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DYNAMIC LIBERATION IN YOGÄCÄRA BUDDHISM

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DYNAMIC LIBERATIOIN YOGÄCÄRA BUDDHISM


by Alan Sponberg


I. Introduction

Why did Šäkyamuni Buddha, having realized liberation from the world, choose to give up the seclusion of his enlightenment and go forth again into that same world? Why did he take on the task of preaching the content of his realization to all the beings still ensnared in the net of death and re-birth? The early Buddhists seem to have had some difficulty accounting for the apparent paradox in this decision. In the Ariyapariyesana-sutta of the Majjhima-nikäya, one of the earliest accounts of the Buddha's enlightenment, we find the reflections attributed to Šãkyamuni: Then I thought, now I have gained the doctrine, profound, hard to perceive, hard to know, tranquil, transcendent, beyond the sphere of reasoning, subtle, to be known by the wise

But if I were to teach the Doctrine, and others did not understand it, it would be a weariness to me, a vexation. Then also there naturally occurred to me these verses unheard before:

Through painful striving have I gained it,

Away with now proclaiming it; By those beset with lust and hate Not easily is this Doctrine learnt.

Fhis Doctrine, fine, against the stream,

Subtle, profound, and hard to see, They Will not see it, lust-inflamed,

Beneath the mass of darkness veiled.

Thus, monks, as I reflected, my mind turned to inaction, not to teaching the Doctrine. Then Brahmü Sahampati


knowing the deliberation of my mind thought, "verily the world is being destroyed, verilv the world is going to destruction, in that the mind of the Tathägata, the arahat, the fully enlightened, turns to inaction and not to teaching the Doctrine." Then Brahma Sahampati, iust as a strong man rnight stretch out his bent arm, or bend his stretched-out arm, so did he disappear from the Brahma-world and appear before me. And arranging his upper robe on one shoulder he bent down his clasped hands to me and said, "may' the reverend Lord teach the Doctrine, may the Sugata teach the Doctrine

What was it then that finally overcame Säkyamuni's initial hesitation? In this and other versions of the incident we are told that the fateful decision was made only at the behest of the god Brahma, who, in the interest of the beings, descended from his Brahma Heaven to intercede in a deus ex machina manner. This explanation was apparently not adequate for some however. With the Mahäyãna innovation that made explicit the integral link between compassion and wisdom,

an additional means of resolving this puzzling question was provided. The enlightenment realized by Säkyamuni was seen to comprise both Great Wisdom (mahäPrajñä) and Great Compassion (mahäkaru@ä); whereupon his preaching career became perfectly consistent with the very nature of his enlightenment. It would thus have been inconceivable—with or without the intercession of Brahmä—for Šäkyamuni not to have sought the liberation of other beings as well. This solution was one part of a broader universalistic tendency in Mahäyäna Buddhism, a development which raised additional problems that were to become the focus of further soteriological innovations in the later Mädhyamika and Yogãcãra schools. Once the ideal of universal salvation through the agency of enlightened Buddhas and


bodhisattvas was asserted, the problem remained of accounting—both theoretically and practically—for the relationship between the supramundane and the mundane, between the Absolute and the individual. How can the transcendental interact with the worldly? How is the bodhisattva to function at the same time in two mutually exclusive realms? In what way does the bodhisattva after realizing the transpersonal Absolute still retain some individual personality active in the relative world for the salvation of other beings?


The two principle schools of Mahäyäna Buddhism each sought to work out answers to these basic questions, answers that are probably best seen as complementary rather than contradictory. Both schools shared a good deal of common ground and certainly a common basic problematic. It is in this context that the doctrinal differences between the two schools must be examined. The thesis upon which the present article hopes to shed some light can be stated simply as the view that Mãdhyamika and Yogãcära represent two different, yet parallel, approaches to the same set of problems: Mädhyamika focusing its attention primarily on the logical and philosophical issues involved and Yogäcära concerning itself more with the practical and psychological issues.


The significance of this common problematic and of the subsequent differences between the two schools can most clearly be seen in the contrast in the formulations of the nirvana doctrine in the two schools. Unfortunately, this has not as yet been fully appreciated. While a great deal has been written in the West on the Mãdhyamika conception of nirväqa, very little has been said about the corresponding Yogãcära doctrines of unfixed nirvana (aPrati§thita-nirvãpa) and non-discriminating cognition (nimikalPaka-jñäna), a rather striking reflection of the current state of Yogäcära studies. 2 We are still a long way from a comprehensive account of the place of Yogãcära in Buddhist thought; certainly one necessary step is a preliminary examination of these two key doctrines.


Il. Soteriological Innovation in Yogãcära Buddhism


It is these two doctrines that represent the major soteriological innovation of Classical Yogãcãra Buddhism: 6 a (Ivnamic conception of liberation formulated to bridge, in practice, the apparent gap between the individual and the Absolute. The Yogäcãrins felt the need for a formulation of n Irvãna that would shed light on the practical aspects of the psychological transition in the individual to the

Absolute. The doctrine of unfixed nirvana (aPrati§thila-nirvãna) expressed the Yogäcära understanding of liberation as a state of enlightenment in which the practitioner is not permanently established in either the Absolute or the mundane human realm, and the concomitant doctrine of intuitive or non-discriminating cognition (nirvikalPaka-jñäna) elucidates the special cognitive process involved in that dynarnic state of liberation.


