Affiliation: bodhisattva gotra (Short Notes on gotra Theory in YogƗcƗra Buddhism)

Affiliation: bodhisattva gotra

(Short Notes on gotra Theory in Yogacara Buddhism)

Vladimir Korobov

Centre of Oriental Studies, Vilnius University

The article continues discussion on ontological entities in Yogacara Buddhism, originally initiated by Matsumoto Shirǀ and Hakamaya Noriaki. Analyzing teachings presented within the frameworks of YogƗcƗra school of Buddhism, some modern Buddhologists find there traces of ontology which originally conflicts with basic Buddhist doctrines of no-self and dependent arising. According to the position of these Buddhologists, such concepts as gotra and tathƗgatagarbha represent a “generative monism” or a “foundational realism” in YogƗcƗra Buddhism. The author of the article argues that all the attempts to find an ontological basis for enlightenment are no more than efforts to place Buddhist practical epistemology into the limits of Western philosophy.

A. Although the very term gotra (rigs) in Yogacara Buddhism does not seem difficult to understand and interprete and lately there have appeared several papers where this term was discussed in detail,1 in the light of the polemic on “Critical Buddhism” I feel the need to discuss this term once again. “Critical Buddhism” is a neologism invented by Hakamaya Noriaki, Professor at Komazawa Junior College and author of The Hermeneutics of VijñƗptimƗtratƗ

(Shunjnjsha, 1994), An Annotated Translation of Mahayanasnjtralaükara (co-translator, Daizǀ Shuppan, 1993), and other writings. In a series of articles2 he and his colleague Matsumoto Shirǀ, Professor in the Faculty of Buddhism at Kamazawa University, ____________

1 See, for example, D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Meaning of the Term “Gotra” and the Textual History of the Ratnagotravibhaga”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39, 2 (1976): 341–63. Useful materials for understanding of the “gotra” term may be found in James Apple, “Twenty Varieties of the Saïgha: A Typology of Noble Beings (Ɨrya) in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism”, Journal of Indian Philosophy 31 (2003): 503–92; 32 (2004): 211–79. See also John J. Makransky, Buddhahood Embodied: Sources and Controversy in India and Tibet, New York, 1997.

2 See collection of critical essays by Hakamaya Noriaki Hongaku shisǀ hihan [Critiques of the doctrine of original enlightenment] (Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1989), Hihan Bukkyǀ [[[Critical Buddhism]]] (Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1990). See also critical essays written by Matsumoto Shiro and collected in Zen shisǀ no hihanteki kenkynj [Critical studieson Zen Thought] (Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1993), Engi to knj: Nyoraizǀ shisǀ hihan [PratƯtyasamutpƗda and emptiness: Critiques of the doctrine of tathƗgata-garbha] (Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1989).

I S S N 1 6 4 8 – 2 6 6 2 . ACTA ORIENTALIA VILNENSIA 6.2 (2005): 36–44 made a distinction between “not true” Buddhism which is based on monism and positive ontology and “true” Buddhism based on the doctrines of no-self and dependent arising (pratƯtyasamutpƗda) only.

According to Matsumoto, dhƗtu and gotra theories in MahƗyƗnasnjtrƗlaükƗra, MahƗparinirvƗna Snjtra, Bodhisattvabhnjmi and AbhisamayƗlaükƗra represent monistic tendencies in Buddhism and cause social discrimination “ultimately affirming the differences of an actual phenomenon (dharma) and spiritual lineages (gotras) among people”. To describe this phenomenon, Matsumoto have introduced the dhƗtu-vƗda concept. DhƗtu-vƗda, or the “theory of locus” has according to Matsumoto the following defining characteristics:

“1. ‘Locus’ is the basis for ‘super-loci’.

2. ‘Locus’ gives rise to ‘super-loci’.

3. ‘Locus’ is one, ‘super-loci’ are many.

4. ‘Locus’ is real, ‘super-loci’ are not real.

5. ‘Locus’ is the essential nature (atman) of “super-loci’.

