HOW INNOVATIVE IS THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA?

INTRODUCTION

(1) The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha and other Yogācāra texts claim orthodoxy for the ālayavijñāna on the grounds that it had been taught by the Buddha within accepted scriptural sources, and that it was in fact posited by other Abhidharma schools in the guise of more or less synonymous terms.1 [i.e., claim of orthodoxy] (2) In an ironic reverse appeal, Walpola Rahula has claimed that “although not developed as in the Mahāyāna, the original idea of ālayavijñāna was already there in the Pāli Canon.”2 [i.e., claim of origination] (3) On the other hand, Schmithausen (1987: 46) has recently suggested that the <200> conception of the ālayavijñāna eventually entailed “redrawing the theory of mind.” [i.e., claim of innovation] In this essay I will examine the

relationship between the canonical3 conception of vijñāna (Pali: viññāṇa) and the Yogācāra concept of the ālayavijñāna so as to contextualize these claims. The innovative aspects of the ālayavijñāna have so often been emphasized that its commonality with its canonical predecessors and Abhidharma contemporaries, the very context in which it most needs to be understood, is all too frequently overlooked. We shall view the ālayavijñāna not simply as a radically new departure, but also as the systematic development of the early concept of vijñāna within the more sophisticated context of Abhidharma. From this perspective we shall be able to more fully appreciate both its continuity with the earlier conceptions, as well as the gradual development and

elaboration of vijñāna theory within Abhidharma and Yogācāra, thereby supporting but at the same time qualifying the ahove-mentioned claims to (1) orthodoxy, (2) origination and (3) innovation. In the early discourses preserved in the Pāli Canon vijñāna was a polyvalent term with diverse (i) epistemological, (ii) psychological, and (iii) metaphysical dimensions, many of which became marginalized within orthodox Abhidharma discourse. • The ālayaviñāna is, in crudest outline, this canonical vijñāna minus its role within immediate cognitive processes; • it encompasses those aspects of vijñāna pertaining to the continuity of saṃsāric existence that could not be readily integrated into orthodox Abhidharma discourse, focusing as it does upon the immediacy of transient states of mind. The ālayvijñāna system effectively reunited these divergent dimensions in a bifurcated model of the mind which articulated a simultaneous and interactive relationship between (1) the momentary, surface level of sensory cognition and (2) an abiding, subliminal level of sentient existence. Since the ālayavijñāna is presented in terms of

(i) the wide range of functions played by the canonical vijñāna [i.e., Section A] and (ii) the various problematics to which these arrived within Abhidharma [i.e., Section B], we shall examine these in some detail before we present (iii) the gradual systematization of the ālayavijñāna itself [i.e., Section C]. <201>

A. THE CANONICAL CONCEPTIONS

AA. ‘VIJÑĀNA’ AS ‘CONSCIOUSNESS’, ‘VIJÑĀNA’ AS ‘COGNITION’

In the early Pāli texts, vijñāna was considered equally (1) as ‘consciousness’, an essential factor of animate existence without which there would be no individual life, and (2) as ‘cognition’, the ordinary sensory and mental models of perception and knowing.4 (1) Vijñāna as ‘consciousness’ plays a major role in the early Buddhist explanation of the cycle of birth, death and rebirth, known as saṃsāra. Together with ‘life’ (āyu) and ‘heat’ (usmā), vijñāna is one of the essential factors necessary for animate existence and without which one would die.5 Vijñāna enters into the womb at the time of conception,6 and exits the body at the time of death.7 As a factor of saṃsāric continuity, it is precisely the advent, the ‘stationing’ or ‘persistence’ of vijñāna in this world that perpetuates saṃsāric existence.8 It is this unbroken stream of vijñāna that, proceeding from life to life,9 is virtually the medium of the

accumulated potential effects of past actions, of karma.10 In this context, vijñāna, along with the other four skandhas, is said to “attain growth, increase, abundance” [virūḷhiṃ vuddhiṃ vepullam āpajjeyya].11 The total elimination of this accumulated karmic potential along with the eradication of the afflicting passions is closely equated with liberation, nirvāṇa, at which point vijñāna, the medium of this accumulation, is also (i) eradicated or at least (ii) fundamentally transformed.12 As we shall see, the Yogācāra conception of the ālayavijñāna replicates these functions in every one of these respects. This became necessary, I will argue, largely because of the one-sided emphasis Abhidharma put upon vijñāna’s second major dimension: the role that vijñāna, as simple cognition, plays within ordinary cognitive processes.13 (2) As the central element within the perceptual processes, vijñāna as

‘cognition’ occurs in six modes depending upon the type of sensory or mental stimulus and its respective perceptual organ (the five sense organs and the ‘mental’ organ).14 In this context, vijñāna as cognition occurs upon the contact between the relevant unimpaired sense organ, its respective object and attention [[[manasikāra]]].15 Both of these aspects of vijñāna, • first as ‘consciousness’, the essential principle of animate existence and a continuous medium within saṃsāra, and • second, as simple, immediate ‘cognition’, co-existed <202> within the mass of transmitted teachings, albeit within different contexts of meaning.16 The earliest traditions evinced little awareness of discordance between the two, since at the deepest metaphysical level17 they were so inseparably intertwined as to be virtually causes and effects of one another:

• Karmic actions, within which vijñāna as cognition plays a central role, lead to continued existence within saṃsāra, the major medium of which is the unbroken stream of consciousness, of vijñāna. • And this unbroken stream creates, in turn, the very pre-conditions for such cognition to occur at all. But to see just how this is, we must examine the relationship between these two aspects of vijñāna as they are articulated within the twelve-member formula of the dependent co-arising (pratītya-samutpāda).18 We should note that the mutual conditionality between these two aspects of vijñāna constitutes the central insight of the ālayavijñāna-based model of mind.

AB. ‘VIJÑĀNA’ WITHIN THE ‘PRATĪTYA-SAMUTPĀDA’ SERIES

Vijñāna has two essential places within the pratītya-samutpāda series, which correspond roughly to the two aspects described above. • First, vijñāna conditions the very development of a sentient body by descending into the mother’s womb, thereby securing a foothold or support in a new life, wherein it may grow, increase, and multiply;19 vijñāna thus constitutes one of the preconditions for any cognitive activity whatsoever.20 Vijñāna at this point is directly conditioned by the saṃskāras, the formative forces of the past.21 • Second, vijñāna is implicitly yet directly involved in the karmic activities that perpetuate saṃsāric life. The terms of the twelve-member pratītya-samutpāda series which directly succeed vijñāna and name-and-form (nāma-rūpa) delineate all of the essential elements of the cognitive processes and the affective responses to which they give rise: the six sense-spheres (ṣaḍāyatana) and sense-impression (sparśa) are essential preconditions for cognition to take place,22 while the next factor, feeling (vedanā), is (along with apperception, saṃjñā) said to be its virtually inseparable concommitant.23 Feeling and apperception, moreover, are themselves karmic activities (saṃskāra) of mind (citta) (M I 301: saññā ca vedanā cittasaṅkhāro). Thus, as Johansson (1979: 139) notes, every act of cognition is, or perhaps more precisely, <203> entails saṃskāras, formative karmic activities, and thus leads to further rebirth.24 But the affective dimension outlined within the series of dependent co-arising is just as important: feeling gives rise to craving (tṛṣṇā) and grasping or ‘appropriation’ (upādāna),25 affective attitudes or actions which lead directly toward renewed rebirth in the future.26 These are followed by becoming (bhava) and birth (jāti), which have long been considered a second process of rebirth within the pratītya-samutpāda series by the traditional exegetes. As a link between one life and the next, this juncture will also be cited by the Yogācārins to support the existence of a specific type of mind, the same one that is conditioned by the saṃskārā earlier in the series in a parallel relationship, viz., the “ālaya” vijñāna. The pratītya-samutpāda series then depicts vijñāna as both (1) a principle of animate existence conditioned by the formative forces (saṃskārā) and subsisting throughout one’s lifetime, and, implicitly, as

(2) intrinsically related within the cognitive processes to the complex of activities that perpetuate saṃsāric existence.27 This is implicit in the very structure and sequence of the series. These two dimensions of vijñāna, moreover, may be considered as causes and effects of one another: • ‘subsisting’ vijñāna, while itself conditioned by previous karmic activities associated with past perceptual processes, provides the ground or the preconditions for the continued occurrence of those very processes.28 • And for as long as the afflicting predispositions (anuśaya or āśrava) elicit feeling (vedanā), craving (tṛṣṇā) and grasping (upādāna) in conjunction with those processes, they will in turn continue to perpetuate the cycle of rebirth. This reciprocal cause and effect relationship between the two aspects of vijnāna remains implicit and undefined within the early texts;29 the Yogācārins will later rearticulate this relationship by differentiating two types of vijñāna, (i) the abiding “ālaya” vijñāna and (ii) the momentary, perceptual vijñānas (pravṛtti-vijñāna), and by explicitly describing their simultaneous and reciprocal conditionality.

AC. THE LATENT DISPOSITIONS (ANUŚAYA) IN EARLY BUDDHIST THOUGHT The relationship between the perceptual processes and the affective <204> responses they elicit are, we have seen, central to the karmic activities, the formative forces that perpetuate saṃsāric existence. This involves a dispositional substructure which was quite essential to the theory of saṃsāric continuity in early Buddhist thought and subsequently to the developments within Yogācāra doctrine under consideration here. Although there are several important notions connected with dispositional tendencies in early Buddhism,30 we will limit ourselves here to the anuśaya, the latent dispositions or tendencies,31 for it was the persistence of these latent tendencies that became the focus of debate during the Abhidharma period and which eventually led Yogācārins (for much the same reasons and along the same lines as the ālayavijñāna) to postulate a distinct aspect or mode of mind representing them, i.e. the kliṣṭa manas. The latent dispositions are essential to the early Buddhist world view in much the same respects as vijñāna: (1) psychologically, they are causally related to the various karmic activities associated with the perceptual processes; and thus, (2) ‘psycho-ontologically’, they perpetuate further saṃsāric existence; whereas (3) soteriologically, their gradual eradication is closely related to progress upon the path toward liberation. These dispositions are instrumental in instigating the karmic activities connected with perceptual processes. In the standard formula of dependent co-arising the perceptual processes give rise to feeling or sensation

(vedanā), followed by craving (tṛṣṇā) and grasping (upādāna). This important sequence of affective arousal is usually stated without further elaboration The close connection between feeling (vedanā) and its affective responses, so essential to the perpetuation of saṃsāra, demands explication; this lies within the structure and dynamics of the latent dispositions. According to M III 285: Visual cognition arises dependent on the eye and visual forms, the coming together of the three is sense-impression; dependent on sense-impression a pleasant, unpleasant or neutral feeling arises. Being stimulated by a pleasant feeling, he will be pleased, welcome it and remain attached to it; his latent disposition to desire (rāgānusaya) lies latent (anuseti).32 The same is true for the other sensations: there is a latent disposition to aversion (paṭigha) within an unpleasant sensation and to ignorance <205> (avijjā) in a neutral sensation.33 These dispositions represent the infrastructure, as it were, of the saṃskārā, the karmic complexes that feed and interact with vijñāna; thus they help to explicate the dynamics underlying these processes within the series of dependent origination.34 [ad 2] These dispositions also have the same ‘psycho-ontological’ consequences as vijñāna, that is, they help perpetuate saṃsāric existence: If one does not will, O monks, does not intend, yet [a disposition] lies dormant (anuseti), this becomes an object for the persistence of consciousness. There being an object, there comes to be a support of consciousness. Consciousness being supported and growing, renewed existence takes place in the future. Renewed existence in the future taking place, old age and death, grief, lamentation, suffering, sorrow and despair come to pass. Such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.35 It is clear then that these affective latent dispositions or tendencies are central to the various karmic activities and thus help perpetuate the long-term results of continued rebirth. [ad 1] These dispositions are, moreover, fundamental to the basic psychic structure of human beings. In the Mahāmāluṅkya-sutta, the Buddha states that even a small baby has various kinds of anuśaya: If, Māluṅkyāputta, an ignorant baby boy lying on his back has no [[[awareness]] of] self-existence ([of] dharmas … rules … sensual pleasure … persons), how could his view of self-existence (… doubt regarding dharmas … attachment to rules and rituals in rules … lust toward sensual pleasure … aggression toward persons) ever arise? That disposition (anusaya) of his toward a view of sell-existence (… doubt attachment to rules and rituals … desire for sensual pleasure … aggression) lies latent (anuseti).36 We find here an apparent dichotomy, foreshadowing later developments, between the latent disposition and its actual manifestation: though the unlearned infant possesses only the disposition toward a view of self-existence (sakkāyadiṭṭhānusaya), etc., the ordinary individual “lives with his mind possessed by the view of self-existence” (sakkāyadiṭṭhi-pariyuṭṭhitena cetasā viharati), etc. In contrast to these, the learned monk, well practiced in the Buddha’s teachings and well trained in meditation,

does not live with his mind possessed by the view of self-existence [etc.], nor <206> overcome by the view of self-existence etc., and he understands as it really is the deliverance from the view of self-existence [etc.] which has arisen. That view of self-existence of his is eliminated along with the latent disposition.37 [ad 3] These dispositions are present throughout one’s lifetime and for as long as one exists within saṃsāra.38 Their gradual destruction reflects stages upon the path toward liberation39 and only upon full liberation are they completely eliminated.40 In sum, the anuśaya represent a dispositional substructure which, like vijñāna, persists throughout the life and lives of individual sentient beings and is central to the karmic activities instrumental in perpetuating saṃsāric existence. The anuśaya describe the essential connection between ordinary sensations and feelings (vedanā) and the ill-fated reactions elicited by them, and as such are, like vijñāna crucial to the Buddhist explanation of saṃsāric continuity.

How Innovative is the ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA by William S. Waldron B. MOMENTARINESS AND CONTINUITY IN THE ABHIDHARMA The two doctrinal contexts we have examined above in which vijñāna, as well as the latent dispositions, play a central role, viz. (1) in the immediate and discrete processes of cognition and (2) in the very continuity of saṃsāric existence, pertain to arguably distinct temporal dimensions.41 Although this distinction is seldom explicitly addressed within the sutta-piṭaka, it became quite central to the doctrines put forth in the newly emerging Abhidharma literature. Abhidharma literature preserves doctrinal developments from probably shortly after the parinirvāṇa of the Buddha up to and succeeding the early Yogācāra texts that first depict the ālayavijñāna. It was in the context of these developments that early Yogācāra and the concept of the ālayavijñāna evolved.42 The similarity of their concerns is obvious at even a cursory glance: • the Abhidharmic issues debated, • the technical vocabulary with which they were expressed, and • the general presuppositions underlying them are the same as those used to discuss, describe and defend the concept of the ālayavijñāna. The presentation of Abhidharma doctrine in this section43 will thus serve to contextualize the ālayavijñāna, and the problems toward which it was addressed, within this overarching Abhidharma milieu, <207> thereby demonstrating both its continuity with and its development of canonical vijñāna theory.

BA. ABHIDHARMA ANALYSIS OF MIND: ITS PURPOSE, METHODS AND PROBLEMATICS44 Abhidharma represents the efforts to bring about systematic order and consistency within the variegated body of the discourses of the Buddha for the higher purpose, as its name – ‘higher doctrine’ – suggests, of leading practitioners toward the ultimate goal of liberation.45 In an immensely consequential hermeneutical tack, the Ābhidharmikas considered this ‘higher doctrine’, which was expressed in the precise and technical language of dharmas, existential elements discretely distinguishable by their own characteristic,46 to be ‘ultimately’ true. Those aspects of the doctrine, however, which were conveyed in the simpler, almost vernacular language of the early discourses, and thus not readily transposable into dharmic terms, were considered merely ‘conventional’, that is, merely nominal designations47 for aggregations of those dharmas which exclusively could be said to truly exist. Since the dharmas, moreover, are strictly momentary48 and wholly constitutive of the animate and inanimate worlds, what appear to be ‘individuals’ and ‘things’ are actually only the stream or continuity of these aggregated dharmas occurring one after the other in serial fashion. The discernment of these dharmas through higher awareness is essential for the Abhidharma’s stated purpose of liberation, since, Vasubandhu declares, there is no other way to pacify the afflictions (kleśa) than by examining the dharmas, which can only be done through the Abhidharma.49

Two distinct kinds of problems were created by these developments, belonging roughly to the dimensions of (i) momentariness and (ii) continuity we noted above in the canonical contexts of vijñāna. 1. [‘Synchronic’ or ‘dharmic’ analysis:] Dissecting experience into its discrete and momentary elements, it was essential to understand the internal relationships within and between these momentary processes, for it is the presence or absence of certain factors, especially the afflictions (kleśa), that make any particular moment karmically wholesome or unwholesome; such an analysis is thus both essential to, and only realizes its significance within, the <208> soteriological project as a whole.50 I shall call this analysis of momentary dharmic factors ‘synchronic’ or ‘dharmic’ analysis. 2. [‘Diachronic’ or ‘santāna’ discourse:] The second problematic was entailed by the first: since each mind-moment is strictly momentary, the continuity of certain characteristics of an individual (or rather, of the mental stream, citta-santāna) became problematic, both empirically and in regard to the traditional doctrines of karma, kleśa, rebirth, and gradual progress on the path. In short, the indispensable relationship between causal conditioning and temporal continuity, of how the past continues to effect the present, became problematic within the new context of momentariness. I shall call this traditional reference to aspects of experience that appear to persist for longer periods, ‘diachronic’ or ‘santāna’ discourse. Both the synchronic, dharmic analysis and diachronic discourse of the mental stream are of central importance to Abhidharma as a whole. The presence of the afflictions and the type of actions (karma) they instigate can be discerned only through the synchronic, momentary dharmic analysis, since they alone are ultimately true, while the continuity of individual saṃsāric existence is almost always described in reference to the diachronic level of the mental stream. The exclusive validity that Abhidharma accorded to the analysis of momentary processes of mind threatened to render that very analysis religiously vacuous by negating the legitimacy of its overall soteriological context, that of saṃsāric continuity and its ultimate cessation.51 We shall briefly examine the developments within the Abhidharma tradition of • the synchronic analysis of mind-moments [Section BB], • the diachronic analysis of continuity [Section BC] and • the issues elicited by their fateful disjunction [[[Sections]] BD-BG]. We shall see that here too, as with its multivalence and manifold temporal contexts within the Pāli suttas, vijñāna is central to both of these discourses. BB. THE ‘SYNCHRONIC’ ANALYSIS OF MIND The synchronic analysis focuses primarily upon citta, ‘thought’, or ‘mind’ (an important term also used in the early canonical texts to denote the central faculty or process of mind52 which can become either contaminated or purified and liberated53) and the mental factors (caitta or cetasika) which occur with and

accompany it.54 This analysis <209> of citta is an analysis of vijñāna as well, since vijñāna is central to nearly every moment of mind and is, in any case, synonymous with citta in the Abhidharma.55 Although the basic relationship between the citta and caitta is reciprocal and simultaneous (sahabhū),56 the quality of karmic actions depends upon the specific relationships between particular factors. It is the mental factors (caitta) which are ‘conjoined’ or ‘associated’ with the mind (citta-saṃprayukta)57 that make their accompanying actions karmically effective.58 Conversely, the formative forces which are unassociated with mind (citta-viprayukta-saṃskārā) are less determinative and thus karmically indeterminate (avyākṛta).59 Since dharmas last for only an instant, continuity or change is actually only the incessant arising of succeeding new dharmas of a similar or different type.60 Abhidharma explains the dynamics of their succession through a system of causes (hetu), conditions (pratyaya) and results (lit.: fruit, phala).61 It was, generally speaking, the difficulty in accounting for diachronic phenomena within the specifics of this system that brought about the problems towards which both certain Abhidharma notions and the concept of ālayavijñāna were addressed. We will discuss only those most pertinent to our concerns,62 foremost among which is the resultant cause and effect (vipāka-hetu/phala). The relationship between the vipāka-hetu, the ‘resultant, maturational’ or ‘hetergeneous cause’ and its result, the ‘ripened’ or ‘matured fruit’ (vipāka-phala), is the core of Abhidharma karmic theory since it refers to the functioning of karmic cause and effect over extended periods of time.63 This relationship stands, however, in some tension with the ‘homogeneous and immediate condition’ (samanantarapratyaya),64 the conditioning influence that dharmas bear upon immediately succeeding dharmas of a similar nature.65 While the immediate succession of relatively

homogeneous dharmas is readily explainable, heterogeneous succession is more problematic since it requires that a wholesome factor, for example, succeed an unwholesome factor, or vice versa.66 But since this succession cannot be the result of homogeneous (by definition) and immediately antecedent conditions, it must be conditioned by a causal chain initiated at some earlier time. But how could a cause which is already past, and therefore <210> no longer existent, exert a causal influence on the present?67 In Abhidharmic terms, what present dharma constitutes the link between the vipāka cause and result necessary for such long-term karma to operate?68 And how or where exactly does it factor into the other momentary processes of mind? For if Abhidharma discourse is truly ultimate, and thus implicitly comprehensive, this must be accounted for within the dharmic analysis of purely momentary states. The problems surrounding the maturational cause and effect, then, involve much more than the mere succession of heterogeneous states, since it entails origination from non-homogeneous or non-immediately antecedent conditions, of which the potential for karmic results over extended periods of time is crucial. But much the same problems are posed by the long-term persistence of the latent dispositions as well: • if the anuśaya are present in any effective sense in each moment, how would wholesome actions ever occur? • But if they were entirely absent, from where would they arise? (and why would one not already be an Aryan?). Though this will be discussed further below, the latent afflictions, in brief, are also problematic within the analysis of strictly momentary states.

• And last, the attainments and achievements acquired along the path, but not reaching full fruition until perhaps even lifetimes later, could hardly be explainable by reference to purely momentary states of mind.69 In sum, if only momentary processes are real and effective, Abhidharma cannot account for factors that must, for (i) exegetic, (ii) systemic and (iii) empirical reasons, be conceived as subsisting over the long term. But the very purpose of synchronic analysis was, as stated above, to ascertain the underlying motivations, and thus axiomatically the nature of one’s actions, so as to diminish the overpowering influence of the afflictions (kleśa), cease accumulating karmic potential and thereby gradually progress along the path toward liberation. Thus the diachronic discourse could not be disregarded without undermining the larger soteriological framework within which the synchronic analysis is ultimately made meaningful and intelligible. And it was the continuing validity, indeed the necessity, of just these traditional doctrines alongside the newer analytic that the various Abhidharma schools, each in their own way, felt compelled to address. BC. ‘DIACHRONIC’ DISCOURSE: TRADITIONAL CONTINUITIES – KARMA, ‘KLEŚA’ AND SEEDS The traditional relationship between the dynamics of karma, kleśa and saṃsāric continuity are also well preserved in the Abhidharma literature: It is said [AKBh IV 1] that the world in its variety arises from action (karma). It is because of the latent dispositions (anuśaya) that actions accumulate (upacita), but without the latent dispositions [they] are not capable of giving rise to a new existence. Thus, the latent dispositions should be known as the root of existence (mūlaṃ bhava).70 It is this accumulation of actions performed, permeated and influenced by the afflictions (kleśa) and their latent counterparts, the anuśaya, that increases the mind-stream and so perpetuates the cycle of existence: In accordance with the projective [[[cause]]] (ākṣepa-[[[hetu]]]) the mental stream (santāna) increases gradually by the afflictions (kleśa) and karma and goes again into the next world … Such is the circle of existence without beginning.71 The close relationship between karma, its accumulation,72 and the medium or vehicle of this accumulation is, in contrast to the Pāli materials, explicitly identified as vijñāna in Sautrāntika-leaning sections of the AKBh: Mental motivation (manaḥsañcetanā) projects (ākṣepa) renewed existence; that [[[existence]]] which is projected is, in turn, produced from the seed (bīja) of vijñāna which is infused (paribhāvita) by karma. Thus, these two are predominant in bringing forth the existence which is not yet arisen.73 This much is in substantial agreement with canonical doctrines,74 except that, it should be stressed, the Sautrāntikas developed the traditional metaphor of seeds to explicitly stand for the latent potency of both (i) karma and (ii) kleśa, as we shall see.

