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Dharmakīrti and His Commentators’ Views on the Transformation of the Basis and the Status of the Ālayavijñāna

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Vincent ELTSCHINGER is professor of Indian Buddhism at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes (Paris). The many aspects of the Buddhist intellectuals' polemic against Brahmanical orthodoxy are his main research interest. His most recent publications include books and articles on Asvaghosa, the Yogacarabhumi and later Buddhist ideas on language and concept formation.

E-mail: vincent.eltschinger@ephe.sorbonne.fr


Abstract


The scholarly understanding of Dharmaklrti’s arguments in favor of idealism has greatly improved in the past few years. However, many aspects of this philosopher’s position remain unclear. In particular, the gnoseological and psychological foundations of his denial of the external world remain little known: Does he accept an alayavijnana or not? And if yes, is this alayavijnana the same as the eighth vijnana of “classical” idealism? What does asraya refer to in the expression asrayaparivrtti? In addition to addressing these and similar questions, the present paper aims at summarizing what can be said in the light of past and present research on the topic of Dharmaklrti’s idealism. Key words: Dharmakirti, Buddhist Idealism, Buddhist Epistemology, alayavijnana, Asrayaparivrtti


Introduction


As is well known, Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignaga (fl. ca. 500) and Dharmakirti (ca. 550-650) endorse mind-only idealism (vijnaptimatrata) as what appears to be their final religio-philosophical position.1 The exact import of their arguments and the nature of their idealism, however, remain debated issues even after — or perhaps because of — a decade of sustained scholarly attention, due partly to the competing heuristic models (e.g., the “sliding scale of analysis”) and philosophical interpretations resorted to.2 Another reason for this uncertainty is certainly to be found in the fact that the most important source of information, the bulky third chapter of Dharmakirti's PV, remains in many respects — and rather shamefully after nearly four decades of intensive research on Dharmakirti — a terra incognita for Western scholarship. Whatever the case may be, most recent scholarship has focused on Dharmakirti'sinternalism” (Kellner) as a set of intricate arguments in the service of a philosophical and partly soteriological program. In particular, two types of idealism have been distinguished in order to make sense of Dharmakirti's approach (Arnold): “epistemic idealism,” which amounts to a form of

transcendental skepticism” (Ratie) insisting on the unknowability of external/extra-mental things, and “metaphysical idealism,” an ontologically committed form of idealism directing ad hoc arguments against the existence of external/extra-mental things. In the past few years, the extent to which these two forms of idealism match emic — both Buddhist and non-Buddhistdistinctions (Kumarila, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, Manorathanandin) has been discussed; Dharmakirti's indebtedness to earlier Yogacara sources, especially Vasubandhu's Vs and Dignaga's AP, has been investigated; taxonomies and analyses of the master's arguments have been proposed. However, if the general outline of

Dharmakirti's argumentative strategy is much better known today, other, more properly doctrinal/technical aspects of this philosopher's idealism have not received the attention they deserve. I am referring here mainly to the psychological, gnoseological and ontological infrastructure of the Yogacara/ Vijnanavada claim that external things are unknowable/nonexistent; i.e., issues such as the number and structure of the vijnanas, the part played by seeds and imprints in the psychological dispositif (device) presiding over the constitution of the pseudo-external world, etc. This relative neglect is hardly surprising for, just as Dharmakirti's arguments are difficult to assess due to their abundance and sophistication, the Yogacara and/or Sautrantika doctrines underlying his idealism mostly remain out of sight—and deliberately so in my opinion. I can see at least two reasons for Dharmakirti’s silence: First, this philosopher is generally reluctant to discuss doctrines that are the stake of heated intra-buddhistic debates, especially

when these are not necessary for his argument and could threaten or at least weaken his own position. Second, he may well have regarded issues such as the alayavijnana as being beyond the epistemological and apologetic jurisdiction of the hetuvidya of which he was a specialist. There can be no doubt, however, that a systematic study of the third chapter of Dharmakirti’s PV with this kind of questionnaire in mind will shed much light on the general outline of his idealism. In other words, most of what can be grasped at present stems from the commentaries which, as we shall see, often reflect (possibly) contradictory views on the problems discussed — here, we should refrain from taking the epistemological text tradition as a “school” entailing doctrinal unanimity.


Needless to say, there can be no question of filling this gap in the present paper. Once again, such an enterprise presupposes a thorough acquaintance with PV 3, its commentaries as well as those written on its epitome, PVin 1. In what follows, I shall limit myself to mapping a certain number of issues raised by Dharmakirti’s idealism, from its soteriological implications to the psychological foundations of his position and argument. Focusing on the soteriological topic of the “transformation of the basis”3 (asrayaparivrtti) will enable us to get a sense of the exegetical diversity if not incompatibilities reflected by indigenous commentaries.


The Scope and Limits of Epistemology


Dharmakirti defines a real thing (vastu, paramarthiko bhavaK) as that which is endowed with causal efficacy (arthakriya). Inasmuch as it is part of a causal complex (hetusamagri), such a thing can give rise to another entity, cast an image of itself in cognition or fulfill such and such a practical expectation (purusartha, etc.). These different aspects of a real thing’s efficacy are the very basis of Dharmakirti’s epistemology as it is outlined in PV 2.1-5ab, where our philosopher regards as reliable (avisamvadin) any cognition that is capable to prompt the cognizer toward something able to fulfill his/her needs. This

corresponds to Dharmakirti's first “definition” of a (means of) valid cognition (pramana).4 In PV 2.5ab (in bold), he presents the criterion which, according to him, allows one to ascertain epistemic validity (pramanya), and discards an objection according to which this very criterion makes a treatise on epistemology pointless:


[Objection:] But how can one ascertain [that a certain cognition] is a valid cognition (*pramanya?)? [Answer:] It is a valid cognition due to practical activity (vyavaharena), i.e., due to a subsequent (*pascatkalabhavin?') cognition bearing on an [[[empirically]] recognized] causal efficacy (*arthakriyavisayd?). [Objection:] If it is due to practical activity that one knows [that a certain] cognition is a valid cognition, then a treatise (*rartra) [defining what a valid cognition is] is pointless, [and] therefore there is no need to compose (a^rabh-) [such a treatise]. It is [certainly] not pointless, because [such] a treatise removes delusion [concerning the characteristics of valid and non-valid cognition]. Since deception(/unreliability) (*visamvada?') is possible if one acts without knowing the characteristics (TakanO) of that valid cognition which [alone] allows one to act (*pravartaka), he who wishes to act (*pravrttikama) should know the [respective] characteristics of a valid cognition and a pseudo-[valid cognition] (*tadabha?) before acting (*pravrtteh prak?). Inasmuch as it allows [one] to dispell the cognizing subject's (*pratipattr?) ignorance (*ajnana?) as regards [what] valid cognition is and is not (*pramanetara?), [such a treatise] is not pointless.5


