Gomyō’s Interpretation on the proof of idealism (vijñapti-mātratā)

by Shigeki Moro

(Hanazono University, Kyoto)

Introduction

According to Yinmin-ruzhengli-lun-shu 因明入正理論疏 (“Commentary on Nyāya-praveśa,” hereafter YRLS), written by Ji 基 (632–682), Xuanzang 玄奘 (602-664), during his studies in India, was at a large Buddhist service held by the king Śīlāditta 戒日王, and on the king’s request, established an inference to prove the vijñapti-mātratā.

After traveling around India and completing his study, our master [i.e. Xuanzang], wanted to return to China. At that time, Śīlāditta, who was the king of India, held a large and uninterrupted Buddhist service that lasted for eighteen days and asked our master to spread his interpretation of Yogācāra all over India. The king chose those who have wisdom and goodness, called them to the service. He sent non-Buddhists and Hīnayāna Buddhists to dispute with Xuanzang. Our master had made the following inference and no one could make an argument against it: ・

Thesis: In truth (*paramārthataḥ), colors and forms (*rūpa), which are mutually accepted [by proponent and opponent] (*lokaprasiddha), are not separate from the visual consciousness. ・

Reason: Because, [based on the ground] we accept, they are included in the first three [[[dhātus]]], but are not included in the eye. ・

Example: Like as the visual consciousness.1 Since this inference (also known as “the proof of idealism” 唯識比量, 真唯識量, hereafter the Proof) was introduced to East Asia, many studies were conducted regarding the Proof, particularly in Japan from ancient times to the middle ages. Daijō-hossō-kenjin-shō 大乗法相研神章 written by Gomyō 護命 (750-834) has a chapter titled Ryakken-inmyō-nisshōri-mon 略顕因明入正理門 (“Summary of Nyāya-praveśa,”2 hereafter RINM).

1 且如大師、周遊西域、学満将還。時戒日王、王五印度、為設十八日無遮大會、令大師立義遍諸天竺。簡 選賢良、皆集會所。遣外道小乗、競申論詰。大師立量、時人無敢対揚者。大師立唯識比量云: ・

真故極成色不離於眼識宗 ・

自許初三摂眼所不摂故因 ・

猶如眼識喩 (T44, 115b) 2 In the opening paragraph of Ryakken-inmyō-nisshōri-mon, Gomyō interprets the character “論 (treatise)” after “因 明,” “正理,” and “入.”

The chapter devotes much space to the Proof, since its interpretation, as well as that of the inference of Bhaviveka’s Dacheng-zhangzhen-lun 大乗掌珍論, was one of the important topics in the confrontation between the Hossō school 法相宗 and the Sanron school 三論宗 from Nara to Heian period3. Gomyō interprets it based not only on Yinmin-ruzhengli-lun-shu but also on Ji’s Dacheng-fayuan-yilin-zhang 大 乘法苑義林章 and Cheng-weishi-lun-shuji 成唯識論述記 (“Commentary on Cheng-weishi-lun”). The discussion in the RINM seems to be his answer of the previous discussions in East Asia, though he makes little quotations of the previous works. In this paper, I would like to examine Gomyō’s interpretation on the Proof, especially focusing on the backgrounds of his discussion. Against whom was the Proof expounded? The View of Gomyō In the RINM, Gomyō offers the following statement concerning those against whom Xuanzang expounded the Proof:

Q. To whom did he offer this inference in argument? A. The preoccupations of the Hīnayāna schools are different from each other. Yet, in accordance with the mundane [[[reality]],] and comparing it to a discipline of their own school, they claimed “the consciousness and the object are independent of each other,” and did not believe that the object existed only in the consciousness. Hence it was to these [[[people]]] that [[[Xuanzang]]] posed the inference. Q. The Hīnayāna schools are also Buddhist. Why did they not believe in vijñapti-mātratā? A. The teachings of the Buddha were all preached in keeping with the faculties [of his congregants]. If the faculties [of his congregants] for Mahāyāna were still immature, [[[Buddha]]] did not preach the teaching of Mahāyāna. Although Buddha ultimately entered into nirvāṇa, [by the time Xuanzang had visited India,] the faculties [of the Hīnayāna people] had gradually matured. Thus, it was [[[Xuanzang]]] who sought to convince them by posing this inference. 4

Here, Gomyō limits the intended target of the Proof to the Hīnayāna. Nevertheless, as I quoted above, the YRLS states that the Proof was expounded in a large Buddhist service that involved non-Buddhists as

3 See Moro 2004a, Moro 2004b and Moro 2012. 4 問。誰人為敵而立此量耶。 答。諸部小乗計執各別。但皆随俗、託自乗学、而演説云「心境相離」。即便不信境唯心裡。今対此等而立量。 問。彼小乗部是仏弟子、何故彼等不信唯識耶。 答。仏説教法悉随機器、大根未熟不与大教。仏雖入滅而根漸熟、是故今者立量令信。(T71, 31c)

well as the Hīnayāna. There has been much debate as to whether non-Buddhists should be included among those to whom the Proof was addressed. A recent example is the view of Lü Cheng, who believes that “in yinming 因明 (hetu-vidyā; i.e. Buddhist logic), the concept of anumāṇa does not refer to purely abstract inference, but is rather something that possesses a specific objective, shaped through discussion and argument.” On the basis biographies of

