Dharmakirti against the pudgala

by Vincent Eltschinger / Isabelle Ratie

The rise to prominence of the VatsTputriyas and especially the SainmitTyas, two Buddhist sects noted for their defence of a “person” (pudgala) that cannot be said (avakatavya, avacya) to be either the same or different from the constituents (skandha), is very likely to have aroused a heated controversy as regards the ontological status of the pudgala, the Buddha's didactic intentions while referring to it as well as its soteriological relevance. Taking into the

consideration the fact that the Sainmitiyas had become, by the middle of the 7th century, the numerically most important among the Buddhist Sravakayanist denominations, this contro¬versy raises very interesting sociohistorical and methodological questions as regards the use of such categories as “orthodoxy” and “heterodoxy” in the Indian Buddhist context. And indeed, the anti-Personalist doctors showed no unanimity as to whether their Pudgalaviadin opponents were co-religionists (svayuathya ) or not, i.e. genuine Buddhists (bauddha ) capable of obtaining the highest fruit of religious life, or rather pseudo-, purely nominal Buddhist (saugatammanya ) espousing the outsiders' doctrines (antascaratirthika, “outsiders from within” ). Extant Sanskrit and/or (translational) Tibetan literature records three

main testimonies concerning the pudgala controversy, all of which reflect the anti-Personalist side: Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosabhasya (AKBh), Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara (MAV 244,1-288,9) and Kamalasila's commentary (Tattvasangrahapanjika, TSPS 159,16- 166,18/TSPK125,16-131,9) on Santaraksita's Tattvasangraha (TS 336-349). Whereas the latter two have received comparatively little attention, the so-called ninth chapter of the AKBh thas been made the object of several editions, translations, summaries and studies. However, probably due to both the institutional importance of the Saam. mitaiyas and the doctrinal as well as soteriological relevance of the topic, the controversy over Personalism did attract the attention of several other outstanding Buddhist scholars, and it left traces in parts of their works. This is the case of the Mahaayaanasuatraalannkaara (MSA 18.92-103) and its Bhaa.sya (MSABh 154,27-160,6), of Dharmakairti's Pramaan. avaarttika (PVSV 147,2-148,5 and PV 2.202-204) and of Bhaaviveka/Bhavya's

Madhyamakah.rdayakaarikaa (MHK 3.90-93). Now, these allegedly minor testimonies have remained either entirely neglected (MSA[Bh]) or largely unnoticed (PVSV/PV 2, MHK 3.90-93). This disdain is unjustified in at least two cases: the MSA(Bh) presents many interesting arguments, and although a number of them do not recur in Vasubandhu's polemical tract, it is a likely source of AKBh 9; as for the PVSV, it presents us with an entirely new line of argument (that, however, left hardly any trace in subsequent epistemological literature). One of the two authors of this study has dealt with MSA(Bh) 18.92-103 elsewhere. The present essay focuses on Dharmakairti's anti-Personalist arguments in PVSV 147,2-148,5 and PV 2.202-204. The immediate context and doctrinal background of PVSV 147,2¬148,5

To the best of our knowledge, Dharmakairti alludes nowhere explicitly to the pudgala. How to make sure, then, that PVSV 147,2-148,5 is directed against the (or at least one version

of the) pudgalavada? Let us distinguish here between external and internal criteria. Exter¬9nal criteria exhaust themselves in the fact that Dharmakirti's commentators Sakyabuddhi and Karn. akagomin are unanimous in holding this passage as a piece of polemics against the pudgala. Besides their introductory objection, both of them consistently explain Dharmakirti's anaphoras (tad, etc.) as referring either to the pudgala or the skandhas (quite often: rupadi). Among the internal criteria, let us mention first that significant parts of Dharmakirti's terminology are reminiscent of traditional discussions about the

pudgala. Thus the word avacya (PVSV 147,6, 7, 15, 148,4), highly characteristic - especially in the context of the treatment of identity (tattva) and otherness (anyat[t]va) -, clearly echoes the Pudgalaviadins' avaktavya/avaacya; so does the allusion to upaadaana (PVSV 147,23), which is to be interpreted in a sense closer to the notion of upadayaprajnapti (“designation- on-the-basis-of”) than to that of upaadaana as “material cause” found in the Abhidharmic theory of causality. Moreover, the opponent's recourse to causality (PVSV 147,5-12) as a means of demonstrating that a certain entity (the effect) cannot be said to be either identical with or different from another one (the cause) is certainly reminiscent of the MSA(Bh)'s and the AKBh's lengthy digressions on the relationship between fuel (indhana, etc.) and

fire (agni, etc.). We take it for granted, then, that PVSV 147,2-148,5 is to be interpreted as a critique of the (or a version of the) pudgalavada. Yet the passage shows significant differences with respect to previous attempts to refute Personalism. Making an exhaustive list of these differences and systematically examining them is far beyond the scope of this article, but a brief summary of the passage's context and structure may be of help in understanding how Dharmakirti's strategy in the pudgala controversy departs from that of his predecessors.

The discussion over the pudgala occurs in the context of the inference of the fact that things perish at every single moment (vinasitvanumana). While explaining the reason of this inference, i.e. the fact that things' destruction is spontaneous or causeless (ahetuka), Dharmakirti specifies that stating this reason does not amount to seeing destruction as a property which would come to belong to the perishing entity. When saying that a thing's destruction is causeless (a formula seemingly implying that the thing and its destruction are ontologically distinct), the proponent of causeless destruction only makes use of an artificial distinction so as to make clear that there is no cause for destruction, for the use of an

expression such as “the x of y” does not necessarily imply that x and y are distinct real entities. The opponent objects that Dharmakirti, who has repeatedly stated that an

tity itself ] (PV 1.276). An entity, once produced, does not receive [its] destruction from [anything] else [i.e. from any cause of destruction], for it is produced itself as being exactly such [i.e. as possessing a transient nature]. Thus when one wishes to know just this [i.e. when one wonders whether the destruction of an entity comes from something else or not],a by indicating the [transient] nature of this entity in order to negate a {Wiki|distinct} property [i.e. destruction] that [would] depend on something else, it is [in fact nothing but this] nature that [we] describe in those terms (tatha), but this we

do after distinguishing through [[[Wikipedia:conceptual|conceptual]]] thought a property [i.e. destruction] from a property-bearer as if [this property were] something [really] distinct [from it]. [And] this is precisely what (tad etat)b dull-witted [[[people]] erroneously] construe (aaropya) as a [[[Wikipedia:distinct|distinct]]] property [consisting in] destruction, [subsequently construing] its existence as well [and its being] either with or without a cause, [as these people are] led astray by the mere words[: ‘The entity's destruction occurs'] because they have seen, in a certain [other] case [i.e. in such words as ‘the king's servant'c that it is] so,

