Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction Oxford Handbooks Online Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction Matthew T. Kapstein The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy Edited by William Edelglass and Jay L. Garfield Print Publication Date: May 2011 Online Publication Date: Sep 2011 Subject: Philosophy, Non-Western Philosophy DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195328998.003.0023 Abstract and Keywords The intellectual history of Tibetan Buddhism is only imperfectly understood. Although abundant new textual sources have been discovered in recent decades, it will take some time before scholars have assimilated this growing documentation, which, considering only what is pertinent to the history of philosophical thought, amounts to many thousands of individual works composed over a millennium. This article touches upon selected topics that are now generally agreed to be of importance for the history of Tibetan Buddhist thought overall. It discusses the beginnings of Tibetan Buddhism, the formation of the major Buddhist traditions, Tibetan scholasticism, Buddha-nature and the luminosity of mind, and Tsongkhapa and his critics. Keywords: Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan scholasticism, Buddha-nature, Tsongkhapa intellectual history of Tibetan Buddhism is only imperfectly understood. Although abundant new textual sources have been discovered in recent decades, it will take some time before scholars have assimilated this growing documentation, which, considering only what is pertinent to the history of philosophical thought, amounts to many thousands of individual works composed over a millennium. Accordingly, we can do no more here than to furnish a concise introduction, touching upon selected topics that are now generally agreed to be of importance for the history of Tibetan Buddhist thought overall. THE The Beginnings of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Indian, Chinese, and Indigenous Sources Tradition considers Buddhism to have been first adopted in Tibet by the monarch Songtsen Gampo (Srong-btsan sgampo, reigned ca. 617–650), who unified his nation and set it on the path of imperial expansion in Central Asia. His Chinese and Nepalese brides are said to have encouraged the king and his court to adhere to the Buddha's teaching. Nevertheless, there is little evidence that the new religion had much success in Tibet until the early eighth century, when another Chinese princess, (p. 246) Jincheng (d. 739), married Songtsen's descendant Tri Detsuktsen (Khri Lde-gtsugbtsan, reigned 712–755) and sponsored a monastic community from Khotan, a Buddhist state then under Tibetan rule. Despite this royal support, an anti-Buddhist reaction on the part of nobles who favored native Tibetan religious traditions (later referred to in general as “Bön”) led to the expulsion of the Khotanese monks following the princess's death. It was Tri Detsuktsen's son and heir, Tri Songdetsen (Khri Srong-lde-btsan, reigned 755–ca. 797), who firmly adopted Buddhism as the religion of his dynasty and committed considerable state resources to its promotion. Several of the edicts promulgated by this remarkable ruler survive, and in them we find indications of his understanding of and interest in Buddhist doctrine. He writes, for instance, that All those who are born and revolve among the four sorts of birth,1 from beginningless origins to the infinite end, become as they are owing to their own deeds (karman). … That which is neither good nor evil is unspecified. Page 1 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction The result of what one does to another ripens upon oneself. One may be born as a god among the heavenly stages, or as a human on earth, or as an anti-god, a hungry ghost, an animal or a subterranean creature of the hells—all born in these six have done so owing to their own deeds. Transcending the world are those who become Buddhas, and those who make progress as bodhisattvas, selfawakened ones (pratyekabuddha), and pious attendants (śrāvaka)—all of them have done so owing to the provisions of merit and gnosis that they themselves have amassed. Besides the adherence to Buddhist normative doctrine that is evident here, it is striking that Tri Songdetsen was particularly interested in the means whereby we may know the truth of religious claims. For he goes on to say: If one investigates what is found in the Dharma [the Buddha's teaching], some points are immediately evident in their good or evil consequences, while others that are not immediately evident may nevertheless be inferred on the basis of those which are, and so are also fit to be held with certainty.2 In other words, he was familiar with, and sought to introduce his subjects to, the view of the Indian Buddhist epistemologists that knowledge may have two valid sources (pramāṇa): direct perception (pratyakṣa) of what is evident to the senses and intellectual intuition, and inference (anumāna) of what is “hidden,” that is, not directly evident. Tri Songdetsen established Tibet's first full-fledged monastery, called Samyé (Bsam-yas), in about 779, which housed an important translation academy. Its scholars, including Tibetans and foreign Buddhist monks, rendered large numbers (p. 247) of Indian Buddhist scriptures and treatises from Sanskrit into Tibetan and achieved an outstanding level of accuracy, an important result of which was the formation of a well-standardized philosophical vocabulary in Tibetan. The project of creating in this way a canonical literature was continued under Tri Songdetsen's successors, until the collapse of the dynasty during the mid-ninth century, by which time many hundreds of Indian religious and philosophical texts were available in Tibetan versions. At the same time, Tibetan translators also begin to author manuals introducing the new vocabulary together with elements of Buddhist thought. Some of these works are notably philosophical, such as the treatise entitled Distinctions of Views (Lta ba'i khyad par) by the renowned ninth-century translator Yeshé-dé (Ye-shessde), in which, for example, he summarizes a key argument of the Madh-yamaka school: In accordance with the system formulated by Ācārya Nāgārjuna, all outer and inner entities are explained to be interdependently originated. Relatively, because they have arisen from cause and condition, they exist just apparitionally, whereas ultimately, entities are without production, [as is demonstrated] by the fourfold proof that states that they are not born from self, other, both, or causelessly. “Not born from self” means precisely not born from itself. For if entities were born from themselves, they would have to be said to be born from a self whose own coming-into-being was completed, or else from one that has not come into being. On the one hand, were it born from what had already come into being, it could never be the case that it does not come into being, and this leads to an endless regression. But on the other hand, were it born from what had not come into being, then the rabbit's horn and the barren woman's son might also come into being!3 Therefore, it is not born from self. It is also not born from other, for that implies the fault of everything's coming into being from everything. Nor is it born from both self and other, for in that case both of the aforementioned faults are combined. Neither is it born causelessly, for in that case there are these faults: it would always arise with dependence on anything at all, everything would emerge from everything, and all purposeful undertakings would be fruitless. Thus, because the birth of the entity is not established, therefore there can be no birth. Birth-talk is no more than conventional utterance.4 Tibetan thinkers thus began to become familiar with the major