Xuanzang such as that included in the Further Biographies of Eminent Monks, Lü Cheng believes the intended audience of the Proof to have been the Sāṃmitīya5. Briefly, bringing together the accounts of the Xuanzang’s various biographies including the YRLS shows that: • When Xuanzang had written the Zhì-èjiàn-lùn 制悪見論 (“Treatise on Restricting Heretical Views”), composed in opposition to the Bàng-dàchéng-lùn 謗大乗論 created by *Prajñagupta 般若毬多 of the Sāṃmitīya, he was invited to preach on its contents by King Śīlāditta. • In order to spread the Zhì-èjiàn-lùn throughout India, King Śīlāditta

convened a grand Buddhist service at Kānyakubja. • The Proof was expounded at the Buddhist service held at Kānyakubja. This appears to suggest that the intended target of the Proof may have therefore been the Sāṃmitīya. However, as I have indicated in Moro 2013, the fact that the tradition of the Proof does not appear in any materials dating from Xuanzang’s lifetime and the wide variation in written accounts of the tradition suggests that we must exercise caution in determining the intended audience of the Proof from Xuanzang’s biographies. In yinming [i.e. Buddhist logic], determinations like jíchéng 極成

(*lokaprasiddha) are used to limit the scope of the meanings of words in an inference, often in relation to the discussants. In the Proof, not only jíchéng but also determinations like zhēngù 真故 (*paramārthataḥ) and zìxǔ 自許 are used. The following section investigates Gomyō’s basis for believing that the Proof addressed only to the Hīnayāna, examining the explanation of the determinations of the Proof in the YRLS. Ji’s interpretation in the YRLS of the use

of the determinations jíchéng and zhēngù First off, the description of the initial use of zhēngù 真故: The presence of “in truth” (zhēngù) in the [[[Wikipedia:thesis|thesis]]] subject, by demonstrating that [the Proof] stands in the position of ultimate truth (勝義; *paramārtha) rather than of worldliness, eliminates any contradiction with the common sense of those who are uneducated [regarding religion or philosophy] (非学世間). Also, by demonstrating that [the Proof] stands in the position of the

5 Chen, Daqi, and Cheng Lü. 2007: 267-268

superior truth of Mahāyāna (大乗殊勝義) rather than of Hīnayāna, the contradiction with the independence of colors and forms (rūpa) from the [[[visual]]] consciousness preached in Hīnayāna scriptures is eliminated. Likewise, the contradiction with the common sense accepted by Hīnayāna scholars (小乗学者世間) is eliminated.6

Here, the inference is described to stand “in the position of the superior truth of Mahāyāna.” According to later contexts, “Mahāyāna” undoubtedly refers to the Vijñapti-mātratā school espoused by Xuanzang and Ji. What should be noted here is the initial word “subject.” In conjunction with jíchéng 極成, which appears later on, Ji states that the subject is formed by the five characters reading 真故極成色 (“in truth, colors and forms, which are mutually accepted”). Thus, as it seems that we cannot understand the intention looking only at zhēngù, I would like to look next at “jíchéng 極成.”

The term “mutually accepted” (jíchéng) [in the thesis suject] eliminates [from this inference] the colors and forms (rūpa) tainted by the afflictions [that constitute] the body of the bodhisattva (i.e., Shakyamuni) in his final life [before entering nirvāṇa] preached by Hīnayāna [but not accepted by Mahāyāna] (小乗後身菩薩染汚諸色) as well as the colors and forms tainted by the afflictions [that constitute] the bodies of all Buddhas (一切仏身有漏諸色). Claiming [the inference in the absence of this determination] to demonstrate vijñapti-mātratā will result in an error whereby subject (所別) of the thesis partially unaccepted by the proponent (一分自所別不成) or else partially contradicts [the proponent’s own] doctrine. [Conversely], the colors and forms (rūpa) [that

constitute the bodies] of the Buddhas of the worlds in all directions [accepted by Mahāyāna], or otherwise the colors and forms that are not tainted by the afflictions of the Buddhas are not recognized by the other party [i.e. Hīnayāna]. Claiming [the inference in the absence of this determination] to demonstrate vijñapti-mātratā will result in an error whereby the subject of the thesis goes partially unrecognized by the other party (他一分所別 不成). [Moreover] these two types [of colors and forms] are partly unaccepted [by the proponent or the opponent] in reason as well (随一一分所依不成). It is by using “mutually accepted” (jíchéng) that such [errors] are eliminated. [[[Xuanzang]] claims] vijñapti-mātratā using colors and forms (rūpa) accepted in common [by both the proponent and the opponent], which are apart from these other two types [of colors and forms mentioned above]. 7

6 有法言「真」、明依勝義、不依世俗、故無違於非学世間。又顕依大乗殊勝義立、非依小乗、亦無違於阿含 等教色離識有、亦無違於小乗学者世間之失。(T44, 115c) 7 「極成」之言、簡諸小乗後身菩薩染汚諸色、一切仏身有漏諸色。若立為唯識、便有一分自所別不成、亦 有一分違宗之失。 5

