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Journal of World Philosophies
An Examined Life: Women, Buddhism, and Philosophy in Kim Iryŏp
JIN Y. PARK
American University, USA (jypark@american.edu)
The four reviews collected here are the result of two author-meets-critics panels on my translated
volume Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun (Ŏnŭ sudoin ŭi hoesang 어느 修道人의 回想). The first panel
was held at the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy’s annual meeting in October 2015,
and the second panel was held at the International Society for Buddhist Philosophy’s group meeting
at the Eastern Division American Philosophical Association meeting in January 2016. I would like to
thank those who organized and participated in these panels. The reviewers addressed different
aspects of Kim Iryŏp’s life and philosophy, which demonstrates the richness of her life and thought.
Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun is the translation of Kim Iryŏp’s (金一葉 1896–1971) book
published in Korean in 1960. At the time, Iryŏp was a Zen/Sŏn master, a well-known figure not
only to Korean Buddhist nuns and lay practitioners but also more broadly to the general public in
Korea. Iryŏp’s fame was not solely based on her position as a Zen master. Before she joined the
monastery, she was a provocative female writer and a leading figure in Korean women’s movement
in the 1920s. Around the late 1920s, Iryŏp began to practice meditation and eventually joined the
monastery in 1933. She was in her late thirties at the time.
As I was translating Iryŏp’s book, I asked myself a question: How and why do women
engage with Buddhist philosophy? To put it differently: Women, Buddhism, and philosophy—how
and where do they meet? This topic became a major theme in my monograph Women and Buddhist
Philosophy: Engaging Zen Master Kim Iryŏp, published in 2017. Inquiry on gender in world religions
emerged as an important topic among religious scholars starting around the mid-1980s. The Women
and World Religions series that was published in the 1980s examined the images and treatment of
women in the world’s major religious traditions, including Buddhism. However, when gender was
discussed in the context of Buddhism, the examination was usually limited to the context of religious
tradition, and gender in Buddhist philosophy has not yet been seriously and critically explored. The
division between religion and philosophy has western roots, and East Asian thought-traditions,
including Buddhism, usually contain both religious and philosophical dimensions. Still, I think that
Iryŏp offers us an exemplary case to explore the philosophical dimensions of women’s engagement
with Buddhism.
Philosophy has been one of the most male-dominated disciplines in the humanities. Asian
philosophy, including Buddhist philosophy, is still at the margin of philosophy in western academia.
Bringing the two marginal positions of gender and Buddhist philosophy together exposes issues and
questions that we might not usually find in our discussion of women in the context of western
philosophy.
1
Women and Buddhist Philosophy
Iryop’s position on the women’s movement after she joined the monastery has been one of the
questions Iryŏp’s critics have consistently asked. In her pre-monastic life, Iryŏp was an active
member of the New Women movement, the first-generation Korean feminist movement that
demanded women’s freedom and gender equality. Did Iryŏp give up her idea of gender equality after
she joined the monastery?
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Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 155–182
Copyright © 2020 Douglas L. Berger, Leah Kalmanson, Erin McCarthy, Mark A. Nathan, and Jin Y. Park.
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In this context, Erin McCarthy points out an important and seemingly controversial issue of
the relationship between Buddhism and feminism. The Buddhist concept of self is known as “noself,” which teaches that one should let go of the self, since the self we cling to is illusory and
becomes a source of suffering. Feminism claims that patriarchal society deprives women of their
identities, portraying them as a nameless existence living in the shadows of men. For women to
liberate themselves from such an invisible position and live the lives they deserve, the first step from
a feminist perspective is for women to gain a clear sense of identity, instead of realizing that the
sense of self is illusory as Buddhism teaches. Some might argue that one needs to find the self
before letting it go. In her review, McCarthy discusses Iryŏp’s position on women’s issues side by
side with that by Hiratsuka Raichō (平塚 らいちょう 1886–1971), a representative Japanese New
Woman who must have had a significant influence on Iryŏp’s work. McCarthy argues that the
problem of women’s identity in patriarchal society is not that women do not have an identity. The
problem arises from the anonymity of their existence. Namelessness is itself women’s identity, and
that is why it is illusory.