In the concluding part of PVin 1, however, Dharmakirti sheds entirely new light on these two topics, first by adjusting his doctrine of epistemic validity to the idealistic framework developed in PV 3 and PVin 1, and second by introducing an epistemological distinction that puts these two topics in a soteriological perspective: [Objection: But] if he negates an object for all cognitions, how [can the idealist] claim that error and non[-error] are valid cognition or not since [[[cognitions]]] do not differ [in their erroneousness]? [Answer:] The imprints of an error are discontinuous[, and] it is due to this deficiency [that the idealist] can, by observing that the practical activity [made possible by this cognition] is unreliable even for an unawakened [[[person]]], claim that one [of these cognitions] is not a valid cognition; [but] of the other [[[cognition]]] which, because [its] imprint is persistent, prolongs

itself without being cut [from the cognition of its result] as long as the samsara is lasting, [he can claim that] it is a valid cognition on the basis of its reliability with regard to practical activity in this [[[world]]]. [In the present treatise, we have only described] the nature of this empirical-practical (samvyavaharika) valid cognition, [because] even concerning it, deluded opponents [such as the Naiyayikas] lead the world astray [by composing treatises that are incompatible with practical activity]. But those who [zealously] cultivate the insight born of [[[rational]]] reflection directly realize the ultimate (paramarthika) valid cognition which is immaculate due to being free of error, and non-deficient.6

This important statement entails two main elements. First, Dharmaklrti reduces epistemic validity to the type of imprint (vasana) responsible for the respective cognitions.7 Second, by distinguishing between empirical-practical and ultimate pramanas* this passage induces a decisive reorganization of epistemology as a whole. Whereas the doctrine presented in PV 2.1-5ab appeared to characterize any possible cognition, its relevance is now limited to the (admittedly vast) realm of samsara. In this new perspective, a cognition whose reliability is ascertained by successful practical activity is a samvyavahdrikapramana, but not a pramana pure and simple anymore. Both de facto and de jure, Dharmaklrti’s theoretical enterprise is thus restricted to the sphere of empirical and practical activity within samsara. The distinction between pramana and apramana (pramdndpramdnavibhdgd^') in the framework of an idealistic epistemology (vijnanavada, PVSVT 211,16-18; rnam par sespa tsam du zad pa’i Ita bay PVT Je D115a4-6/P136a2-4) is the topic of a second—but chronologically prior—passage:

The conceptual constructs’ inability [to grasp the particular as it really is] is due to ignorance [...] [Objection:] If erroneousness originated from ignorance, it would (prasanga) also characterize [[[perceptions]]] such as visual cognitions. [Answer:] No, because this [[[ignorance]]] is characterized as the [superimposing] conceptual construct, for nescience is nothing but conceptualization, [and] it is mistaken by its very nature. On the contrary, sensory cognitions are not conceptual constructs[; hence are not affected by ignorance]. Alternatively, there is no fault concerning them either because, [as] we shall say [in the third chapter], non-dual [sensory cognitions erroneously] appear as dual. Even though all [these cognitions] are erroneous, the distinction between valid cognition and pseudo-

[valid cognition] comes from [a certain cognition’s] reliability with regard to what is regarded as capable of causal efficacy,10 [and this] until the [final] revolution of the basis [takes place]. Even if [a cognition such as that of selflessness] is [at first] erroneous [inasmuch as it proceeds by way of superimposition, it is a valid cognition] due to its being conducive to the tranquillization [of the defilements].11

Although the distinction between the samvyavahdrika and the paramarthika types of valid cognition is not mentioned, this passage divides valid cognitions according to a scheme that is entirely parallel to the one resorted to in PVin 1: Whereas “validation” by means of practical activity characterized cognitions belonging to the realm of samsara in PVin 1, it now characterizes any cognitive event prior to the asrayaparivrtti. As stated by Sakyabuddhi and Karnakagomin, “before the transformation of the basis, the ascertainment of epistemic validity comes always from [a certain cognition’s] reliability with regard to what is regarded as capable of causal efficacy.”12 This applies to ordinary cognitions of a perceptive or inferential character (PVSV 51,3-4) as well as to “technical” or “scholarly” (sastnya) inferences such as that of selflessness (anatman)

from being a product (krtaka; PVSV 51,4-5).13 Pointless as they may be in everyday life, the latter are soteriologically relevant in that they make nirvana possible.14 'This is “due to the fact that, for those who give themselves up to [[[mental]]] cultivation, having [first] grasped the [real] thing in the aspect of a universal(/generality) such as selflessness, [[[defilements]]] such as desire will be eliminated by making the selfless particular, etc., perceptible at the end of the cultivation[-process].”15

Let me summarize what could be gained from these two passages. The completion of the cultivation process induces a radical transformation of the yogin’s psychological and gnoseological dispositions that coincides with liberation (tharpa, PVinTDh) and the end of samsara. This final transformation of the basis of existence amounts to reaching nirvana (PVT, PVSVT, PVinTjfi), obtaining omniscience (*sarvajnajnana and *sarvarthagrahana, PVinTDh; sarvajnata, PVinTjfi) and buddhahood (buddhapada and *buddhatavastha, PVinTDh), being free from the objective and subjective modes of apprehension (*grahyagrahakakararahitatva, PVinTDh), and eliminating the seed of dual appearance that characterized the mental continuum in which the obstructions had not yet been uprooted (PVT, PVSVT). As a basic gnoseological reorientation, the asrayaparivrtti makes the epistemology described by late


Buddhist philosophers irrelevant.