The Mahãyäna-samgraha as a Source


The best primary source for a preliminary study of these two doctrines is the Mahäyäna-samgraha of Asañga,4 best because it provides an introduction to the most important features of the two that is both detailed and systematic. Reference to the two terms can be found, at least implicitly, in a number of other Yogäcära works: in some—e.g., the Abhisamayälañkära, the Ratnagotravibhäga, the Sandhinirmocana-sütra and the Lañkävatärasütra—that most likely predate the

Mahãyäna-sarpgraha, and also in others—e.g., the Mahäyäna-süträlahkära, the Madhyäntavibhäga, the Trin§ikä and the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun—that are more closely contemporaneous with, or of later composition than, the Mahäyäna-smpgraha.5 For the most part however, these other references are either very cursory or already presuppose a basic familiarity with the doctrines. Thus, as is generally the case with Yogäcära studies, one is well advised to begin with the Mahäyäna-samgraha.

Before considering the two doctrines individually it will be useful to review the organization of the Yogäcära system presented in the Mahäyäna-sarpgraha. This will give us some idea of the place and the significance of these two doctrines in the broader context of Yogäcära soteriology. The arrangement of the ten chapters of this work provides us with a concise outline of classic Yogäcära thought. Extrapolating from the list of topics in the introduction and from the content of each chapter we can devise the following summary:

l. The Base of the Knowable" (jñeyäšraya), i.e., the store-cognition (älaya-ujñäna), eighth of the eight modes of mental activity and the basis for that which can be known.

11. The Characteristics of the Knowable (jñeyalakýl?.ža), i.e., the three natures—the Imaginary, the Dependent, and the Absolute—that characterize that which can be known.

111. l'he Entrance to the Characteristics of the Knowable (jñeyalakèffl.ža-Prave.<a), i.e., conceptualizationonly-ness (Z'ljña ti-mälratä), the philosophic principÍe asserting t užt the world, as we experience it, is nothing but conceptualization.

IV. The Cause and the Fruit of the Entrance (tatPravešahetuPhala), i.e., the six virtues or perfections (Päramitä) of the bodhisattva.

V. The Various Degrees of Cultivation of the Cause and Fruit of that Entrance (taddhetuphalabhävanäPrabheda), i.e., the ten lands or stages (dašabhümi) of the bodhisattva.

VI. The Training of Superior Morality (adhišilam šik§ä), i.e., the bodhisattva discipline (samãdhi) involved in the above cultivation.

VI I. The Training of Superior Thought (adhicittarn šiksä), i.e., the various meditative trances or concentrations (samädhi) involved in the cultivation.

VI Il. The Training of Superior Wisdom (adhiPrajñaez šik4ã), i.e., the intuitive or non-discriminating cognition (nirvikalPaka-]ñäna) involved in the culti- vation.


I X. The Severing which constitutes the Fruit (phalaPrahäna), i.e., the unfixed (aPrati§thita) nirvär.la of the bodhisattva characterized by a basic revolution (äšrayaParävrtti) in which he rejects all defilements (samkleša) and yet does not abandon the mundane realm subject to death and re-birth (samsära). X. Cognition of the Fruit (Phalajñäna), i.e., the triple body (trikäya) of the Buddha.


Thus, Chapters I and Il discuss what is to be known and how we are to know it; Chapters Ill, IV and V treat the entrance to and the progression of the practice; Chapters VI, VI I, V Ill discuss the types of training involved in the practice; while Chapter IX treats the decisive turning-point that is the fruit of the above activity, and Chapter X discusses the various modes in which the fruit is experienced or known. The important chapters for the present study are the IXth, which is completely devoted to the Yogäcära notion of liberation, i.e., unfixed nirvana, and the VI 11th, which presents the special form of cognition that leads to and constitutes that liberation.


The pivotal position of these two doctrines in the system is apparent from the place of their respective chapters in the above outline. It is also important to note the concomitant relationship between the two. Asvabhäva indicates this in his Upanibandhana; commenting on the transition in the Mahäyänasamgraha from Chapter VI Il, on non-discriminating cognition, to Chapter I X, on the severing brought about in unfixed nirvana, he says, "The non-discriminating cognition

[topic of Chapter VI Il] is able to counter everything that is to be countered [i.e., it is the antidote (pratipaksa) for every instance of opposition (vipahsa)l. It necessarily implies the severing [that constitutes nirväqa], and so the author [Asañga] immediately continues [in Chapter I X] to discuss the distinctions of this severance."7


Asañga's presentation in the Mahäyäna-sarwaha is thus sequential. The present analysis will employ a more heuristic approach, beginning with a discussion of the features of unfixed nirvãQa and then proceeding to consider the particular, if not to say peculiar, type of cognition that leads up to and constitutes it. It will remain necessary to bear in mind, throughout, the connection between the two, the state of liberation and the type of cognition that makes it possible. APratÇ(hita-nirvña


What then is meant by the unfixed liberation of the Yogäcärins, and what is the dynamic element of this doctrine? Apratis!hita is best understood as referring to a nirvana that is not permanently established in, or bound to, any one realm or sphere of activity. 9 The implicit contrast is to the nirvana of the érävakas and pratyeka-buddhas who are criticized in several early Mahäyäna works it ) for remaining permanently established or fixed (prati§thita) in the

transcendent state of nirvãna-without-remainder (niruPadhiše§a-nirvãpa), a notion of liberation that was the ideal of the earlier Äbhidhärmikas, who saw in it the final extinction of both mental and physical afflictions. The dynamic notion of aprati§thitanirväna gradually developed as the later Yogãcärin Äbhidhärmikas came to reject the earlier view as inconsistent with the Mahãyäna ideal of the salvation of all beings."


While this doctrine of unfixed nirvana is mentioned in the Mahäyänasutrãlañkära, its soteriological implications are developed much more fully in the Mahäyäna-sarpgraha. In Chapter IX of the latter work, Asañga introduces the doctrine in the context of his discussion of the severing of all obstacles (ävararya) 12 that comes as the fruit of the three types of training discussed in Chapters VI, VI I and VI Il. He then goes on to present the following concise definition:


This severing is the unfixed nirvana of the bodhisattva. It has as its characteristic (lak§ana) the revolution of the dual base in which one relinquishes all defilements, but does not abandon the world of death and rebirth (sarpsära). l


Thus the essential features of this Yogãcära notion of liberation are that it is a radical reorientation of the base of all cognition, and that it allows the bodhisattva to enjoy emancipation from all defilements (samkle§a) without losing any salvific efficacy in the realm of beings who have not yet achieved liberation. This is the dynamic aspect, the aspect that resolves, at least at the level of practice, the apparent duality of Absolute and individual, of nirvana and samsära.