The Buddhist no-self theory enabled both Iryŏp and Raichō to find the real self, and they
did so not by consolidating the self before letting it go but by realizing that the socially imposed and
marginalized self was not their real identity. Iryŏp called it the small self (soa 小我) and encouraged
both men and women to embrace the no-self, which Iryŏp called the great self (taea 大我). Raichō
emphasized the importance of spiritual concentration in women’s search for the authentic self that
she believed every woman has inside, as she beautifully described in her essay in the inaugural issue
of the Seitō (青鞜), “In the Beginning, Woman Was the Sun” (Genshi, josei wa taiyōdeatta 元始、女性
は太陽であった). For both Iryŏp and Raichō, meditation facilitated the path to the authentic self.
Against the claim that Iryŏp distanced herself from women’s issues after she joined the monastery,
McCarthy states, “we can read Iryŏp’s early feminist work as laying the foundation for her spiritual
awakening and her later Buddhist writing” (McCarthy 2020: 156).1 For Raichō, Zen meditation was
essential not only for the process of finding the self but also for social engagement. She observed,
“Had I not practiced Zen, I would have led a life utterly unrelated to social activism” (cited in Yusa
and Kalmanson 2014: 613).2 McCarthy evaluates that Raichō’s urge for women’s liberation through
meditation was rather metaphysical, whereas Iryŏp’s was more existential.
Leah Kalmanson raises another seminal question regarding the relationship between women
and Buddhism. In her nuanced analysis of Iryŏp’s Buddhism, Kalmanson connects Buddhist selfcultivation with the classic feminist slogan, “The personal is political.” Kalmanson asks where we
should locate the personal when subjectivity is always already the effect of social power and shaped
by political institutions.
As much as each of us is a product of our biological, social, and political environments, we
are also individuals. The environment produces each of us, but the suffering we experience is our
own as well. One can feel empathy for other people’s suffering and pain, but we are the ones who
have to deal with our own: our suffering is personal. This is so true, but if our thinking stops there,
we become the prisoners of our own world, and solipsism will be the condition of our existence.
Buddhism proposes a different path. From the Buddhist perspective, one’s suffering is one’s own on
the surface. However, if one gives serious thought to the causes of the suffering, the person will not
be able to pin down a single exclusive cause of the suffering. To use a Buddhist expression, suffering
is empty. This is why Buddhism teaches the four levels of understanding suffering, known as the
Four Noble Truths. The Four Noble Truths teach us that “I” might feel dying pains as an individual
in my own situation, but those pains do not have an essence or independent identity. From the
Buddhist perspective, a positive response to and overcoming of “my” pains and “my” suffering is
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Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 155–182
Copyright © 2020 Douglas L. Berger, Leah Kalmanson, Erin McCarthy, Mark A. Nathan, and Jin Y. Park.
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possible when one realizes that this “mine-ness” of “my” pain explains only a fragment of the
suffering one deals with.
We need to be careful about the claim of an individual’s suffering as illusion. The
proposition that one’s pains are illusory does not negate the actual existence of pain. Instead, it
offers a path to deal with the pain and turn the current predicament into an experience of awakening
to the human existential condition. This is also what gives meaning and power to the
autobiographical narrative that Iryŏp employed in her writings. One’s life story is personal, but in
our effort to find meaning in the raw material called life, we realize that what we considered personal
does not remain personal but is always intertwined with various domains that connect the individual
with others and the world.
In this context, Kalmanson asks what a “person” means to Iryŏp and notes that for Iryŏp, a
person was understood as a being with “creative and dynamic” power (Kalmanson 2020: 163).
