Oslo Coalition on Freedom of Religion or Belief International seminar “The Orthodox and the Other” Lysebu, Oslo, December 13-15, 2013 BUDDHISM IN RUSSIA: TRADITION, POLITICS, TENSIONS Andrey Shishkov St. Cyril and Methodius Post-Graduate School of the Russian Orthodox Church 1. Buddhism in Russia appears as the Other, both in relation to the Orthodox Church and to the State. The latter is due to the fact that supreme leaders of the Buddhist Schools, which Russian Buddhists belong to, are outside Russia and aren’t Russian citizens. In my paper I will turn to several cases in which a complex nature of otherness of Buddhism in the Russian context most representatively reflected. This otherness concerns both relations of Buddhist communities with the State and the Church, as well as the processes that occur within Buddhism in Russia. The idea that Buddhism as a religious doctrine is radically open to diversity is spread widely enough. In Buddhism, for example, there is no notion of heresy or schism in the Christian sense. Buddhist Schools, even upholding opposite views on certain key aspects of Buddhist doctrine, quite peacefully coexist with each other. So the inner attitude of Buddhism to the Otherness in doctrine and practice fundamentally differs from that of Christianity. However, going beyond the doctrinal space to political one, this otherness often discloses the negative manifestations, concerned with intolerance and political struggle. In my paper I will sketch briefly the key historical factor. 2. Buddhism in Russia is the one of the religions which are recognized by the State as traditional one, alongside with Orthodoxy, Islam and Judaism. The Russian Federation includes traditionally Buddhist regions with people practicing Buddhism through ages – Republics of Buryatia, Kalmykia and Tyva. Clergy in those regions belong to Tibetan School Gelug (also known as “the Yellow Hat”) headed by the Dalai-lama. Up until now in Russia there is no unified and centralized Buddhist community (Sangha). Sanghas of Buryatia, Kalmykia and Tyva are independent from each other, or one may say, autocephalous. The territories with the Buddhist population were annexed to the Russian Empire during the colonization of Siberia in the early XVII century. However Buddhism was recognized by the imperial authority as legitimate religion only in 1741. In 1764 the Empress Catherine II established the position of Pandit Hambo-Lama – the head of Eastern Siberia and Baikal Region Buddhists. In response to this act the Buryat clergy recognized in the figure of Empress the incarnation of White Tara – one of the Bodhisattvas of the Buddhist pantheon of Tibetan branch of Buddhism. From this moment the tradition of loyalty of Buryat Buddhists to State power begins. From Catherine the Second to Nicholas the Second all the Emperors of the Russian Empire were recognized as the incarnations of White Tara regardless of their religion. After the Bolshevik Revolution Buryat higher clergy, Hambo Lama Aghvan Dordjiev in particular, have demonstrated loyalty to the Soviet government by positioning Buddhism as a proto-Communism. This, however, did not save him from being arrested and persecuted in soviet camp the 1938. Tradition of sacralization of the Russian State power has revived when the current head of Buryat Buddhists Hambo Lama Damba Ayusheev publicly called President Vladimir Putin the incarnation of White Tara, and he did it more than once. President Dmitry Medvedev has been proclaimed the incarnation of White Tara after a special initiation ritual, which took place during his visit to the Republic of Buryatia in 2009. This tradition of loyalty, strongly supported by the government, followed with the rejection of political separatism. When country has been facing the challenging times, Buddhist peoples were the first ones who declaimed against separatism for saving the integrity of the country. State government always had a good example of Buddhist regions to address to in the face of threat of separatism. After the Civil War Buryat clergy stood for integrity of the country, supporting the Soviet regime. The Soviet government encouraged long enough the idea of Buddhism as a protoCommunism (up to 1929), until the threat to integrity of the country has fade away. In the early 90-ies., when Russia faced the strong separatist tendencies in the national republics, Kalmykia and its President Ilyumzhinov were demonstratively strong for the integrity of the Russian Federation. It should be noted that it is Buddhism that was one of the tools of political loyalty in Buddhist regions, and the Buddhist clergy was an agent of ideas of loyalty. In response, the government began to grant preferences exactly to traditional ethnic Buryatia, Kalmykia and Tyva Buddhism. 