Buddhism and the Sciences: Historical
Background, Contemporary Developments
Richard K. Payne
Journal of Dharma Studies
Philosophy, Theology, Ethics, and
Culture
ISSN 2522-0926
Volume 3
Number 2
DHARM (2020) 3:219-243
DOI 10.1007/s42240-020-00086-8
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https://doi.org/10.1007/s42240-020-00086-8
ORIGINAL ARTICLE
Buddhism and the Sciences: Historical Background,
Contemporary Developments
Richard K. Payne 1
Accepted: 13 October 2020 / Published online: 23 November 2020
# Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
Abstract
While discourse on the relation between Christianity and science has a long history, it
has only been in the last century that Buddhists and Buddhist scholars have begun to
consider the relation between their own religious tradition and the promises and
challenges of modern science. This does not mean that there has not been a long
history of a relation between Buddhism and the sciences. However, rarely has that
relation been conceived of in terms of “discourse on religion and science” as such. As a
result, much of the recent work done in the area of science and religion, though
significant in its own right, inadequately considers many core Buddhist concerns.
Originally published in 1993, this version has been updated with a preface surveying
developments over the last three decades.
Technology Scientific method . Science as social institution . Interpretation . Secularizing .
Buddhist thought
Preface to “Buddhism and the Sciences”
Introduction: Enduring Issues The essay below was written in hopes of contributing to
a more productive dialogue between Buddhism and science, and the conviction that a
more productive dialogue could be achieved by adding clarity to key ideas in the
rhetoric. Dividing the essay into two sections, contemporary developments and historical background, reflects the difference between a dialogue between Buddhism and
science, and a dialogue about Buddhism and science. In both cases, distinctions were
drawn that can make these dialogues more fruitful.
Clarifying the dialogue between Buddhism and science, the contemporary discourse,
calls for three different sets of distinctions. First is the distinction between “Science” as
an abstraction, and “the sciences” as specific epistemological projects. Second, there
* Richard K. Payne
rkpayne1@mac.com; https://www.shin–ibs.edu/
1
Institute of Buddhist Studies, at the Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley, CA, USA
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are four different rhetorial uses of the term “science.” And third, a distinction between
different kinds of materialism.
The first distinction actually seeks to set aside vague generalities about “Science” as an
undifferentiated whole by shifting the focus to specific sciences. Each of the sciences has
their own set of concepts, categories, and concerns, as well as unique histories, methods, and
theories. An additional distinction within the sciences is between experimental and observational. This distinction serves to displace the common presumption that the category
“science” only properly means experimental sciences. Second, the four different rhetorical
uses of the term science point to distinctions that all too often are not made. When we say
“science”, it can mean a body of authoritative knowledge, the method for producing such
knowledge, a social institution, and a set of practices (on this last, see Latour 1986). The third
distinction is between methodological materialism, metaphysical materialism, and materialistic values. The methodological commitment to only consider physical phenomena when
theorizing is, although perhaps logically more fundamental, no different from other methodological commitments. That is different from a metaphysical materialism, which is the
idea that only material phenomena actually exist. Materialistic values are often seen as being
informed by a metaphysical materialism, making it important to distinguish from a methodological materialism as a commitment within the scientific method.
The typology of historical relations between Buddhism and science discussed in the
original essay can also continue to serve as a means of clarifying the differing questions
about the relation between the two in the past, and provide a way of thinking about those
relations in the present and future. Those three are supportive, integral, and consequential. Buddhist projects of various kinds have supported the development and crosscultural borrowing of scientific and technological knowledge. Historically, a wide
variety of scientific knowledge was an integral part of Buddhist thought. And in some
cases, scientific concerns are seen as having been a consequence of Buddhist thought.
Three Decades On
In the three decades intervening between when this essay was written and its present
republication, the topic of Buddhism and science has continued to be an important one,
both for the scholarly community and in a different way for the Buddhist community of
practitioners. While these two communities—scholarly and practitioner—do overlap, developments in the discourse remain divided into these two categories. That overlap contributes
to an analysis of the discourse into three categories: scholarly inquiries into the complexity of
Buddhist thought beyond the “religious,” practitioner discussions that often remain committed to a naïve Baconian idea that science is adequately considered simply a matter of
observation and generalization, and attempts to either integrate studies of Buddhist practice
into the cognitive sciences, or interpret Buddhist thought in light of the cognitive sciences.
Historical Background and Contemporary Developments
The original twofold division between historical background and contemporary developments remains relevant, though there are differences in each from where they stood
three decades ago. The historical study of Buddhism has been transformed by a radical
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change in the conception of the object of study, while contemporary developments
have been increasingly influenced by an explicitly secularizing trend in popular
Buddhism. This addendum does not attempt to be a comprehensive review of research
completed since the early 90s, and studies mentioned in each section below are only
exemplary, pointing toward important instances of research. Following a discussion of
the developments in the historical and contemporary study of Buddhism, the essay
closes with an examination of the importance of examining the rhetoric employed in
the Buddhism and science discourse.
Changing the Object of Study
The conception of Buddhism as the object of academic study has changed significantly in the last three decades. The scholarly heritage of religious studies from the
mid-nineteenth century, when Buddhist studies was first fomulated as a field for
European and American scholarship, defined Buddhism as a religion. In turn, the
category of religion was created by sublating liberal Protestant theology. Most
importantly, doctrine was privileged as what it was important to know about
Buddhism, and the doctrinal portions of texts were selectively treated as providing
the essential understanding of Buddhism. This background is well-known, having
been examined by many authors (Masuzawa 2005). It is relevant here in that
conceiving of Buddhism as a religion meant that not only was it understood as a
system of doctrines but that it was also oriented toward the spiritual instead of the
material, toward the transcendent rather than the worldly, toward the timeless
absolute rather than the impermanent conventional. These preconceptions endure
in popular religious culture, and continue to mould the reception of Buddhism. More
sophisticated analyses that problematize the two terms of what is usually treated as
an opposition, “Is Buddhist Scientific or Religious,” are being made accessible to
popular audiences by Buddhist scholars (Dunne 2019; for a more extended and
historical treatment see Crosby 2021).
Academically, however, Buddhism has increasing come to be understood as an
institution, with its own history and an identity autonomous from the defining framework of liberal Protestant theology, and from the constraints of being a “religion.”
Thus, Buddhism is now increasingly studied as a complex intellectual culture having
many dimensions that link it to scientific knowledge. These include embryology and
medicine, environmental science, astrology and calendrics, and logic.
Medicine and Embryology
Two of the areas that have become much more adequately conceptualized as elements
of Buddhist thought are medicine and embryology. Since the time of James Sanford’s
“Wind, Waters, Stupas, Mandalas” (Sanford 1997), several scholars have published
works on embryology. Frances Garrett (2008) places embryology in the wider perspective of medicine in Tibet, and Anna Andreeva and Dominic Steanu have edited a
collection on embryology covering East Asia (2015). Janet Gyatso (2015) explores the
interaction between medical and religious knowledge in the early modern period of
Tibet, particularly in terms of the epistemic transformation involved. (See also YoeliTlalim 2020.) C. Pierce Salguero, who describes himself as a “transdiciplinary medical
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humanities scholar,” has produced several significant works in the area of medicine and
Buddhism, both as sole author (2014, 2016 [2007]) and as editor (2017, 2019).