The paramarthikapramana succeeds—and abrogates—the samvyavaharikapramanas that were operating in samsara as well as the ordinary criteria for the validation of cognitions.16 As long as samsara is lasting—in everyday life as well as along the path—“practical congruency” alone is acceptable as a criterion. However, says Dharmottara, “if [one were to ascertain a cognition’s validity] in dependence on the cognition of an omniscient person (psarvajnajnanapeksayd?'), all these cognitions would be unreliable. Thus it is that [this cognition] is a valid cognition in dependence on the [type of] reliability (*avisamvada?) that [characterizes] the infantile’s (pbalajana?) transactions (*vyavahara) within samsara, before liberation, but not in dependence on the state of being a buddha (*na buddhatavasthapeksaya)”1


What Does the “Basis” (Asraya) Consists of?


Dharmakirti refers thrice to the final transformation of the basis: twice in the PV (PVSV 51,3-4 [[[asrayaparavrtti]]], PV 2.205b [asrayah parivartate]) and once in the SAS (sutra 90 [tib. gnas ma gyurpa’i phyir]). True to his doctrinal oscillation between external “realism”/externalism and idealism/internalism, Dharmakirti seems to have played with two different views of ignorance (avidya) and the transformation of the basis. Whereas one of them can be accounted for in terms of the yogin’s final encounter with the true nature and structure of reality,18 the other consists in the final resorption of any kind of duality and especially of any trace of subject-object (grahyagrahaka) dichotomy. The intelligibility of the “idealistic” model of the asrayaparivrtti strongly depends on the commentators (essentially Devendrabuddhi and Sakyabuddhi). According to this model, the transformation of the basis coincides with the definitive resorption of any dual modality of cognizing. This “transformedcognition perceives neither an object (visaya, grahya) nor a subject (visayin, grahaka), and the true reality (tattva) of erroneous notification (vijnaptir vitathakara); i.e., its being empty of duality (dvayasunyata, comm.), is now fully recognized and directly realized. ’Hie transformation of the basis of existence thus consists in the yogin’s final break with ordinary ways of knowledge. ’ffiese are apparently caused by the so-called imprint of duality (dvayavasana, etc., comm.), which is instrumental in one’s adherence (abhinivesa) to the subject¬object duality, the reification of purely fictitious aspects of cognition, and one’s

distributing them into internal and external. This way of knowing characterizes ordinary people (prthagjana) and “infantiles” whose cognition is just as erroneous (bhrantavjnana) as the taimirikas’ and just as mistaken as that of people whose vision is troubled by magical incantations, etc. (mantradyupapluta). Even sravakas and pratyekabuddhas are affected by ignorance (avidyopapluta), defined here by Dharmakirti's commentators as undefiled ignorance (aklistajnana) and most likely to be interpreted as the obstacle/obstruction to knowable things (jneyavarana) that prevents omniscience. buddhas alone possess the most eminent perception (paradarsana), that of non-dual reality, because they alone have, as bodhisattvas, sufficiently cultivated non-conceptual, non-dual cognition (Sakyabuddhi, SAST; see also Vs 22). According to this model, the transformation of the basis of existence thus seems to coincide with the final elimination of the imprint of duality that is responsible for one's adherence to the subject¬object dichotomy, with the eradication of undefiled ignorance and with the cessation of obstacles/obstructions (avaranavigama).


The major problem faced by the interpreter of the great epistemologist's position is his understanding of “basis” —what is the asraya according to Dharmakirti? Does he admit an alayavijnana or not? And if yes, is this alaya the same as the Yogacara tradition's eighth vijnana? Scholars have proposed different answers to these questions. Dharmakirti himself mentions only once the alaya(vijnana), and this in PV 3.522;19 i.e., in a passage that is not related to the asrayaparivrtti: “Even if heterogeneous [[[cognitions]] can] arise simultaneously, [only one cognition] arises from the alaya, not the others, due to the incapacity [to produce them] caused by a particularly intense cognition.”20

According to Schmithausen (1967, 128), however, “this verse simply shows, as the context makes clear, that even on the basis of the Yogacara system and its complex of the mental continuum, one cannot do without the causality of the immediately preceding (empirically graspable) actual cognition—the samanantara-pratyayah. This does not at all imply that Dharmakirti himself approves of these Yogacara presuppositions.” If he admits that PV 3.522 does not allow one to conclude that Dharmakirti admitted the alayavijnana, Franco regards PV 3.133, a stanza which seems to allow for multiple simultaneous cognitions, as a proof of the logician's acceptance. This interpretation contradicts Lambert Schmithausen's and David Seyfort Ruegg's earlier views on the subject. According to Schmithausen, Dharmakirti's idealism is of the same type as the one reflected in Vasubandhu's KSi and Vs and in Dignaga's AP, i.e., a form of idealism based on “Sautrantika presuppositions.” The key passage in this connection is PV 3.396-397: H ere as well [i.e., when one wishes to infer fire from smoke], a cognition in which smoke appears could [very well] make known, not [real] fire, [but] just a cognition in which fire appears—[provided] the imprint [of the latter cognition] is sharp [enough] for being actualized(/woken up). [For it is] only inasmuch as it possesses an imprint that is capable to [give rise to a cognition of fire that] a mental continuum reveals a cognition in which smoke appears.21

Considered in the light of this passage, Dharmakirtis idealism does not rely on the many-layered psychological complex of classical idealism, but on the one suggested by the KSi, the Vs and the AP, i.e., a mind-only idealism based on a one-layer mind continuum and dispensing with the seventh and eighth vijnanas, i.e., the klistam manas and the alayavijnana. This epistemological system presents itself as an extension of the blja ~ vasana ~ saktivisesa doctrine through which the Sautrantikas account for (karmic) retribution. The ideas (vijnapti, “notification”) in which objects appear are caused neither by external things nor by an alayavijnana containing all seeds (sarvabljaka), but by a particular transformation of the mental series (santanaparinamavisesa). Of course, Dharmakirti occasionally deviates from Dignaga. However, if there is no reason to suspect such a deviation and, in addition, the little Dharmakirti says suggests that he was on the same line as Dignaga, I see little point in postulating a disagreement between them. This interpretation finds support in several statements by Dharmakirti's earliest (?) commentator Devendrabuddhi. One of them is his explanation of the following stanza by Dharmakirti, PV 3.217: “For [[[people]]] who are beset with ignorance, just as for [those who, being affected by] timira, etc., [[[Wikipedia:perceive|perceive]] two moons, etc.], an erroneous notification (vijnaptir vitathakara) arises in dependence on its own respective conditions[, and not due to an object located outside the mind].”22 Here is Devendrabuddhi's commentary:

There arises an erroneous notification that causes one to perceive corporeality, etc. (*rupadi), as real (paramarthena, *paramarthatas?'). — For whom? — For [[[people]]] who are beset with ignorance, i.e., for ordinary people jprthagjana) who have not eliminated undefiled ignorance23 japrahinaklistajnana?2) [yet]. This

is presented [by Dharmakirti] as the cause of the(/an) erroneous appearance (‘vitathapratibhasa?). [Objection:] If the notification (‘vijnapti') does not depend on an external object (*bahyartha)’ how is it that [this notification] proceeds on account of a limitation in [terms of] space[, time], etc.?25 [In order to answer this objection, Dharmakirti] says ‘in dependence on its own respective conditions.’ [Which means:] The notification proceeds autonomously (Svatantryena?) even without any dependence on an external object; rather, the cause (putpattinimittd) of the arising of each notification is a certain transformation of the [[[mental]]] continuum/series26 (santanaparinama)?'2 As we can see, Devendrabuddhi’s explanation is perfectly in tune with the above-quoted PV 3.396-397, and ultimately refers back to the issues dealt with in and around Vs 2. The second statement I would like to briefly discuss in this connection is representative of the kind of problems raised by the recourse to the commentaries while trying to make sense of Dharmakirti’s idealism. This statement entails many difficulties that I have not been able to solve in a satisfactory manner yet. Dharmakirti’s root text, PV 3.336, runs as follows: “Something actualizes the internal imprint of a certain [[[cognition]]]. It is due to this [actualization] that [definite] cognitions are bound to occur [at a certain time, but] not in dependence on an external object.”28 Here is Devendrabuddhi’s commentary:

Aius in this case, a certain cognition <1> (*vijnana') actualizes, at a certain time (kadacifP), the internal imprint of a [certain cognition <2> such as] the perception of blue, etc. (*niladidarsana?')’ but [certainly] not all of them. Aierefore, this and that [[[cognition]], but certainly] not all [of them], could be produced by the fact that [[[cognition]] <1>] could(/can) trigger(/give rise to) the actualization of cognition <2> when(/once) the transformation of the vijnana (*vijnanaparinama) thanks to the successive natures (*aparaparasvabhava?) of the capacity at each moment29 (pratiksanam?) has taken place(/has been taken possession of?) (*upagata?). Thus it is due to this actualization that cognitions are bound to occur, [but] not in dependence of an external object.30

Once again, this passage raises several problems. One thing is certain, however: Devendrabuddhi makes no mention of an alayavijnana and seems to be content with the notion of ‘vijnanaparinama (which, besides its occurrences in the Vs, can also be connected with the Tr, a treatise that, in spite of “traces” of Sautrantika presuppositions, actually defends a genuinely Yogacara alayavijnana). But commenting on Devendrabuddhi’s explanation, Sakyabuddhi understands cognition <1> as a certain *pravrttivijnanaiy that acts as a cooperating factor (*sahakaribhuta? Cf. Vibh.) for the rise of cognition <2> (described as *utpitsu?, “[about to/aspiring] to arise”),32 and the internal imprint of cognition <2> as a certain capacity (*sakti) located (*stha?) in the ’‘alayavijnana,33 with no explanation as to how ‘alayavijnana should be interpreted in this context. According to Sakyabuddhi, the actualization of the imprint consists in the “production of an unimpeded (‘avyahata?') capacity to bring about a particular cognition (‘vijnanavisesajanana?'),”3’1 whereas by “transformation” (‘parinama, ’parinati33?'), one should understand the actual capacity to bring about the result (‘karyajananalaksana ?).36

^fliis is but one example of the doctrinal hesitations to be met with among Dharmakirti’s commentators. As was suggested long ago by Schmithausen, Prajnakaragupta may well have accepted the alayavijnana as an alternative to the one-layered mental continuum inherited from the Sautrantikas. Answering an objection against the alaya, Prajnakaragupta replies first: “Let us not expatiate [here] on the a^yav^in-ana!' (astam iyam alayavijnanacinta), which suggests that according to Dharmakirti’s commentator, the a^avy-nana is superfluous in the system. One is free to conjecture that this reflects Dharmakirti’s own way of dealing with the matter. But a little later, Prajnakaragupta adds the following remark: “Alternatively, this [[[alayavijnana]]] has been postulated (parikalpita) as the bearer of the imprints [of an earlier cognition], so that the [above-mentioned] fault [of the alaya being superfluous] does not affect our position.” We shall meet again with the hypothesis of the alayavijnana as an alternative of the one-layered cittasantana. As I have suggested above, Dharmakirti makes no pronouncement as regards the nature of the asraya. As for his commentators,37 they provide divergent interpretations of the basis to be transformed, with perhaps a short majority in favor of the alayavijnana. In the context of Dharmakirti’sidealistic” version of the asrayaparivrtti, Sakyabuddhi, Karnakagomin and Vinitadeva identify the asraya with the alayavijnana,313 and so do Manorathanandin, Prajnakaragupta and Ravigupta (the latter two as the second term of an alternative) in the framework of the master’s “realist” soteriology in the second chapter of the PV.39 Contrary

to this, Devendrabuddhi, Prajnakaragupta and Ravigupta (the latter two as the first term of an alternative) interpret asraya as the defiled mind,40 or simply as the mental continuum (cittasantana).41 The same apparent anarchy predominates in the commentators’ interpretation of parivrtti/paravrtti. Whereas Sakyabuddhi and Karnakagomin do not comment on this term, Vinitadeva explains it as the “elimination of the imprint of the concept of a subject and an object”;42 Prajnakaragupta and Ravigupta, as “complete purification” (parisuddhatva); as for Manorathanandin, he glosses “transforms itself” by “changes itself into a mental continuum dissociated from the defilements due to the cessation of its defiled condition.”43 Finally, Dharmakirti’s commentators hold different opinions as regards the doctrinal meaning or consequence of the dsrdydpdrivrtti (as a compound): “the mind’s having the path for its essence/nature” according to Devendrabuddhi,44 and “the elimination of the obstructions (consisting in the defilements and the obstructions to the knowable object)” (avaranavigama) according to Sakyabuddhi and Karnakagomin.