The explanation of “in truth” (zhēngù) mentions Hīnayāna and “those who are uneducated [regarding religion or philosophy] (非学世間),” probably in reference to non-Buddhists. However, it is notable that the explanation of the determination “mutually accepted” (jíchéng) makes no mention of the latter group. Regarding the determination “in truth” (zhēngù), Hajime Nakamura has made the following critique: In this formula, Ji explains that even though the argument runs contrary to what is believed by the general public, the attachment of the determination zhēngù (“viewed from the perspective of the truth of paramārtha”) excludes any fallacy that contradicts what would be accepted by the general public. Nevertheless, this argument has no persuasive effect against those who do not accept the extrasensory truth position of paramārtha. In other words, as the parārthānumāna preached by Buddhist logic, it is nonsense.8 I would like to examine Nakamura’s critique diagrammatically. • {x | x = the colors and forms (rūpa) accepted by “those who are uneducated (非学世間)”} • {y | y = the colors and forms (rūpa) accepted by the Hīnayāna scholars (小乗学者世間)} • {z | z = the colors and forms (rūpa) accepted by the superior truth of Mahāyāna (大乗殊勝義)} Using the above terms, Nakamura seems to interpret the portions eliminated by “in truth” (zhēngù) as shown in Figure 1.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2 Conversely, according to the YRLS, the portions that “mutually accepted” (jíchéng) eliminates would be as in the diagram of Figure 2. Combining these two, we find that: • ¬ (rūpa eliminated by zhēngù ∪ rūpa eliminated by jíchéng) = ∅ 十方仏色及仏無漏色、他不許有。立為唯識、有他一分所別不成。其此二、因皆有随一一分所依不成。 説「極成」言為簡於此。立二所余共許諸色為唯識故。(T44, 115c) 8 Nakamura 1958: 7.

The referent of “in truth, colors and forms, which are mutually accepted” (真故極成色) would thus in fact be nothing at all. As Nakamura says, this would be nonsensical. However, interpretations such as Nakamura’s are unnatural when we consider that “in truth” (zhēngù) is used as a determination for a subject in combination with “mutually accepted” (jíchéng), which also eliminates doctrine exclusive to Mahāyāna. In the explanation of the YRLS above, zhēngù is not said to be a determination standing in a Mahāyāna-specific position, necessarily distinct from Hīnayāna or non-scholarly worlds, but rather one that eliminates contradictions with them. Accordingly, it is reasonable to think that zhēngù eliminates the doctrine-specific mindsets of the Hīnayāna or the non-scholarly worlds. Such a conception of the scope eliminated by zhēngù would be schematically represented by Figure 3.

Fig. 3

Fig. 4 Accordingly, we find that: • ¬ (rūpa eliminated by zhēngù ∪ rūpa eliminated by jíchéng) = y ∩ z Which can be represented in Figure 4. If this interpretation is valid, “in truth, colors and forms, which are mutually accepted” (真故極成色) would refer to “colors and forms accepted by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna;” in other words, colors and forms which are not separate from the visual consciousness. Consequently, the intended audience of the Proof would have been only the Hīnayāna, and would not have included non-Buddhists, since the segment b in Figure 4 represents the portion not accepted by the non-scholarly world. It is possible that the usage of determinations noted above underlies Gomyō’s contention9, which as we saw earlier, held that the intended audience of the Proof was limited to the Hīnayāna.

9 However, Gomyō does not regard zhēngù as a part of the thesis subject, based on the debates in East Asia. See Moro 2004a, Moro 2004b and Moro 2012.

Ji’s interpretation in the YRLS of the use of the determination zìxǔ Let us now look at another determination, zìxǔ 自許. As this appears in the reason for the Proof, it means “[based on the ground] we accept.” Concerning this, as well, Nakamura offers a critique as follows: Additionally, indicating a proposition accepted only by the proponent’s own side as a reason despite the fact that reason must be accepted by both proponent and opponent (共許極成) is nonsense as a basis for demonstration. 10

Nevertheless, Ji’s interpretation appears to differ from that of Nakamura.

If that is so, then why bother stating “we accept”? The answer is to prevent the error of contradicting the implications of the [[[Wikipedia:thesis|thesis]]] subject (有法差別相違過). It is not intended to demonstrate the fact that “colors and forms, which are mutually accepted, are included in the first three [of the eighteen dhātu] but are not included in the eye” is accepted only by the proponent’s own party in an argument and not by the opponent. The phrase “in truth, colors

and forms, which are mutually accepted” expresses the thesis subject literally (有法自相), while the phrase “are not separate from the visual consciousness” expresses the thesis predicate literally (法自相). The phrases “colors and forms that necessarily exist outside the visual consciousness” or else “colors and forms that do not necessarily exist outside the visual consciousness” are implicit in the thesis subject (有法差別). The proponent [[[Xuanzang]]] implies “colors and forms that are not separate from the visual consciousness,” but [without the determination of “we accept”] the outside party [the Hīnayāna] would make an argument which would take exception to these implications, as follows: ・

Colors and forms, which are mutually accepted, are not those things that are not separate from the visual consciousness. ・

Because while being included in the first three [of the eighteen dhātu], they are not included in the eye. ・

