Edward Conze: A Call to Reassess the Man
and his Contribution to Prajñāpāramitā Studies
Jayarava Attwood
Abstract
Edward Conze still dominates the field of Prajñāpāramitā Studies,
such as it is, forty years after his death in 1979. He continues to draw
the highest praise from some quarters for his “meticulous” scholarship
and his “pioneering” work on Prajñāpāramitā. Does he deserve this
praise? As a person, he could be extremely unpleasant shading into
something more like malevolence. He was a self-confessed elitist,
who hated “blacks” and thought of women as “servants”. As a scholar,
Conze was erratic, eccentric, and obscurantist with a conscious
commitment to magical thinking. His editions, translations, and
exegesis of Prajñāpāramitā are all unreliable. The argument here,
however, is not for summary judgement; rather, I present evidence to
establish the case for a thorough reassessment of Conze’s oeuvre.
Introduction
The eccentric Anglo-German scholar, Eberhard Julius Dietrich Conze (1904–
1979), aka Dr Edward Conze, looms large in the study of Prajñāpāramitā
literature.1 In an unfavourable review of Conze’s Large Sutra translation, Leon
1
I posted a draft of this essay on academia.edu and received some helpful comments from various
people. I would especially like to acknowledge the extensive input from Eric Zsebenyi who took
me to task for being unfair on Conze. Although I am unrepentant, Eric’s comments did make me
reinforce my case somewhat. Several high-profile academics encouraged me to pursue this aspect
. (19): –51. © Jayarava Attwood
EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
Hurvitz (1923-1992) referred to Conze as “a meticulous scholar” and suggested
that alone of Buddhist converts, his scholarship is “above reproach” (Hurvitz
1969: 403-404). Such accolades are not unusual right up to the present and one
could be forgiven for thinking that this was a consensus view.
The key historical source for Conze’s life is his Memoirs of a Modern
Gnostic (1979 I & II), written at the behest of Jan willem de Jong (see wiles
2018). It was published in two parts, though these were circulated together in
a ring-bound A4 format. Conze alludes to a Part III which contains statements
his lawyer deemed open to prosecution for libel or breaching the race relations
Act. Conze decided to delay publication until after the deaths of the people
concerned on the principle that dead men file no lawsuits. After Conze died in
1979, Part III disappeared without a trace. There is a persistent rumour in the
Triratna Buddhist order that Sangharakshita (d. 2018), who had been on good
terms with Conze, had a copy of Part III. I asked him about this in 2007 and he
denied ever having had a copy of the manuscript and said he thought Muriel
had destroyed it after Conze’s death. Paul williams, who helped to arrange the
purchase Conze’s library for Bristol University ca 1980-81, recalls seeing the
manuscript but it was not part of the purchase and he also thinks that Muriel
destroyed it (personal communication 21 May 2020). It was not amongst the
personal papers that later were acquired and archived at Bristol. So it seems
unlikely that any copies survive. on balance, this is probably a good thing.
Jan nattier (2003) noted several principles for extracting historical
information from normative texts such as Buddhist sutras, one of which was
the principle of embarrassment. This states that if something is included in a
normative text that reflects poorly on the author, then it is likely to be true,
for few authors set out to darken their own reputations. A great deal of what
Conze says about himself reflects poorly on him and this has been exacerbated
by social changes in the last 10-15 years that have shifted public attitudes. Some
may argue that it is unfair to judge him by the standards of our time when the
moral boundaries have been redrawn. As we will see, even by the standards of
his day, Conze was a rather extreme man. The standards for good scholarship,
by contrast, have not changed very much and holding him to these standards
needs no justification.
of my work on the Heart Sutra without wanting to be drawn into the inevitable controversy. I’m not
entirely comfortable being a lightning rod, but someone had to say something. I thank Eivind Kahrs
for discussing this issue with me at length and for reading and critiquing the draft essay.
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
In the romantic view, a genius may be forgiven any number of flaws as long
as they produce art or literature that appeals to romantic sensibilities. Historical
examples include Mozart’s appalling manners, Byron’s drug addiction, and Jung’s
sexual incontinence. Typically, the flaws of the romantic “genius” are minimalized
by romantics because of their contributions to art and letters. True art is thought
to transcend such petty concerns as morality. Conze’s oeuvre very much appealed
to the romantic sensibilities of the post-war English-speaking world and his class
sensibilities likely appealed to the English (though not to some in the British labour
Party). He partly rode the post-war rush to embrace so-called “Eastern Mysticism”,
so poignantly described in Gita Mehta’s book, Karma Cola, but he was also fêted
by scholars like Hurvitz who seemed to view religious enthusiasm warily.
I approach Conze with the jaundiced eye of Generation-X, having grown up
with vocal feminists attacking the patriarchy and the ongoing exposure of church
leaders and popular entertainers as sexual predators. I’m also one of a handful of
scholars who have published more than one article on the Heart Sutra, and one of
perhaps a dozen who have had a sustained interest in Prajñāpāramitā after Conze.
In this essay, I try to establish a case for re-evaluating Edward Conze and his
contribution. Firstly, I will use his own words to indict him as a snob, a narcissist,
a racist, and a misogynist. worse, I will argue that Conze was a kind of intellectual
fraud. Much of his scholarship is tainted by poor attention to detail. The fact that
he was very obviously not meticulous raises the question of why he is so often
credited with such accolades. By far the worst aspect of Conze’s contribution,
however, has been his confusion of Buddhism with his peculiar personal religion,
which mixes Theosophy with a melange of perennial philosophy and mysticism
framed in Buddhist technical terms. Having encountered Conze’s work over nearly
three decades and more recently having reviewed his work on the Heart Sutra in
forensic detail, my principal response has been to ask, “How did he get away it?”
As we learned in laborious and painful detail watching the political events
of American politics in 2019, an indictment is not a trial. An indictment
is an argument for the necessity of a trial. And even when that argument is
successfully made, a trial may not occur. I will be making the best case I can that
Conze deserves to be put on trial, which in this context means being subjected
to critical scrutiny. Historian, Carl r. Trueman makes the salient point that
objectivity is not neutral or unbiased (2010: 27ff). objectivity by its very nature
excludes the majority of explanations. My aim here is objectivity, not neutrality.
The corollary is that scholars have not looked at Conze and Prajñāpāramitā
objectively and critically. I will offer evidence to all these charges.
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
Conze the Man
reading Memoirs we wade through a series of self-absorbed anecdotes full of
Conze’s trademark contradictions and disparaging remarks. we meet a man who
has many of the social attitudes we might expect from his bourgeois European
background (concerning class and race for example) but who was also an avowed
Communist (at least for a time). He professed to hate warmongering but, because
of his intolerance, he harboured lifelong animosities based on perceived faults
in others. He was an industrious worker, but a lazy intellectual who preferred
magical thinking and mysticism to reason and science. As he says, his “life-long
acceptance of magic... has not been so much due to theoretical considerations
as to the early acquired intuitive certainty that beyond, or behind, the veil of the
deceptive sensory appearances, there lies a reality of magical, or occult, forces”
(I 32). And in his view science “…has little cognitive value, but is rather a bag
of tricks invented by God-defying people to make life increasingly unbearable
on Earth and finally to destroy it” (I 32).
