Descriptions of “Feeling” (veation” (samjna), and “thdana), “ Idee Unconditioned” (asamskrta) in Vasubandhu’s Pancaskandhaka and Sthiramati’s Pancaskandhakavibhasa
by JOWITA KRAMER
Descriptions of “Feeling” (vedana), “Ideation” (samjna), and “the Unconditioned” (asamskrta) in Vasubandhu’s Pancaskandhaka and Sthiramati’s Pancaskandhakavibhasa
Abstract
This article focuses on three passages of Vasubandhu’s “[Treatise] on the Five Constituents of the Person” (Pancaskandhaka) and its commentary by the 6th-century Indian scholar Sthiramati, the Pancaskandhakavibhasa. The three parts dealt with here comprise the sections on “feeling”, “ideation”, and “the unconditioned” and are compared with parallel descriptions of these concepts in other Abhidharma texts, including the Abhidharmakosabhasya and the Abhidharmasamuccaya.
The treatment of the unconditioned factors is particularly notable since the lists of these factors vary strongly in the works under discussion, ranging from three to nine entities. Among the unconditioned factors the two entities “cessation [obtained through] consideration” (pratisamkhyanirodha) and “cessation not [obtained through] consideration” (apratisamkhyanirodha) are of particular interest and are analysed in detail in the present study.
Keywords: Buddhism, philosophy, Abhidharma, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati
1. Introduction
The present study continues a series of previously completed articles investigating the contents of Vasubandhu’s Pancaskandhaka and its commentary by Sthiramati, the Pahcaskandhakavibhasa. The main focus of these two works is the description of the five constituents of the person (skandha). From the viewpoint of doctrinal development the most relevant parts of this description are the sections on “matter” (rupa), “impulses” (samskdra), and “perception” (vijhana). Therefore, I have dealt with these three skandhas
in three separate publications. The present investigation focuses on three other passages of the Pancaskandhaka and its commentary that have not been considered so far. These three passages include the treatment of the two skandhas “feeling” (vedana) and “ideation” (samjhd) as well as the category of those factors that are considered to be “unconditioned” (asamskrta). The treatment of the two skandhas “feeling” and “ideation” comprises only a few lines in the Pancaskandhaka and around three folios in the
Pahcaskandhakavibhasa. The discussion of the “unconditioned” is of similar extent. Despite the concision of these descriptions the passages are, nonetheless, worthy of closer examination. As already indicated in my study of the Pancaskandhaka’s samskara section, the comparison of the Pancaskandhaka and the Pahcaskandhakavibhasa with other Abhidharma
texts, like the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Abhidharmakosabhasya, reveals noteworthy parallels and discrepancies. Therefore, I present an overview of the contents of the relevant passages in the Pancaskandhaka and its commentary in the following, and compare them with corresponding descriptions in the Abhidharmakosabhasya, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and its commentary, the Abhidharmasamuccayabhasya.3
2. Feeling (vedana)
In the Pancaskandhaka Vasubandhu explains feeling as experiencing (anubhava), of which he distinguishes three kinds: pleasant (sukha), unpleasant (duhkho), and neither pleasant nor unpleasant. He then adds that a pleasant feeling is characterized by the fact that one wishes to be (re)united with it when it has ceased. In contrast, the unpleasant feeling leads to the wish of being separated from it, whereas the neutral feeling does not result in either of these two desires. The enumeration of three alternative feelings
corresponds to the explanation of the Abhidharmakosabhasya. However, the latter adds a sixfold classification into the various kinds of feeling that arise from contact of the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and the mental faculty with their objects. This sixfold categorization is also found in the Abhidharmasamuccaya. The latter does not refer to
feeling as anubhava within the general definition of feeling, but the term is used in another passage of the text to describe the main characteristic of vedanci* The Abhidharmasamuccaya additionally explains that feeling can also be classified as physical (kayika) or mental (caitasika), being either related to the five sense perceptions (and
thus based on the contact of the five sense faculties with their objects) or to the mental perception (manovijhana). Another distinction proposed by the Abhidharmasamuccaya is between feeling “associated with worldly pleasures” (samisa) and “not associated with worldly pleasures” (nirdmisa) or between feeling “based on craving” (gredhasrita) and
