interpretations of Buddhism are available in these pages I am personally responsible for them as in fact they are my own criticisms. I firmly hold that Dīñnāga's theory of knowledge is basically different from that of Hume, Kant or Wittgenstein and that those who have compared his theory with that of Kant or British empiricists or modern Analytical Philosophers have done injustice to him. Further I believe that his theory of knowledge is basically correct and that it can change the course of contemporary philosophy, Western or Indian. Contemporary western philosophy, I think, has gone through a process of purgation and clarification recently, through the movements of logical Positivism, logical Empiricism and British Analysis and has come to a point where it feels that clarity is not enough or that vision or insight into the nature of truth and meaning is essential. Dīñnāga has combined these two processes of Analysis and Insight into his theory of knowledge, which is therefore extremely relevant to the present needs of contemporary western philosophy. Dr. Tripathi has endeavoured to reconstruct it in the light of available fragments from Dīñnāga and its developments at the hands of Post-Dīñnāga philosophers like Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Prajñākaragupta, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and others. He has also utilized the valuable investigations of modern

Buddhist philosophers like Th. Stcherbatsky, H. N. Randle, A. B. Keith, Dr. D. Suzuki, Yama Kami Sogen, Dr. T. R. V. Mūrti, Dr. Satkari Mukerji, Rahul Sankrityayan and others. His reconstruction may not acclaim universal acceptance; at places it may even be found faulty. But nobody will disagree with me that such a reconstruction delineates an important phase of Buddhist thought and is thoroughly relevant to current discussions of the problem of knowledge.

II

Studies such as Dr. Tripathi's are generally called investigations into the history of Philosophy. But are they merely historical? Most of such studies are undoubtedly only historical. But there are studies into the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle which have changed the course of philosophy. Similarly there are studies into the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, the Vedas and Upaniṣads, the Bhagvadgītā and the Brahmasūtra, which have tremendously changed the philosophical currents of their times. In the history of philosophy we find such movements as Back to Plato, Back to Kant, Back to Hume, Back to Hegel, Back to the Vedas, Back to the Upaniṣads, Back to Bādarāyaṇa and the like. Such movements are launched by historical studies that are impregnated with new possibilities. The past is past no doubt; but its interpretation is not past. The interpretation of the past is a sign of the present and an index of the future.

Studies in the philosophy of Dīnāga have become important since 1921 when Pandit S. C. Vidyabhusana in 'A History of Indian Logic' (Ancient, Mediaeval and Modern) informed the world that Dīnāga is the Lord of all logicians.¹ (Sakala nyāyavādinām Faraṁeśvaraḥ). Professor H. N. Randle brought out his Fragments from

1. See also Pramāṇavārtikālakāra of Prajñākara Gupta.

Diñnāga in 1926 and gave the outlines of the Philosophy of Diñnāga to a world which has no access to any of his works. Shri H. R. R. Iyenger published from Mysore (India) in 1930 the *Pramāṇa Samuccaya* of Diñnāga. He edited the first chapter of *Pramāṇa Samuccaya* called *Pratyakṣa* in Tibetan and restored it into Sanskrit with *Vṛtti*, *ṭkā* and notes. In the same year Mr. G. Tucci published from Heidelberg (Germany) the *Nyāyamukha* of Diñnāga, the oldest Buddhist text on logic after Chinese and Tibetan materials. In Chinese the *Nyāyamukha* of Diñnāga was rendered by Huan Tsang and in Tibetan it was rendered separately by two persons, Kanaka Varman and Vasudhāraṣita. Then came forward the great Buddhist scholar and philosopher Th. Stcherbatsky who brought out his Buddhist logic in two volumes in 1930-1932. His Buddhist logic is a classic. He has clearly explained the logical standpoint of Diñnāga and his followers Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. He has also given the rudiments of Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti's theory of knowledge. The 'Buddhist logic' is undoubtedly a great masterpiece of modern investigations in Buddhist logic and epistemology. It may be called the Bible of the neo-Buddhist studies which are emerging slowly and steadily as the studies into Diñnāga and his school are progressing. After Stcherbatsky Dr. Satkari Mukerji published in 1935 from Calcutta his researches into the metaphysics of the school of Diñnāga under the title 'The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux' an exposition of the philosophy of Critical Realism as expounded by the school of Diñnāga. Then Aiya Swami Śāstrī published in 1942 from Madras the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* and *Vṛtti* of Diñnāga with the commentary of Dharmapāla. The *Ālambana-parīkṣā* with *Vṛtti* of Diñnāga was also published from Tibetan version in 1953 from Kyoto, Japan. Erich Frauwallner published in 1959—'Diñnāga, Sein work und Seine Entwicklung' and in 1961 "Landmarks in the History of Indian logic" in Wiener

Zeitschrift für die Kunde des süd- und ost-Asiens; Vienna. Dr. Ashoka Kumar Chatterji published in 1962 his thesis 'The Yogācāra Idealism', and although it has been written mainly on the basis of Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratā Siddhī* it has also considered the metaphysical views of the school of Dīñnāga. Dr. Dharmendra Nath Śāstrī has dealt with the conflict between the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school and the Buddhist Dīñnāga school in his book entitled 'Critique of Indian Realism,' which was published in 1964. H. Kitagawa has published in Japanese from Tokyo in 1965 'A Study of Indian Classical Logic—Dīñnāga's system. In 1968 Mr. Masaaki Hatton published the *Pratyakṣa Pariccheda* of Dīñnāga's *Pramāṇa Samuccaya* from the Sanskrit fragments and Tibetan versions from Harvard University Press under the title 'Dīñnāga on Perception.' All these studies at least show the global interest in the philosophy of Dīñnāga and his school. Such studies are still in their infancy because all the works of Dīñnāga are still not available in original Sanskrit or in any modern language. So there are two types of studies in this field—first, the publication of original works of Dīñnāga and his school in Sanskrit and in modern languages, and second the commentaries upon those works. Dr. Tripathi's work does not belong to either of these two categories. It is an exposition of the theory of knowledge as expounded by Dīñnāga and his school. Dr. Satkari Mukerji has dealt with the metaphysics of this school; Dr. Stcherbatsky and Dr. Randle have dealt with the logic of the school and Dr. Tripathi has dealt with the epistemology of the school.

There is another difference between Dr. Tripathi and others in their treatment of the subject. While other scholars and philosophers have accepted Dharmakīrti's improvements upon Dīñnāga's views, Dr. Tripathi has upheld that Dharmakīrti's improvements upon Dīñnāga's views and assertions are, by and large, not necessarily true. In his

opinion Diñnāga's views are more profound than Dharmakīrti's. I share this view. In support of my view I may point out Dharmakīrti's improvement upon Diñnāga's definition of perception. Diñnāga defines perception as that knowledge which is devoid of all conceptual construction (*pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham*). Dharmakīrti here adds that this knowledge must be non-illusory (*Abhrāntam*). Dharmakīrti's addition I think, is not consistent with the description that perception is devoid of all conceptual construction. So his definition of perception is a contradiction in terms. There are two ways of knowing, perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference or conceptual construction (*anumāna*). These two ways of knowing are similar to Russell's two kinds of knowledge, knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. The former kind of knowledge reveals *svalakṣaṇas* or sense-data and the latter *sāmānya lakṣaṇas* or universals. Thus universals have no existence; they are conceptual constructions. What are in existence then? They are *svalakṣaṇas* or sense-data. *Svalakṣaṇas* cannot be described into the terms of conceptual construction. But to call the knowledge of *svalakṣaṇas* non-illusory (*abhrāntam*) is to describe them in terms of conceptual construction. This is the reason why the adjective or qualification non-illusory cannot be added to perception, or better speaking, indeterminate perception or sensation.

Thus we need not believe that the Post-Diñnāga Buddhist developments of Diñnāga's theories are invariably correct. Diñnāga was a great thinker. He moulded both Buddhist and non-Buddhist thought in a new direction. He criticized Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Mīmāṃsā theories. His theories were further criticized by Nyāya philosopher Udyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra, Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda, Mīmāṃsā philosopher Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, Advaita philosopher Śaṅkarācārya and Jain philosopher

Siddhasena Divākara. The followers of Diñnāga have given rejoinders to these critics. Such exchanges of views influenced, by and large by the conditions of mediaeval thought which was clouded and shrouded by religious doctrines and dogmas. If we disengage the theories of Diñnāga and his followers from their religious dogmas, some of the criticisms of their opponents may be found very helpful and constructive to their basic stand-point in logic and epistemology. The theory of indeterminate perception may again be taken to illustrate this point. The opponents of Diñnāga like Kumārila Bhaṭṭa have understood this theory more correctly than his followers like Dharmakīrti. Further if we similarly separate the theories of Diñnāga's opponents and critics from their religious dogmas and metaphysical beliefs, we may find an area of agreements between them. Thus if religious dogmas and metaphysical beliefs are ignored, Diñnāga and his opponents may be taken to belong to one and the same school of logic and epistemology. In the field of logic this school has already emerged. The doctrine of vyāpti, the theory of Svārthānumāna, the distinction between Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna, the doctrine of Trairūpya (three aspects of Reason or hetu) and the standard form of three membered syllogism were first originated by Diñnāga and now they are accepted by all schools of Indian logic. In the field of epistemology also the works of Diñnāga have brought about a consensus of opinions among all the schools of Indian philosophy. This is largely manifested in their rational approaches to the problems of knowing and being. Since Diñnāga's discussions and debates are continuing on the subjects introduced by him :

(1) Does knowledge depend upon the knowable ? or vice versa ?

(2) In knowledge (jñāna) sākāra (having forms) or nirākāra (formless) ?

(3) Is the truth of a proposition or judgment intrinsic or extrinsic ? and finally

(4) What is truth ? Sārūpya or arthakriyā-kāritva or avyabhicāritva or anything else ? Such questions, by and large owe their origin to the works of Diñnāga. If we ignore the religious dogmas and metaphysical beliefs of different schools of Indian philosophy we may find that now they are all upholding the view that there are only two ways of knowing—Pratyakṣa and Anumāna and that there is a pramāṇa-vyavasthā i. e.; there are limits of perception and inference—each has its own sphere and cannot encroach upon the sphere of the other. Contemporary Indian philosophy which is show of religious dogmas and metaphysical beliefs is thus providing a good and suitable background for furthering the epistemological and logical views of Diñnāga.

III

We have now come to a position which may be given a philosophical name, Back to Diñnāga. This movement has the following features. First the works of Diñnāga and the commentaries upon them which are not available in original Sanskrit are being restored into Sanskrit from their Tibetan and Chinese versions. Secondly their translations with commentaries are being made in modern languages, preferably in English. Thirdly, Buddhist developments of Diñnāga's theories such as made by Dharmakīrti are also being restored in Sanskrit. Pandit Rahul Sankrityayana has already restored some of them in Sanskrit but much work remains to be done in this direction. Fourthly the criticisms of Diñnāga and his school that were made by non-Buddhist Indian thinkers are being investigated and assessed in a critical spirit. Fifthly the philosophy of Diñnāga is being reconstructed denova, i. e., without the

help of any commentary or criticism. The modern spirit of enquiry is more near to Diñnāga than his own disciple Dharmakīrti. The problems that were posed by Diñnāga are now being discussed and debated directly. In such discussions and debates philosophers from every part of the world are participating. As we have seen above that philosophers from Russia, Tibet, China, Japan, India, France, Germany, Italy and America have been participating in such debates and discussions since 1921. But uptill now they have simply prepared the ground from which the philosophical movement of 'Back to Diñnāga' is to start. The future of the movement is therefore, brighter than its past. Hence arises the sixth and last characteristic of the movement. This is to apply the theories of Diñnāga to solve the contemporary problems of philosophy. This application of Diñnāga's philosophy is its extension. Most of the present Asian philosophers are doing philosophy in this very way. They are overtly or covertly carrying out the programme of Diñnāga. This movement is leading to certain good consequences. First, it is uniting Asia and is laying down the foundation of modern Asian philosophy. Secondly, it is stimulating new thinking in India and is bringing all systems of Indian philosophy closer. Thirdly, it is accepted as a new philosophy even in the West. Diñnāga's theory of knowledge is still little known and understood in the West. His religious dogmas and metaphysical beliefs are better known than his epistemological innovations. But the latter are more important than the former. Diñnāga's theory of knowledge is likely to bridge the wide gulf that has been created in the West between Idealism and Analytical Philosophy. The refutation of idealism that has been attempted by G. E. Moore and R. B. Perry is not applicable to Diñnāga's idealism which is called logical idealism (Nyāyānusāri Vijñānavāda). This logical idealism is not based on the principle of *esse est percipi*. It is not the

dialectical idealism or Pan-logism of Hegel. It does not hold that logical knowledge or awareness is the whole and sole truth. Further it is not absolutism or eternalism and therefore it does not rest upon the Ego-centric predicament or the All-Knower Absolute. That is why the arguments of Moore and Perry are not applicable to Diñnāga's idealism. It is similar to contemporary phenomenism that is held by some Positivists and neo-Kantians. But it accepts the theory of indeterminate perception and thereby retains its belief in the existence of svalakṣaṇas and in several kinds of perception including Yogic perception. Diñnāga has combined the theory of conceptual construction with the theory of indeterminate perception. The former theory is idealistic while the latter is realistic. His idealism is thus based on critical idealism.

Diñnāga is prepared to go all along with the logical positivists. But he is likely to correct them when they go astray. He sees that Ideas and words are mutually related as cause and effect. Ideas on conceptual constructions are the source and cause of words and words are the source and cause of conceptual constructions or ideas. The words and conceptual constructions do not touch what is real. Ideas determine ideas and words determine words. Ideas are impregnated by words and words are impregnated by ideas. The reality is beyond both of them. It can be enjoyed in silent perception :

Vikalpayonayaḥ śabdāḥ
 Vikalpāḥ śabda yonayaḥ
 Kārya kāraṇatā teṣāṃ,
 Nārtham śabdāḥ spṛśantyapi.¹

This view of Diñnāga shows that the theory of knowledge and the theory of language are reciprocally connected.

1. Quotation from Diñnāga in the Nyāyavārtikātparyatikā of Vācaspati Miśra.

But they cannot obliterate what is real. This is the corrective which Diñnāga's modern exponents may offer to those contemporary philosophers who boast of having eliminated metaphysics through their linguistic analysis on phenomenological reduction. His idealism is based on those very conceptual activities which are pursued by Logical positivists, Logical empiricists and Analytic philosophers. It does not treat these movements as a 'retreat from truth' but as an approach to truth. Clarity is the first requirement of those who want to see what is real. Clarity is not its own end. It is simply a means to apprehension or vision i.e. darśana.

Diñnāga's philosophical position may be termed as Empirico-logical transcendentalism. He has utilized logic to secure a base of empiricism like modern logical empiricists and further used this logical empiricism to establish transcendentalism. The latter activity supplies the bridge that is required between the logical empiricism of the second quarter of the twentieth century and the Absolute Idealism of the first quarter of the same century.

IV

Diñnāga's relation with his Master Vasubandhu has become a matter of controversy in recent times. Dr. C. D. Sharma has maintained¹ that although Diñnāga was a disciple of Vasubandhu, his idealism is different from that of Vasubandhu. Diñnāga's idealism is nyāyānusārī or based on logic while Vasubandhu's idealism is Āgamānusārī i. e., based on the Āgamas or scriptures. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana has also held that the genius of Vasubandhu faded away when the genius of Diñnāga arose in the philosophical horizon². This view of Dr. Sharma and Pandit Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana goes against the testimony of Śāntarakṣita

1. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy, p.125. See also Baudha Darśana and Vedānta (in Hindi), Vārāṇasī.

2. See Darśana Digdarśana (in Hindi), Allahabad,

who has said that his school of philosophy clearly followed the transcendentalism of Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*¹ which had been rendered clearer by his predecessors like *Diñnāga* and *Dharmakīrti*, Dr. *Stcherbatsky* has also corroborated the view that *Diñnāga's* *Ālambana-parīkṣā* simply summarizes the arguments of Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*². A comparative study of the *Viñśatikā* and the *Ālambana-parīkṣā* certainly lends support to the view of Dr. *Stcherbatsky*.

But Dr. C. D. Sharma and Pandit *Rāhula Sāñkṛtyāyana* are not entirely wrong in their view. *Diñnāga* did bring about a change in Buddhist idealism. But that change was not as great in its metaphysics as in its theory of knowledge and hence *Śāntarākṣita* and Dr. *Stcherbatsky* are also correct in their view.

The change brought about by *Diñnāga* amounted to a great philosophical revolution in Indian philosophy. It was like Kantian revolution in European philosophy. Both these revolutions replaced metaphysics by epistemology. *Diñnāga* concentrated only upon *nyāya* and ignored the *Āgama*. His Master Vasubandhu was a great authority on both the *Āgama* and the *Nyāya* and had written authoritatively in both fields. But his writings in the field of the *Āgama* are greater in bulk and importance than those in the field of *Nyāya*. Hence his fame as a commentator of the *Abhidharma* overshadowed his genius as a logical idealist. *Diñnāga* took the fundamentals from Vasubandhu's logic and developed them in several treatises. He originated or clearly developed many logical theories, definitions and fallacies which became the common property of all schools of Indian logic in due course of time. To the modern mind which

1. *Vijñaptimātratā siddhir dhīmad bhir vimalīkṛtā.*

Asmābhistad disāyātam paramārtha viniścaye.

Tattva Saṅgraha 2084

2. *Buddhist Logic*, vol. I

attaches more importance to Reason than to Tradition, Diñnāga's view is more acceptable than Vasubandhu's. What is significant in this respect is this that much before Kant or Descartes, Diñnāga liberated philosophy from theology and tradition and based it on the secure foundation of logic. This is, I think, the greatest contribution of Diñnāga to philosophy.

5-3 1972

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CONTENTS

Foreword	
Preface	i
Introduction	iv
Contents	xvi
Chapter I The Nature of Knowledge	1
1. The Problem of Knowledge	1
2. The Realist theory of Apprehension	1
3. The Sautrāntika theory of Apprehension (The theory of Co-ordination or Sārūpya-vāda)	5
4. The appraisal of the theory of Co-ordination (Sārūpya-vāda)	17
5. The Idealistic theory of Apprehension	19
What is the Biotic Force ?	22
Anubhava Vāsanā	23
Anādi Vāsanā	23
Criticism of the theory of Anādi Vāsanā	25
Chapter II The Criterion of Knowledge	35
1. What is right knowledge ?	35
2. What is a source of knowledge ?	36
3. The sources of valid knowledge	38
i. Verbal testimony	40
ii. Is the Veda a separate source of knowledge	41
iii. Analogy	45
iv. Presumption	46
v. Negation	48
vi. Ratiocination and Probability	49
vii. Tradition and Intuition	49
4. Criterion of Truth Criticism of the four theories of Truth	50 52
5. The Nature of Illusion	57
Is the perception of yellow conch shell a right know- ledge ?	61
6. Kinds of Illusion	63
7. The Idealistic theory of Illusion	64

Chapter III The Realistic Theory of Perception 84

1. Introduction	84
2. The definition of perception	85
3. The function of Kalpanā	89
4. Relevance of the Non-illusive or Abhrāntam	95
5. Appraisal of the Yogācāra definition of Perception	99
6. Proof for the existence of indeterminate Perception	100

Chapter IV Kinds of Perception 113

1. Sense-perception	113
2. The Nature of Mental Sensation	114
3. The Definition of Mental Sensation	115
4. Is Mental Sensation Momentary ?	118
5. Kinds of Mental Sensation	118
6. Theories of Mental Sensation	119
i. The Substitute theory	119
ii. The Alternation theory	120
iii. The Admixture theory	121
iv. The Simultaneity theory	123
v. The appraisal of the above theories	125
7. Criticism of the theory of Mental Sensation	126
8. Is Mental Sensation transcendental ?	127
9. Self-cognition	129
10. The Yogic-perception	131
11. Is Yogic-perception a different source of Knowledge?	133

Chapter V Object of Perception 146

1. The Object of perception (the Extreme Particular)	146
2. Meaning of the 'Particular'	147
3. Why 'Particulars' alone the object of Perception ?	150
4. Appraisal of Svalakṣaṇas.	151
Four theories regarding the object of Indeterminate perception.	
i. Advaita Vedāntin's theory	
ii. Jain theory of Sumati	
iii. Kumārila's Theory	

iv. The Theory held by Prabhākara and Indian Realists.	
5. Are Svalakṣaṇas transcendental ?	157
Chapter VI The Idealistic Theory of Judgment	163
1. Idealistic basis of Judgment	163
2. Empirical basis of Judgment	166
3. Synthesis in Concepts	169
4. Judgment and Name-giving	172
5. Judgment and Proposition	175
6. Categories	177
7. Analysis and Synthesis	180
8. Validity of Judgment	182
9. Examination of Pramāṇa-Vyavasthā	184
Chapter VII The Idealistic Theory of Inference	198
1. Judgment and Inference	198
2. The nature of Inference	199
3. The principles of Inference	203
4. Is Inference a Pramāṇa ?	208
Chapter VIII The Idealistic Theory of Relation	222
1. Inference and Relation	222
2. The nature of Relation	224
3. Identity	227
4. Causality	230
5. Negation	234
Chapter IX The Idealistic Theory of Negation	240
Part I Negation	240
1. Nature of Negation	240
2. Negation and Being	242
3. Negation and Judgment	244
4. Is Negation a separate source of Knowledge ?	245
i. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view	245
ii. The Mīmāṃsaka view	247
iii. Kumārila's view	248
iv. The Buddhist view	250

Part II Universal	258
1. The Nature of Universal	258
2. Kinds of Universal	261
3. Realists' arguments regarding the existence of Universals	261
Part III The Theory of Apoha	274
1. Nature of Apoha	274
2. Kinds of Apoha	276
3. Realist objections to the theory of Apoha	277
4. Proof for the negative nature of Apoha	285
5. Examination of other theories regarding the denotation of word	286
i. The Aggregate theory	287
ii. The theory of unreal relationship	287
iii. The theory of the real with unreal adjuncts	287
iv. Coalescence theory	288
v. Imposition theory	289
vi. Intuition theory	290
6. Importance of the theory of Apoha	291
Chapter X The Doctrine of Mind-Only	303
1. Introduction	303
2. Arguments for the reality of the external world	304
3. Refutation of the Realists' arguments	306
4. Objections to the doctrine of Mind-Only	320
5. Vijñaptimātratā and Ātman	327
6. The nature of Consciousness	331
7. Vedāntic criticism of the doctrine of Mind-Only	336
8. Is Vijñaptimātratā momentary ?	338
9. The evolution of the external world	
from Vijñaptimātratā	342
i. Ālaya-Vijñāna	343
ii. Manas	344
iii. Pravṛtti-Vijñāna.	345
Glossary	370
General Index.	381
Bibliography	392

CHAPTER I

THE NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

1. The problem of knowledge

The problem of knowledge is posed in a simple question by Indian philosophers. How do we know that we are apprehending a thing when we apprehend it? What is the guarantee that the selfsame thing is apprehended?

Three main solutions of the problem have been advanced by realists, critical realists and idealists successively. According to the realist school of Naiyāyikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Vaiśeṣikas a special quality arises in the object when it comes in contact with consciousness. It is this peculiarity which imparts distinctness to our knowledge. According to the critical realists or Sautrāntika Buddhists, this distinctness arises when there is 'conformity' or similarity between the object of perception and the image of the object contained in consciousness. According to the idealists or Yogācāra philosophers, there is no such thing as an object apart from consciousness. The certainty which appears to us is the result of transcendental illusion¹. These theories need a little elaboration for their proper appraisal.

2. The Realist theory of apprehension

The realists believe that knowledge is based on real relations. In the process of knowledge there must be an agent (subject), an object, an instrument and a process. When a tree is cut down, there must be an agent who cuts, a tree which is cut, an axe with which it is cut and the process of cutting. Similarly when an object is known, there must be an agent who knows, an object which is known, a means by which it is known, and the process of knowing. Consciousness does not contain any images. When an object comes in contact with consciousness, there arises a new quality in the object,

the quality of cognizedness². This quality disappears as soon as the cognition is over. It is inherent in the object and distinguishes the knowledge of the object from similarity between the object and consciousness. In the words of *Prāśastopāda* the characteristics of an object do not owe their origin to mere co-ordination³ of the object with consciousness. They are due to the characterization⁴ of the object itself⁵. The instrumentality of cognition consists in apprehending what has not been already apprehended. It is the cognition of an object yet uncognized⁶. Kumāriila holds that consciousness is pure like light and contains no images or impressions. There is no direct knowledge of objects. All knowledge is mediated by inference when the quality of cognizedness arises⁷.

The Buddhist objection to the theory of cognizedness is that cognizedness is not visible when the object is cognized. Had it been a quality of the object, it would have been apprehended just as the colour 'blue' is apprehended in the flower. The realist reply to this objection is that 'cognizedness' or illumination⁸ is not different from consciousness. It is the nature of consciousness⁹. Just as the light of a lamp is not in need of anything external to illuminate itself, in the same way consciousness does not need anything for its illumination. The Buddhist rejoins that the reply leads us no further. If there is a real relation between consciousness (the subject) and the object (the apprehended) certain unwarrantable presuppositions are involved. One such presupposition is the distinction between the subject and the object, a distinction between the means of apprehension and the object of apprehension¹⁰. But the distinction of the subject (the apprehender) and the object (the apprehended) is not real. It is a mere convention. It is a popular way of expressing our ideas. The entire universe comprehending the threefold phenomena of the subjective (immaterial), the objective (material) and the imaginary (fictitious) is mere ideation, the mere idea which appears as various in each individual according to the different chains of causation¹¹. These phenomena continue so long as transcen-

dental illusion persists. They are cancelled the very moment enlightenment is attained. .

Every cognition is devoid of both the apprehender and the apprehended because it is cognition, just like the cognition of the reflected image¹² or the idea of hare's horn or the son of a barren woman. The distinctions that are made between the agent and the instrument of knowledge are fictitious. In common life we see that there are different notions for the same thing. For instance (1) the bow pierces, (2) he pierces with the bow, (3) the arrow proceeding from the bow pierces. The same 'bow' is spoken of 'agent' instrument and oblique. Hence the distinction between the agent, source and result is imaginary¹³. Such expressions as 'consciousness apprehends' or 'cognition is self-cognizant' does not mean that it is the apprehender or cognizer in the sense as we cognize colour, it means that it shines with its own lustre ; it illumines itself. Illumination is the very nature of it¹⁴. There can be no self-cognition of this cognition for it is the action as well as the active agent. It is impartite in form and cannot have three characters. Hence how can there be cognition of any other thing in the shape of cognition¹⁵.

Kumārila objects to the Buddhist explanation thus : Even though the cognition is illuminative still it is in need of something else for its apprehension. For instance the eye is of the nature of illumination but it is restricted to colour in its apprehension¹⁶. It cannot apprehend itself. However well-versed an acrobat may be, he cannot dance upon his head. In the same way consciousness must need something for its apprehension. Moreover apprehension means apprehending of something other than this apprehending. Buddhist himself accepts that it is the apprehension of the object that is called cognition¹⁷. Hence his view that there is no distinction between the 'apprehender' and the 'apprehended' goes against this acceptance.

The Buddhist however explains that the 'apprehension of an object' does not mean something different from the

4 The Problem of knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism

cognition. It is the cognition itself which is called by different names such as apprehension¹⁸, comprehension¹⁹, objective consciousness²⁰ and ideation²¹. The same cognition is also called as 'apprehender' or 'apprehended'. The apprehending of the object is synonymous with cognition. But how is it known that they are synonymous ? There must be something in existence upon which cognition should operate. It cannot operate in vacuum. It cannot cognize what is non-existent, e.g. the sky flower or the horns of a horse ? The Buddhist reply to these questions is that the assertion that the cognition is of the nature of illumination is not based on the ground that it apprehends objects. It means that cognition is pure and simple²². The Lord Buddha has said that there must be non-difference between the blue and its cognition, because they are always found together. But Bhadanta Śubha Gupta says that here the term 'together' can never mean 'one'²³. Dharmakīrti says that at first there is appearance of an object as the cause of cognition, and hence this is what is apprehended first, and the apprehension of the cognition comes later²⁴. If we do not regard the distinction between the 'apprehender' and the 'apprehended' the consequence would be fatal. It will go against the fundamental doctrine of Buddhism that the Lord is omniscient. If there is nothing to apprehend, what does the Lord apprehend ? And if he apprehends nothing, how can he be omniscient²⁵. Śabara also maintains the distinction between them. The external object is directly perceived as having a shape and as connected with external space²⁶. It is also supported by the experience of common life. When a man says that I do not remember that I cognized an object at a particular moment, he means that though he does not remember the particular object, but he remembers the appearance of the apprehending cognition without any idea of the apprehended object. If the 'apprehension' (cognition) and the apprehended object were not different from each other, he would have remembered the apprehended

object also, at the moment when he remembered that he did not apprehend any object²⁷.

3. The Sautrantika theory of apprehension

The realist theory of pure consciousness²⁷ means that consciousness is pure and simple and there are objects which come into its contact and produce knowledge. Here the question arises how the object is related to consciousness? According to one definition of object "an object is what exists". It becomes the object of our consciousness because it exists²⁸. Hence all things are known to us without any effort and every body becomes omniscient. But obviously this is an absurd position. Another definition of object is that "an object is what produces knowledge". Here the object is that which is apprehended by our cognition, which gives definite knowledge, and which is definite to certain cognizers and in a certain place. But this definition of object leads to some other futilities. Knowledge is not produced by objects alone. It is produced equally by sense organs. For instance a patch of blue colour becomes the object of our cognition not by itself but only through the sense of vision. Hence if we pursue this definition to the end, sense-organs would equally become objects of our cognition. Further if all objects which produce cognition become objects of our cognition, how are they differentiated? There is no quality by which they could be differentiated by themselves. Nor is there anything in the cognition which could differentiate one object from the other. And if there is no distinction between objects, the entire business of life which depends upon their distinctions comes to an end.

These difficulties in the realist theory of knowledge led the Buddhist to idealism. He came to hold that there are images in our consciousness 'which are the only objects of knowledge. When cognition takes place at first there is an indefinite and vague idea regarding the object which is perceived. But when the object is identified with its corresponding image contained in the consciousness, the object

becomes crystal clear and we come to know distinctly that 'this is that'. For instance when we perceive a patch of blue colour, at first there is an indefinite image regarding the colour, but when in the next moment, it is cognized as similar to the blue and dissimilar to the yellow and all other colours we come to the judgment that 'this is a patch of blue colour'. This identity of the object with the image of consciousness is known in Buddhist terminology as the theory of co-ordination²⁹. This theory meets all the difficulties that are created by the realist theory. It gives a distinct cognition and criterion to distinguish one object from another. So in the words of Vasubandhu 'co-ordination' means conformity between consciousness and its object-element. It is a conformity owing to which cognition although caused also by the activity of the senses, is not something homogeneous with them³⁰. This co-ordination consists in the fact that a constructed mental image with all its inhering attributes corresponds to utterly heterogeneous³¹ point-instants of efficient reality³². It is founded on relativity³³.

According to Dinnāga consciousness is not that element which gives definiteness to our knowledge because this factor is present in every cognition illusory or veridical. When a man sees the vision of fatamorgana or double moon, he is not devoid of consciousness. Hence it cannot be maintained that consciousness is the cause of our distinct knowledge. It is only when the factor of similarity enters to the undifferentiated consciousness that the object becomes distinct and is identified with the image contained in consciousness³⁴. In other words according to this theory the concept or image of the blue alone makes the stimulus produced on the sense of vision a real cognition of the blue patch³⁵. The blue knowledge of the blue is not simply produced by the eye, because of the consequence of suchness of the yellow knowledge. It is produced from the image of the blue³⁶. The Abhidharma-kośa mentions that one who has the visual cognition cognizes the blue all right, but not as blue, because the knowledge of

blue as blue comes later on when there is similarity between the form of blue contained in the consciousness and the external blue³⁷.

Vinītadeva holds that 'co-ordination' means similarity. It denotes the relation of the object to its corresponding mental image. But its implication is too deep. Co-ordination implies the difference of the image of a particular object from all dissimilar images and its connection with all similar images owing to the sense of sameness. Here an important problem arises 'why do we say that it is the co-ordination which is the source of our definite cognition' ? Why is it regarded as the bestower of a distinct cognition when we have no proof of its existence ? Why should we not regard our sense-organs as the true source of knowledge with the help of which we are able to cognize an object and whose existence cannot be denied by a man of normal vision ? Vinītadeva says that it is certainly true that senses are the causes of our cognition, but they give mere sensations or bare outlines. Sense-perception is devoid of any conceptual content. It cannot impart definiteness. So how can it be the source of determinate knowledge ? How can we make a judgment regarding an object which involves conceptual knowledge ? Moreover senses are present in every cognition. Had they been the source of definite knowledge, all cognitions perceived by us would have been true. There would have been no illusion. Again the sense-organs are defective. Instead of perceiving a white conchshell we perceive a yellow one owing to our defective vision. These facts prove that the senses are not the source of definite knowledge.

'Co-ordination' differentiates one cognition from all other similar and dissimilar cognitions. When we perceive a patch of blue lotus, at the first moment of our sensation, there is a bare idea that something is visible. Later on the process of co-ordination reveals that it is a patch of blue lotus, and not of yellow lotus³⁸. The Sautrāntikas maintain that since the

'co-ordination' by the method of comparison and contrast brings similarity between the object and its corresponding mental images and thus imparts 'distinctness' to our cognition, it is the source of our knowledge. In the cognition that 'this lotus is blue', it is this principle which gives definiteness to our knowledge that 'this lotus is blue'. Hence it is the source of our knowledge. But this co-ordination which imparts 'distinctness' to our consciousness in the shape of blue lotus is the result of our cognition.

The Vātsīputrīya Buddhist objects to the theory of co-ordination. He says that there is a permanent soul and there are external objects which are apprehended by it. In support of his theory he adduces the scripture 'consciousness apprehends'. According to him the very phrase 'consciousness apprehends' indicates that there is an entity whose function is to cognize and there must be something apart from consciousness upon which consciousness operates³⁹.

Vasubandhu meets the objection thus : 'consciousness apprehends means nothing at all'. It appears in co-ordination with its objective elements, like a result which is homogeneous with its own cause. When a result appears in conformity with its own cause, it does nothing at all still we say that it conforms. The same applies to consciousness also 'consciousness apprehends' means that the previous moment is the cause of the successive moment. The illusion of 'apprehension' takes place because the next moment follows the previous moment uninterruptedly. For example 'the ball resounds, or the bell makes noise'. Here the bell is doing nothing, the later sound is following the previous sound continuously. Hence we impose the idea of activity on the bell. Similarly light moves or illuminates or is the cause of illumination. In reality light is doing nothing. Luminosity is its very nature. It does not resort to any activity. Still it is believed that light is the cause of the visible things. In the same way moments of consciousness follow successively. Their succession makes us believe that consciousness is the cause of apprehension⁴⁰. In reality there is no

difference between consciousness and the object that is before consciousness. In the words of Śāntarakṣita 'the cognition of the object' is the fruit of the 'means of cognition.', and the 'means of cognition' consists in the sameness of form between the cognition and the cognized⁴¹. In the case of 'self-cognition' the 'cognition of itself' is the fruit and the capacity of cognizing itself is the source or means⁴².

The realist retorts that if we maintain that the means of cognition and its fruit are the same, the well-known relation between cause and effect will be set at naught. Our cognition begins with an object and we employ some means to achieve that object. If the means itself is the objective, the entire activity will be impossible. After all there is some purpose of our knowledge, and only that knowledge is right knowledge which is efficient, which is capable of producing some result⁴³. If the result is not something different from the source of knowledge (cognition), there is no need to insert the epithet 'efficient' Arthakṛyākāri in the definition of knowledge. The very definition of result shows that it is something of the nature of attainment⁴⁴. For instance when an axe strikes a mango tree, the 'cut' nowhere appears in a guava tree, hence nowhere in the world the cutting weapon 'axe' is the same as the 'cut' tree⁴⁵.

The Buddhist answers that the things being momentary there can be no action executed by them. The distinction between agent the instrument (means) and the result is unreal. There is no such distinction in the cognition. The distinction between the cause and effect is based upon the fact of 'what is distinguished' and 'what distinguishes', and not upon the 'producer' and the 'produced'. The fact which gives 'distinctness' to our cognition is the principle of 'similarity'⁴⁶ or 'being of the same image'. After all 'the cognition of blue' is not the cognition of yellow. Because when the 'blue' of our cognition tallies or corresponds to the blue image of our consciousness and is distinguished from all dissimilar and similar images we come to recognize that 'this is blue

and this is not blue'. Thus this 'distinction' this distinct knowledge is result, and the process which has brought this distinction is the source which is nothing but the very nature of cognition⁴⁷. Further he says that our experience testifies to this truth. For instance 'sweat wets him', 'he is wet with sweat', 'sweat produced by heat wets him'. In these examples the same 'sweat' has been described as 'agent' instrument and oblativ, and yet it is not incongruous⁴⁸. Now the question arises how are we going to explain that the cutting weapon axe and the 'cut' tree are the same? The answer is that the 'cut' does not exist apart from the axe, the 'cut' consists in the entering of the axe, into the 'wood fibre' and this 'cut' is the property of the axe itself. Hence there is sameness between the axe and the cut wood⁴⁹. The objection that if there is no distinction between the 'producer' and the 'produced' all business-transaction would come to an end, does not hold good. It is essential to maintain that there are differences in our cognition and the relation of cause and effect can be based only if we recognise differences in our cognitions. And for this recognition of difference there can be no other basis than the 'sameness' of forms. It is the 'sameness' of form which distinguishes our object from all other objects and therefore it is the most efficient instrument on the basis of which men are prompted to take activity. There is no such principle of 'sameness' which may impart 'distinctness' to our objects in the doctrine of the realists, hence the theory of co-ordination is more effective weapon for determining the activity of man than the realist one⁵⁰.

Diñnāga says that the realists maintain that there is a result of our cognition, because they imagine that the process of cognition is an act. But we do not assume that the result of cognition differs from the act because the supposed result is nothing but the image of the cognized object and it is this image which separated into an act and a content⁵¹. It is a

metaphor when we assume that our ideas are instruments of knowledge and they cannot exist without showing an activity, Let us take the example of 'corn'. It is produced by seed, that is, it agrees in kind with the seed, which is its cause and people think that it takes the shape of its cause. In the same way people think that cognition is also not debarred from activity and 'takes' or 'grasps' the form of its object. Jinendra-Buddhi says that there is immanent in cognition not the slightest bit of the distinct nature of 'a thing produced' and 'its producer'. Our ordinary idea of causation of 'producer' and 'being produced' is in any case not far away from having the nature of an imposition⁵².

The realist asks the Buddhists even if we accept your view that there is no 'producer' no 'produced', why do we feel that there are a 'producer' a 'produced' a result (content) and a source ? What is the basis of our thinking in terms of the 'producer' and the produced ? The Buddhist answers that cognition gives something attained, e. g. the knowledge that it is the 'mango' tree, it is this knowledge which evokes an idea of something produced and we imagine that it is the result of our cognition. But this very cognition apprehends the image of the object and imparts distinction i. e., definiteness to our cognizing process by making it sure that it is the same object which we want to apprehend. Hence it is imagined as exhibiting some activity though in reality it is doing nothing, and this 'grasping' of images is imagined as an action. And since it grasps the image of the object and makes our knowledge definite, it is regarded also as the source of our knowledge, the instrument of our cognition. When something has taken place, and another thing follows it immediately without any interruption, not allowing the gap even of one moment we regard that the previous thing is the producer of the successive thing. For instance we see a patch of blue colour. It produces some stimulus upon our sense organs. We immediately feel that it is present in our cognition and then

feel something existing 'externally' and afterwards come to recognize that it is the same thing which is in our ken. Now this 'sameness' is the most efficient cause⁵³ of our cognition. If this co-ordination were not in operation, there would be no knowledge of objects, hence this co-ordination through the sense of sameness is predominantly the producer of a distinct cognition of our objects⁵⁴.

The realist objects to the use of 'producer' and says that if there is no 'production' according to the Buddhist theory why do they say that the Co-ordination 'produces' or co-ordination is the source of the definite cognition of an object. The Buddhist says that the term 'production' is not used in the sense of something being produced, as a jar is produced. Co-ordination is 'producer' only in the sense that it is the 'creator' in the real sense, because it does not differ from cognition at all⁵⁵. According to this theory to attend the object (to cognize) and to fetch it are the same thing. The fetching⁵⁶ of the object by our knowledge is nothing but the focussing⁵⁷ of our attention on it, and this focussing is nothing but the cognition of an aim of our possible purposive action⁵⁸, Dharma-Kīrti says that just this direct cognition is itself the result of the act of cognition as far as it has the form of a distinct cognition⁵⁹. Vinītadeva says that on the one hand sense-perception which is a source of knowledge is regarded as the essence of knowledge and on the other, judgment is the very essence or content of knowledge because only after arriving at a judgment we come to know that 'this is that.' Hence the source (cognition) and content are one⁶⁰.

Here it may be asked that if 'cognition' is the source as well as the result of itself, is it not a contradiction to assume that one and the same undivided reality should be regarded as its cause as well as its effect ? The same man cannot be his father as well as his son. The seed is the cause of the sprout but seed is not itself the sprout. Buddhist logicians have tried to solve this inconsistency by giving different

explanations. Jinendra Buddhi says that act and content of cognition are not really two different things. We superimpose two different aspects on one and the same reality. The aspect of something cognized (content result) and the aspect of an agency cognizing it. There is no difference in the substratum of the underlying reality. If a thing is looked at from two different stand-points, difference accrues. The same woman is mother, wife and daughter. But she is numerically one and the same person. Human experience is replete with such cases. We say that 'honey which makes us drink is being drunk by us' ; or 'I myself oblige myself to grasp my own self', 'my mind grasps its own self'⁶¹. In these examples the same thing has been represented in three different capacities, wherein reality it is one and the same. The same applies to the process of cognition. Though in reality, act, content and instrument of cognition are not different from one another, a difference between them is supposed on account of the stand-point from which they are considered.

Dharmottara suggests two alternatives that can explain the relation between the source and the content of cognition. The first is causal relation (of producing and being produced) and the second is the relation of determination (of determining, and being determined). He rules out the application of causal relation to explain the relation of 'act and content' of cognition because it would be absurd to assume causal relation between them as they occupy one and the same time, and causal relation assumes an interval of time or a gap between two moments. The relation of 'determining' and 'being determined' has no such pre-requisite of two different moments. We can assume that the same entity has two aspects, a process of cognition which imparts distinctness to our cognition, and a resulting content in the sense that we have a distinct knowledge that 'this is a patch of blue and not of yellow.' The Buddhists have always regarded 'co-ordination' as the source of knowledge only in this sense that through it the distinct cognition of an object that 'this is

blue' is possible. Hence the second relation of determination can be applied here without involving any contradiction⁶².

Exposing the theory of co-ordination Udayana says that there are two possible kinds of relation to determine the relation between an instrument and the work produced by it—(1) real relation⁶³ which relates the possessor of a function and the function itself, and logical relation⁶⁴ which relates a logical antecedent and its consequence. According to the realist there is a real relation between the axe and the 'tree' which is to be cut. Though there is no relation between the axe and the tree as long as the function of the 'cutting' does not commence. But there is a contact to be established hence common people maintain a relation between axe and tree. For the realists the 'axe' is not a stream of moments but a real entity having stability⁶⁵. Hence the operation of the axe is something real and can be distinguished from the non-operating axe. Here real relation⁶⁶ is a third entity that mediates the two entities. There cannot be established identity between the instrument and content of knowledge. Hence the Buddhist view of identity between 'source' and content of cognition is rejected by realists as absurd. But according to the Buddhist doctrine everything is fleeting every moment. Axe is not real. It is a construction of our mind. It is evanescently changing. Hence the axe at the moment of cutting and at the moment of not cutting are different. There may be no inconsistency if we hold that axe (cognition) is source at one moment and content at an other moment when it has received a definite shape. But to maintain that axe is a permanent instrument of cutting and the 'tree' is a permanent object of cutting is fraught with inconsistency, because according to the theory of universal momentariness there can be no permanent object at all. Udayana thus rejects the theory of real relation, for explaining the relation of act and content of cognition and resorts to logical relation. The logical relation mainly operates in mental field where the subject-object-relation is included in every self-conscious

idea⁶⁷. But it is also operative in external field⁶⁸. For instance the proposition 'whatever is a jonesia⁶⁹ is also a tree. The jonesia is not different from the tree and the tree is not different from the jonesia. Their difference consists in the logical meanings, the same thing can be differently conceived from different points of view and can have different meanings. For instance the tree is jonesia when contrasted with other trees and is tree when contrasted with the plants. The same applies to the relation of 'act' and 'content' 'instrument' and 'result'. In essence they are not different. Differences lies in our conception⁷⁰.

The realist raises the objection that if there is no distinction between the source of cognition and its content, why do the Buddhists often say that co-ordination⁷¹ is the cause of our distinct knowledge of objects or knowledge is the result of our cognition? The Buddhist answers that this usage is due to the limitation of language. The practical life⁷² will be impossible without using such phrases. Dharmakīrti says that the knower of truth has to follow the common men as the elephant has to walk closing its eyes to the dust and the dirt of the world, though in reality knowing that all this is superimposition of the mind and nothing else⁷³. Berkeley has said that we should think with learned and talk with the vulgar. The vulgar talk does not affect the learned thought.

Dinnaga's view of co-ordination

Diñnāga holds two alternative views regarding the result of cognition. At first he says that the result of our cognition is a feeling of external object⁷⁴. Later on he says that the resulting content of our cognition is 'self feeling'⁷⁵ which determines what is desirable and what is 'undesirable'. With reference to his first theory he says that the resulting content of cognition has an image of the external object and is explained by the example of corn and seed⁷⁶. But later on he refers to the other theory which may be put in his own words. We can also envisage the internal feeling (of something either

desirable or not) as a kind of resulting content in the process of cognition, since the object and the consequent purposive action are determined by it⁷⁷. The first view is similar to the views of Vasubandhu, Vinīta Deva Dharmakīrti and other Buddhist writers, and has been discussed in detail. Now the second view is examined.

Diñnāga answers because it determines the object and the consequent purposive action. He continues in his system every cognizing mental state can be viewed from two standpoints. (1) From the realist point it is the reflex image⁷⁸ of an external object, and (2) from the idealist point, it is the reflex of the cognizing self. Explaining the view of Diñnāga Jinendra-Buddhi says that according to Diñnāga a cognition has two parts-subjective and objective. The subjective part is the self-feeling of desire or aversion, and the objective part is the object feeling of something having white colour or some other colour. The self-feeling means that it is a reflex from within⁷⁹. It has the form of the cognition of a cognition. It is of the nature of self-cognition, the cognition of its own self. It is the real reflex itself⁸⁰ which appears as 'grasping' aspect⁸¹.

The objective feeling means representation⁸², the idea of the object. It is the 'grasped' part which is immanent in our cognition. The realist objects to this theory that self-feeling is also the result of our cognition. For according to him the function of our sense organs is to cognize some external object and not merely the ideas which have no objects as their basis. According to the idealist the realist objection is baseless. The self feeling is result of our cognition because our behaviour towards the objects is determined by it. There can be no cognition beyond ideas. Whatever object exists is cognizable. It exists because it is known. Whatever is not known does not exist. Cognizability is cogitability. When an object is immanent to the cognition of a man, it immanent together with the idea of that object. The man feels something either desirable or avoidable according to what he internally feels. Even the realist can not deny this position. Because his know-

ledge is also nothing beyond sensations and images⁸³. In reality there is nothing real beyond our ideas⁸⁴. When we internally feel a desire for something only then we come to a judgment and thence we are prompted to take activity. If we have no mental state in which a desire is felt we will not come to a judgment⁸⁵ and in absence of a judgment no activity is possible⁸⁶.

The other aspect of the doctrine of Diñnāga, i. e. co-ordination between our images and the external object was emphasised by Dharmakīrti and followed by Dharmottara, Vinīta Deva etc. Dharmakīrti like Diñnāga maintains that there is no difference between the act and content of knowledge. The same cognition becomes the content when it is co-ordinated with the mental image⁸⁷. When it is said that a cognition has sprung from an object it means that this cognition is a fact which is co-ordinated with a momentary object. For instance the cognition produced by a patch of blue colour is co-ordinated with the substratum of the blue⁸⁸. According to professor Stcherbatsky there is a difference between the co-ordination theory of Diñnāga and that of Dharmakīrti. According to the former co-ordination obtains between the feeling of an object⁸⁹ and its ascertainment and also the subsequent purposive action. According to the latter co-ordination obtains between the point-instant of reality and the image. But this difference is not inconsistent with the theory of Diñnāga. It is based on his theory that there is co-ordination between an external object and its image. Thus we see that though there has been difference of opinion regarding the nature of co-ordination among the Buddhist philosophers, yet the dogma of synonymy of the 'act' and 'content' 'source' and 'result' or the 'apprehender' and 'the apprehended' has been maintained by them with unparalleled zeal and earnestness.

4. The appraisal of Sarupyavada

The realist theory fails to provide any criterion to judge whether our knowledge derived from the senses is genuine or

not, whether the object which we cognize is the same object which prompts us to act or not. The theory of co-ordination explains how to know that the object is identical with that which prompts us to act. Here lies the merit of co-ordination. It imparts distinction to our cognition by comparing and contrasting all similar and dissimilar images of objects which are stored in our consciousness. When the object which evokes stimulus upon our senses corresponds to its image immanent in consciousness we come to a judgment that 'this is that' or 'the patch of blue is blue and not yellow.' We come to ascertain that the blue is knowledge⁹⁰ and not that there is the knowledge of blue⁹¹. Co-ordination is the source of our knowledge. It is the criterion of truth in the sense that it is the cause of our distinct knowledge. This quality of distinction is not found in senses which are passive, or in consciousness which is the same in all our cognition and which gives a bare, simple and sensuous knowledge in absence of co-ordination. But when 'co-ordination' takes place the thing becomes definite. So the conclusion is that this factor of definiteness is neither in senses, nor in consciousness. It is only in 'co-ordination'. In the words of Stcherbatsky 'this inexplicable sense of sameness is thus much more the cause of cognition than the coarse concept of a supposed 'grasping of the object through the instrumentality of the senses, because it appears as the most efficient feature⁹².

But the theory of co-ordination has found vigorous opponents from among the Buddhists themselves to speak nothing of other Indian philosophers. The principle of 'sameness' is a mystery or a magic invention. How the same entity becomes a cause, an effect and an instrument at the same moment is a miracle⁹³, which stands self-condemned. The co-ordination has been described as a purchase without paying its price, since the supposed reality receives perceptibility or becomes distinct and clear but does not pay any equivalent or does not impart form to our cognition because it is itself formless⁹⁴.

The extreme Yogācāra Buddhist raises a serious objection to the theory of co-ordination. He insists that the Sautrāntika sticks to an illegitimate conception of co-ordination and is biased towards co-ordination of images alone. The co-ordination of an image with the point-instants is simply impossible because the two are entirely disconnected and have no rendez-vous.⁹⁵ If co-ordination has any meaning, it is the co-ordination of images themselves. Thus the realist conception of co-ordination is replaced by the idealist conception of co-ordination.

The idealist points out that there are more factors in co-ordination than those which are taken account of by the Sautrāntika. For instance in the perception of a colour, the sense of vision, light and the previous moment of consciousness play as vital role as the external object. Since they are the causes of our perception of a patch of colour, they must also be objects of our perception. Thus according to this theory the external object, the sense of vision, light and the previous moment of consciousness become the objects of perception⁹⁶. This theory fails to explain why the external object alone is regarded by it as the object of our perception and not the other factors, therefore, it is absurd. The answer of the Sautrāntika that the object is absolutely the same as its image and it is the image that makes an object what it is, is not satisfactory; because if we follow this definition, the preceding conscious moment, the moment preceding our perception of the blue possesses still more sameness than the external blue object, and therefore the preceding conscious moment will constitute an object of our image of the blue patch. The moment of sensation would thus be more entitled to an object of knowledge than the moment of conception which is the case. The theory of co-ordination, therefore, falls flat on the ground. It does not explain the situation of knowledge.

5. The Idealistic theory of apprehension

The Yogācāra philosopher advances the theory of 'biotic

force⁹⁸ in epistemology. He challenges the very foundation of co-ordination theory by declaring that the reality of the external world is nothing but a construction of mind. If there is no object at all there is nothing to compare with. Hence the co-ordination theory is not possible. Moreover an image is immanent in our cognition. It is contained inside consciousness, while the external objects are outside consciousness. How is it possible for this image which is purely conceptual (mental) by its very nature to proceed beyond its ken to grasp the external object, which is non-conceptual (material)? Is it not contradiction in terms to hold that two entirely different things are meeting? We cannot make the plea that image has double aspects of being the subject as well as the object because to suppose such contradictory qualities inherent in an image will go against all the canons of logic.

Sautrāntika holds that every object has double aspects of sensuously apprehended and mentally constructed. In sense-perception we see the vision of an extreme-particular object which is a point-instant beyond the sphere of place, time and nature. Hence there is no possibility of apprehending the real in its essence. But in imagination where our apprehension is distinct, we come to a perceptual judgment that 'this is that' and on the basis of this judgment we take the initiative to do some purposeful action. The Sautrāntika says that his reasoning is supported by the great Diñnāga who says that—A man who has distinctly delineated his object by these two modes of cognition in a judgment takes action and is not led astray.

The Yogācāra philosopher here urges that as all judgment is a mental construction based on images, it cannot go beyond its ken and execute constructions or pass decision regarding an object which is external. Hence the Sautrāntika explanation 'the co-ordination of two aspects or moments of knowledge' is self-refuted⁹⁹. The Sautrāntika reinforces his position by the argument that the image which is felt inwardly by us is not an artificial construction of our mind,

but is directly felt. Although our judgments about reality are the product of our intellect, yet the reality is not something imagined. Experience shows that activities based on such images which are projects of our inward flux lead to successful action, because men reach their destinations. Hence though they are subjective, still they are related to the real thing which is beyond our ken. Dharmottara himself says that, 'Judgment or inference guides the purposive action of men because the course it takes consists in having *prima facie* to deal with mental contents of a general unreal character, and in ascertaining through them some real fact ¹⁰⁰.

But Yogācāra philosopher finds the above explanation inadequate. In his analysis the essence of our thought-construction may be either imagined sensation¹⁰¹ or something else. But our mental construction cannot be imagined sensation as it is not possible for the sensation which is passive ¹⁰², sensuous and direct to be identical with conception which is active¹⁰³, mental¹⁰⁴, and indirect¹⁰⁵. To suppose them identical is as absurd as to suppose a solid liquid stuff¹⁰⁶. The Naiyāyikas and Mimāṃsakas have also urged this argument against the theory of co-ordination. The above discussion is sufficient ground to hold that 'co-ordination' theory cannot explain the relation between our mental images and the external objects lying outside our ken which are absolutely dissimilar¹⁰⁷. Now we have to go elsewhere in order to find a satisfactory solution for this puzzle. We can reach a safe harbour from this troubled water if the Sautrāntika maintains that the sensation and imagination function simultaneously but with one qualification that the object felt is immanent in our cognition¹⁰⁸. In reality there are no real objects. The reality of the external world has no more solid foundation than the world of dream. What we indeed feel is the double aspect of our knowledge¹⁰⁹, and what we construct in imagination is the external object which is unreal.

There can be no denial of the fact that we have ideas of

external objects. What is the cause of these ideas ? The Yogācāra philosopher asserts that there is a cause of these ideas. There is nothing which comes out of nothing. Though external objects are not real, yet there is an internal biotic force¹¹⁰ which accidentally produces ideas of the external world¹¹¹.

What is Biotic Force ?

For the idealist philosopher the biotic force is the principle of the evolution of our life. It explains how the phenomenal world of our experience evolves out of the transcendental reality. The innumerable phenomena are lying dormant in the store-house consciousness¹¹² in the form of ideas. When circumstances become favourable, when the 'biotic force' is ripe, the phenomenal world appears with all its varieties and vividness. But when man wakes up from his perpetual slumber of ignorance, when he realises the four noble truths, when he gets the enlightenment and the veils of suffering and the knowable¹¹³ are removed, when he comes to realise that there is no soul, there are no objects, then for him there is no external world¹¹⁴.

The term 'vāsanā' is derived from the root 'vas' which means 'to live' and also from the root 'vas' which means 'to perfume'. The Buddhist idealists take it in the first sense while the Sāṃkhya philosophers take it in the second sense. In Abhidharmakośa it is often identified with the word 'bhāvanā' which propels the evolution of our life. We may compare it with the principle of 'elan-vital' of Bergson which is developed in the creative evolution as a principle to explain the origin and development of the phenomenal world. In every system of Indian philosophy there is one principle or the other which plays the role of 'vāsanā' in the creation of the world. In early Buddhism there is consciousness¹¹⁵ and in Vedānta and Mādhyamika schools there is 'māyā'. In the Sāṃkhya there is vāsanā with a different meaning. In the

Mīmāṃsaka school we find 'bhāvanā, adṛṣṭa 'apūrva' abhyāsa and saṃskāra are found in all schools. They discharge the function of vāsanā. Kamalaśīla explains vāsanā as the force (impression) which is created by constant association of names with objects in former experiences¹¹⁶. It is due to this that even a new-born child is prompted to take activity of crying, smiling, sucking the breast etc when he has not learnt even to speak¹¹⁷.

But Dharmakīrti explains it as the accumulated knowledge of former experiences¹¹⁸. There are two kinds of vāsanā—Anubhava-vāsanā and Avidyā vāsanā or Anādi vāsanā.

Anubhava vāsanā—The term 'anubhava vāsanā implies the reality of the external world. We feel that there is an external world. The world of joy and sorrow, of pleasure and pain, of love and aversion, the entire activities of life, the hustle and bustle around is due to this. We have various kinds of impressions, habits and saṃskāras accumulated in our previous lives. On account of these impressions we take the world around us to be real and resort to activity.

Anādi vāsanā—When we ponder over the reality of this world in which we live and walk, worship and fight, it seems to be vanishing. The more we ponder the more it wither away. We cannot know anything beyond ideas. And how these ideas, which are entirely subjective, can be related to the external world, cannot be explained. The world beyond our ideas is meaningless. We know the world only through ideas which are internal. Hence we may conclude that there is an internal force which creates the illusion of the external world. It may be called the force of transcendental illusion¹¹⁹. It can be compared with the māyā śakti of Brahman with this difference that here is no substratum like Brahman. Every idea is perfumed by this transcendental illusion¹²⁰.

The extreme Yogācāras and the Sautrāntika Yogācāra give a different explanation of the anādi vāsanā. For the

sautrāntikas the external world is real. The reality is particular¹²¹, unique¹²² extreme point-instant¹²³ and beyond all our conceptions¹²⁴. We can perceive it as such but we cannot know it as such. It can be known only through our internal images which correspond to the external objects and only through this correspondence¹²⁵ we come to realise that 'this is that' or 'this is the Vindhya mountain'. But the yogācāra school of Asaṅga ridicules the theory of sārūpya and urges that no activity has ever resulted from co-ordination between images and the extreme-particulars. All activity is due to transcendental illusion¹²⁶. Śrīdhara finds in this doctrine a starting point of all the three doctrines of empiricism, rationalism and extreme idealism. (1) When the categories of our understanding are shown to have their origin in the former experiences, the force producing them is called *anubhava vāsanā*, and the school believing in this principle is called empiricism¹²⁷. (2) When the categories of understanding are explained as having their origin in spontaneous functioning of reason, we may call it *vikalpa vāsanā* and the school believing in this principle as rationalism¹²⁸. (3) Finally when we say that all the ideas are immanent in our consciousness and it naturally creates an illusion of the external world, it may be called *anādi vāsanā*. The world created by this *anādi vāsanā* is empirical reality soaked with transcendental reality¹²⁹. The school which believes in this principle may be called extreme idealism of yogācāra.¹³⁰

Now how is it possible for a philosopher who does not believe in the reality of the external world to explain the idea of "grasped" and 'grasping' in the same consciousness which is undifferentiated. The idealist answers that from the stand-point of transcendental reality¹³¹, there is no differentiation, but hampered as we are by transcendental illusion, we see simply a part of reality, a fraction of it. Our knowledge apprehends exclusively an indirect experience of it¹³², through the medium of subject-object relation. Hence the difference of 'cognition' and of 'being cognized' is made from

empirical point of view¹³³, and not from transcendental point of view¹³⁴. When a man is suffering from jaundice he sees the white conch-shell as yellow. In the same way we are suffering from transcendental illusion. So we see the absolute reality as an external world. As long as the absolute reality is not rightly known, this illusion continues. The moment we are enlightened, there is neither a 'cognizing' nor a 'cognized'. There is the vision of that reality which is inexplicable.

Criticism of the theory of Anadivasana

The Sautrāntika raises some fundamental objections to the theory of anādi-vāsanā as a principle of evolution of the phenomenal world. First--the biotic force,¹³⁵ is the subjective thought immanent in the stream of consciousness which produces the ideas of the external world from within only at the stage of its 'maturity'. This 'maturity' is the stage of its perfect development and readiness to produce things. Yogācāra does not believe in the existence of separate personalities. So the preceding moment of the stream of consciousness is the cause of this maturity. But all the moments of consciousness are equal and efficient because they are all subjective. Hence either every moment of consciousness will be the cause of maturity or none will be so. We cannot choose one moment as the cause of maturity and reject others because being by nature as subjective they are equally efficient¹³⁶. Thus the Yogācāra explanation of ripening of Vāsanā is arbitrary and baseless. The Yogācāra replies that the objection is not justified, because every new moment of consciousness has a different force. As the moments change their effects also change, so certain moments are more efficient than others. In this way the charge of arbitrariness and baselessness is unfounded. The Sautrāntika further says that the above explanation will lead the Yogācāra philosophy to an absurd position which is contradicted by experience. If every moment is different in its capacity, from other moments, only one moment will be capable of arousing the sensation that 'this is a patch of blue colour'. Thus the image

of blue colour will never recur twice in the same individual. But our experience show that we have seen the patch of blue colour many times. If on the other hand it is maintained that other moments are also capable of producing the image of the same blue patch then how are they different ? And if they are not different, every moment of consciousness will have the capacity to produce the image of blue. And as all the moments are equally efficient to produce images of blue, and being efficient, they cannot postpone their action, the result will be that all the moments will produce just the same image of a blue patch¹³⁷. Secondly—according to the theory of *Vāsanā* all our ideas have their origin in the same stream of consciousness. Hence they must be constantly in the same form. But in actual life we see that the ideas are changing and have new characters. Sometimes we have the idea of compassion, sometimes that of cruelty, sometimes of joy, sometimes of sorrow and so on. This nature of ideas disproves the theory of *Vāsanā*. Lastly—if there are only ideas, and all are of the same nature, being dependent upon the biotic force, then how can change be explained ?

The Yogācāra philosopher says that the criticisms levelled by the Sautrāntika are unfounded. The origin of our external perception is to be found in our internal stream of thought, in our streams of store-house consciousness, which has occasional variety of perceptions. The change of our perceptions can be explained from within. The biotic force may or may not be ripe to produce an effect. Even the Sautrāntika cannot deny the fact that our knowledge is limited to sensations and ideas. He cannot trespass beyond its ken, because he does not know any thing which is beyond its ken¹³⁸. All our judgments are reached only when we feel a desire in our mental substratum¹³⁹. In the words of Jīnendrabuddhi we may conclude that even if we take our stand on realism and maintain the existence of an external world, we must confess that our knowledge of the external

world goes only as far as our sensations go¹⁴⁰. This reduces realism to sensationalism which is at best a gross form of idealism, for sensations are not only would-be ideas but also forms of confused ideas themselves.

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1. Anādivāsanā dauṣṭhulya.
2. Jñātātā.
3. Sārūpya.
4. Viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya sambandha.
5. Nyāya-kandalī pp. 112-116.
6. Anadhigatārtha adhiganṭṛ.
7. Śuddham eva nirākāraṁ grāhakaṁ sarṁvidasti hi. Śloka-vārtika. Śūnyavāda verse 76.
8. Artha-prakāśa.
9. Buddhist logic vol 2 p. 395 note 1.
10. Śloka-vārtika. Sutra 4. Pratyakṣa 75.
11. Vijñaptimātram evedaṁ traidhātukam, tacca vijñānam, pratisattva santāna bhedād anantam, aviśuddham cānādhī gatatattvānaṁ viśuddham ca prahīṇācaraṇānāṁ pratikṣaṇa visarāruca sarva prāṇa bhṛtāmojayate. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 550 lines 8-10.
12. Yad yajjñānam tattat grāhya grāhakatva dvayarahitaṁ jñānatvāt, pratibimba jñānavat. Ibid p. 550 lines 13-14.
13. Dhanur vidhyati dhanuṣā vidhyati, dhanuṣo niḥśṛtya śaro vidhya tīti yaccaikasya dhanuṣaḥ. Kartṛtvādayaḥ kalpita na viruddhyanate tatthehāpīti. Ibid p. 399 lines 21-22.
Ata utprekṣīto bhedo vidyate dhanurādivat. Utpādyot-pādakatvena vyavastheye na neṣyate. Tattva-saṁgraha. verse 1347.

14. Nahi grāhakabhāvena ātma saṁvedanam abhipretam, kim tarhi ? Svayaṁ prakṛtyā prakāśātmatayā nabhas-tala varttyalokavat, Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 559 lines 21-22.
15. Kṛyā kāraka bhāvena na svasamvittir asya tu. Ekasyā-namśa rūpasya trairūpyānupapattitaḥ. Tadasya bodha-rūpatvād yuktam tāvat sva vedanam. Parasya tvartharūpasya tena saṁvedanam katham. Tattva-saṁgraha verses 2-1-2002.
16. Śloka vārtika-śūnyavāda. verses 184-186.
17. Nanu cārthasya samvittir jñānamevābhidhīyate. Tattva saṁgraha verse 2017.
18. Vitti.
19. Upalabdhi.
20. Artha pratīti.
21. Vijñapti.
Vittir upalabdhir arthapratītir, vijñaptir iti jñānam evaitaiḥ parayāyair abhidhīyate. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 563 line 11.
22. Jñānasyārthānubhāva-avyatirekābhyupagame sva saṁvitti prasamgāt. Syādetannarthānubhavātmat vijñānasya prakāśakatvam iṣṭam. Ibid pp. 563-564 lines 27, 1.
a. Sahopaiambhaniyamo abhedo naūla taddhiyoḥ.
23. Saha sabdaśca loke 'nyo nai vānenā vina kvacit. Viruddho' yaṁ tato hetur yadyasti saha vedanam. Bhadanta Śubha Gupta Quoted in the Tattva saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 567 lines 17-18.
24. Viśayaśya jñāna hetutayopanidhiḥ prāgupalambhaḥ paścāt samvedanasya iti. Ibid p. 568 lines 19-20.
25. Yadi na kimcijjānāti katham tarhi sarvajñaḥ syād iti. Ibid p. 573 line 27.
26. Ākāraṇa bāhyo'rthaḥ saḥ bahir deśa sambaddhaḥ pratyakṣam upa labhyate. Mīmāṁsā-sūtra-bhāṣya 1.15. Quoted in the Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 578 lines 14-15.

27. Na smarāmi mayā ko'pi grihīto'rthastadeti hi.
Smaranti grāhakotpāda grāhya rūpa vivarjitam.
Tasmāda-bhinnatāyān ca grāhye'pi smaraṇam bhavet.
Grāhaka smṛti nirbhāsāt tatrā'pyeśaiva grhyate.
Śloka-vārtika. Śūnyavāda. Verses 83-84.
28. Nirākāraṁ jñānam.
29. Śattayā.
30. Sārūpyavāda.
31. Abhidharmakośa. Chapter 9. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 343-349.
32. Atyanta-vilakṣaṇa.
33. Arth kriyākāri kṣaṇa. Nyāya vārtika-tātparya-tikā p. 14 line 13.
34. Anya-vyāvṛtti.
35. Nyāya kandalī pp. 123-124.
36. Pariśuddhi p. 153-7, 9 Buddhist logic vol. 2 p 374.
37. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 374 note 3.
38. Caḥṣur vijñāna saṁjñī nīlaṁ vijānāti notu nīlam iti.
Quoted in the Tattva-saṁgraha pañjikā p. 12 line 22.
39. Vinītadeva says that at the first moment of pure sensation we have simply the knowledge of the presence of a blue patch (nīlasya jñānam) but we do not know that it is blue (nīlam iti jñānam).
40. Abhidharma kośa chapter 9. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2. p. 343.
Vasubandhu deals with the theory of coordination in controversy with the vatsīputrīya Buddhists who believe in the existence of permanent soul.
41. Abhidharma kośa 9. Translated in Buddhist logic vol 2. p 343.
42. Viśayādhigatiścātṛa pramāṇa phalam iṣyate.
Tattva-saṁgraha. verse 1344.
43. Svavittir vā pramāṇam tu sārūpyam yogyata'pi vā.
Ibid verse 1344.
44. Yena kṛtena ca arthaḥ prāpito bhavati, sa eva ca prāpaṇa-phalam. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā 1. 19.

45. Śloka vārtika sense-perception verses 74, 75.
46. Sārūpya or tadākaratā.
47. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1345.
48. Ibid, verse 1347.
49. Viśliṣyamāṇa sandhau ca dārvādau paraśucchidā. Praviśannucyate tena tatraikatvam avasthitam. Ibid verse 1348.
50. Avaśyam ādau vyavasthā dvāreṇaiva sādhya sādhana saṁsthā kartavyā, na hya vyavasthāpya saṁvid bhedaṁ viśaya bhedena niyamena pravṛttir yuktā saṁvid, bheda vyavasthāyāśca sārūpyam eva nibandhanam iti sāmartyā deva āyataṁ sārūpyasya sādhaḥka tamatvaṁ sārūpyādeva ca jñānasya pravarttakatvaṁ, pravarttakasya vā pramāṇatvaṁ pravṛttikāmena nirūpyate na vyasanitayā. Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā p 400 lines 6-10.
51. Sa vyāpāra pratītvāt pramāṇaṁ phalameva sat. Pramāṇatvopa-cāraṣtu nirvyāpāre na vidyate, Pramāṇa-samuccaya. 1. 9.
52. Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on the Pramāṇa samuccaya 1. 9. (translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 378-383),
53. Adhipati-pratyaya, prakṛṣṭopakāraka.
54. Abhidharma kośa chapter 2.
55. Jinendra buddhi's commentary on Pramāṇa samuccaya 1. 9. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 378-383.
56. Prāpti, adhigati, pratīti, bodha.
57. Pravṛtti, Jñānasya pravṛtti.
58. Pratīti yogyārtha, arthakṛyāsamarthārtha.
59. Tadeva ca pratyakṣaṁ jñānam prāmāṇa phalam artha-pratīti rupa tvāt. Nyāya-bindu 1. 18.
60. Nyāya-bindu 1. 19.
61. Jinendra buddhi pramāṇa samuccaya 1. 9. Buddhist logic vol 2. p 381.
62. Tad vaśādartha pratīti siddheriti. Nyāya bindu 1. 20.
63. Vyāpāra-vyāpāri bhāva.
64. Gamyā-gamaka-bhāva.

65. Sthāyitva.
66. Vigrahavān saṁbandha.
67. Sva prakāśe vijñāne.
68. Bāhya ceti.
69. Aśoka.
70. Pariśuddhi. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 372-377.
71. Sārūpya.
72. Loka vyavahāra.
73. Loka.
74. Pramāṇa-vārtika pratyakṣa verse.
75. Viśaya-saṁvedana.
76. Svasaṁvedana.
77. Pramāṇa-samuccaya 1. 9.
78. Sva saṁvittiḥ phalaṁ cāsyā, tadrūpyā darthanīścayaḥ. Viśayakāra evasya pramāṇam tena mīyate. Ibid 1. 10.
79. Pratibhāsa.
80. Svasminneva bhasate.
81. Asya pratibhāsaḥ svayameva.
82. Commentary of Jinendra buddhi. Translated by Stcherbatsky Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 386-387.
83. Asya viśayasya pratibhāsaḥ. It may have a realist interpretation which will mean an image corresponding.
84. Saṁvedana mātram.
85. Jñānāt pṛthag vastu abhāvāt.
86. Niścaya.
87. Buddhyā eva yadā icchā anubhūyate, tadā arthaicchā niścīyate. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 387-389.
88. Yasmād viśayāj jñānam udeti tad viśaya sadṛśam tad bhavati. Nyāya-bindu-tīkā p. 18 lines 22-23.
89. Yathā nīlād utpadyamānaḥ nīla sadṛśam. Ibid p. 18 lines 23-24.
90. Pramāṇa-samuccaya 1, 10. Buddhist logic vol 2 p. 384 note 1.
91. Nīlam iti jñānam.
92. Nīlasya jñānam.

93. Sādhakatam kāraṇa, prakṛṣṭopakāraka, adhipati-pratyaya. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 380 note 2.
94. Tasminneva karmakartṛ kāraṇa bhāvo na yujyate. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 389 note 4.
95. Idarṇ punaramūlyadānakrayi svarūparṇ ca nādarśayati prat yakṣatārṇ ca svīkartum icchati. Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts p. 99 lines 15-16.
96. Place of common resort, meeting place agreed on. Oxford Concise Dictionary p. 1032.
97. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 371 (an extract from the Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra).
98. Nīla vijñāna samanantara pratyayasya.
99. Anādivāsanā.
100. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 362. An extract from the Nyāya kaṇikā of Vācaspati Miśra.
101. Svapratibhaṣe'narthe'dhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 9 line 20.
102. Anubhavāropa.
103. Nirvikalpa.
104. Savikalpa.
105. Adhyavasāyi.
106. Apratyakṣa.
107. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 257 Translated in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 364.
108. Atyanta vilakṣanānārṇ sālakṣaṇyam. Nyāya vārtikatātparya-ṭīkā p. 340.
109. Ātmabhāvāvasthita.
110. Exnihilo nihil fit.
111. Anādi vāsaṇ.
112. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 258 Translated in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 367-368.
113. Ālaya vijñāna.
114. Kleśāvaraṇa obstruction of suffering and jñsyāvaraṇa obstruction hiding the transcendental truth (the knowable) T. S. P. Foreward p. XLVII.
115. Dvayasya nāstitvarupeti dhīmān. Mahāyāna sūtrā

laṁkāra vikalpamātram tribhavam bāhyamartham na vidyate. Laṁkāvatāra sūtra, anityatā parivarta, verse 77.

115. Cetanā.
116. Nāmārtha bhāvanā.
117. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 367 lines 22-23.
118. Vāsanā pūrvam jñānam.
119. Buddhist logic vol. 2 footnote 3. pp. 367, 368.
120. Vastrāder mṛgamadādinā vāsyastvam yathā. Nyāya-vārtikatātparya-ṭīka p. 145 lines 22-23.
121. Sva-lakṣaṇa.
122. Sarvato vyāvṛtta.
123. Kṣaṇa.
124. Deśakāla svabhāvananugata.
125. Sārūpya.
126. Na dṛṣṭa artha krīyā svalakṣaṇa sālakṣaṇyena (sārūpyeṇa) apitu anādi vāsanā vasāt alīkasyaiva dāha pākādika sāmartyā ropah. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 368.
127. Anubhavavāsanāvāda.
128. Vikalpa vāsanā vāda.
129. Anādi vāsanā vāsitaḥ samvyāvahārikaḥ pratyayaḥ. Nyāya-kandalī p. 279 line 15. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 368.
130. Atyanta vikalpa vāsanā vāda or ekānta vikalpa vāsanāvāda.
131. Tathatā—thisness.
132. Lakṣyate eva.
133. Yathā dṛṣṭam yathā tathatām.
134. Anabhilāpya.
135. Vāsanā.
136. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 369.
137. Ibid pp. 369-370.
138. Jñānat pṛthak vāstvabhavat,

139. Buddhya eva yadā icchā anubhuyate tadā artha icchā niściyate. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 389.
 140. Yathā anubhavaṁ eva artha pratitih, na tu yathārthanubhavaṁ. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 390.
 141. Pramāṇa-samuccaya. 1. 10. Commented by Jinendra Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 389-390.
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CHAPTER II

THE CRITERION OF KNOWLEDGE

1. What is right knowledge ?

We call a man trustworthy when things told by him are known to us to be exactly what he told and which are not falsified later on. In the same way in the sphere of knowledge that knowledge is regarded to be valid which makes us reach the object pointed by it and which is not contradicted by subsequent action.¹ For instance we see the vision of water at a distance. We suppose it to be water and endeavour to reach it. After reaching the place of water if we find that it is water, our knowledge is right. But if we find that it is not water, we believe that our knowledge of it is not right. Hence one of the criteria of our knowledge is that it should make us reach the object indicated.² We may also regard the knowledge of an object valid if we have a reasonable ground for the expectation of the desired result emanating from it. For instance a farmer begins his activity of sowing with the expectation of reaping a good harvest in normal conditions undisturbed by storms and stones. His knowledge of the act of sowing is valid as it indicates the possibility of reaching the desired result. In the words of Kamalasila that knowledge is valid which refers to a possible successful action, though not to its actual achievement.³

We regard that an object which is present before consciousness. It is present either directly or indirectly. That which is directly present is called the object of perception, while that which is indirectly present the object of inference. The object of sense-perception is localized in space and time in a particular dimension, but that of inference is conceived through the mark and becomes localized afterwards. Hence the object indicated can come only through

sense-perception and inference. Therefore, the validity of our knowledge depends upon these two sources.⁴ That knowledge which differs from the above mentioned one is not right. Only that knowledge is right which indicates an attainable object and an object is attainable only through sense-perception and inference. Hence that knowledge which comes in ways other than perception and inference is not valid.⁵ Such knowledge would be either absolutely unreal like the sky-flower or it would be abstract like the universals. Another characteristic of right knowledge is that it indicates an object which is capable of producing a purposeful activity,⁶ because men endeavour to attain only that object which will satisfy their need.⁷ Hence right knowledge should always be efficient knowledge,⁸ a knowledge which indicates an object which makes our cherished dreams realised.

2. What is a source of knowledge ?

What is the source of right knowledge ? There is a difference between what is indicated by sense-organs and the object ? Here we are confronted with a difficulty. Our knowledge is limited to senses, and if they are giving a different form of the object than what it is in its actual being, what would be the source of our knowledge and belief ? Dharmakīrti says that sense-organs are not the sole source. The form of the object presented by the senses is not to be considered as valid if it differs from the form of the object presented by the understanding. For instance the vision of a yellow conchshell seen by a daltonist is not considered to be valid because in reality it is white. In the same way the vision of mirage is not considered as valid because it does not quench our thirst. In such cases where there is an apparent difference between the presentation of senses and the object of understanding, we have to test the efficiency of the object. If the object is capable of producing the result expected from it, it is valid, if it is not, it is invalid. Hence another criterion of knowledge is its

capacity of producing the effect attributed to it.⁹ That fire is real which is capable of burning, cooking and lighting. The fire which is incapable of discharging these functions is unreal.¹⁰ Besides the characteristics of being uncontradicted by experience and being efficient the validity of our source of knowledge consists in its presenting to us the cognition of that object which has been uncognized till the moment, i. e. it is the first cognition¹¹ which gives validity and not the subsequent ones.¹² The cognition which lasts for more than a moment is not cognition because it cognizes what has already been cognized. It is memory.¹³

The question arises 'why is the first moment of cognition alone the valid cognition and not the subsequent ones? Why is this prejudice for the one moment and abhorrence for other ones? Diñnāga holds that if we regard every moment of cognition as the source of valid knowledge, there would be no limit to our sources.¹⁴ In fact what takes place in our cognition is that in the first moment there is a flash of reality—the extreme particular¹⁵ on our sense-organs. We have a simple reflex.¹⁶ Then we try to determine what the object is and afterwards we come to a definite judgment, 'this is that' or 'this is a patch of blue colour'. This judgment is the result of our conception, the fruit of our understanding, which is expressible in words, while the particular as such is unutterable,¹⁷ because the moment we try to determine its form it vanishes. Thus valid knowledge may be defined as that knowledge which is uncontradicted and which reveals its own object as well as differentiates other objects.¹⁸ It is the knowledge where we get no defect or contradiction even after taking pains to investigate the defect and contradiction.¹⁹ It is the factor which gives knowledge a definite object which is capable of producing effect and which has a relation of either identity or causation.²⁰ Mīmāṃsaka defines source of knowledge as a cognition of the object uncognized.²¹ According to the

Naiyāyika a source of knowledge is the predominant among all causes producing cognition.²²

These definitions of Pramāṇa given by different schools of Indian philosophy resemble the definition of Pramāṇa given by Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Prajñākara and Gupta etc. But there is a fundamental difference between the Buddhist and the realist schools. According to the realist the object indicated is durable, subsisting of qualities, universals, particulars, inherence etc. While for the Buddhist it is momentary, devoid of the factors of time, place, quality, universal etc. It is extreme particular, point-instant.²³

3. The sources of valid knowledge

Reality has two characters, one which is directly apprehended and the other which is distinctly conceived. Like the two characters of reality, there are two sources of the knowledge of reality, perception and inference. In perception we have the direct vision of reality. Here we have sensations (simple reflex) caused by the stimulus of the reality upon the senses. Here the process is not subject to analysis. The object of perception is the extreme-particular which is unimaginable and unutterable. While in inference we try to encircle the reality visualised in the sense-perception within the categories of the understanding. Here we remember what has been perceived in the first moment. The remembrance stimulates will and the will stimulates action. In the process of knowledge the object is not directly perceived, but is distinctly conceived and we know that 'this is a patch of blue colour.' The reality apprehended by this process is apprehended through a mark. For instance from seeing the smoke we infer the existence of fire. The difference between these two sources is a radical one, a real one, or in other words a transcendental one²⁴. They are mutually exclusive. Perception cannot transgress the sphere of inference and vice-versa. What is

perceived is unimaginable, and what is imagined or conceived can never be the subject of perception. Dharmakīrti declares that there are two and only two sources of knowledge because there are only two characters of reality, the directly perceived and the indirectly conceived. Any attempt to increase or decrease the number of sources of knowledge would be illogical and futile.²⁵ This theory of 'exclusive domain' is called 'unmixed' or 'settled' theory of right knowledge in contrast with the realist of theory of 'mixed' or duplicate knowledge.