traditions of Indian Buddhist philosophy: Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, and Madhyamaka. Yeshé-dé recognized two main divisions of the latter: one, following Bhāvaviveka, adhered to Sauntrāntika conventions in their treatment of relative reality, while the other, following Śāntarakṣita, adopted the idealist approach of the Yogācāra. Both would be later classified as divisions of the SvātantrikaMādhyamika, the school (p. 248) that sought to demonstrate the thesis of universal emptiness by means of direct, or “autonomous,” proof. The Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika, which favored indirect proof and would later become the dominant trend in Tibetan Madhyamaka thought, was as yet unknown. Page 2 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction During the same period, Chinese Buddhism made inroads in parts of the Tibetan world. Teachers affiliated with the teaching of Chan (“meditation,” or Zen in Japanese) introduced Tibetans to the idea that enlightenment, or awakening, was immediately, intuitively present, without striving for numberless lifetimes as the mainstream of Indian Buddhism affirmed. This led to a protracted dispute in Tibet between partisans of “sudden” versus “gradual” enlightenment, the former sometimes associated with a teaching of mystical intuition, and the latter with the methodical application of reasoned analysis. The controversy resurfaced repeatedly in later times owing to its implications for concepts of our prospects for spiritual progress and, indeed, our very nature: are we essentially flawed creatures, for whom selfperfection is a far distant goal, or are we, and all creatures, already in fact Buddhas? Does the latter position entail a kind of gnosticism, according to which ignorance and knowledge are all that really matter, and moral effort merely an illusion? Traditional sources recount that the first actual debate over these issues took place at Samyé during the late eighth century, and that the disputants were the Chinese Chan master Moheyan and the Indian philosopher Kamalaśīla. The accounts that have come down to us are mostly late, and tend to caricature the Chan perspective: When master Kamalaśīla asked for his opponent's position, saying, “What is the Chinese religious tradition like?” the Chinese responded, “Your religious tradition, beginning with going for refuge and the cultivation of an enlightened attitude, is an ascent from below, like a monkey climbing a tree. Because one will not be awakened as a Buddha by such contrived doctrines, it is in this tradition of ours, having meditatively cultivated the nonconceptual, that one becomes awakened by realizing the nature of mind itself. So this is like the eagle's alighting from the sky upon the top of a tree; it is a ‘pure panacea’ because it is a doctrine that thus descends from on high.” To this the master said, “Your example and its significance are both invalid. For the eagle alights upon the tree, either spontaneously generated in the sky with its wings fully grown, or born in its eyrie, where its wings have gradually matured. Only then does it alight. The first is an impossibility and the second should be a gradualist example, but is inappropriate as an example of sudden enlightenment.”5 Though this exchange may be a pious fiction, it does reflect the important role, inherited from Indian systems of argument, of exemplification and counterexample in the accepted procedures of reasoning. At the same time, it underscores the great gulf that separated rationalist from intuitionist approaches to Buddhist insight. (p. 249) The currents entering Tibet from India and China provoked dynamic responses, both harmonious and hostile, on the part of indigenous Tibetan traditions as well. It was this process that gave birth to the native religion of Bön (Bon), which, from about the tenth century on, established its own monastic communities and scriptural canons, in many respects resembling those of Buddhism. Nevertheless, the elaboration of Bön literary traditions also encouraged efforts to give written form to autochthonous techniques and beliefs. Though Bon thinkers often used the Buddhist philosophical apparatus, they also developed an almost anthropological interest in documenting the practical means whereby Tibetans have traditionally interacted with the natural world, seen as an abode of benign and malignant spirits. Here, a twelfthcentury author summarizes the “priestly way of the realm of appearance” (snang-gshen): The four gates of incantation are the gate of worship of the divine spirits, the gate of expulsion and cleansing, the gate of liberation and ransom, and the gate of creation, fortune and power. […] One enters [this priestly way] unerringly, in accord with the chants of thanksgiving and the methods of playing the drum. As for practical action: because all that appears and comes into being is present as gods and demons, in order to deal with obstacles and spirits [ … ] one amasses the stipulated requisites and ritual items. Having distinguished between beneficial deities and harmful spirits, one beseeches the deities to fulfill one's final purposes, and offers a refuge as befits the lords and patrons of the priesthood.6 In time, the ancient traditions reflected here, which sought not transcendence, but instead a mastery of the forces inhering in the phenomenal world, would become part and parcel of Tibetan Buddhist thought and practice as well. Inclinations toward holism and a view of the world as the play of divine and quasi-divine energies would be regularly reasserted throughout the history of Tibetan religious thought. Thus, esoteric (or “tantric”) Buddhism, with its emphasis on ritual agency and its philosophical grounding in the Mahāyāna conception of the ultimate identity of worldly existence (saṃsāra) and transcendent peace (nirvāṇa), introduced not just an Indian pantheon, but embraced also the native gods and demons of Tibet. Page 3 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction The Formation of the Major Buddhist Traditions The century or so following the collapse of the Tibetan empire is traditionally remembered as a dark age, when Buddhism was suppressed and learning and letters were no more. Although recent scholarship shows this to be much exaggerated, translation activity and the scholarship associated with it were severely (p. 250) reduced until the end of the tenth century, when the West Tibetan kingdom of Gugé began to patronize Buddhist art and learning on a large scale once again. Henceforth, conditions favoring doctrinal and philosophical investigations gradually reemerged. Central to this revival was the long, influential sojourn of the Bengali scholar and saint Dīpaṃkaraśrījñāna, better known as Atiśa, first in Gugé (1042–1045) and then in central Tibet until his death in 1054. Atiśa sought to emphasize above all the ethical grounding of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and his teachings became the basis for subsequent Tibetan education with respect to the Mahāyāna path, including the substantial literature on “training the mind,” or “spiritual exercise” (blosbyong). The essential framework for instruction in this area was a moral anthropology that recognized three grades of aspirant, as defined by Atiśa in his widely read Lamp on the Path of Enlightenment (Bodhipathapradīpa): Whoever by whatever means strives for his own sake Only for saṃsāra's pleasures—that one is the lesser person. Turning his back to worldly pleasure, and shunning sinful deeds, The soul who strives for his own peace is called the middling person. One who, owing to the pain of his own existence, wholeheartedly seeks to end All the pain of others—that is the superior person.7 Atiśa's overriding concern to encourage the practice of such “superior persons” is evident, too, in