6. ‘Super-loci’ are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that they have arisen from the ‘locus’ and share its nature”. Summarizing, Matsumoto writes: “[…] the basic structure of dhƗtu-vƗda is that of a singular, real locus (dhƗtu) that gives rise to a plurality of phenomena. We may also speak of it as a ‘generative monism’ or a ‘foundational realism’”. Setting apart the obvious Platonic complexion of these defining characteristics, let us take a close look at what is called gotra.

B. In his analysis of the text of RatnagotravibhƗga Ruegg writes: “The word gotra is frequently used in the literature of MahƗyƗna Buddhism to denote categories of persons classified according to their psychological, intellectual, and spiritual types. The chief types usually mentioned in this kind of classification are the Auditors making up the ĞrƗvaka-gotra, the Individual Buddhas making p the pratyekabuddha-gotra, and the Bodhisattvas making up the bodhisattva-gotra. In the Saüdhinirmocanasnjtra these three types constitute altogether different gotras, which thus coincide with the three separate Vehicles (yƗnas) as recognized by YogƗcƗrin / VijñaptimƗtratƗ school. To these three some sources add the further category of the undetermined (aniyatagotra), which is made up of persons not yet definitively attached to one of the three proceeding classes; and the non-gotra (agotra), that is the category made up of persons who cannot ____________

be assigned to any spiritual class. Each of the first three categories is thus comprised of persons capable of achieving a particular kind of maturity and spiritual perfection in accordance with their specific type or class, the Auditor then attaching the Awakening (bodhi) characteristic of the ĝrƗvaka and so on. Especially remarkable in this connection, and somewhat anomalous as gotra, is non-gotra, i.e. that category of persons who seem to have been considered, at least by certain YogƗcƗrin authorities, as spiritual ‘outcastes’ lacking the capacity for attaining spiritual perfection or Awakening of any kind; since they therefore achieve neither bodhi nor nirvƗõa, they represent the same type as icchantikas to the extent that the latter also are considered to lack this capacity”.7

He also suggests two ways of understanding the term gotra:

The word gotra thus either designates extensionally a (soteriological and gnoseological) category or class; or it designates intensionally the factor or capacity that determines classification in such a category or class. In these meanings the term gotra is evidently related to the concept of a lineage, clan, or family, or of a genus; and its meanings are associated with a socio-biological metaphor (gotra = kula, vaüĞa ‘family’, etc.) and a biological or botanical metaphor (gotra = bƯja, ‘seed, germ’).8

Saüdhinirmocanasnjtra in connection with the spiritual element of living beings (sattva-dhƗtu) speaks of three different classes: nyan thos kyi theg pa’i rigs can (ĞrƗvaka-yƗna-gotraka) – “those who are of the Hearers’ lineage”, rang sang rgyas kyi theg pa’i rigs can (pratyekabuddha-yƗna-gotraka) – “those who are in the lineage of Solitary Realizers (Individual Buddhas) and de bzhin gshegs pa’i rigs can (tathƗgata-gotraka) – “those who are in the lineage of TathƗgata”. In LaïkƗvatƗrasnjtra two additional categories are included: aniyata-gotra “those whose lineage is undetermined” and a-gotra – “persons who are of no lineage at all”.9

In KƗĞyapaparivarta Ɨrya-gotra (‘phag pa’i rigs) is mentioned. It is stainless (vimala), real (satya), indestructible (akùaya) and permanent (nitya). It is anƗtman and doesn’t belong to an object (anupalambha). 10 In Gotra Chapter of MahƗyƗna- snjtrƗlaükƗra 3.2 this term is described as follows: “Existence of gotra is ascertained in the diversity of dhƗtu, of freedom, of knowledge, of obtainment of fruits. ____________ 7

D. Seyfort Ruegg, “The Meaning of the Term ‘Gotra’ and the Textual History of the RatnagotravibhƗga”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39, 2 (1976): 341. 

8 Ibid., 341–42. 9

See David Seyfort Ruegg, La Théorie du TathƗgatagarbha et du Gotra. Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme, Publications de l’École Francaise d’Extréme-Orient LXX, Paris, 1969, 73. The very term gotra Ruegg translates as “lignée spirituelle”. It is remarkable that L. Schmithausen translates this term by the German “Heilsanlage” (see his Der NirvƗõa-Abschnitt in der ViniĞcayasaügrahaõƯ der YogƗcƗrabhnjmiþ, Wien, 1969), while Gustav Roth translates it as “innate spiritual predisposition” (see his article “Observations on the First Chapter of Asaïga’s Bodhisattvabhnjmi”, Indologica Taurinensia 3–4 (1975–76): 403–12).