Asañga continues in the Mahäyäna-satpgraha to gloss each of the key terms in the above definition:


The world of death and re-birth (samsãra) is the defiled component of the dependent nature (Paratantrasvabhãvasamklešabhãga), [i.e., the Imaginary]. Nirvär.ra is the pure component of the dependent nature1 4 (Paratantrasvabhävavyavadänabhäga), [i.e., the Absolute].



The dual base (ãšraya) is the dependent nature with both components combined. The revolution (Parävrtti) takes place when, on the arising of the dependent nature's antidote (PratiPak4a) one rejects the defiled component and redeems the pure component.


In his commentary to this passage, Asvabhäva develops two important connections. First, he points out that the antidote (pratipakya) that initiates the revolution is the non-discriminating cognition (nirvikalPaka-jñäna). l " He then goes on to illustrate the role of the two key Mahayana virtues, wisdom (Prapîä) and compassion (karuwä), in this process:


he bodhisattva dwells in this revolution of the base as if in an immaterial realm (ärüPyadhätu). On the one hand—with respect to his own personal interests (svakärtham)—he is fully endowed with superior wisdom (adhiprajñä) and is thus not subject to the afflictions (kleša); while on the other hand—with respect to the interests of other beings (Parärtham)—he is fulfy endowed with great compassion (mahäkaru.nä) and thus never ceases to dwell in the world of death and re-birth (samsãra).


This dynamic interaction of prajñã and karunã is an important correlative feature of the unfixed nirvana. It is clarified further in a helpful passage from the Ch'eng-wei-shih-lun discussing four types of nirvana, the last of which is the aPrati§thita-nirväna:


The fourth is unfixed nirväna: It is Thus-ness (tathatä) free from the obstruction blocking what is to be known (jñeyävaraea); it is always assisted by great compassion (mahãkarupä) and great wisdom (mahäPrajñä). Because of this the bodhisattva does not remain fixed in either samsära or nirvär.la•, in working for the weal of all beings, though he actively employs [his compassion and wisdom] until the end of time, he nonetheless remains forever quiescent. Hence it is called nirvãl)a.


The fact that this nirvana is free from the jñeyävarapa indicates that it is the prerogative of fully enlightened bodhisattvas and not of the arhats, who succeed in severing only the obstacle of the defilements, or passions (kle§ävaratza).


Having thus resolved the problems of formulating a nirväna doctrine that bridged the gap between Absolute enlightenment and continued individual activity, and that allowed full play of both the Mahäyäna ideals of wisdom and compassion, the Yogãcärins felt it necessary to say something more about the special kind of cognition in which one realizes this dynamic state of liberation. Along with the Mädhyamikas, they recognized that the cause of our defilement and affliction is the discriminating and conceptualizing cognition by which we constitute our world and participate in it. Concerned primarily' with the practical psychology of liberation, they then asked what manner of awareness or cognition would allow the bodhisattva to free himself of this world-constructing involvement and yet to continue to work actively for the weal of the beings still ensnared in that world. The doctrine of nirvikalPaka-jñãna is the Yogãcärin's attempt to answer this question.


NirvikalPaka-jñäna


Vikalpa, for the Buddhists, is the discrimination or conceptualization by which we perceive and function in the world and, correspondingly, by which we are inextricably bound to this world, with its inevitable frustration and woe. It is a negative activity, always with the implicit connotation of false discrimination or vain imagining, because it is what prevents us from realizing the true Thus-ness of all things, the Absolute. NirvakalPaka-jñäna is, for the Yogäcãrins, the antidote to this world-constructing activity. When rendered literally as 'nondiscriminating cognition or

awareness,119 the negative aspect of its meaning is readily apparent: it is a kind of cognition or awareness that is free of the discrimination that binds us to the world of death and re-birth. A good deal more than a simple lack-of-something is implied by the term, however. In this cognition there is not only the lack of discrimination; there is also a more positive aspect: the direct and intuitive cognition of the Absolute. This is an essential feature and suggests some freer translation such as 'intuitive wisdom,'20


While correct in the broadest sense, this rendering does not have the disadvantage of obscuring the somewhat paradoxical aspect that becomes apparent in the Sanskrit term when we reach the fully developed form of nirvikalPaka-jñäna, the mode which allows participation in both nirvana and samsära, in the supramundane Absolute and in the mundane realm of discrimination. In this mode of nirvikalPaka-jñäna we shall find a nondiscriminating cognition that, subsequent to enlightenment, is still able to function in the world of discrimination, the characteristic that allows the crucial dynamic aspect of unfixed

nirväl)a. This interpenetration of the apparent duality of nirvana and samsãra must also be an essential feature of the non-discriminating cognition. Thus, for the Yogäcärins, nimikalPaka-jñãna has at once a negative, a positive, and a dynamic connotation: negative, in that it is non-discriminating cognition; positive, in that it is intuitive wisdom; and dynamic, in that it gives access to the Absolute without yielding efficacy in the relative. A survey of the Mahãyäna-sauzgraha chapter that is devoted to the nirvikalPaka-jñäna21 will make these three features more clear. There we find that there are three varieties or degrees of non-discriminating cognition:


l . preliminary non-discriminating cognition (Präyogika-nirvikalPaka-jñãna).