Environmental Science
Looking at the historical relation between Buddhism and the environment is a new field
established by the groundbreaking work of Johan Elverskog. Study of the Buddhist
institution as an environmental force has long been hampered by an apologetic
representation of Buddhism, “eco-Buddhism” (Elverskog 2020, x–xi). Critiques of
eco-Buddhism have questioned the contemporary representation, but historical study
is very recent.
Calendrics, Astrology
Edward Henning (2007) examined the calendrics of the Kālacakra tantra, one of its key
elements for determining the timing of battles against barbaric hordes, which is one of
the motifs organizing the Kālacakra. This is taken symbolically now to mean doing
metaphoric battle with one’s own obscurations, and is now therefore employed to
determine the appropriate timing for practice, rituals, initiations, and other important
events (Berzin nd). In addition to the astrological calendrics of the Kālacakra, astrology
played an important role throughout Buddhist history. In particular, consider the several
publications by Jeffrey Kotyk (2018a, b, and others), which extend across Indian,
Chinese, and Japanese Buddhist history. Also contributing to a deeper understanding of
the history of astrology is Bill M. Mak (for instance Mak 2018).
In many cases, these expansions to the understanding of Buddhism as the object of
study have been conducted for their own sake, rather than as a part of a dialogue
between Buddhism and science. There are important exceptions, however, including
Janet Gyatso’s work on Tibetan Buddhist medicine. Gyatso notes that her “project
ponders key issues for the history of science, including the disjunctions—and conjunctions—between scientific approaches to knowledge and religious ones” (Gyatso 2015,
1).
Research in these areas have highlighted the difficulty of trying to fit the rich
intellectual history of Buddhism developed over two and a half millennia and across
several different linguistic and religious cultures into the category of “religion,” as that
is usually deployed in academia. If we allow such a limited view of Buddhism as that
seen through the window of “spiritual,” then understanding of the whole of the tradition
and its possible ways of relating to science is disastrously distorted.
Contemporary Developments
The Secularizing Impulse
One of the trends in popular Buddhism that has emerged over the last three decades is
the movement to secularize Buddhism. Central to much of modern thought regarding
religion was the expectation that, as an irrational and superstitious vestige of the
premodern, religion would gradually vanish away—a triumphalist secularism (Hefner
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2011, 152). This sense of a teleological progress toward greater rationality and rejection
of superstition characterizes some of the secularizing discourse, thus a motivating force
for secularizing Buddhism is the desire to bring it into accord with modern thought, and
particularly with modern science. In some cases, this means interpreting various
Buddhist doctrines so as to bring them into accord with modern science, but in other
cases it means actively expunging aspects of the tradition considered superstitious and
in contravention to modern science.
Purifying Buddhism
The strategy of expunging aspects of Buddhist not in accord with modern conceptions
of science and reason is evident in popular treatments such as Robert Wright’s (2017).
By selecting only those parts of Buddhism that accord with Darwinian evolutionary
theory, Wright creates a representation of Buddhism which he judges to be “true”
because it accords with Darwinian evolutionary theory (and yes, this is how circular his
argument is). Karma and rebirth are in particular the kinds of themes that are rejected,
while Wright recognizes the centrality of the teaching of anātman, he finds it so
contrary to his own Western conceptions of the self that he simply abandons it as
incomprehensible.
While different secularizing authors may select different aspects of Buddhist thought
to expunge, they generally follow the same kind of reasoning as does Wright. They
take their own, modern conceptions of the truth as given, and then eliminate those parts
of Buddhism that do not meet that standard. In doing so, they will often have recourse
to the claim that this is what the Buddha told his adherents to do, such as in the Kalama
Sutta. As Bhikkhu Bodhi as noted, however, “On the basis of a single passage, quoted
out of context, the Buddha has been made out to be a pragmatic empiricist who
dismisses all doctrine and faith, and whose Dhamma is simply a freethinker’s kit to
truth which invites each one to accept and reject whatever he likes” (1998). While
expunging teachings that are not comfortable with modern scientific preconceptions is
one strategy, some contemporary thinkers work to reinterpret teachings so as to better
accord with present views.
Interpreting Buddhism Naturalistically
Gil Fronsdal is a contemporary teacher whose orientation is naturalistic. That is, he is
effectively agnostic about those aspects of Buddhist thought that do not have immediate relevance to human existence. In his view, this means “Buddhist teachings that rely
on what can be observed in this very life through our natural senses. It does not require
any beliefs, agency, entities or experiences that are supernatural, that is, that fall outside
of the laws of nature as we know them or outside of what we can know for ourselves
through our ordinary, natural senses” (Fronsdal in press).
A different though equally naturalistic strategy is that of interpreting apparently
supernatural aspects of Buddhist teachings as having psychological symbolism. Thus,
for example, the six realms of rebirth may be interpreted not as representing six actual
different postmortem states, but rather six different emotional conditions. Although no
longer a popular figure in contemporary Buddhism, this strategy is exemplified in the
work of Alan Watts (1975). Similarly naturalistic but much more philosophically
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sophisticated are Dale Wright’s two works (2011, and 2016). These two are deeply
informed by Dale Wright’s decades of studying Zen.
Making Buddhism Practical
Stephen Batchelor has been a singularly influential figure in the development of a
secularized Buddhism. A consistent theme in his recent work has been to interpret
Buddhism as a kind of pragmatism, a teaching that is not concerned with metaphysical doctrines or with the truth of such claims. In this regard he cites the well-worn
allegory of the man shot with an arrow who needs to have the arrow removed as
quickly as possible rather than understanding what the arrow is made of and where it
came from (Batchelor 2015a, 23–24). In place of understanding Buddhism as a
project oriented toward truth, Batchelor (2015b) proposes understanding Buddhism
as task oriented.
Interpreted in this fashion what Buddhism provides is a framework of ethics as
behaviours that are conducive toward awakening, but awakening is not to be understood as a matter of correct knowledge or correct understanding. Thus, the Four Noble
Truths are recast as the Four Great Tasks.
Batchelor’s view of Buddhism as pragmatic moves away from questions of truth,
and at the same time participates in the rejection of anything supernatural, similar to,
although distinct from, Robert Wright’s approach. At the same time, portraying the
core of original Buddhist teachings as naturalistic is similar to, although distinct from,
Gil Fronsdal’s approach. Moving away from questions of truth, however, places
Buddhism in an entirely separate category from science, and would seemingly preclude
any productive dialogue. At the same time, it also effectively forecloses any questions
as to whether Batchelor’s representation of Buddhism is true.
Buddhist Thought, Cognitive Sciences, and Modern Continental Philosophy
The 1990s were officially designated the “Decade of the Brain.” Increased public
awareness, and greater funding for research led to many advances in the study of
neurocognition, and rise of “cognitive science” as an interdisciplinary project involving
linguistics, computer science, neural anatomy and physiology, and psychology. The
research finding perhaps most consequential for the dialogue between Buddhism and
science was neural plasticity. Up to this point, it was thought that the brain was static
after final development in late adolescence, and after that time was only subject to
gradual decline. The discovery that the brain continued to change and develop throughout life came as an exciting surprise.
Almost immediately, this new understanding came to be applied to the study of
meditation. In 1998, James H. Austin began a series of publications on the relation
between neurology and Zen meditation. Greater public attention and more research
publications have, however, been directed to the secularized form of mindfulness
meditation initiated by Jon Kabat-Zinn (Wilson 2014, 75–104). Many such studies,
however, have been short-term—both in terms of the experience of the meditators and
the duration across which the effects are studied. Alan Wallace has called for long-term
studies of deeply experienced meditators as a means of understanding the effects of
meditation more accurately, and at the same time has argued for a shift away from
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third-person models of research, validating first-person reports by experienced meditators (Wallace 2000).
