国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要
第 14 号（平成 22 年)
Journal of the International College
for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies
Vol. XIV, 2010
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda: A Late Indian Subclassification of
̇ ̇ Madhyamaka and its Reception in Tibet
Orna Almogi
国際仏教学大学院大学研究紀要第 14 号 平成 22 年 5 月
135
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda: A Late Indian Subclassification of
̇ ̇ Madhyamaka and its Reception in Tibet＊
Orna Almogi
1. Introductory Remarks
In a recent publication I briefly touched upon the issue of subclassifications
of Madhyamaka, and in particular the rather unfamiliar subclassification
into Māyopamādvayavāda―or the “strand which maintains that [phenomena] are one, inasmuch as they are like illusions” (sgyu ma lta bu gnyis
su med par smra ba, also known as sgyu ma lta bur ’dod pa:
*māyopamamata or sgyu ma rigs grub pa; henceforth Māyopamavāda: sGyu
ma lta bur smra ba)―and Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda―or the “strand
̇̇
which maintains that all phenomena have no substratum whatsoever”
(chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas par ’dod pa, or simply rab tu mi gnas pa;
henceforth Apratisthānavāda: Rab tu mi gnas par smra ba). There I
̇̇
identified the eleventh-century Tibetan scholar Rong zom Chos kyi bzang
po (henceforth Rong zom pa) as a proponent of Apratisthānavāda, and
̇̇
argued that his philosophical stance on various issues can only be
understood within the framework of this strand of Madhyamaka.1
However, since a thorough examination of the nature of this subclassificaI would like to express my thanks to Prof. Dorji Wangchuk (University of
Hamburg) for his useful comments and suggestions and for helping to solve
＊
numerous problems concerning both philological and philosophical matters. Thanks
are also due to Prof. Harunaga Isaacson (University of Hamburg) for his suggestions
and comments regarding some doubtful Sanskrit titles, names and terms. I would
also like to thank Philip Pierce (Nepal Research Centre, Kathmandu) for
proofreading my English and for his comments in terms of both style and contents.
1 See Almogi 2009: 39-41 & 226-231.
136
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
tion was beyond the scope of my study, I announced then that it would be
dealt with elsewhere, having left numerous questions open. In the present
paper I shall therefore make a first attempt to give some answers, by
taking up where I left off, and so addressing some of the main problems or
ambiguities connected with this particular subclassification of Madhyamaka, while also briefly touching upon the Tibetan controversy surrounding it.
However, I should perhaps concede from the very outset that while I was
preparing this article for publication it became increasingly clear that I
have just barely managed to scratch the surface and that there is still a long
way to go before we can fully understand this division of Madhyamaka in
general, and Madhyamaka in Tibet during the eleventh to thirteenth
centuries in particular.
2. The Origin of the MāyopamavādaApratisthānavāda Divide
̇̇
It is well known that both ways of subclassifying Madhyamaka―that is, the
division into Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka prevalent during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet and the division into
Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and Prāsan
̇ gika-Madhyamaka prevalent during
the later propagation period―were attempts made by Tibetan scholars to
systematically define and differentiate the various strands of Madhyamaka
found in Indian sources. Although in both cases the two subclasses were
defined on the basis of accurate observations and have become standard in
Tibet, they do not―as has been pointed out by several scholars―seem to
have existed as such in India, and a characterisation of them is not without
its problems. In fact, the only explicit and clear-cut division into two
branches of Madhyamaka found in Indian sources seems to be that into
Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda―for all its having often been
̇̇
criticised by a number of Tibetan scholars.2 It is perhaps important to
2
Among the Tibetan critics were rNgog lo tsā ba, Gro lung pa, and Tsong kha pa
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
137
briefly note here that earlier Tibetan scholars such as rNgog lo tsā ba Blo
ldan shes rab (1059-1109?) criticised this subclassification as having been
made on the basis of differences in the establishment of the absolute level―
criticism that would be repeated by several later scholars. Other Tibetan
scholars, such as sTag tshang lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen (b. 1405),
defending this subclassification, pointed out several Indian sources in which
it is found. Some of these sources have already been noted by modern
scholars, such as David Seyfort Ruegg; they include the Tattvaratnāvalī of
Advayavajra
(11th
cent.),
the
*Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama
ascribed to a certain Aśvaghosa/Śūra, and Candraharipādaʼs (11th cent.)
̇
*Ratnamālā.3 One may add here Jñānavajraʼs (11th cent.?) *Tattvamārgadarśana, several other works by Advayavajra, the *Guruparamparākramopadeśa by the latterʼs disciple Vajrapāni (11th cent.), and perhaps also the
̇
bKa’ gdams bu chos ascribed to Atiśa (982-1054). As most of these works
can be dated with certainty to the eleventh century, it could well be that
this is also when this division of Madhyamaka came into vogue, and that
too, probably in circles of scholars belonging to the MadhyamakaVajrayāna synthesis.
Interestingly, most of these sources present doxographical schemes
that include these two strands of Madhyamaka. Both Candraharipādaʼs
*Ratnamālā and the bKa’ gdams bu chos divide Mahāyāna into four schools,
namely, Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda (subdivisions of Yogācāra), and
Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda (subdivisions of Madhyamaka).
̇̇
Jñānavajraʼs *Tattvamārgadarśana, following along similar lines, divides the
Mahāyāna into five schools, including, in addition to the four just mentioned,
the Sautrāntikas. Likewise, Vajrapāni, in his *Guruparamparākramopadeśa,
̇
splits the Mahāyāna (in conformity with Advayavajraʼs Tattvaratnāvalī,
and his followers, to mention only some. Concerning this group and related Tibetan
critics, along with references to their works, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 32-35.
3 See Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 34.
138
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
upon which it comments) into two strands, the Causal Vehicle of
Characteristics and the Resultant Adamantine Vehicle (for which strands,
however, Advayavajra employs the terms pāramitānaya and mantranaya).
He further divides the Causal Vehicle of Characteristics into three schools:
Sautrāntika (regarded by him as inferior), Yogācāra (regarded by him as
mediocre), and Madhyamaka (regarded by him as superior). He then goes
on to divide Yogācāra into Sākāravāda and Nirākāravāda, and Madhyamaka into Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda. I shall return to these
̇̇
doxographical schemes below, where they will be discussed in somewhat
more detail, but this brief mention of them here should suffice to
demonstrate that the MāyopamavādaApratisthānavāda divide featured
̇̇
prominently in some Indian mastersʼ systematic presentations of doxographical schemes.
Concerning the division of Madhyamaka into Māyopamavāda and
Apratisthānavāda, Seyfort Ruegg has remarked that similar terminology
̇̇
was employed in early Tibetan works, such as sKa ba dPal brtsegsʼs lTa
ba’i rim pa’i bshad pa (＝lTa ba’i rim pa’i man ngag snang ba bcu bdun),
though in a different sense.4 Indeed, my preliminary examination of this
work, and several early works by the Tibetan scholar dPal dbyangs, leads
me to believe that in no case do the terms sgyu ma lta bu and rab tu mi gnas
pa (with variants such as mi gnas pa and gnas med pa, or the term rten med
(pa), again a rendering of apratisthāna)5 refer to two different branches of
̇̇
Madhyamaka, but are apparently used, rather, to refer to the same thing,
namely, the nonexistence of phenomena as real entities. Nonetheless, it
appears that at least in some (Tibetan) sources, sgyu ma lta bu was used to
describe phenomena while establishing the conventional level, and rab tu
mi gnas pa to describe phenomena while establishing the ultimate level,
4
5
Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 58-59, n. 174; Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 34, n. 60.
On these and similar terms, see Almogi 2009: 231.
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
139
which may, however, reflect the Apratisthānavāda position.6
̇̇
3. Discussions in Indian Sources
In the following I shall present―by way of either citation or summary―
several passages from Indian sources in Tibetan translation in which the
Māyopamavāda―Apratisthānavāda division of Madhyamaka is discussed.7
̇̇
6
See the Thugs rje spyan thag gi gnas―the first of five short texts (lung) found in
the mDo rgyud rtogs pa’i sgron ma discovered by Nyang ral (and said to have been
translated by Padmasambhava and Vairocana)―where it is stated (P, 246b4; not
found in D; S, vol. 44: 573.18-19):
The Muni stated that
It is in reliance on the two truths
That the illusory [versus] the substratumless [nature of phenomena] has been
taught.
bden pa gnyis la rab brten nas￤
sgyu ma rab tu mi gnas pa￤
nges par bden [＝bstan?] zhes thub pas gsungs￤ .
Similarly, the gSang sngags nges par byed pa’i don, the fourth text in the mDo rgyud
rtogs pa’i sgron ma, while apparently emphasising the indivisibility of the two truths
from the point of view of Mantrayāna, provides as one [speculative] etymology of
the word ʻmantraʼ the following (P, 252b3-4; S, vol. 44: 585.19-586.1):
[The syllable] ma [means that phenomena are] like dreams [or] illusions;
[The syllable] tra [means that] they have no substratum, [but that they
nevertheless] appear;
Seeing that the [two] meanings [of phenomena as being like] illusions and [as]
having no substratum
Are indivisible is the meaning of ʻmantra.ʼ
ma ni rmi lam sgyu ma bzhin￤
tra ni de la gnas med gsal￤
sgyu ma rab tu mi gnas don￤
dbyer med mthong ba gsang sngags don￤.
7 All Tibetan texts of the Indian and Tibetan sources cited or summarised in the
present study―except for the long passage from Jñānavajraʼs *Tattvamārgadarśana,
of which merely the main points have been summarised―are provided in the
appendix.
140
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
Tellingly, all authors cited seem to be Apratisthānavādins, inasmuch as in
̇̇
all cases the Apratisthānavāda position is presented as doxographically
̇̇
higher, whereas the Māyopamavāda position is vehemently criticised.
(a) Aśvaghosa/Śūra
̇
The *Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama is a short versified work that
has been ascribed to Aśvaghosa (or Śūra) and was translated by
̇
Padmākaravarman and Rin chen bzang po. It has the characteristics of a
doxography and briefly describes and refutes the philosophical positions of
the non-Madhyamaka Buddhist systems. The work seeks to examine ʻthe
nature of the mind, that is, reality which is blissʼ (sems nyid bde ba’i de
nyid) by employing the so-called tetralemma analysis (spelled out, for
example, in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā 1.1). The two kinds of Madhyamaka systems presupposed by it are obviously Māyopamavāda and
Apratisthānavāda, although these terms are not used. For Māyopamavāda
̇̇
can be described as the position, so described there, according to which
phenomena, when not analysed, impinge on the subject as ʻmere illusions,ʼ
and when analysed, can be shown to be indeed deceptive. And
Apratisthānavāda can likewise be described as a position according to
̇̇
which the true nature of phenomena is that they lack a substratum;
moreover, although this nature is expressed by terms such as ʻemptiness,ʼ
emptiness itself is empty, and although it can be illustrated by means of
analogies such as ʻlike an illusion,ʼ it is actually not an object susceptible of
illustration. The text argues that the very terms employed to designate the
various phenomena do not themselves exist, and that in fact there is
nothing to be eliminated. According to it, not perceiving any phenomena
constitutes awakening. One important difference that the author seems to
see between Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda concerns the method
̇̇
of gaining access to true reality. For the former, true reality is attestable in
the form of some kind of affirmation, whereas for the latter it is not. It is
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
141
argued, from the second point of view, that the logical fallacies that
necessarily result from any affirmation would be subsumable under the
fallacies resulting from the postulation of one of the four extremes (i.e.,
here, existence, nonexistence, both, or neither). The author thus suggests
that because Māyopamavāda resorts to some kind of affirmation it cannot
defend itself against the charge of positing one or the other of the
extremes.8
If [one assumes that] the fallacies [incurred by] all affirmations
Are subsumable under these (i.e. the fallacies of maintaining one of the
four extreme positions],
Then [Māyopamavāda] is deluded, inasmuch as [it on the one hand
accepts phenomena] in a non-analytical and naive manner,
[And on the other,] based on analysis, [it affirms that their true
nature] is mere illusion. (1)
Even those [who maintain that] mind [partakes of] an aspect of
illusion
And [that] awakening, too, is like an illusion,9
Are not [able to] see the verbally inexpressible
Freedom from manifoldness, namely, Mañjuśrī (i.e. in his definitive,
ʻontologicalʼ sense). (2)
The illusory [nature proposed by you can]not [be expressed in terms
of] mere illusion.
If it [could] be, it would not be [logically] attestable.
*Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama (P, 18a6-b4; D, 16a3-7; S, vol. 64: 46.847.3).
9 These two lines also occur within a longer passage of citations in Rong zom paʼs
Rang byung ye shes (121.12-18), dKon cog ’grel (199.5-11), and Theg tshul (447.118
15). In the Rang byung ye shes, the source indicated is a certain Māyājālatantra (sGyu
’phrul drwa ba’i rgyud).
142
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
If it were attestable, it would follow
That other (i.e. non-Buddhist) systems, too, [would be propounding
the same] doctrine of illusionism.
Therefore the nature of illusion is [such that]
It is not expressible through [statements such as] “It is like an
illusion.” (3)
Nonetheless, the Compassionate One (i.e. the Buddha),
Resting [on the scheme of] the two modes of reality,
Proclaimed the [doctrine of] no-self, [which is like] a lionʼs roar,
In reliance on the conventional [mode of] reality. (4)
*Apratisthāna-Madhyamaka is illustrated
̇̇
Through the different modes of the various vehicles,10
[Namely,] by means of synonymous terms such as ʻemptinessʼ
[And by] numerous analogies, such as ʻbeing like illusions.ʼ (5)
[But] although [an attempt can be made] to illustrate [true reality, it
is] not an object [susceptible] of illustration.
There is nothing whatsoever to be eliminated with regard to it.
Given that [it] is empty, emptiness, too, is empty.
In this [dimension] there are neither buddhas nor sentient beings. (6)
Self and other, phenomena [as they] appear and [as they] exist,
Release and bondage are mere names.
[But] names [ultimately] do not exist either.
Everything resembles space. (7)
Thus, when phenomena are not perceived,
[That very] non-manifestation or non-perception is [considered to be]
perceiving Mañjuśrī.11
On the notion of various vehicles, see Wangchuk 2007: 118-119, where
references to Indian and Tibetan sources are provided.
11 On the notion of knowing or perceiving nothing being the correct seeing, see
MacDonald 2009.
10
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
143
[In this way one] crosses the ocean of samsāra,
̇
An existence [subject to] birth and dying. (8)
(b) Candraharipāda
As I have pointed out elsewhere, Candraharipāda―a Kāśmīri master from
whom Rin chen bzang po (958-1055) and rNgog lo chung Legs paʼi shes rab
(b. 10th cent.) received a number of Tantric initiations12―in his
*Ratnamālā divides Buddhist thought up into seven schools, namely, into
Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Pratyekabuddha, Sākāra[vāda], Nirākāra[vāda],
̇
Māyopama[vāda], and Apratisthāna[vāda].13 Since Candraharipādaʼs
̇̇
treatment of the schools is rather unsystematic―the work merely
consisting of a collection of verses cited from or inspired by various
Buddhist treatises―it is quite difficult to determine from it exactly what he
conceives the difference between the positions of Māyopamavāda and
Apratisthānavāda to be. I shall, however, quote a few verses that are
̇̇
revealing in this regard. The position of the Māyopamavāda (presupposing
Yogācāra doctrinal elements) seems to be expressed in the following lines
of verse, stating that according to this school of thought phenomena, when
analysed on the basis of logical reasoning, are found to be free from the
extremes of existence and nonexistence, and when not so examined, are
found to be of two kinds, either inanimate matter or cognition:14
Self-cognition [as the ultimately existent phenomenon], which is the
outcome of [Yogācāraʼs] refutation of the absolute [of the lower
See Almogi 2009: 180.
*Ratnamālā (P, 66b5-6; D, 68b4; S, vol. 63: 1039.15-16): sangs rgyas pa ni rnam
bdun te‖ bye brag smra dang mdo sde pa‖ rang rgyal rnam bcas rnam med dang‖
12
13
sgyu ma rab tu mi gnas pa‖. See also Almogi 2009: 311.
14 *Ratnamālā (P, 69a6-7; D, 71a4; S, vol. 63: 1045.12-14). The meaning of the first
two lines is not very clear to me, and the translation provided here is thus tentative.
144
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
systems, which they consider] to be conceptually constructed
(brtags pa’i yang dag),
[Is in fact] an illusory conglomerate.
[Phenomena, when] examined [on the basis of] logical reasoning, turn
out to be free from the extremes of existence and nonexistence,
While if [they are viewed] in a non-analytical, naive manner, both
inanimate matter (bems [po]: jada) and cognitive [constructs are
̇
possible].