Like the visual consciousness. The determination “we accept” is used in order to prevent such errors. 11

10 ibid. 11 若爾、何須「自許」言耶。為遮有法差別相違過、故言「自許」。非顕“極成色、初三所摂、眼所不摂”、 他所不成、唯自所許。謂「真故極成色」是有法自相。「不離於眼識」是法自相。定離眼識色、非定離眼識色、 是有法差別。立者意許是不離眼識色。外人遂作差別相違言、 ・ 極成之色非是不離眼識色。

As in the emphasized portion of the quote above, the determination “we accept” is not intended to indicate reasons “merely accepted only by proponent’s own party in an argument,” but states that the content of the reason are limited to the subset of “colors and forms, which are mutually accepted” (“colors and forms that are not separate from the visual consciousness”). Accordingly, Nakamura’s critique is unfounded. Based on the above explanation, with “in truth, colors and forms, which are mutually accepted…” as the subject of the thesis of the Proof, Xuanzang’s intended meaning was “colors and forms, which are accepted by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna….” This also means that we can rephrase “because [based on the ground] we accept, they are included in the first three [of the eighteen dhātu], but are not included in the eye” as “because they are included in the first three [of the eighteen dhātu] of which are not separate from the visual consciousness, but they are not included in the eye of which are not separate from the visual consciousness.”12 Schematically, this would be represented as in the diagram below.

初三所摂眼所不摂故。

猶如眼識。 為遮此過、故言「自許」。（T44, 115c-116a）

12 This interpretation seems to result in a tautology:

Thesis: colors and forms that are not separate from the visual consciousness are not separate from the visual consciousness. ・

Reason: Because they are included in the first three [of the eighteen dhātu] of which are not separate from the visual consciousness, but they are not included in the eye of which are not separate from the visual consciousness. ・

Example: Like as the visual consciousness.

Not separate from the visual consciousness (NSVC) ¬ NSVC

The first three dhātu of zìxǔ (= NSVC)

The eye (of NSVC) Dhātu (of NSVC) except the eye

Visual consciousness 真故極成色

The Critique of Ji’s Position by the Monks of Silla Ji’s interpretations, such as the one above, were not universally accepted in East Asia, and in fact attracted considerable criticism. In particular, many criticisms were leveled by the monks of Silla. The writings of Silla passed to Japan, where they had a large impact even prior to Gomyō. Nakamura, continuing in the passage cited earlier, states as follows:

In other words, Tripiṭaka master Xuanzang did not sufficiently understand the distinction between an inference for the purposes of one’s own understanding (自比量) and a demonstration for the purposes of convincing others (他比量). The presence of fallacies in his argument was indicated by Sungyeong 順憬 of Silla 新羅. 13

While the individual named here by Nakamura is Sungyeong, there are some traditions in which it is actually said to be the position of Weonhyo. By this critique, Weonhyo gained a reputation as the “reincarnation of Dignāga.”14 As I have discussed this Weonhyo/Sungyeong critique in Moro 2010 and Moro 2012, here I would like simply to give an overview.

Weonhyo held [Ji’s] interpretation to be inadequate. Concerning on the school which accepts the doctrinal premise that [the bodhisattvas of the eighth stage and above] could use the [functions] of the five sensory organs interoperably (五根実互用宗), the following [[[Wikipedia:inference|inference]]] could be stated: ・

In truth, colors and forms (rūpa), which are mutually accepted, are separate from the visual consciousness, which are mutually accepted. ・

Because, [based on the ground] we accept, they are included in the first three [of the eighteen dhātu], but are not included within the visual consciousness. ・

Like as the visual organ. 15

What becomes problematic here is Weonhyo’s use of the Mahāyāna-specific doctrine that “[the bodhisattvas of the eighth stage and above] could use the [functions] of the five sensory organs

13 Nakamura 1989: 282 14 （元暁和上縁起云）玄奘三蔵於西域中、欲学瑜伽論。時西域中、在戒賢論師欲涅槃時、天唱如是言「漢 国之賢人為学瑜伽論故来、莫為涅槃」。爾時玄奘順付、往学瑜伽論。然後立真故極成量、而破小乗執、時西 域諸論師等無釈此量。此諸論師皆言「不陳那不能是量釈」。時玄奘還於漢国、而為説是量、時無斥是量過。 爾時造広百論疏、文軌師誓願言「不陳那菩薩無是量釈、若有是量過人、我為其作臣也」。爾時順師学是已、 還於羅国申是量。時元暁菩薩云「此量有法差別相違過」。爾順師如其自知通於唐国言「水土是易故、至於羅 国知是量過」。時論師等皆向東三礼尊重讃嘆。故道証師等章疏中、羅国元暁師等章疏中、羅国師所説、由是 義故知、陳那菩薩云云 (Zōshun 蔵俊. Inmyōdaisho-shō 因明大疏抄. T68, 525b-c) 15 暁師判云、此通未尽。若対五根実互用宗、則応立言、 ・

真故極成色離極成眼識。 ・

自許初三摂眼識不摂故。 ・ 猶如眼根。(Zenju 善珠. Inmyōronsho-myōtōshō 因明論疏明燈鈔. T68, 322b-c)

interoperably”. This suggests the Weonhyo understood the determination “in truth” in the same fashion as Nakamura as shown in Figure 1. In opposition to this interpretation by Weonhyo, Ji states that:

Roughly, by the rules of yinming [i.e. Buddhist logic], argument for oneself (自比量) relies on thesis, reason and examples that are all one’s own [exclusively accepted concepts]. This is similar with [argument intended to persuade] other parties and [argument conducted using only concepts held] in common. If the proponent uses his or her own [exclusively accepted concepts], another party’s [exclusively accepted concepts], or common [[[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]]], then the opponent must also use these same things respectively. Good yinming is free from error (無疎謬). The Proof, introduced earlier, is an inference based on mutually accepted ground (共比量). Conversely, because the present [[[Wikipedia:inference|inference]] of Sungyeong] is an argument that uses his own [[[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] that he alone accepts], the following inconsistencies are present throughout the inference. 16

As well as emphasizing that the Proof is a “an inference based on mutually accepted ground” (共比量) that does not use any Mahāyāna-specific doctrine, he objects that Weonhyo’s critique is mistaken in that it uses Mahāyāna-specific doctrine. The passage from Daehyeon’s 大賢 lost writing Inmyeong-ipjeongni-ron-gojeokgi 因明入正理論古 迹記 cited in Zoshun’s 蔵俊 Inmyōdaisho-shō 因明大疏抄 suggests that it was a document that contained various criticisms towards Ji17. As an example, let us briefly examine the discussion of Dojeung 道証, who is held to have been Daehyeon’s teacher.

The Gi 集 (“Anthology”) states as follows. Some masters’ interpretations of “we accept” is utterly unable to understand [[[Xuanzang’s]]] true meaning. [The determination] “we accept” in Tripiṭaka master Xuanzang’s inference, if we accept that it was intended to avoid the [alleged] contradiction [from] the other party, then it is a wasted effort. […] Accordingly, because Tripiṭaka master’s [i.e., Xuanzang’s] intention in establishing [the Proof] was aimed at both the Hīnayāna and non-Buddhists, it states as a reason that “[based on the ground] we accept, they are included in the first three” so as to avoid the error of partial one-sidedness (一分随不成過) [that could result] from the fact that non-Buddhist schools do not recognize the eighteen dhātu. Because the reason is accompanied by “we accept,” it falls into the category of argumentation for oneself. 18

16 凡因明法、若自比量、宗因喩中皆須依自。他共亦爾。立依自他共、敵対亦須然。名善因明無疎謬矣。前 云唯識、依共比量。今依自立、即一切量皆有此違。(YRLS. T44, 116a-b) 17 See Moro 2012: 56-65. 18 集曰、諸釈「自許」皆失本意。三蔵量中「自許」、若避他相違者、虚設劬勞。…然彼三蔵立唯識意、通対 小乗及外道宗、避外不立十八界者一分随不成過故、因言「自許初三摂」也。因既「自故」自比量 摂。 (T68, 520b-c)

As is stated here, Dojeung appears to believe that the Proof was written against the Hīnayāna and non-Buddhists, in line with the tradition of the YRLS. This line of thinking differs from that of Ji and of Gomyō, as we have seen. Additionally, he states that the determination zìxǔ, using concepts that are accepted only by one’s own party, is a determination intended to advance argument for one’s own side (自比量). As we saw earlier, it was Ji’s contention that the Proof was an argument conducted using concepts accepted by both parties (共比量). Also, while Weonhyo/Sungyeong also appears to have considered zìxǔ essentially to have been a determination for using Mahāyāna-specific doctrine, still he did not conclude that the Proof was an demonstration for one’s own argument. Accordingly, claims such as Dojeung’s are worth noting in the history of interpretation of the Proof. Gomyō’s explanation of zìxǔ Gomyō has the following to say concerning the determination zìxǔ:

Q. What is the meaning of “[based on the ground] we accept, they are included in the first three”? A. The phrase “we accept” (zìxǔ 自許) express the meaning “mutually accepted” (共許). It is recognition by the opposing party in an argument, as well as recognition by one’s own party. Q. If that is so, then [[[Xuanzang]]] should say “mutually accepted”. Why [did he] say “we accept” (zìxǔ)? A. Here, the character for “self” (zì 自) has a deep significance. This is because, if other errors exist, then we must certainly limit [the meaning of the word in order to eliminate] them. Q. If that is so, to whom does “self” (zì) refer? A. It is the “self” (zì) of the proponent. Only when reasons are mutually accepted does this “self” (zì) take on the meaning of “mutually accepted”.19

These statements are similar to the interpretation of Ji, as we saw earlier. However, this interpretation is not simply Ji’s interpretation as copied by Gomyō, since there was a conflict of opinion over this issue. The Hossō-tōmyō-ki 法相灯明記 (“Treatise on the Lamp of Dharma Character”) estimated to have been compiled in 815, the Tōdaji 東大寺 monk Zen’an 漸安, known by the honorific title Konpon Inmyōji 根本因明師 (“Fundamental Logic Master”)20, likely on the basis of position of Shuen 修円 (c.