Conze was a man who believed in his own genius and seems to have
something of a Messianic complex. For example, he says, “From early times
onwards it has been my conviction that I have come from a higher realm... and
that I was sent to the western barbarians so as to soften their hearts by teaching
them the Holy Prajñāpāramitā” (I 55). on the other hand, he makes it clear
that he despises those same barbarians: “Speaking of ‘hoi polloi’, it has always
been a cornerstone of my beliefs that there are two qualitatively distinct kinds
of people... ‘the noble ones’ and ‘the foolish common people’... the elite and
the canaille” (I 52). The French word canaille means “a pack of dogs”. The
messiah who hates the people he has been sent to save is not a common trope in
storytelling, but messianic delusions are, sadly, all too common.
Early Life
Conze freely admits that he was a man of his class and age (I iv). His father was
from German aristocracy and his mother the daughter of a wealthy industrialist.
The Conze family owned textile manufacturing plants in the small but wealthy
town of langenberg near the ruhr Valley. His mother’s family, the Köttgens,
were also “textile barons” (Heine 2016: xvii). Conze describes the 1903 marriage
of his parents, Dr Ernst Conze (1872–1935) and Adele louise Charlotte Köttgen
(1882–1962) as, “a marriage between two factories” (I 1). Ernst Conze earned
a doctorate in law from Bonn University, then joined the Auswärtigen Amt
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
(Foreign office), where he served in Berlin and Antwerp, before being posted
to Britain as a Vice Consul. Eberhard was born in london, in 1904. However,
the family soon returned to langenberg where Ernst became first a magistrate
and then the District Court Director in Düsseldorf. He also held the office of
President of the Reich Disciplinary Chamber from 1924 to 1934 (Langenberger
Kulturlexikon 2009: 262). Adele was a painter of some talent, even exhibiting
her work in 1930 (Langenberger Kulturlexikon 2009: 875).
His parents’ marriage was unhappy and he did not have a good relationship
with his mother (I 4). This seems to have affected his relations with women
generally. Conze notes that his mother had great potential but was forced into
the life of a small town hausfrau with no prospect of escape. As Conze tells
the story, she was bored and bitter, and since young Eberhard leaned towards
his father, she included him in the enmity she felt for Herr Conze. His younger
brother, wolf, however, was the object of her affections. Conze admits to
choosing women like his mother – small and dark. Accused of grooming a
young woman employed as a typist he complains that it is ridiculous because
she is blond and he “does not even like blonds.” The accusation was not simply
random however since he reveals that he repeatedly chose his sexual partners
from amongst his female students. He recounts sexually assaulting a female
student as though it were an amusing anecdote (II 116-118). He also confesses
that his first sexual experiences were with the Conze family’s blond maid.
Being born in Britain entitled Conze to British Citizenship and when he
visited England in 1924 he took the opportunity to renew his citizenship. Thus,
when he fell foul of the nazis, who he deplored on class grounds as much as
anything, he was able to escape to Britain. Conze’s attitude toward the nazis
is instructive. He described Hitler as someone literally possessed by demonic
forces but he also says that Hitler “illustrates the danger of allowing the lower
middle classes to exercise power” (I 9). Hitler was not one of the social elite and
thus lacked the upbringing and education to fit him for leadership (I 11). Indeed
it is likely that the mocking epithet “nazi” reflects the same social prejudice.
The German bourgeoisie of that time would often tell jokes in which the butt
was a Bavarian peasant nicknamed nazi, short for the popular name, Ignatius
(Forsyth 112-3). Conze’s stories about the nazis vary. Early in the Memoirs, he
says he was warned by nazis to flee Germany in a rather bland encounter over
the flying of a flag from his balcony, but later (I 40, n.1) he seems to suggest
that he was being actively pursued by the Gestapo. In any event, Conze left
Germany on 15th June 1933, six months after Hitler was appointed Chancellor.
26
EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
Although Conze hated the nazis he did share some of their views on
race, for example, he says, “In due course [notting Hill] was finished off by
the blacks, who slowly moved down from Paddington Station” (I 64). He
writes about being “driven out of notting Hill by the blacks” (I 102), but
also notes, “My further comments on the negrification [sic] of notting Hill
Gate manifestly contravene the race relations Act of June 1977. They are
therefore removed to Part III” (I 65). when mentioned in Memoirs, people
of African descent are always negatively characterised. Although he writes
positively of Jewish people, Conze uses the racial label in an essentialist
way. That someone is “a Jew”, for example, is always stated whereas he does
not insist on referring to, say, Giuseppe Tucci, as “an Italian” or “a Fascist”,
indeed Tucci is characterised as rich and socially superior (Conze admired
his gold cutlery). Jewishness is not necessarily disapproved of – Conze’s first
wife was Jewish – but it is always marked.
Conze recounts that his first contact with Buddhism was aged thirteen when
he came across an account of the religion by lafcadio Hearn (I 6). His interest
in Buddhism continued through his university days. At one point he says that
shortly after gaining his PhD, he was introduced to Theosophy and astrology
by Professor Johannes M. Verweyen (I 9), of Bonn University, who at that
time ran the German Theosophical Society and whose special field of research
was parapsychology. later on, Conze says that “the Conze family had always
harboured a number of Theosophists though they were usually of the rudolf
Steiner persuasion” (I 31). when he was ill as a child one of his aunts gave
him a copy of Annie Besant’s translation and explanation of the Bhagavadgītā.
He says, “I was terribly excited by it” (I 31). Conze embraced the irrational
and rejected science early on. referring to this encounter with the occult
before wwII, he says, “Astrology has set me inwardly free from the claims a
technological society can make on my allegiance” (I 32). It is important to keep
in mind that astrology and Theosophy were foundational to Conze’s worldview
and that there was none of the compartmentalisation we might expect from a
scholar. Conze had no interest in objectivity. His worldview was only reinforced
by his contact with D. T Suzuki.
The family wealth allowed Eberhard to pursue his university education
in a desultory fashion, moving around until he found a teacher to his liking.
He describes himself as “rebellious”, but I suspect he simply did not like or
respect his teachers and lacked the self-control or motivation to hide it. Being
unwilling to put up with anyone he judged inferior and having more or less
27
EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
unlimited funds from his father, he simply moved on when he disliked his
teachers. Thus he studied at half a dozen different German universities before
he eventually completed the equivalent of a doctorate at the University of
Cologne in 1928 (aged 24). Young Eberhard also showed early promise as
a linguist, acquiring proficiency in at least a dozen languages although he
officially studied philosophy.
we can only presume that it was after arriving in England, in 1933, that
Eberhard became Edward, but he does not mention this change. Conze had a
variety of teaching jobs during and after the war. It is notable that he never
held a permanent academic position, but continued to be peripatetic and often
supported himself by teaching night classes. The one academic position he was
offered was in the USA but the US government saw him as an undesirable alien
because of his involvement in Communism. late in his life, some bequests
made him financially independent.
on fleeing Germany, Conze had married his (pregnant) partner, Dorothea
Finklestein, as much as anything to prevent her being sent back to Germany
and certain death because she was Jewish. This marriage did not last long. They
were briefly reconciled but then separated again, although they did not divorce
until much later, partly because Dorothea converted to Catholicism (I 48). on
reflection Conze says:
“I did not want a wife at all, but a servant who would look after
me while I was doing my scholarly work. If it had not been for the
servant shortage which set in after 1918, I would never have had
any motive to marry at all” (I 31).