10 Ibid., 109–15.

Commentary:

By reason of the multiplicity of the dhƗtu of beings, the classification of dhƗtu does not have a limit; as is said in the AkùarƗĞi snjtra. After admitting that the diversion of dhƗtu is based on similar knowledge, the result of the gotra is diverse in the three vehicles (yƗnƗs). The diversity of the illumination is ascertained in the beings. At first such and such a belief in such and such a yƗna brings illumination; hence it cannot be produced without the diversity of gotra. When illumination is provoked by an experience, one ascertains the diversity of the knowledge, one advances, one does not advance; it is not produced without the diversity of the gotra. The diversity of a fruit is also ascertained; the illumination is inferior, mediocre or superior; it is not produced without diversity of gotra as the fruit corresponds to the seed”.

In gotra-pañala of Bodhisattvabhnjmi gotra together with the primary cultivation of an enlightened attitude (dang po sems bskyed) and a range of conductive aspects of enlightenment (byang chub kyi phyogs kyi chos thams cad) make up the “ground” (gzhi). The following definition of gotra is suggested: De la ni rigs gang zhe na/ mdor na rnam pa gnyis te/ ran bzhin gyis gnas pa dang/ yang dag par bsgrubs pa’o/ de la ran bzhin gyis gnas pa’i rigs ni byang chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi skye mched drug gi khyad par gang yin pa ste/ de ni gcig nas gcig tu brgyud de ‘ongs pa thog ma med pa’i dus can chos nyid kyis thob pa de lta bu yin no/ de la yang dag par bsgrubs pa’i rigs ni sngon dge ba’i rtsa ba goms par byas pa las thob pa gang yin pa ste/ don gyi skabs ‘dir ni rnam pa gnyi ga yang ‘dod do/ rigs de ni sa bon zhes kyang bya/ khams de ni rang bzhin zhes kyang bya’o/

“What is gotra? Briefly, there are two divisions [of gotra]. One existing naturally and [the other] attained. The naturally existing gotra is a specific state of the six sense bases (ayatana) of bodhisattvas. [This state] is successively transmitted from the beginningless past [to the present] and is similar to the possession of dharmata (chos nyid). The attained gotra is a possession of roots of virtuous deeds [accomplished] in former [[[lives]]]. Both divisions [of gotra] are asserted here [with reference] to the preliminary context. The gotra is also called ‘potentiality’ (sa bon) and the dhƗtu (khams) in turn is called ‘self-nature’ (rang bzhin)”.

Further in the rigs Chapter of Bodhisattvabhnjmi there are discussed differences between gotras and the superiority of the bodhisattvas’ gotra is established. Regarding two hindrances – afflictive hindrance (nyon mong pa’i sgrib pa, kleĞƗvarana) and intellectual hindrance (shes bya’i sgrib pa, jñeyƗvarana) – Ğravakas (nyan thos) and pratyekabuddhas (rang sangs rgyas) are able to get rid of the first only, whereas ____________ bodhisattvas (byang chub sems dpa) dispose of the both and on the score of this they are called unexcelled superiors (khyad par du ‘phags pa bla na med pa). Then bodhisattvas’ advantages over Ğravakas and pratyekabuddhas are established in connection with four aspects: 1) as resulting from power (dbang po las gyur pa) – bodhisattva naturally has the highest powers (rang bzhin gyis dbang po rno ba yin); 2) as resulting from practical benefits (sgrub pa las gyur pa) – bodhisattva acts and lives for the benefit of others; 3) as resulting from discernmental skills (mkhas pa las gyur pa) – bodhisattva knows more and is experienced in other sciences than Ğravakas and pratyekabuddhas, (rig pa’i gnas gzhan thams cad la yang mkhas par byed), and 4) as resulting from the outcome (‘bras bu las gyur pa) – bodhisattva attains the fruit of the highest, pure and perfect enlightenment (bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa’i byang chub).14 C. As we can see from the texts of MahƗyƗnasnjtrƗlaükƗra and Bodhisattvabhnjmi, there is established an evident differentiation between bothisattvas’ and other gotras.