[i.e. that such a statement refers to two distinct entities. In so doing] they perplex themselves with [idle] ontological considerations (bhavacinta) of unfounded truth.” a According to PVT Je D323a5/P395a6-7 « PVSVT 521,28-29: bhavasyanyasmat kirn vinaso bhavati na veti*...*veti em. PVT (... 'gyur ram 'on te...): ceti Ed. bNote PVT Je D323a6/P395a8-b1 « PVSVT 521,31-522,10: tad etad ... bhavad* avyatiriktam nasitvam tattvato vyavasthapitam ... *bhavad em. PVT (d'nos po las): abhavad Ed. “Precisely that de¬struction that has been determined as not being really distinct from the [perishing] entity [itself].”

cPVT. Je D323a7/P395b2 = PVSVT 522,12-13: rajnah purusa ityadau vyatirekavibhakti*prayoge tathadarsanat sambandhinor vibhaagadarssanaat /. *Note PVT. tha dad pa'i rten can rnam par dbye ba, “case-endings that possess a distinct basis.” “Because they have seen, in a use of the case-endings [conveying] a distinction, such as: ‘the king's servant', [that it is] so [i.e. that there is] a distinction between the two correlates.” On the use of the genitive vyatirekavibhakti when there is no real difference, see fn. 19.

(19) PVSV 32,18-33,5 (together with PV 1.60): nanu ca vacyavisesabhavat sanketabhedo 'py ayukto dvayor ekaabhidhaanaat / tathaa ca vyatirekin. yaa vibhakter ayogas tasyaa bhedaassrayatvaat / dvayor ekaabhidhaane 'pi vibhaktir vyatirekini / bhinnam artham ivanveti vacye lesavisesatah // na vai sabdanam kacid visayasvabhavayatta vrttir icchato vrttyabhavaprasangat / te yatha vyatirikte 'vyatirikte va prayoktum i.syante tathaa niyuktaas tam artham apratibandhena prakaassayanti / tena gaur gotvam ityekaarthaabhidhaane 'pi kasyacid visesasya pratyayanartham krte sanketabhede vyatiriktartha vibhaktir

arthantaram ivadarsayanta pratibhaaty anarthaantare 'pi tathaaprayogadarssanaabhyaasaat / na taavataa sarvatra bhedah. / anyatraapi puru.secchaavassaat prav.rttasya pratibandhaabhaavaat / yathaikam. kvacid ekavacanena khyaapyate tadavisse.se 'pi gauravaadikhyaapanaartham. bahuvacanena /. “Objection (nanu ca): since the [thing] signified [by the two words ‘property' and ‘property-bearer'] is the same (visse.saabhaava), even a distinct convention is improper, for these two [words] refer to one [and the same thing]. And thus[, since the property and the property¬bearer are not distinct things according to you], a

[[[Wikipedia:genitive|genitive]]] case-ending conveying a distinctiona is improper, because [the use of] this [case-ending] presupposes (aassraya) a [real] distinction. [Answer:] Even though the [two words expressing the property and the property-bearer] refer to one [and the same thing], the [[[Wikipedia:genitive|genitive]]] case-ending, which [usually] conveys a distinction, shows (anveti, gl. darsayati) the object as [if it were] distinct because ofthe slight difference [brought] into the signified [by a distinct convention, and not because of any real difference]. (PV 1.60) The reference of words is certainly never (na ... ssabdaanaam. kaacid ... v.rttih. ) based on the [intrinsic] nature of the [external] objects, for it would follow that reference would not be [made] arbitrarily. These [words are] employed

in the way one wishes to use [them, be it] with regard to [something] distinct[, as when one says: ‘the king's servant',] or with regard to [something that is] not distinct[, as when one says: ‘It is the self that is the seer of the self', and they] manifest this object without any restriction (apratibandhena). Therefore, even though the [two words] ‘cow' [for the property-bearer and] ‘cowness' [for the property] refer to one [and the same] thing, when a specific convention is made in order to make known a certain difference,b the [[[Wikipedia:genitive|genitive]]] case-ending whose object is [usually] distinct appears and

entity x is subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to an entity y,* must admit that destruction is either distinct from the entity that perishes (but then destruction should be perceived as a distinct entity, which is not the case) or identical with it (but then nothing can happen to this entity that is destruction itself ): whatever the case, how can the entity ever perish? Dharmakirti answers that in fact the alternative between identity and otherness only applies to the arising of something real possessed of a distinct nature. As a consequence it cannot concern destruction itself, for the proponent of causeless destruction does not assert the existence of a distinct property called “destruction” but only

the fact that the entity itself does not exist. Destruction only appears to be endowed with a nature of its own when we say that it is causeless, but the activity (vyapara) expressed by any verbal root (i.e. here, the activity consisting in existing) can only belong to an entity endowed with functionalities, so that destruction cannot be considered the real agent of the verb “to be”. Thus when we say that a hare's horn is a non-existence, far

from asserting the hare's horn existence, we actually intend to deny the existence of the hare's horn; accordingly, the statement “destruction is causeless” is not the affirmation that destruction exists as a real entity but the negation of its having a cause. Dharmakirti concludes that only a real entity x (i.e. only an entity possessing a nature of its own, which is not the case of destruction) is subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to y.