Conze started a relationship with Muriel Green, the sister of one of his
students, in 1948 (wwII did not improve the servant shortage), though of course
Conze was still married to Dorothea and so he and Muriel could not marry. The
two lived together as a married couple and Muriel changed her name to Conze
by deed poll. Conze credits Muriel with providing the “material stability” that
enabled him to continue his work. He was, in the manner of bourgeois men,
incapable of any domestic task. However, before he met Muriel, Conze went
through a crisis.
As a student, Conze also became infatuated with Communism and helped to
organise political activities, particularly once the nazis rose to prominence, and
wrote books on Marxism. He continued his involvement in radical politics on
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
moving to Britain and made connections in the British labour party, particularly
with “red” Ellen wilkinson with whom he wrote anti-fascist pamphlets and
two short books. Conze visited Spain (I 18-20) just before the Spanish Civil
war, under the auspices of the publisher warburg. He was disgusted with the
Spanish communists and the piece he published on return outraged many on
the left (I 20). After a series of vituperous clashes with the “Stalinists” in the
labour Party, Conze completely abandoned politics in Britain. He nonetheless
remained committed to communism throughout his life. In a letter to Herbert
Elbrecht dated 23.10.76, Conze wrote: “In contrast to the ‘our God has failed’
school, I have never lost my devotion for the Soviet Union and consider most of
what one reads in the capitalist press as despicable warmongering for world war
three.”2 However, his break with the labour Party resulted in a broader crisis. In
his memoriam for D. T. Suzuki, Conze (1967) says:
“My political faith had collapsed under the impact of Stalinism
and of what I had observed in Spain, my marriage had failed,
my job seemed distinctly bleak, I had even started to consult
psychoanalysts, and there seemed nothing left that I could live for”
It was at this point, around 1937, that Conze (re)turned to Buddhism. He
credits this to his acquaintance with three men: D. T. Suzuki, Har Dayal, and
Graham Howe, but Suzuki seems to have been the pivotal figure, so it is worth
spending some time on him.
D. T. Suzuki
Daisetz Teitarō Suzuki (1870–1966)3 was for some decades the face of Zen
Buddhism outside of Japan. After university and his period of rinzai Zen
training at Engaku Temple (1892-1897), Suzuki spent several years in the US
working for the theologian and author, Paul Carus. Here he came into contact
with various occult ideas including the work of Emmanuel Swedenborg.
Between 1909 and 1915, Suzuki translated several of Swedenborg’s books
“Zum Unterschied von der ‘our God has failed’ Schule habe ich nie meine Hingabe an die
Sovietunion verloren und betrachte das meiste was man in der kapitalistischen Presse liest als
verächtliche Kriegshetze für den dritten weltkrieg” (Conze 1976). My thanks to Eivind Kahrs for
translating the German.
3
The Kanji for his name are: 鈴木 大拙 貞太郎. He adopted the name Daisetsu or Daisetz
during his Zen training at Engakuji in Kamakura (1892-1897).
2
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
into Japanese and composed a biography of him (Mulder 2016: 5). Another
source for Suzuki may have been Theosophy which seems to adopt many of the
same ideas, especially a fascination with the neoplatonic idea of “The one” or
“The Absolute”. Such ideas became part of the vocabulary of western Buddhist
discourse despite having no traditional equivalents. For example, Conze says
at one point: “‘Truth’ should here be understood as the one in contrast to the
manifold variety of error” (1975: 105). Suzuki’s wife, Beatrice lane, was a
major figure in the US Theosophical world.
Suzuki called his approach to Prajñāpāramitā “the logic of sokuhi”. The
Japanese term sokuhi (即非 Ch. jí fēi) translates roughly as “is/not”. As Suzuki
formulated it, the logic runs: “That A is A means that A is not A, and therefore
A is A” (1964: 59-60). This derives from a series of apparent negations in
the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā. Conze cites a version of this formula in
his commentary on the Heart Sutra (1958: 84). Michiko Yusa quotes Suzuki
referring to this as “the logic of spiritual intuition... If you understand what
it means, you will understand not only the Diamond Sutra but also the entire
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra of 600 scrolls” (Yusa 2019: 590).
This expression of “logic” was influential on the Kyoto School of Japanese
philosophy via Suzuki’s lifelong friend, nishida Kitarō (1870–1945). The Kyoto
School were implicated in the nationalistic aggression of Japan in the 20th
Century and have come in for much criticism in the 21st Century. The adoption
of the logic of sokuhi by members of the Kyoto School can also be seen in the
light of nationalism. on learning the way Suzuki was thinking, nishida wrote
an encouraging letter to him, saying, “we must construct it logically so that it
can stand on its own to face western logic” (Yusa 2019: 590). The scandal of
orientalism, in which the attitudes of European scholars studying the people
and cultures of the Middle East and Asia were exposed as racist fantasies (Said
1978) led to a major shift in academia. Suzuki came to be seen as an Asian
who adopted the forms of orientalist exoticism in his presentation of Zen to
Americans and Europeans. Bernard Faure (1995) has referred to this in relation
to the Kyoto School as “reverse orientalism”.
The idea of the Kyoto School was to find a native Japanese approach to
logic that could be positively contrasted with “western” logic. Suzuki’s “reverse
orientalism” presentation of Buddhism emphatically contrasted an idealised,
but fundamentally corrupt (dualistic and discriminative) western society with
an idealised and fundamentally pure (non-dualistic and non-discriminative)
Eastern society epitomised by the Japanese, and within Japan by the Zen Monk.
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
However, Suzuki’s nationalism went a little deeper than just pro-Japanese
sentiments.
In his meticulous studies of Meiji Japanese militarism, Brian Victoria (1997,
2003) has shown that the Zen Buddhist establishment was complicit in and
actively supportive of the Meiji wars of aggression and associated atrocities as
well as institutionalised domestic terrorism (2019).
“Suzuki addresses all of the criticisms levelled at the nazis, i.e., their
oppression of the Jews, their totalitarianism, their regimentation of
youth, their fanatical hatred of Soviet Communism and ultimately
supplies a convincing rationale for all of their extremist stances
within the context of the times.” (Victoria 2013a: 14)
D. T. Suzuki was perhaps not the worst offender, but in a series of articles
Victoria demonstrates that Suzuki had close personal contacts with nazis in
Japan, was sympathetic to their policies in Europe, and sought to recast Zen
Buddhism as a “death cult” so that Japanese soldiers would kill (and die) without
hesitation or remorse (Victoria 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b). Suzuki himself
made much of his kenshō or “insight” experience. However, as Victoria notes
this doesn’t seem to have made him any more compassionate:
“As Suzuki’s subsequent statements make clear, his kenshō
experience did not alter his view of “religion during a [national]
emergency.” Again, this is hardly surprising in light of the fact that
Suzuki’s own rinzai Zen master, Shaku Sōen … was also a strong
supporter of Japan’s war efforts.” (2013b: 4).