“based on renunciation” (juiiskramydsrita). The feeling associated with worldly pleasures is explained in the Abhidharmasamuccaya as being associated with desire for the self, whereas the feeling that is based on craving is paraphrased as relying on greed for the five sense objects. Interestingly, all the characterizations of feeling found in the
Abhidharmasamuccaya are not referred to by Vasubandhu in the Pahcaskandhaka, but are supplemented by Sthiramati in his commentary. Additionally, Sthiramati mentions two interpretations of feeling by other scholars. The first specifies feeling as the experiencing of a desirable or undesirable contact (sparsa), or contact that is different from
both, and is ascribed by Sthiramati to Sahghabhadra. Sthiramati rejects this view by arguing that in this case feeling as the experiencing of contact would either be used in the sense of “feeling accompanying contact” or “feeling having contact as its cause”. But both these statements are unsuitable for paraphrasing the distinct nature of feeling, as all the mental factors share the quality of accompanying contact and because contact is the cause of all mental factors. The second theory proposed by other scholars and opposed by
Sthiramati states that feeling is the experiencing of effects of maturation of previous virtuous (subha) and non-virtuous deeds. Sthiramati rejects this view by referring to the assumption that only the alayavijhana and the neutral feeling accompanying it are the results of maturation of virtuous and non-virtuous deeds and that the pleasant or unpleasant feelings are actually “arisen from the [result of] maturation” (vipakaja), i.e. are only secondary products of maturation.
3. Ideation (samjha)
Ideation is characterized in the Pahcaskandhaka as “the grasping of an object’s specific features (nimitta) ”. This definition is similar to the explanation of the Abhidharmakosabhasya, except for the latter’s additional enumeration of six kinds of ideation depending on the five sense faculties, the mental faculty (manas) and their
objects. The Abhidharmasamuccaya also mentions the phrase “grasping of specific features” (mtshan mar ’dzin pa) when defining the characteristic nature (laksana) of samjha, and it also explains that there are six kinds of samjha, arising on the basis of one of the five sense faculties or the mental faculty. However, it additionally classifies ideation into another six kinds, namely ideation of an object associated with a specific feature (sanimitta), of an object without a specific feature (animitta), of a limited (parTtta)
object, of a great (mahadgata) object, of an immeasurable (apramana) object, and of “the sphere of nothingness” (dkimcanydyatana).^ Remarkably, the Tibetan version of the Pahcaskandhaka includes the statement that samjha is of three kinds comprising ideation of limited, great, and immeasurable objects. However, this explanation does not occur in
the Sanskrit manuscript of the text preserved in China, nor does it have a parallel in the Chinese translation of the Pahcaskandhaka. Sthiramati includes the discussion of all six kinds of objects in his commentary without mentioning that Vasubandhu enumerated only three of them. As these six kinds of samjha are, moreover, not referred to in the form
of a quotation from the root-text, it is very likely that Sthiramati supplemented - as he did in the case of vedana - the root-text with the description of the six objects, presumably relying on the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Thus, the three kinds of ideation listed in the Tibetan text of the Pancaskandhaka are possibly a later addition. However, in case
they were part of the original Sanskrit text, the listing of only three items in contrast to the six kinds of objects mentioned in the Abhidharmasamuccaya would provide another example of a divergence between the latter and the Pancaskandhaka. As for Sthiramati’s comments on the six kinds of objects, they are probably influenced by the
Abhidharmasamuccaya and also show parallels with its commentary, the Abhidharmasamuccayabhasya. One of the common features of the latter and the Pahcaskandhakavibhasa is the addition of the three arguments “because [the sphere of desire] is inferior”, “because [the material sphere] is superior”, and “because [the spheres of unlimited space and
unlimited consciousness] are boundless.’’They have been introduced to explain the nature of the three kinds of objects “limited”, “great”, and “immeasurable”. In contrast to the Abhidharmasamuccayabhasya, Sthiramati also mentions the reason why the object of the sphere of nothingness is called “nothingness”: because there is no grasping at all.