A few lines later, Candraharipāda presents a critique of this position―
presumably put forward by Apratisthānavādins. First it is pointed out that
̇̇
the postulation of real entities leads to unwarranted conclusions, and these
in turn inevitably lead to disputes, an idea found already in earlier
Madhyamaka works such as the Yuktisastikā.15 Candraharipādaʼs presentȧ ̇̇
tion of the issue seems to make it clear that the main bone of contention
between Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda, at least from the latterʼs
̇̇
standpoint, is not the illusory nature ascribed to phenomena or the
description of appearances as illusion-like, but rather the ontological status
of this illusory nature or these illusion-like appearances. The Apratisthānȧ̇
vādinsʼ greatest difficulty seems to be the position attributed to
Māyopamavāda according to which the ʻillusory [nature of phenomena] is
attestable on the basis of logical reasoningʼ (sgyu ma rigs pas grub [pa])―
which explains why Māyopamavāda has often been designated in Tibetan
sources as sGyu ma rigs grub pa. An Apratisthānavādin would have no
̇̇
difficulty in admitting that all phenomena are illusion-like or illusory in
nature insofar as this is accepted as a non-analytical, naive stance as
opposed to a verity based on logical reasoning. (The question as to whether
a Māyopamavādin would indeed posit that the illusory nature of
15
Yuktisastikā 46 (Lindtner 1997: 86 & 175).
̇ ̇̇
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
145
phenomena is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning is a separate
matter.)
It is argued that a demonstration of the illusory nature of phenomena
on the basis of logical reasoning―something which, although not explicitly
stated by Candraharipāda, seems, according to other sources cited in the
present study, to be the conclusion drawn by the Māyopamavādins, in line
with their stance just cited―leads to the logical flaw that phenomena
would then be real, and generally questions the logic behind resorting to
the term ʻillusionʼ in order to illustrate things that have been shown to be
unreal:16
If the illusory [nature of phenomena could] be attested on the basis of
logical reasoning―
Inasmuch as [all phenomena as they] appear [and as they] exist are
illusion-like
And gnoses and buddhas [too] are illusory―
It would follow that [phenomena] are not illusory but [rather] real.
If [the Māyopamavādins then] said: “No, [that] would not follow,
inasmuch it [can] be attested that [phenomena] are illusory,”
[Then either] the meaning ʻlogically attestableʼ would not be
applicable,17
[Or] there would be no point in applying the term ʻillusionʼ [in the first
place].
The learned ones hold that such [a position], too,
Has not transcended the demon of clinging to entities.
The Apratisthānavāda view is presented in the verses that follow. In the
̇̇
16
17
*Ratnamālā (P, 69a8-b1; D, 71a5-6; S, vol. 63: 1045.17-1046.1).
Or: “[Then] a logically attestable entity would be unreal.”
146
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
first few lines, the nature of phenomena is stated to be such that it can be
established as neither of the components of such pairs as existent and
nonexistent, empty and non-empty, illusory and real, or samsāra and
̇
nirvāna. Then, in the remaining lines, the notion that there is nothing that
̇
can be eliminated or added is underscored, and the view that gnosis does
not exist at the stage of a buddha is urged.18
(c) Jñānavajra
Jñānavajra (fl. 11th cent.?), in his *Tattvamārgadarśana, identifies five
philosophical tenets of Mahāyāna, referred to by him as ʻbasesʼ or
ʻfundamentalsʼ (rten): Sautrāntika, Sākāravāda, Nirākāravāda, Māyopamavāda, and Apratisthānavāda. He discusses these tenets under four points:
̇̇
conduct (spyod lam), view (lta ba), meditation (bsgom pa), and flaws
(skyon), and provides lengthy and detailed descriptions of each of them. But
unfortunately the Tibetan translation is very poor, which significantly
hinders an understanding of the text. I shall nonetheless attempt to provide
here a summary of the main points on the basis of my preliminary reading.
First, Jñānavajra states that while there are no differences in regard to the
conduct advocated by the above-mentioned five Mahāyāna tenets, there
are differences in regard to their views, which he then summarises as
follows:19
It is maintained that the five [tenets] do not differ in regard to the
conduct during these three phases (i.e. preparatory, actual, and
posterior phases of conduct), but that there are differences in regard to
The verses proclaiming that there is nothing to be eliminated or added and
those dealing with the question concerning the existence of gnosis at the stage of a
18
buddha have been translated and critically edited in Almogi 2009: 311-314 & 436437, respectively.
19 *Tattvamārgadarśana (P, 148a5-8; D, 133a7-b2; S, vol. 41: 356.7-12).
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
147
[their] views. [Their positions in regard to all] three―preparatory,
actual, and posterior [phases of conduct are as follows]: Sautrāntika
holds to [the notion of] dependent arising. Sākāra[vāda] holds to [the
existence of] mental images. Nirākāra[vāda] holds to [the existence
of] ʻgood conceptionʼ (i.e. pure cognition). Māyopama[vāda] holds that
[phenomena] are like illusions. Apratisthāna[vāda maintains that]
̇̇
although [this] is [the case on] the conventional level, [it] is not [so
on] the absolute level. [It] holds that [on the conventional level they]
are unreal appearances, like a dream. [But] regarding the absolute
level they take no stand. The other [tenets] take positions in regard to
the absolute.
Jñānavajraʼs discussion of the views of the two Madhyamaka systems can
be tentatively summarised as follows:20 The Māyopamavādins reject the
positions of both Sākāravāda (i.e. here clearly Satyākāravāda, which
maintains the existence of true images) and Nirākāravāda (which
maintains the nonexistence of images), asserting that it is neither the case
that images are true nor that there are no images, but rather that images
are like illusions, which, like any other phenomena, are impermanent on
account of being momentary, but at the same time continuous (skad cig gis
mi rtag la rgyun du gnas), that is, in terms of their mode of appearance.
Therefore, according to them, on the absolute level images, when analysed,
are unattestable; still, the illusions are true, since otherwise experiencing
happiness or suffering would be fictitious (brdzun), and it would then be
pointless to strive for Buddhahood, while the four buddha-Bodies for their
part would not exist either. In support they refer to Buddhaguhya who,
according to them, claimed to have shown, on the basis of logical reasoning,
The summary presented here is based on *Tattvamārgadarśana (P, 160a5162b5; D, 143b3-145b4; S, vol. 41: 382.3-387.8).
20
148
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
that the physical Bodies are like illusions [resulting from] residual
impressions (bag chags); and Kamalaraksita, who maintained that ʻtheseʼ
̇
(i.e. the non-establishment of images and their being established as
illusions?) reflect the state of meditative absorption and the postmeditative state, [respectively]. They also refer to the position of others
according to which the physical Bodies appear to sentient beings without
any intervening conceptualising.
The Apratisthānavādins reject all previous positions, asserting that all
̇̇
of them merely apply to the conventional level, while arguing that in the
case of the absolute level neither negative determination (vyavaccheda:
rnam par bcad pa) nor positive determination (pariccheda: yongs su gcod
pa) is valid. They, too, are said to resort to the ʻfour great syllogismsʼ (gtan
tshigs chen po bzhi) of Madhyamaka. Only three of them, however, are
identical with those of other systems, while the fourth one is called the ʻnonestablishment of the objects of knowledge and the knowerʼ (shes bya shes
byed ma grub pa).21 They first set about refuting the charge that they
advocate annihilationism, arguing that all the entities that the Māyopamavādins claim exist on the absolute level as illusions―namely, the mind in its
true nature, emptiness, the perfection of insight, and the dharmakāya―are
Jñānavajra uses here the rather late collective term gtan tshig chen po bzhi,
which became very popular among Tibetan Mādhyamikas. For a number of
references to this collective term (including in the Madhyamakārthasamgraha by
̇
the later Bhāviveka/Bhavya and the Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā ascribed to Atiśa),
see Mimaki 1982: 212, n. 547 (I thank Dr. Anne MacDonald (University of Vienna),
for pointing out this reference to me). Of the commonly known four great syllogisms,
the Apratisthānavādins are said by Jñānavajra to make use ofʻvajra slivers/fraġ̇
mentsʼ (rdo rje gzegs ma: vajrakana), ʻnegation of arising in terms of the four limitsʼ
̇
(mu bzhi skye ba ’gog pa: catuskotyutpādapratisedha), and ʻbeing free from the one
̇ ̇
̇
and the manyʼ (gcig dang du ma dang bral ba: ekānekaviyoga), but to replace
ʻdependent arisingʼ (rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba: pratītyasamutpāda) with ʻnonestablishment of the objects of knowledge and the knowerʼ (shes bya shes byed ma
grub pa).
21
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
149
in fact merely conventional [phenomena resulting from] dependent
arising. Since the Apratisthānavādins accept that phenomena on the
̇̇
conventional level are mere illusions, they cannot be accused of
annihilationism when they reject the Māyopamavādinsʼ postulation that
these illusions are true on the absolute level. After presenting their
application of the four great syllogisms to establish their case, Jñānavajra
highlights some of the points of disagreement between the two branches, in
the form of objections and replies. The Apratisthānavādins, having no
̇̇
theses in regard to the absolute, refute the Māyopamavādinsʼ postulations
concerning the absolute by means of a series of reductiones ad absurdum
(prasaṅga). The objection posed by the Māyopamavādins that if, on the
conventional level, phenomena are illusions, it would follow that it would be
no use striving for Buddhahood, [because then even an ordinary being
would have access to the true nature of phenomena], is rejected by arguing
that even if one accepts the Māyopamavādinsʼ postulation regarding the
absolute, it need not be equally applicable to the conventional [since the
distinctive features of individual phenomena are still retained on the
conventional level]: just as the functions of water and fire are different and
the sensations of bliss and suffering are different, so are samsāra and
̇
nirvāna, and thus there is no problem in accepting the dharmakāya,
̇
svābhāvikakāya, and the two rūpakāyas as conventional phenomena.
In what follows, the objections and replies mainly revolves around the
Māyopamavādinsʼ critique, and in fact rejection, of the Apratisthānavādinsʼ
̇̇
claim that, unlike the Māyopamavādins, who attempt to establish the
absolute in the form of a positive determination, they, in their refusal to
formulate either a negative or a positive determination, have no thesis in
regard to the absolute. First, in an allusion to the fourth syllogism applied
by the Apratisthānavādins, the Māyopamavādins pose the question
̇̇
whether their claim that they have no proof (shes byed) refers to the
absolute or to the conventional level, to which the Apratisthānavādins
̇̇
150
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
reply that in regard to the absolute they have no thesis, and therefore they
need no proof, while in regard to the conventional neither a proof (shes
byed) nor something to be proven (shes bya) would make any difference in
view of the continuum nature of phenomena, which is characterised by
momentariness. Then they go on to rebuff the next possible critique―that
if they put forward neither a proof nor something to be proven, they are
propagating nihilism―by arguing that since they have nothing to postulate
they cannot be accused of being nihilist, any more than space can be
accused of any fault. The Māyopamavādins then confront the Apratisthā̇̇
navādins with the following critique: You claim that neither a negative nor
a positive determination can be achieved. This negatively determining the
fault of nihilism, however, amounts to establishing it in the form of a
positive determination. So you, too, are left with a positive determination;
for you, too, there is something that can be determined on the basis of
analysis of the absolute. The Apratisthānavādins, in reply, continue to insist
̇̇
that their attempting neither a negative nor a positive determination in
regard to the absolute means that they have no thesis, and accuse the
Māyopamavādins, in their own attempt to establish the absolute by
formulating a positive determination, of wrongly concluding―having found
fault with the Apratisthānavādinsʼ analysis of the conventional―that the
̇̇
Apratisthānavādins have come to a negative determination on the
̇̇
conventional level, which, as in their own case, would naturally result in a
positive determination on the absolute level. The Apratisthānavādins,
̇̇
however, claim that, on the basis of their analysis of the conventional level,
they merely establish that there is nothing to be established on the absolute
level; they do not make any assertions regarding the absolute, as the
Māyopamavādins do. The Māyopamavādins retort that the positive
determination applied by the Apratisthānavādins to the conventional level
̇̇
cannot, in that case, be established22 on that level, with which observation
the Apratisthānavādins agree. Consequently the Māyopamavādins enquire
̇̇
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
151
whether this non-establishment of a positive determination can be
determined, and argue that if it can, whether in the form of either a positive
or negative determination, then the Apratisthānavādins too, like the
̇̇
Māyopamavādins, would be bound by such a determination, while if they
reject both negative and positive determinations, they would never be able
to prove anything, as nothing can be proven without a proof. In response,
the Apratisthānavādins claim that they negatively determine what is
̇̇
postulated by the Māyopamavādins regarding the absolute level, disproving it by an analysis of the conventional level, and that this refutation is
established on the conventional level. Both positive and negative
determinations eventually cease being compelling or come to a natural
standstill (rang zhi ba)―in other words, become redundant―on the
conventional level, and thus no ʻexcluderʼ (sel byed) need be proposed by
them for the absolute level. The expressions ʻnot affirmedʼ and ʻabsolute
level,ʼ they argue, refer to nothing but this state of affairs, and can be
regarded as conventional, inasmuch as one cannot avoid expressing them.
They agree that what is to be established (ci ’grub) is the absolute, and
further, that on the conventional level that which is indeterminate (ci yang
ma yin pa) is transient, being, like a river, an undisrupted chain of moments.
The Māyopamavādins, in a last attempt to point out further fallacies in
the Apratisthānavādinsʼ position, ask whether the latterʼs non-postulation
̇̇
of any thesis―which is based on the ʻcoming to a standstillʼ of the negative
determinations set forth by the Māyopamavādins and their own setting
forth of positive determinations (considered by themselves as valid)―has
come about in the form of some negative determination or not. If not, then
they submit that it must be on the basis of some positive determination, for
otherwise they would incur the fault of postulating a third alternative
P reads grub pa ma, D reads grub pa man (P, 162a5; D, 145a5; S, vol. 41: 386.7).
The text should clearly read either grub pa min or, perhaps better, grub pa med, as in
the immediately following sentence.
22
152
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
(phung po gsum pa’i skyon). They go on to ask whether, if it has come about
in the form of some negative determination, the determinant (gcod byed)
has arisen from some other determinant or from itself, and argue that
neither can be the case. This, too, is rejected by the Apratisthānavādins,
̇̇
who counter with the following examples: Seeing and hearing exist due to
the existence of objects that are respectively visible forms and audible
sounds, and if there were no such objects, the sense faculties would induce
neither seeing nor hearing, and thus if these conditions were not present
the sense faculties would naturally disappear. Likewise, as long as fuel has
not been spent a fire will keep burning, whereas once it has been, the fire
will naturally die away. Thus, they state, there is nothing that can be
negatively determined, and hence [phenomena] are by nature devoid of a
substratum.
(d) Advayavajra
There are two short versified works ascribed to Advayavajra (alias
Avadhūtapāda or Maitrīpa) devoted to an explanation of the terms māyā
and apratisthāna, namely, the Māyānirukti and Apratisthānaprakāśa.23 Since
̇̇
̇̇
these two works, extant in both the Sanskrit originals and their Tibetan
translations, focus on the meaning of the terms māyā and apratisthāna and
̇̇
not on the Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda branches of Madhyamȧ̇
ka, they do not provide information regarding the employment of the two
terms by the two branches or the differences between these branches, and
thus I shall not discuss them here. In his Tattvaratnāvalī, which is a
somewhat longer work (also available in both Sanskrit and Tibetan),
Sanskrit editions of the Māyānirukti and Apratisthānaprakāśa are found in
̇̇
Mikkyō-seiten kenkyūkai [Study Group on Sacred Tantric Texts] (ed.), “Advaya23
vajrasamgraha: New Critical Edition with Japanese Translation” (3＋4). AICSB 12,
̇
1990: 313-310 (52-55) and AICSB 13, 1991: 259-256 (78-81), respectively; their
Tibetan translations are P3078, D2234 and P3079, D2235, respectively.
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
153
Advayavajra explicitly refers to both Madhyamaka branches and deals
with them briefly.24 According to him, the Māyopamavādins hold that
phenomena, when analysed, are found to be free from the four extremes of
existence, nonexistence, both, and neither, and so long as they are not
analysed, can be accepted as existing in the manifold ways they appear.
They do not see this as contradictory since they consider phenomena to be
one, inasmuch as they are like illusions. The Apratisthānavādins for their
̇̇
part maintain that phenomena are not their various designations, and insist
that they do not propagate annihilationism, since according to them
phenomena are neither eternal nor are they disrupted, nor are they both or
neither of the two. The true nature of phenomena is that they are all devoid
of a substratum. I shall treat this brief presentation by Advayavajra in
more detail below on the basis of the rather elaborate commentary by his
disciple Vajrapāni.
̇
Further, in his *Apratisthānadeśakavrtti, Advayavajra briefly presents
̇̇
̇
the view of Yogācāra, only to refute it with the aid of authoritative citations
and logical reasoning, both of which he refers to as the great fangs of the
lion-like *Apratisthānavāda-Madhyamaka, which [opponents] cannot
̇̇
withstand (rab tu mi gnas par smra ba’i dbu ma seng ge lta bu’i lung rigs kyi
mche ba ches mi bzad pa). First, a certain sūtra is cited in which five
methods of examining phenomena are noted, apparently corresponding to
Sautrāntika, Sākāravāda, Nirākāravāda, Māyopamavāda, and Apratisthā̇̇
navāda, respectively:25
(1) All phenomena exist in the manner they appear, since phenomena,
which are rooted in the four elements, exist on the conventional level
like illusions.