The Pudgalavadin enters the stage at this point, objecting that the pudgala is not sub-

(24) PVSV 146,11-147,2 (together with PV 1.278ab): tasmad yasya naso bhavatity ucyate sa svayam eva na bhavatity uktam syat / na vai ghosasamyad visayantaradrsto vidhih sarvatra yojanam arhati / na hi gadarbha iti namakaranad baleyadharma manusye 'pi samyojyah / tatha na caitrasya putro bhavatity atra dr..s.to vidhir nasse 'pi virodhat / evam. c abhidhane 'pi prayojanam aveditam eva / atah. / bhave hy e.sa vikalpah. syad vidher vastvanurodhatah. / bhavo 'vassyam. bhavantam apek.sate / sa ca svabhava eva / nih. svabh avasya kvacid vy apare sam avess abhavat / vy apara iti hi tathabh utasvabh

avotpattih. / sa nih. svabh avasya katham. syat / katham idanlm bhavaty abhavah sasavisa-nam ityadivyavaharah / na vai sasavisa/nam kimcid bhavatity ucyate / api tv evam asya na bhavatlti bhavapratisedha eva kriyate / api ca / vyavahartara eva etad evam. vyap aravad iva samaropy adarssayanti prakaran. ena kenacit / na tu tat tath a / sarvarthavivecanam. hi tatra tattvam. na kasyacit samavessah. / na khalv evam. vin asso vastuni tadbhav at / as av api yadi vakt.rbhir evam khyapyate na tu svayam tatha tada na kimcid bhavatltlstam eva / tasmat svayam bhavan svabhavo vikalpadvayam. n ativartate tattvam anyattvam

iti /. “Therefore one must say that it is the [[[entity]]] the destruction of which is said to ‘exist' that does not exist itself. It is certainly not the case that, on the grounds of a [mere] similarity in wording, the affirmation (vidhi, bya ba) observed in another case [such as: ‘Caitra's son'] can be applied to every case [i.e., to ‘the thing's destruction' too]. Indeed, the properties of an ass (baleya) cannot be applied to a human being as well [merely] on the grounds that [a certain person] is named ‘Gardabha (= ass)'; in the same way, the affirmation (vidhi, bya ba)a that is observed in the [statement]:

‘Caitra's son exists' (caitrasya putro bhavatlti) [does] not [apply] to [the case of] destruction as well,b because it is contradictory. And although the [[[verbal]]] expression is [grammatically] the same (evam), [its real] purpose (prayojana, dgohs pa) has been presented [above].c Therefore: this alternative [between identity and otherness] can [only] concern the [coming into] existence [of something real], because activity (vidhi) necessarily belongs (anurodha) to something real (PV 1.278ab). [Coming into] existence necessarily requires [something] that comes into existence, and this [can] only [be] a

nature, for that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity (vyapara). For [what we call] an ‘activity' is [nothing but] the arisal of such a nature; [but] how could this [arisal] pertain to [something] that lacks a nature[, i.e. destruction]? [Objection:] Now, [if that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity,] how [do you explain] a usage such as ‘a hare's horn is a non-existence' ? [Answer:] One certainly does not say that a hare's horn is something; rather, [when] thus [stating that a hare's horn is a non-existence,] one simply negates the existence of this [hare's horn by saying]

that [it] does not exist. Moreover, it is the speakers who, according to the context [of discussion such as: ‘Is the hare's horn non-existence or is it not?', erroneously] construe and present this [hare's horn] thus [i.e. as the agent of existence in the sentence: ‘The hare's horn is a non-existence'] as if it had an activity; but it is not so.d Being devoid of [the nature of] any object is the true nature of this (tatra) [hare's horn, and] nothing [unreal] engages in [an activity such as coming into existence].e [But our opponent] certainly does not [admit] destruction [to be] such[, i.e. characterized as void of the nature of any ob ject , like a hare's horn or the son of a barren woman], because [according to him] this [property] exists [i.e. arises] in

the entity. Even though (yadi... tu) the [ordinary] speakers present this very [destruction that our opponent considers thus] in the same way [as having an activity when they say that it ‘exists', they] do acknowledge that it iself is not so [i.e. that it does not have arisal as a property],f [and] therefore that it is nothing. Therefore if it exists by itself [i.e. in a non-superimposed way],g the nature [of an entity] cannot escape these two [mutually] exclusive options (vikalpadvaya), i.e. [either] identity [or] otherness.” aPVSVT. 525,23: vidhir arthantarasya putrasya vidhanam /. “Affirmation, i.e. the

position of a son who is something distinct.” In spite of the Tibetan rendering of vidhi as bya ba (a usual equivalent of Skt. vyapara), here the meaning of vidhi seems more likely to be “affirmation,” although from the next verse onwards it obviously means vy apara (in the sense of the grammatical agent's activity). bPVSVT. 525,24: na bhavasya nasso bhavatlty atr api bh av ad vyatireko nasso vidheyah. /. “In the [statement:] ‘There is a destruction of the entity' as well, destruction is not to be posited as distinct from the entity [itself].” Note that PVT. Je D325a6/P397b7 explicitly refers here to the

genitive (*sasthl) case-endings (de Itar na nag pa'i bu zes bya ba'i nag 'di la tha dad pa'i rten can gyi drug pa [*vyatirekavibhakti.sa.s.thl] sbyar ba dag ni...). cI.e. in PVSV 145,16-17 jected to this alternative since it is neither the same as nor other than the constituents:* 25 it is not identical to them because its nature is distinct from theirs, but it is not other than them because it is causally related to them and because otherness is a mere lack of relation (apratibandha). Dharmakirti criticizes his opponent's notion of causality (which entails that a cause and its effect are neither identical