The latent dispositions in the AKBh constitute a reservoir of ever-present proclivities predisposed to flare up and possess (paryavasthāna) the mind75 in response to specific objects76 and feelings.77 This constitutes the vicious saṃsāric circle: the fruit of karma occurs primarily as feeling,78 by which the dispositions are expressly provoked <212> (kāmarāga-paryavasthānīyadharma),79 whereupon they in turn instigate activities that lead to further karmic result, and so on. As in the Pāli materials, moreover, these dispositions persist until they are eradicated along the path toward liberation80 as an Aryan.81 • But if these dispositions were constantly present and dynamically unwholesome (akuśala) factors associated with mind (citta-saṃprayukta), and thus by definition incompatible with wholesome factors,82 they would prevent wholesome processes of mind from ever arising.83 • But if they were not active and manifest at that very moment,84 how could they impart any unwholesome influence at all? • And finally, how would a momentarily wholesome mind of an ordinary worldling differ from that of the momentary, mundane wholesome mind of an Arhat, since they would be at that time phenomenologically similar, dharmically speaking? The kleśa/anuśaya problem thus poses the same question as that of karmic potential: how can dispositional factors, which are diachronic, santāna-related elements par excellence, be described in terms of the synchronic, dharmic analysis? The Sautrāntikas again utilize the metaphor of seed, this time to refer to the dispositions: The affliction (kleśa) which is dormant is called a latent disposition (anuśaya), that which is awakened, an outburst (paryavasthāna). And what is that [[[affliction]]] which is dormant? It is the continuity (anubandha) in a seed-state (bīja-bhāva) [of that affliction] which is not manifest. What is awakening? It is being present. What is called a ‘seed-state’? It is the capacity (śakti) of that individual (ātmabhāva) for an affliction to arise born from a [previous] affliction, as is the capacity or memory to arise born from experiential knowledge (anubhava-jñāna), and the capacity for sprouts, etc., to produce a grain (phala) of rice bred from a [previous] grain of rice.85 The Sautrāntikas here, in agreement with the sutta materials examined above and in contrast with the Sarvāstivādins and the Theravādins,86 clearly distinguish between the latent dispositions and their manifest outbursts.87 But in so doing they opt out of the dharma system altogether: the latent dispositions are neither associated (citta-saṃpratyuka)88 nor dissociated with mind (citta-viprayukta) since they are not real existents (dravya).89 <213>

And neither is the Sautrāntika concept of seed (bīja), representing both the potential for karmic result and the latent dispositions within the mind-stream, since it too is only nominally existent (prajñaptisat).90 It is related, rather, to solely diachronic terms, such as citta-santāna, vijñāna,91 saṃskāra, āśraya, nāma-rūpa (or, as above, the even more nebulous ātmabhāva), an explicit admission of its incompatibility with, or rather untransposability into, synchronic, dharmic discourse: What is called a ‘seed’? Any psycho-physical organism (nāma-rūpa) that is capable of producing a fruit either mediately or immediately through a specific modification of the mental stream (santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajāt). What is called a ‘modification’? It is the mental stream being in a different state. What is called the ‘mental stream’? It is the motivating complexes (saṃskārā) of the three times existing as cause and effect.92 It is only in reference to the mental stream (santāna) that the concept of seed has relevance. But it is just the mass of accumulated karma (karmopacitam) and the inertia of the predispositions that constitute individual saṃsāric existence and the habitual energy patterns that perpetuate the whole cycle. This mass and inertia exist, in a sense, at a subliminal level wholly independent of the dharma system, constantly informing and driving the supraliminal functions of mind, which in turn create further karma and stronger affliction-complexes,93 just as a current of water creates and deepens its own stream bed, which then governs its overall course and rate of flow. Vijñāna then in the Sautrāntika parts of the Abhidharmakośa in particular, and in Abhidharma in general, plays the same dual role as in the early Pāli materials. • First, vijñāna as cognition plays a central role within the momentary processes of mind which the citta/caitta dharmic analysis explicates. • Second, the persistence and stationing of vijñāna as a principle of animate life is a requisite of saṃsāric existence94 and a bodily support throughout life, since it is the common element (sādhāraṇabhūtāḥ) from the moment of conception (pratisandhi-citta) at rebirth until the time of death,95 when it finally <214> leaves the body altogether.96 The stream of mind (citta-santāna), corresponding roughly to these latter aspects of vijñāna, is also explicitly infused by karma and the afflictions, thus perpetuating the cycle of rebirth. In the Abhidharma, however, these two dimensions or contexts of meaning are radically differentiated and • one of them, that of the momentary dharmic analysis, is given priority and ultimate status, while • the other, the santāna discourse explicitly championed by the Sautrāntikas in the AKBh, is considered merely conventional or nominal; since it remained for all of them, however, the indispensable soteriological framework within which dharmic analysis is ultimately made meaningful and, in the end, intelligible,97 problems arose.

BD. ‘SARVĀSTIVĀDIN’ DOCTRINES

The Sarvāstivādins’98 attempt to reconcile the dharmic analysis of mind with the diachronic phenomena of karma, kleśa, and their gradual removal along the path presents an interesting contrast to the Sautrāntika concept of seeds, since it avoids involving vijñāna altogether. Rather than resorting to a metaphor denoting the continuous potential of such phenomena, they proposed an ontology in which dharmas exist throughout the three times (past, present and future).99 This was argued on the grounds that if past causes did not exist, then no longer being present, they could not lead to future results. In one of the Sarvāstivādin interpretations, what distinguishes a dharma as present is its ‘activity’ (karitra), that is, whether or not it has the capacity to condition the occurrence of another dharma.100 An additional dharma called ‘possession’ (prāpti) was also proposed, which would determine when a certain mental factor would occur at a given moment, that is, when it falls into one’s, or rather its own mental stream (santāna).101 This ‘possession’ itself, however, is unassociated with mind (citta-viprayukta) and so may co-exist with either a wholesome or unwholesome nature of mind,102 thereby also allowing for heterogeneous succession.103 And since it is the ‘possession’ of a dharma that determines its presence or absence within the mental stream, the need to distinguish between active (paryavasthāna) and latent (anuśaya) afflictions is <215> obviated. The Sarvāstivādins therefore simply conflate the two and assert that they are associated with mind (citta-samprayukta),104 claiming that the latent dispositions mentioned in the suttas actually refer to ‘possession’ by another name.105 Moreover, what distinguishes an Aryan in a mundane moment from an ordinary being (pṛthagjana) is just the ‘possession’ (prāpti) of the appropriate dharmas.106 Thus, the Sarvāstivādins as well as the Sautrāntikas distinguished abandonment of the afflictions independently of the actual present state of mind107 with the concepts of ‘possession’ and ‘seeds’, respectively. The dharma of ‘possession’, however, was not systematically worked into the complex scheme of cause, condition, and result (hetu, pratyaya, phala). As the final mechanism of the nature of karmic actions, the afflictions which instigate them, and the ultimate indicator of progress along the path, prāpti itself is remarkably vague and indeterminate, betraying its ad hoc nature and inviting Vasubandhu’s open disdain.108

BE. THE MEDIUM OF SEEDS, BODY/MIND RELATIONS AND MEDITATIVE CESSATION T

he idea that the accumulation of karma and the continuity of the afflicted dispositions were transmitted through the stream of mind raised, however, further questions regarding the two aspects of vijñāna delineated above: • how does this mental series relate, if at all, to the traditional six cognitive modes? • Is the series merely one moment of cognition after another? If so, then is there sufficient homogeneity between succeeding moments of the six cognitive modes, with their attendent and divergent mental factors and physiological bases, so as to allow for the transmission of such karmic potential

• And if not, would the stream of mind that transmits such potential refer to a heretofore unspecified kind of mind? These questions were brought to a head in the context of body/mind issues in which the continuous presence of mind was essential: • what kind of vijñāna (or citta)109 is it that, as in the canonical doctrines, takes up or appropriates (upatta or upādāna) the body and its sense organs at birth and is thereafter its support or basis (āśraya)110 until its departure from the body at death? • And what kind of mind keeps the body alive during the absorption of cessation in <216> which all mental activitities come to a halt (nirodha-samāpatti)?111 • Either mind is present, in which case what type of mind would it be without any mental activities whatsoever? • Or, if mind were completely absent and its continuity cut, then what would ensure the transmission of karma and afflictive potential,112 and why would the practitioner not simply die? • And what would serve as the homogeneous and immediately antecedent condition (samanantarapratyaya) for the moment of mind which emerges from this absorption,113 since its ‘mind support’ (manāśrayaḥ), an immediately antecedent mental cognition,114 would necessarily have been absent? It is clear that no single one of the six cognitive modes is fully capable of all of the various functions attributed to vijñāna in both canonical and Abhidharma sources, since each of them depends upon their respective sense organs and specific sense objects, is intermittent and always accompanied by associated mental factors. The various approaches to these questions evince a similar search for a different type of mind, one subsisting in some fashion independently of the six cognitive modes. • The Sautrāntikas suggested that the citta which emerges from the absorption of cessation arises from seeds continuously preserved in the body, since they held that mind and body are mutual seeds of one another;115 others, however, criticized this for abrogating the condition of homogeneity, that the effect must be similar to the cause.116 • The Sarvāstivādins held that the emerging citta is directly conditioned by the last moment of citta preceding the absorption, since for them those past dharmas actually exist.117 • Others maintained, however, that a subtle form of mind (sūkṣma-citta) subsists without apparent functioning during the absorption, since otherwise the complete withdrawal of vijñāna would result in death.118 • The Yogācārins combined these characteristics into a continuous and subtle type of mind that carries the seeds of both body and mind together, viz. the ālaya-vijñāna.119

BF. BHAVAṄGA-CITTA The transition from one body to another at rebirth is an interruption in the material series, over which the transmission of accumulated <217> karma and the ingrained kleśa traverses until one has achieved liberation. Most Abhidharma schools considered the mind which reconnects (pratisandhi-citta) at rebirth (upapatti), and thereupon, joins with the fetal materials, to be a moment of mental cognition (manovijñāna).120 The Theravādins, however, amended this position with the new concept of the life-element or life continuum (bhavaṅga-citta),121 which addresses a variety of problems and so bears comparison with the ālayavijñāna. The bhavaṅga-citta is a resultant (vipāka), and thus karmically neutral, mind of homogeneous nature which takes its particular character at rebirth and to which the mind naturally reverts in the absence of cognitive objects.122 As a neutral ‘buffer-state’ between moments of cognition, it serves, along with the object itself and attention, as one of the immediate conditions upon which specific cognitions arise, thus also resolving the problem of heterogeneous succession.123 It is not, however, a continuous stream since it is constantly interrupted by these cognitions, nor is it simultaneous with them.124 Neither is the bhavaṅga-citta in its classical formulation connected to the acute functions of karma or kleśa, since it is concerned primarily with continuity and perception. Karmic continuities in the Theravāda, rather, in Collins’ words (1982: 248), have no “underlying connecting thread, save the overall force of karma which creates them,” transmitted through the unbroken succession of either mental moments, some subliminal and some supraliminal, or, during the mindless absorptions, the material life faculty – in sum, a conception not too dissimilar from the Sautrāntikas’ mental stream (citta-santāna), where it is the stream of citta or vijñāna per se that insures the continuity of karma except during the absorption of cessation. It is with its metaphysical functions, however, that the bhavaṅga-citta bears the closest resemblance to the ālayavijñāna. Commenting on these Collins (1982: 239) remarks: It is a condition of existence in two senses: • first, in the sense of its mere occurrence as a phenomenon of the saṃsāric, temporally extended sphere, as a necessary part of any individual name-and-form … it is both a causal, ‘construct-ive’ and a resultant, construct-ed factor … • Secondly, it is itself a conditioning factor of existence, in the particular sense of being a necessary condition for any conscious experience of life. It is only on the basis of bhavaṅga that any mental processes can arise.125 <218> And it is precisely upon this dual nature (i) of a continuous, constructed aspect of mind necessary for saṃsāric existence and (ii) of an active, conditioning aspect serving as a precondition for all cognitive processes that the complex notion of the ālayavijñāna was built.126 BG. INDEX OF CONTROVERTED ISSUES We have seen that the Abhidharma tradition laid ultimate validity upn the momentary factors (dharmas) wholly constitutive of the individual and whose (mostly) unbroken succession is conventionally designated

the mental stream (citta-santāna).127 The discernment of these factors as they inform, indeed constitute, one’s thoughts and actions provided a powerful analytic in service of the higher religious aims of purification of the mind, the cessation of karmic accumulation, and the gradual progress toward these goals. This newer Abhidharmic analytic, however, became increasingly problematic when contextualized within the larger soteriological framework in which it was ultimately meaningful. For when it came time to describe the accepted workings of karma and kleśa, and their gradual eradication, in terms of the analysis of momentary processes of mind and its concommitant mental factors (citta-caitta), the dogmatic, systemic and empirical inadequacies became glaring indeed. And this inability to adequately contextualize the dharmic analytic undermines the very purpose of discerning these momentary processes and overcoming their pernicious influences for which it was conceived in the first place. The totality of the problems created by the Abbidharmic analytic suggests they are of a systemic nature, elicited by the disjunction between the two temporal dimensions of vijñāna which we first discerned within the early Pāli materials. The common thread connecting them is that they refer to, rely upon or seem to require aspects of mind which persist in some fashion beyond, or more precisely, independently of the momentary cognitive processes.128 And while these continuous elements must be, for the most part, potentially present, they must also be strictly neutral in their karmic influences.129 A short summary of these issues, most of them discussed above, bears this out.130 <219> Karma: (1) is there a distinct factor of karmic accumulation (karma-upacaya)?131 (2) is karmic accumulation (karma-upacaya) related to mind (vijñāna )?132 Kleśa/anuśaya: (3) are the outbursts (paryavasthāna) of afflictions (kleśa) distinct from their latent dispositions (anuśaya)?133 (4) are the latent dispositions (anuśaya) dissociated from the mind (citta-viprayukta), and thus karmically neutral?134 (5) are the latent dispositions (anuśaya) simultaneous or compatible with wholesome states (kuśala-citta)?135 (6) are there innate, but karmically neutral afflictions (kleśa)?136 (7) are there seeds (bīja) that represent the latent dispositions, their ‘impressions’ (vāsanā), the potential for karmic result, and/or subtle forms of vijñāna?137 Attainments: (8) do Aryans harbor afflictions or latent dispositions (anuśaya)?138 (9) is there a distinct attainment which distinguishes those who are or will be Aryans from the non-liberated?139 Continuity of Consciousness:

(10) are there subtle (sūkṣma) and enduring forms of mind?140 (11) is a subtle form of mind (vijñāna) present during the absorption of cessation or unconscious states?141 (12) is there a distinct type of vijñāna that transists at rebirth?142 (13) is there a neutral type of mind which can mediate between two heterogeneous states? Simultaneity of Consciousness: (14) can ordinary mind (citta or vijñāna) contain or accept the seeds (bīja) or ‘impressions’ (vāsanā)?143 (15) is there a type of mind (citta or vijñāna) underlying the cognitive modes as their basis (āśraya) or root (mūla)?144 <221> (16) do the different cognitive modes (vijñāna) function simultaneously?145 C. CONCLUSIONS Collins’ (1982: 224) remark on the use of seed imagery in Theravāda – “the imagery of seeds and fruit is never regularized to the extent of becoming technical terminology built into the ultimate account of continuity” – can, I believe, be extrapolated to the problem of the individual mind stream within Abhidharma as a whole. Since all dharmas are momentary, Abhidharma does not attribute ultimate validity to any factor which continues independently of the analyzable, momentary processes of mind. All the doctrines referring to the continuity of karma and kIeśa examined above, however, (with the exception of vijñāna in its momentary, cognitive aspect), depend upon their relation to elements (citta-santāna, āśraya, nāma-rūpa, ātmahhāva, bīja) considered extraneous to dharmic discourse.146 The fact that this juxtaposition of doctrinally technical language with naturalistic metaphors, analogies and conventional usages was necessary in order to give a full account of the continuity of karma, kIeśa, and the attainment of stages in their eradication, demonstrates the limitations of purely dharmic discourse, a conclusion supported by all the above-mentioned ‘pseudo-permanencies’ and ‘pseudo-selves’ (Conze, 1973: 132, 138). The seeds, for example, were never intended to be part of that discourse since they were not real existents (dravya) at all, but simply metaphors for the underlying capacities (śakti or sāmarthyam),147 potentials and developments of mind in terms of the life-processes of insemination (paribhāvita), growth (vṛddha) and eventual fructitication (vipāka-phala; ‘ripened fruit’). Central to these tensions lay, again, the concept of vijñāna, with its two temporal aspects from canonical times, (i) as momentary ‘cognition’ and (ii) as a continuous, conscious factor essential for life, corresponding, respectively, to (i) the synchronic analysis of mind (citta/caitta) and (ii) the diachronic discourse of the mental stream (santāna) which grows and develops. To the extent that Abhidharma represents the exclusive validity of the synchronic analysis over diachronic discourse, it is so removed from any greater temporal context as to be nearly ahistorical, <221> for anything more than the immediate succession of momentary dharmas was indescribable, i.e. only nominally or figuratively true (and even this was problematic, as the issues involving heterogeneous succession demonstrate, for these were ultimately

How Innovative is ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA by William S. Waldron inseparable from problems surrounding the fruition of past karma, the persistence of latent dispositions, the emergence from the absorption of cessation, etc.148). The Abhidharma analysis thus undermined its own encompassing soteriological context in which alone it was made meaningful and coherent. The entire Abhidharma project, in short, of a soteriology based upon a systematic analysis of momentary mental processes in terms of discrete elements or factors, is at stake here. And it is at stake because the Abhidharma, as it stands, cannot accommodate dispositional or conditioning factors outside of, but still very much influencing, those processes most amenable to their probing investigation, in other words, those unmanifest factors clinging to the mental stream, the continuity of individual existence within samsāra. And it was the tension, at least in part, between these two levels of doctrinal analysis and discourse, focused upon the momentary and continuous processes of mind, respectively, that foreshadowed if not stimulated the conceptualization of the ālayavijñāna. For it is the series that, if anything, ‘carries’ the seeds and so insures doctrinal and empirical meaning and coherence. If the Abhidharma project as a whole was to be salvaged, the series and its seeds must be systematically worked into dharmic discourse, so that it may adequately describe the continuing persistence and influence of the afflicting passions, the accumulation of karmic potential, the presence of bodily vitality, and the marked stages along the path, yet at the same time preserve the developed system of analysis of one’s actions in terms of the momentary and discrete psychology worked out over the centuries by generations of scholars and adepts. But for this a wholly new model of mind was called for, one that could articulate the simultaneous existence of both of these temporal dimensions, of momentary, manifest activities and of the persisting influences of the past. Of all the notions proffered, only the ālayavijñāna attempted to systematically integrate, or rather reintegrate in the context of the sophisticated <222> Abhidharma doctrine, these two distinct aspects of mind first found undifferentiated in the early discourses.

D. THE ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA

DA. EXCURSUS ON THE ‘ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA’ AS A ‘SYSTEMATIC’ INNOVATION

It is clear that the issues which became problematic within Abhidharma discourse were of a systemic nature, i.e. they entailed aspects of experience which lay outside of the dharmic analysis of momentary mental processes, yet which were, for exegetical, doctrinal and empirical reasons, necessary for preserving the continuous potential for conditioning those very processes. When a whole series of related problems arises in this fashion predicated upon the same presuppositions, it suggests that they are entailed by those very presuppositions which piece-meal solutions alone cannot fully resolve. The various concepts proffered by the various Abhidharma schools were simply ad hoc, since they addressed these issues separately, without either challenging their underlying presuppositions nor contextualizing them within a larger, more encompassing conceptual framework. This was only accomplished when the Yogācārins fundamentally <10> restructured the theory of mind with the ālayavijñāna at its center, resulting in a bifurcated model of mind which depicted distinct, simultaneous and wholly interdependent types of mental processes: (i) those of discrete, momentary cognition and (ii) an abiding, maturing and accumulating, yet subliminal, level of basal consciousness. This represents a systematic development of those aspects of vijñāna which had become marginalized within dharmic discourse, which at the same time explicates the relationship between the manifold functions and contextual nuances originally found commingled in the early notion of vijñāna. The systemic nature of these problems and of the new theory of mind which addresses them suggests that what has taken place is nothing less than a ‘paradigm shift’ in Kuhn’s sense of the word. These developments correspond closely to Kuhn’s analysis of the dynamics of paradigm shifts in many respects: the model of mind centered on the ālavavijñāna represents a transformation of “some of the field’s most elementary theoretical generalizations” through a “reconstruction … from new fundamentals” (Kuhn. 1970: 84f); this shift was instigated by a ‘crisis’ in the previous paradigm due to the number of “recognized anomalies whose characteristic feature is their stubborn refusal to be assimilated to existing paradigms” (97): the Abhidharmists’ initial response to these anomalies was to devise “numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict,” (78) each variation of which might express “some minor or not so minor articulation of the paradigm, no two of them quite alike, each partially successful, but none sufficiently so to be accepted as [a new] paradigm” (83): the “proliferation of versions of a theory,” Kuhn observes. “is a very usual symptom of crisis” (71). The various ‘demonstrations’ of the ālayavijñāna discussed below, which typically describe and defend the ālayavijñāna while demonstrating the inadequacy of alternative theories, also suggest Kuhn’s description of a paradigm shift: since “paradigms gain their status because they are more successful than their competitors in solving a few problems that the group of practitioners has come to recognize as acute” (23), he says, “the decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and

the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms <11> with nature and with each other” (77). Hence the formal ‘proofs’ of the existence of the ālayvijñāna with their insistent critique of (1) the traditional six vijñāna theory and (2) its presupposition of serial functioning. Having demonstrated a ‘family resemblance’ between the problems elicited by the presuppositions of Abhidharma, and their systemic nature stemming from exclusive reliance upon the dharmic discourse, it remains to outline exactly how the complex of notions surrounding the ālayavijñāna actually addresses these issues within a larger systematic framework, which at the same time harks back to the earlier constellation of features surrounding the canonical vijñāna. That is, we must describe the characteristics of this new paradigm of mind in some supporting detail. But before we examine the ālayavijñāna in this fashion, the aim of this essay must be reiterated. Since I am attempting to understand the import of the ālayavijñāna system within the larger context of Buddhist vijñāna theory, I focus more upon its structural similarities with early vijñāna and its schematic relationship with contemporary Abhidharma than on the discrete rationales for its initial introduction (and for each step of its long development and systematization), which Schmithausen (1987) has recently addressed in painstaking detail. These rationales are, of course, indispensable to any complete understanding of its long development149 and we shall readily follow Schmithausen’s basic chronological reconstruction. I would argue, however, that in the light of the systemic problems provoked by the dharmic theory as a whole, these rationales represent more the occasions for the origination and continual development of a new system of mind – as gradual refinements of a new paradigm – than its overall significance and justification: but just such an inquiry is, I believe, still a desideratum. Thus, I focus upon the disjunction, centering on vijñāna, between the synchronic dharmic analysis and diachronic santāna discourse on the grounds that when a number of hypotheses (of which the ālayavijñāna was only one) are put forth addressing similar concerns, their individual origins are overshadowed by the overall problematics to which they are all addressed: for such concepts may well be (and indeed often are) conscripted for purposes quite <12> remote from their originating context. Since the “proliferation of versions of a theory is a very usual symptom of crisis,” it is the exact nature of this crisis and the Yogācārin response150 to it which are under consideration here.

DB. THE ‘YOGĀCĀRABHŪMI’ (‘INITIAL PASSAGE’), THE ‘SAṂDHINIRMOCANA SŪTRA’ AND THE ORIGINS OF THE ‘ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA’151

The Yogācara conception of the ālayavijñāna developed considerably from one text to the next (following Schmithausen’s chronology) through an increasing systematization, along largely Abhidharmic lines, and with the continuous accretion of related functions, most of which were originally associated with the canonical notion of vijñāna and had became topics of controversy amongst the Abhidharma schools. It is this profusion of associated concepts and the detail of its systematic argumentation that now warrants our attention.

Although the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra is traditionally regarded as the first major Yogācāra text, the beginnings of the ālayavijñāna seem rather to be found within the voluminous Yogācārabhūmi, closely associated with the name of Asaṅga.152 In what Schmithausen takes to be its initial occurrence, and thus titles the ‘Initial Passage’.153 the ālayavijñāna is portrayed as a kind of basal consciousness which remains uninterruptedly within the material sense-faculties during the absorption of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti) and possesses in seed-like form the causal conditions for the future occurrence of cognitive processes in the traditional six modalities. These latter are now colIectively designated as “arising” or “functioning” cognitions (pravṛtti-vijñāna) inasmuch as they intermittently arise, come forth, issue, occur, etc., in contrast to their more steady counterpart, the abiding, uninterrupted ālayavijñāna.154 The ālayavijñāna here is closely aligned with bodily existence: it is that consciousness (vijñāna) which is necessary, along with heat (uṣma) and life-force (āyus), for maintaining bodily life and preventing death.155 Nevertheless, this conception of the ālayavijñāna does little more than replace the Sautrāntika notion that the body is the carrier of the seeds during the absorption of cessation with a new and indeterminate form of mind, still unrelated <13> to the traditional six cognitive modes.156 Nor is its status outside of the absorption of cessation clearly defined. It is the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra that addresses these latter issues and, in few short passages, outlines the key developments in the Yogācāra model of mind, largely through explicating those santāna-related characteristics first found in the canonical notions of vijñāna. In a significant departure from its earlier role as a basal consciousness (vijñāna) that sticks closely to the body, what had been primarily a “physiological” vijñāna now assumes a distinctly “psychological” character: the ālayavijnāna not only functions in tandem with the six modes of cognition, but, more importantly, it underlies and supports them as their basis. All of them, moreover, may occur together simultaneously rather than serially. First, the sūtra describes the ālayavijñāna as the mind that possesses all the seeds and which, as vijñāna in the early Pāli doctrines and santāna in the AKBh were portrayed, enters into the mother’s womb, appropriates the body, and increases and develops within saṃsāric existence: In saṃsāra with its six destinies (gati), such and such beings are born as such and such a type of being. They come into existence (abhinirvṛtti) and arise (utpadyante) in the womb of beings. … There at first, the mind which has all the seeds (sarvabījakam cittam), matures, congeals, grows, develops and increases157 based upon the two-fold appropriation (upādāna), that is, 1. the appropriation of the material sense-faculties along with their supports (sādhiṣṭhānarūpīndirya-upādāna) and 2. the appropriation (upādāna) which consists of the predispositions (vāsanā) toward profuse imaginings (prapañca) in terms of conventional usage (vyavahāra) of images (nimitta), names (nāma) and conceptualizations (vikalpa) (nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañcavāsanā-upādāna). Of these, both of the appropriations exist within the realms with form, but the appropriation is not twofold within the Formless realm.158

In the form of the two appropriations, the ālayavijñāna maintains an intimate and essential relationship with the animate body, while at the same time it transmits the predispositions or impressions stemming from past cognitive and conceptual experience. It is an ongoing basal consciousness which, like the organic processes used to describe it, is both produced by and preserves the impressions of its own past developmental processes. These twin appropriations (upādāna) reflect as well the double functions that appropriation (upādāna) played in <14> the early discourses and in the series of dependent origination which we observed above: “fuel, supply, substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going,” and so derivatively, “finding one’s support for, nourished by, taking up.” It represents (i) a key link in one of the rebirth sequences within that series, as well as (ii) the active, affective sense of “attachment,” or “grasping,” a key psychological factor in perpetuating saṃsāric life. This dual character, as we shall see, is implicit in most of the important synonyms of the ālayavijñāna. The sūtra continues: This consciousness (vijñāna) is also called the appropriating consciousness (ādāna-vijñāna) because the body is grasped (gṛhīta) and appropriated (upātta, or ātta) by it. It is also called the “ālaya” vijñāna because it dwells in and attaches to this body in a common destiny (ekayogakṣema-arthena). It is also called mind (citta) because it is heaped up (ācita) and accumulated (upacita) by [the six cognitive objects, i.e.:] visual forms, sounds, smells, flavors, tangibles and dharmas.159 Although they also contain distinct affective implications, these synonyms reflect the primarily somatic nature of the type of basal consciousness which the early descriptions of the ālayavijñāna suggest. As such, they refer to functions traditionally attributed to vijñāna of preserving the continuity of (mostly embodied) individual existence throughout a lifetime and over many lives, as well as allowing for the continuous transmission of karma and kleśa, in the guise of the “mind which possesses all the seeds.” But it is through its relationship with the traditional six cognitive processes that the ālayavijñāna is “heaped up”, signifying the important role that the ālayavijñāna plays within the momentary processes of mind and initiating its eventual integration into the synchronic Abhidharma analytic. In perhaps its most significant departure from the traditional psychology, these cognitive modes no longer occur conditioned solely by the concomitance of their respective sense organs and epistemic objects, but they occur supported by and depending upon the ālayavijñāna as well, with which they occur simultaneously: The six groups of cognition (ṣaḍvijñānakāya) … occur supported by and depending upon (saṃniśritya pratiṣṭhāya) the appropriating consciousness (ādāna-vijñāna). Of these, the visual cognition occurs supported by (niśritya) visual forms (rūpa) and the eye furnished with consciousness (savijñānaka cakṣus). A discriminating mental <15> cognition (vikalpaka manovijñāna) with the same sense field occurs at the same time (samakāla) along with the visual cognition.