Tattvaratnāvalī (6.12-7.11 (§ III)); Tib. (P, 129a3-b6; D, 118a7-119a1; S, vol. 26:
343.1-344.9).
25 *Apratisthānadeśakavrtti (P, 234b5-235a5; D, 215a3-b3; S, vol. 26: 1535.7-1536.8).
̇̇
̇
24
154
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
(2) All phenomena are nothing but mind, since phenomena, variously
designated, appear at all times variously as a self or as objects, on the
basis of residual impressions implanted in the mind, giving a sense of
permanence and continuance as conceptual constructs. On the
ultimate level, however, they have no own-nature since they do not
exist apart from the mind.
(3) The mind itself has not arisen, since it has neither shape nor colour, nor
is it subjected to the three times, nor does it have a periphery or
middle.
(4) All phenomena appear in the form of illusions and, like illusions, cannot
be established, since all phenomena arise and emerge from causes and
conditions.
(5) All phenomena are by nature non-arisen and by nature devoid of a
substratum, are free from all extremes associated with actors and
actions (? las dang bya ba’i mtha’), are beyond the domain of
conceptual and non-conceptual, and are primordially free from
manifoldness, since all this being the true nature of all phenomena.
This is followed by the following logical argumentation:26
What is the logical reasoning? The extant well-expounded writings of
great beings of the past state that as all phenomena have simply arisen
in accordance with the mechanism of dependent arising, they are like
illusions. Thus, on the ultimate level, the arising from themselves,
something else, both, or causelessly is not at all tenable, and so on the
ultimate level they are like a ʻsky lotus.ʼ This teaching alone is
sufficient. If those endowed with the eye of insight would undertake a
straightforward, careful examination on the basis of the syllogism of
26
*Apratisthānadeśakavrtti (P, 235a5-8; D, 215b4-6; S, vol. 26: 1536.8-16).
̇̇
̇
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
155
identity (rang bzhin gyi gtan tshigs: svabhāvahetu) alone, they [would
realise that] in the end nothing attestable [can] be found, and thus it is
established that all phenomena are devoid of a substratum.
(e) Vajrapāniʼs *Guruparamparākramopadeśa
̇
The eleventh-century master Vajrapāni, in his *Guruparamparākramȯ
padeśa, adopts the doxographical scheme of his master Advayavajra found
in the Tattvaratnāvalī, dividing the entire Buddhist system as follows:27
The three Vehicles―Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna―
rest on a total of four ʻbasesʼ (i.e. tenets), namely, Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika,
̇
Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka. Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna
follow Vaibhāsika, which in turn is divided into two, Western Vaibhāsika
̇
̇
and Kāśmīra Vaibhāsika. Śrāvakayāna is divided into three corresponding
̇
to disciplesʼ faculties, namely, dull, mediocre, and sharp. Those with dull and
mediocre faculties are said to follow Western Vaibhāsika, and those with
̇
sharp faculties and those following Pratyekabuddhayāna, Kāśmīra
Vaibhāsika. Mahāyāna is first divided into two, namely, Causal *Laksȧ
̇
nayāna and Resultant Vajrayāna. The Causal *Laksanayāna is then divided
̇
̇ ̇
into three, again corresponding to disciplesʼ faculties: for those with dull
faculties, Sautrāntika; for those with mediocre faculties, Yogācāra; and for
those with sharp faculties, Madhyamaka. Both Yogācāra and Madhyamaka
are further divided into two, namely, the former into Sākāravāda and
Nirākāravāda, and the latter into Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda.
̇̇
Vajrapāni then discusses the total of nine systems introduced by him―
̇
three subdivisions of Śrāvakayāna for disciples with dull, mediocre, and
sharp faculties (1-3); Pratyekabuddhayāna (4); the three subdivisions of
Causal *Laksanayāna for disciples with dull, mediocre, and sharp faculties,
̇ ̇
*Guruparamparākramopadeśa (P, 184b6-185a3; D, 164b4-165a1; S, vol. 41:
446.10-447.13). The partitioning as found in Advayavajraʼs Tattvaratnāvalī is cited
and discussed in Mathes 2007: 548-549.
27
156
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
that is, Sautrāntika (5), Yogācāra with its two subdivisions of Sākāravāda
and Nirākāravāda (6-7), and Madhyamaka with its two subdivisions of
Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda (8-9)―under four points:28 discerṅ̇
ment (so sor rtog pa: pratyaveksana), meditation (sgom pa: bhāvanā), stains
̇ ̇
(i.e. risks) in meditation [that should be avoided] (sgom pa’i dri ma), and
view (lta ba: drsti/darśana).29
̇ ̇̇
In his discussion of Māyopamavāda, Vajrapāni first cites and
̇
comments upon the four lines of verse from Advayavajraʼs Tattvaratnāvalī
according to which the Māyopamavādins hold that phenomena, when
analysed, are found to be free from the four extremes of existence,
nonexistence, both, and neither,30 and then goes on to comment as follows:31
Now I shall explain the Māyopama[vāda] system:
[[…]]
Therefore, it claims [the existence of] a luminous cognition that is like
an illusion and free from the four extremes (i.e. of existence,
nonexistence, both, and neither). Moreover, it teaches that nirvānic
̇
phenomena, too, are like illusions [or] like dreams, and that even if
there were a phenomenon superior to nirvāna, it, too, would be like an
̇
illusion [or] like a dream.32 Therefore, the diverse [phenomena] and
the mind itself are one insofar as they are like illusions. This is the
For a further discussion on this notion of four tenets and nine systems, see Rig
ralʼs bSlab pa gsum gyi rgyan gyi me tog (393.3ff).
29 *Guruparamparākramopadeśa (P, 185a3-4; D, 165a1-2; S, vol. 41: 447.14-15): de
ltar na sbyor ba dgu la dbye ba bzhi bzhi ste｜ so sor rtog pa dang｜ sgom pa dang｜
28
sgom pa’i dri ma dang｜ lta ba’o‖.
30 The citation has not been translated here, but it is provided in the critically
edited text found in the appendix.
31 *Guruparamparākramopadeśa (P, 189a3-b6; D, 168a7-169a1; S, vol. 41: 456.11457.19).
32 A similar statement is found in Rong zom paʼs Theg tshul (447.16-17).
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
157
discernment [of Māyopamavāda]. Maintaining [the realisation that]
all the various [phenomena] are one insofar as they are like illusions,
neither real nor false―like the moon [seen on a body of] water or a
reflection in a mirror―is the meditation [of Māyopamavāda].
Attachment to [the extreme of] annihilationism is [considered by it] a
stain in meditation [that should be avoided]. Acting for the sake of
sentient beings after purifying the [first] five perfections in regard to
the three spheres [of actor, act, and recipient] by means of the three
non-objectifications―by means, [that is,] of a perfection of insight
[that cognises that phenomena] are like illusions―is the view [of
Māyopamavāda].33
Further, [Apratisthānavāda] maintains, as follows, that because all
̇̇
phenomena are devoid of a substratum, that which is like an illusion
[can]not be established:34
No one has ever seen [phenomena]―
Be they conspicuous or inconspicuous―as they [really] are.
Thus although [they] may be expressible in words, [they] are
devoid of content,
Just like [the expression] ʻthe son of a barren woman.ʼ
[Query:] Is that which is like an illusion something luminous (i.e. a
cognitive entity) or is it something other than the mind (sems)?
[Response:] A phenomenon that is other than the mind is not attested.
If it is the mind, on the level where the mind itself [can]not be
established, that which is illusion [can]not be established either. Why
is that so ? Because there is nothing other than the mind itself.
The employment of the term ʻviewʼ here (as in the parallel passage concerning
Apratisthānavāda cited below) is unusual. One would expect a term such as
̇̇
ʻconductʼ (spyod pa), whereas under the first point, where one would indeed expect
ʻview,ʼ our author uses the term ʻdiscernment.ʼ
34 The source of this verse could not be identified.
33
158
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
[Perceiving phenomena as being something] like an illusion is the
cognition of an injudicious person, [entailing as it does both] false
imputation and false depreciation. For example, if a person with
diseased eyes looks at the sky, [he] would say, under the influence of
his diseased eyes, that a second moon, balls of hair, or the like appear,
[thereby] falsely imputing [existence to them]; a judicious person,
with his knowledge, on the other hand, would recognise, as soon as
[they] appear, that [these phenomena] do not exist, and say that
[they] do not exist, [thereby] falsely depreciating [their appearance].
Likewise, saying that illusion-like [phenomena] appear in various
[forms] on account of [oneʼs] karma and ignorance is false imputation;
and the statement that [they] are like illusions―made on account of a
judicious personʼs aptitude [for recognising these phenomena], as soon
as [they] appear, to be empty―is false depreciation.35 Therefore
[Māyopamavāda] rests on the extremes of false imputation and false
depreciation.
In his discussion of Apratisthānavāda, Vajrapāni first cites three verses
̇̇
̇
from Advayavajraʼs Tattvaratnāvalī―the first presenting the view that
phenomena are found to be free from the four extremes of eternalism,
annihilationism, both, and neither36―follows with a citation of Abhisamayālamkāra 5.21 (＝Ratnagotravibhāga 1.154)37,38 and then proceeds to
̇
expand on them as follows:39
For the employment of the same analogy (also found in the following passage)
by *Madhyamaka-Simha, see Almogi 2009: 303.
̇
36 For a translation and a discussion of these three verses, particularly from the
point of view of Mahāmudrā, see Mathes 2007: 551-558.
37 For further references and a translation of this verse, see Wangchuk 2007: 199200, n. 11; Almogi 2009: 312.
38 The citations have not been translated here, but they are provided in the
critically edited text found in the appendix.
35
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
159
Furthermore, the position of the Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda:
̇̇
[[…]]
It rests neither on false imputation of existence nor on depreciation
into nonexistence. The experiencing of the mind as various appearances is [the result of] dependent origination, and thus [phenomena]
are non-arisen. That which is non-arisen appears as if [it] arises, and
thus the two―arising and non-arising―are not different [from each
other]. Likewise, if one examines, on the basis of logical reasoning, that
which appears, [one realises that it] is empty; while that which is
empty, unattested, and unable to withstand logical analysis is
appearance. That which is empty is nothing but appearance, and
appearance is nothing but that which is empty. For example, the
appearance of water in a Fata Morgana is empty of water, and the
absence of water [in it] appears as water.40 The two―the waterʼs
appearance and the absence of water [in it]―are not different [from
each other]. Likewise, an appearance has no own-nature, while that
which has no own-nature appears. An appearance and the lack of an
own-nature, [which latter means] emptiness, are not different [from
each other]. For example, if a bundle of firewood is consumed by fire,
[it becomes] one in essence with the fire. Then, once the firewood is
exhausted, the fire does not exist [any more]. Likewise, once [the
nature of all] the diverse appearances has been established as
emptiness, on the basis of logical reasoning, [one realises that] even
the nonexistence of entities and emptiness do not subsist.41 Similarly,
*Guruparamparākramopadeśa (P, 189b6-190b5; D, 169a1-b5; S, vol. 41: 457.20459.21). Compare Mathes 2007: 558-562, where some portions of Vajrapāniʼs
̇
treatment of Apratisthānavāda are cited and translated.
̇̇
40 For Rong zom paʼs employment of this analogy in his dKon cog ’grel, see Almogi
2009: 293.
41 For references to similar employment of the analogy of firewood and other fuels,
39
160
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
regarding [appearance and emptiness as] not being different: once
[their] being different [can] no [longer] be attested, [their] being
identical is no [longer] attestable either. Therefore, [in order to]
eradicate other [beingsʼ] attachment or to eliminate false imputation
and false depreciation, or in a provisional sense, one speaks [of
phenomena] as being empty and non-arisen. Yet, [when] explored by
judicious persons, or in a definitive sense, [even] these (i.e. emptiness
and non-arising) do not subsist. Negative determinations, positive
determinations, false imputation or false depreciation do not subsist
either. Attachment, negation and affirmation, and two [separate states
of] meditative absorption and post-meditation do neither exist nor
subsist. This is the discernment [of Apratisthānavāda]. The noṅ̇
[focusing of] attention (or: non-mentation, yid la mi byed pa:
amanasikāra) that is devoid of false imputation, false depreciation, and
attachment [in regard to phenomena] is the meditation [of
Apratisthānavāda]. [To be sure, reaching a state of] total blankness
̇̇
(lit. ʻbecoming [like] inanimate matterʼ) as a result of holding an
annihilationistic view in regard to all [external] objects and [thus no
longer] experiencing [phenomena] is [considered by it] a stain in
meditation [that should be avoided]. Acting for the sake of sentient
beings after purifying the [first] five perfections in regard to the three
spheres [of actor, act, and recipient] by means of the three nonobjectifications―by means, [that is,] of a perfection of insight [that
cognises phenomena] without [succumbing to] false imputation, false
depreciation, and attachment―is the view [of Apratisthānavāda]. For
̇̇
example, when a judicious person with healthy eyes looks at the sky,
thanks to his healthy eyes he perceives no balls of hair or the like
see the index in Almogi 2009: 528, s.v. analogies: firewood/fuel and fire & wick,
sesame oil, and lamplight.
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
161
whatsoever, and [that] judicious person does not engage in false
imputation or false depreciation by saying, “[Such objects] exist” or
“[Such objects] do not exist.” Likewise, since [according to Apratisthā̇̇
navāda] the essence of phenomena is that [they] are all non-arisen by
nature, and so [can] in no way abide in terms of either existence or
nonexistence, [it] in no way rests on false imputation and false
depreciation vis-à-vis existence or nonexistence. This is [its] cognition
of true reality. The compassion [advocated by both] Māyopama[vāda] and Apratisthāna[vāda] is an objectless compassion. It is an
̇̇
objectless compassion because [the focusing of oneʼs] attention (or:
mentation) is [in this case] without perceiving any phenomena
whatsoever.
(f) bKa’ gdams bu chos ascribed to Atiśa
The work titled ’Brom ston pa rgyal ba’i ’byung gnas kyi skyes rabs bka’
gdams bu chos (or short: bKa’ gdams bu chos) is found in the recently
published Jo bo’i gsung ’bum, though it was very probably not written by
Atiśa but rather by some of his direct Tibetan disciples, and perhaps
includes input by later followers of his. It is, however, not to be ruled out
that the work incorporates notes taken during and after oral instructions
given by the master, such as the passage cited here. In its first chapter,
relating ʼBrom stonʼs birth as the Brahmin child gSal ba (dGe ba’i bshes
gnyen pa bram ze’i khye’u gsal bar ji ltar skye ba bzhes pa’i le’u), a similar
division of Mahāyāna is found in a passage containing teachings ascribed to
Atiśa.42
It (i.e. Mahāyāna) has two [schools]: Madhyamaka and Yogācāra.
Madhyamaka has two [branches]: Madhyamaka which holds [that
42
bKa’ gdams bu chos (160.9-16).
162
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
phenomena]
are
Madhyamaka)43
mere
appearances
(i.e.
*Pratibhāsamātra-
and Madhyamaka which holds [that phenomena]
have
no substratum (i.e. *Apratisthāna[vāda]-Madhyamaka).
̇̇
*Pratibhāsamātra-Madhyamaka establishes that the false appearances
are false, and demonstrates this with the aid of the eight illustrations of
illusion―dreams and the rest. Furthermore, because the pair
[comprising] that which is to be demonstrated and the demonstrator
are respectively a deceptive object and subject, they need to be
abandoned and yet to be known (or: they need to be known as
something to be abandoned). *Apratisthāna[vāda]-Madhyamaka
̇̇
teaches that buddhas may appear or may not appear, but the true
nature of all phenomena is [that they] have had no substratum since
primordial times,44 and therefore it is to be accepted and known.
Yogācāra has two [branches]: that which postulates that appearances
Here ʻmere appearanceʼ (snang ba lta bu: pratibhāsamātra) is clearly used as
synonymous with ʻmere illusion,ʼ which latter expression, as we have already seen, is
used by some interchangeably with ʻlike an illusionʼ (sgyu ma lta bu: māyopama) in
the context of Māyopamavāda. Of possible relevance is the expression māyopama43
pratibhāsamātra used by Vāgīśvarakīrti in his Tattvaratnāvaloka (142.16-17), also in
connection with Madhyamaka. For time constraints I have not been able to look at
the matter more closely. However, it should be noted that the expression ʻmere
appearanceʼ is more commonly associated with Apratisthānavāda. See, for example,
̇̇
the table presenting Klong chen paʼs subclassification of Madhyamaka, which
includes the subbranch sNang tsam rab tu mi gnas pa. Moreover, as I have shown
elsewhere (Almogi 2009, passim), the term ʻmere appearanceʼ is central to Rong zom
paʼs Madhyamaka, which is clearly to be identified as Apratisthānavāda.