One is tempted to bring some order into this interpretative cacophony. In the context of Dharmakirti’s idealistic version of the dsrdydpdrivrtti, let us say that his commentators are strongly inclined to interpret the asraya as dlayavijnana. In the context of Dharmakirti’s “realist” version of the transformation of the basis, they seem to favor an interpretation of asraya in terms of citta(santana'). Needless to say, these explanations are difficult to disambiguate. Devendrabuddhi’s explanation seems to correspond best to Dharmakirti’s thought as it is expressed in PV 2: “The basis transforms itself, i.e., the defiled mind has the property never to be produced anew” (rten niyons sugyur par ’gyur nes pa dan bcaspa’i sems sin tu skye ba med pa’i chos canyod).


Breif Conclusion


The results of the present investigation are admittedly disappointing. Not much could be regained from the psychological doctrine underlying Dharmakirti’s idealism. As we have seen, his commentators may have adapted their own positions to the context of the discussion. At any rate, their disagreements prevent us from making their testimony an additional argument in favor of one or the other model of idealism. Disappointing as they may be, these results are, at the same time, interesting for what they reveal of the

Buddhist epistemologists’ way of tackling issues debated within Buddhism as a whole. First, the alayavijnana may have been considered superfluous in the demonstration of mind-only idealism, and a doctrine, at that, which brought more theoretical difficulties than it offered solutions. After all, important as the turn to idealism was in order to provide the aporias of externalism with a solution, the question of which of the alayavijnana or the santanaparinama accounted best for idealism could be deemed secondary. Second, intellectuals whose principal task was to provide arguments in defense of Buddhism may have felt reluctant to dive into the intricacies of Yogacara psychology. The Buddhist epistemologists are champions of Buddhism developing a methodology for inter-confessional debate and not Abhidharma specialists or representatives of the adhyatmavidya in charge of Buddhist doctrine and scriptural exegesis.


Notes 1 On Buddhist idealism, see, e.g., May (1971), Frauwallner (1994, 255-407), Kragh (2013), and Schmithausen (2014). 2 See in particular Arnold (2008), Kellner (2011), Ratie (2015), and Kellner (2015). 3 On the asrayaparivrtti (or -paravrtti), see La Vallee Poussin (1929, 606-612 and 661¬667), Davidson (1985), Sakuma (1990), and Eltschinger (2005). In the sense relevant here (“complete reorientation de l'organisme psycho-physique,” May [1971, 312]; “the fundamental change that spiritual practice or the path to salvation brings about in the person who practices it,” Sakuma [1990, I.164]), the term belongs to the Yogacara tradition (Sakuma [1990, I.32-45]) and, connected to the practice and the result(s) of the path, appears as early as the Bodhisattvabhumi (Sakuma [1990, I.58]). 4 On PV 2.1-7, see Katsura (1984), van Bijlert (1989, 115-150), and Franco (1997, 45¬66). On the meaning and the background of Dharmakirti's “second” definition (PV 2.5cd), see Krasser (2001) and Kataoka (2003). On Dharmakirti's philosophy as a whole, see, e.g., Vetter (1964), Dunne (2004), and Eltschinger (2010). 5 PV 2.5ab (vyavaharenapramanyam sastram mohanivartanam /), together with PVP D5a6-b3/P6a1-6: 0 naji Itar tshad ma nidnespar bya ze na / tha snadkyis ni tshadma nid// dusphyis ’byun ba can gyi don byedpa’i yul can gyi s'espas so // gal te tha snad kyis tshad ma nid rtogs pa yin pa de'i tshe bstan bcos don med pa can yin pa'i phyir / brtsam par bya ba ma yin par ’gyur ro // don med pa can ma yin te / gan gi phyir / bstan bcos rmons pa zlog byed yin // ’jugpar byed pa’i tshad ma’i mtshan nid mi s'espar jug pa na slu ba srid pa’iphyir ro // ’jugpar dod pas jugpa las snar tshad ma dan der snan ba dag gi mtshan nid rtogspar bya ba yin no // [...] rtogs pa po’i tshad ma dan cig sos mi s'es pa ldog par byed pa yin pa de ltar na don med pa ma yin no //.

6 PVin 1 43,12-44,5: so’pi katham sarvajnananam visayam vyatirecayann upaplavetarayoh pramanetaratam bruyad visesabhavat / upaplavavasanavisandhidosad aprabuddhasyapy anasvasikam vyavaharam utpasyann ekam apramanam acaksita (/) aparam a samsaram avis'listanubandham drdhavasanatvad iha vyavaharavisamvadapeksaya pramanam / samvyavaharikasya caitatpramanasya rupam uktam (/) atrapi pare mudha visamvadayanti lokam iti / cintamayim eva tu prajnam anusilayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapayi paramarthikapramanam abhimukhikurvanti /. See also Vetter (1966, 101) and Krasser (2005, 142-144). 7 PVTi D264b5-6: rnam par rig par smra ba ni ’jig rten pa’i tshad ma dan tshad ma ma yin pa'i ran bzin dpyad na bag chags brtan pa dan mi brtan pa tsam rgyu mtshan ne bar len to //. “When he analyzes the nature of ordinary valid cognition and non-valid cognition (*laukikapramanapramana?), the idealist (*vijnaptivadin?) acknowledges as a criterion (*nimitta) the mere persistence or non-persistence of the imprint (*vasanadardhyadardhyamatra?) [of a given cognition].” According to Dharmottara (PVinTDh D166b6-7/P194b6-7 and D167a2-4/P195a2-5), by “persistent” (drdha) is meant an imprint that (1) brings about a cognition in which (pseudo-)things such as blue or water appear, and (2) “nourishes” (rgyaspar byed pa) the imprint of a cognition in which appears the arthakriya, the *sadhy(arth)a or the phala of what appeared in the first cognition (blue, water, etc.). In other words, a persistent imprint is one that successively (kramena) generates the cognition of an object and the cognition of the result of this object. It is in this sense that one should understand Dharmakirti’s statement to the effect that this imprint prolongs itself without being cut from the cognition of its result. In contradistinction to this, an adrdhavasana only gives rise to the first cognition, but does not feed the other vasana, hence does not give rise to the cognition of the result. See also PVinTDh D166b4-5/P194b3-4, PVinTjft D201b7-202a1/P239b5 and Mikogami (1989, 31-37).