Sthiramati also includes explanations of the terms sanimitta and animitta in his commentary. He defines the first class of objects as follows: Whichever [feature] is ascribed [to an object’s nature] by means of a word[, this is its specific feature]. The entity’s intrinsic nature endowed with this specific feature is
“associated with a specific feature”. The ideation which [[[recognizes]] that] this is the nature ascribed to the object [and] this is the term [referring to it] - this is the ideation which has an object “associated with a specific feature”.
According to Sthiramati, the object “not associated with a specific feature” (animitta) refers to an object not having a feature that can be ascribed to it. This can apply to the nature of an entity (vastusvarupa), nirvana, or the peak of existence (bhavagra). In the first case the object is not associated with specific features because “there is no specific feature, [in the case of nirvana} because there is no specific feature of matter and feeling, and [in the case of the peak of existence] because there is no clarity” of
the specific feature. Sthiramati goes on to explain that in the first case someone who is inexperienced in connecting words and objects has an ideation of the nature of matter but does not recognize it explicitly as “[this is] matter”. Therefore, the ideation having such an object is to be considered an ideation whose object is not associated with a
specific feature. As for the sphere of nirvana, Sthiramati states that it is characterized by the cessation of all specific features of the conditioned. Thus, the ideation accompanying the person absorbed in contemplation having this object is an ideation which is “not associated with a specific feature.” In the case of the peak of existence it
is, according to Sthiramati, due to its lack of clarity that it is not associated with specific features. The ideation of someone who has entered this state does not conceptualize the object. Therefore, this ideation is the one whose object is not associated with specific features. This condition is compared with a thin woman who is
described as having no waist. This state is not referred to as “not associated with specific features” in the sense that there is no specific feature at all. Otherwise, Sthiramati explains, it would follow wrongly that there is no ideation at all (because samjna has been defined as “the grasping of specific features”). If there was no specific feature at all their grasping would be completely impossible In the case of the thin woman the fact that she lacks the specific feature consisting in a (fat) waist (and in this
sense is animitta) makes others conceptualize her as a thin woman. Except for the example of the thin woman, the explanations of the object not associated with specific features found in the Pancaskandhakavibhasa closely resemble the parallel definition found in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.
4. The Unconditioned (asamskrta)
The passages dealing with the category “the unconditioned” show remarkable divergences in the Abhidharma works under discussion. While the Abhidharmakosabhasya enumerates three unconditioned categories, the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Pancaskandhaka(vibhasa) mention eight and four, respectively:
1. space Aakasa)
2. cessation not [obtained through] consideration (apratisamkhyanirodha)
3. cessation [obtained through] consideration Apratisamkhyanirodha)
1. true reality of beneficial factors {kusaladharmatathata)
2. true reality of non-beneficial factors (akusaladharmatathata)
3. true reality of neutral factors (avydkrtadharmatathata)
4. space Aakasa)
5. cessation not [obtained through] consideration Aapratisanikhyanirodha)
6. cessation [obtained through] consideration Apratisamkhyanirodha)
7. the state of motionlessness Adnihjya)
8. cessation of ideations and feelings Asanijhavedayitanirodha)
1. space Aakasa)
2. cessation not [obtained through] consideration (apratisanikhydnirodha)
3. cessation [obtained through] consideration Apratisamkhyanirodha)
4. true reality Atathata)
The last two categories listed in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, that is the dninjya and the samjhavedayitanirodha, correspond to the “equipoise of non-conception” Aasamjhisamapatti) and “equipoise of cessation” (mrodhasamcipatti) respectively. It is remarkable that these two entities are subsumed under the category “the unconditioned” after they have already been defined as belonging to the “factors dissociated from mind” Acittaviprayuktah samskarah) and thus as obviously being part of the conditioned.
A list of eight unconditioned factors identical with the list provided in the Abhidharmasamuccaya appeals in the Yogdcarabhumi. This enumeration seems to be related to a group of unconditioned factors ascribed to the Mahrsasakas Asa ston pa 'i sde pa) in the *Samayabhedoparacanacakra. According to this source the latter state that the following nine factors are asamskrta: “cessation [obtained through] consideration, cessation not [obtained through] consideration, space, the state of motionlessness, true reality of beneficial factors, of unbeneficial factors, and of neutral factors, tine reality of the path, and true reality of the conditioned arising.” In the following, the definitions of the four unconditioned factors mentioned in the Pancaskandhaka are investigated in more detail and compared with the corresponding explanations in the other Abhidharma works.