As noted in the original essay, the late Francisco Varela played a key role in
constructing the interface between Buddhist thought, cognitive science, and Continental philosophy. In a brief note from 1999, he discussed the importance of the change
that made consciousness a legitimate object of scientific inquiry. Writing at the end of
the Decade of the Brain, he noted that “As a result of this research frontier, science has
been gradually waking up to what, until very recently, seemed ‘un-scientific’: consciousness itself” (Varela 2010). Probably, the most influential institution in the
development of is the Mind and Life Institute which Varela co-founded. For decades,
Evan Thompson collaborated with Varela, and has also been an active participant in the
Mind and Life Institute. While The Embodied Mind had brought attention to the
potential value of phenomenology, specifically Merleau-Ponty, as an approach to the
study of mind and consciousness, Thompson has since gone on to consider the
contributions of the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl (Thompson 2010).
More recently, he has continued to develop a conception of the self as “an experiential
process that is subject to constant change. We enact a self in the process of awareness,
and this self comes and goes depending on how we are aware” (Thompson 2016, 927).
The last decade or so has seen this line of inquiry further developed by Buddhist
scholars working on a model of cross-cultural philosophy (Garfield and Edelglass,
2011). As important as these studies are, they are explicitly philosophical in nature.
Thus, while they may make reference to cognitive science in the context of their
discussions of consciousness, they are only tangentially related to issues in the Buddhism and science dialogue per se.
Another long-standing participant in the Mind and Life Institute has been Willoughby Britton, along with colleagues including Jared Lindahl, who has been studying the
negative effect that some people experience as a consequence of meditation practice
(Rocha 2014). This research opens up a dimension of experiences often ignored by
apologetic presentations that emphasize the positive effects of meditation. This kind of
experience is not only documented by this contemporary research but is also recorded
across the spectrum of Buddhist literatures. This reinforces the frequently repeated
advice of working with an experienced teacher. Contrary to simplistic representations
of meditation as a kind of mental technology that has uniform effects, meditation
appears to be more complex, and potentially more powerful than some modern
advocates have countenanced.
Rhetoric in the Buddhism and Science Discourse
Many of the positions regarding the relation between Buddhism and science identified
in the original paper remain active in the present discourse as well. These include
claims regarding the identity or congruity of Buddhist concepts and scientific ones, and
the assertion that this demonstrates either the truth of Buddhism, or that the Buddha
already knew these truths. It is important to attend to this kind of rhetorical presentation
of Buddhism because simple word usages are vastly consequential.
The last claim, that the Buddha already knew the truths of modern science, is
suggestive of the pressures converging Buddhist thought with the hegemony of
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Christian ideas in Western popular religious culture. Classically in Christian theology,
the attribute of omniscience, along with omnipotence and omnipresence, has been
claimed to characterize God. And equally classically, Buddhist thought has attributed
the characteristic of sarvajñatā to the Buddha. In a simple, literal fashion, this can be
rendered as “all knowing,” and taken to mean that the Buddha is omniscient in the same
way that God is—consciously aware of every event, action, and thought throughout the
entire universe. However, in the context of Buddhist thought, the term sarvajñatā has
significantly different implications. Pointing to the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (attributed to
Maitreyanātha, c. 350 CE), Buswell and Lopez (2014) summarize this complex term as
meaning
the knowledge of a śravaka [auditor] or pratyekabuddha [solitary awakened one],
in contrast to the buddha’s knowledge of all aspects (sarvākārajñatā), which is
reached by cultivating a bodhisattva’s knowledge of the paths (margajñatā). The
“all” (sarva) means all the grounds (vastu) of the knowledge of defiled (saṃkliṣṭa)
and pure (viśuddha. . .) dharmas systematized in the four noble truths (779).
We also learn that the term is used negatively to “identify the absence of skillful means
(upāya) and the lack of the total absence of subject–object conceptualization
(grāhyagrāhakavikalpa) in śrāvakas, in order to point clearly to the superiority of the
bodhisattva path” (779). The psychologized character of contemporary popular Buddhist discourse finds this expressed in pious claims that the Buddha was the world’s
first/greatest psychologist/psychotherapist.
Another way of looking at this is to see convergence as an instance of
overdetermination. There are aspects in both Buddhism and popular religious culture
that appear to be the same, and so the interpretation of Buddhist concepts as variants of
those found in the dominant culture is overdetermined. That is, a particular interpretation follows from the apparent similarity—even when the similarity is not consciously
reflected upon. Although not using the specific term, Gyatso notes this when she
comments about the tendency to read the Western history of conflict between religion
and science onto Buddhism. “Those instances where Tibetan theorists argued that
medicine falls squarely within the Buddha’s dispensation are not to be equated with
nineteenth– and twentieth–century apologetics that maintain that Buddhism has always
been scientific, or that Buddhism goes further than modern science and has much to
teach it” (Gyatso 2015, 16–17). Geoffrey Samuel has also addressed several of these
issues, with the intention of moving away from apologetics and toward real dialogue
(Samuel 2014). Equally foundational are Donald S. Lopez, Jr.’s two publications, one
an historical overview of the dialogue (2008), and the other on the modernist image of
the “scientific Buddha” (2012).
The last 30 years have seen the dialogue on Buddhism and science become
increasingly recognized as an important area of study and research. We have now
moved past the presumptions of European exceptionalism that informed the foundational work by Joseph Needham and his colleagues, opening to a broader understanding of science as systematic knowledge and its importance in the history of Buddhist
praxis. Secularizing trends have often maintained a simplistic, Baconian conception of
science as observation and generaliztion, as well as participating in the latest iteration of
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the “science proves Buddhism is true” rhetoric. The rise of popular interest in meditation has in turn led to the development of programs of research into the nature of mind
and consciousness that are likewise drawing on cognitive science, phenomenology, and
Buddhist thought.
Buddhism and the Sciences: Historical Background, Contemporary
Developments
While discourse on the relation between Christianity and science has a long history, it
has only been in the last century that Buddhists and Buddhist scholars have begun to
consider the relation between their own religious tradition and the promises and
challenges of modern science. This does not mean that there has not been a long
history of a relation between Buddhism and the sciences. However, rarely has that
relation been conceived of in terms of “discourse on religion and science” as such. As a
result, much of the recent work done in the area of science and religion, though
significant in its own right, inadequately considers many core Buddhist concerns.
That much of the discourse on science and religion is structured according to
assumptions and concerns particular to the theistic traditions generally, and Christian
theology specifically, is understandable. Discourse on the sometimes-conflicted relationship between science and religion originates in a theistic context. This relation has
at times been a conflicted one, at least since the Renaissance. However, the fundamental concerns of Buddhist thought differ substantially from those of Christianity and
other theistic traditions. While Buddhist scholars can learn from the models of discourse developed in the relationship between Christianity and modern science, in order
for them to enter fully into constructive dialogue with science, basic presuppositions
about the nature of science-religion interaction will need to be revisited.
What might this re-visitation look like? In this chapter, I propose three steps. First, in
order to bring fundamental Buddhist concerns into conversation with science, it is
necessary to clear the intellectual ground upon which dialogue between science and
Buddhism will be established. The first portion of this chapter concerns itself with this
task. This ground clearing will involve the clarification of several key issues, assumptions, and terminology involved in discussing the relation between Buddhism and
science.