3. In the Russian Empire the traditionally Buddhist ethnic groups were the only ones, who had the right to profess Buddhism legitimately. However, in the late XIX – early XX centuries Buddhism had become well-known in imperial centers, especially among the St. Petersburg elite. Cases of conversion from Christianity to Buddhism increased after 1909, when the Parliament issued a resolution on freedom of the conversion from Christianity to other religions1. Information about Buddhism and its doctrine came in Russia not only from Europe (the latter received it by colonies), but also thanks to work of Russian Orientalists in Mongolia and Central Asia. It is no wonder that exactly Russian Orientalists were the first who converted to Buddhism. In 1915 in St. Petersburg a Buddhist temple (Datsan) was opened with the efforts of Hambo Lama Aghvan Dordjiev. By 1918 there were around 200 Buddhists in the city, many of them were Russians. One of the lamas of St. Petersburg Datsan was Charles-Augustus Tennyson2, ethnicallyLatvian. In Soviet times the interest to Buddhism has not disappeared in the intellectual millieu, despite of persecution of the former by the State. In contrast, in the 1960-70-ies there was an upsurge of interest to Buddhism among Russians and other Europeans in the Soviet Union. Similarly to preSoviet times, the main adherents of Buddhist practices became the Oriental and Buddhist Studies scholars. European centers of Buddhism were located in Moscow, Leningrad and Soviet Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). In the 1950-60’s a mass exodus of Buddhists from Asia to the West took place under the onslaught of Asian Communist regimes (from Tibet, Vietnam etc.). After the collapse of the 1 2 Андреев А.И. Храм Будды в Северной столице. – СПб.: 2004. Ibid. Soviet regime thee Buddhist teachers from the West gained admittance to Russia. Due to their influence a population of ethnic Russian and other Europeans on the Russian territory Buddhist community has increased greatly. Moreover, other Tibetan Schools (Kagyu, Nyingma), Zen Buddhism, Korean Seon, Theravada tradition have disseminated. Tibetan, Korean and Vietnamese teachers have settled in Russia for quite a long time, forming communities, large enough and consisted mainly of Russians and other Europeans. 4. The first case I want to turn to is connected with a tension between traditional ethnic Buddhism (Buddhism of traditionally Buddhist regions) and, tentatively speaking, “Russian” Buddhism (outside of traditionally Buddhist regions and people). As I mentioned, ethnic Buddhism has received special preferences from the State power in exchange for loyalty guarantees. When it goes about the official status of Buddhism as the traditional religion of Russian Federation, it means the ethnic Buddhism. Realization of such major Federal projects as the development of educational programs and text-books in teaching the foundations of Buddhist culture component in public schools and training Buddhist chaplains for Russian Army and Navy is carried out on the basis of traditional Buddhist Sanghas. “Russian” Buddhists, many of whom are scholars in Oriental and Buddhist Studies, translators of canonic Buddhist texts, take part in those processes individually, but not institutionally. Meanwhile the traditional Buddhist authorities were suspicious about the “Russian” Buddhism and were striving for maintaining the status of the only official representatives of Buddhism in Russia, official negotiators on behalf of Russian Buddhists with the government, society and other religions. Such political bodies as the Presidential Council for Cooperation with Religious Organizations of the Russian Federation, the Civic Chamber of Russian Federation, the Russia’s Inter-Religious Council, etc. include representatives of the ethnic traditional Buddhism only. Following the State, the Russian Orthodox Church builds a dialogue with Buddhists in Russia only through the representatives of traditional Sanghas. As I said above, the authorities of the traditional Sanghas were suspicious about conversion of Russians to Buddhism. The Head of Buryat Buddhists Hambo Lama Ayusheev more than once declared that Russians should be Orthodox, and Buryats (as well as Kalmyks and Tyva) should be Buddhists. A second person in the hierarchy of the Buryat clergy, abbot of the Ivolga monastery Dagba Lama Ochirov in personal talk in 2006 said to me that he dislike conversions of Russians to Buddhism. Being on that moment the rector of the Buddhist University, he was very skeptical about the educational perspectives of Russians in it. Dagba Lama appealed to the huge cultural gap between Russians (traditionally and culturally Orthodox) and Buryats. “To understand Buddhism one should be born in a Buddhist culture” – he said3. The famous Buddhist scholar and Tibetan translator, "Russian" Buddhist Andrey Terentyev does not agree with such a monopoly of ethnic Buddhists on Buddhism. In my interview with him in 2010 he argued on the statement of Dagba Lama: “I do not agree that not a Mongol, not a Chinese or not a Tibetan cannot be Buddhist, if he feel a deep congeniality with this belief system. All the people have more or less the same thinking...Another thing that European or 3 Personal archive Russian never become Buryat or Kalmyk. I think for your conversation partner his Buddhism and his nationality wrongfully became one”4. Official representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church are quite satisfied with the position of the traditional Buddhist clergy about Russian population. Church is not interested in the conversion of Russians, who culturally belong to the Orthodox tradition, in Buddhism. Moreover, in the eyes of the Orthodox missionaries and apologists those Buddhist centers, which are working with the Russian population, often fall into the category of dangerous sects. At the same time the Buddhist centers that belong to the