Other schools of Indian philosophy do not accept the Buddhist view that there are only two sources of knowledge and that they are mutually exclusive. They widely differ on this point from one another. For instance the Cārvākas believe only in perception. The early Vaiśeṣikas believed in perception and inference; although their view of perception and inference differs from the Buddhist view of perception and inference. The sāṅkhya believed in testimony in addition to perception and inference. The Naiyāyika adds analogy as the fourth source of knowledge. The Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka adds 'presumption' as the fifth source of knowledge. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka adds 'non-apprehension' as the sixth source of knowledge. Thus perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, presumption and non-apprehension are generally regarded as the six classical sources of knowledge. Advaita Vedānta recognises all of them as right sources of knowledge. Some schools of theistic Vedānta, however add to this list of pramāṇas ratiocination²⁶, probability²⁷, tradition²⁸, intuition²⁹ and negation³⁰. But the Sautrāntika says that there are only two sources of knowledge, perception and inference. The other sources of knowledge either do not possess the character of right cognition, or are included in perception or inference³¹. Their validity as a source of right knowledge is examined in detail.

a. Verbal testimony

According to Śabara Swāmin 'the cognition of things not within the reach of senses which proceeds from the cognition of words is called verbal.'³² Śāntarakṣita explains that verbal cognition is that knowledge of imperceptible things which is derived from words, the words being either 'eternal sentence' or 'sentence uttered by a trustworthy person.'³³ The verbal cognition is regarded as a separate source of knowledge because the knowledge derived from it can not be sense-perception as its object is beyond senses, nor can it be 'inference' because it lacks all the characteristics of an inferential cognition.³⁴

The trustworthiness of verbal cognition can be examined in two heads, (1) the trustworthiness of eternal sentence and (2) the trustworthiness of a reliable person.³⁵ The eternal sentence means one that does not proceed from a human source. It may be capable or incapable of bringing about its cognition at all times. If it is capable of bringing about its cognition at all times, there is no need to proceed to the process of cognition at all, and if it is incapable of producing cognition, there is no need of resorting to it. In either case it does not stand critical examination.³⁶ Further if a sentence is eternal, and does not emanate from a person, it is not possible for it to give any kind of knowledge at all,³⁷ as knowledge is invariably associated only with persons. As regards knowledge derived from a trustworthy person, it cannot be a separate source of knowledge. The man is found to be true, that is his statements have been corroborated in actual life. Hence what he states is believed on the basis of an inference.³⁸ The actual form of inference is as follows—Whatever statements he makes are true. This is a statement made by him. Hence this statement is true. This shows that the verbal testimony of a trustworthy person is included into inference.

This view endorses the view of Dīrṅnāga who maintains that 'verbal cognition' cannot be a separate source of

knowledge as it is either perception or inference. Trustworthy means (1) either that the trustworthy person speaks truly or (2) that the thing spoken is trustworthy and true. In the former case it means that the 'credibility of the person' is derived from inference, in the later case our belief is based on perception. Because when the person apprehends in perception the truth of the statement, he comes to realise that the statement is true.³⁹ In this way verbal testimony cannot be regarded as a separate source of knowledge.

b. Is the Veda a separate source of knowledge ?

The Mīmāṃsaka believes in the authority of the Veda and regards it as the highest source of knowledge. To prove the infallibility of the Veda he gives certain arguments which are found unsound by the Buddhists : First the words of a trustworthy person cannot be valid because it is difficult to decide who is trustworthy and who is not. Secondly men suffer from defects like hatred, delusion, attachment infatuation etc and hence their utterances cannot give valid knowledge. The words of the Veda are valid because they are not human creations. They cannot be vitiated by the defects of human speech³⁹. But Dharmakīrti charges that the argument cannot provide a sound base for the validity of the Veda. As the defects like hatred, delusion and infatuation subsist in a person, so excellences like compassion, virtue, wisdom etc. which provide validity to a cognition also subsist in a person. They cannot subsist in a vacuum. The Veda is not human creation. So it is devoid of excellences and cannot be a source of true knowledge⁴⁰. Moreover if the 'non-creation' by a human being is regarded as the ground of truth and eternity, the same can prove sky-lotus to be true and eternal. Again the meaning of the sentences of the Veda or any other scripture or creature that matter can be known only through symbols and these symbols can be expressed only by human beings. Human beings suffer from defects like hatred, delusion etc. Hence the meaning which is attributed

to eternal words through symbols by human beings is vitiated by errors⁴¹. It may be argued that the relation between Vedic words and their meanings is eternal. In such a case the meaning of the Veda being eternal must be clear even to ignorant persons, but experience shows that this presumption is baseless. Hence whether we maintain the eternity or non-eternity of the Veda, there is no difference in the conclusion that it cannot be a separate source of knowledge. The presumption that the Vedas are eternal (non-human creation) will create many difficulties. If we maintain that the relation between words and their meanings cannot be expressed by human beings, it would be impossible to know the content of the Veda, the Veda will not be known by any one. And in its unknown position it cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge.

The Mīmāṃsaka argues that the Vedas are not human creations as no body is able to remember their author. Had they been human creation, someone would have certainly been able to know their author. Another argument for the eternity of the Veda is that the study of the Veda has been pursued since time immemorial by teachers and their pupils and so beginning of this study cannot be ascertained⁴². Dharmakīrti's charges against these arguments is that they would make the works like Raghuvamśa, Meghadūta etc non-human creation⁴³ and infallible because they have been also studied by teachers and their pupils for a pretty long period of time⁴⁴. The mere fact that a thing has continued since time immemorial and has come to us from a continuous line of teachers cannot be a reason for its truth. Can the marriage-relations between sons and mothers or fathers and daughters as prevalent among the Pārasīs be regarded infallible and valid on the ground that they have been in vogue since time immemorial ?⁴⁵ If custom or the line of teachers is regarded as a solid foundation for the validity of any knowledge, then the immoral customs of foreigners and the books of non-believers would equally be a

valid source of knowledge like the Vedas and there will be no value of our efforts in contending the authority of the Vedas⁴⁶. Moreover the Vedas do not reveal their own meanings. They are revealed only through human beings who are vitiated with defects. Then what would be the criterion of judging that the meaning assigned by Jaimini or Yāska (who are equally human beings) is the only correct one ?

The argument of the Mīmāṃsaka is that the Vedas cannot be understood by human beings because they are subject to greed, temptation, anger etc. The Veda itself is unable to reveal its own meaning. If it is neither known nor revealed what would be the criterion of its apprehension ? What would be the basis of our presumption that particular sentence has this very meaning and not some other meaning ? For instance how are we going to maintain that the sentence 'svargakāmaḥ agnihotrāṇ juhot' means that 'a man desirous for heaven should perform agnihotra ? Why should we not maintain that this sentence means that a man should eat the flesh of a dog ?⁴⁷ The argument that only the first meaning is correct and not the second one because it is prevalent among the people cannot be accepted ; because entirely different interpretations have been given by the upholders of the argument to the words which have different meanings prevalent among the people. For instance Urvaśī is commonly known as a heavenly damsel but for the Mīmāṃsaka it means a particular vedic utensil. Heaven means 'abode of gods', but for the Mīmāṃsaka it is a particular bliss⁴⁸.

It is further said that the Vedas are a valid source of knowledge because they have such utterances which are uncontradicted by experience. For instance we find in the Veda 'fire is medicine of cold.'⁴⁹ Dharmakīrti says that the validity of one or two sentences of the Veda cannot validate the whole text of the Veda as the invalidity of one or two

sentences cannot invalidate it. If this is a criterion of validity then there will be nothing like invalidity, because even the worst liar speaks one or two sentences which are completely true⁵⁰. Dharmakīrti therefore, concludes that verbal cognition can never be a source of knowledge at all. What is true by 'perception' and 'inference' cannot be falsified even if we donot believe in the Vedas. And what is untrue on the basis of perception and inference can never be validated by the Vedas. For instance the relation between smoke and fire has been perceived by senses and corroborated by inference. It cannot be invalidated by the Vedas⁵¹. Thus the Buddhist do not accept the authority of the Veda. For them there are only two sources of knowledge. But they regard the Buddha as the *pramāṇa*-incarnate. The very first line of the *pramāṇa-samuccaya* begins with the salutation to Buddha who is 'pramāṇa incarnate'⁵². Dharmakīrti says that the Buddha is *pramāṇa* because he has a consistent knowledge⁵³. Śāntaraksita in his *Tattvasaṅgraha* and Kamalaśīla in his *pañjikā* (a commentary on *Tattvasaṅgraha*) devote a whole chapter named 'Sarvajñaparīkṣā' to prove the omniscience of the Buddha. Even the earlier Yogācāras Asaṅga and Vasubandhu regard Āgama as a separate source of knowledge and rely on the words of the Buddha for their philosophical guidance. To ridicule the authority of the Vedas and to accept the words of the Buddha appear to be the mission of Buddhist philosophers. This mission is obviously self stultifying. It does not prove that verbal testimony is no source of knowledge. It simply replaces one type of verbal testimony by another type. The Buddhist cannot remain a Buddhist if he becomes a free thinker and casts aside the veil of the authority of the words of the Buddha. All that appears to be correct in his position is this that verbal testimony is a separate source of knowledge. It cannot be included in perception or in inference. If the words of the Buddha are reliable, there is nothing to disprove the reliability of the Veda. What can be said of the one

can equally be said of the other. So the Buddhist rejection of the Vedic testimony is prejudiced and biased.

c. Analogy⁵⁴.

'Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity to a known object'⁵⁵. For instance when we see at first a 'gavaya' we remember the features of a cow which we have often seen and compare the general features of the "gavaya" with those of the 'cow' and conclude that it is 'gavaya'. According to Śabara⁵⁶ upamāna or similitude brings about the cognition of things not in contact with the senses. For instance the sight of the 'gavaya' brings about the 'remembrance' of the cow⁵⁷. The Mīmāṃsaka holds that 'analogy' is a separate source of knowledge. As it is entirely devoid of the function of the sense-organs, it cannot be called sense-perception. Again it lacks the features of inference. There is no probans in analogy to make it inference. Analogy apprehends an entirely new object which is not previously apprehended. For instance before the perception of a 'gavaya' its similarity with a cow is not apprehended at all⁵⁸.

But the Buddhist analysis shows that analogy is not a separate source of knowledge. The man who makes the analogy that this 'gavaya' is like a cow sees both the cow and the 'gavaya' and their general features. He distinguishes the 'gavaya' from the cow on the basis of some characters which are not present in the cow. This apprehension he gets with the help of his sense-organs. Hence his mode of this apprehension is perceptual. Analogy is a case of perception. Kumārila challenges the above explanation and urges that the object of analogy is the similarity between a remembered thing and a perceived thing. Though similarity is cognized by sense perception, yet the cognition of the remembered object as qualified by similarity with the perceived object is not cognized by sense-perception. Hence analogy is

different from sense perception and is a separate source of knowledge⁵⁹. Śāntarakṣita objects to the explanation given by Kumārila and says that 'analogy' does not differ from 'remembrance'. What happens here is that there are some parts in the body of a 'gavaya' which bring 'remembrance' of the same parts of a cow and also its difference from the cow. Hence the perception of the 'gavaya's body is followed by the remembrance of the cow's body. 'Remembrance' apprehends what has already been apprehended, so 'analogy' being 'remembrance' cannot be regarded as a separate source of knowledge. If such slight difference of cognitions makes it a separate source, there would be no limit to sources of knowledge⁶⁰.

Diñnāga maintains analogy is only the 'perception of likeness' and is not distinct from perception and testimony⁶¹. When a person perceives a cow and a 'gavaya' it is through sense-organs that he apprehends the likeness between the two. When he is told about the 'likeness' between a cow and a 'gavaya' he remembers that some qualities of the cow are present in the 'gavaya' while other qualities are absent. Thus analogy is not different from perception and testimony.

Commenting on the argument of Diñnāga Vācaspati Miśra says that Diñnāga commits a mistake in thinking that the 'knowledge of likeness' or the knowledge of an object "qualified by likeness" is the result of sense-perception, for the knowledge of 'likeness' or of an object qualified by likeness constitutes a new means of cognition. But Vācaspati Miśra's contention is too wide. Analogy may be different from mere perception, but it is not different from remembrance as Śāntarakṣita insists. If it is remembrance it can be regarded the joint operation of perception, inference and verbal-testimony. So it is not a separate source of knowledge.

d. Presumption

Presumption⁶², according to Śabara Swāmin consists in

presuming something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived would not be possible without it. For instance it is found that Devadatta who is alive, is not seen in his house, and this 'non-existence' in the house leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house⁶³.

Kumārila enumerates five kinds of presumption. First—when a man hears that Devadatta does not eat during daytime and still he is fat, it is at once presumed that he eats at night. This presumption is based on what is heard⁶⁴. Secondly—when we presume the quality of motion in the sun from its going from one place to another. This is a presumption based on inference⁶⁵. Thirdly—when on seeing the 'gavaya' we remember its likeness with cow and presume that it is 'gavaya', the presumption is based on analogy⁶⁶. The fourth kind of presumption is based upon presumption itself. For instance the denotation of a word cannot be defined unless we assume the expressive potency of words. Further this potency would not be possible but for the 'presumption' of the eternity of words⁶⁷, because what is non-eternal cannot be related to any convention. The fifth kind of presumption is based on negation. When we do not see Devadatta in the house, we presume that he would be outside the house. It is based upon negation⁶⁸.

The Buddhist take a critical view of presumption and find it non-different from perception or inference. The example of 'moving sun' and the nocturnal eating of Devadatta are the clear cases of inference. We infer from our experience that a thing which goes from one place to another has motion. The sun appears at one place and disappears at another. Hence like an ordinary thing the sun has also the capacity of motion. The fatness and eating are related with one another as the effect and the cause respectively. Hence the former leads to the inference of the later. The presumption based on analogy is in fact analogical inference. The presumption based on presump-

tion is a case of multiple inference. The presumption of verbal potency is actually the effect of the perception of words or hearing. The presumption based upon negation gives no certainty, so it cannot be a valid source of knowledge. For instance the absence of Devadatta in the house does not provide the certainty that he is outside his house. He might not be in the world at all. Moreover negation is a kind of inference. So presumption based upon negation is nothing but inference⁶⁹.

e. Negation⁷⁰.

Negation is said to be the means of cognition of an object in the case of which the five means of cognition do not function⁷⁰. In the case of non-functioning of perception and the other means of cognition negation may consist either in the 'non-modification of the soul' or in the cognition of an other object⁷¹.

Kumārila avers that 'negation' is a means of cognition because like the eye etc it serves as the cause of cognition. The object of negation is negative. Its source of knowledge therefore must be negative⁷². He explains the difference between negation and perception. Negation is known by a different name than perception. Had there been no difference between the two, there would have been no need to have a different nomenclature. In perception we apprehend the positive aspect of a thing, while in negation we apprehend the negative aspect of that thing⁷³. The Buddhists refute the arguments of Kumārila. If, 'negation of cognition' is an entity, the negation of cognized object should also be an entity. And if it is an entity, why should it not be included under perception⁷⁴. The argument of Kumārila that the 'negation of the effect consists in the presence of the cause, itself shows that this fact of its presence in the cause is an entirely different thing from negation and is included under perception⁷⁵. The argument that negation is a means of cognition like the eye etc cannot be upheld;

because what is entirely featureless cannot serve as the basis of cognition^{75a}. As regards the definition that negation consists in the non-modification of the soul, it is entirely irrelevant. A permanent and eternal entity can have no modification and even if it has modification, its modification cannot be provisional. It should be permanent like the soul. But our experience shows that negation is not permanent but provisional. Hence it does not belong to soul⁷⁶.

(f, g) Ratiocination and probability are regarded by some philosophers as separate sources of knowledge. But Kumārila has rightly included them in inference. They are the different types of inference Ratiocination⁷⁷ is illustrated as follows— 'A comes about when B is there. A does not come about when B is not there. Therefore A proceeds from B. Obviously this ratiocination is a clear case of inference based on causality. So it cannot be taken as a separate source of knowledge.

(g) Further probability⁷⁸ is also nothing but a kind of inference. It brings about the cognition of the components of an aggregate after the aggregate is known. The members of the aggregate are the causes of the idea of the aggregate. From the idea of the aggregate we infer the idea of its component parts. Hence it is inference.

(h,i) Tradition and Intuition

(h) Tradition⁷⁹ is that means of cognition whose original promulgator cannot be traceable, but which has come down through a long continued assertion, e.g., a ghost resides in this banyan tree⁸⁰.

(i) Intuition is that cognition which indicates the 'existence' or 'non-existence' of things, and which appears suddenly without any restrictions of time or place. When a girl has the notion 'my brother will come today', and this does come about, it is a case of intuition⁸¹.

'Śāntarakṣita says that 'tradition' and 'intuition' are

often found to be false. They cannot give certainty and therefore cannot be a true source of knowledge⁸² at all. The knowledge derived from the tradition and intuition is either perceptible or imperceptible. In the former case it is included in perception and in the later in inference⁸³. In conclusion all the alleged sources of knowledge except perception and inference lack the fundamental characteristics of a valid source of knowledge. They are not 'uncontradicted by experience'. They are not apprehension of an unapprehended object. Hence they cannot be sources of knowledge⁸⁴. The sources of knowledge are two and two only. Their number can neither be increased nor decreased⁸⁵.

4. Criterion of truth

Experience is the sole guide in every matter. But are all cognitions caused by perception or inference valid or invalid themselves? Does reliability of a cognition come after due ascertainment from alien sources? These questions have been the points of debate among the various schools of Indian philosophy and four main theories have been propounded⁸⁶. First, according to the Jains truth is incomprehensible. It is dialectical in nature. What is true for one may simply be one aspect of truth which is not grasped by others who regard it to be false. Therefore every knowledge is always to a certain extent false and to a certain extent true. Truth and falsity are nothing but different aspects of truth. Both are intrinsic or natural to knowledge. This theory is known as the theory of intrinsic truth and intrinsic falsity⁸⁷. The Sāṅkhya also maintain this very theory, although they give a different reason for it. The vicinity of 'self-luminous consciousness' illuminates cognition and its truth as well as its falsity. Secondly, according to the Nyāya, knowledge is not itself true or false⁸⁸. Its truth and falsity are ascertained by experience. Truth and falsity cannot be said to be intrinsically made out⁸⁹ or intrinsically known⁹⁰. The Naiyāyika asks if our first apprehension is true in itself why is it that we often doubt it whether it is right or not? This shows that

truth of knowledge is known extrinsically or extraneously⁹¹. A cognition is valid if it leads to a fruitful effect⁹². In other words that knowledge is true which is consistent with the subsequent result or is uncontradicted by the subsequent experience. The correspondence is the test of knowledge. This correspondence resembles the Buddhist theory of co-ordination.

Thirdly, according to the Buddhist 'all knowledge is erroneous, and becomes true only through subsequent assertion and annulment. When we come to experience that a certain kind of knowledge leads to a successful purposive action and our aims are fulfilled by it we regard it as true while as long as its efficiency has not been realised or believed to be so on reasonable grounds we cannot rely on its truth⁹³. For instance only after seeing the effect of poison or wine which brings unconsciousness, swoon, disturbance of mind or death we come to regard it as wine or poison⁹⁴. So falsity is intrinsic and truth is extrinsic to knowledge.

The theory of intrinsic truth of knowledge fails to distinguish between truth and falsity. On the basis of this theory illusions and other erroneous cognitions become true because their truth is intrinsic or inherent in them—a fact which is obviously not the case. Knowledge cannot be regarded as true unless it succeeds on the test of uncontradicted experience and efficiency of producing effect. Its truth is not determined by itself. It is determined by non-contradiction and practical efficiency. This conclusively shows that its truth is extraneous to it.

Fourthly, Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins maintain that all our experiences are intrinsically true. There is no ground for suspicion that knowledge is false, because knowledge is knowledge, not error. Knowledge is rendered illusory and erroneous only when the apprehender suffers from some disease or when some hindrance meddles with knowledge. For instance a man who suffers from jaundice sees everything yellow, and a piece of nacre appears to be a piece of silver. But these 'experiences are sublated by subsequent ones. Sublation proves the former

false. Thus the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins regard that while truth is intrinsic to knowledge, falsity is extraneous to it⁹⁵.

Criticism of the theories of truth

The theory that both validity and invalidity are inherent involves contradiction. Validity and invalidity are contradictory. The existence of one denotes the absence of the other. Hence we are not in a position to hold that both validity and invalidity belong to one and the same cognition⁹⁶. If we maintain that they belong to two different individual cognitions, we will have to face the difficulty of their relationship. What is their relation? What is the criterion to judge that one cognition is valid and the other invalid? In absence of such criterion it would be difficult to differentiate between valid and invalid cognitions⁹⁷.

The theory that both validity and non-validity are extrinsic is also untenable. If the cognition is devoid of both validity and non-validity then it is featureless and has no character at all. A characterless cognition can serve no purpose. If it has no character at all, how any character can be infused into it later⁹⁸? For instance we perceive a moving tree from a distance and try to apprehend it. In order to ascertain our cognition we approach the tree and come to the conclusion that our cognition is not valid. In fact it is not moving. But if we do not accept any character in the knowledge of tree, no ascertainment can take place. Again validity and invalidity are mutually exclusive, so both cannot be extrinsic together⁹⁹. One of the two must be present in cognition. For instance we see a patch of blue colour. There are only two alternatives. Either our cognition of the blue patch is wrong or right. If it is wrong, by subsequent experience it can be apprehended in its exact nature and this wrongness can be annulled. On the other hand if it appears to be right in the first moment, the later illusion may be removed by initially valid cognition. But when both 'right-

ness' and 'wrongness' are external to cognition, cognition becomes inexplicable and indeterminate.

The theory of extrinsic validity and inherent invalidity is also not possible. What is by itself intrinsically invalid can never be expected to be valid, because it is itself invalid. If validity comes to a particular cognition from outside, an infinite regress is inevitable¹⁰⁰. In order to ascertain a single cognition innumerable other cognitions will be needed and they in their own turn will go on needing other cognition to be valid. Obviously this process is endless. Hence the ascertainment of every cognition becomes impossible.

The criticism of the previous theories of validity shows that self sufficiency or independence is the only basis for the validity of knowledge. If 'dependence' upon other factors be admitted then the validity of every act of cognition would be destroyed. It can be preserved in fact if knowledge is regarded inherently valid¹⁰¹. Mīmāṃsakas, therefore, propose the theory that cognition is valid by nature and it becomes invalid only when it is contradicted by a subsequent cognition. Kamalaśīla says that there are only two alternative meanings of inherence of validity. It is inherent either in the sense that 'being eternal it has no cause' or it means that even though it is not eternal, it appears at the same time that cognition has its essence (existence) brought about by its causes, and its validity is not imposed subsequently by other causes. Now if the 'pramāṇa' is regarded to be eternal, its effect should also be regarded as eternal. But such an assertion will go against common experience. We see that the effect of any thing is occasional and not permanently existent. So the validity of pramāṇas cannot be inherent in the first sense because it goes against perception and inference. If the second meaning of 'inherence of validity' is accepted, there is no difference between the Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsaka view. Because both regard that the capacity¹⁰² is produced by the causes of the cognitions (pramāṇas) them selves and it (capa-

city) cannot be imposed upon them by other causes¹⁰³. But despite this unanimity a difference divides the Buddhist and the Mīmāṃsaka. The latter maintains that knowledge is itself valid and there is no need of extraneous conformity, while the former holds that knowledge is intrinsically invalid and needs an extraneous factor regarding its certainty.

The Buddhists urge that though the capacity to produce effect cannot be infused into a thing from outside it is not possible to regard an apprehension as certain and valid unless it is confirmed by our later experiences. For instance in the apprehension of double moon all the factors of true apprehension are present the same sense-organs the same object, and the same apprehender, still it is illusory. If apprehension is intrinsically valid, it would be impossible to differentiate the valid cognitions from the invalid ones. Hence in order to ascertain whether an apprehension is valid we have to confirm whether it is capable of producing the expected result. The validity of cognition lies in its conformity to produce the desired result known to the mankind from time immemorial¹⁰⁴. The argument of the Mīmāṃsaka that the validity itself would be destroyed, if it were dependent on something else does not hold good. How can validity be destroyed, which is indivisible by its nature and which is brought about by its own cause. The 'dependence' on extraneous factors is necessary only for bringing about certainty regarding its validity and not for its origin¹⁰⁵. The process of validation is different from the genesis of valid knowledge.

Kamalaśīla says that all the arguments which have been put forward in support of the intrinsic validity of knowledge may equally be applied to the theory of extrinsic validity. It may be said with equal force that 'invalidity is inherent' because if it did not exist itself it could not be brought about by anything else. Self sufficiency is thus the basis for invalidity as it is the basis of validity. As for the Mīmāṃsakas 'the capacity for non-conformity' (with the real state of things) and 'certain cognition' is due to other causes, so for the

Buddhists the capacity for conformity and certain cognition is due to other causes. Hence both the doctrines of 'intrinsic validity' and 'extrinsic validity' stand on the same footing. There should not be love for the one and hatred for the other¹⁰⁶.

The Mīmāṃsaka insists that we have to admit the self-validity of knowledge, because if we stick to the position that validity comes from outside there will be an infinite regress. The objection that the annulment of illusory cognition is extraneous does not hold good, because even though the discarding of validity will depend on extraneous causes, it would not involve infinite regress. The reason is that after all it is dependent upon validity which is inherent in cognition¹⁰⁷. The argument of the Buddhist that the first cognition is validated by the subsequent cognitions when there is conformity between the result of the first and the subsequent ones is futile. Because subsequent cognitions are themselves invalid owing to the fact that they apprehend what has already been apprehended¹⁰⁸. If corroboration by subsequent cognitions were the ground for the validity of our cognitions how can we explain the validity of the cognition of those things which are born and immediately destroyed or those auditory cognitions which once heard are never heard again. In such cases no corroboration by the eyes or by other means of cognition is possible¹⁰⁹.

The Buddhist urges that 'if the cognitions are themselves valid, there should be no doubt, no suspicion, no misconception at all. Had every cognition been valid in itself there would have been no wrong conception which we experience. If the principle of corroboration by subsequent cognitions is not maintained there would be no definite knowledge, we will not be able to differentiate between right and wrong cognitions¹¹⁰. Further if all cognitions are inherently valid there should be no difference of opinion regarding the same thing among the various persons. But experience shows contrary. According to one person the validity of cognitions is always inherent and self-sufficient. According to another person the

validity of cognitions is inherent in some cases and extraneous in other cases¹¹¹. Further there is difference of opinion regarding the same thing among the followers of the same school. For instance there is difference of opinion even in the Mīmāṃsakas. After refuting the theory of 'inherent validity of knowledge, the Buddhist establishes his own theory of 'extraneous validity of knowledge'.

He maintains that the 'validity' consists in conformity with the real state of things and this conformity is known when the cognition is capable of producing effective action¹¹². For instance when the fire is seen capable of burning, cooking and lighting, we come to the conclusion that it is the real fire¹¹³. Kamalaśīla substantiates his position by quoting words of the Dharmakīrti to the effect that *pramāṇa* or valid cognition is that cognition which is in conformity with the things. No infinite regress infects the Buddhist theory of extrinsic validity of cognition because there is no need for further investigation regarding the validity of a cognition. The activity accruing from it is sufficient to validate or invalidate it¹¹⁴. As long as a cognition does not appear in its effective form, there is always doubt about its validity. When it is in an effective form or when it leads to an activity, its truth or falsity is certain. The objection from the Mīmāṃsaka to the effect that the initial cognition apprehends the same object which is apprehended by the subsequent cognition, hence both cognitions are subject to suspicion of invalidity is superfluous. Because there are many grounds of suspecting the validity of initial cognition for example non-cognition of the effect resulting from it, similarity with another object which is not the object of it, and defect in the sense-organs and the like¹¹⁵. But in the subsequent cognition there are no causes of misapprehension. So its validity is self-sufficient¹¹⁶. Kamalaśīla says that validity does not mean simply conformity with the real state of things. It stands for what actually figures in it¹¹⁷, The Mīmāṃsaka further alleges that if effective action

is the criterion for the validity of cognitions, dreams will also be veridical. For effective action is present in dreams also¹¹⁸. The Buddhist waives aside this allegation on the ground that dream has no *locus-standi* in the external objects and hence is invalid¹¹⁹. He further says that for the validity of a cognition there must be three factors (1) absence of defects in the sense-organs and the intellect, (2) absence of invalid cognitions and (3) presence of excellence¹²⁰.

The final Buddhist position is that the validity of knowledge cannot be explained by any or all the above mentioned four theories. The validity may be sometimes inherent as in the case of mystic intuition, repeated experience, and effective action etc. Sometimes it may be extraneous as in the case when the sense-organ is defective or when the thing is at a distance or when the mind is disturbed. Kamalaśīla therefore, propounds a fifth theory to the effect that there can be no hard and fast rule which may be applicable to all the cases of valid cognition¹²¹.

5. The nature of Illusion

Dharmottara defines 'illusion' as the factor of knowledge which contains contradiction with the underlying essence of reality which possesses efficiency¹²². Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla take the term 'illusion' in the sense of inconsistency¹²³. According to Yogācāra Idealists 'illusion is an eccentric projection of a subjective idea into the external world ; it is purely subjective hallucination¹²⁴. For instance in the nacre-silver illusion the subjective silver-form of cognition appears as the form of an external object¹²⁵. The crucial question regarding the nature of illusion is ; 'are illusions purely mental ? Diñnāga holds that 'illusions' are purely mental. They have their *locus*¹²⁶ in understanding. They cannot have their origin in the sense-perception. Perception being non-conceptual does not involve any judgment. Illusions are wrong judgments regarding reality. Hence they must be conceptual or mental. He says just as there are fallacies of inference or logical fallacies of

reason¹²⁷, in the same way there are fallacies of perception¹²⁸. They are not perceptions. They simply appear like perceptions. These fallacies of perception are put on the account of senses whereas they are produced by the misconception of the intellect.

Dharmakīrti shares the view of Dinnāga to some extent but also maintains that there are illusions which are not mental but are caused by eye diseases, rapid movement, travelling by ship and disturbance of one of the three humours of the body, i.e. the gaseous, the bilious and the phlegmy¹²⁹. For instance a bilious man sees yellow conchshell instead of a white conchshell. He distinguishes between the illusions of senses and the illusions of understanding. There are some illusions which are purely mental. They cease when mental aberration or error ceases. For instance the vision of snake in the piece of rope ceases the moment it is known as rope and not snake. Had mental aberration or error been the sole cause of illusion, it would have ceased the moment mental error ceases¹³⁰. But there are illusions, for instance the vision of double moon, which never cease even though there is no mental error. Hallucinations and dreams are as vivid as sense perceptions¹³¹. They lack that vagueness and generality which is characteristic of mental conceptions. They are not mis-interpretation of a thing. If illusions are purely mental and are solely due to misrepresentation of objective facts, the absurd conclusion will result that hallucinations are right perceptions. Explaining the view of Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara classifies the causes of illusion into four heads. First some illusions are owing to defect in the sense-organs, e. g. floating hairtuft before the eyes. It is due to eye-disease, i.e. colour blindness. Secondly some illusions are owing to object of perception. For instance when we swing a fire-brand rapidly we have the illusion of a fiery circle. Thirdly some illusions are caused by the place where man is situated. For instance when a man is travelling by ship

he has the illusion of moving trees and running buildings. Lastly some illusions are caused by the disturbance of the psychical conditions of a man. For instance when the gaseous principle in the body is disturbed, deceitful images like that of a flaming post arise¹³². In dealing with illusions Dharmottara goes to an other extreme and says that all the causes of illusion whether they are caused by the defective sense-organ or by the object whether they are internal or external, invariably affect the sense organ, when the sense-organ is normal there can be no illusive sensation¹³³.

Śāntarakṣita endorses the view of Dharmottara and maintains that illusions are sense-born. They appear only when the sense-organ is there and cease when the sense-organ is hurt or annihilated. Thus for him hallucinations like hairtuft etc are sense born¹³⁴. But his view of illusion is open to certain objections. First, if illusion is there only when the sense-organ is there, mental illusion will be inexplicable, for it is present in remembrance and not in sense perception. Secondly, the argument that illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the sense-organ is inadmissible for, it is also found in the case of effects produced indirectly, for example in the case of the mule. Thirdly, the assertion that 'mental illusion' ceases on reflection is also inadmissible because generic ideas of things like 'jar' etc do not cease at all. The explanation that 'when a man reflects upon the ideas of universals and the like they disappear on the ground that they are invisible or do not appertain to the specific individuality of things', is unsatisfactory because the same explanation can be given against the illusion of 'two moons etc which are held to continue even when mental satisfaction regarding their reality has taken place. It can be said that they cease the moment one ponders that they do not belong to the specific individuality of things¹³⁵.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refute the above arguments thus: Against the first argument it is urged that as

the vision of the double moon is not contradicted by the vision of one moon, so the former is the direct product of the senses. It is not a mental illusion. Further the statements that illusion is an aberration produced by the aberration of the sense-organ is not inconclusive, for there is no intervention by any unmistakable notion. Again the notions like 'entity and universals' come to an end when the person retracts them by his own wish. But in the case of the illusions like the 'hairtuft' etc there can be no retraction at will. Hence there can be no similarity between the notions of universal and the illusion of hairtuft etc. The argument of the opponent that in case of sense perception also cessation of cognitions can take place at will by closing one's eyes cannot be maintained, because sense-perception does not cease immediately after the appearance of a man's wish. His wish can close only his eyes, and it is only after the eyes have ceased to function that the visual perception ceases. But in the case of mental illusions it ceases directly on the wish of the man. In our actual experience when the eyes are set on a particular object, the object is perceived again and again even when there is no desire to see it. Hence the wish has no direct bearing upon the sense-perception of a man¹³⁶.

Kamalaśīla brings the controversy regarding the origin of illusion to an end by taking a comprehensive view of illusion. He says that there are four cases of illusion, which are place, time, man and circumstances¹³⁷. If the object of perception is at a distant place, it is liable to be misapprehended. The illusion of mirage is due to the misapprehension of distant sands¹³⁸. Some illusions are due to time factor¹³⁹. For instance in the darkness of night we perceive a snake in a piece of rope and are frightened, or we imagine the existence of a devil in a post. Sometimes the illusion takes place due to some peculiarity in the particular man. For instance the vision of double

moon or yellow conchshell is perceived due to defective sense-organ¹⁴⁰. Sometimes it is derangement of perceptive organs, which takes place due to love, hate, intoxication, madness, hunger, thirst and other similar circumstances¹⁴¹.

These causes of illusion indicate that illusion is by and large, related to perception. Professor Stcherbatsky rightly says that though it is true that the senses do not judge, they contain no judgment at all, neither right nor wrong one, but the senses being in abnormal condition can influence the faculty of judgment and lead the understanding astray¹⁴².

The Buddhist theory of illusion and error is akin to that of Kant's. 'The senses cannot err, because there is in them no judgment at all, whether true or false. Sensibility if subjected to the understanding, as the object on which it exercises its function, is the source of real knowledge, but sensibility if it influences the action of the understanding itself and leads it on to a judgment, is (can be) the cause of error¹⁴³.

Is the perception of yellow conchshell a right knowledge ?

Among the followers of Diñnāga there are some who believe that the perception of yellow conchshell is a right knowledge, though it may be illusory in its form. The knowledge of yellow conchshell is derived from senses, hence it cannot be inference, and it corresponds to reality hence it is not incongruent but consistent knowledge. Even the illusory, knowledge is a right knowledge that is the reason that Diñnāga did not introduce the characteristic of 'non-illusory' in his definition of sense perception. For him, the illusion, ignorance, inference and error, all these have semblance of sense perception. Hence it is enough to say that right knowledge is non-conceptual and non-incongruent knowledge¹⁴⁴.

But is the knowledge of yellow conchshell valid ? Can our activities be successful if we proceed on the basis of this cognition ? Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla oppose such a presumption. Kamalaśīla says that the validity of a cognition is of two kinds (1) its compatibility with the appearance and (2) its compatibility with the apprehension. In the present case, i. e. in the cognition of yellow conchshell, the compatibility is not in accordance with the appearance, because what appears is yellow conchshell while in actual existence it is not yellow but white. In the same way there is no compatibility of yellow conchshell with the apprehension, because it is the yellow thing itself that is apprehended as capable of a particular fruitful activity, but in reality no such fruitful activity is found.¹⁴⁵

The argument of behalf of the objector that 'though the apprehended colour is not obtained, yet its shape is certainly obtained¹⁴⁶, is untenable because 'there can be no shape apart from colour'¹⁴⁷. It is argued that 'for the validity of any cognition we have not to look towards the form of the cognised object but be satisfied with the fact that it results in the fulfilment of the desired object', this argument goes against the assertion of Dīñnāga who maintains that 'the definite cognition of a thing is in the form of the thing'¹⁴⁸. If there is no consistency on the basis of fruitful activity, why there is consistency between the apprehension of yellow conchshell and its result ? According to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla the consistency between the apprehension of yellow conchshell and fruitful activity resulting from it is the result of impressions left on the mind by previous apprehensions of white conchshell¹⁴⁹. Actually what takes place is this that we have perceived many times a white conchshell and the purpose for which it is used. Hence even when we become diseased we have those previous impressions in our mind and act upon that very basis without thinking that it is yellow conchshell or white conchshell.

6. Kinds of Illusion

Asaṅga enumerates five kinds of illusion. (1) The illusion of substance¹⁵⁰. The apprehension of water in a desert. (2) The illusion of number¹⁵¹. The apprehension of double moon by the man of a dim light. (3) The illusion of order¹⁵². The vision of moving circle in a fire brand. (4) The illusion of colour¹⁵³. The vision of yellow colour by a man suffering from jaundice. (5) The illusion of motion¹⁵⁴. When a man travelling by a train sees that the trees are running.

These five kinds of illusion may be conceptual or perceptual. They are conceptual¹⁵⁵ when the mind of a man has attachment in those five kinds of illusory objects. They are perceptual¹⁵⁶ when the apprehending capacity of the man has become so confused that he has desire, attachment, and infatuation in those illusory objects. According to Diṅnāga there are four kinds of illusion¹⁵⁷. (1) Illusion proper—Fatamorgana is an example of this kind of illusion. Here the intellect mistakes the rays of light for the atoms of sand in a desert. (2) Transcendental illusion—According to it, all empirical knowledge is nothing but an illusion. We superimpose objective reality on things which are nothing but image of our intellect, creation of our imagination. (3) Inferential knowledge—All knowledge derived from inference is nothing but illusion. The knowledge of fire from the knowledge of smoke is an illusion. All judgments are mnemonic, though they are wrongly given the form of perceptual judgments. In the words of Diṅnāga himself 'all the fabric of the empirical world, this inter connected whole of substances and their attributes and the inferential knowledge founded upon it, is a construction of our mind and does not adequately represent external reality. Hence it is an illusion¹⁵⁸ (4) Taimira jñāna—It is that knowledge which result from some defect in the sense-organ as the vision of yellow conchshell. Kamalaśīla explains the

word 'taimira' for 'ignorance¹⁵⁹ as well as for the knowledge arising from defective sense organ¹⁶⁰. Jinendrabuddhi also uses it in both the senses. Dharmakīrti also enumerates the above mentioned four kinds of illusion of perception¹⁶¹. According to him the first three cannot be included in perception because they proceed from the wrong interpretation by the understanding¹⁶². The fourth that is 'taimira jñāna' also cannot be included under perception because it results from defective sense organ.

Professor Stcherbatsky Summing up the position of Dīñnāga and Dharmakīrti says that they are perfectly aware that error is produced by a wrong interpretation of the sense-datum by the intellect. If still they consider that perception is 'non-illusiv' it is probably because they like Kant think that though sensibility is the source of the real knowledge, but 'sensibility' if it influences the action of the understanding itself and leads it on to a judgment may become an indirect cause of error.¹⁶³

7. The Idealistic theory of illusion

According to the idealist theory of self-apprehension the entire world is an illusion. It is a reflex or a thought-image. Nothing is real except consciousness¹⁶⁴ or mind¹⁶⁵. Just as a man with defective sense-organs sees the vision of double moon, or floating hairtuft before his eyes, or a moving circle in a firebrand, or the fatamorgana in a desert, or takes bubbles for crystals,¹⁶⁶ in the same way the ignorant man who has not attained to the absolute wisdom,¹⁶⁷ sees the vision of diverse colours and forms and acts on the presumption that they are real. In fact all these various objects are illusive. They are projections of the mind¹⁶⁸ and appear as something external.¹⁶⁹ They are mere ideas and have not more reality than the objects of a dream, or images reflected in a mirror. They are like an echo reverberating in a valley or the goblin in a wooden post.¹⁷⁰ The subject and the object are the two pillars

upon which the phenomenal world depends. But actually these two pillars are the products of the mind. The mind exhibits itself in the form of storehouse-consciousness¹⁷¹ subject¹⁷² and the world.¹⁷³ Mind is the fountain head of all visible things. The diversity of things and the plurality of innumerable persons, in short the whole universe and its inhabitants are the creation of the mind.¹⁷⁴

Thus according to the theory the whole phenomenal world is illusory and has no existence. The projections of the mind are themselves apprehended as real. This theory reduces the objects of the world, e. g. cows, men, mountains and rivers etc which are the very basis of our activities to the position of the mistaken objects, e. g. a snake in a piece of rope or silver in a mother of pearl. It is known as the theory of self-apprehension¹⁷⁵ and has been attributed to the Yogācāra school of Buddhism by Maṇḍana Miśra Vidyāraṇya Mādhavācārya and other great Indian philosophers. It has been vehemently criticized on several grounds. First if the illusory cognition, e. g. of silver, has no external reality and is an idea which arises in consciousness we could say 'I am silver' instead of saying 'This is silver'.¹⁷⁶ Secondly, the distinction between valid cognition and illusory cognition is rendered impossible by the theory of self-apprehension and consequently there would be no possibility of subverting an illusory cognition by a valid one.¹⁷⁷ Thirdly, the illusory cognitions being forms of consciousness would be apprehended like internal feelings of pleasure and pain. Fourthly, the theory under discussion will imply the theory of mis-apprehension, because the ideas of consciousness are apprehended not as ideas but as something external. Fifthly, it will also imply the theory of wrong-apprehension, because the cognition of external objects has no objective basis apart from consciousness.¹⁷⁸ Lastly, it cannot explain the origin of illusory cognition.

Vidyāraṇya has further raised some insoluble difficulties which arise when an attempt to explain the origin of

illusory cognition, e. g. that of silver is made on the basis of the present theory. Is the cognition of silver in a mother of pearl, devoid of origination owing to its peculiar character or is it subject to origination? It cannot be devoid of origination because its emergence as an object is apprehended. If it is subject to origination as is experienced by us, it must be produced either by an object or by a cognition. It cannot be produced by an object because according to Yogācāra school there are no external objects. If it is produced by a cognition, is its production by a pure cognition or by a cognition due to a vitiated cause? It cannot be produced by a pure¹⁷⁹ cognition because a pure cognition brings Nirvāṇa. If we assume that it is produced by a vitiated cognition, there are only two alternatives possible. Either the vitiated cognition is the same originating cognition which apprehends silver or it is some other cognition. The first alternative is not possible, because the originating cognition and the originated cognition both being momentary, cannot take place at the same time. The second alternative is also impossible, because if silver is apprehended by another cognition, that cognition cannot be a cognition produced by a vitiated cause because there is no reason why a cognition should apprehend only silver and not some other thing? If it is maintained that the cognition which apprehends the illusory silver is produced by a vitiated cause, then that cause is either silver or not silver. It cannot be silver because in that case it would have causal efficiency and consequently it would have an objective reality which is denied by Yogācāra system. If silver is not the cause it cannot be perceived in illusory cognition. Thus the origin of illusory cognition of silver is impossible.¹⁸⁰ So the theory of self-apprehension is untenable.

The Buddhist says that all these questions arise from the misunderstanding of the theory of self-apprehension. The

ideas or impressions have been continuing from time immemorial in the form of beginningless ignorance. The illusory cognition of silver in the form of 'this is silver' is apprehended. It is not apprehended in the form of 'I am silver'. Hence the first objection that the apprehension should be in the form of 'I am silver instead of this is silver' is unfounded. Moreover, as there is no real 'blue' but only an idea of the blue, so there is no real 'I' but only the idea of the 'I'. "The 'I' has no separate existence apart from the discrete consciousness of 'I'." Hence 'this is blue' is not less justified than 'I am blue'.¹⁸¹ The second objection is also unfounded. The people are lying under the veil of transcendental illusion which is ingrained in their very nature and comes to an end only after the attainment of arhatship. This ignorance causes the notions of external objects. Hence valid cognitions based on external objects are possible.

Further all empirical objects are not on the same level. They are divided into two classes of purely imaginary objects¹⁸² which have no basis, and dependent objects¹⁸³ which have their basis in the ideas of consciousness. The former denote objects like sky flower, the son of a barren woman, the rope in a snake etc. and the latter denote objects like cow, man, table, mountain etc. The purely imaginary or illusory objects are entirely different from the dependent or empirical objects. Therefore, the sublation of illusory cognitions by valid cognition creates no difficulty.

The third argument is also unfounded. The existence of empirical objects is not denied till the cognizer attains arhatship. Hence illusory cognitions are not apprehended as internal feelings of pleasure and pain.

The fourth and fifth arguments also meet the same fate. The basis of misapprehension and wrong apprehension lies in self-apprehension because it is the ideas of consciousness which are apprehended in different or wrong forms. The

last argument of Vidyāraṇya falls to the ground the moment the force of transcendental illusion and its implications are realised. Thus, according to the idealists of Yogācāra school there are two kinds of illusions : (1) Empirical and (2) Transcendental illusion. They are also called *anubhava vāsanā* and *anādi vāsanā* or *avidyā vāsanā* respectively.

According to the empirical point of view the 'moving' tree is an illusion. The vision of mirage, the vision of double moon, and of yellow conchshell etc are nothing but illusions. In the same way the objects of dream which satisfy our desires and give us pleasure are illusions. But from transcendental point of view the visions of 'standing tree', of real water, of the rope, of the single moon and of the white conchshell are also illusions. Just as the objects of dream satisfy our desires of food and drink, so long as we are not awakened, in the same way the objects of the visible world also satisfy our desires and are real as long as we are sleeping under the veil of ignorance¹⁸⁴. The moment we reach the state of arhatship and realise the absolute reality the hollowness and unreality of the objects which are momentary and unreal like the foam of water, a lightning flash or vanishing clouds¹⁸⁵, is exposed. The stream of *Ālaya* dries up and the phenomenal world comes to an end.¹⁸⁶

Hence the entire world, all the subject-object relations, the feeling of doer and of doing, of apprehender and of being apprehended are nothing beyond non-dual consciousness. The internal consciousness itself appears as if it is something external¹⁸⁷. Only the unenlightened men believe in its external existence and not the wise ones¹⁸⁸.

We cannot apprehend reality in its true nature¹⁸⁹. What we know, is only through six sense-organs. Our knowledge is empirically true but transcendently false. For instance when two men suffer from the same eye disease, the one will say that 'this conchshell is yellow', and the other will accept

it. In the same way when one will say that the moon is double, the other will confirm it. They find their mutual knowledge consistent. But it is inconsistent with normal human knowledge and is therefore wrong. The treasure of our knowledge is limited to our sense-organs. If we would have possessed more sense-organs our knowledge would have been different. If we would have possessed an intelligible non-sensuous intuition which the saints and the Buddhas have, we would have become omniscient and would have possessed true knowledge.

Explaining the theory of self-apprehension Buddhists hold that every object is produced by an aggregate of four causes : co-operating causes¹⁹⁰, dominant cause¹⁹¹, immediate cause¹⁹² and external cause¹⁹³. That which is produced by an aggregate of four causes is real and that which is not produced by any or all of them is unreal. The object of illusion has none of these causes. Hence it is unreal. The Yogācāra view of illusion can be explained with the help of the stock example of the illusion of silver in the mother of pearl. The illusion of silver cannot be produced by the co-operating cause which is light in the present case, because light is the cause of distinctness of perception. Nor can it be produced by the dominant cause which is the visual sense-organ in the present case, because it is the cause of the visual character of perception only and cannot account for the particular nature of silver. The immediate cause which is the preceding cognition cannot explain the vision of silver because the preceding cognition may be of entirely different nature, e.g. that of a jar. The external cause too cannot explain the vision of silver for according to Yogācāra idealists there is no external object. The Yogācāras hold that illusory cognition is produced by Vāsanā which arises in the beginningless series of transcendental illusion. For example the illusion of silver in the mother of pearl is produced by the impression of silver which arises in the beginningless series of transcendental illusion or ignorance and

is produced by an earlier impression of silver, and so on. Thus the cognition of silver is the result of a beginningless series of impressions of silver. This beginningless series of impressions is purely subjective. Thus illusion is not produced by an external object in contact with sense-organs. It is a subjective notion which is a projection of our mind¹⁹⁴. The internal force which creates the illusion of the external world may be compared with the Māyā of the Vedāntins. It is the force of transcendental illusion and impregnates or perfumes every object¹⁹⁵.

Dr. C. D. Sharma endorsing the view of Vācaspati Miśra rightly says that the Yogācāra idealists are not ātmakhyātivādins but, like the Vedāntins are anirvacanīya-Khyātivādins. For the idealists, illusion is an indescribable superimposition which does not really affect the ground and is contradicted only by superior wisdom¹⁹⁶. For instance the cognition of silver cannot be said to be real as it is contradicted later on. It cannot be regarded as unreal because as long as it is not contradicted by a subsequent cognition it remains the cognition of silver and prompts men to activity. It cannot be described either as real or unreal. Hence it is indescribable. The transcendental illusion or Avidyā performs a double function, positive and negative, in creating the illusion of silver in a mother of pearl. First, it covers¹⁹⁷ the character of the mother of pearl, and secondly it projects silver on it.

Hence in every illusory cognition the transcendental illusion or Avidyā with the help of the process of concealment and superimposition creates an illusory cognition which is contradicted by a higher knowledge¹⁹⁸. In the words of Jinendra Buddhi from the standpoint of thisness there is no difference between the subject and the object at all. Hampered as we are by transcendental illusion we perceive only a core of reality. All that we know is exclusively the appearance of reality presented into the duality of the subject

and the object and not in its true sense. Just as when our faculty of vision is blurred by magical show, disease, love or hatred etc, we mistake separate bodies of elephants and other animals for lumps of clay, and just as the vision of fatamorgana is seen in a desert and small things seem to be large, in the same way our consciousness appears in the dual forms of subject and object due to transcendental illusion.

The objector may argue that the explanation is not satisfactory as persons whose vision is not hampered by magic, disease or delusion, and who apprehend things at hand, have the apprehension of subject and object. To this Jinendra Buddhi replies that transcendental illusion exhibits the essentially non-differentiated consciousness into its grasping and grasped aspect¹⁹⁹.

The opponents object to the doctrine of transcendental illusion on the ground that it reduces the entire world to an illusion and the real objects of our daily life have no better position than a sky-flower or the son of a barren woman. The idealists reply that the objection is based on a misapprehension of their doctrine. The doctrine of transcendental illusion does not mean that the world is a vacuity or a mere zero. It simply means that the objects cannot be described as existent or non-existent. They fall beyond the categories of our understanding and therefore they are described as illusion. In reality they are indescribable²⁰⁰.

REFERENCES

1. Avisarṇvādikaṁ jñānaṁ samyag-jñānam. Nyāyabinduṭīkā p. 4 line 6. Avīsarṇvādi jñānaṁ, pramāṇam Pramāṇa-vārtika. 2: 1.
2. Prāpakarṇ jñānaṁ pramāṇam. Nyāyabinduṭīkā Vijñānamapi svayaṁ pradarśitam arthaṁ prāpyat sarṇvādakam uccyate. Ibid p 4 line 7.

3. Avisarṇvāditvaṃ cābhimatārtha kriyāsamarthārtha-prāpaṇa śaktikatvaṃ na tu prāpaṇameva pratibandhāti sarṇbhavāt. Tattvasarṇgraha-pañjikā p. 329 line 7.
4. Dvididhaṃ samyag-jñānaṃ, pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca. Nyāyabindu 1. 2-3. Dvididhaṃ ca samyag-jñānam arthakriyanirbhāsaṃ, arthakriyā-samarthe ca pravartakam. Nyāyabinduṭīkā p. 6 line 2-3.
5. Pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca pramāṇaṃ hi dvilakṣaṇam. Prameyaṃ tatprayogārthaṃ na pramāṇāntaraṃ bhavet. Pramāṇa-samuccaya. 1. 2.
6. Arthakriyā-samarthavastu-pradarśakaṃ samyagjñānam. Nyāyabinduṭīkā p. 4 lines 8-9.
7. Arthakriyārthibhiś cārtha-kriyā-samarthārtha prāpti-nimittaṃ jñānaṃ mṛgyate. Ibid. p. 5 line 7.
8. Arthakriyā-samarthaṃ vastu. Tattva-sarṇgraha verse 1675:
9. Arthakriyāniṣpattiḥ. Pramāṇavārtika 2. 1. p. 4.
10. Arthasya dāhapākādeḥ kriyāniṣpattiḥ tasyaḥ sthitiḥ avicalanaṃ avisarṇvādanāṃ vyavasthā vā. Sā cārthakriyā-bhāvinī na tatkale. Pramāṇavārtikālakāra p. 4 lines 2-3.
11. Anadhigatārthādhiganṭṛ prathamam avisarṇvādi jñānaṃ pramāṇam. Buddhist logic vol 1 p. 64.
12. Yenaiva hi jñānena prathamam adhigatorthaḥ tat anadhigata-viśayaṃ pramāṇam. Nyāyabinduṭīkā p. 4 lines 13-14.
13. Pratyabhijñā.
14. Pramāṇasamuccaya 1.3.
15. Svalakṣaṇa.
16. Pratibhāsa.
17. Anabhilāpya.
18. Pramāṇaṃ svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ bādha-vivarjitam. Nyāyāvatāra.
19. Yatra prayatnenāviśyamāṇopi kāraṇadoṣo bādhakajñānaṃ vā nopalabhyate tat pramāṇam. Śāstradīpikā p. 50.

20. Arthakriyā-svarūpasya niścitasyāvabodhanāt. Jñānaṁ pramāṇaṁ tādātmya-tadutpatti-prabhāvataḥ. Pramāṇavārtikālakāra. Pramāṇasiddhiḥ verse 205.
21. Anadhigatārtha-adhigantṛ pramāṇam.
22. Sādhakatamaṁ jñānasya kāraṇaṁ pramāṇam.
23. Deśakālasvabhāvānanugataṁ sarvato-vyāvṛttaṁ, svalakṣaṇaṁ kṣaṇam.
24. Buddhist logic vol 1 p. 73.
25. Pramāṇa-vārtika verses 63-64.
26. Yukti.
27. Saṁbhava.
28. Aitihya.
29. Pratibhā.
30. Abhāva.
31. Uccyate na dyayād anyat pramāṇam upapadyate. Pramāṇalakṣaṇāyogad yoge cāntargamādiha. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1488.
32. Śābha-jñānādasannikṣṭertha-jñānaṁ śābdam iti. Mīmāṁsābhāṣya 1. 1-5 Quoted in Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 434 line 3.
33. Tattva-saṁgraha, verses 1489-1491.
34. Apauruṣeya-śabda-janitam pratyayit-puruṣa-vākyajaṁ ca tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 434 line 5.
35. Tattva-saṁgraha, verse 1501.
36. Tattva-saṁgraha. verse 1503.
37. Āptavākyāvisaiṁvāda-sāmānyād anumānatā. Pramāṇa-samuccaya ch. 2. quoted in 'A History of Indian logic' p. 288 and also in Fragments from Diṅnāga p. 17.
38. Āptopadeśa iti kim āptānām avisaiṁvāditvaṁ vā pratipadyate, ahośvid arthasya tathā-bhāva iti. Yadyāptānām avisaiṁvāditvaṁ pratipadyate tad anumānāt arthasya tathābhāvaḥ so'pi pratyakṣeṇa yadā hyayam arthaṁ pratyakṣeṇopalabhate, tadā tathābhāvam arthasya pratipadyata iti. Nyāya-vārtika p. 63 13 Quoted in the 'Fragments from Diṅnāga' p. 17.

39. Pramāṇa-vārtika. anumāna ch verse 222.
40. Pramāṇa-vārtika. anumāna ch 1 verses 227-228.
41. Prāmaṇa-vārtika ch 1 verse 229.
42. Ibid ch 1. verses 242-243.
43. Apauruṣeya.
44. Ibid ch 1 verse 244.
45. Ibid ch 1 verse 248.
46. Ibid ch 1 verse 249.
47. Ibid ch 1 verses 320-321.
48. Ibid ch 1 verses 322-323.
49. Agnir himasya bheṣajam.
50. Pramāṇa.vārtika ch 1 verses 332-337.
51. Ibid ch 4. 6.
52. Pramāṇabhūtā.....pramāṇa-samuccaya l.l.
53. Saṁvādakatvāt bhagavān pramāṇam Ibid. ch 2.
p. 165 Tattvasaṅgraha verse 6. Tattvasaṅgraha-
pañjikā verse 1.
54. Upamāna.
55. Kīdrśo gavaya ityevaṁ prṣṭasya yad vākyam yādrśo
gaus tādrśo gavaya iti asya vākyasyopamānatvaṁ prasi-
dham. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā 444 lines 6-7.
56. Upamānam api sādṛśyam asannikṣṭe'rthe buddhim
utpādayati yathā gavaya-darśanaṁ gosmaraṇasya. Ibid
l. 444 lines 9-10.
57. Tattva-saṅgraha, verses 1526-1527.
58. Ibid. verses 1538, 1540, 1542.
59. Ibid verses 1536-1537.
60. Ibid verses 1557-1558.
61. Pratyakṣāgamābhyāṁ nopamānaṁ bhidyate, pramāṇa-
samuccaya Quoted in Nyāya-Vārtika p. 60. l. 16.
Na sādṛśya-pratītiphalam upamānaṁ pratyakṣād vāky-
ād vā vyatiricyate pramāṇa-samuccaya Quoted in
Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p. 135 line 14 see 'Frag-
ments from Dīnāga pp. 148-49.
62. Arthāpatti.

63. Dṛṣṭaḥ śrūto vārtho'nyathā nopapadyata ityadrṣṭa-kalpanā tad yahtā-Jīvati Devadatte gṛhādarśanena bahirbhāva-kalpanā iti. Śabara-bhāṣya on sūtra 1.1.5. Quoted in Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 456 lines 23-24.
64. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1592. Śloka-vārtika. Presumption verse 51.
65. Ibid verse 1588.
66. Ibid verse 1599.
67. Ibid verses 1600-1601. Ibid presumption verses 6-7.
68. Ibid verse 1602. Ibid presumption verses 8. 9.
69. Tattvasaṁgraha. verses 1645-1647.
70. Tattvasaṁgraha verse 1648. Śloka-vārtika. Negation 1.
71. Ibid verse 1649 ibid negation 11.
72. Ibid verse 1657. Ibid negation 45.
73. The problem of negation is given in detail in the chapter on negation see infra chapter 9.
74. Ibid verses 1667-1670.
75. Ibid verse 1671.
- 75a Ibid verse 1680.
76. Ibid verses 1662-1664.
77. Yukti. Asmin sati bhavateva na bhavatyasatīti ca, tasmādato bhavateva yuktireṣābhidhīyate. Ibid verse 1692.
78. Saṁbhava Tatra Saṁbhavaśca lakṣaṇayā sumudayaḥ; śaṁbhava-pratipattan samudāyi pratipattiḥ. Yathā sahasra-sadbhāve jñāte śatādi sattā pratipattiḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā lines 6-7.
79. Aitiḥya.
80. Tatrānirdiṣṭa-vaktṛkaṁ pravāda-pāraṁparyam aitiḥyam. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 484 lines 15.
81. Pratibhā
82. Anityata deśakālam ākasmikaṁ sadasatsūcakaṁ jñānaṁ pratibhā. Ibid p. 484 line 16.
83. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1700,
84. Ibid verses 1702-1708.

85. Pramāṇa-vārtika ch 3. 63.
86. Kadācidubhe'pi prāmāṇyāprāmāṇye svata eva iti prathamahaḥ, kadācidaparta eva iti dvitīyaḥ. prāmāṇyaṁ parato' prāmāṇyaṁ tu svata eva iti tritīyaḥ, etad viparyayaśca caturthaḥ. Tattvasaṅgraha-pañjikā; p. 745 lines 4-5.
87. Prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyam ubhayam svataḥ.
88. Prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyam ubhayaṁ parataḥ
89. Svato grāhya.
90. Svatojanya.
91. Paratogrāhya.
92. Idaṁ jñānaṁ pramā saphala-pravṛtti-janakatvāt yadyat saphala-pravṛtti-janakaṁ tat jñānaṁ pramā yathā pramāntaram. Quoted in the introduction to the 'Vibhramaviveka' of Maṇḍana Mīśra by Śrī Kuppū Swāmī.
93. Aprāmāṇyaṁ svataḥ prāmāṇyaṁ parataḥ.
94. Tattvasaṅgraha verses 2837-2838.
95. Prāmāṇyaṁ svataḥ aprāmāṇyaṁ parataḥ, sarvapramāṇānāṁ svataḥ prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyaṁ tu parataḥ ityāhur jaiminiyāḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 745 lines 1-2.
96. Na tāvad ekasyāṁ vyaktan paraspara-parihāra-sthitalakṣaṇayoḥ prāmāṇyetaṛa-dharmayoḥ sambhavaḥ virodhāt. Ibid p. 745 line 7.
97. Nāpi, vyakti-bhedena, niyamakāraṇābhāvān niścaya-hetva-sambhavāccā saṁkīrṇa-pramāṇāpramāṇa-vyavasthā-nābhāvaprasaṅgāt. Ibid p. 745 lines 8, 9.
98. Prāgubhaya-svabhāvarahitasya jñānasya, niḥsvabhāvatva-prasaṅgāt, Ibid p. 745 line 12.
99. Nahi paraspara-parihāra-sthitalakṣaṇayoḥ prāmāṇyetaṛayorabhāve rūpāntaramasya-śakyam avadhāraitum ityasaṁśayam asyānupā-khyatvam āpadyate. Ibid p.745 lines 13-14. Śloka-vārtika-codanā-sūtra verses 35,37.
100. Na tāvat parato' pramāṇabhūtāt prāmāṇyamāśaṁsanīyam, tasya svayam-evāpramāṇatvāt. Nāpi pramāṇa-

bhūtāt, tasyāpi tulyaparyanuyogena parataḥ prānāṅyā-
śanisāyām anavasthāprasāṅgāt. Ibid p. 74 lines
17-19. 'na hi svato'sate śaktiḥ kartum anyena śakyate.
Ślokavārtika-codanāsūtra verse 47 (second half portion).

101. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 2814.
102. Ibid verses 2821-2822.
103. Ibid verse 2827.
104. Tasmād arthakriyā-jñānam anyadvā samapekṣyate.
Niścayāyaiva na tvasyā ādhānāya viṣādivat. Ibid
verse 2836.
105. Ibid-verses 2841-2842.
106. Ibid verses 2843-2846.
107. Ibid verses 2861-2863.
108. Ibid verse 2898.
109. Ibid verse 2900.
110. Ibid verse 2941.
111. Ibid verses 2944-2945.
112. Uccyate vastusaṁvādaḥ prāmāṅyam abhidhīyate.
Tasya cārthakriyābhyāsa-jñānād anyan na lakṣaṅam.
Ibid 2959.
113. Avisāṁvādo'rthakriyā-lakṣaṅa eva, sa cārthakriyā-
dāhapākādinirbhāsa-jñānodaya-lakṣaṅā. Tattvasaṁ-
graha-pañjikā p. 778 lines 21-23.
114. Tadutpādād evārtha-kriyārthinaḥ pravṛthasyākāṁkṣā
nivr̥theḥ.....na ca tatsādhyarṇ, phalāntaramākāṁkṣitaṁ
puruseṇa, Yenāparamarthakriyānirbhāsi pratyayāntaro-
dayam anusarato' navasthā syāt. Ibid p. 778 lines 23-27.
115. Tattva-saṅgraha verses 2967-2968.
116. Ibid verse 2973.
117. Pratibhāsaśāddhi pratyakṣasya grahaṅāgrahaṅe
natvarthāvisaṁvāda-mātrāt. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā
p. 782 lines 12-13.
118. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 2980.
119. Ibid verses 2981-2982. Na ca svapne'rtha-saṁvādosti
sarvasyā eva svapnāvasthāyā bhrāntatvena. Tattva-
saṅgraha-pañjika p. 784 line 9.

120. Doṣābhāvāpramābhāva guṇabhāveṣu triṣvapi. Avaśyābhyupa-gantavyā pratītir niyamādataḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 3051.
121. Na hi Bauddhair eṣāṁ caturṇām ekatamo'pi' pakṣo bhīṣṭo' niyamapakṣasyeṣṭatvāt. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 811 line 17.
122. Abhrāntam artha-kriyā-kṣame vasturūpe' viparyas tam accyate. Artha-kriyā-kṣamaṁ ca vasturūpaṁ sanniveśopādhi-dharmātmakam. Tatra yan na bhrāmyati tad-abhrāntam. Nyāyabindu-tīkā p. 9 lines 6-8.
123. Abhrāntam atrāvisarṇvāditvena draṣṭavyaṁ, na tu yathā'vasthitālaṁbanākāratayā. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 392 line 5.
124. Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṅgraha p. 34. Quoted in Indian Psychology perception p. 287.
125. Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva Mīmāṁsā p. 102.
126. Adhiṣṭhāna.
127. Hetvābhāsa.
128. Pratyakṣābhāsa.
129. Tīrāśubhramaṇa-nauyāna. Saṅkṣobhādyanāhita-vibhramaṁ jñānaṁ pratyaksam. Nyāyabindu 1. 6.
130. Tattva-saṅgraha verses 1313-1314. Yadi manobhrāntiḥ syāt tato manobrānteveva kāraṇān nivarttetānivṛtte 'pyakṣa-viplave, sarpādi-bhrāntivat. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 392 lines 22-23.
131. Svapnāntikasyāpi nirvikalpakatvam asti, spaṣṭa-pratibhāsivāt Ibid p 392 lines 17-18.
132. Indriyagataṁ, viṣayagataṁ, bāhyāśvāyasthitam, adhyātmagataṁ vibhramakāraṇam. Nyāyabindutīkā p. 12 lines 3, 5, 7, 9.
133. Sarvaireva ca vibhrama-kāraṇair indriya-viṣaya-bāhyādhayātmikāśvayagatair indriyameva vikartavyam. Avikṛta-indriya indriya-bhrāhtyayogāt. Ibid p. 12 lines 10-12.

134. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1314. Indriyabhāve sati bhāvād indriyavikāre copaghāta-lakṣaṇe vikārasyopahatilakṣaṇasyopalāmbhāt tadanyendriya-buddhivad indriya-jeyam keṣaṅdrakādibuddhiḥ. Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā ; 392 lines 20-21.
135. Tattva-saṁgraha verses 1315-1320.
136. Ibid verses 1321-1324.
137. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 2876.
138. Ibid verses 2877-2878.
139. Ibid verse 2879.
140. Ibid verse 2880.
141. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 2881. Pramāṇavārtika 2.282.
142. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 160.
143. Critique of pure reason p. 239. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 160.
144. Pītasamkhādi-buddhīnām vibhrame'pi pramāṇatām. Arthakriyā' visarṇvādād apare saṁpracakṣate. Tattva-saṁgraha. verse 1324. Bhrāntasyāpi pītasamkhādi-jñānasya pratyakṣatvāt, tāthāhi na tadanumānam alimḡajatvāt. pramāṇam cāvisarṇvāditvāt. Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā p. 394 lines 18-19.
145. Tattvasaṁgraha verses 1325-1326. Prāmāṇyam hi bhavad dvābhyāmākārābhyām bhavati, yathā pratibhāsam avisarṇvādād yathādhyavasāyam vā., tatteḥ na yathā pratibhāsam avisarṇvadaḥ, pītasya pratibhāsanāt tasya yathābhūtasya prāpteḥ. Nāpi yathādhyavasāyam avisarṇvadaḥ, pītasyaiva viśiṣṭārtha-kriyākāritvenādhyavasāyāt, na ca tadrūpārtha-kriyā-prāptirasti. Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā p. 395 lines 1-4.
146. Yadyapi varṇo'dhyavasito na prāpyate, saṁsthānam tu prāpyate. Ibid p. 395 line 6.
147. Na varṇavyatiriktaṁ ca saṁsthānam upapadyate, bhāsamānasya varṇasya na ca saṁvāda iṣyate. Tattvasaṁgraha verse 1327.
148. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1328. Naiva hyarthakriyā' visarṇvāditvamātreṅākāram anapekṣya prāmāṇyam

kalpanīyaṃ, viṣayākārasyāprāmāṇya prasaraṅgāt. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 395 lines 17-18. Yathā yathā hyarthasyākāraḥ śubhrāditvena sanniviśate tadrūpaḥ sa viṣayaḥ pramīyat. Quoted in Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 395 lines 18-19.

149. Vāsanāpākahetūtthas tasmāt saṁvāda-saṁbhavaḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1329.
150. Arthakriyā-saṁvādastu pūrvārthānubhava-vāsanāparipākādeva pramāṇāntarād bhavatātyavaseyaṃ pītasarṅkhajñānasya vāsanā-paripāka-hetuḥ, śukla eva śarṅkhas tadādhipatyena tat-paripākāt. Tattva-saṅgraha-panjikā p. 395 lines 20-23.
- 150a. Saṁjñā bhrānti.
151. Saṁkhyā-bhrānti.
152. Saṁsthāna-bhrānti.
153. Varṇa-bhrānti.
154. Karma-bhrānti.
155. Citta-bhrānti.
156. Dṛṣṭi-bhrānti. Quoted in the Darśana-digdarśana p. 730.
157. Bhrāntiḥ saṁvṛti sajjñānam anumānānumānikarṅ, smārtābhilāpikarṅ coti pratyakṣābhāṅ sa taimiram, Pramāṇa-samuccaya 1-8.
158. Sarvo'yam anumānānumeya-vyavahāro buddhyārūḍhenaiva dharma dharmibhāvena na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣate. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭikā, p. 39. line 13.
159. Ajñāna.
160. Timir śabdo'yam ajñāna paryāyaḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha-panjikā p. 394 line 22.
161. Pratyakṣābhāsa.
162. Trividham kalpanā jñānam āśrayopaplavodbhavam, avikalpam ekaṅca pratyakṣābhāṅ caturvidham. Pramāṇa vārtika 3, 289.
163. Buddhist logic vol. 2. p. 19.

164. Vijñaptimātra.
165. Citta-mātra.
166. Studies in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra.
167. Samyag-jñānam.
168. Vijñaptimātramevaitad asadarthāvabhāsanāt, yathā taṁmīrikasyāsat keśacandrādi darśanam. Viṁśatikā. 1.
169. Yadantar-jñeya rūpam tu bahirvad avabhāsatē Ālambana-parīkaṣā 6. Quoted in Tattvasaṁgraha-panjikā p. 582. lines 11-12.
170. Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra.
171. Ālaya.
172. manana.
173. jagat. Triṁśikā 2.
174. Dṛśyaṁ na vidyate bāhyaṁ-cittaṁ citraṁ hi dṛśyate. Deha-bhoga-pratiṣṭhānaṁ cittamātraṁ vadāmyaham. Laṅkāvatārasūtra. Cittamātra verse 23.
175. Ātmakhyāti.
176. The first and the fifth arguments contain the objections of Prabhākara to the theory of self-apprehension. Jayanta has offered them on behalf of Prabhākara.
177. Nyāya-mañjarī p. 188, see Indian psychology perception p. 287.
178. Arguments no 2-4 have been advanced by Prabhāchandra a Jain philosopher in his Prameya-Kamala-mārtaṇḍa p. 13. see Indian psychology-perception p. 287.
179. Viśuddha.
180. Vivaraṇa-prameya-saṁgraha pp. 34-35. Summarized by Professor Jadu Nath Sinha in his Indian psychology-perception pp. 288-289.
181. The Yogācāra Idealism p. 63.
182. Parikalpita.
183. Paratantra.
184. Triṁśikā-vijñapti verse 17. Evaṁ vitatha-vikalpābhyāsa-vāsanānidrayā prasupto lokaḥ svapnaivābhūtam arthaṁ paśyan na prabuddhas tad abhāvaṁ yathāvan nāvaga-

82 The Problem of knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism

cchati. Yadā tu tat-prati-pakṣalokattara-nirvikalpa-jñāna-lābhāt prabuddho bhavati tadā tatpṛṣṭha-labhāsuddhalaunikajñāna-sammukhībhāvād viṣayābhāvaṁ yathāvad avagacchatīti samānam etat. Triṁśikābhāṣya p. 14 lines 16-18.

185. Tārakā timīraṁ dīpo māyā vaśyāya budbudarṇ, svaparṇ ca vīdyudabhrarṇ ca eveam draṣṭavyarṇ saṁskṛtam. Vajracchedikā p. 32.
186. Tasya vyāvṛttir arhatve, tadāśritya pravartate. Tadā-lambarṇ manonāma vijñānarṇ mananātmakam. Triṁśikā-vijñapti 5.
187. Yadantar jñeyarūparṇ tu bahirvad avabhāṣate. Ālambana-parīkṣā 6. Quoted in Tattvasaṁgraha-pañjikā p. 582 line 11.
188. Avibhāgo'pi buddhyātma viparyāsita-darśanaiḥ. Grāhya-grāhaka-sarṇvitti bhedavan iva lakṣyate. Pramāṇavārtika 3, 354. Triṁśikā 26. Yāvad advaya-lakṣaṇe vijñaptimātre, yoginaś cittarṇ na pratiṣṭhitarṇ bhavati tāvad grāhya-grāhakānuśayo na prahīyate Triṁśikābhāṣya p. 54 lines 14-16. .
189. Tathatā.
190. Sahakārī-pratyaya.
191. Adhipati-pratyaya.
192. Samanantara-pratyaya and
193. Ālambana-pratyaya.
194. Vidyāraṇya-Vivaraṇa-prameya-sarṇgraha p. 34. Summarised in Indian psychology-perception p. 287.
195. Vastrāder mṛgamadādinā vāsyatvarṇ yathā Nyāya-Kaṇikā. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. Isyate vāsanā-vidbhīḥ śaktirūpā hi vāsanā. Pramāṇa-vārtikā-lakṣṇa. Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 116. Jñānasyaiva hi śaktimātraṁ vāsanā. Nyāyaratnākara on śloka-vārtika-śūnya-vāda 17 p. 273 line 11. Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 116.

196. 'A critical Survey of Indian Philosophy p. 232.
 197. āvaraṇa.
 198. Vikṣepa.
 199. Pramāṇa-samuccaya vṛttitīkā l. 10. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 396.
 200. Sadasatpakṣa-vigata utpādabhaṅga-virahita na bhāvo nābhāvo māyā svapnarūpa-vaicitryadarśanavan nābhāvaḥ Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra p. 198.
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CHAPTER III

THE REALISTIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION

1. Introduction

There are only two sources of knowledge, perception and inference. Perception is called the direct means of knowledge, while inference the indirect one. The two means of knowledge are diametrically opposed to each other. What is direct cannot be indirect and vice-versa. Buddhists believe in the theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* or 'the limitations of means of knowledge'. One means of knowledge cannot enter into the arena of another means of knowledge. The spheres of both means of knowledge are mutually exclusive. There is no joint function of the two means of knowledge. Their processes are different and mutually exclusive. Their objects are different and mutually exclusive. What is the object of perception cannot be the object of inference and vice-versa.

The theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* is a great contribution of Buddhists to epistemology. Although many other philosophers have recognised perception and inference as the only two sources of knowledge, they have not recognised the fact that their spheres are mutually exclusive. They have held that both the means of knowledge function jointly. Their theory is called '*pramāṇa-samplava*' or 'coalescence' of means of knowledge. It is surprising that although they recognise the distinction between perception and understanding, they could not understand the exclusive and distinctive characters of either. *Pramāṇa-samplava* is a mistake which is as important in epistemology as the category mistake pointed out by Gilbert Ryle is in metaphysics. This mistake must be avoided. Russell, a contemporary British philosopher comes nearest to the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* when he advances the view that knowledge is of two kinds—'knowledge by

acquaintance' and 'knowledge by description'¹ and that their spheres are mutually exclusive. He has demonstrated the tenability of the Buddhist theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*.

Non-Buddhist philosophers could not distinguish sharply between perception and inference. Buddhists did so through their definitions of perception and inference. In this connection the definition of perception is of paramount importance, because it is the back-bone of not only the theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā*, but also of the whole of epistemology.

2. The definition of perception

According to Akṣapāda Gautam 'perception is the knowledge which arises from the intercourse of sense-organs with their objects, being determinate, unnamable and non-erratic'². The fundamental objection to this definition is that it does not mention even the special factor of perception that is 'manas' whose intercourse with the soul brings about the perception. Vātsyāyana³ tries to defend it by saying that it has enumerated only the special factors of the process of sense-perception and not the general factor like soul and 'manas' which are essential not only to sense-perception but to inference also. Further the Vaiśeṣika definition of perception which includes 'manas' has been accepted by Nyāya in toto, and the factor 'manas' has not been rejected or criticized. Hence it should be understood that it has been accepted. According to Vaiśeṣika philosopher Kaṇḍa 'perception is knowledge which arises from the intercourse of the soul with the mind, the mind with a sense-organ and the sense-organ with its object'⁴.

Diñnāga criticizes the above explanation of Vātsyāyana vehemently and says that the Nyāyasūtra has mentioned the eye, ear, nose, tongue and touch distinctly, but nothing has been said about 'manas', whether it exists or not. If the silence is presumed to be the acceptance of the existence of 'manas' why did the Sūtrakāra enumerate other sense-organs which are also mentioned in the 'definition'⁵. Hence

it follows that the Nyāya does not believe in the existence of mind (manas) as a separate sense-organ and the result is that the experience of pain and joy³ and sorrow becomes inexplicable.

Vasubandhu, the great Yogācāra philosopher also falls in track with the realists when he defines perception as 'knowledge arising from that (very) thing'⁶. In the words of Uddyotakara this definition means that perception is that knowledge which arises from just that thing of which it is designated as the knowledge and not from anything else⁷. In perception an object is seen with the help of a sense-organ. For instance a man sees a jar with the help of his eye. The jar has colours, length, breadth, voidness and many other qualities. The apprehender can know the jar only through these qualities. Thus the knowledge which arises in this perception is not the knowledge of the jar but of colour etc. Hence on this definition it is impossible to get the knowledge of the jar as such, because we cannot apprehend the jar as such apart from its qualities. In the words of Uddyotakara 'On Vasubandhu's view, such a whole as a pot would not be an object of perception because the knowledge, which is designated as knowledge of the jar is knowledge arising from colour etc. and therefore does not arise from just that thing of which it is designated as knowledge⁸. Further it is inconsistent with the Buddhist theory of universal momentariness. Buddhists believe in the theory of 'instantaneous being'. The object is the cause of the knowledge and knowledge is the effect of it. The cause precedes the effect, i.e. the cause has already passed when the knowledge arises. The object (the cause of knowledge) and its knowledge are not present at one and the same moment therefore its knowledge cannot be perception. In other words the knowledge would be other than perception because the reality apprehended and the apprehending cognition will not be simultaneous⁹.

The Naiyāyika commentators elaborate their definition by saying that perception is produced by a sensory stimulus,

coming from an eternal object, a cognition which is not an illusion, which is either an unutterable (sensation) or a perceptual judgment¹⁰. Buddhists find this definition defective. For instance, according to this definition a perceptual judgment 'this is a cow' is possible while according to the Buddhists perception cannot have any judgment. Because a judgment or a decision presupposes a distinct image¹¹ which is utterable¹² or in other words expressible by means of names but the object of perception has no power to amalgamate a sensation with a name, because names are neither appended to it, nor inherent in it, nor produced by it¹³. In perception a cognising individual apprehends a simple reflex but thinks that all the conceptual qualities of the mind are present in the object. He has two faculties ; the faculty of perception and the faculty of imagination. The imaginative faculty¹⁴ is mind's own characteristic,¹⁵ its own spontaneity. It has its source in a natural constructive capacity¹⁶ by which the general features¹⁷ of the object are apprehended¹⁸. It is so powerful that even in the perceptual process the cognising individual thinks that all the imaginative qualities are present in the object while they are nothing but the constructions of his own mind¹⁹.

In order to guard off against this mistake Diñnāga makes a radical distinction between perception and imagination. He defines perception as that 'which being free from conception is unconnected with name, genus etc', 'It is the cognition of the form of things which through the imposed identity of the qualifying and denotative adjuncts—appears as non-determinate, in connection with each of the sense-organs'²⁰. Dharmakīrti adumbrates Diñnāga's definition²¹. Explaining the meaning of 'perception' held by Dharmakīrti his commentator Dharmottara says that in its etymological sense 'pratyakṣa' means that the sense-organ is "approached" or the 'knowledge dependent upon the senses'. In its actual use it indicates the idea of direct knowledge. Therefore any

knowledge which presents an object directly is called perception.