̇̇
44 This famous line, found in several versions in various sources (see Wangchuk
2007: 78, n. 24), should actually read affirmatively: “It is taught that the true reality of
phenomena subsists primordially [as it is]” (chos rnams kyi chos nyid ye nas gnas par
gsungs pas｜). One possibility is that the negative particle is an error introduced later
accidentally. It may also be that the author exploited the phrase ye nas gnas pa and
deliberately intended the negative particle so as to reflect the position of the
Apratisthānavāda.
̇̇
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
163
are true and that which postulates that they are false. From the point
of view of *Apratisthāna[vāda]-Madhyamaka, both of these [posi̇̇
tions] are deluded, and yet need to be known.
4. The Reception of the Māyopamavāda-Apratisthānavāda Divide in Tibet
̇̇
It is impossible to discuss in detail the Tibetan reception of the partitioning
of Madhyamaka into Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda within the
̇̇
framework of this article, but I wish to touch upon some of the main issues
on the basis of a few examples. As stated above, despite the fact that this
division can be traced to Indian sources, it was categorically dismissed by
several Tibetan scholars. The first was apparently rNgog lo tsā ba Blo ldan
shes rab (1059-1109?), who with the following two lines in his sPrings yig
seems to have triggered the Tibetan controversy regarding this
subclassification:45
The subclassification of Madhyamaka into the two systems
Of *Mayādvaya[vāda and] Sarvadharmāpratisthāna[vāda] instils a
̇̇
sense of wonder [only] among simpletons.
In the centuries that followed, the nature of this division was heatedly
debated between those who dismissed it and those who accepted it,
particularly as regards whether it was made on the basis of a view
concerning the ultimate level, and―related to this―as regards the
methods employed by these two branches to establish the ultimate level.
Even those who accepted this division held different positions as to its
relation to the more familiar division of Madhyamaka―whether Apratisthānavāda is to be equated with Prāsan
̇ gika-Madhyamaka and Māyopȧ̇
sPrings yig (Kano 2007: 11.5-6):
sgyu ma gnyis med chos kun mi gnas dbu ma yi‖
lugs gnyis rnam ’byed de yang rmongs pa mtshar bskyed yin‖.
45
164
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
mavāda with Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, or whether both should be
subsumed under Svātantrika-Madhyamaka.
(a) Deliberations on the Nature of the Division
Those who vehemently rejected the Māyopamavāda-Apratisthānavāda
̇̇
divide seem to have associated it with a postulation regarding the absolute.
The situation among those who accepted it seems more complex. As we
have seen above, the Māyopamavādins are generally said to hold
phenomena to be like illusions, while the Apratisthānavādins assume no
̇̇
thesis. As we have also seen, the terms ʻnegative determinationʼ and
ʻpositive determinationʼ play a central role in this connection.
(i) Gro lung pa Blo gros ʼbyung gnas
Gro lung pa Blo gros ʼbyung gnas (11th cent.), who clearly followed his
master rNgog lo tsā ba in categorically rejecting this distinction, states the
following:46
Further, some foolish persons [claim that] there are two Madhyamaka schools, namely, Apratisthāna[vāda] and Māyopamavāda. [They]
̇̇
claim that Ācārya Śāntaraksita and others proposed that the illusory
̇
[nature of phenomena] is the absolute, and that, having categorically
negated (i.e. in the form of a negative determination) the true
existence (bden pa) imagined by the Substantialists (dngos po[r] smra
ba: vastuvādin), [these masters went on], on the basis of logical
reasoning, [to] affirm a false existence (brdzun pa), [in the form of] a
positive determination. [This can] in no way be [true, given the
following] statement in Madhyamakālamkāra [63]:47
̇
bsTan rim chen mo (437b7-438a3).
See Ichigō 1989: 212. Compare the English translation in ibid.: 213. See also Mi
phamʼs dBu ma rgyan ’grel (216.2-221.3), where variant readings of the verse are
46
47
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
165
Therefore these entities
Have the characteristic of [merely being] conventional [reality].
If one posits that it (i.e. conventional reality) is the absolute,
Then what is there that I can do !
[Śāntaraksita] considered this false existence to be a mere object of
̇
perception, and [he also] stated that [what is established in the form
of] a positive determination, [of the sort] included among the four
[kinds of] affirming negation [employed for] the negation of arising, is
false conventional [reality]. If one posits that [a given ʻxʼ], be it
existent or nonexistent, is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning,
one would be possessed by the great demon of extreme views, and
thus remote from the Middle Way. For [Śāntaraksita also] stated,
̇
among other things, that if [one posits] existence, [one would fall into
the extreme of] eternalism.
(ii) Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge
Until recently Phywa pa Chos kyi seng geʼs (1109-1169) works have not
been accessible, and his positions on various Madhyamaka issues were
known of only second-hand, as reported by later Tibetan scholars. Phywa
pa has long been considered to have been a Tibetan proponent of
Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and a vehement opponent of Prāsan
̇ gikaMadhyamaka48―an issue, however, beyond the scope of this study. What I
merely wish to do here is to present Phywa paʼs assessment of the
Māyopamavāda-Apratisthānavāda divide (which he clearly does not
̇̇
approve of) as found in his doxographical work entitled bDe bar gshegs pa
dang phyi rol pa’i gzhung rnam par ’byed pa (henceforth: gZhung rnam
’byed). He discusses the issue, in the context of presenting the absolute
discussed.
48 For a brief discussion of Phywa paʼs Madhyamaka, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 3741.
166
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
truth (or reality) according to the Madhyamaka system, as follows:49
In regard to the absolute truth (or reality), some have claimed that
there are two [Madhyamaka] systems (lugs), namely, [Māyopamavāda,] which posits that appearances, [things] devoid of true existence,
are like illusions (bden pas stong pa’i snang ba sgyu ma lta bur smra ba),
and [Apratisthānavāda,] which posits that no true existence (bden pa)
̇̇
[positively determinable] in the form of an implicative negation
[exists] anywhere [as something] having a substratum. [All] this
[amounts to] a foolhardy exposition (mun sbrul gyi bshad pa).50
Regarding the claim that Māyopamavāda is a system different (lugs
gzhan) from Apratisthānavāda: (a) Is [Māyopamavāda] a different
̇̇
system because [it] does not accept that [phenomena are] empty of
hypostatic existence, or (b) is [it] a different system because [it]
accepts that appearances are [positively determinable] in the form of
an implicative negation? (a) In the first case, if Māyopamavāda does
not accept that [phenomena are] empty of hypostatic existence, this
would contradict the fact that it does accept manifold appearances, and
thus it would illogically follow that it does not even accept the illusionlike [nature of phenomena]. (b) In the second case, (i) is
[Māyopamavāda] different from Apratisthānavāda because it accepts
̇̇
mere appearances that are [positively determinable in the form of] an
implicative negation, or (ii) is [it] different from Apratisthānavāda
̇̇
because [it] accepts that appearances [that are positively determinable in the form of] an implicative negation are [capable of]
withstanding logical analysis (dpyad bzod)? (i) In the first case, it
gZhung rnam ’byed (65.6-67.2).
The exact meaning of the word mun sbrul, often employed in exegetical
writings, is not wholly clear. It seems to convey something like tramping in the
darkness (mun) over places inhabited by poisonous snakes (sbrul).
49
50
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
167
would follow that even Apratisthānavāda itself would be a different
̇̇
system from Apratisthānavāda, inasmuch as [it too] accepts mere
̇̇
appearances that are [positively determinable in the form of] an
implicative negation. If it did not accept [that], it would follow that it,
like the Lokāyata [system, could be accused of postulating the view of]
annihilationism, inasmuch as [it would then] depreciate conventional
[truth/reality], and inasmuch as it would deny not only what is not
apparent, like the latter (i.e. the Lokāyata system), but even deny what
is obvious. (ii) In the second case, it would follow that Māyopamavāda,
in accepting that these [appearances] are [capable of] withstanding
logical analysis and [positively determinable in the form of] an
implicative negation, would not51 be different from the Substantialists.
Again, if it is maintained that Apratisthānavāda is a system
̇̇
different from [that of] Māyopamavāda, [the questions would be]
whether it is a different system (a) because [it] does not accept [that
the nature of phenomena is] illusory or (b) because [it] does not
accept that the illusory [nature] is capable of withstanding logical
analysis? (a) In the first case, [it would mean that Apratisthānavāda]
̇̇
accepts no conventional [phenomena] at all (i.e. not even one that is
illusory in nature), and thus it would follow that Apratisthānavāda is
̇̇
censurable even by [the standards of] the Lokāyata [system], for
whereas the Lokāyata [system] depreciates [only] a portion of the
conventional [phenomena] (i.e. those that are not apparent), Apratiṡ
thānavāda would depreciate all conventional [phenomena]. (b) In the
̇
second case, it would follow that Māyopamavāda itself would be
different from Māyopamavāda, inasmuch as it would accept (i.e. in
contrast not only to the Apratisthānavāda position but also to its own)
̇̇
The text has no negative particle here, but the logic of the argument seems to
call for one.
51
168
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
that the illusory [nature of phenomena] is capable of withstanding
logical analysis. Positing that [it] is capable of withstanding logical
analysis [entails] a hypostatic appearance (bden pa’i snang ba), and
thus the semantics of ʻillusory [nature]ʼ would not hold [any longer].
And in positing that appearance is capable of withstanding logical
analysis, [Māyopamavāda] would not be [doing anything] different
from the Substantialists. Thus no Mādhyamika would consider the
illusory [nature of phenomena to be capable of withstanding logical]
analysis. There are no differences, then, among the Mādhyamikas,
inasmuch as they all accept that the utter unattestability [of
phenomena] alone (cir yang ma grub pa kho na) is capable of
withstanding logical analysis.52
(iii) Rog Shes rab ʼod
We have seen that the terms negative determination (vyavaccheda: rnam
par bcad pa) and positive determination (pariccheda: yongs su gcod pa)
play a great role in the arguments surrounding the two strands of
Madhyamaka under discussion. The issue is complex and needs to be
This statement of Phywa pa is a very significant one, since he has often been
cited by later Tibetan scholars as having maintained that the absolute truth (or
reality) is something that is capable of withstanding logical analysis (Seyfort Ruegg
2000: 38, n. 71). Those scholars must have such statements as this one in mind when
they reported Phywa paʼs position on the absolute truth, which seems to have been a
target of ridicule among Tibetan Mādhyamikas. For the general perception is that
what is capable of withstanding logical analysis must by definition be something real,
which is of course held to be impossible. Obviously for Phywa pa an ʻxʼ can by no
means bear the force of Madhyamaka logical analysis, whereas the utter
unattestability of ʻxʼ can be said to be immune to Madhyamaka logical analysis,
perhaps inasmuch as the utter unattestability of ʻxʼ is what ultimately prevails as
true reality. A careful examination of Phywa paʼs position, however, would be
necessary to come to any definite conclusion.
52
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
169
further investigated, but here I shall merely present Rog Shes rab ʼodʼs
(1166-1244) brief explanation of these two terms in connection with the
notion of māyopama and apratisthāna:53
̇̇
The second [point], what is to be negated [in the form of] a negative
determination, has two [subpoints]: general and specific [ones]. As to
the first, [namely,] the characteristics of the general negandum,
whatever position one arrives at―after scrutinising on the basis of
logical reasoning―according to which there are some features of a
true nature (rang bzhin: svabhāva), be it [of] existence or nonexistence, is the negandum. If one specifies the negandum [according to the
negation applied], there are two: [that which is negated in] a nonimplicative negation (med pa dgag pa) and [that which is negated in]
an implicative negation (ma yin pa dgag pa). As to the non-implicative
negation, [it is applied to] negate the propounding of external objects
as [real] entities by ordinary people and Śrāvakas. As to the
implicative negation, [it is applied to] negate what is propounded by
the Mind-Only [school], which [posits] self-cognition as the absolute.
[The third point], what is to be established [in the form of] a
positive determination, has two [subpoints]: ʻbeing like illusionsʼ and
ʻhaving no substratum.ʼ [The establishment of phenomena as] being
like illusions is the negation of the true existence of appearances
(snang ba’i dngos po) and in its place the establishment of [their]
mere illusory [nature]. [The establishment of phenomena as] having
no substratum is the negation of the position maintaining the true
existence of appearances and then―without even maintaining a mere
illusory [nature in their regard]―[attempting to establish that they]
have no substratum.
53
Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me (A, 176.5-177.5; B, 264.3-265.3).
170
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
(b) Māyopamavāda-Apratisthānavāda versus Prāsan
̇ gika-Svātantrika
̇̇
The question as to whether Apratisthānavāda is to be equated with
̇̇
Prāsan
̇ gika-Madhyamaka and Māyopamavāda with SvātantrikaMadhyamaka, or whether both are to be subsumed under SvātantrikaMadhyamaka, was answered differently by different scholars, who, in this
regard, can be generally divided into two groups. The first one, including
Rog Shes rab ʼod and Klong chen pa (1308-1364), subsumed both
Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda under Svātantrika-Madhyamaka,
̇̇
whereas the second, including mKhas pa lDeʼu (13th cent.), bCom ldan Rig
paʼi ral gri (1227-1305),54 sTag tshang lo tsā ba,55 mKhas grub rje (13851438) (followed by other dGe lugs scholars),56 and Mi pham rNam rgyal
rgya mtsho (1846-1912), identified Māyopamavāda with SvātantrikaMadhyamaka and Apratisthānavāda (or at least a branch of it) with
̇̇
Prāsan
̇ gika-Madhyamaka. In the following I shall first cite Rog Shes rab
ʼodʼs presentation, where Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda are
̇̇
subsumed under Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, and provide an overview of the
division as presented by Klong chen pa, who, however―unlike Rog Shes
rab ʼod―further subdivides each of the two (referred to by him as
respectively ʻlowerʼ and ʻhigherʼ Svātantrika-Madhyamaka). Then, as
For a summary of bCom ldan Rig paʼi ral griʼs treatment of the two branches of
Madhyamaka, see below in the concluding paragraph of this section.
55 Grub mtha’ kun shes kyi rnam bshad (141.22-144.9).
56 See Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 58-59, n. 174, where reference to mKhas grub rjeʼs
understanding of this subclassification is made. According to him, Māyopamavāda is
the school of Śāntaraksita and Haribhadra (i.e. Yogācāra-Madhyamaka), and
̇
Apratisthānavāda that of Candrakīrti (i.e. Prāsan
̇ gika-Madhyamaka). See also
̇̇
Seyfort Ruegg 2000: 33-35, n. 60, concerning the view of other dGe lugs scholars,
including ʼJam dbyangs bzhad pa Ngag dbang brtson ʼgrus (1648-1721/22) and
lCang skya Rol paʼi rdo rje (1717-1786), and other Tibetan scholars, such as Go rams
pa bSod nams seng ge (1429-1489), Shākya mchog ldan (1428-1507), and ʼBaʼ ra ba
54
rGyal mtshan dpal bzang (1310-1391). See also Seyfort Ruegg 1981: 31-32, n. 58, for
further references.
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
171
representative of the second group, I shall present mKhas pa lDeʼuʼs and Mi
phamʼs partitioning of Madhyamaka, followed by Nyang ral Nyi ma ʼod zerʼs
(1136-1204) explanation of these two strands of Madhyamaka and that of
the further subdivisions of Apratisthānavāda. At the conclusion of this
̇̇
section I shall present a summary of bCom ldan Rig paʼi ral griʼs treatment
of Madhyamaka, which in my view reflects the diversity of opinion among
Tibetan scholars on this issue and gives a general overview of some of the
points of contention.
Rog Shes rab ʼod states the following:57
[As to] the fourth general point, [namely,] the object of application
(ʼjug yul) of inference (rjes dpag: anumāna), there are two
[approaches]: svatantra and prasaṅga. The difference between the two
[is as follows]: the mere elimination of faults, namely, doubts regarding
oneʼs own autonomous view, is svatantra, while the refutation of othersʼ
theses is prasaṅga. Among [those who employ] svatantra [there are]
two [strands]: Māyopama[vāda] and Apratisthāna[vāda]. The
̇̇
difference between the two [is as follows]: That [strand] which, in
determining negatively, negates the negandum and then, in determining positively, affirms that the [nature of phenomena] is like delusive
illusions is Māyopama[vāda]. That [strand] which negates [the
existence of] real entities from the perspective of a negative
determination and has no thesis whatsoever from the perspective of a
positive determination is Apratisthāna[vāda]. These two are
̇̇
Svātantrika-[Madhyamaka]. Prāsan
̇ gika-[Madhyamaka] takes no
stance of its own but refutes [whatever is] posited by others as
absolute. By what means is it refuted? [It] is refuted by means of the
five kinds of logical reasoning (rigs pa: yukti)58 shown above.
57
Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me (A, 189.2-190.3; B, 275.2-276.2).