4.1 Space (akasa)
The Pancaskandhaka defines space as “the one that [gives] room for matter” (PSk 18,14: yo rupavakasah). The explanation found in the Abhidharmasamuccaya is similar, but at least the wording does not appear to be directly related to that of the Pancaskandhaka'. “it is the absence of matter because it [gives] room for all kinds of activities.” The
terminology used in the Abhidharmakosabhasya to characterize space seems to differ from both the Pancaskandhaka and the Abhidharmasamuccaya: “Space is that which does not hinder. Space has for its nature not hindering [[[Wikipedia:matter|matter]]]. It is where matter spreads.” Later Vasubandhu adds the “Sautrantika” view on space: “Space is the mere absence of
touchable things: for instance, when [[[people]]], in the dark, do not touch [anything that possesses] resistance they say [there is] space.” In his commentary on the four basic elements in the Pancaskandhaka, Sthiramati emphasizes that space is not to be regarded as a fifth basic element (mahabhuta):
That which is called “space” is nothing else than the mere absence of impenetrable matter. An impenetrable thing makes room in its own location for [another] impenetrable [thing] when it moves away from it. Space is not [like this], because space [can]not move from a particular place in the same way as matter [does]. Thus, it is not possible to
say that [[[space]]] makes room. Impenetrable matter prevents the arising of other matter at its own place. Space [can]not [do this]. Therefore, there is no room where there is [[[Wikipedia:matter|matter]]], and there is room where it is not there. Thus, the departure [of matter] from a certain place is [what constitutes the action of] making room by this [[[Wikipedia:matter|matter]]]; it is not [providing room] by space. Therefore, space is not a basic element in the same way as earth etc. is.
4.2 Two Kinds of Cessation
The second unconditioned factor mentioned in the Pancaskandhaka is apratisamkhyanirodha, “cessation not [obtained through] consideration.” This and the following category, the “cessation [obtained through] consideration” (pratisamkhyanirodha) seem to be concepts that are of particular importance mainly within the framework of the theory that all
factors exist (sarvam asti) on the three time levels of present, past and future. If one assumes that all future possibilities are “existent,” those of them that are not to become present in the end have to be “blocked” somehow. This condition is achieved through the application of the two entities pratisamkhyd- and apratisamkhyanirodha, both of
which are capable of preventing the arising of a future factor. In the case of the first entity, the non-arising (of a contaminated factor) is attained by means of an antidote produced in the personal continuum of a person, and of the insight related to it. The Pancaskandhaka explains the pratisamkhyanirodha as that “which is a cessation and that
[which] is a separation. It is the permanent non-arising of the constituents [[[caused]]] by the antidote against a contamination.” In the definition found in the Abhidharmakosabhasya the meaning of the term pratisamkhya is specified in more detail:
Cessation [obtained through] consideration is a separation. Cessation [obtained through] consideration is a separation from impure factors. The analysis [or] consideration of the [four] noble truths of suffering etc. is a particular insight (prajna)', the cessation obtained through this [[[insight]]] is the cessation [obtained through] consideration.
[The phrase “obtained through”' is not mentioned], because the middle word is elided as in the expression “ox-cart” [used instead of “ox-drawn-cart"]. Vasubandhu then goes on to explain in the Abhidharmakosabhasya that there is more than one pratisamkhyanirodha:
Is there only one “cessation [obtained through] consideration” of all impure factors? No. Instead, each [separation occurs] separately. The objects of separation are as many as the objects of conjunction. If it were otherwise, experiencing the cessation of the defilement which is abandoned by seeing the [[[truth]] of] suffering would result in experiencing [at the same time] the cessation of all defilements. It would be useless in this way to cultivate the remaining antidotes.
Sthiramati’s comments on the definition of pratisamkhyanirodha offered in the Pancaskandhaka are partly related to this explanation from the Abhidharmakosabhasya. Sthiramati also states that consideration is “a particular insight” (prajhavisesa), adding that this insight “belongs to the uninterrupted path”. He then continues by stating that
[the cessation obtained through consideration] is obtained by means of consideration. [The phrase “obtained” is not mentioned] because the middle word is elided. [As for the
phrase] “which is a cessation”, [it could lead to] the wrong consequence that it [is to be applied to] all cessation. Therefore it is said: “and that [which] is a separation”. In this way [this cessation] is distinguished from the other four cessations, since they are not characterized as separation. [This] separation indicates [the definition:] “it is the permanent non-arising of the constituents [[[caused]]] by the antidote against a contamination”.