8jinendrabuddhi is inclined to contrast conventional and supermundane (means of) valid cognition(s) (vyavahari.ka and lokottarapramana, PST MS B 258b6-7 on PS[V] 6, in fine, PST 1 74,14-75,3 on PSV ad 1.[1.]9d2). Contrary to that of a conventional (means of) valid cognition, the object (in this context, bhagavato dharmah) of a supermundane (means of) valid cognition is to be personally realized (pratyatmavedya) (PST MS B 258b6-7). 9 According to PVT Je D114b7/P135b5 = PVSVT 211,7, or, according to Sankaranandana’s PVTi D264a4-6, the distinction between valid cognition and pseudo-(valid cognition), or sensory cognitions’ being included into valid cognition fipramanantarbhava?'). 10 The idealist can define causal efficacy as a notification in which burning and cooking appear (arthakriya dahapakadinirbhasavijnaptilaksana, PVT Je D115a2-3/ P135b7-8 = PVSVT 211,11-12; see also PVTi D264a6-b1). In this perspective, a cognition having the appearance of fire or water (agnijalanirbhasa) has the capacity to bring about a cognition in which burning or cooking appear (dahapakadinirbhasavijnanotpadanasamartha, PVT Je D115a4-6/P136a2-4 ~ PVSVT 211,16-18). 11 PVSV 50,16-51,5: asaktir esam vikalpanam avidyaprabhavat / [...] avidyodbhavad viplavatve caksurvijnanadisv api prasangah / na / tasya vikalpalaksanatvat / vikalpa eva hy avidya / sa svabhavenaiva viparyasyati / naivam indriyajnanani vikalpani / na va tesv apy esa doso dvayanam dvayanirbhasad iti vaksyamah / sarvesam viplave ’pi pramanatadabhasavyavastha a asrayaparivrtter arthakriyayogyabhimatasamvadanat / mithyatve ’piprasamanukulatvat [...] /. See also Vetter (1964, 37) and Dunne (1996, 529-535). 12 PVT Je D115a1-2/P135b6-7 ~ PVSVT 211,9-10: asrayaparavrtteh purvamPVy sarvadArthakriyayogyabhimatasamvadanat pramanyavyavastha [...] /. 13 See PVT Je D115a6-7/P136a4-6 - PVSVT 211,18-20. 14 See PVT Je D115a7-b1/P136a7 = PVSVT 211,22 and PVT Je D251b4/P299a2 = PVSVT 400,27 (on PVSV 111,5). 15 According to PVSVT 211,22-23: anat-madiaamanyakarena vastu grhitva bhavayatam

bhavananispattav anatmadisvalaksanapratyaksikarena ragadiprahanat. To be compared with PVT Je D115b1/P136a7-8. 16 Note, e.g., PVinTjn D202a1-2/P239b6-7: ’khor ba kun tu ni thams cad mkhyen pa nid ma thobpa’am mya nan las ’daspar ma zugs kyi bar duo // mi slu ba dan mi ’brel par jug pa’i phyir ro //. ‘“As long as the samsara is lasting,' i.e., before obtaining omniscience (*sarvajnata?') or before entering nirvana, because [from then on, epistemic validity] proceeds without any connection [whatsoever] with reliability (*avisamvadasambaddha?').” See also PVinTDh D167a2/P195a2.

17 PVinTDh D167a5-6/P195a7-8: gal te thams cad mkhyen pa’i mkhyen pa la ltos na sespa ’di thams cad slu ba yin pa de ltar na yan ’khor ba di na thar pa’i sna rol du byispa’i skye bos byas pa’i tha snadgan yin pa de la mi slu ba de la ltos nas tshad ma yin gyi sans rgyaspa nid kyi gnas skabs la ltos pa ni ma yin no //. 18 The “realist” model (implicit at PVSV 110,15-111,11; explicit at PV 2.205-210) is directly inspired from Sautrantika conceptions as they can be found in Vasubandhu's AKBh (63,20-23; 93,25-26; 232,25-27). Adapted to the realist epistemology that underlies PV 2, this model interprets the asrayaparivrtti as the definitive eradication (niranvayavinas'a) of the defilements: Inasmuch as the yogin's practice of the counteracting path (pratipaksa[[[marga]]]) has eliminated them together with their seed (bija) or trace/after-effect (vasanaya saha), these defilements cannot (avibhutva) affect the mental continuum anymore, which has now become essentially incompatible (viruddha’ etc.) with them. Even if they were capable of it (sakta, sakti, samartha), they would have no more chance to develop (praroha) there than fire on a wet ground. In order to demonstrate this impossibility, Dharmakirti resorts to Sautrantika epistemology and reinterprets accordingly the canonical topos of the mind's natural radiance (prakrtiprabhasvarata). At the completion of the path, the mind/thought proceeds by force of the real things themselves (vastubalapravrtta) insofar as it is generated by these very things casting (arpana) their most genuine/real aspects (selflessness, impermanence, etc.) onto it. This is tantamount to saying that the mind/thought now essentially and entirely consists (satmibhava, svabhava, etc.) in the perception of selflessness (nairatmyadars'ana) and cannot host the painful and adventitious (agantuka) defilements anymore. Born from ignorance/nescience defined as the personalistic false view/wrong belief (satkayadrsti) and erroneous perception, these defilements are rooted in the imprint of erroneous concepts (vitathavikalpavasana) and superimposition (samaropa). Inasmuch as they do not proceed by force of the real things themselves, they are not corroborated by the means of valid cognition (pramana). On ignorance/nescience in Dharmakirti's writings, see Eltschinger (2009 [2010]) and (2010 [2011]).

19 For a translation, see Schmithausen (1967, 127-128) and Franco (1994, 371). 20 PV 3.522: sakrd vijatiyajatav apy ekena patiyasa / cittenahitavaigunyad alayan nanyasambhavah //. 21 PV 3.396-397ad1: tatrapi dhumabhasa dhih prabodhapatuvasanam / gamayed

agninirbhasam dhiyam eva napavakam // tadyogyavasanagarbha eva dhumavabhasinim vyanakti cittasantano dhiyam [...] //. Here is Lambert Schmithausen's German translation (1967, 127): “Auch in diesem Fall konnte (es doch so sein, dafi) die Erkenntnis, in der Rauch erscheint, nicht (reales) Feuer erscheinen lafit, sondern nur (die Tatsache, dafi) das Residuum einer Erkenntnis, in der Feuer erscheint, (genugend) Intensitat fur die Aktualisierung besitzt. (Denn) nur ein Erkenntnisstrom, der ein fur die (Erzeugung einer Feuererkenntnis) geeignetes Residuum enthalt, manifestiert eine Erkenntnis, in der Rauch erscheint.”