same schools, but are working with ethnic Buddhists, don’t give rise to unfavorable criticism. The Higher Buddhist clergy of the traditional Sanghas look with an unfriendly eye at the Buddhist Schools, which came from the West and have followers among Russians and Europeans. Especially when the School claims to play a significant role in the political space of Buddhism in Russia. Karma Kagyu School is the best example here. Activity of this School in Russia is associated with the name of ethnic Danish Lama Ole Nydahl who has founded there numerous spiritual centers and now regularly visits Russia for lectures and rituals. Karma Kagyu School met in Russia a rebuff at the level of authorities of the Kalmyk Sangha. In particular, the Head of Kalmyk Buddhists Telo Tulku Rinpoche called the Karma Kagyu School in Russia conflicting with the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism. While the Karma Kagyu School is a branch of one of the four Schools of Tibetan Buddhism together with Gelug School to which ethnic Buddhists in Russia belong. Activitiies, maintained by Ole Nydahl and the Karma Kagyu School, were criticized also by the members of the Russian Orthodox Church. In particular, the Russian Association of Centers for the Study of Religions and Sects, headed by the leading sectologist of the ROC Alexander Dvorkin, included the Russian Association of Karma Kagyu in the List of dangerous totalitarian sects. Meanwhile, Lama Ole Nydahlgot his initiation from the leader of the Tibetan Kagyu School Karmapa XVI, a figure, comparable to Dalai Lama. Few other lamas besides Lama Ole Nydahl, who established their spiritual centers outside the traditional Buddhist regions of Russia, have been criticized. Among them is a Tibetan Gelug School monk Geshe Jampa Tinley, who has been sent to Russia by Dalai Lama XIV. Traditional Buddhist clergy and the Orthodox Church are challenged by the fact that activities of Ole Nydahl, Geshe Tinley etc., gather many followers among Russians. As a result, neither the State nor religious organizations such as the Russian Orthodox Church just "don’t see" the "Russian" Buddhism. It is entirely in the private area of religious practice and academic research. Of course, the fact of political absence of “Russian” Buddhism is connected not only with opposition from ethnic Buddhist clergy. The “political body” of traditional Buddhism in Russia are the ethnic groups with their own cultural and religious traditions. “Russian” Buddhism don’t have such “political body”. In Russia, Russian population is generally considered as potentially Orthodox through the cultural tradition. Religious self-identification of the individual different from the Orthodoxy, simultaneously is a process of separation from this “political body”. It is 4 Personal archive also true for the other religion traditions in Russia that have an ethnic character (eg, Islam). We know the cases of the protest of Russian Muslims against the discrimination by the ethnic Muslims of Russia. Therewith the "Russian" Sanghas still do not have a sufficient number of Russian Buddhist Teachers. These communities are usually headed by Buddhist teachers, who came from the West and are not citizens of Russian Federation (mostly Tibetans). Ethnic Russian lamas, after graduation from Buddhist University in Buryatia, are teaching in the system of traditional Sanghas. But the spread of Buddhist practices among the ordinary people (the “invisible part”) is sufficiently large, primarily due to the interest to Yoga, which is considered as part of the health care procedures (like fitness).Usually Yoga Centers offer philosophical concepts, rooted in the Buddhist doctrine, in addition to a set of practices. Yoga motivates people if not convert to Buddhism (even though the latter does not require any official ritual of transition), than at least to be engaged in Buddhist practice and study Buddhism. In large cities the percentage of people who practice Yoga is quite high. 5. But traditional ethnic Buddhism in Russia is not monolithic one. Despite the fact that the Buddhists of Buryatia, Kalmykia and Tyva belong to one Tibetan Gelug School, headed by the Dalai Lama, there is no centralized Buddhist organization in Russia. And if Tyva Buddhists politically are in self-isolation, the Buddhists of Buryatia and Kalmykia are antagonists throughout contemporary Russian history. This antagonism is reinforced by the very persons of the leaders of Buryatia and Kalmykia Buddhism. The Head of Buryat Buddhists Hambo Lama Damba Ayusheev represents a typical “self-made man” person, who has grown from the bottom to the top. In the Soviet times he was a teacher in the public school. In the late Soviet period he entered to Buddhist University of Ulan-Bator (Mongolia). Being Hambo Lama (since 1995) he is pursuing an active policy of increasing the influence of Buryat Sangha. In public space he is positioning himself as the leader of all Buddhists in Russia. Well known as a friend of the President Putin. Ayusheev sometimes really accompanies the President on trips. In foreign policy he is defending the political interests of Russia. The Head of Kalmyk Buddhist Shandjin Lama Telo Tulku Rinpoche belongs to the Buddhist world elite. Born in the United States in the family of Kalmyk emigrants. Graduated Drepung Goman in India – the leading Buddhist