Sthiramati also explains the way in which the contaminations are hindered from arising one by one (and not all in a single moment):
This basis [of personal existence] arises accompanied by all seeds of contaminations belonging to [the world of] the three spheres. Then, when a certain moment of the path, which is an antidote for a particular [contamination], appears on this path, this moment of the basis is not capable of producing another moment of the immediately following
basis that would carry on the seed of the contamination that is being abandoned by this [very moment of the path], because it is the condition that hinders the arising of this [following moment of the basis]. However,[this moment] only becomes the cause of that state which is characterized by the separation from the seed of a contamination that is
being abandoned by this [very antidote] since [other] conditions that are compatible with the arising of those [[[seeds]] that are not abandoned by this moment of the path] are [still] existent. It is to be understood that this moment of the path is the condition that is incompatible with the arising of another moment that would carry on the seed of
the contamination that is being abandoned by this [very moment of the path]. It is[, however,] compatible with other [contaminations]. In this way, when the antidote for the smallest of the small of contaminations of the kind that is to be abandoned through [repeated] cultivation arises, this basis [of existence] becomes the cause for another moment
that is characterized by the separation from all seeds of contaminations belonging to [the world of] the three spheres that are to be abandoned through an insight or [repeated] cultivation. In this way, is achieved the permanent non-arising [[[caused]]] by the antidote against a contamination of which the seed has been removed - in the sense that the basis
for the contamination does not appear - and [the permanent non-arising] of the factors related to it. And this is the cessation [obtained through] consideration, [which] is described as separation.
In the case of the apratisamkhvanirodha, the future factor does not arise due to other reasons than pratisatpkhya, namely because of an insufficiency of causes. This situation occurs, for instance, if a potentially perceivable object is not grasped by a sense perception because the respective sense faculty is occupied with another object. In this case, the first object is “lost” as a condition for the arising of its perception in the next future moment. This is because it cannot be perceived anymore as soon as it passes
from the present to the past. The apratisamkhyanirodha apparently is the entity that blocks the arising of the (potentially possible) perception of this object that did not get into the scope of the sense faculty in the present moment and therefore did not become an appropriate condition for the emergence of its perception in the future moment. This example of the functioning of the apratisamkhyanirodha appears in the Abhidharmakosabhasya and is also mentioned in Sthiramati’s Pancaskandhakavibhasa. The Abhidharmakosabhasya explains:
For example, for someone whose visual faculty and the mental organ are occupied with one particular visible object, [other] visible objects, sounds, odours, tastes and tangibles
pass [from the present into the past]. [Therefore] the five kinds of perception which have the latter as their objects cannot arise, since [these perceptions] are not able to grasp their object when it is past. There is thus a cessation of these [[[perceptions]]], which is not [obtained through] consideration [but] due to the insufficiency of the cause [of arising].
Sthiramati seems to have the same condition in mind (and to draw on the passage in the Abhidharmakosabhasya) when he explains:
For example, if for someone whose eye consciousness is engaged in [perceiving] one particular kind of a visible object other objects and other kinds of visible [entities] occur,
then the five kinds of sense perceptions that have [these other entities] as their objects cannot arise. [This is] because, as for the present [entities], they cannot become immediately preceding conditions and, as for the past [entities], they cannot become objective conditions (for the present perceptions). Therefore, there is an apratisamkhyanirodha of these [[[perceptions]]].