Suzuki’s support for the nazis did not come to light after the Japanese
surrender, so he was free to spread his message untainted by his close association
with them. Suzuki’s cachet in Buddhist, especially Zen, circles remained intact.
His brand of mystical anti-intellectualism had fuelled the imagination of the baby
boomer generation, meshing with and amplified by the psychedelic counterculture in the 1960s. And it continues to be influential. However, robert Sharf
is emphatic that despite the influence of Suzuki and other Japanese intellectuals
on the conception and practice of Zen in America and Europe, they did not
represent the Japanese monastic tradition of Zen nor did they have influence
in that sphere. rather, Sharf says, “the style of Zen training most familiar to
western Zen practitioners can be traced to relatively recent and sociologically
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
marginal Japanese lay movements.” (1993: 40). It seems that the Zen monk at
the heart of Suzuki’s utopia simply does not exist. Arthur Koestler was perhaps
the only public intellectual who was not taken in by Suzuki’s hand waving at
the time:
“There is one redeeming possibility: that all this drivel is deliberately
intended to confuse the reader, since one of the avowed aims of
Zen is to perplex and unhinge the rational mind. If this hypothesis
were correct, Professor Suzuki’s voluminous oeuvre of at least a
million words, specially written for this purpose, would represent
a hoax of truly heroic dimensions, and the laugh would be on the
western intellectuals who fell for it” (from the essay “A Stink of
Zen”, cited in Sharf 1993: 41).4
Ironically, Paul Harrison has shown that Suzuki’s understanding of the
Vajracchedikā was based on a misconception (2006: 136-140). The Tibetan
translations reflect the correct reading of the compounds involved in the
negations of the Vajracchedikā. To take his principle example, Conze (1957: 75)
translated Section 13c into Buddhist Hybrid English: “And that which as a world
system was taught by the Tathagata, as a no-system that has been taught by the
Tathagata. Therefore it is called a ‘world system’” (138).5 Harrison argues that
while “no-system” is a grammatically possible reading, it is not philosophically
cogent. rather the phrase should be read “Any world-system there is has been
preached by the realised ones as systemless. Thus it is called a world system.”
(138). Harrison concludes:
“The Vaj is not therefore an expression of some kind of mystical
paradoxicality, but is rather analogous to the standpoint taken by
nāgārjuna, in asserting that conventional language only makes
sense because of the ultimate emptiness of the things it names,
embedded as they are in a network of causal relationships” (140).
If Harrison is correct, and I think he is, then Suzuki’s whole approach to
Prajñāpāramitā is discredited as is Conze’s. Although Harrison has published
4
Elsewhere Sharf (1995: 158 n.98) records some of the retorts that Koestler’s comments drew
from apologists including Christmas Humphries and Carl Jung as well as Suzuki himself.
5
yo ‘pyasau lokadhātustathāgatena bhāṣitaḥ, adhātuḥ sa tathāgatena bhāṣitaḥ | tenocyate
lokadhāturiti ||
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
this argument, it is only available to date in an obscure and expensive norwegian
monograph (Harrison 2006). Harrison’s forthcoming book on the Vajracchedikā
is long overdue, but it should be more accessible and we can anticipate that it
will do much to clear up the confusion surrounding this text.
Despite being a nazi sympathiser, an orientalist, misrepresenting Japanese
Zen Buddhism and monasticism, and despite having misunderstood the core
text of his philosophy Suzuki was enormously influential. Something about
his message struck a chord amongst his audience. And in particular, he was a
seminal influence on Conze and his approach to Prajñāpāramitā. Faure, Sharf,
and Victoria are leading figures in a general reappraisal of D. T. Suzuki’s life
and work in the light of Meiji Japanese politics and culture. no such movement
yet exists for the reappraisal of Edward Conze. Conze’s naïve encounter with
Suzuki—for whom he expressed “unlimited admiration, little short of idolatry”
(I 78)—was to prove decisive in his life.
Midlife Crisis
In Suzuki’s series of essays on Zen, Conze found a framework for rationalising
his rejection of a world and an affirmation of his idiosyncratic, not to say
syncretic, worldview, which I will refer to as his idiodoxy. In Suzuki’s idiodoxy,
the mythical Zen monk, perhaps an idealised memory of Suzuki’s own time
at Engaku Temple, was the focus. Conze was drawn to the ideal that Suzuki
described and initially sought to emulate it. with the zeal of the new religious
convert he threw himself into what he imagined an ideal Buddhist life to be:
“In 1937, at the age of 33… Under the impulse of D. T. Suzuki’s
message I then withdrew into a private wood belonging to a Quaker
friend of mine in the new Forest, and practised as much meditation
as can be practised in this evil age” (1967a).
This was the wood called Sandy Balls, near Godshill Village, Hampshire,
owned by Aubrey westlake. In the Memoirs Conze recalls living there for
several years (I 38). However, he also says that he moved there because the
outbreak of war (in Sept 1939) had interrupted his night classes and deprived
him of an income (with no mention of Suzuki or meditation). The chronology
of this period seems particularly confused in Conze’s account. Also for several
pages (starting on I 41), he details his difficulties finding work while living at
Sandy Balls, so he was hardly in retreat.
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
of this period of meditating, he says that he “experienced a great
elation of spirit” (I 45). later in Memoirs, he mentions that in his book
Buddhist Meditation he mainly covered meditation practices drawn from
Buddhaghosa. It seems to have been these that he practised in Sandy Balls.6
living an ascetic life, combined with his bourgeois domestic incapacity
left Conze with symptoms of malnutrition such as chronic diarrhoea and
degeneration of the gums leading to the loss of all his teeth (I 47). The
combination of malnutrition, the cold of winter, sleep deprivation, and long
periods of meditation probably all contributed to the delusions he apparently
experienced: “Unbidden, several psychic faculties came my way” (I 46). As
already noted, magical thinking was foundational to Conze’s worldview so
that he interpreted any unusual experiences that he might have had in line
with his existing beliefs (as we all do).
Conze does not say how long this period of meditation was. He decided to
end his retreat: “I also felt that I had gained as much insight as I could bear in
my present body or realise in our present social circumstances” (I 47). Conze
later refers to the effects of “years of meditation on mettā” (II 79) but it’s unclear
from Memoirs to what extent he continued to pursue meditation. He blames his
failure at Sandy Balls on “this evil age” or “our present social circumstances”
but the severe discomfort caused by malnutrition is the more obvious immediate
cause of ending his retreat. At about the same time his wife, Dorothea, asked
him to move back in with her for the sake of their daughter. So he moved to
oxford and was assigned a job in the wartime Ministry of Agriculture. This led
him back into the orbit of academia.
Scholarship
living in oxford with a wife to attend to his domestic needs and an undemanding
government job gave Conze leisure to study and access to research materials in
the Bodleian library and the India Institute library. He took Sanskrit lessons
from Thomas Burrow (1909 – 1986). He also met Frederick w. Thomas (1867
– 1956) and collaborated with him on a translation of a Jain text from Sanskrit.