The question is: what is the basis of this differentiation?

Matsumoto’s answer obviously implies a Plato-like model of ontology: “[…] I find Yogacara theory of gotra to be based on monism […]”.15 And Hakamaya writes: “The mind cannot be separate from its thoughts which constantly arise and perish, but if there is an “origin of the mind” behind the mind, then this can be identified as an eternal and unchanging “thusness” (Skt. tathatƗ, Jpn. shinnyo) that sustains all phenomena”.16 The issue of differentiation between gotras is brought up in AbhisamayƗlaükƗra 1.39:

Since there are no any distinctions in dharmadhƗtu, then the differentiation among gotras isn’t tenable. [But because] of dependency dharmas have [their] peculiarities. That is why 17 the classification [of gotras] is proclaimed. ____________ 14 Ibid., 3–4.

15 I would like to make some notes on Matsumoto’s translation of rang bzhin gyis gnas pa as ‘[the gotra] located on prakçti’. In his response to the critical article written by Yamabe Nobuyoshi (see “Critical Exchange on the Idea of DhƗtu-vƗda”, in Pruning the Bodhi Tree, 206) he argued that traditional translation of this phrase as ‘[the gotra] existing by nature’ or ‘naturally existing [[[gotra]]]’ is a fault and we should translate it as it was mentioned above – ‘[the gotra] located on prakçti’ or ‘[the gotra] existing on prakçti’. It should be stated that it is hardly possible for the same phrase to have a different lexical meaning within one short segment of text. The phrase rang bzhin gyis appears at least twice at the same page of the Gotra Chapter of Bodhisattvabhnjmi: rang bzhin gyis dbang po and rang bzhin gyis sbyin pa. The translation is obvious: ‘naturally’; ‘naturally [has] powers’ and ‘natural generosity’. The same method of translation must be applied also to the phrase rang bzhin gyis gnas pa – ‘naturally abides’ or ‘[is] presented naturally’.

16 Hakamaya Noriaki, Hongaku shisǀ hihan [Critiques of the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment], Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1989, 5. 17 “chos kyi dbyings la dbyer med phyir/rigs ni tha dad rung ma yin/brten pa’i chos kyi bye brag gis/de yi dbye ba yongs su brjod//”, from AbhisamayƗlaükƗra-PrajñƗpƗramitƗ-UpadeĞa-ĝƗstra, The work of Bodhisattva Maitreya, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, St. Petersburg, 1929. Commenting on this fragment, mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang writes:

In this case, the basis for the perception (dmigs rten), [that is, the object,] is called the basis (rten). It is not [a distinction between the] “basis (rten) and what is a based [or dependent = brten pa] phenomenon” in the sense of “what is caused and the cause” [but instead in the sense of the “object perceived and the perceiver”]. Therefore, even though the division of the Ɨryan beings of the three vehicles into different lineages is not made in regard to reality qua the perceived basis or perceived object (dmigs yul) of their respective gnoses [as these are all identical, in each case being reality], the division into the three lineages of the three vehicles is made with regard to reality in so far as the three gnoses, which are the dependent [[[phenomena]], i. e. “based” = brten pa], the perceivers that take reality as their object. When meditated on, these act as the causes of the different Ɨryan states, hence the division into 18 three lineages.

This is the meaning.