Having cleared some of the intellectual ground, the second step in the process of
building constructive dialogue between Buddhism and science involves asking the
question: what is it about the Buddhist tradition that appears to be amenable or open to
dialogue with the sciences? The second section of this chapter takes up this question,
which can be answered by considering various instances of constructive interaction
throughout the history of Buddhism. This examination is organized so as to develop a
typology of relations. This typology, outlining ways in which Buddhism seems open to
discourse with the sciences, should provide a foundation upon which dialogue can be
established.
The third step in establishing constructive dialogue involves assessing how contemporary scholars have begun to re-envision discourse between science and religion so as
to more adequately consider fundamental Buddhist concerns. The final section of this
chapter takes that step. A significant area of work for contemporary scholars is the
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dialogue between Buddhism and the cognitive sciences, philosophy of mind, and
psychology. Much popular literature has concerned itself with similarities between
varieties of Asian religious thought and certain theories from physics. These claims of
similarity, however, appear to be grounded on little more than an inadequately nuanced
analogy, that is Buddhist doctrine is portrayed so as to appear fully consonant with
theories from contemporary physics. These analogies depend heavily upon particular
ways of expressing Buddhist doctrines, entailing selective interpretations, which
heighten the appearance of similarity. Moreover, these articulations frequently remove
doctrine from its own intellectual context. The result is that genuine dialogue between
Buddhism as it is practiced and science is compromised. In contrast, recent developments in Buddhism and cognitive science, for example, are more sensitively conceived,
and, significantly, remain in keeping with the priorities of Buddhist thought itself.
A final introductory note should be made concerning the difficulty of representing the
Buddhist tradition. There is no ‘orthodox’ interpretation of Buddhist thought. Hence, there
can be no single authoritative Buddhism. The Buddhism that anyone describes cannot be
anything other than Buddhism as that person understands it. Given this, the reader needs to
take into consideration that throughout this chapter, when I speak of “Buddhism,” it is a
shorthand way of referring to “Buddhism as I understand it.” My reading of Buddhism is
not intended to be either normative or essentialist. In other words, it should not be taken as
a claim regarding what Buddhism should be, or as a claim regarding what the essence of
Buddhism is. Moreover, I do not intend for the description of Buddhism that follows to
arbitrate what is or is not Buddhism, nor do I presume that everyone who identifies him/
herself as a Buddhist would necessarily agree with the entirety of what I have to say. The
object “Buddhism” differs greatly depending upon one’s mode of engagement with the
tradition. Having made these qualifications, it will be enough that many of those who
identify themselves as Buddhists would at least be able to recognize a significant similarity
between what follows and their own religious commitments.
Clearing the Ground
Because dialogue between religion and science has involved Buddhism less frequently
than some other traditions, it is important to clear the intellectual ground, gaining a
better sense of the terrain, before beginning constructive work. This process of ground
clearing involves (1) reviewing ways in which the landscape has been misunderstood
and consequently misrepresented—mistakes which inhibit solid construction; (2) removing this rubble of misunderstanding by defining terms, allowing us to survey the
ground more effectively; and (3) noting several key landmarks on the Buddhist terrain
that will need to be incorporated into our construction plans.
Reviewing the Landscape: Neither Apologetics nor Polemics
Any claim that an entire religious tradition either supports or impedes science is
generally nothing more than a simple rhetorical strategy designed for apologetics or
polemics. This chapter is neither. Such unambiguous claims tend to be a-historical,
assuming some unchanging essence as characterizing both religion and science, and
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then selectively drawing upon historical evidence to support the position taken. Beginning from an essentialized view of the tradition, rather than examining what the
relations actually have been, the apologetic or polemic position builds an argument
about what the consequences of that essential nature must be. Such arguments are
referred to as a priori or as retrodictive.
An example in which this essentializing is evident is Joseph Needham’s famous
series of studies on Science and Civilization in China. His is a polemic argument that
the failure of China to achieve a “scientific revolution” was due to the “inhibitory
influence” of the supposedly otherworldly tendencies of Buddhism. He asserts that the
doctrine that the world is illusory (the teaching of maya) precludes Buddhists from
actively engaging in empirical research, and that the otherworldliness of the goal of
nirvana (the cessation of suffering) precludes Buddhists from engaging in technological
projects which seek to improve the human condition in this world.
In the background of this argument are the British colonialist representations of
Indian religions as contributing to a culture of passivity, a representation that was
used to justify both evangelism and imperialism. More specifically, Needham
represents Buddhism as reducible to a single, unchanging essence: the doctrines of
maya and nirvana. Thus, Buddhism is represented as teaching that all of existence is
an illusion from which one must escape without any reference to the vastly different
forms Buddhism has taken over its history. This latter failure makes his representation of Buddhism a-historic, and thus untenable. Not only is it problematic to
represent Buddhism as essentially a teaching of illusion and escape but Needham
also fails to ask whether the interpretations of the concepts of maya and nirvana
which he employs are accurate. At the same time, he does not establish that these
concepts were of central importance in the history of Chinese Buddhism, or that they
actually played any role at key moments in the history of the Chinese sciences.
Rather, he presents Buddhism as essentially this negative worldview, and then
deduces from that dubious premise the conclusion that Buddhism must have impeded scientific development in China.
Finally, the argument seems to assume that the intellectual cultures of all societies
ought to develop in such a fashion as to culminate in experimental science, and that if a
society did not develop that way, then something must have deleteriously impeded that
development. From that conclusion, he looks backwards for the cause, retrodictively
examining various aspects of Buddhism in his attempt to identify the culprit. This is a
conception of cultural progress as a unilinear development, itself a historically untenable view.
Although Needham’s polemic evaluation of Buddhism portrays a negative relation
to science, much the same kinds of problems would also be found with apologetic
attempts to assert that Buddhism has an unambiguously positive relation with science.
Such arguments might assert that:
&
&
&
Buddhism is conducive to science
Buddhism is in agreement with science
Buddhism has already discovered what science only now has learned, sometimes
called “the ancient wisdom argument”
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These arguments tend to select particular doctrinal views to represent the entirety of the
tradition, simplifying them, and treating them as true of the entire tradition throughout
its history. Arguments of this kind, based on essentialized, de-contextualized, and ahistorical portrayals of the religious tradition, can only serve rhetorical ends. They
cannot provide the basis for an historical study of the actual relations between a
religious tradition and the sciences.
Removing the Rubble: Definitions, Distinctions, and Clarifications
For our discussion of science and Buddhism, it is important to clear the ground of
misconceptions by defining key terms and making key distinctions. First, we need to
distinguish between Science and the sciences. The idea of Science as a single, unitary
entity would seem to be the product of late nineteenth and early twentieth century
positivism, which envisioned a single, unified scientific realm in which all explanations
could, at least in principle, be reduced to physics. When religious authors reject
scientific explanations as reductionist, it is quite often this positivist conception of
science—this idea that physical explanations are the only legitimate explanations—
which they have in mind.
In contrast to Science, there is what one might refer to as the sciences. These are
specific fields of study with organized bodies of knowledge, recognized procedures for
adding to that knowledge, shared criteria for evaluating such knowledge, and usually
having a distinct terminology. Note that when conceived of as a single, unified entity,
Science is something other than the cumulative total of the sciences.