Kalmanson connects Iryŏp’s concept of a person with the idea of transformation. Buddhist practice
has heavily invested on the importance of the transformation of the self. If any change is to take
place in the self or the world, the epistemic self needs to change his or her way of looking at the
world. Kalmanson rightly points out that meditation, which is at the core of the Buddhist experience
of self-transformation, is never an individual act. Instead, as she observes, “meditation is not a break
from politics but is itself a force for social change” since “meditation does not just affect the single
self who meditates” (Kalmanson 2020: 165). In her recent publication Cross-Cultural Existentialism,
Kalmanson further observes, “meditation is not simply a private experience but an efficacious
practice that conducts the transformative energy into the surrounding world” (Kalmanson 2020:
81).3 In this sense, Kalmanson sees the “political potency of Buddhist practice” to the extent of
declaring, “Practice is political” (Kalmanson 2020: 165).4
Tanabe Hajime (田辺 元 1885–1962), a Kyoto school thinker, mentioned that solipsism is not
possible because the world and the self from the beginning cannot be separated from each other.
Seen from the Buddhist perspective, beings do not exist as isolated islands, but their existence is
possible because they exist in the web of connections with other beings. To be aware means to be
aware of something, which means that one cannot isolate one’s thinking and stay within it. Knowing
the self already means knowing the self in the midst of the world. Once one realizes the
interconnected nature of one’s existence, one should be able to see one’s self not just as a being with
a boundary drawn by one’s physical reality but as a being with others. Iryŏp describes this
transformed self as “the great self,” the “complete person,” or the “original mind.” This self is the
one that fully exercises “life energy,” and its mode of existence is characterized by qualities such as
“creativity” or “culture.” In Kalmanson’s understanding of Iryŏp’s life and philosophy, one notices
that the seemingly binary postulations of tradition versus modernity, personal versus political, and
private meditation versus social change come together, revealing the very synergy of our existence,
which Buddhism calls dependent co-arising.
2
Kim Iryŏp’s Buddhism, Christianity, and Recovery/Discovery of the Self
Mark Nathan connects Iryŏp’s transformed self with her Christian background. In her discussion of
Buddhism, Iryŏp repeatedly emphasizes that one should become fully human, and becoming fully
human for Iryŏp meant living as a free being. Before joining the monastery, Iryŏp devoted her time
to challenging gendered social structures, believing that social change will bring about a way for her
to regain freedom from the gender discrimination in her society. As she further considered the
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Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 155–182
Copyright © 2020 Douglas L. Berger, Leah Kalmanson, Erin McCarthy, Mark A. Nathan, and Jin Y. Park.
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human condition, Iryŏp realized that gender discrimination was only one aspect of the existential
conundrum. Iryŏp’s realization of human existential conditions led her to Buddhism, through which
her focus changed from a feminist social activist perspective to that of a religious practitioner.
“Creativity” and “culture” are the words with which Iryŏp characterizes the state of freedom.
Nathan asks why Iryŏp used these expressions instead of more traditional Buddhist ones, such as
“Buddha nature,” “suchness,” “tathāgatagarbha,” or “no-thought.” His answer is to examine Iryŏp’s
Christian background. I believe that this is a viable path of inquiry. Iryŏp’s relationship to
Christianity is more complex than the story of a simple conversion from Christianity to Buddhism.
On the surface, Iryŏp was a Christian until her young adulthood and then became a Buddhist nun.
Based on this fact, we can rightly say that Iryŏp converted from Christianity to Buddhism. But
changes in our lives do not happen as a linear movement from one island to another. In his book
The Nature of Doctrine, George Lindbeck, a theologian, proposes that we should understand religious
doctrine not as an exclusive truth claim but more like a language.5 Religious teachings structure our
thoughts and construct our worldview. Questioning which religion is right or wrong is like asking
whether French is right or wrong. As Nathan pointed out, in Iryŏp’s interpretation of Buddhism and
later in her interpretation of Christianity, we see mutual influences of Buddhism and Christianity in
the construction of her worldview and also her understanding of these two traditions.
In Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun, Iryŏp reinterpreted Christianity based on her Buddhism.