Here an objection may be raised 'if by perception we take only that knowledge which depends upon the senses, only sensations or sensuous knowledge will be meant, and other varieties of direct knowledge such as mental sensations will not be included in perception. Dharmottara brushes aside this objection as irrelevant. He says that the term 'cow' is derived from the root 'go' which means 'to move' but in practical life it refers to an animal whether it moves or not. In the same way etymologically 'pratyakṣa' may mean 'knowledge depending upon the senses', but in practical life it denotes every knowledge which is direct and immediate²².

According to Dharmottara the definition given by Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti is not exhaustive. It enumerates certain characteristics of perception, e.g. 'non-constructiveness' 'non-illusiveness' and 'non-associableness' with name and genus etc. whereas the essence of perception is its nature of presenting an object directly²³. For instance, when it is said that 'sound is impermanent', this 'impermanence' is not the essence²⁴ of the word 'sound'; it is simply one of its characteristics. This view is also shared by Stcherbatsky. Against this view Vinītadeva and Kamalaśīla²⁵ hold that it is the definition of perception and not a mere enumeration of some characteristics. Vinītadeva goes to the extent of even reversing the order of the definition and maintains that whatever is 'non-constructive' and 'non-illusiveness' is perception.

According to Diñnāga the perception of a snake in a rope or of water in a desert is not a perception at all. It is a construction of our imagination. In the same way our perception which involves the association with name and genus etc. is not a perception. For instance when we perceive a cow and say that 'it is red' or 'it is black', it is not perception. It is simply a description of its general characteristics which are found in other cows as well. In perception we perceive a cow

which is a peculiar cow which has its own individuality, and which cannot be compared or contrasted with this or that cow. It cannot be associated with a class character and also cannot be designated by a name. It is a self-conscious process which determines the object and confirms to the unique individual nature of the object even without attributing it a name or a colour²⁶.

3. The function of kalpana

In perceptual process the apprehending individual is always confronted with a reality which is fleeting every moment. He has a glimpse of a series of discrete and unconnected extreme particulars. The moment he tries to grasp the reality, being momentary it becomes already vanished. He is therefore confronted with a difficulty. What is the use of that perception which is indeterminate and inexpressible²⁷ in words. If he has to make his perception of some use for himself and for the mankind at large, he has to devise some means by which he may be able to decide what he perceived. Kalpanā or judgment is the process through which the apprehending individual becomes able to decide what he has perceived. It is the process which synthesises the unconnected svalakṣaṇas into a connected whole. Dīnāga defines kalpanā—as the association with class-character, quality, action, substance and name²⁸.

The definition given by Dīnāga has been subject to a severe criticism. It is defective and inconsistent with the general position of his philosophy. According to Buddhists the categories of universals, action, quality, and substance do not exist. They are thought-constructions and do not possess objective reality. Being mere creations of the understanding they cannot be associated with a real object because association is possible only between two real things like milk and water or between two compartments of a train. Hence the association between the conceptual content and the universal etc. is untenable. If the association between the conceptual content and the universal, quality, action and

substance is maintained, the position becomes identical with the realists who believe in the objective reality of these universals etc. and thus the definition becomes inconsistent with his philosophy. Diñnāga is thus charged with looseness of expression or confusion of thought or perhaps both by resorting to this tortuous formulation²⁹.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla defend the definition of Diñnāga by maintaining that the definition expresses both the views of the realists who hold that conceptual content is always associated with universals as well as of the Buddhists who hold that it is connected only with name³⁰. Hence the realist view is to be rejected and the Buddhist view is to be accepted. The realist objects to the explanation given by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla by saying that it is not in tune with the explanatory note given by Diñnāga. In the explanatory note Diñnāga says that in the case of proper names like *Dittha* what is denoted is an object qualified by a name, in the case of common nouns like 'cow' what is denoted is the object qualified by the universal 'cow', in the case of adjectives like 'white', what is expressed is the object qualified by the quality of 'whiteness', in the case of verbal nouns, what is denoted, is the object qualified by the action, and in the case of words speaking of substances like *stickholder*, *horned*, and the like, what is denoted is the object qualified by the substance. This note given by Diñnāga proves that things qualified by the qualification of the 'universal' etc. are also separately denoted by words³¹. Kamalaśīla meets the objection thus—'The note given by Diñnāga is not inconsistent with his general position. Just as when proper names are pronounced, what is denoted is the object qualified by the name, so also in the case of words expressive of the universal etc. like 'cow' what is denoted is the object qualified by that name ; similarly in all cases objects are denoted qualified by a name³². The realist objects to this unnatural explanation of Diñnāga's explanatory notes given by Kamalaśīla by saying that it is inconsistent with the definition of perception

given by Dīnāga where conceptual content has been mentioned as associated with universal (viśeṣaṇa) and name (abhīdhāyaka)³³. Kamalaśīla refutes the realist objection by saying that this definition also contains the Buddhist as well as the realist view. He gives two interpretations of this definition. According to first interpretation it contains the Buddhist view as well as the realist view. Here he interprets the term 'viśeṣaṇa' or 'qualifying adjunct' for the 'universal' and the term 'abhīdhāyaka' or 'denotative adjunct' for the name. Thus 'perception' is free from the conceptual content associated with universal and name³⁴. According to the second interpretation it is purely a Buddhist view of conceptual content. Here the term 'viśeṣaṇa' stands for 'differentiation' or exclusion, and the word is the 'abhīdhāyaka' or denoter of this 'exclusion' and not of the universal³⁵. The epithet jātīyojanā or association with universal is an unnecessary addition to the definition of the kalpanā or the conceptual content. The Nāmāyojanā or verbal association itself is sufficient to characterise it. Even Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla had at least to admit that verbal association was alone sufficient to indicate the distinctive role of kalpanā. The 'association with universal' was added only out of regard for other's views which were widely prevalent³⁶.

In order to avoid this unpleasant controversy Dharmakīrti excludes the epithet 'jāti' from the definition of kalpanā and defines it as a 'distinct cognition of mental reflex which is capable of coalescing or being associated with a verbal designation'³⁷. This coalescence or association takes place when the denoted object and the word expressing it are apprehended in one act of cognition and it appears to the cogniser that both factors are inseparable part of one connected and inalienable whole³⁸. For instance, a man sees a cow with his eyes. At the stage of sense perception he is unable to decide what he sees. But immediately after this apprehension his cognition becomes expressible and he at once realises that the object seen was a 'cow'. Now this judgment that the 'object

seen was a cow' is the result of conceptual content or 'kalpanā.' The term 'yogya' or 'competent' has been inserted in the definition of kalpanā with a view to include not only those judgments which are expressed through the medium of words, and which are delivered by men of experience but also the judgments of new born babies who have not learnt to speak but whose actions have reached to the state of judgment and are governed in their execution by the conceptual content³⁹. For instance a baby sees his mother's breast at one moment, and at another moment he stops crying and begins to suck milk. This action of the baby shows that his knowledge is not free from ideation or conception even on the first day of his life⁴⁰. It involves the recognition of the breast and its synthesis with the past cognition of the breast. It also proves the fact that the actual employment of words is at best, symptomatic of conceptual thought and does not constitute its essential character. It may operate even in the absence of the employment of speech⁴¹.

A question may be raised that if judgments do not coalesce with words what certainly do we have regarding their nature of being coalesced with words ? Our certainty regarding their nature of coalescing with words is based on the fact that they are not limited to the fact actually perceived. The perceived fact or object is absent at the moment of our conceiving. The perceived fact could have produced a limited impression had it been present. For instance only an existing patch of blue colour produces a limited visual sense impression and not an absent one. The conceptual content is not limited to a distinct image and involves a synthesis ; that is the reason that it represent a vague, indefinite and blurred vision of reality and is not as authentic and reliable as the knowledge of the first moment of sensation⁴². Śāntaraksīta and Kamalaśīla follow the line of Dharmakīrti and define kalpanā as 'idea associated with verbal expression'⁴³. It is the factor which governs all activities and makes the business of the world possible. A man has always to designate a thing

with a name in order to communicate it to others. This process of constant associating of things with their names continues and leaves an impression or capacity in the minds of the people. It is due to the presence of this capacity that even an infant is capable of such activities as smiling, crying, sucking the breast and becoming pleased etc. even at the stage when he does not know how to speak⁴⁴. Even the realists who define *kalpanā* as association with universal, quality, motion and substance will at last have to admit that it is the association with name or words which is capable of giving meaning to their definition. In absence of the association with words it would be impossible to associate a universal or a quality with a thing. It is due to this reason that a man seeing a 'cow' or a 'stick holder' designates it with a special name before enumerating its several feature⁴⁵. Stcherbatsky supports the view of *kalpanā* enunciated by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla and observes that it corresponds to our judgment and more specially to a judgment in which the subject represents Hoc Alivid, i.e. something indefinite to be made definite by the predicate, a judgment of the form "this is that." The judgment 'this is Dittha' is name *kalpanā*, "this is a patch of blue colour" is *guṇa kalpanā*, "this is a cow" is *jatikalpanā*. This can be called the "epistemological" form of judgment and every judgment is reduced to this form. It can be also viewed as a construction, a division, a bifurcation, an imagination (*vikalpa*) etc. since every judgment suggests in its predicate a division of the whole into the predicate and its counterpart, e.g. 'blue and not blue' 'cow and not cow' etc⁴⁶.

Kumārila objects to the view that 'perception' is non-conceptual. He says men resort to activity when they know that a certain thing is the source of pleasure and a certain thing is a source of misery. This activity to achieve the object or to avoid it commences when there is certainty regarding the object that 'this is that'. This certainty cannot be secured from perception, for according to the Buddhist view of percep-

tion we cannot come to a judgment 'this is that' or 'this is a cow', because the object of perception is unutterable. On the other hand 'inference' cannot be a sure ground for the beginning of the said activity because before we begin to take any initiative on the basis of inferential knowledge we must have a well ascertained knowledge about the fact. For instance the inferential knowledge of 'fire' from the vision of smoke can be deduced only when we have perceived in our daily life that 'fire' produces smoke. There is no third sources of cognition in Buddhism. Hence activity becomes impossible, and if activity is impossible, the entire business of the world will come to an end⁴⁷

Kamalaśīla answers that the objection of Kumāriila is baseless. Though the perception is non-conceptual, still the activity is not hampered. It takes place thus—Whenever a sense-perception of something e.g. of 'fire' takes place, it takes place as differentiated from all homogeneous and heterogeneous things, and is also accompanied by the idea of the thing as differentiated from all other homogeneous and heterogeneous things. It manifests in that very thing certain positive and negative concepts as for instance 'this is fire' and 'this is not a bunch of flower.' Thus there arises certainty regarding that particular thing. Therefore there is no difficulty in holding perception as 'non-conceptual'⁴⁸. Further Kumāriila confuses between the objects of perception and the objects of understanding or inference. He is right in maintaining that activity proceeds from a piece of certain knowledge but he is wrong in holding that objects of perception can be certain or doubtful. The question of validity is different from the question of genesis. Perception generates knowledge. It does not answer the question of validity which pertains to the sphere of understanding. Objects of perception are facts. They are neither true nor false, neither certain nor uncertain. Facts are facts or sense-data. They are given. Objects which are constructed out of them can be either true or false, certain or uncertain. The proper Buddhist

reply on this basis to Kumāriḷa's objection is that although activity proceeds from certain knowledge, this knowledge is not perceptual. Activity proceeds from conceptual knowledge. Perceptual knowledge is the basis of this knowledge.

Buddhists themselves are responsible for the confusion of Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa. Because they have tried to add the attribute of 'abhrāntam' or 'non-illusivē' to perception. This attribute is responsible for the view that the perception cannot be non-conceptual, because the characteristic of 'nonillusiveness' is conceptual. If it characterises perception, perception cannot escape the charge of being conceptual. Here an examination of the characteristic of the 'non-illusiveness' must be made to ascertain what perception is.

4. Relevance of the 'Non-illusivē' or Abhrantam

Diṅnāga defined perception as 'a cognition free from conceptual content and unassociated with name, universal, substance, quality and action'⁴⁹. He dropped the characteristic of non-illusiveness from his definition of perception and thus deviated from the definition of perception given by Asaṅga who perhaps under the influence of the realists had inserted this characteristic of 'non-illusiveness' in his definition. The reason for dropping this characteristic was manifold. Diṅnāga thought that the adjective 'kalpanāpoḍḷam' was sufficient to exclude inferential knowledge which was invariably associated with ideal constructions, from the domain of perception⁵⁰. For him the entire empirical world, this interconnected whole of substance and its qualifications, and the inferential knowledge founded upon it, is a construction of our mind, and has no reference to an external existence and non-existence⁵¹. Therefore such constructions or judgments as 'this is a tree' or 'this is a patch of colour' do not come under the domain of perception, but on the other hand they are within the purview of indirect knowledge or inference. Hence it is unnecessary to say that perception is non-illusivē. It is also capable of

excluding errors and illusions from the category of perception; because these errors and illusions are never in harmony with facts, though they may be free from ideal constructions while the perception is always in harmony with the facts⁵². Thus perception being free from constructive knowledge and being harmonious with actual facts should by its very nature be understood to be 'non-illusive'. Hence it would be a useless repetition to call it non-illusive.

Jinendra Buddhi holds that an other reason for Diñnāga to drop the characteristic of non-illusiveness' was a desire on his part that his definition may be equally acceptable to the realists and the idealists⁵³. If it were added to the definition of perception, it would not have been acceptable to the idealists for whom the entire external world was an illusion. Further the term 'illusion' admits many interpretations. Its ambiguous nature might have created a difficulty for the entire system of Buddhist logic⁵⁴. Explaining the position of Diñnāga Vācaspati-Miśra says—the Buddhist logic is founded upon two diametrically opposed means of knowledge—sensibility and understanding. What is the object of sensibility can never be touched by the understanding and vice-versa. The object of sensation or perception is simple reflex, an indeterminate momentary sensation, while the object of conception or understanding is, determinate, enduring, decisive and universal. If we start on the above reasoning, the entire perception of every object as having body, property and quality would be an illusion. The perception of every extended body is a sense illusion, because it is never a simple reflex, and a simple reflex is never an extended body. Hence the unity of a body, the unity of various parts constituted by innumerable atoms is an illusion just as the vision of a forest from a long distance, instead of the vision of trees would be an illusion. If we declare these constructed judgments to be real, why should we not declare the moving firebrand, the double moon, the running tree and the mirage equally to

be real ? It was the reason that Diñnāga dropped the characteristic of 'non-illusiveness' from the definition of perception, because such a definition would have been suicidal for the whole system⁵⁵. Dharmakīrti, following the line of Asaṅga, reinserted the characteristic of 'non-illusiveness and defined perception as the source of knowledge which is free from conceptual content and is non-illusive⁵⁶. Dharmakīrti defines 'non-illusiveness' as 'not contradicted by that underlying essence of reality which possesses efficiency⁵⁷. For instance the water which does not quench our thirst is no water, nor the fire which does not burn our finger is any fire. It denotes the knowledge which is not at variance with the direct reality. Kamalaśīla takes it in the sense of non-incongruous (*avisarṅbādi*). According to him we cannot understand by it 'as having for its basis a form as it really exists', because if we take the second meaning, it will not be applicable to the Yogācāra idealists for whom no-real basis (in the form of external objects) exists at all⁵⁸. The term 'non-incongruous' means 'the presence of the capacity to envisage a thing which is capable of the intended fruitful activity. It does not mean actually envisaging it, because there are obstacles likely to appear in its actual envisaging'⁵⁹.

The question arises 'what is the reason that Dharmakīrti inserted the characteristic of 'non-illusiveness' in his definition of perception when it was dropped by Diñnāga ? According to some of the followers of Diñnāga, the illusions are purely mental perception being free from conceptual content, is non-illusive by its very nature. Hence the addition of the characteristic 'non-illusiveness' was a useless repetition. But according to Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla etc the addition of the non-illusiveness is necessary to combat⁶⁰ the prevailing misconception among the followers of Diñnāga who hold illusions purely to be mental. If this characteristic is not inserted in the definition of perception, illusions caused

by the desiesed sense-organs, e. g. the vision of yellow conchshell and the flying hairtuft before an eye, and the hallucinations will also become valid perception. Further all our knowledge is mixed up with conceptual content and therefore it cannot bring distinct knowledge of the thing⁶¹. Kamalaśīla says that even if it is granted that illusions are purely mental, still the inclusion of 'non-illusiveness' in the definition of perception is not superfluous. The purpose of inserting this characteristic is not only to include that perception which comes through the senses but also that perception which appears in the mystic intuition of the saint and which is purely mental. It also includes dream cognitions which are purely non-conceptual⁶².

The observation of Kamalaśīla is in line with the reading of Dharmakīrti who maintains that the experience or exceptional sagacity of the yogis is also 'non-constructive' and hence it is direct knowledge. This knowledge of the yogis cannot be regarded as synthetic because it does not grasp former experiences which happened at the time of the formation of the language⁶³. Thus the perception of Dharmakīrti is devoid of all the mental and sensuous illusions which are caused by colour blindness, rapid motion, travelling on a boat, sickness or other causes⁶⁴. It is the knowledge which is directly produced from undefective sense organs, is devoid of conceptual content and is free from all kinds of mental and sensuous illusions and is uncontradicted by experience. Summarily we may say that Dharmakīrti inserts the characteristic of 'non-illusiveness' in Diñnāga's definition of perception, in order to distinguish perception from illusion and hallucination. Illusions and hallucinations resembles perception but they are contradicted by their subsequent experiences and are incapable of producing any results. Perceptions on the other hand are different from such experiences. They are non-contradicted by their subsequent experiences and are also effective in producing results. These considera-

tions led Dharmakīrti to insert the attribute non-illusory, or *abhrāntam* in the definition of perception.

5. Appraisal of the Yogacara definition of perception

Of all the definitions given by Aśāṅga, Vasubandhu, Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti and others, the definition of Diñnāga is the most revolutionary. It is also in perfect accordance with Yogācāra idealism. The adjective 'abhrānta' dropped by Diñnāga is indeed superfluous and against the Yogācāra theory of perception and reality. Dharmakīrti's and Kamalaśīla's view on retaining 'abhrāntam' in the definition of perception is vitiated with the following mistakes. First—they mistake the role of inference in cognition. That is why they include dreams, hallucinations and illusions under perception. They are according to Diñnāga not perceptions. They are, like the cognitions of pots and trees, mental constructions out of *svalakṣaṇas*. Worldly objects are not objects of sense-perception. They are objects of mental construction. Secondly—the object of perception cannot be 'bhrāntam' or 'abhrāntam', valid or invalid. It is the datum. 'Bhrāntam' or 'abhrāntam' are the attributes of mediate or inferential knowledge. Thirdly—the discriminative adjective 'abhrāntam' implies that there is a perception which is 'bhrāntam' also. But this is not the case. Fourthly—objects of perception are like the impressions of Hume, matters of fact. They are neither true nor false. Truth or falsity is the property of judgments. Lastly—Diñnāga has been misunderstood by Dharmakīrti and Kamalaśīla. His opponents Kumārila and Uddyotakara have understood him correctly. They have refuted his theory of perception and maintained that perception is discursive. But their criticism does not answer the problem of sense data or *svalakṣaṇas*. They are either 'constructed' or 'given'. If they are constructed, then their construction will lead to an infinite regress, for they will be constructed out of materials which are also constructed. Moreover in

that case they will not be different from the objects of understanding, and perception will not differ from understanding. If they are given then the process of their reception cannot be construction. It should be radically different from construction. This appraisal of the term 'abhrānta' is partly supported by the observations of Dr. Satkarya Mukerji also. He observes that the introduction of the objective 'abhrāntam' was not made by way of improvement but was dictated by a practical necessity to rebut a prevailing misconception among a section of Buddhist philosophers, which perhaps on account of its volume and strength called for this amendment. Thus in his opinion the insertion of 'non-illusivē' was not a theoretical improvement. It was a practical necessity to dispel the prevailing misunderstanding⁶⁵. But Dr. Mukerji's finding that the insertion of 'abhrāntam' in the definition of perception was a practical necessity is also objectionable. The author of the *Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā-ṭippaṇī* clearly states that this insertion is in accordance with the demand of the external view of Sautrāntika philosophy and is not the internal view of Yogācāra philosophy, according to which the insertion of 'abhrāntam' should not be made because validity of perception is inherent and there is nothing which can be excluded from itself.⁶⁶

6. Proof for the existence of indeterminate perception

The existence of indeterminate perception has been a point of controversy among the different schools of Indian philosophy. The Grammarians, Rāmānujites, Vallabhites and the followers of Madhava hold that there is no indeterminate perception at all. The Buddhist, the realists, the followers of Sāṃkhya system and the Advaita Vedāntins hold that there is indeterminate perception. They adduce certain proofs for the existence of indeterminate perception. The experience of our daily life shows that there is an indeterminate perception. At the first moment of the

apprehension of an object when it casts its reflexes upon the sense, there is the vision of an object in its mere 'bareness.' We do not know what we apprehend? We simply know that we apprehend something. Only at a later stage when the understanding begins its function through the categories of name, universal, action, quality and substance, we come to a judgment that 'this is a blue colour' and 'this is not a yellow colour.' Sometimes we experience that our imagination continues its function even when our senses are engaged in the apprehension of an object. For instance, at the time of reading a book we conceive a story or at the time of perceiving blue colour our mind is walking elsewhere.⁶⁷ If there had been no indeterminate perception, the conception of the story or the conceptual walking would not have taken place at the time of reading a book or at the time of perceiving a blue colour. Because it is an established fact that the mind cannot fix its attention at two different things at one and the same time.

The indeterminate perception is an antecedent and indispensable condition for a determinate perception. The determinate perception involves relation between things already apprehended. It starts on the presupposition that there are some factors which are to be related. It gives name to the things which are yet unnamed. If there is no indeterminate perception which apprehends something, the existence of the determinate perception will also become impossible. It will have no material to work upon. It will have no ground for the application of the categories of assimilation and differentiation, analysis and synthesis. It is only after these processes that the intellect comes to decide that a thing is 'this' or 'that'.⁶⁸ Hence the existence of the indeterminate perception is a *sine qua non* for the existence of determinate perception.

The opponents of the theory of indeterminate perception try to explain the existence of determinate perception even

without the existence of indeterminate perception with the help of some extraordinary presumptions. First—there are some philosophers who hold that the perception of qualifications, e. g. substantive and attributes is also determinate. Hence there is no need for the presumption of indeterminate perception.⁶⁹ But if we uphold this theory we will be subject to an infinite regress. Determinate perception always involves the application of understanding. If we suppose the determinate perception of qualifications, we will further have to suppose other qualifications which help us to understand the first qualifications of the object perceived and thus the process will never come to an end.

Secondly, there are others who hold that the determinate perception of qualifications in past life causes the determinate perception of the present object⁷⁰. But this argument is too far-fetched and involves absurdity. The cause must be an immediate antecedent of the effect. Between the space of the past and the present life innumerable things take place, it would be difficult to establish a causal relation between the perception of the qualification and the qualified object. There is no instrument to know whether the cogniser was existent prior to this life or not. Even if he existed what is the proof that he perceived those very qualifications (e. g. jarhood etc) which are being related to the present perceived object (e. g. jar etc).

Thirdly, there are some other philosophers who hold that there is a divine cognition of the qualification (e. g. jarhood etc) and this cognition is the cause of our determinate perception.⁷¹ But this argument is fallacious. It presupposes two substrata, one for the cognition of the qualifications and the other for the cognition of the qualified object. In order to have perception there must be one substratum which is apprehender both of the qualifications as well as the qualified object. The cognition of the qualification, e. g. blueness by Yajñadatta cannot be

the cognition of the qualified object, e. g. blue lotus by Devadatta. Because the eyes of Yajñadatta cannot be the eyes of Devadatta. There is no other source of transmitting the experience of 'blueness' by Yajñadatta to Devadatta except through speech. And this speech cannot be regarded as perception. Speech is an instrument of describing what is given in sensation.

Lastly, the other view holds that the recollection of the qualifications produces the determinate perception of an object. For instance we remember that there is qualification like jarhood or blueness and when we perceive a jar or a patch of blue colour we at once remember the jarhood or the blueness and say that 'this is a jar' or 'this is a patch of blue colour'⁷². Thus the determinate perception takes place even without postulating indeterminate perception. This theory is untenable. Recollection presupposes perception. We can recollect only those things which have been either perceived through the senses or revealed to us from those persons, who have perceived it, not otherwise. The recollection that 'this is a patch of blue colour, takes place due to the fact that we have perceived in the past the blueness of the colour. We never say, that 'the son of a barren woman is blue colour' or 'the horns of an hair are very sharp'. Further if we hold that the recollection causes the determinate perception of an object we will have to presume the recollection of the recollected qualifications, and then again the recollection of the recollected qualifications. In this way our process will continue infinitely and we will never be able to perceive a thing. Besides, even if we donot remember the qualifications of a thing the perception will take place if all the factors necessary for the occurrence of a perception are present. For instance, if the perceiver, the sense-organ eye, the object and sufficient light are present, the perception of the object will take place.

What is the source of our knowledge regarding the

existence of indeterminate perception, the adherents of the doctrine of indeterminate perception are divided themselves—First, the earlier Naiyāyikas, Vaiśeṣikas, Mīmāṃsakas and Buddhists hold that the perception itself is the sole guide in this matter⁷³. Secondly, the Buddhists appeal to the experience of our daily life and say that we feel that there is an immediate apprehension of an object⁷⁴. Thirdly, the new Naiyāyikas hold that the knowledge of the existence of the indeterminate perception does not come through perception but through inference. The indeterminate perception is non-relational. If we hold that it is perceived we will have to accept that it is related to the self—the knower, and the moment we relate it with the self it becomes relational and ceases to be non-relational indeterminate perception. Hence the existence of the determinate perception of an object with all its qualifications presupposes that there must be an indeterminate perception of an object which has all these qualifications but which is non-relational at that time.

The new Naiyāyikas are logical positivists or empiricists. For them the existence of indeterminate perception and its objects is a matter of logical inference or analysis. The old Naiyāyikas and Buddhists are like old empiricists, for example Locke, Berkeley and Hume who regard the existence of indeterminate perception and its objects as a matter of perception. The controversy between old empiricism and new empiricism was thus first represented in India by Buddhists and Navya Naiyāyikas. Diñnāga represents the school of old empiricism which is sensationalism. Gaṅgeśa, the father of Navya-Nyāya represents the school of logical positivism. Perception is regarded as means of knowledge by both new and old empiricists. Therefore, old empiricists and Diñnāga and his followers are more justified than new empiricists and Gaṅgeśa and his followers in maintaining that the proof of indeterminate perception is perception itself⁷⁵. The discovery of 'Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa' by Diñnāga has been accepted by all Indian philosophers except Grammarians and the

followers of Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva. They have incorporated the theory of Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa into their theory of perception. According to them perception has two successive stages, indeterminate and determinate. The theory of the first stage of perception indicates that they have accepted Diñnāga's theory of perception. Their only difference from Diñnāga is that determinate perception is also perception. For Diñnāga, perception cannot be determinate. If it is determinate it is conceptual or inferential knowledge.

The controversy between the followers of Diñnāga on the one side and Hindu philosophers on the other side ranges round the problem whether determinate perception is perception or inference. Most of the arguments of Hindu philosophers are based upon the misunderstanding of the Buddhist meaning of inference. They have not taken 'inference' in the sense of imagination, conception or understanding. They have taken it in the sense of deduction. That is why the refutations of the Buddhist theory that the determinate perception is inference and not perception are vitiated with gross misunderstanding of the genuine problem. No amount of words can prove that the determinate perception is devoid of the construction of understanding or imagination. Hence Buddhists are on much better logical position in maintaining that the perception is only indeterminate and the so called determinate perception is not perception but imagination or conception. Their opponents make contradictory statements by accepting both indeterminate and determinate perception.

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2. Indriyārtha sannikarṣotpannaṁ jñānam, avyapadeśyam, avyabhicāri, vyavasāyātmakaṁ pratyakṣam. Nyāya-sūtra 1. 1. 4. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 426, A History of Indian Logic p 278.
3. Taccatanmantavyam ātmamahāḥ sannikarṣajam evānavadhāraṇa jñānamiti.....Ātmādiṣu sukhādiṣu ca pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇaṁ vaktavyam. Anindriyārtha sannikarṣajam hi taditi indriyasya vai sato manasa indriyebhyaḥ pṛthagupadeśo dharmabhedāt.....Manasaś cendriyabhāvān na vācyaṁ lakṣaṇāntaramiti. Tantrāntarasamācārād caitat pratyetyamiti. Paramatamapratīṣidham anumatamiti hi tantrayuktiḥ. Nyāya-bhāṣya 1.1.4. Quoted in 'A History of Indian Logic p. 278.
4. Ātmendriya-mano'rtha-sannikarṣād, yanniṣpadyate tadanyat. Pramāṇasamuccaya chapter 1. Ātmendriyārtha-sannikarṣād yanniṣpadyate tadanyat. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 3. 1. 18.
5. Na sukhādi prameyaṁ vā mano vāstīndriyāntaram, aniṣedhādūpāttaṁ ced anyendrirutam vṛthā. Pramāṇasamuccaya 1. 21.
6. Tato'rthād viñjānaṁ pratyakṣamiti. Nyāya-vārtika 1. 15 see 'Fragments from Diñnāga' p. 10.
7. Yasyārthasya yad vijñānaṁ vyapadiśyate yadi tata eva tad bhavati nārthāntarād bhavati tatpratyakṣam. Ibid 1. 15. see 'Fragments from Diñnāga' p. 10.
8. Rūpādibhya utpannaṁ jñānaṁ ghataṣya vyapadiśyate... na tato bhavisyatītyapakṣiptam. Ibid 1. 15. see 'Fragments from Diñnāga' p. 11.
9. Grāhya-grāhaka-jñānayoḥ yugapad bhāvāj jñānam apratyakṣam syāt. Ibid 1. 13. see 'Fragments from Diñnāga' p. 11.

10. Buddhist logic vil 2 p. 259 note 2.
11. Niyatapatibhāsa.
12. Abhilāpa-saṁsarga-yogyā.
13. Na santi sarṅhyogena, samavāyena, kāryatayā vā. Pariśuddhi. Quoted in Buddhist logic vil. 2 p. 259.
14. Utprekṣā vyāpāra.
15. Mānasam ātmīyam.
16. Vikalpa-vāsanā or vāsanā.
17. Aniyatārtha or aniyata-pratibhāsa.
18. Abhilāpasamānsargānapekṣam abhilāpasamānsargiṇam adarśayad vikalpavijñānaṁ vikalpa-vāsanotthāpitam aniyatārthagrahi mānasam ātmīyam upekṣālakṣaṇam vyāpāraṁ tiraskṛtya anubhava-prabhavatayā, anubhavavyāpāraṁ darśanaṁ puraskṛtya vartamānam anubhavatayā' bhimanyante. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭikā p. 88 lines 7-9.
19. Pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍhaṁ nāma-jātyādyasammutam. Pramāṇa-samuccaya 1. 3.
20. Yat jñānam artha-rūpādaṁ viśeṣaṇābhidhāyakābhedopacāreṇāvikalpakaṁ tadakṣamaṁ pravarttata iti pratyakṣam. Nyāyamukha, Quoted in Tattvasaṁgraha-panjikā p. 372, lines 25-26.
21. Dharmakīrti adds the characteristic of non-illusory (abhrānta) to the definition of perception given by Dinnāga, thus his definition runs as—pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam, Nyāyabindu 1-4.
22. Pratigatamāśritamaksam. Akṣāśritauvaṁ ca vyutpattinimittam śabdasya. Ananena tvalakṣāśritatvenaikārthasamavetaṁ artha-sākṣātkaritvaṁ lakṣyate..... Tataśca yatkiṁ cidarthasasakṣātkārijñānaṁ tatpratyakṣam uccyate. Yadi tvakṣāśritatmeva pravṛttinimittam syād indriya-jñānameva pratyakṣa mucyeta, na mānasādi. Yathā gacchatītigauriti gamana-kriyāyāṁ vyutpādito' pi gośabdo gamana-kriyopalakṣitam 'ekārtha-samavetaṁ gotvaṁ pravṛtti-nimitti-karoti. Tathā ca gacchatyagacchati ca gavi gośabdaḥ siddho bhavati. Nyāyabindu-ṭikā p. 8 lines 3-12.

23. Arthasākṣātkāritva, artheṣu sākṣātkārijñānam. Ibid pp. 8-9 lines 7-8 and 4 respectively.
24. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 15 note 2.
25. Tatra jñānasya kalpanāpoḍhatvam abhrāntatvaṁ cānū-
dya pratyakṣatvaṁ vidhīyate, sarvatraiva lakṣyasya
vidhyīamānatvāt. Yathā yaḥ kampate sośvattha iti.
lakṣyamatra pratyakṣaṁ, tallakṣaṇasyaiva prastutvāt.
Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 366 lines 25-27. **Tippaṇṭī**
p. 39 line 12.
26. Viśayasvarūpānuvidhāyi paricchedakam ātmasaṁved-
yaṁ pratyakṣameti. Quoted in the 'Fragments from
Diñnāga' p. 9.
27. Anabhilāpya.
28. Nāmajātiḡuṇa-karma-dravyakalpanā, nāmajātyādi yojanā
vā. Nyāyamukha.
29. Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux p. 284.
30. Heyopādeya viśaya-kathanāya dvayoktitaḡ. Parāpara
prasiddheyam kalpanādvividhositā. Tattva-saṁgraha
verse 1221.
31. Yadrcchāśabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo'rtha uccyate ḡittha iti,
jātiśabdeṣu jātyā gauriti, ḡuṇa śabdeṣu ḡuṇena śukla iti,
kriyā-śabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti, draya-śabdeṣu drav-
yeṇa daṅḡi viśāṇṭi. Pramāṇasamuccaya-vṛtti. Quoted
in Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 369 lines 23-25.
32. Yathā yadrcchā-śabdeṣu prayujyamāneṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo'
rtha uccyate, evaṁ jātyādi śabdeṣu gaurityādiṣu nāmnā
viśiṣṭo'rtha-uccyate ityetat sarvatra granthe yojanīyam.
Ibid pp. 369-370 lines 27, 1-2.
33. Yat jñānam artha-rūpādaḡ viśeṣaṇābhidhāyaka-bhedo-
pacāreṇāvikalpakaṁ tadakṣamakṣam prativarttata iti
pratyakṣam. Nyāyamukha. Ibid p. 372 lines 25-26.
34. Kalpanāvaiparītyena jñānameva pratyakṣatvena darśay-
atā jñānadharmatvaṁ kalpanāyā darśitam. Tathācāy-
amartho bhavati-Yajñānaṁ nāmādyabhedopacāreṇā-

vikalpakarṇ tatpratyakṣam. yat tu jñānarṇ tathāvikalp-
akarṇ tat kalpanātmakatvān na pratyakṣarṇ iti. Śāmar-
thyādabhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpaneti pratyakṣa-vaiparīti-
yena siddhyati, evaṇ parāpara-matasamgraho darśita
iti. Ibid p. 373 lines 3-7.

35. Yadavā viśeṣaṇaṇ bhedo yenānyāpoha kṛcchrutiḥ, jāt-
yādīnāṇ vyavacchedam anena ca karotyayam. Tattva-
samgraha verse 1238.
36. Abhilāpa-saṁsargayogya-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā,
Nyāyabindu 1. 5.
37. Ekasmin jñāne'bhidheyākārasyābbhidhānākāreṇa saha
grāhyakāratayā śīlanam. Nyāyabinduṭīkā p. 10
lines 9-10.
39. Tatra kācit pratītir abhilāpena saṁsṛṣṭābhā bhavati.
Yathā vyutpanna-saṁketasya ghaṭārthakalpanā ghaṭa-
śabdasaṁsṛṣṭārthavabhāsā bhavati. Kācit tvabhilāpenā-
saṁsṛṣṭā'pyabhilāpa-saṁsarga-yogyābhāsā bhavati. Yathā
bālakasyāvyutpanna-saṁketasya kalpanā, Ibid p. 10
lines 11-14.
40. Bālopi hi yāvaddṛśyamānaṇ stanarṇ sa evāyamiti pūr-
vadrṣṭatvena na pratyavamṛṣṭati tāvannoparatarudito
mukhamarparyati stane. Ibid p. 11 lines 4-5.
41. Buddhist philosophy of Universal flux p. 282.
42. Asatya Abhilāpa-saṁsarge kuto yogyatāvasitiriti cet.
Aniyatapratibhāsatvāt. Aniyatapribhasatvaṇ ca prati-
bhāsa-niyamahetor abhāvāt. Grāhyo hyartho vijñānarṇ
janayan niyata-pratibhāsarṇ kuryāt. Ibid p. 10 lines 20-22.
43. Abhilapinet pratītiḥ kalpanā. Tattva-samgraha verse
1214.
44. Atītabhavanāmārtha-bhāvanā vāsanānvāyat. Sadyo
jāto'pi yadyogāditi kartavyatā paṭuḥ. Ibid 1216.
45. Kalpanāyā yogāt iti-kartavyatāyārṇ, smitarudita-stana-
pāna praharṣādi-lakṣaṇāyārṇ caturo bhavati. Tattva-

saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 367 lines 21-22. Iti-kartavyatā loke sarvaśabda-vyapāśraya. Yāṁ pūrvāhit-saṁskāro bālopi pratipadyate. see Ibid p. 367 lines 23-24.

46. Buddhist logic vol. 2. pp. 20-21 Note 6,
47. Nanu ca yadyavikalpakam pratyakṣam katham tena vyavahāraḥ. Tathāhi'idaṁ sukhasādhanam, idaṁ duḥkhaśya iti yadi viniścinoti tadā tayoḥ prāptiparihārāya pravarttate. Kiñca anumānānumeya vyavahārābhāvaśca prāpnoti. Yathā hi anumāna-kāle avaśyāṁ dharmīdharmo vā pramāṇāntareṇa niścito gṛhītavyaḥ. Sa ca na pratyakṣeṇa aniścayātmakena niścito gṛhītuṁ śakyate. Nāpyanumānena anavasthādoṣāt. Na cānyat pramāṇāntaram astīti sarva vyavahārocchedako prāpnoti. Tasmād anumānādi-vyavahāra-pravṛttitolingād anumānabādhiteyam avikalpa-pratijñeti yaścodayāt te pratyāḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā pp. 389-390 lines 27, 1-6.
48. Avikalpam api jñānam vikalpotpatti-śaktimat. Niḥśeṣavyavahārāṅgam taddvāreṇa bhavatyataḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1306. Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham api sajātīya-vijātīya-vyāvṛttam analādikam artham tadākāra-nirbhāsotpattiḥ paricchinadad utpadyate. Tacca niyata-rūpa-vyavasthita-vastugrāhitvād vijātīya-vyāvṛtta vastvākārānugatavācca tatraiva vastuni vidhī-pratise dhāvāvirbhāvayati-analoyam nāsau kusumastabakādiḥ iti. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 390 lines 10-13.
49. Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham nāmajātyādyasaṁyutam. Pramāṇa samuccaya 1.3.
50. Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux p. 275
51. Sarvo'yam anumānānumeya-vyavahāro buddhyārūḍhenaiva dharmadharmibhāvena na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣata iti. Quoted in the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyatikā p. 39 lines 13-14. Mano viśayaḥ hi vibhrama-viśayaḥ. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti. 1.19.
52. Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux p. 275

53. Buddhist logic vil. 1 p.156 Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 392 line 6 Yogācāramatena tvabhrāntagrahaṇaṁ na kartavyaṁ Saṁvādakasya saṁyagjñānasya prastutvāt, anya-vyāvartyasyābhāvāt. Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā-ṭīppaṇī p. 19.
54. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 157.
55. Tadiyam abhrāntatā bhavatsyeva praharati itypekṣitā ācāryeṇa. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 194,17. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 158.
56. Kalpanāpoḍhaṁ abhrāntaṁ pratyakṣam. Nyāyabindu 1.4.
57. Abhrantam arthakriyākṣame vasturūpe, viparyas tam uccyate. Arthakriyākṣamaṁ ca vasturūpaṁ sanniveśopādhi-dharmātmakam. Tatra yan na bhrāmyati tad-abhrāntam. Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā p. 9 lines 6-8.
58. Abhrāntam atrāvisaṁvāditvena dṛṣṭvyaṁ, natu yathā'vasthitālaṁbanākāratayā. Anyathā hi yogācāramatena lambanāsiddherubhayanayasamāśrayeṣṭasya pratyakṣa-lakṣaṇasyāvypitā syāt. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 322 lines 5, 6.
59. Avisāṁvāditvaṁ cābhimatārtha-kriyā-samarthārtha prāpaṇa-śaktikatvaṁ, na tu prāpaṇameva pratibandhādīsaṁbhavāt. Ibid p. 392 lines 7-8.
60. Abhrāntagrahaṇaṁ vipratipattinirākaraṇārtham. Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā p. 9 line 8.
61. Spāṣṭapratibhāsā ca na prāpnotītyayam aparāḥ prasāṅgaḥ. Nahi Vikalpānuviddhasya spāṣṭārtha-pratibhāsītā, sāmānyollekhenaiva tasya pravṛtteḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 392 lines 23-25.
62. Nanu ca bhavatu nāma mānasam, tathāpyabhrāntagrahaṇaṁ kartavyameva, na hyanendriyajñānasyaiva pratyakṣalakṣaṇaṁ, kartumārabdhaṁ, kim tarhi ?, Mānasasyāpi yogijñānād eḥ, tatra ca svapnāntikasyāpi, nirvikalpakatvam asti, spāṣṭa-pratibhāsivāt, na tvabhrāntatvamiti tan nivṛttyartham, abhrāntagrahaṇaṁ yuktameva. Ibid p. 392 lines 15-18,

63. Sphuṭābhatvān nirvikalpakān, pramāṇasuddhārtha-grāhitvācca saṁvādakam. Ataḥ pratyakṣam. Nyāyabindu ṭīkā p. 15 line 15.
64. Timirāsūbhramaṇanauyānasaṁkṣobhādyanāhitavibhramān jñānān pratyakṣam. Nyāyabindu l. 6.
65. Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux p. 281.
66. Bāhyanayena sautrāntika-matānusāreṇa ācāryeṇa lakṣaṇān kṛtamityadoṣaḥ. Yogācāra-matena tvabhrāntagrahaṇān na kartavyān saṁvādakasya samyagjñānasya prastutvāt ānya-vyāvavartyasyābhāvāt. Nyāyabindu ṭīkā tippaṇi p. 19.
67. Pratyakṣān kalpanāpoḍham vedyateti parisphuṭam. Anyatrāsaktamanasā'pyaksairnilādi vedanāt. Tattvasaṁgraha verse 1243. Anena svasaṁvittyā pratyakṣataḥ kalpanā-virahaḥ siddhaḥ Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 374 line 9.
68. Indian psychology perception p. 57.
69. Ibid p. 58.
70. Ibid p. 58.
71. Ibid p. 58.
72. Ibid p. 59.
73. Ibid p. 57.
74. Tattva saṁgraha verse 1243.
75. Pratyakṣān kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhyati, pratyātmavedyaḥ sarveṣānvikalpo nāmasaṁśrayaḥ. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 123. Vikalparahitam pratyakṣān svasaṁvedanādeva pratīyate. Pramāṇa-vārtikālarikā p. 245 line 24.

CHAPTER IV

KINDS OF PERCEPTION

There are four kinds of perception¹. (1) Sense-perception, (2) Mental sensation, (3) Self-cognition, (4) Intelligible intuition.

1. Sense-perception

Sense-perception may be defined as the cognition of an object which comes into being through the functioning of sense-organs and which contains no conceptual element. It is the cognition which depends on the activity of the senses alone². Here an object is apprehended by the apprehender with the help of his sense-organs. He exercises full attention. It is the stage which is devoid of every kind of imagination³. After the sense-perception we begin to think that such a kind of thing, e.g. 'a patch of blue colour' was perceived by me, and a particular kind of image regarding that object begins to appear but such imagination had not emerged at the first moment of perception. The stage of first apprehension antecedent to the subsequent stage of imagination is called 'sense-perception'⁴. Hence the sense-perception is always regarding some particular which is bereft of all the characteristics of space, time and nature which the intellect imposes upon it after it has been apprehended by the sense⁵. Our sense-perception is regarding some particular. It cannot be expressed by words because the moment our understanding begins to encircle it within its categories, and tries to give it a definite name, it disappears being momentary and extreme particular⁶.

It is of five kinds :—(1) Visual sense-perception, it is the apprehension of an object through the eyes, e.g. the perception of colour. (2) Auditory sense-perception, it is the apprehension of an object through the ears, e.g. the hearing of sounds. (3) Olfactory sense-perception, it is the apprehen-

sion of an object through the nose, e.g. the smelling of fragrance. (4) Flavorous sense-perception, it is the apprehension of an object through the tongue, e. g. tasting of butter. (5) Tactile sense-perception, it is the apprehension of an object through the body, e. g. touching of an object with hand or any other bodily organ.

2. The nature of mental sensation

By his theory of perception Diñnāga has destroyed the unity of knowledge and created a gulf between perception and understanding. In his system an important question arises as to what links understanding with perception. Unless there is a link between them perception becomes meaningless and useless and understanding becomes illusive and futile. If the reality is inaccessible to understanding it cannot impart any good to mankind; again if the world accessible to our understanding is unreal, no good comes out of it. So there appears to ensue a crisis of knowledge from Diñnāga's theory of perception. But Diñnāga does not let this crisis creep in knowledge by his theory of mental sensation, which links perception with understanding. It is a psychological mechanism to avert the crisis of knowledge.

In the process of sense perception, at first we have sensations which are produced by particular objects, and at the next moment we have a mental sensation to the effect that there is something in our ken. Thus in the same stream of awareness there are two consecutive moments of sensation. First, sensory stimulation and secondly, sensations caused by the help of mind, i. e. mental sensations. They are related as a cause and effect to each other. Mental sensation cannot come into existence in absence of pure sensations. These two kinds of sensations have something in common. First, they are homogeneous because they are different moments of the same stream of awareness⁷ and secondly, they are heterogeneous⁸ because pure sensation is the product of the senses, while the mental sensations are product of the mind. The mental

sensation may be called in terms of modern psychology⁹ as the moment of 'attention', when after the first glimpse of the object the mind is fixed on the particular object. We may explain this phenomenon by an example. Suppose we go to a garden and see a rose flower. At first the vision of this flower will appear to the visual sense-organ (eye), immediately after it our attention will be aroused and we will try to apprehend what it is, and after this ascertainment we try to express this idea into words that 'this is a rose'. This second moment of our perception is mental sensation which is called also by the name of 'intelligible intuition'. The subsistence of this intelligible intuition is conditioned by the presence of the object in our ken. If we would have been able to have an intelligible intuition even without the existence of the object, we would have been enlightened,¹⁰ omniscient beings because to have intelligible intuition even without the presence of an object lies only within the capacity of the Buddhas. In the epistemological nomenclature we may call it a direct, non-synthetical, unique moment, which is called as intelligible intuition, but which lacks the most characteristic feature of being intelligible, in the sense that it is also unintelligible, and thus as unimaginable and unutterable as the first. It is therefore, half intelligible, something intermediate between pure sensation and pure conception.

3. The definition of mental sensation

Mental sensation is that non-constructive and non-conceptual inner knowledge which we possess regarding the feelings of the object¹¹. It is that form of consciousness which arises from the preceding moment of sensation¹². Mental sensation follows the first moment of every sense cognition which is thus its immediately preceding homogeneous cause. The latter co-operates with the corresponding moment of the object, i. e. with that momentary object which immediately follows the proper momentary object (of sensation)¹³.

From the above definition we come to know that there

are two consecutive moments in the same stream of thought, i. e. (1) pure sensation and (2) mental sensation. The first moment of this stream, i. e. pure sensation is called direct knowledge. Hence the second moment, that is mental sensation is also direct knowledge. It forms part of the same stream of thought, so it is different from the intuitive knowledge of the saint, which presupposes different streams of thought (different personalities) existing simultaneously at the same moment.

Some fundamental objections have been raised to the theory of mental sensation : First, the mental sensation is not a new cognition because it apprehends what has been already apprehended by the outer sense. Secondly, if mental sensation apprehends a new object, the blind and deaf persons will equally be capable of apprehending objects with the help of mental sensation though they lack physical sense-organs. Thirdly, it is a mere abstract idea. These objections have been brushed aside by Buddhist logicians. According to them first of all it is not right to hold that mental sensation apprehends what has already been apprehended by sense perception because the objects of the two are entirely different¹⁴. Further the objects of cognition being momentary, they cannot last even for two moments. Hence the apprehension of an already apprehended object does not take place. Secondly, mental sensation invariably follows the cognition produced by outer sense and pure sensation is its cause, the deaf and the blind being devoid of sense-organs cannot have the sense-perception (of sound and light respectively)¹⁵. Thirdly, the objection that both the outer and the inner sensations are equally the same is also not tenable, because mental cognition apprehends an entirely new thing which is not the object of outer sense. It begins to function when the outer senses have ceased to function. If we maintain that both the sensations of the outer sense as well as the inner sense are simultaneous we would have no pure sensation depending exclusively upon

the senses and consequently it would be difficult to distinguish between pure sensation and mental sensation. Fourthly, the objection that the mental sensation is an abstract idea is against experience because it shines clearly as a sensation¹⁶.

Some persons have argued that the mental sensation is not sense produced, it is entirely internal, because its function begins when the senses have ceased to function. Hence its object of cognition is an internal fact. Vācaspati Miśra objects to this argument and says that it is not well founded. Mental sensation is not intent upon the first moment of pure sensation but it is intent upon the second moment of sensation which immediately follows the first moment of pure sensation caused by the object moment¹⁷. In the Nyāya-bindu ṭikā-ṭippaṇī we find another argument against the definition of mental sensation¹⁸. If the organ of sight operates, why does indeed the same sensation not arise at the second moment, and how is it that both are not called sensations of the outer sense ? Further if mental sensation is really something different from pure sensation, this must be proved by positive facts, i.e. by observation, experiment or some other proof. Confronted with such arguments Dharmottara quotes Buddha vacana in support of his thesis which says that 'colour is apprehended in two ways, by the sense of vision and by the internal sense evoked by the external one'¹⁹.

Dharmakīrti says 'if we maintain that mental sensation apprehends what has already been apprehended, it will lose its validity as a means of right cognition because it does not apprehend a new object, which has not been known till the moment ; if on the other hand we maintain that it apprehends entirely new thing which was not apprehended by the senses till that moment, we will come to the absurd position that there will be no blind and deaf persons because even in absence of outer sense-organs they will be able to apprehend colour and sound with the help of mental organ. Hence the only correct view regarding mental cognition is that it appre-

hends the next moment which immediately follows the preceding moment of pure sensation'²⁰.

4. Is mental sensation momentary?

In Buddhism 'what is real is momentary'²¹. The mental sensation is not an exception to this fundamental principle, one of the three gems of Buddhism. Jam yan tshadpa gives an argument in order to explain why he believes that 'mental sensation is momentary'. He says if we do not believe in the momentariness of the mental sensation, some absurd consequences will follow which will shake the very foundation of the critical philosophy which is based on the sharp distinction between sensibility and understanding. If mental sensation continues for more than a moment we will have a clear image by the force of simple reflex of the object and there will be no possibility of illusion or image and all knowledge will be valid automatically. Hence there will be no such judgment that 'this is not right'. Consequently every one of us will become omniscient, apprehender of all truth and infallible²². But such an assumption is unwarranted by experience, because in experience we have wrong knowledge, wrong judgment. We have illusions, e.g. the vision of snake in a piece of rope, the vision of double moon, a fatamorgana and the like, which are in direct contravention to the qualities of omniscience and infallibility. Therefore we have to believe that it is momentary. The above view of the great Lama is supported by Dharmakīrti²³, who maintains that perception (which includes mental sensation) apprehends simple reflexes. It does not provide definite knowledge of any object.

5. Kinds of mental sensation

Corresponding with the five sense-organs it has been classified under five groups²⁴—(1) Mental sensation grasping colour and lines. (2) Mental sensation grasping sounds. (3) Olfactory mental sensation. (4) Flavorous mental sensation and (5) Tactile mental sensation.

6. Theories of mental sensation

The very basis of Diñnāga's doctrine of mental sensation as a link between two absolutely dissimilar things of pure sensation and empirical knowledge is challenged. The question is : 'How do we know that the mental sensation is the second moment which follows immediately the preceding moment of pure sensation ? What is the basis of our presumption that there is no mental sensation at the moment of pure sensation ? What would be the harm if we assume the simultaneous existence of pure sensation and mental sensation, or if we assume the mental sensation as the preceding condition of all our perception ? Four explanations have been given to solve this problem. Consequently four theories are developed. They are :—(1) Substitute theory of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara (2) Alternation theory of Prajñākara Gupta (3) Simultaneity theory of Śaṅkarānanda and (4) Admixture theory of Jñānagarbha,

(1) Substitute theory—

According to this theory there are two worlds of our knowledge entirely heterogeneous and dissimilar to each other. First, the world of sensation which results from the direct perception of the external objects through the senses, and Secondly, the world of understanding which gives shape to the indefinite knowledge produced by external object by forming such judgments, e.g. 'this is a patch of blue colour' etc. In the process of perception at the first moment we have the vision of reality through our sense-organs which arises directly from the particular object. In the next moment when the sense-organs have ceased to function²⁵ we feel that we have perceived something ; and at the third moment mnemonic images begin to arise and we come to knowledge what actually was seen. This second moment of perception is intelligible intuition according to Dharmottara. The existence of this factor was first hinted by Diñnāga who had conceived the idea of sensations and understanding as entirely different

sources of knowledge. Dharmakīrti developed this idea in his Seven-treatises and Dharmottara gave it a final shape²⁶.

This theory of mental sensation as a joining link between sensation and understanding has been target of severe attack not only from the realists of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya schools but also from the Buddhists. The realist says if the mental sensation is capable of joining two extremely heterogeneous and dissimilar worlds of pure sensation and understanding what is the harm if it is maintained that a fly can be combined with an elephant with the help of a donkey ?²⁷ He further asks what is the basis of the conception that the mental sensation does not exist at the very moment when the pure sensation exists ? What is the proof of its separate existence ? If its existence is not proved by positive facts why should we not regard it as non-existent ?

Dharmottara retorts why do you not declare that the eyes do not exist because they are invisible ? How can you see that thing in the form of something positive like an āmalaka fruit which is the very basis of knowledge ? It is not a matter of logic. It is felt in the inner heart of a man. It is the postulate of our system. It cannot be proved by empirical methods²⁸. On the other hand if we deny its existence, the whole system which is based on the sharp distinction between pure sensation and understanding will collapse. He quotes Dharmakīrti in support of his thesis who maintains that its existence can be experienced by a real experiment in introspection²⁹. Although it is a necessary condition of all empirical knowledge but it is itself something which cannot be proved by empirical methods. It is entirely transcendental³⁰.

(2) Alternation theory—

This theory is attributed to Prajñākara Gupta³¹. According to this theory at the first moment of sense perception when the senses come in contact with external objects, a simple reflex arises, it is a bare sensation. At the next moment

a mental sensation arises. At the third moment another pure sensation arises, thus the process of perception continues. This theory invites some objections which cannot be overlooked. First, if we believe in the alternately arising sensations of sense-organs and the mind, we will not be able to apprehend the object by our sense-organs, because the moments of pure sensation and mental sensation will be mixed up. Secondly, there will be no continuous apprehension of the object, because just after a moment of pure sensation mental sensation comes in, and then again pure sensation in this way the continuity of our perceptual process is hampered which is the basis of our perception. In the words of Dharmakīrti we may say 'if a thing would be apprehended in turns, we would not have the experience of its continuous contemplation'³².

3. Admixture theory

According to Jñānagarbha³³ mental sensation is pure intuition and hence homogeneous to pure sensation. On the other hand it is intelligible intuition, hence homogeneous to understanding. Thus the water-tight division of knowledge between sense perception and understanding is repaired. He repudiates the theory that in the first moment there is pure sensation only and exclusively ; and the next moment has mental sensation when the former sensation has ceased to function. He poses a question : 'What is the guarantee that our two moments of cognition are entirely exclusive to each other ? Why should we not maintain that every sense perception has the element of mental sensation also, due to existence of which we feel something like the object perceived ?

The question may arise : How is it possible to maintain two different kinds of sensations arising from the same sense-organ at the same very moment ? Jñānagarbha answers : 'Although two homogeneous sensations cannot arise at the same time from the same sense-organ but two different (heterogeneous) sensations of different senses can exist without

evolving any contradiction. It is also not right to maintain that it does not exist because of its being not apprehended separately. The existence of mental sensation is proved by the fact that in the successive moment when the image of the object that 'it is blue' arises, it is homogeneous with mental sensation. If there would have been no intermediate factor between pure sensation and conception, we would not have been able to have a constructed image of the blue patch which follows immediately in its track. Further a mental sensation that 'this is blue' can arise only out of something homogeneous to it, that is out of mental sensation and not out of that thing which is exclusively heterogeneous to it e.g. pure sensation. For example when an object e.g. 'a patch of blue colour' is perceived by a stream of consciousness called Devadatta, it can not evoke its judgment in another stream of consciousness called Yajñadatta, which is exclusively dissimilar to the former. It can evoke its judgment only in Devadatta. The argument that the sensation is not different from the constructed mental image does not hold good. Because any man of normal vision can recognise the distinction between mental feeling of an object and the constructed mental image in which that object is ascertained³⁴.

Dharmottara raises some fundamental objections to this theory. First, the argument that constructed mental image must arise out of something homogeneous to it, so we must accept the existence of mental sensation, has no sanction of our experienced life. We feel a kind of refreshment at the sight of camphor while the white colour produced by a piece of camphor and the feeling of refreshment are heterogeneous³⁵. Secondly, we can have no mental element as long as our consciousness is engaged in a visual cognition of some particular object. How is it possible to have two different kinds of sensations 'one sensuous and the other mental from the same very object at the same very moment? We can have experience of mental feeling only when the visual organ

has ceased to function³⁶. Hence a constructed image can be evoked from a pure simple reflex which is heterogeneous to it, and the mental sensation belongs to the same stream of thought though this mental sensation is the subsequent moment of that stream of thought of which simple reflex makes the first moment. Dharmottara cites the view of Dharmakīrti who says, 'when one simple reflex is apprehended, the other features will also be apprehended, they will appear by the force of a conscious³⁷ germ and also by the force of memory which has its own function to achieve³⁸.

4. The simultaneity theory

This theory is attributed to Śaṅkarānanda³⁹. According to this theory three elements should always be present in our perceptual process. They are—(1) the element of pure sensation, (2) the element of mental sensation, and (3) self-consciousness. When we see a patch of blue colour, in the first moment pure sensation arises. In the next moment there is a mental sensation that there is something like a patch of blue colour in our field of cognition along with the pure sensation caused by the outer sense. This moment of mental sensation which succeeds immediately after the first moment of pure sensation is the first moment of mental sensation, and the pure sensation running simultaneously with it is the second moment of pure sensation. Thus the simultaneous stream of pure sensation as well as mental sensation continues till the end of the perceptual process. Śaṅkya Paṇḍita supports the view of Śaṅkarānanda by saying that 'both the alternation theory as well as the substitute theory contain contradiction. This is the only theory by which the principle of homogeneous causation can be saved and the unity of knowledge restored⁴⁰.

Some objections have been raised to this theory. First, there is no logical justification in asserting that there are only three elements in a sensuous cognition. Jamyan tshadpa poses a question: Why should there be only three elements i. e.

the sensation of the outer sense, mental sensation and self-consciousness? Why should there not be seven elements, i.e. the five elements of sensible qualities, along with the element of sensation⁴¹ and the element of attention or mental sensation?⁴² He justifies his criticism by quoting a passage from the commentary of Nyāya Nidhi⁴³, according to which 'if we reckon the elements in the object, they will be five, and if we add the elements of sense and of the intellect, it will make seven. Secondly, it would be a great mistake on our part if we presume that at the time of apprehension of an object by our sense-organs, there is another factor like mental sensation which also clearly apprehends the same object. Such presumption is against the authorities of Buddhist logic. Dharmakīrti categorically rebukes this idea of equal participation by all the three constituents in a process of perception at one and the same moment. He says 'although heterogeneous sensations may arise simultaneously, but only one of them will be always predominant, and thus it will weaken all other elements and will not allow any other of them to appear on the threshold of consciousness⁴⁴. Śāntarakṣita supports the view of Dharmakīrti and maintains that a double sensation which appears (atonce) without succession from two (different sourced) cannot exist⁴⁵. Lastly, this theory is opposed to all the characteristics of a mental sensation which have been laid down by the great teachers i.e. (1) that the mental sensation follows the pure sensation, and (2) it apprehends the second moment of perception which immediately follows the moment of pure sensation and begins to function when the outer sense has ceased to function⁴⁶.

Jamyān tshadpa says that the theory ascribed to Śāṅkarānanda can be rescued from meeting the tragic fate if we interpret him with a new vision, which will make it consistent with the classical theory of Diṅnāga and his followers. According to this interpretation, there are only two kinds of sensation. At first moment there is pure sensation which comes through the external sense-organs and which is accomp-

anied with internal self-consciousness. At the next moment of perception there are three elements i.e. the pure sensation, the mental sensation which follows the pure sensation, and the internal self-consciousness which accompanies the first as well as the second stage of sense perception.⁴⁷

5. The appraisal of the above theories

Jamyān tashadpa after examining all the prevalent theories of mental sensation as mentioned above holds that it is the only theory which comes true to the test of criticism. He quotes passages from many authorities in support of the theory held by Dharmottara. The Abhidharma-sūtra says-- that the apprehension of colour (and lines) is double (1) as conditioned by the sense of sight and (2) as conditioned by the intellect. Diñnāga confirms this theory by holding that the intellect also when it apprehends an object in a mental sensation does not possess the character of constructive imagination⁴⁸. The same idea is expressed in the Khaiduḅ 'It does not matter much for the continuity of pure sensation, (without any participation of mind or attention), and for its discontinuity, whether all causes (and conditions) producing it are completely present or not, but it is not indifferent whether some counter-acting agency has appeared or not, because as long as there is nothing to stop the run of (the moments of) pure sensation, it will go on enduring without interruption, and the entrance door for intelligible intuition will be closed⁴⁹.

The words of the Buddha also indicate the correctness of the theory held by Dharmottara. The colour is apprehended in two ways, by the sense of vision and by the internal sense evoked by the external one. Stcherbatsky also shares the view of Dharmottara. He says 'to maintain the simultaneous existence of two pure intuitions, the one sensible and the other intelligible is absurd⁵⁰. The hard and fast distinction between pure sensation and understanding as hinted by Diñnāga, explained by Dharmakīrti, and brought to its full

development by Dharmottara can only be saved if we hold the principle of functional interdependence, that is when we hold that the mental sensation begins to function when the visual sense organ ceases to function. To deviate from this theory means that there would be no sharp distinction between sensation and conception. There would be between them only a difference of degree, then sensation would be only a confused conception. In other words there would be no pure sensation at all.

From the horry past if we return to our native time, we will see that like Dharmottara, Kant was also puzzled to find a silken bond to join phenomenon and nonmenon, which had an unbridgable gulf lying between them. Finding 'reason' to be absolutely inadequate he had to resort to 'the starry heaven above and the moral law within' for the solution of this problem. In the same way Dharmottara had to postulate the existence of mental sensation to join the pure sensation and the intelligible intuition. But the position held by Dharmottara as well as by Kant is indispensable for the critical philosophy which they propounded. To forsake the sharp distinction in kind between pure sensation and understanding would mean either to return to the Naive realism of the Naiyāyikas or lose oneself in the wholesale skepticism of the Mādhyamikas⁵¹.

6. Criticism of the theory of mental sensation

Vācaspati Miśra challenges the very basis of the theory of mental sensation. He asserts that we know from our daily experiences that the object of our cognition is an enduring substance. It is one and indivisible whole. There can be no water-tight division of it into a series of preceding and succeeding moments. Further its unitary character is also proved by recognition. For instance when we meet a friend even after a long time we recognise that he is the same person whom we met long ago⁵². Therefore it is baseless to assume that a cognition has at first a pure sensation and then it is

followed by a mental sensation. Maṇḍana Mīśra also holds the same view. According to him the theory of cognition based on the existence of successive moments is untenable. Because the object we apprehend in our cognition presents itself as a one united whole and not into a series of many fleeting moments⁵³. Since it is established that the senses do not reflect separate moments, therefore, it is not possible for intellect to grasp the succeeding moment which follows the moment of simple reflex. It grasps just the same object as has been grasped by the senses. If we maintain that the mental sensation is the silken bond which joins two such absolutely heterogeneous things as the pure sensation and the understanding, we should also not hesitate to hold that a fly could be made similar to an elephant through the medium of a donkey⁵⁴. Dr. Satkārya Mukerji also doubts the existence of the mental sensation. He says that Manovijñāna has no epistemological importance and can be jettisoned without harm. The inclusion of it in the scheme of perception is made only in deference to scriptural authority and not for any logical or epistemological necessity⁵⁵.

7. Is mental sensation transcendental ?

Diñnāga Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara believe that mental sensation is the second moment of our apprehension. It begins to function when the sense-apprehension has ceased. Some objections were raised to this theory by Jñānagarbha and his followers as, 'what is the proof that mental sensation does not work simulataneously with pure sensation. Is there some positive proof to decide its existence, or is it a mere assumption like a sky flower or a moving fire brand? Dharmottara says that the existence of mental sensation cannot be empirically proved⁵⁶. We cannot show its existence in the manner as we show the existence of material things. But it does not mean that it does not exist. It is the very basis of our critical philosophy. It is the postulate of our system. It cannot be apprehended by categories of understanding. It is transcendental⁵⁷. Dhar-

makīrti holds the same view and says that the mental sensation cannot be empirically cognised but can be only mentally realised⁵⁸. Rgyal-tshab confirms the view of Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara and says that mental sensation cannot be empirically proved, its existence is to be asserted on dogmatic basis. He further says, 'although it is subjected to a critical purification⁵⁹, by means of reason, perception and inference there is no other (direct) evidence to establish it empirically⁶⁰.

Some objections were raised to the transcendental character of mental sensation. Some persons hold that mental sensation is present in every ordinary man and its existence can be proved by their direct knowledge, because in their introspection they apprehend their mental sensation. Had it been transcendental, it would not have been apprehended by introspection. Jamyan tshadpa refutes this argument and says 'it is beyond the scope of introspection to have apprehension of every thing which is cognised. If the introspectious were infallible, and susceptible of every thing cognizable, the Cārvākas would have known through their introspection their opponents' power of making inference. But it is not the case. Hence if the 'introspection' is not capable of even indicating 'inference' which is one of the source of our knowledge how is it possible for it to apprehend those things which are beyond empirical propositions.' He says 'if we maintain that 'introspection' can apprehend every thing which consciousness contains, it will also apprehend the ultimate unreality of the world⁶¹ which is present in every consciousness. If every man with the help of his 'introspection' apprehends the ultimate unreality of the world, we will reach to an absurd conclusion that every ordinary man is a saint. Because knowledge of ultimate unreality of the world is possessed by the saint alone who acquires it after many lives' severe meditation'⁶². Therefore, the objection to the transcendental character of mental sensation is unfounded. Stcherbatsky also supports the transcendental character of mental sensation. He says: 'the moment of intelligible intuition is not empirically cognisable,

because it is a moment. A single moment is always transcendental. It cannot be represented in an image. It is unutterable. But its assumption is urged upon us by the whole system which is built upon a radical distinction of the two sources of knowledge⁶³.

9. Self-Cognition

The feeling of pleasure and pain, joy and sorrow is for the Yogācāra school a consciousness of consciousness, a self-consciousness.⁶⁴ Ācārya Dīnāga analyses it into the three moments of sensation, mental sensation and self-cognition. In the first moment of our perceptual process there is a simple reflex which is in response to a particular and indefinite object. In the next moment a mental feeling arises which is invoked by the simple reflex⁶⁵ to the effect that there is something in our field of perception. When these two moments of pure sensation and mental sensation cease to function we feel in the third moment a desire to achieve or avoid the object. This feeling of desire⁶⁶ or aversion⁶⁷ for the object is called self-cognition⁶⁸. Its knowledge is immediate and direct because the intellect has not yet emerged to play its role in its occurrence. It is non-constructive perception⁶⁹. Dharmakīrti gives a logical explanation of the analysis of Dīnāga. According to him the feeling of desire or aversion which is thus caused does not depend upon the external object. Hence it cannot be described in the terms of subject-object relations⁷⁰. There is no way of describing anything other than the subject-object relation. So it is indescribable or unutterable⁷¹. Self-cognition or the feeling of desire and aversion is one of the kinds of direct knowledge. It reveals new objects which are not revealed by any other means. It is not a construction of our mind but a vivid experience which is confirmed by our daily experiences⁷². It carries our knowledge further to the points which are untouched by pure sensation and mental sensation.

Realists reject the above Yogācāra analysis of self-cognition.

They maintain that as the feeling of desire or aversion for the object is experienced by the idealists only after it has been apprehended in pure sensation and mental sensation, it is largely due to the object itself. The idealist analysis of self-cognition has a lacuna. The feelings of desire and aversion are in regard to an object and arise after its apprehension. Hence the locus of these feelings must be the object. The Buddhist rejects the objection and gives two arguments in support of his view. First, in the sense-perception when we perceive a patch of blue colour, we at first have an indefinite knowledge which arises from the external object. In the next moment when the object is fully apprehended we have images of the particular object, i.e. we feel the image of the patch of blue colour and not of the pleasure. If the pleasure were identical with the object, the image of the object would have followed. But such thing never takes place. Hence feelings of pleasure and pain are internal. Secondly, different men have different feelings with regard to the same object. For instance we can take the example of a lotus. It arouses different feelings in the mind of a poet, an artist, a scientist and an ordinary man. According to Yogācāra theory of introspection every consciousness and every mental phenomenon are self-conscious⁷³. In other words we may say that the simple consciousness which arises in the first moment of pure sensation as well as all the constructed mental ideas, feelings, volitions, passions and quasi ideas are self-conscious. Consciousness like light reveals itself. It is not in need of another factor for its own revelation. It is awareness⁷⁴ which is self-luminous⁷⁵.

This theory of self-cognition is indirect contrast to the realist theories of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya Vaiśeṣika schools, for whom self-consciousness is simply a mental phenomenon which arises when the object comes in contact with the subject. For the Buddhist there is no mental phenomenon which could be unconscious of its own self. In fact we cannot perceive that it is a patch of blue colour unless we know, or in other

words, are self-conscious to the fact that what we perceive is a patch of blue colour⁷⁶. The opponent asks : 'If every consciousness and mental phenomenon are self-conscious, what would be the fate of those instinctive thoughts and actions which are automatic and do not seem to possess consciousness? Dharmottara replies that some actions are quasi-automatical, because the incurring stimulus is followed straight off by a purposeful action. The quasi-automatical actions seem to be lacking self-consciousness, because the intermediate complicated process being habitual and very rapid, escapes discursive introspection. According to him even the action of a new born child when he stops crying and presses his lips on his mother's breast is self-conscious. In this sense, self-consciousness is a synonym of life. He further says that when we apprehend a patch of blue, we at the same time are conscious of another thing, of something pleasant⁷⁷. This feeling is a feeling of the condition of our ego. Indeed in this form in which the ego is felt, is a direct self-perception, consisting in being self-conscious⁷⁸. Stcherbatsky endorses the view of Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara regarding self-cognition and says that it is transcendental by its nature and accompanies all other forms of cognition. At the time of experiencing a visual sensation we simultaneously experience something else, something additional, something accompanying every mental state, something different from the perceived external object⁷⁹, something without which there is absolutely not a single mental state⁸⁰. And this something is our own ego⁸¹.

10. The Yogic perception.⁸²

The joys and pleasures of the Tuṣītaloka where the Amitābha rules, the luxuries and enjoyments of the Sukhāvātīvyūha, the delightful city of Akniṣṭha free from the habitation of unclean beings, the grand and glorious personality of the invisible Tathāgata, the vision of the four noble truths, the Deśanā of the Lokanātha, the invisible grand vision of the Mahābhiniṣkramaṇa of the Śākya-

muni at midnight, the sentiments of love and piety or *karuṇā* and benevolence which impel the blessed Lord to descend on earth, in order to remove the sufferings of the ignorant people and to lead them to the gate of Nirvāṇa revealed to the Buddhists the hollowness of other types of cognition which deal with discrete bare instants and with objects mingled with imagination. They thought : Is there not a method by which all the grandeur of the objects of sense-perception and noble conception be apprehended within a moment ? Is there not some instrument which may reveal the secrets of the heart, the treasures of the hidden earth and the mighty waves of the future ? Is there not some source of knowledge which may transcend the barriers imposed by sensibility and understanding ? And the result was the discovery of Yogic perception.

The Yogic perception is the source of revealing all the objects, physical and mental, past, present and future, remote and near, hidden and visible which are beyond the limits of the intellect of ordinary human beings. It may be defined as 'the cognition which arises out of the contemplation of things, and which is free from conceptual content and error.' According to Dharmakīrti 'it is the perception which is produced from the subculminational state of deep meditation on transcendental reality.'⁸³ In order to understand it, it is important to explain what is 'transcendental reality'⁸⁴ and what is subculminating point.⁸⁵ The 'reality' is transcendental. It is 'existence as such.'⁸⁶ It is the basis of all our knowledge. It is crystal clear and pure like gold. It is self-luminous⁸⁷ and falls short of all descriptions.⁸⁸ It is beyond the triad of knower, known and knowledge. The ideas of the 'apprehender' and the 'apprehended'⁸⁹ cannot touch it. The means of cognition are simply a device to indicate it as a child is given a mirror to apprehend the moon, but he is not the actual apprehender of the real moon. This reality which is the substance of all things⁹⁰, and which is devoid of all the attributes⁹¹,

becomes an object of contemplation for the saint who takes now to see a vision of it. The Yogin focusses his attention on this reality again and again⁹² in his consciousness. By his repeated practice of meditation he comes to a stage when the reality begins to emit its lustre, though it has not yet been realized. It is the stage when the image of the contemplated object begins to reach a condition of clarity as though it were present before the meditator.⁹³ It is called the culminating point of contemplation. The subculminating stage is that stage which precedes culminating stage.⁹⁴ It is the degree of clarity which precedes complete vividness.⁹⁵ Now the Yogic perception may be defined as 'a perception of reality which occurs at the subculminating stage of contemplation.' It is a knowledge which apprehends with absolute vividness the contemplated image as though it were actually present before the meditator.⁹⁶ This knowledge of the mystic is non-conceptual, uncontradicted by experience, and vivid and non-illusory. It is a new piece of knowledge unapprehended prior to this stage and has its origin in contemplation.⁹⁷ It is a faculty by which the saints are capable of completely changing all ordinary habits of thought and contemplating directly the universe 'sub specie aeternitatis' in a vivid image.

11. Is Yogic perception a different source of knowledge ?

In a Yogic perception there is no sense contact with the object. Hence it cannot be regarded as perception. If it is perception, how is it possible for it to apprehend those objects which are beyond its reach ? If on the other hand, the Yogic perception is not perception but conception, the entire knowledge of the saint which results from it will become unreal because conceptual knowledge which proceeds through dialectical process has no reference to external reality and is a mere thought-construction.⁹⁸ Consequently, there would be no difference between the knowledge arising from Yogic perception and the knowledge which arises from

infatuation, sorrow, fear, lunacy, illusion and dreams.⁹⁹ These questions led Kumāṛila to deny the perceptual character of Yogic perception. According to him Yogic perception is in fact a fanciful imagination like wishful thinking and memory. It cannot be regarded as a kind of perception, because it lacks the contact of objects with the sense-organs which is an ingredient of perception.¹⁰⁰ It may be argued that it results from contemplation,¹⁰¹ but the contemplation is nothing except 'concentration of the mind on an object.' Actually what happens in a 'mystic intuition' is that there appears a series of memory-images of an object uninterrupted by the thought of another object¹⁰² with so vividness and clearness that it comes to be regarded as perception.

Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla find Kumāṛila's objections to the theory of Yogic perception as baseless. According to them 'all things can be manifested¹⁰³ by the clear and unflinching light of knowledge called 'Yogic perception.' Even those objects which are not in direct sense-contact and are deprecated as 'illusory' are cognized through the 'mystic intuition of the saint through the 'mind' whose perceptiveness has been brought about by the impressions of the past experiences.¹⁰⁴ The mental power of the saint is capable of apprehending even the most subtle and remote things. All superiorities and peculiarities lie within the field of mental cognition. Nothing lies beyond its field therefore the questions regarding the restrictness of sense-organs in their scope or the apprehension of one thing by one sense-organ alone does not arise.¹⁰⁵ Through the contemplation of 'reality' in the meditation the mind of the Yogin and his mental cognitions become superior. He acquires a superior grade of wisdom, mercy and other qualities. By constant practice of the Yoga his mental faculty of apprehension of objects reaches the highest stage. He acquires power by which all the objects past, present and future, become apprehensible for him like an āmalaka fruit.

He has no need to resort to inference for their apprehension.¹⁰⁶

The position of a Yogin may be compared with a young goose.¹⁰⁷ Just as a young goose in the beginning is incapable of going even out of his nest but through constant practice becomes capable of crossing even the vast oceans. Similarly the meditator on 'reality' has at first a limited power but through constant practice of Yoga he acquires tremendous powers.¹⁰⁸ The moment a Yogin reaches the highest stage of his meditation, he suddenly acquires the transcendental intuition.¹⁰⁹ He changes completely. He becomes another pudgala, a Saint, an Arya, a Bodhisattva. All his habits of thought are changed. He acquires the habit of realising the relativity¹¹⁰ and unreality of the phenomenal veil¹¹¹ concealing absolute reality.¹¹² He enters the Māhāyanistic *dr̥ṣṭimārga* and first of the ten Mahāyānistic stages which is known as 'pramuditā'. At the same time he is filled with overwhelming devotion to the salvation of all living beings.¹¹³ He then understands the four noble truths of the saint in their Mahāyānistic interpretation as a formula intended to support the equipolency of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa* in a Monistic universe.¹¹⁴ On the basis of this transcendental capacity he can know whatever he wishes to know. He can apprehend things either simultaneously or successively or both as he likes. There shall be involved no logical inconsistency, because he has shaken off all evil and has reached a stage which is beyond the sphere of logical thought.¹¹⁵

In fact perception is a process which envisages the objects clearly and distinctly without the help of the categories of understanding or imagination. On the other hand the conception,¹¹⁶ cannot envisage an object without the help of the categories of imagination. The object of perception is the extreme particular, the point-instant devoid of all attributes¹¹⁷, while the conception deals with those objects which are expressed through the medium of words. In a Yogic perception the objects appear simultaneously and

vividly in their original form where the language has not begun to play its role. Hence the whole knowledge arising from it is perception, Dharmakīrti argues that the objects of knowledge whether they are external or internal remain within the range of perception as long as the words do not start their business of dichotomy and dialectic.¹¹⁸ The knowledge arising from the Yogic perception is vivid and results from the contemplation on the absolute reality in a meditated and undisturbed condition, while the knowledge arising from dreams, illusions and hallucinations is vague and conceptual. This is a characteristic difference of Yogic perception from dream, illusion and hallucination.¹¹⁹ Another difference between these types of knowledge is that yogic perception is uncontradicted¹²⁰ by normal experiences of mankind, whereas the knowledge of dream, illusion and hallucination is contradicted. The latter knowledge is conceptual while the former is perceptual. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa is right in maintaining that the Yogic perception is the highest degree of perception. He contends that although it is rare, it is not impossible. The yogic perception is thus probable for normal human beings. This probability is converted into a reality by saints through the development of their meditation.¹²¹ For the Mīmāṃsakas, Yogic perception is not a source of right knowledge at all. It is simply a fancy which owes its origin in human imagination. It is like the fancy of ordinary men. But their view is mistaken. It is a means of valid knowledge because it is a kind of perception. According to Dharmottara the knowledge arising from Yogic perception cannot be inferential or rational because there is no middle term. 'When a Yogin reaches the highest stage of his contemplation he has the vision of the reality as vivid and unconstructed as sense perception. It is not contradicted by experience. The object which is apprehended in 'meditation' is pure. Thus the knowledge arising from Yogic perception is different from inferential and illusory knowledge.¹²²

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2. Indriyāśritam yat tat pratyakṣam. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 12 line 22. Cakṣurādijanitam indriya-vijñānameva. Pramāṇa-vārtikālakāra p. 303 line 25.
3. Saṁhṛtya sarvataścintāṁ stimitenāntarātmanā. sthitopi cakṣuṣā rūpam ikṣate sākṣajā matiḥ. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 124.
4. Punarvikalpayan kiñcidāśīd vo kalpanedṛṣī. Iti vetti na pūrvoktāvasthāyāmindriyād gatau, Ibid. 3. 125.
5. Ekatra dṛṣṭo bhedo hi kvacin nānyatra dṛṣyate. Na tasmād bhinnāṁ astyanyat sāmānyāṁ buddhyabhedataḥ. Ibid 3 126.
6. Tasmād viśeṣaviśayā sarvaivandriyajā matiḥ. Na viśeṣeṣu śabdānāṁ pravṛtterāsti saṁbhavaḥ. Ibid 3. 127.
7. Eka saṁtānāntarābhūta samānajātiya. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 13 lines 7-8.
8. Indriya-jñāna viśayād anyad viśayo manovijñānsya. Ibid p. 13 line 18.
9. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 205.
10. Ibid p. 206.
11. Mānasam cārtharāgādi svasānvittir akalpikā. Pramāṇa-samuccaya quoted in Pramāṇavārtikālakāra p. 303 line 23. Cittamapyartharāgādi svasamvinnirvikalpakaṁ. Pramāṇa-samuccaya 1. 6. Mānasam apyartharāgādi svarūpasānvedanam akalpakatvāt pratyakṣam. Pramāṇavārtikālakāra p. 303 line 24.
12. Indriya-vijñānāntara pratyayod bhavaṁ manovijñānam. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 244.