nor mutually other) while relying on his own analysis of relation (according to which a relation can be either of identity or of causality, the latter obtaining between entities that have distinct natures). He then puts forward his own definition of otherness as the fact that two natures remain unmixed. As a consequence, if, as the Pudgalaviadin contends, the pudgala and the constituents do not have the same nature, there can be no relation between them (except a causality relation that the Pudgalaviadin cannot accept since it concerns entities that are mutually other) and they have distinct properties, so

that they must be mutually other. The opponent attempts to rescue the thesis of a relation between the constituents and the pudgala by explaining that this relation does not lie in a causal connection between them but in some sort of invariable connection between their respective cognitions. Dharmakirti replies by showing that there is no such connection and by arguing that the pudgala, which is not known through a distinct cognition but, according to the Pudgalavaidin himself, “on the basis” of the constituents,

has no nature of its own: if it did it would necessarily appear in a distinct way as an object of cognition. Dharmakirti thus follows the gist of the MSABh or AKBh arguments insofar as he too attacks the Pudgalavaidin's contention that the pudgala is designated on the basis of the constituents by showing that the causal relation assumed between the constituents and the pudgala does not stand critical examination and that the pudgala is not perceived on the basis of the constituents. However he does so with arguments that appear profoundly

renewed insofar as they rest on important innovations of his own system: while his criticism of the relation between the pudgala and the constituents rests on his definition of the so-called natural relation (svabhavapratibandha), his analysis of the pudgala's alleged perception, which shows that the pudgala is no real entity, rests on his elaboration of the notion of anupalabdhi and more importantly, on the equation between existence and functionality (arthakriyaa) and on the idea that any existing entity must have the minimal efficacy consisting in producing a cognitive appearance of itself: the

pudgala is not a real entity precisely because it is devoid of such a power. Here the pudgalavada's critique is instrumental in establishing Dharmakirti's own version of the identity principle (according to which a real entity x must be either the same as or other than a real entity y), or rather, it is instrumental in establishing that this principle only applies to real entities (so that the opponent of the causeless destruction thesis cannot claim that destruction must be subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness

with respect to the perishing entity). However it is worth noting that the TSP adopts the reverse strategy: there the pudgala's ontological status is no longer used to establish the scope of the identity principle; rather, it is the scope of the identity principle that determines the pudgala's ontological status. Thus Santaraksita and Kamalasila endeavour to show that because the identity principle only applies to real entities, the pudgala, which escapes the

alternative between identity and otherness with respect to the constituents, cannot be a real entity. Saying that only a real entity cannot escape the alternative between identity and otherness is tantamount to claiming that something which cannot be stated in terms of identity or otherness can only be unreal or is a pseudo-entity (avastu), and such is (one among) the Buddhist epistemologists' criteria for the old Abhidharmic distinction between “substantially real” (dravyasat) and “real as a designation” (prajnaptisat) so constantly at stake in all the traditional accounts of the pudgala

controversy. How to establish the pervasion ( vyaapti) between the two properties tattvaanyatvaavaacyatva and avastutva? This is what Ssaintaraks. ita is up to in TS 338-342. The argument is formulated as follows in TS 338a2-d: “A real pudgala does not exist, because it cannot be said to be either identical with or other than [another entity], like a water-lily in the sky.” Kamalassiila reformulates his master's argument in the following “formal” application (prayoga): “[[[Vyapti]]:] Whatever cannot be said to be either the same as or other than a [given]

entity is not a [real] entity, like a water-lily in the sky. [[[Paksadharmata]]:] now, the pudgala cannot be said [to be either the same as or other than another entity. The logical reason involved in the present argument] is the non-perception of the pervader.” According to TSPS 114,22/TSPK 126,17, TS 340¬342 are aimed at demonstrating this pervasion: “Since the alternative between difference and identity has a [real] entity as its basis, the [pseudo-things] that are without a nature [of their own] are not [to be] designated as identical with or other than [other things], etc., but [this is] not [the

case of] a [real] entity. For the negation [to which one resorts when saying:] ‘[x] is not y [i.e., does not have y for its nature]' entails (◦vat) [the affirmation of] another entity. [Therefore] one obviously states [its] otherness with regard to y. And to negate that [x] does not have y for its nature amounts to saying that [x] is identical [with y]. Therefore a [real] entity [x] does not transgress [the alternative between] identity and difference with regard to a [real] entity [y].” As a consequence, the pudgala is not a real entity. Equivalently, the pudgala is nothing but an entity of designation,

which perfectly coincides with the MSA(Bh)'s and Vasubandhu's conclusions. PVSV 147,2-148,5 : Annotated Translation (41) A [certain real] nature [x]'s being other [than y] is nothing but its not being y, for visible shape's (rupa) and taste's being reciprocally other, too, is nothing else [than each one's not being the other one]. Objection: [although x does not have the nature of y, still it cannot be said to be other

than y, for] otherness [actually] consists in [their] natures' lacking a [mutual] relation (pratibandha). [Answer:] What does this so-called relation [between x and y] consist of, so that [x] would be neither this [i.e. of the nature of y] nor of a nature other [than y]? Obj ection: [this relation consists in x's] being born (janman) [of y]. [Answer: if it were because x is the effect of y that it could not be said to be either y or other than y, then] no cause <and no effect> could [ever] be said