If the conditions for a single visual cognition occurring simultaneously are present, then supported by and depending upon the appropriating consciousness only a single visual cognition occurs simultaneously. If the conditions for up to all five groups of cognition occurring simultaneously are present, then all five groups of cognition occur simultaneously.160 In a further move away from the ‘somatic’ mind (vijñāna) of the Initial Passage, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra also states that the ādāna/ālayavijñāna has its own epistemic object: the ādānavijñāna occurs with an imperceptible or unrecognizable cognition of the stable external world (asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājanavijñapti).161 Motivated perhaps by the usual cognitive definition of vijñāna in which an object is a requisite condition for the occurrence of vijñana, the object of the ālayavijñāna must be constantly present, but not so strong as to contradict its inactive nature within the absorption of cessation. In sum, by redrawing the model of mind in this fashion, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra initiates the reintegration of the diachronic dimension of vijñāna pertaining to saṃsāric continuity – rebirth, the maintainance of the animated body, and the perpetuation of karma in the form of seeds – with the synchronic analysis of mind focusing upon momentary cognitive processes. Though the details have yet to be filled in, the broad outline is clear. The two distinct dimensions of vijñāna occur simultaneously and mutually dependent upon each other: • the continuous ālayavijñāna provides the constant support and basis for the supraliminal cognitive modes, • while they in turn “heap up” (ācita) and “accumulate” (upacita) in the newly fashioned citta, the “mind with all the seeds” (sarva-bījakam cittam). The affective connotations of ‘attachment’ and ‘clinging’, implicit in the terms ‘ādāna’ and ‘ālaya’, and which will become the basis for yet further development, is only hinted at in the famous verse closing Chapter V: The appropriating consicousness, profound and subtle, Like a violent current, flows with all the seeds; I have not taught it to the ignorant. Lest the should imagine [it] as a self.162 <16> DC. THE ĀLAYA TREATISE OF THE ‘YOGĀCĀRABHŪMI: THE ‘PROOF PORTION’ The Ālaya Treatise of the Yogācārabhūmi, which consists of the Proof Portion and the Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti Portions,163 further develops the concept of the ālayavijñāna, describing it in systematic Abhidharmic terms and elaborating in specific detail the mutually interactive relationship between these distinct levels of simultaneous mental processes. The systematization of the ālayavijñana found in these chapters essentially completes the integration of the diachronic and synchronic articulations of vijñāna along the lines found in

the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, and in addition develops a conception of subliminal afflictive mentation as a continuous, separate and discernable function of mind. The conception of the ālayavijñāna in the Proof Portion is less detailed than in the later sections of the Ālaya Treatise, but displays marked development over that found in the Initial Passage and the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra.164 It offers ‘proofs’ for the dimension or type of mental processes such as the ālayavijñāna, chiefly on the grounds that (1) the diachronic functions traditionally attributed to vijñāna, in particular the appropriation of the body at rebirth, throughout life, and during the absorption of cessation and the process of death, cannot be carried out by the six cognitive modes, and that (2) even such synchronic processes as immediate cognition are not fully tenable without the simultaneous functioning admitted by the new system centered upon the ālayavijñāna. (1) As for the diachronic functions of mind, the ālayavijñāna and the functioning cognitions (pravṛtti-vijñāna) are dichotomized on the basis of their originating conditions and along lines quite similar to those we first analyzed in the early Pāli materials: • the ālayavijñāna is constant, because it occurs conditioned by past saṃskārās and is therefore also a karmically indeterminant resultant state (avyākrta-vipāka), and it pervades the entire body; • the functioning cognitions (pravṛtti-vijñāna), on the other hand, are momentary and intermittent, since they occur due to present conditions (the sense faculties, sense fields and attention), are experienced as wholesome or unwholesome and thus karmically determinant, and they are related to only their own respective sense bases.165 For these reasons, none of the momentarily occurring <17> types of cognition can be the vijñāna which appropriates the entire body at birth or throughout life. Much the same reasons are implicit166 in the question of mutual seeding (bījatvam … anyonyam), which addresses the immediate infusion and continual transmission of the seeds from moment to moment. Since the cognitive processes which succeed each other are of such diverse qualities and may belong to radically divergent realms of existence, there is insufficient homogeneity between them for the seeds to be properly received or transmitted through the arising cognitions alone; thus, a continuous and neutral type of mentality capable of receiving all types of seeds such as the ālayavijñāna was deemed necessary.167 This point implicitly raises the difficulties surrounding heterogeneous succession as discussed in the Abhidharma literature. (2) The Proof Portion advocates the simultaneous functioning of the ālayavijñāna and six arising cognitions on the grounds that the multifaceted nature of common cognitive and physical experience cannot be adequately explained either (i) without an underlying and simultaneous sentient basis such as provided by the ālayavijñāna, or (ii) solely by the serial functioning of the arising, as in the traditional scheme.168

The cognitive functions of the ālayavijñāna are also expanded and expressed in terms of the complex nature of conscious experience in general. Its functions are four-fold: (a) the perception of the world, (b) the perception of this basis [i.e. the body], (c) the perception “[This is] I,” and (d) the perception of the sense-fields. These perceptions are experienced as occurring simultaneously moment to moment. It is not tenable for there to be diverse functions like this within a single moment of a single cognitition.169 The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra VIII 37.1 had already declared that the ādāna-vijñāna has an (implicitly) continuous, though all but imperceptible, perception of the enduring external world (asaṃvidita-sthirabhājana-vijñapti). To this is now added the constant sensations stemming from the ālayavijñāna’s bodily basis. Together with the normal perception of the sense-fields and a distinct sense of self-identity, of “[This is] I,” we have the first glint of the full Yogācāra <18> model of mind, to be elaborated still further in succeeding texts. This last item, the sense of self-identity, alludes to a continuous but subliminal level of self-view which subsists until the later stages on the path. This was clearly adumbrated in the early Pāli materials, became problematic in the AKBh, and was then fully systematized only in the Pravṛtti/nivṛtti Portions and, more especially, in the MSg.170 The subsistence of the impressions of (vāsanā) or dispositions toward (anuśaya) these afflictions became problematic, we shall remember, within the strictures of the dharmic analysis and the Sautrāntikas used the metaphor of seeds to refer to their continuing yet unobstructing presence (in addition to potential for karmic fruition). The conception of the ālayavijñāna has heretofore concerned primarily the seeds of karma without directly addressing the question of the latent dispositions. But once the ‘somatic’ emphasis of the ālayavijñāna is superseded by its psychological functions the whole perspective is changed, for the afflictive dispositions are much more psychologically active than the simple storage of the seeds of karma. This is because, however important the genesis of the supraliminal forms of mind may be, it is the presence of the afflictions themselves that most directly affect the activity of those forms, making them karmically unwholesome.171 Thus the presence of afflictive tendencies plays an essential role in the continual karmic activities that perpetuate saṃsāric existence as a whole. In terms of dependent origination, it is just the saṃskārās, represented by the afflictive activities, that lead to the fruit, a resultant vijñāna, here denoted the “ālaya” vijñāna. While the closing verse of Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra V. had only hinted at the affective nuances of the term ‘ālaya’ as ‘clinging’ and ‘attachment’, the ASBh (11.1, just prior to the Proof Portion) includes them in its ‘etymological’ explanation: “Because dharmas dwell (ālīyante) there as seeds, or because beings grasp [it] as a self, [it is] the ālayavijñāna.”172 Since the ālayavijñāna refers to citta in the Yogācāra view, this accords with traditional views that citta is often (mis)taken as a self.173 This important aspect of the ālayavijñāna system will be further elaborated in the next important sections treating the ālayavijñāna, the Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti Portions, which constitute the remainder of the Ālaya Treatise. <19>

DD. THE ‘ĀLAYA TREATISE’: ’ THE ‘PRAVṚTTI’ AND ‘NIVṚTTI PORTIONS’ T

hese portions of the Ālaya Treatise present the ālayavijñāna within a more systematic Abhidharmic framework, while at the same time portraying the metaphysical aspects of the ālayavijñāna much as vijñāna was portrayed in the early Pāli materials and in the AKBh: the continuity and cessation (or ultimate transformation) of the ālayavijñāna is virtually equated with the perpetuation and cessation of individual saṃsāric existence. The conception of the ālayavijñāna here represents the nearly complete systematic integration of the diachronic aspects of vijñāna with the synchronic dharmic analysis of mind focusing upon the momentary arising cognitions (pravṛtti-vijñāna). As such, it articulates within the more sophisticated Abhidharma milieu the relationship between those two distinct dimensions of vijñāna first discernable in the early Pāli materials. In the Nivṛtti Portion the ālavavijñāna is virtually equated with the mass of accumulated karma, defilements (saṃkleśa), appropriations (upādāna) and spiritual corruptions (dauṣṭhulya) which keep beings entrapped in saṃsāra. Since it possesses all the seeds, the ālayavijñāna is the root of the defilements in this world: • it is the “root of the coming-about (nivṛtti) of the animate world (sattva-loka) because it is what brings forth (utpādaka) the sense faculties with [their material] bases and the arising cognitions.”174 • It is likewise the root of the inanimate world (bhājana-loka)175 and • the cause of the continuance of the afflictions (kleśa-pravṛtti-hetu).176 The ālayavijñāna thus comprises those very elements which constitute and perpetuate saṃsāric existence. When wholesome dharmas are cultivated, however, the ālayavijñāna comes to an end.177 As the basis is revolved or transformed (āśrayaṃ parivartate) the ālayavijñāna is eliminated (prahīṇa), and thus so are all the defilements, appropriations. and spiritual corruptions, and with them the cause of future rebirth.178 In sum, the perpetuation and cessation of the ālayavijñāna is that of individual saṃsāric life itself, much as vijñāna was portrayed in the early Pāli texts. The somatic and metaphysical aspects of the ālayavijñāna outlined so far are in basic agreement with traditional understandings of vijñāna and, although presented in more descriptive detail, represent little <20> substantive development over earlier Yogācāra treatments. What distinguishes the Ālaya Treatise’s conception of the ālayavijñāna, above all, is its systematic description in terms of the major categories of Abhidharma metapsychology. The ālayavijñāna functions (1) in terms of its cognitive objects (ālambana) and associated mental factors (saṃprayukta-caitta), making it a veritable vijnāna in the traditional epistemic sense;179 and (2) in terms of the processes of mind with which it is simultaneous (sahabhāva) and reciprocally conditioning (anyonya-pratyayatā), i.e. the six arising cognitions and a new level of afflictive mentation, the manas.

These developments elaborate in Abhidharmic terms the basic structure first presented in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. The ālayavijñāna’s epistemic objects consist of (i) the external world and (ii) the so-called “inner appropriations” (adhyātman upādāna), much as in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. The implications which these objects, and their mutual relationship, carry for the Yogācāra theory of mind can hardly be overstated. The inner appropriation comprises the sense faculties and “the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated,”180 the latter representing the cognitive and affective patterns, the dispositions and complexes built up over time from previous errant and afflicted experience and upon which the continual perpetuation of saṃsāric existence chiefly depends. These subtly influence the ālayavijñāna’s perception of the external world: ‘the outward perception of the receptacle world whose aspects are undiscerned’ (bahirdhāaparicchinnākāra-bhājana-vijñapti) refers to a continuous, uninterrupted perception of the continuity of the receptacle world based upon that very ālayavijñāna which has the inner appropriation as its object.181 This subliminal perception of the external world depends upon the sense faculties which directly sense the world as they are informed by the predispositions accumulated from the past (a process, in fact, which is not dissimilar to that of normal perception). In other words, this subliminal perception is based upon the ālayavijñāna’s inner sources of knowledge or information, as it were, which consist of the sedimented impressions or propensities instilled by past experience and by which the ālayavijñāna itself is ultimately formed. This is <21> illustrated by the analogy of the flame of a lamp which illuminates the external objects surrounding it on the basis of its wick and oil;182 that is to say, cognition depends upon the material body and its mental or psychic fuel or substratum (upādāna).183 Both the cognitive processes and the epistemic objects of the ālayavijñāna are barely perceptible,184 and thus do not overwhelm or obstruct those of the surface, functioning cognitions. In the Pravṛtti Portion, these processes are carried out by the five omnipresent mental factors associated with mind, which are also subtle and hard to perceive, entail no further karmic result and are of neutral feeling tone.185 The ālayavijñāna is, therefore, compatible with all types of supraliminal processes,186 since their respective epistemic objects, feeling tones and karmic nature are quite distinct;187 it constitutes, in effect, a second, relatively independent stream of mind.188 It is important to note, however, that even though the ālayavijñāna has an object and functions homogeneously (ekarasatva) from birth to death,189 it is not considered a singular entity190 since it cognizes its objects from instant to instant and so flows in a continuous stream of moments (kṣaṇika-srotaḥ-santāna-vartin).191 The ālayavijñāna as portrayed here is a distinct genre ot truly cognitive processes with three specific types of perceptual objects:

(1) as a basal consciousness, it is deeply connected to bodiIy sensation and the material sense faculties: (2) as an evolving mind which grows and develops, built upon past experience, it retains various affective and cognitive dispositions and impressions: and (3) based upon these first two, it dimly perceives the external world. This model of perception does not, in the main, deviate from widely accepted Buddhist formulas. All of it, though, takes place beneath the threshold of conscious awareness. It is, however, the articulation of a fully interdependent relationship between the ālayavijñāna and the supraliminal arising cognitions that accomplishes the final reintegration of the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of vijñāna. This is achieved through extrapolating the Abhidharmic relations of simultaneity and mutual conditionality, previously reserved for citta and its mental factors (caitta), to the relationship between the two distinct processes of vijñāna, the <22> ālayavijñāna and the pravṛtti-vijñāna.192 Elaborating on the model first presented in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, the Pravṛtti Portion articulates both the simultaneous functioning (sahabhāva-pravṛtti) of and mutually conditioning interaction (anyonya-pratyayatā-pravṛtti) between the supraliminal and the subliminal processes of mind – a conceptual development necessary in order to describe both the distinctive diachronic and synchronic phenomena of mind and their inseparable interaction. It is also deeply congruent with the early notions expressed in the formula of dependent origination. As we first observed in the formula of dependent origination, the presence of consciousness (vijñāna) animating the body is a prerequisite for any cognitive processes whatsoever; in more developed Abhidharma terms, vijñāna has appropriated (upātta) the body. In the same way, the ālayavijñāna “provides a support” (āśraya-kara) for the momentary sense cognitions inasmuch as it too appropriates the sense faculties upon which the first five sense cognitions are based, while it directly supports both the mental cognition (manovijñāna), the sixth, and the new level of afflictive mentation, the manas.193 This underlying dimension of mind, the ālayavijñāna, conditions the supraliminal processes of cognition, moreover, by bearing the specific causal conditions, the seeds, for them to occur at all – for without the conditioning provided by past experience and actions and transmitted within the deep structure of mind (i.e. the ālayavijñāna), there would be no saṃsāric life in the first place, endowed with these specific modes of cognition and the affective dispositions which accompany them. As also depicted in the formula of dependent origination, the momentary cognitive activities are themselves instrumental in conditioning future rebirth and the perpetuation of saṃsāric life. Similarly, in the Yogācāra scheme the momentary processes of mind instill the generative causal conditions, the seeds and predispositions, for further existence through increasing and fattening the seeds for their own future arising,194 and, even more importantly, by creating the conditions for the continued reproduction of the ālayavijñāna, the virtual medium of individual saṃsāric existence, in the future.195 The ālayavijñāna grows and matures conditioned by just these supraliminal <23> activities of mind and so bears not just the simple imprint of the formative influences of its own generative history, but the structures of mind created thereby, that is, the “seeds” and “impressions” or “predispositions,” which are then capable of reproducing

those same active processes.196 The ālayavijñāna is thus depicted in terms of organic processes of growth and maturation constantly interacting with its environment by means of the diverse cognitive structures which have been built up (“heaped up”) or accumulated in the course of its own protracted development, and ultimately capable of producing the diverse fruits conditioned by these very processes – all reflecting the vegetative metaphors and analogies with which the whole system is largely described. But this is not all. As we observed above, it is the afflictions accompanying actions which build up karmic potential and thus perpetuate the cycle of rebirth. And accounting for the persistence of these afflictions in a latent state until their final eradication far along the path also troubled Abhidharma thinkers. The Pravṛtti Portion develops upon the notion found in the Proof Portion of a distinct type of mind (manas) representing the subsistence of certain afflictions. It states that the manas which conceives “I-making” (ahaṃkāra) and the conceit “I am” (asmimāna) always occurs and functions simultaneously with the ālayavijñāna, which it takes as its object, thinking “[this is] I” (aham iti) and “I am [this]” (asmīti).197 This type of mentation, moreover, is subliminal, since it occurs in higher meditative states without contradicting their wholesome karmic nature and it persists (until finally eradicated) accompanied at all times by the four afflictions which occur innately (sahaja): the view of self-existence (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), the conceit “I am” (asmimāna), self-love (ātmasneha) and ignorance (avidyā).198 This new level of subliminal mentation is clearly conceived along the same lines, and for much the same reasons, as the ālayavijñāna itself. It addresses the incompatibility between the subsistence of latent dispositions until far along the path with the momentary occurrence of wholesome states. And, as with the ālayavijñāna, it describes an enduring, distinct, yet subliminal, locus of afflictive mentation capable of co-existing with the entire range of divergent supraliminal processes, <24> as a kind of continuous, unconscious self-centeredness. Like the ālayavijñāna, it represents not so much a departure from, as an expIication of earlier notions.

DE. THE ‘KLIṢṬA-MANAS’ IN THE ‘MAHĀYĀNASAṂGRAHA (MSG)

It is the MSg, however, that fully systematizes the kliṣṭa-manas into the new model of mind, relying upon the same kinds of arguments adduced for the ālayavijñāna, a mixture of exegetical, systemic and logical reasonings. As discussed above in the AKBh, the MSg argues that there must be unobtrusive, subliminal afflictive mentation (kliṣṭa-manas), because it is held that grasping to self (ātmagṛāha) is present at all times, even in wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate states of mind. Otherwise, the affliction of the conceit “I am” (asmimānakleśa) would be present [only in unwholesome states] because it is associated only with unwholesome states of mind, but not in wholesome (kuśala) or indeterminate (avyākṛta) ones. Therefore, since [it] is present simultaneously but not present associated (saṃprayukta) [with citta], this fault is avoided.199 If there were not such unobtrusive mentation, Vasubandhu asks in his commentary to the MSg, “how would wholesome states such as giving, etc., occur since it is always associated with that [[[affliction]]]?”200 Therefore, there must be some locus of afflictive mentation unassociated with citta, but which nonetheless

subsists until higher stages upon the path201 and allows for the compatibility between momentarily wholesome states and the continued subsistence of the afflictive dispositions. The stages of its eradication also serves to differentiate the temporary wholesome states of ordinary wordlings from those who are more advanced on the path.202 It is whether or not this level of afflictive mentation is present that the absorption of non-apperception is distinguished from that of cessation.203 And without mentation like this, life in the realm of existence which corresponds to the absorption of non-apperception would be totally without the afflictions of self-view, etc., which would be tantamount to becoming an Aryan being.204 Therefore, there must be a locus of afflictive mentation which is not associated with mind and thus karmically indeterminate, yet which <25> continuously subsists and serves as the ever-present basis or source for the occurrence of the afflictions themselves. With this final level of subliminal afflictive mentation, the system of mind centered upon the ālayavijñāna is now complete. What this systematic description of mind delineates is a simultaneous and symbiotic relationship between the relatively unchanging, subliminal and the strictly momentary, supraliminal processes of mind. They are constantly interacting and conditioning each other in an internally dynamically structured mind which as a whole increases, develops and matures, explicating the energetic inertia and generative power of saṃsāric, habitual behavior patterns, together with all of their attendent metaphysical ramifications. We have at last fully redrawn the map of the mind, without, however, changing the territory. For all of this was ultimately developed upon, though much more explicitly delineated than, the earliest functions of vijñāna within the early discourses and the formula of dependent origination. DF. RETURNING TO THE SOURCE: THE DEFENSE OF ‘ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA’ IN THE MSG Whereas the Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti Portions are primarily descriptive, the MSg, like the Proof Portion, is largely a defense: it explicitly relates the ālayavijñāna to themes articulated within the older strata of Buddhist thought by adducing various sūtra and Abhidharmic texts and doctrines in support of both the ālayavijñāna and its accompanying level of afflictive mentation, the newly styled kliṣṭa-manas. The MSg thus serves as the capstone for the themes taken up in this essay, having provided the inspiration, the seed if you will, of its themes and structure. The MSg discusses the role of the ālayavijñāna in the formula of dependent origination in two different fashions. (1) It interprets the formula both as descriptive of simultaneous origination and as determinative of the various destinies in which sentient beings are born, that is, simultaneous conditioning and that which takes place sequentially.205 (2) The second refers to the more usual twelve-membered formula. The first distinguishes the dharmas’ various characteristics (svabhāva-vibhāgika) inasmuch as they occur depending upon the <26> ālayavijñāna, since (according to the commentary) it is the ālayavijñāna that differentiates the natures of those defiled dharmas.206 Within this momentary dependent origination the two kinds of vijñāna, the ālayavijñāna and the pravṛtti-vijñānas, are said to be reciprocally causal conditions (hetu-pratyaya) of each other,207 precisely articulating the major theme of this essay: the causal relations between these different aspects of vijñāna, especially as found in the formula of dependent origination. The MSg and its commentaries also defend the ālayavijñāna by demonstrating how the various roles that vijñāna plays within the series of dependent origination cannot be accounted for by the intermittent and temporary functioning cognitions alone. • First, none of the six transient types of cognition could serve as the vijñāna which is conditioned by the saṃskāra (saṃskāra-pratyayaṃ vijñānam), and which in turn gives rise to name-and-form (nāma-rūpa), since they arise only momentarily and are intermittent.208 The point is that the saṃskārā, virtually all intentional activities, condition vijñāna, according to the Yogācāra, by infusing it with the impressions and seeds of those actions;209 the functioning cognitions cannot receive, retain or transmit such impressions or seeds. • Similarly, existence conditioned by appropriation (upādāna-pratyayo bhavaḥ) would also be impossible without that same type of subsisting vijñāna.210 The doctrine found in the early sūtras that vijñāna and name-and-form are mutually conditioning would also be impossible without the ālayavijñāna, according to the MSg and its commentaries. Assuming that this implies a constant, simultaneous interdependence, the Upanibandhana states that since “name” comprises the four nonmaterial aggregates and “form” the embryo (kalala), the vijñāna which is the condition and support of these in a constant stream from moment to moment must be none other than the ālayavijñāna, for if the vijñāna found within the “name” elements refers to the functioning cognitions, what then, the commentary asks, would the vijñāna which conditions it stand for?211 Though this is not a likely rationale for the introduction of the ālayavijñāna, Schmithausen warns, it does provide, he says (176, very suggestive of Kuhn), “a more elegant solution” to the relationship between the diachronic and synchronic dimensions of <27> vijñāna within the formula of dependent origination, represented by vijñāna and name-and-form, respectively.212 The further notion, found throughout the early discources, of vijñāna as a sustenance or nourishment (vijñānāhāra) of life also lends credence to a type of mind such as the ālayavijñāna, since, according to Vasubandhu, this vijñāna-sustenance is what appropriates the body and thus prevents it from decaying and purifying.213 The MSg also cites several concepts profferred by various Abhidharma schools, which we have mentioned briefly above, claiming that these schools are in fact teaching the ālayavijñāna by different names (paryāya), i.e., the root-consciousness (mūlavijñāna) of the Mahāsaṃghikas, the aggregate that lasts as long as saṃsāra (āsaṃsārikaskandha) of the Mahīśāsakas, and the bhavaṅga of the Sthaviravādins, the present-day Theravādins.214 Except for the bhavaṅga-citta, we lack sufficient historical materials to make any extended systematic comparison. Suffice to say that, as we have discussed at some length above, these concepts respond to the same general problematics within which the ālayavijñāna is also largely situated.