19 問。自許初三攝等者意如何耶。 答。自許之言顯共許義。彼敵者許立論自許也。 問。若爾應言共許、何故而言自許耶。 答。是自字者其意深也。若有餘過、必爲簡故。 問。若爾自言是誰之自耶。 答。立論者自也。於共許因是此自者言共許耳。(T71, 33c) 20 Zōshun. Inmyōdaisho-shō (T68, 494a)

749-834), records the occurrence of a doctrinal conflict between the temples of Kōfuku-ji 興福寺 and Gangō-ji 元興寺 in Nara. Regarding zìxǔ as well, the following conflict is recorded to have occurred.

Concerning the determination “we accept” (zìxǔ) in the reason of the Proof: Other people [i.e., Gangō-ji] claim that it is both that which is commonly accepted [by the proponent and the opponent] and that accepted by the [proponent] himself (zìxǔ). Yamashina-dera 山階寺 temple [i.e., Kōfuku-ji] holds as follows. If one has already said “mutually accepted”, then why say “accepted by the [proponent] himself (zìxǔ)”? Accordingly, the determination “we accept” (zìxǔ) attaches only to the proponent. This is because [this determination] is used only in the demonstration of one’s own doctrine. 21

As we have seen thus far, a variety of theories were suggested in Táng and Silla as to the interpretation of determinations in the Proof. Accordingly, it is natural for such conflict to have arisen in Japan, which had imported these varied interpretations. While Gomyō was originally from Gangō-ji, his interpretations concerning zìxǔ seem generally to be consistent with the Gangō-ji position as related in the Hossō-tōmyō-ki. From among a variety of options, Gomyō selected the position taken by Ji. The background of Gomyō’s interpretation of the Proof The background of the Twofold Truth Debate Gomyō’s interpretation of zhēngù 真故 in the Proof is comprised of extensive quotations from a chapter on the twofold truth (二諦義) in the Dàchéng-fǎyuàn-yìlín-zhāng 大乗法苑義林章. Gomyō holds that the “truth” 真 of zhēngù 真故 (“in truth”) is the absolute truth (paramārtha-satya) of the twofold truth, and

advances his argument while citing the theory of the four types of the twofold truth (四 重二諦) advocated in the chapter on the twofold truth. I do not investigate this in detail here, but this interpretation seems to underlie his earlier arguments as well. As to which of the four types of absolute truth (paramārtha-satya) the “truth” of zhēngù corresponds, the Hossō-tōmyō-ki relates a disagreement between the temples of Kōfuku-ji and Gangō-ji To which number of the four types of paramārtha-satya does the “truth” 真 [of the determination zhēngù 真故 (“in truth”)] used in the Proof correspond? Some [i.e., Gangō-ji] say that it “leads to all four types of paramārtha-satya.”

21 一。唯識比量因自許言： 余云、共許自許。 階云、既云共許、云何亦云自許耶。故自許言独属立者、立自義故。(T71, 50a)

At Yamashina-dera temple [i.e., Kōfuku-ji], we say that “it is the second of the paramārtha-satya” (this is explained in detail in Director monk Matsui’s 松井僧都 Yuishikihiryō-ki 唯識比量記 [“Treatise on the Proof of Idealism”]). 22

It is brief, so it is unclear what sort of debate was held. The Yuishikihiryō-ki by the Director monk Matsui (details unknown) is referenced, but confirmation is not possible at the present time. An account that seems to be based on this debate can be seen in the RINM.

Q. If that is so, there are four types of absolute truth (paramārtha-satya). Which absolute truth (paramārtha-satya) is the absolute truth (paramārtha-satya) [of zhēngù]? A. It is a determination that refers to [all] four types of absolute truth (paramārtha-satya) Q. How can we understand this? A. There are two types of proof. The first is proof by scripture (教証). The second is [[[proof]]] by logic (理諦). 23 […] Q. The Mahāyāna Master Ji stated that the theories of vijñapti-mātratā, the three natures 三性 and so on come into existence through the second of the absolute truths (paramārtha-satya). So why did he pose [the Proof] using [all] four types of absolute truth? A. He [i.e., Ji] advocated setting up a theory of cause and effect. The other [i.e., Xuanzang] expounded [the Proof] in order to demolish the mistaken thinking of his opponents. They must not be regarded as identical. 24

Gomyō, as expected, thus held to the same views as Gangō-ji. Notably, Zenju 善珠, in his Yuishiki-bun-ryō-ketsu 唯識分量決, expressed opinions that differed from the aforementioned theories. Reasons for mentioning Jayasena’s inference Gomyō, in the RINM, mentions Jayasena’s 勝軍 inference. It is an inference posed by Xuanzang’s Indian teacher, a lay Buddhist named Jayasena, which claimed that the Mahāyāna Buddhist scriptures were Buddha’s true teachings. In Yaṣṭivana of the central Indian kingdom of Magadha, there was a wise lay priest. […] His true

22 一。唯識比量簡別「真故」者、四重真諦中何重真諦耶。或云「通四重真」云云。階云「真第二重也」。広 如松井僧都唯識比量記。(T71, 50a) 23 問。既爾眞諦實有四種。以何眞諦而爲眞諦耶。 答。以四種眞而爲簡別。 問。以何知爾耶。 答。謂有二證。一教證。二理諦。(T71, 32c) 24 問。大乘基師所説唯識三性等依第二眞而建立、何依四眞而立比量耶。 答。彼依因果建立門説、此依對他破執門説、不可准思。(T71, 33a)

name is Jayasena. This treatise master posed an inference to the people of Hīnayāna. Expounded therein was as follows: ・