monastery – under the guidance of the best Tibetan teachers. Recognized as a reincarnation of one of the great lama of the past. Related to the Dalai Lama XIV. He was elected Shandjin Lama in 1992. For many years he is fighting for the permit for Dalai Lama’s visit to Russia. Hambo Lama has a great political influence in Russia. In particular, the representatives of the Buryat clergy occupy the overwhelming majority of seats in several institutes associated with State-Society-Religion dialogue. Shandjin Lama, by contrast, has a good reputation in the West, in Mongolia and among Tibetan clergy surrounding the Dalai Lama. By the range of cooperation with the world Buddhist centers Shadzhin Lama is far ahead of Hambo Lama. Tensions between the two Buddhist centers are coming out in story with the building of a Buddhist temple in Moscow. Attempts to build a temple in Moscow are taking place since 90s.The Moscow Orthodox community, of course, protests the construction. However the fact that Moscow still hasn’t a Buddhist temple (although Buddhism is the one of the four traditional religions of Russia) is not a merit of Orthodox believers. The main reason is the absence of a centralized Buddhist Sangha. Despite the fact that the political weight of the Buryat Buddhism in Russia is higher than Kalmyk one, the government none the less cannot take such a step as to grant the land for a temple to the Buryat Sangha to the detriment of Kalmyk Sangha. However the permission to build three temples (for every traditional ethnic Sangha) is radically incorrect as well, because it will lead to the wide protest of Orthodox people and to discontent of Muslims which have only five mosques in Moscow despite the fact that they are more numerous than Buddhists. In this situation "Russian" Buddhism, which could be an alternative, is neglected by the state power. 6. I will summarize. a) Buddhist communities in Russia were loyal politic partners in relation to the State authorities throughout the history of their existence on this territory. In Buryatia this expression of loyalty was formed in a tradition of recognition of the State leaders as incarnation of Bodhisattva White Tara. In response, the State has granted to traditional Sanghas the preferences of traditional religion of Russia. The only problem that today overshadows the relations between Buddhists in Russia and the State is the ban on Dalai Lama XIV visit to Russia, which has been putted by the Russian Government under the pressure of Chinese Government. b) Buddhist Sanghas, both traditional and non-traditional for Russia, are showing regard for the Russian Orthodox Church and Orthodox tradition in common. Buddhist leaders strongly emphasize non-missionary nature of their religion, removing suspicions thereby of proselytism among the Russian population that is considered to be traditionally Orthodox. Of course, the opening of Buddhist centers outside the traditional Buddhist regions raises awareness among the Church members; however, these centers also emphasize their nonmissionary nature. c) Buddhism in Russia is composed of two unequal parts: ethnic Buddhism of Buryatia, Kalmykia and Tuva, that is traditional for Russia and Buddhism, spreading beyond the traditional Buddhist regions and ethnic groups (I call it in my paper the “Russian” Buddhism). There are tensions between the traditional Buddhism and the “Russian” one. Those tensions are expressed in the contestation of traditional Sanghas to control the Buddhist political and public space. The results of this struggle are the following. First, the “Russian” Buddhism is completely ignored at the level of cooperation between the State, society and traditional religions in Russia. “Russian" Buddhist communities are not involved in significant public and government projects and discussions, inter-religious dialogue. The state does not recognize the "Russian" Buddhist communities as groups that belong to the traditional religions of Russia. The Russian Orthodox Church also ignores the "Russian" Buddhism at the official level, preferring the dialogue with ethnic Buddhism of Buryatia, Kalmykia and Tyva. Second, the development of the "Russian" Buddhism often provoked an opposition from the clergy of the traditional Sanghas. In contemporary Russia, "Russian" Buddhism, having already more than a century of existence, meets with oppression. d) Inside the traditional Buddhism in Russia there are also tensions expressed in the struggle for influence between Buryat Sangha and Kalmyk Sangha. e) “Russian” Buddhism is an intercultural phenomenon, where Russian Culture (deep-rooted in Orthodoxy) meets with Buddhist doctrine and practices. At the same time, “Russian” Buddhism is “an invisible, submerged part of iceberg” which is slightly seen from the public space. “Visible part” of the “Russian” Buddhism is very small. The “invisible part” is connected with the spread of Yoga practices among the general population. Yoga motives people to be engaged in Buddhist practice and study Buddhism. So as any other place for meeting and dialogue, it contributes to development of the unique spiritual and cultural diversity. In large cities the percentage of people who practice Yoga is quite high. I suppose, it is comparable to the percentage of culturally Orthodox people (who call themselves Orthodox, but do not attend the Church).