How Innovative is ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA by William S. Waldron Finally, the MSg argues for a multi-layered model of mind on the grounds that the gradual process of purification, in which some of the causal conditions, the seeds, of defiled dharmas remain even after their purification has begun, would otherwise be unintelligible: When the mind which counteracts the afflictions (kleśa-pratipakṣa-vijñāna) has arisen, all the other mundane cognitions (laukika-vijñāna) have ceased. It is not possible that the counteracting mind could, without the ālayavijñāna, possess the seeds of the afflictions and the secondary afflictions because it is liberated by nature (svabhāva-vimukta) and does not arise and cease simultaneously with the afflictions and secondary afflictions. If there were no ālayavijñāna, then when a mundane cognition arises later, it would arise from what is without seeds, since the impression together with its support (sāśrayam) is non-existent, having long since passed away.215 If there were no mind with all the seeds, this would entail the further consequence that when a supramundane moment of mind occurs in the Formless Realm, the other mundane cittas would be non-existent, that is, as the commentary points out, “when the counteractant (pratipakṣa) is present, then since all of the counteracted <28> (vipakṣa) have ceased, nirvāṇa without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa) would be attained naturally and without effort.”216 But when the concept of the ālayavijñāna which contains all the seeds is accepted, the gradual process of purification and eradication of the accumulated results of karma and the embedded dispositions is coherent; and eventually the resultant consciousness is made absolutely seedless,217 like the vijñāna found in the early Pāli texts. This process, however, takes place at a level far deeper and more profound than that of the momentary and intermittent cognitive modes. E. CONCLUSION The mass of materials, often mutually contradictory, treating the ālayavijñāna and its related concepts is weltering indeed, as Schmithausen’s work (1987) has so radically demonstrated. One hesitates to make general statements about the ālayavijñāna without qualifying each one “in this text,” or even “in this section of this text.” In the wake of this well-advised circumspection,218 however, the significance and import of such a complex concept as the ālayavijñāna remains elusive. This essay, as indicated in the introduction, is an attempt to interpret the ālayavijñāna through contextualizing it in relation to its canonical antecedents and Abhidharma contemporaries.219 The fully elaborated ālayavijñāna system (i.e. the eight modes of vijñāna, their respective functions, interrelations and various synonyms) accomplished what the other Abhidharma innovations failed to do: it provided in one fell swoop the keystone dharma capable of addressing the numerous conundrums created by the doctrine of momentariness through explicitly delineating and ultimately reuniting the diverse and disparate functions of the canonical notion of vijñāna within the context of the new Abhidharmic analytic. Throughout the corpus of texts describing the ālayavijñāna, it is explicitly argued that, in contrast to the six modes of intermittent and discrete ‘cognitive’ vijñāna, only the constant and relatively homogeneous “ālaya” vijñāna is able to perform the following roles either traditionally associated with vijñāna or newly distinguished within the Abhidharma milieu:

(1) It is the “ālaya” vijñāna that stations itself and grows and develops within saṃsāric existence; <29> (2) and conversely, whose purification, destruction and cessation is coterminous with the end of saṃsāra. (3) The ālayavijñāna is the principle of animate existence conditioned by the past saṃskārās, (4) which brings about rebirth through developing within the mother’s womb,220 (5) and thereafter sustains the body throughout one’s lifetime by continuously appropriating it,221 (6) even during states otherwise devoid of conscious activity.222 (7) As the product of such saṃskārās, the ālayavijñāna is a resultant state (vipāka), and so karmically neutral and compatible with any of the supraliminal states of mind and all kinds of seeds, permitting heterogeneous succession between them.223 (8) The ālayavijñāna constitutes a distinctive, continuous224 and subliminal225 (9) nexus of karmic potential226 (bīja) and, in the closely related concept of “afflictive mentation” (kliṣṭa-manas), of persisting latent afflictions. (10) Similar to that discernable within the early series of dependent origination, the ālayavijñāna and the supraliminal, cognitive activities of mind are mutually the cause and effect of each other, (11) for the ālayavijñāna simultaneously supports, influences and interacts with, the active cognitive modes, (12) while they in turn simultaneously infuse “seeds” and “impressions’ (vāsanā) upon or into it. (13) And last, its various functions and its relations with the supraliminal arising cognitions is described in terms of the momentary citta/caitta dharma analysis and thus significantly integrated into the Abhidharma system of causes, conditions and fruits.227 In short, the ālayavijñāna brings together and articulates within a single, unifying, synthetic conception of mind228 those diverse aspects of vijñāna first found commingled in the canonical doctrines and later bifurcated, and thus rendered problematic, within Abhidharma doctrine.229 The ālayavijñāna complex delineates a continuous, interactive and dynamic relationship between the subliminal level of mind, with all its <30> accumulated habits, experiences and knowledge, and the supraliminal level of ordinary perceptual and cognitive processes. Seen within the context of the problematics between continuity and momentariness as a whole, the ālayavijñāna is simply the most comprehensive attempt of all the concepts proffered230 to articulate a fully multi-tiered model of mind systematically integrated into and expressed in terms of the Abhidharmic analytic. What was synthesized, in short, was the diachronic karmic relationship of cause and effect (hetu-phala) (represented by the seeds and, more indirectly, by the latent dispositions) with the notion of simultaneity. Karma now has a niche carved out for itself within the synchronic analysis of momentary processes of

How Innovative is ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA by William S. Waldron mind and is no longer bedeviled by questions of temporality, because the seed-support (bijāśraya) as the hetu-pratyaya, the causal condition,231 exists simultaneously with the supraliminal active states of mind. The mind which has all the seeds represents then the totality of karma, of causal conditioning, subsisting within, indeed virtually constituting, the mental stream, and thereby supporting all of its intermittent and momentary cognitive and affective processes. In this fashion, the ālayavijñāna system provided for a more coherent theory of knowledge, memory, and apperception based upon the continuing influence of past experience symbolized by the seeds of karma and the growth and persistence of the latent afflictions. For the ingrained habits, inborn dispositions and accumulated experiences of the past may now play their essential role in influencing and informing the momentary functions of mind, without which ordinary knowledge, memory, even perception, would all be simply unintelligible. Every moment of purposeful activity creates impressions which are indelibly imprinted upon the receptive, subliminal level of mind; likewise, the accumulated results of these experiences and impressions in turn provide, through the medium of such a constructed and impressed mind, the basis and support for the continued re-production of these very activities, influencing and conditioning them in what is, at bottom, a continuous feedback process. Fattening the seeds232 until they reach fruition, increasing the impressions or propensities (lit. ‘perfumations’, vasanā), the growth and development of vijñāna – all these vegetative metaphors point to a dynamic relationship in which <31> the two distinct dimensions of vijñāna are inseparably interactive, expressing a constructive synergy that supercedes and animates the simple metaphors of seeds, storage, and substratum, upon which it is all based. This is just to say that the living processes of body and mind occur under the sway of karma. Articulating such a “dual layered” model of mind, the ālayavijñāna also represents probably the first systematic concept of an unconscious realm of mental activity radically differentiated from conscious mind, expressing and articulating the deep and ancient Indian insight that, as Eliade (1973: xvii) states, the great obstacles to the ascetic and contemplative life arose from the activity of the unconscious, from the saṃskāras and the vāsanās – ‘impregnations,’ ‘residues,’ ‘latencies’ – that constitute what depth psychology calls the contents and structures of the unconscious. By synthesizing the traditional, canonical conceptions of vijñāna with the newer Abhidharmic framework, the ālayavijñāna system generated a powerful new conception of mind, in all of its depth and diversity, for the ālayavijñāna expresses deep truths about the human condition, about our capacity to understand and to work with what we are – and what we are not. It indicates that the real obstacles to self-understanding and self-control, and the concerted efforts to develop them within our deeply implicated relationships with others, depends upon an appreciation of the continuing influence of past experiences, without reference to which even the most mundane activity is ultimately unintelligible. Any attempt to direct our energies in such a deliberate fashion must take into account not only the effects of past cognitive and affective conditioning. but must also recognize this conditioning as a self-perpetuating energy actualizing in each instant. It is this understanding of what and who we are and do, moment to moment, that the ālayavijñāna attempts to conceptualize and articulate; and this is the unfathomable ground of being.

And it is unfathomable because ultimately the ālayavijñāna is built around or upon the metaphor of the seeds, of containing or storing the seeds, and even though it superseded these metaphors in its dynamic depth psychology, yet the ambiguity, the resonance, of its initiating metaphor remains. For the seeds are hard to get at: they are <32> not experiential data. They represent a temporal relation between cause and effect, a karmic relation, and as such are not real existents; yet they continue to exert causal influences through the conditioned structures of knowing and feeling, the propensities and dispositions built up by beginningless past experience. The seeds and the dispositions represent relationships and tendencies which cannot be expressed Abhidharmically, but only through metaphors or merely conventional or nominal expressions. Seeds then are simply ciphers, empty significations for unfathomable relations, in place of whose explication Vasubandhu constantly evokes secret “special powers” (śakti-viśeṣa).233 But a cipher is just a place holder whose main function is to be empty, a mathematical “zero” (‘śūnya’ in Sanskrit). But this zero, this cipher in the place of, or rather signifying, an in-principle specifiable cause and effect relation,234 is neither ontological nor logical, but primarily psychological. The seeds are part and parcel of the mental stream, where the unfathomable realm of karma functions moment to moment within the manifold processes of mind. But if the seeds are merely ciphers, place-holders for the unknowable relations of cause and effect, what then is the ālayavijñāna inasmuch as it preserves all the seeds? It too then represents everything that goes on outside of the conscious mind, inaccessible to introspective analysis, but without whose basis, or at least the inference of such, no mental processes make any sense whatsoever. So at another level, the Yogācāra interpretation of emptiness is that of the ultimate interdependence of mental processes, in flux between the known and the knower, conditioned by all past knowing. And this entire process is unthinkable without the basis of unknown knowing, which is the cipher of knowledge, the basis containing seeds, a mere metaphor of causal relation. In this way, the epistemological inquiry of the Yogācārins led to an understanding of emptiness, of dependent origination, within the direct psychological processes of knowing, for actual knowing is itself based upon unknown relationships, on metaphorical, invisible, inferential yet inescapable, causal relations. But by saving this place for the preunderstandings of knowledge and experience, the Yogācārins have saved the explanatory project as a whole. The mind, knowing, and causal relations <33> in the world, can all be treated just as common sense dictates, just as the doctrinal tradition evolved with all its complexities requires, only now the whole project is based, epistemologically as well as ontologically, on emptiness, on utterly interdependent phenomena whose bottom line, which is the completely contingent and unfathomable basis of knowledge and being, cannot be got at. As the verse at the tail end of the AKBh IX warns: “Nobody but the Buddha understands in its entirety action (karma), its infusion, its activity and the fruit that is obtained.”235

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I wish to thank Dr. David Patt and Nobuyoshi Yamabe for many helpful suggestions regarding both the form and content of this essay. I would also like to thank Gelong Lodro Sangpo for reformatting the document into its present form. 1 For example, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra Ch. VIII.37.1 states that understanding the appropriating consciousness’ (ādāna-vijñāna) dim cognition of the constant external world (asaṃvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapti) is being “skilled in the arising of citta (cittotpāda-kuśala) in accordance with the way things truly are (yathābhūtam).” (ji ltar na sems kyi skye ba la mkhas pa yin zhe na / sems kyi skye ba rnam pa bcu drug shes na sems kyi skye ba la yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du mkhas pa yin te / de la sems kyi skye ba rnam pa bcu drug ni brtan pa dang snod rnam par rig pa (mi rig pa) ‘ni ‘di lta ste / len pa’i rnam par shes pa’i o.). See Schmithausen (1987:385, n. 629) for emendation (mi rig pa) and Sanskrit reconstruction based upon TBh kārikā 21.11 (asaṃviditaka-upādi-sthāna-vijñāptikaṃ ca tat); Nivṛtti Portion 6 states that its description of the ālayavijñāna is “the correct way (samyaknyāya) of establishing citta, manas, and vijñāna.” (de ltar na ‘di ni sems dang yid dang rnam par shes pa rnam par gzhag pa’i tshul yang dag pa yin te/); Msg I. 1-4 adduces several Mahāyāna sūtras, viz. the Abhidharma-mahāyāna-sūtra and the Saṃdhirmocana Sūtra, that teach the ālaya/ādāna-vijñāna, while MSg 1. 11 cites the āgamas of contemporary non-Mahāyāna schools where the ālayavijñāna had purportedly been taught by synonymous terms (paryāya). 2 Walpola Rahula (1978:99).

3 By ‘canonical’ I refer to the authoritative scriptures generally cited under the rubric ‘āgama’ or ‘sūtra’ in the Abhidharma and Yogācāra texts, as well as the ‘nikāyas’ of the Theravādins. (For such citations found within the AKBh see Pāsādika, Bhikkhu. 1989 Kanonische Zitate im Abhidharmakośabhāṣya des Vasubandhu. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.) This use implies mainly the first of two senses of ‘canon’ described by Collins (1990:90f): The word ‘canon’, in relation to textual materials, can usefully he taken in two ways: first in a general sense, as an equivalent to ‘scripture’ (oral or written). Used in this way, the term does not specify that the collection of texts so designated constitutes a closed list; it merely assigns a certain authority to them, without excluding the possibility that others could be, or may come to be included in the collection. In the second sense, however, the idea of a ‘canon’ contains precisely such an exclusivist specification that it is this closed list of texts, and no others, which are the ‘foundational documents’ … When compared with other extant collections of scriptures in Buddhism, I think the Pāli Canon is unique in being an exclusive, closed list. (Emphasis in original). 4 The Pāli-English Dictionary (PED:618) entry testifies to the extreme multivalence of the term vijñāna: (as a special term in Buddhist metaphysics) a mental quality as a constituent of individuality, the bearer of (individual) life, life-force (as extending also over rebirths), principle of conscious life, general consciousness (as function of mind and matter), regenerative force, animation, mind as transmigrant, as transforming (according to individual kamma) one individual life (after death) into the next. In this (fundamental) application it may be characterized as the sensory and perceptive activity commonly expressed by ‘mind.’ It is difficult to give any one word for v., because there is much difference between the old Buddhist and our modern points of view, and there is a varying use of the term in the Canon itself … Ecclesiastical scholastic dogmatic considers v. under the categories of (a) khandha; (b) dhātu; (c) paṭicca-samuppāda; (d) āhāra; (e) kāya. For this section of this essay, I have benefitted most from the works of Johansson (1965; 1970; 1979), even when disagreeing on points of translation and interpretation. The translations are based upon those of the Pāli Text Society, except where noted; they have frequently been altered, however, for the sake of terminological consistency. For the same reason, I will use the more familiar Sanskrit terms vijñāna, saṃskāra, nirvāṇa, saṃsāra, etc., throughout the text. 5 S III 143. “When, then, the three factors of life, heat, and consciousness abandon this body, it lies cast away and forsaken like an inanimate stick of wood.” (yadā kho āvuso imaṃ kāyaṃ tayo dhammā jahanti: āya usmā ca viññāṇaṃ, athāyaṃ kāyo ujjhito avakkhitto seti, yathā kaṭṭhaṃ acetanaṃ.) Cf. M I 296 and AKBh II 45 a-b. Schmithausen (1987:285, n. 165). 6 D II 62. “I have said that consciousness (viññāṇa) conditions name-and-form. Were, Ananda, consciousness not to descend into the mother’s womb, would name-and-form coagulate there?” “No, Lord.” “Were consciousness, having descended into the mother’s womb, to depart, would name-and-form come to birth in this life.” “No, Lord.” (viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpan ti … viññāṇaṃ va hi ānanda mātu kucchiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāmarūpaṃ m ātu kucchismiṃ samucchissathāti. no h’etaṃ bhante. viññāṇaṃ va hi ānanda mātu kucchiṃ okkamitvā vokkamissatha, api nu kho naṃarūpaṃ itthattāya abhinibbattissathāti. no h’etaṃ bhante). Also S II 101. “When consciousness is established and increases, then name-and-form descends [into the mother’s womb].” (yattha patiṭṭhitaṃ viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti). 7 S I 38 specifically states that it is mind (citta) that passes over (vidhāvati) at the time of death. As Collins (1982:214) points out, citta and vijñāna here are functionally equivalent.

“Consciousness being established and growing, there comes to be renewed existence in the future.” (tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññaṇe virūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbati hoti). D II 68, S III 54 also describes the persistence of viññāṇa from life to life; viññāṇa passes over into another body in S I 122 and S III 124 (PED:618). 9 This is not to say that vijñāna, as a self-subsistent entity, continues unchangingly from life to life. In M I 258 the Buddha specifically denies the thesis of his interlocutor, Sāti: “Even so do I, Lord, understand dhamma taught by the Lord: it is this consciousness itself that runs on, fares on, not another … it is this [[[consciousness]]] that speaks, that feels, that experiences now here, now there, the fruition of deeds that that are lovely and that are depraved,” (evaṃ byā kho ‘haṃ bhante Bhagavatā dhammaṃ desitaṃ ājānāmi yathā tad - ev’ idaṃ viññāṇaṃ sandhāvati saṃsarati, anaññan i... yvāyaṃ bhante vado vedyyo tatra tatra kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedetīti). The Buddha responds stating that “apart from conditions there is no origination of consciousness” (aññatra paccayā natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo ti). Rather it is that the stream of vijñāna continues unbroken, as in the context of rebirth. (See also S III 58). Though the term ‘stream of consciousness’ (viññāṇasotaṃ) belongs more properly to the later literature, it does appear in the Pāli texts in D III 105: “He understands a man’s stream of viññāṇa which is uninterrupted at both ends is established in both this world and the next.” (purisassa ca viññāṇasotaṃ pajānāti ubhayato abbocchinnam idhaloke paṭṭhitañ ca paraloke paṭṭhitañ ca.) See Johansson (1965:192) and Jayatillike (1949:216, as cited in Matthews 1983:63) for differing interpretations of this passage. 10 There is no passage in the Pāli Canon to my knowledge which explicitly states that vijñāna receives or maintains impressions of karma. Nevertheless, Johansson calls vijñāna the “transmitter of kamma” (1965:195f), or the “collector of kamma effects” (1979:61), citing, however, only passages which are fairly ambiguous. This conclusion is, with some qualifications, defensible, I believe, and can be deduced by the passages that do discuss karma, while taking into account the overall characteristics of vijñāna as the only possible medium of karmic continuity, particularly across lifetimes. Such a question was not, however, explicitly discussed at length until the Abhidharma period. The supporting texts may be summarized as follows: First of all karma is accumulated (upacita) and passed on: A V 292. “I declare that the intentional actions performed and accumulated will not be destroyed without being experienced;” M I 390: “beings are heirs” to their actions (kammadāyādā sattā ti vadāmi); M III 202: kammassakā sattā kammadāyādā kammayonī kammabandhu... Nāhaṃ... sañcetanikaṇ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ appaṭisaṃviditvā vyantibhāvam vadāmi. yaṃ kammaṃ karonti kalyānaṃ vā pāpakaṃ vā tassa dāyādā bhavanti. Numerous such passages are found throughout the Pāli Canon. Vijñāna itself, moreover, is directly effected by the quality of a karmic action: S II 82. “If an ignorant man undertakes meritorious actions [his] consciousness (viññāṇaṃ) will go to merit, and [if he] undertakes demeritorious actions, [his] consciousness will go to demerit.” (avijjāgato yaṃ... purisapuggalo puññaṃ ce saṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti, puññūpagaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ. apuññaṃ ce saṅkhāram abhisaṅkharoti, apuññupagaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ). See Johansson (1979:61; 1965:195f). These two characteristics together nearly suffice: vijñāna takes the quality of karmic activity, which itself accumulates until it comes to fruition; and vijñāna is virtually the only factor which is described as departing at death and reemerging at the time of conception. For the karmic potential to accrue to an individual lifestream and pass along through the series of rebirths, then it must do so, at least at that time, in conjunction with vijñāna. Thus Johansson (1965:191) declares, with some license: “The continuity in the material diversity of the series of rebirths must be something that can transmit ethical resultants just as a wave of energy can run through different types of matter and on its way change its form because of the momentary matter and itself cause changes in the matter. This ‘wave of energy’ is called viññāṇa.”

“By means of the body [[[feeling]], etc.]... consciousness would persist, if it is to persist. With body [etc.] for its object, with body [etc.] for its support, seeking a means of enjoyment, it would attain growth, increase, abundance.” (rūpupāyaṃ... viññāṇaṃ tiṭṭhamānaṃ tiṭṭheyya rūpārammaṇaṃ rūpapatiṭṭaṃ nanadupasevanaṃ virūḷhaṃ vuddhiṃ veppulam āpajjeyya). D III 228 is nearly identical. See Johansson (1979:128). These exact terms for propagation are also used in an analogy between seeds and consciousness in S III 54. “Now would these five kinds of seeds come to growth, increase and abundance?.... As the five kinds of seeds, so should consciousness with its sustenance be considered.” (api nu imāni... pañcabījajātānti vuddhiṃ virūḷhaṃ veppulaṃ āpajjeyyunti.... pañcabījajātānti evaṃ viññāṇaṃ sāhāraṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.) Elsewhere consciousness is declared the seed for further saṃsāric existence. (A I 223. viññāṇaṃ bījaṃ... hīnāya dhātuyā viññāṇaṃ patiṭṭhitaṃ.) As we shall see, these vegetative analogies will also to be used to describe the ālayavijñāna: the “mind possessed of all the seeds matures, congeals, grows, develops and increases” ( Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (V.2): *sarvabījakam cittam vipacyate saṃmūrcchati vṛddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vipulatām āpadyate; sa bon thams cad pa’i sems rnam par smin cing ‘jug la rgyas shing ‘phel ba dang yangs par ‘gyur ro). Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987: 356, n.508). 12 Passages equating the cessation of viññāṇa with liberation (vimutta) are not uncommon in the Pāli Canon. S III 61. “By the disgust, the dispassion, the cessation of viññāṇa [[[monks]]] are liberated without grasping - they are truly liberated.” (viññāṇassa nibbidā virāgā nirodhā anupādā vimuttā te suvimuttā.) Johansson (1965:200). M II 265. “As he does not delight in that equanimity, welcome or cleave to it, viññāṇa does not depend on it, nor grasp it. A monk without grasping (anupādāna), Ananda, attains nibbāna.” (tassa taṃ upekhaṃ anabhinandato anabhivadato anajjhosāyo tiṭṭhato na tan nissitaṃ hoti viññāṇaṃ na tad upādānaṃ. anupādāno, ānanda, bhikkhu parinibbāyati.) S III 61. “This eightfold path is the way leading to the cessation of consciousness (viññāṇa).” (ayaṃ... aṭṭhangiko maggo viññāṇanirodhagāminī paṭipadā). (Johansson. 1970:101). D I 223. “When mind and body are completely destroyed, it is destroyed by the cessation of viññāṇa” (ettha nāmañ ca rūpañ ca asesaṃ uparujjhati, viññāṇassa nirodhena etth’etaṃ uparujjhati.) There are, however, other views found within the same texts, further expressing the rich and complex polysemy of vijñāna and suggesting that it continues in some form beyond saṃsāric existence. A passage in SN 734 in fact describes the cessation of vijñāna and its calming in the same breath: “By the cessation of viññāṇa, there will be no origin of suffering; through the calming of viññāṇa a monk is without craving and completely free.” (viññāṇassa nirodhena n’atthi dukkhassa sambhavo... viññāṇūpasamā bhikkhu nicchāto parinibbuto.) The ‘survival’ of vijñāna after the attainment of nirvāṇa is supported by many textual passages. M I 329: “Viññāṇa is without attribute, endless and radiating all round.” (viññāṇaṃ anidassanaṃ anantaṃ sabbatopabhaṃ). A vijñāna without ‘support’ or ‘resting place’ neither increases nor performs karmic activities, and is liberated (S III 53. tad apatiṭṭhitam viññāṇaṃ avirūḷhaṃ anabhisaṅkhārañca vimuttam); thus the vijñāna of a Buddha or Arhat is said to be without a resting place or support (apatiṭṭhita- viññāṇa). (Cf. D III 105; S I 122; S II 66; S III 54.) It is surely more than coincidental that a nearly equivalent expression is central to the Yogācāra conception of liberation, viz., apratiṣṭhita-nirvāṇa, in which the impure or defiled portions of the ālayavijñāna are removed and its support or basis (āśraya) within saṃsāric life utterly transformed, leaving the Bodhisattva with no fixed abode (apratiṣṭhita). On various Yogācāra treatments of this concept, see Griffiths, et. al. (1989: 244f) for commentaries on MSg X.34; Nagao (1990: 23-34); and Sponberg (1979). These two conflicting conceptions of the fate of a post-saṃsāric vijñāna, in whatever form, are central to many of the later controversies concerning nirvāṇa and Buddhahood. The complex and often contradictory passages preserved in these early texts serve to remind us both of the antecedents and origins of the many controverted issues raised within