172
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
Klong chen paʼs scheme can be summarised as follows:59
Madhyamaka
Svātantrika-Madhyamaka
PrāsangikaMadhyamaka
Māyopamavāda
Apratisthānavāda
＝Lower Svātantrika
＝Higher Svātantrika
（
）
（
）
1. sGyu ma rigs grub tu ʼdod pa 1. Kun rdzob rab tu mi gnas pa
2. sGyu ma ltar snang du ʼdod pa 2. rGyu mtshan mi gnas pa
3. lDog cha mi gnas pa
3. sGyu ma tsam por ʼdod pa
... ［
4. lDog byed mi gnas pa
］ 5. gCig mi gnas pa
6. Du ma mi gnas pa
7. gCig dang du ma dang bral
ba mi gnas pa
8. sNang tsam rab tu mi gnas pa
... ［
］
The subclassification of Madhyamaka as proposed in the Theg mchog mdzod
(vol. 1: 125.1-126.5)
mKhas pa lDeʼu and Mi pham, who equate Prāsan
̇ gika-Madhyamaka with a
branch of Apratisthānavāda, divide Madhyamaka as follows:
̇̇
Rog refers here to the five syllogisms (gtan tshig: hetu) he has just discussed in
the previous paragraph. See the Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me (A, 177.5ff.; B,
58
265.3ff.). The five syllogisms presented by him include the common group of four
(great) syllogisms (see above, n. 21), and in addition ʻnegation of arising in terms of
existence and nonexistenceʼ (yod med skye (ba) ʼgogs (pa)).
59 Compare Almogi 2009: 475-483, where other divisional schemes drawn up by
Klong chen pa are presented in the context of a discussion of various conceptions of
Buddhahood.
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
173
Madhyamaka
Māyopamavāda
Apratisthānavāda
1. sTong pa rab tu mi gnas pa
2. rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa
3. bTang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa
4. Zung ʼjug rab tu mi gnas pa60＝PrāsangikaMadhyamaka
The subclassification of Madhyamaka as proposed in the lDe’u chos ’byung
(119.16-20) and bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad (33.1-35.5)
This second scheme is also found in the gSang sngags lung gi bang mdzod, a
gter ma text said to has been discovered by Nyang ral Nyi ma ʼod zer, and
one of the main sources for Mi phamʼs bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad. This text is
one of the few that attempt to explain the difference between the further
subdivisions of Apratisthānavāda found in Tibetan sources:61
̇̇
Madhyamaka is [of] two [kinds]: (I) Māyopamādvaya[vāda] and (II)
Apratisthāna[vāda]:
̇̇
(I) [For] Māyopamādvayavāda, Madhyamaka proper (don gyi dbu
ma) is freedom from the four extremes.62 As regards the view of
As noted by Seyfort Ruegg, two of the four branches of Apratisthānavāda
̇̇
named here, namely, Zung ʼjug rab tu mi gnas pa and rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa,
were also listed by sGam po pa as subdivisions of this branch. See Seyfort Ruegg
2000: 35.
61 gSang sngags lung gi bang mdzod (141.6-146.4).
62 An alternative interpretation of the sentence is possible: “Māyopamādvayavāda
is the Madhyamaka [school] proper (don gyi dbu ma), [in that it posits] freedom
60
from the four extremes.” In later Tibetan sources, Madhyamaka came to be
subclassified broadly into ʻMadhyamaka of content, that which [can] be expressedʼ
(brjod bya don gyi dbu ma) and ʻMadhyamaka of words, that which expressesʼ (rjod
174
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
*Māyādvaya[vāda], it maintains that there are no external entities out
beyond cognition (or mind), [this] by way of refuting the position of
the Alīkākāravāda [branch] of Yogācāra according to which [the
manifold appearances caused by] residual impressions [implanted in]
the mind can be described neither as being identical with it (i.e. the
mind) nor as being something different [from it], while a perfect
nature that is momentary is the absolute. [Query:] Well, how does [it,
for example,] postulate (i.e. explain) white and red appearances?
[Response:] [It] maintains that these appearances appear on account
of residual impressions as mere illusion. Further, given that [they]
have been caused by a condition, namely, self-cognition, they are
[considered] to be non-arisen.
Moreover, it accepts two [kinds of truth or modes of reality,
namely,] (1) absolute and (2) conventional:
(1) The conventional is of two [types]: (i) false conventional and (ii)
efficacious (or functional) conventional. (i) The false [conventional] is
like the appearance of two [moons that arise] from [one] moon.
Although it (i.e. the second moon) appears, it is not efficacious. (ii)
The efficacious conventional is endowed with four characteristics: it
has arisen from causes and conditions; it is efficacious; it appears in a
similar manner (i.e. to individuals sharing the same form of existence
with the same non-erroneous sense of perception); and if it is examined
it [is found to] be empty.63
(2) The absolute is of two [types]: (i) quasi-absolute truth
(paryāyaparamārthasatya) and (ii) absolute truth proper (nisparẏ
byed tshig gi dbu ma). See, for example, Mi phamʼs dBu ma rgyan ’grel (78.6-79.2).
63 Compare Rong zom paʼs lTa phreng ’grel pa (324.11-13): de la yang dag pa’i kun
rdzob ni｜ dngos po’ rgyu rkyen las skyes pa｜ mthun par snang ba｜ don byed nus pa｜
brtags na dben paʼi mtshan nyid can rnams so‖ log pa’i kun rdzob ni｜ snang du ’dra’
yang de ltar don byed mí nus pa rnams so‖.
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
175
āyaparamārthasatya). (i) Quasi-[absolute truth]: By applying the four
kinds of logical reasoning (rigs pa: yukti)64 to the subject of a thesis
(chos can: dharmin), [any] absolute entity (yang dag pa’i dngos po)
[can] be rejected, and so [phenomena] are established as mere
illusions. [As to the term paramārthasatya (don dam pa’i bden pa):]
because [quasi-absolute truth] is the object of correct gnosis, it is
called ʻabsoluteʼ; because it is non-erroneous and non-deceptive, it is
called ʻtruth.ʼ As to [the term] paryāya (rnam grangs), it refers to
deconstructive logical reasoning. (ii) Absolute truth proper: If visual
perception has not arisen, it [simply] has not arisen. When [it] has
arisen, [it] has arisen in the form of visible matter. Visible matter is [in
essence] of the nature of visual perception. Since visual [perception] is
accompanied by images of visible matter, it is said to be ʻwith images.ʼ
Even though [the visual perception] is accompanied [by images of
visible matter, the visible matter itself] is empty of real entities. Thus
appearances [of visible matter and the like] do not cease, and [they
continue to] appear in the form of mere illusions. And as they (i.e.
phenomena) [are considered to] be one, [inasmuch as they are all like
illusions, this school of thought] is called Māyopamādvaya[vāda].
As regards being free from the four extremes: [The Māyopamavādaʼs view] is free from the extreme of eternalism because [it
proposes that phenomena are] empty of true [existence]; it is free
from the extreme of annihilationism because [it proposes that
phenomena, which] are empty and yet appear, are unceasing; it is free
from the extreme of [postulating] both [eternalism and annihilationism] because [it proposes that] the same [phenomena that] appear in
the form of mere illusions are also devoid of true existence; it is free
For a recent brief discussion of the four kinds of logical reasoning along with
references to primary and secondary literature, see Wangchuk 2009: 217-218.
64
176
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
from the extreme of [postulating] neither of the two because [it
proposes that phenomena can]not be established as neither of the two
through [the negation of] both. The Madhyamakālamkāra states:65
̇
As [we] do not [claim that] the various [phenomena are
characterised by] eternalism,
[And] do not propound annihilationism,
[Or] neither eternalism nor annihilationism either.
[Our position] is free from the four extremes.
The explanation of the position of Māyopamādvaya[vāda] is
[herewith] concluded.
(II) Apratisthāna[vāda] has four [divisions]: (1) Apratisthāna[vāda
̇̇
̇̇
that emphasises] emptiness, (2) Apratisthāna[vāda that emphasises]
̇̇
extinction, (3) Apratisthāna[vāda that emphasises] equanimity, and
̇̇
(4) Apratisthāna[vāda that emphasises] the union [of appearance
̇̇
and emptiness].
(1) Apratisthāna[vāda that emphasises] emptiness postulates
̇̇
that the absolute and the conventional are separate. That is, [for it]
the various appearances are conventional reality, and [thus] are
deceptive and untrue appearances. On the absolute level, [phenomena
are postulated as] being free from all extremes of manifoldness. [It is
also] postulated that these entities are utterly nonexistent (gtan nas
This verse is not found in Śāntaraksitaʼs Madhyamakālamkāra (or in
̇
̇
Ratnākaraśāntiʼs Madhyamālamkāropadeśa). Compare, however, Āryadeva IIʼs
̇
Jñānasārasamuccaya 28 (as in Mimaki 2000: 241), where the expression catuskotivi̇
nirmukta (mtha’ bzhi las grol) is employed in a similar context. The verse is also
found in Jetāriʼs *Sugatamatavibhan
̇ gakārikā (P, 64b7-8; D, 8a3; S, vol. 63: 885.7-8,
where the Tibetan reads mtha’ bzhi dag las nges grol ba), and in Atiśaʼs
*Dharmadhātudarśanagīti (P, 271a7-8; D, 256b2-3; S, vol. 26: 1665.10-12, where the
65
Tibetan reads mtha’ bzhi yang ni nges grol bas).
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
177
med pa), just as whatever [apparently] substantial entities (rdzas kyi
dngos po) that exist in a dream, for example, are utterly nonexistent
after one has awakened. The Abhisamayālamkāra states:66
̇
In virtue of [having realised] emptiness, one is released.
If one does not realise it, one is bound.
And:
What is the absolute [reality] of all phenomena like?
[The Buddha] declares: [It is] emptiness.
(2) Apratisthāna[vāda that emphasises] extinction postulates
̇̇
that as long as conceptual thoughts exist, [their] antidote―the
accumulation of gnosis (jñānasambhāra)―also exists, but once
conceptual thoughts are exhausted, even the term gnosis no [longer]
exists. For example, it is like [charcoal]: as long as charcoal is present,
[the colour] white does not occur.67
(3) Apratisthāna[vāda that emphasises] equanimity [postulates
̇̇
the following]: The preceding views rest on the extremes of false
imputation and depreciation: That is, the Śrāvaka [system] has falsely
imputed the object-subject dichotomy. [Māyopamavāda] has sucThese verses are not found in the Abhisamayālamkāra. What is expressed in
̇
them is, however, widely familiar. Regarding the first two lines, compare, for
example, Hevajratantra 1.1.11ab. See also Wangchuk 2007: 199-200.
67 This analogy does not seem apt. As pointed out above, the usual analogy in this
context is that of fire and wood (or fuel), which stand for gnosis and conceptual
thoughts, respectively, in the sense that as long as there is fuel there is fire, and once
the fuel is exhausted the fire, too, dies out. The analogy based on charcoal and the
colour white seems to be used in the case of two things that are mutually exclusive.
For such an instance, see Mi phamʼs ’Od gsal snying po (110.6): … sol ba bkrus kyang
mi dkar ba …. One could, of course, interpret the analogy here in the sense that as
long as charcoal has not been exhausted by fire, the colour white (referring in this
case to the colour of the ash it leaves behind), would not appear. However, apart from
the fact that I have not been able to locate an instance of such an analogy in this
sense, it would still not serve the intended purpose.
66
178
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
cumbed to depreciation, inasmuch as [it] postulates that [phenomena], like illusions, are empty of an own-nature, [while it] has
falsely imputed [existence to a logically attestable] illusory [nature].
The Apratisthāna[vāda that emphasises] emptiness has succumbed
̇̇
to depreciation in [postulating that phenomena] do not exist even as
mere illusions; [and it] has falsely imputed [existence to utter]
empti[ness].68
(4) Apratisthāna[vāda that emphasises] the union69 [of appeaṙ̇
ance and emptiness postulates as follows]: Cognitions (or cognitive
entities) have no substratum (yongs su gnas pa med pa＝rab tu mi gnas
pa). Appearances have no true existence [even] when oneʼs selfcognitive mind appears in the form of an [endless] cycle of dependent
arising. As truly existent entities are not attestable [they can]not be
held to be false [either]. [And it] proposes no thesis whatsoever. The
Candrapradīpa (i.e. Samādhirājasūtra) states:70
No one, [not even] an intelligent [person],
Would be able to challenge
A view that contains no proposition,71
[Propounding] neither existence, nonexistence, [both] existence
and nonexistence, nor neither [of the two].
One wonders why no reference is made here to the views of Yogācāra and
rGyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa, both of which clearly fall under the category of views
ʻlowerʼ than that of bTang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa in Nyang ralʼs presentation.
Moreover, one would naturally expect here that the Śrāvakas, too, would be accused
of some kind of depreciation.
69 Note that the text erroneously reads here ʻapratisthāna of equanimity.ʼ
̇̇
70 I was not able to locate this verse in the Samādhirājasūtra. It is, nonetheless,
clearly an allusion to Madhyamakālamkāra 68 and Catuhśataka 16.25, for which see
̇
̇
Ichigō 1989: 212, 213.
71 Note the usage of the phrase khas len gyi lta ba yod med by Rig ral in the same
context in the passage paraphrased below.
68
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
179
Having refuted the [claim that] appearances are truly existent,
*Madhyamaka-Māyopamavāda maintains that illusion (or illusory
nature) is attestable on the basis of logical reasoning. This is
untenable: As far as illusion is concerned, any characteristic (mtshan
nyid ci yin) [attributed to it that is allegedly] attestable on the basis of
logical reasoning [can] be logically invalidated (rigs pas gnod pa).
[Objection: The position according to which] the cognitive subject that
postulates that appearance is truly [existent] is attestable on the basis
of logical reasoning is not refutable on the basis of logical reasoning.
[Reply:] Well, in that case it needs to be asked whether illusion is
existent from having arisen or existent from not having arisen,
employing thereby [the logical reasoning of] ʻvajra slivers/fragmentsʼ
(rdo rje gzegs ma) [and the following line of argument]: Is appearance
existent on account of [its] having arisen or [its] not having arisen? If
[Māyopamavāda] states that it is called an illusion on account of its
having arisen and [of its nevertheless being] nonexistent, it could be
analogously stated (mgo bgre) that it is also called an appearance on
account of [its] having arisen and [of its nevertheless being]
nonexistent.
The supposed differences between these and other subdivisions of the two
branches of Madhyamaka certainly need further investigation. Worth
mentioning here, however, is the fact that Nyang ral explains rGyun chad
rab tu mi gnas pa as the branch that maintains that gnosis exists as an
antidote as long as conceptual thoughts exist, but once the latter come to an
end, even the term ʻgnosisʼ ceases to exist. This could certainly be taken as
descriptive of Apratisthānavāda as understood by Rong zom pa. Also
̇̇
worth mentioning is that a number of bKaʼ brgyud scholars, such as Padma
dkar po (1527-1592), reportedly characterised the distinction between
Sūtric and Tantric Mahāyāna as paralleling that between Rab tu mi gnas
180
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
pa and Zung ʼjug rab tu mi gnas pa.72
Lastly, I would like to summarise the main points of bCom ldan Rig paʼi
ral griʼs treatment of Madhyamaka in his Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog,
which attempts to address some of the issues surrounding the Tibetan
controversy regarding this Madhyamaka divide. Rig ral first divides
Madhyamaka
into
Svātantrika-Madhyamaka
and
Prāsan
̇ gika-
Madhyamaka, and then adds that these are also called (zer) Māyopama[vāda] and Apratisthāna[vāda]. He goes on to list several differences (as
̇̇
obviously claimed by others) between the two branches―namely, that
they differ over whether they postulate the existence or nonexistence of
gnosis at [the stage of] a buddha; whether they accept or reject hypostatic
existence on the conventional level; whether they do or do not have a thesis
(khas len gyi lta ba yod med, lit. “whether they do or do not have a view
[statable in terms] of propositions”); regarding the number of [types of]
valid cognition [accepted by them]; whether they do or do not postulate
that all objects are false and all minds are deluded; whether or not they
postulate subdivisions of the conventional; whether they consider the
absolute to be [characterisable in terms of] a non-implicative negation or
freedom from manifoldness; and so forth―but then rejects the idea that one
can differentiate between them on the basis of these criteria, since this
approach would be inconclusive and even misleading. He refrains, however,
for reasons of space, from discussing the matter in more detail. In the end,
according to him, the basic distinction between the two lies in [the type of]
syllogism [employed](i.e. svatantra or prasaṅga).73 After addressing this
point and citing from several authoritative Indian works, he goes on to state
that what are called Māyopama[vāda] and Apratisthāna[vāda] in the
̇̇
Mahāmudrā [system] of Maitrīpa and elsewhere are in fact nothing but
See, for example, the discussion by dGe ʼdun rin chen (1926-1997), the Sixtyninth rJe mKhan po of Bhutan, in his gSung lan dus gi pho nya (466.1-465.2).
73 Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog (391.1-6).
72
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
181
these two systems (i.e. Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and Prāsan
̇ gikaMadhyamaka). This scheme, he opines, simply reflects a shift of emphasis:
Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, when expounding on [reality,] tend to [emphasise] the illusory [nature of phenomena], while Prāsan
̇ gika-Mādhyamikas
tend to [emphasise] freedom from manifoldness, [which means that] not
even the illusory [nature of phenomena] has a substratum. Both of them
set out to establish the illusory nature [of phenomena] on the basis of
logical reasoning, and therefore saying that sGyu ma rigs grub [pa] (i.e.