2. fundamental non-discriminating cognition (müla-"), and

3. subsequently-acquired non-discriminating cognition (pt§thalabdha-U).22

The order of the three degrees or modes is progressive, and the text discusses first the preliminary or preparatory stage of non-discriminating cognition, the stage which according to Vasubandhu's commentary is also known as conjectural wisdom vitarka/Paritarka?-Prajñä) or investigative wisdom (ParVasubandhu says also that this first stage arises by virtue of faith (šraddhã) and resolute conviction (adhimukti), which is to say that initially a bodhisattva in training

hears from others about the principle of being free from false discrimination (nirvikalPa-naya); though he is as yet unable to realize it for himself, hearing of it does produce a resolute conviction on the basis of which he proceeds to investigate the principle. 24 By virtue of that investigation, non-discriminating cognition does eventually arise, and thus the first stage is said to be the cause (hetu) of the second.25


It is with the second stage that we are dealing with nirvikalPaka-jñãna proper, and hence it is known as the root or fun. damental stage of non-discriminating cognition. Vasubandhu adds that it is also known as introspective wisdom (Pratyätmavedyaprajñä) or the wisdom of realization (sãk§ätkära- ).26 It is with this cognition that one realizes the Absolute, and we are in fact told that it is identical (sama) with Thus-ness (tathatä). 27 With the fundamental cognition, one is thus liberated from all obstacles (ãvaraqa); one becomes fully accomplished and perfected. 28

This being the case, why did the Yogäcãrins add yet a third stage? In the second, fundamental stage we can see both the negative, non-discriminating aspect and the positive, intuitiveidentification-with-Thus-ness aspect; the third essential feature, however, is still undeveloped.

It is in the third or subsequently-acquired (Prê(ha-labdha) stage of non-discriminating cognition that we again see the characteristic Yogäcãra innovation of an explicitly dynamic notion of liberation. This third stage is 'subsequently-acquired' in that it is the result or fruit of the fundamental cognition. It is also known as the active or practical wisdom : kriyã?prajñä) or as the sustaining wisdom (samdhärapa-0). 29 In his commentary on the Mahãyäna-sarpgraha passage discussing the advantage of the three degrees, Vasubandhu tells us:


By virtue of the power of this [subsequently acquired] cogmtion of the bodhisattvas, out of consideration tor the weal of all sentient beings, decide to be reborn in the world. When they are reborn, however, they are no longer subject to defilement by worldly contingencies, viz., the eight lokadharmas: gain (lãbha), loss (aläbha), praise (Prašat?usä), censure (nindä), honor (yašas), dishonor (ayašas), frustration (duhkha) and happiness (sukha). Because this [subsequently-acquired] cognition is born of the [fundamental] non-discriminating cognition, it is also called non-discriminating.


hat last statement raises a provocative question. If the subsequently-acquired cognition allows the bodhisattva to be active in the world, is it still non-discriminating (nirvikalpaka)? Just how does non-discriminating awareness function effectively in the world of discrimination? This is a variation of the central soteriological issue for the Yogãcärins. As Vasubandhu himself puts it, "If non-discriminating cognition thus succeeds in realizing Buddha-hood, having

become free of effort (äbhoga) and mental discrimination (manasikäravikalPa), how then does it accomplish the matter of bringing benefit and pleasure to the beings? "31 The Yogäcära masters had no doubt that this can in practice be done, that non-discriminating cognition can function actively in the world of discrimination without being discriminating; they recognized, however, that it does seem paradoxical—at least to the discriminating mind. To side-step the apparent paradox inherent in the terminology, they employed a metaphorical explanation which Asañga expresses in one concise verse:


Just as the precious gem32 and the divine musical instrument"

Perform their respective roles without any conscious thought,34

So are all the various activities of the Buddha performed,

Also thus, quite free of any conscious thought.30

In explanation Vasubandhu says:


The metaphors of the precious gem and the divine musical instrument in this verse demonstrate that just as the wishfulfilling gem, though devoid of discrimination, is still capable ot fulfilling whatever it is that beings desire, and moreover that just as the divine musical instrument, without anyone to play it, produces all varieties of sound in accord with the aspirations of the beings in its proximity, just so you should know that the non-discriminating cognition of the buddhas and bodhisattvas, while free ot discrimination, is nonetheless able to carry out all sorts of activity.3b


To this Asvabhäva adds:

The wish-fulfilling gem and the divine musical instrument do not have the thought, "I shall now radiate brilliancy!" or "I shall now give forth sound!" because they are both without any conscious thought; nevertheless, by the power of the meritorious actions and aspirations of the beings in their proximity and without waiting to be played [etc.], they emit all sorts of radiance and give forth all varieties of sound. You should know the non-discriminating cognition of the buddhas and bodhisattvas to be just like this: though completely free of discrimination and without making anv effort, they are nonetheless capable of producing all varieties of benefit and service in accord with the merit and aspirations of the beings converted by them.37


This is a crucial passage, for it was this analogy that conveyed fòr the Yogäcärins the inner workings of the special type of cognitive activity' that made their notion of dynamic or unfixed nirvana viable. It is their explanation of how non-discriminating cognition can, at the highest level, be active within discrimination.

These then are the three degrees of non-discriminating cognition as presented in the Mahãyãna-samgraha. illustrate the differences between them, and the sequence within, Asañga summarizes the three in a series of brief verses:


l . Like a mute seeking to comprehend some obiect, Like a mute who has succeeded in comprehending the

object,

Like a non-mute who has comprehended the object, The three cognitions are analogous to these.

2. Like a fool, seeking to comprehend some object,

Like a fool who has succeeded in comprehending the obiect,

Like a non-fool who has comprehended the object, rhe three39 cognitions are analogous to these.


3. Like the five modes of sensory perception, seeking to apprehend an object,

Like the five when they have succeeded in apprehending the object,

Like manas'() when it has comprehended the object, The three cognitions are analogous to these.