the histroy of Indian Buddhist thought and of the relevance these texts still hold for the study of virtually every phase of Indian Buddhism. 13 13 M I 292. “It is called ‘cognition’ because it cognizes.” (vijānāti ti kho tasmā viññāṇan ti vuccati.) 14 D III 243. “There are six cognition-groups: visual cognition, auditory cognition, olfactory cognition, gustatory cognition, tactile cognition, mental cognition.” (cha viññāṇa-kāyā, cakkhu-viññāṇaṃ, sota-viññāṇaṃ, ghānaviññāṇaṃ, jivhā-viññāṇaṃ, kāya-viññāṇaṃ, mano-viññāṇaṃ). There is also the famous simile in M I 259 where the Buddha declares that in just the same way that a fire is named by the type of material which is burning, such as a brush fire, etc., so also each type of cognition is named after its respective conditions, that is, after its perceiving organ. 15 Similar formulas, for example M I 190, include an unimpaired internal sense-organ of sight, external visible forms entering into the field of vision, and an appropriate act of attention on the part of the mind, at which time a visual mode of cognition manifests. (ajjhattikaṃ... cakkhu aparibhinnaṃ hoti... bāhirā ca rūpā āpāthaṃ āgacchanti... tajjo ca samannāhāro hoti... viññāṇa-bhāgassa pātubhāvo hoti). Jayatilleke (1963:433f). 16 It is not at all clear that this distinction always applies, or when it does, which ‘aspect’ predominates. Citing a number of passages, for example M III 260, in which both senses of vijñāna may be seen (“I will not grasp after viññāṇa and so will have no viññāṇa dependent on viññāṇa.” na viññāṇaṃ upādiyissāmi, na ca me viññāṇanissitaṃ viññāṇaṃ bhavissati.) Johansson (1965:198f) vacillates: “there is a form of viññāṇa dependent on cognitive processes, and probably viññāṇa in its rebirth-aspect is intended,” while he states at the same time that “rebirth-viññāṇa probably also simply is ordinary consciousness,” and that “there is no reason to distinguish between the perceptual and the rebirth-viññāṇa.” The point is that these two divergent contexts of meaning form part of a complex, with all its attendent tensions, whose essential unity as well as its differentiation calls for explication - a call answered, in fact, by the majority of subsequent exegetes, traditional and modern. 17 I am referring here to the widespread view within Indian religion of an ultimate homology between what we would call the psychological and metaphysical realms, what Maryla Falk (1943:49) considers a “conception of a fundamental identity of the facts and events on both the scales, which are considered as only twin projections of one common complex of facts and events.” 18 The pratītya-samutpāda series, delineating patterns or complexes of conditioned co-arising, often occurs with a number of factors different than the traditional twelve. All of them, however, are based upon the following formula: “When this is, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this is not, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases.” (imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti; imass’ uppādā idaṃ uppajjati. imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hoti; imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjati.) M II 32, etc. 19 The Mahānidāna-sutta (D II 63) describes the reciprocal conditionality of vijñāna and name-and-form (nāma-rūpa), which is itself composed of the five skandhas, including vijñāna. It states that the descent of vijñāna into the mother’s womb is a necessary condition for the development of the name-and-form (along with its variegated faculties including vijñāna), while the name-and-form is a necessary condition for vijñāna to find support in this world, facilitating the arising of birth, old age, death and the mass of suffering. (viññāṇa-paccayā nāmarūpan ti iti kho pan’ etaṃ vuttaṃ... viññāṇaṃ va hi ānanda mātu kucchiṃ na okkamissatha, api nu kho nāma-rūpaṃ mātu kucchismiṃ samucchissathāti? no h’etaṃ bhante.... tasmāt ih’ ānanda es’ eva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo nāmarūpassa, yadidaṃ viññāṇaṃ... nāmarūpa-paccayā viññāṇan ti iti kho pan’ etaṃ vuttaṃ... viññāṇaṃ va hi ānanda nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṃ nālabhissatha, api nu kho āyati jāti-jarā-maraṇa-dukkha-samudaya sambhavo paññāyethāti? no h’etaṃ bhante. tasmāt ih’ ānanda es’ eva hetu etaṃ nidānaṃ esa samudayo esa paccayo viññāṇassa, yadidaṃ nāmarūpaṃ.) The Sheaf of Reeds sutta (S II 114) has a similar passage, but the subsequent members of the twelve-fold series follow directly upon name-and-form: “It is just as if, friend, two sheaves of reeds stood leaning against each other, so also,

friend, viññāṇa arises conditioned by name-and-form, name-and-form conditioned by viññāṇa, the six sense-spheres conditioned by name-and-form, contact conditioned by the six sense-spheres, and so on; thus is the arising of the entire mass of suffering.” (seyyathāpi āvuso dve naḷakalāpiyo aññam aññam nissāya tiṭṭheyyuṃ. evam eva kho āvuso nāmarūpapaccayā viññāṇaṃ viññāṇapaccayā n āmarūpaṃ. nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ saḷāyatanapaccayā phasso... pe ... evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakhandhassa samudayo hoti). We shall see that the MSg specifically claims that the ālayavijñāna is the vijñāna which is reciprocally conditioned by nāma-rūpa. See n.13 above. 20 As do the other essential prerequisites to life mentioned above, life and heat (āyu, usmā), as well as the five groups of grasping (pañcupādānakkhandhā). 21 Saṃskāra are closely allied with the intentional activites defined as karma, and inexorably associated with the perpetuation of saṃsāric existence through the medium of vijñāna. S II 39,360, III 60, A II 157 define saṃskāra as “intention” (sañcetanā). M I 53 relates saṃskāra with vijñāna: “From the arising of saṅkhāra, there is the arising of viññāṇa; from the cessation of saṅkhāra, there is the cessation of viññāṇa. The way leading to the cessation of viññāṇa is just this noble eight-fold path.” (saṅkhārasamudayā viññāṇasamudayo, saṅkhāranirodhā viññāṇanirodho, ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhangiko maggo viññāṇa-nirodha gāminī paṭipadā). 22 Plus the sense-object, of course. M I 111. “Dependent on the eye and [[[visual]]] forms, a visual cognition occurs, the concommitance of the three is sense-impression; conditioned by sense-impression feeling [occurs], what one feels one apperceives, what one apperceives one reflects upon.” (cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso, phassapaccayā vedanā, yaṃ vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vitakketi.) 23 M I 293. “Your reverence, whatever one feels, that one apperceives; whatever one apperceives, that one cognizes; therefore these states (dharma) are associated, not dissociated, and it is not possible to recognize a difference between these states (dharma), having analyzed them again and again.” (yaṃ h’ āvuso vedeti taṃ sañjānāti, yaṃ sañjānāti taṃ vijānāti, tasmā ime dhammā saṃsaṭṭhā no visaṃsaṭṭhā, na ca labbhā imesaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhujitvā vinibbhujitvā nānākaraṇaṃ paññāpetuṃ.) 24 One pratītya-samutpāda sūtra in fact begins with the cognitive processes: “Dependent on the eye organ and visual form, visual cognition arises; the concommitance of the three is sense-impression. Depending on sense-impression is feeling, depending on feeling is craving, depending on craving is grasping, depending on grasping is becoming, depending on becoming is birth, depending on birth old age, death, grief, lamentation, suffering, distress and despair come about. This is the arising of the world.” S II 73. (Cakkhuṃ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ; tiṇṇam saṅgati phasso; phassapaccayā vedanā; vedanāpaccayā taṇhā; taṇhāpaccayā upādānam; upādānapaccayā bhavo; bhavapaccayā j āti; jātipaccayā jarāmaraṇaṃ sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupāyāsā sambhavanti. ayaṃ lokassa samudayo.) See also Johansson (1979:80f). 25 I prefer ‘appropriation,’ with its verbal sense of ‘seizing, taking,’ and ‘taking as one’s own’ (ad-proprius), as well as the nominal ‘that which is taken, seized, appropriated.’ This is etymologically closer to ‘upādāna,’ which is comprised of the preffix ‘upa,’ “towards, near, together with,” plus the noun ‘ādāna,’ “receiving, taking to oneself” (SED), or even “the material out of which anything is made” (Apte: 471), thus meaning “grasping, attachment, drawing upon, finding one’s support by, nourished by, taking up” (PED:149). It also conveys within the Pali materials the more concrete meanings of “fuel, supply,” and thus “substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going.” It is thus formally akin to saṃskāra, in that it may mean both an active process and a passive product, a conditioning and a conditioned state. See Schmithausen (1987:72). Upādāna, with its related and suggestive sense of ‘fuel,’ is closely connected with the process of rebirth. One sutta states that just as a fire will burn only with fuel (upādāna), but not without it, so too will rebirth occur only with appropriation (upādāna), but not without it. Here craving (taṇhā) becomes the fuel or substratum (upādāna) for one

who has laid aside the body, but not yet taken up another. (S IV 399. seyyathāpi vaccha aggi sa-upādāno jalati no anupādāno. evam eva khvāham vaccha sa-upādānassa upapattim paññāpemi no anupādānassā ti... yasmiṃ kho... samaye imañ ca kāyaṃ nikkhipati satto ca aññataraṃ kāyam anuppanno hoti, tam ahaṃ taṇhupādānaṃ vadāmi. taṇhā hissa... tasmiṃ samaye upādānaṃ hoti.) (See Johansson 1979:65 and Matthews 1983:33). Without such a substratum, however, one becomes liberated. S IV 102. “If a monk is enamored of them [[[visible forms]] (rūpā)], if he welcomes them, if he persists in clinging to them... he will have viññāṇa resting on them, appropriation of them... [but] without appropriation... the monk will be liberated.” (tañ ca bhikkhu abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati; tassa... tannissitaṃ viññāṇaṃ hoti tadupādānaṃ... anupādāno... bhikkhu parinibbāyati.) M III 16. “These five aggregates of appropriation have desire as a root; that which is desire and passion toward these five aggregates of appropriation is the appropriation/fuel of them.” (ime kho... pañc’ upādānakkhandhā chandamūlakā... yo kho... pañc’ upādānakkhandhesu chandarāgo, taṃ tattha upādānaṃ). Johansson (1979:66,68). Translation altered. See also M II 265. 26 Passages relating desire, craving, grasping, etc. to rebirth are too numerous to relate. Of particular interest is S II 101 which states that when there is passion, delight, and craving for any of the four sustenances (āhāra) of life, edible food, sensation, mental impulses or intentions, and vijñāna, then vijñāna persists and increases. When vijñāna persists and increases, then name-and-form descends [into the mother’s womb], the saṃskārā increase, and there is renewed existence in the future, and thus old age and death, etc. (kabaliṃkāre... phasse... manosañcetanāya... viññāṇe ce... āhāre atthi rāgo atthi nandi atthi taṇha patiṭṭhitaṃ tattha viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ. yattha patiṭṭhitaṃ viññāṇaṃ virūḷhaṃ atthi tattha nāmarūpassa avakkanti. yattha atthi nāmarūpassa avakkanti atthi tattha saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi. yattha atthi saṅkhārānaṃ vuddhi atthi tattha āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibatti atthi tattha āyatiṃ jātijarāmaraṇaṃ). Again, the MSg I.37 will claim that the ālayavijñāna, as opposed to any of the six momentary cognitions, is just this consciousnessfood (vijñānāhāra). 27 Johansson (1979:63f) delinates these two distinct functions of mind: “Viññāṇa refers mainly to the stream of conscious processes which characterizes the human mind, but it is also... responsible for the continuity both within this life and beyond.... Since viññāṇa is used in two different contexts, the paṭiccasamuppāda series and the khandhā, one may expect different shades of meaning, although they are not clearly kept apart. In the former type of context, it is more of an inner functional unit, inner space, store-room; in the latter, more of concrete, conscious processes which are the inhabitants of this inner room.” 28 Johansson (1979:92f), commenting on a passage where viññāṇa results from feeling rather than the more usual opposite order (M III 260. “viññāṇa rests upon feeling born from visual contact.” cakkhusamphassajaṃ vedanānissitaṃ viññāṇaṃ), remarks: “Perception is produced through the confrontation of a neural message with memories stored in the nervous system. The information supplied through the senses can be interpreted only by being compared with this stored information; this information can from a Buddhist point of view be envisaged as provided by viññāṇa and therefore present before the stimulus; it is activated only through the contact, phassa. Viññāṇa is... a precondition of perception... The dimension of consciousness is the condition of sensation, and the concrete content is the result of it.” In the same vein, Wijesekera (1964:254f) suggests that we take the verb ‘uppajjati,’ usually rendered ‘arise,’ to mean rather that vijñāna “begins to function” in relation to a specific sense organ, while Thomas (1935:104) also suggests simply that vijñāna “manifests itself through the six sense organs.” 29 There is the danger, of course, of anachronistically reading into the texts distinctions only subsequently made by the later commentators. But, in agreement with the later exegetes, the texts cited here support, indeed call for, just such an analysis. It is not, however, strictly necessary to claim two distinct aspects of vijñāna in these early texts (let alone in the intentions of their author(s)); it is sufficient merely to delineate two consistently distinct contexts of meaning. In

any case, my primary purpose is to present and examine the materials by which the conclusions of the later writers were supported, and thereby contextualize their claims. 30 The most well-known concept relating to dispositional tendencies is āśrava (Pāli: āsava) variously translated as ‘outflows,’ ‘inflows,’ even ‘cankers.’ The Sanskrit root ‘sru’ means “to flow, stream, issue, come from, come in” etc. (SED:1274); the PED (115) records the metaphorical meanings of intoxicating extract or plant secretion, or discharge from a sore; hence the translation favored one hundred years ago: ‘canker.’ The āśrava are directly connected to the perpetuation of saṃsāra (for example M I 54f: āsavasamudayā avijjāsamudayo; āsavanirodhā avijjānirodho... avijjāsamudayā āsavasamudayo; avijjānirodhā āsavanirodho), and present in all states prior to the attainment of liberation. We will not examine them more deeply as they are not closely related to the concepts under discussion here in any systematic fashion. See Cox (1992:66f,92f) for a summary of the overall role of this concept, particularly as found in the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma literature in Chinese translation. 31 The term is composed of the preffix ‘anu-’, “along, follow behind,” and the Sanskrit root ‘śī,’ meaning “to lie down, to sleep, to dwell.” The verbal form ‘anuśeti’ (Pāli: anuseti), thus means “to lie down with, to dwell upon,” but when referring to ideas, the PED (44) defines it as “to fill the mind persistently, to lie dormant and be continually cropping up,” while the nominal form, ‘anusaya,’ is glossed as: “bent, bias, proclivity, the persistance of a dormant or latent disposition, predisposition, tendency. Always in bad sense.” Although the anuśaya merited an entire chapter in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, their role within the early Pāli texts was more peripheral. Recent English language scholarship based upon the Pāli materials includes the works of Johansson, Padmasiri de Silva (1972; 1979), and Matthews (1983). Collet Cox (1992:68f) has also discussed the anuśaya and its treatment by the Sarvāstivādins. 32 M III 285. cakkhuñ ca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ, tiññaṃ saṅgati phasso; phassapaccayā uppajjati vedayitaṃ sukhaṃ v ā dukkhaṇ v ā adukkhamasukkham vā. so sukhāya vedanāya phuṭṭho samāno abhinandati abhivadati ajjhosāya tiṭṭhati; tassa rāgānusaya anuseti. 33 M I 303. “A disposition to passion lies latent in pleasant feeling; a disposition to aversion lies latent in unpleasant feeling; a disposition to ignorance lies latent in neutral feeling.” (sukhāya... vedanāya rāgānusayo anuseti, dukkhāya... vedanāya paṭighānusayo anuseti, adukkhamasukhāya... vedanāya avijjānusayo anusetīti). These three form the basis of an early classification of the anusaya into seven different types, the first three corresponding to the three unwholesome roots of greed (lobha), hatred (dosa) and delusion (moha), with the additional dispositions towards speculative views (diṭṭhi), sceptical doubt (vicikicchā), pride (māna), and craving for existence (bhavarāga): S V 60; A IV 9; PED (44) warns, however, that “these lists govern the connotation of the word; but it would be wrong to put that connotation back into the earlier passages.” There are several other types of anusaya mentioned in the early texts to which we shall return shortly: ‘dispositions to a view of personal existence’ (sakkāyadiṭṭhānusaya), ‘attachment to rules and rituals’ (sīlabbataparāmāsānusaya), ‘desire for sensual pleasure’ (kāmarāgānusaya), and the ‘disposition toward the pride that creates ‘I’ and ‘mine’’ (ahankāra-mamankāra-mānaanusaya). 34 One sutta (S II 66) has the anusaya initiate the entire pratītya-samutpāda series: “If one does not will, O monks, does not intend, yet [a disposition] lies dormant, this becomes an object for the persistence of consciousness. There being an object, there comes to be a support of consciousness. Consciousness being supported and growing, there come to be the descent of mind-and-body; conditioned by mind-and-body, the six sense-spheres, and so on; such is the arising of this entire mass of suffering.” S II 66. (no ce bhikkhave ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇaṃ etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā; ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti. tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūḷhe nāmarūpassa avakkanti hoti. nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatanaṃ; pe. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti).

no ce bhikkhave ceteti no ce pakappeti atha ce anuseti, ārammaṇam etaṃ hoti viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā; ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti. tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe virūḷhe āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatti hoti. āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbatiyā sati āyatiṃ j ātijarāmaraṇam sokaparidevadukkha-domanassupāyāsā sambhavanti. evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. 36 M I 433. Daharassa hi maluṅkyāputta kumārassa mandassa uttānaseyyakassa sakkāyo (dhammā... sīlā... kāmā... sattā) ti pi na hoti, kuto pan’ assa uppajjissati sakkāyadiṭṭhi (dhammesu vicikicchā... sīlesu sīlabbataparāmāso... kāmesu kāmacchando... sattesu byāpādo); anuseti tv’ev’ assa sakkāyadiṭṭhānusayo (vicikicchānusaya... sīlabbataparāmāsānusayo... kāmarāgānusayo... byāpādānusayo). 37 M I 434. na sakkāyadiṭṭhi-pariyuṭṭhitena cetasā viharati na sakkāyadiṭṭhiparetena, uppannāya ca sakkāyadiṭṭhiyā nissaraṇaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti; tassa sā sakkāyadiṭṭhi sānusaya pahīyati. The interpretation of this last phrase, “eliminated along with the anusaya” (sānusaya pahīyati) became the source of exegetical disagreements, together with their important doctrinal ramifications, between the various Abhidharmic schools. See note 86, below. 38 An interesting question here is not so much the continuous subsistence of these dispositions, for that seems unquestioned; the real question is whether or not they are in any sense karmically effective in their latent state. The texts, however, are ambivalent; for while the anuśaya are not portrayed as active in every mental process, as the difference between the innocent babe and the beleagured adult illustrates, they are, nevertheless, held to be generally effective within the wider context of saṃsāric continuity, as in S II 65 above. See Johansson (1979:109). These will become important issues surrounding the ālayavijñāna. 39 An Aryan who has destroyed only the five lower fetters (samyojanani), for example, may still have a subtle remnant (anusahagato) of the pride, desire and disposition toward ‘I am.’ (S III 131. evam eva kho āvuso kiñcāpi ariyasāvakassa pañc’ orambhāgiyāni saññojanāni* pahīnāni bhavanti. atha khvassa hoti yo ca pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusahagato asmīti māno asmīti chando asmīti anusayo asamūhato). Schmithausen (1987:437, n.918) reads “saṃyojanāni” here, based upon a parallel passage on the preceeding page, S III 130. A more advanced Aryan, however, is free of these dispositions and so does not react to unpleasant, pleasant and neutral sensations with the habituated responses of aversion, attachment, and ignorance, respectively. (S IV 209. tam enam dukkhāya vedanāya apaṭighavantam yo dukkhāya vedanāya paṭighānusayo so nānuseti... tassa kāmasukhaṃ nābhinandato yo sukhāya vedanāya rāgānusayo so nānuseti... adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya avijjānusayo so nānuseti.) 40 Liberation (vimukti) and the perfect comprehension of pride (mānābhisamaya) are closely related to the absence of any disposition (anusaya) toward the pride which produces ‘I’ or ‘mine.’ A I 133. “Because, indeed Sāriputta, in so far as a monk... has no disposition to the pride that produces ‘I’ or ‘mine’ regarding this body endowed with consciousness, has no disposition to the pride that produces ‘I’ or ‘mine’ regarding all external phenomena (nimitta), and who abides accomplishing liberation of the mind and liberation through insight, he abides accomplishing liberation of the mind and liberation through insight without a disposition to the pride that produces ‘I’ or ‘mine’ - such a monk, Sāriputta, has cut off craving, has broken the bonds, has through perfect comprehension of pride made an end of suffering.” (yato kho sāriputta bhikkhuno imasmiṃ saviññāṇake kāye ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti, bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti, yañ ca cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ upasampajja viharato ahankāra-mamankāra-mānānusayā na honti tañ ca cetovimuttiṃ paññāvimuttiṃ upasampajja viharati. ayaṃ vuccati sāriputta bhikkhu acchecchi taṇhaṃ vāvattayi saṃyojanaṃ sammā mānābhisamayā antam akāsi dukkhassa).

Eliminating the anusaya, along with ignorance, is an essential part in bringing an end to suffering and coming to have perfect view. M I 47. “When, friends, a noble disciple understands unwholesomeness thus, understands the roots of unwholesomeness thus, understands wholesomeness thus, understands the roots of wholesomeness thus, having eliminated all disposition towards passion, having dispelled the disposition to anger, having removed the disposition to pride which is the view ‘I am,’ having eliminated ignorance, having obtained knowledge, he has in the present brought an end to suffering. To that extent also, friends, does a noble disciple come to have perfect view, whose views are upright, who possesses unwavering confidence in the dhamma, who has come into the true dhamma.” (yato kho āvuso ariyasāvako evam akusalaṃ pajānāti evaṃ akusalamūlaṃ pajānāti, evaṃ kusalaṃ pajānāti evaṃ kusalamūlaṃ pajānāti, so sabbaso rāgānusayaṃ pahāya paṭighānusayaṃ paṭivinodetvā asmīti diṭṭhimānānusayaṃ samūhanitvā avijjaṃ pahāya vijjaṃ uppādetvā diṭṭhe va dhamme dukkhass’ antakaro hoti. ettāvatā pi kho āvuso ariyasāvako sammādiṭṭhi hoti, ujugatā ‘ssa diṭṭhi, dhamme aveccappasādena samannāgato. āgato imaṃ saddhamman –ti). 41 The distinction between these two temporal dimensions may well be universal categories based in evolutionary biology. For example, the great Russian neurologist A.R. Luria (1987;xvi.) was, Jerome Bruner states in the forward, convinced that the aim of mental functioning was to construct two complementary versions of the same world... that the human nervous system is structured in a manner to help us achieve this dual representation and to help us put the two representations together. One is a simultaneous world in which, as in a panorama, we catch “on the fly” what is needed of what is there. The other is a temporally organized world that is structured around plans and intentions, a world made possible by the frontal cortical system. Frontal lesions disrupt intentionality and planfulness; occipital and parieto-temporal ones produce such anomalies as “simultanagnosia,” in which elements and features can be isolated, but a “whole” or meaningful picture cannot be put together. Though immediate cognition and the long-term continuity of consciousness correspond roughly to these two temporal dimensions, Abhidharma doctrine emphasizes the validity of the former over that of the latter. 42 Indeed, Yogācāra must be considered as one of the Abhidharma shcools. See, for example, Guenther (1959) and Mizuno (1978). Nevertheless, since this essay focuses upon distinctions between Yogācāra and the other Abhidharma schools, I shall follow the traditionally accepted sectarian affiliations of the works associated with Asaṅga and Vasubandhu and their commentators. 43 Much of the following has been discussed at length elsewhere; see especially Stcherbatsky (1956), La Vallée Poussin (1937a), Conze (1973:138f), Jaini (1959), also Collins (1982), Chaudhuri (1983), Griffiths (1986), Cox (1992). 44 A word about the prominence of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (AKBh) is in order. We shall be utilizing the AKBh as the primary, though by no means sole, source of Abhidharma doctrine in this section. Though its historical relation to the contemporaneous Yogācāra literature is far from clear, and thus its contents cannot be used to support arguments of historical priority or causality, it can be used as an adequate contemporary source for presenting the general context of Abhidharma doctrine. This choice is made on the grounds that, despite the clear sectarian nature of many of its own positions, the AKBh preserves doctrines of indubitably older origins which were largely shared by other schools, despite differences in specific details. It is its inclusion of these disputed issues and its presentation of the differing approaches of two schools, the Sautrāntikas, ‘those following the Sūtras,’ and Sarvāstivādins, ‘those who assert that all exists (sarva asti),’ that further recommends the AKBh; to oversimplify a bit, they represent allegiance to the Sūtras and the Abhidharma, respectively. (See note 86 below). Vasubandhu was, moreover, also a key figure in the Yogācāra school and considerable doctrinal overlapping exists between the AKBh and such Yogācāra texts of his as the Karmasiddhi-prakaraṇa (see Muroji, 1985, for corresponding passages). 45 AKBh ad I.2b; Shastri: 12; Poussin: 4, tadayaṃ paramārthadharmaḥ v ā nirvāṇaṃ dharmalakṣaṇaṃ v ā pratyabhimukho dharma ity abhidharmaḥ. 46 AKBh ad I.2b; Shastri: 12; Poussin: 4. svalakṣaṇadhāraṇād dharmaḥ. The concept of dharma retained, however, the ambiguity, suggesting a tenuous unity, between its sheer existence (svabhāva) and its distinguishing characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), what Western scholastics temed existentia and essentia, respectively; Guenther (1989: 11); see also Griftiths (1986: 166f, n. 15). The relative emphasis of one side or the other of these two aspects of dharma may have been central to certain divergent tendencies in Buddhist thought, one leading toward an ontological realism and the other toward nominalism, as evident in, for example, the Sarvāstivādins and the Sautrāntikas, respectively. 47 AKBh, ad I.2b, above; Buddhaghosa’s Aṭṭhasālinī, III 488, concurs: abhidhammo nāmo paramatthadesanā. Cited in Guenther (1958:2). Jayatilleke (1963:361-8) discusses the canonical meanings of ultimate (paramatta) and conventional (sammuti) discourse and their relation to definitive teachings (nītattha) and those in need of interpretation, that is, indirect teachings (neyyattha). While both the terms ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’ are found in the canon (S I 135: “just as much as the word ‘chariot’ is used when the parts are put together, there is the use (sammuti) of the term ‘being’ (satto) when the (psycho-physical) constituents are present”; yathā pi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti) they are “nowhere contrasted in the Canon” (ibid.:366), and when they are used they refer rather to a “distinction of subject matter and not a distinction of two kinds of truth” (ibid.:368), which, apparently, was left to the commentarial tradition to elaborate. The Kathāvatthu I.1.1-146, for example, disputes as great length the contention that the pudgala, the ‘person,’ exists ultimately and in truth (saccikaṭṭaparamaṭṭhena). The commentary to the Aṅguttaranikāya (AA.I.94, cited in ibid.:363) states that ‘person’ is conventional teaching, as is ‘being,’ while such things as ‘the impermanent,’ ‘the suffering,’ ‘selfless,’ and ‘the aggregates’ are ultimate teachings (puggalo ti sammutikathā, na paramatthakathā... tattha puggalo satto... ti evarūpā sammuti-desanā. aniccaṃ dukkhaṃ anattā khandhā... ti evarūpā paramattha-desana). See also Kathāvatthu, V.6; Miln. i 45; Visuddhimagga XVIII; Compendium, 6,11, 81 n.1, 200 n.1. 48 This statement needs some qualification. The Theravādins and the Sarvāstivādins, for example, held that each moment of mind (citta) lasted for only an instant (Cf. Kathāvatthu XXII.8, for example, only denies that all phenomena last merely a single mind-moment; eka-citta-kkhaṇikā sabbe dhamma), but they divided this instant into three and four parts of arising, abiding and passing away, and impermanence, respectively. (See also Kalupahana (1992: 206-216), who argues that it was only with Buddhaghosa that the theory of momentariness was introduced into Theravādin Abhidhamma and thereafter at variance with earlier doctrine.) Though this division of a single instant was elsewhere criticized for not being strictly instantaneous (AKBh ad II 46ab; Shastri:259; Poussin:228), this does not directly affect the issues under discussion here; I shall use “momentary” and “momentariness” with these qualifications in mind. The AKBh IV ad 2b-3b (Shastri:568; Poussin:4), for example defines as momentary (kṣaṇikaḥ) that which is destroyed immediately after it attains its existence (ko ‘yam kṣaṇo nām? ātmalābho ‘nantara vināśī, so ‘sya asti iti kṣaṇikaḥ), while Yaśomitra (ibid. in Shastri’s edition) glosses ‘kṣaṇa’ simply as the limit or boundary of time (kālaparyantaḥ kṣaṇaḥ). 49 AKBh I.3; Shastri:14; Poussin:5. dharmāṇāṃ pravicayam antareṇa nāsti kleśānām yata upaśāntaye ‘bhyupāyaḥ...na hi vinā abhidharmopadeśena śiṣyaḥ śakto dharmān pravicetum iti. See Bareau (1955:137f,188,197) for the doctrines that the dharmas are entirely knowable (jñeya), perceptible (vijñeya) and comprehensible (abhijñeya). (citing Sarvāstivāda thesis #3, the later Mahīśāsaka thesis #3, and Śāriputrābhidharmaśāstra thesis #31.)