22 PV 3.217: yathasvapratyayapeksad avidyopaplutatmanam / vijnaptir vitathakara jayate timiradivat //. Here is Tilmann Vetter's German Translation (1964, 70): “Bei Leuten, die durch die Unwissenheit (avidya) getauscht sind, entsteht eine Erkenntnis, die eine irrige Form zeigt, in Abhangigkeit von einer jeweils eigenen Ursache wie bei einem Timirakranken.”

23 Undefiled ignorance is defined by Sakyabuddhi (ad loc.) as one's adherence to an object and a subject (PVT ne D205b2/P253b2—3: non monspa can ma yin pa’i mi ses pa ni gzun ba dan dzinpar mnonpar zenpa’o //). Cf. Vibh. 183, n. 4: grahyagrahakabhinivistanam. 24 Cf. PVVM 183,22: aprahinaklistajnananampumsam.

25 Note Sakyabuddhi's explanation in PVT ne D205b3/P253b3—4: ci’iphyiryul nespa la sogs pa’i sgo nas jug par ’gyur ze na zes bya ba ni phyi rol gyi don la bltos pa med pa yin na yul dan dus la sogs pa thams cad du rnam par rig pa thob po snam du sems so //. “[While thinking:] ‘If the notification does not depend on an external object,' [our opponent] has the following in mind: If there is no dependence on an external object, the notification would take place everywhere and everytime.” This addresses, of course, the same type of issue as Vs 2.


26 Cf. Vibh. 183, n. 4: santanaparinama utpattinimittam.

27 PVP D195a2—5/P227b5—228a2: gzugs la sogs pa la don dam pa bzin du mthon bar byed pa’i rnam rig de bzin min rnampar/ /skye ’gyur ro // gan dag ce na / ma rig pas bcom bdag nid can // so so'i skye bo non mons pa can ma yin pa'i mi ses pa ma spans pa can gyi'o // 'dis ni phyin ci log tu snan ba'i rgyu bstan to // [.] gal te rnam par rig pa phyi rol gyi don la bltos pa med pa yin na / ci’i phyir yul nes pa la sogs pa’i sgo nas ’jugpar ’gyur ze na / ji lta’i ran rkyen la ltos” nas zes bya ba smos te / [.] phyi rol gyi don la ltosa pa med na yan rnam par rig pa ran dban gis jug pa yin no // o na ci yin ze na / rnam par rigpa la la’i rgyud yons su gyur pa ’ga’ zig skye ba'i rgyu mtshan yin no //. aD : P bltos.

28 PV 3.336: kasyacit kincid evantarvasanayah prabodhakam / tato dhiyam viniyamo na bahyarthavyapeksaya //. Here is Tilmann Vetter's German translation (1964, 81): “Irgendetwas weckt den inneren Eindruck (antarvasana) fur irgendetwas. Dadurch besteht der Zwang (viniyamah) der Erknenntnisse, nicht aber durch Abhangigkeit von einem aufieren Gegenstand.”

29 Note PVT ne D220b4—5/P271b7: skad cig ma re re’i nus pa’i ran bzin gzan dan gzan gyis te / skad cig ma khyad par can phyi ma phyi ma gzan skyed par byas pas so //. 30 PVP D223a4-6/P261b7-262a-2: de Itar naa’dir ’ga’ ziggi tshe snon po la sogspa mthon ba’i 'ga’zig rnam par ses pa ni nan gi bag chags rab tu sad par byed pa yin gyi thams cad ni ma yin no // desb na ses pa gan gis skad cig ma re re la nus pa'i ran bzin gzanc dan gzan gyisd rnam par ses pa yons su gyur pa ne bar 'groe ba naf ses pa rab tu sad par byed pa 'byun bar 'gyur ba gan yin pa de'i dban gis de dan de skye barg 'gyur ba* thams cad ni ma yin no // de ltar na rab tu sadpar byed dephyir blo ni rnam nes kyi1 //phyi roldon ltosl mayin no //. aD : P ni. bD : P de. cD, PVT : P om. gzan’ Agyis em. (PVT) : DP gyi. egro em. (PVT) : DP ’pro. fI am inclined to emend ni (DP) into na on the basis of PVT ne bar gro ba ni kun gzi zes bya ba’i rnampar sespa’i bdag nid du byed pa na’o. gP : D skyed par’ hP : D kyis’ ‘D : P bltos. *de’i dban gis de dan de skye bar ’gyur ba is somehow reminiscent of Tr 18cd (.. ,-vasad.... sa sa

31 PVT ne D220b2-3/P271b4-8: ’ga’zig rnampar ses pa ni zes bya ba ni ’jugpa’i rnam par ses pa las gan yan run ba'o //. 32 *sahakaribhuta and *utpitsu in PVT ne D220b4/P271b6. 33 PVT ne D220b3/P271b5: nangi bag chags ses bya ba ni kun gzi rnam par ses pa laa gnas pa'i nus pa'o //. aD: P las. 34 PVT ne D220b3/P271b5-6: rab tu sadpar byed pa ni khyad par can gyi rnam par ses pa bskyed.”par bya ba la nuspa thogspa med pa skyed par byed pa’o //. aD: P skyed.’ bD: Ppar.

35 Note Vibh. 220, n. 4: alayaparinateh sahakarijnanam. 36 PVT ne D220b5/P271b7: yons su gyurpa zes bya ba ni ’bras bu skyed pa’i mtshan nid do //. 37 Leaving Sankaranandana’s PVTi D264a6-b1 out of consideration. 38 Respectively asrayo bhrantibijam alayavijnanam (PVSVT 211,8-9), gnas pa ni kun gzi rnam par sespa’i ’khrul pa’i sa bon can no (PVT je D115a1/P135b6), kun gzi rnam par ses pa'i mtshan nid can (SAST 69,4-5). 39 Respectively asrayasya cittasantanasyalayasya va (PVAS 142,30-31), sems kyi rgyud dam kun gzi pa (PVVR pe D376a5-6), as'rayah kles'avasanabhutam alayavijnanam (PVVM 81,15-16). On Prajnakaragupta’s alaya, note Yamari’s explanation (PVATY be D224a3-4), which alludes to the *yogacaragama (rnal ’byor spyod pa’i lun); see also PVATJ de D341b1-2.