his reserve with respect to aspects of philosophical activity. While he promoted the study of Madhyamaka, and in particular the work of Candrakīrti, he wished to emphasize meditation on emptiness as a necessary component of the path of practice, and not dialectical reasoning per se. Thus, he famously wrote: [Investigations of] perception and inference are unnecessary. They have been formulated by the learned to refute the disputations of extremists. Nevertheless, an analysis of the phenomena of everyday experience is essential, so as to arrive at the insight that: There is neither seeing nor seer, but peace without beginning or end, Abandoning substantiality and insubstantiality, free from conceptions, free from objectives, Neither an abode, nor that which abides, no coming or going, unexemplified, Ineffable, not to be viewed, unchanging, uncompounded— (p. 251) If the adept realizes that, the affective and cognitive obscurations are abandoned.8 In brief, Atiśa, following Candrakīrti in what became known as the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika (the Madhyamaka school that admits only indirect proof, prasaṅga in Sanskrit), held that relative, or ostensible reality (saṃvṛtisatya), is best described in accord with the conventions of everyday language. The special role of philosophical discourse is not system building, but the criticism of our assumptions about reality, dismantling them until we arrive at the profound realization of emptiness. Atiśa's disciples established a distinctive monastic order, called Kadampa (Bka'-gdams-pa), meaning the “adherents of the canon and practical instructions” of the Mahāyāna. During the same period, a number of other new orders were founded that would similarly shape the later history of Tibetan Buddhism. Foremost among them were the Kagyü pa (Bka'-brgyudpa) “adherents of the oral lineage,” stemming from the followers of the translator and tantric adept Marpa Chöki Lodrö (Mar-pa Chos-kyi blo-gros, 1012–1096), and the Sakyapa (Sa-skya-pa) “adherents of Sakya,” referring to the monastic center founded by the aristocratic Khön family in 1071. The differences among these and other contemporaneous orders reflected primarily differing lineages and traditions of esoteric ritual and yoga rather than philosophy and doctrine, though as they developed through the generations they also began to elaborate distinctive doctrinal positions, as will be seen below. At the same time, lines of teaching that traced their antecedents back to the earlier imperial period sought to retain their distinct identity over and against the newer orders, and so came to be known as Nyingmapa (Rnying-ma-pa), the “Ancients.” The latter, together with the Bön, considered the highest realizations to be embodied by the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen), a system of abstract contemplation that was sometimes attacked as a resurgence of the Chan teaching of sudden enlightenment. The Kagyü pa, for their part, promulgated the Mahāmudrā—the “great seal” delimiting Page 4 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction the parameters of all possible experience—an esoteric approach to meditation that, in some of its forms at least, became the object of similar criticism. Both of these systems, however, served as important stimuli for later doctrinal investigations. Tibetan Scholasticism From the late eleventh century onward, Tibetan monastic colleges emphasized a highly rationalized approach to Buddhist doctrine, over and against one dominated primarily by faith. At the forefront of this development was the college of Sangpu (p. 252) (Gsang-phu), established in 1073 by one of Atiśa's foremost disciples, Ngok Lekpé Sherab (Rngog Legs-pa'i shes-rab), whose nephew Ngok Loden Sherab (Rngog Blo-ldan shes-rab, 1059–1109) was responsible for its preeminence in philosophical education. The younger Ngok was an excellent scholar of Sanskrit, who studied Buddhist philosophy in Kashmir and who, despite Atiśa's reservations, was much inspired by the rigor of Indian epistemological theories. The curriculum he formulated required the careful study of philosophical writings, with the epistemological and logical works of Dharmakīrti (c. 600) supplying the major methodological organ. Other required topics included the monastic code or Vinaya (‘dul-ba), the “meta-doctrine” or Abhidharma (chos-mngon-pa), the Perfection of Wisdom or Prajñāpāramitā (phar-phyin), and the teaching of the Middle Way (dbu-ma), that is, the Madhyamaka dialectic of the Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna. Henceforth, this would become the core curriculum of Tibetan monastic colleges, regardless of the order to which one belonged. Instruction at Sangpu emphasized the practice of debate. Precise definition of key terms and the understanding of their relations with regard to a number of basic logical operations formed the foundations of the Tibetan debate logic. Relations among terms were defined in terms of “invariable concomitance,” or “pervasion” (Skt. vyāpti), a technical concept derived from Indian logic that refers to the extension of terms (i.e., what the term “covers”). When two terms are mutually pervasive—they cover the same ground, as we would say colloquially—they are treated here as synonyms. Understanding such relations—whether terms are synonyms, contradictories, or contraries—allows one to draw out their implications. What this system of reasoning in fact seeks to do is to explore the implications of the terms proposed until one arrives at the recognition that one's initial premises were inconsistent or otherwise defective, or else one reaches those fundamental assumptions that must be accepted as intuitively valid, without further possibility of dispute. The debate is thus at once an inquiry that seeks to arrive at sound and valid conclusions and at the same time a game, in which one deploys all the dialectical skill one can muster with the sole objective of defeating one's opponent. In this respect, the debate becomes also a dramatic performance, in which exaggerated movements, verbal tricks, and sometimes humorous asides are deployed to drive home the point. Each argument is part of a larger discussion and introduces further possible lines of inquiry, in accord with the overall architecture of the Buddhist philosophical edifice. On the analogy of a game, the individual argument may be seen as a single round or innings. The dialectical method that is employed here is often described as a threefold procedure, consisting of, first, a refutation of erroneous positions (dgag), followed by the definition of the position one wishes to defend (bzhag), and, finally, the refutation of challenges to that position (spong). As the debaters develop their skill through practice, like chess players who thrive on constant competition, they pursue the analysis of the entire range of topics treated in the monastic curriculum, examining in full detail the concepts of fundamental reality, the path to spiritual awakening, and the nature of the Buddha's enlightenment itself as these were (p. 253) elaborated in the four principal schools of Indian Buddhist philosophy mentioned above. The practice aims to sharpen and deepen one's sense of the conceptual relations among Buddhist ideas, and so reinforces a ready familiarity with the conceptual scheme as a whole, fixing it as one's way of spontaneously engaging with the world. The Sangpu curriculum was refined by a succession of brilliant teachers, including Chapa Chöki Senggé (Phya-pa Choskyi seng-ge, 1109–1169), who is often credited with giving definitive form to the system of debate logic overall. One of the scions of Sakya, famed as Sakya Paṇḍita (1182–1251), also received his early philosophical education at Sangpu, and then, after 1204, continued his studies with the Kashmiri master