As we can clearly see, differentiation between gotras is presented here as an epistemological and not an ontological problem. References to different abstract entities (tathatƗ, dharmadhƗtu, tathƗgatagarbha, etc.) in Buddhist texts do not necessarily imply an ontological background. Gotra gradation corresponds to different levels of involvement into the understanding of thatness and in that way speaks about self-awareness irrespective of any “locus”. The level of involvement depends on the personal will, attempts and cognitive situation but not on any a priori given metaphysical support. Moreover, this gradation corresponds to the path (lam), i.e. all gotra categories are not ascertained once and for all, because knowledge and awareness themselves all the time are in progress. Pro tanto the background for gotra gradation may be understood in terms of the Aristotelian teaching on İȞIJİȜȑȤİȚĮ which is a union of the final goal and result. On the one hand, it is possible to understand İȞIJİȜȑȤİȚĮ as ‘assiduity’, because a goal requires some attempts to reach it (as in the case of ‘attained gotra’ – dag par bsgrubs pa’i rigs). On the other hand, it already potentially presents as a result (as in the case with ‘naturally existing gotra’ – ran bzhin gyis gnas pa’i rigs). Both they formally (with no regard to the Aristotelian theory of soul) compose the background which may be called tathƗgatagarbha – embryo-essence, a spiritual germ (gotrata1) or generative matrix, the cause and the goal. As the union of the goal and result, İȞIJİȜȑȤİȚĮ is not an ontological entity, it is an inner power, and a person may be aware of this power and concerned with it in different ways. In this connection, I remember the theory of consciousness presented by Kierkegaard in his Sickness Unto Death. According to this theory, we all have consciousness to different degrees: “The more consciousness, the more self; the more consciousness, the more will; the more will, the more self. A person who has no will at all is no self, but the more will he has, the more consciousness of self he has also”. 19 This disposition described by ____________

18 A Dose of Emptiness, An Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang by José Ignacio Cabezón, Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series 125, Delhi, 1993, 221.

19 Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie, Princeton, 1968, 162. Kierkegaard resembles the structure of gotras, particularly in case of a-gotraþ persons who have no will accordingly have no consciousness and hence cannot aspire to enlightenment.

D. It seems to me that Buddhism in general and YogƗcƗra Buddhism in particular builds its epistemology on the basis of self-awareness and existential responsibility rather than on admission of Absolute Reality that denudes a person of the option and designates strata for different living beings. Dan Lusthaus says: “Gotra, which means ‘family’ or line of descent, has since the earliest Buddhist texts been used to counter caste-consciousness by means of substituting a functional meaning for the term rather than an essential or ontological meaning. Simply, one is what one does (karmaka), rather than what one claims to be (ƗtmanƗ)”. mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang writes: “[…] we are thinking of a lineage during the time [that person is on] the path [and not something possessed by all beings]”. And ƖcƗrya Haribhadra commenting AbhisamayƗlaükƗra 1.39 in his AbhisamayƗlaükaravçttiþ spuñarthƗ writes: “If pure dharmadhƗtu is a cause of the realization of Ɨrya qualities (‘phags pa’i chos rtogs par ‘gyur ba’i rgyu), then those [possessing this cause] supreme bodhisattvas automatically (de bzhin du) may be reckoned among the lineage of the highest enlightenment. However, as regards the affiliation (gnas pa) with [this lineage], such pure (ideal, kho na) bodhisattvas do not exist […]. Likewise it is perceived in the stages of the Ğravaka vehicle, for the purpose of realization of Ɨrya qualities, dharmadhƗtu is considered as being existential cause. From this point of view the lineages are designated”. He continues with an illustration: “Just as in pots witch are made from the same clay and burnt on the same fire may be stored both honey and sugar, the same way the three vehicles in which dharma is stored must be recognized to be different”.

So, it seems to me that concerning gotra, it is useful to take into account that: 1) the classification of three types of Ɨrya beings has an epistemological and not an ontological ground. TathƗgatagarbha being a goal and a cause concurrently is an epistemological entity. Suffice it to say that in the first chapters of AbhisamayƗlaükƗra three types of Ɨrya being are described on the grounds of three types of knowledge: sarvƗkƗra jñatƗ (rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid) – total omniscience of Buddhas, mƗrga jñatƗ (lam shes nyid) – knowledge of the path peculiar to bodhisattvas, and sarva jñatƗ (thams cad shes pa nyid) – all-knowledge, conforming to the state of ĞrƗvaka and pratyekabuddha Ɨrya. In all the above texts, classification of Ɨrya beings is discussed in terms of ____________ knowledge, realization and cognition (rtogs pa, shes pa). There is no any trace of ontology or monism here; 2) besides, it is necessary to take into account that all the terms that provoke looking for ontology in Buddhism (tathatƗ, tathƗgatagarbha, svabhava, etc.) are related to the path and not used generally. All these concepts are useful not on their own as metaphysical or ontological concepts, but simply as handy practical models.