Academic connections led to further literary ventures and, after 1945, to
invitations to teach abroad, including in Germany and the USA.
6
Sangharakshita confirms: “and he practised meditation, following very seriously the
instructions given by Buddhaghosa in the Visuddhimagga, and achieving some degree of
meditative experience” (1996: 20).
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
Despite his animus towards so many people, Conze had several productive
working relationships, for example with Jan willem de Jong, Giuseppe Tucci,
Isaline B. Horner, and lewis lancaster. That Tucci was a supporter of Italian
Fascism and Benito Mussolini does not seem to have deterred Conze. In turn, and
despite his abrasive personality and sloppy and distorted work, many scholars
of the day idolised Conze and he is still the subject of effusive and obsequious
praise from many quarters.
Conze set himself the task of translating all of the Prajñāpāramitā texts
into English. In some cases, as with the Heart Sutra, this involved establishing
a critical edition of the Sanskrit texts. without the burden of a permanent
academic position, Conze could stay largely focused on editing and translation
work and he published many editions and translations as well as other books on
Buddhism and meditation, with a focus on Prajñāpāramitā. Amongst these were
a long essay outlining the extent and history of the Prajñāpāramitā literature
(1960) and a lexicon which was intended to be expanded into a dictionary of
Prajñāpāramitā but never completed (1967b).
Conze approached Mahāyāna Buddhism with enthusiasm and industry. The
great shame is that so much of what he did was careless, flawed, and coloured
by his idiodoxy. It all needs to be done again. At the same time, there seems
to be little interest in Prajñāpāramitā in academia in the present day and no
appetite for critical editions or translations. A handful of scholars struggle away,
year after year.7 The “publish or perish” mentality means that even those with
nothing to say must continue to publish several times per year. However, I
think the nonsensical interpretation of Prajñāpāramitā fostered by Suzuki and
uncritically repeated in universities around the world, as well as the bizarre
translations and interpretations by Conze, combine to put most students off
pursuing research in this area.8
The first Prajñāpāramitā text Conze worked on was one of the best known
and most widely read texts in all of Buddhism, i.e. the Heart Sutra. And he
About a dozen scholars publish serious work on Prajñāpāramitā in English. More work is
done in Japan, but it is seldom translated. From what little of the Japanese Heart Sutra research
that I have access to it seems to be largely in the service of religious orthodoxy. Prajñāpāramitā
scholarship has been severely diminished by the deaths of Karashima Seishi in 2019 and Stefano
Zacchetti in 2020.
8
This observation is partly based on informal comments by several academics who did not
wish to go on record. Most academics seem to be very guarded about making public comments
on Conze.
7
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
returned to it repeatedly. Just as the Heart Sutra is a representative microcosm
of the Prajñāpāramitā macrocosm, Conze’s work on this text reflects trends in
his oeuvre more generally and thus we can use it as a window on his scholarship.
Before this, however, we need to draw out more detail of Conze’s approach to
Prajñāpāramitā: his idiodoxy. one place to start is his 1953 article entitled “The
ontology of the Prajñāpāramitā” published in Philosophy East and West.
Conze-ism
Conze begins his exposition on Prajñāpāramitā ontology by stating that
Prajñāpāramitā texts do not make reasoned arguments (1953: 117) and then
proceeds to exemplify this. Conze sees prajñā as “a special virtue, or force”
(118). Buddhism, he argues, uses this special virtue to arrive at a non-rational
understanding of “the ultimate facts of reality” (dharmas) (118). The special
virtue of wisdom is that it allows us to see that the “own being” (svabhāva) of
dharmas is “emptiness”. reflecting his commentary on the Heart Sutra, Conze
says that “dharmas, when viewed with perfected gnosis, reveal an own-being
which is identical with emptiness, i.e. in their own-being they are empty” (120).
Conze bends this around to a more conventional Madhyamaka view so that it
means that dharmas do not have svabhāva.
Conze outlines three approaches to the abstract noun “emptiness”. Firstly
he sums up the “ontology” of dharmas in a series of mutually contradictory
propositions: “dharmas are nonexistent” and “dharmas have a purely
nominal existence” and “dharmas have no characteristics”, “dharmas are
not related to each other”, “dharmas have never left the original emptiness”
(though “original emptiness” is not defined). In short, Conze’s ultimate facts
of reality are like the old quip about the Holy roman Empire, not Holy,
not roman, and not an Empire. Still, ignorance of these facts is, according
to Conze (126), the root of all evil. However, we should (or must) ignore
these facts and disbelieve them (124). This should be relatively easy because
we ourselves do not exist (125). If we can only extinguish our non-existent
“self” then we will see this because it is precisely the existence of our nonexistent self that prevents us from seeing (and ignoring) the true nature of
ultimate reality. The (nonexistent) saint has no opinion or anything to say
about any of this or anything. At this point, Conze turns to the “logic” of
Prajñāpāramitā.
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
After all this heavy-duty dualism, Conze precedes without irony to tell us
that the heart of this logic is non-duality. However, sometimes, when they
make distinctions between dharmas, then nonexistent people do exist and they
make distinctions between dharmas (126). Still, absolute knowledge abolishes
them (whether nonexistent people or nonexistent distinctions are abolished is
unclear). This is because: “It is the same to be as not to be” (126). And this,
according to Conze is the important point: despite the facts of ultimate reality
being nonexistent, merely by saying this, we confirm that they do exist. And by
saying that they do exist we confirm that they do not exist. And this is wisdom.
Charitably, Conze admits that “this kind of philosophy gives little comfort
to common sense” (128), but he assures us that it is “perfectly consistent with
itself”. His final word is that “The ontology of the Prajñāpāramitā is a description
of the world as it appears to those whose self is extinct. That is its justification,
and the source of both its strength and of its limitations.” (129).
Since this drivel was published in a prestigious, peer-reviewed journal, and
because it is still accepted as gospel by religieux and scholars alike, I need
to add a few words of commentary. The Emperor is not wearing any clothes.
This not only seems like nonsense, it genuinely is nonsense completely
lacking in scholarly objectivity and critical thinking. what was editor, Charles
A. Moore, thinking when he published this? Did this article really survive
anonymous peer-review? Conze is obsessed with nonexistence, magic, and
metaphysics while the Prajñāpāramitā texts are concerned with the absence
of sense experience and epistemology. Prajñā is a word that fundamentally
refers to some form of knowledge, not to some “special virtue or force”. It is
something that one learns from applying meditative techniques in which sense
experience ceases and leaves one in a state of absence (śūnyatā) of experience
or “contentless awareness”.
with this, let us turn our attention to the Heart Sutra.
Heart Sutra
Conze first published a translation of the Sanskrit Heart Sutra in 1946, along
with some background in a series of three articles in The Middle Way, the journal
of the Buddhist Society. His critical edition of the Sanskrit text appeared in
the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society in 1948 and was subsequently revised
in 1967. He published a four-part essay entitled “The Heart Sutra explained”
in The Middle Way in 1955-56. The Middle Way articles were collated and
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
published as Buddhist Wisdom Books (1958), which contained a translation
of and commentary on the Vajracchedikā and a version of the Sanskrit text
of the Heart Sutra along with a translation and commentary. A second edition
of Buddhist Wisdom Books was published in 1975. Another translation of the
Heart Sutra was published in Perfect Wisdom: The Short Prajñāpāramitā Texts
(1973). Conze tinkered with his edition, his translation, and his interpretation
over several decades.