13. Sva-viṣayānantara viṣaya-saha-kāriṇendriyajñānena sam-anantara-pratyayena janitarṅ tanmanovijñānam. Nyāya-bindu I. 9.
14. Yadā cendriya-jñānaviṣayād anyo viṣayo manovijñānasya tadā yṛhītagrahaṇādāsañjito'prāmāṇyadoṣo nirastaḥ. Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā p. 13 line 18. Kṣaṇikatvāt atītsya darśanasya na sambhavah. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 241. Kṣaṇakṣaiṇo hi sarvabhāvaś tato 'tītasya katharṅ grahaṇarṅ yena gṛhītameva gṛhuṇīyāt. Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṅkāra p. 304 line 5.
15. Yadā cendriyajñāna viṣayopādeya-bhūtaḥ kṣaṇo gṛhītas tadendriyajñānenāgṛhītasya viṣayāntarasya grahaṇād andha-badhirādyā-bhāvadoṣa prasaraṅgo nirastaḥ. Etacca manovijñānarṅ uparatavyāpāre cakṣuṣī pratyakṣamiṣyate. Nyāya-bindu ṭīkā p 13 lines 19-22.
16. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 120 lines 13-17. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 319.
17. Ibid p. 120 line 14.
18. Vyāpāravati cakṣuṣi kimitīndriya-vijñānarṅ notpadyate dvitīye kṣaṇe yogya-karaṇe sati samāna-dvyayam. Tena tayoh kathamindriyavijñāna-vyapadeśo na syāt. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā ṭippaṇī p. 30 lines 3-5.
19. Āgama quoted in Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā ṭippaṇī p. 26 line 10.
20. Pūrvānubhūta-grahaṇe mānasasyāpramāṇatā. Adrṣṭa-grahaṇe'ndhāderapi syādartha-darśanam. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 240.
21. Yat sat tat kṣaṇikam.
22. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 332.
23. Na pratyakṣarṅ kasyacid niścāyakarṅ tad yadapi gṛhaṇāti, tanna niścayena, kim tarhi tat-pratibhāsenā. Dharmakīrti's words quoted in Anekāntajaya-pataka p. 177 and Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 332 note 2.
24. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 323.

25. Atacca manovijñānam uparatavyāpāre cakṣuṣi pratyak-
samiṣyate. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 13 lines 21-22.
26. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 206.
27. Hasti-maśakāvapi rāsabhaḥ sarūpayet. Nyāya-vārtika-
tātparya-ṭīkā p. 341 line 25.
28. Etacca siddhānta-prasiddham mānasam pratyakṣam. Na
tvasya prasādhakamasti pramāṇam. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā
p. 14 lines 1-2.
29. Pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhyati.
Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 123.
30. Atyantaparokṣa.
31. This theory is attributed to Prajñākara Gupta. Accord-
ing to Khaidub the attribution of alternation theory to
Prajñākara Gupta is based upon a tradition current
among scholars. It is not to be found in the translated
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tion of the seven Treatises). Rgyal tshab in his com-
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ṭīkā' supports the above view of Khaidub. Buddhist
logic vol. 2 p. 325.
32. Avicchinnā na bhāseta tatsamivittiḥ kramāgrahe. Pram-
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33. Ācarya Jñānagarbha is the author of the *Satyadvaya-
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34. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā-ṭippanī p. 30 lines 9-17. Translated
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line 11.
36. *Uparata-vyāpāre cakṣuṣi* p. 13 lines 21-22.

37. Saṁvit-sāmarthya.
38. Pramāṇa-viniścaya. Quoted in its Tibetan version in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 317.
39. Khaidub says that the attribution of simultaneity theory to Śaṅkarānanda is based on a mere tradition current among the ancient teachers. It is not to be found in any of the Tibetan translation of his works. (Elucidation of the seven treatises) Quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 327.
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46. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 330.
47. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 330.
48. Cittamapyarthaṅgādi svasaṁvinnirvikalpakam. Pramāṇa-samuccaya 1. 6.
49. Khaidub 'elucidation of the seven treatises. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 332.
50. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 208.
51. Ibid.
52. Pratyabhijñā bhagavati sthapayiṣyati (abhedam). Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 126, line 9. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 321.
53. Quoted in the Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 122 lines 5-6. Ibid vol. 2 p. 321.

54. Hasti maśakāvapi rāsabhaḥ sarūpayet. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭikā p. 341 line 25.
55. The Buddhist philosophy of Universal Flux.
56. Etacca siddhānta-prasidhham mānasaṃ |pratyakṣam. Na tvaṣya prasādhakam asti pramāṇam. Nyāya-bindu ṭīkā p. 14 lines 1-2.
57. Atyantaparokṣa.
58. Pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhyati. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 123.
59. Threefold method of vicāra or mīmāṃsā (scrutiny) is perception (pratyakṣa) inference (anumāna) and non-contradiction (avirodha).
60. Commentary upon the Short Treatise of logic. p. 31 a5. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 332.
61. Śūnyatā.
62. Blo-rigs⁷, 6, 31b² (Tsu-gol). Translated and Quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 335.
63. Buddhist logic-vol. 1, p. 209.
64. Ātma-saṃvedanaṃ jñānam, jñānasya jñānam.
65. Pratibhāsa.
66. rāga.
67. dveṣa.
68. sva-saṃvedanam.
69. Nirvikalpakaṃ pratyakṣam. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 14.
70. Mānasaṃ cārtharāgādi-svasaṃvittir akalpikā. Pramāṇa-samuccaya, as quoted in Pramāṇa-vārtika p. 303 line 23.
71. Nābhijalpānuṣamgiṇī. Āśakya-samayohyātmā rāgādi nāmananya-bhāk. Teṣāmataḥ svasaṃvittir nābhijal pānuṣamgiṇī. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 250.

142 The Problem of knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism,

72. avisaṁvāditvāt.
73. Sarva-citta-caittānām ātma-saṁvedanam. Nyāya-bindu I. 10.
74. Jñātatā jñānam.
75. Svayaṁ-prakāśa.
76. Apratyakṣopalaṁbhasya nārtha-dṛṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati. Dharmakīrti quoted in Sarvadarśana-saṁgraha p. 30.
77. Iha ca rūpādaḥ vastuni dṛśyamāne'ntaraḥ sukhādyākāras tulyakālaṁ saṁvedyate. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 14 lines 12-13.
78. Yena hi rūpeṇa ātmā vedyate tadrūpam atmasaṁvedanam pratyakṣam. Ibid p. 14 lines 9-10.
79. Nīladyarthād anyadeva sātam anubhūyate nīlānubhava kāle. Ibid p. 14 lines 16-17.
80. Nāsti sā kāciccittāvasthā yasyām ātmanaḥ saṁvedanaṁ na pratyakṣaṁ syāt. Ibid p 14 lines 8-9.
81. Buddhist logic vol. I p. 168.
82. Yogipratyakṣa.
83. Bhūtārtha-bhāvanodbhūtaṁ kalpanābhrānti-varjitaṁ yogivijñānam. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1343.
84. Bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajaṁ yogijñānam ceti. Nyāya-bindu I. II.
85. Bhūtārtha.
86. Prakarṣa-paryanta.
87. Sattā.
88. Prakṛti-prabhāsvara anirvacanīya.
89. Grāhya-grāhaka-vinirmukta.
90. Bhūtārtha.
91. Sarvopādhi-vinirmukta.
92. Bhūtārthasya bhāvanā-punaḥ punaścetasi viniveśanam. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 15 line 1.
93. Bhāvanāyāḥ prakarṣo bhāvya-mānārbhābhāsasya jñānasya suphuṭābhatvārambhaḥ. Ibid, p. 15 lines 1-2.

94. Saṃpūrṇāvasthāyāḥ prāktanyavasthā
sphuṭābhatva-prakarṣa-paryanta uccyate. Ibid, p. 15
lines 4-5.
95. Prakarṣasya paryanto yadā sphuṭābhatvamīśadasaṃ-
pūrṇaṃ bhavati. Ibid, p. 15 lines 2-3.
96. Tasmāt paryantād yajjñātaṃ bhāvya-mānasya sanni-
hitasyeva sphuṭatarākāra-grāhi jñānaṃ yoginaḥ prat-
yakṣam. Ibid, p. 15 lines 5-6.
97. Prāguktaṃ yogināṃ jñānaṃ tesāṃ tad-bhāvanāmayaṃ.
Vidhūtakaḥpanā-jālaṃ spaṣṭamevāvabhāṣate. Pra-
māṇa-vārtika 3. 282.
98. Sarvo'yam anumānānumeya-bhāvo buddhyārūḍhena
dharma-dharmi bhāvena na bahiḥ sadastittvam apek-
ṣate. Pramāṇa-samuccaya. Quoted in Nyāya-vārtika-
tātparya-ṭīkā p. 39 line 12. Fragment from Dignāga
p. 61.
99. Kāmaśoka-bhayonmāda caurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ.
Abhūtānapi paśyanti purto-vasthi-tāniva.
Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 283.
100. Śloka-vārtika-sūtra 4. verses 26-31.
101. Bhāvanā prakarṣa.
102. Bhāvanā hi samāna-viśayā vijātyā'vyava-hitā smṛti-
sarntatiḥ. Ibid p. 142 lines 11-12.
103. Yasmān nirmala niṣkampa jñāna-dīpena kaścan.
Dyotitā khila vastuḥ syād ityatroktaṃ na bādhakam.
Tattva-saṃgraha verse 3269.
104. Bhūtārthabhāvanodbhuta mānasevaiva cetasā.
Aprāpta eva vedyante ninditā api saṃvṛtau. Ibid
verse 3319.
105. Ibid verses 3381-3389.
106. Yadi va yogasāmarthyād bhūtājātanibhaṃ sphuṭam.
Lirṅgāgam nirāśmsaṃ mānasaṃ yogināṃ bhavet.
Ibid verse 3474.
107. Rājahaṃsa.

108. Rājaharṣa-śīśuḥ śakto nirgantum na gṛhādapi. Yāti cābhyāsabhedena pārambhaḥ-paterapi. Ibid verse 3428.
109. Yogipratyakṣa.
110. Śūnyatā.
111. Saṁvṛti.
112. Paramārtha or bhūtārtha.
113. Mahākaṣṇā.
114. Buddhist logic vol. 2. p. 32 note.
115. Yad yad icchati boddhum vā tat tad veti niyogataḥ. Śaktirevaṁvidhā tasya prahīnācaraṇau hyasau. Yugpat paripāṭyā vā svecchayā pratipadyate. Labdhajñānaṁ ca sitto hi sakṣaṇairhyādibhiḥ prabhuḥ Tattva-saṁgraha verses 3428-3429.
116. Kalpanā.
117. Sarvopādhi-vinirmukta-vastumātra-darśanam.
118. Tasmād bhūtam abhūtam vā yad yad evābhībhāvyaṭe Bhāvanā pariniṣpattau tat sphuṭākālpadhī phalam. Tatra pramāṇa saṁvādi yat prāg ṇirṇītavastuvat. Tad bhāvanājam pratyakṣam iṣṭam śeṣā upaplavāḥ. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3, 286-287. Svātmāvabhāsa-saṁvittes tatsvalakṣaṇa-gocaram. spaṣṭāvabhāsa-saṁvedāt tacca pratyakṣam iṣyāte. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 3475.
119. Yat khalu bhāvanābalabhāvitvepyavisamvāda-sambhavi prāg nirṇīta-vastu paraloka caturārya-satyādikam tadvijayameva pratyakṣam na tu kāmādi-viṣayam, Tadvispaṣṭābhatayā nirvikalpakatvepyupaplavā eva. Etena svapnādijñānānām visamvādinām apratyakṣataiva. Pramāṇa-vārtika-bhāṣya p. 327 lines 32-35.
120. Tacca sphuṭa-pratibhāsatayā prakalpanāpoḍham tat hāvidha-vastvavisaṁvādacca bhrāntamityataḥ pratyakṣa-lakṣa-nopetatvāt pratyakṣamiti siddham. Tattva-saṁgraha-panjikā p. 902 lines 11-12.

121. Indian Psychology-perception pp. 339-340.

122. Kartalāmalakavadbhāvyamānasyārthasya.

Yaddarśanaṁ tadyogiṇaḥ pratyakṣam.

Taddhi sphuṭābham. Sphuṭābhatvādeva ca nirvikal-
pakam.

Pramāṇasuddhārthagrahītāvācca saṁvādakam.

Ataḥ pratyakṣam itara-pratyakṣavat.

Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 15 lines 8-10 and 15-16.

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CHAPTER V

OBJECT OF PERCEPTION

1. Object of perception

Diñnāga holds that the object of perception is an extreme particular¹. It is beyond our speculative thought. The categories of understanding that is name, universal, action etc. do not characterize it. They are applicable only to the generalised images of inferential knowledge². It is beyond space³, and time⁴. It represents a single moment⁵. It is similar to nothing⁶. It is unique⁷. It is the reality which can be apprehended only through the senses. It is the ultimate reality and is the cause of our imagination⁸. It is the basis of all our empirical knowledge. It is the underlying substratum beneath all our empirical purposeful activities. It is devoid of every possible adjuncts⁹ and is unutterable¹⁰. Dharmakīrti says that in a perceptual process the cogniser apprehends the vision of reality which is 'essence in itself', and has no tinge of imagination or description. The vision of this reality is possible only when the senses of the cogniser are fixed on a particular point, and all the speculative processes have stopped. Only after the apprehension of this reality the imaginative faculty stirs and tries to categorise what has been perceived previously¹¹. It is immediately and invariably followed by conception¹². The object of perception is a 'unique particular' says Śāntarākṣita. It is beyond speech and imagination¹³. Its non-conceptual character can be inferred by this fact that its presence as a unique particular, as something devoid of all its adjuncts is felt even at the moment when the attention of an apprehender is engaged at a place different from the place of apprehension¹⁴. The Abhidharmasūtra also supports the present view of the

essences in themselves. 'A man who is absorbed in the contemplation of a patch of blue, perceives the blue but he does not know that it is blue; of the object he then knows only that it is an object, but he does not know what kind of object it is¹⁵'. On the other hand the universal is a generalised image a mere thought-construction, hence it cannot be apprehended through the senses, and is in need of inference or conception¹⁶.

2. Meaning of the 'particular'

Dharmakīrti defines 'particular' as something whose mental image varies according to its nearness and remoteness¹⁷. It is the object of cognition which produces a vivid flash¹⁸ of consciousness when it is near and a dim one when it is at a distance¹⁹. Indeed, all external reality is experienced "vividly" when at hand and dimly when at a distance²⁰. This 'particular' is not in need of a universal to denote its subsistence as is contested by the realists. The particular 'fire' is not in need of a universal 'fire' to denote its subsistence that 'it is fire'. The things are by nature mutually differentiated or "exclusive". Whenever a sense perception of a particular thing, e.g. 'fire' takes place, it takes place as differentiated from all the homogeneous and heterogeneous things, and as in this perception we apprehend one definite thing with a definite form, differentiated from all other things, it naturally indicates that 'it is fire' and not a tuft of hair.

An important question arises: 'Is the reality which appears vivid when at hand and dim when at a distance, reality at all? Does it not have two forms (a dim one and a bright one²¹? How can it then be regarded as unique?' The author of the *Ṭippaṇī* holds that the dim or bright image of an object for instance of 'blue colour', is not itself ultimate reality. In this cognition of dimness or vividness the 'essence-

in-itself' is that factor which is the cause of these two effects. Indeed it is the capacity or efficiency capable of producing the effect that it is the reality²². The vividness or dimness is based on our mental images produced from the unique particular. For instance, we may take 'fire'. There is a general notion of 'fire'. Every fire is not real, but only that fire is real, which is capable of burning and cooking²³.

Dharmakīrti takes this 'particular' in more than one sense. First, it is the 'existence as such'²⁴. It denotes a stage when it has not been divided into the categories of subject and object, 'apprehender' and 'being apprehended'. Secondly, it is taken, in the usual sense of the particular, which is extreme, concrete particular²⁵, the pure ālambana, existence localised in time, space²⁶, beyond all mental constructions²⁷, but not beyond the conception of 'apprehender and being apprehended'²⁸. In this sense, it is the moment of efficiency capable of affecting our sensibility²⁹. Thirdly, it is taken in the sense of every concrete and particular object, because its substratum is the svalakṣaṇa, the essence-in-itself.

The term 'viśeṣa' has been frequently used even by the Indian realists. But we must not confuse it with the 'viśeṣa' or svalakṣaṇa of the Buddhists. The realists have used this term to denote various meanings³⁰. First, it is used to denote one of the seven categories. It has an objective reality. Secondly, sometimes it is used to denote an aspect of an object along with the universal. An object is considered to possess universal and particular attributes³¹. According to Uddyotakara there are three kinds of objects—sāmānya, viśeṣa, and objects possessing both of them³². Thirdly, sometimes it is used to denote an 'individual' in which a universal resides. For instance in an individual cow, the universal 'cowhood' subsists³³. Fourthly, sometimes, the term 'viśeṣa' is used for universals other than sattā viz. dravyatva etc, as is evident from the words of Praśastapāda. 'The

universals dravyatva etc. are called primarily *sāmānyas* inasmuch as they have many individuals, but they are also called 'viśeṣas' in a secondary sense because they differentiate their substrata from others'³⁴. Lastly, the term 'viśeṣa' or 'antyaviśeṣa' is used as a special attribute of an atom which differentiates it from all other atoms³⁵.

The *svalakṣaṇa* of *Diñnāga* (which means of its own kind or which has no similar of it in the whole universe) stands for an entirely different meaning. It is neither an individual nor a universal because both are relative terms and the creation of our language. It is neither an attribute of an object like redness or blueness nor an object itself like a tomato or a potato. It is not only shorn of all qualities, but is also shorn of duration in terms of time and extension in terms of space. It is differentiated and distinguished from every things else in the world. Having no duration it is vertically cut off from all other reality in terms of time, and having no extension, it is horizontally cut off from all other reality in terms of space³⁶. It may simply be designated as 'kṣaṇa' or 'moment'. It is this unique, unrelated, self-characterised real, having nothing in common with other such moments, emerging incessantly under the inexorable law of *pratītyasamutpāda*, which is directly experienced through the sense-organs³⁷. Because of too much emphasis on the doctrine of 'particularity' in the old *vaiśeṣika* system it may be speculated that 'the theory of *Diñnāga* may perhaps have been partly influenced in its logical aspect by some views entertained in the school of *vaiśeṣikas*'³⁸. But we must be very cautious at the time of drawing such conclusions. It is the genius of *Diñnāga* which brought exclusive distinction between the particular and the universal and demarcated the sphere of their apprehension. It is he who declared that there are only two sources of knowledge, the perception and the inference. The apprehension of the

svalakṣaṇa can be done only through perception while of the universals through the inference³⁹.

3. Why particulars alone the object of perception ?

A question may be raised why are ‘particulars’ alone the objects of perception ? The particular is capable of evoking mental image and so it is regarded as the object of perception. Hence whatever is capable of evoking mental image must be an object of perception. If we receive images from universal objects, they must also be regarded as objects of perception. But we know that ‘universals’ are incapable of evoking images. They are themselves thought-constructions. They are non-existent⁴⁰ and inefficient⁴¹. They coalesce with words⁴². At the time of perception they are not cognized, and at a subsequent stage when they are constructed by our understanding, the reality being evanescent has already vanished, so they cannot be objects of perception ? Moreover, there are occasions when due to illusion or defects in the sense-organs we may have reflexes which are unreal, e.g. the vision of mirage or the vision of a yellow conchshell. Therefore every particular is not the object of perception but only that which is capable of producing an effect⁴³, and which is consistent with the normal human experience. Thus only that water is real which quenches our thirst and only that fire is real which burns our finger or cooks our food.

A question arises why is the particular alone the ultimate real ? The Buddhist answers thus:

First, the universal or the general, being non-existent is incapable of producing the desired effect, so no question arises regarding its reality. The only alternative is the particular and it serves the purpose, so it is the real. Secondly, only that thing is real which has the capacity to produce an effect. If a thing is not true on this criterion of ‘efficiency’ it

is not real. The particular, alone is efficient to produce the desired effect, so it is real. Thirdly, all our purposive actions are directed towards those objects which are existent. The 'particular' alone is existent so it is real. The ideas of space, time and causality are regarded as constructions of mind, but the unique particulars being their substratum are real.⁴⁴

4. Appraisal of svalaksanas

The Buddhist theory that svalakṣaṇas are the objects of perception or indeterminate perception has invoked much criticism from Advaitins, Jains, Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. They have advanced their own theories of objects of indeterminate perception which can be enumerated into four theories. According to the first theory the object of indeterminate perception is "pure being" (sanmātram) which is 'mahāsāmānya' or "summum genus"⁴⁵. According to the second theory the object of indeterminate perception is 'universal' or sāmānya. According to the third theory the object of indeterminate perception is 'vyakti' or 'individual' which is substratum of particulars and universals. According to the last theory the objects of indeterminate perceptions are both 'particulars' and 'universals' although they are unrelated.

In order to resolve this controversy we have to examine these theories by turn. The first theory is held by Advaitins. They maintain that particulars cannot be the objects of perception. The knowledge of particulars depends upon the knowledge of their mutual differentiation or exclusiveness. This exclusiveness or differentiation is a property which is conceived by imagination and is the object of the understanding. In other words the cognition of a particular depends on the cognition of its difference from other particulars. This difference is made by understanding and not by perception. So particulars cannot be objects of perception.

Universals again, cannot be the objects of perception because they are also formed by understanding out of the common features of different particulars. Thus in indeterminate perception there is the apprehension neither of the particular nor of the universal. The object appears in its true form which is the locus of both the universal as well as the particular. It is neither an individual object nor any or all of its qualities, because individual objects and qualities require the aid of understanding. It is "pure being" or "existence".

The above view of Advaitins is rejected by realists, who urge that "mere existence" cannot be the object of indeterminate perception, as there is a distinct awareness of particulars in it. If indeterminate perception apprehends the mere being how can its particular characters be perceived? The existence of an object can never be perceived apart from its different particular characters. The Jain philosophers make an attempt to retain the universal as the object of indeterminate perception. Their universal is not the 'great universal' of the Advaitins which is one and without a second. They propose that the universals are many and they are the objects of indeterminate perception. Sumati, a Jain philosopher of the Digambara school says that the particular is perceived only as infused with the characters of such universals as 'being' etc, and is not perceived otherwise. Hence the particular is an attribute of the universal substantive. The universal substantive is capable of being perceived independently of all particulars. In this way there is no incongruence in the view that the universal is the object of non-conceptual or indeterminate perception⁴⁶.

Kumārila Bhaṭṭa says that the view of Sumati is untenable. There is no difference between the universal and the particular in indeterminate perception. Hence the universal as different from particulars cannot be the object of indeterminate perception. If it is said that the particular is insepar-

able from the universal and this universal is taken to be object of an indeterminate perception, it is not universal. If it is inseparable from particular and the particular is inseparable from it, then there is no duality of category of the particular and the universal. So the object of indeterminate perception can neither be universal nor particular. According to him, the object of indeterminate perception is an individual or 'vyakti' which is the substratum of its generic and specific character⁴⁷. It is a simple apprehension or bare awareness of an object which becomes the basis of the objective consciousness which arises later on. This apprehension is similar to the apprehension of an infant and a dumb⁴⁸. It is nameless and inarticulate. Here we are not conscious of its generic and specific characters, because the processes of assimilation and discrimination which apprehend the generic characters of an object and which distinguish it from other objects are not present at this time. They involve memory of other objects and their differentiation from the perceived object, which is impossible; because the other objects than the perceived one are not present at the time of the indeterminate perception. The 'individual' or 'vyakti' which is said to be the object of indeterminate perception is a concrete universal. It seems to be different from the 'particular' and the 'universal' because it is their substratum. But such an individual is neither conceived nor perceived. It is not conceived because whatever is conceived is either a particular or a universal. Further, it is not perceived because whatever is perceived is not a connection or holding of the particular and the universal. If the individual is perceived, it is perceived as such. It is not perceived as the substratum of the particular and the universal. Again, if it is accepted that the individual is perceived as such and not as a substratum of the particular and the universal, such an individual is the same as the 'svalakṣaṇa' of the Buddhists.

Kumārila's view that the particular and the universal both are the characters of the object of indeterminate perception is untenable. It is not right that one and the same cognition should apprehend the specific individuality as well as the universal⁴⁹. Because the cognition can be either conceptual or non-conceptual. If it is conceptual, there can be no apprehension of the specific individuality, if it is 'non-conceptual' there can be no apprehension of the universal. Moreover Kumārila himself maintains that the universal is not other than the individual⁵⁰. If it is so, the universal cannot be said to characterise the object of indeterminate perception which is an individual. Individuals do not pervade over one another, there is no pervasive entity which is given in perception. Therefore the universal cannot be an object of perception⁵¹. It is an object of understanding, Gaṅgeśa, the father of modern logic has made an important addition to this criticism. He says that indeterminate perception is non-relational. It is the cognition which is independent of the knowledge of the relation of the attribute and the substantive⁵². Kumārila has taken indeterminate perception as relational because according to him it conveys the relation of the substantive and the attributive. Hence his views of indeterminate perception and its object are full of contradictions⁵³. Thus Prabhākara, Vācaspati Miśra, Pārthasārathi and others have rejected Kumārila's view that the individual or 'vyakti' is the object of indeterminate perception. The theory of 'vyakti' as something over and above the particular and the universal is Kumārila's beard which has been shaved by Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realists with their Occam's razor, that is the law of parcimony or lāghavanāya.

The fourth view is held by Praśastapāda, Prabhākara, Pārthasārathi, Vācaspati Miśra, Śrīdhara and Viśvanātha etc. This is the theory which is generally maintained by

Mīmāṃsakas, Naiyāvikas and Vaiśeṣikas. According to this theory the object of perception is both the particular as well as the universal⁵⁴. The indeterminate perception apprehends the bare nature of the particular and the universal 'svarūpa-mātram'. In this apprehension there is no distinction between the particulars and the universals. They are given in indeterminate perception as unrelated. It is a non-relational and undifferentiated apprehension of the bare nature of an object. For instance we may take the perception of a 'cow'. In indeterminate perception, though the particular 'cow' and the universal cowhood, both constituents of the object 'cow' are perceived. But they are not perceived a related with one another as substantive and attribute. Their apprehension as related with one another takes place later on when the processes of assimilation, discrimination, recollection and recognition start their function of constructing the reality into a united whole. The indeterminate perception of an object is the experience of 'this is something'. It is the apprehension of mere 'this' or 'that'. It is not the apprehension of the 'what' characters of 'this' or 'that'. It is completely devoid of the 'what' characters of the object that is perceived.

The realists believe that what is known of an object after its perception is somewhat given in it. This is the reason that they hold the view that particulars and universals both are present in perception although they are unrelated and undifferentiated. Now the question is : 'If particulars and universals are unrelated and undifferentiated in indeterminate perception, how can they both be apprehended in it?' Their dual presence is based upon relation and differentiation, but indeterminate perception is non-relational and undifferentiated. Hence the object of indeterminate perception cannot be dual. It is either particular or universal. It cannot be both. Therefore the realist view is inconsistent.

They hold that indeterminate perception is non-relational and undifferentiated and that its object comprises both particulars and universals. This is their inconsistency.

The Buddhist view that the svalakṣaṇas are the object of perception is a correct view. Its criticism by Advaitins and realists is based upon a misunderstanding of the nature of svalakṣaṇas. Svalakṣaṇas are not the individuals or vyaktis of Kumārila. They are not particulars as contrasted with universals. They are unique particulars and are beyond all comparison and contrast. They are self-revealing sense-data. They are not the particulars of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā. Their particulars are contrasted or related with universals. They are categorised and are objects of understanding. Svalakṣaṇas, on the other hand, are uncategorised. They are the ideas of Berkeley or the impressions of Hume. They can further be compared with the sense data of Russell or C.D. Broad. They are known by acquaintance. Perception is 'knowledge by acquaintance'. Here we have acquaintance with any thing of which we are directly aware, without the intermediary of any process of inference or any knowledge of truths. For instance, in the presence of my table I am acquainted with the sense data that make up the appearance of my table, e.g. its colour, shape, hardness, smoothness etc. Later on we come to the knowledge of the table which is a 'knowledge by description'. According to Russell 'there is no state of mind in which we are directly aware of the table. All our knowledge of the table is really knowledge of truths, and the actual thing which is the table is not strictly speaking known to us at all'⁵⁵.

Russell's knowledge by acquaintance resembles our sensation, but his division between the sense data and the external object exposes him to the same criticism which Locke had to face. We may conclude the discussion with the words

of H.H. Price that the term 'sense-datum stands for something whose existence is "indubitable" (however fleeting) something from which all theories of perception ought to start, however much they may diverge later on. The Ancients and the Schoolmen's 'sensible species', Locke and Berkeley's ideas of sensation, Hume's 'impressions', Kant's 'Vorstellungen' and Dr. C.D. Broad's 'sensa' are the various names of sense-data'⁵⁶.

5. Are Svalakṣaṇas transcendental ?

Stcherbatsky has interpreted svalakṣaṇas as 'transcendental' or 'things in themselves'. Dr. Dharmendra Nātha Śāstrī⁵⁷ has also fallen in his line. Stcherbatsky has construed the line 'Kṣaṇasya prāpaitum aśakyatvāt' as 'jñānena prāpaitum aśakyatvāt'⁵⁸. And this construction is the basis of his view that Svalakṣaṇas are transcendental or 'things-in-themselves'. As this construction is a misconstruction, the view of Stcherbatsky is baseless. Svalakṣaṇas are not beyond experience or knowledge. They are only beyond discursive knowledge. Hence svalakṣaṇas are not transcendental or 'things in themselves'. Because 'things in themselves' are not only beyond discursive knowledge but also beyond experience.

There is one more meaning of the word transcendental. That is 'apriori' character of knowledge which categorises all knowledge. In this sense also svalakṣaṇas are not transcendental, because they are empirically given. The view of Stcherbatsky that svalakṣaṇas are transcendental or 'things in themselves' is responsible for propagation of the error that Dīnnāga's and Dharmakīrti's philosophy is similar to the philosophy of Kant. Rāhula Sāṃkṛtyāyana⁵⁹ compares Dharmakīrti with Kant and thinks that this comparison brings credit to Dharmakīrti. But Dīnnāga and Dharmakīrti's philosophy is opposed to the philosophy of Kant. They

uphold the view that there are two distinct sources of knowledge which cannot cross each other's sphere. Kant on the other hand holds that all knowledge is synthetic a priori, i.e. all knowledge is the result of the joint operation of perception and inference. Further according to Kant 'things-in-themselves' cannot be the object of sense perception whereas according to the Buddhist logicians they are not only the objects of sense perception but the basis of the whole edifice of knowledge also. With this wide gulf between Buddhist epistemology and Kantian epistemology it is pointless to identify the two. Hence the theory of identity or similarity between Buddhist epistemology and Kantian epistemology as propounded by the modern Buddhist philosophers like Stcherbatsky, Rāhula Sāmkṛtyāyana and Dharmendra Nātha Śāstrī is baseless and pointless.

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4. Deśānanugata.
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6. Sarvatovyāvṛtta.
7. Trailokya-vyāvṛtta.
8. Svalakṣaṇam hi pratyakṣa-gocaraḥ, tadeva paramārthasat. Ibid p 12 lines 17-19.
9. Sarvopādhi-viviktavastumātra. ,
10. Anabhilāpya.
11. Pramāṇavārtika 3. 124-128,

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yate. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p 4 line 5.
13. Tasmāt svalakṣaṇe jñānaṁ yatkiṁcitsaṁ pravartate.
Vākpathātīta-viṣayaṁ tannirvikalpakam. Tattva-saṁ-
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pena na sāmānyagrahas tasmimstato'numā. Pramāṇa-
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tibhāsabhedas tatsvalakṣaṇam. Nyāya-bindu 1. 13,
18. Sphuṭa.
19. Yo hi jñānasya viṣayaḥ sannihitaḥ sansphuṭamābhāsaṁ
jñānasya karoti, asannihitastu yogyadeśāvasthita evās-
phuṭaṁ karoti tatsvalakṣaṇaṁ. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p 16.
lines 15-16.
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yaṁ śaktiḥ yasyā saḥ). Pramāṇa-vārtika-bhāṣyam p 4
line 4.
24. Sanmātram or sattāmātram.
25. Kincididam.
26. Kṣaṇa.
27. Nāmajātādi-kalpanāpoḍha.
28. Grāhya-grāhaka-kalpanāpoḍha.
29. Arthakriyāsamartha. Buddhist logic vol 2 p 35 note 6-

30. A full account of the term *viśeṣa* has been given by Dr. Dharmendra Nātha Śāstrī in his 'Critique of Indian Realism' pp. 312-317.
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32. Viśayaḥ sāmānya-viśeṣa-tadvadbhedāt tredhā. Ibid p 14 line 2. Quoted in 'Critique of Indian Realism'. p 312 quotation No. 22.
33. Pratipattiśca viśeṣeṣviva sāmānyeṣu ca nirapavādādarśitaiva. Nyāya-mañjarī part 1 p 286 line 21. Quoted in 'Critique of Indian Realism' p 312 no. 23.
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Etāni tu dravyat vādīni prabhūta-viśayatvāt prādhānena sāmānyāni, svāśraya-viśeṣakatvāt bhaktyā viśeṣākhyānīti. Praśastapāda-Bhāṣya p 312 line 15. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p 313 No. 26.
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36. Critique of Indian Realism p 343.
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sākṣātkaṛtuṁ śakyate ityaviruddha asya vikalpa-viṣaya-
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lines 3-6.
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Tayorādhāra-bhūtā tu vyaktirevāvasīyate. Śloka-vārtika
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viśeṣya bhāvāvagāhi. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p 108
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162 The Problem of knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism

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CHAPTER VI

THE IDEALISTIC THEORY OF JUDGMENT

1. Idealistic basis of judgment

The Buddhists start with a radical distinction between sensation and understanding or conception. The sensation which is defined as that cognition derived from the senses which excludes every minute of thought-construction¹ warrants us against any kind of presumption that this 'reality' apprehended by senses is conceivable. The 'reality' (the *sva lakṣaṇa*) being momentary eludes the understanding as soon as an attempt is made to make it an object of speech. The sensation indicates the presence of an object in our ken². Only that object is the cause of our sensation which is an efficient cause, which calls forth an image. An object which does not call forth an image is not the cause of our sensation.

The judgment which is the operation of understanding refers this image which is ideal and constructive to the 'reality'. It is this factor which gives to our bare scattered sensations a shape of consistent knowledge. The sensation imparts to our knowledge reality³, particularity⁴, vividness⁵ and efficient affirmation⁶, but being indescribable and unutterable, being beyond names and concepts, it cannot be available to our understanding hence useless. On the other hand, the conception provides to our knowledge or judgment, its generality⁷, its logic⁸, its necessity⁹, and its distinctness. It grasps the meaning of sensations, and by weaving them into a texture pictures their inter-relation and continuity. The judgment may be unreal so far as the extreme particular or *svalakṣaṇa* is unavailable to it. But it is perfectly real so far as the interconnection and continuity of the extreme particulars is constructed by it. Thus judgment imparts to our knowledge ideality and universality. It is the reconstruction of reality into ideality and universality.

The realists hold that there is no such water tight division between the reality as such and its ideal content or between sense-perception and thought-construction. They maintain that there is not even a single sense-perception which does not involve judgment nor there is any judgment which is devoid of sense-perception. For them reality is both perceived and conceived¹⁰. 'There is no contradiction if perception and inference each involves the elements of sensation and conception' says Vardhamāna¹¹. But the Buddhists oppose to this theory and maintain that sense-perception by its very nature can have no element of judging or conceiving. In words of Dharmottara the senses alone could never arrive at a judgment. The judgment is not in the sensation, though it follows its track¹². These judgments are not unreal like a sky-flower. They are valid source of knowledge because they lead us to the desired objects and are uncontradicted by experience. Their non-contradictory character¹³ in the practical life establishes their reality.

Judgment is called *kalpanā* by Buddhists. The author of the *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā-ṭippaṇṭī* mentions three theories of judgment¹⁴. The *Vaibhāṣikas* maintain that judgment is a sensuous image mentally united with conceptions. Thus for them the judgment is a mental act uniting sensation with conception. But this view of judgment is not acceptable to *Yogācāra* idealists for the simple reason that sensation and conception cannot be simultaneous and cannot be united in order to be synthesized in a judgment. Judgment is not the association of a concept with a sensation. The sensation deals with a unique particular whereas judgment deals with an ideal content which is universal. Therefore the *Yogācāra* idealists define judgment as that knowledge which is bifurcated into subject and object. According to them judgment is mediate knowledge, and does not relate sensation with conception. It relates two concepts which are the products of understanding. These concepts are subject and object. The judgment is thus the union of a concept with subject.

Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti find this definition of judgment inadequate. Judgment is not inclusion in or exclusion from subject. It is not the assertion that subject and predicate are identical or different. Subject and object are themselves concepts. They therefore themselves depend upon judgment and do not explain judgment. The above two theories presuppose that every judgment has two ideas. The Vaibhāṣikas presuppose that every judgment is a relation with a concept and a sensation. Earlier Yogācāra idealists presuppose that every judgment is a relation between object and subject. Diñnāga rejects these theories of judgment and propounds that 'judgment is a mental idea formed out of universal, name, substance, quality and action'. It is a categorized idea or an idea which is characterised by the five categories of universal, name, substance, quality and action. Every judgment is an idea or concept and every concept or idea is a judgment. Judgment thus does not deal with two ideas as is held by Vaibhāṣikas and earlier Yogācāra idealists. Diñnāga's view of judgment is perfectly corroborated by Bradley. He says that 'it is not true that every judgment has two ideas. We say on the contrary that all have but one. We take an ideal content, a complex totality of qualities and relations and we then introduce divisions and distinctions and we call these products separate ideas with relations between them'¹⁵. 'But this is objectionable. We cannot deny that the whole before our mind is a single idea. The relations between ideas are themselves ideals. They are not the psychical relation of mental facts. They do not exist between the symbols but hold in the symbolized. They are part of the meaning and not of existence, and the whole in which they subsist is ideal and so one idea'¹⁶.

Stcherbatsky has failed to grasp Diñnāga's theory of judgment and has attributed the Vaibhāṣika theory of judgment to him and his followers. He accepts the view that the faculty of judging has its fundamental act that it is included in the negative definition of pure sensation, it is a non-sensa-

tion, a thought-construction¹⁷. But in contrast to this idealistic view of judgment he inconsistently maintains that the judgment is a mental act uniting sensation with conception with a view to knowledge¹⁸. He could not appreciate the idealistic view that judgment is a single idea and every single idea is a judgment and maintains that every judgment has two terms¹⁹. He confuses between the meaning of a judgment and the psychical event of judgment. Judgment is defined by Dinnāga in terms of its meaning and not in terms of the psychical event. As Bradley says 'the idea in judgment is the universal meaning, it is not ever the occasional imagery and still less can it be the whole psychical event'²⁰. Dinnāga's theory of judgment is idealistic. Professor Stcherbatsky has made it empiricist. He has mistaken the epistemological process of judgment for a psychological process. Every judgment is a psychological event as well as a logical or epistemological meaning. The psychological event is a psychological fact which follows sensation in the mind of a particular individual and constructs it into a concept with the help of the five categories. This is the process of classification, categorization, generalisation and name-giving. The epistemological process consists in referring a concept to its meaning. The meaning of a concept is universal. It is the essence of judgment. The psychological fact or event is not the essence of judgment. The judgment therefore must be defined as 'the meaning of an ideal content or idea'. The meaning of an ideal content according to Dinnāga consists in the five categories of genus, name, quality, substance and action. Hence judgment is an ideal content associated with these five categories. It is according to Dinnāga, nāmajātyādi-sarṁśliṣṭaṁ manojñānam.

2. Empirical basis of judgment

The Yogācāra theory of pramāṇa-vyavasthā brushes aside all possible relations between the object of judgment and the object of sensation. But the object of judgment is

not absolutely unrelated to the object of sensation. Their relationship poses a problem for Yogācāra idealism. If objects of judgment are absolutely unrelated to objects of sensation; they become illusory and fictitious and if they are the same as the objects of sensation and refer to the same meaning as the objects of sensation, the theory of *pramāṇa-vyavasthā* collapses. Between the absolute reality and absolute unreality of objects of judgment there seems to be no *tertium-quad*. But this *tertium-quad* is the solution offered by Yogācāra idealists. This is the middle position²¹ between Vaibhāṣika realism and the Mādhyamika nihilism. The Vaibhāṣika realists hold that all objects of judgment are real. On the contrary the Mādhyamika nihilists hold that all objects of judgment are unreal. The Yogācāra idealists avoid these two extreme positions and adopt the middle position that all objects of judgment are ideally real and empirically unreal²². They are technically called *paratantra* or phenomenal and differ from both the *parikalpita* or fictitious objects and *pariṇiṣpanna* or absolutely real objects. The object of judgment is a logical and psychological result²³ of sensation. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu use the term 'vijñāna' for both sensation and conception²⁴.

Stcherbatsky²⁵ has suggested that the object of judgment is connected with the object of perception in three possible manners :

First, on the basis of the images or concepts we resort to some purposeful activity and become successful in reaching the desired object. Thus the image becomes a cause of apprehending the particular²⁶.

Secondly, from another stand-point the image or concept is the effect of the extreme particular or the object of perception because it follows the extreme particulars and grasps their seires. It articulates what is apprehended in perception²⁷.

Thirdly, it is a natural illusion of human mind to identify the extreme particular things with its (gene-

ral) image though it is a mere creation of human mind. The first two explanations clearly indicate the empirical basis of judgment. The third however runs counter to them and shows the inherent falsity of judgment. It contradicts what has been rightly laid down by the first two explanations. So the third explanation given by Stcherbatsky for establishing relation between perception and judgment deserves to be rejected. The first two explanations show that judgment has an empirical basis, and is rooted in the nature of things that are perceived. If it is so, it cannot be a natural illusion of human mind. It tries to grasp the connection of extreme particulars which may not be there, but which is necessary to have any view of them. If judgment is a natural illusion logic will become a fiction. But in the epistemology of the Yogācāra school logic occupies an important role. Its object is to articulate the same object which is grasped by perception. Therefore the third explanation of Stcherbatsky is unjustified, whereas the first two explanation are justified.

The 'mental sensation' and 'self cognition' which are the two of the four varieties of sensation²⁸ also relate judgment with sensation. They are the psychological mechanism of bridging the gulf between sensation and understanding. The universal which is the object of judgment is the result of a psychological process which involves mental sensation and self-cognition²⁹. In terms of modern psychology both mental sensation and self-cognition can be termed as introspection. The idealistic view of judgment is inextricably connected with the introspections of the individual who judges. Even Bradley's theory of judgment has been shown to be grounded upon these psychological experiences³⁰. 'My judgment' as an individuality not 'qua mine' but qua judgment manifesting a finite content. In fact every judgment has threefold distinction between existence, content and meaning. So far as its existence is concerned it has its roots, in the psychical event which is connected with mental sensation and self-cognition. And so far as its content and meaning are con-

cerned it has no connection with the psychical fact of sensation³¹.

3. Synthesis in concepts

The conceptual element gives distinctness to sense-perception which is clear but not distinct³² in itself. This sense-perception is connected with the conception because it calls forth conception³³. On the other hand judgment has the very citadel of its activity built on the rock of conceptuality. Because it proceeds not on the basis of sense knowledge or sensations directly, but it tries to apprehend the reality through some concept. Hence both perception and judgment are in need of concepts in order to produce a synthesis between the scattered mass of bare sensations and our mental ideas which give them a distinct shape, which reveal their essence that 'this is that'. The synthesis has to perform double function of referring an image to a particular sensation, and secondly to bring under a particular synthetic image or general concept, the scattered mass of multiple sensations. The synthesis takes the task to establish a relation between the reality as such and the reflexes which we have in our mind regarding it. It unites the essence-in-itself with the denotative names. It passes judgment like 'this is a flower' 'this is a patch of blue colour' etc. This synthesis of reality with our mental ideas takes place when we conceive the multiplicity of sensations within the frame of time, place and conditions. Though this unity or synthesis is construction of our mind, but still good and advantageous for our practical life³⁴. This synthesis is expressed by such judgment as 'this is that'³⁵. In such judgments the non-synthetic element, 'thisness'³⁶ is united with the synthetic conceptual element of 'thatness'³⁷.

Vācaspati Mīśra enumerated four theories which deal with the synthesis between the essence in itself and its image which is mental. (1) The first theory is held by the Naiyāyikas who hold that synthesis means to grasp the object³⁸. (2) The Mīmāṃsakas hold that synthesis consists in the fact

that a change is produced in the object, which is known as 'cognizedness'³⁹. (3) According to another theory synthesis means 'to subsume' the reality under a class⁴⁰. (4) The fourth theory is held by the earlier Yogācāra idealists and the vedāntins who hold that our mental ideas are imposed upon something⁴¹.

According to the Naiyāyikas who are extreme realists, our senses go to the object, apprehend its characteristics and return back to inform to the mind what was apprehended by them. After this process we come to a distinct perceptual⁴² judgment like 'this is a flower' and then to a conceptual judgment⁴³ in our introspective consciousness. This conceptual judgment corresponds to the perceptual judgment. The Mīmāṃsakas hold that our consciousness is imageless⁴⁴ and devoid of immediate self-consciousness⁴⁵, and we have no immediate feeling of the object. What happens is this that when the apprehender comes in contact with an external object, a kind of new quality known as cognizedness⁴⁶ is produced in the object and through this cognizedness he infers the object. In other words the cognizer of the Mīmāṃsā school cognizes the object through the inference of cognizedness which is produced in the object of cognition⁴⁷. The Buddhists refute the above two theories and say that 'it is not possible for a cognizer to take his subjective images for a real object. The consciousness cannot change the unreal images into objective reality⁴⁸, in the same way as even hundred artists cannot change yellow colour into blue one.'

The third theory is also impossible. In a judgment like 'this is that' the term 'this' refers to the reality as such and 'that' to a mental construction. The reality as such is inconceivable. Hence it cannot be coalesced with a mental construction which is conceivable. In words of Kamalaśīla the reality as such is external while the mental construction is internal. Both are of entirely different character, so they cannot be coalesced in a judgment⁴⁹.

According to another theory a kind of identity is established between the ideas and the objects. For instance in a judgment like 'this is a flower' an identity is established between 'this' which stands for the reality as such and the flower is a mental image, a construction of our mind. This theory is subject to serious objections⁵⁰. The assertion that our knowledge imposes its own ideas which are subjective upon those objects which are real has no meaning. It is impossible to impose the image before it is itself apprehended. Even if the apprehension of the image or mental ideas is explained still we will be subject to a dilemma. There are only two alternatives. Either the apprehension of the image takes place after the superimposition of the image to the object, or the apprehension of the image and its superimposition upon the object is simultaneous. The first alternative is not possible because images are momentary. They cannot last for more than one moment. Hence images cannot be superimposed after they have been apprehended. Because this process requires at least two moments and thus is inconsistent with the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. The simultaneous process of apprehension cannot be maintained because image is internal whose existence, we feel in introspection. This image cannot leave its place and go to an external object because in so doing it will lose its place. On the other hand if it is maintained that the mental image lives outside the mind, it will involve an inconsistency. A mental image cannot be external. This image cannot be accepted to be united with the external object, because the 'real' is ineffable and eludes the grasp of reasoning and mental ideas.

The Yogācāra Idealists and the Vedāntins propound another theory to establish a relation between the 'reality' and the mental ideas. They maintain that our ideas are themselves taken to be as external reality. Owing to transcendental illusion⁵¹ we take our own ideas as really existing in the form of external objects and run after them in order to grasp them⁵². The doctrine of superimposition is also not tenable.

It reduces the entire phenomena of the world to be an illusion. The doctrine is incapable of explaining the difference between the external objects like cows, trees and buildings, and the illusory objects like a mirage, double moon and fatamorgana. From the above account of all these theories it is evident that these theories are inadequate to explain the synthesis between the reality as such and the understanding. The external reality corresponding to our mental construction cannot be maintained as external or a real cognition, or an image of reality. It is an illusion⁵³. The external object which is identified or synthesized with our mental images is nothing but an objectivized image. In words of Dharmottara the object⁵⁴ cognized by productive imagination⁵⁵ as separated from others is an idea and not an objective reality.⁵⁶ It is an unfounded belief. The object being a mere objectivized image the synthesis which proceeds on the presumption of the existence of an external object is also an unfounded belief and illusion. Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla say that the 'real as such' is indescribable. Our language cannot express it at all⁵⁷. The synthetic judgments are valid only for our practical life. They are an attempt to know the 'essence in itself.'

4. Judgment and name-giving

The cognition of the 'reality' through the senses, the knowledge of sensations, its dichotomization by the consciousness into subject-object-form⁵⁸, the running of the consciousness through a variety of sensations⁵⁹, its halt on some particular sensations⁶⁰, and its ascertainment would have no meaning unless it is designated by a name, unless the cognizer knows that the particular object which he desired to apprehend has been apprehended and is known by a name, such and such. The designation of a thing by a name, the expressibility of it through the medium of words is the very basis of all the activities that are resorted to⁶¹. It is the very foundation of our active life. It is present in the form of

impressions in the mind of even an infant and leads him to such activities as smiling, crying and sucking the breast⁶². The realists imputed the capacity of judging and name-giving to our cognition even at the stage of perception and defined it as produced by a sensory stimulus (coming from an external) object, a cognition which is not an illusion, which is (either) an unutterable (sensation) or a perceptual judgment⁶³.

The Buddhist logicians who started with a fundamental distinction between sensation and conception, objected to this theory which imputes the power of name-giving and judging to the senses and held that senses always apprehend the 'reality' which is shorn of all distinctions, of all concepts. It is one, unique and momentary point-instant, i. e. extreme particular and eludes the temporal and spatial categories and therefore is unutterable and unnamable. On the other hand judgment involves a distinct image of the reflexes which we receive in sensation and is utterable⁶⁴. If the attribute of being expressed in words is attached to the sensory knowledge, there will be no distinct knowledge of sensation and conception and we will reach to a stage of utter confusion. A question may arise : How is it known that names are not attached with the object ? Why should we not maintain that they are the property of the object as well as of the mind ? The Buddhist logicians say that the names are not contained in the object. They are neither appended to them nor inherent in them, nor produced by them⁶⁵. The objects are not identical with their names. Had the objects been identical with their names there would have been no distinction between the behaviour of a man who does not know the name of an object and the man who knows it. By the mere cognition of the object, the cognizer would have known the name of the object⁶⁶. The argument of the realists that the names might not have causal relations or identity with the objects, they might be associated with the objects as a consequence of an arbitrary agreement does not solve the problem,

Because there is no limit to our fancy. We can attribute any name to anything⁶⁷. For instance men have such judgments which involve the existence of universals while there are no universals. They maintain that there are entities like gods, devils, the sky-flower and hare's horn. These are designated by names but in reality there are no such objects.

The Buddhist logicians hold that names are not reality. They are logical constructions and belong to the faculty of conception. Concepts are utterable while the sensations are unutterable. If the sensations would have been utterable we would have known the nature of fire by its mere name in the same way as we feel it by actual experience. But our actual experience does not support this hypothesis. The name of fire does not remove our cold⁶⁸. Hence the names are always associated to a judgment. A judgment brings synthesis between the flow of sensations received from the 'reality' as such and the images of our mind. Every judgment refers to reality. The indescribable and non-categorical reality is explained and named by a judgment. For instance in the judgment 'this is a rose' 'this' refers to the reality which is beyond name and form and 'rose' refers to the 'reality' which we construct in our mind. It refers to the general, the universal the mental ideas which are unreal. Our judgment or *kalpanā* is always associated with name. Dharmakīrti defines *kalpanā* or judgment as 'a distinct cognition of a mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation'⁶⁹. Dharmottara holds that the judgment or mental construction includes not only those judgments which are named or expressed in words, e. g. 'this is a jar', but also those judgments which are not expressed in words but which can be expressed in words. For instance the activities of an infant which proceed on some judgments but which he is unable to express owing to lack of the capacity of expression⁷⁰. Therefore the term 'judgment' includes both primitive and complex judgments.

These judgments and names are associated with each other and determine each other. In the words of Diñnāga 'the names have their source in concepts and the concepts have their source in names'⁷¹. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla strengthen the position of Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti by maintaining that 'conceptual content or kalpanā is an idea which is always associated with verbal expression'⁷². There has been a constant associating of things with their names which leaves its impression⁷³ or capacity⁷⁴ on the mind, continues and becomes the basis of such activities of a newly born infant as smiling, crying and sucking the breast etc⁷⁵. Hence conception or judgment apprehends all our ideas and images which are capable of being expressed in words. It does not touch the essence-in-itself which is beyond expression. This theory finds its support in European logic also when Sigwart accepts the mutual influence of concepts on the formation of names and of names on the formation of concepts⁷⁶.

The judgment is always associated with names is also proved by our daily life experiences. When we are thinking on some problem or trying to imagine about something, there is always an inner speech, a murmur of the mind, something which is not expressed loudly but revealed secretly. Stcherbatsky supports this view and says that 'On such occasions when we freely indulge in fancy and allow our imagination a free play, we notice that the play of our visions and dreams is accompanied by an inward speech'⁷⁷. This observation of Stcherbatsky falls in the line of the observation of Dharmakīrti who holds that 'just as perception is free from conceptual content is realised by introspection'⁷⁸, 'in the same way it is also realised in introspection that the conceptual content is always associated with words'⁷⁹.

5. Judgment and proposition

Modern logic makes a distinction between judgment and proposition. A proposition is a verbal judgment or judg-

ment expressed in words. Thus the modern idealistic logic believes in both judgment and proposition. But modern linguistic logic rejects the possibility of judgment which is other than proposition. It believes only in the possibility of proposition. Every proposition is a verbal statement. Thought is invariably connected with language or proposition. What cannot be stated is regarded by modern logicians as nonsense. Diñnāga seems to be nearer to linguist logicians than idealist logicians, although his followers like Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara and others are nearer idealist logicians than linguist logicians. For him kalpanā, properly speaking, is not judgment but proposition as it cannot be unnamed⁸⁰. (avyapadeśyam). What is avyapadeśyam is sensation. If kalpanā cannot be avyapadeśyam, it cannot be without its verbal form. So kalpanā cannot be called judgment according to Diñnāga, who has said that 'the kalpanā is product of śabda, hence kalpanā is not judgment⁸¹. It is proposition. Dharmakīrti misunderstood the meaning of Diñnāga and made a difference between judgment and proposition. This difference is unwarranted by the logic of Diñnāga and of modern logicians. So kalpanā is to be understood as the form of verbal cognition. Śāntarakṣita also maintains that conceptual content is idea associated with verbal expression⁸². Śaṅkaraśwāmin has proved that kalpanā which is not associated with words is full of contradiction⁸³ hence it is to be given up.

Is kalpanā the basis of verbal expression ?

Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Śaṅkaraśwāmin reply in the negative. They say that it is not the basis of verbal expression⁸⁴. Kamalaśīla says that kalpanā is verbal expression⁸⁵. And the basis of this expression consists of the universal, the name and so forth. Abhilāpa is expressive word and is generic form⁸⁶.

Is kalpanā possible without speech ?

It is possible without speech but not without words⁸⁷. Infants also understand propositions and not judgments. They do so because of the propositions of their previous life

wherein thought and language were always united⁸⁸. This conceptual content, presenting the object, as associated with vague verbal expressions and existing only in the subjective form as if it were something external, appears in the mind of infants also, by virtue of which in their later life, they become capable of comprehending the relevant conventions⁸⁹.

6. Categories

The reality is only the essence-in-itself the extreme particular⁹⁰. It is beyond the concepts of space, time and condition⁹¹. It is peculiar, momentary and beyond the reach of human language, therefore no question of category, classification or division arises regarding the reality as such. The moment our intellect tries to conceive it within its net, it slips away; the moment we try to draw a picture of it, it goes beyond the eye-sight; hence our intellect remains frustrated. The classification, dichotomy or division is possible only in the sphere of reason which tries to conceive the non-discursive into discursive language, the unimaginable into imagination, and the particular into the general notions. The intellect tries to apprehend the reality in different ways. Hence there are different categories or kinds of concepts or names. The only categories that can be conceived are the categories of substance and attributes. All other categories are categories of attributes of the substance.

The Vaśeṣikas have presented a set of seven categories which are :—(1) substance (2) quality (3) motion (4) universals, (5) differentials (6) inherence and (7) non existence. But Dīnāga establishes a set of five categories, which are known as five fold constructions. His categories are classification of names which are founded on the basis of grammar. These five fold categories are —(1) proper names (2) general or class names, (3) qualities or adjectives (4) motion or verb and (5) substances.

(1) By a proper name a non-connotative thing is denoted for instance *Ḍittha* or *Ḍavittha*. (2) By a class name an

object is designated which represents a class or generality of objects e. g. a 'cow'. (3) By the 'quality' is designated the attribute to an object which is sensible, e. g. white, blue, red etc. (4) By the verb action is designated, e. g. cooking, and lastly (5) the substance designates an object which possesses something e. g. possessor of a stick, the possessor of horns⁹².

This entire division of categories or names is based on the fundamental principle of synthesis and non-synthesis. What is non-synthetical does not admit any kind of division, but that which is within the region of our synthesis, which can be made subject to our judgments, is subject to our categories as well. The Buddhist logicians hold that categories are mere names⁹³. They do not designate any object which really exists⁹⁴. The realist who believes in the reality of categories objects to this theory and says: 'It may be accepted to a certain extent that common names do not represent 'reality' but how is it possible to assert that proper names also which indicate a particular individual do not designate any reality and are mere constructions of our mind' ? The Buddhist answers that the entire variety of the phenomena of our life which is subject to thought and speech is nothing but a construction of our mind, hence it is not reality. The proper names are not capable of designating any object which is marked by a momentary character. We find that a proper name e. g. Dīṭṭha is applied to an individual. The body of the individual is changing every moment. A man in his childhood is not the same person as he is in his old age, but the name designating him does not change according to changes in his personality. It continues in the same form from the childhood upto the old age. Hence it is a mere conceptual element, a general idea which is applied to an object as its name whether it designates a class or an individual⁹⁵.

The Buddhist further says: 'Neither a proper name nor a common name has denotation. Every name has only connotation. The distinction between proper names and:

common names is not tenable. Both proper names and common names are connotative. The difference between the two classes is seen to be one of degree of connotativeness only⁹⁶. The realist says : 'If exclusion or apoha of others is the only connotation of words, and the words are dependent merely on the will of the speaker, there should be either proper names or only common names⁹⁷. But our experience of life shows that some objects are denoted by proper names e. g. Citrāṅgadā, Chiprā etc and some objects are designated by common names, e. g. 'cow' elephant etc. Even Diñnāga himself has used these two classes of names for 'Dittha' and 'cow' separately. If they stand on the same level there would be no difference between them, which would be inconsistent with our daily usages according to which proper names are said to have only denotation and no connotation whereas common names are said to have both connotation and denotation. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla answer that the objection is not well-founded. Diñnāga has followed simply the common usage in order to avoid the inconvenience of the common people⁹⁸. In ordinary life people do not know that even proper names are conceptual. The use of the same class of names both for the proper and common names would have created a lot of confusion among the people. That is why Citrāṅgadā is classed as proper name and the word 'cow' as common name⁹⁹.

Comparing the categories of Diñnāga with that of the Vaiśeṣikas Stcherbatsky holds that Diñnāga has simply three categories of substance, quality and motion. But Diñnāga's position is different from that of the Vaiśeṣikas. For the Vaiśeṣikas categories are real. They represent reality¹⁰⁰. For Diñnāga they are mere thought-constructions¹⁰¹. Diñnāga rejected the category of 'universal' because from his standpoint all the categories are nothing but universal, being mere imagination of our intellect. The category of 'difference' was also rejected because ultimately it comes out as the substratum of all categories, the basis of our conception, and it

itself it is non-category, the undifferentiated essence-in-itself beyond all our thoughts and words¹⁰². The categories of 'inherence' and 'non-existence', also have been rejected, because for the Buddhists two things cannot be related by 'inherence'. Everything is exclusive of all other things. The non-existence is a mere negation of existence. Existence is what is causally efficient and is capable of producing an effect. What is causally inefficient is non-existence. So non-existence is also not a category¹⁰³

7. Analysis and synthesis

All our judgments regarding the 'reality' are nothing but constructions of our mind, an attempt to conceive the inconceivable reality which appears at first in the form of mere point-instants, which admit neither synthesis nor analysis. Our imaginative faculty which has a natural constructive capacity¹⁰⁴ bifurcates these point-instants into subject and object, into 'apprehender' and 'apprehended.' It imagines that as there are sensations there must be their cause too in the form of something external. Suffering as we are from transcendental illusion the 'mind' forgets that this entire phenomenon is its own creation and takes the mental construction as objectively real and tries to have a synthesis between the mental ideas and the external objects (which are mental creations but are supposed to be real). It passes judgment like 'this is that' 'this is a flower.' This judgment is a synthesis when it is viewed as a whole. But it is an analysis when its component parts are dealt with separately. When we move from the phenomenal world towards the 'reality' and try to establish a relation between the two we have synthesis, but when we try to know the nature of 'reality' and describe it through the categories of name and form, we have analysis. Our judgments regarding the 'reality' that 'it is indescribable' 'it is indivisible point-instant', and it is beyond the categories of space and time, name and form are judgments of analysis. The judgment has

thus both analysis and synthesis. It is the joining line between the 'reality' which is a synthetic whole and its (imagined) component parts which are the result of bifurcation¹⁰⁵ of it into attributes.

The Sanskrit term 'kalpanā' stands both for analysis and synthesis. These two terms 'analysis' and 'synthesis' represent the two opposite sides of the same picture which is a unity in diversity.¹⁰⁶ The judging capacity¹⁰⁷ of our mind has an inherent power to draw different pictures of the same reality.¹⁰⁸ It may describe a 'flower' as 'red' as 'beautiful' or as 'fragrant' where infact it is nothing but a point-instant, a mere sensation. In the same way it may describe fire as 'pleasant looking' 'heat giving' and 'having cooking value' etc. where infact it is nothing but a point of heat-sensation. Similarly all other objects may be considered. Thus all our judgments have no essence in themselves. Stcherbatsky rightly assesses the relation between synthesis and analysis as the two component parts of a judgment. When unity of a judgment is put to the front 'it is a synthesis,' when its component parts are attended to, it is an analysis. The function of the understanding in judgments may be described as analytic, synthetic and likened to the dispersion of the rays from, and collecting them in the same thing which is this focus.¹⁰⁹

Stcherbatsky has expounded the characteristics¹¹⁰ of a judgment with special reference to the role of analysis and synthesis in it :

First, a judgment belongs to imaginative faculty of our knowledge. It is a decision of our understanding.

Secondly, it consist in giving an objective reference to a mental idea.

Thirdly, it does not differ from conception because conception also refers to an object.

Fourthly, it is always synthetical. It has a double synthesis. At first it establishes a synthesis between the bare

sensations and the image of our mind. Secondly, it brings the varieties of pure sensations into a unity in conception

Fifthly, it can be regarded as an analysis because it tries to explain the indescribable reality with the help of its predicates.

Sixthly, it is an illusion, because being a mental process it cannot touch the external object.

Seventhly, it is singular as well as plural at the same time. The subject of a judgment is always a singular entity the particular the essence-in-itself while its predicate is always plural a universal, because it tries to explain the 'particular' with the help of these general or universal characteristics.

Eighthly, the nature of perceptual judgment is always affirmation. It is always of the nature 'this is the that'. The negative and illimited judgments belong to a later stage. They are not perceptive but derivative.

Ninthly, the judgments are categorical as regards relation. The hypothetical and disjunctive judgments are derivative.

Finally, from the stand-point of modality judgments are apodictic. The assertory judgments are not different from the apodictic ones. We may conclude that for a Buddhist logician there is no difference between judgment, decision, concept or synthesis and necessity or apodictic necessity.¹¹¹

8. Validity of judgment

The validity of a judgment consists in its efficacy.¹¹² If it leads to a successful activity it is valid, and if it leads to an unsuccessful activity it is invalid. Our sensations have no validity unless there is an identification of them with our mental images, unless they have taken the form of such judgments as 'this is a cow' 'this is a flower' or 'the 'vision of mirage does not satisfy our thirst.' How this synthesis or identification between the 'extreme particular' and our

mental ideas, takes place poses a difficulty. The Buddhist says: it is true that there is a gulf between the extreme particulars and the general images. They are dissimilar and non-identical. There is nothing similar. Things are dissimilar by their very nature, they have a tendency to exclude others. Still a kind of a similarity or identity is established. The notion of similarity or identity is based on the fact to what extent we can neglect the differences. All cows, animals or things are dissimilar. No cow is similar with another cow still we identify the cows and regard them as similar in contrast with such animals as lions, elephants or tigers.¹¹³

Do our judgments refer to some objective reality? Do they have some objective element? If they do not have some objective value what is the use of taking so much pain in referring our mental images to an eternal reality. The Buddhist answers: 'As far as the nature of judgments is concerned, they do not refer to an external reality. Every judgment refers to another judgment. Every idea refers to another idea. No judgment or idea refers to any thing which is not a judgment or idea. All such references are ideal only. They are the products of our understanding which has an inherent capacity to construct images out of the bare sensory elements derived in sense-perception from the 'essences in themselves'.¹¹⁴ The process of judging consists in dealing with one's own internal reflex which is not an external object in the conviction that it is an external object.¹¹⁵ It has no reference to an external existence or non-existence.¹¹⁶ It is simply our idea which is taken to be non-different from its counter part (the thing as it is in itself) says Dharmottara¹¹⁷

Now a question arises: 'If judgments do not refer to an objective reality, all purposive actions of human beings will become impossible and people will not reach to their desired goal'. The Buddhist says that the judgments are not entirely illusory. They are objectively valid only to this extent that

they are not contradicted by human experience. They have a consistent position with the objects of our life.¹¹⁸ The objector raises another question, 'Is it not a contradiction to assume at one time that judgments are illusion and mere projections of our mind and at another time to assume their objective validity on the basis of practical experience of human life?' The Buddhist answers that 'the judgments are objectively real as far as our empirical life goes, but they are illusion as regards 'the essence-in-itself.' The empirical life is phenomenal. What is phenomenal is the work of understanding as necessitated by virtue of its own inherent nature. Judgment is the operation of understanding by virtue of its inherent nature. This is the reason why every judgment which is valid leads to a successful activity. Action is one of the five categories on which a judgment is moulded. So if action validates judgment there is nothing unreasonable in it.

9. Examination of Pramanavyavastha

What is the source of our judgments? Are they exclusive property of the faculty of our understanding, or they admit any kind of relation with the senses as well? There has been a controversy over this point between the realists belonging to the schools of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā, and the Buddhists. The realists hold that there is no such water-tight division between the faculty of senses and the faculty of understanding. A thing may be apprehended by senses as well as by understanding. For instance, fire may be apprehended by sense-perception (by seeing and touching) as well as by inference (from the presence of smoke). What actually takes place in our daily life is this that at first moment there arise bare sensations from the object which involve no determination or conception and we are not able to comprehend them within our ideas. It is the stage of indeterminate perception. In the next moment of apprehension that very object which was indistinct and dim

becomes clear and we know it that 'it is such and such.' It is the stage of determinate perception.¹¹⁹ Here the understanding begins to play its role and we apprehend the reality within the categories of space, time, and nature. There is no radical distinction between these two kinds of perceptions. The difference is only of degree, not of kind. Hence the perception involves the knowledge of the particular as well as of the universal. We cannot come to such a decision that 'this is a cow' unless we recognize that the entity of apprehension comes within the class of 'cows.' In fact there is no 'perception' without 'inference' and no inference without perception. For instance there is an element of sense-perception when we infer the presence of fire on the hill (?) there is an element of constructive thought when we see fire through our visual sense-organ. Hence there is no contradiction in maintaining the coalescence of sensation and conception.¹²⁰ This theory of the realists is known as the 'coalescence' theory of knowledge¹²¹ as it admits relation or meeting between the two sources of knowledge.

In contradistinction to the theory of the realists the Buddhists maintain a radical distinction between sensation and conception. According to them the faculty of sensation is quite separate from the faculty of conception (which includes inference and judgment) What is object of sensation cannot be touched by conception and what is the object of conception, cannot be touched by perception. For him the sensation and the conception are the only sources of knowledge. The knowledge which is derived neither from sensation nor from conception is not real knowledge at all.¹²² The object of sensation or sense-perception is the extreme particular, 'existence in itself,' a point-instant which transcends empirical space and empirical time, which is causally efficient and admits no distinction or definition.¹²³ It is the 'essence-in-itself' shorn of all extension. On the other hand the object of conception is the universal which is not reality¹²⁴

but simply a logical construction produced by the congenital capacity of our reason.¹²⁵ This universal is incapable of producing any effect. Hence it cannot be real. Since it is not real, it cannot produce any sensation. It does not produce any sensation, therefore it is devoid of any kind of efficiency and hence it is invisible.¹²⁶ To imagine any kind of relation or coalescence between the two absolutely dissimilar particular and universal is an impossibility. It will shake the very foundation upon which the grand citadel of Buddhist logic is based. Hence it would be spurious on our part to imagine that the 'essence-in-itself' can also be conceived by our imaginative faculty or inference. It is the universal which can be conceived by inference and where our relations can be applied.¹²⁷ There can be no relation between the universal and the particular.¹²⁸ This theory of the Buddhists is called 'pramāṇa-vyavasthā' (the theory of radical distinction). According to this theory the sense of vision apprehends only the colour, and the tactile sense-organ only the touch. The distinct image of fire which is in our mind is not the real fire but a universal. The real fire is only the moment of heat-sensation. On this theory even such perceptual judgments as 'this is a rose' 'this is a peacock' or 'this is a cow' become conceiving stage of our mind and therefore come within the field of inference. The Buddhist theory of Pramāṇa-vyavasthā is most scientific in its approach and is the proof of the logical acumen of the Buddhists. It is supported by some of the modern logicians of Europe who arrived at this conclusion through their independent approach. For instance Sigwart maintains that the perceptual judgments like 'this is gold' 'this is a pen' come within the province of inference.¹²⁹

Uddyotakara examines this theory and tries to reduce it to a point of absurdity. He says that there are not only two sources of knowledge i.e. particular and inference nor there are only two kinds of objects i.e. particular and universal,

On the other hand there are four sources of knowledge (1) perception (2) inference (3) analogy and (4) testimony which cannot be denied even by the Buddhist who on several occasions has admitted the infallibility of the words of the Buddha.¹³⁰ And there are three kinds of objects i.e. (1) the particular (2) the universal and (3) the individual (the possessor of universals).¹³¹ Further there is no such radical distinction between perception and inference. The object of perception can be known by inference, similarly the object of inference can be known by perception. The same thing may be known by sense-perception as well as by mental construction. The perception of colour may be limited to sense of visual. But the perception of solid bodies is not limited to the visual sense alone. For instance the jar may be cognised by visual sense organ as well as by tactile sense organ. The substances (the possessors of attributes) can be cognised by every sense-organ. He explains his theory of *Pramāṇa-samplava*, according to which the perception of every object involves sensation as well as perception, with the help of an example. He says we cognize fire, we apply not only the eye but also the mind. If the mind is not in attention we will not be able to apprehend the thing even though our eyes are fixed on it. In the same way in every act of inference there is an element of perception otherwise we will come to the absurd position that 'inference' is the exclusive domain of 'blind and deaf men.' Stcherbatsky critically examines both the theories and comes to conclusion that the fundamental differences which consists in the position of the realists and the Buddhist is due to the fact they take the word 'particular' and 'universal' on the entirely different level. Particulars and universals are empirically conceived by the realists while they are transcendently understood by the Buddhists.

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20. Principles of logic vol 1 p 10.

21. Madhyamā-pratīpat.
22. Athavā vijñānavad vijñeyamapi dravyata eveti kecin manyante vijñeyavad vijñānāmapi sarvṛtīteva na paramārthata ityasya dviprakārasyāpyekānta-vādasya pratiṣedhārthaḥ prakaraṇārambhaḥ. Trīmśikā-vijñāpti-bhāṣyam p 17 lines 13-15.
23. Pariṇāma.
24. Evaṁ ca sarvaṁ vijñeyaṁ parikalpita-svabhāvatvād vastuto na vidyate. Vijñānaṁ punaḥ pratītyadamutpannatvād dravyato' stītyabhyupeyam. Pratītya-samutpannatvaṁ punar vijñānasya pariṇāma-śabdena jñāpitam. Ibid p 18 lines 20-22.
25. Buddhist logic vol 1 p. 473.
26. Gṛhīta-sarītānaśca pratyakṣa-prṣṭha-bhāvino vikalpasyā 'dhyavaseyah. Prāpaṇīyaśca pratyakṣasya sarītāneva. Nyāya-praveśa-vṛtti-pañjikā p 74.
27. Yathārthāvisarṇvādītvād arthaṁ prāpayat pratyakṣaṁ pramāṇaṁ, tadvad arthāvinābhāvitvād anumānamapi paricchinna marthaṁ prāpayat pramāṇamiti. Ibid p 40. Adhyavaseyastu pratyakṣa-balotpannena niścayena sarītāneva. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p 16.
28. Infra. Chapter 2 Kinds of perception.
29. Svasarṇvedana pratyakṣa-siddhameva cānumāna-jñāna-pratibhā sino'rthasya sādharmaṇa-rūpatvamiti. Nyāya-praveśa-vṛttipañjikā. p 74.
30. 'The Empirical tradition in Bradley's logic' by Professor R. N. Kaul in the journal of 'the-Philosophical Quarterly' pp 177-189.
31. Ibid p 184.
32. Pratyakṣam tu vikalpa-jñānāt. Nyāya-kaṇikā p 257. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol 1 p 213.
33. Anumānaṁ vikalpa-rūpatvāt tad viśayam. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol 1 p 213.

34. Na ca vikalpānāṃ gocaro yo vikalpyate deśa-kāla avasthā bhedenaikatvena anusandhiyate. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā p 338 lines 15-16.
35. Tadevaidam.
36. Idamntā,
37. Tattā.
38. Grahaṇam.
39. Jñātata.
40. Yojanā or abhijalpa. Tattva-saṃgraha verse 890.
41. Samāropaḥ. Atha ko'yamadhyavasāyaḥ. Kim grahaṇamāho svitkarṇam ut yojanā atha samāropaḥ. Ibid p. 339 lines 9-10.
42. Adhyavasāya.
43. Anuvyavasāya.
44. Nirākāra.
45. Svasaṃvedana.
46. Jñātata.
47. Pūrvam sā jñātata ākārata grhyate paścād jñānam tad-jñātata-vaśāt. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 267 line 12. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol 2 p. 409 note 2.
48. Tatra svapratibhāsam anartham artham katham grhṇiyāt kuryād vā vikalpaḥ. Nahi pītaṃ nīlaṃ śakyaṃ kartuṃ vā śilpiśatenāpi. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā p. 339 lines 11-13.
49. Nāpyagrhitena svalakṣaṇena svākāraṃ yojaitumarhati vikalpaḥ. Na ca svalakṣaṇaṃ vikalpagocara iti copapāditam. Ibid p. 339 lines 12-14. Sa ca buddherātmagat evākāro yukto na bāhyas, tasyaikāntena parasparaṃ vivikta-svabhāvāt. Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā p. 288 lines 14-15.
50. Na tāvad agrhitāḥ svākāraḥ śakya āropaitumiti tadgrahaṇameṣitavyam. Tatkiṃ grhītvā āropayati atha yadaiva grhīti tadaivāropayati. Na tāyat pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ na hi

vikalpa-jñānaṁ kṣaṇikam kramavantau grahaṇa- samā-ropau karthumarhati. Uttarasmirṇstu pakṣe vikalpa-vasarṇvedana pratyakṣād vikalpākārād shamkārāspa-dāh aharṇkārāspadaṁ samāropyamāṇo vikalpo nāsva-gocarō na śakyo' bhinnaḥ'pratipattuṁ nāpi bāhyaṣvala-kṣaṇaikatvena śakyaḥ pratipattuṁ vikalpa-jñānena svalakṣaṇasya bāhysyapratibhāsanāt. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p. 339 lines 14-21.

51. Avidyā-balāt.

52. Yo vār'tho buddhi-viṣayo bāhyavastunibandhanah. Sa bāhyaṁ vastviti jñātaḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścidiṣyate Tattva-saṁgraha verse 891. Buddhi-rūpatvenāvīrbhā-vito bāhyatayādhyā-vasita ityārthaḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 285 lines 12-13.

53. Tasmādeṣa vikalpaviṣayo na jñānaṁ na jñānākāro nāpi bāhya-ityalīka evāstheyah. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p. 339 lines 21-22.

54. Rūpa.

55. Buddhyā kalpikayā.

56. Buddhyā kalpikayā viviktam aparair yadrūpam ullikh-yate buddhir no na bahiriti. Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭīkā. Quoted in Ibid p. 339 lines 22-23. This passage is not found in the Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā. Perhaps it is a quotation from Pramāṇa-viniścaya ṭīkā. Buddhist logic vol 2 p. 411 note 1.

57. Na kiñcid bhavato'bhidhīyate śabdaiḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 286 lines 4-5.

58. Grāhya-grāhakākāra.

59. Vitarka.

60. Vicāra.

61. Iti-kartavyatā loke sarva-śabda-vyapāśrayā. Yāṁ pūr-vāhita-saṁskāro bālo'pi pratipadyate. Quoted in Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 367 lines 24-25.

62. Atīta-bhava-nāmārtha-bhāvanā vāsanāvayāt. Sadyo jāto'pi yadyogād iti kartavyatā-patuḥ Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1216. Yasyāḥ kalpanāyāḥ yogāt iti-kartavyatā-yām smit-rudita-stanapāna praharṣādi-lakṣaṇāyām paṭuḥ bhavati. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 367 lines 22-23.
63. Adhyavasāyātmakarīṁ pratyakṣarīṁ savikalpakam. Buddhist logic vol 1 p. 211.
64. Abhilāpa-saṁsarga-yogya. Nyāya-bindu 1. 5.
65. Na santi saṁyogena, samavāyena, kāryatayā vā Pariśuddhi. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol 2 p. 259 note 6.
66. Na hyarthe śabdāḥ santi arthātmāno vā tathā-satyavyutpannasyāpi vyutpannavad vyavahāraḥ syādityayuktam. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā p. 88 lines 3-4.
Na hi saṁketamantareṇa śabdānām prakṛtyārtha prakāśanamasti, avyutpannasyāpi tato'rtha-pratīti prasaṁgāt. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 88 lines 15-16.
67. Saṁketamātra-bhāvinyo vācaḥ kutra na saṁgatāḥ. Nai-vātmādi-padānām ca prakṛtyārtha-prakāśanam. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 206. Svatantrecchā-mātra-bhāvī hi saṁketaḥ tanmātra-vācinyasca vācaḥ tatkathamāsārīṁ kvacidapi pravṛttīprasasarodho bhavet. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 88 lines 13-14.
68. Tasmād yaddṛṣṭam na tena śabdānām sambandho yena tu sambandho na taddṛṣṭam. Api ca dṛṣṭasya śabdavācyatve darśanādiva-vahniruşṇa iti vākyādapi pratiyeta. Tathā ca śabdādapi tasminpratite śītāpanodana-prasaṁgah. Nyāya-vārtika tātparya-ṭikā p. 88-89 lines 25, 27, 1.
69. Abhilāpa-saṁsarga-yagya-pratibhāsa pratītiḥ kalpanā. Nyāya-bindu 1. 5.
70. Tatra kācit pratītir abhilāpena saṁsṛṣṭābhāsā bhavati. Yathā vyutpanna-saṁketasya ghatārtha-kalpanā ghaṭa-śabda-saṁsṛṣṭārthābhāsā bhavati. Kācit tvabhilāpena

samsṛṣṭā'pyabhilāpasamsarga-yogyābhāsā bhavati,
yathā bālakasyāvutpanna-saṁketasya kalpanā. Nyāya-
bindu-ṭīkā p. 10 lines 12-15.

71. Vikalpayonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ kārya-
kāraṇatā teṣāṁ nārthaṁ śabdaḥ spṛśantyapi. Pramāṇa-
samuccaya.
72. Abhilāpinī pratītiḥ kalpanā. Tattva-saṁgraha verse
1214.
73. Vāsanā.
74. Sāmarthya.
75. Yasyāḥ kalpanāyāḥ yogāt itikartavyatāyāṁ smitārudita-
stanapāna-praharṣādi-lakṣaṇāyāṁ caturo bhavati,
Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 367 lines 22-23.
76. Sigwart logic I. p. 51. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol I
p. 215.
77. Cintotprekṣādile ca vispaṣṭāṁ yā pravedyate.
Anuviddhaiva sā śabdairaphnotuṁ na śakyate.
Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1217. Buddhist logic vol I p. 216.
78. Pratyakṣaṁ kalpanāpoḍhaṁ pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhyati.
Pramāṇa-vārtika 3.
79. Śabdārtha-ghaṭaṇā-yogyā vṛkṣa ityādi rūpataḥ. Yā
vācāmaprayoge'pi sābhilāpeva jāyate. Tattva-saṁgraha
verse 1215.
Vikṣa ityādirupato yā vācāmaprayogē'iti
sambandhaḥ. Yadi vā pūrveṇa śabdārthaghaṭaṇā-yogyā
vṛkṣa ityādirūpatā itī sambandhaḥ. Anena pratyakṣata
eva kalpanāyāḥ siddhi-mādarśayati sarvaprāṇa bhṛtām-
anusiddhatvād vikalpasya. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā
p. 367 lines 14-16. See Infra. Chapter III section
kalpanā.
80. Avyapa-deśyam.
81. Vikalpayonayaḥ śabdāḥ vikalpāḥ śabdayonayaḥ. Pram-
āṇa samuccaya.