Śākyaśrībhadra, who arrived in Tibet accompanied by an entourage of Indian scholars. Sakya Paṇḍita was one of a number of Tibetan clerics who were inspired by this opportunity to learn directly from knowledgeable Indian teachers and he applied himself to mastering Sanskrit grammar and other aspects of Indic learning, a training that would lend a notably “Indological” perspective to his scholarship in later years. In his treatise, the Scholar's Gate (Mkhas-pa ‘jug-pa'i sgo), he sets forth a general program representing his scholarly ideals, detailing a trivium based on the mastery of composition, rhetoric, and debate. Page 5 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction Indian traditions of logic and epistemology figured prominently among Sakya Paṇḍita's major concerns. His key contributions included the final redaction of the Tibetan translation of Dharmakīrti's masterwork, the Pramāṇavārttika, and his own synthesis of Indian Buddhist epistemology, the Treasury of Epistemology (Tshad-ma rigs-gter), which enjoys a singularly extensive commentarial tradition. In other writings he commented at length on current doctrinal debates, voicing trenchant criticisms of various developments in Tibet. Among his foremost targets was the notion of sudden enlightenment, which he often characterized as the “Chinese Great Perfection” (rgya-nag rdzogs-chen). But he found many other issues to be problematic as well, including the claims of everyday language philosophy: Some sophists, conforming with master Candrakīrti, establish the relative as according with ordinary worldly conventions, and they say that, though the individual may not be a worldling, he nevertheless engages [in activity] conforming to the unanalyzed, unexamined engagement of a worldly mind. But if this be examined [in terms of] the logic and epistemology of conventional signs, it is [shown to be] unsound. For, to a mind that has not investigated them, there are no engagements involving [well-formed notions of] perception, inference, proof, elimination of the exclusion,9 and so on, and therefore the entire order of epistemic criteria and their opposites, that are explained in the seven treatises [of Dharmakīrti], are brought to decline. If you wish to follow those who thus affirm a worldly philosophy, then [you are already refuted], because among (p. 254) the objects of knowledge [you may admit] there are only entities and nonentities, and among the entities only inanimate matter and awareness, and every way of affirming inanimate matter has already been refuted, while, as for awareness, except for Mind Only nothing else is sound.10 In short, everyday conventions are inevitably unsustainable. To elaborate a sound approach to relative reality some system building must be countenanced, even though, like everyday discourse, this will ultimately give way under the assault of the Madhyamaka dialectic. The traditions of Sangpu and Sakya were largely responsible for the content, style, and method of subsequent Tibetan Buddhist scholasticism, which came to be characterized by close study of the major Indian Buddhist philosophers— Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Dignāga, and their commentators Candrakīrti, Vasubandhu, and Dharmakīrti, above all—rigorous adherence to the canons of argument, and precise and elegant use of language. Nevertheless, despite the resulting edification of exegetical systems in which the Buddha's teaching was subject to thoroughgoing rationalization, skeptical undercurrents still sometimes rose to the surface. Thus, the second Karmapa hierarch, Karma Pakshi (1206–1283), authored a catalogue of disputed opinions, in which he writes: It is held that saṃsāra has a beginning and end, and it is held that saṃsāra is without beginning or end. It is held that minds are of identical nature throughout all saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and it is held that all minds are of differing natures. It is held that sentient beings are newly produced, and it is held that sentient beings are not newly produced. … But whatever such tenets—whether good, bad, or mediocre—one might harbor are the causes of good, bad, or mediocre [conditions of] saṃsāra. They are devoid of the life-force of nirvāṇa. Therefore, whatever tenets, hankerings or particular philosophical positions you hold, they cause you to be buddhaless, and make you meet with saṃsāra. You should know in this way the whole mass of tenets, [each one] in particular.11 Buddha-Nature and the Luminosity of Mind The fourteenth century saw deepening interest in topics associated with the so-called “third turn of the doctrinal wheel”: Buddha-nature or the “matrix of the tathāgata” (tathāgatagarbha), the “consciousness of the ground-of-all” (ālayavijñāna), and the “luminosity of mind” (cittaprabhāsa) foremost among them. There can be little doubt that the effort to elaborate satisfactory intellectual frameworks for the investigation of these and related topics received its impetus in part from the spread of (p. 255) contemplative and yogic techniques, which made use of these same concepts in the practical context of spiritual disciplines. The presence of similar terminology in some branches of the Indian scholastic literature and in certain of the sūtras led a growing number of scholars to argue that the highest teachings of the Buddha were to be found in such texts and to elaborate an exegetical program in support of that position. The debates to which this gave rise became some of most hotly contested areas of Tibetan Buddhist thought, and among the richest in terms of the range of perspectives that emerged. A strong current of idealist influence may be detected in many authors, though most, who were well aware of the critiques of idealism on the part of the Indian Madhyamaka philosophers, steered clear of any commitment to the ultimate viability of metaphysical idealism. The efforts expended by Indian Buddhist writers in order to distinguish the teachings of ālayavijñāna and Page 6 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction tathāgatagarbha from various “doctrines of self” (ātmavāda) demonstrate that they were felt to be problematic almost from the time that they were first introduced. D. S. Ruegg has argued that interpretive approaches to them exhibited two broad tendencies: on the one hand there were those who sought to show that the doctrines in question were not literally intended, but regarded as deriving from a soteriological strategy tailored for the needs of those not yet ready to apprehend the genuine purport of the Buddha's teaching; and on the other there were those who maintained that they had been so intended, adding only that their proper relationship with other discourses on the absolute, especially the concept of emptiness, had to be understood correctly.12 It was this latter approach that was most obviously problematic, as it seemed to suggest that, once emptiness was comprehended, there was nevertheless something more to be known. The Third Karmapa Rangjung Dorjé (Karma-pa Rang-byung-rdo-rje, 1284–1339) was one of the most influential figures in connection with the developments with which we are concerned. His views are set forth in his celebrated treatise, Profound Inner Meaning (Zab mo nang don), summarized here in the remarks of Jamgön Kongtrü l (‘Jam-mgon Kongsprul, 1813–1899): That reality, or suchness, that is the ground of all saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, is referred to by many names, such as the “primordial, indestructible, great seminal point,” “Prajñāpāramitā,” “inborn gnosis,” and “ordinary cognition.” When it is stirred by the agitating vital energy of intellect, extraneous thoughts grow active. Owing to the appearance of dichotomized phenomena, one adopts the convention [of distinguishing between] the “gnosis of the