For the same reason, the question of at least conventional identity became problematic, since the dharmic factors had to be related closely enough to be considered those of an “individual” mind-stream, if not an actual “person,” for otherwise the boundaries between individual minds would blur and karmic cause and effect would diffuse indiscriminately, unattributable to any particular mind-stream. 51 And skirting the boundaries of incoherence as well. The inconceivability of purely momentary experience devoid of a larger interpretive framework has been pointed out by Thomas Luckmann (1967:45) in a context not altogether incompatible with basic Buddhist tenets: Subjective experience considered in isolation is restricted to mere actuality and is void of meaning. Meaning is not an inherent quality of subjective processes but is bestowed on it in interpretive acts. In such acts a subjective process is grasped retrospectively and located in an interpretive scheme... The interpretive scheme is necessarily distinct from [and].... “transcends” ongoing experience.... The meaning of experience is derived from the relation of ongoing processes to the scheme of interpretation [which]... rests upon a certain degree of detachment. Such detachment cannot originate in a simple succession of isolated subjective processes... a genuinely isolated subjective process is inconceivable. One may, however, in agreement with its Mahāyāna critics, question the Ābhidharmikas’ claim to ultimate truth and consider Abhidharma as simply another interpretive scheme, preserving ‘inconceivability’ for higher concerns. See Piatigorksy (1984) for the most extensive, and sympathetic, treatment of this approach and Daye (1975). Derrida (1973; esp. 60-69) also discusses the relation between temporality and ‘pure experience’ in reference to Husserl’s concepts, particularly in The Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness. 52 The PED (266f) entry for this term indicates, once again, the common indivisibility between the process and the agent of the process in so many key Buddhist terms; citta is “the centre and focus of man’s emotional nature as well as that intellectual element which inheres in and accompanies its manifestations: thought. In this wise citta denotes both the agent and that which is enacted.” See Guenther (1989:1f) for similar remarks on the meaning and translation of citta. In the early discourses it was frequently grouped with vijñāna and manas, cognition and mentation, respectively. S II 95. yaṃ ca kho etaṃ... vuccati cittam iti pi mano iti pi viññāṇa iti pi. AKBh II 34a-b; Shastri:208; Poussin:176f: cittaṃ mano ‘tha vijñānam ekārthaṃ. These terms are distinguished, however, by their characteristic functions and nuances: citta, in Vasubandhu’s usual double etymology, accumulates (cinoti), and refers to a variety (citram) of pure and impure elements; manas mentates and refers to a previous state of mind inasmuch as it supports the succeeding one; and vijñāna discerns objects and arises supported by two conditions, i.e. the organ and object. (ibid.: cinoti iti cittam. manuta iti manaḥ. vijānāti iti vijñānam. cittaṃ śubhāśubhair dhātubhir iti cittam. tad eva āśrayabhūtaṃ manaḥ. āśritabhūtaṃ vijñānam iti apare). The Yogācārins will subsequently, and significantly, designate the ālayavijñāna as citta, while the manas will be equated with ‘afflictive mentation’ (kliṣṭa-manas), and vijñāna with the ‘functioning cognitions’ (pravṛtti-vijñāna). 53 A I 8. paṇihitene cittena... nibbānam sacchikarissati. D II 81. “Citta, when thoroughly infused with wisdom, is set quite free from the maleficent influences (āsava), namely the maleficent influences of sensual pleasure, existence, views and ignorance.” (paññā-paribhāvitaṃ cittaṃ sammād eva āsavehi vimuccati seyyathīdaṃ kāmāsavā bhavāsavā diṭṭhāsavā avijjāsavā). The verb “paribhāvita” is used with the seeds (bīja) in the AKBh, and when used with citta will have important implications for Yogācāra ālayavijñāna theory. See also Johansson 1965:176 and 1970:23. 54 Though the general scheme of dharmas is common to most Abhidharma schools, the exact list differs from one school to the next. For example the Yogācārins considered five caittas as ‘omnipresent’ (sarvatraga) factors essential for mental functioning at every moment (sparśa, sensation; manaskāra, attention; vedanā, feeling; saṃjñā,

apperception; and cetanā, motivation), in addition to which the Theravādins reckoned two, ekaggatā (individuality of object) and jīvitindriya (life faculty), and the Sarvāstivādins five others: chanda, desire; mati, discernment; prajñā, discriminatory awareness; smṛti, recollection or mindfulness; adhimokṣa, determination; and samādhi, concentration. There are futher categorizations and distributions of caittas, with the exact members differing from school to school, in terms of wholesome mental factors (kuśala-caitta) occurring in each wholesome citta, unwholesome factors in unwholesome cittas associated with universal affliction factors (kleśa-mahābhūmika) or simply with the afflictions (kleśa) themselves. AKBh ad II 24-29; Shastri:186; Poussin:153-6,161-169; Hirakawa (1973:Vol.I.xii-xxiv); Compendium:94-96; Chaudhuri (1983:105-108). 55 Vijñāna (or vijñāna-skandha), sometimes together with mano, constitutes the category of citta in many Abhidharma texts, as, for example, the Prakaraṇapāda, (T.26.627a13, 692b28), as well as throughout the Yogācāra corpus. See Hirakawa (1973, Vol. I.xii-xxiv). Citta, vijñāna and mano are equated in AKBh II 34a-d; see note 52 above. 56 AKBh ad II 50c-d\51; Shastri:283-291; Poussin:248-255. When considered as causal factors, they are called the ‘simultaneous-’ or ‘co-existent causes’ (sahabhū-hetu). Although the Sarvāstivādins maintained this type of cause, the Sautrāntikas rejected it on the grounds that it contradicts the accepted principle that cause and effect necessarily follow one another. As Tanaka (1985) points out, however, this misses the point, since this refers rather to the conditions supporting a phenomena at any given time, as, for example, a tripod, each of whose legs must be simultaneously present for the others to function. Although this causal factor does not seem particularly emphasized within the Abhidharma, the Yogācārins will thoroughly exploit it in relation to ālayavijñāna theory. It corresponds closely to the co-nascent condition (sahajāta-paccaya), the sixth condition of the Paṭṭhāna of Theravādin Abhidhamma. Yaśomitra seems to agree: since mind (citta) and its concommitant mental factors (caitta) are the mutual effect of one another they are simultanteous causes. (AKBh ad II 53; Poussin:288; Shastri:307: anyonyaphalārthena sahabhūhetuḥ. Yaśomitra comments: cittaṃ caittasya phalam, caitto ‘pi cittasya iti anyonyaphalam iti tenārthena sahabhūhetuḥ.) Yaśomitra defends this causal condition by citing the accepted scriptural formula that sensation is the concommitance of feeling, apperception and intention born together (AKBh ad II 49; Shastri:279; Poussin:245. taiḥ saha jātā vedanā saṃjñā cetanā ca iti sahabhūhetuḥ). Theravādin Abhidhamma commentaries holds a similar concept in MA II 77: tam phassaṃ paṭicca sahajātādivasena phassapaccayā vedanā uppajjati. Quoted in Jayatillike (1963:435f). 57 Mental factors are associated with citta when they share five specific commonalities (samatā): 1) the same physical basis (āśraya), i.e. the five sense-faculties and the mental-faculty (mano-indriya); 2) the same object (ālambana), i.e. the same respective sense-fields (viśaya); 3) the same aspect (ākāra), i.e. they both conform to the character of the object; 4) the same time of occurrence (kāla); and 5) the same number of dharmas at a time, i.e. one. (AKBh II 34b-d; Shastri:201f; Poussin:177f.) This schema seems to have begun at an early date, for much the same formula is found in Kathāvatthu VII.2, where sampayutta seems to be defined as having the same physical basis (ekavatthuka) and the same object (ekārammaṇa), arising and ceasing together (ekappāda, ekanirodha), and being concomitant, co-existent and compounded (sahagata, sahajāta, saṃsaṭṭha). The Pāli Abhidhamma text, the Paṭṭhāna, gives the same three commonalities for the sampayutta-paccaya, the nineteenth condition, though the whole system of conditions found in this work is altogether more complex and thoroughgoing than that found in the Sarvāstivādin or Yogācārin works. See Nyanatiloka (1983:125). 58 AKBh IV 1b. (Shastri:567; Poussin:1) quoting a sūtra, defines karma as intention and performing an action having intended. (kim punas tat karma? iti āha cetanā tatkṛtam ca tat. sūtra uktam “dve karmaṇī cetanā karma cetayitvā ca” iti.)

For example, the mental factors of anger or lust being conjoined (saṃprayukta) with mind (citta), constitutes or instigates ‘unskillful’ or ‘unwholesome’ (akuśala) actions, which eventually produce unpleasant or undesirable results; similarly ‘skillful’ or ‘wholesome’ (kuśala) actions produce pleasant or desirable results. AKBh IV 45; Shastri:652; Poussin:106; kṣemākṣemetarat karma kuśalākuśaletarat \ ... kṣemaṃ karma kuśalam, yadiṣṭavipākaṃ... akṣemakuśalam... yasyāniṣṭo vipākaḥ \ puṇyāpuṇyamaniñjaṃ ca sukhavedyādi ca trayam \ ... punaḥ trīṇi - sukhavedanīyaṃ karma, duḥkhavedanīyam, aduḥkhāsukhavedanīyaṃ ca. This last set of terms, “karma leading to happiness or suffering,” etc. (sukhavedanīyaṃ karma, duḥkhavedanīyam) are also found in the Pāli texts A IV 382, S V 211. 59 AKBh ad II 35-46; Poussin:178-244; Chaudhuri:108-109. See also Jaini (1959c). 60 Stcherbatsky (1956:31) describes this brave new dharmic world as follows: Just as they are disconnected, so to say, in breadth, not being linked together by any pervading substance, just so are they disconnected in depth or in duration, since they last only one single moment (kṣaṇa). They disappear as soon as they appear, in order to be followed the next moment by another momentary existence. Thus a moment becomes a synonym of an element (dharma), two moments are two different elements. An element becomes something like a point in time-space... A cause for the Buddhists was not a real cause but a preceeding moment, which likewise arose out of nothing in order to disappear into nothing. 61 For the Sarvāstivādins the six causes are the main or efficient cause (kāraṇa-hetu), the simultaneous cause (sahabhūhetu), the cause by association (saṃprayukta-hetu), the homogeneous cause (sabhāga-hetu), the omnipresent cause (sarvatraga-hetu), and last but certainly not least, the maturational cause (vipāka-hetu). AKBh ad II 49-73; Poussin:244-331. Verdu (1985:66-128) and Chaudhuri (1983:108-115) treat these causes, conditions and results at some length. For corresponding Yogācārin views of this system of hetu, pratyaya, and phala, see ASBh:35-43. 62 We need not describe each cause, condition and fruit. We have already mentioned the ‘simultaneous or co-existant cause’ (sahabhū-hetu), and the ‘associated cause’ (saṃprayukta-hetu) (referring to the relationship between the citta and caittas mentioned above which share the five commonalities. AKBh ad II 51.) The first cause, the kāraṇa-hetu, is the ‘effecient cause,’ the most essential and general cause, such as when an eyecognition arises due to a visual form and the unimpaired eye-organ (AKBh ad II 49: Vyākhyā, Shastri ed.:279: cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi ca upadyate cakṣurvijñānam iti kāraṇāhetuḥ.) Two other major causes which only seldom arise in the debates under consideration here are 1) the ‘homogeneous cause’ (sabhāga-hetu), from which dharmas follow uniformly and automatically (niṣyanda-phala), which is to say, their fruit is of the same nature as its cause, wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral (AKBh II 54a-b; Shastri:306; Poussin:268) and 2) the ‘all-pervading cause’ (sarvatraga-hetu), which usually refers to ignorance (avidyā) inasmuch as it has not been eradicated and thus influences all actions. AKBh II 57c; Shastri:330-332; Poussin:291; Sakurabe (1981:98); Stcherbatsky (1956:28f); Verdu (1985:75). Stcherbatsky (1956:67) has well illustrated this system of causes, conditions and fruits with the example of the process of visual cognition: The Sarvāstivādins establish several kinds of causal relations between the elements. If, e.g., a moment of the sense of vision produces in the next moment a visual sensation, it is termed kāraṇa-hetu and its result adhipati-phala [predominate result]... When the next moment is just the same as the foregoing one, thus evoking in the observer the idea of duration, this relation is termed sabhāga-hetu [homogeneous cause] as to a niṣyanda-phala [[[Wikipedia:uniform|uniform]] fruit]. If this moment appears in a stream (santāna) which is defiled by the presence of passions (kleśa), this defiling character is inherited by the next moments, if no stopping of it is produced. Such a relation is called sarvatraga-hetu as to niśyanda-phala. Finally every moment in a stream is

under the influence of former deeds (karma) and many, in its turn, have an influence on future events. This relation is termed vipāka-phala. 63 Vipāka, more literally ‘maturation’, is derived from the root verb ‘pac,’ ‘to mature or ripen,’ or ‘to come to perfection,’ while the preffix ‘vi-’ carries the weight of English ‘dis-’, roughly ‘difference.’ It refers to a ripened or matured fruit different from its cause, in that it is an indeterminate dharma (avyākṛta-dharma) resulting from a dharma which is either unwholesome (akuśala) or wholesome with contaminants (kuśala-sāsrava) and reaching maturation at a later time neither simultaneously nor immediately afterwards. (AKBh ad II 57a-b; Shastri:330; Poussin:288. vipāko ‘vyākṛto dharmaḥ anivṛtāvyākṛto hi dharmaḥ vipākaḥ... ya uttarakālaṃ bhavati na yugapad na api antaraṃ sa vipākaḥ). This contrasts with the ‘homogeneous cause’ (sabhāga-hetu) and ‘all-pervading cause’ (sarvatraga-hetu) and their uniform fruition (niṣyanda-phala). Guenther (1958:19-20) calls vipāka an “energetic process” intimately related to karma, such that “in its potential state energy is ‘heaped up’ (upacita), while in its kinetic state it develops (vipacyate) toward a certain effect.” 64 For Vasubandhu, the adhipati-pratyaya, the ‘predominant condition,’ and the hetu-pratyaya, the ‘root condition,’ comprise the kāraṇa-hetu and other hetus, respectfully, while the ‘object condition’ (ālambana-pratyaya) refers to the epistemic object. (AKBh ad II 61c-64c; Shastri:381-392; Poussin:299-311). Theravādin doctrine differs here from that found in the Abhidharmakośa, for the system preserved in the Paṭṭhāna of the Abhidhamma-piṭaka lists a series of twenty-four conditions (paccaya). (Nyanatiloka 1983:117-127). These are, however, reduced in the Abhidhammatthasangaha (VIII.12; p.197) to four main conditions: object condition (ārammaṇa-paccaya), sufficing condition (upanissaya-paccaya), the action condition (kamma-paccaya) and the presence condition (atthi-paccaya). 65 AKBh II 62a-b; Shastri:342; Poussin:300: cittacaittā acaramā utpannāḥ samanantaraḥ... samaś ca ayam anantaraś ca pratyaya iti samanantarapratyayaḥ. 66 Thus most Abhidharma schools attempted to mitigate the immediately antecedent and homogeneous condition by positing factors that would allow for heterogeneous succession between dharmas of different types. As Jaini (1959b:244) sums up Yaśomitra’s (ad II 35-6) comments: Even the Vaibhāṣikas, he says, must resort to some such theory [as the seeds] to explain the phenomena of the succession of two heterogeneous cittas. They also believe that an akuśala can be succeeded by a kuśala. Do the Vaibhāṣikas here agree that the kuśala is produced by an akuśala? If they do not agree then they deny samanantara-pratyaya. If they agree then they must explain what kind of power (śakti) it is that produces a kuśala-citta. If this power is akuśala it cannot produce kuśala. If it is kuśala then it cannot on their terms remain in an akuśala-citta. 67 AKBh ad V 25b; Shastri:805; Poussin: 51; “If the past would not exist, how would there be the future fruit of pure and impure karma, since at the time the fruit arises the cause of maturation (vipākahetu) is not present?” (yadi ca atītaṃ na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmaṇaḥ phalamāyatyāṃ kathaṃ syāt? na hi phalotpattikāle varttamānāṃ vipākahetur asti iti.) See also Poussin (1937a:77). 68 As Piatigorsky (1984:50) note regarding karma, “the only thing it really does is that it connects cause with effect.” [Emphasis in original.] 69 AKBh ad VI 26a; Poussin:180f. “It is called ‘entering into assurance’ because it is entering into the assurity of perfection. In the sūtra it is called ‘the perfection which is nirvāṇa’, obtaining which is ‘entering,’ and from whose production one is called an Āryan person. The state of being a worldling is destroyed by the future state.” (saiva ca niyāmāvakrāntir ity ucyate; samyaktvaniyāmāvakramaṇāt. ‘samyaktvaṃ nirvāṇam’ ity uktaṃ s ūtre... tasyābhigamanam avakramaṇam. tasyāṃ côtpannāyām āryapudgala ucyate. anāgatayā pṛthagjanatvaṃ vyāvartyate.)

The Appendix of the English translation of the Kathāvatthu (383,re:XXI 7,8) discusses niyāma as follows: Niyama means ‘fixity,’ but niyāma is ‘that which fixes.’ The former is derived from ni-yam-ati, to fix; the latter from the causative: niyāmeti, to cause to be fixed. When the Path—i.e., a certain direction, course, tendency, profession, progressive system of a person’s life—is called sammatta, or, contrariwise, micchattaniyāma, both forms are understood in the causal sense. Thus the former ‘path’ inevitably establishes the state of exemption from apāyas (rebirth in misery), and the latter inevitably establishes purgatorial retribution after the next death. Niyāma, then, is that by which the Niyama (the fixed, or inevitable order to things) is established, or that by which fixity is brought about, or marked out in the order of things.... The orthodox view is that, in the whole causal flux of ‘happenings’—and these comprise all dhammas, all kammas—there are only two rigid successions, or orders of specifically fixed kinds of cause-and-effect. These are—(1) The sammatta-niyāma; (2) the micchatta-niyāma. By or in the latter, certain deeds, such as matricide, result in purgatorial retribution immediately after the doer’s next death. By or in the former, the Path-graduate will win eventually the highest ‘fruit’ and Nibbāna. See also Kathāvatthu V,4; VI,1; XII,5; XIII,4; on sammatta-niyāma (Skt.:samyaktva-niyāma) see S I 96; S III 225, A I 121f. Suttanipāta 55, 371. Conze (1973:137f) has succinctly summarized these issues: Saints are credited with a number of possessions and achievements which are lasting in the sense that they are not lost as soon as the present moment has passed. A Streamwinner need never again be reborn in a state of woe, and thus has won a quality which he will always have. The Arhat, according to some, can never fall away... Even while he does not actually realize it, a saint has the power to realize at his will this or that attainment, and thus possesses it potentially. The fact that a mental state is definitely abandoned or definitely established lies outside the momentary series of states, and so does permanent ownership or potential ownership of a spiritual skill. One speaks of a person being ‘destined’ (niyata) for some future condition, and asserts that he will certainly obtain it. For instance people are said to be ‘destined for Nirvana’, or ‘to be destined’ either for salvation (samyaktva) or perdition (mithyātva). 70 AKBh ad V 1a; Shastri:759; Poussin:106; karmajaṃ lokavaicitrayam iti uktam. tāni ca karmāṇi anuśayavaśād upacayaṃ gacchanti, antareṇa ca anuśayān bhavābhinirvartane na samarthāni bhavanti. ato veditavyāḥ mūlaṃ bhavasya anuśayāḥ. Yaśomitra (Shastri: 760) explains that existence or becoming (bhava) refers here, as with so many of the concepts we are examining, to both resultant (vipāka) and active aspects, i.e. the resultant aspect of renewed existence (punarbhava) and existence inasmuch as it consists of further life-creating activities (karma-bhava). Theravāda Abhidhamma similarly divides bhava into resultant, renewed becoming (upapatti-bhava) and activities that create existence (kamma-bhava); Vibhanga, 137; Compendium, VIII 5.:89f, 262; Visuddhi-magga XVII 250f. 71 AKBh III 19a-d; Shastri:433f; Poussin:57-9; yathā ākṣepaṃ kramād vṛddhaḥ santānaḥ kleśakarmabhiḥ. paralokaṃ punar yāti... iti anādibhavacakrakaṃ. This latter statement means both that kleśa and karma are due to birth and that birth is due to kleśa and karma. (AKBh III 19a-d; Shastri:433f; Poussin:57-9; etena prakāreṇa kleśakarmahetukaṃ janma tad hetukāni punaḥ kleśakarmāṇi tebhyaḥ punar janma iti anādibhavacakrakaṃ veditavyam.) 72 Accumulation (upacaya) of karma is defined as the accumulation until their fruit ripens of intentional actions which necessarily give a result. (AKBh ad IV 120; Shastri:746f; Poussin:242f; sañcetanā... vipākāc ca karmopacitam... kathaṃ sañcetanataḥ? sañcintya kṛtaṃ bhavati... kathaṃ vipākataḥ? vipākadāne niyataṃ bhavati.)