82. Abhilāpinī-pratītiḥ kalpanā. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1214.
83. Quoted in the Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 367 line 4.
84. Klṛpti hetutvādyātmikā na tu. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1214.
85. Klṛptir-vyapadeśaḥ Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 367 line 7.
86. Abhilāpo vācakaḥ śabdāḥ, sa ca sāmānyākāraḥ. Ibid p. 367 lines 9-10.
87. Yā vācāmaprayoge'pi sābhilāpeva jāyate. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1215.
88. Iti-kartavyatā loke sarva-śabda-vyapāśrayā.
Yaṁ pūrvāhit-saṁskāro balo'pi pratipadyate.
Quoted in the Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 367 lines 24-25.
89. Sā punaḥ sanmūrchitākṣarākāra dhvani-viśiṣṭamantar mātrā viparivarttinamarthambahirivādarśayantī teṣāṁ samupajāyate, yayā paścāt saṁketa-grahaṇa-kuśalā bhavanti. Ibid p. 367 lines 25-27.
90. Svalakṣaṇa.
91. Deśa-kāla-svabhāvānanugata.
92. Yadṛcchā śabdeṣu nāmnā viśiṣṭo'rtha uccyate dittha iti, jāti-śabdeṣu jātyā gauriti, guṇa-śabdeṣu guṇena śukla iti. Kriyā śabdeṣu kriyayā pācaka iti, dravya-śabdeṣu dravyeṇa daṇḍī viśāṇīti. Quoted in Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 369 lines 23-25 and Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyāṭikā p. 102 lines 2-5.
93. Svasiddhaiva kevalā kalpanā. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1224.
94. Na kirīcid bhāvato'bhidhīyate śabdaiḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 286 lines 4-5.
95. Yadṛcchā śabda vācyāyā jāteḥ sadbhāvato na ca. Avyāptirasya mantavyā prasiddhestu pṛthakśrutiḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1226.

96. The Philosophy of Grammar by Otto Jaspers p. 65.
97. Nanvanṅāpoha vācyatvāj-jāti śabdastu kevalaḥ. Viva-
kṣāparatantratvād vivakṣā śabda eva vā. Tattva-saṁ-
graha verse 1227.
98. Sa tyarṅ lokānuvṛttyedamuktaṁ nyāya-videdṛśam. Iya-
neva hi śabdo'smin vyavahāra-pathaṁ gataḥ. Ibid
verse 1228.
99. Gavādayo hi śabdā loke jātiśabdatayā pratītāḥ,
Citrāṅgadādayastu samjñāśabdatvena iti pṛthag vaca-
nam. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 371 lines 2-3.
100. Sattā.
101. Nāmakaḥpanā.
102. Buddhist logic vol 1 p. 218.
103. Ibid.
104. Vikalpa-vāsanā
105. Dvaidhīkaraṇa
106. Ta eva bheda avivakṣita-bhedāḥ sāmānyam. Tattva-
saṁgraha pañjikā p. 371. lines 1-2
107. Kalpanā.
108. Ekam avibhāgaṁ svalakṣaṇaṁ anādivikalpa-vāsanā-
samāropita-jātyādibhedāṁ tathā tathā vikalpyate.
Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p. 89 lines 12-13.
109. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 220.
110. Ibid vol. 1 p. 222.
111. Vyavasāyātmaka-padaṁ sāksāt savikalpakasya
Vācakaṁ tathā hi vyavasāyo viniścayo vikalpa itya-
narthāntaram. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā. p. 87 lines
24-25.
112. Arthakriyākāritva
113. Alīkabāhyameṣāṁ viśayaḥ bāhyabhedāgrahaścāsyā
bāhyatvaṁ na punar bāhyābhedagrahaḥ. Nyāya-
vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā. p. 339 lines 24-25.

114. Yadartha-sāmarthyalabdha-janma na tacchabda-kalpanānugatam. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā p. 88 line 10.
115. Svākāram abāhyam bāhyamadhyavasyan vikalpaḥ svākārabāhyaviṣaya iti cet. Ibid p. 339 lines 7-8.
116. Svapratibhāse 'narthe' dhyavasāyena pravṛttatvāt. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p 9 line 20.
117. Sarvo'yam anumānānumeya-bhāvo buddhyārūḍhena dharmā-dharmibhāvena na bahiḥ sadasattvam apekṣate. Pramāṇa-samuccaya. Quoted in Ibid p. 127 lines 2, 3 and p. 39 lines 13-14.
118. Buddhyā kalpikayā viviktamaparair Yadrūpam ullikhyate buddhir no na bahiriti. Pramāṇa-viniścaya-ṭīkā. Quoted in Ibid p. 339 lines 22-23.
119. Savikalpaka-pratyakṣa.
120. Pratyakṣayor anumānayor vā samplave na bādḥakam uktam. Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 303 note 2.
121. Samplava, Saṁkāra. Ekasmin viṣaye sarveṣāṁ pramāṇāṁ pravṛttiḥ. Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 302 note 1.
122. Pramāṇa-samuccaya 1. 2.
123. Svalakṣaṇaṁ tu syāt tadeva paramārtha-sat. Arthakriyā-sāmarthya-lakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ. Etadeva asya svam asādhāraṇaṁ lakṣaṇaṁ yaddeśato 'nanugamenā-deśātmakasya paramārthatvaṁ, kālato' nanugamena ca kṣaṇikatvam. Tasmāt svalakṣaṇa-viṣayaṁ pratyakṣam. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā p 12 lines 19-20.
124. Sāmānya. vikalpādhiṣṭhānaṁ vikalpa-viṣayo'likam. Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 305 note 3.
125. Sāmānyaṁ vyāvṛttirūpam alīkam, anādi-vikalpa-vāsānā vāsitam. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 305 note 1.

126. Sāmānyam arthakriyāyām asaktatvāt tan na paramārtha-sat, asattvān na tad vijñāna-janakam, ajanakattvān na sarūpakam, asarūpakatvān na darśanāgocaraḥ. Pariśuddhi. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 264 note 4.
127. Pratibandhaḥ sāmānya dharmāvāśrayate. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p. 12 line 24.
128. Paramārthasat sāmānyam vicāra asaham. ' Pariśuddhi. Quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 305 no. 1.
129. Sigwart logic vol. 2. p. 395.
130. Pramāṇa-vārtika. Chapter 2. Bhagavat-prāmāṇya-vārtikam.
131. Viśeṣa-sāmānya-viśeṣa tadvad-bhedāt tredhā. Nyāya-vārtika p. 14 line 2. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 312 note 22.
132. Sāmvyāvahārika.

CHAPTER VII

THE IDEALISTIC THEORY OF INFERENCE

1. Judgment and inference

Judgment and inference are the two operations of one and the same faculty of understanding.¹ Both are called knowledge which arises after sensation. The Buddhist term for both of them is inference.² The Buddhist inference is not the inference of the realists. It is understanding, judgment, or imagination. In a word it is mediate knowledge. There is little difference between judgment and inference. As Bradley says every judgment implies inference essentially. 'Judgment comes short of inference only so far as it omits to mark or specify a condition fundamental to its own being. Inference on the other side makes ostensible this condition involved in all judgment.'³ Thus inference is a developed judgment.

Although every judgment carries in itself the ground of its justification or the process of its formation, this ground or process is not explicitly laid down in it, when this is explicit it becomes an inference. Inference is therefore a judgment which carries in itself the ground of its justification on the logical process of its formation. Stcherbatsky rightly calls judgment proper as perceptual judgment and 'svārthānumāna' as inferential judgment. The former is direct and the later is indirect. The indirect judgment or inference has three terms, which are called subject, or minor term, predicate or major term and mark or middle term. Of these three terms the middle term is the mediator between other two terms. It suggests the explicit meaning of a judgment and explicates what is implicit in it.⁴ In an inferential judgment we cognise the object 'P' or the major term through its mark 'M' or middle term

which is cognized with 'S' the minor term in a perceptual judgment. For example 'there is fire' because 'there is smoke' this is inferential judgment where 'fire' is cognized at a particular place because of its association with smoke which is cognized in a perceptual judgment.

2. The nature of inference

Akṣapāda defines inference as knowledge which is preceded by perception and which is of three kinds, apriori, a posteriori and commonly seen.⁵ The same definition with a little change is given by Nāgārjuna in the *Upāyaḥ-dayam*.⁶ Vātsyāyana while amending this definition states that 'inference is the knowledge of an object through the previous knowledge of some sign or mark.'⁷ This definition of inference in terms of mark or middle term was further amended by Diñnāga in his doctrine of the three aspects of the middle term. According to him anumāna consists in the presence of the middle term in the subject of the inference⁸, its presence again what is like the subject of the inference (*sapakṣe sattvam*) and its absence in what is not like the subject (*vipakṣe sattvam*).⁹ Later Buddhist logicians adopted Diñnāga's definition of inference. The Nyāya-praveśa first defines 'inference' as 'the cognition of an object through a mark but immediately adds to it that the mark again has three aspects'. Thus according to the Nyāya-Praveśe 'inference is the cognition of an object through a mark which has three aspects.' Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara explicitly include the three aspects of the mark into the definition of inference.¹⁰ Uddyotakara and Vācaspati Miśra criticize Diñnāga's definition of inference based upon three aspects of mark. From their long criticism of the doctrine of *trairūpya* and the adoption of the doctrine by post Diñnāga Buddhist logicians it is clear that this theory in its developed form was initiated by Diñnāga, although as Stcherbatsky says it was already contained in Vasubandhu's works.¹¹ And as

Randle says it is already implicitly present in Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya on Nyāya-sūtra chapter 5, 1.34 and even in that sūtra itself.¹² There seems to be much truth in Suguir's findings that the significance of the middle term (called *hetu*) for inference and hence for the theory of reasoning is for the first time discussed by Diñnāga and the result of his study is the famous doctrine of the three phases of *hetu*.¹³

The doctrine of *trairūpya* is explicitly adopted by the Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda in his *Padārtha-dharma-saṃgraha*. He cites two couplets in which this doctrine is mentioned and which father this doctrine to Kāśyapa or Kaṇāda.¹⁴ Hence a question is raised as to which of the two Diñnāga and Praśastapāda borrowed the doctrine from the other. Stcherbatsky believed in 1904 that Praśastapāda borrowed the doctrine from Diñnāga. A. B. Dhruva and Randle on the contrary have established the view that Praśastapāda took the doctrine which first developed in the Vaiśeṣika circles. Between these two extreme positions Stcherbatsky in his *Buddhist logic* maintained in 1932 that we cannot here deny the possibility of mutual influencing and borrowing at an early date. But the developed *trairūpya* theory is essentially Buddhist.¹⁵ So there was mutual borrowing and influencing between Buddhist and Vaiśeṣika logicians. The dates of Diñnāga and Praśastapāda are controversial. Stcherbatsky, Randle and Keith believe that Diñnāga was prior to Praśastapāda. Stcherbatsky however later on revised this judgment and held that Praśastapāda was an elder contemporary of Diñnāga. A. B. Dhruva has established that the balance of probability is in favour of Praśastapāda's priority to Diñnāga.¹⁶ But it is significant that although the doctrine of *trairūpya* is mentioned by Praśastapāda in connection with the characters of *hetu* or middle term this doctrine is not incorporated in his definition of inference. For Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara the doctrine constitutes the definition of in-

ference. Hence even though Praśastapāda is prior to Diānāga the incorporation of the three aspects of hetu in the definition of inference is first made by Diānāga. The credit of defining inference by means of the doctrine of the three phases of hetu must therefore be given to Diānāga.

The inference defined in terms of three phases of hetu is the cognition based on the principle, *nota notae est nota rei ipsius*. Kant laid down this principle which is an improvement upon Aristotle's dictum '*de omne et nullo*'.¹⁷ Aristotle's dictum means the axiom of inclusion in extension. Obviously if inference involves inclusion in extension it embodies a *petitio principii*. Kant saved the principle of inference from its defect by replacing the axiom of 'inclusion and extension' by the axiom of connection of attributes or marks. His principle states 'what stands under the condition of a rule stands under the rule.' In other words the condition of the rule or the nota or mark leads to another nota or mark. This is inference in Kantian terminology which is in fact the same as the Buddhist definition of inference which states that inference is the cognition of an attribute or an object through a mark. Obviously this definition of inference is free from the fallacy of *petitio principii* which vitiates Aristotle's dictum '*de omni*.'

Bradley points out that even this definition of inference as *nota notae est* or *lingādartha darśanam anumānam* is defective. It cannot cover all the cases of inference. There are inferences which the principle does not justify. For example A is prior to B and B to C and therefore A is prior to C is a perfectly valid inference. But this is not covered by the principle '*de nota notae*' or (*lingādartha darśanam*). Buddhist logicians too recognised that the definition of *anumāna* as '*de nota notae*' is too narrow to include all the cases of inference. This truth is brought home to us by their serious attempts to define inference by means of invariable concomitance or '*avinābhāva*.' Vasubandhu is the first logician who defines inference as the cognition of an

object inseparably connected with another object by a person who knows about it from perception.¹⁸ Diñnāga adopts this definition in the definition of *hetu* and maintains that 'reason is a quality of the subject or minor term which is pervaded (universally accompanied) by an aspect (major term) of the subject.'¹⁹ As Randle remarks 'the Vyāpti doctrine is ultimately inconsistent with the view of inference as an affair of examples embodied in the *trairūpya* doctrine.'²⁰ Keith has pointed out that 'the fact that reasoning can only be by means of a general proposition had thus not yet been appreciated in the school (of Nyāya), for this reasoning still was from particular to particular by analogy in the manner approved by J. S. Mill.'²¹ Thus he is right in showing the fact that inference for *Akṣapāda* and *Uddyotakara* consists in reasoning from particular to particular by analogy or *drṣṭānta*. Vasubandhu was the first Indian logician who dispersed away with the role of example or *drṣṭānta* in inference and clearly laid down the principle of internal inseparability or invariability (*antarvyapti*). The Jain logician *Siddhasena Divākara* refers to Vasubandhu and credits him with the invention of the doctrine of *antarvyāpti*.²²

Ratnākara Śānti criticizes the doctrine of *bahirvyapti* which is maintained by Nyāya-*vaiśeṣika* philosopher as of no use in inference, because it is liable to be forgotten.²³ The *bahirvyāpti* or external invariability is illustrated by the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire as seen in kitchen. This is established on the evidence of perception. The internal invariability or *antarvyāpti* is illustrated by the invariable concomitance of smoke and fire. It does not refer to kitchen. It does away with it and is formulated by understanding. There is no cognition of kitchen in the formulation of *vyāpti*.²⁴ *Uddyotakara* has criticized Vasubandhu's doctrine of *vyāpti* and has shown that it should be formulated as *nāntarīyaka darśanam*. A B. Dhruva has rightly clarified the misgivings of Keith and shown that 'it

is not the doctrine of *avinabhāva* or *nāntarīyakārthadarśanam* but only the particular form in which the definition is worded.²⁵ We can go a step further and say that Uddyotakara has criticized the doctrine of *antarvyāpti* and maintained the doctrine of *vahirvyāpti*. This is the reason why example or *dṛṣṭānata* is retained by him in syllogism. The Buddhist logicians rejected example from their syllogism and held that syllogism consists of two premises apart from its conclusion. The two premises are *pakṣadharmatā* and *vyāpti*²⁶ This reform of five membered syllogism was necessitated by the doctrine of *antarvyāpti*. A. B. Dhruva has ignored the distinction between *antarvyāpti* and *vahirvyāpti* and hence has not given credit to Vasubandhu and *Dīnāga* for the innovation of the doctrine of *vyāpti*. Randle has noted the distinction between the *vyāpti* doctrine and the *trairūpya* doctrine which is connected with *vahirvyāpti* and found them mutually inconsistent. The *antarvyāpti* doctrine is the principle of modern logicians like Spencer, Jevons, Waundt, Bradley and Bosanquet, who maintain that the principle of inference is that 'the things related to the same are related to each other.' Bradley however modifies this principle and puts it in the form that 'things related to the same are related to each other'²⁷ under certain conditions or related to the same within the same kind or interrelated within that kind.' In this amended form Bradley finds the principle of *antarvyāpti* as covering and explaining all cases of inference. In this connection it can be safely said that the Buddhist doctrine of *antarvyāpti* has been better appreciated in the circle of modern idealist logicians than in the circle of *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* philosophers.

3. Principles of inference

Much confusion has recently gathered round the original contribution of *Dīnāga* to the logical theory. Keith for example gives *Dīnāga* the credit of the innovation of the

doctrine of generalization (avinābhāva). But A. B. Dhruva traces its origin to Nyāyavaiśeṣika circles and denies what Keith has said.²⁸ Similarly Diñnāga's original contribution to the nature of inference is subject to the same fate.²⁹ Siguira, Vidyābhūṣaṇa and Stcherbatsky maintain that Diñnāga's theory of what is to be inferred is different from the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika theory of what is to be inferred. All such confusions are due to the discrimination between the idealistic and the realistic theory of inference. Buddhist logicians hold an idealistic theory of inference whereas Nyāya Vaiśeṣika logicians hold realistic theory of inference.

Diñnāga says that the object of inference is an ideal construction. The whole business of probans and probandum depends upon the relation of quality and possessor of quality, a relation which is imposed by thought and has no reference to an external existence and non-existence.³⁰ Thus according to him the relation of logical reason and consequence does not depend upon external reality but on the relation of attribute and the thing which is a product of the mind. Keith has rightly commented upon this passage that 'the ideas thus obey laws of connection not imposed by reality, but by the action of our own thought and thus apriori in character.'³¹ Inference according to Diñnāga has apriori characters. The principle of generalization or antaryvāpti is the basis of inference. It is apriori law of our mind. It is not derived from observation or from inference. Inference depends upon it and it does not depend upon inference. In Kantian terminology the principle of generalisation depends upon the categories of identity and causality. Dharmakīrti explains this almost in a phraseology which reminds of Kantian terminology. He says that the rule according to which there exists an inseparable connection between objects does not arise from observation or non-observation, but from the laws of causality and identity which have a universal application.'³²

The problem of antarvyāpti or generalisation in Buddhist logic is the same as the problem of induction posed by Hume in western logic. Hume reduced the principle of generalisation to the association of ideas and undermined its apriori character. Kant defended the principle by showing that this principle is based upon causality which is a necessary precondition of our thinking. But Kant's defence denies that there is a problem of generalisation and hence empiricist logicians who acknowledge Hume's problem of generalisation or induction find little support in Kant's defence in favour of the justification of the generalisation principle. Joseph has solved the problem of generalisation by saying that it is deducible from the law of identity. According to him causality itself is derived from this law. In this way Kant and Joseph have demonstrated the validity of the process of generalisation by assuming that causality or identity is the precondition of our thinking. It is of no mean importance that Dharmakīrti's defence of the principle of generalisation is in substance the same as that of both Kant and Joseph. This fact shows beyond any shadow of doubt that Dīñnāga and Dharmakīrti's theory of inference is idealistic and is nearer the theory of Kant and Joseph.³³ Keith is perfectly justified in saying that the principle of apriori has had a natural right to exist in Buddhistic idealism.³⁴ A. B. Dhruva's criticism of Keith's view ignores the basic difference between idealistic logic and empirical logic. The principle of generalisation or vyāpti which is not a precondition of our thinking but is derived from observations cannot explain the problem of induction and cannot provide for the rule of deduction. Because according to Buddhist logicians all ideas are mental and are conditioned by the principle of generalisation which is mental. All ideas behave in accordance with the principle of generalisation. Inference is based upon the apriori principles that is the

principles which are not derived from observation and which prevade all mental constructions.

Another important point in the Buddhist theory of inference is that it demonstrated the idea of the substantive as it is qualified by its attributes. What is inferred is neither a substance nor an attribute nor their connection but the qualification of the substantive by its attribute.³⁵ In this way Diñnāga has criticized the realist theories of inference and established his idealistic theory of inference. Inference does not refer to any external reality. It proceeds on the ideal construction of the attributive and goes to the ideal conception of a substantive as ideally modified by it. The substantive, the attributive and their relation are all ideal construction. Nyāya Vaiśeṣika philosophers failed to understand their ideal character and committed a fallacy which may be termed as the fallacy of illegitimate physicalism. Vācaspati Miśra for example raises two objections against Diñnāga's view of the 'probandum' of inference :

First, there is no substance like a mountain according to Diñnāga which may be perceived as the locus of an attribute like smoke.³⁶ Secondly, in the opinion of those who hold that substance as a spatial point is an object of observation, the inference from smoke rising in the sky and reaching clouds is not possible because no spatial point is observable in the case.³⁷ Both these objections of Vacaspati Miśra are vitiated by the fallacy of the illegitimate physicalism. There is no legitimate ground in regarding substance and space as physical wholes. They are mental categories, and not physical things independent of mental activity. Whenever an inference is made its probandum occupies a point in mental space and is further characterized by the categories of the substantive and the attributive which are as much mental as mental space. So Vācaspati Miśra's objections fail to undermine Diñnāga's theory of probandum. They

are illustrations of 'ignoratio elenchi' rather than the defects in Diñnāga's theory. A. B. Dhruva also commits the fallacy of illegitimate physicalism by following Vācaspati Miśra's love of criticism of Diñnāga's theory. It is significant that modern logic has incorporated the theory of logical constructions in its epistemology and maintains that inference is confined to logical construction. Inference has nothing to do with the objects of sensation. Buddhist logicians particularly Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti were the first who innovated the idealistic theory of inference and demarcated it from the realistic theory of sensation or perception. They have a realistic theory of sensation and an idealistic theory of inference. Their overall view is therefore akin to modern mathematical logic in which axioms and logical constructions perform the same function which is done by Vikalpanā in the epistemology of Yogācāra idealism.

The third characteristic of Buddhist theory of inference is that it bases inference upon ideal relations which are called by modern logicians as 'logical relations.' The Vaiśeṣika philosophers based inference upon four real relations which are causation (kārya) inherence (samavāya) conjunction (saṁyoga) and contradiction.³⁸ Buddhist logicians have rejected the theory of real relations. Dharmakīrti has written a special treatise in refutation of these relations. He has based inference upon three ideal relations which are identity, causality and negation.³⁹ Although modern logic has gone ahead of Buddhist logic so far as the logical properties of relations is concerned. Yet it is significant that the Buddhists were the first logicians who started investigation into the logical properties of relations and distinguished logical relations from real relations. The discovery of negation as a logical relation is particularly of immense importance. Buddhists have developed a concatenation of ideas which are mutually related by negation.

The Buddhistic theory of inference is characterised by the doctrine of the apriori, the doctrine of logical construc-

tions, the doctrine of *antarvyāpti* which is the second analogy of experience in Kantian terminology, the doctrine of the attributive and the substantive which is the first analogy of experience in Kantian terms and finally the doctrine of ideal or logical relations. These characteristics of inference must be understood thoroughly to avoid the fallacy of illegitimate physicalism which is often committed in understanding it.

4. Is Inference a *pramana* ?

Materialists deny that inference is a source of right knowledge. They have adduced the following reasons in their support.

First, inference is brought about by the three-featured probans which is present even in wrong cognitions⁴⁰ and therefore it cannot lead to a desirable result. For instance the eye and other organs are for the purpose of other persons, because they are composite things like couch, seat and other things. But this inference is obviously fallacious, for eyes are not for the purpose of other persons

Secondly, the three features may be present in cases where there is no inference at all, as two features of reason are found to be present in the cases which are not inferences.⁴¹ Hence three features of reason do not constitute inferences.

Thirdly, the contradiction of every inference is possible and hence inference is antithetical. For instance a thesis may be proved that 'sound is non-eternal because it is a product like a jar,' but its antithesis can equally be proved that 'sound is eternal, because it is incorporeal⁴² like the sky'.⁴³

Fourthly, the process of inference involves the fallacy of *petitio principii*. Every inference involves an invariable relation between the mark or the middle term and the object to be inferred or the major term. From the vision of smoke we can infer the existence of fire only when

we already know that the smoke is always contained in fire. This knowledge of invariable relation between the two is the indispensable condition for inferring the existence of fire from the vision of smoke. In absence of such a knowledge no inferential knowledge is possible. If we start with this knowledge that there is an invariable relation between the thing seen and the thing to be inferred, what we gain through such inference is no new knowledge at all. It is the knowledge of what is already known.⁴⁴

Fifthly, the structure of inferential knowledge is based on the invariable relation between the middle term or mark and the major term or the object to be inferred. The knowledge derived from inference may be certain and true if there is certainty regarding the invariable relation. This certainty may be achieved only if we can perceive all the cases of smoke and fire existing now in different parts of the world. But it is impossible. It is beyond the capacity of human beings to apprehend all the cases of smoke and fire existing in different parts of the world. It is more impossible to perceive the past and future existences of smoke and fire at one and the same time. Therefore invariable relation cannot be established by perception. If it is assumed on the basis of inference, we will have to assume another inference to know this inference and so on, thus it will lead to an infinite regress. If we assume that this relation is based on the testimony of trustworthy persons, it will not be devoid of difficulty because testimony itself depends on inference. The relation of invariable concomitance being itself uncertain and unestablished, cannot give certainty to inference which demands it as an indispensable condition.⁴⁵

These Materialists' arguments have been thoroughly examined and found fallacious by Buddhist logicians, who maintain that inference is a source of right knowledge like perception. (1) The first argument of the materialists cannot be available, because the three featured-mark or reason

is never present in any wrong cognition.⁴⁶ Right cognition is that cognition which is appurtenant to the thing as such and which leads to the thing desired. On the contrary, wrong cognition is the cognition which is not appurtenant to the thing as such and which does not lead to the thing desired.⁴⁷ The cognition proceeding from the three-featured probans is indirectly appurtenant to the thing-in-itself, and leads to the desired a object, hence it cannot be wrong cognition. It is the factor of appurtenance or consistency with the thing which forms the basis of our right cognition. It is this factor which makes our perception valid, and is admitted even by the materialists. The same factor is present in the cognition emanating from the three-featured probans. Thus the same basis of validity is equally present both in the perception and the inference. To accept the one and to refute the other would be unjustifiable.⁴⁸ The illustration of the first argument given by the Materialists is in appropriate, for its reason lacks the character of three features. In as much as there is no absence of the reason in the contrary of the probandum as there is nothing which is non-composite.

(2) The second argument of the Materialists fails to establish its probandum. Three features of reason discriminate inference from perception.⁴⁹ The Materialists could not give any instance of a cognition which has three featured reason and which is not inference. It is possible to have a non-inferential cognition which has two features of reason but it does not prove that three features of reason are present in wrong inferential cognition.⁵⁰

(3) The third argument of the Materialists is serious, and undermines the very possibility of inference. For, it shows that inference by nature is paradoxical. This argument may be called the paradox of inference. Diñnāga recognises it as a fallacious reason. He calls it antinomic reason which is the same as the Kantian antinomy of reason. His term for its is *viruddhāvyaḥicāri*⁵¹

which literally means that reason which is contradictory and non-contradictory. But there is a difference between Diñnāga's fallacy of antinomic reason and the Materialists' paradox of inference. Materialists maintain that all inferences are paradoxical and hence valid, whereas Diñnāga holds that some inferences are paradoxical and hence invalid. According to Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara the paradoxical inferences have reasons which lack in three features and which cannot be corroborated by the force of facts⁵² and which pertain to the subject matter of scriptural testimony. They show that the paradox of inference is impossible because its form is not established by valid means of knowledge.⁵³ Only that inference is fallacious whose form is not established by valid means of knowledge i.e. which is not presented by a three-featured reason. Another reason why the paradox of inference is impossible is that the reason in every inference is either existential identity or a cause which cannot be self-contradictory.⁵⁴ Further Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla demonstrate that the antinomic reason or the paradox of inference is based upon several confusions :

First, although the contradiction of a particular inference is possible, yet the contradiction of inference as such is not possible. The contradiction of a particular inference does not mean the contradiction of inference as such. The contradictions of particular inferences far from proving the invalidity of inference as such rest upon the validity of inference as such.⁵⁵

Secondly, the denial of inference as a source of right cognition would deprive the Materialists of the very basis of their arguments. Materialists want to express their ideas and intentions to others. But these ideas and intentions are not object of perception. They cannot be perceived. They are simply inferred with the help of the words which they speak. If there is no inference their ideas cannot be known.⁵⁶

Thirdly, it is only a well-ascertained probans which leads to a desired object and not the doubtful one. For instance the existence of fire is inferred from a well-ascertained smoke and not from one which is suspected as vapour. And once the nature of a probans has been ascertained, it is impossible to make it otherwise. Because one thing cannot have two contradictory nature.⁵⁷ Hence a valid inference cannot be contradicted when a certain conclusion has been deduced with great care from an inference, it cannot be proved to be otherwise, even by cleverer persons.⁵⁸

Fourthly, though the things vary with the variations of condition place and time, still the cognition of things is not unattainable through such probans which are well-ascertained. Men well-versed in particular things are capable of discerning them from other things.

Fifthly, those reasons or probans which lead to contradictory conclusions are not proper reasons. They lack the three features. The proper reasons which have three features are not liable to contradiction.

Lastly, an inference which is based on the nature of things cannot have a probans which may lead to contradictory conclusions, because contradictory properties cannot belong to one and the same thing.

These refutations of the third argument of the Materialists have a special significance in Yogācāra epistemology. Diñnāga like Kant discovered the antinomy of reason or the dialectical character of reason. But where Kant discarded reason on account of it and made room for faith, Diñnāga allotted to it its right place and saved reason from its pollution. The Kantian solution of the antinomy of reason is illogical as well as misological. It generates hatred for logic and places moral and religious experiences over and above logic. Hegel solves the antinomy of reason by making it the very nature of reason and interpreting it

as creative through its dialectical functions. His solution is epistemological and is acceptable only to the epistemology of idealism which lays down that knowledge or reason is creative.

Diñnāga's solution of the antinomy of reason is logical. It avoids Kantian misology and Hegelian panlogism. It does not make reason as such antinomic as both Kant and Hegel have done. He does not infer the fallacious character of all reason as Kant has done. He does not treat all knowledge as self-contradictory as Hegel has done. His theory of inference is near Hegelian theory of inference but his theory of perception saves him from the Hegelian mistake of panlogism. He counts the antinomy of reason as a kind of fallacious reason which is its logical solution. But it is unfortunate that his followers, like Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara denied the antinomy of reason and did not benefit from Diñnāga's solution of it, for they did not recognise the antinomic reason as a fallacious reason. Hindu logicians benefitted from Diñnāga's logic and accepted his antinomic reason or viruddhāvyabhicāri hetu as sat-pratipakṣa-hetvābhāṣa, that is a fallacious reason which has a contradictory probandum. In this connection it can safely be said that Diñnāga's discovery of antinomic reason was better appreciated by Hindu logicians than by the Buddhist ones.

(4) The fourth argument of the Materialists against the validity of inference raises the important point that every inference has a petitio. J. S. Mill makes the same charge against inference or syllogism. Johnson while replying to the charges of Mill made a distinction between epistemic conditions and constitutive conditions of syllogism. The constitutive conditions are those conditions which are independent for the thinker. They mean the logical relations upon which inference is based. The epistemic conditions are those conditions which refer to the relation of the premises to what the thinker may happen to know. They are

the psychological conditions and pertain to the thinker who infers. Johnson has maintained that the fallacy of *petitio principii* relates to epistemic conditions and has no bearing upon the constitutive conditions. The conclusion of syllogism is logically dependent upon its premises but this logical dependence has nothing to do with *petitio principii*. It is the logical relation of implication upon which inference is based. The relation of implication is unique. The conclusion is not contained in the premises as the charge of *petitio principii* demands. The conclusion on the contrary is implied by premises. Inference is valid in virtue of its form or of the objective relation of implication. Johnson's defence of syllogism has become a classical argument and has been repeatedly held by almost all later writers on logic. Bradley however raises his voice of dissent to this solution of Johnson. He asserts that if inference is defined as *dictum de omni* or the principle of 'nota notae' then the fallacy of *petitio principii* can not be avoided from it. The fallacy demands that the Aristotelian definition of inference should be replaced by a new definition. Bradley consequently attempts the new definition of inference as the knowledge of things related to each other from the knowledge of their relations to one and the same thing. Obviously there is no scope for *petitio principii* in this definition of inference

Diñnāga's definition of inference has already been shown to be the same as that of Bradley. Diñnāga himself charges the definition of inference given by some logicians with the fallacy of *petitio principii*. If some logicians infer fire from smoke they gain no new knowledge from this inference for it is already known that smoke is inseparably connected with fire.⁵⁹ What is inferred is not fire or the connection of fire with smoke because they are already known. What is inferred is a fiery place or a fiery hill which is previously unknown. Thus inference is new knowledge and is not vitiated with a *petitio principii*.

(5) The last argument of the Materialists against the validity of inference concerns the principle of generalisation or universal concomitance. It rightly maintains that this principle cannot be derived from induction per simple enumeration or induction by analogy. But from this it does not follow that the principle of universal concomitance upon which inference is based is unavailable. The principle is available because it is apriori as Dharmakīrti says : 'The principle of universal concomitance is derived neither from observation nor from non-observation but is deduced from the apriori concept of identity and causality'.⁶⁰ The principle of universal concomitance is thus the presupposition of all operations of understanding, and is not derived from perception. So the argument of the Materialists is in applicable to it.

All the arguments of Materialists against the validity of inference being rejected inference is established as a right means of cognition. Dharmakīrti adduces three arguments for recognising inference as a right means of cognition. First, origination, meaning, validity or invalidity of objects of perception demand a source of cognition other than perception. Secondly, the ideas and intentions of other minds are not amenable to perception. They therefore require inference, i.e a source of knowledge other than perception. Thirdly, negative judgments demonstrate that inference is a source of knowledge because they cannot be the result of perception. The object of perception is present before the senses whereas the object of negative judgment is not present before them, so it cannot be apprehended by perception. It is known only by inference.⁶¹

These arguments of Dharmakīrti positively establish beyond any shadow of doubt that over and above perception there is another source of knowledge which has the contrary characteristics of perception. It is the source of mediate knowledge and is called inference or anumāna.

These arguments of Dharmakīrti weighed against the Materialists' arguments and exercised much influence upon the later logicians. His influence passed beyond Buddhism and swept Jain and Hindu logicians,⁶² who maintain the validity of inference as a source of right cognition against the Materialists onslaughts on it. The object of inference according to Buddhism is neither the same as the object of perception nor a copy of it. It is entirely different from the object of perception. The object of perception is sensible (grāhya) and essence-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa) whereas the object of inference is conceivable (adhyavaṣeya), and universal (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa). The novelty of the object of inference further establishes the independence of inference from perception. Inference is an independent source of knowledge. Its nature, its mode of operation, its object and its result all are independent of perception, and different from the nature of perception, mode of operation of perception, object of perception and result of perception respectively. Inference is thus as much an independent source of knowledge as perception.

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29. Ibid XXII-XXIII.
30. Sarvo'yam anumānānumeya-bhāvo buddhyārūḍhena dharmā-dharmi-bhāvena na bahiḥ sada-sattvam apekṣat iti. Quoted in the Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā p. 127 lines 2-3.
31. Indian Logic and Atomism p. 102
32. Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt. Avinābhāva-niyamo 'darśanān na tu darśanāt. Pramāṇa-vārtika 1. 33.
33. See 'An Introduction to Modern Logic' by L. S. Stebbing. pp 415-417 for the view of Kant and Joseph.
34. Indian Logic and Atomism p 104.
35. Kecid dharmāntaraṁ meyaṁ liṅgasyāvyabhicārataḥ. Sambandhaṁ kecid icchanti siddhatvād dharmadharminḥ. Liṅgaṁ dharme prasiddhaṁ cet kimanyat tena mīyate. Atha dharmiṇi tasyaiva kimarthān nānumeyatā. Sambandhe'pi dvayaṁ nāsti śaṣṭhī śrūyeta tadvati. Avācya'nugṛhītātvaṁ na cāsau liṅga-samgataḥ. Liṅgasyāvyabhicāras tu dharmeṇānyatra dṛśyate. Tatra prasiddhaṁ tadyuktaṁ dharmiṇaṁ gamaiṣyati. Pramāṇa-samuccaya ch. 2. Quoted in the Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭīkā p. 120 lines 12-17. 'Fragments from Dīnaga' Fragment F pp. 18-19 and History of Indian Logic pp. 281-282.

36. Na hyasyate parvato nāma kaścīd avayavī yadādhāro dhūma upalabdhayet. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyā-ṭikā p. 121 lines 1-2.
37. Yeṣāmapī deśābhedo vayavī darśanārhaḥ teṣāmapī viyadvarttīnīm dhūm-lekhām abhramliḥām upalabhyā-nupalabdha-deśānām nānumāna saṁbhava itī. Ibid p. 121 lines 1-2.
38. Saṁyogī samavāye-kārtha-samavāyī virodhī ca. Vaiśeṣika-sūtra 3. 1. 9. Kāryam kāryāntarasya. Ibid 3.1.10. Yacca vaiśeṣikaiḥ catus-prakārah sambandha uccyate, asyedarṁ kāryam, kāraṇam, sambandhyekārtha-samavāyī virodhī cetī laṁgikam itī. Nyāya-vārtika tātparyā-ṭika p. 109 lines 12-13.
39. Trīṇī eva ca liṁgāni, anupalabdhīḥ, svabhāva karye cetī. Nyāya-bindu 2. 12-13.
40. Svārthānumānam pramāṇam na bhavati trirūpa-liṁga-purvadvān-mithyā-jñānavat. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 426 lines 3-4.
41. Na ca trairūpyam anumīti-kāraṇam, ananumāne'pī bhāvād dvairūpyavat. Ibid p. 426 lines 5-6.
42. Amūrta.
43. Sarvatra sādhanēnumāna-virodhaḥ saṁbhavati.
Sarvatra ca viruddhāvyabhicārī saṁbhavati.
Anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvāt ghaṭavat.
Nityaḥ śabdaḥ amūrtatvāt ākāśa-vat.
Ibid p. 426 lines 9-10.
44. Anuvādatvān na pramāṇam. Ibid p. 427 line 16.
45. An Introduction to Indian Philosophy pp. 67-68.
Yasmāt sākṣād anumeyāprakāśakatvam tasmān na śrotrapekṣayā vacasaḥ prāmāṇyam avinābhāva-sambandha jñānavad itī. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 427 lines 24-25.
46. Trirūpa-liṁga-pūrvadvasyāpramāṇe kvacidapyabhāvāt. Ibid p. 429 line 2.
47. Yatas trirūpa-liṁgajam yajjñānam tat pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibaddham ato' visamvādakam pratyakṣavat.

220 The Problem of knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism

Ibid p. 428 lines 7-8. Lir̥ṅga-lir̥ṅgi-dhiyorevaṁ pāram-paryeṇa vastuni, pratibandhāt tadābhāsa-śūnyao' rapyavañcanam. Quoted in Ibid p. 428 lines 8-9.

48. Arthasya sambhaves'bhāvāt pratyakṣe'pi pramāṇatā. Pratibaddha-svabhāvasya taddhetutve samañ dvayam. The verse of Dharmakīrti quoted by Hem Candra in his Pramāṇa-Mīmāṃsā on the sūtra 1. 1. 11 and by Prajñākara Gupta in the Pramāṇa-vārtika-bhāṣya-parārthānumāna verse 204. -
49. Etenaiva prakāreṇa dvitīye hetva-siddhatā. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1471.
50. Ananumāne kvacidapyabhāvāt. Tattva - saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 429 line 13.
51. Viruddhāvyabhicārī.
52. Vastubala. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 87 line 6.
53. Na ca viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ pramāṇa-siddham asti rūpam. Ato na sambhavaḥ. Ibid p. 86 lines 15-16.
54. Yat kāryaṁ yaśca svabhāvaḥ sa katham ātmakāraṇaṁ vyāpakāṁ ca svabhāvaṁ parityajya bhavedyena viruddhaḥ syāt. Ibid p. 86 lines 22-23.
55. Yataḥ sādhyaviparyaya sādhanād viruddha, iṣyate na ca viśeṣaḥ sādhaitum iṣṭaḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha pañjikā p. 429 lines 26-27.
56. Nānumānam pramāṇaṁ ced viphalā vyāhatis tava, na kaścidapi vādo hi vivakṣāṁ pratipadyate, Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1481.
57. Superiniścītaṁ lir̥ṅgaṁ gamakam iṣyate na sarñdig-dham. Nahi dhūmo vaṣpādirūpeṇa sandihyamāno vahner niścāyako bhavati. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 430 lines 10-11.
58. Yatnenānumito'pyarthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ. Nānyathā sādhyate so'nyair abhiyukta-tarairapi. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1477.
59. Pramāṇa-samuccaya. Chapter 2.

60. Nahi svabhāvaḥ kāryam vā svabhāvāt karaṇādṛte. Bhedānimittatā-prāptes te vinā's'ti na cānumā. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1478. See also Pramāṇa-vārtika 1. 33.
61. Pramāṇetara-sāmānya-sthiteranyadhiyo-gateḥ. Pramāṇāntara sadbhāvaḥ pratiṣedhācca kasyacit. Quoted with approval in Pramāṇa-Mīmāṁsā 1. 1. 11. and also in the Nyāya-kandī saṁvalit Praśastapāda-bhāṣya p. 623 (translated into Hindi by Dr. Durgadhar Jha).
62. Dvividho hi pramāṇasya viśayo grāhyaśca yanākāram utpadyate. Prāpaṇīyaśca yam adhyavasyati. Anye hi grāhyo' nyaścādhyavaseyaḥ. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 16 lines 1-3.

CHAPTER VIII

THE IDEALISTIC THEORY OF RELATION

1. Inference and relation

The sense-perception deals with the extreme particulars, the non-relative reality. It admits not even a bit of conception or imagination. Hence no question of relations arises as far as the 'real' is concerned. But the sensuous knowledge being incoherent and limited simply to momentary flashes of the 'real', being mere scattered sensations, it cannot be a starting point of our empirical life, which is based on the purposive actions, which lead to a definite goal. Hence the relations come in picture and function as the joining link between two discrete and non-relative moments. They play their role in inference which is operation of the faculty of understanding and which deals with the 'real' indirectly. It tries to establish a link between a symbol and a quality which are ultimately related to the real. Hence it is the sole ground of our empirical life which proceeds on the assumption of relations. In the words of Diñnāga the whole business of probans and probandum depends on the relation of quality and possessor of quality—a relation which is imposed by thought ; and has no reference to an external existence and non-existence¹. Thus we see that relations play an important role in our inferential knowledge. In other words we may say that they are the very life of our empirical knowledge. They are the necessary principles which give shape to our incoherent sensuous knowledge.

But these relations are not haphazard concepts which can be applied to join any two facts. They denote the necessary presence of one fact when the other is present, and the absence of one fact when the other is absent. There are only two ways in which the objects can be apprehended. They

can be either affirmed or denied, hence there are only two kinds of relation ; affirmative and negative. When we infer from the presence of smoke the presence of fire, or from the presence of 'jonesia'² the presence of tree, these are the cases of affirmative relation. When we infer the absence of a jar in a particular place on the basis of its imperceptibility, it is the case of negative relation. The affirmative relation can be only of two kinds. Either the fact dependent on the other fact is part and parcel of it or is the effect of it. In the former case the relation is called identity, and in the later case causality.

Identity is the basis of inference in the following example : This is a tree, because it is jonesia and all jonesias are trees. Here both tree and jonesia refer to the same reality. Jonesia is not different from tree. The tree is nothing but exclusion of 'non-trees' and the jonesia is nothing but the exclusion of 'non-jonesia' and the exclusion of 'non-jonesia'. Hence the difference between tree and jonesia is due to the number of exclusions. As far as the first exclusion is concerned there is identity between tree and jonesia. Further causality can also be the basis of inference. For instance : There is fire, because there is smoke. Here the inference is based upon causality. Fire is the cause of smoke. Smoke which is the effect of fire necessarily implies its cause namely fire. Dharmottara says: 'A product cannot possibly exist without a cause. But causes do not necessarily carry their results, since an unexpected impediment may always interfere³. But effects or products undoubtedly imply their causes. Thus the inference from a cause to its effect may be doubtful, but the inference from effect to its cause is always certain. Lastly, negation is the basis of inference. For example : There is no jar on this spot, because it is not perceptible⁴. Here the inference based upon negation. From the non-observation of the jar on a place we infer that it does not exist on that place. Had it been existent, it would have been perceived like other objects of that place.

These three relations determine universal concomitance⁵ which is the ultimate basis of inference. In the case of the first two relations universal concomitance is both positive and negative, although only one of them is sufficient to justify inference. Some Buddhist therefore emphasise that in the case of first two relations only one of the cases of universal concomitance must be used⁶. In the case of the third relation the universal concomitance is only negative. To explain all inference on the basis of universal concomitance is the epoch-making discovery of Buddhist logicians. As A. B. Dhruva says: 'In the svabhāva-hetu the relation between hetu and sādhya is that of species and genus and consequently essential, in the kārya-hetu it is causal, and in the anupalabdhi hetu the argument is from one negation to the other. The distinction between svabhāva-hetu and Kārya-hetu is a valuable contribution of Buddhists to Indian logic⁷. These relations are made the basis of the classification of judgment and of the division of syllogism. As Keith rightly says: 'Reduced to a Kantian form we can recognise, without too much pressing the ideas apriori, substance and attribute, being, non-being, identity and cause, a list which has sufficient affinity with the Kantian categories to be more than a mere curiosity of speculation'⁸.

2. The nature of relation

According to Dinnāga all relations are of the form of the substantive and the attributive⁹ and are apriori¹⁰. They are rules or principles of understanding which are constructed by our imagination for the sake of explaining the connection between two empirical phenomena. They are contingent realities and have no self-existence. In the words of Dharmakīrti 'Relation means 'dependence'¹¹, interpenetration¹², relativity¹³ and causality'¹⁴. The essential feature of relation is that it is an entity which subsists in two objects. More than this there is no characteristic of relation¹⁵. Relation is thus a 'Janus' like entity¹⁶. It and its relata subsist only in the mind. The understanding according to its inner principle establishes relation among objects which

are infact unrelated¹⁷. Relations in the sense of ultimate (or independent) reality do not really exist. Vinītadeva says that 'The expressions such as related to another 'dependent on another', 'supported by another' and 'subject to another's will are synonymous', Relations are thus ideal, and not real according to Buddhist logicians¹⁸.

Dharmakīrti in his 'Tract on Relations' has criticized the realist theory of relations. According to Indian realists relations are as real as the objects of perception. They are immediately perceived by sense-organs in the same way as the objects of perception. If there be no real relation between two objects, we would not be able to deduce the presence of one from the presence of another. For instance the knowledge of fire is known through the mark of smoke, because there is real relation between fire and smoke. Had it been otherwise we would have been equally capable to infer the presence of 'fire' from the presence of water. Therefore Uddyotakara maintains that 'the perception of the connection of an object with its mark is the first act of sense-perception from which inference proceeds¹⁹. Hence connection as well as the facts based on this connection are equally real and subject to sense-perception. The Buddhist challenges the view of the 'Realists' and insists that the ultimate reality which is 'extreme particular' cannot be related. The relations are creations of our imagination which are conceived within the frame-work of space, time and identity and produce no distinct image upon our mind, therefore it is absurd to believe in their reality. Dharmakīrti has adduced four main arguments against the objective reality of the relations :

First, relation is 'dependence'. If relata are 'accomplished'²⁰, they cannot be dependent ; and if they are not 'accomplished', they are out of existence like the horns of an hare²¹. Hence they are not dependent on any thing.

Secondly, relation is 'interpenetration'²². But there being two relata, 'interpenetration' is impossible because their

separate existence contradicts 'interpenetration'. And if the two relata have the same numerical existence, the relation itself becomes impossible, because relation is a link between two terms. Therefore from ultimate point of view²³ there can be no relation between things identical²⁴ by nature²⁵.

Thirdly, relation is 'relativity'²⁶. The question is whether a term which stands related is real or unreal. If it is unreal, it is like the horns of an here and is not relative to any object and if it is real, it does not stand in need of anything to be real. Hence the relation cannot be 'relativity'. Fourthly, 'Is the relation identical²⁷ to its relata or different from them? If it is identical, it cannot have any separate existence apart from the relata. If the relation is different from its relata, it is a separate entity and hence it will require another relation to join it with its relata. This second relation being a separate entity will require third relation to join it with previous relation and relata and in this way the process of linkage of relations will lead to a regressus ad infinitum, which makes the conception of relations as a separate entity impossible²⁸.

Professor Stcherbatsky²⁹ has rightly compared Dharmakīrti's criticisms of relations with those of Bradley's, but he has ignored the point of difference between the views of these two great philosophers, concerning the ideality of relations. For Bradley relation is full of contradictions and is an appearance. For Dharmakīrti relation is not appearance, but the frame-work of appearance. Again for him the ideality of relation is not full of contradiction. He finds that relation is a category of understanding, which cannot dispense away with it. His theory of relation is nearer Kant's theory of categories and T. H. Green's theory of relation, than Bradley's theory of relation. Another important point in Dharmakīrti's theory of relation is that relation is functional dependence. His view of causality³⁰ is infact the theory of functional dependence of objects. In this respect his theory of causality

or relation is the same as the theory of functional dependence of modern science which has replaced the conception of cause and the conception of substance and reduced all cases of causation to the cases of functional dependence.

3. Identity

According to Buddhist logicians reality is Kinetic. It is always changing. Hence as regards ultimate reality no question of identity arises. It is a logical construction and plays its role in our constructed world. It arises from the neglect of differences that obtain between things. Frequent occurrence of similar cognitions gives rise to the idea that the things are identical. For instance we see a tree called 'dalbergia sissoo'³¹. In contrast with 'non-trees' it is a tree, and in contrast with 'non-dalbergia sissos' it is 'dalbergia sissoo'. Though two 'dalbergia sissos' are not identical, but are different and independent entities, yet the relation between a 'dalbergia sissos' and a tree is that of 'identity'. It is an imputed identity and has no real existence. The identity of two non-identical cognitions consists in the identity of their objective reference. The 'dalbergia sissoo' and the tree are not two identical cognitions, but the real object to which both these cognitions refer is identical. The same object which can be called 'dalbergia sissoo' can also be called a tree³².

Indian Realists object to the Buddhist conception of identity. They hold that analytic judgments or deductions based on 'identity' will not exist at all. Because if two concepts are the same, it would be meaningless to deduce one fact from the other. For instance the judgment 'leaves are foliage' is based on identity. It is a mere repetition of the same thing and does not give any information, but the judgment that 'dalbergia sissoo' is a 'tree' is not an analytic judgment for the 'realists' because here the terms 'dalbergia sissoo' and 'tree' denote two different realities. 'Dalbergia sissoo' is not the same as the tree but it is inherent in the

tree. The tree is genus and the 'dalbergia sissoo' is its species. The relation between the two is based on 'inherence'³³. Buddhists hold that there is no entity like genus. Things are different by nature. The similarity of effects causes the notion of the similarity of their causes. As 'emblica officinalis'³⁴ and 'terminalia chebula'³⁵ though of entirely different forms, are capable of removing various kinds of diseases, jointly as well as severally, in the same way different kinds of cow or different 'dalbergia sissoo's lead to the notion of the genus 'cow' or 'tree' without there being any such genus³⁶.

The concept of 'identity' plays a vital role in the world of phenomena. It is one of the two concepts on which the principle of invariable concomitance³⁷ is based. Dharmakīrti says that the principle of invariable concomitance is determined either by causality or by identity³⁸. Identity supplies a special type of hetu. Inference involves a necessary relation between the reason or hetu and the object which is to be inferred. There are only three kinds of relation which establish a necessary link between the reason and the object which is to be inferred. One of them is logical dependence of the reason upon the object to be inferred, and the other two are the deduction of the one from the other and the non-perceptibility of a perceptible object respectively. Defining identical reason Dharmakīrti says that 'it is a reason for deducing a predicate when the subject alone by itself is sufficient for that deduction'³⁹. In words of Dharmottara 'in such cases where the inference is based on identical reason, the predicate possesses such characteristic that its existence can be ascertained wherever the existence of reason is ascertained'. 'A predicate whose presence depends on the mere existence of the reason and requires no other condition beside the existence of reason, is a predicate which is inseparable from the reason'⁴⁰.

Identity also supplies a special kind of judgment,

These judgments are called analytic. These are the result of the process of analysis and do not have their origin in experience. In such judgments a concomitant relation is established between two concepts through identity. This identity is not the identity between two concepts which are exclusive but it is the identity which refers to an objective reality and which is the substratum of both these concepts. In such judgments which are founded on identity, there are two parts, a dependent part and an independent part. The dependent part is capable of indicating the independent part and not vice-versa. The independent part is thus deduced from the dependent part⁴¹. For instance we may take the example of '*dalbergia sissoo*' and tree. Though '*dalbergia sissoo*' and 'tree' refer to the same objective reality but they are not themselves identical. The '*dalbergia sissoo*' is the dependent part whose existence indicates the presence of the independent part, that is of the tree. Where there is '*dalbergia sissoo*', we can necessarily infer that there is a 'tree' but from the presence of a tree we cannot necessarily infer the presence of '*dalbergia sissoo*'. For there may be 'trees' which are not '*dalbergia sissoo*'s⁴².

Identity is a necessary relation. It is a mental category without which no concept is possible. It is formative of all concepts. In this sense Buddhist conception of identity is the same as Kant's conception of 'identity'. The Buddhist theory of 'identity' assimilates Leibnizian conception of the 'identity of indiscernibles' and Kantian conception of the category of identity. As regards ultimate reality both Buddhists and Leibniz hold what 'reals' are by nature dissimilar and identity arises from non-discrimination of their dissimilarity. Thus 'identity' has no ontological significance. Again both Buddhist and Kant have invested fundamental epistemological significance upon identity by making it one of the formative principles of all concepts. All concepts are mental constructions. All mental constructions are formed through the frame work of under-

standing which is composed of identity, causality and negation.

4. Casuality

The law of causality is the pivot around which the wheel of Buddhism revolves. It is one of the most precious jewels among the teachings of the Tathāgata⁴³. Human destiny, cosmology and theology are built on this doctrine of Karman or causation⁴⁴. Buddhism has remained faithful to this doctrine through its history,

There are three different conceptions of the doctrine of causality—Ābhidharmika, Mādhyamika and idealistic (Yogācāra). 1. According to the Ābhidharmika conception causality means the production of one fact on the existence of a number of causes and conditions⁴⁵. It is a temporal sequence⁴⁶ which rigorously takes place between things which necessarily succeed their antecedent ones. The happening of an event or the production of an effect guarantees the presence of the totality of its causes and conditions⁴⁷. For instance we take the case of the production of fire. When the factors of fire stick⁴⁸, twirling stick⁴⁹, cord for the twirling stick, matrix⁵⁰, burnt rag for tender and human effort are present, fire will be produced. When they are not present it will not be produced⁵¹. In the same way when the factors of potter, clay instruments of making pot, and other conditions are present, pot will be produced.

2. Mādhyamikas, however reject the Ābhidharmika view of causality as regular succession in the real world and hold that causality means nothing but relativity⁵². According to them causality does not mean temporal sequence of things but the essential dependence of things⁵³. It denotes the unreality⁵⁴ of things⁵⁵. Further the objects of the world are not real by themselves⁵⁶. They are interdependent and relative as the short and the long⁵⁷. Every thing is dependent, nothing then is intrinsically real⁵⁸. Hence there can be no real causal relation between the causes and the effects. All

the objects of the world are illusory. Origination, existence and destruction are of the nature of *māyā*, dreams of a fairy castle. In principle there is no difference between a magical creation and the objects produced by the law of causation. In either case we are unable to explain wherefrom the effect comes into existence. Hence causation is unutterable like an illusory appearance⁵⁹. The denial of causal relation may lead to the conclusion that there is no relation between a cause and its effect. Things may be produced at random. In order to avoid this awkward position Candrakīrti, in defence of the Mādhyamika view of causality says: 'That which originates is nothing by itself, there is thus no self hood, or independent existence. What is in itself, by its own nature, is not produced by causes and conditions. All phenomena are conditioned. The conditioned is not a thing-in-itself. The relativity or non-absolute nature of things is their *śūnyatā*⁶⁰. He again says that 'the term 'pratītya samutpāda' cannot be accepted to be a term of fixed connotation⁶¹. It means simply the origination or production of objects subject to certain causes and conditions (relative)'.

The Mādhyamika conception of causality is a half way house to Yogācāra idealism, for it paves the way to the idealists in maintaining that causal connections are ideal. Mādhyamikas have successfully maintained that causal connections are not real. But they have gone astray in saying that causal connections are nothing at all. If their view of causality is taken seriously it means that causal connections are imaginary or ideal. When they prove that causality means 'relativity' they demonstrate that concepts are interdependent. This obviously rests upon the view that interdependence or relativity is an ideal relation. Sthirmati clearly says that realistic and nihilistic views of causality are extremes to be avoided. The middle position between them is idealistic. Causal connections are neither real nor unreal. They are ideal. 'Pratītya-samutpāda' means the modification of ideas.⁶²

Dharmakīrti exposes the realistic view of causality and shows that causality as a real connection between real objects is fraught with difficulties. It is neither an object of perception nor an object of non-perception. It is transcendental in the sense that it is known through inference or discursive reason. The effect is the sign of the cause as dewlap⁶³ is the sign of cow⁶⁴. The two are necessarily or invariably related. This is the only meaning of causal connection. This invariable connection is both regressive as well as progressive. It is regressive in the sense that it is the basis of all inference or mediate knowledge. It is progressive in the sense that it is on the basis of this principle that understanding creates its world of ideas which is unreal.⁶⁵ Here Dharmakīrti's view of causality combines the views of Kant and Hegel. Whereas for Kant causality is a regressive principle of understanding which is known through transcendental analysis to be the basis of all mediate knowledge, for Hegel it is the progressive or constructive principle which creates the entire world of ideas. Vasubandhu and Sthīrmati identified causal activity with the activity of ālaya-vijñāna. Their view of causality is very much Hegelian. While maintaining this legacy of thought Dharmakīrti analysed the concept of causality further and demonstrated its transcendental character.

Thus the Yogācāra conception of causality goes against the Mādhyamika conception of causality. It does not equate causality with void⁶⁶. It restores the Ābhidharmika conception of causality as rigorous sequence, which means a temporal sequence of objects or dharmas (cause and effect). For the idealists, causality does not mean temporal sequence of object because according to them objects do not exist. It means the sequence of the moments of consciousness or ideas. The subsequent moment of consciousness arises following the antecedent moment of consciousness. This process of causation continues till the stream of Ālaya dries up. It is the sign of reality and not of the 'unreality' as the Mādhyamika holds.

Hsuen Tsang defines causality as 'the process which is subject to production and destruction. It continues till the moment of the realisation of Nirvāṇa⁶⁷. It has its own nature⁶⁸. It is not void or devoid of nature as the Mādhyamika holds. It is not 'anirodham amātpādam, anucchedam and aśāśvatam.' It does not refer to a motionless cosmos the parts of which have merely an illusive reality. But on the contrary it means 'motion' a cosmos which is essentially kinetic. Śāntarakṣita defines the principle of 'dependent origination' according to which 'every thing is kinetic. There is no God, no matter, no substance, no quality, no (separate) actions, no universal and no inherence, but there is strict conformity between every fact and its result'⁶⁹.

The principle of causality is not real as the 'realists' hold. It is a mental category⁷⁰ like identity. It is apriori⁷¹. It is one of the three laws of the understanding, which are its original possession, the other two being the laws of contradiction and identity. It is not derived from experience. It makes experience possible. It is indispensable for the occurrence of human experience. It precedes experience. It is a necessary and universal truth. It resembles Kant's view of causality, according to whom causality is an apriori principle which makes our experience possible. In other words 'We may say that it is a necessary principle which is not revealed by the lamp of experience but represents the lamp itself. It is one of the three weapons with which our understanding is armed before it starts on the business of collecting experience⁷². Along with identity it is the basis of universal concomitance⁷³ and makes inferential knowledge possible⁷⁴.

The Realists of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school have challenged the view of causality as propounded by the idealists. They object to the theory of temporal sequence and hold that in order to produce an effect the causal factors must exist simultaneously i.e. at the same time⁷⁵. There must be some factor which operates and another factor where operation

takes place. For instance, for the production of a jar, a potter, a lump of clay, the implements of the potter and the wheel must exist at one and the same time. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla refute the charge of the Realists and say that simultaneous existence of cause and effect will create difficulties. If the cause and the effect were present at one and the same time like the horns of a cow, it would be difficult to decide which is the cause and which is the effect. Nor can it be maintained that 'both are both' because it will lead to the fault of 'reciprocity'⁷⁶.

In fact there is no activity. The whole universe is devoid of activity. There is no doer, there is no deed, there is no active agent, there is no objective⁷⁷. The activity is not something like an entity which is reported to as the anthropomorphic Realists believe. The reality itself is activity⁷⁸. It is kinetic. It has no time to stay and to resort to activity and produce some result. The truth is this that every phenomenon of the world is restricted in its capacity. On account of the restriction imposed by the nature of its cause, when it comes into existence at the very first moment, there appears immediately afterwards something coming into contact with the second moment, and it is under these circumstances that the first is regarded as the cause—the producer and the subsequent as the produced—the effect⁷⁹.

Negation

Negation plays, along with causality, the most important role in Buddhist theory of knowledge. It is the third ideal relation which is the basis of all ideas. It creates ideas, relates them and supplies them their meanings. In view of its importance in Buddhist epistemology, it requires a separate treatment in a fresh chapter.

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2. Aśoka tree.
3. Na ca kāraṇamantareṇa kāryam asti. Na tu kāraṇā-nayavaśyaṁ kāryavanti bhavanti. Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā p. 45 lines 10-11.
4. Na pradeśa viśeṣe kvacid ghaṭa upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasyānupalabdheriti. Ibid p. 26 lines 2-3.
5. Avinābhāva.
6. Pratibandha-vataśca hetor anvaya-vyatirekayoḥ, prayoga-dvayo'reka eva prayoktavyo na dvāviti. Yata ekenaiva sādhyāvinābhāvanīyamavatā prayuktenāparasya gater na dvayor yogo yugapatkartuṁ yuktaḥ, Nyāya-praveśa-vṛtti-pañjikā p. 49 lines 13-15.
7. Notes on Nyāya-praveśa p. 23.
8. Indian logic Atomism p. 102.
9. Dharmidharma-bhāva.
10. Buddhyārūḍha.
11. Pāratantrya.
12. Rūpa-śleṣa.
13. Parāpekṣā.
14. Kārya-kāraṇa-bhāva.
15. Dviṣṭho hi kaścit sambandho nātonyat tasya lakṣaṇam. Sambandha-parikṣā, verse 11.
16. Janus is an Italian god who has double faces.
17. Tau ca bhāvo tadanyaśca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ. Ityamiśrāḥ svayaṁ bhāvās tān miśrayati. Kalpanā. Ibid 5.
18. Words of Vinītadeva quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 247.

19. Nyāya-vārtika. Quoted in *Ibid* vol. 1 p. 246.
20. Niṣpanna.
21. Pāraṅtryaṁ hi sambandhaḥ siddhe kā paratantratā. Sambandha-parīkṣā. verse 1.
22. Rūpa-śīṣa.
23. Tattvataḥ.
24. Abhinna.
25. Upaśleṣo hi sambandhaḥ dvitve sa ca kathāṁ bhavet. Tasmāt prakṛti-bhinnānāṁ sambandho nāsti tattvataḥ. *Ibid* verse 2.
26. Parapekṣā.
27. Abhinna.
28. Dvayorekabhisambandhāt sambandho yadi tadvayoḥ. Kaḥ sambandho'navasthā ca na sambandha-matistathā. Sambandha-parīkṣā. verse 4.
29. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 246.
30. Pratītya-samutpāda.
31. Śīrṣapā.
32. Buddhist logic vol 1 p. 272.
33. Samavāya.
34. Dhātrī.
35. Harītikī.
36. Ekārtha-kāritayā sāmyam. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 317 line 14. Evam atyanta-bhede'pi kecin niyat-śaktitaḥ. Tulya-pratyavamarśāder, he tutvaṁ yānti nāpare. Tattva-saṅgraha. verse 726. see also *Ibid* verse 723.
37. Vyāpti.
38. Pramāṇa-vārtika 1. 33.
39. Svabhāvaḥ sva-sattāmātra-bhāvini sādhyā-dharme hetuḥ. Nyāya-bindu. 2. 19. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2, p. 65.
40. Yo hetorātmanāḥ sattām apekṣya vidyamāno bhavati na tu hetusattāyā vyatiriktam, Kiñciddhetum apekṣate sa sva-sattāmātrabhāvi sādhyāḥ. Tasmin sādhye yo hetuḥ

sa svabhāvaḥ. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 28 lines 5-7. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 66.

41. Tādātmyāvīśeṣe'pi yatpratibaddhaṁ tad gamakam. Yat pratibandha-viśayas tad gamyam. Ibid p. 30 lines 16-17.
42. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 272.
43. Pratītya-samutpāda-pradhānam idaṁ bhagvataḥ. Provacanaratnam. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 10 line 19.
44. Poussin 'Way to Nirvāṇa'.
45. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 131.
46. The Yogācāra Idealism pp. 29-30.
47. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 133.
48. Araṇī.
49. Araṇīpotakaḥ.
50. Uttarārṇi.
51. Milinda-pañha. Book 2. Chapter 3 section 5 (becoming).
52. Yaḥ pratītya-samutpādaḥ śūnyatā saiva te matā. Quoted in 'The Central philosophy of Buddhism p. 167.
53. Parasparāpekṣatva.
54. Śūnyatā or niḥsvabhāvatā.
55. The Yogācāra Idealism p. 30.
56. Svabhāva-śūnyatā. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 141.
57. Dīrgha-hrasvavat. " " " "
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59. Yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharva nagaraṁ yathā. Tathotpādas tathā sthānaṁ tathā bhāṅga udāhṛtaḥ. Mādhyamika-kārikā 7. 34. Māyātaḥ ko viśeṣo'sya yan mūḍhaiḥ satyataḥ kṛtam. Māyayā nirmitaṁ yacca hetubhir yacca nirmitam. Ayāti tat kutaḥ kutra yāti ceti nirūpyatām. Bodhicaryāvatāra. Hetutaḥ saṁbhavo yeṣāṁ tadabhāvanna na santi ye. Kathaṁ nāma na te spaṣṭaṁ pratibibasamā mathāḥ. Yukti-śaṣṭhikā. All these verses are quoted in The Central philosophy of Buddhism p. 177. Anutpannam idaṁ sarvaṁ na ca bhāvā na santi ca. Gandharva-svapna-māyākhyā bhāvā vidyantyahetukāḥ. Svapna-keśondrukaṁ māyā gandh-

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60. Tasmādiḥ pratītya-samputpannasya svatantra-svarūpavirahāt, svatantra-svarūpa-rahito'rthaḥ śūnyatārthaḥ. Catuḥ-śataka-vṛtti pp. 226-228. Quoted in the Central philosophy of Buddhism p. 178.
61. Rūḍhiśabda.
62. Pratītya-samutpannatkarṇ punar vijñānasya pariṇāmaśabdena jñāyate.
63. Śāsnā.
64. Tad bhāvābhāvāt tatkārya-gatir yāpyanuvarnyate. Saṅketa-viśayākhyā sā śāsnāder go-gatir yathā. Saṁbandha-parīkṣā verse 15.
65. Bhāve bhāvini tad-bhāvo bhāva eva ca bhāvitā. Prasiddhe hetuphalate pratyakṣānupalambhataḥ. Etāvanmātra-tattvārthāḥ kāryakāraṇa-gocarāḥ. Vikalpā darśayantyarthān mithyārthā-ghatītāniva. Ibid verses 16-17.
66. Śūnyatā.
67. Sotpādam, sanirodham anucchedam..... Bauddhadharmā darśana, p. 449.
68. Sasvabhāva.
69. Prakṛtīśobhayātmādi-vyāpāra-rahitaṁ calam. Karmataphala-saṁbandha vyavasthādi-samāśrayam etc. Tattvasaṁgraha verses 1-6.
70. Vivakṣā-mātra-saṁbhūtasāṅketānuvidhāyinaḥ. Ibid verse 519.
71. Buddhyārūḍha.
72. Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 262.
73. Avinābhāva.
74. Pramāṇa-vārtika 1. 33.
75. Nanu kārya-kāraṇa-bhāvo hi karma-kartṛbhāvaḥ sa ca bhinna-kālo viruddhyate. Nahighaṭa-kulālayor-yauga-

padye sati karmakartṛbhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha pañjikā p. 176 lines 6-7.

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77. Kartṛtvādi-vyavasthā tu santānaikya-vivakṣayā. Kalp-anāropitaiveṣṭā nāṅgam sā tattva-saṁsthitaiḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha. Verse 504. Yāvatā nirvyā pāramevedaṁ viśvaṁ nahi paramārthataḥ kaścit kartākarma-vāstyanyatra dharma-saṁketāditi samudāyārthaḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 176 lines 14-15.
78. Sattaiva vyāpṛtiḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 520.
79. Niyamādātma-hetūtthāt prathama-kṣaṇa-bhāinaḥ. Yadyato'nantaraṁ jātaṁ dvitīya-kṣaṇa-sannidhiḥ. Tattejjanayatītyāhur vyāpāre'pi vastuni. Vivakṣāmatra-saṁbhūta saṁketānuvidhāinaḥ. Tattva saṅgraha verses 518-519.

CHAPTER IX

THE IDEALISTIC THEORY OF NEGATION

Part I Negation

1. Nature of negation

Human knowledge is limited within the boundary of 'present' and 'absent' facts. All our judgments are either affirmative or negative. They denote either the existence or absence of some fact. As far as the question of existing facts is concerned, their apprehension raises no difficulty. They are within the means of our sensuous cognition and we are capable of perceiving them, but the question of 'absent' or 'negative facts' creates a difficult problem for philosophers. What is negation? How is it known? Is it an existent fact or a mere creation of our imagination? These are the questions which have been raised and answered by philosophers.

According to Realists of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school of Kumārila negation is as real as any other object of the world. It is not unreal like a mirage or the objects of a dream. It is real like a cow or a horse. According to them there is no difference between a present object and an absent object so far as its reality is concerned. Objects are of two kinds—positive and negative. The former are characterized by existence and the latter by non-existence. Further every object has two aspects, the existent and the non-existent.¹ The existent aspect is cognized through perception with the help of five sense-organs, and the non-existent aspect is cognized by a mode of cognition which is called negation or non-apprehension. According to Śabara 'negation implies the absence of the means of cognition of positive objects and gives rise to the notion of a certain unseen and non-existent object.'² Explaining the view of Śabara, Kumārila says

that 'negation as a means of cognition consists in the non-functioning of perception and other means of cognition and apprehends the object which is beyond the comprehension of the five means of cognition.'³ The Nyāya school also holds the view that negation is real and has an objective reality like substance, attribute, universal, particular, action and inherence. The negative facts are as real as positive facts.⁴

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school of Kumārila and the Nyāya school both emphasise the objective reality of negation. The point of difference between them lies in the fact that for the school of Kumārila 'negation' is the source as well as the object of knowledge. The negative objects of the world cannot be cognized through perception or other positive means of knowledge. But for the Nyāya school negative objects are cognised through perception. Thus for the realist schools of the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā of Kumārila and the Nyāya school negation is a real entity. It may be described as 'a real Non Ens'⁵, 'a hypostasized Non Ens,' 'a bodily Non Ens,'⁶ a 'separately shaped Non Ens'⁷ and 'a Right Honourable Non Ens.'⁸

Buddhist logicians do not agree with the view of the Realists. They denounce the doctrine of the objective reality of negation. They hold that negation is not a separate reality and is simply a subjective notion. It is not real like a cow or a deer. It is also not absolutely unreal like the sky-flower or the horns of an hare which have no corresponding reality. It simply denotes the absence of an object which would have been perceived had it been present. It may be defined 'as the process through which either the absence of some thing or some practical application of the idea of an absent thing is deduced.'⁹ In the process of negation the cognition of an object does not take place. The cognizer does not cognize the presence of an object before his eyes. For instance he wants to see a jar at a particular place. He does not find it there and concludes that it is not there.

Hence it may be said that the essence of negation lies in an experience which does not take place.¹⁰ But it does not mean that it is beyond experience. It always refers to possibilities of sensation. In every negation there is either affirmation of the contradictory counterpart of the denied fact or the denial of its cause. These two facts belong either to the law of contradiction or of causation and are within the field of sensibilia. These laws of contradiction and causation refer to sensible objects.¹¹ Hence the basis of negation lies in perception. If they are not within the range of perception, we cannot know that they are imperceptible. Thus the realist doctrine of negation as an objective reality falls to the ground.

2. Negation and being

According to Realists negation is an entity. It is objective and is independent of our mind. It is the absence of something real and is capable of producing fruitful activity by regulating our practical behaviour. Kumārila adduces four arguments for the objective reality of negation. First, when things are not perceived by sense-organs and other means of cognition we conclude that they are not present. For instance the non-apprehension of a jar on a table denotes that it does not exist. If negation were a non-entity it could not have the capacity to suggest the absence of the jar because non-entity has no capacity at all.¹² As negation suggests its counter-positive it must be real and have the capacity of this suggestion. Secondly, there is an idea of negation. All ideas correspond to objective realities. There can be no idea without an objective reality. Hence negation also has an objective reality.¹³ Thirdly, negation is four-fold¹⁴ : prior negation, destructive negation, mutual negation and absolute negation. It is impossible for a non-entity to be diverse. Diversity belongs to entities. The diversity of negation therefore proves that negation is an entity. Lastly, like objects of the world negation is apprehended through

identity and difference. Difference means that negation is different. Previous negation is different from destruction. Identity means that the four kinds of negation come within one class. The characteristic of identity and difference points that negation must be an objective reality.¹⁵

Buddhist logicians refute the above arguments of Kumāṛila and hold that negation is a mere idea. The first argument cannot be maintained. Negation does not suggest a non-real object. It suggests hypothetical visibility of an object, or the repudiation of an imagined object.¹⁶ For instance when we say that there is no jar on the table, it means the perception of a place, a positive substratum, without a jar which would have been perceived in all normal conditions had it been present. Hence in all cases of negation what is perceived is the ground or the substratum of the desired object. Every negation must have a ground and this ground is positive.¹⁷ The second argument of the realists is untenable. We have the idea of the son of a barren woman, a sky-flower and a fata morgana, but these are not real objects. These are false ideas which have no corresponding objects. These are the creation of our imagination. They come into being when two or more contradictory things are put together. The third argument is also wrong. Four kinds of negation have been formulated by men of experience for the sake of convenience. They are mere conventions and verbal usages. In fact it is not the negation which differentiates various objects. It is the positive objects themselves which differentiate different kinds of negation. All kinds of negation being of identical nature can not differentiate themselves without the help of positive objects.¹⁸ Hence different kinds of negation are based on positive objects and not vice-versa.¹⁹ The fourth argument is also unfounded. An idea cannot be regarded as reality simply on the ground that it is of 'exclusive' and 'inclusive' nature.

Ideas are by themselves of exclusive nature. They indicate one thing as well as differentiate it from other things. For instance we take the idea of an army. It stands for each of its soldiers 'exclusively' as well as for all its divisions 'inclusively.' Kamalaśīla says that such instances as 'curd is not milk' and 'milk is not curd' are certainly right but they do not denote a negative reality. The negation of an effect denotes the presence of its cause. The cause has a distinct character from its effect and is apprehended through perception. Hence it is useless to assume that there is an independent means of cognition in the form of negation.²⁰ Thus Buddhist logicians repudiate the existence of negation as a separate entity as well as a separate source of knowledge and maintain that all our objects which are alternately perceived and not perceived are necessarily perceptible. The knowledge of the absence of a thing is always produced only by the repudiation of an imagined presence.²¹

3. Negation and Judgment

Cognizable things are only of two kinds. They are either positive or negative. There is assertion either of some thing existent or of something non-existent. Hence judgments are also of two kinds. They are either affirmative or negative. All our negative judgments are based on negation. Their essence lies in the negation or the cancellation of a hypothetical perceptibility. They provide certainty to our knowledge regarding an object which is not present. In such judgments we presume the existence of an object and think that if the object were present at the place it would have been perceived. But as it is not perceived, it is not there. The validity of such judgments can be guaranteed only in those cases where the normal conditions of perception are present. For instance in order to judge that 'a jar is not on the table' there must be sufficient light and the cognizer must be free from the defects of visual organ. The object must be present within the range of perception. Negative,

judgments provide definite knowledge only of those objects which have been experienced in the past or which are present. They do not provide knowledge of those objects which will take place in future life, because future experience is itself uncertain and can not decide the non-existence of any fact.²² In the same way negative judgments are not possible regarding metaphysical entities like soul, God and Brahman. These entities can neither be said as existent or non-existent, because they are inaccessible to space and time and invisible by nature. These are possible regarding those objects which are subject to space, time and nature.²³ Therefore the basis of all our negative judgments lies in the experiences of our daily life, the experiences which depend upon 'sensibilia' or the objects of perception. In the words of Herbert Spencer 'the negative mode can not occur without excluding a correlative mode. The antithesis of positive and negative being, indeed is merely an expression of this experience.'²⁴

4. Is negation a separate source of knowledge ?

The positive objects are known through perception and inference. They are either in contact with sense-organs, or are inferred by some mark on the basis of previous perception. Therefore there is no problem regarding their apprehension. But how are negative objects known ? Their knowledge is a problem because they are neither in contact with sense-organs nor are inferred by some mark on the basis of previous perception. Different explanations have been given to explain the apprehension of negative objects.

5. The Nyaya Vaisesika view

According to the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika school negation is not a non-Ens. It is an objective reality. Just as the objects of perception for instance, a jar, a book, are perceived when they come in contact with the senses, in the same way the non-existent objects are also known through the contact of the senses. The eyes see the ground as well as the absent

jar. They do not stop functioning after the apprehension of the ground.²⁵ The moment we apprehend a vacant place through sense-contact we also apprehend that the place is without a jar. As all persons accept that the apprehension of the vacant place takes place through sense-perception, there should be no controversy regarding the apprehension of the absent jar, because it is also perceived at the same moment.²⁶

According to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa 'when we open our eyes we perceive the ground as well as the non-existence of the jar, but when we close them we perceive neither the ground nor the non-existence of the jar. Both cognitions are subject to the phenomena of opening the eyes and therefore both of them are sense-perception.'²⁷ The relation between the positive object and the non-existent object is regarded as a subject attribute relation. It is an adjective or determination,²⁸ of a positive entity.²⁹ It has a relation of subject-attribute,³⁰ with the positive fact. When the positive fact comes in contact with the visual sense-organ it is perceived. For instance the ground³¹ is perceived and along with the ground the negation that 'there is no jar on the ground' is also perceived because of its adjectival character. When there is no dispute regarding the perception of the substance, there should be no dispute regarding the perception of the predicate which is part and parcel of it.³²

Kumāriḷa and his followers assail the position of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school on the following grounds :

First, only those objects can be perceived through the eyes which have shape and colour. Negation has no shape and colour, hence it can not be perceived. *Secondly*, only those things can be perceived through the senses which are existent and come in contact with the senses. The negation being absent cannot come in contact with the senses. Hence it cannot be perceived.³³ *Thirdly*, the relation of substance and attribute is no relation at all. The substance and attribute

relation is possible either through 'connection'³⁴ or through 'inherence'³⁵ or through their combination e.g. connected inherence.³⁶ The non-existence cannot have the relation of connection with the ground because it is not a substance. It cannot have also the relation of inherence with the ground because it is different from qualities.³⁷ Keśave Miśra quotes the Mīmāṃsaka argument against the substance attribute relation according to which it is not a relation at all. A relation is different from the objects related. It resides in both the terms of relation and is numerically one reality. The relation of attribute and substance is not an entity different from them because the relation of the substantive is identical with the substantive and the relation of the attribute with the attribute. It does not reside in both the related objects because substantiveness resides only in the substantive and attributeness resides only in the attribute.³⁸ Further so called relation is not one entity. It is substantiveness and attributiveness put together. Therefore the very basis of perception, the subject-object-contact is absent in the case of negation. The followers of Kumārila maintain that even if the theory of negation advocated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school is accepted it cannot cover all the cases of negation. The perception of present negation may be explained on the basis of sense-object contact but it cannot explain the case of past negation, because the object of negation does not exist before the eyes in that case.

The Mimamsaka view

The Pūrva Mīmāṃsā school is divided into two groups. The one group is headed by Prabhākara and the other by Kumārila. Prabhākara accepted the Buddhist theory of negation implicitly. According to him negation is not a real entity like a 'cow.' It denotes simply the denial of a hypothetically perceived object. There is no difference between the reality of 'there is no jar on the table' and the mere existence of the table. The non-existence of the jar

on the table means the existence of the table *per se*. Hence non-existence of the locus.³⁹ The existence of the locus is perceived through the senses. On its basis we imagine the existence of an other object. When we find that it is not visible though the conditions necessary for its apprehension are all the same, we conclude that it does not exist.⁴⁰ Thus the knowledge of an absent object is not 'a positive knowledge of a negative entity, but is a negative knowledge of a positive entity.' The negative knowledge is not a mode of knowledge different from positive knowledge.⁴¹

Kumarila's view

According to Kumārila negation is an entity. The source of the apprehension of an object must be according to the nature of the thing apprehended.