4. Like one who has not yet understood a treatise

But seeks to understand it, eventually com rehending t now the letter of] the doctrine and finally] the meaning,

This sequence IS a metaphor for the three cognitions: Thus should you know the preliminary, etc. 4 1

According to Asvabhäva's commentary, the preliminary stage of non-discriminating cognition is like a mute or a fool seeking to comprehend some object, because they can neither comprehend it nor talk about it—the mute lacking the verbal ability and the fool lacking the conceptual ability. Fundamental cognition is like the case of a mute or fool who has managed to comprehend the object but is still unable to communicate his comprehension. Finally, the subsequently-acquired cognition is like one with full verbal and conceptual powers who has comprehended the object and can also communicate his understanding.42


Regarding the third verse, he explains that even when one has apprehended an object by means of the five modes of sensory perception one nonetheless lacks the conceptualization or discrimination (vikalpa) which is added by the sixth or coordinating mode of perception called mano-vijñãna.

In Vasubandhu's explanation of the fourth verse he comments that first one seeks to understand the treatise, then one comes to understand the words; and finally one understands the words and the meaning. In the same way one progresses through the three cognitions.44

The analogies employed in these four verses reiterate and summarize the most basic theme involved in the doctrine of the three degrees of non-discriminating cognition: that understanding must be coupled with activity, that wisdom must include compassion. The subsequently acquired cognition is not to be seen as a relapse from the fundamental cognition—or even as a voluntary retreat. Rather, it is the fruition, the fulfillment, of that realization. The verses make clear that both of the latter two degrees are necessary. According to this doctrine, the enlightenment of the buddhas and bodhisattvas is in full flower only when the subsequently-acquired cognition has developed in addition to the fundamental cognition.45


Ill. Some Broader Implications


The preceding analysis of the doctrines of unfixed nirvãna and non-discriminating cognition in the Mahäyäna-samgraha suggests several observations on the place of these Yogäcära innovations in the broader context of Buddhist soteriology and also, more particularly, on the relationship between Yogãcära and Madhyamaka. In order to bring these into focus it is necessary first to review the common ground shared by the two schools.


rwo main themes characterize the revitalization movement initiated in the early Mahäyäna scriptures:

l) a marked tendency towards philosophic absolutism; and


2) a concern for the salvation of all sentient beings in contrast to the earlier focus on individual liberation.


These two developments are, of course, not unrelated. Both may be seen as instances of a broader theme of universalization. Just as the Buddha was

universalized from an historical individual to an abstract principle, so also was the concept of liberation universalized, in both content and extension.


The basic difference that the Mahäyãna converts saw between their notion of liberation and that of their Hïnayäna antagonists is eloquently expressed in the PrajñãPäramitä Scriplures and in the Lotus Sütra. 4 () The nirvärya sought by the šrãvakas and pratyekabuddhas was criticized as the attainment of a transcendent (lokottara or aParyäPanna) state, irrevocably separated from the mundane sphere of human existence. Nirväna and samsära were thus seen as totally distinct, an assertion antithetical to the emerging notion of Mahäyäna absolutism. A primary objective of the early Mahäyäna scriptures was to counter that view with a universalized notion of liberation that recognized no ultimate distinction between samsära and nirvana, and that encompassed the salvation of all beings as its ultimate goal. This was the common ground shared by adherents to the Mahãyäna.

The task of working out the implications of these new ideas, both in theory and in practice, was subsequently taken up by the later Mahãyãna masters. What was initially a division of labor and inclination among these Mahayanists eventually resulted in the division into the two main Mahäyäna schools. Following the epistemological criticism implicit in the PrajñäPäramitä ScnPtures, the Mãdhyamikas focused their interest on the abstract and logical issues of the basic

Mahayana themes; one may say their approach was primarily philosophical. The Yogäcärins had no quarrel with the critical philosophy of the Mädhyamikas; indeed, they assumed it, while going on to take a rather different approach. Following the systematic soteriology of the early Äbhidhärmikas, the Yogäcãrins focused their interest on the practical and technical issues of the common Mahäyäna themes; thus, their approach may be seen as basically psychological. The two schools shared a common problematic; their difference was one of method and point of view.


This difference in approach between the two schools resulted in two parallel formulations of nirvãna. 47 Concerned with the logical refutation of duality, the. Mädhvamika discussions of nirväl)a are characteristically negative in expression. In one of the best known summaries of the Mãdhyamika conception of nirvär.la, Nãgärjuna states:


What is not abandoned and not attained,

Not cut off and not eternal,

What is not suppressed and not produced, That is called nirvana.

To which Candrakïrti comments:

That which cannot be abandoned like greed and the other [afflictions] and also cannot be attained like the fruits of renunciation, that which cannot be cut off like the aggregates, etc. and also is not permanent like non-empty [principles], that which by its nature is not suppressed and not produced, that which has as its characteristic the cessation of all vain discourse, that is what is called nirväna.


The intention of the Mädhyamika notion of nirvãrya is to break down, by means of the via negativa, the duality implicit in all conceptual formulation. The Absolute is inexpressible; ultimately, one must realize that there can be no duality, that there can be neither samsãra nor nirvana.

The above analysis of the doctrines of unfixed nirvana and non-discriminating cognition has shown the Yogäcära conception of liberation to be characteristically more positive in expression. The delusion of duality is still to be resolved, but in their framework the emphasis is different: the Absolute must be shown to encompass or interpenetrate both nirvana and samsära at one and the same time.49

The Mädhyamikas were primarily concerned with critically examining the philosophic nature of bondage. By examining the logical inadequacies of language and discursive thought, they sought to explain why we are trapped by the duality of samsära and nirvãna. The Yogäcärins, accepting that critique, turned away from the purely philosophic issues to address the more immediate question of how one is to realize that nonduality in practice. By analyzing the psychological

structures by which beings become trapped in the dualities of discursive thought, they sought to chart the path by which one may, in practice, escape bondage. Both schools recognized that we are bound to the world of our experience and that this inevitably leads to frustration and suffering. Madhyamaka sought to explain logically how this experience was ultimately a delusion; it generated thereby a critical and soteriologic philosophy of language. On the basis of

that critical analysis of delusion combined with their own interest in meditative practice, the Yogäcärins sought to examine the mental process by which we perpetuate the worldconstructing delusion, and to explain in practical terms how one is to escape from that process. They, in turn, generated a speculative and soteriologic psychology.