The AKBh differentiates the action (karma) which creates such potential from the accumulation (upacaya) of that potential itself. (AKBh ad IV 120; Shastri:746; Poussin:242f. “What is done and what is accumulated is called karma.” kṛtaṃ ca, upacitaṃ ca karmocyate). This is derived from canonical passages treating karma, as cited previously; A V 292: “I declare that the intentional actions performed and accumulated will not be destroyed without being experienced.” It is not, however, universally accepted, as Kathāvatthu XV. 11 (kammūpacayakathā) demonstrates. This debate concerns the same issues as does the persistence of the dispositions: how can there be a distinct type of karmic accumulation that is not simultaneously related to the mind in a causally effective manner? The interlocutors, the Andhakas and the Sammatīyas according to the commentary, suggest that, in contrast to kamma itself, its accumulation (upacaya, or more suggestively, ‘conservation’ according to the English translators, p.300, though in later Abhidhamma upacaya typically also means ‘growth, development’, Compendium:252) is simultaneous (sahajā) with otherwise incompatible states, since its nature is not determined by the nature of the actions with which it co-exists; nor is it associated with the same mental factors as the mind; that the accumulation takes no object (anārammaṇo) and, unlike action itself (kamma) which is bound to the momentary states of citta, the accumulation does not cease with the citta with which it is simultaneous. (kusalena kammena sahajāto kammūpacayo kusalo ti? na h’evaṃ vattabbe.... sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena kammena sahajāto kammūpacayo sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto ti? na h’evaṃ vattabbe... kammaṃ cittena sahajātaṃ, cittaṃ bhijjamānaṃ, kammaṃ bhijjatīti? āmantā. kammūpacayo cittena sahajātaṃ, cittaṃ bhijjamānaṃ, kammūpacayo bhijjatīti? na h’evaṃ vattabbe). The English translators, interestingly, translated ‘kamma’ as “karma as conscious process” and ‘kammūpacayo’ as “continuation of karmic accumulation as product.” The last paragraph of this kathā discusses the distinction between kamma, its accumulation and its maturation (vipāka). According to the commentary Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā, 156, the heterodox interlocutors held that the accumulation of kamma, like that of the latent dispositions (Kathāvatthu IX.4; XI.1), is neutral (abyākata), unassociated with mind (citta-vippayukta) and without an epistemic object (anārammaṇa) Dube (1980:336). As with many issues presented in the Kathāvatthu, however, the later Theravāda position is rather more complex, for the Pāli writer Dhammapāla’s commentary the Paramatthamañjūsā or Visuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā, comments on a standarad Dhammasangaṇi passage (“it is only when it is past that kamma is a condition for kamma-originated materiality,”), stating: If the fruit were to arise from present kamma, the fruit would have arisen in the same moment in which the kamma was being accumulated; and that is not seen.... kamma has never been shown to give fruit while it is actually being effected; nor is there any text to that effect.— But is it not also the fact that no fruit has ever been shown to come from a vanished cause either?... when the fruit arises from kamma that is actually past it does so because of kamma having been performed and because of storage. (Pm.768) as quoted in Visuddhimagga (p.695) 73 AKBh III 41c-d; Shastri:496; Poussin:125f; manaḥsañcetanayā punarbhavasya ākṣepaḥ. ākṣiptasya punaḥ karmaparibhāvitād vijñānabījād abhinirvṛttir iti anyor anutpannasya bhavasya ākaraṇe prādhānyam. Here intentions (manaḥsañcetanā), that is, mental actions (manas karma), correspond to the saṃskāra, which in the series of dependent co-arising directly condition the arising of consciousness (vijñāna). Interestingly, Theravādin commentaries give an Abhidhammic interpretation of passages describing seeds and their relation to consciousness (viññāṇa) as examples of a “construction-consciousness” (abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇa) (Collins, 1982:223; SnA. 257, AA.II. 334), and use a term to convey the consciousness conditioned by such saṃskāra, that is, “construction

consciousness born together with karma” (SnA. 505-6: kammasahajātābhisaṅkhāraviññāṇa) (Collins:206). See notes 125, 165. Also: AKBh III 21a-c; Shastri:436; Poussin:62f. pūrvakleśā daśā ‘vidyā saṃskārāḥ p ūrvakarmaṇaḥ \ sandhiskandhāstu vijñānam. 74 See note 11 above, for passages in the early Pāli texts (S III 54; A I 223) that relate bīja with vijñāna in reference to continued saṃsāric existence. 75 AKBh ad V 34; Shastri:829f; Poussin:72f; “The kleśa with complete causes [arises] from non-abandoned latent dispositions (anuśaya), from the presence of an object and from incorrect comprehension.” (aprahīṇād anuśayāt viṣayāt pratyupasthitāt ayoniśo manaskārāt kleśaḥ.., sampūrṇākāraṇaḥ). For example, sensual desire arises when a dharma which provokes an outburst of sensual desire (kāmarāgaparyavasthānīya-dharma) appears in the sense fields and the latent disposition toward it (rāgānuśaya) has not been abandoned or correctly understood, while there is incorrect comprehension thereto. (AKBh ad V 34; Shastri:829; Poussin:72f; tat yathā rāgānuśayo ‘prahīṇo bhavati aparijñātaḥ kāmarāgaparyavasthānīyāś ca dharmā ābhāsagatā bhavanti. tatra ca ayoniśo manaskāra evaṃ kāmarāga utpadyate.) Ignorance is thus the root of them all. (AKBh ad V 36c-d; Shastri:831; Poussin:74; sarveṣāṃ teṣāṃ mūlam avidyā.) 76 AKBh ad V 22; Shastri:801; Poussin:48; “The latent disposition of a certain person is disposed toward a certain object; he is bound to it by that [disposition].” (yasya pudgalasya yo ‘nuśayo yasmin ālambane ‘nuśete sa tena tasmin saṃprayuktaḥ.) 77 This is true in the sutta materials (M I 101, etc.) examined above and as quoted both in the Kathāvatthu, XIII.8, and in the Abhidharmakośa: “Passion lies latent (anuśete) in pleasurable feeling, aversion lies latent in unpleasant feeling, and ignorance lies latent in neutral feelings.” (AKBh V 45; ad II 3; Shastri:843; Poussin:88; sukhāyāṃ vedanāyāṃ rāgo ‘nuśete, duḥkhāyāṃ pratighaḥ, *aduḥkhāsukhāyāṃ avidyā iti uktaṃ s ūtre. *Emended from “aduḥkhādukhāyāṃ.”) 78 AKBh ad IV 55c-d; Shastri:664; Poussin:106. vipākaḥ punar vedanāpradhānaḥ. 79 See note on AKBh ad V 34, above. 80 The AKBh states this clearly and, in agreement with canonical teachings while still hinting at newer, Sautrāntika concepts, equates the eradication of the afflictions with seeds rendered infertile by fire: “The basis (āśraya) of the Arya has been transformed due to the force of the Path of Seeing so the destroyed afflictions (kleśa) will not be able to sprout again. It is said that the basis is without seeds, having destroyed the afflictions, like [[[seeds]]] burned by fire, whereas the seeds are [merely] damaged by the mundane path.” (AKBh ad II 36c-d; Shastri:215f; Poussin:183; āśrayo hi sa āryāṇaṃ darśanabhāvanāmārgasāmarthyāt tathā paravṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tat praheyāṇāṃ kleśānāṃ prarohasamartho bhavati. ato ‘gnidagdhavrīhivadabījībhūta āśrayaḥ kleśānāṃ prahīṇakleśa iti ucyate. upahatabījabhāve vā laukikena mārgeṇa. Pāli suttas mentioning similar doctrines: M I 47; A I 133; S IV 208f. Collins (1982:222f) cites references in the Theravādin Abhidhamma literature depicting those who have progressed along the path as having “rendered consciousness seedless” (Miln. 146; abījaṃ viññāṇaṃ kataṃ) and having “destroyed seeds” (Sn.235; khīṇabīja). 81 The Kathāvatthu presents several debates on this issue, demonstrating the antiquity and ubiquity of the distinction between the manifest outbursts and the latent counterparts of the afflictions, to be discussed in more detail below. In a discussion on the possibility of an Arhat falling away (I.2.61, parihānikathā) the Sammatīyas, Vajjiputtiyas, Sabbatthivādins, and some of the Mahāsāṅghikas, according to the commentary, claim that this occurs due to an outburst of passion (rāgaparyuṭṭhito) which arises conditioned by its latent disposition (anusayaṃ paṭicca uppajjatīti);

but arahats are not said to have these dispositions. Even more to the point is the discussion in III.5 (aṭṭhamakakathā) concerning whether or not the eradication of the outbursts on the first stage of entering the path also entails the eradication of their latent dispositions. According to the commentary, it is the Andhakas and the Sammatīyas who hold that it does not; the Theravādins disagree. Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghosa, XXII.45 correlates the succesive eradication of afflictions and their latent tendencies with gradual progress upon the path: the Once-returner eliminates gross fetters, the gross inherent tendencies of greed for sense desires and resentment; the Non-returner, the residual fetters and the residual inherent tendencies of the same; the Arahat, greed for existence, conceit, agitation and ignorance, and the inherent tendencies toward conceit, greed for becoming and ignorance. XXII.73 correlates their elimination with the knowledges: “the inherent tendencies to [false] view and to uncertainty are eliminated by the first knowledge. The inherent tendencies to greed for sense desire and to resentment are eliminated by the third knowledge. The inherent tendencies to conceit (pride), to greed for becoming, and to ignorance, are eliminated by the fourth knowledge.” XXII.60. explains the term anusaya: “For it is owing to their inveteracy that they are called inherent tendencies (anusaya) since they inhere (anusenti) as cause for the arising of greed for sense desires, etc., again and again.” 82 The Kathāvatthu preserves disputes about this issue as well. IX.4 (anusayā anārammaṇā ti kathā) portrays the opponents (the Andhakas and some of the Uttarāpathakas) asking if one who has not fully eradicated the afflictions does not still have their latent form even when his mind is otherwise wholesome or indeterminate (puthujjano kusalābyākate citte vattamāne “sānusayo ti” vattabbo ti? āmantā.). XI.1 (tisso pi anusayakathā) carries the argument the next logical step and asks if therefore wholesome and unwholesome states could not co-exist together, which would entail that the dispositions are karmically neutral, a position that the Theravādins however do not concede to their interlocutors, here the Sammatīyas and the Mahāsaṅghikas. (puthujjano kusalābyākate citte vattamāne “sānusayo ti” vattabbo ti? āmantā. kusalākusalā dhammā sammukhībhāvaṃ āgacchantīti? ne h’evaṃ vattabbe -pe-. tena hi anusayā abyākatā ti), 83 As Jaini (1959b:240) succinctly outlines the problem: even an infant is in possession of kleśa, because the latter are present in him in their dormant state (anuśaya) and become active when there arise suitable conditions for their operation (pariyuṭṭhāna). This implies that when the passions are not operating they always remain in a dormant state. If they are always present in the mind then the latter is always akuśala, for a kuśala can neither co-exist nor operate simultaneously with an akuśala. Consequently, there will be no kuśala-citta as long as the latent passions are not removed, and they will not be removed without a kuśala-citta. 84 There is a further complication here as well, because some of these factors are, in the AKBh at any rate, considered to be karmically neutral at times. Vasubandhu differentiates between holding to a view of self-existence and extreme views (common to birds and other animals) which are innate and neutral (sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭir avyākṛtā), and thus not in contradiction with virtuous actions such as giving, and those views which are deliberated (vikalpita) and thus unwholesome. (AKBh ad V 19; Shastri:794; Poussin:40. kāmadhātau satkāyāntagrāhadṛṣṭī tat saṃprayuktā ca avidyā avyākṛtaḥ. kiṃ kāraṇam? dānādibhir aviruddhātvāt. ahaṃ pretya sukhī bhaviṣyāmi iti dānaṃ dadāti śīlaṃ rakṣati.... sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭir avyākṛtā. yā mṛgapakṣiṇām api vartate. vikalpitā tu akuśala iti pūrvācāryāḥ). This idea of innate, yet neutral, wrong views will also have larger ramifications within the Yogācāra system, as is perhaps hinted by the term ‘pūrvācārya’, which frequently alludes to Yogācāra-like ideas within the AKBh. See note 201 below. 85 AKBh ad V 1d-2a; Shastri:763f; Poussin:6f; kathaṃ ca sautrāntikānām?... prasupto hi kleśo ‘nuśaya ucyate, prabuddhaḥ paryavasthānam. ka ca tasya prasuptiḥ? asammukhībhūtasya bījabhāvānubandhaḥ. kaḥ prabodhaḥ? sammukhībhūtaḥ. ko ‘yaṃ b ījabhāvo nāma? ātmabhāvasya kleśajā kleśotpādanaśaktiḥ. yathā anubhavajñānajā smṛyutpādanaśaktiḥ, yathā ca ankurādīnāṃ śāliphalajā śāliphalotpādanaśaktir iti.

Chapter Nine of the AKBh (Shastri:1230; Poussin:295; Stcherbatsky, 1976:72; Pradhan:477 or 478) defines the mental stream (santāna) as the “continued production of citta from earlier action (karma)” (yaḥ karmapūrva uttarottara cittaprasavaḥ sā santatiḥ) and states that the last moment of the specific modification or transformation (pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ) is specially characterized by the “capacity to immediately produce a result.” (sa punaryo ‘nantaraṃ phalotpādanasamarthaḥ so ‘ntyapariṇāmaviśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ.) Another passage states that the conclusion of the result (phalaparyanta) of maturation (pāka) is engendered by this specific modification (pariṇāma-viśeṣaḥ) of the mental stream and not by either the simultaneous (sahabhū-), associated (saṃprayukta-), or homogeneous causes (sabhāga-hetu). (AKBh ad II 54c-d; Shastri:312; Poussin:272. pāko hi nāma santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajaḥ phalaparyantaḥ. na ca sahabhūsaṃprayuktahetvoḥ santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajaṃ phalam asti. na ca api sabhāgahetvādīnāṃ phalaparyanto ‘sti.) 86 The AKBh ad V 1d-2a (Shastri:761; Poussin:3-4) preserves a debate between the Sautrāntikas and the Sarvāstivādins over the relationship between the latent dispositions and their manifest counterparts. The text begins by asking if one should interpret the compound ‘sensual desire-latent disposition,’ (kāmarāga-anuśaya) as the anuśaya which is itself sensual desire (kāmarāga eva anuśayaḥ), or as the anuśaya of sensual desire (kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ). If the two were simply equated, then this would contradict the sūtra (sūtravirodhaḥ) which states that the outburst of sensual desire is eliminated along with its anuśaya (kāmarāgaparyavasthānaṃ... sānuśayaṃ prahīyate). If, on the other hand, the two were distinguished, this would entail that the anuśaya be disjoined (viprayukta), which contradicts an Abhidharma passage stating the anuśaya is associated (samprayukta) with the three feelings. (katham idaṃ jñātavyam—kāmarāga eva anuśayah . k āmarāgānuśayaḥ, ahosvit kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ k āmarāgānuśayaḥ? kiṃ c ātaḥ? kāmarāga eva anuśayaś cet sūtravirodhaḥ... “tatkāmarāgaparyavasthānaṃ... sānuśayaṃ prahīyate.” iti / kāmarāgasya anuśayaś ced viprayuktānuśayaprasaḥgād abhidharmavirodhaḥ—“kāmarāgānuśayas tribhir indriyaiḥ samprayuktaḥ iti. The Vyākhyā glosses indriya as: “sukha-saumanasya-upekṣendriyaiḥ samprayuktā iti,” upon which our translation of ‘indriya’ as ‘feeling’ is based.) The Sarvāstivādin position is that they are simply the same, since in the Abhidharma the word anuśaya means the afflictions due to its characteristic, i.e. it is what makes the mind afflicted, it obstructs wholesome states from occurring and eliminates them once they have occurred; thus the anuśaya cannot be dissociated. (AKBh V ad 1d-2a; Shastri:762; Poussin:5; kāmarāga eva anuśaya iti vaibhāṣikāḥ... lakṣaṇikas tu abhidharme kleśa eva anuśayaśabdaḥ / tasmāt saṃprayuktā eva anuśayāḥ... yasmāt anuśayaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ cittaṃ bhavaty apūrvaṃ kuśalaṃ na utpadyate, utpannac ca parihīyate, tasmān na viprayuktaḥ.) The Sautrāntika position is that the latent dispositions are different from their manifest afflictions, but that they are neither associated not dissociated, since they are not separate entities (AKBh ad V 1d-2a; Shastri:763f; Poussin:6f; kathaṃ ca sautrāntikānām? kāmarāgasya anuśayaḥ k āmarāgānuśaya iti / na ca anuśayaḥ saṃprayukto na viprayuktaḥ, tasya adravyāntaratvāt. This statement serves to introduce the Sautrāntika description of the latent or dormant dispositions as seed-states (bīja-bhāva). Jaini (1959b:242) concurs with Yaśomitra’s comments that the Sautrāntikas, as their name suggests, rely upon the scriptures (sūtra) as authoritative and not upon the scholastic treatises (śāstra) (Vyākhyā, Shastri ed.:15: ye sūtraprāmāṇikāḥ na tu śāstraprāmāṇikās te sautrāntikāḥ) when he concludes that in contrast with the Sautrāntikas, “it is clear from these discussions that the Theravādin as well as the Vaibhāṣika interpretation of the term sānuśaya, and the subsequent identification of the anuśayas with paryavasthāna, are contrary to the sūtra quoted above [The MahāMāluṅkya-sutta, M I 433]. They show a determined effort to uphold the Abhidharma in preference to the sūtra.” 87 Kathāvatthu XIV.5. Of Latent Bias as Something Apart (añño anusayo ti kathā) discusses this point explicitly. The opponent here, the Andhakas according to the Commentary, maintain the distinction on the reasoning that an ordinary person whose mind is wholesome or neutral must still have the latent form of the affliction. The Theravādins dissent

as elsewhere, on the grounds that the dispositions should be treated no differently than other afflictions, such as sensual desire (rāga). (puthujjano kusalābyākate citte vattamāne “sānusayo ti” vattabbo ti? āmantā. “pariyuṭṭhito ti” vattabbo ti? ne h’evaṃ vattabbe -pe-. tena hi añño anusayo aññaṃ pariyuṭṭhānan ti. puthujjano kusalābyākate citte vattamāne “sārāgo ti” vattabbo ti? āmantā. “pariyuṭṭhito ti” vattabbo ti? ne h’evaṃ vattabbe -pe-. tena hi añño rāgo aññaṃ pariyuṭṭhānan ti). 88 Again Kathāvatthu XI.1 (tisso pi anusayakathā) preserves disputes over this topic as well, with the Sammatīyas and the Mahāsaṅghikas asserting that is it because the dispositions are unassociated with citta that they are able to co-exist with wholesome or neutral types of citta, but the Theravādins press them on this, implying that the dispositions are no different from the manifest afflictions and that therefore they too must be unassociated with mind, which is of course unacceptable (puthujjano kusalābyākate citte vattamāne “sārāgo ti” vattabbo ti? āmantā. rāgo tena cittena sampayuttā ti. ne h’evaṃ vattabbe -pe-. tena hi rāgo cittavippayuttā ti). The Theravādin orthodoxy, however, is not presenting their opponents position in full, for they are misconstruing, or at least conflating, the term ‘sārāgo’ ‘possessed of or having passion,’ which in the context of this discussion seems to mean rather ‘not having fully eliminated passion,’ with the simple occurrence or manifestation of that passion itself. In that case, of course, one must say that passion is associated with mind; but if everyone were possessed of such passion until reaching the state of an Arhat, the problem would still remain as to how any wholesome states could ever occur. 89 See note 86, above. 90 Vyākhyā ad AKBh ad II 36c-d; Shastri:219; na bījaṃ nāma kiñcid asti; prajñaptisattvāt. Nominal entities are established merely by designation, convention, or established usage (Vyākhyā, ibid.: prajñaptyā saṃvṛtyā vyavahāreṇa dharmaḥ prajñaptidharmaḥ), whereas the analysis into dharmas which carry their own characteristics, we shall remember, is that which indicates the ultimate truth in the Abhidharma (Vyākhyā:12, ad AKBh I.2b: svalakṣaṇadharaṇatvena niruktaḥ pāramārthikasāṃketikābhidharmaḥ). The metaphor of seeds was commonly used in “conventional” descriptions. Although the Theravādins, for instance, rejected the seed as a real dharma, and thus employable within ultimately valid discourse, they readily resorted to its use in conventional speech. The metaphor is prominent in the early discourses, for which the Theravādin commentarial tradition regularly glosses with a more dharmic term, abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇa, “construction-consciousness,” while an Arhat is frequently referred to as one who has made his viññāṇa seedless (abījaṃ viññāṇaṃ kataṃ) (Collins 1982:218224). 91 Excluding vijñāna’s role within the immediate cognitive processes, of course. Vijñāna is at least once said to be merely a figurative term for the mental stream with nothing but itself as its antecedent cause. AKBh IX; Shastri:1219f; Poussin:281; Stcherbatsky (1979:57); Pradhan:473 or 474; vijñānasantānasya vijñāne kāran .abhāvāt vijñānaṃ vijānāti iti vacanān nirdeṣam... evaṃ vijñānam api cittānāṃ santāna upacaryate. 92 AKBh ad II 36d; Shastri:217; Poussin:185; kim punar idaṃ bījam nāma? yan nāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samarthaṃ sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā; santatipariṇāmaviśeṣajāt. ko ‘yaṃ pariṇāmo? santater anyathātvam. ke ca iyaṃ santatiḥ? hetuphalabhūtās traiyadhvikāḥ saṃskārāḥ. The circular nature of this definition borders on tautology: a seed is what produces a result through the mental stream, which is itself just the saṃskāra existing as cause and effect. 93 The seed is the capacity (śakti) for an affliction to arise born from a [previous] affliction, as is the capacity for memory to arise born from experiential knowledge, etc. (See AKBh ad V 1d-2a, cited above). 94 AKBh III 5-8a (Poussin:16-26) discusses the manifold possibilities of the ‘vijñāna-sthitis,’ the ‘stations of consciousness.’

Shastri:78; Poussin:50; vijñānadhātur vijñānaṃ s āsravaṃ... janmaniśrayāḥ. ete hi janmanaḥ pratisandhicittād yāvat cyuticittasādhāraṇabhūtāḥ. La Vallée Poussin (49,n.2) identifies the sūtra cited as Dhātuvibhaṅgasutta, M III 239. 96 AKBh II 45a-b; Shastri:248; Poussin:215; āyurūṣmātha vijñānaṃ yadā kāyaṃ jahatyamī. apaviddhas tadā śete yathā kāṣṭhamacetanaḥ. La Vallée Poussin cites parallells in S III 143; M I 296. 97 This necessary reference to and reliance upon conventional terminology on the part of so many commentators seems to belie Abhidharma claims to ultimate discourse, leading Conze (1973:122-134), for one, to refer the compensatory ‘pseudo-selves’ (132), i.e. the citta-santāna, saṃskārā, āśraya, nāma-rūpa, and ātmabhāva, as the subjective referrent of the dharmic analysis. 98 There is, in addition to the Abhidharmakośa which frequently presents the Sarvāstivādin or Vaibhāṣika positions from a polemical perspective, an orthodox Vaibhāṣika work extant in its original Sanskrit which responds to Vasubandhu’s criticisms, the Abhidharma-dīpa (edited by P.S. Jaini, 1977); also La Vallée Poussin (1937), Documents d’Abhidharma, translates from the Chinese some of the key texts of the Sarvāstivādins. See Collet Cox (1992) for a succinct discussion of the Vaibhāṣika treatment of many of these issues; also Paul Williams (1981) on Vaibhāṣika ontology. 99 AKBh ad V 25b; Shastri:805; Poussin:50f; yadi ca atītaṃ na syāt śubhāśubhasya karmaṇaḥ phalam āyatyāṃ kathaṃ syat. na hi phalôtpattikāle varttamānāṃ vipākahetur asti iti. tasmād asti eva atītānāgatam iti vaibhāṣikāḥ. See also La Vallée Poussin (1937:77f) on a passage from the Abhidharma-nyāyānusāra of Sanghabadra (T.29.1562.629a28f). 100 Poussin (1937; esp. 93-95); T.29.631b20f; 409c22f. This is Vasumitra’s view, in any case, one of four Sarvāstivādin views presented in AKBh V 24-26. See Stcherbatsky (1956:76-91). 101 AKBh II 36c-d; Shastri:211; Poussin:179; prāptyaprāptī svasantānapatitānām. Note the need here again for a nondharmic referent, santāna. 102 AKBh II 35a-b; Shastri:209; Poussin:178; viprayuktās tu saṃskārāḥ prāptyaprāpti. Jaini (1959b:240, 245). 103 AKBh ad II 36c-d; Shastri:214; Poussin:182; utpattihetudharmāṇāṃ prāptir... sahajaprāptihetukā. Jaini (1959b:245). 104 See note 86, above. 105 ibid. aupacārika vā sūtre ‘nuśayaśabdaḥ prāptau. 106 AKBh ad II 36c-d; Shastri:214f; Poussin: 183; vyavasthāhetuḥ prāptiḥ. asatyāṃ hi prāptau lokikamānasānām āryapṛthagjanānām ‘āryā ime’, ‘pṛthagjanā ime’ iti na syād vyavasthānam. prahīṇāprahīṇakleśatā viśeṣād etad bhavitum arhati. 107 As Conze (1973:141) warns, The term prāpti obviously sails very near the concept of a ‘person’ or ‘self.’ ‘Possession’ is a relation which keeps together the elements of one stream of thought, or which binds a dharma to one ‘stream of consciousness,’ which is just an evasive term for an underlying ‘person’.... ‘Possession’ implies a support which is more than the momentary state from moment to moment, and in fact a kind of lasting personality, i.e. the stream as identical with itself, in a personal identity, which is here interpreted as ‘continuity.’ 108 At the end of a long exchange, Vasubandhu asked why ‘possession’ is in fact a real entity (dravyadharma) instead of merely a conventional one (prajñapti-dharma), as the Sautrāntikas charge, to which the Sarvāstivādins (the Vaibhāṣikas) answer simplistically “because that’s our doctrine” (AKBh ad II 36c-d; Shastri:218; Poussin:186:

prajñaptidharmaḥ, na tu dravyadharmaḥ... dravyam eva tu vaibhāṣikāḥ ubhayaṃ varṇayanti. kiṃ kāraṇaṃ? eva hi naḥ siddhānta iti.) 109 AKBh ad II 5-6; Shastri:142f; Poussin:110f; tatra cittāśrayaḥ ṣaḍindriyāṇi. etac ca ṣaḍāyatanaṃ maulaṃ sattvadravyam. 110 As mind is also its basis; AKBh ad I 34; Shastri:91; Poussin:63. upāttam iti ko ‘rthaḥ? yac cittacaittair adhiṣṭhānabhāveno upagṛhītam; anugraho ‘paghātābhyām anyonyānuvidhānāt. 111 Vasubandhu’s Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (Lamottte 1935:234-247; Pruden 1988:58-65) most succinctly presents this debate and the positions taken by various schools. AKBh treats it in II ad 42-44; Poussin:200-214. On the whole topic of the absorptions and their problematics within Abhidharma doctrine see Griffiths (1986), in particular pp.122-128 and Appendix B. Schmithausen (1987:18ff) considers the absorption of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti) the originating context for the concept of ālayavijñāna. 112 Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (Lamotte 1935:233; Pruden 1988:57, para.21); “If the fruit arises afterwards from the mental stream (citta-santāna) which has been infused by the power of karma, then how can the fruit of an earlier action arise afterwards from the interrupted mental stream of those in the two mindless attainments and unconscious existence?” (paraphrase from the Tibetan, P. mDo #58 sems-tsam Si, 161b3f; D.4062,139b3f: gal te las nus kyang des bsgos pa’i sems kyi rgyud las tshe phyi ma la ‘bras bu ‘byung na / sems med pa’i snyoms par ‘jug pa gnyis dang / ‘du shes med pa pa sems kyi rgyud chad pa dag gi las snga ma’i ‘bras bu tshe phyi ma la ji ltar ‘byung bar ‘gyur.) 113 Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (Lamotte 1935:235; Pruden 1988:58): “But the mind of entry into the absorption has been destroyed (vinaṣṭa) for a long time. How could it constitute an equal and immediate antecedent?” 114 Since a single moment of mind has in addition a phenomenologically similar and immediately antecedent condition (samanantara-pratyaya), a moment of mind or cognition (vijñāna) has (at least in the human realm) two types of support: the simultaneous support (sahaja āśraya) of its respective sense organ (indriya), and the immediately antecedent mental cognition as its ‘mind support’ (manāśrayaḥ). (AKBh I 44c-d; Shastri:125f; Poussin:95f; caramasyāśrayo ‘tītaḥ pañcānāṃ sahajaś ca taiḥ. manovijñānadhātoḥ samanantaraniruddhaṃ mana āśrayaḥ... tatra cakṣurvijñānasya cakṣuḥ sahaja āśrayo yāvat kāyavijñānasya kāyaḥ. atītaḥ punar eṣām āśrayo mano iti api ete pañca vijñānakāyā indriyadvayāśrayāḥ.) 115 AKBh ad II 44d; Shastri:246; Poussin:212; Griffiths (1986:124); cittam api asmād eva sendriyāt kāyāt jāyate, na cittāt. anyonyabījakaṃ hi etad ubhyaṃ yad uta cittaṃ ca sendriyaś ca kāya iti pūrvācaryāḥ. See also Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, para.23. 116 See Sthiramati’s strong criticism of this position in Griffiths (1986:125). 117 AKBh II ad II 44d; Shastri:245; Poussin:211; Griffiths (1986:123); katham idānīṃ bahukālaṃ niruddhāc cittāt punar api cittaṃ jāyate? atītasya api astitvād iṣyate vaibhāṣikaiḥ samanantarapratyayatvam. 118 Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa (para.24) quotes Vasumitra as positing a subtle mind that not leave the body during the absorption of cessation (Pruden:59): “But I maintain that this absorption of extinction is endowed with a subtle mind (sūkṣmacitta).” An almost identical passage (Muroji 1985:27) appears in AKBh ad II 44d (Shastri:245ff; Poussin:211, 212, n.2.) and AKBh ad VIII 33b (Poussin:207f) and is discussed in Griffiths (1986:125f). This “subtle mind” is considered an “unmanifesting mental-cognition” (aparisphuṭa-manovijñāna) by the Vyākhyā on this passage. Bareau (1955:164f,172) cites the Dārṣṭānikas (theses 40,58) and the Vibhajyavādins (theses 5,6) as also asserting a subtle form of mind during the absorption. He also states (240) that the Theravādins (thesis 217) agree with this, citing the Siddhi (142,202-3,207) as his source. Collins (1982:245f,304), however, demonstrates the opposite, citing the orthodox Theravādin texts, the Visuddhimagga (XXIII.43,47), which reads “without mind” (acittako), and the later