When the thing to be apprehended is positive, there must be a positive source of knowledge. When the thing to be apprehended is negative there must be a negative sources of knowledge.⁴² In the case of positive objects there is a direct contact of them with the senses and they are apprehended through perception.⁴³ In the same way when the apprehension of an object takes place through a mark or reason the source of knowledge is inference. It takes place in such cases where the reason or mark is known to be invariably related with the object of apprehension. But in such cases where all the means of cognition fail, when we are incapable of apprehending a thing through sense-perception or inference, non-apprehension is the only source of knowledge. For instance we take the example of the apprehension 'there is no jar on the ground.' In this example the jar is not perceptible because there is no contact with the visual sense-organ. Nor is inference possible in this case because in inferential process there must be a middle term or reason which is invariably related with the predicate and the apprehender is aware of the relation between the reason and the predicate. In negation there is no reason which is

invariably related with the absent object. Here we first cognize the bare ground⁴⁴ and then remember the object desired and find that the object is not there. This knowledge of the absence of the object is due to negation pure and simple.⁴⁵ Therefore, the knowledge of negation is immediate and unpreceded by a reason and a concomitant relation. Buddhist logicians and the followers of Prabhākara assail the doctrine of negation on the following grounds.

First. According to Kumārila cognition is imperceptible. If cognition itself is imperceptible how is it known that it brings cognition of other things? Non-apprehension being a kind of cognition is as such imperceptible and therefore it cannot be a source of cognising other things. The argument that it is known through presumption is unacceptable. It is a kind of cognition and as such is imperceptible. It cannot be known. If we presume another presumption to apprehend the previous presumption our cognition will be subject to an infinite regress. We shall go on postulating other presumptions in order to know the prior presumptions and thus the entire life will come to an end, even then we will not know the absent object.⁴⁶ *Secondly,* the followers of Kumārila hold that there is no idea without a substratum.⁴⁷ Negation is an idea therefore it must be based on a substratum. If the negation qua the means of cognition i.e. non apprehension is an entity, the negation of the cognized object i.e. the absent object should be an entity. And if it is an entity, it can be cognized through perception as other entities are cognized. Hence it is useless to postulate another means of cognition for the apprehension of an object which can be apprehended through perception.⁴⁸ *Thirdly,* according to Kumārila 'effect' is the negation of the cause.⁴⁹ The negation of effect consists in the presence of the cause. The cause is apprehended through perception. Hence to assume that the negation of effect is apprehended by another means of cognition is useless. Because a distinct means requires the apprehension of a distinct object which cannot be apprehended by other means of cognition.

Here the object of cognition, the cause, is apprehended by perception itself. Hence there is no need of postulating negation as a separate source of knowledge.⁵⁰

Fourthly, Kumārila's view that negation is an entity and is featureless involves contradiction.⁵¹ The term entity denotes capacity of producing an effect. If it is incapable of producing an effect, it is a non-entity. The term 'featureless' denotes that it is devoid of every thing and is incapable of producing an effect. Hence a thing cannot be an entity as well as featureless at one and the same time.⁵² Further if negation is featureless, its assumption as a source of knowledge is useless, because a featureless thing is devoid of the form of cognition and cannot serve as a means of cognition.⁵³

Lastly, Kumārila's argument that positive things are known through positive means of knowledge and negative things through negative means of knowledge is unacceptable. There is no such royal dictum by which the object of cognition and its source must be of a similar nature. There is no propriety in holding that non-existence should be apprehended by a negative means of knowledge. It is not necessary that the offering of a deity should be of the same nature as that of the deity.⁵⁴ In this way Buddhist logicians show that Mīmāṃsaka theory of negation is a bundle of inconsistencies.

The Buddhist view

According to the Buddhist logicians negation is not an objective reality. It is simply a subjective idea which denotes the non-existence of a thing at a particular place and time. The object which is not present at one place is present at another place. Therefore it is perceptible through sense-organs and is not in need of a separate source of knowledge. Realists raise objection to the Buddhist theory of negation on four grounds. First, it is inconsistent with the Buddhist theory of perception. In perception we are in direct touch with reality which produces sensations and is apprehended

through sense-organs. In negation the object is absent. There can be no relation between the object and the sense-organ concerned. Therefore the non-existent object cannot be apprehended through perception. Secondly, Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti have dealt with negation in the chapter of inference. Had it (negation) been an object of perception they would have dealt with it in the chapter of perception. Thirdly, if the absence of a visible object be apprehended through perception, the practical importance of inference as a guide of our actions would come to an end. Lastly, negation cannot be an object of inference. In an inference we infer from a known object to an unknown object. In this process there is a reason or middle term which is invariably related with the inferred object. In negation there is no reason or middle term which would establish relation between the present and the absent object. Therefore it is not an object of inference. Buddhists maintain only two sources of knowledge—perception and inference. Negation is apprehended neither by perception nor by inference. Hence it is inexplicable.

Buddhist logicians refute the above arguments of the Realists. The first argument is wrong. The non-existent object is not perceived directly. It is perceived in imagination. For instance we do not perceive a jar on table, imagine its hypothetical presence as being perceived. In case of negation our knowledge of it is not on 'nothingness' or emptiness. It is based on the positive substratum of the bare ground and the cognition of such a bare ground. On the basis of this perceived substratum and its cognition we arrive at a judgment regarding the absence of an object which is imagined as being perceived in all normal conditions of a possible experience, had it been there.⁵⁵

The second objection is not correct. Though an absent object is a case of perception, the understanding plays a predominant part in its ascertainment. It is not the absence of the jar that is deduced, what is deduced is the practical conse-

quence which follows from that negation. The practical consequence consists in the negative propositions and the respective purposive activity as well as its successful end. All these are found on the negative perception of the above jar. Sense-perception is beyond the stage of words, propositions and imaginations. This is the reason why Dīnāga and Dharmakīrti dealt negation in the chapter of inference.⁵⁶

The third argument is unacceptable. The importance of negation is not minimised or comes to an end due to the fact that negation is apprehended through perception. Inference plays an important role in our negative behaviour. At first negation creates a doubt in our mind regarding the existence of a thing. We think that the object desired might be there. At this stage we are hesitant and our activity is at a standstill. Afterwards imagination comes in. It provides certainty to our knowledge of the non-existent object. We begin to think if the jar does really exist on the place which forms part of the same cognition, it would have been visible. From this hypothetical presence we conclude that since the object desired is not visible on that place, therefore, it does not exist. This kind of imagination leads us to the conclusion that the object does not exist and helps us in performing our activities.

The fourth argument also meets the fate of the other three arguments. According to Dharmottara 'the idea of the non-existence of an imagined object receives practical application on the basis of an inference whose middle term is non-perception.'⁵⁷ Kamalaśīla also supports the view of Dharmottara and avers that the non-apprehension of the character of a thing leads to the thing being regarded as non-existent. In reality what has to be perceived is the non-apprehension of the effect which leads to the cognition of the non-existence of the cause.⁵⁸ The process of inference begins to play its role the moment an object is perceived. The question of the presence or absence of the middle does not arise. In the apprehension of the non-existence of an object, after the

apprehension of the hypothetical visibility of the object, the imagination begins to function, and does not wait for the existence of a middle term. In fact the whole phenomenal world is the creation of our imagination. Inference itself is based upon imagination. Negation is inferential in its character because it is the function of imagination.

REFERENCES

1. Tatra Mīmāṃsākānāṃ sadasallakṣaṇayor bhāvābhāvayor vastutvaṃ, sarvasya ca pādārthasya sadasadrūpeṇa dvayātmakatvam ityabhyupagamaḥ. Tattva-saṃgraha pañjikā p 470 lines 24-25.
2. Abhāvo'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstīyarthasyāsannikṛṣṭasyeti. Śābara-bhāṣya 1. 1. 5. Quoted in Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjika p. 471 line 9.
3. Pramāṇā pañcakaṃ yatra vasturūpe na jāyate. Vastu-sattavabodhārthaṃ tatrābhāva pramāṇatā. Śloka-vārtika. Negation verse 1. Tattva-saṃgraha 1648. Pratyakṣāderanutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva uccyate. Ibid, negation verse 11. Tattva-saṃgraha 1649.
4. Abhāvattvaṃ dravyādi-ṣaṭkānyonyābhāvavattvam. Siddhāntamuktāvali. Quoted in the Nyāya Theory of Knowledge.
5. Vāstavo'bhāvaḥ.
6. Vighrahavān abhāvaḥ.
7. Bhinna-murtirabhāvaḥ.
8. Āyusmān abhāvaḥ. Nos. 4-7 quoted in the Buddhist logic vol. 1 p. 368.
9. Nyāya-bindu 2.46 as translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 102.
10. Pratipattuḥ pratyakṣo ghatādirarthas tasya nivṛttir anupalabdhis tadabhava svabhāveti. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 33 lines 5-6.

11. Sarvatra cāsyām abhāva-vyavahāra-śaddhīanyām anupalabdhou yeṣāṃ svabhāva-viruddhādīnām upalabdhyā kāraṇādīnām upalabdhyā ca pratiśedha uktas teṣāṃ upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptānāma eva upalabdhir anupalabdhiśca veditavyā. Nyāya-bindu 2. 46.
12. Yadi pramāṇābhāvo vastu na bhavet tataśca sarvasāmarthya śūnyatvād asyeti tato nābhāva-pratītiḥ syāt. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 471 line 17.
13. Nāstītyapi ca samvittir na Vastuvugamādṛte. Jñānaṃ ca jāyaate kiñcid upaṣṭambhana-varjitam. Śloka-vārtika. Negation 16.
14. Prāgabhāva, pradhvmsābhāva, anyonyābhāva, atyantābhava. Ibid Negation verses 2-4, 8.
15. Yadvānuvṛtti vyāvṛtti buddhigrāhyo yatastvayam. Tasmād gavādivad vastu prameyavācca gamyate. Ibid-Negation 9. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1656.
16. Tatrānupalabdhir yathā na pradeśa viśeṣe kvacid ghaṭa upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasyānupalabdheriti. Nyāya-bindu 2. 16.
17. Bradely.
18. Bhavo bhāvād ivānyasmād abhāvāṃśadapi dhruvam. Asaṅkirṇo-bhyupetavyaḥ sa katham vā bhaviṣyati. Anyonyamapyabhāvānāṃ yadyasaṅkirṇata svataḥ. Bhāvaiḥ kim aparāddharāṃ vā parataścet kuto nu sā. Nyāya-mañjarī Part I p. 52 line 26. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 412 no. 51.
19. Idam tāvat sakala-prāṇi-sākṣikaṃ samvedana-dvayam-upajāyamānaṃ dṛṣṭam. Ihi ghaṭosti ihi nāstīti tatra vikalpāmātra-samvedanam anālambanam ātmāṃ śāvalambanam vetyādi yadabhilapyate tannāstitā-jñāna ivāstitva-jñānēpi samānam ato dvayorapi prāmāṇyam bhavatu, dvayorapi vā mā bhut yattvastīti jñānaṃ pramāṇam itaurad apramāṇam iti kathyate tadicchāmātram. Nyāya mañjarī part I line 21 quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 533.

20. Kāryādīnām abhāvo hi bhāvo yaḥ kāraṇādīnā. Sa cāpara-viviktātmā pratyakṣeṇaiva gamyate. Tattva-saṁgraha. 1671.
21. Buddhist logie vol. 1 p. 384.
22. Anāgatā-hyanupalabdhiḥ, svayameva saṁdigdha-sva-bhāvā. Tasyā asiddhāyā nābhāva-niścayo'pi tvatīta-vartamānāyā iti. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 35 lines 7-9.
23. Viprakṛṣṭa-viṣayānupalabdhiḥ pratyakṣānumānā-nivṛttī-lakṣaṇā saṁśaya-hetuḥ, pramāṇa-nivṛttāvapyarthābhāvā asiddheriti. Nyāya bindu 2. 47. pp. 44-45.
24. (apud Stuart Mill, logic 81, p. 322) quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 103 foot note 3,
25. Nyāyamañjarī I pp. 51-54. Quoted in the Nyāya-Theory of knowledge.
26. Api cendriya-sannikarṣād upalabhyamāne bhūtale abhāva-jñānamapi bhavati aghaṭam bhūtaalam iti tatra bhūtalasyevābhāvasyāpi pratyakṣatā kiṁ nesyate. Nyaya Kandalī p. 226 line 4. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 405.
27. Nanu bhūpradeśaṁ ca ghaṭābhāvaṁ ca Viśphārite cakṣuṣī nirīkṣāmahe, nimīlite tasmin tayoranyataram api na paśyāmaḥ. Tatra samāne ca tadbhāva-bhāvitve bhūpradeśa-jñānam cākṣuṣam abhava-jñānam na tu cākṣuṣam iti kuto viśeṣam avagacchāmaḥ. Nyāya-mañjarī pl p 46 line 22. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 405 No. 28.
28. Viśeṣaṇa.
29. Bhāvapadārtha.
30. Viśeṣya-Viśeṣaṇa.
31. Bhūtala.
32. Tarka-bhāṣā p. 6 and Tattva-cintāmaṇi vol. 1 pp. 574-576. Quoted in the Nyāya Theory of Knowledge.
33. Nanu nirūpasya asaṁbaddhasya ca cākṣuṣatvam abhāvasya Katham abhīdhyate. Nyāya-mañjarī part I p. 48 line 28, Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 405 No. 30.

34. Saṁyoga.
35. Samavāya
36. Saṁyukta-samavāya.
37. Sannikarṣo hi saṁyoga-samavāya-svabhāvaḥ tat-prabhava-bhedo vā samyukta-samavāyādirīha nāsteva. Saṁyukta-viśeṣaṇabhāvopi na sambhavati Kumbhābhāvasya bhūpradeśā viśeṣaṇatvābhāvāt, na hya-saṁyukta-samavetaṁ vā kiñcid viśeṣaṇaṁ bhavati saṁyuktasya daṇḍādeḥ samavetasya śukla-guṇādes-tathābhāva darśanād abhāvaśca na keñcit saṁyujyate adravyabhāvāt, na Kvacit sa samavaiti guṇādivailakṣaṇyāditi. Nyāyamañjarī part 1 p. 46 line 13. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 406 n. 31.
38. Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya bhāvaśca sambandha eva na bhavati, bhinnobha-yāśritaikatvābhāvāt. Tarka-bhāṣā p. 51 line 11. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 406 n. 32.
39. Adhikaraṇa-kaivalyam.
40. Śāstra-dīpikā p. 326 quoted in the Nyāya Theory of Knowledge.
41. Epistemology of the Bhāṭṭa school of Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā. p. 348.
42. Mānaṁ Katham abhāvaścet prameyaṁ cāsyā Kīdrśam. Meyoyadvad bhāvo hi mānamapyeva miṣyatām. Bhāvātmake tathā meyenābhāvasya pramāṇatā. Śloka-Vārtika. Negation verses 45-46.
43. Tat sambandhe sadityevaṁ tadrūpatvaṁ pratiyate. Nāstyetredam-itīdaṁ tu tadsaṁyoga hetukam. Ibid. Negation verse 26.
44. Bhūtaḥ (deśa-mātre).
45. Svarūpa-mātraṁ dṛṣṭvā'pi paścāt kiñcid smarannapi. Tatrānya-nāstitāṁ prṣṭas tadaiva pratipadyate. Ibid. Negation verse 28.
46. Gattva saṁgraha verses 1667-1669.
47. Śloka-vārtika. Negation verse 16.

48. Yadi vastu pramābhāvo meyābhāvaś tathaiva ca. Pratyakṣentaragato bhāvas tathāsatī katharī na te. Tattva saṁgraha verse 167.
49. Kāryādīnām abhāvaḥ ko yo bhāvaḥ Kāraṇādīnaḥ. Śloka-vartika. Negation 8.
50. Tattva saṁgraha verse 1671.
51. Arthakriyā samartharī ca sat anyad asaducyate. Samāveśo na caikatra tayoryukto virodhataḥ. Ibid verse 1675.
52. Dvirūpatvaṁ naivekatrāsti vastuni. Ibid verse 1676. Yau ca paraspara-viruddhau na tayorekasmin vastuni yugapad upalayanam paraspara viruddhe ca sadasadrūpe, iti vyāpaka-viruddhopalabdhiḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 477 lines 26-27.
53. Nīrūpsya hi vijñāna rūpa hānau pramāṇatā. Na yujyate prameyasya sā hi saṁvitti-lakṣaṇā. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1679.
54. Tasmād yuktam abhāvasya nābhāvenaiva vedanam. Na nāma yādṛśo yakṣo balirapyasya tādṛśaḥ. Nyāyamañjarī part 1 p. 51 line 13. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism.' p. 404 n. 26.
55. Upalabdhi-lakṣaṇa-prāptasyānupalabdhiḥ. Nyāya-bindu 2. 16. Dṛśyamānād arthāt tadbuddheśca samagra-darśana sāmāgrikatvena pratyakṣatayā saṁbhāvitasya nivṛttir avasīyate. Tasmād artha-jñāna eva pratyakṣasya ghaṭaśya abhāva ucyate. Na tu nivṛttimātram ihābhāvo nivṛttimātrādṛśya nivṛtṭya niścayāt. Dṛśyānupalabdhiḥ niścaya-sāmarthyadeva ca dṛśyābhāvo niścitaḥ. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 33 lines 9-12 and 15-16.
56. Abhāvasya vyavahāro nāstīty evamākāraṁ jñānaṁ śabdaś caivamākāro niḥśamkarī gamanāgamana-lakṣaṇā ca pravṛtṭiḥ kāyiko'bhāvavyavahāraḥ. Ghatābhāve hi jñāte niḥśamkarī gantum āgantum ca pravartate. Tadevam etasya trividhasyābhāva-vyavahārasya dṛśyānupalabdhiḥ sādhanī pravartikā. Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā p. 34 lines 15-18. See also Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 84.

57. Atha yadi dṛśyānupalambhena kevala-bhūtalagrāhi pratyakṣeṇa dṛśya-ghaṭābhāvo niścīyata eva na vyavahriyate, tarhi kena vyavahartavya ityāh-dṛśyetyādiḥ. Dṛśyānupalambhena līṅgabhūtena vyavahartavya ityarthāḥ. Ibid p. 29 line 5. Quoted in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 82 foot note 4.
58. Tasmāt sarvaiva svabhāvānupalabdhir asadvyavahāra hetuḥ. Paramārthataḥ. Kāryānupalabdhir eva dṛṣṭavyā. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 481 line 11.

PART II UNIVERSAL

1. The Nature of Universal

What is that element which makes us know that 'the Buddha is a human being and not a devil' or 'this is a cow and not a horse?' Three different explanations have been given to explain this problem of knowledge. The Realists hold that the knowledge that the 'Buddha is a human being and not a devil' is due to the fact that there is an element of generality¹ or universality² which is found in every individual human being. The Buddha is different from Christ but they are linked with a common bond of humanity. In the same way the 'black cow' may be different from 'white and red cows', but there is the element of cowness which at once strikes to our mind when we see a particular cow and state that 'this is a cow.' This element of cowhood or manhood persists even when an individual cow or an individual man dies. It is attached to a particular cow or a man when she or he is born. This principle of sameness which pervades all

Individual cows or men is called universal. It is an actual Entity which resides in the object of the external world. It possesses unity, eternity and inherence³. In every particular object it somehow resides in toto. To exist means to be united with the universal being⁴. It may be defined as 'that which resides in its individuals by the relation of inherence and which at the same time is eternal'⁵. In other words it is a positive object which subsists in its particulars by way of inherence.

The Jains and the Advaita Vedāntins maintain the conceptualist view of universals. According to them universal is not a real entity above and apart from its individuals. It is an abstract element which is found in different individuals of the same class. It has no separate existence but is identical to its individuals. It is not a mental construction but is found in the objects of the daily life. It governs the activities of mankind. According to Ahrikan, every object has two kinds of qualities universal and particular⁶. The universal quality is common to all things and gives rise to the knowledge of a particular thing. If an object were entirely different from other objects, it would have been non-different from a sky-flower. The common notion appears only with regard to entities or objects. It never appears with regard to non-entities like cow's teeth⁷, or the son of a barren woman. Its appearance in entities and non-appearance in non-entities shows that it is something more than the creation of our mind.

The Idealist Buddhist maintain that universals are not real⁸. They are mental constructions which do not represent any external reality⁹. They owe their origin to the cognitive capacity of our reason¹⁰. We overlook the difference that obtains between the external points of reality, point-instants or unique particulars. Suffering as we are from an inveterate habit of beginningless illusion we take them to be external¹¹. Dharmakīrti says that every thing other than the 'particular' is universal¹². The knowledge of universal

is not direct. It is not derived through sense-organs. It is indirect knowledge which is derived from inference or imagination¹³. The universal character of something is that essence which belongs equally to an indefinite number of points of reality. For instance the fire existing in imagination refers equally to every possible fire. It represents the universal essence of fire¹⁴.

Now an important question arises; if universals are mental constructions and do not represent any objective reality lying outside mind how is it that we do not confuse between, for example, a cow and a crow, when we say that 'this is a cow' ? Universals being mental constructions are present in all ideas and no external reality is represented by them. The idea of crow may therefore be imputed to the idea of cow. To disclaim the external reality of the universals and believe in their correspondence with ideas contained in the mind will be nothing less than contradiction in terms.

The Buddhists' reply to this question is that the use of words depends upon the will of speakers. They are entirely unfettered in their use of words and use words which suit their will. They do not think that the words spoken by them must always correspond to external object. For instance they use the word 'dārāḥ' which is plural, for single woman and the word Saṅṅagarī which is singular, for six cities¹⁵. The idea of universal arises not because it is really existent. It is a false notion which is caused by the similarity between things which are entirely dissimilar. There are objects which are similar with some particular objects in contrast with other objects which are entirely dissimilar. For instance, the idea of cow arises from the similarity of individual cows in contrast with the idea of 'crow' which is entirely dissimilar to cow. Hence the idea of universal is a false mental notion which originates from the mental difference among individuals¹⁶.

2. Kinds of Universal

There are two kinds of universal—(1) *para sāmānya* and (2) *apara sāmānya*; ultimate universal and penultimate universal. *Para-sāmānya* is the mere existence (being only) which pervades all things. It is the existence of categories—substance, action and quality. It is the reality of all things.

Every object is endowed with another universal which is inferior to the ultimate universal. It serves the purpose of knowing all the subdivisions of substance as such and differentiates things denoted by a substance from the things which belong to other substances. In this way penultimate universals too become the cause of the exclusive notion of those substrata¹⁷. According to the Realists all notions of commonness or generality are not universal in the true sense. Only those notions of commonness are universal which are eternal and which inhere in their individual objects. The common notion of being in one class is not a universal. It is an attribute or *upādhi* which can be forsaken by every student. The common notion of living in a city is not a universal as any city-dweller of Allahabad can leave it for *Vārāṇasī* or some other place. But the notion of 'cowhood' or manhood is a universal in the true sense. A cow cannot forsake its cowhood nor can a man change his manhood. Śivāditya rightly says that universal is of two kinds (1) *Jāti* e. g. *sattā*, *dravyatra* etc, and (2) *Upādhi*, e. g. the state of being a cook¹⁸. But the later *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika* writers accept only one kind of universal which is eternal¹⁹.

3. Realists' arguments regarding the existence of Universals

Realists have adduced four arguments for the real existence of universals. First, the existence of universal is proved by perception. It appears when the sense-organs are functioning²⁰. The universals of manhood, cowhood and treehood inhere in all individual men, cows and trees respectively. When we perceive any of these objects we perceive the universal inhering in them. This idea of universal proceeds from something different from the form of man, cow

and tree. It differentiates one object from the other. Secondly, the existence of universal is proved also by inference. All our ideas correspond to some objective reality, and the universal is an idea therefore it must have an objective reality. According to Śrīdhara 'the nature of each object being different from others, there can be no comprehension of a common form of different objects without accepting the universal which pervades them²¹. It is this universal which helps us to determine that 'this is a cow' and not an elephant.' The universal cow²² remains the same in all the cows while the individual cows differ from one another²³. Thirdly, the idea of a cow cannot be based upon a particular cow because it appears even when there is no individual cow. All individual cows are the species of the universal cow which subsists in each of them in its entirety. Though it subsists in each individual, it is not diverse. It is the universal cow. Lastly, the notion of the universal cannot be regarded as wrong because neither there is defect in its source nor there is annulment of it by a subsequent cognition²⁴.

But according to Buddhists universals do not exist and are mental constructions. The categories of substance, quality and action too, which are believed to be real by Realists, do not exist at all. The universals which are supposed to subsist in these categories, are, therefore, baseless. Further universals are not perceived. In our daily life we cognize only an individual object unassociated with its universal. We cognize only an entity, e. g. a cow and not two entities, e. g. a cow and a universal cow (cowhood). Had it been in existence we would have cognized a cow along with the universal cow, as we see a man with a stick²⁵. Aśoka Paṇḍita who is an acute Buddhist logician compares the universal with a person who wants to purchase a thing without paying its price. The universal does not reveal its form in cognition (which is the price and yet wants to be regarded as a separate object of perception²⁶.) He maintains that what is cognized is only an individual object and not a universal.

Everybody knows only five fingers. Nobody knows the sixth finger which is other than the five fingers and is called the universal finger²⁷.

In fact universals are not cognized through sense-organs. They are the creation of convention²⁸. The idea of a universal arises out of the capacity of performing a common function or having a common (similar) cause²⁹. For instance the cases of *emblica officinalis*³⁰ and *terminalia chebula*³¹ may be taken. They have the capacity to remove various diseases singly or collectively, yet there is nothing like a universal which pervades both of them. Had there been a common universal uniformly subsisting in them, there would have been no possibility of removing the diseases quickly or slowly³².

The notions of universal cow, man or jar, etc. are formed by those persons who are familiar with conventions attached with these particular terms. Appearance of a particular object, social membership of a particular subject and the association of the appearance with the convention of society are the prerequisites of the formation of universals. The apprehension of universal is a complex process consisting of several steps. In some cases the apprehension of a universal takes place so quickly that no step of its process is recognized and hence the existence of a universal thing is forced upon in confusion. But those persons who are well-versed at the use of words³³ are not confused in this way. According to Dharmakīrti universals are constructions of our imagination. They do not denote any objective reality. They are formed to express the activities which are associated with particular things. The reality of universals is the result of an illusion which is generated by well established linguistic usage or practice³⁴. Further, the existence of universals cannot be inferred from the idea of universals. Every idea does not correspond with an objective reality. There are such ideas as sky-flower, the son of a barren woman, and the horn of a hare. But they have no objective reality. They have

never been cognized. If we infer the reality of a universal from the premises that it is an idea and has a word for it, we will have to believe the existence of many patent absurdities. The dead and unborn persons who have no reality at all would then become real objects³⁵. The wonders of magic lantern, the powerful oration of Śukanāsa, the story of Kādambarī and Candrāpīḍa would then become real. Thus no distinction between truth and fiction, valid cognition and illusion or reality and dream would then be possible.

According to Paṇḍita Aśoka the realist argument that a common notion must be based on some common objects as its source is vitiated by the fallacy of undistributed middle. There are many cooks who are called by the common name 'cook'. But there is nothing which may be common to all of them. Had it been so the common notion of cook would have arisen before they started the job of cooking³⁶. The argument that the common act of cooking is the cause of common notion with reference to all cooks is untenable because they are called by the same name (cook) even though they have desisted from the act of cooking³⁷ further. Moreover the universal cowhood cannot be the basis of an individual cow. We see in our daily life that an individual cow is endowed with colour, shape and many other qualities whereas the universal cow is devoid of shape, colour and all other qualities. Both are entirely different from one another. Hence the universal cow cannot be the basis of an individual cow³⁸. Further, the assertion that the universal subsists in every individual in its entire form is wrong. If a single universal subsists in its entire form in several things, all different things will become of identical form and thus the world of phenomena which is experienced in our daily life will come to an end. If we accept the world of phenomena, we will have to regard the universal as being of diverse forms because it subsists at one and the same time in its entire form in several things. But the acceptance of the uni-

versal as being of diverse forms will undermine the very basis of the Realist for whom the universal is one and eternal³⁹.

The last argument of the Realist regarding the existence of the universal is also untenable. The transcendental illusion is always there. It has powerful influence on the mind of human beings. Because of its existence we take a thing to be externally real where in fact it is a mere idea. Hence the source of defect is always there in the shape of transcendental illusion⁴⁰ which causes the idea of a real universal when in fact it is a mental construction⁴¹ which results from the exclusion of exclusively different things. According to the Realist the universal subsists in several things in its entire form. A universal and an individual object are of entirely exclusive nature. Hence the question regarding the nature of the subsistence of the universal in its individual objects becomes of great importance. The subsistence of the universal in its individual objects may be either in the form of staying or in the form of being manifested. 'Staying' further admits of double meaning. It may mean (1) not deviating from its own form and (2) having its downward movement checked. The first meaning is impossible. The universal being eternal by its very nature can never deviate from its own form. The second meaning is also impossible. The universal is 'incorporeal' and all-pervading hence it has no movement at all. The subsistence cannot be used in the sense of being manifested. If it is capable of bringing about its own cognition there is no need of those causes which bring its manifestation. If it is incapable of bringing about its own cognition, no cause can bring about its manifestation⁴².

The meaning of ubiquitous nature of universals is fraught with confusions. Is the universal ubiquitous⁴³ or ubiquitous within its own sphere⁴⁴? The first alternative cannot be accepted because it will bring confusion of all things.

The things being pervaded by one and the same universal will not be distinguished from one another.

If the second alternative is accepted and the universal is located in its own sphere, its relation with a newly produced object, e. g. a jar will be inexplicable. There are only two alternatives possible. Either it goes from the first jar to be associated with the second jar or it does not go from its place and yet is associated with the second one. In the first case it will become a substance, because only substances are capable of movement. In the second case its relation with the new jar is impossible, because a thing cannot be related with another thing without any movement. Further if the universal subsists in its particulars what happens to it after the destruction of the jar ? There are only three alternatives possible. (1) either it continues to subsist even after the destruction of the jar, or (2) it perishes with the jar or (3) it goes elsewhere. The first alternative is untenable, because it makes absurd position of the universal without any particular object to reside in. The acceptance of the second alternative will deprive the universal jar of its eternity. It will become a perishable object and hence lose its universality. The third alternative is also impossible. If the passing of the universal from one particular object to another is accepted it will become an ordinary substance which is subject to movement and lose its fixed nature. Again does universal subsist in its particulars in its entirety or in parts. Both alternatives are untenable. If it subsists in one of its particulars in its entirety, it will be exhausted there and will not be found in other particulars. If it subsists only in parts, the universal 'jar' will not be found anywhere and there will be no idea of the universal jar with reference to particular jars. Moreover the universal being partless cannot have parts in which it can subsist in every individual.⁴⁵ Moreover the subsistence of the universal is impossible. It can subsist neither in a jar nor in a non-jar. If it subsists in a jar the jar in that case is already a jar even without its subsistence

and therefore the universal is not needed, if it is maintained that the universal subsists in a non-jar, in that case even a pen and other objects would become a jar. But obviously this is an absurdity⁴⁶.

The Buddhists further insist that the universal being 'ubiquitous' should be visible everywhere if it is once manifested by the medium of a particular jar. But our experience shows that it is not visible everywhere. If it is said that it is invisible everywhere because it lacks a receptacle⁴⁷ in the form of an individual jar, it means that the knowledge of the universal jar follows the knowledge of a particular jar. If it is so, we can maintain that the knowledge of a particular jar is the basis of the knowledge of the universal jar and not vice-versa⁴⁸. In the words of Diñnāga the doctrine of universals is a clever contrivance. 'It is great dexterity that what resides in one place should without moving from that place, reside in what comes to exist in a place other than that place. The universal is joined with a thing (which is now coming into existence) in the place where the thing in question is : and yet it does not fail to pervade the thing which is in that place. Is not this all wonderful ? It does not go there and it was not there before and yet it is there afterwards although it is not manifold and does not quit its former receptacles. What a series of difficulties⁴⁹.'

After critically examining the realist theory of universals we find that universals are mental constructions which cannot touch reality. The reality is beyond the categories of relation. Related are only the universals⁵⁰. The essence of universals is never positive but negative. They always contain a correlative negation⁵¹. The realist levels a serious charge against the Buddhist theory of universals. Since universals are illusive realities or mere thought-constructions and inferential knowledge which is the very basis of all our activities, depends upon them, therefore inferential knowledge is altogether objectless⁵² and our activities are rendered

impossible. The Buddhist answer to this charge is that although universals are internal mental constructions, still they are related to external reality, because in our practical life we do not notice the difference⁵³ between mental images and external reality. We are prompted to action by ideas, and reach our desired end through them. Actions based upon universals are never contradicted by experience. Although universal is devoid of reality, it is nevertheless a source of right knowledge in as far as it belongs to a man who thinks and acts consistently⁵⁴.

To conclude, the contribution of Buddhist logicians to the theory of universals is unique in the epistemology of the whole world. They were the Indian nominalists and analysts. Their analysis of universals is a masterpiece of epistemology. It is clear and correct. It is quite near the theory of universals which is advocated by logical positivists in modern times. But there is a great difference between Buddhist logicians and western nominalists and logical positivists. The Buddhist logicians vigorously preponderated that universals are negative in their meaning, or their function is by and large negative. Western nominalists and logical positivists have yet to learn this lesson from their Buddhist predecessors. Their approach to universals has been positivistic and hence has failed to undermine realism and elaborate conceptualism. If universals are positive in their character and role, the denial of their being is a contradiction in terms. But unfortunately this contradiction is writ large upon the whole of western nominalism and logical positivism. The Buddhist theory of universals is free from this contradiction. Universals are not positive in meaning and function. They are undoubtedly constructive. But their basic nature is negative. The negative and constructive approach to universals is the greatest need of present day-epistemology because it can clear off those confusions which have remained after the purges of nominalism and logical positivism. It is the only correct approach to universals.

REFERENCES

1. Jāti.
2. Sāmānya.
3. Ekatva, nityatva, sarivetatva. Buddhist logic vol 1 p. 452.
4. Sattā-sāmānya-yogitvamena sattvam.
5. Nityatve sati aneka sarivetatvam. Nyāya-siddhānta-muktāvali on verse 8. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 320 No. 46.
6. Sarvameva vastu sāmānya-viśeṣātmatvatena anekātma-
kaṁ yathā śabalābhāsaṁ ratnam. Tattva-saṁgraha.
pañjikā p. 486 lines 25-26.
7. Anyathā hi na sā buddhir balibhug daśanādiṣu.
Vartate niyatātveṣā bhāveṣveveti kiṁ kṛtam.
Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1714.
8. Vastu-śūnyo vikalpaḥ.
9. Vikalpa-viśayo alīka evāstheyah. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-
ṭikā p. 339 lines 21-22.
10. Anādi-vāsanodbhūta vikalpādhiṣṭhānaṁ vikalpākārasya
vā alīkasya vā svam anumānagocarobhyupeyam. Ibid
p. 12 lines 25-26.
11. Alikam bāhyam eṣaṁ viśayaḥ, bāhyabhedāgrahaścāsyā
bāhyatvaṁ na punar bāhyābheda-grahaḥ. Ibid p. 339
lines 24-25.
See Buddhist logic vol 2 p. 418.
12. Anyat sāmānya-lakṣaṇam. Nyāya-bindu 1. 16.
13. So'numānasya viśayaḥ. Ibid 1. 17.
14. Samāropyamāṇaṁ hi rūpaṁ sakala-vahni-sādhāraṇam.
Tatas tat sāmānya-lakṣaṇam. Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā p. 18
line 1.
15. Yad yathā vācakatvena vaktṛbhir viniyamate.
Anapekṣit bāhyarthān tattathā vācakaṁ vacaḥ.
Dārāḥ saṅgarī tyādau bhedābheda-vyavasthiteḥ.

270 The Problem of knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism

- Khasya svabhāvaḥ khatvaṁ cety atra vā kiṁ nibandhanam.
Pramāṇa-vārtika l. 68-69.
16. Ibid l. 70-74.
17. Tattva-saṅgraha verses 709-711.
18. Saptāpadārthi p. 37 section 41. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 320.
19. Critique of Indian Realism p. 321.
20. Pratyakṣataḥ prasiddhāstu sattva gotvādi jātayaḥ.
Akṣa-vyāpāra-sadbhāve sadādi-pratyayodayāt.
Tattva-saṅgraha verse 714.
21. Pratyekaṁ padārtha svarūpāṇi bhinnāni katharṁ teṣve-
kākāra-pratītiḥ, eka śabda-pravṛttiś'cānanteṣu samban-
dha-grahaṇābhāvāt. Atha teṣvekaṁ nimittam asti nah
samīhitam. Nyāya kandalī p. 12 line 12.
Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 327 no 58.
See Tattva-saṅgraha verse 715.
22. Gotva.
23. Gavādi-śabda-prajñāna viśeṣa gogajādiṣu.
Samayākṛti piṇḍādi vyatiriktārtha-hetavaḥ. Tattva-saṅ-
graha verse 716.
24. Śloka-vārtika. Vanāvāda verses 44-49.
25. Atraike vadanti bhinneṣv anugatā buddhiḥ sāmānyam
vyavasthāpayati. Sā ca pratipiṇḍam daṇḍa-puruṣāviva
na svātantreṇa sāmānyā viśeṣa-lakṣaṇe dve vastunī prati-
bhāsayati nāpi tayor viśeṣana-viśeṣya bhāvaṁ gotvī-
gotvavānityevam anudayāt. Kirntu tādātmya-grāhiṇī
pratītiriyam gaurayam ityekātmatā-parāmarśāt, ubhay-
or anyonya-prahāṇena svarūpāntarā bhāvācca. Nyāya-
kandalī p. 315 line 8. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian
Realism' p. 332 n 70.
26. Idam punar amūlya-dāna-krayī sāmānyam svarūpaṁ ca
nādarśayati pratyakṣatām ca svīkartum icchati. Six-

- Buddhist-Nyāya-tracts. Chapter 6 sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dik-prasāritā p. 99 lines 15-16.
27. Etāsu pañca-svavabhāsanīṣu pratyakṣa-bodhe sphuṭam aṁgarīṣu. sādharmaṇaṁ ṣaṣṭham ihekṣate yaḥ. Śṛṅgaṁ śīrasyātmana ikṣate saḥ Ibid pp. 101-102.
28. Akṣa-vyāpāra sad-bhāvān na hyanantara-bhāvinaḥ. Sadādi-pratyayās siddhāḥ samketābhogatastu te. Tattva-saṁgraha-verse 722 see 739.
29. Ekārthakriyā-kāritvād, eka hetutvācca. Nyāya-kandalī p. 318 line 5. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 352 no 136. Tulya-pratyavamarśād, kāryamātropa-yogitvāt. Tattva-saṁgraha-verses 726-727. Tasmad yasmīnnekākāra parāmarśa vyavesthitārtha kriyāsāmarthya-mātra pratipāditam evābhedaṁ parāmrśya saditi śrutim viniveś yanti. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 240 lines 20-21.
30. Dhātrī.
31. Harītikī.
32. Yathā hyāmalakyādayaḥ parasparam atyanta-vibinnamūrtayo'rapī pratyekaṁ samuditā vā nānāvidhi-vyādhi-vyāvarttana-sāmarthyādhyāsītā bhavanty anantareṇāpyaṇugāminam, na hi tatra sāmānyam eva tathā vidham arthakriyāṁ sampādayatīti yuktaṁ vaktum. Yatas teṣu vividhārtha-kriyā-sampādana-yogyāṁ na sāmānyam asti. Yadi syāt tadā yeyaṁ kvacit kadācit Kāsāncid dhātryādīnām cirakṣipra-roḡādyupa-śamana-sāmarthyopalabdhiḥ sā na syāt, sāmānya-syaikarūpatvāt. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjika pp. 239-240 lines 27, 1-4.
33. Na hyagrhīta-samayānāṁ sadādi-pratyaya-prasūtir anyathā samketakaraṇa vaiarthyaṁ syāt.....Kvacid atyabhyāsataḥ āśutarotpādād amīṣāṁ kramo nāvadhāryate. Mandābhyāsāstu sphuṭataram avadhārayanteva. Ibid p. 240 lines 19, 25-26.
34. Pramāṇa-Vārtika 3. 31, 49.

35. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 748-749.
36. Icchā-racita-rūpeṣu candrāpīḍādiṣu nabhastalopakalpita dhavala-grādiṣu naṣṭa-jāteṣu mahāsammat-śarṅkha-prabhṛtiṣu buddhir vinaikenānugāminā Katharṁ bhavat. Nahi .tatrāpi sāmānyam asti, vyaktyāśritatvāt tasya. Tattva-saṁgraha pañjikā p. 246 lines 20-23. Anaikāntika tā.
37. Six Buddhist Nyāya-Tracts chaper 6. Sāmānya-dūṣaṇa-dikprasāritā pp. 94-95 lines 9-17 and 1-4.
38. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 247 lines 11-14. Anvayī-pratyayo yasmācchabda-vyaktyavabhāsavān. Varṇākṛtyakṣarākāra-śūnyā jātiṣtu varṇyate. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 739.
39. Ekarya ca sarvātmanā bahuṣu parisamāptatve sarveṣāṁ vyaktibhedānāṁ parasparam ekarūpatāpattiḥ, eka-vytipariniṣṭhita svabhāva-sāmānya-padārtha-Saṁisprṣṭatvād eka-vyakti-rupatvāt. Sāmānyasya vā'nekatvāpattir guga-padaneka-vāstu parisamāpta-ātma rūpatvāt. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 258 lines 20-22.
40. Anāderavidyā-vāsanā-lakṣaṇasya kāraṇa-doṣāsyā vidyamānatvāt. Ibid pp. 258-259 lines 28, 1.
41. Tasmān mithyā vikalpoyam artheṣvekātmatāgrahaḥ. Itaretara-bhedosya bījaṁ samjñā yadarthikā. Pramāṇa-vārtika l. 74.
42. Tattvasaṁgraha verses 798-801.
43. Sarvagatam.
44. Svāśraya-Sarvagan.
45. Kim pratipiṇḍaṁ kārtsnyena vartate jātirutaik-deśeneti dvayam api cānupapannam. Piṇḍe sāmānyam anyatra yadi kārtsnyena vartate, Tatraivāsya samāptatvān na syāt piṇḍāntare grahaḥ. Eka-deśena vṛttau tu gotva, jātir na kutra cit, Samagāstīti gobuddhiḥ pratipiṇḍaṁ Kothaṁ bhevet. Jāteśca nirāvayavatvān na kecid ekadeśāḥ santi yaireṣā pratipiṇḍaṁ vartate. Na caikatra piṇḍe samāptyā

vartamānā piṇḍāntare samāptyaiva vartitum arhati, samāptasya pnnarutpattim vinā samāptyantarānupap-
atteḥ. Nyāya-mañjarī part 1 p. 272 line 10. Quoted in
the 'Critique of Indian Realism p. 339 No. 101.

46. Na gotvañi, gavyaigavi vṛttyabhāvāditi cet-atha manyase
yadidam gotvañi goṣvanuvṛtti-pratyaya-kāraṇaṁ tat kim
gavi vartate āhosvid agavi. Yadi tāvad gavi, prāg
gotvayogād gaurevāsāviti vyarthañi gotvam, atha agavi,
na, aśvādyapi gotva-yogād gauḥ prāpnoti. Na cānyā gatir
asti. Tasmān na gotvād anuvṛttipratyaya iti. Nyāya-
Vārtikn p. 6691 ine 8. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian
Realism p. 341 No. 106.
47. Āśraya.
48. Vyaktau vaikatra sā vyaktyā'bhedāt sarvatragā yadi.
Jātir dṛśyēt sarvatra, na ca sā jātyapekṣā (i). Vyañj-
akā-prati-pattau hi na vyamgye sampratīyate. Viparyā-
yaḥ punaḥ kasmād iṣṭaḥ sāmānya tadvatoḥ. Pramāṇa-
vārtika; 1. 307-308.
49. Anyatra vartamānasya tato'nyasthāna janmani. Tasmād
acalaḥ sthānād vṛttirityati-yaktatā. Yatrāsau Vartate
bhāvas tena sambadhyate na tu. Taddeśinañ ca vyāp-
noti kimapyetan mahādbhutam. Na yāti na ca tatrā std,
asti paścān na cāñśavat. Jahāti pūrvañ nā dhāram
aho vvasana-santatiḥ. Pramāṇa-samuccaya. Chapter 5
Apoḥavada.
50. Pratibandhaḥ sāmānya-dharmā vāśrayate. Nyāya-Vārtik-
atātparya-tikā p. 12lines 23-24.
51. Anya-vyā vṛttirūpam. Ibid p. 13 line 6.
52. Tat kim sāmānyasya asattvāt, svalakṣaṇe ca pratibandha-
graha-asam bhavād anumānañ nir viṣayam eva. Pariśu-
ddhi quoted in the Buddhist Logic vol 2 p. 305 No. 2.
53. Bāhya-bhedāgrahāt. Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparyatīkā p. 13
line 7.
54. Bhrāntamapi pramātrā śraya vaśāt pramāṇam. Ibid p. 13
line 8.

PART III

THE THEORY OF APOHA

1. Nature of Apoha

The Buddhist theory of apoha is a counter-part of the realist theory of universal. According to this theory, words and concepts are dialectical by their very nature. They proceed on the basis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning.¹ When a word or concept is uttered, it at once means what it is not. For instance, when the word 'cow' is uttered, it at once means that it is not a 'non-cow.' The apprehension of a cow is dependent on the exclusion of all those things which are non-cows. The cow and the non-cow are mutually exclusive terms. Cows are completely different among themselves. There are not even two cows which are similar to one another. But in contrast with lions, elephants and horses, they are similar. It is this similarity which generates the wrong notion of identity, universality or commonness.²

In fact, the human mind is incapable of apprehending all the innumerable particulars in their own individuality. It forsakes their difference and apprehends only their similarity.³ Suffering as we are from transcendental illusion, we do not know the real nature of things. We impose a uniform and undifferentiated form, which is a mental construction, upon things which are entirely different from one another. Owing to transcendental illusion, we forget this imposition, regard it itself as a real thing and say that it is eternal, all-pervading etc. This doctrine of 'exclusion' or 'negation' is known as the doctrine of bhedāgraha,⁴ apoha,⁵ anyavyāvṛtti,⁶ and atad-vyāvṛtti.⁷ Kamalaśīla, explaining the doctrine of apoha, says that the 'one uniform, non-different form that is imposed upon things, proceeds on

the strength of the apprehension of things in the form of the 'exclusion of other things' and it, being itself of the nature of exclusion or negation of other things, is mistaken by people under the spell of illusion to be one with that which is excluded by it. It ultimately brings about the apprehension of the thing excluded from others.'⁸

The mental concept or apoha requires double synthesis⁹ in constructing the empirical world which has no real basis apart from the purely subjective consciousness. The first synthesis consists in the form of a perceptual judgment like 'this is a cow' or 'this is an elephant.' Here a false identity is established between two entirely dissimilar things i. e. between the thought-image and the extreme particular, and the things are apprehended as identical. The notion of identity or commonness is caused not by some positive commonness residing in the individual objects of a class, but by a negative commonness which belongs to all individuals of a particular class. For instance, all cows of the world are different from one another and have nothing in common among themselves except the performance of a particular function and the fact of their origin from similar causes. Yet all of them have a negative commonness in that they are different from non-cows, e. g. horses, lions etc.¹⁰ 'By the second synthesis, absolutely dissimilar extreme particulars of a class are falsely considered as similar and brought together under one concept as if they belonged to one class and had a common universal.'¹¹ Exposing the Buddhist theory of Apoha, Vācaspati Miśra says that the real function of a mental concept is to affirm identity in difference, to represent a unity in difference of place, time and quality or to pass such judgments as 'this is that.'¹²

Apoha or the thought-image takes the following steps in creating the illusion of a real world consisting of identical objects. At first there arises the determinate perception of a particular object e. g. a cow. It externally projects an image which is similar to those images which are projected

by the determinate perception of other cows. The thought images do not take place at the same time. Therefore, the human mind is incapable of comprehending the difference between two thought-images and takes those images as identical.¹³ The identity of those images produces the identity of indeterminate sensations, which are the cause of thought-images. On account of the identity of sensations, extreme particulars which are reflected in those sensations are also regarded as identical. This process is summarized in a well-known Buddhist verse which runs thus. 'On account of identical ideas, there arises a notion of identity with regard to sensations, and on account of sensations being identical, there results the identity of unique particulars (Svalakṣaṇas) as well.'¹⁴

2. Kinds of Apoha

Śāntarakṣita has classified apoha in two kinds—(1) Paryudāsa (relative negation) and (2) Niṣedha or Prasajya-Pratiṣedha (absolute negation). The relative negation or Paryudāsa is again divided into two kinds—(1) Buddhyātman (logical negation) and (2) Arthātman¹⁵ (ontological negation).

The Buddhyātman is logical or internal negation. It is negation or apoha in a true sense. Here the mental image which is the object of determinate perception externally projects itself and causes the notion of an external object. The Arthātman or ontological negation is the extreme particular which is real, and is called apoha only in a secondary sense. Śāntarakṣita gives four reasons¹⁶ to explain why a logical or ontological negation is designated by the name of apoha.

First, the principal reason is that a thought-image is called apoha because it appears as excluded (distinguished) from all other images. It is unmingled¹⁷ and entirely disconnected with all other mental images.¹⁸ It is invoked in our mind the moment a word is spoken.

Secondly, the thought-image regarded as cause leads us to the extreme particular, the real entity by excluding it from all other objects and makes our purposeful actions possible.¹⁹

Thirdly, the mental image may be regarded also as effect of the extreme particular because it is the result of direct perception of the extreme particular.²⁰

Fourthly, owing to transcendental illusion, it always apprehends the similarity of objects and excludes the special features which are the essences of extreme particulars.²¹ The thought-image is the real apoha to which the second kind of apoha i.e. 'Niṣedha' can also be applied. The thing-in-itself can be called apoha only indirectly on the ground that it appears as differentiated or excluded from all heterogeneous objects and is the very foundation of exclusion.²² The simple negation consists in such phrases as 'a cow' is a 'non cow.' In such examples apoha or negation of others is apprehended very clearly.²³

3. Realists' objections to the theory of Apoha

The champions of the cause of realism like Kumāriḷa, Uddyotakara, Bhāmaḷa, Vācaspati Miśra, Jayanta Bhāṭṭa and Śrīdhara have given long discourses to refute the apoha theory. Kumāriḷa holds that according to the Buddhist, the thought-image or apoha denotes something negative. For him the term apoha e.g. a 'cow' denotes the exclusion of non-cow. The 'non-cow' can be excluded only when the 'cow' is established because 'non-cow' is the negation of 'cow.' Therefore the Buddhist must explain the nature of 'cow' which has been negated by the particle Nañ (non). If the 'cow' is of the nature of the negation of non-cow, it will involve mutual dependence (arguing in a circle).²⁴ And if the cow is self-established, the postulation of the theory of apoha is useless. If apoha means mere negation, it is the void²⁵ which is put forth in the garb of apoha and denies an object whose existence is

proved by experience. The import of word always appears in the form of positive entity, e.g. 'this is a cow' and not in the shape of negation, e.g. 'this is a non-cow.' Though one cognition is different from another cognition, yet when it appears, it does not tend to the exclusion of non-entity. For instance, at the time of the apprehension of a cow, it is the vision of a positive horse which is not visible and not that of the non-horse.²⁶ Further, if apoha were meant by the words, all words which denote diverse universals as well as diverse particulars will be synonymous.²⁷ The relation between different apohas raises a difficulty. There are only two possible alternatives. Apohas are either (1) different or (2) non-different. If they are different, they must be regarded as entities and consequently it is established that apoha denotes some positive thing. If they are non-different, they become non-entities. Consequently the plurality of apohas is inexplicable.²⁸

Bhāmaha endorses the views of Kumāriḷa and says that the theory of apoha is against human experience. Words do not denote exclusion. When words like cow, elephant etc. are used, they always denote some positive form. If the word 'cow' denotes merely the negation of the non-cow, the first idea that should come to our mind directly and immediately on hearing it should be that of non-cow. But such thing never occurs in our daily life. If words denote mere negation e.g. non-cow, we have to invent other words which denote affirmation that 'this is a cow,' because it is not possible for a single word to give two meanings entirely different from one another.²⁹ The Buddhist refutes the objections raised by Kumāriḷa and Bhāmaha. He says 'unless we know what is a non-cow we cannot cognize a cow. The knowledge of cow depends only on the exclusion of non-cows. There must be a word which connotes cow and in its very connotation it excludes non-cows. If we do not maintain this, it will not be possible to distinguish non-cows from cows just as it is

impossible to know a man *Ḍittha* unless we know previously his difference from other men viz. *Ḍavittha* etc. If we cognize a cow without knowing its distinction from non-cows, our cognition will be of no importance. We cannot reach the desired object. If some body asks to bring a cow and we do not know its distinction from non-cows e.g. lions, horses, bridges, paper etc, we may bring him a horse or anything for that matter. Exposing the Buddhist position, *Vācaspati Mīśra* says, 'if exclusion of other objects is not expressed by a word, a person asked to fasten a cow to a post may fasten a horse.' Thus the realist theory fares no better than the Buddhist one. Both are subject to the fallacy of moving in a circle. The fact is that both affirmation and negation are mutually related terms.

They are like twin brothers.³⁰ The apprehension of the one immediately leads to the idea of the exclusion of the other. In the words of *Kamalaśīla*, 'affirmation is always con-comitant with negation of the unlike, as there can be nothing which is not excluded from things unlike itself.'³¹ The argument against the diversity of the characteristics of apoha is unfounded. Apoha is neither positive nor negative ; neither diverse nor same, neither subsistent nor non-subsistent and neither one nor many. It does not exist in the form in which it is apprehended, so it cannot be positive. It is apprehended as an entity, so it cannot be entirely featureless. Therefore these characteristics have no place in it.³²

The problem of the difference or diversity of apohas creates no difficulty. The difference among various apohas is the result of impressions which are continuing from time immemorial. Explaining the difference of apohas, *Kamalaśīla* says that difference among apohas is due, not to the difference of the substrata, or to the difference among the excluded things ; what happens is that on diverse external objects there are super-imposed apohas which are themselves featureless and consist only in the form of those

objects, and hence appearing as diverse ; they are so superimposed by cognitions which, though rather objectless, rest upon diverse 'unreal' objects, and are related to variegated conceptual impressions extending over all time without beginning ; and being thus imposed, these apohas appear as diverse and as existing, so that the diversity and positive character of apohas results from the diversity of the said impressions.³³ The Realist objects to this explanation by saying that the impressions are themselves the result of an entity. Therefore the diversity or the positive character of apohas cannot be based on impressions.³⁴ Replying to the Realist argument, Kamalaśīla says that the theory of apoha does not deny the positive apprehension. It simply states that along with the positive apprehension, the negative apprehension in the form of exclusion of other things also takes place. It is not a direct apprehension but an indirect one, the mental cognition ultimately provides the idea of the thing. Hence to this extent both the Realist and the Buddhist theory are on the same ground. The fundamental difference between the two is that according to the former the word denotes a positive real thing but according to the latter it does not denote any real positive character.³⁵

Uddyotakara examines the Buddhist theory of apoha and finds it full of inconsistencies. According to him, there can be only two alternatives. The term non-cow may be either 'positive' or 'negative' in character. In the first case, it may be identical either with the cow or with the non-cow: if it is identical with the cow, there is no difference between the position of the Buddhist and the Realist: if it is identical with the non-cow it will be contrary to human experience because there is no man who has ever attributed the character of non-cow to a 'cow'.³⁶ In the latter case too, it is subject to a dilemma. The exclusion of the 'non-cow' from the cow is subject to two alternatives. It may be different from the cow or non-different from it. If it is different from the cow, the question is whether it abides any-

where or not ? If it abides anywhere it will become a quality, and the word 'cow' will lose its substantive character. Consequently such expressions as 'the cow gives milk' etc. will be meaningless because the quality cannot do any thing apart from the substance. If it does not abide anywhere, our effort to describe cow as the 'non-non-cow' is useless. If it is regarded that it is non-different from the cow, it will become synonymous with the cow. Consequently there will be no difference between the Buddhist and the Realist position regarding the denotation of a word.³⁷

Uddyotakara raises another question. Is apoha one and the same in all cases or is it several ? If it is one and the same in all cases it is identical with the universal; and if it is different from different objects, it will be innumerable like particular objects and it will be impossible for us to account for the classes of cows and lions etc.³⁸ Further he asks: 'Is apoha itself 'denoted' or not denoted ? If it is denoted, is it denoted as positive or negative ? If it is denoted as some positive thing, it will go against the Buddhist theory of apoha according to which apoha does not denote any positive thing. And if it is denoted as something negative i. e. in the form of the exclusion of other things, we will have to presume another apoha to explain the first apoha and a third one to explain the second one. Thus there will be an endless series of apoha and the result will be that the whole life will come to an end in ascertaining what object is meant by a word without reaching it. If it is argued that it is not denoted, the Buddhist theory of apoha that the word denotes 'exclusion of other things, is staked.'³⁹

Uddyotakara further says that the theory of apoha is inconsistent with the declaration of Diñnāga who holds that 'a word denotes some thing when it brings about in its denotation the exclusion of what is denoted by other words.'⁴⁰ The Buddhist says that the objections of Uddyotakara to the theory of apoha are baseless. Apoha does

mean exclusion or negation *prima facie*. It means the reflected image of the thing which has its basis in a positive substratum, the unique particular. Negation of all other things is implied after the image has been ascertained positively.⁴¹ But the theory of apoha is not inconsistent with the declaration of Diñnāga. According to Diñnāga, apoha denotes the reflected image of the extreme particular. It does not touch the exclusive factor in the shape of the extreme particular⁴²

Śrīdhara has given several arguments to refute the theory of apoha. One of his important arguments is given thus: Just as the difference between numerous images of determinate knowledge is not comprehended (and therefore according to the Buddhist those images are regarded as identical), so their identity too, is not comprehended. Now, as there is the imposition of identity on account of the non-comprehension of difference, there should be an imposition of difference also on account of the non-comprehension of identity. Hence it would not be possible to take the objects of a class as belonging to the same class.⁴³ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also does not lag behind in showing the futility of the theory of apoha. The chief argument advanced by him runs thus: There can be no difference among various classes of apoha because all of them denote negation. If it is argued that there is difference among them i.e. they are of different kinds like the unique particulars, they will have to be accepted as positive and real. The Buddhist argument that the universals are also subject to the same dilemma because of their general character is untenable. The universals being positive, are mutually distinguishable owing to their different nature: but in the case of apohas, the one cannot be differentiated from the other, because their individual nature is nothing but negation.⁴⁴

The Buddhist urges that all these realist objections are based on a misunderstanding of the theory of apoha. Apoha does not denote negation. First of all it produces the refle-

cted image of the thing (spoken) and when the thing has been apprehended, the exclusion of all other things follows by implication⁴⁵.

Vācaspati Miśra and others make a subtle analysis of the nature of apoha and find that it does not have a universal character. It cannot explain the apprehension of all things. The objectors enumerate four instances where the theory of apoha is inapplicable. First, it cannot explain the apprehension of the term 'all', because the term 'all'⁴⁶ denotes the comprehension of all its constituents and not their exclusion⁴⁷. Secondly, the word 'apoha' may exclude only those things which have a substratum, e. g. a cow, a horse or an elephant. It cannot explain the apprehension of the son of a barren woman because there is no such external son who can be excluded⁴⁸. Thirdly, it cannot explain convention⁴⁹. A convention requires some common element which is the basis of understanding between the speaker and the listener, and which endures for a period of time.

According to the Buddhist theory, apoha as 'form of reflection', is an idea. The ideas of listener's mind and speaker's mind are entirely different. There is no common element in those ideas which may be the basis of apprehension by the listener as well as the speaker. Further, the ideas being momentary cannot endure even for two moments. The idea when the convention was made and the idea when it is apprehended are not the same. They are absolutely dissimilar and have no common element. Hence no convention can be established on their basis. Lastly, apoha or the exclusion of others cannot be the nature of a unique particular because it is contrary to its affirmative nature⁵⁰.

The Buddhist refutes the charge of the lack of universal application of the theory of apoha by replying to all the points satisfactorily. The first point does not arise at all. The word 'all' is used always with reference to a group of objects, such as 'all cows' 'all horses' etc. Apoha in that case will represent all objects different from these groups.

If the word (all) is meant to represent all the objects in the world, in that case each individual thing will represent its opposite and will be called 'not all'⁵¹. The explanation of the second instance creates no difficulty. The application of apoha to the word apoha or 'exclusion of other things' arises only and only if it indicates the reflection of some positive entity like a cow, a horse or an elephant. But apoha is not so. Further the son of a barren woman or a sky-flower⁵² is a non-entity. Therefore no question of apoha (exclusion) arises in regard to it. The existence of convention can be easily explained by the theory of apoha. All verbal usage is purely illusory being assumed in accordance with the notions of individual persons. Hence the speaker and the listener are cognisant of their own ideas. But the transcendental illusion equally binds both of them. It produces the apprehension of what is meant by the ideas of one another. The ideas are momentary and cannot last for more than a moment. But owing to the transcendental illusion, the speaker and the listener have the false notion that the thing cognized now and cognized at the time of making convention are one and the same.⁵³

The last instance of the inapplicability of the theory of apoha to the extreme particulars is also unfounded. The unique particular, as grasped by determinate Perception, is not the real external particular, but merely imaginary, therefore its nature, both as affirmative and negative, does not involve a contradiction.⁵⁴ The Realist rejoinder is that it is useless to assume similarity between an unreal thought-image and an unreal unique particular. The Buddhist answer is that no identity between an unreal object of determinate perception and unique particular is established. The power of burning and cooking (which belongs to the real unique particular, fire) is attributed to the unreal because of its similar function.⁵⁵

4. Proof for the negative nature of Apoha

After refuting the realist objections to the theory of apoha, the Buddhist advances some positive arguments to show the negative character of apoha. Vācaspati Miśra has summed up the Buddhist arguments thus⁵⁶—The apoha (the external illusory object) is in the nature of exclusion of others⁵⁷ for three reasons—(1) It is commonly applied to both existence and non-existence. (2) It brings about similarity between the extremely dissimilar and (3) It is experienced as such (i.e.) having the nature of exclusion of others.⁵⁸ Vācaspati Miśra explains the first reason thus :

Whatever is common to both existence and non-existence can only be in the nature of the exclusion of others, for example incorporeality⁵⁹ which is found in knowledge (which is existent), and also in the hare's horn (which is non-existent). The objects of determinate perception like a jar or cloth, are instances of the above example which are common to both existence and non-existence. With regard to these objects of determinate perception, we make assertions like 'a cow exists' and 'a cow does not exist' which refer to both its existence as well as non-existence. If the object 'cow' were of positive nature like the unique particular which is always of an affirmative nature, i.e. existent only, it could not be related to non-existence because of contradiction. An object which is existent cannot be non-existent. Nor can a cow be related to existence because it will be a mere repetition. The word 'cow' being affirmative means a cow which is existent, and therefore to say that 'a cow exists' is a mere repetition.⁶⁰

After explaining the first reason, Vācaspati Miśra explains the second reason. 'Besides, similarity between absolutely dissimilar objects can only be due to the exclusion of others. There may be said to be similarity even between a cow, a horse, a buffalo and an elephant on account of their common differentiation from a lion. (All

these animals are absolutely different from one another, yet they may be said to be similar in that they are different from a lion). Like-wise, there is similarity of an external unique particular, which is of affirmative nature and is an ultimate reality, and the unreal (object of determinate perception, like a cow) which is extremely dissimilar to it. The external reality, although of affirmative nature, is differentiated from non-cows ; similarly, if the object of determinate perception (i.e. the empirical object cow) is also differentiated from non-cows, then on the basis of the differentiation alone, similarity can be established (between different objects of determinate perception i.e. cows) and not otherwise.⁶¹

After explaining the first two reasons, Vācaspati Misra explains the third reason. 'The object of determinate perception (the empirical cow) is actually experienced in the form of differentiation or exclusion from others. If exclusion from other objects be not experienced at the time of the determinate perception of a cow, a person who has been asked to fasten a cow to a post may fasten a horse instead, because the cow is not comprehended as distinguished from a horse. And if it has been comprehended as distinguished from a horse, why not the fact of its being in the nature of exclusion from non-cows be accepted ? Therefore a classname and a determinate perception associated with it are of the nature of exclusion of other things.⁶²

5. Examination of other theories regarding the denotation of word :

The Buddhist examines six other theories which deal with the denotation of words and finds them inadequate to denote the unique particular. These theories are (1) the aggregate theory, (2) the theory of unreal relationship, (3) the theory of the real with unreal adjuncts, (4) coalescence theory, (5) imposition theory and (6) intuition theory.

1. Aggregate theory

According to the aggregate⁶³ theory, a word denotes an aggregate of some qualities without forming any distinct conception of them either collectively or individually. For instance, when the word 'forest' is spoken, it does not give a well-defined notion of mango, jack, banyan or any other tree individually or of all of them collectively. It is merely a vague and indefinite idea of the trees in general.⁶⁴

The Buddhist says that this theory is untenable. The term 'aggregate' stands for a more clear conception of universals and particulars. Hence the aggregate theory is vitiated with all the defects which vitiate the realist theory of universals and particulars (which have already been refuted in the section of universals and particulars).⁶⁵

2. The theory of unreal relationship⁶⁶

According to this theory, the word denotes the relation of a thing to an undefined universal thing. The relation is regarded as unreal because the word does not denote the correlated things. The things related are not apprehended in their own forms. They are apprehended in the form of an aggregate. For instance, when we apprehend a whirling fire-brand we do not apprehend the individuals which form the whirling fire-brand.

3. The theory of the real with unreal adjuncts⁷⁶

According to this theory, the word denotes the relation of the unreal attributes with a real entity. For instance, a piece of gold is transformed into bracelets, ear-rings, necklaces and other ornaments. These ornaments have no substance but the gold which permeates through them. When the ornaments are melted they become gold. The word denotes this real with unreal adjuncts. The Buddhist strikes at both these theories with one stroke. He says that relations as well as universals are mental constructions.

They cannot be related with individual things. Hence the relation of individuals with the universal cannot be denoted by words. The relation of the real with unreal adjuncts involves a contradiction in terms. Reality and unreality cannot exist together. Moreover, there is no substance which pervades through its attributes. There are only attributes. The idea of a substance pervading through its attributes is a mental construction. Hence both these theories are untenable.⁶⁸

4. The theory of coalescence⁶⁹

According to the theory of coalescence, the word itself in the form of coalescence with external object, e.g. 'this is a cow' constitutes its own meaning.⁷⁰ People believe by constant practice that the objects of the world are real. They impose the form of the object on the words. Owing to this imposition there is misconceived a notion of identity between words and objects. When the words are in the state of unification with the object, they are said to be in the state of coalescence. The Buddhist finds this theory untenable. External objects are apprehended by sense-perception alone. Words are incapable of apprehending external objects. Hence no coalescence is possible between words and objects. Universals are imaginary and unreal, so no question of coalescence of words with them arises. Further, coalescence can reside only in cognition. External words and external objects are different from one another. They are perceived by different sense-organs. Hence no coalescence is possible between them. It is possible only of such words and objects which reside in cognition. So it is a form within cognition. This interpretation of coalescence leads to a position which is indistinguishable from the theory according to which (idea) itself is regarded as the denotation of a word. Both these theories are subject to the same criticism. In both cases the denotation of a word would be purely subjective. The only difference being that the word and the denotation have coalesced and become one.⁷¹

5. Imposition theory

According to this theory, there are external objects and there are ideas. External objects form the contents of ideas. These forms of external objects are manifested through ideas, but this manifestation of external objects through ideas is apprehended itself as something external.⁷² This apprehension of the idea as something external is the denotation of a word. The theory deserves a bit further exposition. According to this theory, ideas are real. They are the basis of our activities. They are not purely subjective because what is purely subjective can have no connection with activity. But we know from our experiences that such activities as 'bring the cow', 'drink water' etc. proceed the moment a word is uttered.⁷³ Hence what is apprehended as an idea cannot be denoted by words.⁷⁴ But when the form of the idea is impinged upon the external object like substance and other things, the observer becomes influenced by its external character and comes to regard it as capable of action.⁷⁵ Therefore according to this theory what is apprehended by verbal cognition is not the form of idea, but the external object which is capable of effective action and yet the external object is not really apprehended by it because the apprehension is not in strict accordance with the real state of things; on the contrary the thing is accepted in accordance with the apprehension. So the import of words is something that is superimposed. It is the idea (superimposed on an external object) that is really denoted by a word.⁷⁶

The Buddhist finds this theory inconsistent with our daily experiences. Things are external and ideas are internal. An external thing cannot be manifested through an internal idea. If we presume a real relation to establish a link between the two entirely dissimilar things, we have to postulate another relation to explain the former relation of object and idea. This process of postulating relation to explain other relations will lead to an infinite regress. It

may be argued that the theory of apoha is identical with the theory under examination, because it states that words apprehend ideas as something external, by exclusion of other things.⁷⁷ The Buddhist replies that there is a great difference between the theory under examination and the theory of apoha. According to the former, the idea has a real basis. The apprehension of things in the form of ideas is not a mental construction but a real event⁷⁸. According to the latter, ideas have no real basis. The apprehension of things as numerically existents is a false notion. Its basis lies in their mutual exclusion, and it is this which is denoted by words⁷⁹.

6. Intuition theory

According to this theory, words do not actually denote any thing directly⁸⁰. They denote an intuition or a mental capacity⁸¹ which tends to bring about the notion of a certain activity as due to a certain cause.⁸² This mental capacity is produced by the word in association with certain usage.⁸¹ The usages of words are various. Therefore intuitions are also various and differ from person to person.⁸⁴ Just as the stroke of a driving hook, used for making things known to an elephant, causes a mental capacity, in the same way all words e.g. tree, cow etc. through repeated usage produce a capacity in the mind of a person.⁸⁵ If we do not accept this theory, we will not be able to explain various contradictory interpretations of books or imaginary stories and other things which have no real basis apart from imagination.⁸⁶

But at the hands of Buddhists, this theory also meets the fate of other theories. Intuitions cannot be based on external things; because if they were based on them, various intuitions which appear in various persons living at various places, regarding the same objects i. e. 'cow', 'tree' etc. would have never taken place because one cannot be the cause of many due to their contradictory nature.⁸⁷ Further, they cannot be devoid of objects because in such case all

our activities and comprehensions which proceed on the basis of external things, will be impossible.⁸⁸ The argument that activities and comprehension are the result of illusion which is caused by the imposition of the object upon that which is objectless⁸⁹ is untenable. If we proceed on this argument, all our verbal knowledge will become illusory.⁹⁰ We will reach a position which is inconsistent with the experiences of our daily life where verbal knowledge is valid and fruitful and not illusory. Further, there must be some cause of illusion. If there is no cause of illusion, it will be all-pervading.⁹¹ If it is maintained that mutual exclusion among things causes the illusion, we come to a conclusion which is identical with the theory of apoha.⁹² Hence apoha or the 'exclusion of dissimilar objects' is the only denotation of words, and not the intuition.

6. Importance of the theory of Apoha

From the above account we come to the conclusion that the theory of apoha has an important bearing on the Buddhist epistemology. With the help of this weapon the Buddhist constructs his phenomenal world which is amenable to language and the intellect out of the mass of sensations which is beyond the apprehension of language and the intellect. It is an important contribution of Diñnāga to Indian epistemology in general and of Buddhist epistemology in particular. By this theory he makes clear that the knowledge derived through the intellect is general in character, while the knowledge derived through senses is positive having its source in extreme particulars. This theory may be compared with the realist theory of universals. Both the theories explain the idea of generality or commonness prevailing in the phenomenal world. Both maintain that the universal or apoha performs double function viz. the inclusion of the common objects of a class⁹³ and exclusion of the objects belonging to different classes. The difference between the two theories is that the realist theory lays more emphasis on the positive and real character of a universal. It

denotes the existence of a thing by its affirmation. The Buddhist theory, on the contrary, lays more emphasis on the negative aspect of apoha. It denotes the exclusion of other things. The universals are regarded as positive and real ; apohas are regarded as mental construction and unreal. The universal denotes the identity or commonness which subsists in the individuals of a class. It is the apprehension of identity.⁹⁴ Apoha denotes similarity which results from the non-apprehension of differences subsisting among different objects.⁹⁵ It is a substitute for universals of the realist schools. It may be designated as negative universal. Upholding the superiority of the theory of apoha, Diñnāga says that apoha itself has all the merits of unity, eternity and subsistence because of its substratum (the thing in-itself) being the same in all cases. It has all the merits which are attributed to imaginary universal without being subject to inconsistencies involved in them. Hence it must be accepted as a theory superior to the theory of universal.⁹⁶

It may be compared with the Hegelian view of negation. According to Hegel, 'the universality of a concept, is posited through its negativity ; the concept is identical with itself only inasmuch as it is a negation of its own negation'.⁹⁷ But there is one fundamental difference. According to Hegel, negation is the soul of the universe. It is the absolute negation. He says 'the positive and the negative are just the same.'⁹⁸ The non-existence of an object is a moment contained in its existence.⁹⁹ Existence is one with its other, with its non-existence. He further says : 'every thing is such as it is only in so far there is another, it exists through the other ; through its own non-existence it is what it is.' Existence is the same as non-existence or position and negation are just the same.¹⁰⁰ According to the Buddhist, negation is not absolute. It has its basis in a positive substratum i.e. the extreme particular. According to Diñnāga, whatever is other is not the same.¹⁰¹ The existence and non existence are contradictory.¹⁰² Jinendra

Buddhi says that apoha does not mean a blunt denial of every reality.¹⁰³ It simply means the denial of thought-constructions, the mental images and not the extreme particulars which are the substratum of the mental images. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla endorse the view of Jinendra Buddhi and assert its positive character. According to Śāntarakṣita, the essence of an apoha, e.g. of a cow, consists in this that its essence is not the essence of another image, say a horse.¹⁰⁴ Kamalaśīla says that 'the mental image is the direct meaning of a word and the negation in the form of exclusion of non-cows is only an implied and secondary meaning.'¹⁰⁵ The term 'apoha' does not mean that there is nothing like positive entity or there is no apprehension of it. What we mean is this that apoha denotes the mental reflection of an external object in direct sense and by implication leads to the conclusion that the mental reflections are entirely different from the mental reflections caused by excluded things.¹⁰⁶ Ratnakīrti in his Apoha-siddhi supports the view of Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in more clear words. He says that the term 'apoha expresses a positive aspect qualified by the negation of others.'¹⁰⁷

The theory of apoha is a great achievement of Buddhist epistemology which has its echo in modern logic. The statements of Palagyi and J. S. Mill seem to be Buddhist utterances. The former says, 'as soon as our mental eyes begin to glimmer and we begin to seek an expression for our feeling in a verbal sign, our object is already beset with contradiction and our thought has become dialectical.'¹⁰⁸ According to the latter, the word 'civil' in the language of jurisprudence stands for the opposite (i.e. for a negation) of criminal, of ecclesiastical, of military and of political.¹⁰⁹

We may conclude the discussion in the words of Thomas Campanella who says that a definite thing exists only in as much as it is not something other. 'The man is' that is positive only because he is neither a stone, nor a lion, nor an ass etc.¹¹⁰

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4. Catching the non-difference.
5. Exclusion.
6. Exclusion of others.
7. Exclusion of what a thing is not.
8. Tatra yat tadāropitaṃ vikalpadhiyā'rtheṣvabhinnaiṃ rūpaṃ tadanya-vyavṛtta-padārtha-anubhava-balāyāta-tvāt svayaṃ cānyavyāvṛttataya prakhyānād bhrāntais cānya-vyāvṛttārthena sahaikyenādhyavasitatvād anyā-poḍhā-padārthādhigati phalatvāccā-nyāpoḍha itiyucyate. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā pp. 274-275 lines 25, 27.1. See also its English translation by Pt. Ganga Natha Jha p. 466-
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11. Ibid p. 353.
12. Ekam avibhāgaṃ svalakṣaṇam anādivikalpa-vāsanā-samāropita-jātyādi-bhedaṃ tathā tathā vikalpyate. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p. 89 lines 11-12.
13. Yādṛśam eko govikalpo bāhyātmatāyā sva-pratibhāsam āropayati go-vikalpāntaram api tādṛśam eva āropayati vikalpāśca pratyekaṃ svākāramātra-grāhiṇo na parasparāropitānām ākārāṇāṃ bhedagrahaṇā ya-para tasyobhaya-grahaṇādhanatvāt tadagrahaṇācca vikalpāropitānām ākārāṇāṃ ekatvamāropya vikalpānām eko viśaya ityucyate, tadeva ca sāmānyaṃ bahirāropite-bhyo vikalpākārebhyo' tyanta-bhedābhāvenābhāvārūpam. Nyāya-kandalī p. 318 line 25 Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 356 n 145.
14. Eka pratyavamarśasya hetutvād dhīrabhedinī. Ekadhī-hetubhāvena vyaktīnāmapya bhinnatā. Nyāya-kandalī p. 319. Critique of Indian Realism p. 357 N. 148.

15. Tathā hi dvividho'pohaḥ paryudāsa niṣedhataḥ. Dvividhaḥ paryudāso'pi buddhyātmārthātma-bhedataḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha, verse 1004.
16. Ibid verses 1007-1008.
17. Aśliṣṭam.
18. Anyāśambaddham, anyato.vyāvṛttam. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 318 line 3.
19. Kāraṇe kārya-dharmāropād vā. Ibid p. 318 line 1.
20. Kārye vā kāraṇa-dharmopacārāt. Ibid p. 318 line 2.
21. Vijātyāpoha-padārthena sahaikyena bhrāntaiḥ pratipattībhīradhyavasitatvācca iti caturthaṁ kāraṇam Ibid p. 318 line 5.
22. Svalakṣaṇe'pi taddhetāvanya-viśleṣa-bhāvataḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 1009.
23. Prasajya pratiṣedhaśca gaur agaur na bhavatyayam Ativispaṣṭa evāyam anyāpoho'vagamyate. Ibid verse 1010.
24. Siddhaścā'gaurapohyeta goniṣedhātmakaśca saḥ. Tatra gaureva vaktavyo na nā yaḥ pratiṣiddhyate. Sa ca cedago nivṛtṭyātmā bhavedanyonya-saṁśrayaḥ. Siddhaśced gaurapohyā'rthaṁ vṛthā'poha prakalpanā. Gavyasiddhetvagaur nāsti tad abhāve ca gauḥ kutaḥ. Śloka-vārtika. Aphorism 5. Apoha-vāda, verses 83-85. See also Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti-ṭīkā p. 287a 2. Translated in the Buddhist Logic vol. 1 p. 467.
25. Śūnya.
26. Vasturūpā ca sā buddhiḥ śabdārtheṣūpajāyate. Tena vastveva kalpeta vācyam buddhyanapohakam. Ibid. Aphorism 5. Apohavāda, verse 39 and Tattva-saṅgraha verse 922.
27. Śloka-vārtika. Aphorism 5. Apohavāda, verse 42. Tattva-saṅgraha, verse 925.
28. Ibid. Aphorism 5. Apohavāda, verses 46-47. Tattva-saṅgraha, verses 926-927.

29. Tattva-saṅgraha, verses 1012-1014.
30. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti-ṭīkā p. 287 p. 7-8. Translated in Buddhist Logic vol. 1 p. 464.
31. Vijāṭīya vyavacchedāvyaabhicāryeva. Nahi vijāṭīyādavyāvṛttasya kasyacit sambhavo'sti. Tenaikasya śabdasya phala-dvayam aviruddham eva. Tattva saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 321 lines 9-11.
32. Na bhāvo nāpi cābhāvo'pṛthagekatva-lakṣaṇaḥ. Nāśrī-tānāśrītā'poho naikānekaśca vastutaḥ, Tathā'sau nāsti tattvena yathā'sau vyavasīyate. Tanna bhāvo na cābhāvo vastutve nāvasāyataḥ. Bhedā bhedādayaḥ sarve vastusatpariniṣṭhitāḥ. Nih svabhāvaśca śabdārthas tas-mādete nirāspadāḥ, Tattva-saṅgraha, verses 1189-1191.
33. Na khalvapohya bhedā (dā) dhārabhedād vāpohānām bhedo'pi tvanādikālapravṛtta vicitra vitattvārtha-vikalpa-vāsanā-bhedānvayais tattvato nirviśayairapi bhinna viśayāvalambibhiriva pratyayair bhinneṣvartheṣu bāhyeṣu bhinnā ivārthātmāna ivāsvabhāva apyapohāḥ samaropyante, te tathā taiḥ samāropitā bhinnāḥ santaśca pratibhāsante, tena vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpatā cāpohānām bhaviṣyati. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 305 lines 14-18.
34. Na cāpi vāsanābhedād bhedaḥ sadrūpitā'pi va. Apohānām prakalpyeta na hyavastuni vāsanā. Śloka-vārtika. Aphorism. 5. Apohavāda, verse 100.
35. Tattvatastu na kimcid vācyam asti śabdānāmiti vidhirūpas tātviko niṣidhyate. Tena sāmṃvṛtasya vidhirūpaya śabdārthasyeṣṭatvāt svārthābhīdhāne vidhirūpe satyanvaya vyatirekasya śāmarthyādadhigater vidhipūrvako vyatireko yujyate eva. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 339 lines 11-13.
36. Tattva-saṅgraha verses 982-988.
37. Ibid verses 989-994.
38. Ibid verses 995-996.
39. Ibid verses 997-1000.