In this sense, we may see Yogäcära as the old Abhidharmic enterprise carried on in the new light of Mädhyamika critical epistemology, an enterprise that required—now in its Yogäcära guise—an innovative and dynamic reformulation of the notion of liberation, one that would go beyond the static duality of the Hïnayäna niruPadhišesa-nirväna and one that would also complement the practical austerity of the rigorously negative Mãdhyamika nirvã(la. And, indeed, this is precisely what we see in the doctrines of nirvikalPaka-jñäna and aPrati§thitamrväna.


NOTES


A summarv 01 this article was presented under the title "Soteriological Innovations in Yogãcãra Buddhism' at the Asian Studies Pacific Area Cotilerence (ASPA(',) held at Evergreen State Universitv. ()lvmpia, Washington, J 1979

All translations are those of the author unless otherwise noted. In the case of passages from the Mahõlÿäntl-.samgraha and its commentaries (see n. 4 below), translations are from the Chinese version of Hsüan-tsang ('l : 1594. XXXl.13'2c-152a) unless otherwise noted. References to the Ch 'eng-wet-shihlun are cited from the edition of SAEKI .Jöin Shindõ Jo-yuis/ukl-ron (Nara: Shösögaku Seiten, 1940). This allows easy reference to the French translation of Louis de la

Vallée-Poussin. VilñaPtimätratäsiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan-lsang (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul ( ;euthner, 1928-1948). l . This is the translation of E. )

l'homas, The Life o/ the Buddha (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1927), p. 81 . In his reference to the Mtlljhima-niköna source of the passage, Thomas indicates that it is from (he Mahäsaccaka-sutta,• in fact, it is from the Ariyaþariye.sana, corresponding to pp. 167-168 of V l'renckner•s edition of the Pali original, M(lljhima-nlkäya. I (London: Pali l'ext Society, 1888).

Verv similar versions of this storv are also found in the l)ïghanikäva (Pali IQxt Societv ed. Vol. I l, p. 36) and in the V'tnaya (H. ed. Vol. l , p. 4). There are other accounts (also in the Majlhinut-nikäya) that tell of Mara tempting the newlv enlightened Buddha with the thought that he should not bother going forth to teach his message, another earlv tradition that also warrants consideration in anv broader st Il(lv of the development of the nirvãna concept.


2. There is no mention of the a/nalisllnla-nirväna doct rine in the most commonlv used surveys of Buddhism, e.g.. E. I 'homas' Hi.slon o/ Buddhist Thought. E. ( •,onze's Buddhism: Its Essence and I)evelo/nnent and Buddhisl Thought in India. A. K. Warder's Indian Buddhism, David Kalupahana•.s Buddhist Philo.yophv. etc. More surprising is the omission of the doctrine in A. K. teriee's The Yogõtcära Idealism and also the verv sum marv and inadequate treatment in Th. Stcherbatskv's Cont•ePtion o/ Buddhi.'l A'in'õn.l(l (pp. 18511 & '2()4n) where it is mentioned onlv parentheticallv as an instance of Yogãcãra having iated from strict Mahãvãnism.

Some discussion ol' apatistlula-nl'l'äna in western-language sources is found in the annotation to the appropriate sections (see below) of L. de la Vallée- Poussin's translation of the Ch 'eng-wei-shih-lun (Vijña/)/imätra/ä-siddhi) and E. Lamotte's translation ot (he Mahäyäna-samgraha, also in l). • I . Suzuki's ()ullines o/ Mahäyäna Buddhism (London: Luz-ac and Co., 1907). pp. 345-346; A. B. Keith's Buddhist Philosophy Clarendon Press. 1923), pp. '257259: ). Masuda's

Der individualistisc/l Idealism us (Heidelberg, 1926). pp. 49fT., J. Kitavama's Metaphvsik des Buddlusmu.s (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1934) pp. I(i4- 165: H. von Glasenapp's Unste»blichkeit und Erliisung In den Indist•hen Religionen (Halle, 19.38). p. 62: N. Ma/läyäna Buddhiffll, new ed. (Delhi: Motilal 1977), p. 250, n. 3. l'hese latter secondarv works {Or the most part simplv paraphrase the one short passage from the Ch'eng-wei-shlhlun translated below in this art icle.

3. The historical development of Yogãcüra doctrine is still a verv cont roversial subject. Provisionally, I would suggest a division of the Yogücãra literature into (at least) three main historical periods: Earlv Yogãcûra (preAsanga), Classical Yogãcãra (Asanga and Vasubandhu. esp. the Mahäyänasamgraha), and Late or Scholastic Yogãcãra (post-Vasubandhu): more refinement must await further textual studies—the Yogäcärabhümi and the Abhidharmasa-muccava, for

example, should go in the first period in spite of their association with Asanga. Contrast Jacques Mav's proposal for a Viiñãnavã(la periodization in "La philosophie bouddhique idéaliste." Asiatische Studien (Etudes asiatique), 25 (197 1): '265-323; and see also Lambert Schmilhausen, Literaturgeschichte (ler älteren Yogãcära-schule," Zeitschnfl (In Deutschen Morgenländtschen Gesell.wha/t, Supplementurn l, Vol. 2 (1968), pp. 81 1-823. I agree with Schmithausen (p. 81 In) that, as a generic term, Yogãcãra is preferable to Vijñãnavã(la.