Māyopamavāda, the school according to which this illusory [nature] is
attestable on the basis of logical reasoning) is inferior (ngan pa) is [an
expression of] ignorance (mi shes pa).74 After providing several citations
from authoritative works, he continues by arguing that the claim by some
that there are Mādhyamikas who postulate that the illusory [nature of
phenomena] is the absolute truth is nothing but a superficial evaluation (ʼol
tshod), for if [this illusory nature] is transient, then [the claim that it is] the
absolute cannot hold, whereas if it is not transient, then [the claim that it is]
illusion-like would not hold; any postulation of the dependent [nature] on
the absolute level would, moreover, conform to the system of the
Substantialists. He further argues that the exposition found in some
scriptures according to which the illusion-like [nature] is the absolute
refers to the quasi-absolute (rnam grangs pa’i don dam). Therefore, he
concludes, all Mādhyamikas are in agreement inasmuch as they postulate
that the absolute is freedom from manifoldness.75
5. Concluding Remarks
From what we have seen in the above-cited sources it can be said that the
treatment of the Māyopamavāda-Apratisthānavāda divide by both Indian
̇̇
74
75
Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog (393.6-394.5).
Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog (396.2-6).
182
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
scholars and their Tibetan successors, while often addressing similar
questions and points of contention, was by no means homogeneous. What
one can, however, say is that Māyopamavāda is normally presented by
Apratisthānavāda as a Madhyamaka school that attempts to positively
̇̇
determine the illusion-like nature of phenomena, while Apratisthānavāda is
̇̇
commonly said not only to reject such an attempt but, in addition, not to
take a position at all in regard to the absolute (some, though, state that they
positively determine phenomena, as being substratumless). Nonetheless,
since all Indian sources cited above present the matter from the
Apratisthānavādin viewpoint, one wonders whether there was anyone at
̇̇
all who considered himself a Māyopamavādin―that is, in the sense
portrayed by their Apratisthānavādin ʻopponentsʼ―or whether the entire
̇̇
ʻcontroversyʼ and ʻdebateʼ took place, at least initially, within Apratisthānȧ̇
vāda circles alone with (more or less) imaginary opponents. Whatever the
case, this subclassification of Madhyamaka is certainly a late one, and
apparently confined to a small circle of primarily Tantric Indian masters.
This scheme therefore seems―possibly because institutionalised Buddhism on the Indian subcontinent was virtually coming to an end―to have
never had the chance to undergo proper systematisation in India or to be
systematically subjected to refutation by its opponents. Tibetans therefore
inherited this doxographical scheme in a very rudimentary form, to say the
least. And although they commonly attempted to systematise and
harmonise whatever apparently conflicting doctrines they did inherit, we
see in our case an unusually vehement rejection on the part of some
Tibetan scholars, despite the fact that the scheme is found in several Indian
sources. One possible explanation stems from the fact that the Indian
proponents of this scheme, being strongly inclined towards Tantric
teachings, did not enjoy much authority among Tibetan masters more
inclined towards non-Tantric teachings. What is undoubtedly certain is that
this scheme not only did not conform (at least not in an obvious manner)
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
183
with the widely accepted subclassification of Madhyamaka during the first
propagation period of Buddhism in Tibet (i.e. that into SautrāntikaMadhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka), but it also appeared to relegate
highly revered masters such as Śāntaraksita and other Yogācārȧ
Mādhyamikas to the inferior Māyopamavāda branch, which was, at least
for some, unacceptable (the same could be said, though, in regard to the
Svātantrika-Prāsan
̇ gika divide). Moreover, this scheme did not seem to
correlate any more straightforwardly with the new partitioning of
Madhyamaka
into
Svātantrika-Madhyamaka
and
Prāsan
̇ gika-
Madhyamaka, which finally gained the upper hand in Tibet (the nature of
this latter scheme, to be sure, has also remained, to a certain degree, a
matter of debate).
One of the main points of contention, and one reason for the vehement
rejection, is no doubt the fact that most (later) Tibetan authors seem to
have taken the difference between Māyopamavāda and Apratisthānavāda
̇̇
to refer to their allegedly divergent postulations regarding the absolute.
The claim that a Mādhyamika would postulate some kind of existence on
the absolute level was no doubt unacceptable in their view. However, there
remains the question of whether this was indeed the case. As I have shown
in my above-mentioned study on various conceptions of Buddhahood―
which, broadly speaking, can be subsumed under two groups: on the one
hand, a conception of Buddhahood according to which the stage of a buddha
comprises the purified dharmadhātu alone, and on the other, several
conceptions that propose that the stage of a buddha comprises, in addition,
other elements (such as non-conceptual gnosis, pure mundane gnosis,
buddha-Bodies, bliss, and the like)―Rong zom pa convincingly shows that
these different conceptions of Buddhahood refer to the conventional level
and not to the absolute level. That is, the first conception is ascribed to
Mādhyamikas who do not seem to follow any of the Yogācāra theories of
knowledge for their postulation of the conventional level, while the
184
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
remaining conceptions are ascribed to Mādhyamikas who follow one of the
Yogācāra theories of knowledge towards that end. Moreover, the first
group is associated with Apratisthānavāda, and the second with
̇̇
Māyopamavāda. Provided that Rong zom paʼs understanding of the nature
of the Māyopamavāda-Apratisthānavāda divide (which is clearly suṗ̇
ported by some Indian and early Tibetan sources) reflects the initial state
of affairs, one wonders what would have been the reason for this cleft. I
have already pointed out that Rong zom paʼs presentation of the
controversy surrounding the constituents of Buddhahood and its connection with the Yogācāra theories of knowledge on the one hand and to the
Māyopamavāda-Apratisthānavāda divide on the other is unique in its
̇̇
scope and grasp of the issue, not only in comparison to discussions found in
other Tibetan sources but also to ones that took place in India. However, as
pointed out earlier, the recent publication of the so-called bKa’ gdams
gsungs ’bum has revealed that Rong zom pa was not alone in his views on
the Madhyamaka stance on Buddhahood and other issues, and presumably
one is likely to find early material therein that will shed more light on the
matter and help us answer at least some of the many open questions. It
cannot be ruled out that Rong zom pa, at one end of the scale, is
representative of highly sophisticated attempts at clarification and
systematisation of the issue, which unfortunately fell into oblivion, whereas
later authors, at the other end, reflect unawareness of such efforts, and
certainly not of the epistemological issues underlying this divide.
Appendix
(a) Aśvaghosa/Śūra
̇
*Paramārthabodhicittabhāvanākrama (P, 18a6-b4; D, 16a3-776; S, vol. 64:
The recto of the wooden block of fol. 16 in D was apparently damaged, since in
several cases portions of letters are missing, the most likely explanation being that bits
of the wood had broken off prior to printing.
76
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
185
46.8-47.3):
gal te grub pa mthaʼ yas paʼi‖
gnod pa ʼdi la rab tu ʼdu‖
des na ma brtags nyams dgaʼ ste‖
sgyu ma tsam la brtags pas bslus‖(1)
sems ni sgyu maʼi rnam pa ste‖
byang chub kyang ni sgyu ma ʼdra‖
des kyang tshig77 tu brjod spangs te‖
spros bral ʼjam78 dpal mthong ba min‖(2)
sgyu ma sgyu ma tsam min te‖
gal te yin na de mi grub‖
grub na gzhan gyi gzhung lugs kyang‖
sgyu maʼi chos su thal bar ʼgyur‖
de phyir sgyu maʼi rang bzhin ni‖
sgyu bzhin ʼdi zhes brjod79 du med‖(3)
‹ʼon kyang›80 thugs rje ldan pa yis‖
bden pa gnyis kyi tshul gnas te‖
tha snyad don la rab brten nas‖
bdag81 med seng geʼi sgra82 chen bsgrags‖(4)
stong pa nyid sogs rnam grangs sgo‖
sgyu ma ʼdra sogs dpe mtha ʼyas‖
theg pa sna tshogs thabs tshul gyis‖
mi gnas dbu ma nye bar mtshon‖(5)
tshig] P, tsheg D (the upper part of the gi gu seems to have broken off)
ʼjam] P, ʼngam D (the middle stroke of ja seems to have broken off)
79 brjod] P, brngod D (the middle stroke of ja seems to have broken off)
80 ʼon kyang] D, ʼdi yang P
81 The upper part of the letter da in D is not visible (apparently having broken off).
82 The right-hand stroke of the superscript sa in D is not visible (apparently having
broken off).
77
78
186
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
mtshon kyang mtshon bya ma yin te‖
ʼdi la bsal bya ci yang med‖
stong pa nyid kyang stong pas stong‖
ʼdi la sangs rgyas sems can med‖(6)
bdag gzhan snang zhing srid paʼi chos‖
rnam grol rnam par bcings pa yang‖
ming tsam ming yang yod ma yin‖
thams cad nam mkhaʼ dang ʼdra ste‖(7)
de ltar chos rnams mthong med na‖
mi mngon mi snang ʼjam dpal mthong‖
skye dang ‹ʼchi baʼi srid pa›83 yi‖
ʼkhor baʼi rgya mtsho pha rol ʼgro‖(8)
(b) Candraharipāda
*Ratnamālā (P, 69a6-7; D, 71a4; S, vol. 63: 1045.12-14):
brtags84 paʼi yang dag bkag pa yis85‖
shugs la rang rig sgyu maʼi lus‖
rigs86 dpyad yod med mthaʼ las grol‖
ma brtags nyams dgaʼ bem87 rig gnyis‖
*Ratnamālā (P, 69a8-b1; D, 71a5-6; S, vol. 63: 1045.17-1046.1):
snang srid sgyu ma lta bu la‖
ye shes sangs rgyas sgyu ma la‖
sgyu ma rigs88 pas grub na ni‖
ʼchi baʼi srid pa] P, srid paʼi ʼchi ba D
brtags] D, btags P
85 yis] D, yi P
86 rigs] D, rig P
87 bem] P, bems D
88 rigs] D, rig P
83
84
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
187
sgyu ma ma yin yang dag thal‖
mi ʼgyur sgyu mar grub ce na‖
rigs grub don ni yang dag min‖
sgyu maʼi ming gis ci byar yod‖
de yang dngos ʼdzin gdon las ni‖
ma ʼdas pa ru mkhas rnams ʼdod‖
(c) Jñānavajra
*Tattvamārgadarśana (P, 148a5-8; D, 133a7-b2; S, p. vol. 41: 356.7-12):
de yang spyod lam khyad par med par dus gsum du lnga char89 ʼdod la lta
ba la khyad yod de｜ sbyor dngos mjug gsum mdo sde pas rten ʼbrel du ʼdod
la｜ rnam bcas sems kyi rnam par ʼdod｜ rnam med pas90 bzang rtog tu ʼdod
la｜91 sgyu ma lta bus sgyu ma lta bur ʼdod｜92 rab tu mi gnas pas kun rdzob
yin gyi don dam ma yin te｜ rmi lam lta bu mi bden par snang bar ʼdod de｜
don dam la khas len med paʼo‖ gzhan don dam du ʼdod paʼo‖.
(d) Advayavajra
*Apratisthānadeśakavrtti (P, 235a5-8; D, 215b4-6; S, vol. 26: 1536.8-16):
̇̇
̇
rigs pa gang zhe na｜ bdag nyid chen po rnams kyis sngon du legs par bkod
paʼi gang dag yod par grags paʼi chos thams cad93 rten cing ʼbrel par ʼbyung
ba tsam las byung baʼi phyir｜ sgyu ma lta buʼo zhes bya ba dang｜ de nyid
kyis don dam par na rang dang94 gzhan dang gnyis ka dang rgyu med pa las
skye ba nam yang mi ʼthad paʼi phyir don95 dam par nam mkhaʼi padma lta
char] D, car P
pas] D, dpas P
91｜] D, ‖P
92｜] D, ‖P
93 cad] D, cad｜P
94 dang] D, dang｜P
95 don] P, dan D
89
90
188
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
buʼo96 zhes bstan pa ʼdi kho nas chog ste｜ shes rab kyi mig dang ldan pa
rnams kyis rang bzhin gyi97 gtan tshigs ʼdi kho naʼi sgo nas drang por zhib
tu bltas na｜ mthar ci yang grub pa ma rnyed pas｜ chos thams cad rab tu
mi gnas par grub98 paʼo‖.
(e) Vajrapāni
̇
*Guruparamparākramopadeśa (P, 184b6-185a3; D, 164b4-165a1; S, vol. 41:
446.10-447.13):99
rim gyis ʼjug paʼi dbang du byas na theg pa ni gsum ste｜ nyan thos kyi theg
pa dang｜ rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa dang｜ theg pa chen poʼo‖ theg pa
gsum ni gnas pa bzhi la gnas te｜ gnas pa bzhi ni bye brag tu smra bar gnas
pa dang｜ mdo sde par gnas pa dang｜ rnal ʼbyor spyod par gnas pa dang｜
dbu ‹ma par›100 gnas paʼo‖ nyan thos dang rang sangs rgyas ni bye brag tu
smra ba la gnas so‖ bye brag tu smra ba la yang gnyis te｜ nub phyogs bye
brag tu smra ba dang｜ kha che bye brag tu smra baʼo‖ nyan thos la gsum
ste｜ dbang po tha ma dang｜ ʼbring dang｜101 rab bo‖ de la tha ma dang
ʼbring po ni ‹nub phyogs›102 bye brag tu smra ba la gnas so‖ rab dang
rkyen rtogs103 ni kha che bye brag tu smra ba104 la gnas so‖ theg105 pa chen
po106 la yang gnyis te｜ rgyu mtshan nyid kyi107 theg pa dang｜ ʼbras bu rdo
buʼo] D, buʼo‖P
gyi] D, gyis P
98 grub] P, ma grub D
99 This passage has not been translated but rather paraphrased.
100 ma par] D, mar P
101｜] P, om. D
102 nub phyogs] P, nub phyogs kha che D
103 rtogs] em., rtog PD
104 ba] D, om. P
105 theg] P, thig D
106 po] D, hardly legible in P due to excessive ink
107 kyi] D, kyis P
96
97
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
189
rjeʼi theg paʼo‖ de la rgyu mtshan nyid kyi theg pa la gsum ste｜ tha ma
dang｜ ʼbring dang｜ rab bo‖ tha ma ni mdo sde paʼo‖ ʼbring ni rnal ʼbyor
spyod paʼo‖ rab ni dbu ma paʼo‖ rnal ʼbyor spyod pa la gnyis te｜ rnam pa
dang bcas pa108 dang｜ rnam pa med paʼo‖ dbu ma pa la yang gnyis te｜
sgyu ma lta bu gnyis su med par smra ba dang｜ chos thams cad rab tu mi
gnas par smra baʼo‖
*Guruparamparākramopadeśa (P, 189a3-b6; D, 168a7-169a1; S, vol. 41:
456.11-457.19):109
da ni sgyu ma lta buʼi gzhung bshad par bya ste｜
[[«yod min med min yod110 med min‖ gnyis ka min paʼang ma yin pa‖
mthaʼ bzhi las ni rnam grol ba‖ de nyid dbu ma pa yis rig‖111»112 ces bya
bas｜113 yod pa ma yin pa ni gcig dang du maʼi sbyor bas gnod paʼi phyir ro‖
med pa ma yin pa ni snang ba nyams su myong ba yod paʼi phyir ro‖ gnyis
ka ma yin pa ni gnyis ka la skyon114 yod paʼi phyir ro‖ gnyis ka ma yin pa
yang ma yin pa ni rgyu med pa mi srid pa dang｜ phung po gsum pa med
paʼi phyir ro‖]]
de bas na mthaʼ bzhi las grol baʼi sgyu ma lta buʼi shes pa ʼod gsal bar ʼdod
‹do‖›115 de yang mya ngan las ʼdas paʼi chos kyang sgyu ma lta bu rmi lam
lta ‹bu la›116 mya ngan las ʼdas pa las ches lhag paʼi chos yod na yang de
yang117 sgyu ma lta bu rmi lam lta buʼo zhes gsungs pas｜ sna tshogs dang
pa] P, ma D
The text within [[…]] has not been translated.
110 yod] D, lod P
111‖] D, om. P
112 This is a citation of Tattvaratnāvalī 25 (6.13-14); Tib. (P, 129a4; D, 118a7-b1; S,
vol. 26: 343.2-3).