[to be either identical with or other than] one another; and so everything [would be] somehow [[[causally]]] useful (upayogin) to everything; therefore nothing would be other than anything. And thus even [someone using the word] “inexpressibility” (avaacyataa) [defined in the afore-mentioned way] would merely express a causality relation with another word without [conveying] a different meaning. [As for ourselves] however, we define ( bruamah. ) otherness as the exclusiveness (ananugamana) of [two real] natures [i.e. as the fact that they do not mix with each other ]. Now, since [all entities]

possessing a [real] nature are mutually [exclusive, they] have to be [mutually] other. And [between entitiesthat are not identical, ] no[thing] except the natural relation consisting in causality [can be] called a “relation,” for it is not contradictory that [something which is causally] independent [from something else] may deviate [from the latter]. [Both] because of this [lack of relation ] and because [x and y have] distinct properties [i.e. inexpressibility-

as and expressibility-as respectively, x and y] are [simply] other. Objection: the relation [between x and y] is a matter (k.rta) of cognition[, not of causality]. Suppose the following be urged (syad etat): because x, the cognition of which is invariably connected to the cognition of y, necessarily appears [in cognition] when y is cognized[, their relation is a matter of cognition, and due to this cognitional relation], x cannot be said [to be other than y] although it does not have the nature of y. [To this, let us answer

as follows:] no, [the cognition of x is not invariably connected to the cognition of y,] because x is devoid of [any] nature of its own (svayam) [i.e. independently of the nature of y,] for its nature is nothing but that which appears [in cognition in the form of y, and this for two reasons: (63) first] because if x were endowed with a nature [of its own, i.e. if it were not simply of the nature of y], then it would appear (pratibhasaprasanga) [separately in cognition], as [does] y; [and second,] because [something] perceptible does not exist if it does not appear

[in cognition]. [And] since even if [x] were [held to be] imperceptible, the cognition [still] would not have this form [i.e. the aspect of x], what is it the cognition of[, and] related to what? (69)Moreover (ca), if the [[[Wikipedia:perceptual|perceptual]]] cognition of a [real entity] x depends on [something else, say] y, it is certainly not the case that the nature of x ceases to appear (pratibhaasa eva nasyati) [in cognition when y appears], as [the nature] of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which depends on

light[, does not cease to appear when light appears in cognition]. Or what does x's close connection (pratyasatti) <to y> consist of, so that x itself is [also] manifest (pratyupati.s.thate ) when one cognizes y [although this y] lacks x's own nature? For [if it were] so there would an absurdity. Objection: [this close connection consists in] the fact that [the x] which is being cognized has y for its basis (upadana). [Answer: but] what is the meaning of “basis”? [First,] a causality relation [between x and y can]not [be

intended] since it is not accepted. Or, if one accepts [a causality relation between x and y, still one does not necessarily perceive x when one perceives y, for] the effect and the cause do not manifest (pratyupasthaapana) a cognition of each other [in a reciprocal way]. Objection: it is the cognition [of x, not x itself,] that is invariably related to y[, and their] close connection [consists in this invariable relation]. [Answer:] has it not been [already] said [above] that this very [invariable relation of a cognition] is impossible in the absence of a relation [between x and y themselves]? Now, [we have

already] said [many times] that [there is] no relation between [things] that are not effect and cause [of one another]. [What has been said, i.e. that] “[an x] the cognition of which is invariably related to the cognition of y, etc.,” [this] also would be [true] provided there were a cognition of x [[[Wikipedia:distinct|distinct]] from y. Now, there is no such cognition,] because there is no cognition of that x which does not appear in cognition in its own form, independently (asam. sargen. a) of [anything] heterogeneous ( asvaruapa ) . And for want of such a [[[cognition]]], defining the nature of an object [such as

x] as inexpressible [as being identical to or other than y] is illegitimate (na sidhyati). A really existing [thing] must therefore be possessed of either identity or otherness[, for there is no other possibility for a real entity]. On PV 2.202-204 Dharmakirti's second argument against the pudgala occurs at the very end of his treatment of the Truth of Destruction (nirodhasatya) in PV 2 (=

Pramanasiddhipariccheda). Here as in PVSV 147,2-148,5, Dharmakirti does not allude to the pudgala in any explicit way, so that this interpretation relies on the immediate context (a discussion of the satkaayad.r.s.ti and the eschatological consequences of one's adhering to a self), on terminology (avaacya in PV 2.203a and c) and on the (almost) unanimous explanation of these stanzas as a critique of the pudgalavada by his successors (Devendrabuddhi, Sàkyabuddhi, Santaraksita, Kamalasàla, Manorathanandin).

It is well-known that, at least from Vasubandhu onwards, the Yogiacaira intellectuals devel- oped a model of causality that denied permanent entities such as God or the self any func¬tionality and therefore any real existence, for only impermanent entities can bring about an effect. To put it briefly, a permanent entity, the causal capacity of which is complete and unimpeded and therefore does not depend on the circumstantial intervention of a co¬operating factor, can bring about an effect neither gradually (kramen. a) nor simultaneously (yaugapadyena ) . It cannot bring it about gradually, because nothing prevents this entity from producing its effect entirely at once. But it cannot bring

about its effect at one time only, since if it is permanent, no change can occur in its nature and it cannot become in¬active once it has started producing. Provided that these authors' criterion for existence is functionality, only impermanent entities can be considered as existent, whereas permanent entities, which do not meet this requirement, are held to be non-existent. Interestingly enough, the issue of the causality of permanent entities had already been touched upon in the MSA(Bh)'s critique of the pudgala. Suffice it to quote here MSA 18.99-100: “Because the [[[pudgala]]] would no [longer] be an agent, because [its exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [[[Wikipedia:exertion|exertion]]] would

occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this pudgala's] effort in order to see [[[visible]] things], etc., cannot be self-arisen. Neither a [[[pudgala]]] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [[[pudgala]]] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this pudgala] would [ipso facto] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a pudgala that would be neither permanent nor impermanent].” Now, the causality of permanent entities also provides the doctrinal background of PV 2.202, a stanza most likely to be interpreted as targetting a

permanent self: “[There can be neither bondage nor liberation for something permanent.] Being the cause of the arisal of suffering is [what we call] ‘bondage' : [since what is permanent is devoid of the capacity to bring about anything] , how [could this belong] to [something] permanent? [And] being the cause of the non-arisal of suffering is [what we call] ‘liberation': how [could this belong] to [something] permanent?” But at least according to Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, Dharmakirti's target in the next stanza has shifted to the Pudgalavadin (which Manorathanandin takes to be a Vaibhai s. ika! ): if only impermanent entities are able to perform functionalities, then the