4. The Mahãvãna-samgraha does not survive in Sanskrit, but we (10 have tour translations into Chinese and two into Tibetan. Etienne Lamotte's La Somme du Grand Vehicule d'Asanga (Louvain: Bureaux du Muséon, 1938; rpt Louvain: Université de Louvain, Institute Orientaliste, 1973) includes an edition of the Tibetan text and an excellent French translation from the Tibetan with annotations from the two principle commentaries. Vasuban(lhu's Mahäyänasamgraha-l)häsytl and

Mahäyäsamgraha-uPanibandhana. For details of the different versions 01 the original work and its commentaries, see Lamotte, Vol. pp. v•viii. In this article references will be given to the Taishõ edition of the Chinese translations: this allows easy reference to Lamotte's translation of the Tibetan which gives the corresponding Taishõ page numbers after each section.

5. For details on these references and others see Lamotte. La ,Somme. pp. *45-46 and *47-48.

6. In Sanskrit jñeya, the passive future or optative participle of Vlñä: "to know." means both "that which is knowable" as well as "that which is to be known." Hsüan-tsang expresses both aspects in his rendering of Vasuban(lhu•s gloss (T: XXXl.3'221)29-cl ).

7. •r:XXXl.434c16-17.

8. The germ at least of this idea is to be fóutl(l alreadv in the A.slasõlhasnkä ra m it(7,• CIP ratisl/ut(l ntl.so hi talhägato 'rhan santlnuld)uth/ sa naiva .samskrte dhätau slhllo nõ1Pv asamskrte (l/lätau slhito na ca '(Ito vyutthitah/ (ed. of R. Mitra, Calcutta, 1888, p. 37). The earliest occurrence in a Yogãcära context seems to be in the Sütnälankãra where it is mentioned several times (see Lamotte, La Somme, p. *48 the references). 9 [he term has been variouslv rendered into Western languages: "the nn•vãna that has no abode" (Suzuki), nirvana wit hotlt basis or stav" (Keith), '(las absolut freie Nirvñna" (Kitavama). 'alt ruistic n irväna" (Stcherbatskv).

'immortel et actif Nirvana" (La Vallée- Poussin), and "le Nirvana instable' (Lamotte). Nn•väna. of course, means literallv "extinction' and represents (he broadest sense the Buddhist conception of liberation, deliverance, salvat Ion, etc.

10. See for example Mahäyänasütralankàrtl X VI 1.42 •

ävis!änäl)) krpavä na manah Same krpâlt-tnam kuta eva lokasau khve svaiïvite l)havet snehahh sarvasva hi laukike saukhve svajïvite ca snehah/ tat ca nihsnehñnäm sarva(luhkhopašame nirväne prati¶ hitam manah/ bodhisattvánñm tu karunü-vl,stat van nirvãne 'pi mano na prat hit am//

Which S. Levi Vol. Il p. '2 1 7) translates: Les Compatissants, tout rés de Compassion. n arrëtent pas leur esprit (lans la Suppression. Comment (lonc se prendraient-il.s (l•affection pour le bonheur mondain ou pour leur vie?

Le monde entier. il est vrai, alme le bon heur mondain et tient a sa Vie. Les Auditeurs et les Boud(llras-pour-soi. qui ne tiennent ni [ S un ni a I aut re, arrêtent du moins leur esprit (lans le Nirvana, qui est le sousApaisement de toute (louleur. Mais les Bodhisattvas. pénétrés qu'ils sont de Compassion, n'arrêtent pas leur esprit meme (lans le Nirvana

I l . Lambert Schmitlrausen has presented a verv important document in the development of the Yogâc.ara conception of liberation in Der Nirvõžnaabschnllt in der Vintšcayasamgrahanï dev Yogõu•äral'llûnnll (Wien: Hermann Bohlaus, 1969, pub, as Ostervetchische Akademie (let' Wissenschaften: Silzungsberichte, 264.2). While the term al)' tili.sthila-nn-võn.l(l is apparentlv not to be found in the Yogãcüral)ht-oni. the doctrine is {Oreshadowed in this section which reflects a

distinction between the static nirvñna 01 the arhats and the (Ivnamic nirvana of the tathägata (see esp. I. pp. 53-59: and also note 1 59, p 159-160). "l 'he (list inct ion is explained with reference to nirupad/n.ú'.)tlnirvüna.• after entering the transcendental nirvana-wit hout-remainder the tathâgata, in contrast to the arhat, chooses to return. As Schmithausen suggests (p. 7) this very likelv represents an earlier and transitional stage in the development of the (IPrali.sthita-nirväna doct rine that is found in later works like the and the

12. Vasubandhtu (T: X' X X identifies these as the obstacle ol the afflictions or passions (kle.<üva and the obstacle blocking what is to be known (jñeyävara net). For a summarv account of the important Yogacãra (loctrine of the two obstacles see Ch 'eng-wei-shlh-lun ix.51)-81) along witli La ValléePoussin's annotations. Note especiallv the different meaning of /fievävarana in a Yogäcara as opposed to a Mâ(lhvamika context. 13. T:XXX1.148c14-15.

14. In Chap, Il (T:XXXI.140c7-l l) Asanga has already explained that the defiled component is the Imaginary (Parikalpita) and the pure component is the Absolute (Parir.nsPanna), while the Dependent (Paralantra) comprises both. 15. T:xxxr. 148c15-18. 16. T:XXXl.435a6-7.

17. T:XXX1.434c21-23. 18. S:x.9b; T:XXXl.55b16-19.

19. The Sanskrit verbal-noun jñäna (cf. vijñäna) should require as an equivalent an English word expressing an act rather than a state; hence 'cognition.' In Buddhist Chinese. however, jñãna is consistently rendered with which is generally translated into English as 'knowledge' or 'wisdom.' Also, the equation of 0-jñäna and 0-prajñã in this context as indicated below should be borne in mind. 20. Cf. Lamotte's "le savoir intuitif.