Sanskrit Edition
In his book on the Tibetan editions of the Heart Sutra, Jonathan Silk refers
to Conze’s Sanskrit edition as “chaotic” (1994: 32) and comments that “…
due to the lack of anything approaching a complete and reliable [Sanskrit]
edition, nothing can be said about the possible affiliations of any of our Tibetan
recensions or sub-recensions with any given Sanskrit tradition” (1994: 40).
Conze’s edition, such as it was, contained several simple grammatical errors
that were not repaired in the 1967 revised edition (Attwood 2015, 2018b).
This was not unusual. Greg Schopen notes many errors in Conze’s edition
of the Vajracchedikā. He says, for example: “The edition of the late Edward
Conze… is of very dubious value from a text-critical point of view… In regard
more specifically to the Gilgit text it should be noted that Conze’s notes to
his edition reproduce all the errors in Chakravarti’s edition, and that there
are a number of cases in which Conze’s notations in regard to the Gilgit text
are wrong or misleading” (Schopen 1989: 96-97). Conze acknowledges this
problem with his work:
“I am constitutionally incapable of registering meaningless details
correctly (that is the price of being an intuition type). Even when
reading proofs I miss most of the misprints, because I automatically
read not what is there, but what ought to be there. In addition,
both my interest and my training in grammar leave much to be
desired…” (1979: I 92)
Unfortunately, the details that Conze misses are not “meaningless” but have
quite major implications for how we understand the Heart Sutra. It is a curious
fact that Conze’s mistakes stood for around 70 years, despite the scrutiny of some
competent Sanskritists, some of who were renowned for acerbic comments on
other people’s work (more on this in my concluding remarks).
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
In the first sentence, Conze gave the phrase pañca skandhāḥ in the nominative
plural case, stranding it without any clear relation to the rest of the sentence and
depriving the transitive verb vyavalokayati sma of an object. Attwood (2015)
showed that Conze’s witnesses include some that give the word in the accusative
plural and that this resolves the problem through the simple addition of anusvāra
(ṃ) to the dhā-akṣara. This allows us to read pañca skandhāṃ as the object of the
verb and to make a coherent sentence out of it, i.e. “Avalokiteśvara… examined
the five branches of experience…”. The addition or elision of anusvāra is one
of the most common scribal errors in Sanskrit manuscripts. The solution also
allows us to remove extraneous modern punctuation that Conze added since the
Sanskrit is now fully parsable and has clear clause boundaries. note also that
Conze insists on translating vyavalokayati as “looks down” when in fact it means
“inspect, examine”. He seems to be concerned tie the name of Avalokiteśvara
to the legend of the thousand-armed figure who “looks down” on the world
in compassion, but falters and splits into many parts that are reassembled into
the thousand-armed, eleven-headed form by Amitābha. In this he may have
been influenced by commentaries preserved in Tibetan, see for example Donald
lopez’s translation of Vimalamitra’s commentary (1996: 52). Although note
also Joel Gruber’s comment:
“After noting that Vimalamitra’s composition is the “first” and
“longest” among the Indian commentaries, Conze disparages the
commentary with a string of analysis unrelated to the actual content
of the text he lambastes. His critiques are strange enough that those
familiar with the work might wonder whether he has mistakenly
analyzed an entirely different text.” (2016: 51-52).
later, in the section he labels VI, Conze inserts a full stop after the word
acittāvaraṇaḥ, and in doing so he creates a sentence with one connecting
qualifier (cittāvaraṇa-nāstitvād) and three adjectives but no verb and no
noun or pronoun for the adjectives to relate to (Attwood 2018a). Since the
adjectives (self-evidently) relate to the subject of the previous sentence—i.e.
bodhisattvaḥ—the obvious solution is simply to remove the full stop. In turn,
this resolves the ambivalence that Conze apparently experienced over the
case ending of bodhisattva: in his 1948 edition he gives the case as genitive
(bodhisatvasya) leaving the sentence without a subject. In the 1967 revision, he
switches to the nominative (bodhisattvaḥ). The popular text and exegesis (1958,
39
EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
1975) leave the case as genitive. The fact that the bodhisattva is the subject of
the sentence and that adjectives which relate to him are all in the masculine
nominative singular tells us that bodhisattvaḥ must be correct.9 Attwood (2020)
shows, on the basis of Huifeng (2014), that there are deeper problems with this
sentence that can be explained by the Sanskrit text being a translation from
Chinese. A more idiomatic Sanskrit translation of the Chinese text looks very
different indeed. Conze seems not to have registered the extremely odd features
of the Sanskrit text itself or the fact that the second sentence is not a properly
constructed Sanskrit sentence. The many scholars and religieux who published
translations of the text also failed to notice these things.
These are admittedly simple errors. we might have written them off as
typographical errors had they not persisted through multiple revisions and
editions. In both cases, however, they result in garbling of the text. Two long
sentences that don’t make sense in a very short text is rather a lot.
Translation and Exegesis
It is widely assumed that Conze knew what he was talking about, just as it
is assumed that he was a competent editor. For these reasons, summing up
Conze’s exegesis of the text is a more complex task. As yet, there is no critical
study of Conze’s interpretation of the Heart Sutra. An assessment is made all
the more difficult because Conze is still considered an authority on the wider
Prajñāpāramitā literature and his idiodoxy has influenced most writing on the
subject since the mid-twentieth century. Conze’s commentary on the Heart
Sutra is eclectic and associative, with Conze making connections far and wide:
“The Prajñāpāramitā texts are so elusive to our understanding
not only because they presuppose a high degree of disinterested
spirituality, but also because they are full of hidden hints, allusions,
and indirect references…” (1975: 101)
As we have already seen, one reason the texts are elusive is that they were
full of mistakes. His translations are also unhelpful at times: vyavalokayati sma
does not mean “looked down”; “nonattainmentness” is not a word; “thought
coverings” is a poor translation of āvaraṇa (Huifeng 2014). Paul Griffiths
(1981: 29-30) used a random paragraph from Conze’s Large Sutra translation,
This might be the only text in which the neuter past participle nirvāṇa is used adjectivally
and declined in the masculine.
9
40
EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
to illustrate what he meant by “Buddhist Hybrid English”, saying, “Dr. Conze’s
translation bears only the most tenuous relationship to the English language in
terms of syntax, and is full of unexplained technical terminology;” (29) The
translation cannot be understood at all without reference to the Sanskrit text, and
those who can read Sanskrit do not need a translation. However, Griffiths adds
“I chose this example not because Dr. Conze’s translations are
worse than anyone else’s; in fact they are better than most. rather,
it illustrates with a concrete example the kind of gibberish that is all
too often produced by the Buddhological community in the sacred
name of translation” (1981: 30. Emphasis added)
Part of Griffiths’ argument is that the Buddhological community, more specifically
Sanskritists in the Buddhological community, are not served at all by a “barbaric
translation” of a “barbaric Sanskrit text” (29). The hermeneutical task of making
his understanding available to others would have been better served by producing a
critical edition and a critical study of the structure of the text and its relations to the
other Prajñāpāramitā texts. An unreadable translation serves no one. of course, there
is no guarantee that Conze could have pulled off such a task. His editions of the much
shorter texts of the Hṛdaya and Vajracchedikā leave much to be desired. what’s
more, his critical study of the Heart Sutra takes us in some very strange directions.