In addition to the distinction between the sciences and Science, the sciences are to be
divided into observational sciences and experimental sciences. While much of the
discussion regarding science and religion has tended to focus on experimental sciences
(also sometimes referred to as modern or hard sciences), in order to engage core
Buddhist concerns, one should also consider the observational sciences (traditional or
soft sciences), systematic forms of knowledge developed through observation rather
than experimentation. This distinction expands the scope of discussion to allow for
consideration of the traditional sciences, such as those developed in India and China,
which were not experimental in character, but did accrue extensive bodies of systematic
knowledge. The assumption that science necessarily means experimental science is not
universal. The equivalents of “science” in various European languages, e.g. Wissenschaft (German), science (French), scienza (Italian), ciencia (Spanish), and nauk
(Russian), do not refer to experimental science as such, but include a broader range
of systematic forms of knowledge.
The so-called experimental sciences are subject to two kinds of limitations: cultural
and practical. The cultural limitation is that there are social mores concerning experimentation on human beings. Increasingly these mores are strictly codified into what are
sometimes called ‘human subjects protocols.’ Such constraints limit certain forms of
experimentation in fields such as medicine, psychology, sociology and anthropology.
There are also several sciences in which the constraint on experimentation is practical.
Meteorology, economics and astronomy are examples of such observational sciences.
Being an observational science does not preclude making predictions and waiting to see
if these are confirmed. However, in such a situation one is not actively controlling an
experimental situation, attempting to hold all variables except one steady. Thus,
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observational sciences can also be ones that engage in theory formation and hypothesis
testing, but the method for testing hypotheses is not experimental in nature. However,
both experimental and observational sciences are equally committed to systematic and
reliable explanation.
We should note here, however, that the characterization of science as theory
formation and hypothesis testing is itself not uncontested. On the one hand, studies
have sought to discern the social and cultural dimensions of scientific practice. On the
other, there are instances in which competing theories are equally confirmed by
experimental results. These different uses are reflected in different uses of the term
science itself. Many fruitless disagreements about the relation between Buddhism and
science can be avoided by a further set of distinctions with regard to the definition of
the term science. Science can be understood to mean several things:
&
&
&
&
Science as a body of authoritative knowledge,
Science as method producing authoritative knowledge,
Science as a social institution, and
Science as a set of practices.
Each of these is sometimes meant when reference is made to science. Without
clarifying which definition or combination of definitions is intended, only confusion
can result. These four categories overlap, making clarity all that much more important.
‘Scientific knowledge’ is one of the most common usages for the term science, and is
often used—quite mistakenly—to mean that which is unquestionably true, irrefutable
knowledge. This colloquial reference to science as “that which is assuredly the case,”
pervades contemporary American culture. Ironically, this rhetorical use misrepresents
the strength of scientific knowledge, which, at its best, remains open to doubt, question,
reconsideration, and reexamination. Such knowledge is distinct from but closely tied to
the question of the methods used to create it, i.e. the scientific method. Although
commonly equated with experimentation, scientific knowledge is more appropriately
identified with this method—theory formation and hypothesis testing, employing
empirical information, with results that are publicly verifiable.
The definition of science and scientific knowledge also needs to be distinguished
from its social institutions. As a social entity, the institutional organization and societal
support for science affects its pursuit of knowledge. In contemporary American society,
institutional location of science has increasingly shifted from governmentally supported
research institutions in universities to privately supported, business-based research. It is
this social institution that is meant when people blame science for such ills of
contemporary society as air pollution, or atomic weapons. Finally, science as a set of
practices points to the interlocking sets of ways in which science is conducted, such as
the organization of laboratories and communication of scientific knowledge through
professional associations.
Finally, in removing the rubble to make room for a Buddhist dialogue with science,
methodological materialism must be distinguished from metaphysical materialism. It is
often popularly assumed that science necessarily entails a materialist metaphysics. Both
laypeople and scientists alike share this assumption. While, as a systematic means of
producing knowledge, science may be methodologically or even epistemologically
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materialist in its presuppositions, that methodological commitment should be distinguished from any particular metaphysical commitment.
Having made some distinctions in what we mean by science, a second set of
clarifications is needed. Discourse between Buddhism and science is encumbered by
caricatures of Buddhism. Authentic exchange cannot take place until these misconceptions are cleared from the field of dialogue.
The first misconception that must be dealt with is the idea that Buddhism is
exclusively concerned with “the other world” or “liberation from the world of phenomena” (seen above in relation to Needham’s claim that Buddhist other-worldliness
was responsible for inhibiting science in China). This view, which was current at the
time Needham was writing, continues to be found in much of the literature on
Buddhism. However, since Needham’s time, this view has been critically reexamined.
This representation of Buddhism results from a confused understanding of two assertions: (1) that there is no permanent, independently existing essence (or “self,” atman),
and (2) that awakening involves extinction (“blowing out,” nirvana). It has been
wrongly assumed that this has meant that awakening results from the extinction of
the self. This appears to have been in large part the result of a failure to discriminate
between Buddhist and certain Hindu conceptions of liberation. A close examination of
the tradition, however, shows that awakening is the extinction of mistaken conceptions
and misplaced affections, and not the extinction of the self. While not unrelated, this
description of the path to awakening is distinct from the ontological claim that there are
no independently existing essences.
A second contemporary caricature of Buddhism is the assertion that it makes claims
effectively identical to those of science, or that Buddhism is perfectly compatible with
science. This version of Buddhism grows out of the movements beginning in the
second half of the nineteenth century now known collectively under the title of
“Buddhist modernism.” Buddhist modernists emphasized the rational character of
Buddhism and the human character of Shakyamuni Buddha, Buddhism’s historical
founder. Buddhism here is presented as primarily a philosophy of life, a path to
achieving the full potential of human existence. This humanistic portrayal of Buddhism
facilitates simplistic claims concerning the relationship between Buddhism and modern
science.
A third, less common caricature, one that was once prevalent in academic circles and
still can be found in popular discussions of Buddhism, portrays Buddhism as an
Oriental version of Occidental idealism. Here, complex philosophical positions within
Buddhism are misinterpreted because they are assumed to be unproblematically the
same as those within Occidental philosophy. The category of idealism, with its
emphasis upon a correlative relationship between ‘observing mind’ and the ‘external
world’, is falsely seen as corresponding to Buddhist descriptions of the workings
consciousness as central to the quest for awakening. This correspondence leads to the
superficial appearance that Buddhism has a relationship to science that parallels the
relationship of idealism to science. One of the most important schools of Indian
Buddhist thought is sometimes described as the “mind only” school, an overly literal
translation of its name (Vijñaptimatrata). This formulation, “mind only,” was then
mistakenly taken to mean that the school taught a doctrine that only the mind exists, i.e.
classic European idealism. The doctrinal claims of the school, however, are more
accurately described as asserting the necessary concomitance of mind with all
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perception and knowledge of objective existence—a theme we will come back to in
considering contemporary developments in the relation between Buddhism and the
sciences.
Differing Landscapes: Buddhist and Christian
In the discourse on religion and science, religion is almost invariably equated with
theistic religion, if not explicitly with Christianity. Furthermore, much current scholarship actually focuses on the relation between theology and science. For the three
Western monotheisms, and even for the theistic strains within Hinduism, this is not
particularly problematic. However, the fundamental conceptions of Buddhist thought
differ substantially from those of the theistic traditions. Without essentializing Buddhism, there do seem to be some basic landmarks, which, if not permanent fixtures on
the landscape of Buddhist history, do seem present through much of its historical and
cultural reshaping. The difference in conceptual landscapes is not adequately recognized by a science and religion dialogue that is based on the theistic traditions. As such,
dialogue between science and Buddhism must take time to point them out.
Buddhism differs from Christianity in at least three important ways, which affect the
way in which Buddhism relates to science. First, Buddhism does not have a history of
antagonism with science. While the historical background to the contemporary dialogue between Christianity and science includes much consonance, it has, particularly
in the last century, been marked by moments of conflict.