40. Yadi śabdasyāpoho nābhidheyo'rthas tadā'bhidheyārtha vyatirekeṇāśya svārtho vaktavyaḥ, 'atha sa evāśya svārthas tathāpi vyāhatam, anya-śabdārthāpohaṁ hi svārthe kurvati śrutirabhidhatte ityucyaate iti. Nyāya-vārtika 2. 2. 63. Quoted in the Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 320 lines 1-8.
41. Pratibimbaṁ hi śabdārtha iti sāksād iyaṁ matiḥ. jātyādi-vidhihānis tu sāmartyādavagamyate. Tattva-saṁgraha, verse 1197.
42. Na śabdasya bāhyārthādhyavasāyi vikalpa-pratibimbotpāda vyatirekenānyo bāhyābhidhāna-vyāpāraḥ sambhāvati. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 320 lines 16-17. See also Tattva-saṁgraha, verses 1017-1018.
43. Yathā vikalpākārāṇāṁ bhedo na gṛhyate tadvad abhedopi na gṛhyate, tatra bhedagrahaṇād abhedāropavad abhedāgraṇād bhedāropasyāpi .prasaktāvabhedocit vyavahāra-pravṛtṭiyogāt. Nyāyakandalī p. 319 line 22. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 367 n. 173.
44. Te sarva evāpoha vācitvāviśeṣāt parayāyāḥ syuḥ apoha-bhedād adoṣa iti cenna, apohānāṁ bheda-bhāvāt, bhidyamānatve vā svalakṣaṇavad eṣāṁ vastutva-prasaktiḥ bhavatpakṣe'pi sāmānyamātra-vācitvāviśeṣāt parayāyatvaṁ samāno doṣa, iti cenna, sāmānyānāṁ vidhirūpatvāt paraspara-saṁrahita-svabhāvatayā nānāvāgamāt, aphaṣtvābhāva-mātra-rūpa-viśeṣān nā parasparaṁ bhidyate. Nyāya-mañjarī part 1 p. 278 line 4.....Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism p. 367 No. 174.
45. Yadi hi pradhānenānya nivṛttim eva śabdaḥ pratipādayet tadaitat syāt, yāvatārtha-pratibimba kameva yathoktaṁ prathamatarāḥ śabdaḥ karoti, tad gatau ca sāmartyādeva nivartanaṁ gamyate iti. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 361 lines 24-26.

47. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 982.
48. Ibid verse 1202.
49. Ibid verses 1208-1209.
50. Na tat-svabhāvo vidhirūpena virodhāt. Nyaya-vārtika-tātparyāṭikā p. 684 line 12. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 364 No. 165.
51. Tattva-saṁgraha, verses 1185-1188.
52. Ibid verse 1203.
53. Sarva eva ayaṁ śābdo-vyavahāraḥ svapratibhāsānurodhena taimirikadvaya dvicandra-darśanavad bhrānta iṣyate.....tatra yadyapi svasya-svasyaivāvabhāsasya vakṛ-śrotṛbhyām paramārthataḥ saṁvedanam, tathāpi taimirika-dvayasyeva bhrānti-bījasya tulyatvād dvayorapi vakṛ-śrotor bāhyārthādhyavasāyastulya eva. Tattva-saṁgraha pañjikā p. 365 lines 17.....21.
54. Adhyavasīyamānam api svalakṣaṇam na paramārtha sad, apitu tadapi kalpitam. Tasmāt tasya vidhi-niṣedharūpatā na viruddhyate. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā p. 684 line 19. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 364 n. 166.
55. Kintu alikasyaiva dāhapākādika sāmartyāropam. Ibid p. 684 line 26. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 365 n. 167.
56. The arguments have been summarised and translated by Dr. Dharmendra Nath Shastri in his Critique of Indian Realism pp. 359-861.
57. Anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpam.
58. Tacedam anya-vyāvṛtti-rūpaṁ bhāvābhāva sādharmaṇyācca, atyanta-vilakṣaṇānām sālakṣaṇyāpādanācca, tād-rūpyānubhavacca. Nyaya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā p. 683 line 6, quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 359 n. 155.
59. Amūrtatva.
60. Yad bhāvābhāva-sādharmaṇam tad anyavyāvṛtti-rupam eva-yathā'mūrtatvam, tat khalu vijñāne ca śāsa-viāṇeṣ

ca sādharmaṇam. Tathā ca vivādādhyāsītā vikalpa-viṣayaḥ ghaṭa-paṭādayaḥ iti svabhāva-hetuḥ. Gaurasti gaur nāstīti hi bhāvābhāva-sādharmaṇo gavādir-vikalpa viṣayo vidhirūpa svalakṣaṇavad bhāvāsādhāraṇye nāstītyanena na sambadhyate virodhāt, astītyanenāpi na sambadhyate paunaruktyāt. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyāṭikā 683 line 6. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 360 n. 157.

61. Api cātyanta-vilakṣaṇāṇām sālakṣaṇyam anyavyāvṛttikṛtam eva. Yathā gavāśva-mahiṣa-mātamgānān atyanta-vilakṣaṇāṇām api siṃha-vyāvṛtṭyā sālakṣaṇyam. Tathā ca bāhyasya svalakṣaṇasya vidhirūpasya paramarthasato' paramarthasatā'tyanta-vilakṣaṇena sālakṣaṇyam iti svabhāva-hetuḥ. Bāhyam hi vidhirūpam api agovyāvṛttam, vikalpa-viṣayo'pi cedagovyāvṛttas tataḥ sālakṣaṇyam nānyathā. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭikā p. 683 line 14. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 360 n. 159.
62. Api cānubhūyata eva vikalpa-viṣayo vyāvṛtti-rūpaḥ. Tatha hi tadapratibhāsane gām badhāneti deśito'svam badhnīyād goraśvād bhedenāpratibhāsanāt. Pratibhāse vā katham nāgo-vyāvṛtti-pratibhāsaḥ. Tasmādanyāpoha gocarau śabda-vikalpāviti. Ibid p. 683 line 19. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 361 n. 160.
63. Samudāya.
64. Samudāyo'bhidheyo va' pya vikalpa-samuccayaḥ. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 888.
65. Ibid verse 897.
66. Asatyō vā' pi saṁsargaḥ śabdārthaḥ. Ibid verse 888.
67. Asatyopādhi satya-sambandha. Asatyopādhi yat satyam tadeva śabda-nibandhanam. Ibid verse 889.
68. Ibid verse 898.
69. Abhijalpa. Śabda vā'pyabhijalpatvamāgato yāti vācyatam. Ibid verse 889.
70. So'yamityabhisambandhād rūpamekīkṛtam yadā. Śabdasyārthena tam śabdam abhijalpaṁ pracakṣate. Ibid verse 890.

71. Ibid verses 899-901

72. Yo vār'tho buddhiviṣayo bāhyavastu-nibandhanaḥ.
Sa bāhyaṁ vastviti-jñataḥ śabdārthaḥ kaiścidiṣyate.
Ibid verse 891. Buddhi-rūpeṇāvīrbhāvito bāhyatayā-
dhyavasita ityarthaḥ Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjika p. 285
line 12-13.

73. Yāvad buddhirūpam artheṣvapratyastaṁ buddhirūpam-
eveti, tattva-bhāvanayā grhyate, tāvat tasya śabdārthat-
vaṁ nāvasīyate, tatra kriya-viśeṣa sambandhathavat.
Nahi 'gāmānaya' dadhi khādyetyādikāḥ kriyās tadṛṣī
buddhirūpe saṁbhavanti, kriyāyoga-saṁbhavī cārthaḥ
śabdair abhidhīyate. Ibid p. 285 lines 13-16.

74. Buddhi-rūpatayā grhīto'sau na śabdārthaḥ. Ibid p. 285
line 16.

75. Yadā tu (buddhirūpo) bāhya-vastuni pratyasto bhavati,
tadā tasmin pratipatta bāhyatayā viparyastaḥ kriyā-
sādhana-sāmarthyam tasya manyate iti bhavati śabdār-
thaḥ. Ibid p. 285 lines 17-18.

76. Na ca buddhyākāraḥ śabdapratyayena vyavasīyate, kim
tarhi ? Bāhyamevārtha-kriyākāri vastu. Na cāpi tena
bāhyaṁ paramārthato vyavasīyate yathātattvam anadh-
yavasāyāt, yathā vyavasāyam atattvāt. Ataḥ samāro-
pita eva śabdārthaḥ. Ibid p. 286 lines 2-4

77. Tadrūpāropa gatyānyavyāvṛttyadhigateḥ punaḥ. Śab-
dārtho'rthaḥ sa eveti vacane na viruddhyate. Quoted
in Ibid p. 285 lines 20-21.

78. Ayam hi buddhyākāravādī bāhye vastunyabhrāntam
saviṣayaṁ dravyādiṣu pāramārthikeṣu adhyastaṁ bud-
dyākāraṁ paramārthataḥ śabdārtham icchati. Na tu
nirālambanam bhinneṣvabhedādhyavasāyena pravṛtter
bhrāntam itaretara bheda-nibandha nam icchati. Ibid
p. 285 lines 21-23.

79. Sarvo mithyāvabhāso'yam arthaṣvekātmanāgrahaḥ.
Itaretara bhedo'sya, bījaṁ sañjñā yadarthikā. Quoted.
Ibid p. 285 lines 24-25.

80. Sabdo na tu bāhyārtha pratyāyaka. Ibid p. 286 line 8.

81. Abhyāsāt pratibhā-hetuḥ sarvaḥ śabdaḥ samāsataḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha, verse 892.
82. Niyata-sādhana-vacchinna-kriyā pratipattyanukūlā prajñā pratibhā Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā. p. 286 lines 12-13.
83. Sā prayoga-darśanāvṛttisahitena śabdena janyate. Ibid p. 286 line 13.
84. Prativākyam prati-puruṣam ca sā bhidyate. Ibid p. 286 line 14.
85. Yathaiiva hyamkuśābhigātādayo hastyādīnām artha-pratipattau kriyamāṇāyām pratibhāhetavo bhavanti. Tathā sarve'rthavat sammatā vṛkṣādayaḥ śabdā yathā-bhyāsam pratibhāmātropasārn'hāra-hetavo bhavanti, na tvartham sākṣāt pratipādayanti. Ibid p. 286 lines 16-18.
86. Anyathā hi katham paraspara-parāhataḥ pravacana-bhedā utpādyā-kathā-prabandhāśca sva-vikalpoparacita padārtha-bhedadyotakāḥ syuriti. Ibid p. 286 lines 18-19.
87. Yadi pratibhā paramārthato bāhyārthaviṣayā tadaikatra vastuni śabdātau viruddha-samayāvasthāyinām vicitrāḥ pratibhā na prāpnuvanti, ekasyānekasvabhāvasambhāvāt. Ibid 289 lines 1-2.
88. Atha nirviṣayās tadā'rthe pravṛtti-pratipattī na prāpnu-taḥ, atadviṣayatvācchabdasya. Ibid p. 289 lines 2-3.
89. Atha svapratibhase'narthe'rthādhyavasāyena bhrāntiyā te pravṛtti-pratipattī bhavataḥ. Ibid p. 289 lines 3-4.
90. Tadā bhrāntaḥ śabdārthaḥ prāpnoti. Ibid p. 289 lines 4-5.
91. Tasyāśca bhrānter bījam kāraṇam vaktavyam, anyathā nirbijā bhrāntir bhavanti sarvataḥ sarvadaiva syāt. Ibid p. 289 lines 5-6.
92. Atha bhāvānām parasparato bheda eva bijam asya abhyupagamyate, tadā'smatpakṣam eva bhavān sādha-yati iti. Ibid p. 289 lines 6-7.
93. Anuvṛtti-pratīti.
94. Abhedāgraha.
95. Bhedāgraha.
96. Sarvatrābhedaḥ āśrayasyānucchedāt kṛtsnārtha-pari-samāpteśca yathākramam jātidharmā ekatva-nityatva-

- pratyeka-parisamāpta-lakṣaṇa apoha evāvatiṣṭhante tas-
 mad guṇotkarṣād apyarthāntarāpoha eva śabdārthaḥ.
 Quoted in the Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjika 316 line 11-14.
97. Wissder logik II 240 Quoted in the Buddhist Logic
 vol. 1 p. 484.
98. Wiss der logik II 74. Quoted in the Buddhist Logic
 vol. 1 p. 485.
99. Ibid II 42. Quoted in the Buddhist Logic vol. 1 p. 485.
100. Ibid II 55. Quoted in in the Buddhist Logic vol. 1
 p. 485.
101. Yad viruddha-dharma-saṁśṛṣṭarṇ tan nānā. Buddhist
 logic vol. 1 p. 485.
102. Sad asadyor yugapad abhāvāt. On metaphysical lever
 Diṅnaga as a monist believes in the ultimate identity of
 all opposition within the unique substance of the world
 i. e. within jñanam advayaṁ, śūnyarṇ, prajñāparamitā.
103. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛttiṭikā translated in Buddhist
 Logic vol. 1 pp. 461-470.
104. Na tadātma parātmeti sambandhe sati vastubhiḥ. Vya-
 vṛttavas tvadhigamo'pyarthād eva bhavatyataḥ. Tattva-
 saṁgraha verse 1041.
105. Pratibimba-lakṣaṇo'pohaḥ sakṣacchabda ir upajanya-
 manatvan mukhyaḥ śabdārthaḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha-
 pañjika p. 319 line 9. Nīśedha-mātraṁ naiveha śabde
 jñāne'vabhāsate. Quoted in Ibid p. 319 line 7.
106. Na hy asmābhiḥ sarvathā vidhirūpaḥ śabdārtho nābh-
 yupagamyate. Yāvatā śabdād arthādhyavasāinaścetasah
 samutpādat sarivṛto vidhirūpaḥ śabdārthobhiṣyate eva.
 Ibid p. 339 lines 9-11.
107. Nāsmābhir apoha śabdena vidhireva kevalo'bhipretaḥ.
 Nāpyanya-vyavṛttimātraṁ, kintu, anyāpoha-viśiṣṭo
 vidhi śabdānām arthaḥ. Six Buddhist Nyāya-Tracts.
 Chapter 1. Apoha-siddhi. p. 3 lines 6-8.
108. Palagyi. Quoted in Buddhist Logic vol. 1. p. 487.
109. Logic 1. 43 ff. Ibid p. 487.
110. Buddhist Logic vol. 1 p. 490.

CHAPTER X

THE DOCTRINE OF MIND-ONLY (VIJNAPTI-MATRATA)

1. Introduction

The school of Vijñānavāda preaches that the entire world which surrounds us is a creation of our own mind. All things which we consider objectively real, for instance, our own body, property and land¹ where we have our abodes are nothing more than our own mind projected and recognized as externally extending. The Buddha's body, his teachings and the state of nirvāṇa are all illusory or the ideas created by our own consciousness². All these objects are considered like objects of dream³. In other words nothing exists outside mind or consciousness. What is visible is nothing but mind. External objects are nothing but appearances. They are like the floating hair in the atmosphere or like the vision of the double moon⁴. The ideas regarding the reality of the objects are accumulated from the beginningless past in the mind in form of impressions (*vāsanā* or habit-energy) and we take these impressions as having objective reality owing to our ignorance. Our attachment to these so-called external objects is the root cause of all our sorrows and sufferings. Since we try to have them, our attachment⁵ for them arises. Once possessed of them, we try to hold them for ever, their loss brings anxiety and sorrow. If we are deprived of them by any person we cherish ill-will against him and thus the feeling of hatred⁶ arises. Feelings of attachment and hatred are the cause of all our troubles. We are enwrapped like a silkworm in the cocoon spun by our own-selves and transmigrate from one form of existence to another, from one world to another forever⁷. The release from the transmigration is possible only when we realise the knowledge that all is illusion and the

external objects are nothing but the creations of our mind. Mind is the absolute. This realization is the real 'emancipation'⁸.

2. Arguments for the reality of the external world

The realist objects to the idealist theory which reduces the entire external world to a mere naught and adduces some arguments which establish its objective reality.

First, the existence of the external world is proved by perception. The beautiful scenery of the holy river Gaṅgā in the moonlit night pleases our eyes. The vision of a corpse or a ghastly murder causes uneasiness in our heart. The melodious voice of a cuckoo or the celestial song of a devout hermit gives joy to our ears, the mourning of a poor man causes sorrow to our heart. The fragrance of a flower attracts us, the bad smelling of rotten seeds or fruits repels us. Similar is the case with the tactile and gustatory sense-organs. If the different kinds of feelings would have been simply mental without having their origin in any real object, they would not have been different from organ to organ because mind is one and the same. Secondly, inference also demonstrates the reality of external objects. The perceptions of walking and speaking which arise in our mind and not refer to our own walking and speaking, as they are not preceded by our own will to walk and speak, indicate the reality of another person who walks and speaks⁹. Further, the invariable concomitant relation proves the reality of external objects. We infer the existence of real fire from the sight of smoke. Had there been no real fire we would have inferred another object instead of fire as the cause of the smoke.

Thirdly, we have experience that there are images or ideas in our mind regarding the reality of external objects. These images are not mental arrangements. Their immediate presence is felt by us. The mind projects the inward reflex and guides the purposive action. People start their functions

on these assumptions and reach their aims. In the words of Dharmottara, judgment or inference guides the purposive action of men because the course it takes consists in having *prima facie* to deal with mental contents of a general unreal character and in ascertaining through them some real fact.

Fourthly, the Buddha preached the reality of the external world. If there were no external world, he would not have taught the existence of *rūpa*, *dhātu*, *āyatanas* and soul etc¹⁰.

Fifthly, the denial of the external world will bring the entire activity to an end. The activities of men are based on some objective. They are directed to achieve some end. People follow the path of salvation. They cultivate virtues and avoid vices. They aspire for *Nirvāṇa* and practise eightfold path. If there is no external object apart from our ideas, why should people resort to activity? Why should they aspire for *Nirvāṇa*? What is the use of following the teaching of the Lord regarding the four noble truths? Moreover it is not for the pleasures of a dream that people engage themselves in the performance of duty¹¹.

Sixthly, the cognition requires two things, the cognizer and the cognized. In the apprehension of colour for instance, we feel that we cognize something. This something is different from the cognizer¹². The feeling of difference between the two arises only when the cognition of an object takes place. When there is no cognition of an object, this feeling does not occur. For instance, people have such notions as 'I do not remember that any object was apprehended by me at that time'. It shows that they remember the appearance of the apprehending cognition without any idea of the apprehended object. If the two were non-different, there should be the remembrance of the apprehended object also, when there is remembrance of the apprehending cognition¹³.

Lastly, the existence of the external object is proved by the fact that its cognition takes place only when it is existent. Its cognition does not take place when it is non-existent, although all the conditions of its apprehension are then

present. For instance, we take the cognition of colour. Here all the essential factors of cognition i.e. the visual sense-organ, the light and the aroused attention may be present. But its cognition cannot take place in absence of a colour¹⁴.

3. Refutation of the Realists' arguments

First, and foremost, the Buddhist says that the external object cannot be known by perception. According to Sautrāntika, realist images are inherent in our knowledge and they refer to external reality. These images cannot invoke direct awareness of the external object because they are locked up in their selves (i.e. internal) and cannot go outside to grasp the external object. If they go outside the consciousness, they will lose their internal character. Because one thing cannot be external as well as internal at one and the same time¹⁵. Further, if we maintain that there are no images in the consciousness and it apprehends the objects directly, even then we are not free from difficulty. We have the apprehension of objects even in dreams where there are no objects, We have such apprehensions as double moon, yellow conch-shell etc. But all of them do not denote any real object¹⁶.

Secondly, the reality of the external world cannot be established by inference either. 'Inference cannot seize the external object directly or indirectly. There is no fact from which its existence could be deduced with logical necessity. If such a fact exists, it must be either an effect of external reality from which the existence of the cause could be necessarily deduced or a fact possessing externality as its inherent property, the existence of this property could then be deduced analytically. There are no such facts¹⁷. The argument that the perceptions of walking and speaking which arise in our mind but which do not belong to us must be caused by other minds is untenable. The origin of these kinds of perception takes place when the internal biotic force accidentally becomes mature and evokes ideas of such perceptions¹⁸.

Thirdly, the feeling of the external world cannot be a reliable source of its existence. "What is really-immediately felt in us is the double subject-object aspect of our knowledge¹⁹ and what is constructed in imagination is the external object. Our own self that we internally feel in us is not something constructed in imagination. The external object, since it is constructed in imagination is not the thing actually felt in sensation²⁰. We cannot know whether the external object exists or does not exist, but what we call construction of an object is nothing but the imagined aspect of its idea. To grasp something external to our knowledge is impossible". We can only make an idea about it²¹. Hence our immediate feeling cannot be relied upon as the proof of the reality of an external world.

Fourthly, the reference to the words of the Buddha regarding the reality of the external world is of no avail. The statement of the Buddha that there are external objects is a clever device²² employed to induce the ignorant to perform good deeds. As the existence of the moon is shown to a child with the help of a finger, though it is not the moon, in the same way the Buddha taught the truth with the help of external objects²³.

Fifthly, the activity is not to be hampered in any way owing to the unreality of the objects. People are sleeping under the veil of ignorance. They accept this world as something real and resort to activity and this process goes on forever. The activity will not be hampered even after knowing the unreality of the objects. Because after knowing through reasoning and scripture the momentariness and soullessness of all things, people fully realise the truth and the wheel of causation. Prompted by sympathy and good will for others they resort to activity thinking that good acts bring good impressions which are beneficial to themselves as well as to others, while no such impressions arise from the performance of such evil deeds, as hampering others and the like²⁴.

Sixthly, the idea of the cognizer and the cognized, the apprehender and the apprehended does not prove the reality of the external world. It is a false notion which is cherished by the people whose light of wisdom has been dimmed by deep ignorance. They do not ponder over the nature of reality and assume the duality of the doer and the deed, or the apprehender and the apprehended²⁵. In fact, the apprehender and the apprehended, the cognizer and the cognized are relative terms and have no meaning in isolation. They are the contents of the same consciousness. The external object i.e. a jar or a piece of cloth is as much intergral to consciousness as its idea. Its external appearance is an illusion²⁶. External objects do not appear in any form but that of the apprehender and the apprehended. These are the two aspects of the same formless consciousness. Hence, devoid of these aspects they have no form at all²⁷. A difficulty arises, 'If the existence of external objects is denied, their multiplicity will also be denied. So it would be impossible to differentiate various objects among themselves'. The Buddhist solves this difficulty by saying that the multiplicity of external objects is due to something which arouses the latent impressions of consciousness²⁸.

Lastly, the reality of the external world cannot be proved by invariable concomitant relation, because the latter itself presupposes the former. The visual perception of the colour, for example, cannot be due to the biotic force which controls the evolution of life, since the biotic force is not ripe to produce the perception in question.

The Yogācāra Buddhist says that an object can be perceived only in two ways (1) either as a substance with its attributes or (2) as a whole with its parts. The first alternative is untenable, for an object is cognised only through its qualities and can never be cognized as an entity separate from its qualities. The realist holds that an object is cognized as an entity²⁹ independently of its qualities. When we see an

object, e.g. a blue lotus, we see simply the blue lotus and not blue and lotus separately. In the same way when we perceive a lump of sugar, we perceive its whiteness and sweetness. We never perceive an object called sugar as distinct and apart from the qualities of whiteness and sweetness. Thus the existence of sugar apart from its qualities is not proved by perception. It may be argued that sugar is seen as white and tasted sweet. So it is distinct from its qualities³⁰. The Yogācāra says that a thing cannot be both white and non-white i.e. sweet at one and the same time. Sweetness and whiteness are different qualities. The existence of the one must repel the existence of the other. The Realist explains away this objection of the Yogācāra. For him while qualities like colour, etc are common to all objects, there is, in the notion of object a specific cognition of its peculiar shape, which can be only due to the existence of a separate substance apart from its qualities³¹. The Yogācāra answers that such cognitions are caused by innate impressions³² of those shapes which are existing in our mind from the eternity of the succession of lives. The different colours can be discarded and differentiation in them can be explained as caused by innate impressions. The Realist retorts by saying that cognitions come about only at certain times and not always and if they are owing to innate impressions, their cause being always present, they would also be always present. According to Uddyotakara, a single object is cognized by seeing and touching, so it must be accepted as one substance as distinguished from the qualities of which it is a common substratum. The Yogācāra points out that what we actually cognize by the senses of vision and touch are two different qualities and not a substance. The qualities colour etc. arranged in those different forms³³ cause the notion of a substance. The Realist rejoins that the arrangement in those forms implies that they must exist somewhere as real. For instance, the illusion of a man caused by a pillar is possible only if the man and the pillar both exist somewhere as real and have

some similarity between them. As the Yogācāra does not accept the existence of real substances like a cow or a horse apart from their qualities, specific notions regarding their shape cannot rise at all from their qualities. If the Yogācāra were to suggest that the different notions of the cow, horse etc. are caused by different arrangements of qualities, colour etc, the answer of the Realist would be to the effect that if these different arrangements are identical with colour etc, they cannot account for the difference in cognitions and if on the other hand they are held to be different from them, it would be tantamount to the acceptance of a separate substance by another name³⁴.

Explaining the Yogācāra position, Vācaspati Miśra says that the arrangement of qualities, colour etc. in different shapes does not create any difficulty. The same atoms of colour etc. when characterised by the function of fetching water are called jar, but when characterised by the function of imparting colour they are called blue etc³⁵. Uddyotakara says that the erroneous cognition of a substance always presupposes a right one. Vācaspati Miśra on behalf of the Yogācāra retorts that the objection can be raised only in the case of an error having a beginning, but in the case of an error without beginning, it can be said that it was based on a prior erroneous notion and that erroneous notion on a still prior one and so on ad infinitum³⁶.

The Yogācāra says that substance and qualities are not two distinct different entities but are identical. There is no cognition of a substance without the cognition of its qualities³⁷. If they were different, their cognition would have taken place separately. It is only in the case of identical things that the cognition of one thing does not take place in the absence of the other³⁸. We may explain it with the help of the examples of a row of trees and a meatsoup. If they were different, the cognition of the one would have taken place even in absence of the other. A row of trees is not

different from the trees, and therefore it is not cognized when the trees are not cognized. In the same way soup is not different from meat and water so it cannot be cognized in absence of them. On the other hand, when one thing is different from another, it may be cognized even if the latter is not cognized³⁹.

Uddyotakara further says that the Yogācāra theory that a substance is not cognized when its qualities are not cognized is untenable. We see that a white crystal appears as blue owing to proximity of a blue object, though its own white colour is not cognized, yet it is cognized⁴⁰. The Yogācāra rejects the argument as unconvincing. He says that crystal is cognized with a changed colour and not without colour.

The Realist says that our experience is the sole criterion for determining the nature of reality⁴¹. In our experience we distinctly apprehend a substratum in which qualities like colour, touch, size etc. reside. Our experience presents two separate realities—the properties and their substratum of which are different in their essence. The Yogācāra avers that the colour etc. are ultimate particulars. They are real by themselves and there is no substance as their substratum⁴². The cognition of substance as distinct from qualities and components is never apprehended. Our experience provides no evidence of its existence, so it cannot be admitted⁴³. As a matter of fact, any such composite substance as the cloth complete in itself and entirely different from its qualities like whiteness, and its components like the yarns (composing it) never appears in any visual or other kinds of cognition. From the non-perception of the substance as distinct from qualities, it follows that there is no basis for the idea of substance and quality or of the composite and the components as distinct entities. In the words of Dharmakīrti, when we cognize an object e.g. a piece of cloth, we cognize simply its attributes e.g. its blue, yellow colour etc, its length, breadth, heaviness, smoothness fatness and the like. Apart from them we do not cognize an

object as such which is their substratum⁴⁴. The object is cognized as blue, heavy, smooth etc. It is cognized only in the form of colour etc. It never appears as an object devoid of all the attributes⁴⁵. When we analyse what an external object is, by seeing we find its colour and form and by touching we find its hardness, softness and smoothness. Even this much knowledge is derived through visual and tactile consciousness etc, not from the object directly. Again, these sense-data acquired through sense-organs are given to the mind and we find judgments like 'this is a jar' 'this is a flower'. Thus at the stage of perception and at the stage of judgment we do not find external objects as such. The moment we minutely examine the nature of objects, they vanish out of existence and reveal themselves as devoid of self-nature, nothing can be said about them. They are unutterable⁴⁶. The Realist rejoins that if the existence of external objects is denied, their multiplicity will also come to an end and we will reach a position which is inconsistent with our daily experiences where we find such assertions as 'this is a jar' 'this is a piece of cloth'. The Yogācāra replies to the objection that there is something of the form of a jar etc. which arouses the impressions of the mind and the multiplicity is the result of such impressions and not of the external objects⁴⁷. It may be asked if there is no external object why do we feel its existence. The Yogācāra answers that it is owing to ignorance. Just as a man suffering from hypnotism takes a lump of clay to be a coin or white conchshell to be a yellow one, in the same way we feel the existence of external objects which are the forms of our own consciousness⁴⁸. Thus we find that the existence apart from its qualities is not proved. In fact there is no such thing as substance apart from its qualities. It is a mental creation.

Now we come to the second alternative that an object is a whole made up of parts. The question is, 'Are the parts different from the whole or identical with it? If parts are different from the whole, they cannot be produced out of

it because they are different by nature and an object cannot be produced out of an entirely different object both being mutually exclusive. If they are identical, they become one. The relation between them as part and whole comes to an end⁴⁹. If the object is a whole made up of its own parts it may be asked what this whole (avayayin) is? What is the relation between the two? Is the whole an entirely different thing? If it is different like the shuttle and the cloth, as holds Uddyotakara⁵⁰, and continues to reside in the parts after its coming into existence, the question arises: What is the relation between the two? Does the whole exist in its parts wholly or partially? If we maintain that the whole (cloth) is entirely different from its parts (yarns) we are contradicted by our daily experience. We never experience a cognition which comprehends the form of a whole as different from the atoms of colour etc. which are born in a continuous flux⁵¹. In fact the whole is not different from its parts. The moment we take away the yarns the cloth vanishes. When a person closely examines a piece of cloth from one end to another he only perceives yarns and not a whole called cloth as different from those yarns⁵². The cloth and the yarns are never perceived as distinct from one another⁵³. Further it is not possible for a thing to be produced out of an entirely different thing⁵⁴.

Another difficulty will arise regarding their existence. Two entirely different things cannot exist in the same substratum⁵⁵. If we maintain that the whole resides in its parts by samavāya relation we are confronted with a difficulty. We will have to admit a certain connection which is required to join samavāya with the whole and the part because like them it is also an entity. And that connection would require another connection, and thus we would be subject to an infinite regress. If we maintain that it is not joined by any connection to the terms which it binds together, the result would be the dissolution of bond which connects the whole with the part⁵⁶.

Further 'does the whole which is one, subsist in many parts in its entirety or partially? In the former case the whole will be exhausted in one part and the remaining parts will be without it. In the latter case it will have to be assumed that the whole has some other parts by which it resides in its constituent parts. In this way the process will go on ad infinitum⁵⁷. The argument that the whole is a unique thing is also untenable. It cannot be conceived as a unique thing existing in its own right irrespective of its parts, because in that case they would lack a common measure, each being unique and consequently no two objects (wholes) will be compared with each other⁵⁸.

Kamalaśīla says that the whole cannot be regarded as an entity, because of the diversity of its facings, if it were an entity, the shaking of the hand or the limbs would have led to the shaking of the whole body⁵⁹ which never takes place. If we maintain that it is a mere name⁶⁰ for the aggregate of the parts even then the difficulty does not come to an end. Because if the collocation of parts does not add something new to the parts, the very purpose of collocation is defeated. If the cloth were not something over and above the yarns no person will try to prepare cloth⁶¹. Thus we find that the whole and part relation also fails in establishing the real existence of external objects. In fact there is no whole apart from its parts. Like substance it is also a mental creation.

The Vaiśeṣika realist says that though the substance-attribute relation and the whole and part relation have failed to establish the reality of external objects some ultimate constituents must be accepted which constitute the external object. According to them these ultimate constituents are atoms. They are the ultimate particulars which are beyond splitting⁶². At this stage the objects are not subject to any further division. If we do not accept the existence of partless atoms and the process of splitting up of parts into parts goes on infinitely we will come to an absurd position that

the Meru mountain and mustard seed are equal in size because both are subject to infinite splitting⁶³. Further as the measure called 'large'⁶⁴ has its culmination in all-pervading measure⁶⁵, similarly the minute measure⁶⁶ should also have its culmination in the minutest measure, which can only be that of an atom.

The Buddhist examines the object constituted by atoms thus : The material thing must be either simple (atom) or composite (composed of atoms). There is no third alternative possible. If it is maintained that it is neither simple nor composite i.e. it is neither of one nor of several forms, intelligent people will not regard it as extent. It would be like a sky-flower⁶⁷. If the external object is simple i.e. in the form of an atom, it should be visible in its own form. If it is not visible in its own form it should be regarded like a sky-flower⁶⁸. But we see that an external object does not appear in the form of atoms but in gross form. Hence it is not simple. The argument of Bhadanta Śubha Gupta that atoms are always produced in an aggregate form as each of them cannot come about independently by itself in consciousness is untenable⁶⁹. If atoms are entities they must appear in their original form even when they appear in the aggregate form. If they lose their original form and are reduced to naught they are no more than a mere idea⁷⁰. Further if external object is a composite of various atoms, it can be reduced to the lowest limit of dimension where it is indivisible and unextended. Thus its position will be like an instantaneous mental object which is a mere idea, a mere cognition or consciousness⁷¹. It may be argued that the composition of objects by atoms in other ways than the above mentioned one may give a satisfactory explanation of their nature. The Yogācāra says that the composition may take place only in three ways. (1) either in every object the atoms are the close conjunction with one another (2) or they remain there in their separate form without touching each other or (3) there is no intervening space between atoms.

In all these cases one atom will be in the middle and other atoms will surround it. Either the atom in the middle confronts the other atoms by the same face or by different faces. In the former case, the atoms will coalesce and there will be no composition and consequently there will be no composite object⁷². In the latter case it will have at least two faces and consequently two parts. Thus it will be a compound and will go against the realist definition of atoms⁷³.

The Realist retorts that atoms are not the minutest parts of a stuff occupying space, but are space themselves. Space does not consist of parts but of spaces. The minutest part of space is also space and therefore divisible. This division may involve an infinite regress and may be infinitely divisible yet in no case, it will be an ideal or subjective idea. It will always remain space⁷⁴. So the criticism is unjustified.

The Yogācāra meets the explanation by saying that according to the realist theory atom is a certain entity with a well-defined form. If he does not accept it, the atom will become something indescribable, indefinite and indeterminate and thus will be an idea in disguise⁷⁵. Further according to him atoms are simple and appear in form of aggregate. They are in conjunction with one another. There is no intervening space between them, and each atom is surrounded by atoms distinct from one another. Thus according to this theory there will be diversity of facings in atoms, which mean that there is diversity of upper and lower parts because without such parts no conjunction among them can take place⁷⁶. According to Vasubandhu the atom on account of its simultaneous connections with six other atoms must have six component parts i.e. six different sides or points where it is connected with six atoms. In the connection of six atoms with the central one has the same point as their substratum, the aggregate of seven atoms (i.e. the one surrounded by six atoms) will remain of the size of a single atom⁷⁷. Thus the real exis-

tence of atom is inexplicable whether it be simple or an aggregate of atoms. Hence atom is nothing but non-existence like a sky-flower⁷⁸.

The Realist further argues that there is an idea of atom. Every idea indicates its cause. Hence the idea of atom must also indicate an object as its cause. The cause is atom itself⁷⁹. The Yogācāra replies that the cause of the atom consists in the shape of the notion of the dust particles coming in through the hole. This notion results from the fruition of the impressions left by the contemplation of wrong teachings⁸⁰. Further the idea of object cannot guarantee its real existence. There is an idea of soul where infact there is no soul apart from the aggregate of the skandhas. In the same way there is an idea of a sky-flower or the horns of hare but it is not real⁸¹. Further objects are perceived. If atoms are the ultimate constituents of an object, they must also be perceived. But experience shows that whatever is perceived is of gross magnitude while the realist maintains that it is composed of atoms which are imperceptible⁸². Hence it involves contradiction. It cannot be held that what is perceived is the whole⁸³ which, itself not being atomic, is yet made of atoms, since no whole can be admitted over and above atoms. The atom is not an object of perception yet the object of perception is nothing apart from atoms. From this paradox the conclusion is drawn that what appears in perception has no objective basis.

Diñnāga raises⁸⁴ another objection. If all objects are atomic, they should give rise to identical perceptions. Differences in the perceived objects can be imported either by the number of atoms constituting them or by their size. But the latter alternative is ruled out as the atoms themselves do not have any size. Mere number of the constituent atoms cannot produce objects of different natures, unless the atoms themselves are different in nature. The difference in their nature can be assumed only if they have a greater or a smaller

number of qualities. This increase of qualities cannot take place without a simultaneous increase of size as is evident from the observation of material things⁸⁵. But the increase of size is inconsistent with the nature of atoms which are formless. We have no logical ground to postulate that we should stop at the stage of atom. Why should the process of division not continue at infinitum. If we stop the process of subdivision it will prove nothing but arbitrariness on our part. The argument that the existence of atom should be assumed to differentiate the large and the small is subject to the fallacy of interdependence. The measure called minute is different from the measure called large can be assumed only if the existence of the atom is first established. But its existence is sought to be established by the assumption of the measure called minute⁸⁶. The analysis of the atomic theory shows that it is vitiated with contradictions and is incapable of explaining the reality of external objects.

From the above discussion regarding the nature of substance or external object we come to the conclusion that atoms or point-instants are discrete. The idea of whole or of an external object is a mental construction which is caused by the unbroken series of cognitions of similar atoms. Just as the coming into existence of similar moments gives an illusion of permanence, in the same way an uninterrupted series of cognitions of similar atoms gives the illusion of whole or external object⁸⁷. The construction of the whole is not due to any objective factor, and if construction is granted to be purely subjective the hypothesis of atoms is rendered superfluous, as the whole is all that is required for empirical purposes. Moreover, if subjectivity is constructive enough to posit the whole, it can with equal plausibility, posit the parts. If a basis for construction be required consciousness itself would serve the purpose. It is thus clear that the concept of objectivity is a futile one and must be cancelled without compunction⁸⁸. It is consciousness alone that makes its own creations appear as though they are outside it⁸⁹.

The Yogācāra adduces some other facts which demonstrate categorically that external objects have no self-existence but are mental constructions. First, a real object can be self-existent⁹⁰ if it remains in one and the same condition forever. But the objects of the world are not of this nature. They are in a constant flux. Every single object is possessed of entirely different characteristics which undermine its very existence. How can it be regarded as identical when its characteristics are mutually conflicting⁹¹. So the objects of the world have not self-nature. They 'depend for their existence on relations, and relations are nothing but the creations⁹² of our mind. In the words of Maxmuller 'when we say that something is large or small, sweet or bitter, these dharmas or qualities are subjective and cannot be further defined. What is large to me may be small to another. A mile may seem short or long according to the state of our muscles and no one can determine the point where smallness ends and largeness begins'⁹³. This applies to all things which we are supposed to know.

Secondly objects invariably accompany consciousness. According to the Realist an object exists outside consciousness which simply reveals it and does not create it. But how do we know that the object exists before it is known? The known is subject to knowing or consciousness. To say that an object existed even before it was known is untenable⁹⁴. To say that the same object is being cognized which was uncognized before involves the process of identification. We can identify only that thing which was known before and is known later. We cannot identify that thing which was not cognized before⁹⁵. So it is impossible to identify the perceived object with the unperceived one. The realist theory of knowledge being rejected the ground for the idealist theory of knowledge is prepared. There is no external object apart from consciousness. Consciousness diversifies itself into indefinite modes⁹⁶ which owing to the presence of transcendental illusion are taken to be as external objects. So external

objects are not something different from 'consciousness. They are non-existent and cannot be imported into consciousness. They are mere ideas and are inherent in the states of consciousness⁹⁷. The experience of our life bears witness to this fact. The objects are invariably related with consciousness. They appear when consciousness appears and do not appear when it does not appear. For instance we may take the apprehension of blue colour. The blue colour can never be known unless there is an idea of blue colour. The blue colour and its idea are inseparable⁹⁸. If the object blue colour is a different entity it should be perceived as such i.e. it should be perceived along with consciousness and also in absence of consciousness. But such thing never takes place. We cannot quote even a single instance where the object blue is apprehended without involving the idea of blueness. Hence the correct view is that the blue and the idea of the blue are not distinct⁹⁹. What exists is only the idea of the blue i.e. consciousness having the form of the blue¹⁰⁰.

4. Objections to the doctrine of Mind-Only

The Realists have raised serious objections to the doctrine of Mind-Only. First, if the objects of the world are illusory like the objects of a dream what would happen to the empirical world which is governed by strict and rigorous empirical laws¹⁰¹. Why is it that all things follow a definite course. We see a particular thing at a particular place and at a particular time. The eye apprehends only colour and not the sound. The ear apprehends only the sound and not the colour. All these things are similarly apprehended by all men. If these representations are creations of an individual's mind, they should be apprehended by him alone, as no body can guess the thought of another person. Being ideal it should happen at any time and at any place because it is not in time and place at all¹⁰². If we do not believe in the external world we cannot explain the results which follow from the external objects. For instance an imaginary torture cannot give pain to any body. He feels pain when

he is actually tortured. Further the objects of dream are subject to sublation. They are negated by our ordinary consciousness. But objects of waking experience such as jar, cow etc. are never negated in any state¹⁰³. The reality of waking experience is the basis of the sublation of the dream objects. If it is itself unreal like dream objects, its unreality cannot be known. Further the visions of dream are acts of remembrance, while the visions of waking state are acts of immediate consciousness, i. e. perception, and the distinction between remembrance and immediate consciousness is directly cognized by every man, for the former is founded on the absence of the object and the latter on its presence. When for instance, a man remembers his absent son, he does not directly perceive him, but merely wishes so to perceive him¹⁰⁴. Thus there is a fundamental difference between the two. The denial of waking experience would result in the denial of perception which would be a great lie which no honest man can do. Without perception memory will be impossible. But nobody can deny that he does not remember the things perceived. Further the objects of waking state are subject to moral laws while the objects of dream are not subject to moral laws¹⁰⁵. There is another distinction between the two. The objects of dream are private. They are the property of an individual dreamer. Other persons have no inkling of it. The objects of waking state on the other hand are public. They are the property of all the cognizers. For instance we perceive a cow. It is the same for all the cognizers. But the cow of a dream is not the same for all the dreamers. They cannot see the same cow at one and the same time and place. If both stand on the same footing the empirical world with its common experience for all persons will be impossible. Therefore on account of such obvious distinctions between the two it would not be wise to place the objects of waking state and dream on the same footing¹⁰⁶.

The Yogācāra avers that the above objection is unfounded. Even in a dream where there are no external objects

we find a particular thing only at a particular place and in a particular time¹⁰⁷. We see all the worldly objects following a regular course. Rainfall is seen only in rainy season. Gardens and meadows are seen only in a plain and not in a desert. People are frightened by the roar of a lion and not by the slow voice of a cow. There is love for a friend and hatred for an enemy. The doctrine of Mind-Only does not affect¹⁰⁸ our empirical world at all till we are under transcendental illusion. It is real and is unsublated so long as we are under the sway of transcendental illusion. The moment transcendental wisdom, the ārya-jñāna is realized, the reality of the external world with all its varied, pleasant and unpleasant experiences vanishes. The world is an object of dream only to that man who has gone to the path of strenuous self-discipline and has realized in the core of his heart that nothing is objective or everything is the creation of the mind¹⁰⁹.

Further the argument that moral laws prove the distinction between objects of waking and dream states is untenable. Deviation from moral laws is seen in the waking life also. People are seen indulging in telling a lie, committing murder and rape and doing other immoral acts. The last objection is also not sound. It is true that there is no common world, but on the other hand there is an infinite multiplicity of worlds¹¹⁰. Everyone has his own experience and his own world. The so-called unity of the world is believed because the difference subsisting in the experiences of others is palpably ignored. Since one cannot jump out of one's skin and see the other people's worlds, the slight differences in various worlds remain unnoticed¹¹¹. The consistency and unity of the world may be compared to the apprehension of a yellow conchshell by two daltonists. Though their apprehension is wrong yet the similar disease causes unity and consistency¹¹². Here the Realist raises an objection. If we believe that ideas are the only reality we will not be able to explain how a desired result can be obtained. Mere ideas

cannot quench our thirst nor can they satisfy our hunger. A thing can be regarded as real only when it is capable of producing the desired result¹¹³. Consequently our empirical world will be staked of which the Yogācāra is always conscious and does not want to tamper with it in any way¹¹⁴.

The Yogācāra replies to the Realist that ideas are capable of producing the desired result¹¹⁵. We experience the horrors of a nightmare¹¹⁶ ? The sight of an illusory snake often causes death. Moreover efficiency itself is a mere idea which is caused by the transcendental illusion and which consists in apprehending an ideal content as something objective¹¹⁷. Thus activity is not hampered in any way.

(3) The Realist further urges that the idealist theory cannot explain illusory cognitions. Transcendental illusion must have a real basis. Without an external object illusion is not possible. The existence of external object is an indispensable antecedent condition for all illusory cognitions¹¹⁸. For instance we may take the rope-snake illusion. The vision of illusory snake is caused by a rope. This cognition is an illusion but the rope and the snake are not themselves illusions. They are real objects which have been previously experienced by us in our daily life¹¹⁹. A man who has never perceived a snake cannot have the illusion of a snake in a piece of rope¹²⁰.

The Yogācāra says that the realist argument is unjustifiable; for it may be accepted that an illusory snake has been superimposed in a piece of rope and yet it cannot be denied that this superimposition is a mental creation. Thus the foundation of idealism is not shaken at all. As for, the cause of an idea is concerned, it may be an ideal¹²¹ one with no detriment to experience¹²². It may have been caused by another idea¹²³.

The Realist raises a few more objections to the doctrine of Mind-Only, which are refuted by the idealists.

First, the doctrine of Mind-Only cannot explain the process of memory. Memory requires a past perception of

some object. When there is no object at all, no question of memory arises at all. But such an assertion would be inconsistent with our daily experiences where we remember objects perceived in the past. The Yogācāra replies that the problem of memory is a greater enigma to the Realist than to himself. According to the Realist the consciousness is formless. The objects come and go without leaving any impression on it. Now how do we know that the same object was perceived in the past, is a problem? The Realist cannot say that the object itself informs that it was perceived in the past because it is an unconscious thing and has no such power. Nor can he say that the consciousness itself retains the memory of its previous cognitions¹²⁴, because consciousness according to him is a transparent entity and has no forms and images¹²⁵. Nor can he say that the same object which was apprehended in the past is the object of memory because it is impossible for the past object to appear before consciousness without its being actually present¹²⁶. Hence memory can be explained only if it is maintained that consciousness has images and projects them when favourable conditions arise¹²⁷.

Secondly, according to the Realist the doctrine of Mind-Only which denies the reality of external objects cannot explain the origin of dreams because they presuppose an objective basis. Though they are illusory and are sublated by waking experience¹²⁸ still they are based on objective reality. If there is no experience of objects there cannot be dreams as well. We see in dream only the objects of our waking state in a different order. The difference between the two is only this that the objects of waking state are subject to rigorous laws while the objects of dreams are placed in a new context¹²⁹. There is none who can say that his dreams are entirely fantastic and present absolutely strange phenomena¹³⁰. Hence the objective character of the dream world can never be denied. The Yogācāra answers that the dream world is entirely subjective. It is a construction of our mind.

It arises when the sense-organs are not in contact with the objects at all. The illusory cognition, e. g. of a serpent has its basis in the object e. g. a piece of rope. It presents an apparent world which is cancelled the moment the illusory snake is cancelled. But such is not the case with the dream world. Here we find a world which has complete similarity with the waking world and is subject to its own laws. The dream world seems to have its basis in the objective world but in reality there are no objects. There is simply the idea of objectivity¹³¹ which has its basis in the transcendental illusion. Thus we see that the consciousness cannot only create the contents of a perceptual world but can also project them as objective. Hence objectivity is not due to the external objects but is a characteristic of consciousness¹³².

Thirdly, the Realist says that the doctrine of Mind-Only ends in solipsism. But for the Yogācāra from transcendental point of view the whole universe is the projection of Mind-Only. Hence no question of the separate existence of separate minds arises at all. All the separate minds are projections of the same reality. They are the vibrations of an ocean caused by the wind of ignorance. But as far as their empirical existence is concerned they are never denied. Just as a Realist can infer the existence of other mind by thinking that he immediately feels that his own speech and his own movements are governed by his own will, so the alien speech and the alien movement which he observes must also be governed by alien wills¹³³. In the same way the Yogācāra can also infer the existence of other minds. Those representations in which our own movements and our own speech appear to us as originating in our own will are different from those which do not originate in our own will. The former appear in the form 'I go' 'I speak,' etc. The latter appear in the form 'he goes' 'he speaks' etc. Thereby it is established that the latter class has a cause different from the cause of former. This cause is an alien will¹³⁴. The Realist objects

that as the Yogācāra has nothing except consciousness or the mind he is not justified in holding the latter class of images as caused by an alien will? But the Yogācāra retorts¹³⁵ that if these images of purposeful actions could appear without a will producing them, then all our presentations of action and speech in general would not be produced by a will. The difference consisting in the fact that one set of images are connected with my body and another set is not so connected, does not mean that one set is produced by a will and the other is not so produced. Both are produced by a conscious will. It cannot be maintained that only one half of our images of purposeful acts and of speech are connected with a will producing them. All are so connected. The Realist rejoins that the Yogācāra can be conscious of his own movements and speech through introspection and can draw the conclusion that they are engendered by his conscious will. But he cannot do so in the case of others' movements and speech because for him alien acts are dreams. The Yogācāra avers¹³⁶ that if purposeful acts point to the existence of a conscious will, they point to it either necessarily in dreams as well as in reality or never. If we maintain that images of purposeful acts can be obtained even without a conscious will, the logical consequence would be that we could never infer the existence of a conscious will from the existence of purposeful acts. The Realist rejoins that dreams are not real¹³⁷. Hence they cannot have corresponding images. The Yogācāra Buddhist answers that images are images. If they are images of reality in one case, they are images of reality in all cases. The difference¹³⁸ between the dreams and other images is only this that the images of waking state have a direct connection with the reality while in dreams or other morbid conditions the relation is indirect. For instance we see in a dream that a general has returned from the battle field after giving a crushing defeat to a powerful and arrogant aggressor and people of his country are welcoming him. All these images are not unreal though they appear in a

dream. They have a connection with reality though there is indeed an interruption in time between reality and these images. The Realist asks : What the source of our knowledge regarding the existence of other minds is. The Buddhist answers that the inference is the only source¹³⁹. Just as we reach our desired goal by performing some purposeful activity, the same goal is reached by other persons as well by performing the same purposeful activity even in absence of my performance of the said activity, we must conclude that it must have been performed by some other person.

Lastly, the Realist raises an important question: If material substances and objects caused by them which are perceived through sense-organs are regarded as mental constructions, what is the guarantee that the Mind-Only exists when it is not cognized at all by any means of knowledge ? Must it not be regarded as unreal ?¹⁴⁰

The Yogācāra answers that the term *dharma-nairātmya* (there is no object) does not mean that there are no objects at all. It simply means that all the objects imagined by our determinate intellect are not there. Our intellect is entangled in the duality of 'subject' and 'object', 'perceiver' and 'perceived' and is incapable of apprehending the reality. The *dharma-nairātmya* refutes simply this phenomenon and not the pure indeterminate Mind-Only¹⁴¹. It refutes the imaginary ego¹⁴², and not the indescribable immaculate Ātman, which is *Vijñaptimātratā* and is the object of realization of the Buddhas. It is impossible to deny it because its denial leads to the fallacy of infinite regress. It can be denied only by another *Vijñapti* and this process will go on *ad infinitum*. Hence its denial is inconceivable¹⁴³.

5. *Vijñaptimatratā* and Ātman

The Buddha maintained silence on metaphysical questions like the existence of soul, God, the reality of the world and its eternity, declaring them to be *avyākṛta* questions. This silence of the great Master was taken as a categorical denial

by the early Buddhists who declared that there was no soul and those who believed in the existence of soul were bound to transmigrate again and again in the whirlpool of saṁsāra. But this situation did not last for a very long time. Human mind would not be satisfied by the agnostic teachings of the Buddha. Therefore while on the one hand the followers of the Buddha paid lip-service to the Master by denouncing the soul or ego substance, on the other hand they declared that there is a higher self the Absolute which lies at the background of the phenomenal world, and that was denounced by the Lord was a lower self¹⁴⁴. The question was how to place the higher self in the system of the Vijñānas and the answer was the evolution of Cittamātra or Vijñaptimātratā which is the locus of all the Vijñānas which cause the illusion of external world. We find in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra verses and passages which describe and demonstrate by concrete examples the existence of ātman. The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says :—

The immaculate soul or ego is to be self-realized. It is the womb of the Tathāgata and is beyond the senses and intellect¹⁴⁵. This shining or luminous soul is contaminated by external defilements. But it can be cleared of them like a dirty garment¹⁴⁶. It is present though invisible in the Skandhas¹⁴⁷. If the existence of soul is denied the stages of Bodhisattva or the self-mastery, psychic power, anointment of the highest order and the excellent samādhi will also meet the same fate¹⁴⁸. If a nihilist asks a positive proof for the existence of soul he should be asked to refute it. Its refutation is self-contradictory. The monks who deny the ātman are therefore censured by the assembly of monks because the doctrine of self is essential to remove the blurred vision of the philosophers and burn the forest of 'egolessness', like the fire arising at the end of the world¹⁴⁹.

Dr. Suzuki says that these passages of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra are to be weighed carefully otherwise they will be taken for the soul which has been denied both in Hīnayāna and

Mahāyāna. But would it not be a misinterpretation of the Text when it is crystal clear in itself We should remember in our mind that throughout the history of Buddhism the stream of soul has been flowing incessantly. It may be that the description of the soul by the name ātman had been denied but not the essence of it which is self-luminous, eternal, all-pervading and the source of all phenomena. The Citta-mātra or the citta of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (which is also known as Tathāgatagarbha, and Ālaya), the Mahātman of Asaṅga and the Vijñapti-mātratā of Vasubandhu bear witness to this fact. Describing the nature of ātman¹⁵⁰ the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says that it is immaculate and self-realizable. It is the Tathāgatagarbha which is beyond the vision of the philosophers. The description of the citta will show how much it resembles the upaniṣadic doctrine of ātman. It is described to be pure and immaculate in its very nature and it is good and free from evil flowings. It is neither separated from habit-energy nor united with it. Though it is covered or enwrapped with Vāsanā it is not contaminated with its characteristics¹⁵¹. The identity of the Citta and the Ātman becomes so clear to the author of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra that he tries to distinguish between the two. Mahāmati asks the Buddha to explain the difference between Tathāgatagarbha and the ātman which seem to be identical. The Tathāgatagarbha is described as essentially pure in its nature, immanent in all creatures, eternal, permanent, auspicious, and unchanged though enveloped within such matter as the skandhas, dhātus, āyatanaś and defiled by the evil of greed, hatred, folly and discrimination¹⁵². In the same way the Ātman is also described as eternal, creator, devoid of attributes, mighty and imperishable¹⁵³. The Buddha answers that the difference consists in this that the Tathāgatagarbha is indescribable¹⁵⁴ while the Ātman is not. But in fact the Ātman is also indescribable¹⁵⁵. We agree with the observations of Dr. Suzuki that 'at all events it is evident that there was historically a close connection between

ago idea and the evolution of Ālaya-Vijñāna (which is another name for the Citta)'. We find the same observation in the Sandhinirmocana-sūtra which says that 'the Ālaya-vijñāna is deep and subtle, where all the seeds are evolved like a stream and it may be imagined as an ego-substance'¹⁵⁶

When we turn from the Sūtra-literature to Yogācāra literature we find a graphic description of the soul or the Mahātman. Asaṅga condemns the ātman or ego-substance by saying that it is neither self-existent (Svalakṣaṇa) nor dependent (vilakṣaṇa) but is an illusion¹⁵⁷. There is no such thing as the permanent substratum of the world which is known as soul. All objects are born of causal relation. It is the result of ignorance that people try to find out whether things are self-existent (being) or non-existent (non-being)¹⁵⁸. But the latter description of the Mahātman shows what Asaṅga condemns is the empirical ego, the feeling of 'I and me', and not the Absolute self which is like a vast and immeasurable ocean where the small souls come and are merged. The description of the Dharmadhātu reminds one that it is the description of the Upaniṣadic soul. Asaṅga says 'Dharmadhātu is like the ocean which is neither satisfied nor increased by the flow of incessant water of numberless rivers¹⁵⁹. It is identified with Citta which is pure and luminous by its very nature, and is self-evident and undefiled though seems to be defiled owing to ignorance'¹⁶⁰. It is devoid of dualism. It is the locus of ignorance. It is beyond the categories of the intellect and is beyond all phenomena. It is immaculate and pure in its nature. As space, gold or water is pure by its nature but seems to be defiled respectively by cloud mine or dust, in the same way reality seems to be defiled by adventitious or superimposed notions¹⁶¹.

In Vasubandhu we find the same description of the reality as unthinkable, unknown by reason and transcendental wisdom. It is indescribable, blissful and permanent. It is happiness. It is nirvāṇa and the Dharmakāya of the great sage

Buddha¹⁶². Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti also follow the line of Vasubandhu in maintaining that the reality is essentially 'non-dual'. It is owing to ignorance that the self-luminous¹⁶³ consciousness which is devoid of all impurities seems to be divided into the subject and the object, the self and the world¹⁶⁴. In fact what is external is nothing but the creation of our mind which looks like external¹⁶⁵. Finally we come to Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla who humbly maintain that to determine the Absolute they are resorting to Vijñaptimātratā which has been well-established by great teachers like Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti¹⁶⁶. It is for a student of philosophy to observe what resemblance the following lines of the Upaniṣads have with the Buddhist doctrine of Vijñaptimātratā. 'When a saint realizes through the light of ego the Absolute reality which is unborn, eternal and immaculate from all defilements, he atonce becomes free from all bonds¹⁶⁷. The reality is immanent in a person's body as oil is present in oil seeds, ghee in curd, water in river and fire in fuel. The man who tries to realize it by means of truth and austerity realizes it¹⁶⁸. The reality is neither internal wisdom, nor external wisdom, nor both. It is unseen, unapprehended, unthinkable, and indeterminate. It is blissful, quiet and non-dual. It is devoid of all attributes and above all phenomena. It is the very essence of every thing, and it is this reality which is to be realized¹⁶⁹. As rivers mingle in the ocean leaving no name and form behind similarly an aspirant for truth¹⁷⁰ is immersed in the reality leaving no trace of name and form.

6. The nature of Consciousness

Asaṅga the founder of systematic Yogācāra philosophy holds that the real is essentially non-dual. It is neither existence nor non-existence, neither affirmation nor negation, neither identity nor difference, neither one nor many, neither increasing nor decreasing, neither pure nor impure, neither production, nor destruction. It is beyond ignorance and

intellect¹⁷¹ His description of 'Reality' resembles that of Nāgārjuna who says that 'Reality' is neither 'being' nor 'non-being' nor 'both' nor 'none'. It is beyond the four categories of the intellect¹⁷². Asaṅga like Nāgārjuna further says that there is no difference between saṃsāra and nirvāṇa for both are non-existence. Still from the phenomenal point of view we say that by performing good deeds and by acquiring true knowledge the cycle of birth and death is stopped and liberation is achieved¹⁷³. Thus the 'Reality' of Asaṅga suffers from a nihilistic tendency like that of Nāgārjuna. But he does not stop here. He makes a historical departure from Nāgārjuna and reaches near the position of Advaita Vedānta. He says that a man attains the Highest reality after following the noble path and after realizing the dharma-nairātmya and pudgala nairātmya by purifying his conception of śūnyatā¹⁷⁴. According to Raine Gruce Asaṅga is always conscious of this fact that he should not leave the philosophy of Nāgārjuna but he goes far beyond the line of Nāgārjuna's śūnyatā which is nothing but negation. He establishes a positive reality where the tathatā and dharmatā of all the objects are merged and become one with the Mahātman. Asaṅga declares : 'Rivers pour themselves into the ocean but the ocean is neither satisfied nor does it increase. Similarly Buddhas after Buddhas pour themselves into the 'Reality', but it is neither satisfied nor does it increase. How wonderful is it ?¹⁷⁵ Further he says: 'Different rivers with different water flowing through different places are called only rivers. When they merge in the ocean they become one with it. In the same way different persons holding different views are called finite intellects, but when they merge in the Buddha, they become one with him. They are the Absolute¹⁷⁶. This kind of description of 'Reality' is a hint that he is deviating from Nāgārjuna and is establishing the Absolute which is the Citta or Vijñaptimātratā. 'There is no duality' says Asaṅga, 'There is only the idea of duality, like the idea of an illusory elephant. In fact there is neither the perceiver nor the perceived. There is only

an idea of perceiver and perceived'¹⁷⁷. He further says: 'The moment an aspirant for truth realizes the unreality of external objects, the Citta (determinate mind) also vanishes because there can be no subject without an object. The duality of subject and object runs simultaneously. The moment one transcends the duality of subject and object he sees the vision of 'Reality' which is known as Dharmadhātu, Tathāgata or Mind-Only'¹⁷⁸. It is beyond duality. It is the locus of ignorance or illusion. It is unconnected with phenomena and is indescribable. It is essentially pure. The apparent defilements are owing to ignorance'.

With Vasubandhu the doctrine of Vijñaptimātratā is established on firm footing. He is not the least afraid of Nāgārjuna. He categorically denies the existence of the external world. According to him consciousness manifests itself into subject and object. It arises out of its own seed and then manifests itself as an external object. That is the reason why the Buddha said that there were two bases of cognition internal and external. By knowing this, one realizes that there is no personal ego and that there are no external objects, as both are only manifestations of consciousness¹⁷⁹. Here Vasubandhu makes a distinct improvement on the śūnyavāda of Nāgārjuna. For Nāgārjuna every thing is relative and things have no self-existence¹⁸⁰. But for Vasubandhu everything is unreal but there is something in whose relation all things are unreal. The indescribable pure consciousness which is directly realized by the Buddhas can never be denied. It cannot be conceived by intellect. The idea of pure consciousness conceived by finite thought with the help of its categories of existence is unreal ; because if it were real the concept of intellect would also be real which is inconsistent with pure consciousness which is the only 'Reality'. The statement 'it cannot be grasped by intellect does not mean that it is non-existent. On the contrary it is the very basis of all existence. Its denial is impossible, because its denial can take place only by another consciousness. The denial of the latter consciousness will need a

third consciousness and this process will lead to infinite regress. Hence the denial of consciousness is fallacious¹⁸¹. The very process of denial is based on the strength of selfluminous and self-evident *Vijñaptimātratā* and not in absence of it. All the categories of understanding such as belief¹⁸² refutation¹⁸³ and assertion¹⁸⁴, negation¹⁸⁵ and position¹⁸⁶, denial¹⁸⁷ and acceptance,¹⁸⁸ *siddhi* and *asiddhi* are possible only on the basis of *Vijñaptimātratā* and not in absence of it. Thus pure consciousness is the only 'Reality' and can be directly realized by spiritual experience which transcends the subject-object-duality. After establishing the *Vijñaptimātratā* as the only reality by logical arguments, Vasubandhu at last says that this Reality is beyond discursive intellect and can be realized only by going beyond all the categories of the understanding and by embracing pure consciousness, in short by becoming a Buddha¹⁸⁹.

According to Dr. C. D. Sharma 'what was denied by the Śūnyavādins is only the individual subject and not the pure consciousness. Śūnyavāda criticizes self-consciousness if it means consciousness of consciousness. Consciousness cannot be conscious of itself in the same way as fire cannot burn itself, the edge of a sword cannot cut itself, and the tip of a finger cannot touch itself.' Dr. Sharma identifies the Bodhi of Nāgārjuna, the Citta of Āryadeva and the Bodhi-Citta of Śāntideva with pure consciousness or the self-luminous self¹⁹⁰. But his view is untenable. If it is accepted, the criticism by Vasubandhu of the view that the consciousness is also relative like external objects becomes futile and the very purpose of writing *Triṅśikā* becomes meaningless, nor its purpose is to denounce the two extreme views the one that like the consciousness the objects are also real and the other that like objects the consciousness is also relative¹⁹¹. Further all the criticisms levelled against the nihilistic doctrine of the Mādhyamikas, by Yogācāra philosophers like Vasubandhu, Diṅnāga, Dharmakīrti, and others will prove their ignorance and lack

of Śūnyavāda philosophy. Hence the correct view is that the consciousness of Vasubandhu which is pure and undefiled existence¹⁹² which is beyond finite thought, which is good¹⁹³ eternal¹⁹⁴ and blissful¹⁹⁵, is something different from the śūnyatā of Nāgārjuna. In fact it is the basis of this śūnyatā as well¹⁹⁶. Thus Vijñānavāda gives not only clear and a detailed account of what was left more or less implicit by the Mādhyamikas, it clears not only the misunderstandings regarding consciousness and the scope of their future occurrence¹⁹⁷, but also has established a theory which differs from Śūnyavada not only in degree but also in kind. The doctrine of Mind-Only which is also known as Abhūtaparikalpita is a piece of unique genius of Yogācāra Buddhists. It applies to all the three forms of reality and is immanent as well as transcendent to them. When it (the abhūtaparikalpita) means the real transcendental ground of all superimposed phenomena it is called pariniṣpanna. When it is applied to the phenomena, it means the phenomenal world of subject-object duality manifested by the self-creative energy of the Ālaya, the constructive consciousness¹⁹⁸. In this sense it issues from Ālaya and is also known as paratantra or relative reality. When it is used for the imaginary objects, it denotes the unreal subject-object duality¹⁹⁹ which is imaginary and is also known as parikalpita²⁰⁰.

Like Asaṅga, Vasubandhu says that when the unreality of external objects is realised, the individual subject also becomes unreal because they are correlative terms. The one cannot exist without the other. The duality of subject and object comes to an end only when the unity of the individual consciousness with pure consciousness is established²⁰¹. The pure consciousness is indescribable. Even to say that pure consciousness is reality falls short of reality, because it is an expression of intellect²⁰².

7. Vedantic criticism of the doctrine of Mind-Only

Vedāntins have charged the Yogācāra idealists with the denial of the external reality of the world which is apprehended by every person. Śaṅkara says that the non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of our consciousness of them.²⁰³ We should not pay attention to the words of a man who, while conscious of an outward thing through its approximation to his senses, affirms that he is conscious of no outward thing and that no such thing exists, for his assertion is like a man who while eating and experiencing the feeling of satisfaction says that he does not eat and feel satisfied ?²⁰⁴ The Yogācāra on his part countercharges Vedāntins that they do not fare better because they also hold that the world is unreal and only the Brahman is real.²⁰⁵ Vācaspati Miśra explaining the difference between the Yogācāra idealism and Vedānta idealism says that though both deny the external world yet there is a fundamental difference in their standpoints. For the Buddhist the external world is unreal because it is made by the mind but for the Vedāntin it is unreal because of its indescribable character. The objects exist outside and independent of the individual mind. They are indescribable and irrational. They are neither real nor unreal, nor both. Hence they are regarded Māyā.²⁰⁶ Sadānanda also follows the line of Vācaspati Miśra and says that for the Yogācāra idealist the world exists inside consciousness and is therefore unreal. But for the Vedāntins it is Māyā or something which can be described neither as real nor as unreal nor as both and is therefore Māyā. This indescribability of the world which baffles intellect is a merit for Vedānta, but not for Vijñānavāda.²⁰⁷

A thorough study of the Idealists like Vasubandhu demonstrates that the Vedāntins' charges are unfounded. They have done so owing to their overzeal to refute Buddhism or unavailability of the original texts. For the

Idealists the objects are not illusory as it is for the Mādhyamikas. Nor there is an unbridgable gulf between the absolute and the phenomenal. The Vijñāna-vādins explained the relation between the Absolute and the phenomenal which was left by the Nihilists and thus they made an important improvement on the Mādhyamika doctrine of Śūnyavāda. Explaining the relation between the Absolute and the phenomenal Vasubandhu says that the phenomenal has its origin in causal relations. It is dependent on something else for its existence. But the Absolute is always and in every way untouched by all those forms in which the phenomenal seems to appear, i.e. it is always above those things which are the result of dependent origination. This absolute cannot be described as different from the phenomenal or identical with it. When the absolute itself appears as phenomenal owing to veil of ignorance, how can it be maintained that it is different from the Absolute? Similarly when the Absolute is untouched by the subject-object duality of phenomenal existence, how can it be regarded as identical with it? Hence the phenomenal is false owing to its indescribable transitory and causally dependent character.²⁰⁸ In the words of Sthirmati if we hold that the Absolute is something different from the phenomenal, there would be no difference between the imaginary (parikalpita) and the phenomenal. On the other hand if we maintain that it is identical with the latter, the consequence would be that either the Absolute will not remain immaculate and will become impure like²⁰⁹ the latter or the latter itself would become pure like the former. Hence it is neither identical nor different. Infact the Absolute is a unitary whole like space. It is always followed by the empirically visible objects. These objects cannot be seen in its absence. When a man realizes through immaculate and non-constructive wisdom the pure nature of the Absolute, he sees also the phenomenal which has its basis in the Absolute. In the light of the above discussion

the charges of Vedāntins become meaningless. As in Vedānta so in Yogācāra Buddhism the reality of the external world is indescribable and has its locus in the Absolute.

8. Is Vijñaptimātratā momentary ?

Regarding the nature of Vijñaptimātratā whether it is eternal or transitory there are two different views. According to the first view it is momentary²¹⁰ and flowing²¹¹ and is not eternal and permanent.²¹² According to the second view it is permanent.²¹³ Both views do not comprehend the real nature of the Vijñaptimātratā. They are partially true. The first view is applicable to the Vijñaptimātratā of Diñnāga, Dharmakīrti, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla for whom the criterion of the reality of an object consists in its capacity to produce the effect. The second view is applicable to the Vijñaptimātratā of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu for whom the test of reality is its unsublative character i.e. its eternity.

The Cittamātra of the Laṅkāvatāra, the Mahātman of Asaṅga or the Vijñaptimātratā of Vasubandhu is an eternal Absolute which shines with its own lustre. The Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra says that the Tathāgatagarbha (which is another name for the Cittamātra) is eternal, permanent, auspicious and unchanged.²¹⁴ The same thing is reiterated by Asaṅga when he describes the reality as unborn and undestroyed.²¹⁵ In Vasubandhu we find a categorical assertion that the reality is eternal and remains in its unchanged position for ever.²¹⁶ The stream of Ālaya dries up when an aspirant for the Absolute attains arhatship.²¹⁷ Sthirmati says that the Vijñaptimātratā has been described as perpetual (dhruva) because of its eternity and non-destruction. It is blissful because it is eternal. Only an eternal thing can be a permanent source of bliss and not a transitory one.²¹⁸ But when we return to the Sautrāntika Idealist we find that the position has changed. Though the reality of pure

consciousness is accepted, it is deprived of its eternal character. The doctrine of momentariness appears once more with all its vigour and covers consciousness also within its sway. The eternal and permanent Tathāgata of the Laṅkāvatāra, the unborn and undying Mahātman of Aśaṅga and the non-out flowing²¹⁹ and permanent Absolute of Vasubandhu becomes fleeting idea in the hands of Diñnāga and his followers. Diñnāga confessing his agreement with Vasubandhu in metaphysics on the logical plane and under the disguise of supporting absolute idealism with independent logical arguments, really tried to revive the theory of momentariness in a subtle manner and actually busied himself with its logical revival in order to modify the Absolute Idealism of Vasubandhu by trying to fuse it somehow with Critical Realism.²²⁰ On logical plane Diñnāga assumes that there are innumerable 'essences in themselves'²²¹ which are momentary and flow uninterruptedly in a stream. They are apprehended through the senses in perception. But they are unthinkable. The categories of understanding cannot bind them. On metaphysical plane he declares that consciousness is the only Reality. External objects do not exist independently of the mind. The consciousness manifests itself as the subject and the object. The so-called external object is only the knowledge-aspect²²² or the object-condition²²³ of consciousness. It is internally cognised by introspection and appears as external object.²²⁴ The ultimate reality is an 'Idea'.²²⁵ Thus the 'external point-instant' of logic becomes an 'internal idea' in metaphysics. Subject and object are both internal. The internal world is double. For instance there is no difference between the patch of blue and the sensation of blue. The idea can be regarded as a cognized object and a cognition, because they are always inseparable.²²⁶ It may be asked as to how a thing which in itself is not differentiated appears as differentiated, Diñnāga would answer that we are blinded by the glamour of transcendental illusion and therefore the Absolute

knowledge is reflected in the double form of subject and object.²²⁷ In Dharmakīrti the empirical idealism of Diñnāga turns towards Critical Realism which is objective idealism at the same time. Here the criterion of Reality is its efficiency or capacity to produce the desired result.²²⁸ Dharmakīrti says that just as a bride has nothing to do with the beauty or ugliness of a eunuch similarly we are not concerned with the existence or non-existence of a thing. If it is capable of producing the desired result, it is non-existent. If it is not capable of producing the desired result it is non-existent. For Dharmakīrti the essence in itself is the only reality because it produces sensation. It is momentary because only that thing can be efficient which is subject to change. A permanent thing which is not subject to change cannot produce any thing, for it remains the same. On metaphysical plane Dharmakīrti follows the line of Asaṅga, Vasubandhu, and Diñnāga and maintains that consciousness is the only reality. Its manifestation as subject and object is only an appearance.²²⁹ The subject and the object are relative terms. One without the other is unreal. Hence the consciousness which is non-dual, transcends the subject-object duality.²³⁰ Every thing which can be defined or can be brought under the categories of intellect is an appearance. It is regarded as unreal because it is indefinable.²³¹ It is only through ignorance that the non-dual pure consciousness appears in the form of subject and object.²³² The critical philosophy does not stop here but goes further and declares that like the external object the internal subject is also unreal. Self-luminous consciousness is the only reality, all objects are adventitious.²³³ The description of the pure consciousness is in complete accordance with Asaṅga, Vasubandhu and Diñnāga. Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla who call themselves the upholders of formless consciousness maintain that the Vijñaptimātratā is the only reality as has been upheld by the great teachers of the past.²³⁴ They call themselves as the upholder of the formless

consciousness in this sense that there is nothing to be apprehended. Consciousness is not in need of the apprehension of any thing. Self-consciousness means necessarily conscious character of consciousness. Śāntarakṣita says it matters little whether consciousness arises as formless or with form or with something else. The fact is this that there are no external objects that are to be apprehended.²³⁵

Consciousness is essentially self-luminous and free from all impositions. It really transcends the subject-object duality. Neither the subject nor the object is ultimately real. That is the reason why the Buddhas have declared it to be free from these two aberrations. None can have wrong notion about consciousness unless he suffers from the idea of duality and determination.²³⁶ This pure consciousness is in fact the pure self. True knowledge consists in the (realization of this pure self.²³⁷) It arises when it is known that ultimate reality is pure consciousness and is devoid of all adventitious impurities.²³⁸ The moment it is realized, the empirical world constructed by our mind vanishes. Thus we find that the consciousness of the Svatantra Vijñānavādins is identical with that of the Yogācāra Idealists. The distinction between the two is that one is eternal and the other is momentary. The description of consciousness of Advaita Vedānta. Śāntarakṣita is conscious of this fact that is the reason why he says that Vedāntins commit only a small mistake when they take self to be eternal.²³⁹ Śrīharṣa levels the same charge against the Idealists and says that their mistake lies only in this fact that their consciousness is momentary. A momentary thing cannot be self-luminous.²⁴⁰ We may conclude the discussion with the emphasis on the original teaching of the Śākya Muni according to which consciousness is the only reality and the diversity of the world is a creation of our conceptual thinking. The moment a man rises above the level of discursive knowledge the phenomenal world with

all its variety comes to an end. We find in the sūtra literature a beautiful description of it.

There is not that earth, water, fire and wind,
 And long and short and fine and coarse,
 Pure and impure no footing find
 There is not that both name and form
 Die out leaving no place behind
 When intellect ceases, they also cease.²⁴¹

The Buddha himself says at the dawn of wisdom :

O Ego ! born of ignorance, creator of this world-house.
 I have cognised thee well. Now thou will not be able to
 construct this house again.

Because all the tools necessary for the construction of
 this house have been broken, the walls of this house have
 fallen.

Because the Mind (consciousness) that is Citta has
 become pure by the cessation of desires and removal of
 impressions.²⁴²

9. The Evolution of the external world from Vijnapti- matra

After refuting the reality of the external world and
 establishing the Mind-Only as the only reality the Buddhist
 demonstrates that Mind-Only or consciousness is not only
 apprehensive in character but is creative²⁴³ as well. He
 holds that the Mind-Only owing to its inherent power
 transforms itself into three forms²⁴⁴ which are (1) Ālaya-
 Vijnāna, (2) Manovijnāna and (3) Viśaya-Vijñapti or
 Pravṛtti-Vijñāna. These forms are not the parts of the
 Mind-Only as hands or feet are the parts of a body but are
 three stages in the process of its transformation from its
 unity to the plurality of the phenomenal world. These
 forms are like different characters played by an actor in the
 drama of the evolution of the phenomenal world. In order
 to explain the process of evolution it is necessary to eluci-
 date what these modifications are :

(1) Ālaya-Vijñāna, it is the first manifestation²⁴⁵ of the Mind-Only in the process of evolution. It is the dynamic stream of constructive consciousness²⁴⁶ which manifests through its power of transcendental illusion the phenomenal world of subject-object-duality. It may be compared with a store-house where the seeds of mental and physical activities have been accumulated from beginningless time. It has been described by different names owing to its different characteristics. It is called Ālaya because all the defiled activities²⁴⁷ are stored up here in the form of impressions.²⁴⁸ It is called Vijñāna because of its ideal form.²⁴⁹ It is known as Vipāka because all the worlds,²⁵⁰ all the ways,²⁵¹ all the species²⁵² and all good and bad deeds²⁵³ are stored up here. It is also called as sarva-bījaka²⁵⁴ because it contains the germs of all activities. They ensue from it as effects. It always contains touch,²⁵⁵ impressions,²⁵⁶ feelings of pleasure and pain,²⁵⁷ idea²⁵⁸ and consciousness.²⁵⁹ It is not eternal like the Mind-Only but is incessantly changing stream of consciousness which flows like a stream of water.²⁶⁰ Hence it is regarded as changing eternity.²⁶¹ The stream of Ālaya continues up to the moment a man has not attained Arhathood. The moment he attains it, the stream of Ālaya dries up and the phenomenal world comes to an end.²⁶²

The Ālaya performs double function in the process of the evolution of the external world: first, it accumulates the impressions of all the ideas, and secondly it gives rise to new ideas by bringing the accumulated ideas to the stage of maturity.²⁶³ The first is called hetupariṇāma on account of its being cause of the subsequent ideas and the second is called phala-pariṇāma on account of its being the effect of the antecedent ideas. The Ālaya performs this difficult job of evolving the external world with its inherent power viz the transcendental illusion²⁶⁴ which performs the double role. As a Vipāka vāsanā it continues the cycle of birth going on and as the niṣyanda vāsanā it develops the impress-

ions latent in the Ālaya and consequently the manas and other pravṛtti vijñānas arise. In other words it may be said that the Vipāka vāsanā maintains the cycle of birth and the niṣyanda vāsanā supplies the content of each birth.²⁶⁵

(2) Manas—It is the second evolute²⁶⁶ of the Mind-Only. It is the process of intellection by which the homogeneous and undifferentiated citta (Ālaya) is differentiated into subject and object, the perceiver and the perceived. It is not an independent agent which acts on the Ālaya from outside, but has its base in the Ālaya.²⁶⁷ Its content is also that of the Ālaya.