pudgala, which cannot be said to be impermanent according to the Personalist opponent, is no more able than the permanent self to act as a cause of bondage or liberation. And such is indeed the intent of the objection that opens Devendrabuddhi's commentary on PV 2.203: “Let us admit that [something] permanent [like the outsiders' self] has neither bondage nor liberation. [As for ourselves,] however, [our position is not flawed] since we acknowledge that the

pudgala, which cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent, [[[experiences]]] bondage and liberation.” Dharmakirti's answer runs as follows: “For that which cannot be said to be impermanent [can]not [be] the cause of anything, [so that] even in the case of [something] that cannot be said [to be impermanent], bondage and liberation cannot be experienced in any way.” While explaining Dharmakirti's stanza, Devendrabuddhi discards the Pudgalavadin's

objection as follows: “This is not the case, for there [can] be no [real] entity lacking one of the two aspects, since [the two properties of being] permanent and [being] impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory. [This is] because, for a [real] entity, being excluded (*vyavaccheda?) from one [of these two] is invariably connected to possessing the other one, and possessing one [of these two] is invariably connected to being excluded from the other one. Now, this pudgala can be either momentary or non-momentary.

To begin with, if it is non-momentary, then it is permanent, because such is the state of [that which] exceeds [one single] moment. Therefore it would be contradictory if [something] permanent could not be said to be permanent.” However the most detailed treatement of this stanza (to be more precise, of PV 2.203ab) is to be found in Kamalasila's commentary on TS 347, which is much indebted to Devendrabuddhi's above-quoted explanation of PV 2.203. Kamalasila introduces his master's stanza as follows: “It is not only because it cannot be said to be either identical with or other than [the constituents] that one

shows that the pudgala is not a [real] entity; it is also because [the pudgala] cannot be said to be impermanent that [it] is a non-entity. In order to show this, [[[Santaraksita]]] states [TS 347].” As we can see, this statement provides us with an interesting transition between Dharmakirti's two lines of argument, i.e. between the critique of the pudgala as tattvanyatvavacya and the critique of the pudgala as anityatvenavacya; and here as in the previous argument, the notion of arthakriya plays a pivotal role. Santaraksita spells this out as follows: “Moreover, the capacity to [perform] functionalities is

the [only] definition of existence, [and this capacity] is limited to momentary [things] only. Thus [something] that cannot be said [to be momentary] is not a [real] entity.” Let us now quote Kamalasila's explanation in full: “Indeed, the definition of existence, [i.e.] the nature of a [real] entity, amounts to this only: the capacity to [perform] functionalities, because not being a [real] entity is defined as [being] devoid of any [functional] efficacy. Therefore being a [real] entity is indirectly defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities. Now, this functionality is limited to

momentary [things] only. [[[Santaraksita's]]] implicit idea is: it implies (vyapta) momentariness. [And this is] because it is contradictory that [something] permanent [may perform] a functionality either gradually or at one time. As a consequence, the pudgala is not a [real] entity [if it] cannot be said to be momentary in this way, because in this case one negates momentariness, which is implied by [functionality], as one negates a [property] such as being a ssim. ssapaa when one negates [the property of] being a tree. As [[[Dharmakirti]] has] said [in PV 2.203ab]: ‘For that which cannot be said to be impermanent

[can]not [be] the cause of anything.' Suppose the following be urged: if the pudgala were permanent, then it would be contradictory for it to [perform] a functionality either gradually or simultaneously. [But] insofar as (yaavataa... atah. ) it [cannot be said] to be permanent any more than it can be said to be impermanent, its efficacy in [performing] a functionality is not contradictory at all. [We reply:] this is incorrect, for an entity lacking both aspects cannot be a [real] individual (svalak.san. a), because [the properties of being] permanent and impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory (

anyonyav.rttiparihaarasthita) , since, for a [certain real] entity, lacking (tyaaga) one aspect is invariably connected to possessing the other one, [and] possessing (parigraha) [one aspect is invariably connected to] lacking [the other one]. Indeed, we do not refuse the application of the word ‘avaacya' to the pudgala, because nobody can negate [something that, like any other verbal designation, is] based on mere free will, but this [[[pudgala]]] is [unfortunately] presented here as having the nature of an entity. Does the nature of this entity called ‘pudgala' always exist or not? If it [always]

exists, then it is simply permanent, for what is called ‘permanent' is nothing else; rather, one calls ‘permanent' a nature that lasts forever [and] does not perish, as [[[Dharmakirti]] has] said [in PV 2.204ab]: ‘Wise [[[people]]] call ‘permanent' that nature which does not perish.' But in the hypothesis that [its nature] does not [always] exist, then again it is simply impermanent, because [being] impermanent is defined as [having] a nature that does not last. As a consequence, since there is no other possibility than [being] momentary or non-momentary, and since it is contradictory that [something] non-momentary [may

perform] a functionality either gradually or at one time, existence, which is defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities, implies momentariness. It is therefore established that one negates existence when one negates momentariness.” As we can see from the immediate context and the purport of PV 2.202-204, Dharmakirti's critique of the pudgala has obvious soteriological implications, for giving credence to the existence of such a pseudo-entity threatens one's progression along the Buddhist path to¬ward salvation. First and foremost, the pudgalav ada is nothing but a characteristic in¬stance of satkayad.r.s.ti (in its parikalpita, “speculative” form, the one eliminated with the darsanamarga, the “path of vision” ), i.e. nescience (avidya), the very origin of suf¬fering according to Dharmakirti. And by negating the impermanence of the pudgala, the Pudgalavadin also denies it any functionality, i.e. deprives it of any agency over transmi¬gration and liberation.