All the attempts to find ontology in Buddhism are nothing but a try to insert dharma into Western intellectual paradigms. Finally it becomes clear that it is impossible. Fortunately, there are things that are incompatible. I would like to conclude these short notes with the words of recently passed away Professor Herbert V. Guenther who devoted all his life to analysis and interpretation of Tibetan texts: “[…] the use of Western categories in connection with Eastern patterns of thought is extremely misleading and in most cases reveals a considerable lack of understanding on the part of him who uses these categories”.23

REFERENCES

A Dose of Emptiness, An Annotated Translation of the sTong thun chen mo of mKhas grub dge legs dpal bzang, ed. José Ignacio Cabezón, Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series 125, Delhi, 1993.

AbhisamayƗlaükƗra-PrajñƗpƗramitƗ-UpadeĞa-ĝƗstra, The work of Bodhisattva Maitreya, ed. Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller, St. Petersburg, 1929. AbhisamayƗlaükaravçttiþ spuñarthƗ by ƖcƗrya Haribhadra, restored and ed. Ramshankar Tripathi, Sarnath, Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1993.

Byang chub semsm pa’i sa//mdzad pa po/’phags pa thogs med/ [Bodhisattvabhnjmi by Asaïga] Taipei, 2003. MahƗyƗnasnjtrƗlaükƗra by Asanga, ed. and trans. Surekha Vijay Limaye, Bibliotheca Indo-Buddhica Series 94, Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1992. Apple, James. “Twenty Varities of the Saïgha: A Typology of Noble Beings (Ɨrya) in Indo-Tibetan Scholasticism”, Journal of Indian Philosophy 31 (2003): 503–92; 32 (2004): 211–79.

Guenther, Herbert V. “Mentalism and beyond in Buddhist Philosophy”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 86, 3 (1966 Jul.–Sept.): 297–304. Hakamaya, Noriaki. Hongaku shisǀ hihan [Critiques of the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment], Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1989. Hakamaya, Noriaki. Hihan Bukkyǀ [[[Critical Buddhism]]], Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1990. Makransky, John J. Buddhahood Embodied: Sources and Controversy in India and Tibet, New York: State University of New York Press, 1997. Matsumoto, Shiro. Engi to knj: Nyoraizǀ shisǀ hihan [PratƯtyasamutpƗda and emptiness: Critiques of the Doctrine of TathƗgata-garbha], Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1989. ____________ 23

Herbert V. Guenther, “Mentalism and beyond in Buddhist Philosophy”, Journal of the American Oriental Society 86, 3 (Jul.–Sept., 1966): 298. 

Matsumoto, Shiro. Zen shisǀ no hihanteki kenkynj [Critical studieson Zen Thought], Tokyo: Daizǀ Shuppan, 1993.

Matsumoto, Shiro. “The Meaning of Zen”, in Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The storm over critical Buddhism, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997, 242–51. Matsumoto, Shiro. “TathƗgata-Garbha is not Buddhist”, in Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The storm over critical Buddhism, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i, 1997, 165–74.

Roth, Gustav. “Observations on the First Chapter of Asaïga’s Bodhisattvabhnjmi”, Indologica Taurinensia 3–4 (1975–76): 403–12. Ruegg, David Seyfort. La Théorie du TathƗgatagarbha et du Gotra. Études sur la Sotériologie et la Gnoséologie du Bouddhisme, Paris: L’École Francaise d’Extréme-Orient LXX, 1969.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. “The Meaning of the Term “Gotra” and the Textual History of the Ratnagotravibhaga”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39, 2 (1976): 341–63. Schmithausen, Lambert. Der NirvƗõa-Abschnitt in der ViniĞcayasaïgrahaõƯ der YogƗcƗrabhnjmiþ, Wien, 1969. Yamabe, Nobuyoshi. “Critical Exchange on the Idea of DhƗtu-vƗda”, in Pruning the Bodhi Tree: The storm over critical Buddhism, Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997, 205–20. Vladimir KOROBOV, Ph.D. (kanjur@delfi.lt), Lecturer of Tibetan Studies and Comparative Philosophy, Center of Oriental Studies, Vilnius University