Thesis: All Mahāyāna Buddhist scriptures are the true teachings of the Buddha. ・

Reason: Because they include no words unspoken by the Buddha, which both parties [[[Mahāyāna]] and Hīnayāna] accept (両倶極成). ・

Example: As with the Āgama of the Ekottarāgama-sūtra and its like. For more than forty years, there were none who could challenge this argument. When Master Xuanzang arrived in India, he critiqued this syllogism by speaking as follows. “There is an error of uncertainty (不定). Although the *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra (発智論) is held to be the teachings of the Buddha by the treatise masters of the Sarvāstivāda school, it contains words unspoken by

the Buddha accepted by those outside the Sarvāstivāda school, the people of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna [i.e., the people of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna outside the Sarvāstivāda school do not regard the *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra to be the teachings of the Buddha]. Hence, in order that this [*Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-]śāstra include no words unspoken by the Buddha accepted by both parties [[[Mahāyāna]] and Hīnayāna] [i.e., to prove that they are the teachings of the Buddha], the Sarvāstivāda school would point out an [error of] uncertainty in the following manner. “As the *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra that we [the Sarvāstivāda school] accept includes no words unspoken by the Buddha accepted by both parties [[[Mahāyāna]] and Hīnayāna], does that not mean that thy own Mahāyāna scriptures are not the teachings of the Buddha? [i.e., if the Mahāyāna claim that the *Abhidharma-jñāna-prasthāna-śāstra are not the teachings of the Buddha, then does not that mean that neither are the Mahāyāna scriptures?] Also, as the Āgama of the Ekottarāgama-sūtra and its like includes no words unspoken by the Buddha accepted by both parties [[[Mahāyāna]] and Hīnayāna], does that not mean that thy own Mahāyāna scriptures are the teachings of the Buddha?” It was difficult to escape this [critique of] uncertainty. So it was, therefore, that Xuanzang added the words “which we accept” (zìxǔ) into the reason, and so avoided the error.

There was a great Buddhist teacher in the sacred court of Japan. His true name was Zenju. […] At the time of the Enryaku 延暦 era, he delivered lectures on inmyō [i.e. Buddhist logic] at Nakatomi-dera 中臣寺 temple25, and the monks were summoned. Against the inference [corrected by Xuanzang], he [Zenju] created a demonstration of contradiction (決定相違). ・

Thesis: All Mahāyāna scriptures are not the teachings of the Buddha.

25 It is perhaps either Hōkō-ji 法光寺 or Kōfuku-ji 興福寺.

Reason: They include no words unspoken by the Buddha accepted by both parties [[[Mahāyāna]] and Hīnayāna], which we accept (zìxǔ). ・

Example: As the treatises on six categories 六句論 [of Vaiśeṣika]. The Hīnayāna side [say that] “the Mahāyāna scriptures are not the teachings of the Buddha”, while the Mahāyāna side [say that] “the Mahāyāna scriptures are the teachings of the Buddha.” The proponent and opponent each say that “each other’s [[[scriptures]]] are not necessarily the teachings of the Buddha.” To say “not necessarily the teachings of the Buddha” is to say that [as stated in

the reason above], “they include no words unspoken by the Buddha, whom both parties [[[Mahāyāna]] and Hīnayāna] accept.” The Mahāyāna claim [is established by the fact that it] reasons that “[[[Mahāyāna scriptures]]] include no words unspoken by the Buddha accepted by both parties.” In the Hīnayāna claim [a contradiction is established by the fact that] it is reasoned that “[[[Mahāyāna scriptures]]] include no words spoken by the Buddha accepted by both parties.” The former and the latter are both equal, and neither can be said to be correct. The great teacher [Zenju] did not dismiss the error26.

At first glance, it does not appear that this argument relates to the Proof. However, if we look back over the history of the interpretation of the Proof in Japan, it seems that a possible connection exists. For example, Zenju’s Yuishiki-bun-ryō-ketsu takes up discussion of several contemporary problems with the Proof. In Yuishiki-bun-ryō-ketsu, in light of the statement in the YRLS that “the determination zhēngù is significant in that it demonstrates ‘the

superior truth standpoint of Mahāyāna’ (大乗殊勝義)”, Zenju catechizes as follows:

Q. The superior truth standpoint of Mahāyāna (大乗殊勝義) is not accepted in Hīnayāna. Why

26 中印度境摩竭陀國、其杖林中有賢居士…諱即勝軍。然是論師對諸小乘、立一比量。彼量辭曰: ・

諸大乘經皆是佛説。宗 ・

兩倶極成非諸佛語所不攝故。因 ・

如増一等阿笈摩經。喩 四十餘年無敢徴詰。 玄奘大師至彼印度、判比量云「有不定過。彼發智論、薩婆多師自許佛説。亦餘小乘及大乘者、兩倶極成非 佛語攝。然則此論、兩倶極成非諸佛語所不攝故、彼薩婆多作不定云“爲如自許發智兩倶極成非諸佛語所不 攝故、汝大乘經非佛語耶。爲如増一等兩倶極成非諸佛語所不攝故、汝大乘經是佛説耶”」。此不定實難免脱。 是故玄奘於其因上置自許言即遮此過。 日本聖朝有大名師、其諱善珠。…延暦年中、於中臣寺講因明也。徴僧在座。約此比量作決定相違云: ・