Second, the path toward awakening, central to Buddhism, is understood very
differently from Christian soteriology, or the study of salvation. The path to awakening
is not based on faith in an external, transcendent deity. Nor is it a salvation that comes
through external intervention in history. Rather, the path to awakening is a
praxiological process of overcoming ignorance about the way the world actually is.
Third, the mythic background of Buddhism does not involve the Creation, a vision of
natural history that gives priority of concern to questions of origin. The absence of emphasis
on creation means that dialogue between Buddhism and science does not give priority to
cosmology, then astrophysics, then chemistry, and then biology. Rather, Buddhism begins
with the awakening of the Buddha, which involves insight into the workings of his own
mind. Thus, the priorities in the religion and science discourse for Buddhism are psychology, cognitive science and the philosophy of mind. Rather than being based on the idea that
the world was created, for Buddhist cosmology, the universe as it is has simply always been
this way “from beginningless time.” Within traditional Buddhist cosmology, there are
living beings which are superhuman (gods and titans), as well as living beings which are
subhuman (animals, hungry ghosts, and those dwelling in the hells). However, all of these,
not only humans, animals, hungry ghosts and hell beings but also gods and titans are
subject to the same natural processes. Central to the Buddhist conception of these natural
processes is the idea of karma, meaning action, which identifies a conception that one’s
actions produce results, which effect both others and oneself.
There are debates, both historically and within the contemporary interpretation of
Buddhist thought, as to which actions are consequential. One interpretation is that it is
only those that might be called ethical which constitute karma. Others maintain that all
actions have consequences and that the category of “ethical” is itself a social creation rather
than a natural category. Under either interpretation, however, there is no creator god who, in
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the beginning, establishes the ethical order and who then also serves as judge of individuals
within that ethical order. These fundamental distinctions between Buddhism and theistic
religious traditions produce differences of orientation within a discourse with science.
A last task of ground clearing is needed before moving to a survey of the ways in which
Buddhism, through its history, may be seen to be amenable to discourse with science. This
task involves distinguishing the major divisions of contemporary Buddhism: Theravada,
Mahayana, and Vajrayana, also known as tantric Buddhism. In the contemporary world,
these are generally described in terms of geographic divisions. Theravada Buddhism is
found in the countries of South and Southeast Asia: Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma.
Mahayana Buddhism is that found in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. Vajrayana
Buddhism is generally identified with Tibet and Mongolia. These geographic identifications are overly simplistic and hence of very limited utility. For example, there are
Vajrayana lineages in China and Japan. Similarly, the Buddhism of Tibet and Mongolia
is strongly Mahayana. The situation is further complicated by the fact that many Mahayana monks take the same vows as part of their initiatory process as do Theravadin monks.
The typical characterizations of these divisions are as much a result of historical accident
resulting from what caught the attention of different writers at different times as they are
reflections of the actual situation. An additional problem with the geographic conceptions
of divisions within Buddhism is that they implicitly reinforce the mistaken conception that
contemporary nation states are in some sense natural entities having unique religious
cultures. While it is unavoidable to speak of “Chinese Buddhism,” or “Tibetan Buddhism,” it should be noted that the reference here is to religious cultures, which have
always interacted with one another, and not to modern nation states.
During a history extending over two and a half millennia and across so many linguistic
and religious cultures, there cannot possibly be a single relation between Buddhism and
science. The historical background to the relation between Buddhism and science extends
across the two dominant intellectual cultures of Asia, i.e. Indian and Chinese, as well as in
the other, less influential intellectual cultures, such as Tibetan, Korean, and Japanese. This
historical background bears on how Buddhism is portrayed in its relationship to science. The
introduction of Buddhism into East Asia, for example, needs to be understood not solely in
terms of religion as we understand that category in contemporary society, but also as a
spreading of Indian culture into East Asia. When and if a more comprehensive history of
Buddhism and science is written, it will need to reflect deeply on the specific kinds of
relations existing at different times and in different places within Buddhism itself. The
following section will outline three basic kinds of relations that can be identified within those
historically and geographically conditioned relations. This outline will attempt to answer the
question, “what evidence is there within its history that might suggest models for relating
Buddhism and science?” in terms of a threefold typology. It is my hope that this typology
adequately reflects Buddhism’s wide and diverse tradition of relating to the various sciences.
(Preliminary) Typological Foundations: Historical Evidence
for the Possibility of Constructive Relations Between Buddhism
and the Sciences
Having cleared some of the intellectual ground which might encumber discourse, the
second step in the process of building constructive dialogue between Buddhism and
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science involves posing the question: what is it about the Buddhist tradition that
appears to be amenable or open to dialogue with the sciences? As suggested above,
the relationship between Buddhism and the sciences should not be founded on the
unambiguous claims of polemical or apologetic writings. In building a solid foundation
for dialogue between Buddhism and the sciences, we should consider various models
for the possibility of constructive interaction throughout the history of Buddhism. This
history suggests that Buddhism is open to at least three types of relationship with
science: supportive, integral, and consequential. The supportive relation is where
existing science and technology has been used in support of Buddhist projects of one
kind or another. In such cases, the Buddhist projects may either stimulate further
development or involve the import of science and technology across cultural boundaries. The integral is characterized by the many scientific and technological assumptions and understandings actively maintained within Buddhism itself. Finally, the
consequential relation is that in which Buddhist teachings and values are the impetus
for scientific or technological undertakings.
Supportive: Buddhist Projects, Science and Technology
Throughout its history one can find examples both of Buddhist projects that were
supported by the science and technology of their time, and of instances in which
science and technology were stimulated by Buddhist projects. In the mid-eighth
century, when the temple of Todaiji was built in capital city of Nara in central Japan,
scientific and technological efforts in Japan were greatly stimulated. The temple
building itself is the largest wooden structure in the world, and the Great Buddha
Vairocana, which is housed within, is the largest bronze statue. In addition to engineering and metalworking, this also stimulated mining in Japan, as construction of the
statue and ornamentation of the building drew on copper, gold, mercury, and silver
mines from various locations around Japan.
Another instance of how a Buddhist project affected the science and technology of
its day can be seen in the life of the priest Kukai (774 to 835), founder of the school of
esoteric Buddhism in Japan known as Shingon. During his studies in China, he
acquired not only the ritual and doctrinal knowledge of esoteric Buddhism but also
many requisite practical skills. These included linguistics, particularly Sanskrit,
brushmaking, metalworking, architecture, and other technologies. These technologies
were necessary for the transmission of new doctrinal and ritual texts, and for the
performance of esoteric Buddhist ritual practices that require special ritual implements
and altar fittings of various kinds.
Integral: Science and Technology as a Part of the Buddhist Institution
Buddhist monastic education in India included study of five fields of knowledge:
linguistics, logic, speculative philosophy, medicine, and creative arts. The presence
of linguistics, logic, and medicine in this curriculum indicates that Buddhism did not
have an oppositional relation to the sciences. This distinguishes Buddhist monastic
education from the education provided to Brahmins, which appears to have disdained
secular training. One can speculate that the origin of this monastic curriculum may be
the consequence of the Buddhist rejection of the caste system with its attendant division
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of labor according to differing social groups. This same pattern of monastic education
continued in the Tibetan Buddhist context as well.