According to Vasubandhu mind is the seventh²⁶⁸ manovijñāna which is always accompanied by four mental notions which are (1) the false notion of an ego, (2) ignorance about the ego (3) elevation over it and (4) attachment to it.²⁶⁹ Though it is known as the Vijñāna, yet it should not be confused with manovijñāna which is merely intellectual where manas is conative, affective and intellectual²⁷⁰ and is the very locus of the manovijñāna²⁷¹. Eye consciousness and ear consciousness etc have eye and ear sense-organs as their locus but the manovijñāna has no locus because it has its locus in the manas itself. It is also known as 'mind in defilement'²⁷² because the spiritual defilement starts nowhere except in the 'manas' the principle of intellection. As long as the understanding has not begun to play its role, the immaculate wisdom is not categorised into the duality of the subject and the object and so no question of defilement arises. It discharges two functions (1) it reflects on the Ālaya and brings its contents—the impressions of mental and physical activities into order²⁷³ and (2) it disturbs the dormant Ālaya and causes the evolution of phenomenal world. Explaining the relation between Ālaya and the manas Dr. Suzuki says that 'manas depends on Ālaya for its existence and in the same time it is the object of the activity of the Ālaya. Without manas there can be no mentation and without mentation the very existence of

Ālaya (Citta) cannot be known. The one thus gives support to the other and at the same time is supported by the other.²⁷⁴ The process of intellection goes on without interruption until a devotee brings it to a halt by his Yogic practices and deep meditation on reality as such or he attain arhatship where the very basis of the Ālaya comes to an end. It is absent in some other transic conditions as well.²⁷⁵

Pravṛttivijñāna

The pravṛttivijñāna is the third evolute of the Mind-Only. It is a distinct awareness of the eternal objects, their bases and the psychic faculty or manovijñāna. It is of six kinds each of which represents a group of similar cognitions and is apprehended through a particular sense-organ. (1) Visual consciousness apprehends forms of objects through the eyes. (2) Auditory consciousness apprehends sound through the ears. (3) Olfactory consciousness apprehends smell through the nose. (4) Gustatory consciousness apprehends taste through the tongue. (5) Tactile consciousness apprehends touch through the body and (6) Nonsensuous consciousness apprehends ideas through the mind. The earlier five consciousness may be comprised under the group of external consciousness and the latter under internal consciousness. All these kinds of consciousness have their origin in the Ālaya which contains their respective seeds.²⁷⁶ They may arise either singly or simultaneously.²⁷⁷ They stand in the same relation to Ālaya as the waves to the ocean.²⁷⁸ These consciousnesses should not be confused with the manas which is a transcendental consciousness while these are empirical ones. The manas depends for its existence on the Ālaya and comes into being just after it, while these consciousnesses arise with the help of the Ālaya and the manas together.²⁷⁹

The author of the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra explains the evolution of the world with the help of a beautiful similes :

The Citta dances like the dancer,
Manas resembles the jester,

The Vijñāna in company with the five imagines what is presented (that is an external world) to be the stage.²⁸⁰

In the above verse Citta is the absolute principle. The Manas which plays the role of a jester has value only when the principal actor is himself present. Without the actor the whole scene will be useless. On the other hand the jester is also important because he helps the actor (Citta) to manifest its potency and skill. With the co-operation of Manas, the Citta creates Vijñānas and the whole world comes with all its variety. The external world is the audience of this dance. If there is no audience to applaud the potency and skill of the actor and the joke of the jester, would have no value at all.²⁸¹ Yamskami Sogen explains the relation subsisting among them with another simile. He says that the first six Vijñānas which perform the sensory functions may be compared to so many gate-keepers posted on the physical eyes etc. which transmit their experiences to the secretary who in his turn conveys them to the Lord (the Citta or the Ālaya). The secretary receives orders, so to say from the Lord, to transmit them to the six Vijñānas.²⁸²

Thus we see that the empirical world the reality of which is taken by the Realists for granted proves itself to be a phantom, a mere idea which has its origin in the Ālaya. The Ālaya itself is a manifestation of the Mind-Only or consciousness. Hence it is established that the Mind-Only is the only reality,²⁸³ which is to be apprehended and by apprehending which every thing will be apprehended automatically.

REFERENCES

1. Dṛśyaṁ na vidyate bāhyaṁ cittaṁ citram hi dṛśyate.
Deha bhoga pratiṣṭhānaṁ citta-mātraṁ Vadāmyaham.
Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra-anityatā parivarta verse 33.
2. Sarva dharmā api māyopamaḥ svapnopamāḥ samyak-
saṁbuddho'pi māyopamaḥ. Nirvāṇam api māyopamaṁ
svapnopamam iti vadāmi kim punar anyad dharmam.
Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā prajñā-pāramitā.
3. Tāraka timiraṁ dīpo māyāvaśyāya budbudam Svap-
naṁ ca vidyudabhram ca evaṁ dṛṣṭavyaṁ saṁskṛtam.
Vajracchedikā p. 32.
4. Vijñaptimātramevaitad asadarthāvabhāsanāt.
Yathā taimirikasyāsat keśacandrādi darśanam.
Viṁśatikā. verse 1.
5. Rāga.
6. Dveṣa.
7. Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra p.
8. Tato vimuktir bhrama-mātra saṁkṣayaḥ. Mahāyāna-
sūtrālaṅkāra. 6.2.
9. Nyāyakaṇṭhikā p. 258 line 18. Translated in Buddhist
logic vol. 2, p. 367.
10. Athāsti sattva upapādaka' ityuktaṁ bhagavatā. Quoted
in the Viṁśatikā kārikā-vṛtti p. 9 line 16.
11. Nahi svapna-sukhādyarthaṁ dharṁe kaścit pravartate.
Śloka-vārtika-nirālamhana-vāda. verse 12.
12. Vāsyā-vāsaka bhāvaśca jñānatvād eka santatau.
Tasmād yad bhāsakaṁ rūpam tad grāhyāt tasya binnatā.
Tattvasaṁgraha verse 2064.
13. Śloka-vārtika śūnyavāda, verses 83-85 and Tattva-saṁ-
graha verses 71-73.
14. Pramāṇa-samuccaya-vṛtti-ṭīkā p. 36a' (Tibetan) transla-
ted in Buddhist logic,

15. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 257 lines 1-3. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 360-361.
16. Pratyakṣa-buddhiḥ svapnādau yathā sa ca yadā tadā. Na so'rtho dṛśyate tasya pratyakṣatvam kathaṁ matam. Vimśatikā, verse 16.
17. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 258 lines 16-22. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 366-367.
18. Ibid p. 258 line 23. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 pp. 367-368.
19. Grāhya-grāhakāro'nubhūto.
20. Pratyakṣa bodhaḥ.
21. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 258 lines 7-8. Translated in Buddhist logic vol. 2 p. 365.
22. Upāya-kausālya.
23. Rupādya-yatanāstitvaṁ tad vineya janaṁ prati. Abhiprāya-vāśāduktam 'upapādakā sattva vat. Vimśatikā. Verse 8.
24. Ahīna sattva dṛṣṭīnāṁ kṣana-bheda vikalpanā. Santānaikyābhimānena na kathañcit pravartate. Abhi-sambuddha-tattvāstu pratikṣaṇa vināśinām. Hetūnāṁ niyamaṁ buddhvā prārabhante śubhāḥ kriyāḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha verses 541-542. See also. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 183 lines 18-24.
25. Kartṛtvādi vyavasthā tu santānaikya-vivakṣayā Kalpanāropitaiveṣṭā nāṅgaṁ sā tattva-saṁsthiteḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 504.
26. Paricchedontaranyonyam bhāgo bahiriva sthitaḥ. Jñāna syābhedino bheda pratibhāso hyupaplavaḥ. Tatraikas-yāpyabhāvena dvayamapyavahīyate. Tasmāt tadeva tasyāpi tattvaṁ yā dvaya śūnyatā. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 213-214.
27. Na grāhya grāhakākāra bāhyamasti ca lakṣaṇa. Atom lakṣaṇa śūnyatvān niḥ-svabhāvāḥ prakāśitāḥ. Vyāpāropādhikaṁsarvaṁ skandhādīnāṁ viśeṣataḥ. Lakṣaṇaṁ sa ca tattvanna tenāpyete vilakṣaṇāḥ. Ibid 3. 216-217.

28. Kasyacit kiñcidevāntar vāsanāyāḥ prabodhakam. Tato dhiyām viniyamō na bahyārtha-vyapekṣayā. Ibid 3. 337.
29. Guṇino'pi guṇa vyatiriktyānupalambhād ayam guṇī rūpādibhyo'rthāntaratvena nātmānam upadarśayati vyatirekaṁ ca tebhyo vāñchatiti citram. Nyāya-mañjarī part I p. 272. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 180 n 56.
30. Tadrūpa-vyatiriktaśca nāparātmopalabhyate. Na cānyā-kāra dhīvedyāyuktāste'ti prasāngataḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha. verse 565.
31. Pratyekā vilakṣaṇa-saṁsthāna-samvedanāt, rūpādivabhāvasya sarvatrāviśeṣāt. Nyāya-kandalī p. 41 line 4. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 181 n 58.
32. Vāsanā.
33. Rūpādibhyastathā sanniviṣṭāḥ. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 184.
34. Ibid. p. 184.
35. Rūpādi paramāṇava eva tena tenākāreṇotpannā ekāyodakāharaṇa kriyayā vyavacchinnā ghaṭādaya ityucyate, anurañjanādikayā tu rūpādivyapadeśaḥ Nyāya-vārtikatātparya-ṭikā p. 205. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 185 n. 68.
36. Ādimān mithyā-pratyayaḥ samyag-jñānaṁ nimittikaroti, ayam punaranādiḥ pūrva, pūrva mithyā-pratyaya janma mithyā-pratyaya pravāhaḥ kṛtam atra samyag-jñānena. Ibid p. 206, Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 185 n. 69.
37. Tadagrahe tad buddhyā bhāvāt. Nyāya-vārtika p. 206 Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 185 n. 70.
38. Yad yasmād anarthāntaraṁ bhavati tadagrahe tasyā-graho drṣṭaḥ. Ibid p. 206. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 185 n. 71.
39. Yacca yato'rthāntaraṁ bhavati tadagrahe tasyā-graho drṣṭaḥ. Ibid p. 206 Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 186 n. 72.

40. Rūpādyagrahe dravyagrahāt, yasmān-nīlādyupadhāna bhedānuvidhāyīṇaḥ sphaṭika-maṇe rūpānupalabdhaū sphaṭika iti pratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ. Ibid pp. 208-209. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 187 n 77.
41. Saṁvideva hi bhāgavatī vastūpagame naḥ śaraṇam. Nyāya-vārtikatātparya-ṭīkā p. 506. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 138 n. 21.
42. Critique of Indian Realism p. 183.
43. Tadārabdhastvavayavī guṇāvayava bhedavān. Naivopalabhyate tena na siddhyaty apramāṇakaḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 556.
44. Tatrāvayava-rūpaṁcet kevalaṁ dṛśyate tathā. Nīlādīni nīrasyaṅyañcitraṁ citrāṁ yadīkṣame. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 202.
45. Darśanopādhi-rahitasyaṅgrahāt tadgrahe grahāt. Darśanaṁ nīlanirbhāsaṁ, nārtho lāhyosti kevalaḥ. Ibid 3. 336.
46. Idaṁ vastu-balāyātaṁ yad vadanti vipaścītaḥ. Yathā yathā'rthāś cīntyante viśīryante tathā tathā. Ibid 3. 210.
47. Ibid 3. 337.
48. Avibhāgo'pi buddhyātma viparyāsita-darśanaīḥ. Grāhya-grāhaka saṁvitti bheedavān iva lakṣyate. Mantrādyupa-plutākṣāṇāṁ yathā mṛcchakalādayaḥ. Anyathaivāvabhasante tadrūpa-rahitā api. Ibid 3. 354-355.
49. Na hi sa evānyathā bhavati. Svabhāvāntarotpattīlakṣaṇatvād anyathātvasya. Tathahi yat tadanyathātvaṁ nāma tat kiṁ bhāvādarthān taramāho-svid bhāva eva na tāvad bhāva eva tasya svahetoreva pūrvaṁ niṣpannatvāt. Atharthāntaraṁ, tathā sati bhāvo'cyutidharmā tathaivāvasthīta iti na tasyānyathābhāvaḥ. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 141 lines 1-4.
50. Arthāntaraṁ paṭat tantavaḥ taddhetutvāt turyādivat iti. Nyāya-vārtika p. 513 line 8.

51. Na ca nirantaro tpanna-rūpādi-paramāṇv-atiriktam āva-
yavyākāraṁ vibhratīṁ saṁvidam ikṣāmahe. Nyāya-
vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p. 478 line 14. Quoted in the
'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 255 n. 36.
52. Yadā buddhyā vivinakti eṣa tantur eṣa tantur iti tadā prā-
cyādañcalāt prabhṛtipratīcīnam añcalaṁ yavad viviñcan
asau tantusantatim eva kevalām upalabhate na
tato'tiriktapaṭāvayavinam. Nyāya-mañjarī. Part II p.
1141 lines 18. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism'
p. 255 n. 33.
53. Na ca tantu paṭayor nānātvam upalakṣitaṁ vidyate ca.
Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 266 line 16 See also Tattva
saṁgraha, verses 828-829.
54. Sarva-bhāvānaṁ kṣaṇikatvena pūrvkebhyaḥ-tantubhyaḥ
paṭāśabda-vācyānāṁ tantūnāṁ tad vilakṣaṇa-padārthā
(rthatvā) sambhave'pyutapādasyāṅgīkaraṇāt. Tattva-
saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 194 line 16.
55. Mūrtānāṁ samāna-deśatā virodhāt. Nyāya-mañjarī
Part II p. 66.
56. Śāṅkara-bhāṣya 2. 1. 18. Translated by Thibaut p. 335
n. 2.
57. Ibid 2.1.18. Translated by Thibaut p. 336.
58. Paramāṇorayogācca na sannavayavī yataḥ. Tattva-
saṁgraha verse 1998.
59. Yairapyānarabdhaḥ paramāṇubhiḥ sthūla iṣṭas teṣāṁ
so'pi paramāṇu vad digbhāga-bhinnatvād eko na yuktaḥ.
Pāṇyādi-kampādau sarva-kampādi prasaṅgāt. Tattva-
saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 559 lines 3-4.
60. Sanniveśa-parikalpa. Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi p. 8.
Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 84.
61. The Yogācāra Idealism p. 84. Śāṅtaraḥṣita says that
in reality the cloth is not different from the yarns. The
two names 'cloth' and 'yarn' have been applied for
various purposes. Tattva-saṁgraha, verses 581-583,

62. Param va ṭruteḥ. Nyāya-sūtra IV. 2. 17. Quoted in the 'Critique of Indian Realism' p. 166 n. 30.
63. Meru-sarasapayoḥ sām̐ya-prasaṅgaḥ. Nyāya-kandalī p. 31. Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 85 n. 1.
64. Mahat-parimāṇa. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 159.
65. Vibhu-parimāṇa- Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 159.
66. Aṇu-parimāṇa. Quoted in the Critique of Indian Realism p. 159.
67. Yadekāneka-svabhāvaṁ na bhavati na tat sattvena grāhyaṁ prekṣavatā yathā vyomotpalam. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 550 lines 16-17.
68. Yaḥ pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye na pratibhāsate svenā-kāreṇa na sa pratyakṣatvena grahitvayaḥ yathā gagana-nalinam. Na pratibhasate ca pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye sthūlākāropagrāhiṇi paramāṇuraneko mūrta itī vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ. Ibid p 551 lines 15-17.
69. Pratyeka-paramāṇūnām svātantryeṇāsti saṁbhavaḥ. Ato'pi paramāṇūnām ekaikā pratibhāsanam. Quoted in the Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p 551 lines 21-22.
70. Sahitenāpi jātāste svarupeṇaiva bhāsinah. Tyajantyanarṁśa-rūpat vaṁ na cettā (na ca ta) sudaśā-svamī. Tattva saṅgraha verse 1970.
71. Labdhāpacaya-paryantaṁ rūpaṁ teṣāṁ samasti cet. Kathaṁ nāma na te mūrta bhaveyur vedanādivat. Ibid verse 1971.
72. Yenaika-rūpenaikāṇvabhīmukho madhyavartī paramāṇus tenaivāpara paramānvabhīmukho yadī syāt tadā parivā-rakāṇām aṇunām ekadeśatva prasaṅgāt pracayo na syāt. Tattva-saṅgraha pañjikā p 556 lines 11-12 and Tattva-saṅgraha verses 1990-1992.

73. Digbhāga-bhedo yasyāsti tasyaikatvaṁ na yujyate. Viṁśatikā, verse 14.
74. Atra kecidāhuḥ evaṁ tarhyaṇīyāṁsaḥ pradeśāḥ santu paramāṇavastatrāpyavayava-kalpanāyāṁ punarapi pradeśānāmevānutvaṁ bhaviṣyati, yadi param anavasthaiva na tu punaḥ sāvayavatva-prasaṅgena śakyate'ṇūnām prajñaptisattvam āpādaitum. Ibid p. 557 lines 21-23.
75. Avaśyaṁ hi pariniṣṭhitarūpaṁ kiñcid vastu paramāṇutvena tad vādināṁgīkartavyam. Anyathā hyanavasthāyāṁ anavadhāritarūpadvād anupākhyatvam eva svayaṁ pratipāditaṁ syāt. Tataśceṣṭasiddhireva parasya kṛtā syāt. Ibid p. 558 lines 11-13.
76. Tathā hi pareṇa paramāṇūnām saṁyuktatvaṁ nairantaryaṁ tathā bahubhiḥ sāntaraiḥ parivāraṇaṁ ceta bhyupagatam anyathā kathaṁ ca pratyato bhavet, tataśca yadyapi digbhāgabhedo vācā nābhyupagabalādeva āpatati. Na hya satyūrdhdhādhobhāgādi bhede saṁyuktatvādi pakṣa-trayaṁ yuktaṁ cittādivadityuktam. Ibid p. 558 lines 16-20.
77. Saṅkena yugapad yogāt paramāṇo ṣaḍaṁśatā. Saṅgāṁ samāna-deśatvāt piṇḍaḥ syād aṇumātrakaḥ. Viṁśatikā verse 12.
78. Asanniścaya yogyo'taḥ paramāṇur vipaścitām. Ekāneka-svabhāvena śūnyatvād viyadabjavat. Tattva-saṁgraha verse 1997.
79. Viśayātīśaya - vyatirekeṇa pratyayātīśayānupapatteḥ. Nyāyamañjarī Part I p 314 Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 87. Yaccoktam aṇuprajñapter avaśyam upādānam aṁgīkartavyaṁ, yat tadupādānam sa eva paramāṇur bhaviṣyātīti. Tattva-saṁgraha-pañjikā p. 558 lines 21-22.
80. Tad atrāstyeva mithyā śāstra-śravaṇa-cintānāhitāvāsanā-pripako vātāyanādireṇu-pratibhāsa buddhir aṇubhṛānter nibandhanam. Ibid p. 558 lines 22-23.

81. Nahi y(t)at prajñāptyāṁ ca tadeva kāraṇaṁ yuktam, aprajñāptisattva-prasaṅgād, anyathā'tma prajñapter ātmaiva kāraṇaṁ syāt na skandhāḥ. Ibid p. 558 lines 22-24.
82. Sthūlakāra grāhakaṁ vijñānaṁ nahi alāmbet sūkṣamā-kāraṁ viṣayam. Anyālabhana-vijñānam anyālabhanā-nupagrahāt. Vijñāpti-matratāsiddhi (JBORS) XIX p. 24 quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 92 n 2. Also Ālabhana-parīkṣā verse 1.
83. Na tāvat paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ prativedyate. Nirāṁśāneka-mūrtābha (nāṁ?) pratyayāprativedanāt. Vyapeta bhāga bhedā hi bhāṣeraṁ paramāṇavaḥ. Nānyathā' dhyakṣatā teṣāṁ ātmākārā samarpaṇāt. Tattva-sarṅgraha verses 1868-1869.
84. Ālabhana-parīkṣā verse 4. Translated in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 93.
85. Śāṁkara-bhāṣya 2. 2. 16. Thibaut English translation vol. 1 p. 394.
86. Kirṇāvalī p. 52. Critique of Indian Realism p. 159.
87. Tulyāpara kṣaṇotpādād yathā nityatva vibhramaḥ. Avicchinna sajātiya grahe cet sthūla vibhramaḥ. Samāna jvālā sarṅbhūter yathā dīpena vibhramaḥ. Nairantarya sthītāneka sūkṣma-vittau tathaikadhā. Tattva-sarṅgraha verses 1972 and 589 respectively.
88. The Yogācāra Idealism 95.
89. Ālabhana-parīkṣā verse 6.
90. Svabhāva-sampanna.
91. Naikaṁ svabhāvaṁ citraṁ hi maṇirūpaṁ yathaiva tat. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 201.
92. Pāratantryaṁ hi sambandhaḥ. Saṁbandha-parīkṣā verse 1.
93. Max Müller in the Introduction to Vajracchedikā contained in the sacred Books of the East vol. XLIX.

94. Samvedanena bāhyatvam atro'rthasya na siddhyati. Samvedanād bahir bhāve sa eva na tu siddhyati. Pramāṇa-vārtikālakāra, quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 62 nl.
95. No cet so'sat kathaṁ tebhyaḥ prādurbhavaṁ samaśnute. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 20, also verses 2030-2031 and Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā pp. 567-568.
96. Dhiyo nīlādirupatve bāhyo'rthaḥ kiṁ pramāṇakaḥ. Dhiyo'nīlādi-rūpatve sa tasyānubhavaḥ katham. Pramāṇa-vārtika. Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 65 n 2. (Yat) yasmad aprthak saṁvedanam eva tat tasmād abhinnarṁ, yathā nīladhīḥ svasvabhāvāt. Diṅnāga. Quoted in the Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 567 lines 12-13.
97. Sva-bīja-paripākād rūpādyābhāsaṁ vijñānaṁ pravartate na tu rūpā-diko'rtho'sti. Madhyānta-vibhāga sūtra-bhāṣya-ṭīkā p. 20. Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 63 n 3. Vikalpavāsanābaddham vicitraṁ citta-saṁbhavam. Lakṣmīkāvatāra-sūtra, anityatā-parivarta verse 32.
98. Sahopalambha-niyamād abhedo nīlataddhiyoḥ. Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 59 n 3. Sakṛd samvedyamānasya niyamena dhiyāsaḥ. viśayasya tato'nyatvaṁ kenākāreṇa siddhyati. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 388 see verse 335 also.
99. Jñānājñeyayoḥ parasparam eka evopalambha na pṛthagiti. Ya eva hi jñānopalambhaḥ sa eva jñeyasya. Ya eva jñeyasya sa evajñānasya iti yāvat. Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 568 lines 8-10. Nārtho'saṁvedanaḥ kaścid anarthasyāpi vedanam dṛṣṭarṁ' samvedyamānantat tayoṁ nāsti-vivekitā. Tasmād arthasya durvāraṁ jñānakālā vābhāsināḥ. Jñānād avyatiṅgīkṛtvaṁ hetu-bhedānumā bhavet. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 390-391.
100. Jñānaṁ eva kevalaṁ dṛśyate nārthaḥ (tasyāpi darśane nīlādyākāra-dvaya saṁvedanaṁ tasyāpi jñāna-kālāvabhāsaṁ punar arthasyā-darśanam. Pramāṇa-vārtikālakāra p. 411 lines 1-2.

356 The Problem of knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism

101. Yadi vijñaptir anarthā niyamo deśa kālayoḥ.
Santānasyāniyamaśca yuktā kṛtya kriyā na ca.
Viṃśatikā verse 2.
102. Mādhyamikāvatāra 6. 55.
103. Śāṅkara-bhāṣya 2. 2. 28 (Thibaut's English translation
vol 1 pp. 424-425.
104. Ibid 2. 2. 28 (Ibid vol 1 p. 425.)
105. Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi p. 9 Nyāyavārtika IV 3. 34 The
Yogācāra Idealism p. 103 n 2.
106. Bahu-cittālambanī-bhūtam ekaṁ vastu sādharmaṇaṁ tat
khalu naikacitta-parikalpitam.....kintu svapraṭi-
ṣṭham. Yoga-sūtra-bhāṣya IV Quoted in the Yogācāra
Idealism p. 106 n 1.
107. Deśādī niyamaḥ siddhaḥ svapnavat. Viṃśatikā verse 3.
Svapne vināpyarthena kvacideva deśa kiṁcid bhramarā-
rāma strī-puruṣādikaṁ dr̥śyate na sarvatra. Tatraiva
ca deśe kadācit dr̥śyate na sarva-kālam iti siddho vinā-
pyarthena deśa-kāla-niyamaḥ. Viṃśatikā-vṛtti p. 7
lines 1-4.
108. Sāpi tadrūpanirbhāsās tathā niyat-saṁgamāḥ. Buddhi-
rāśritya kalpyet yadi kiṁ vā viruddhyate. Pramāṇa-
vārtika 3. 394.
109. Evaṁ vitatha-vikalpābhyāsa-vāsanā-nidrayā prasupto
lokaḥ svapna ivābhūtam arthaṁ pasyan na prabuddhas
tad abhāvaṁ yathāvan nāvagacchati. Yadā tu tatpra-
tipakṣa-locottara nirvikalpa jñāna-lābhāt prabuddho
bhavati tadā tatpr̥ṣṭha labdhā śuddha-laukikī jñāna-
sammukhī bhāvād viśayābhāvaṁ yathāvad avagaccha-
tīti, samanametat. Viṃśatikāvṛtti p. 14 lines 14-19.
Yavād advaya lakṣaṇe vijñaptimātre yoginaś cittarṁ na
pratiṣṭhitarṁ bhavati tāvad grāhya-grāhakānuśayo na
vinivartate, na prahīyate ityarthāḥ. Trimśikā-vijñapti-
bhāṣya p. 54 lines 14-16.
110. Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra-bhāṣya-ṭīkā pp. 16-17.

111. The Yogācāra Idealism pp. 106-107.
112. Santānāntara-siddhi. Verses 6, 5. Translated in Buddhist logic vol pp. 523-524.
113. Arthakriyā-sāmarthalakṣanatvād vastunaḥ. Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā p. 12 line 20.
114. Śloka-vārtika. Nirālambana-vāda. verses 88-91
115. Athābhimatārtha kriyāvabhāsi jñānam eva artha-kriyā-sarivādas tadā'yamanyathā'pi bāhyārthālanbanam-antareṇāpi sambhavyāt iti Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 553 lines 23-24.
116. Viṃśatikā verse 4 and its vṛtti p. 7 lines 15-17.
117. Ālanbana-parīkṣā verse 6.
118. Sarvatrālambanaṁ bāhyaṁ deśa-kālā'nyathātmakaṁ. Janmanyekatra bhinne vā tathā kālāntare'pi vā. Śloka-vārtika nirālambana-vāda verse 108.
Asat-khyātirapi nāsti ekāntāsataḥ kha-puṣpādeḥ prati-bhāsāyogāt.
Deśa-kāla-vyavahitānubhūta pūrva-padārtha viṣaya eva bh rānto'pi pratyayaḥ prāṇabhṛtām bhavati na tvatyantā-sadārtha viṣayaḥ. Nyāya-mañjarī part 2 p. 545 lines 1-4. Pratibhā-nidrādi manodoṣa-janmani svapne'pi dṛṣṭa pūrvaṣyaiva tasyākāsyollekhaḥ. Jvalajjala galad vahni drava dadryādi darśane. Rūpam anyastham-anyatra vetti na tvasadeva tat. Tadevaṁ bhrānta bodheṣu nāstyatyantāsatārṁ prathā. Deśa-kālānyathā-tvaṁ tu kevalaṁ bhāti vastunaḥ. Ibid part 2 p. 545 lines 20-25.
119. Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi p. 17 and Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra-bhāṣyaṭīkā p. 15 referred in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 100 n 1.
120. Pramāṇa-vārtika-3 361-363.
121. Ālanbana-parīkṣā verse 6.
122. Athavā satyarpaṇāt krameṇāpi so'rthāvabhāsaḥ svānu-rūpa-kāryot-pattaye saktiṁ vijñānācārāṁ Karotītyavi-

rodha'iti. Anenāntaraññāne svānurūpa-kāryotpatti
nimitta-śakti-samarpaṇāt karaṇātvaṃ ca tasya pratibhā-
sasya samarthitam. Tattva-saṃgraha-pañjikā p. 582
lines 13-16 and p. 553 lines 23-24.

123. Ālambana-parikṣā. verse 6-7.
124. The Yogācāra Idealism p. 66.
125. Nārthākārā smṛtiḥ. Pramāṇa-vārtikālaṃkāra p. 404.
Smṛti'ś ceddr̥gvidhaṃ jñānaṃ tasyāścānubhavādbhavaḥ.
Sa cārthākāra-rahitaḥ sedānīntadvatī katham.
Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 374.
126. Nārthād bhāvas tadābhāvāt. Ibid 3. 375.
127. Nyāya-kaṇikā p. 258 line 23. Translated in Buddhist
logic vol 2 p. 367.
128. Śāṃkara-bhāṣya.
129. Viśeṣaṇā'prasiddhatva vikalpenaiiva bodhite.
Svapnādipratyaye bāhyaṃ sarvathā nahi neṣyate.
Śloka-vārtika nirālambana-vāda. verse 107.
130. Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra-bhāṣya-ṭīkā p. 22 see The
Yogācāra Idealism p. 80 n 1.
131. Na ca yad yasya kāraṇaṃ tad abhāve tasyotpattir yuj-
yate. Tasmānnirālambanam eva svapnādāvivānyatrāpi
svabīja paripākād arthābhāsaṃ vijñānaṃ utpadyate
ityeva jñeyam. Ibid p. 10 quoted in the Yogācāra
Idealism p. 79 n 1.
132. Tasmād dvirūpamastyekaṃ yadevam anubhūyate.
Smaryate cobhayākārasyāsyā saṃvedanaṃ phalam.
Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 338.
133. Santānāntara-siddhi verse 1 Buddhist logic vol 1 p. 521.
134. Ibid verse 11 Ibid.
135. Ibid verse 12 Ibid.
136. Ibid verse 53 Ibid p. 523.
137. Ibid verse 55 Ibid.
138. Ibid verse 84 Ibid.

139. Ibid verse 72 Ibid p. 524.
140. Yadi jñānātirekeṇa nāsti bhūta catuṣṭayam.
Tat kimetan na vicchinnarṇ vispaṣṭam avabhāṣate.
Tasyaivaṇ pratibhāse'pi nāstitopagame sati.
Cittasyāpi kimastitve pramāṇa bhavatāṇ bhavet.
Tattva-saṅgraha verses 1965-1976,
141. Viśuddha-nirvikalpa-vijñaptimātra.
142. Kalpita-jīvātmā.
143. Yo bālair-dharmāṇāṇ svabhāvo grāhya-grāhakādīḥ pari-
kalpitas tena kalpitenatmanā teṣāṇ nairātmyaṇ na tv
anabhilāpyenātmanā yo buddhānāṇ viṣaya iti. Evarṇ
vijñaptimātrasyāpi vijñaptyanantara parikalpitenāt-
manā nairātmya-praveśāt vijñaptimātra-vyavasthā-
panayā sarvadharmāṇāṇ nairātmya-praveśī bhavati na
tu tadastitvāpavādāt. Viṇśatikā-vṛtti pp. 10-11 lines
20-23 and 1.
144. Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra p. 254.
145. Pratyātmagati-gamyāśca ātmāvai śuddhi-lakṣaṇam.
Garbhas tathāgatasyāsau tārīkānāṇ agocaraḥ.
Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra Gāthā verse 747.
146. Āgantukair anādyaiśca kleśairātmaṇ prabhāsvaraḥ.
Sārīklīśyate upetaśca vastravat pariśuddhyate. Ibid
verse 755.
147. Ibid verses 761-762.
148. Bhūmayo vaśitābhijñā abhiṣekaṇ ca uttaram.
Samādhayo viśeṣāśca asatyātmani nāsti vai. Ibid
verse 763.
149. Vaināśiko yadā gatvā brūyād yadyasti deśyatām.
Sa vaktavyo bhaved vijñāḥ sva-vikalpaṇ pradarśaya.
Nairātmya-vādinō' bhāṣyā bhikṣu karmāṇi varjaya.
Badhakā Buddha-dharmāṇāṇ sadasatpakṣa-drṣṭayaḥ.
Tirtha-doṣair vinirmuktaṇ nairātmya-vana-dāhakaṇ.
Jājvalatyātmāvādo'yaṇ yugāntāgnirivotthitaḥ. Ibid
verses 764-766.

150. Ibid verse 746.
151. Na vāsanair bhidyate cittam na cittam vāsanaiḥ saḥ.
Abhinnalakṣaṇam cittam vāsanaiḥ pariveṣṭitam.
Ibid verse 236 see also verses 237-239.
152. Sa (Tathāgatagarbhaḥ) ca kila tvayā 'prakṛti-prabhāsv-
ara viśuddhyāti-viśuddha eva varṇyate. Dvātriṅśallakṣ-
aṇa-dharaḥ sarva-sattva-dehāntaragato.....nityo
dhruvaḥ śivaḥ śāsvataśca bhagavatā varṇitaḥ.....
Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra p 77.
153. Tīrthakarā api bhagavān nityaḥ kartā, nirguṇo,
vibhur avyaya ityātma-vāadopadeśam kurvanti. Ibid p. 77.
154. Paramārthastu Mahāmate āryajñāna-pratyātma-gati-
gamyo na vāgvikalpa-buddhigocaraḥ. Ibid p. 87.
155. Avārṇmanasgocara.
156. Ādāna-vijñāna gabhīr sūkṣmo ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo.
Bālā na eṣo mayi na prakāśi mohaiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ.
Sandhi-nirmocana-sūtra 5. 5. Quoted in the Triṅśikā-
vijñaptibhāṣya p. 43 lines 5-6.
157. Na cātma-dṛṣṭiḥ svayamātma-lakṣaṇā. Na cāpi duḥ-
sarinstitatāvilakṣaṇā. Dvayān na cānyad bhraṇa eṣa
uccyate. Tataśca mokṣo bhrama-mātra sarṅkṣayaḥ.
Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṅkāra 6. 2.
158. Pratītyabhāva-prabhava katham janam. Samakṣavṛttiḥ
śrayate'nya kāritam. Tamaḥ prakāraḥ katamo'yamīdṛśo.
Yato'vipaśyansadasannirikṣyate. Ibid 6. 4.
159. Yathā toyais tṛptim vrajati na mahāsāgara iva. Na
vṛddhim vā yati-pratata-viśadāmbu praviśaṇaiḥ. Tathā
Banddho dhātuḥ satata samitaiḥ śuddhi viśanair na
tṛptim vṛddhim vā vrajati paramāścaryamih tat. Ibid 9, 55
160. Mataṁ ca cittam prakṛti-prabhāsvaram, Sadā tadāgan-
taka doṣa dūṣitam. Na dharmatā cittamṛte'nya cetasaḥ,
prabhāsvaratvam prakṛtau vidhīyate. Ibid 13, 19.

161. Tattvaṃ yat satataṃ dvayena rahitaṃ bhrānteśca saṃ-
niśrayaḥ.
Śakyaṃ naiva ca sarvathābhilapituṃ yaccāprapañcāt-
makam.
Jñeyāṃ heyamatho viśuddhyamamalaṃ yacca prakṛtyā
matam.
Yasyākāśa-suvarṇa-vāri sadṛśī kleśād viśuddhir matā.
Ibid 11. 13.
162. Vijñaptimātratā-siddhiḥ sva-śaktiḥ sadṛśī mayā.
Kṛteyaṃ sarvathā sā tu na cintyā Buddha gocarāḥ.
Viṃśatikā. Verse 22.
Sa evānasravo dhātur acintyaḥ kuśalo dhruvaḥ.
Sukho vimukti kāyo'sau dharmākhyo'yaṃ mahāmuneḥ.
Triṃśikā-vijñapti, verse 30.
163. Prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ Prakṛtyā gantavomalāḥ.
Pramāṇa-vārtika 2. 209.
164. Avibhāgo'pi buddhyātma viparyāsita darśanaīḥ.
Grāhyagrāhaka-saṃvitti bhedavāniva lakṣyate.
Ibid 3. 354.
165. Yadantara-jñeya-rūpaṃ tu bahirvadavabhāsate.
Ālambana-parīkṣā verse 6.
166. Vijñaptimātratā siddhiḥ dhīmadbhir vimalikṛtā.
Asmābhis tad diśā yātaṃ paramārtha-viniścaye.
Tattva-saṃgraha verse 2084.
167. Yadātma-tattvena tu brahma-tattvaṃ, dīpopameneḥ
yuktaḥ prapaśyēt. Ajaṃ dhruvaṃ sarvatattvair viśud-
dhaṃ, jñātvā devaṃ mucyate sarva-pāśaiḥ. Śvetāśvetara-
upaniṣad 2. 15.
168. Tileṣu tailaṃ dadhniṣu sarpirāpaḥ srotaḥ svaraṇiṣu
cāgniḥ.
Evamātmātmani gṛhyate'sau satyenainaṃ tapasā yo nu
paśyati.
Ibid 1. 15.

169. Nāntaḥ prajñam na bahisprajñam nobhayataḥ prajñam
na prajñānaghanam na prajñam nāprajñam. Adr̥ṣtam
avyavahāryam, agr̥hyam, alakṣaṇam, acintyam,
avyapadeśyam, ekātma-pratyayasāraṁ, prapañcopaśa-
maṁ śāntaṁ, śivam, advaitaṁ, caturthaṁ manyante
sa ātmā sa vijñeyaḥ. Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad mantra 7.
170. Yathā nadyaḥ syandamānāḥ samudre'staṁ gacchanti
nāmarūpe vihāya.
Tathā vidvān namarūpaḥ vimuktaḥ parātparam puru-
ṣamupaiti divyam.
Muṇḍaka-upaniṣad 3, khaṇḍa 2, 8.
Aśabdam, asparśam arūpam avyayaṁ tathārasaṁ
nityam agandhavacca yat. Anādyanantaṁ, mahataḥ
paraṁ dhruvaṁ nicāya tan mṛtyumukhāt pramucyate.
Kaṭhopeniṣad 1. 3. 15.
Yan manasā na manute yenāhur manomatam.
Tadeva bhrama tvarṁ viddhi nedaṁ upāsate,
Kenopeniṣad 1. 4.
171. Na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā, Na jāyate vyeti
na cāvahīyate. Na vardhate nāpi viśuddhyate punar,
viśuddhyate tat paramārtha-lakṣaṇam. Mahāyāna.
Sūtrālaṅkāra 6. 1.
172. Na sat nāsat sadasanna nobhayātmakam. Catuṣkoṭi-
vinirmuktaṁ tattvaṁ mādhyamikā viduḥ. Mādhyā-
mika-sūtra 1.1.
173. Na cāntaraṁ kiñcana vidyate'nayoḥ, Sa dartha-vṛtṭyā
śama-janma-noriḥ. Tathāpi janma-kṣayato vidhīyate,
Samasya-lābhaḥ śubha-karma-kāriṇām. Mahāyāna-
sūtrālaṅkāra 6.5.
Tathāgato yat svabhāvas tat svabhāvaṁ idaṁ jagat.
Tathāgato niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvam idaṁ jagat.
Mādhyamika-kārikā 22. 16.

174. Śūnyatāyām viśuddhāyām nairātmyān-mārga-lābhataḥ. Buddhāḥ śuddhātma-lābhitvād gatā ātma-mahātmatām. Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra 9. 33. See also 11. 47.
175. Mahāyāna-sūtrālamkāra 9. 55.
176. Bhinnāśrayā bhinna-jalāśca nadyaḥ, skalpodakā kṛtya pṛthakatvakāryā. Samudra-viṣṭāśca bhavanti sarvā, ekāśrayā eka mahājalāśca. Ibid 9. 33.
177. Upalabdhimātra.
178. Arthān sa vijñāya ca jalpamātrān, santiṣṭhate tannibhacitta mātre. Pratyakṣatāmeti ca dharmadhātus, tasmād viyukto dvayalakṣaṇena Ibid 6. 7. Nāstīti cittāt parametya buddhyā cittasya-nastitvamupai ti tasmāt. Dvayasya nāstitvamupai ti dhīmān, santiṣṭhate'tad gati-dharma-dhātu. Ibid 6. 8.
179. Yataḥ svabijād vijñaptir yadābhāsā pravartate. Dvi-vidhāyatanatvena te tasyā munirabravīt. Tathā pudgala-nairātmyam praveśo hyanyathā punaḥ. Deśanā dharma nairātmya-praveśaḥ kalpitātmanā. Viṁśatikā. verses 9-10.
180. Mādhyamika-kārikā 22. 16.
181. Vadatovyāghāt.
182. Dhāraṇā.
183. Khaṇḍana.
184. Maṇḍana.
185. Niṣedha,
186. Vidhāna.
187. Nirākaraṇa.
188. Svikaṛaṇa.
189. Viṁśatikā, verse 22.
190. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy p. 116.
191. Athavā vijñānavad vijñeyam api dravyat eveti kecin

many ante, vijñevad vijñānam api samvṛtit eva na paramārthat ityasya dviprakārasyāpyekānta-vādasya pratiṣedhārthaḥ prakaraṇārambhaḥ. Triṃśikā-vijñaptibhāṣyam p. 17 lines 13-15.

192. Anāsravo dhātuḥ.
193. Kuśala.
194. Dhruva.
195. Sukha. Triṃśikā vijñapti verse 30.
196. Śūnyatā vidyate tvatra tasyam api sa vidyate. Madhyānta-vibhāga-sūtra bhāṣyāṭīkā verse 1. 2.
197. Abhūtasya-parikalpo yasmin saḥ.
198. Abhūtasya parikalpo yasmāt saḥ.
199. Abhūtas cāsau parikalpitaḥ.
200. Abhūta-parikalpastu citta-caittās tri-dhātukaḥ. Ibid 1. 9.
201. Yāvad vijñaptimātratve vijñānam nāvatiṣṭhati. Grāha-dvayasyānuśayas tāvan na vinivartate. Vijñaptimātramevedam ityapi hyanupalaṃbhataḥ. Sthāpayan nagrataḥ kiñcit tanmātre nāvatiṣṭhati. Triṃśikā-vijñapti. verses 26-27.
202. Citta-mātropalaṃbhena jñeyārthānupalaṃbhataḥ. Jñeyārthānupalaṃbhena syāccittānupalaṃbhataḥ. Trisvabhāva-Nirdeśa. verse 36.
203. Nābhāva upalabdheḥ. Śāṃkara-bhāṣya 2. 2. 28. (Thibaut's English translation vol 1 p. 420.)
204. Ibid 2.2.28 pp. 420-421.
205. Brahma satyaṃ jagan mithyā.
206. Nahi brahma-vādinō nīlādyākārām vittim abhyupagacchanti kintu anirvacanīyaṃ nīlāditi. Bhāmatī 2. 2. 28. Quoted in 'A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy' p. 313.
207. Vedānta-siddhāntasya tvayaṃ saugata matād bhedaḥ na jñānākāro'rthaḥ kintu bāhyānirvacanīyattvān māyāmayāḥ. Advaita-Brahmasiddhi pp. 100-104. Quoted in 'A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy' p. 316.

208. Paratantra svabhāvastu vikalpaḥ pratyayodbhavaḥ.
Niṣpannas tasya pūrveṇa sadārahitā tu yā.
Atayeva sa naivānyo nānanyaḥ paratantrataḥ.
Anityādi-vad vācyo nādr̥ṣṭe'smin sa dr̥śyate.
Triṃśikā-vijñapti verses 21-22.
209. Yadi hi pariniṣpannaḥ paratantrād anyaḥ syād evaṃ
na parikalpitena paratantraḥ śūnyaḥ syāt. Athānanya
evamapi pariniṣpanno na viśuddhyālaṃbanaḥ syāt
paratantravat saṃkleśātmakatvāt. Evaṃ paratantraśca
na kleśātmakaḥ syāt pariniṣpannād ananyatvāt pari-
niṣpanna-vat. Triṃśikā-vijñapti-bhāṣyam p. 51 lines
13-17.
210. Kṣaṇika.
211. Pravāha-rūpa.
212. Kūṭastha-nitya.
213. Dhruva.
214. Tathāgata-garbho nityo dhruvaḥ śivaḥ śāśvataśca.
Laṃkāvatāra-sūtra—p. 77.
215. Na jāyate vyeti na cāvahīyate. Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃ-
kāra. 601.
216. Dharmāṇāṃ paramārthaśca sa yatas tathatāpi saḥ.
Sarva-kālaṃ tathābhāvāt saiva vijñaptimātratā.
Triṃśikā-vijñapti. Verse 25.
217. Tasya vyāvṛttir arhatve. Ibid verse 5.
218. Dhruvo nityatvāt akṣatayā. Sukho nityatvād eva
yadanityaṃ tad duḥkham, ayaṃ ca nitya iti asmāt
sukhaḥ. Triṃśikā-vijñaptibhāṣya p. 56 lines 24-25.
219. Anāsrava.
220. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy pp. 125-126.
221. Svalakṣaṇa.
222. Grāhyabhāga.
223. Ālambana-pratyaya.
224. Ālambana-parīkṣā. verse 6.
225. Vijñaptimātratā or vijñapti. Tattva-saṃgraha verse
2024.
Sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam. Triṃśikā vijñapti. verse 17.

226. Buddhist Logic vol. I p. 520 note 3.
'abhedo nīla taddhiyoḥ. See also Pramāṇa-vārtika. 3. 229.
227. Avidyayā hi ye anthāstathā vedya-vedakākāra-rahita jñānam api paśyanti. Buddhist Logic vol. 2 p. 399 n. 5.
228. Nyāya-bindu'1. 15.
229. Tasmānnārtheṣu na jñāne sthūlābhāsa tadātmanaḥ. Ekatra-pratiśiddhatvād bahuṣvapi na sambhavaḥ. Pramāṇa-vārtika 3. 212.
230. Paricchedontaranyonyam bhāgo bahiriva sthitaḥ. Jñānasyābhedino bheda pratibhāso hyupaplavaḥ. Ibid 3. 213.
231. Tadbhedāśrayaṇī ceyam bhāvānām bheda samsthitih. Tadupaplavabhāve ca teṣām bhedopyupaplavaḥ. Ibid 3. 215.
232. Ibid 3. 354.
233. Ibid 2. 209.
234. Tattva-saṅgraha verse 20.
235. Anirbhāsam sa nirbhāsam anyanirbhāsameva ca. Vijānāti na ca jñānam bāhyamartham kathaṅcana. Ibid verse 1999.
236. Avedya-vedakākārā buddhiḥ pūrvam prasādhitā. Dvayopaplava-śūnyā ca sā sambuddhaiḥ prakāśitā. Ibid verse 35-36.
Prakṛtyā bhāsvare citte dvayākārākalamkīte. Dvayākārāvimūḍhātmā kaḥ kuryād anyathā-matiḥ (tim) ? Ibid verse 35-38.
237. Viśuddhātma-darśana.
238. Etadeva hi tajjñānam yad viśuddhātma-darśanam. Āgantukamalopeta citta-mātratva-vedanāt. Ibid verse 3535.
239. Teṣām alpāparādhām tu darśanam nityatoktitaḥ. Ibid verse 330.
240. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy 315.
241. Kevattha-sutta—Dialogues of Buddha part 1 p. 284.

242. Gahakāraka Ditthosi pun geharī na kāhasi.
Sabbāte fāsukā bhaggā gahakūtarī visamkhitam.
Visamkhāra-gataṃ cittaṃ taṇhānaṃ khayamajjhagā.
Dhammapadam. Verse 154.
243. Vijñāna-parināmoyaṃ vikalpo yad vikalpyate. Tena
tannāsti tenedaṃ sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam. Triṃśikā-
vijñapti-verse 17.
244. Ātma-dharmopacāro hi vividho yaḥ pravartate. Vijñā-
na-pariṇāmo'sau pariṇāmaḥ sa ca tridhā. Ibid verse
1. Vipāko mananākhyāśca vijñaptir viṣayasya ca.
Ibid verse 2.
245. The Ālaya in the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra is not the mani-
festation of the Mind-Only. It is identical with it.
Here the first manifestation is 'manas'. In the philo-
sophy of Vasubandhu the Ālaya itself is one of the
manifestations of the Mind-Only as is evident from
the verse 2 of the Triṃśikā-vijñapti quoted above.
The following verse clears the position of the
Laṅkāvatāra sūtra. Ālayaṃ hi samāśritya mano vai
sampravartate. Cittaṃ manaśca saṃśritya vijñānaṃ
sampravartate. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra-sagāthakam verse
269.
246. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy p. 119.
247. Triṃśikā-vijñapti-bhāṣya p.1 line 23, p. 222 lines 1-2.
248. Vāsanā.
249. Jñāna-rūpa.
250. Loka.
251. Gati.
252. Yoni.
253. Śubhāśubha karma-sarva-dhātu-gati-yoni-jātiṣu kuśalā-
kuśala-karma-vipākatvād vipākaḥ. Ibid p. 22 lines 3-4.
254. Sarva dharmā hi ālīnā vijñāne teṣu tattathā.
Anyonya-phala-bhāvena hetu-bhāvena sarvadā.
Abhidharma-sūtra. Quoted in the Madhyānta-vibhāga-
sūtra-bhāṣya-ṭīkā p. 28. Quoted in the Yogācāra
Idealism p. 115 note 2.

255. Sparśa.
 256. Manaskāra.
 257. Aduḥkha-sukha-vedanā.
 258. Samjñā.
 259. Cetanā. Sadā sparśa-manaskāravitsarñjñācetanānvitam.
 Trīṃśikā-vijñapti verse 3.
 Sparśa-manaskāra-vedanā-samjñā cetanākhyaiḥ.
 Pañcabhiḥ sarvatragair dharmairanvitam.
 Trīṃśikā-vijñapti-bhāṣya p. 23 lines 11-12.
 260. Vartate srota-sraughavat. Trīṃśikā-vijñapti. verse 4.
 261. Pariñāmīnitya.
 262. Tasya vyāvṛttirarhatve. Ibid verse 5.
 263. Dharmāḥ ālaya-vijñāne dharmeṣu ca vijñānārṇ tathā.
 Phala-svabhāvaśca anyonyārṇ hetu-svabhāvā api sadā.
 Mahāyāna-abhidharma-sūtra. Quoted in the Yogācāra
 Idealism p. 116 Note 1. Ālaya-vijñānārṇ dvidhā
 pravartate-adhyātman upadāna-vijñaptito bahirdhā'
 paricchinnākāra-bhājana vijñaptiśca.
 Trīṃśikā vijñapti-bhāṣyam p. 22 lines 8-9.
 264. Vāsanā. Iṣyate vāsanāvidbhiḥ śakti-rūpā hi vāsanā.
 Quoted in the Yogācāra Idealism p. 163. Sāmarthyam.
 Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā p. 367 line 21.
 265. Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi p. 18.
 266. In the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, it is the first evolute of the
 Mind-Only.
 267. Tadālambarṇ manonāma vijñānārṇ mananātmakam.
 Trīṃśikā-vijñapti verse 5. Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra. Sagā-
 thakam. Verse 102.
 268. Saṅṅāmanantarātītarṇ vijñānārṇ yaddhi tanmanaḥ.
 Saṣṭhāśraya-prasiddhyarthārṇ dhatavo'sṭhādaśa smṛtāḥ.
 Abhidharma-kośa 1. 17.
 269. Kleśaiścaturbhiḥ sahitarṇ nivṛtāvyaḅṛtaiḥ sadā.
 Ātmaḅṛṣṭyātma-mohātmānātma-sneha samjñitaiḥ.
 Trīṃśikā-vijñapti verse 6.
 Avidyayā cātmadṛṣṭyā cāsmimānena tṛṣṇayā.
 Ebhiś caturbhiḥ saṅkliṣṭārṇ mananālakṣaṇārṇ manaḥ.
 Viparyāsa-nimittārṇ tu manaḥ kliṣṭārṇ sadaiva yat.

- Kuśalavyākṛte citte sadāhamkāra-kāraṇam. Quoted in the *Trīṃśikā-vijñapti-bhāṣyam* p. 28 lines 2-5.
270. Vaikalyād viṣayāṇāṃ hi kramavṛttyā pravartate.
Vijñānena vijñāti manasā manyate punaḥ.
Laṃkāvatāra-sūtra 2. 116.
271. *Ibid* 2. 117.
272. *Kliṣṭa-manas*.
273. Cittena cīyate karma jñānena ca vidhīyate.
Prajñayā ca nirābhāsaṃ prabhāvaṃ cādhighacchati.
Ibid anityatā parivarta. Verse 39.
274. *Studies in the Laṃkāvatāra*. Sutra p. 250.
275. *Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi* pp. 24, 34, 35.
276. *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi* p. 33. See the *Yogācāra Idealism* p. 141 H. I.
277. Ālaya-vijñānāt pravṛtti-vijñānānāṃ yugapad ayuga-paccotpattau dṛṣṭāntaḥ. *Trīṃśikā-vijñapti-bhāṣyam* p. 42 lines 17-18.
278. Ālayāt sarva cittāni pravartanti taraṃgavat.
Vāsanā hetukā sarve yathā pratyaya saṃbhavaḥ.
Laṃkāvatāra-sūtra-sagāthakam. Verse 871.
Pañcānāṃ mūla-vijñāne yathā pratyayamudbhavaḥ.
Vijñānānāṃ saha na vā taraṃgāṇāṃ yathā jale.
Trīṃśikā-vijñapti verse 15.
279. *Laṃkāvatāra-sūtra-sagāthakam* verse 269.
280. Naṭavannṛtyate cittam mano-vidūṣa sādṛśam.
Vijñānam pancabhiḥ sārtham dṛśyam kalpeti raṃgavat.
Ibid. kṣaṇika-parivarta. Verse 4.
281. *Studies in the Laṃkāvatāra-sūtra* p. 249.
282. *Systems of Buddhist thought* p. 215.
283. Vijñāna-pariṇāmo'yaṃ vikalpoyad vikalpyate.
Tena tannāsti tenedarṃ sarvaṃ vijñaptimātrakam.
Trīṃśikā-vijñapti verse 17.

G L O S S A R Y

Abhāva	Non Ens ; non existence
„ (Āyuṣmām)	Right Honourable Non Ens
„ (Bhinnamūrṭiḥ)	Separately shaped Non Ens
„ (Vāstavaḥ)	Real Non Ens,
„ (Vigrahavān)	Bodily or Hypostasized Non Ens.
Abhedāgraha	Non-catching the identity
Abhinna	identical
Abhrānta	non-illusive
Abhūtaparikalpita	Store house consciousness; it also denotes fictitious, dependent and Absolute realities
Abhyāsa	A term used for vāsanā or māyā
Adhigati	fetching
Adhiṣṭhāna	locus
Adhyavasāya	perceptual judgment
Adhevaseya	conceivable
Adṛṣṭa	A word used for māyā or vāsanā in the vaiśeṣika system.
Agnihotra	oblation to fire
Aitihya	tradition
Amitābha	One of the mythological Buddhas
Amūrtatva	incorporeality
Anabhilāpya	unutterable
Antarvyāpti	internal invariable concomitance
Anumāna	inference
Anupalabdhi	negation
Anuvyavasāya	conceptual judgement in introspective consciousness

Anuvṛttipratīti	inclusion of the common objects
Anyavyāvṛtti	exclusion of others
Apoha	negative reasoning; exclusion of all things not coming under the category in point
Apratyakṣa	indirect
Apūrva	A word used for māyā or vāsanā in the Pūrva Mīmāṃsā.
Aṛṇī	firestick
Aṛṇīpotakaḥ	twirling stick
Arthakriyāsāmarthatva	capacity to produce an effect
Arthakriyāsāmarthya	” ”
Arthāpatti	presumption
Arthaparakāśa	illumination
Artha pratīti	objective consciousness
Arthātman	onto logical negation, a kind of apoha
Ārya	noble, saint
Asamartha	inefficient
Asat	non-existent
Asiddhi	disproof
Aśliṣṭa	unmingled
Aśoka	jonesia
Āśraya	receptacle
Atadvyāvṛtti	exclusion of what a thing is not
Ātma khyāti	self-apprehension
Ātman	Soul
Ātma-saṁvedana	Self-consciousness
Atyanta parokṣa	entirely transcendental
Āvaraṇa	concealment
Avidyā	Ignorance
Avinābhāva	generalization, universal concomitance

Avisaṃvādi	non-incongruous
Avyākṛta	indescribable
Avyapadeśya	unutterable
Āyatana	base
Bahirvyāpti	external invariable concomi- tance
Bhāvanā	biotic force
Bhāva padārtha	positive entity
Bhedāgraha	catching the non-difference
Bhrama	illusion
Bhrānti	illusion
,, (citta)	,, (conceptual)
,, (dṛṣṭi)	,, (perceptual)
,, (Karma)	,, of motion
,, (saṃjñā)	,, of substance
,, (saṅkhyā)	,, ,, number
,, (saṁsthāna)	,, ,, order
,, (varṇa)	,, ,, colour
Bhūtala	ground
Bhūtārtha	substance of all things, reality as such.
Bodha	comprehension
Bodhi	perfect wisdom, enlightenment
Bodhicitta	the Absolute reality of 'Sāntideva.
Bodhisattva	an enlightened saint of Mahāyāna Buddhism.
Brahman	the Absolute of the Vedānta system
Buddhi (Kalpikā)	imagination (creative)
Buddhyārūḍha	a priori
Buddhyātman	logical negation, a kind of apoha
Candrāpīḍa	the hero of Bāna's Kādambarī.
Citrāṅgadā	one of the wives of Arjuna.
Citta	mind

Cittamātra	Mind-Only
Dārāh	Woman—A Saṅskṛta term which is always used in plural number but denotes a single woman.
Ḍavittha	Name of a person
Deśa	Space
Deśanā	teachings
Deśānanugata	beyond space
Dharmadharmibhāva	substantive attributive relation.
Dharmadhātu	A term used for the highest reality
Dharmakāya	The Absolute reality in Mahāyana religion
Dharma-nairātmya	No-object doctrine
Dhātrī	emplica officinalis
Dhātu	element
Dhruva	perpetual
Ḍittha	Name of a person
Dravya	substance
Dṛṣṭānta	example
Dṛṣṭimārga	the path of (right) view
Dvaidhikaraṇa	bifurcation
Dveṣa	aversion
Ekatva	unity
Gaṅgā	A holy river of India
Gavaya	blue cow, a species of ox
Gotva	cowhood
Grāhya	sensible
Grāhya grāhakākāra	subject-object form
Guṇa	quality
Harītakī	terminalia chebula
Hetu	reason, middle term
„ (anupalabdhiḥ)	reason based on negation
„ (kārya)	reason based on causality
„ (svabhāva)	reason based on identity

Hetvābhāsa	fallacies of reason
„ (satpratipakṣa)	fallacious reason (a term used by Hindu logicians)
Hīnayāna	lower vehicle, original Buddhism
Idamtā	thisness
Jagat	world
Janus	A Roman god having two heads
Jāti	universal, general
Jñānam	knowledge, consciousness
„ (nirākāram)	pure consciousness
„ (tāmirā)	knowledge arising from defective sense-organs
Jñātātā	cognizedness
Jñātāt (jñānam)	awareness
Kādambarī	The heroine of Bāṇa's Kādambarī
Kāla	time
Kālānanugata	beyond time
Kalpanā	judgment, category
„ (guṇa)	category of quality
„ (jāti)	„ „ genus or universal
„ (nāma)	„ „ of name
Kalpanāpoḍham	free from imagination
Karma	motion
Karuṇā	benevolence
Kārya	causation, effect
Kārya kāraṇa bhāva	causality
Klṛptir vyapadeśa	verbal expression
Kṣaṇa	moment
Laṅkāvatārasūtra	A Mahāyāna scripture
Lokonātha	Buddha (the Lord of the world)
Mahābhiniṣkramaṇa	The final departure of Buddha for salvation

Mahātman	The great soul, the Absolute Reality in the systems of Asaṅga
Mahāyāna	The higher vehicle, the later Buddhism
Manas	mind
Manovijñāna	Individual mind
Māya	ignorance
Meghadūta	a lyric of Kālidāy
Meru	a mountain of Indian mythology.
Nirākāra	irimageless
Nirvāṇa	salvation
Niścaya	judgment
Niṣedha	absolute negation, a kind of apoha
Niṣpanna	accomplished
Nityatva	eternity
Nyāya	One of the six systems of the Vedic philosophy ; judgement
,, (lāghava)	low of parcimony
Padārtha	category
Pakṣadharmatā	essential nature of a syllogism
parāpeksā	relativity
paratantra	worldly objects
paratantrya	dependence
parikalpita	fictional objects
Parināma (hetu)	store house consciousness or Ālaya
,, (phala)	
Pariniṣpanna	absolute reality
Parsis	inhabitants of Persia
Paryudāsa	relative negation (a kind of apoha)
Prakṛṣṭopakāra	dominant cause
Pramāṇa	a valid source of knowledge

„ (samplava)	coalescence theory of cognition
„ (vyavasthā)	limitation theory of cognition
Prāmāṇyam	Extrinsic validity and
aprāmāṇyam ubhayam parataḥ	invalidity of truth
Prāmāṇyam aprāmāṇyam	intrinsic validity and
ubhayam svataḥ	invalidity of truth
Prāmāṇyam parataḥ	extrinsic validity and intrinsic
aprāmāṇyam svataḥ	invalidity of truth
Prāmāṇyam svataḥ	intrinsic validity and extrinsic
aprāmāṇyam parataḥ	invalidity of truth
Pramudita	one of the ten stages of meditation in Mahāyāna
Prāpti	fetching
Prasajya pratiṣedha	absolute negation, a kind of apoha
Pratibhā	intuition
Pratibhāsa	simple reflex
Pratīti	comprehension
Pratītyasamutpāda	dependent origination (Budd- hist theory of causation)
Pratyakṣa	perception
„ (indriya)	sense-perception
„ (mānasa)	mental sensation
„ (nirvikalpa)	indeterminate perception
„ (savikalpa)	determinate perception
„ (yogi)	intelligible intuition
Pratyakṣābhāsa	fallacies of perception
Pratyaya	idea, cause
„ (adhipati)	dominant or efficient cause
„ (ālambana)	external cause
„ (sahakāri)	cooperating cause
„ (samānantara)	immediate cause
Pudgala	soul
Pudgala-nairātmya	No-Soul theory
Rāga	desire

Raghuvaṅśa	one of the epics of Kālidasa
Rāja haṅsa	young goose
Rūpa	object
Rūpaśleśa	penetration
Śabda	word, scripture
Sādhya	probandum
Sākṣātkāritva vyāpāra	
Śhkyā miun	the historical Gautama
	Buddha
Samādhi	meditation
Sāmānya	universal, generality
„ (apara)	penultimate universal
„ (mahā)	Summem genus
„ (para)	ultimate universal
Sāmānyalakṣaṇa	universal
Samavāya	inherence
„ (sanyukta)	connected inherence
Sambandha	relation
„ (viśeṣaṇa viśeṣya)	subject-attribute relation
Sambhava	probability
sarṅsāra	world
sarṅskāra	impression, a name for vāsanā, māyā
Samudāya	aggregate
Saṁvit sāmāthyā	conscious germ
Saṁyoga	conjunction
Sandhinirmocana sūtra	A Mahāyāna text
Sanmātra	pure being
Saṅgaarī	six cities (the word is always used in singular number)
Sārūpya	coordination
Sārūpya vāda	theory of coordination
Sarba bijka	store house consciousness, Ālaya vijñāna
Sarvagatam	ubiquitous
„ (Svāśraya)	ubiquitous within its own sphere

Sarvajña parīkṣā	a chapter in the Tattva Saṁgraha where the omniscience of Lord Buddha has been examined,
Sarvatovyāvṛtta	similar to nothing
Sarvopādhivinirmukta	devoid of all attributes
Sattā	reality
Sattāmātra	pure being
Siddhi	proof
Śirījśapā	dalbergia sissoo
Śiprā	a river of India (Madhya Pradesh)
Skandha	
Sphuṭa	vivid flash
Sphuṭāhatva	vividness
Sthāyitva	stability
Śukanāsa	The teacher of the prince Candrāpīḍa in the Kādambarī of the Sanskr̥ta poet Bāṇa
Śūnya	void
Śūnyatā	voidness, unreality of things
Svalakṣaṇa	essence in itself particular, point instant
Svalakṣaṇatva	particularity
Svarūpa mātram	reality as such
Svasarīvedana	self feeling, self cognition
Svayam prakāsa	self luminous
Tadākārata	sumilarity
Tadevoidam	This is that,
Tathāgata	Buddha
Tathāgatagarbha	womb of the Tathāgata
Tathatā	reality in its true nature, reality as such
Trailokya vyāvṛtta	unique
Tattā	thatness

Trimśikā	a work of Vasubandhu on Yogācāra Idealism
Tuṣitaloka	one of the heavens mentioned in Buddhist mythology
Upalabdhi	comprehension
Upamāna	analogy
Urvaśī	a heavenly damsel in Hindu mythology
Utprekṣāvyaṅgyāpāra	imaginative faculty of mind
Vāsanā	habit energy, inherent creative power of Ālaya vijñāna
„ (anādi)	biotic force, transcendental illusion
„ (anubhava)	reality of external world
„ (Niṣyanda)	it is one of the functions of anādivāsanā which develops the impressions latent in the Ālaya and consequently gives rise to means and other vijñānas.
„ (vipāka)	it is one of the two functions of anādi vāsanā which continues the cycle of birth going on.
Vāsanā vāda	
„ (anubhava)	empiricism
„ (atyanta vikalpa)	Absolute idealism of Yogācāra school
„ (ekānta vikalpa)	„ „
„ (vikalpa)	rationalism
Vāstavatva	reality, objectivity
Vicāra	rational thinking, deliberation
Vidhisvarūpatva	efficient affirmation
Vijñāna	sensation, conception
„ (Ālaya)	store house consciousness
„ (pravṛtti)	

Vijñapti	ideation
„ (viṣaya)	
Vijñaptimātrata	Mind-Only
Vikalpa	imagination
Vikṣepa	projection
Vilakṣaṇa	dependent
Virodha	contradiction
Viruddhāvyabhicārī	fallacious reason which is both contradictory and non-contradictory
Viśeṣa	particular
Viśeṣa	adjective, determination
Viśuddha	pure
Vitarka	fanciful thinking, conjecture
Vitti	apprehension
Vyakti	individual
Vyāpti	invariable concomitance
Yukti	ratiocination
Yogya	competent

GENERAL INDEX

Abhidharmasūtra		Bergson	
on mental sensation		on Vāsanā (elan vital)	22
(substitute theory)	125	Berkeley	
Ābhidharmika		on commonsense and	
on causality	230	philosophy	15
Ahrīka		ideas	156
on universal	259	perception (indeter-	
Akṣapāda Gautama		minate)	104
on inference	199	Bhadanta Śubha Gupta	
on perception	85	on apprehension	4
Asaṅga		Bhāmaha	
on abhrānta (its		on apoha	278
relevance in the		Bhaṭṭa (Jayanta)	
definition of per-		on negation	246
ception)	97	perception (Yogic)	136
on consciousness	331-33	Bosanquet	
coordination	23	on antarvyāpti	203
ego (empirical)	330	Bradley	
illusion	63	on antarvyāpti	203
Mahātman	329	inference	201
testimony(Buddha's)	44	inference (Mill's	
Vijñāna	167	view)	214
Aśoka Paṇḍita		judgment	165-66
on universal	262, 264	relation	226
Author of the Nyāya		Broad	
Binduṭīkā Ṭippaṇī		on sense-data	156
on abhrānta (its		Buddha (Lord)	
relevance in per-		on apprehension	4
ception)	100	mental sensation	117
mental sensation	117	mental (substitute	
particular	147	theory)	12

Buddhists		causality	232
on causality	230-34	cognition (unity of agent, means and fruit)	12
cognition (object of)	38	consciousness	340
identity	227	coordination	15, 17
illusion	64-66, 69	external world	311-12
inference	207, 209	identity	228
Judgment and		illusion	58
Name-giving	174-175	illusion(transcendental)	68
Judgment (its vali-		inference	199, 205, 215
dity	183	inference (paradox of)	211
Knowledge	2-3	Judgment	165, 174, 176
Negation	48-49, 241	Kalpanā	91
Negation (Kumā-		knowledge (right)	36
rila's theory	243,249-52	knowledge (sources of)	39
Perception (indeter-		mental sensation	115, 117-18, 128
minate)	100, 104	mental (admixture	
Presumption	47	theory)	122
truth (criterion of)	51, 56	mental (alternation	
Vāsanā (conscious-		theory)	121
ness)	22	mental (simultaneity	
Campanella (Thomas)		theory)	124
apoha	293	mental (substitute	
Candrakīrti		theory)	119-20
causality	231	Negation	251-52
Cārvāka		Particular	147-48
inference	208-9	Perception (its defini-	
knowledge (its source)	39	tion)	87
Dharmakīrti		Perception(object of)	147
abhrānta (its definition		Perception (Yogic)	122-23
and its relevance in		reality (as non-dual)	331
the definition of		reason (antinomy)	213
perception)	95, 97	relation	207, 224-226
apprehension	4	self-cognition	129-130
avinābhāva	204, 215	testimony (Buddha's)	44

- | | | | |
|-------------------------|---------------|-------------------------|--------------|
| testimony (verbal) | 44 | avinābhāva | 204 |
| truth (validity of) | 56 | fallacy of illegitimate | 206 |
| universal | 259-60 | physicalism | |
| Vāsanā | 23 | relations | 224 |
| Veda | 42-44 | trairūpyavāda | 200 |
| Dharmottara | | Diñnāga | |
| on causality | 223 | abhrānta (relevance | |
| cognition (unity of | | of—in the definition | |
| agent, means and | | of perception) | 95 |
| fruits of—) | 13 | analogy | 46 |
| coordination | 21 | apoha | 281-282, 292 |
| identity | 228 | categories | 177-178 |
| illusion | 57-58 | cognition (unity of | |
| inference | 199 | means, agent and | |
| inference (paradox | | fruit of) | 10-11 |
| of) | 211 | consciousness | 339 |
| judgment | 164, 175-176 | coordination (his idea- | |
| | 305 | listic view) | 15-16 |
| mental sensation | 116, | coordination (his | |
| | 127 | realistic view) | 6, 20 |
| mental (admixture | | external world (Vaiśe- | |
| theory) | 122 | ṣika view) | 317, 318 |
| mental (substitute | | illusion | 57, 63 |
| theory) | 119-120 | illusion (transcen- | |
| negation | 252 | dental) | 68 |
| Perception | 87, 88 | inference (definition) | 199 |
| Perception (Diñnāga | | inference (idealistic | |
| and Dharmakīrti's | | theory) | 204, 206 |
| definition) | 88 | jñāna (taimira) | 63 |
| Perception (yogic) | | judgment | 165, 175-176 |
| | 132, 133, 136 | kalpanā (definition) | 89 |
| reason (antinomy of) | | knowledge (right) | 37 |
| | 213 | mental sensation | 115 |
| self-cognition | 131 | mental (substitute | |
| synthesis | 172 | theory) | 125 |
| Dhruva (A.B) | | negation | 251-252 |
| a priori (Keith's view) | 204 | | |

particular (svalak- ṣaṇa)	149	Hume (David)	
Perception (Akṣapāda's definition)	85, 86	generalisation	205
Perception (his own definition)	87, 88	impression	156
Perception (object of)	146	perception (indeter- minate)	104
reality (nature of)	331	Jaimini	
reason (antinomy of)	212-213	Veda	43
reason (fallacies of)	210-211	Jain	
relation	222, 224	truth (criterion of)	50
self-cognition	129	universal	259
testimony (Buddha's)	44	Jam yan tshadpā	
testimony (verbal)	40	mental sensation	118, 128
trairūpyavāda	199	mental (simultaneity theory)	123, 124
universals	265-267	mental (substitute theory)	125
Gaṅgeśa		Jevons	
perception (indeter- minate)	104	antarvyāpti	203
Grammarians		Jinendra Buddhi	
perception (indeter- minate)	100	abhrānta (it relevance in the definition of perception)	96
Green (T. H.)		apoha	292, 293
relations	226	cognition (unity of agent, means and fruits of)	11, 13
Gruce (Rene)		coordination (Diñnāga's view)	16
Asaṅga and Nāgār- juna	332	illusion (trans- cendental)	70-71
Hegel		Vāsanā (anādi)	26, 27
causality	232	Jñānagarbha	
negation	292	mental sensation	121
panlogism	213	(admixture theory)	127
Hsuen Tsang		mental (substitute theory)	
causality	233		

- Johnson
 inference (criticism of
 Mill's view) 213
- Joseph
 antarvyāpti 205
- Kamalaśīla
 abhrānta (the relevance
 of in the definition
 of perception) 97-98
 apoha 274-275, 279-80,
 293
 categories (Dīnāga's) 179
 causality 234
 consciousness 340-341
 external world
 (Realist view) 314
 illusion 60
 inference (paradox of)
 211-212
 jñāna (tāmira) 63
 judgment 175
- Kalpanā (Dīnāga's
 definition) 90
- Kalpanā (own view) 92
 knowledge (right) 35
- Negation 244, 253
- Perception (Dīnāga
 and Dharmakīrti's
 definition) 88
- Perception (Dīnāga's
 theory) 94
- Perception (validity of
 the perception of
 yellow conchshell) 62
- Perception (yogic)
 reality 331
- synthesis 172
 testimony (Buddha's) 44
 truth (Buddhist theory of
 the validity of truth) 56
 truth (his own theory) 57
 truth (Mīmāṃsaka theory)
 54-55
- vāsanā 23
- Kaṇāda
 Perception (definition) 85
- Kant
 avinābhāva 204
 causality 232
 identity 229
 illusion 60
 inference (definition) 201
 mental sensation (sub-
 stitute theory) 126
 Svalakṣaṇa (thing in
 itself) 158
- Keith, A. B.
 Antarvyāpti (origin of) 202
 a priori 205
 avinābhāva 204
 bahirvyāpti 202
 inference (Dīnāga's
 theory) 204
 relations 224
- Keśava Mīśra
 negation 247
- Kumārila
 analogy 45
 apoha 277
 causality (idealistic
 theory) 234
 consciousness 2
 illusion 57

knowledge	39, 2-3	Mahāmāti	
negation (as a source of knowledge)	48	Tathāgatagarbha and ātman	329
negation (as a real entity)	242-243, 248-289	Maṇḍana	
negation (Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view)	246-247	self apprehension	65
perception (Diñnāga's theory)	93	Max Müller	
perception (its object-his view)	152-153	external world (Yogācāra view)	319
perception (its object-Sumati's view)	152	Mill, J. S.	
perception (yogic)	133-134, 136	apoha	293
presumption	47	inference (petitio principii)	213
probability	49	<i>Mīmāṃsaka</i>	
ratiocination	49	coordination	21
		knowledge (right)	37
		negation	247-250
		perception (indeterminate and its source)	104
		self-cognition	130
Leibnitz		synthesis	169-170
identity of indiscernibles	229	truth (Buddhist theory)	56-57
Locke		truth (criterion of theory)	51
perception (indeterminate)	104	vāsanā	23
Logical Positivists		veda	41-44
universals	268	Mukerji, Satkari	
Mādhavācārya		abhrāntam (its relevance in the definition of mental sensation)	100
self-apprehension	65	<i>Nāgārjuna</i>	
Madhvites		inference	199
perception (indeterminate)	100	reality	332
Mādhyamika		<i>Naiyāyikas</i>	
causality	230-231	coordination	21
judgment (object of)	167	knowledge (right)	38
vāsanā	22		

knowledge (sources of)	39	<i>Rāmānujites</i>	
negation	241-246	perception (indeter-	
self-cognition	130	minate)	100
synthesis	169-170	<i>Randle</i>	
truth (criterion of)	50	antarvyāpti	202
<i>Occam</i>		trairūpyavāda	
Occam's razor	154	(its origin)	199
<i>Palagyī</i>		<i>Ratnākara Śānti</i>	
apoha	293	bahirvyāpti	202
<i>PārthaSārathi</i>		<i>Ratnakīrti</i>	
perception (object of)	154, 155	apoha	293
<i>Prabhā Chandra</i>		<i>Realists</i>	
self-apprehension	65	apprehension (theory	
<i>Prabhākara</i>		of)	1-4
knowledge (sources of)	39	categories (Dinnāga's)	178
negation	247-248	cognition	38
negation (Kumārila's		external world	303, 305
view)	249-250	illusion (Śāntaraṣita's	
perception (object of)	154-155	theory)	59
self-apprehension	65	kalpanā (Dinnāga's	
<i>Prajñākara Gupta</i>		theory)	89
mental sensation		judgment	173, 183
(definition)	115	Mind-Only	322
mental (alternation		perception (indeter-	
theory)	120-121	minate)	100
<i>Praśastapāda</i>		perception (object of—	
coordination	2	Advaita Vedānta's	
particular	148	view)	152
perception (object of)	155	relations	225
trairūpyavāda	200	universal	258
<i>Rāhula (Sāṅkṛtyāyana)</i>		<i>Rgyal-tshab</i>	
Dharmakīrti	157	mental sensation	128
		<i>Russell, Bertrand</i>	
		knowledge (by acquaint-	
		ance)	85

388 The Problem of knowledge in Yogācāra Buddhism

knowledge(description)	85	analogy	146
Pramāṇavyavasthā	84	apoha	276, 293
sense-data	156	categories (Dinnāga's)	179
<i>Ryle, Gilbert</i>		causality	233
category mistake	84	consciousness	341, 342
Śabara Svāmin		illusion	59, 60
analogy	45	inference (paradox of)	211, 212
apprehension (theory of)	4	judgment	175, 176
negation	240	kalpanā (Dinnāga's definition)	90
presumption	46	kalpanā (his own definition)	92
testimony (verbal)	40	perception (object of)	147
<i>Sadānanda</i>		perception (yellow conchshell)	61-62
Idealism (Advaita Vedānta and Yogācāra)	336	perception (yogic)	132, 134
<i>Saguira</i>		reality	331
trairūpyavāda	199	self	341
Śaṅkara		synthesis	172
Idealism (Yogācāra)	336	testimony (Buddha's)	44
Śaṅkarānanda		testimony (verbal)	40
mental sensation (simultaneity theory)	123	tradition and intuition	49, 50
Śaṅkara Svāmin		truth (Early Buddhist theory)	53
judgment	176	truth (Jaina theory)	52
<i>Sāṅkhya</i>		truth (Mīmāṃsaka theory)	53
knowledge (sources of)	39	truth (Nyāya theory)	52
perception (indeterminate)	100	truth (Sāṅkhya theory)	52
truth (criterion of)	50	Śaṅkya Paṇḍita	
vāsanā	22	mental sensation (simultaneity theory)	123
Śāntarakṣita		<i>Sautrāntika</i>	
abhrānta (its relevance in the definition of perception)	97	apprehension (theory of)	5-16

- cognition (unity of agent, means and fruits of) 9
 coordination 10-11, 20-21
 vāsanā (anādi) 25, 26
- Sharma, C. D.*
 illusion (Yogācāra theory) 70
 reality (in Śūnyavāda) 334
- Sastri, Dharmendra Nath*
 particular (svalakṣaṇa) 157
 Siddhasen Divākara antarvyāpti 202
- Sigwart*
 Pramāṇa vyavasthā 186
- Śivāditya*
 universal 261
- Sogen Yama Kami*
 ālaya, manas and pravṛtti vijñāna 346
- Spencer, Herbert*
 antarvyāpti 203
 negation 245
- Śrīdhara*
 apoha 282
 perception (object of) 154-155
 universal 262
 vāsanā 24
- Śrī Harṣa*
 consciousness (in Yogācāra Idealism) 342
- Stcherbatsky*
 categories (Diñnāga's) 179
 coordination (Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti's view) 17
 coordination (his own view) 18
 illusion 61, 63
 judgment (Diñnāga's theory) 165, 167-168, 175, 181-182
 kalpanā (definition by Dharmakīrti, Dharmottara, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla) 93
 mental sensation 128
 perception (Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti's definition of) 88
 Pramāṇa-samplava 187
 Pramāṇa-vyavasthā 187
 relations 226
 self-cognition 131
 Svalakṣaṇas 157
 traīrūpyavāda 199
- Sthīramati*
 Absolute and phenomena 338
 causality (Mādhyamika) 232
 illusion (transcendental) 68
 Vijñaptimātratā 338
- Sumati*
 perception (object) 152

<i>Suzuki, D. T.</i>		mental (substitute theory)	120
exposition of the		perception (object of)	154-155
Lañkāvatāra Sūtra	328		
Ālaya and ego	329		
Ālaya and manas	344	probandum (Dharmāga's view)	206
<i>Udayana</i>		Vedānta and Yogācāra	
coordination	14	Idealism	336
relations	14	<i>Vaiśeṣika</i>	
<i>Udyotakara</i>		categories	177
antarvyāpti	202, 203	external world	314-316
apoha	280-281	negation	246
external world	309-311, 313	perception	85
particular	148	perception (indeterminate)	104
perception (Vasubandhu's definition)	86	relations	207
pramāṇa-vyavasthā	186-187	self-cognition	130
relations	225	<i>Vaiśeṣika (Early)</i>	
<i>Vācaspati Miśra</i>		knowledge (its sources)	39
abhrāntam (its relevance in the definition of perception)	96	<i>Vallabhites</i>	
analogy	46	perception (indeterminate)	100
apoha	275, 279, 283, 285, 286	<i>Vardhamāna</i>	
external world (from Yogācāra point of view)	310-311	judgment	164
fallacy of illegitimate physicalism	206	<i>Vasubandhu</i>	
illusion (Yogācāra theory)	70	Absolute and phenomena	337
mental sensation	117, 127	causality	232
		cognition (unity of agent, means and fruits of)	8
		coordination	6, 8
		illusion (transcendental)	68
		inference (definition)	201-202
		perception (definition)	86

testimony (Buddha's)	44	perception (Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti's definition of)	88
vāsanā	22	perception (his own definition)	88
vijñāna	167	relations	225
Vijñaptimātratā	329, 333- 335	<i>Viśvanātha</i> perception (object of)	154-155
<i>Vātsīputrīya</i> coordination	8	<i>Western Nominalists</i> universal	268
<i>Vātsyāyana</i> inference (definition)	199	<i>Wundt</i> antarvyāpti	203
perception (Akṣapāda's definition)	85	<i>Yāska</i> Veda	43
<i>Vedānta (Advaita)</i> knowledge (its sources)	39	<i>Yogācāra</i> causality	231-233
perception	100, 151	coordination	18-20
synthesis	170-171	external world	306-309
truth (criterion of)	51	external (Vaiśeṣika view)	315-317
universal	259	external (his own theory)	318-321
vāsanā (māyā)	22	illusion	57, 68
<i>Vedānta (Theistic)</i> knowledge (its sources)	39	judgment	164-165, 168
<i>Vidyāraṇya</i> self-apprehension	65-66	Mind-Only	323-327
<i>Vinītadeva</i> cognition (unity of agent, means and fruits of)	12	synthesis	170-171
coordination	7		
illusion	57		

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