113｜] D, ‖P
114 skyon] D, skon P
115 do‖] P, de｜D
116 bu la] P, bu D
108
109
190
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
sems nyid sgyu ma lta bur gnyis su med pa ni so sor rtog paʼo‖ sna tshogs
thams cad chu zlaʼam me long gi gzugs brnyan ltar bden pa ma yin la
brdzun pa yang ma yin par sgyu ma lta ‹bur gnyis›118 su med par ʼjog119 pa
ni sgom120 paʼo‖121 chad par zhen pa ni sgom paʼi dri maʼo‖ sgyu ma lta buʼi
shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pas122 pha rol tu phyin pa lnga mi dmigs pa
gsum gyis ʼkhor gsum yongs su dag par byas123 nas sems can gyi don byed
pa ni lta baʼo‖
gzhan yang chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas124 pas sgyu ma lta bu nyid
ma grub par ʼdod de｜125 de yang ʼdi skad du｜
gsal lam mi gsal yang rung ste‖
sus kyang ji bzhin ma mthong bas‖
mo gsham gyi ni bu bzhin du‖
brjod du zin kyang don med de‖
zhes bya bas sgyu ma lta bu nyid ʼod gsal lam｜ ʼon te sems las gzhan zhe
na｜
sems las gzhan paʼi chos ni ma grub la｜ sems nyid yin na sems nyid ma
grub paʼi dus su sgyu ma nyid kyang mi ʼgrub bo‖ de ciʼi phyir zhe na｜
sems nyid las gzhan med paʼi phyir ro‖ sgyu ma lta bu yang mi mkhas126
paʼi shes pa ste｜ sgro ʼdogs skur pa ʼdebs pa ste｜ dper na skyes bu ‹mig ma
dag pas›127 mig nam mkhaʼ la bltas na mig ma dag paʼi stobs kyis zla ba
yang] D, yar P
bur gnyis] D, mostly defaced P
119 ʼjog] P, ʼjig D
120 sgom] P, bsgom D
121‖] D,｜P
122 pas] D, pa yis P
123 byas] em., spyad PD.
124 gnas] P, dmigs D
125｜] D, om. P
126 mkhas] D, °s defaced in P
127 mig ma dag pas] em., ma dag pas PD. Cf. the reading in the parallel passage
117
118
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
191
gnyis pa dang｜ skraʼi ʼkhor lo la sogs pa snang zhes sgro ʼdogs la mkhas paʼi
shes pas snang ma thag tu med par shes te｜ med do zhes skur pa ʼdebs so‖
de bzhin du sgyu ma lta bu yang las dang ma rig paʼi dbang gis sna tshogs
su snang ngo zhes sgro btags la｜ mkhas paʼi stobs kyis128 snang ma thag tu
stong ste｜ sgyu ma lta bu zhes skur pa ʼdebs so‖ de bas na sgro ʼdogs pa
dang129 skur pa ʼdebs paʼi mthaʼ la gnas so‖
*Guruparamparākramopadeśa (P, 189b6-190b5; D, 169a1-b5; S, vol. 41:
457.20-459.21):130
de nas gzhan yang chos thams cad rab tu mi gnas par131 smra bar ʼdod132
pas
[[ʼdi skad du｜ «sna tshogs rtag pa ma yin te‖133 chad par yang ni khas mi
len‖ rtag dang chad pa gnyis ka dang‖ gnyis ka min paʼang ma yin no‖
ʼdir ni thams cad mi gnas par‖ dngos poʼi de nyid mkhas pas rig‖ des na ʼdi
ltaʼi rnam rtog gi‖ sems ni sems kyis rig ma yin‖ ji srid sgro ʼdogs thams
cad ni‖ de kun thams cad du med pas‖ dbu maʼi don la sgro ʼdogs med‖
des na dgag dang sgrub pa med‖»134 ces bya ba dang｜ gzhan nas kyang｜
«ʼdi la ‹bsal bya›135 ci yang med‖ gzhag par bya ba gang yang med‖ yang
dag nyid la yang dag blta136‖ yang dag mthong na rnam par grol‖»137 zhes
below: skye bo mig dag pa.
128 kyis] D, defaced in P
129 dang] D, dang｜P
130 The text within [[…]] has not been translated.
131 par] em., paʼi mthar PD
132 ʼdod] em., ʼdong D, defaced in P
133‖] D,｜P
134 This is a citation of Tattvaratnāvalī 27-29 (6.23-7.1) (P, 129a8-b2; D, 118b3-5;
S, vol. 26: 343.13-19).
135 bsal bya] D, gsal ba P
136 blta] P, lta D
137 This is a citation of Abhisamayālamkāra 5.21(＝Ratnagotravibhāga 1.154). For
̇
further references and a translation, see Wangchuk 2007, pp. 199-200, n. 11; Almogi
192
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
bya bas]]
yod paʼi sgro ʼdogs dang med paʼi skur pa ʼdebs pa la mi gnas te｜ sems nyid
sna tshogs su ‹snang ba nyams su›138 myong ba nyid rten cing ʼbrel par
ʼbyung bas na ma skyes pa ste｜ ma skyes pa nyid skye ba ltar snang ste｜
skye ba dang skye ba med pa gnyi ga tha mi dad do‖ de bzhin du snang ba
nyid rigs pas brtags na stong pa yin la｜ stong pa ma grub pa rigs pas brtag
mi bzod pa nyid snang baʼo‖ snang ba nyid las kyang stong pa gzhan ma
yin la｜ stong pa nyid139 las kyang snang ba gzhan ma yin no‖ dper na smig
rgyu la chur snang ba nyid la chu yis stong la｜ chu med pa nyid chur snang
ste｜ chur snang ba dang chu med pa gnyis tha dad pa ma yin no140‖ de
bzhin du snang ba nyid na rang bzhin med ‹la｜›141 rang bzhin med pa nyid
snang baʼo‖ snang ba dang rang bzhin med pa stong pa nyid ni tha mi142
dad ‹do‖›143 dper na bud shing du ma mes bsregs na meʼi ngo bor gcig ste｜
de nas bud shing zad pa dang me nyid mi gnas so‖ de bzhin du sna tshogs
su snang ba nyid rigs pas stong pa nyid du byas nas dngos po ma grub pa
dang stong pa nyid kyang mi gnas so‖ de bzhin du gnyis su mi gnas pa
yang gnyis su ma grub paʼi tshe144 na gnyis su med pa yang mi ʼgrub bo‖ de
bas na gzhan gyi zhen pa bzlog ‹pa ʼam›145｜ sgro skur gcad146 ‹pa ʼam›147｜
‹drang baʼi›148 don du stong pa dang skye ba med pa zhes brjod kyi｜ mkhas
2009: 312.
138 snang ba nyams su] P, om. D
139 nyid] D, om. P
140 no] P, na D
141 la] D, pa‖P
142 mi] P, me D
143 do‖] D, de｜P
144 tshe] P, che D
145 pa ʼam] P, paʼam D
146 gcad] D, bcad P
147 pa ʼam] P, paʼam D
148 drang baʼi] P, drad paʼi D
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
pas btsal149
193
‹pa ʼam›150｜ nges paʼi don du de151 nyid mi gnas te｜ rnam gcod
dang｜ yongs gcod dang｜ sgro ʼdogs dang｜152 skur pa ʼdebs pa yang mi
gnas la｜ zhen pa med cing dgag pa dang｜153 sgrub pa med la154 mnyam
gzhag dang rjes thob gnyis su med cing mi gnas pa ni so sor rtog paʼo‖ sgro
skur dang zhen pa med par yid la byed pa med pa ni sgom paʼo‖ don thams
cad chad par lta zhing nyams su myong ba med pas bems por gyur pa ni
sgom paʼi dri maʼo‖ sgro skur med pa dang｜ zhen pa med paʼi shes rab kyi
pha rol tu phyin pas pha rol tu phyin pa lnga mi dmigs pa gsum gyis ʼkhor
gsum yongs su dag pas sems can gyi don byed pa ni lta baʼo‖ dper na skye
bo mig dag pa mkhas pa ‹mig gis›155 nam mkhaʼ la ‹bltas pas›156 mig dag pas
skraʼi157 ʼkhor lo la sogs pa ci yang mi dmigs la｜ mkhas pas yod ces bya
baʼam med ces bya bar sgro ʼdogs ‹pa ʼam›158 skur pa ʼdebs par mi byed do‖
de bzhin du chos thams cad rang bzhin du ma skyes paʼi ngo bo nyid kyis
yod med gang yang mi gnas pas yod med kyi sgro skur gang159 du yang mi
gnas pa ni de kho na nyid kyi shes paʼo‖ sgyu ma lta bu dang rab tu mi
gnas paʼi snying rje yang dmigs pa med paʼi snying rje ste｜ chos thams cad
cir yang mi dmigs par yid la byed pas na mi dmigs paʼi snying rjeʼo‖
btsal] D, gcal P
pa ʼam] P, paʼam D
151 de] P, di D
152｜] D, om. P
153｜] D, om. P
154 la] D, la｜P
155 mig gis] P, cig D
156 bltas pas] P, lta ba na D
157 skraʼi] D, sgraʼi P
158 pa ʼam] P, paʼam D
159 gang] P, gad D
149
150
194
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
(f) Atiśa (ascribed)
bKa’ gdams bu chos (160.9-16):
de la gnyis｜ dbu ma dang｜ sems tsam mo‖ dbu ma la gnyis te｜ snang ba
tsam gyi dbu ma dang｜ rab tu mi gnas paʼi dbu maʼo‖ snang ba tsam gyi
dbu ma ni｜ chos rdzun pa yin pa rdzun par gtan la ʼbebs te｜ rmi lam la
sogs pa sgyu maʼi dpe brgyad kyis bstan no‖ de yang bstan bya ston byed
gnyis ka ʼkhrul baʼi yul dang yul can yin pas spang bya yin la shes par bya
dgos so‖ rab tu mi gnas paʼi dbu ma ni｜ sangs rgyas rnams byon yang
rung｜ ma byon yang rung｜ chos rnams kyi chos nyid ye nas mi gnas par
gsungs pas｜ blang bya yin la shes par bya dgos so‖ sems tsam la gnyis te｜
snang ba bden par smra ba dang｜ rdzun par smra baʼo‖ de dag gnyis car
rab tu mi gnas paʼi dbu ma la ltos te ʼkhrul ba yin la shes par ni bya dgos｜
(g) Gro lung pa Blo gros ʼbyung gnas
bsTan rim chen mo (437b7-438a3):
yang blun po kha cig dbu maʼi lugs gnyis te｜ rab tu mi gnas pa dang sgyu
ma lta bur smra baʼo‖ slob dpon zhi ba ʼtsho la sogs pa ni sgyu ma don dam
pa bzhed pa ste｜ dngos po smra bas btags pa bden pa bkag nas brdzun pa
yongs gcod rigs pas bsgrub pa kho naʼo zhes zer ba ni ci ʼang ma yin te｜
dbu maʼi rgyan nyid las｜
de phyir dngos po ʼdi dag ni‖
kun rdzob pa nyid mtshan nyid ʼdzin‖
gal te don dam ʼdi ʼdod na‖
de la bdag gis ci byar yod‖
ces rdzun pa de snang baʼi yul tsam du gsungs la｜ skye ba dgag pa dgag
bzhis bsdus paʼi yongs gcod ni log paʼi kun rdzob nyid du gsungs paʼi phyir
dang｜ yod paʼam med paʼang rung ʼgaʼ zhig rigs pas gnas par smra na
mthar lta baʼi gdon chen pos zin pas dbu maʼi lam las thag ring ba nyid do‖
yod na nges par rtag par zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs paʼi phyir ro‖
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
195
(h) Phywa pa Chos kyi seng ge
gZhung rnam ’byed (65.6-67.2):
don dam paʼi bden pa la yang kha cig bden pas stong paʼi snang ba160 sgyu
ma lta bur smra ba dang｜ ma yin dgag tu bden pa gang du yang rab tu mi
gnas par smra baʼi lugs gnyis yod zer ba ni mun sbrul gyi bshad pa ste｜
sgyu ma lta bur smra ba rab tu mi gnas par161 smra ba las162 lugs gzhan du
brjod pa de (a) bden pas163 stong par164 khas mi len pas165 lugs gzhan yin
nam｜166 (b) snang ba167 ma yin dgag tu khas len pas lugs gzhan yin｜168 (a)
dang po ltar na sgyu ma lta bur smra bas bden pas stong par khas mi len na
de snang ba169 sna tshogs par khas len par ʼgal bas sgyu ma lta bu nyid
kyang khas mi len par ‹thal lo›170‖ (b) gnyis pa ltar na (i) snang ba171 ma
yin dgag pa tsam khas len pas172 rab tu mi gnas pa las173 lugs gzhan yin nam
(ii) snang ba ma yin ‹dgag de›174 dpyad bzod du khas len pas rab tu mi gnas
pa las lugs gzhan yin｜ (i) dang po ‹ltar na›175 rab tu mi gnas par smra ba
nyid kyang rab tu mi gnas pa las lugs gzhan du ʼgyur te｜ snang ba176 ma yin
ba] em., text reads pa
par] em., text reads paʼi
162 las] em., text reads la
163 pas] em., text reads pa
164 par] em., text reads pa
165 pas] em., text reads pa
166｜] em., text reads‖
167 ba] em., text reads pa
168｜] em., text reads‖
169 ba] em., text reads pa
170 thal lo] exp., text reads thalo
171 ba] em., text reads pa
172 pas] em., text reads par
173 las] em., text reads la
174 dgag de] em., text reads te dgag
175 ltar na] em., text reads ltar
176 ba] em., text reads pa
160
161
196
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
‹dgag de›177 tsam khas len paʼi ‹phyir ro›178‖ khas mi len na kun rdzob la
skur pa ʼdebs pas rgyang ‹ʼphen pa›179 ltar chad par ʼgyur te｜ des ma
mthong ba180 bkag pa ltar ʼdis mthong ba181 nyid kyang bkag paʼi phyir ro‖
(ii) gnyis pa ltar na sgyu ma lta bur smra ba dpyad bzod ʼdi pa ma yin dgag
khas len pas dngos por182 smra ba dang tha dad ‹med par›183 ʼgyur ro‖
rab tu mi gnas pa yang sgyu ma lta bur smra ba las lugs gzhan du brjod
na｜184
(a) sgyu ma khas mi185 len paʼam (b) sgyu ma dpyad bzod du khas
mi len pas lugs gzhan yin｜ (a) dang po ltar na rab tu mi gnas pas186 kun
rdzob ‹thams cad›187 mi ʼdod pas ‹rgyang ʼphen pas›188 kyang smad par bya
bar ʼgyur te｜ rgyang ʼphen189 pas kun rdzob kyi phyogs gcig190 la skur191 pa
btab pa yin la rab tu mi gnas pas kun rdzob ‹thams cad›192 la skur ba btab
paʼi phyir ro‖ (b) gnyis pa ltar na sgyu ma ltar smra ba nyid kyang sgyu
ma ltar smra ba nyid193 las tha dad du ʼgyur te｜194 sgyu ma dpyad bzod par
khas len paʼi phyir ro‖ dpyad bzod du khas len na bden paʼi snang ba195 yin
dgag de] em., text reads te dgag
phyir ro] exp., text reads phyiro
179 ʼphen pa] em., text reads phan phar
180 ba] em., text reads pa
181 ba] em., text reads pa
182 The final r is added below the syllable po.
183 med par] em., text reads par
184｜] em., text reads‖
185 The syllable mi is added below the line of writing.
186 pas] exp., text reads pa
187 thams cad] exp., text reads thamd
̇
188 rgyang ʼphen pas] em., text reads rgyas pa bas
189 ʼphen] em., text reads phan
190 gcig] em., text reads cig
191 skur] em., text reads bskur
192 thams cad] exp., text reads thamd
̇
193 The text inserts here kyang sgyu mar smra ba.
194｜] em., text reads‖
195 ba] em., text reads pa
177
178
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
197
pas sgyu maʼi don mi gnas la｜ snang ba196 dpyad bzod197 par ʼdod pas dngos
por smra ba dang yang tha dad med par ʼgyur ro‖ ‹de bas na›198 dbu ma ba
‹thams cad›199 kyis sgyu ma lta bu nyid ni dpyad200 par mi ʼdod pas｜ cir
yang ma grub pa kho na dpyad bzod par ʼdod pa la tha dad gtan med pa yin
no‖
(i) Rog Shes rab ʼod
Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me (A, 176.5-177.5; B, 264.3-265.3):
gnyis pa rnam bcad201 dgag bya la gnyis te｜ spyi dang｜ bye brag go‖
dang po dgag bya spyiʼi mtshan nyid ni｜ dngos po ʼam｜ dngos med kyang
rung ste｜ rigs202 pas dpyad203 nas204 rang bzhin gyi khyad par ʼgaʼ zhig
dang ldan par ʼdod pa gang rnyed pa de dgag bya yin no‖ ‹dgag bya›205 la
bye brag tu phye na gnyis te｜ med pa dgag pa dang｜ ma yin pa dgag
paʼo‖ med pa dgag pa ni｜ so so skye bo dang｜ nyan thos pa｜ phyi rol gyi
don dngos por ʼdod pa ʼgogs la｜ ma yin pa dgag pa ni｜ sems tsam rang rig
don dam du ʼdod pa ʼgogs paʼo‖.
yongs gcod206 bsgrub bya la gnyis te｜ sgyu ma lta bu｜ rab tu mi gnas
paʼo‖ sgyu ma lta bu ni｜ snang baʼi dngos por bkag nas｜ shul du sgyu ma
ba] em., text reads pa
The text inserts here du khas len na bden paʼi snang ba yin pas sgyu maʼi don mi
gnas la｜ snang ba dpyad bzod, obviously due to a skip of the eye to the previous
sentence.