ground-of-all” (ālayajñāna) and the “consciousness of the ground-of-all” (ālayavijñāna). Regarding the gnosis of the ground-of-all: it is buddha-nature, and in the Prajñāpāramitā and the Uttaratantraśāstra it is called the “nature of mind.” … That, moreover, is the homogeneous causal basis of nirvāṇa, and the dominant or appropriating causal basis of saṃsāra. And because it abides latently in the consciousness of the ground-of-all, in the manner of water and milk mixed (p. 256) together, those who are bewildered about the definitive significance do not recognize the gnosis of the ground-of-all, and maintain that there are only the six aggregates of consciousness; and even if they maintain there to be eight aggregates, they apprehend the ground-of-all as consciousness alone.13 Passages such as this, taken out of context, may lead one to suppose that Karmapa Rangjung Dorjé favored a substance ontology similar to that sometimes associated with idealist traditions. Other passages from the Karmapa's work, however, suggest that the fundamental ground, as he understood it, was something far more diaphanous than some sort of “mindstuff.” Indeed, in the verses in which he comes closest to characterizing it directly, he deliberately undercuts the tendency to substantialism: The causal basis is mind-as-such that is beginningless. Though it is without interruption and imbalance, Through its unimpeded play— Empty in essence, radiant in nature, unimpeded in features— It arises as anything whatsoever.14 And elsewhere he describes the significance of the ground in the altogether normal Madhyamaka terms of “uncompounded reality, surpassing thought, neither indicated by affirmations, nor refuted by negations.”15 The figure most often associated with controversial ontological speculations, however, was a junior contemporary of the Karmapa, Dölpopa Sherab Gyeltsen (Dol-po-pa Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan, 1292–1361), whose radical teaching asserted that emptiness was not the intrinsic nature of the absolute, which was in fact to be realized as a plenitude. It is thus only extrinsically empty, that is, empty of all that constitutes relative reality: The intention is to distinguish intrinsic emptiness (rang-stong) from extrinsic emptiness (gzhan-stong). As for those who do not do so and who say that all is only intrinsic emptiness, and that emptiness is not determined in terms of extrinsic emptiness, but that only intrinsic emptiness determines emptiness, and who maintain that all [the Buddha's] statements that ultimately there is existence, permanence, self, purity and truth are of provisional meaning, while all statements of nonexistence, impermanence, non-self, impurity and rottenness are of definitive meaning, and that the […] absolute, the ultimate body of reality, the essential body, natural luminosity, natural coemergence, natural great bliss, the (p. 257) naturally innate, natural nirvāṇa, the natural and spontaneously achieved maṇḍala, etc., as well as the natural abiding buddha-family with its many classifications, the ultimate buddha-nature endowed with many attributes, etc., are held with respect to reality but that reality is itself 16 Page 7 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction intrinsically empty—these and more are so many perverse views, coarse and bad views, without number.16 Dölpopa's thinking sparked a prolonged dispute and he was condemned in some circles as a tacit adherent of the Hindu teaching of the ātman. After the order to which he adhered, the Jonangpa, was suppressed by the Fifth Dalai Lama for political reasons, his writings were even banned, and many believed the suppression itself to be due to perceived heresy. Nevertheless, Dölpopa's insistence that the absolute could not be conceived as a mere nothingness had touched a sore nerve in Tibetan Buddhist thought, so that his teaching has been repeatedly revived, albeit with various modifications, down to the present time. His work had made clear the great difficulties involved in reconciling the teachings of the “third turn,” as described above, with those of the “second turn,” that is, the Perfection of Wisdom sūtras with their emphasis on emptiness. The noted editor of the canon, Butön Rinchendrup (Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub, 1292–1364), for instance, insisted against Dölpopa that the Buddha's definitive teachings were to be found just there, and not in the third turn. Their disagreement in matters of hermeneutics was not without significant philosophical ramifications. The great interest aroused by discussions of luminosity and Buddha-nature may be seen, too, in the work of Longchen Rabjampa (Klong-chen Rab-’byams-pa, 1308–1364), the greatest theoretician of the Nyingmapa teaching of the Great Perfection. Nowhere is this more evident than in his treatment of the “ground” (gzhi), the basis for the actualization of the “fruit” (‘bras-bu) that is buddhahood. In his conception of the emptiness of the absolute, he avoids Dölpopa's position, but is nevertheless similarly concerned not to embrace what he regards as the nihilistic tendencies of some Tibetan scholars: The primordially luminous reality that is unconditioned and spontaneously present, from the perspective of emptiness is in no way established as entity or characteristic, and so is in no way divided into saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, etc., for which reason it is free from all elaborated extremes, like space. From the perspective of lucency, being primordially endowed with the nature of body and gnosis, there is spontaneous presence and luminosity, like the maṇḍalas of sun and moon…. Nowadays, most of the teachers and all of the hermits alike make out the ground to be a bare vacuity, nothing at all, and this does not accord with the intention of the significance of the matrix. By experientially cultivating a ground that is nothing at all, the fruit of awakening as buddha, with all enlightened attributes, will not emerge, because the trio of ground, path, and result has been confounded. This is because the awakened buddha, unconditioned and possessing the spontaneously present enlightened attributes, is a disclosure of the (p. 258) result of a separation [of adventitious taints from the primordially pure ground]. … Here, on the other hand, it is the unconditioned and spontaneously present luminosity that is held to be the ground. From the inherent structure of such a ground, when not recognized as it is, there comes to be unawareness. Due to that, having errantly constructed the apprehending subject and apprehended object, one turns through the three realms.17 Tsongkhapa and His Critics The fourteenth century was in many respects the golden age of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy. Besides the figures just surveyed, a host of scholars, many of whom were educated in the Kadampa and Sakyapa traditions, contributed to the elaboration of every aspect of Buddhist thought, engendering lively controversies in most areas. It became customary for aspirants to move from one center to another, studying with different masters and honing their debating skills on the way. One of those who entered this world of itinerant scholars was Jé Tsongkhapa Lozang Drakpa (Rje Tsong-kha-pa Blobzang-grags-pa, 1357–1419). Originally from the far northeastern Tibetan province of Amdo (modern Qinghai), he came to central Tibet as a teenager and pursued rigorous studies with all the foremost luminaries of the various orders. His dedication to the Kadampa teaching of the progressive path of the bodhisattva was such that he and his successors often came to be thought of as “new Kadampa” (bka’-gdams gsar-ma) and his treatise the Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path (lam-rim chen-mo) is renowned as a definitive expression