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Abhidharmakosavyakhya). Stefan Anacker: Abhidharmakossa, Chapter Nine: Refutation of the Self. Pp. 510-516 in Potter 1999. Andre Bareau: Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Vsehicule. Paris 1955: Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient (Publications de l'Ecole Française d'Extrême-Orient, 38). Bodhicaryavatarapanjika (Prajnakaramati). Dwarika Das Shas¬tri: Bodhicaryaavataara of Aarya Ssaantideva with the Commentary of Shri Prajnakaramati and Hindi Translation. Varanasi 1988: Bauddha Bharati (Bauddha Bharati Series, 21). Robert Jr. Buswell: Summary of the Sâmmitâyanikâya Sastra. Pp. 353-365 in Potter 1999.

George Cardona: Panini's karakas: Agency, Animation and Iden¬tity. Journal of Indian Philosophy 2 (1974), pp. 231-306. Thich Thien Chau: The Literature of the Pudgalavaadins. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 7/1 (1984), pp. 7-16. Thich Thien Chau: Les reponses des Pudgalavaadin aux critiques des ecoles bouddhiques. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 10/1 (1987), pp. 33-53.

Edward Conze: Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajnaparamita Literature. Tokyo 1973: Suzuki Research Foundation. Lance S. Cousins: Person and Self. Pp. 84-101 in Williams 2005 (reprint of pp. 15-31 in Buddhism into the year 2000. Bangkok 1995: Dhammakaya Foundation).

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Pramanavarttikahka (Sakyabuddhi). D no. 4220, Je 1b1-Ne 282a7/P no. 5718, Je 1b1-TVe 348a8. Rahula Sankrtyayana: Dharmakarti's Pramanavarttika with Commentary by Manorathanandin. Appendix of the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 24-26 (1938-1940). Stanislaw Schayer: Kamalasalas Kritik des Pudgalavada. Rocznik Orjentalistyczny 8 (1931-1932), pp. 68-93. Sambandhaparaksa (Dharmakarti). S. D. Shastri: Vadanyaya- prakarana of acharya Dharmakirti with the commentary Vipan- chitartha of acharya Santaraksita and Sambandhapariksa with the commentary of acharya Prabhachandra. Varanasi 1972: Bauddha Bharati.

• SarnmitayanikayaSastra. T 32, no. 1649, 462a-473a. See also Venkata Ramanan 1953.

Theodore Stcherbatsky: The Soul Theory of the Buddhists. Varanasi 1970 (Petrograd 19191): Bharatiya Vidya Prakasan. Junjiro Takakusu/Kaikyoku Watanabe: Taisho shinshu daizokyo. Tokyo 1924-1932: Taisho Issaikyo Kankokai. Helmut Tauscher: Candrakarti: Madhyamakavatarah und Madhyamakaavataarabhaa.syam (Kapitel VI, Vers 166-226). Vienna 1981: Arbeitskreis für tibetische und buddhistische Studien Uni¬versität Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhis¬muskunde, 5).

• Tridharmakassaastra. T 25, no. 1506, 15c-30a.

Tibetan version.

TSPK = Embar Krishnamacharya: Tattvasangraha of Santa- raksita With the Commentary of KamalaSala. 2 vols. Baroda 1984: Oriental Institute. TSPS = Swami Dwarikadas Shastri: Tattvasangraha of Acarya Shantaraksita with the Commentary ‘Panjika’ of Shri Kamalshala. 2 vols. Varanasi 1981: Bauddha Bharati (Bauddha Bharati Series, 1).  Venkata Ramanan 1953 K. Venkata Ramanan: Sainmitiyanikaya Sastra. Visva-Bharati Annals 5 (1953), pp. 155-243. Vetter 1990 Tilmann Vetter: Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharmakürtis Pramanavarttika. Vienna 1990 (19841): Arbeitskreis für tibeti¬sche und buddhistische Studien Universität Wien (Wiener Stu¬dien zür Tibetologie ünd Büddhismüskünde, 12). Williams 2005 Paul Williams (ed.): Critical Concepts in Religious Studies, vol.

II. London 2005: Routledge. Yoshimizu 1999 Chizuko Yoshimizu: The Development of sattvanumana from the Refutation of a Permanent Existent in the Sautraintika Tradition. Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens 43 (1999), pp. 231¬254.

Keywords Buddhism, Dharmakirti, pudgala - person, pudgalavada - personalism, SammitTya, nairatmya - selflessness, nairatmyavada - doctrine of selflessness ISSN 1342-7377 JOURNAL OF INDIAN AND TIBETAN STUDIES Ж 14 #

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Association for the Study of Indian Philosophy DEPARTMENT OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, FACULTY OF LETTERS, RYUKOKU UNIVERSITY, SHICHIJO OMIYA, KYOTO 600-8128 JAPAN http://www.jits-ryukoku.net/ e-mail: skatsura@let.ryukoku.ac.jp (075) 343-3311 (XW ennM ©-■>© (»1003766 am JOURNAL OF INDIAN AND TIBETAN STUDIES

(INDOGAKU CHIBETTOGAKU KENKYU) http://www.jits-ryukoku.net/ No. 14, 2010 CONTENTS Shobun A. NAITO, The "Six Meanings of dharmadhätuvisuddhi " in the Mahäyänasüträlamkära Chapter IX —The Structure of Chapter IX Implied by the Concepts of " bauddhadhätu " and "dharmadh ätu "— (1) Ensho NASU,

A Japanese Translation of Vibhäsä, 75, sur l’Äkäsa et l’Äkäsadhätu; Samghabhadra, Commentaire de Kosa, II, 55 c-d: Les trois Asamskrtas; Äkäsa; Apratisamkhyänirodha in "Documents d'Abhidharma traduits et annotés par Louis de La Vallée Poussin: Textes relatifs au Nirväna et aus Asamskrta en général II. " (21) Yoshihiko NASU, On Cittaviprayuktasamskära in the Abhidharmakosa, Chapter II —An Annotated Japanese Translation of the Abhidharmakosa and Its Commentaries (4)— (48) Kiyotaka GOSHIMA,