In their definition of apratisamkhyanirodha the Pahcaskandhaka and the Abhidharmasamuccaya explain this category as that “which is a cessation but not a separation”, the first text adding that “it is the permanent non-arising of the constituents without the antidote against contaminations (klesa).” The Abhidharmasamuccayabhasya comments that this
cessation is not a separation, because it does not eradicate evil propensities (anusaya). The Abhidharmakosabhasya states that “[it is] a different [type of] cessation, not [obtained through] consideration, which consists of the absolute hindering of arising: cessation not [obtained through] consideration is a cessation that is different from
separation [and] which consists of the absolute hindering of the arising of future dharmas.” The statement that this cessation (i.e. non-arising) is not a separation refers to the concept that blocking of the arising of a certain future factor, evidently a contamination, does not mean that this (contaminated) factor has been previously removed by the
application of its antidote, and the person is permanently separated from it. Instead, it only indicates that a future factor is prevented from becoming present because the conditions necessary for its arising are not available in a certain moment. In his comments on this passage of the Pahcaskandhaka, Sthiramati adds that
as for [the phrase] “a separation”, if a seed exists its association with future factors is determined because it is their [general] nature to arise. [Their] permanent non-arising when their antidote has removed their seed from its place is the [pratisamkhyajnirodha. It is said that the permanent non-arising of future factors, [which occurs] even
though no previous mental process towards the removal of the seed has been developed due to an insufficiency of causes, is the cessation not [obtained through] consideration. Further on in his commentary, Sthiramati analyses the meaning of the phrase “[[[cessation]] not obtained through consideration] is the permanent non-arising of the skandhas without the antidote against contaminations.” He explains that there is permanent non-arising of the arhat’s personal constituents (skandhd), even though he still has seeds of
beneficial and neutral skandha associated with another (i.e. a future) existence, and that one could assume that this is also a cessation not obtained through consideration. Sthiramati objects to this idea by stating that “this [[[non-arising]] of beneficial and neutral skandhas associated with a future existence] in spite of the presence of seeds of
beneficial and neutral skandhas is not obtained without the antidote against contaminations.” Thus, if the contaminations had not ceased due to a pratisamkhya, the conditions for the reappearance of these seeds (of beneficial and neutral factors) in a future existence would not have been removed. Therefore, according to Sthiramati, this is a pratisamkhyanirodha, not an apratisanzkhya- nirodha. Sthiramati concludes that in this way both the state of nirvana with remainder
(sopadhisesa) and nirvana without remainder (nirupadhisesa) are a pratisamkhyanirodha. The nirvana with remainder corresponds to the state of the arhat having seeds of beneficial and neutral skandhas, the one without a remainder is the cessation of the arhat’s skandhas after his death. Finally, Sthiramati explains the single components of the
phrase “[[[cessation]] not obtained through consideration] is the permanent non-arising of the skandhas without the antidote against contaminations” in more detail: The antidote against contaminations is understood here as being the pure path. As for “permanent non-arising”, the term “permanent” [is used] in order to differentiate [this
non-arising] from the cessation [which follows] the arising [of factors] (i.e. impermanence) and from the one which is the “equipoise [of cessation]” (nirodhasamapatti). The [[[latter]]] is nonarising, but it is not permanent because the mind and mental factors arise again. “Non-arising” [is different] from cessation that is impermanence (i.e. the
cessation that follows the arising of a factor). Cessation that is impermanence is [the cessation] of a present [factor]. However, [the apratisamkhyanirodha] is not the non-arising of a present, but only of a future [factor].
The Abhidharmakosabhasya includes some further remarks on the two kinds of cessation which are not mentioned in the other texts. It explains, for instance, that there are four possibilities of occurrence of pratisamkhya- and apratisamkhyanirodha:
1. Factors of which only the pratisamkhyanirodha is obtained, namely the impure factors which are past, present and certain to arise;
2. Factors of which only the apratisamkhyanirodha is obtained: pure conditioned factors which are not destined to arise;
3. Factors of which both is obtained, pratisamkhyanirodha and apratisamkhyanirodha: impure factors which are not destined to arise;4. Factors of which neither pratisamkhyanirodha nor apratisamkhyanirodha is obtained: pure factors which are past, present and destined to arise.