of this approach. From his Sakyapa teacher, Remdawa Zhönu Lodrö (Red-mda'-ba Gzhon-nu-blo-gros, 1349–1412), he acquired a special concern for the interpretation of the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika philosophy of the Indian master Candrakīrti, and it was in collaboration with Remdawa that he undertook his celebrated reform of the practice of the monastic code, or Vinaya. He thoroughly rejected the “extrinsic emptiness” doctrine of Dölpopa, regarding it as an extreme representative of persistent Tibetan misunderstandings of the Yogācāra philosophy of India, and, though accepting the authority of the PrāsaṅgikaMādhyamika, he developed his own distinctive interpretation thereof, that in many respects was not anticipated in the work of Remdawa or earlier thinkers. In contradistinction to Atiśa's reservations with regard to the utility of Buddhist Page 8 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction epistemology, for instance, Tsongkhapa sought to forge a viable synthesis between Dharmakīrti's approach to logical analysis and Candrakīrti's conception of the two truths. In Tsongkhapa's formulation of the latter, (p. 259) the absolute did not override conventional reality, but in the highest insight one arrived at a seamless integration of the two. As he himself expressed it: The Buddha's realization is not comprehended so long as the infallible conditionality of appearance and emptiness-without-assertion18 are both understood as separate. When [they arise] simultaneously, without alternation, so that in just perceiving the infallibility of conditioned origination all positions apprehending the ascertained object dissolve, at that time the analysis of viewpoints is concluded.19 In short, though drawing on earlier tradition, Tsongkhapa formulated a novel synthesis of the Indian Buddhist legacy, strongly emphasizing careful textual study and the demands of logic. After founding his own monastic center of Ganden in 1409, his followers gradually came to be established as a distinctive new order, which eventually adopted the name Gelukpa (Dge-lugs-pa) and to which the Dalai Lamas adhere. Tsongkhapa clearly perceived that the many contested topics in the Buddhism of his day could not be resolved by appealing to scriptural authority alone and wrote: A scriptural passage which merely says “this [text] is of this [level of meaning]” cannot establish that to be so, for, as there is in general no such invariable concomitance [relating statements of the form given to the levels of meaning to which they refer], the mere statement, “this [scripture] is of this [level of meaning]” cannot prove a particular instance of interpretable or definitive meaning.20 The would-be interpreter is therefore thrown back on the operations of natural reason if he is to cut through the conundrums posed by doctrinal texts. In connection with the Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika philosophy, in particular, there were principally eight such conundrums about which Tsongkhapa proposed new solutions. One of his chief disciples, Gyeltsab-jé (Rgyal-tshab-rje, 1364–1432), lists them as follows: (p. 260) In relation to the ground: (1–2) the denials of the ground-of-all and the self-marking particular,21 and (3) the affirmation of outer objects. In relation to the path: (4–5) the denials of the autonomous syllogism [i.e. direct proof] and reflexive awareness22 as the means for realizing just what is as it is, and (6–7) the affirmation of [a unique approach to the explanation of] how the two obscurations are established and of the realization, among pious attendants and self-centered buddhas, of the absence of the substantial nature of principles.23 And in relation to the result: (8) [a unique approach to the explanation of] how the Buddha cognizes the extension of things. Each of these topics is complex, and each occasioned extensive discussion. As we have seen aspects of the earlier treatment of the consciousness of the ground-of-all, some extracts of Gyeltsab-jé's comments on this may be taken as illustrative: Some hold that, if virtuous or unvirtuous deeds were to abide until the maturation of the result, then they would be permanent, so that [one who affirmed this] would fall into the extreme of eternalism, while if, on the other hand, the deed that was performed were to be annihilated in the second instant, then, because the annihilated cannot be an entity, it could not generate the mature result, wherefore completed deeds would vanish without trace. Some respond to this argument, saying that, even though the deed be annihilated, there is a ground for the successive emergence of the potency of the deed, which is considered to be the ground-of-all, while others affirm this to be the continuous stream of intellectual consciousness. And some respond by holding that, even though the deed be annihilated, the deed's acquisition remains in existence, while others hold there to be some other principle, called “inexhaustion,” that is like the seal witnessing a debt. Our own response is that, even without affirming any of those four propositions, beginning with the ground-of-all, it is implied that the completed deed will not vanish without trace. For even if those [four theories] are not affirmed, there is no contradiction involved if we assume that it is the annihilated deed that generates a result. If [our opponent counters,] saying, “Unproven! For what is annihilated cannot be an entity,” then [we respond that] that is unproven, for, though the annihilated cannot be an entity if you affirm the self-marking particular [to be the defining entity], we do not affirm Page 9 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction the self-marking particular even as a matter of convention, wherefore both annihilated and unannihilated deeds are equivalent with respect to whether or not they are entities.24 Tsongkhapa's solution to the problem of karma and causation, that the annihilation or destruction (zhig-pa) of a thing could act in a causal stream just as does an entity, may appear to be a rabbit pulled from the hat just in order to preserve his system. This, indeed, is how his critics perceived it and, together with many other of (p. 261) the distinctive aspects of his thought, it was universally rejected by those outside of the Gelukpa order he had founded. One of his sharpest opponents, the Sakyapa Gorampa Sonam Senggé (Go-rams-pa Bsod-nams seng-ge, 1429–1489), for instance, argued that it had the absurd entailment that “karma and its effects are different since at the level of conventions, they are set off from one another by an intermediary, namely ‘destruction qua real entity,’ just like two mountains that face each other are set off from one another by the river [that runs between them].”25 Much of the later history of Buddhist thought in Tibet, in fact, may be interpreted in terms of the continuing debate between Tsongkhapa's critics and defenders. Among the former, besides Gorampa, particularly notable philosophers include the Sakyapa master Serdok Paṇchen (Gser-mdog Paṇ-chen, 1428–1507) and the Eighth Karmapa hierarch Mikyö Dorjé (Mi-bskyod rdo-rje, 1507–1554), while, among the latter, Sera Jetsü n Chöki Gyeltsen (Se-ra rje-btsun Chos-kyi rgyal-mtshan, 1469–1546) is famed for his detailed defenses of Tsongkhapa's thinking against all three of the critics mentioned here. Later Developments Political turmoil in Central Tibet throughout much of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, in tandem with changing relations with Tibet's Mongol and Manchu neighbors, contributed to a remarkable shift in Tibet's cultural geography. Whereas Central Tibet had been, throughout the preceding centuries, the unrivaled heart of Tibetan religious life, new centers of intellectual and artistic activity now emerged in Tibet's far