21. The eighth chapter on the "Training of Superior Wisdom" (T:XXXI. 147b 19-148cl l): Erich Frauwallner's Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin; Akademie-Verlag, 1969) includes a translation of some brief selections from this chapter (pp. 345-347) and also a discussion in which he draws attention to the key position of nirvikalpaka-jñäna and Prsthalabdha-jñäna in Asanga's thought.

22. The text discusses the difference between the three modes at some length before the specific terms are actually introduced at T:XXXI. 148a23• 28. Later scholastic works in Chinese refer to the three also as the initial *'J, the middle , and the subsequent 23. •r:XXX1.363c15-20. 24. T:XXX1.365b23-26. 25. •r:XXX1.363c21. 26. 27. T:XXX1.364b24-25.

28. Mahäyäna-samgraha T:XXXI. 148al -2 and Vasubandhu's Bhãya T:xxx1.365c2-5. 29. Hsüan-tsang translates (T:XXXl.363c19); Lamotte reconstructs ãdhära-0, but that seems less likely since samdhãrana ("holding together") is used specifically in the sense of "supporting life," etc. Also for samdhärana is attested in Hsüan-tsang's translation of the Koša, T:XXIX. I lc10. 30. T:XXX1.365c10-14.

31. T:XXX1.'366a28-29, 32. This is the cintämani, the wish-fulfilling gem or philosopher's stone that fulfills its possessor's every wish. 33. This is a musical instrument (tüoa) that produces without being played just what the possessor wishes to hear. Hsüan-tsang's is probably elliptic for (or Paramartha's

34. In Hsüan-tsang's Chinese normally renders acetanam, "unconsciousty," "without conscious intent," etc. Paramärtha (T:XXXI.128c3) says "without discriminating" in the second half of the verse; Buddhašänta (T:XXXI. 109a6-7) speaks of "non-discrimination" in the case of the gem and musical instrument and of the Buddha's "unfixed [nirvana]" in the second half. Dharnragupta (T:XXXI.3()8a7-8) has "free from discrimination" in both cases. 35. T:XXXl.148al 7-18. Latnotte, La Somme. p. 245, points out that this verse is very close to Mahäÿänasütrãlankära I X. 18-19.

36. •r:XXX1.366b4-7.

37. T:XXXl.431c23-28. 38. Each of these is further analyzed in the text (T:XXXI. 148a23-28) into various sub-species—three, three, and five respectively. These further distinctions are explained in Vasubandhu's and Asvabhäva's commentaries (see Lamotte, La Somme, pp. 248-250). 39. Following the variant given in the notes T:XXXI. 148.

40. Vasubandhu (T:XXX1.366a5) and Asvãbhava (T:XXX1.431b27-28) both specify the "manaç transcribed in the text to be mano-vijñäna, the sixth mode of mental activity (vijñäna). 41. T:XXX1.148a5-12. 42. T:XXX1.431b15-23. 43. T:XXX1.431b23-29.

44. T:XXXI.366a7-12. The commentary explains the third line of the verse, saying that "the doctrine ( :dharma)" means "the words ( )," i.e., what it says as opposed to what It means.

45. There is an unfortunate error in La Vallée-Poussin's discussiot>0f the three cognitions that obscures this important point (La Siddhi, p. 634). In a paraphrase of the first of these same four verses from the Mahäyäna-samgraha he says that the preliminary cognition corresponds to "le muet qui ne sait pas"; the fundamental cognition, to "le muet qui sait"; and the subsequentlyacquired cognition, to "le non-muet qui ne sait pas" (emphasis added). The whole point of the analogy, however, is that the subsequently-acquired cognition is a step beyond the fundamental: it corresponds to someone who both knows and can act, in this case, talk about or preach his realization to others.


46. Perhaps the best study contrasting the differences between the various notions of nirvana in the Hinayana as opposed to the Mahäyäna schools is found in Nalinaksha Dutt, Mahäyäna Buddhism (see above, n. 2), pp. 178-254.

47. It is surely no coincidence that, of the principal adversaries in the modern debate over the meaning of Buddhist nirväQa, Stcherbatsky, who advocated a more negative conception, worked especially with Mädhyamika works in Tibetan, while La Vallée-Poussin, who advocated a more positive understanding of the term, worked especially with Yogäcära works in Chinese. Consider also in this light Stcherbatsky's evaluation of aPratiJ!hitanirvãna as a Yogäcära deviation from "strict Mahäyänism" (see n. 2 above).

48. This is verse XXV,3 of the Mülamadhyamakakärikä along with Candrakïrti's PrasannaPadä commentary. aPrahïnam asamPräPtam anucchinnam a'd§vatam/ aniruddham anutPannam etan nirvänam ucyate//

V!tti: yad dhi naiva Prahïyate rägädivat napi Präñate srämapyaPhalavat nãPyucchidyate skandhädivat yac cãPi nanityam aSünyavat tat svabhãvato 'niruddham anutPannam ca sarvaprapañcopa.§ama-laksanam nirvãnam uktam/

The Sanskrit text is found in the revised and enlarged edition of Stcherbatsky's The ConcePtion of Buddhist Nirväna (ed. by Jaideva Singh, Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasham), p. 40 of the appendix. For Stcherbatsky's somewhat different translation of the same passage, see pp. 288-289 of the Singh ed. or pp. 186-187 of the original ed. 49. The significance and prominence of this 'positive' element in Yogãcära thought is too quickly disregarded by those who would represent Indian Buddhism as negative and world-denying in contrast to Chinese Bud. dhism which is positive and world-affirming.



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