God, for Iryŏp, is a creator, not in the sense that God created the world, but in the sense that God is
the being who fully exercises the capacity of free being and engaging with life without constraint,
which Iryŏp calls creativity. This is the capacity that Iryŏp claims every being possesses. Iryŏp even
claims that God and the Buddha come from the same seed. Nathan makes a refreshing connection
between Iryŏp’s use of the expression “creativity” and the Christian creation myth. When
Protestantism came to Korea at the end of the nineteenth century, many Koreans were intrigued by
the theory of creation, and as Nathan pointed out, Buddhist intellectuals like Paek Yongsŏng (白龍城
1864-1940) envisioned a Buddhist version of the creation story, not in the form of a creation myth
but by creating a Buddhist cosmogony.
Iryŏp’s interpretation of Christianity, God, the Buddha, and their relationship to human
beings also offers us a new way of engaging with the philosophy of religion, as I have discussed
elsewhere (Park 2018).6 A philosophy of religion drawn from Buddhism offers different ways to
conceptualize the traditional themes of the western philosophy of religion, including the
transcendental being, human beings’ relationship to it, and the idea of good and evil.
In connection with Iryŏp’s treatment of Christianity, Nathan asks whether Buddhism is the
only way, for Iryŏp, for one to become fully human. This is a challenging question that reveals
Iryŏp’s ambivalent attitude toward Buddhism. She claims that God or the Buddha is not an object of
our worship and that we all have the capacity to be like them. She also says that people do not need
Buddhist temples to practice Buddhism. Iryŏp was envisioning Buddhism and religious practice
beyond institutional limits. On the other hand, she severely criticized Ch’oe Namsŏn (崔南善 18901957), a Korean celebrity intellectual and historian, when he converted to Catholicism. If Iryŏp was
proposing religious practice beyond institutional boundaries, why should one’s religious affiliation be
an issue of any significance? One cannot but say that she was contradicting herself on this issue.
Nathan also asks whether monasticism, for Iryŏp, would be the only way to be fully human. Iryŏp
does not offer a clear answer to this.
I should admit that both questions reveal the limitations of Iryŏp’s position with regard to
inter-religious dialogue and Buddhism’s capacity for openness. Despite her claim that one does not
need a temple or a church to practice Buddhism or Christianity, it seems that she is implying that
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Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 155–182
Copyright © 2020 Douglas L. Berger, Leah Kalmanson, Erin McCarthy, Mark A. Nathan, and Jin Y. Park.
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Buddhism should be the religion that one must practice to become fully human and joining the
monastery is the path one must follow in that effort.
Douglas Berger places Iryŏp’s Buddhist practice in a broad spectrum of the evolution of
Buddhist ideas about enlightenment. Berger asks whether awakening is a discovery of the existing
self or the recovery of the original self. Zen Buddhist tradition claims that the sentient being is
already Buddha, and in that sense Zen practice is a way to discover one’s self as it is. Faithful to that
tradition, Iryŏp constantly emphasized that we are all free beings of infinite capacity, and that when
we realize this truth about our existence, we realize the great self, as opposed to the small self of our
daily lives.
But it is also a recovery, as Berger demonstrates well in his review. The original self—the
great self—must be recovered while we are immersed in the small self. The important point of
Iryŏp’s Buddhism, according to Berger, is that discovery and recovery are not in tension but
interdependent. In the environment where we live our lives, we constantly make mistakes and still
make efforts to overcome them and be like the Buddha, which according to Buddhism is our
original face. Berger observes that this is why Buddha, for Iryŏp, is the combination of Buddha and
demon, and Buddhahood is humanhood through and through. In this sense, Berger points out,
Iryŏp’s philosophy “reminds us of our own situatedness as academics and scholars of Buddhist
thought” (Berger 2020: 169).7 In practicing Buddhism without isolating it from the reality of human
existence, Iryŏp recorded both beauty and ugliness, and success and failure, in her own life and
others. As Berger states, “Instead of writing, so to speak, a hagiography about herself, Kim in
Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun speaks about her struggles, her failures, her pain, her misgivings both
about others and about her own capacities to make progress on the path to awakening” (Berger
2020: 169).
In Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun, Iryŏp offers a creative interpretation of Buddhist
philosophy and practice. One distinctive aspect of the book is her use of her own life stories to
discuss Buddhist philosophy. These stories involve the lives and deaths of her family members, her
relationship with Christianity, the meaning of the Buddha, and her own intimate relationships. These
diverse topics, together with Iryŏp’s unique way of interpreting Buddhism, mark her book as an
alternative way of philosophizing and understanding Buddhism in the milieu of daily existence.
3
Buddhism, Modernity, and Existential Search
The four reviewers presented here aptly answer the core of my previous question: Why and how do
women engage with Buddhism? The essays collected in Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun contain more
than just Iryŏp’s writings on her life and practice. In it, and in her last book, In Between Happiness and
Misfortune (Haengbok kwa pulhaeng ŭi kap’i esŏ 幸福과 不幸의 갈피에서), Iryŏp combined her life
stories and those of her friends with her discussion of Buddhist philosophy. Her writings were a way
of remembering her existence in words. By retelling her own and her friends’ stories, Iryŏp made
women’s lives visible. Her narratives are witnesses to her life and the lives of other women. This was
her way of engaging with women’s issues. Remembrance is testimony, and Iryŏp’s writing is her
testimony about what it means to live as an independent being, challenging the limitations imposed
on women by patriarchal society.
Because Iryŏp presented these stories in the context of Buddhist philosophy, a new form of
philosophy also emerges through them. That is a philosophy that gives priority to lived experience.
In Women and Buddhist Philosophy, I identified this mode of philosophizing as a narrative philosophy, a
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Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 155–182
Copyright © 2020 Douglas L. Berger, Leah Kalmanson, Erin McCarthy, Mark A. Nathan, and Jin Y. Park.
e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.5.2.10
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philosophy that is deeply engaged with the narrative discourse of our daily experiences instead of
heavily relying on theorization and abstraction.8 Philosophy has a tendency to distinguish itself from
the life world and stories by claiming to be the search for truth (logos), which is the opposite of
story (mythos), as truth should be unchanging whereas lived experience is always fluctuating.
The binary postulation of philosophy as search for truth and of literature (storytelling) as a
fictional endeavor has played a significant role in philosophy’s self-defined identity in western
philosophical tradition. Are philosophy and storytelling mutually exclusive concepts? Can we
understand our lives in that manner? Despite a long tradition of conceptualizing philosophy as logos
and of storytelling as lying outside its realm, twentieth-century French philosopher Phillippe LacoueLabarthe asks in The Subject of Philosophy (Le sujet de la philosophie, 1979): What if logos is mythos and
mythos is logos? Logos is mythos in the sense that it is a myth we created, and mythos is logos in
the sense that storytelling contains its own truth. For Lacoue-Labarthe, “neither is more true (or
more false, deceptive, fictional, etc.) than the other” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1979: 17; 1993: 7).9
By restoring the story of life to the context of a person’s lived experience, biographical and
autobiographical writing reveals truths that even that person might not have been able to recognize
at the time events took place. Such writings also highlight our engagement with life through
philosophizing. The primacy of lived experience and our efforts to give coherent meaning to life
also reflect Buddhism’s attitude toward what we call philosophy. The Buddha’s rejection of
systematic philosophizing is articulated in various early discourses of Buddhism. However, the
Buddha did not reject philosophy in its entirety. Through his warning against certain forms of
philosophizing, the Buddha refused the philosophy that is alienated from people’s reality, especially
the reality of suffering. In this context, we can say that Iryŏp’s Buddhism shows a deeply existential
focus on the meaning of one’s self, on leading a good life, and on how to deal with the pain and
suffering of daily existence.
Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun affords us a multi-layered structure of storytelling and the
production of meaning. At the basic level, we hear a story of a woman named Kim Iryŏp, a firstgeneration Korean feminist, writer, and Zen Buddhist nun. On another level, the book deals with
how we construct our identities, meanings, and values from our life experiences. At yet another
level, Iryŏp’s writings are an effort to demonstrate how women’s practice of philosophy sometimes
takes a different format from the familiar, patriarchal mode of philosophizing. Finally, Iryŏp’s life
and Buddhism tell us how the tradition was rewritten by an individual through her life and thoughts
in the face of modernity, which brought her new ideas of the self, gender equality, and individual
freedom in the milieu of the perennial question of the conundrum of human existence and suffering.
In the introduction to a 1945 anthology of world philosophy that included both Indian and
Chinese philosophy, Merleau-Ponty asked whether cultural differences between the west and China
or India make it difficult for westerners to understand these philosophies. He contended that if
philosophy is about our existence, cultural differences should not hamper our understanding of it.
Instead, the lived experiences of people of different cultures should offer us “a variant of man’s
relationship with being which would clarify our understanding of ourselves” (Merleau-Ponty 1960:
226; 1964: 139).10 Asian philosophy, including Buddhism, might pose difficulties for westerners. By
the same token, women’s philosophy might not look like philosophy from the point of view of the
traditional patriarchal model. However, if we approach different philosophical traditions from the
perspective that philosophy is a human effort to understand the meaning and values of our existence
and that such an effort should be based on our lived experience, different modes of philosophizing
should tell us about the different ways that humans understand our existence and generate meaning
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Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 155–182
Copyright © 2020 Douglas L. Berger, Leah Kalmanson, Erin McCarthy, Mark A. Nathan, and Jin Y. Park.
e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.5.2.10
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and value in our lives. Iryŏp’s Buddhism demonstrates well the fundamental function of
philosophizing.
Jin Y. Park is Professor and Department Chair of Philosophy and Religion at American University,
USA. Park specializes in Korean Buddhism (especially Sŏn and Hwaŏm Buddhism), Buddhist ethics,
Buddhist-postmodern comparative philosophy, and modern East Asian philosophy. Her books
include Women and Buddhist Philosophy (2017); Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun (2014); Makers of Modern
Korean Buddhism (2010); Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism (co-edited, 2009); Buddhism and Postmodernity
(2008), and Buddhisms and Deconstructions (2006). Park currently serves as the President of the North
American Korean Philosophy Association (2016–present). Park also served as the President of the
Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy (2018–2019).
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Erin McCarthy, “Kim Iryŏp: Buddhist Feminist?” Journal of World Philosophies 5, vol. 2 (2020): 155-60.
Michiko Yusa, and Leah Kalmanson, “Raichō: Zen and the Female Body in the Development of
Japanese Feminist Philosophy,” in The Oxford Handbook of Japanese Philosophy, ed. Bret W. Davis (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 613-30.
Leah Kalmanson, Cross-Cultural Existentialism: On the Meaning of Life in Asian and Western Thought (New
York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020).
Leah Kalmanson, “The Personal, the Political: Zen Practice and the Feminist Critique,” Journal of
World Philosophies 5, vol. 2 (2020): 161-6.
George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Westminster: John
Knox Press, 1984).
Jin Y. Park, “Religion Beyond the Limits of Reason: Inoue Enryō, Kim Iryŏp, Tanabe Hajime on
Philosophy of Religion,” in Reconfiguring Philosophy of Religion, ed. Jim Kanaris (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2018), 131-50.
Douglas L. Berger, “Reconciling Buddhism and Bringing It to Life: The Value of Kim Iryŏp’s
Philosophy,” Journal of World Philosophies 5, vol. 2 (2020): 167-70.
Jin Y. Park, Women and Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press 2017).
Phillippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Le sujet de la philosophie (Paris: Flammarion, 1979) and The Subject of
Philosophy, transl. Thomas Trezise (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960) and Signs (Evanston, IL: Northwestern
University Press, 1964).
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Journal of World Philosophies 5 (Winter 2020): 155–182
Copyright © 2020 Douglas L. Berger, Leah Kalmanson, Erin McCarthy, Mark A. Nathan, and Jin Y. Park.
e-ISSN: 2474-1795 • http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp • doi: 10.2979/jourworlphil.5.2.10