Some of the “hidden hints and illusions” exist only in Conze’s mind. For
example, Conze presented the Heart Sutra as a Mahāyāna version of the four
noble truths (or “holy Truths” as he calls them), going to elaborate lengths to
make this seem plausible (1975: 90, 100-1). The idea is based on the commentary
in the Abhisamayālaṅkāra. Conze’s arguments for this interpretation are
prima facie unconvincing. when we look at his “barbaric” translation of the
Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā (Conze 1975) we note two things. The Heart Sutra
does indeed quote from the section associated by the Abhisamayālaṅkāra with
the noble truths, however the quoted passage begins with the last few lines of
the paragraph that supposedly outlines the second truth (samudaya) and ends
halfway through the section on the third truth (nirodha). The Heart Sutra
includes nothing from the paragraphs on the first (duḥkha) or fourth (marga)
truths. whether the author of the Abhisamayālaṅkāra has made a plausible
argument that these lines in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā represent the four noble
truths is moot, but having read these lines in Sanskrit and Conze’s translation
I can say that I do not find them remotely suggestive of the four noble truths.
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
Similarly, Conze stated that “this mantra has the traditional attributes of the
Buddha” (1975: 102). In fact, “of the terms in the Heart Sutra, only anuttara
‘unexcelled’ has an actual parallel and it is a rather common superlative applied
to any and all Buddhist ideals” (Attwood (2017: 29). And they are not applied to
the mantra, but to Prajñāpāramitā.
when the text says that “there are no four noble truths” Conze gets around
the apparent contradiction by denying that “no” means “no”. It cannot be an
ordinary negation, he says, “because it is used in a proposition of which one
term, i.e. ‘emptiness’, is itself a self-contradictory unity of Yes and no” (1958:
90). Unsurprisingly, Conze goes on to admit that this kind of rhetoric confused
everyone. without any trace of irony, he refers to the confusion engendered by his
self-contradictions as his readers being “dazed by so much splendour” (1975: 90).
Despite his admiration for Suzuki, the two men did not always agree. Suzuki
was not happy about the presence of a mantra in the text that was so important
to Zen Buddhism.
“This [mantra] is apparently a degradation of degeneration… why
this nonsense, so to speak… what has this ejaculation to do with
disciplining oneself in deep Prajnaparamita? A Mantram or Dharani
is generally supposed, when uttered, to effect wonders… Can we
say, then, that the end of the Buddhist disciplines can be attained
by means of a mere mystic phrase?” (1934: 210. Emphasis added).
Suzuki spent fully half of his essay on the Heart Sutra decrying the presence
of the mantra and trying to explain it away. He concludes that “taken in itself
[it] has no meaning, and its vital relation to the Prajñāpāramitā is unintelligible”
(Suzuki 1934: 217). Conze takes the opposite view and appears to quote Suzuki
when he says: “Mantras are incantations which effect wonders when uttered”
(1975: 102). Again, Conze is engaged in magical thinking: “It is… not the fault of
mantras that in this present age they run up against the general incomprehension
of magical forces which the vulgarisation of science has fostered amongst towndwellers” (1975: 103).
Conze’s contempt for ordinary people is evident throughout his commentary
on the Heart Sutra:
“This Sutra is not meant for the stupid, the emotional, or the
uninformed. other means will assure their salvation. Everything
that is at all worth knowing is contained in the [Heart Sutra]. But it
42
EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
can be found there only if spiritual insight is married to intellectual
ability, and coupled with a delighting in the use of the intellect.”
(1958: 99).
As noted above, Conze sees himself as a member of an elite who have special
knowledge not available to the “stupid, the emotional, or the uninformed”.
Passages like this reek of narcissism.
The “intellectual” influence of Theosophy can be seen in statements such as
“‘Emptiness’ is our word for the beyond, for transcendental reality… this is the
mystical identity of opposites” (1958: 83). recall that by “the beyond” Conze
refers to a magical reality he is convinced exists beyond the phenomenal world.
He also says things like, “[The bodhisatva] is able to bear the absolute aloneness
of his solitary Spirit” (1958: 94). other examples include:
“The series of negations… does not add up to nothingness, but
points the way to a unique ultimate reality” (1958: 95)
“when viewed from the subject-side, the transcendental reality is
known as ‘thought only’, because, one and simple, free from duality
and multiplicity, it is without a separate object. This Thought, or
Spirit, forms the very centre of our being” (1958: 96)
Decades later, what can we say about passages like these? Foremost in my
mind is the question of how he got away with so blatantly misrepresenting
Buddhism. The language is such a mishmash that teasing out the origins would
be impossible, but if it were a cheap perfume then we would detect notes of
neoplatonism and Vedanta, on a base of Theosophy.
Conclusion
In my introduction, I said that this essay would be an indictment of Edward
Conze, i.e. a call to objectively assess Edward Conze and his contribution to
Buddhism and Buddhist Studies. That Conze deserves a place in the history of
Buddhist Studies is undisputed. The general view of Conze seems to be that
he was a curmudgeon but that he made an invaluable contribution through his
editions, translations, and exegesis. with so many curmudgeons in the field
(including, some would say, the present author), we could not afford to judge
Buddhist Studies on this criterion. I have tried to show that this view of Conze
is understated on one hand and overstated on the other. Conze’s personality was
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
abrasive, his manner acerbic, and his commentary on other people brutal. These
flaws are less serious than his open racism, misogyny, and misanthropy. In light
of this, his messianic delusion seems tragically funny. That his Buddhist idol
Suzuki was a nazi sympathiser fits this picture perfectly. Still, he was enormously
influential. like the Danish physicist niels Bohr, Conze seems to have had the
kind charisma that made for sycophantic converts. Physicist and philosopher of
science, David Albert describes the effect that Bohr had on other physicists:
“… there was just this long string of brilliant people who would
spend an hour with Bohr, their entire lives would be changed. And
one of the ways in which their lives were changed is that they were
spouting gibberish that was completely beneath them about the
foundations of quantum mechanics for the rest of their lives… And
they revered him. There’s a quote from [John] wheeler saying, “The
thing that made me convinced that there were people like Jesus and
Moses and Buddha was meeting niels Bohr” (emphasis added).10
Conze openly acknowledged his character flaws in the Memoirs, but
nonetheless maintained the delusion that he came from a “higher realm” to save
humanity; even though he found that he could not love humanity. Conze says
of himself, “Throughout my life I have been a stranger on this earth and never
felt at home anywhere. nor have I ever found anyone who was completely
congenial or whom I could trust altogether” (1979: I 54). Muriel Conze referred
to him as “the old man who hates everybody” (II 75). A more tragic epitaph for
a Buddhist Messiah or bodhisattva can hardly be imagined.