This classification shows that pratisamkhyanirodha hinders only the occurrence of impure factors. This is because it is not reasonable to assume that a pratisamkhya, an insight, hinders the arising of pure factors. In contrast, the apratisamkhyanirodha can stop the coming into existence of both, pure and impure, entities (the impure only if they are not
destined to arise). In the first case the factors have either already arisen (being past or present) or they are destined to arise (because their conditions are available). Therefore, only a pratisamkhyanirodha achieved through the application of an antidote can stop their future existence (that is, can prevent them from becoming present). An
apratisamkhyanirodha, which would be a non-arising due to the lack of conditions, is impossible in this case. Factors that have already arisen or which are automatically going to arise due to the existence of appropriate conditions cannot be hindered by an apratisamkhyanirodha. The second category involves pure factors for which there are no causes enabling them to arise. The impure factors referred to in the third category7 are not destined to arise and therefore must have been removed before by means of an antidote.
Therefore, there is a pratisamkhyanirodha of their occurrence in the future. As for their apratisamkhyanirodha, it probably' occurs in the moments following their pratisamkhyanirodha because then there are no causes anymore for their future arising. In the last case, pratisamkhyanirodha is not possible because the factors are pure, and
apratisamkhyanirodha is not applicable since they have already arisen or are certain to arise due to appropriate conditions. Other notable explanations found in the Abhidharmakosabhasya with regard to the two cessations are concerned with the presentation of divergent positions on this topic. In this context Vasubandhu mentions that
“another school says: The capacity of insight [is decisive] for the nonarising of the evil propensities (anusaya). Therefore this [[[non-arising]]] is cessation [obtained through] consideration. ‘Cessation not [obtained through] consideration’ is the non-arising of suffering, which is only an insufficiency of evil propensities as conditions for the arising [of suffering] and therefore not a capacity of insight.”
Vasubandhu objects that this non-arising of suffering is not established without consideration - therefore it is “cessation [obtained through] consideration”. After this he mentions another divergent viewpoint: ‘“Cessation not [obtained through] consideration’ is the subsequent non-existence of an arisen [factor] due to its spontaneous destruction.
” According to Vasubandhu, this hypothesis results in “a cessation not [obtained through] consideration” which is impermanent since it is non-existent as long as the factor has not perished. In the same chapter of the Abhidharmakosabhasya the divergent viewpoint of the “Sautrantikas” with regard to the nature of the unconditioned factors is discussed. At first Vasubandhu presents the following view:
The nature of this [factor called “cessation obtained through consideration”] is to be recognized only by the noble ones, each for himself. It is only possible to say that it is a distinct real entity which is eternal and beneficial and which is called separation from this [contamination] and “cessation [obtained through] consideration”.
However, according to Vasubandhu, the Sautrantikas [say] that all these unconditioned [factors] are not real entities. They are not distinct entities like matter, feeling etc. [...] Cessation [obtained through] consideration is the cessation of the (future) arising of already produced evil propensities [and] the non-arising of any other by reason of the force of consideration. The non-arising independent of [the force of] consideration [and only] due to an insufficiency of causes is the “cessation not [obtained through] consideration”.
The last unconditioned factor to be discussed here is tathata. Unsurprisingly, this category is not mentioned in the Abhidharmakosabhasya. As already mentioned above, in the Abhidharmasamuccaya three kinds of the tathata are indicated: the suchness of beneficial, of non-beneficial, and of neutral factors. Only the first, however, is described in more detail, whereas the other two are simply said to be understood in a parallel way: What is the suchness of beneficial factors? It is the twofold essencelessness (nairatmya), emptiness (sunyata), the [[[realm]]] not associated with specific features (animitta), limit of existence (bhutakoti) and the ultimate (paramartha). It is also the true reality of the factors (dharmadhatu). Why is suchness called suchness? Because it does not become anything else. Why is it called emptiness? Because pollution does not occur [there]. Why is it called “not associated with specific features”? Because it is the tranquility of specific features. Why is it called the limit of existence? Because it is the object of the correct [[[insight]]]. Why is it called ultimate? Because it is the object of true knowledge of the noble ones. Why is it the true reality of the factors? Because it is the cause of all factors of the sravakas, pratyekabuddhas and buddhas. The suchness of the non- beneficial and of the neutral factors is to be understood in the same way as the suchness of beneficial factors.