eastern regions of Amdo and Kham. In the latter, with the patronage of the rulers of Dergé (Sde-dge), Karmapa and Sakyapa masters contributed to the foundation of Tibet's greatest publishing house, the Dergé Printery, which made canonical and other works widely available. At the same time, the Gelukpa monasteries in Amdo for the first time also became important centers of learning in their own right, for instance at Kumbum (Sku-'bum), near Tsongkhapa's birthplace not far from the city of Xining (Qinghai Province), and Labrang (Bla-brang), founded by Jamyang Zhepa (‘Jam-dbyangs-bzhad-pa, 1648–1721) in southern Gansu. Scholars associated with these latter centers were often not ethnic Tibetans, and they frequently enjoyed the patronage of the Manchu court, which regarded Tibetan Buddhism as supplying a cultural lingua franca for the peoples of Inner Asia. The prominence of the east in this period is very well illustrated in the life and work of the great eighteenth-century master Changkya Rolpei Dorjé (1717–1786). Born among the Monguor of Qinghai, he was identified at the age of four as the (p. 262) incarnation of a famous lama and sent to Beijing to be educated at the court. There he became the fast friend of a Manchu prince, who later succeeded to the throne as the emperor Qianlong (reigned 1736–1799), the greatest of the Qing monarchs. Changkya rose with his boyhood friend to become the empire's preeminent Buddhist clergyman, as well as the confidante and biographer of the Seventh Dalai Lama Kelzang Gyatso (Bskal-bzang rgya-mtsho, 1708–1757). As Changkya's writings make clear, he adhered closely to Tsongkhapa's ideal of reason in seeking to resolve for himself the conflicted points of Buddhist teaching. One of Changkya's most esteemed and puzzling works, called the “Epistemological Path” (Tshad ma lam rim), records a dream-vision in which the relationship between the systematic study of Dharmakīrti's epistemology and progress on the Buddhist path is set out in general terms. Changkya, by placing his sketch of Buddhist rationalism in the context of a dream-vision, effectively annuls the gulf separating religious experience from reason. In his dream, a voice instructs him: You must reflect on your understanding of Dharmakīrti, intermingling your intellectual insight with your present experience: these varied pleasures and pains that occur to you now in the course of things are ephemeral occurrences. These pleasures and pains are experientially proven to occur on the basis of causes and conditions. … Thus you arrive at the thought that the Buddha's teachings of impermanence, suffering, and causality are established by reason and verified experientially….”26 Hence, for Changkya, the reasoned investigation of the teaching is to be intermingled with one's experiences; it must flow from, and in turn inform, one's engagement in the self-cultivation that characterizes the Buddhist path. The position of the non-Gelukpa orders was relatively stronger in Kham, where, during the nineteenth century, a dynamic Page 10 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction movement often characterized as “eclectic” or “universalist” (ris-med) sought to defuse the intense sectarianism that had often plagued Tibetan Buddhism. The encyclopedic writings of Jamyang Khyen-tse (‘Jam-dbyangs Mkhyen-brtse, 1820– 1892) and Jamgön Kongtrü l (1813–1899) became in some respects a new canon for the adherents of this movement. One of their disciples, Mipam Namgyel (Mi-pham rnam-rgyal, 1846–1912), also elaborated a new scholastic curriculum emphasizing the doctrinal standpoint of the Nyingmapa order, and engaged in wide-ranging debates with some of his Gelukpa contemporaries. Like his teachers, however, Mipam was convinced that the Tibetan Buddhist orders had more in common than sectarian polemicists were readily willing to admit. In a satirical essay, after noting some of the strengths and vulnerabilities of the four major orders, he concludes: The philosophical systems of the teaching in Tibet began at the time of the […] the religious king [Tri Songdetsen]. From that ancient and excellent legacy, all [the Tibetan orders] are alike in affirming the four seals that mark the transmitted precepts of the teaching.27 Above and beyond that, they all affirm the (p. 263) great unelaborate emptiness and, what's more, also affirm the vehicle of the tantras, [which teaches] the coalescence of bliss and emptiness. Because, then, in point of fact, their views and systems are similar, they are exceedingly close. In thinking about other factions, [consider that] among non-Buddhists and barbarians, with whom we share not even tokens and dress, and who are [as numerous] as nighttime stars, we, who are just a few, like daytime stars, are approaching the completion of the teaching. While something of it remains, those who have entered into the domains of the teaching with common purpose ought to cultivate the perception that they are most closely related. Because mutual enmity will bring ruination, regard one another as does a mother her child, or as does a beggar a treasure, and so cultivate a perception of joy.28 Though sectarian antagonisms have remained undiminished among some Tibetans, the ideal of tolerance espoused here has become widespread, and in our times is embraced by H. H. the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. Bibliography and Suggested Readings (2007) Vaste sphère de profusion, Klong-chen rab-’byams (Tibet, 1308–1364), sa vie, son œuvre, sa doctrine. Orientalia Analecta Lovaniensa 167. Leiden: Peeters. ARGUILLÈRE, S. CABEZÓN, JOSE IGNACIO, and GESHE LOBSANG DARGYAY. (2007) Freedom from Extremes: Gorampa's “Distinguishing the Views” and the Polemics of Emptiness. Boston, MA: Wisdom. (1952) Le concile de Lhasa: une controverse sur le quiétisme entre bouddhistes de l'Inde et de la Chine au VIIIe siècle de l'ère chrétienne. Bibliothèque de l'Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, Volume VII. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale de France. DEMIÉVILLE, P. DREYFUS, GEORGES B. J. (2003) The Sound of Two Hands Clapping: The Education of a Tibetan Buddhist Monk. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press. DUDJOM RINPOCHE, JIKDREL YESHE DORJE. (1991) The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History, translated by Gyurme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein. Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications (2nd ed. 2002). (2007) The Dharma's Gatekeepers: Sakya Paṇḍita on Buddhist Scholarship in Tibet. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. GOLD, J. C. GOLDFIELD, A., J. Levinson, et al. (trans.). (2006) The Moon of Wisdom: Chapter Six of Chandrakīrti's Entering the Middle Way with Commentary from the Eighth Karmapa. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. GUENTHER, HERBERT V. Shambhala. (1989) From Reductionism to Creativity: Rdzogs-chen and the New Sciences of Mind. Boston, MA: (2004) Maps of the Profound: Jam-yang-shay-ba's Great Exposition of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist Views on the Nature of Reality. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. HOPKINS, J. JACKSON, DAVID. (1987) The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III): Sa-skya Paṇḍita on Indian and Tibetan Tradition of Page 11 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction Pramāṇa and Philosophical Debate. 2 vols. Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 17, 1–2. Vienna: Arbeitskreis fü r Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien. (2001) Reason's Traces: Identity and Interpretation in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist Thought. Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications. KAPSTEIN, M. T. KARMA PHUNTSHO. (2005) Mipham's Dialectics and the Debates on Emptiness. London: Routledge. KLEIN, A. C., and GESHE TENZIN WANGYAL RINPOCHE. (2006) Unbounded Wholeness: Dzogchen, Bon, and the Logic of the Nonconceptual. New York: Oxford University Press. KUIJP, LEONARD W. J. VAN DER. Steiner Verlag. (1983) Contributions to the Development of Tibetan Buddhist Epistemology. Wiesbaden: Franz LOPEZ, D. S., JR. (2006) The Madman's Middle Way: Reflections on Reality of the Tibetan Monk Gendun Chopel. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. (1997) Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. MAKRANSKY, JOHN J. MATHES, KLAUS-DIETER. (2007) A Direct Path to the Buddha Within: Gö Lotsāwa's Mahāmudrā Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāga. Boston, MA: Wisdom. and JAY GARFIELD. (2006) Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Nāgārjuna's Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. New York: Oxford University Press. NGAWANG SAMTEN PETTIT, JOHN. (1999) Mipham's Beacon of Certainty. Boston, MA: Wisdom Publications. RUEGG, DAVID SEYFORT. (1989) Buddha-nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective: On the Transmission and Reception of Buddhism in India and Tibet. London: School of Oriental and African Studies. STEARNS, CYRUS. (1999) Buddha from Dolpo. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. THUPTEN, JINPA . (2002) Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy: Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle Way. London: Routledge Curzon. THURMAN, R. A. F. (1984) Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. TSONG-KHA-PA . (2001–2004) The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment, translated by Joshua Cutler et al. 3 vols. Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion. WILLIAMS, PAUL . (1998) The Reflexive Nature of Awareness: A Tibetan Madhyamaka Defence. Surrey, England: Curzon. Notes: (1.) Birth from an egg, from the womb, due to heat and moisture, or miraculous birth. (2.) Following the text as established in Hugh Richardson, “The First Tibetan Chos-'byung,” in his High Peaks, Pure Earth: Collected Writings on Tibetan History and Culture, ed. Michael Aris (London: Serindia), pp. 89–99. Unless otherwise stated, this and all translations in the present chapter are my own. (3.) The “rabbit's horn” is a standard example, in Indian philosophy, of an empirical impossibility, the “barren woman's son” of a logical contradiction. (4.) Ye-shes-sde, Lta ba'i khyad par. Archaic version, ms. Pelliot Tibetain 814, reproduced in Macdonald and Imaeda, Choix de documents tibetains (Paris: Bibliotheque Nationale, 1978), vol. 1, plates 210–225. (5.) Sba-bzhed ces-bya-ba-las Sba Gsal-snang-gi bzhed-pa bzhugs (Beijing: Nationalities Press, 1980), pp. 64–76. Page 12 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction (6.) Gal mdo (Dolanji: Tibetan Bonpo Monastic Centre, 1972), p. 167.2ff. (7.) Atiśa, Bodhipathapradīpa, verses 3–5. (8.) Both this and the preceding quotation are from Atiśa, Satyadvayāvatāra. The affective obscuration (Skt. kleśāvaraṇa) includes all dispositions underlying the emotions that bind us to worldly patterns; the cognitive obscuration (jñeyāvaraṇa) the inability to penetrate to a full realization of the true nature of things. (9.) The elimination of the exclusion (Skt. anyāpoha) was the centerpiece of the Buddhist theory of meaning, developed by Dignāga. According to this theory, which accords with aspects of modern semantics, the content of a term or concept is a function of its range of exclusion. That is, “cow,” which excludes all things that are not cows, is conceptually richer than “living being.” (10.) Sa-skya Paṇḍita Kun-dga'-rgyal-mtshan, Tshad ma rigs gter (Beijing: Nationalities Press, 1989), pp. 43–60. (11.) ‘Dod pa rgya mtsho mtha’ yas, in Karma Rang-byung-rdo-rje, Rgya mtsho mtha' yas skor (Gangtok, 1978), vol. 1, pp. 625–626. (12.) Refer to Ruegg 1989. (13.) Kong-sprul Yon-tan rgya-mtsho, Rnal ‘byor bla na med pa'i rgyud sde rgya mtsho'i snying po bsdus pa zab mo nang gi don nyung ngu'i tshig gis rnam par ‘grol ba zab don snang byed, in Bka’ brgyud pa'i gsung rab pod nyi shu pa: thabs grol (Xining: Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 2001), pp. 69–70. (14.) Karma Rang-byung rdo-rje, Zab mo nang gi don zhes bya ba'i gzhung, in Bka' brgyud pa'i gsung rab pod nyi shu pa: thabs grol, pp. 3–4. (15.) Nges don phyag rgya chen po'i smon lam, op. cit., p. 892. (16.) The ‘Dzam-thang Edition of the Collected Works of Kun-mkhyen Dol-po-pa Shes-rab-rgyal-mtshan (New Delhi: Shedrup Books and Konchhog Lhadrepa, 1992/1993), vol. 5, pp. 335–343. (17.) Kloṅ-chen Rab-’byams-pa Dri-med-'od-zer, Sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan, in Miscellaneous writings (Gsuṅ thor bu) of Kun-mkhyen Klon-chen-pa Dri- med-'od-zer (Delhi: Sanje Dorje, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 377–392. (18.) In adopting this expression, Tsong-kha-pa emphasizes his commitment to the Prāsaṅgika tradition of Candrakīrti, over and against the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika, associated with such figures as Bhāvaviveka and Śāntarakṣita, for whom emptiness is asserted in the positive conclusion of a formal demonstration. (19.) Rje Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa, Lam gyi gtso bo rnam gsum, in Rje tsong kha pa chen po'i bka' ‘bum thor bu (Xining: Mtsho sngon mi rigs dpe skrun khang, 1987), pp. 344–346. (20.) Rje Tsong-kha-pa Blo-bzang-grags-pa, Drang nges legs bshad snying po, Sarnath ed., p. 3. (21.) In the system of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the “self-marking particular” (svalakṣaṇa) is the discrete phenomenon that bears those qualities that establish its unique identity for a perceiver who is not subject to error. This, the elementary building block of their ontology, was accepted by many Tibetan thinkers as conventionally true, even in Madhyamaka contexts, but by Tsongkhapa to be not even conventionally acceptable for the Prāsaṅgika. (22.) For Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, reflexivity or apperception (svasaṃvittiḥ) was the elementary unit of consciousness, paralleling, in their system, the self-marking particular as the minimal object. Tsongkhapa, true to his own principles, in rejecting one, rejected equally the other. (23.) The more prevalent view was that śrāvaka-s and pratyekabuddha-s, who exemplified the highest goals of the “lesser vehicle” (hīnayāna), realized the insubstantiality (“selflessness”) of persons, but not of the principles (dharma) upon which persons supervene. (24.) This and the preceding quotation from Rgyal-tshab-rje Dar-ma rin-chen, Dbu ma rtsa ba'i dka’ gnad chen po brgyad kyi brjed byang, in Dbu ma'i lta khrid phyogs bsdebs (Sarnath: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, 1985), pp. 154–187. Page 13 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015 Buddhist Thought in Tibet: an Historical Introduction (25.) Cabezón and Dargyay 2007, 137. (26.) Tshad ma lam rim, in Lcang skya rol pa'i rdo rje'i rnam thar, pp. 635–638. (27.) The four seals of the teaching are that conditioned entities are impermanent; that corruptible things involve suffering; that no entity is or possesses a substantial self; and that nirvāṇa is peace. (28.) Mi-pham, Gzhan stong khas len seng ge'i nga ro, Ser-lo dgon-pa (Nepal) xylographic ed. Matthew T. Kapstein Matthew T. Kapstein is Director of Tibetan Studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Paris) and Numata Visiting Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Chicago. His recent books include The Tibetans (Oxford, 2006), an edited volume entitled Buddhism Between Tibet and China (Boston, 2009), and a translation of a Sanskrit philosophical allegory, The Rise of Wisdom Moon (New York, 2009). Page 14 of 14 PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 13 November 2015