40 PVP D87a5/P100a8b1: nes pa dan bcas pa’i sems ('sadosa-/dosavaccittd!)’ Concerning PVA and PVVR, see the preceding footnote. 41 PVAS 142,30-31: parisuddhatvam bhavati; PVVR pe D376a5-6: yons su dag pa'i (em. : D dga' ba'i) no bo nid. 42 SAST 69,5-6: gzun ba dan 'dzin par rnam par rtog pa'i bag chags span ba yin no (*grahyagrahakavikalpavasanaprahana?). 43 PVVM 81,16-17: parivartate klistadasanirodhat klesavisamyuktacittaprabandhatmana parinamati. I am inclined to understand citta in the sense of the classical Yogacara’s eighth vijnana. 44 PVP D87a5/P100b1: lam de'i bdag nid la sems gnas par 'gyur ro.


Abbreviations


AK(Bh) Abhidharmakosa(bhasya) (Vasubandhu), ed. Pradhan, Prahlad (1975; first edition, 1967). Abhidharmakosabhasyam of Vasubandhu.’ Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute. AP Alambanapartksa (Dignaga). See Frauwallner 1930. D sDe dge edition of the Tibetan bsTan ’gyur, ed. Takasaki, Jikido; Yamaguchi, Zuiho; Ejima, Yasunori (1981ff.). sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka bsTan hgyur, Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo. KSi Karmasiddhiprakarana (Vasubandhu), Tibetan version, ed. Lamotte, Etienne (1935-1936). “Las grub pa’i rab tu byed pa’’ Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 4: 183-205. P Peking edition of the Tibetan bsTan ’gyur, ed. Suzuki, Daisetz T. (1957). The Tibetan Tripitaka. Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of Otani University, Kyoto’ Tokyo-Kyoto: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute. PST 1 Pramanasamuccayattka (Jinendrabuddhi), ed. Steinkellner, Ernst;

Krasser, Helmut; Lasic, Horst (2005). Jinendrabuddhi’s Visalamalavati Pramanasamuccayattka, Chapter 1. Part I: Critical Edition. Beijing and Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House and Austrian Academy of Sciences Press.

PST MS B Pramanasamuccayattka (Jinendrabuddhi). Sanskrit Manuscript “B” as described in Steinkellner, Ernst; Krasser, Helmut; Lasic, Horst (2005). Jinendrabuddhi’s Visalamalavati Pramanasamuccayattka, Chapter 1. Part II: Diplomatic Edition (with a Manuscript Description by Anne MacDonald). Beijing and Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House and Austrian Academy of Sciences, pp. ix-xxxvi. PV 2-4 Pramanavarttika, Chapters 2-4 (Dharmakirti), ed. Miyasaka, Yusho (1971¬ 1972). “Pramanavarttika-karika (Sanskrit and Tibetan).” Acta Indologica 2: 1-206. PVAQ Pramanavarttikalahkara (Prajnakaragupta), ed. Ono, Motoi (2000). Prajnakaraguptas Erklarung der Definition gultiger Erkenntnis (Pramanavarttikalamkara zu Pramanavarttika II1-7). Teil I: Sanskrit- Text und Materialien. Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften.

PVAS Pramanavarttikalahkara (Prajnakaragupta), ed. Sankrtyayana, Rahula (1953). Pramanavarttikabhasyam of Varttikalahkarah of Prajnakaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttikam). Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute. PVATJ Pramanavarttikalahkarattka (Jayanta), D no. 4222, De 1-Ne 312a7. PVATY Pramanavarttikalahkarattka (Yamari), D no. 4226, Phe 174b1-Tse 251a7. 

Pramanaviniscaya, Chapter 1 (Dharmakirti), ed. Steinkellner, Ernst (2007). Dharmakirti’s Pramanaviniscaya, Chapters 1 and 2’ Beijing and Vienna: China Tibetology Publishing House and Austrian Academy of Sciences Press. Pramanavinis'cayatika (Dharmottara), D no. 4229, Dze 1-289a7 and D no. 4227, Tshe 1-178a3; P no. 5752, Dze 1-We 209b8. Pramanavinis'cayatika (Jnanasribhadra), D no. 4228, Tshe 178b4-295a7; P no. 5728, We 209b8-355a6. Pramanavarttikapanjika (Devendrabuddhi), D no. 4217, Che 1-380; P no. 3717b, Che 1-390a8. Pramanavarttikasvavytti (Dharmakirti), ed. Gnoli, Raniero (1960). The Pramanavarttika of Dharmakirti, the First Chapter With the Autocommentary. Text and Critical Notes. Roma: Istituto Italiano Per Il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente. Pramanavarttikasvavyttitika (Karnakagomin), ed. Sankrtyayana, Rahula (1982). Karnakagomins Commentary on the Pramanavarttika of DharmakirtiKyoto: Rinsen Books (reprint of the Allahabad edition, 1943).

Pramanavarttikatika (Sakyabuddhi), D no. 4220, Je \~Ne 282a7; P no. 5718, Je 1-Ne 348a8. Pramanavarttikatika (Sankaranandana), D no. 4223, Pe 1-293a7. Pramanavarttikavytti (Manorathanandin), ed. Sankrtyayana, Rahula (1938-1940). “Dharmakirti’s Pramanavarttika with Commentary by Manorathanandin.” Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24-26: Appendix. Pramanavarttikavytti (Ravigupta), D no. 4225, Pe293b1-398a7. Santanantarasiddhi (Dharmakirti), ed. Scerbatskoj, F.I. (1992). Tibetskij perevod” socinenij Samtanantarasiddhi Dharmakirti i Samtanantarasiddhitika Vinitadeva. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass (reprint of the Petrograd’’ edition, 1916). Santanantarasiddhitika (Vinitadeva). See SAS.

Tibetan version.

Trimsika Vijnaptimatratasiddhih (Vasubandhu), ed. Buescher, Hartmut (2007). Sthiramati’s Trimsikavijnaptibhasya. Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and its Tibetan Translation. Vienna: Verlag der Osterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Vibhuticandra’s notes on PVV. See PVVM. Vimsika Vijnaptimatratasiddhih (Vasubandhu), ed. Levi, Sylvain (1925). Vijnaptimatratasiddhi, deux traites de Vasubandhu: Vimsatika et TrimsikaParis: Librairie Ancienne Honore Champion.


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[[Category:]Dharmakīrti]