The definition offered in the PSk is far less extensive than the one in the Abhidharmasamuccaya: “[It is that] which is the true reality (dharmata) of factors, the essencelessness of factors (dharmanairatmya).” Notably, the Pancaskandhaka does not mention the “twofold essencelessness” (but only the dharmanairdtmya), nor the terms sunyata,
animitta, bhutakoti, paramartha, or dharmadhatu. Thus, we may assume that Vasubandhu did not draw on the wording of the Abhidharmasamuccaya in this case. In Sthiramati’s commentary only the very beginning seems to rely on the explanation given in the Abhidharmasamuccaya: “It is ‘suchness’ because it does not become anything
else.” The remaining comments do not appear to be related to the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Notably, Sthiramati does not mention the threefold classification of the tathata into the suchness of beneficial factors and so on. Obviously this system of presenting the true reality did not assert itself throughout the Yogacara tradition. Sthiramati mainly paraphrases the single terms of Vasubandhu’s definition in his commentary:
“Of factors” means of matter, feeling, ideation, impulses, and consciousness. “True reality” (dharmatd) is the [true] being of factors, [their] true essence
(yathatmya), [their] ultimate being (bhutaprakarsa). Since factors also have the nature of being effects, being impermanence, and so on, therefore [the root text says:] “the
essencelessness of factors”. The characteristic feature through which entities become objects of knowing (= mind) and speech is their self. Therefore, they are free from a self because they do not have that [[[self]]] as [their] intrinsic nature (svabhdva). Due to this, they are selfless (or “essenceless”).
Sthiramati’s interpretation of this essencelessness is of particular interest. He understands it as the fact that the factors are empty of their “imagined nature”: “[This essenceless] state of these [factors] is the essencelessness of the factors (dharmanairatmya). This is the emptiness of the factors of the imagined nature (kalpitasvabhavasunyatd)."
5. Conclusions
The passages of the Pahcaskandhaka and its commentary, the Pahcaskandhakavibhasa, discussed in the present paper show parallels with the Abhidharmakosabhasya, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the Abhidharmasamuccayabhasya. At the same time they also include notable divergences from these other works. When defining the category “feeling”
(vedana), for instance, Vasubandhu restricts himself to the explanation of the three kinds of pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral feelings. He does not mention any of the other characterizations, as for instance “physical” and “mental” feeling or feeling “based on craving”, described in the Abhidharmasamuccaya. As already suggested by Sthiramati, a
possible explanation for this omission could be that Vasubandhu tried to give a very condensed presentation of the topic in his Pahcaskandhaka, and therefore limited himself to the most important information. Vasubandhu's description of “ideation” (sainjhd) in the Pahcaskandhaka also does not fully correspond to the definitions found in the other texts
under discussion. The version transmitted in the Sanskrit manuscript available through the copy preserved in the China Tibetology Research Centre is extremely short and, notably, does not contain the classification of samjha into various kinds (as found e.g. in the Abhidharmasamuccaya), like, for example, the ideation of objects associated with
specific features (sanimitta) etc. Three of these classes of samjha appear in the Tibetan translation of the Pancaskandhaka. Vasnbandhu’s enumeration of four unconditioned entities in the Pancaskandhaka is obviously a compromise between the three unconditioned factors listed in the Abhidharmakosabhasya on the one hand and the eight entities as
found in the Yogacarabhumi and in the Abhidharmasamuccaya on the other. He probably adopted this group of three and adjusted it to the Yogacara context of the Pancaskandhaka by adding tathata to it, a central philosophical concept of the Yogacara tradition. However, Vasubandhu seems not to have relied directly on the explanations of the
Abhidharmasamuccaya when he defined the tathata in the Pancaskandhaka. The definition of the unconditioned factor “space” (akasaf is similar in the works under discussion with regard to its contents. However, the wording does not seem to be directly related. Of particular interest are the explanations of the two cessations, pratisamkhyd- and
apratisamkhyanirodha, which are very similar in the Pancaskandhaka and the Abhidharmasamuccaya. In the Abhidharmakosabhasya the discussion of these categories, which prevent future entities from becoming present, is far more extensive. This might be due to the fact that the two cessations are of crucial importance in the context of the Sarvastivada
theory that entities exist on all three levels of time. Remarkably, Sthiramati’s comments on this topic are also rather lengthy and include, for instance, the notable remark that the nirvana with remainder (sopadhisesa) and the nirvana without remainder (nirupadhisesa) are both to be classified as “cessation [obtained through] consideration.”
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