198 de bas na] em., text reads de bas
199 thams cad] exp., text reads thamd
̇
200 dpyad] em., text reads spyad
201 bcad] em., gcod A, gcad B
202 rigs] B, rig A
203 dpyad] em., spyad AB
204 nas] B, na A
205 dgag bya] B, dag ga A
206 gcod] A, spyod B
196
197
198
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
tsam cig207 sgrub paʼo‖ rab tu mi gnas pa ni｜ snang baʼi dngos por ʼdod pa
bkag nas sgyu ma tsam du yang mi ʼdod de rab tu mi gnas paʼo‖
Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me (A, 189.2-190.3; B, 275.2-276.2):
spyi don bzhi pa rjes dpag gi ʼjug yul la gnyis te｜ rang rgyud dang｜ thal
ʼgyur ro‖ de gnyis kyi khyad par ni｜ rang rgyud kyi lta ba la dogs paʼi
skyon sel tsam cig208 rang rgyud yin la｜ gzhan gyi khas len ʼgogs pa de thal
ʼgyur ro‖ rang rgyud la gnyis te｜ sgyu ma lta bu dang｜ rab tu mi gnas
paʼo‖ de gnyis kyi khyad par yang｜ rnam bcad209 kyi dus su dgag bya
bkag nas｜ yongs gcod210 la rdzun paʼi211｜ sgyu ma lta bur khas len pa ni｜
sgyu ma lta buʼo‖ rnam bcad212 la bden paʼi dngos po bkag nas｜ yongs
gcod213 la khas len gang yang med pa ni rab tu mi gnas paʼo‖ de gnyis rang
rgyud do‖ thal ʼgyur ni｜ rang gi khas len gang yang med pa la｜ gzhan
gyis yang dag tu khas len pa ʼgogs214 paʼo‖ de gang gis ʼgogs na｜ gong du
bstan paʼi rigs pa lnga pos ʼgogs so‖
(j) Nyang ral Nyi ma ʼod zer
gSang sngags lung gi bang mdzod (141.6-146.4):
dbu ma la gnyis te215￤ (I) sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med pa dang￤ (II) rab tu
mi gnas paʼo￤
(I) ‹142› sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med par smra ba ni￤ mthaʼ bzhi dang
bral ba don gyi dbu maʼo￤ sgyu ma gnyis med kyi lta ba ni￤ sems tsam
cig] A, gcig B
cig] A, gcig B
209 bcad] em., dpyad AB
210 gcod] em., dpyod AB
211 paʼi] A, paʼam B
212 bcad] em., dpyad AB
213 gcod] em., dpyod AB
214 ʼgogs] B, ʼgog A
215 te] em., text reads ste
207
208
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
199
rnam rdzun gyis216 sems nyid kyi bag chags dang￤ de nyid dang gzhan du
brjod du med pa dang don dam yongs grub skad cig mar ʼdod pa bkag nas
ʼdi shes pa las ma gtogs217 pa phyi rol gyi don med par ʼdod pa de￤ ʼo na
dkar dmar gyi snang ba ʼdi ji ltar ʼdod zhes na￤ snang ba ʼdi nyid bag chags
kyi dbang gis￤ sgyu ma tsam du snang bar ʼdod￤ de yang rang rig paʼi
rkyen las bskyed paʼi phyir ma skyes pa ces byaʼo￤
de yang (1) don dam (2) kun rdzob gnyis su ʼdod de￤
(1) kun rdzob la yang gnyis￤ (i) log paʼi kun rdzob dang｜ (ii) don
byed paʼi kun rdzob bo218￤ (i) log pa ni zla ba las gnyis su snang ba lta bu
ste￤ snang yang don byed mi nus paʼo￤ (ii) don byed paʼi kun rdzob ni￤
mtshan nyid bzhi dang ldan pa ste￤ rgyu rkyen las skyes pa￤ don byed nus
pa｜ mthun par snang ba￤ brtags na dben paʼo￤
(2) don dam la gnyis￤ (i) rnam grangs kyi don dam paʼi bden pa
dang￤ (ii) rnam grangs ma yin paʼi don dam paʼi bden paʼo￤ (i) rnam
grangs ni￤ gtan tshig bzhi chos can la bzhag pas￤ yang dag paʼi ‹dngos
po›219 bcad nas￤ sgyu ma tsam du bsgrub paʼo￤ ye shes dam paʼi yul du
gyur pas don dam pa zhes byaʼo￤ ma nor mi slu bas bden pa ces byaʼo￤
rnam grangs ni ʼjoms220 byed kyi rigs221 pa la ‹143› byaʼo￤ (ii) rnam
grangs222 ma yin paʼi223 don dam paʼi bden pa ni￤ mig gi rnam par shes pa
ma skyes na ma skyes￤ skyes na gzugs su skyes￤ gzugs mig gi rnam par
shes paʼi ngo bo yin￤ ‹mig gzugs›224 gzugs kyi rnam pa dang bcas pas225
gyis] em., text reads gyi
gtogs] em., text reads rtogs
218 bo] em., text reads so
219 dngos po] em., text reads dngos
220 ʼjoms] em., text reads ʼjam
221 rigs] em., text reads rig
222 grangs] em., text reads pa
223 paʼi] em., text reads pa
224 mig gzugs] exp., text reads migzugs
225 pas] em., text reads pa
216
217
200
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
rnam226 bcas￤ zhes byaʼo￤ bcas bzhin du yang dag paʼi dngos por stong pas
snang ba ma ʼgags te227￤ sgyu ma tsam du snang ba yin la￤ de gnyis su
med pas sgyu ma gnyis med zhes byaʼo￤
mthaʼ bzhi las grol lugs ni￤ yang dag paʼi stong pas rtag228 paʼi mthaʼ
dang bral￤ stong zhing snang ba ma ʼgags pas chad paʼi mthaʼ dang bral￤
sgyu ma tsam du snang ba nyid yang dag gi dngos por stong pas gnyis kaʼi
mthaʼ dang bral￤ gnyis ka bas gnyis med ma grub pas￤ gnyis med kyi
mthaʼ dang bral￤ dbu ma rgyan las￤
sna tshogs rtag229 pa ma yin pas￤
chad pa yang ni khas mi len￤
rtag chad gnyis ka ma yin pas￤
mtha ʼbzhi las ni yongs su grol￤
ces ʼbyung ngo￤ sgyu ma ltar gnyis su med paʼi ʼdod pa bshad zin no￤
(II) rab tu mi gnas pa la bzhi ste￤ (1) stong pa rab tu mi gnas pa￤ (2)
rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa｜ (3) btang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa￤ (4)
zung ʼjug rab tu mi gnas pa
(1) stong pa rab tu mi gnas pa ni￤ don dam dang kun rdob tha dad du
ʼdod pa ste￤ snang pa sna tshogs ʼdi kun rdzob kyi bden pa ʼkhrul paʼi snang
‹144› ba mi bden paʼo￤ don dam pa na spros paʼi mthaʼ thams cad dang bral
baʼo￤ dper na rmi lam rdzas kyi dngos po ci yod pa las￤ sad nas gtan med
pa bzhin￤ dngos po ʼdi gtan nas med par ʼdod￤ mngon par rtogs paʼi brgyan
las￤
stong pa nyid kyis grol bar ʼgyur￤
de ma shes na ʼching230 bar ʼgyur￤
rnam] em., text reads rnams
te] em., text reads ste
228 rtag] em., text reads rtags
229 rtag] em., text reads btags
230 ʼching] em., text reads ʼchi
226
227
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
201
zhes pa dang￤
chos thams cad kyi yang dag pa ji lta bu lags￤
bkaʼ stsal pa stong pa nyid￤
zhes paʼo￤
(2) rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa ni￤ ji srid rnam rtog yod kyi bar du￤
gnyen po ye shes kyi tshogs kyang yod la￤ rnam rtog zad nas ye shes kyi
ming yang med par ʼdod do￤ dper na sol ba ma zad na dkar po mi yong pa
ltar ro￤
(3) btang snyoms rab tu mi gnas pa ni￤ de man chad kyi lta ba sgros
btags dang￤ skur ʼdebs kyi mthaʼ la gnas te231￤ nyan thos kyis232 gzung
ʼdzin du sgros btags￤ sgyu ma lta bur rang bzhin gyis233 stong par ʼdod pa
pa skur ‹pa btab›234￤ sgyu ma sgros btags￤235 stong pa rab tu mi gnas pas
sgyu ma tsam du yang med ces skur pa btab￤ stong pa sgros btags so￤
(4) ‹zung ʼjug›236 rab tu mi gnas pa ni￤ blo yongs su gnas pa med de237￤
snang ba rang gi sems kyi rang rig rten ʼbrel gyi ʼkhor lo sna tshogs su
snang baʼi dus na bden paʼi dngos ‹145› po ma grub￤ bden paʼi dngos po ma
grub pas238 rdzun par mi ʼdzin￤ khas gang du yang mi len te￤ zla ba sgron
ma las￤
yod dang med dang yod med med￤
khas mi len paʼi lta ba la｜
de la blo dang ldan pa ni￤
sus kyang klan ka bya mi nus￤
zhes ʼbyung ngo￤
te] em., text reads ste
kyis] em., text reads kyi
233 gyis] em., text reads gyi
234 pa btab] em., text reads par btags
235 btags￤] em., text reads btags
236 zung ʼjug] em., text reads btang snyoms
237 de] em., text reads ste
238 pas] em., text reads paʼi
231
232
202
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
dbu ma sgyu ma lta bu ni￤ snang pa yang dag du ʼdod pa bkag nas￤
sgyu ma239 rig pas bsgrub par ʼdod de240 mi ʼthad241 de￤ sgyu ma ni mtshan
nyid ci yin rigs242 pas grub la￤ rigs243 pas gnod paʼo￤ snang ba244 dag su
ʼdod paʼi blo yang￤ rigs245 pas grub pa la rigs246 pa mi gnod pa la byaʼo￤ ʼon
snang ba247 skyes nas ‹grub bam›248 ma skyes pas grub zer nas rdo rje
gzegs ma gtong na￤ sgyu ma skyes nas grub pam￤ ma skyes pas grub
byaʼo￤ skyes249 nas ma grub des na sgyu ma zhes byaʼo￤ zhes zer na￤
skyes250 nas ma grub pa des snang ba251 yang ces byaʼo zhes mgo bgreʼo252￤
(k) Rig paʼi ral gri
Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog (391.1-6):
de ʼdraʼi dbu mar smra ba la‖
rang rgyud pa dang thal ʼgyur gnyis‖
de la sgyu ma lta bu dang‖
rab tu mi gnas zhes kyang zer‖
ʼdi gnyis kyi khyad par sangs rgyas la ye shes yod med du ʼdod paʼam kun
rdzob la bden pa khas len mi len nam khas len gyi lta ba yod med dam tshad
maʼi grangs mang nyung ngam yul thams cad rdzun pa dang blo thams cad
ma] em., text reads mar
de] em., text reads ste
241 ʼthad] em., text reads thad
242 rigs] em., text reads rig
243 rigs] em., text reads rig
244 ba] em., text reads pa
245 rigs] em., text reads rig
246 rigs] em., text reads rig
247 ba] em., text reads pa
248 grub bam] exp., text reads grubam
̇
249 skyes] em., text reads spyad
250 skyes] em., text reads spyad
251 ba] em., text reads pa
252 bgreʼo] em., text reads bgriʼo
239
240
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
203
ʼkhrul par ʼdod mi ʼdod dam kun rdzob la dbye ba ʼdod mi ʼdod dam don dam
med dgag dang spros bral la byed pa la sogs pa tsam gyis ni khyad par mi
phyed de ma khyab pa dang ʼkhrul paʼi253 phyir ro‖ de rgyas par bshad na
ni shin tu mang por ʼgyur ro‖ ʼon kyang ʼdi gtan tshigs kyi dbye ba yin no‖
Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog (393.6-394.5):
mai tri paʼi254 phyag rgya bzhi la sogs pa nas sgyu ma lta bu dang rab tu mi
gnas pa zhes ʼbyung ba deʼang ʼdi gnyis yin te rang rgyud pa rnams ni sgyu
ma lta bu shas cher ʼchad la｜ thal ʼgyur ba ni sgyu ma tsam mi gnas paʼi
spros bral shas cher ʼchad pas shas che chung la btags pa yin no‖ ʼdi gnyis
ka sgyu ma lta bu ni rigs pas sgrub pa yin te … des na sgyu ma rigs grub
ngan pa yin no zhes zer ba ni mi shes pa yin no‖
Grub mtha’ rgyan gyi me tog (396.2-6):
kha cig gis sgyu ma lta bu don dam paʼi bden par ʼdod paʼi dbu ma pa yod
ces zer ba de ni ʼol tshod kho na yin te brtags pas ʼjig na don dam yin pa
nyams la｜ mi ʼjig na sgyu ma lta bu nyams paʼi phyir dang｜ gzhan dbang
don dam du ʼdod pa dngos po smra baʼi lugs yin paʼi phyir ro‖ gzhung ʼgaʼ
zhig las sgyu ma lta bu la don dam zhes bshad pa de ni rnam grangs paʼi don
dam yin no‖ deʼi phyir dbu ma pa thams cad don dam spros bral la ʼdod par
mthun par yin no‖
253
254
paʼi] em., text reads baʼi
paʼi] em., text reads baʼi
204
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
Sigla and Bibliography
1. Sigla
A&B
See Grub mtha’ bstan pa’i sgron me.
D sDe dge bKa’ ’gyur and bsTan ’gyur. Numbers according to
Hakuju Ui et al., eds., A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan
Buddhist Canons (Bkah-hgyur and Bstan-hgyur). Sendai: Tōhoku
̇ ̇
̇
Imperial University, 1934.
P
Peking bKa’ ’gyur and bsTan ’gyur. Numbers according to Shoju
Inaba et al., The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition. Catalogue &
Index, Reduced-size edition. Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co., 1985.
S bsTan ’gyur (dpe bsdur ma). Beijing: Krung goʼi bod kyi shes rig
dpe skrun khang, 1994-2005.
2. Primary Sources
a. Indian Sources
*Apratisthānadeśakavrtti Advayavajra, *Sarvadharmāpratisthānadė̇
̇
̇̇
śakatattvārthagāthāvrtti.
̇
―Tib. P3144; D2296; S1204, vol. 26.
*Dharmadhātudarśanagīti Atiśa, *Dharmadhātudarśanagīti.
―Tib. P3153; D2314; S1216, vol. 26.
*Guruparamparākramopa-
Vajrapāni, *Guruparamparākramopadeśa.
̇
deśa ―Tib. P4539; D3716; S2414, vol. 41.
Hevajratantra Śrīhevajramahātantrarāja.
―In The Hevajra Tantra: A Critical
Study. Part 2: Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts,
ed., D. L. Snellgrove. London Oriental
Series 6. London: Oxford University Press,
1959: 1-101.
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
*Paramārthabodhicittabhāva-
Aśvaghosa/Śūra,
̇
nākrama bhāvanākrama.
205
*Paramārthabodhicitta-
―Tib. P5308; D3912; S3141, vol. 64.
*Ratnamālā Candraharipāda, *Ratnamālā.
―Tib. P5297; D3901; S3130, vol. 63.
*Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā Jetāri, *Sugatamatavibhaṅgakārikā.
―Tib. P5296; D3899; S3128, vol. 63.
*Tattvamārgadarśana
Jñānavajra, *Tattvamārgadarśana.
―Tib. P4538; D3715; S2413, vol. 41.
Tattvaratnāvalī Advayavajra, Tattvaratnāvalī.
―Skt. H. Ui (ed.), Tattvaratnāvalī. Nagoya
Daigaku Bungakubu Kenkyu Kiyou (The
Journal of the Faculty of Nagoya University) 3.1, 1950: 1-31.
―Tib. P3085; D2240; S1146, vol. 26.
Tattvaratnāvaloka Vāgīśvarakīrti, “Tattvaratnāvalokah with
̇
Vivarana of Mahāpandita-Vāgīśvarakīrti.”
̇
̇
Dhīh 21 (1996): 129-149.
̇
Yuktisastikā Nāgārjuna, Yuktisastikā.
̇ ̇̇
̇ ̇̇
―In Chr. Lindtner (ed. & tr.), Master of
Wisdom: Writings of the Buddhist Master
Nāgārjuna, Translation and Studies. Revised edition of 1986. Berkeley: Yeshe De
Project, Dharma Publishing, 1997: 72-93
(Tibetan text and English translation),
174-175 (Sanskrit fragment).
b. Tibetan Sources
bKa’ brgyad rnam bshad Mi pham rNam rgyal rgya mtsho, dPal
sgrub pa chen po’i bka’ brgyad kyi spyi don
206
Māyopamādvayavāda versus Sarvadharmāpratisthānavāda (Almogi)
̇̇
rnam par bshad pa dngos grub snying po. In
MS, vol. 21: 1-207.
bKa’ gdams bu chos ’Brom ston pa rgyal ba’i ’byung gnas kyi
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Orna Almogi