If Conze were merely an unpleasant person and a bigot, this would be
incongruous with his religious profession, but it would not invalidate his claim
to being a great scholar. However, his combativeness had a rather deleterious
effect on Buddhist Studies. As Charles Prebish reminisces,
“I was convinced that Buddhist Studies, as it was developing in
north America, was misguided. In the first place, most of the role
models for this blooming discipline: Edward Conze, leon Hurvitz,
10
The quote is from an interview with David Albert by Sean Carroll on his podcast
Mindscape. From the online transcript (starting at 41:40): https://www.preposterousuniverse.
com/podcast/2019/03/04/episode-36-david-albert-on-quantum-measurement-and-the-problemswith-many-worlds/.
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Alex wayman, and a few others, were amongst the meanest
individuals in academe [sic]. while they were utterly brilliant
scholars, they seemed to take real delight in humiliating students
rather than encouraging them.” (Prebish 2019).
As far back as 1979, Edward Bastian was hoping that a reissue of Conze’s
survey of Prajñāpāramitā Literature would help “to rekindle interest in this
crucial aspect of Buddhist Studies (1979: 99. Emphasis added). Bastian’s review
is the only example of a critique of Conze’s views on Prajñāpāramitā that I have
seen.11 Summing up his scholarly contribution, Eric Zsebenyi—who has been
working on a biography of Conze for some years—says, “Conze’s pioneering
accomplishment is still hailed as a model of meticulous scholarship, and he
ranks among the greatest and most prolific modern translators of the Buddhist
tradition” (2004: unpaginated). Effusive praise such as “utterly brilliant”,
“pioneering contribution”, and “meticulous” is de rigueur for Conze. Having
worked on the Heart Sutra for eight years I simply cannot understand it. His
editions are “chaotic” and “unreliable”, his translations are “barbaric” and all
too often “gibberish”, and his exegesis seems to bear only a tenuous relationship
to Buddhism as I understand it.
It is interesting that Prebish brackets Conze with Hurvitz (1923–1992) and
wayman (1921–2004). The two younger men might have turned their critical eye
to Conze’s work and saved us a lot of trouble. Hurvitz (1975, 1977) and wayman
(1977, 1984) both published articles on the Heart Sutra, but neither noticed crucial
mistakes in Conze’s Sanskrit edition or expressed doubts about his idiosyncratic
translation and interpretation of it. Even when he was being critical of Conze’s
botched Large Sutra translation, Hurvitz could still say that Conze’s scholarship
was “above reproach” (Hurvitz 1969: 404). All of the published reviews of the
Large Sutra translation that I can find are complimentary to Conze at the same
time as being sharply critical of the work. David Seyfort ruegg (1977) praises
Conze but spends most of his short review pointing out unfortunate translation
choices. Even the often combative Greg Schopen (1977), who spends most of his
seventeen-page review pointing out mistakes and infelicitous translation choices,
gives Conze the benefit of the doubt at the end of this catalogue of blunders:
“There is both much to be criticized and much to be praised.” (151). The wonder
In the same issue Bastian wrote a short obituary, promising a longer review of Conze that
never emerged.
11
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
is that Conze was on the friendliest of terms with Jan de Jong. Charles Prebish
again: “De Jong was famous for his book reviews, which regularly tore apart the
research publications of even the greatest scholars of the discipline, while rarely
publishing anything original of his own” (2019).
In his Heart Sutra commentary, Conze wrote: “It is not the function of a
commentary to make this paradoxical doctrine plausible, to guard it against
misunderstandings, or to show up its manifold theoretical, spiritual and practical
consequences.” (1975: 84). on the contrary, this is exactly the function of a
commentary or at least in Paul Griffiths’ (1981: 30) words, the “hermeneutical
task” of the commentator. And concerning Conze’s translation of the Large
Sutra, Griffiths says that “he failed signally in his hermeneutical task” (30).
nattier (1992), Huifeng (2014), and Attwood (2015, 2018a) show that Conze
also failed in the case of the Heart Sutra. Schopen (1989) and Harrison (2006)
have shown he failed in the case of the Vajracchedikā as well.
Conze’s oeuvre is an example of what Carl r. Trueman calls the atheistic
fallacy, which can be summarised as: “if it looks convincing, it is convincing” or
applied to the world of scholarship: “if it looks scholarly, then, agree or disagree
with it, it is scholarly and must be taken seriously and allowed a place at the
scholarly table” (2010: 45). Conze’s aberrant scholarship looked convincing to
me until I began to try to parse his Sanskrit Heart Sutra and tried to understand
his English translation of the text. The appearance of scholarship fell apart and
left me wondering how his faulty work had ever passed scrutiny, especially
in the light of my own sometimes bruising encounters with Buddhist Studies
journal editors and anonymous reviewers. The likes of Hurvitz, wayman, and
de Jong could be brutally critical of others and yet they gave Conze a free ride.
The indictment is that while Conze adopted the forms and methods of
scholarship, he was not a skilled editor (by his own admission) and rather than
being a Buddhologist, he was primarily a theologian of Conze-ism: a syncretic
mishmash of Theosophy, neoplatonism, Gnosticism, and Mysticism, framed
in the technical jargon of Buddhism but unrelated to any form of Buddhism
traditional or modern. He convinced more or less everyone that Conze-ism was
synonymous with Prajñāpāramitā largely because the only other commentator
of note was Suzuki who was equally flaky. Hurvitz and wayman might have
exposed the hoax but merely helped to normalise Conze-ism. This situation
in which aggressive (white) men dominated the field of Buddhist Studies for
decades and normalised complete nonsense would be an ideal target for a
Feminist or a Foucauldian critique.
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EDwArD ConZE: A CAll To rEASSESS THE MAn
Edward Conze came to the study of Prajñāpāramitā with many preconceptions
that caused him to misunderstand what he was looking at. These were not the
unexamined biases of the uneducated. Conze had a PhD in philosophy and had
consciously adopted an anti-intellectual pose and embraced magical thinking. He
was not misled by D. T. Suzuki, but simply changed the brand of obscurantism
he endorsed from Marxism to Buddhism. The tragedy is that Conze’s idiodoxy
became orthodoxy in academia and some Buddhist circles. Prajñāpāramitā has
never produced the kind of critical scholarship that makes the study of Pāli texts
so stimulating because of the likes of Dines Anderson, richard Gombrich, oscar
von Hinüber, roy norman, Helmer Smith, and a long list of others all involved in a
creative dialogue and bringing unique points of view. The study of early Mahāyāna
via the Chinese and Tibetan translations has also been fruitful (see Drewes 2010
for a summary and assessment of this field). Prajñāpāramitā studies, by contrast,
are still dominated by Conze and have made little progress since Conze’s death
40 years ago, largely because almost no one wants to work on these texts. Conze
might have pioneered Prajñāpāramitā Studies, but he also murdered them at birth.
Edward Conze thought of himself in messianic terms, but in the immortal
words of Mandy Cohen, “there’s no messiah in here, there’s a mess alright
but no messiah.”12 we would do well to stop idolising Edward Conze and to
start paying critical attention to what he said and did because he was neither
a gentleman nor a scholar and the Prajñāpāramitā texts really are some of the
most important Buddhist texts.
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