One of the central issues in any reflection on the nature of science as a source of
knowledge is causality. Causality has been a central concern of Buddhism from its very
inception. This concern is expressed in the foundational teachings of the four noble
truths and conditioned co-arising. The four noble truths are that all things are
dissatisfying, that dissatisfaction has a cause, that having a cause dissatisfaction can
be extinguished, and the path to such extinction. Conditioned co-arising is the assertion
that nothing exists independently of all other things, but rather arises along with all
other things as the result of causes and conditions. The concern with causality is found
throughout almost every form of Indian Buddhist thought. For example, the
abhidharma—the classic scholastic system of speculative philosophy and psychology
which provides the basis for all later Buddhist thought—has in its extensive literature
several discussions and theories of causality. For example, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharma
verses and autocommentary, which is considered by many to be the most important
medieval compendium of abhidharma thought, identify six kinds of causal relations.
Later in medieval India, the concern with epistemology, which characterizes so
much of Indian religious thought, developed into a semiformal analysis of inference in
the work of Dignaga and Dharmakirti. In common with much of Buddhist thought,
these thinkers asserted the existence of only two valid sources of knowledge—
perception and inference. Another source, testimony (or what we would call the appeal
to authority), is also one which is discussed extensively by other Buddhist thinkers.
The inferential schemes of medieval Indian philosophy grew out of the debate
tradition, rather than the mathematical tradition as was the case in Greece. Debate
was an important function in the medieval Indian religious milieu since the religious
affiliation of kingdoms at times depended upon the outcome of a debate. The debate
tradition of medieval India continues into present-day Tibetan and Japanese Buddhism.
One of the fundamental distinctions that Dignaga makes is between an argument
intended to convince another, and an argument intended to determine the truth of a
claim for oneself. This distinction evidences the debate background for the formation of
Buddhist logic.
An argument for others has five parts, called “limbs” in Sanskrit. One of the most
common examples of a five part argument is the following:
Proposal: There is fire on the mountain,
Reason: because there is smoke on the mountain.
Justification: Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as for example in a kitchen.
Application: Because there is smoke on the mountain,
Conclusion: there is fire on the mountain.
Upon examination, one can see that the final two parts are a restatement of the proposal
and reason. It is these two parts that Dignaga eliminates as unnecessary when one is
creating an inference for oneself. In the instance given here, the justification is a
positive one. It was also recognized that one could infer on the basis of a negative
justification, such as: Where there is no fire, there is no smoke, as in a lake. Dignaga
pointed out that where one has both a positive and a negative warrants, one has a more
convincing argument.
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This openness to logic and reason reveals a disposition within Buddhism that one
can tentatively conclude suggests an amenability to dialogue with contemporary
science.
Consequential: Science and Technology as the Result of Buddhist Teachings
and Values
Belief in reincarnation has been considered one of the central teachings of Buddhism
throughout its entire history. The desire to understand the processes of rebirth led to a
concern with embryology. This concern is evidenced, for example in both the Tibetan and
Japanese traditions. Typically, the process of rebirth was divided into two periods: the period
between death and conception, and the period from conception to birth. The treatment of
these concerns most familiar in the West is the so-called Tibetan Book of the Dead, which
focuses most of its attention on the period from death to conception. However, it is far from
being the only Buddhist text to discuss the processes of rebirth. For example, Gampopa’s
Jewel Ornament of Liberation gives greater attention to the gestation period itself. In
addition to works such as these where the intent is primarily religious, other works were
more explicitly medical in character. Several similar works are also found in the Japanese
esoteric Buddhist tradition of Shingon. While the Tibetan works largely assume a negative
view of the cycle of rebirth (samsara) as unremittingly marked by suffering, the Japanese
works more consistently operate from a nondual conception of the cycle of rebirth as
identical with the awakened condition in which the sources of suffering are extinguished
(nirvana). These Japanese works generally employ a five or an eight stage developmental
sequence. This is usually an 8-week long period, covering the time of conception to the time
when the fetus is fully formed, i.e. a tiny human being, and not to birth as such. A key
religious concept for the Shingon discussions of embryology is that of awakening in this
body (sokushin jobutsu). This is the idea that one is already inherently awakened and can
become aware of that inherent purity of mind through practice, in one’s present body, rather
than over the course of countless lifetimes of practice. The emphasis on embodiment
provided a way of giving positive religious value to conception and birth.
One of the central values for the Mahayana tradition is that of compassionate action. The
ideal figure for the Mahayana is called a “bodhisattva,” or one who is committed to attaining
full awakening. Bodhisattvas are characterized by both wisdom and compassion. While
wisdom is seen as passive insight into the absence of any metaphysical absolute in either
persons or objects, compassion is the resulting activity which arises from wisdom.
Thang-stong rGyal-po (1361 to 1485), a fifteenth century Tibetan visionary and
lineage founder, is a culture hero celebrated for the construction of iron chain suspension bridges in several locations in central and eastern Tibet. Travel in Tibet is very
difficult as the country is marked by a large number of narrow river valleys. Even if
there was a ferry across a river, passage could be subject to the whims of the ferryman.
In addition, the countryside was troubled by bandits who preyed upon travellers. As a
consequence of his bodhisattva compassion, Thang-stong both established monasteries
and temples in locales made dangerous by bandits, and also built many iron chain
suspension bridges across rivers. He is said to have discovered a mine of iron ore,
which then made it possible to create the links necessary for the construction of his
bridges. Here we see the Buddist value of compassion motivating mining, iron
smithing, and bridge construction.
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Similarly, in the summer of 820, the priest Kukai, mentioned above, was put in
charge of the reconstruction of a reservoir in his home island of Shikoku. Originally
constructed almost a century before, this reservoir was needed by farmers for irrigation.
Although several prior reconstruction efforts had failed, Kukai was able to complete the
project within about 3 months. While the reservoir has needed further repairs in the
intervening 1100 years, it continues to provide water control services to this day.
Another instance of scientific and technological work being motivated by Buddhist
values is the construction of an armillary sphere and an astronomical clock in eighth
century China. This was motivated by the traditional Buddhist conception that the
effectiveness of the Buddhist teachings would decline in three stages, and that eventually
after the end of the last stage, another Buddha would be born into this world. These ideas
created a concern with calculating the temporal distance from the death of Shakyamuni
Buddha in order to determine what stage one was in, and to calculate how long before the
next Buddha would appear. Buddhist messianism was combined with Chinese utopianism, the goal of achieving a stable, harmonious, peaceful, and prosperous social order
under the direction of an Emperor whose actions are guided by being harmoniously
integrated into the order of nature. Yixing (673 to 727) was one of the most important
Buddhist monks of the Tang dynasty, and has been recognized not only for his extensive
translation work and doctrinal studies but also as one of the greatest mathematicians and
astronomers of his time. While the clock that Yixing constructed drew on earlier clocks,
his is the first definitely known to have employed an escapement.
An interesting side note here involving the construction of clocks in China in the late
seventh and early eighth centuries addresses one of the preconceptions regarding the effect
of religion on science—the belief that a linear conception of time characteristic of Western
culture was necessary for the creation of clocks. Buddhist conceptions of time, which may
be described as cyclic, did not preclude a concern with time and its accurate measurement.
The entire construction within which the armillary sphere existed included as one of
its main elements a five-story pagoda housing an immense statue of the Buddha. While
this alone indicates Buddhist piety as one of the motivating factors, the close link
between the tower and the armillary sphere is critical. A stereotype frequently repeated
is that religion is concerned with “the timeless” or with “eternal truths.” This fundamentally Neo-Platonic view of religion has been uncritically projected onto Indian
religions in their entirety, including Buddhism. The implication of this projection is that
religions of Indian origin are unconcerned with a more ‘scientific’ conception of time.