An Annotated Japanese Translation of the Tibetan Version of the Brahmapariprcchä (2) (89) Yasuhiro OKAZAKI, An Annotated Translation of the Samgitaratnäkara Chapter 1 (3) (126) Vincent ELTSCHINGER and Isabelle RATIÉ, Dharmakirti against the pudgala (185) Mark SIDERITS and Shoryu KATSURA, Mülamadhyamakakärikä XXII-XXVII (216)

Editor Sh oryu Ka ts ur a Association for the Study of Indian Philosophy Kyoto, Japan

(21) PVSV 145,21-25 (together with PV 1.277ab): svato 'pi bhaave 'bhaavasya vikalpass ced ayam. samah. / nanv aparabhaavitve 'pi vinaassasya svata eva bhaavasya bhavato 'yam. tattvaanyattvavikalpas tulyah. / tadaa kim arthaantarabhaave bhaavo na dr.ssyate / anarthaantaratve 'pi tad eva tad bhavati / tan na kim. cid asya jaatam iti katham. vina.s.to naama /. “[Objection:] Even if [one admits with you that] non-existence [i.e. destruction] exists by itself

[i.e. is causeless, you have to face] the same alternative [between identity and otherness] (PV 1.277ab). But even if [destruction] is not due to [anything] else, [you have to face] the same alternative as to whether an entity's destruction existing only by itself is the same [as the entity itself] or other [than it]. Then if [this causeless destruction] exists as something distinct, why don't [we] perceive this [[[Wikipedia:distinct|distinct]]] entity?a [But] again, in case [this causeless destruction] is not something distinct, it is the [[[entity]] itself, say a pot,] that is what [is called ‘destruction']. Therefore since

nothing happens to the [[[entity]]], how [can it be called] ‘destroyed' [at all]?” aPVT Je D323b5/P396a2: ...ci'i phyir mi snai ste / snai ba nid du 'gyur ro /. “Why don't [we] perceive this entity? [We] should perceive [it].” Here does bhaavah. refer to destruction (which should be perceived if it is a distinct entity) or to the entity such as the pot (which remains unaffected by destruction if destruction is something distinct from it, so that it should be perceived)? The interpretation of tan na kim. cid asya jaatam iti depends on the answer given to this question. In the first hypothesis, this

(29) The MSA(Bh) rejects the pudgala's existence as a substantially existing (dravyasat) nature on the grounds of its not being perceived (see MSA

18.92: prajnaptyastitaya vacyah pudgalo dravyato na tu / nopalambhaad viparyaasaat sam. klessaat kli.s.tahetutah. //. “The pudgala must be said to exist as a [mere] desig¬nation, but not as a [real] substance, because one does not perceive [it] (nopalambha), because [our pseudo¬perception ofthe pudgala] is

[nothing but] a wrong notion, because it is a pollution, because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled.” Translation Eltschinger 2010:305; on the form nopalambha, see Conze 1973 s.v.). The AKBh, examining the relation between the awareness of the constituents and that of

the pudgala, points out that the designation (prajnnapti) “pudgala” rests either on the perception of the constituents (but then the unperceived pudgala is nothing but a designation for the perceived con¬stituents) or on the perception of the pudgala itself (but then the pudgala differs from the constituents

since it can be perceived by itself). See AKBh 463,3-6/LE50,1-5: yadaa ca pudgalah. prajnnapyate kim. taavat skandhaan upalabhya prajnnapyate / aahosvit pudgalam / yadi taavat skandhaam. s te.sv eva pudgalaprajnnaptih. praapnoti / pudgalasyaanupalambhaat / atha pudgalam. katham asya skandhaan upaadaaya prajnnaptir bhavati / pudgala eva hi tasyaa upaadaanam. praapnoti /. “And when the pudgala is designated, is it designated when perceiving the constituents

or the pudgala [himself]? On the one hand, if [it is designated when perceiving] the constituents, then the designation ‘pudgala' concerns only these [constituents], since the pudgala is not perceived (anupalambha); on the other hand, [if it is designated when perceiving] the pudgala, how could the [[[pudgala]]] be designated on the basis of (upaadaaya) the constituents [as the Pudgalaviadin claims]? For then the basis (upaadaana) ofthis [designation]

concerns the sole pudgala.” See also AKBh 463,25-464,2/LE56,8-13: atha ruapaan. y upalabhamaanah. pudgalam upalabhate / kim. tayaivopalabdhyopalabhate / aahosvid anyayaa / yadi tayaiva / ruapaad abhinnasvabhaavah. pudgalah. praapnoti / ruapa eva vaa tatprajnnaptih. / idam. ca ruapam ayam. pudgala iti* katham idam. paricchidyate** / athaivam. na paricchidyate / katham idam. pratijnnaayate raupam apy asti pudgalo 'py astati / upalabdhivasena hi

tasyastitvam pratijnayeta*** /. *AKBhLE iti: AKBhPr om. iti. **AKBhLE paricchidyate: AKBhPr gamyate. ***AKBhLE pratijnnaayeta: AKBhPr pratijnnaayate. “If [the opponent explains that] one perceives the pudgala when perceiving visible shapes (ruapa), does one perceive [the pudgala] through the same perception [as that of the visible shapes] or through another one? If [it is] through the same [[[perception]]], the pudgala must have the same nature [as the visible shapes], or

(59) According to PVT. Je D327a1/P400a7 w PVSVT. 528,20, tatah. provides the first of two reasons: tato 'pratibandhaat* pudgalasya skandhebhyo 'nyattvam /. *PVT. reads *yathoktaad apratibandhaat. “Because of

(70) Explanation, PVSVT 529,19-20: yatha naladanam alokapratibaddhajnananam aloke pratibhasamane 'pi svapratibhaso na nasyati / alokavyatirekena tesarm pratibhasanat / tadvat pudgalasyapi syat /. “For example, the own [[[Wikipedia:cognition|cognitive]]] appearance of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which is related to light, does not cease when light appears [in the cognition], because these [colours] appear distinctly from light [in