諸大乘經非佛説。宗 ・

自許極成佛語所不攝故。因 ・

如六句論等。喩 彼小乘者大乘經者是非佛説、此大乘者大乘經者皆是佛説。立敵更互別説彼非定佛説。非定佛説故、極成佛 説所不攝也、極成非佛説所不攝也。大乘宗意、取極成非佛語所不攝義、而以爲因也。小乘宗意、取極成佛 語所不攝義、而作相違。彼此齊等、以何爲正。大名法師不敢斥過。(T71, 36a-b)

determinate (簡別) it by using a predicate (法) not accepted in common? A. This has two meanings. The first is that, originally, Mahāyāna is accepted by Hīnayāna too. However, the profound teachings of Mahāyāna were unknown to the Hīnayāna scholars. Accordingly, the error of [contradicting the knowledge of] Hīnayāna scholarship was circumvented by using a determination. The second is that the Mahāyāna scriptures have already been proven finally to be the teachings of the Buddha by three inferences. Accordingly, [at the superior truth standpoint of Mahāyāna] this is satisfied even with the addition of a determination. 27

Notable here is the second reason proffered by Zenju. What is referred to by the “three inferences” spoken of by Zenju is unclear. However, from the fact that the Mahāyāna saṃgraha-śāstra inference and Jayasena’s inference are introduced in the fourth volume of Ji’s Chéng-wéishi-lùn-shùjì 成唯識論述記, in the commentary on the argumentation that the Mahāyāna scriptures are the teachings of Buddha expounded in the Chéng-wéishi-lùn, it is possible that it might be these three to which he is referring. Gomyō also states that the Mahāyāna scriptures are the teachings of Buddha in the RIMN, interpreting the meaning of “the superior truth standpoint of Mahāyāna” (大乗殊勝義):

Q. Those Hīnayāna people do not accept “the superior truth standpoint of Mahāyāna” (大乗殊勝 義). Why can the meanings [of the determination zhēngù] eliminate contradictions? A. It is accepted that Mahāyāna scriptures are the teachings of Buddha. Since the seven reasons of Maitreya and the five reasons of Chéng-wéishi-lùn have been accepted, “the superior truth standpoint [of Mahāyāna]” has also been accepted.28

It is reasonable to say that Jayasena’s 勝軍 inference was important for Gomyō to interpret the Proof. Works cited Chen, Daqi, and Cheng Lü. 2007. 因明入正理論悟他門淺釋 因明入正理論講解. Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company中華書局. Franco, Eli. 2004. “Xuanzang’s proof of idealism (vijñaptimātratā).” Hōrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur, 11: 199-211. Moro, Shigeki. 2004a. “清辨比量の東アジアにおける受容 (Understanding of Bhāviveka’s inference in East Asia).” 불교학연구 (Buddhist Studies) 8.

27 問。大乘殊勝義小乘不許、如何用不共許法以爲簡別耶。 答。有二義。一本有大乘是小乘亦許。今大乘深妙之法非是小乘學者之所知、故擧簡別遮學者世間過。二先 以三箇比量證大乘經是佛語已、故成簡別。(T71, 451c) 28 問。大乘殊勝義、彼小乘者之所不許也。何以彼義而簡相違耶。 答。成大乘經是佛説也。慈氏七因、唯識五因、以成已畢、故殊勝義成共許已 (T71, 35a)

Moro, Shigeki. 2004b. “玄奘の唯識比量と新羅仏教: 日本の文献を中心に (Xuanzang’s proof of idealism and Silla Buddhism: Focusing on Japanese Buddhist texts).” 2004 금강대학교 국제불교학술회의 (Proceedings of the International Conference on Buddhist Studies at Geumgang University in 2004). Moro, Shigeki. 2010. “元暁の唯識比量解釈: E. Franco 氏の説と比較しつつ (Weonhyo’s interpretation of the proof of idealism: Comparing with Dr. Eli Franco’s interpretation)” 元曉學研 究

15. Moro, Shigeki. 2012. 東アジア仏教論理学の形成と展開: 唯識比量をめぐる文化交渉を中心とし て (Formation and Expansion of Buddhist Logic in East Asia: Focusing on the Cultural Interaction of the Proof of Idealism). PhD Thesis, Kansai University, Osaka, Japan. Moro, Shigeki. 2013. Xuanzang’s proof of idealism (眞唯識量) and Sīlabhadra’s Teaching. Journal of the First International Academic Forum on Maitreya Studies. Hong Kong: Institute of Maitreya Studies. Nakamura, Hajime. 1958. 國譯一切經 和漢撰述部 論疏部 23. Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha大東出版 社. Nakamura, Hajime. 1989. チベット人・韓国人の思惟方法 (The Tibetan and Korean Ways of Thinking). Tokyo: Shunjūsha.