Buddhist science of time belies this uncritical assessment.
These three models of the historical relationship between Buddhism and science and
technology—supportive, integral, and consequential—suggest that Buddhism is indeed
open to contemporary discourse with science. With these models serving as conceptual
background, we will assess the work of current scholars working to establish constructive dialogue between Buddhism and the sciences.
Contemporary Constructions
The foundations of Buddhist thought rest on the awakening of Shakyamuni Buddha. In
the context of Indian religious culture, that awakening is itself understood as the
cessation of mistaken conceptions and misplaced affections that keep us from living
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in the world as it actually is, i.e. as impermanent. Thus, the primary focus for
Buddhism, which shapes its interaction with the sciences, concerns issues of epistemology and the nature of consciousness. The path to awakening is primarily concerned
with developing an understanding of how the mind works so as to no longer be misled
by our mistaken belief that permanent satisfaction is possible. It is for this reason that
despite the popular fascination with possible similarities between contemporary physics
(e.g. chaos theory, folded universes, black holes) and Asian religious traditions, it is
neuroscience, psychology, the cognitive sciences, and philosophy of mind that I would
suggest ought to have the highest priority for the discourse between Buddhism and
science.
As mentioned above, in late nineteenth and early twentieth century scholarship, the
Buddhist critique of the idea of an independently existing mind was understood in
terms of the Western philosophical tradition of idealism—both the idealism of Berkeley
and of Hegel. More recently, however, especially in light of some of the contemporary
work in neuroscience, cognitive science, and psychology, these critiques are being
reinterpreted in terms drawn from Husserlian phenomenology. For example, the
phenomenological category of intentionality, i.e. the necessary relation between subject
and object (not to be confused with the common usage, meaning purposeful), provides
a way of talking about Buddhist conceptions of the relation between subject and object
without falling either into idealism or into the now long-discredited introspectionism.
This is a theme that B. Alan Wallace has recently developed as part of a general critique
of materialism and objectivity as necessary presuppositions concerning the nature of
scientific knowledge.
From the Buddhist perspective developed by Wallace, the necessarily concomitant
relation between the mind and the world it apprehends addresses both naive realism and
scientific realism. Naive realism is the ordinary, unreflective conception that objects exist
independently of our perception or knowledge of them. Scientific realism extends this to
include the independent existence of unobservable, theoretical objects. In this way,
reflections on the nature of mind motivated by the Buddhist priorities do speak directly
to the philosophical presuppositions underpinning much of contemporary science.
Phenomenology, particularly that of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, has also contributed to
the interface between Buddhism and cognitive science in the work of Varela, Thompson and Rosch. They have emphasized the importance of embodiment in any understanding of consciousness. Much contemporary discussion in cognitive science concerns the question of conscious awareness. The Buddhist view that all existing things
arise as the result of certain causes and conditions is congruent with many contemporary approaches to consciousness that view consciousness as the result of complex
physiological interactions arising as the human body has evolved within the natural
world of which it is an integral part.
Reflections such as Wallace’s on the philosophy of science explore how materialist
and realist metaphysical views have come to influence our own contemporary preconceptions about the nature of science and with it the nature of nature itself. At the same
time, this kind of reflection has also been directed toward cultural preconceptions
concerning religion and how those have influenced our apprehension of the Buddhist
tradition. One of the surprising outcomes of such reflection is that positivist understandings of science and Romantic conceptions of religion, two schools of thought that,
on the surface, may appear to be antithetical to one another, share much more than is
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usually recognized. Recently, Dale Wright has noted that the conception of unmediated
experience as the ground of religion is analogous to the notion that one can get at ‘the
facts’ as irreducible items of information, or, in other words, that it is possible to allow
the data to speak for itself without interpretation. In both cases the knowing subject is
understood as existing separately from the object of knowledge, and that the process of
coming to know has little or no effect on the object known. The assumption Wright
identifies as being shared by both positivism and Romanticism—that the mind exists
independently of the objects of which it is aware—is fundamentally different from
Buddhist conceptions of the mind and how it works, and descriptions of the path to
awakening, both of which emphasize the interdependence of all existence.
Conclusion
The relation between Buddhism and the sciences has largely been overlooked in modern,
Western Buddhist Studies. Why is this? Perhaps, one important factor in the image of
Buddhism as having not been involved in scientific thought results from the background
training and concurrent interests of those who study Buddhism. Neither philological nor
religious study approaches to Buddhism necessarily lend themselves to examinations of
those texts and traditions that contain information about the history of Buddhism and the
sciences. Moreover, the presentation of Buddhism in the West by apologists and polemicists has misrepresented the relationship of Buddhism and science. Challenged by Christian missionaries in their homelands, Buddhist advocates focused, in their interactions with
Western intellectual traditions, on the most immediate kinds of questions being raised, that
is religious questions. Challenged by a Western imperialism that deployed science and
technology to its own benefit, many Buddhist apologists attempted to appropriate the
prestige of science in their own rhetorical claims of superiority to Christianity.
How might discourse between science and religion be reconceived to more adequately consider core Buddhist concerns, and, in turn attract the interest of Buddhist
scholars? In this chapter, I have suggested that this re-conception should include at least
three steps. First, we need to clear the intellectual ground upon which discourse will be
established. Much of the recent work done in the area of science and religion, because
of its roots in theistic traditions, fails to address Buddhist concerns. Much popular work
that has addressed the relationship between science and Asian religious traditions has
misrepresented Buddhist concerns as well. Hence, the establishment of solid discourse
between Buddhism and contemporary science begins with a process of defining terms,
making distinctions, and finding clarification.
The second step in re-conceiving dialogue to more appropriately account for
Buddhist concerns involves surveying models of discourse throughout Buddhist history. In posing the question, “In what ways has Buddhism been amenable to discourse
with science and technology?” this chapter has articulated a threefold typology of
relations: supportive, integral, and consequential.
Finally, the third step in re-conceiving dialogue involves assessing current developments
in Buddhism-science scholarship. This assessment reminds us that discourse between
science and Buddhism remains most true to the central concerns of Buddhism when that
discourse begins with questions of epistemology and the nature of consciousness, drawing
on neuroscience, the cognitive sciences, psychology, and the philosophy of mind.
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241
As noted in the introduction, that much of the contemporary discourse on science and
religion is structured according to assumptions and concerns particular to the theistic
traditions generally and Christian theology specifically, is understandable. This discourse
finds its origins in a theistic context. However, because the fundamental concerns of
Buddhist thought differ substantially from those of Christianity and other theistic traditions, basic presuppositions about the nature of science-religion interaction need to be
revisited if Buddhist scholars are to be more fully involved in the future of this discourse.
Acknowledgements The essay that follows this new Preface was originally published in Bridging Science and
Religion, edited by Ted Peters and Gaymon Bennett, SCM Press, 1993, and reprinted by Fortress Press, 2003, pp.
153–172. It is republished here with the permission of both presses, to whom we wish to express our gratitude.
I would also like to express my gratitude to the editors of this special issue, Thomas Calobrisi and Devin
Zuckerman for this opportunity to republish this essay. In addition to making it accessible to a wider audience,
this allows me to make some minor corrections. Other than some grammatical changes, however, the essay
itself remains as originally published. It was written for a general audience, and therefore does not include the
diacritics or the reference citations normal to an academic publication.
Data Availability Not applicable.
Compliance with Ethical Standards
Code Availability
Conflict of Interest
Not applicable.
The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.
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