Abhidhammattha-sangaha (Compendium, IX.9), which states that “mental continuity is suspended” (cittasantati vocchijjati); he concludes that “personal continuity spanning a period of cessation, then, is guaranteed by the continued existence of the body, or rather the material life-faculty, and not by the continued occurrence of bhavaṅga-moments.” This then would accord closely with the Sautrāntika position. Schmithausen (1987:19f; ns.149-167) discusses all the passages pertinent to a subtle form of mind. 119 Vyākhyā ad AKBh ad 44c; Shastri:245; Muroji 1985:27; tatra acittakāni eva nirodhāsaṃjñi-samāpatty-āsaṃjñikāni iti vaibhāṣikādayaḥ. aparisphuṭa-manovijñāna-sacittakāni iti sthavira-vasumitrādayaḥ. ālayavijñāna-sacittakāni iti yogācārāḥ iti siddhānta-bhedaḥ. 120 The canonical doctrines (D II 63, etc.), as we observed above, held that vijñāna descended into the mother’s womb and coagulated, wherein nāma-rūpa developed. The question here is exactly which type of vijñāna it is that coagulates. The Sarvāstivādin position (AKBh III 42b-c; Shastri:500; Poussin:131; cyutyupapattayaḥ manovijñāna evaṣṭaḥ. “Death and birth are considered to be [moments of] mental cognition.”) is that it is a mental cognition which transits at rebirth and coagulates in the womb, with which the Sautrāntikas are in substantial agreement (Schmithausen:301,n.232 cites VGPVy 416b1-4; PSVy 20b7: mdo sde pas smras pa— yid kyi rnam par shes pa ma’i mngal du mtshams sbyor ba.) 121 Vibh. 414: manoviññāṇa-dhātu is the only viññāṇa at the time of rebirth (upapatti). See also Miln. 299; Visuddhimagga XIV 111-114,124; in Visuddhimagga XIV.98 bhavaṅga-citta is classified along with rebirth-mind as a ‘neutral resultant mind-consciousness element’ (vipākāhetuka-manoviññānadhātu). See also the Aṭṭhasālinī III 581-3 (Guenther 1959:25f). For a more lengthy description of the bhavaṅga-citta, including some comparison with the ālayavijñāna, see Collins (1982:225-261), Mizuno (1978:853f); also Cousins (1981). 122 Visuddhimagga XIV 115. “When the rebirth-linking consciousness has ceased, then, following on whatever kind of rebirth-linking it may be, the same kinds, being the result of that same kamma whatever it may be, occur a lifecontinuum consciousness with that same object; and again those same kinds. And as long as there is no other kind of arising of consciousness to interrupt the continuity they also go on occurring endlessly in periods of dreamless sleep, etc., like the current of a river.” See also Abhidhammattaha-sangaha (Compendium) 1979:266-7. 123 For example, a mental cognition has a dhamma (that is, the usual object of a mental cognition), attention and the bhavaṅga-cttia as its conditions (Visuddhimagga XV.39: bhavaṅgamana-dhamma-manasikāre paṭicca uppajjati manoviññāṇaṃ. Cited in Collins 1982:241). The translator of the Compendium (268) also explains this last function of the bhavaṅga-citta: “The passage from a state of anger to one of joy would be too abrupt without the mediation of a hedonically indifferent element, which acts as a sort of buffer between two opposing natures.” 124 Visuddhimagga XIV.115 With the life-continuum continuously occurring thus, when living beings’ faculties have become capable of apprehending an object, then when a visible datum has come into the eye’s focus, there is impinging upon the eye-sensitivity due to the visible datum. Thereupon, owing to the impact’s influence, there comes to be a disturbance in [the continuity of] the life-continuum. Then, when the life-continuum has ceased, the functional mind-element arises making that same visible datum its object, as it were, cutting off the lifecontinuum, and accomplishing the function of adverting. So too in the case of the ear door and so on. 125 This twofold nature as both ‘constructed’ and ‘constructive’ is widely predicated of many key Buddhist terms in the Abhidharma, such as the saṃskārā, vijñāna, and upādāna (appropriation), and is not infrequently described in terms of

an active/passive dichotomy, a causal/resultant bifurcation drawn out of terms (frequently participial forms) which were used more simply in the early canon. Upādāna, as we have seen, refers both to the act of grasping or appropriating and that which is so appropriated. Schmithausen (1987:356, n.510) describes the same distinctions about prapañca: “‘Prapañca’ is used both in the sense of the process of proliferation... or even of (emotionally involved) proliferating or diversifying conceptual activity, as also in that of what is the result of such an activity.” (Emphasis in original). Collins (1982:202) has also stressed that saṅkhāra has a similar dual role as constructing and as constructed: “Both the activity which constructs temporal reality, and the temporal reality thus constructed, are saṅkhāra.” The Theravādins articulate the relationship of saṅkhāra to vijñāna, with a concept remarkably similar to the ālayavijñāna: When used in the eschatological context, then, the term abhisaṅkhāra denotes a karmically forceful, ‘constructive’ act, which determines a specific length of saṃsāric continuity... The idea of such constructions, such acts, as being conditions for the future occurrence of an appropriate form of consciousness, which is itself the ‘dependently originated’ condition for psycho-physical individuality... and so on, is expressed also by the use of the term ‘construction-consciousness’ (abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇa). (202) Therefore, “the concept of abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇa, then, refers to that consciousness which continues throughout saṃsāra, both constructing future temporal existence, and itself constituting the medium for the temporal reality thus constructed” (208). As such, reiterating the canonical vijñāna and resonating with the ālayavijñāna, the abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇa is used to explain the destruction and non-persistence of viññāṇa in the context of nirvāṇa as the “reversal and cessation of saṃsāra” (207). The PED (70), moreover, glosses ‘abhisaṅkhāra’ as “store, accumulation (of karma, merit or demerit), substratum,” etc. and refers to C. Rhys-Davids’ translation of ‘abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇa’ as a “constructing, storing intellect” in the Dhammasangaṇi translation (A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics, p.262). We noted above (n.90) that the notion of abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇa is regularly used to gloss bīja in the Abhidhamma commentaries. 126 With the important elaboration of the seeds representing the influence of past karma and afflictive mentality (kliṣṭamanas) representing the persistence of an innate yet subliminal craving and self-grasping. 127 In addition to the material factors, of course; they are, however, less important for our present discussion. 128 As Conze (1973:138) so well summed it up: It looks as if not only actualities but also potentialities must be accepted as real. People not only do things but have the ‘power’ to do or not to do them. A person can call upon such powers, in the same way in which one is said to ‘know’ French, although no French word may occur in the present moment of consciousness. It is very hard to maintain the view that a person should at any given time be identified with just the one dharma which is in him from moment to moment.... the dogmatic assertion of instantaneousness could be made credible only by introducing a number of pseudo-permanencies. 129 Otherwise, a strict determinism and an infinite regress would follow. For example, Kathāvatthu XVII.3 rejects the thesis that everything, even karma itself, is due to karma (sabbaṃ idaṃ kammato ti kathā), while VII.10 rejects that idea that vipāka itself entails further vipāka (vipāko vipākadhammadhammo ti). Dube (1980:334) aptly concludes: “If everything is due to karman, everything becomes a vipāka. The same thing is vipāka with respect to the past and a cause (hetu) with respect to the future. In fact taken together these two theses constitute complete determinism where there is only a distinction of relative position of the sequence but hardly of any qualitative difference between karman and vipāka.” 130 The diversity of positions taken by the various schools testifies to the universal recognition of these questions, as well as the relative inability to radically address them within the prevailing presuppositions.

Many of these issues appear in rudimentary form in such early texts as the Kathāvatthu and Vasumitra’s Samayabhedoparacanacakra; the most thorough edition of the latter is that of Teramoto and Hiramatsu (1935), which includes three Chinese and one Tibetan text, Japanese translations of the commentaries by Bhavya and Vinītadeva, and indices and comparative charts. Much of the material from Vasumitra’s text is found in Masuda (1925). They reached more developed form by the time of the Sarvāstivādin literature and the AKBh, roughly contemporaneous with the Yogācāra school. Again, the extreme similarity in terminology used in discussing these issues illustrates the deep commonality between the Yogācāra and other schools of the period, justifying our continued reference to, and contexualization within, Abhidharma sources. No one has demonstrated this doctrinal and terminological commonality in minutiae between the Abhidharma schools of this early formative period better than Bareau (1955), who has collected and collated references to the doctrinal positions of all the traditional eighteen schools, including their subsects and splinter groups. He draws chiefly upon the Kathāvatthu, the above-mentioned texts of Vasumitra, et al., the Vijñapti-mātratā-siddhi (La Vallée Poussin, 1928) and several Chinese commentaries. Since the materials he has collected, however, differ greatly in time, source, and sectarian viewpoint, and thus historical reliability, we use them with due caution. The sectarian affiliations of the views disputed in the Kathāvatthu, for example, derive only from the much later commentary. Dube (1980) has also compiled and discussed many of these issues, based upon much the same sources, in a thematic and narrative form. Due to limitations of space we will confine the sectarian positions of each issue to the notes. 131 Kathāvatthu XV.11.: Andhakas and Sammatīyas assent; Theravādins dissent. 132 Kathāvatthu XV.11.: Andhakas and Sammatīyas assent; Theravādins dissent. 133 Kathāvatthu XIV.5.: Andhakas assent; Theravādins dissent. Bareau (1955): Mahāsāṃghikas (70,thesis 63), Vibhajyavādins (177,thesis 38) and Mahīśāsakas (183,thesis 3) assent; Theravādins dissent (230,thesis 139). 134 Kathāvatthu IX.4; XI.1.; XIV.5.: Mahāsaṃghikas and Sammatīyas assent; Theravādins dissent. Bareau (1955): Bahuśrutīyas reject either alternative (83,thesis 11); Andhakas (95,thesis 47), Sammatīyas (125,thesis 17), Vibhajyavādins (177,thesis 39), Mahīśāsakas (183,thesis 4), Dharmaguptakas (194,thesis 5: both anuśaya and kleśa are viprayukta), Uttarāpathakas (249,thesis 13), and Vātsīputrīyas assent, but the latter claim that anuśaya pertain to the pudgala (120,118,theses 37,18); Sarvāstivādins (142,theses 26,27) and Theravādins (226,230, theses 108,140) dissent. Kathāvatthu XIV.6 relates the position of the Andhakas that even the outbursts of the afflictions (pariyuṭṭhāna) are disjoined from mind (cittavippayutta). 135 Kathāvatthu IX 4.; XI.1.: Andhakas, Mahāsāṃghikas and Sammatīyas assent; Theravādins dissent. 136 Bareau (1955): Sarvāstivādins assent (148,thesis 85). See AKBh ad V 19, cited above. 137 Bareau (1955): Mahāsāṃghikas (68,thesis 46), Sautrāntikas (157,thesis 12), Vibhajyavādins (177,thesis 38) and a Mahīśāsaka subsect (188,thesis 10) assent; Theravādins dissent (240,thesis 222). 138 Kathāvatthu I.2.; III 5: Theravādins dissent. 139 This controversy surrounds the attainment, or predicted future attainment of fruits of the path either in the present or in future lifetimes. It is discussed in various regards in Kathāvatthu I.5; V.2,4,10; IX.7; XII.5; XIX.7. Dube (1980:180183). Assurance of entering the path (sammattaniyāmāvakkanti) is mentioned in S I 196; S III 225; SN 55, 371; A I 121; and Kathāvatthu V.5, VI.1, XIII.4. AKBh ad VI 26a. See note 69, above. 140 Bareau (1955): Mahāsāṃghikas (72,thesis 78) posit a root-consciousness (mūla-vijñāna) which underlies and supports (āśraya) the discrete sensory cognitions; Mahāsāṃghika subsect (74,thesis 8) asserts a subtle mental consciousness (sūkṣma-manovijñāna) that pervades the entire body; Mahīśāsakas posit an aggregate which lasts as long as saṃsāra (saṃsāra-koṭiniṣṭha-skandha) (187,thesis 37); Theravādins posit a bhavaṅga-citta, a mind (citta) which is an element (aṅga) of existence (bhava), that is, the cause of existence and the unity of diverse successive existences (240,thesis 219). See note 214, below. 141 Bareau (1955): Sautrāntikas (158,thesis 29), Dārṣṭāntikas (164,thesis 58) and Vibhajyavādins (172,theses 5,6) assent. Bareau states the Theravādins (240,thesis 217) assert a subtle mental-consciousness (sūkṣma-manovijñāna) present in the attainment of cessation; this is countered by Collins (1982:245f). See n.118 above. 142 The Theravādins (Bareau 1955:240,thesis 218) assert a subtle mental-consciousness that exists at the moment of rebirth. The Sautrāntikas and Sarvāstivādins also consider it to be a mental-consciousness (mano-vijñāna) (AKBh III 42b-c.). 143 Bareau (1955): Sautrāntikas assent, and claim mind (citta) and body (kāya) can seed each other (156,thesis 18) and that ordinary vijñāna arise from seeds (156,thesis 28); Mahāsāṃghika dissent (72,thesis 79). 144 Bareau (1955): Mahāsāṃghikas (72,thesis 78) assent; Sautrāntikas dissent (159,thesis 30); a Mahīśāsaka subsect asserts that anuśaya and bīja reside perpetually in the present from where they exclusively may produce other dharmas (188,theses 9,10). 145 Kathāvatthu XVI.4.: Theravādins dissent. Bareau (1955): Mahāsāṃghikas assent (72,thesis 79). 146 Silburn’s remark (1955:249), though in a slightly different context, is particularly apropos: “ils posent à nouveau le problème du point de vue de l’être plutôt que du point de vue de l’act.” 147 AKBh ad V 1d-2a; ad II 36d; Vyākhyā ad II 36c-d: śaktiviśeṣa eva bījam; AKBh IX: phalotpādana-samarthaḥ. The Sarvāstivādin concept of “activity” (kāritra) falls into much the same category. 148 Nyanaponika Thera (1965:28f), perhaps unwittingly, concurs to a substantial degree with this contention, when, in addition to ‘breadth,’ the simultaneous relations (sahajāta-paccaya) between elements, and ‘length,’ the “sequence of observed, consecutive changes stretching forward in time” (anatara-paccaya), he speaks of ‘depth,’ the ‘third dimension’: The spatial world of qualified analysis is limited to the two dimensions of breadth and length. Bare or qualifed analysis dare not admit those conditioning and conditioned phenomena which are bound up with the third dimension, that of depth... by ‘depth’ we understand that subterraneous flow of energies (a wide and intricate net of streams, rivers and rivulets) originating in past actions (kamma) and coming to the surface unexpectedly at a time determined by their inherent life rhythm (time required for growth, maturing, etc.) and by the influence of favourable or obstructive circumstances. The analytical method, we said, will admit only such relational energies as are transmitted by immediate impact (the dimension of breadth) or by the linear ‘wire’ of immediate sequence (the dimension of length). But relational energies may also arise from unknown depths opening under the very feet of the individual or the object; or they may be transmitted, not by that linear ‘wire’ of immediate sequence in time-space, but by way of ‘wireless’ communication, travelling vast distances in space and time... The point here is not whether this ‘third dimension’ that “bare analysis dare not admit” is eloquently, or even adequately, expressed in terms of such common metaphors as depth, flow, growth or even energy, but rather if and to what extent they are compatible with the stated aim, and circumscribed range, of Abhidharma discourse, which was roughly defined earlier in the same work by Nyanaponika Thera (5,3) himself as the systematisation of the... Sutta doctrines in strictly philosophical (paramattha) or truly realistic (yathābhūta) language that as far as possible employs terms of a function or process without any of the

conventional (vohāra) and unrealistic concepts assuming a personality, an agent (as different from the act), a soul or a substance... In the Abhidhamma, this Sutta terminology is turned into correct functional forms of thought, which accord with the true ‘impersonal’ and everchanging nature of actuality; and in that strict, or highest, sense (paramattha) the main tenets of the Dhamma are explained. If the Abhidhamma is an adequate and truly realistic (yathā-bhūta) account of things, then it is asked (by all its contemporary disputants) how such a philosophic language expresses the “subterraneous flow of energies” from whose “unknown depths” they arise through “wireless” transmission? If such conventional metaphors (as opposed to truly real dharmas), used in or at least in conjunction with the Abhidharma, as ‘flow,’ ‘depth,’ ‘growth’ and ‘energy,’ are necessary in order to account for this ‘transmission’ of karmic energy, as well as the afflicted dispositions, then we must ask if it has successfully fulfilled its stated aims. For either these are necessary elements of reality, in which case they should be truly real, albeit momentary, dharmas, or they are unnecessary, in which case they are not actually real and this range of issues is therefore, at the very least, extraneous or superfluous to Abhidharma discourse. Thus, a comtemporary commentator like Nyanaponika concurs in every sense and on nearly every point with the criticisms leveled by the Sautrāntikas and raised by the Yogācārins in terms of the context of the ālayavijñāna. 149 As is, of course, its integration with citta-mātra and the rest of the Yogācāra tradition, which is beyond the scope of this essay. It seems, however, that the genesis of the ālayavijñāna has no intrinsic relationship with vijñapti-mātra thought and that it is as equally compatible with the more traditional ontology as with that of the Yogācāra (Schmithausen, 1987: 32-3). This is certainly so for the Yogācārabhūmi: “Most parts of the Yogācārabhūmi … presuppose, more or less explicitly, the traditional ontology according to which dharmas (including material ones) are really existent, though impermanent and devoid of Self or Person,” ibid., n. 221, p. 297; see also 64, 89. 99, 203f. Moreover, while the ālayavijñāna is cited in support of citta-mātra, the reverse is not found, i.e. citta-mātra is not, to my knowledge, called upon in any of the standard ‘proofs’ or demonstrations asserting the ālayavijñāna. 150 “The novel theory seems a direct response to crisis” (Kuhn, 1971:75). 151 The possible textual references to this section are much too numerous to cite fully and would in any case, given the ālayavijñāna’s long development, always inevitably be only partial. My aim here is only to outline the general development and central aspects of the ālayavijñāna. In addition to the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, the treatises most extensively discussing the ālayavijñāna include the following: the Yogācārabhūmi, of which several key portions found in the Viniścayasamgrahaṇī, the so-called (following Schimthausen’s nomenclature) Proof Portion (see Hakamaya, 1978, and Griffiths, 1986) and the Pravṛtti and Nivṛtti Portions (see Hakamaya, 1979); the MSg (MSg-L, MSg-N); Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa; the Triṃśikā-bhāṣyam; the later compilation of Hsiian Tsang, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Siddhi), also treats the ālayavijñāna extensively and more systematically from a slightly later, more developed, period. Where the Sanskrit texts are no longer extant and thus absent in the notes, we have relied upon their Tibetan and Chinese translations. Since the Sanskrit terms found therein are all reconstructions, the usual asterisk has been dispensed with. I have utilized the most plausible suggestions for these terms found in the relevant studies, viz. in Hakamaya (1978, 1979); Lamotte (1935, MSg-L); Nagao (MSg-N); and Schmithausen (1978). 152 Schmithausen has stratified this text primarily according to its doctrinal content, dividing it into “pre-ālayavijñāna” sections, sections that sporadically refer to the ālayavijñāna, and those which quote from and thus postdate the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Schmithausen (1987: 12-14); on Asaṅga’s relationship to the Yogācārabhūmi, as author, editor or redactor, see Schmithausen (1987: 183f). 153 Yogācārabhūmi manuscript 78b5 (Y-T dzi 172a6-8; Y-C 340c27ff): nirodhaṃ samāpannasya cittacaitasikā niruddhā bhavanti / kathaṃ vijñānaṃ kāyād anapakrāntaṃ bhavati / tasya hi rūpiṣv indriye <ṣv a> pariṇateṣu vṛttivijñāna-bījaparigṛhītam ālayavijñānam anuparataṃ bhavati āyatyāṃ tadutpattidharmatāya. Schmithausen (1987:18,n.146). 154 These terms clearly distinguish between vijñāna as an abiding, indeterminate sentience and an active cognitive process, a distinction that several observant scholars of the Pāli materials have noted: Wijesekera (1964: 254f), interprets ‘uppajjati’, ‘to arise’, and when used with ‘vijñāna’ to mean ‘begin to function’ in relation to a specific sense-organ, and Thomas (1935: 104) suggests that vijñāna “manifests itself through the six sense organs.” The term ‘ālaya’ has two basic meanings, which fortuitously combine in this concept: ālaya is a nominal form composed of the preffix ‘ā,’ ‘near to, towards’ with the verbal root ‘lī’, ‘to cling or press closely, stick or adhere to, to lie, recline, alight or settle upon, hide or cower down in, disappear, vanish’. ‘Ālaya’ thus means “that which is clung to, adhered to, dwelled in, etc.”, thus ‘dwelling, receptacle, housem etc,’ as well as an older meaning found within the early Pali materials of ‘clinging, attachment or grasping’ (SED: 154, PED: 109). See also Schmithausen (1987: 24; 275, n. 137; 294, ns. 202-3). See Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, V. 3; Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, para 33; ASBh, 11, 9; MSg I.3. l.11a; TRBh 18, 24-26; Siddhi 92; Schmithausen (1987: 275, n. 137; 294, n. 202f). 155 S III 143; M I 296; AKBh I 28c-d; II 45a-b; Schmithausen (1987:20f). 156 As Schmithausen (1987:30) observes, what this concept does here is “hypostatize the Seeds of mind lying hidden in corporeal matter to a new form of mind proper.” See Schmithausen (18-33) for more extensive treatment of this necessarily greatly abbreviated account. 157 sarvabījakaṃ cittam vipacyate saṃmūrcchati vṛddhiṃ virūḍhiṃ vipulatām āpadyate. Tib.: sa bon thams cad pa’i sems rnam par smin cing ‘jug la rgyas shing ‘phel ba dang yangs par ‘gyur ro. Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987:356, n.508). This closely parallels passages found in canonical texts examined above; S III 53, D III 228: viññāṇaṃ... viddhiṃ virūḷhiṃ vepullam āpajjeyya. Also noted above (n.11), this expression is used in an analogy between seeds and vijñāna in S III 54. See also notes 73, 80, 90. The use of ‘sarvabījakaṃ cittam’ as a synonym of the ālayavijñāna is also found in MSg I.2: “The consciousness (vijñāna) containing all the seeds is the receptacle (ālaya) of all dharmas. Therefore it is called the ālayavijñāna.” Also ASBh:11. 158 Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, V.2. ‘gro ba drug gi ‘khor ba ‘di na sems can gang dang gang dag sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du ‘... mngal nas skye ba... ‘i skye gnas su lus mngon par ‘grub cing ‘byung bar ‘gyur ba der dang por ‘di ltar len pa rnam pa gnyis po rten dang bcas pa’i dbang po gzugs can len pa dang / mtshan ma dang ming dang rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad ‘dogs pa’i spros pa’i bag chags len pa la rten nas / sa bon thams cad pa’i sems rnam par smin cing ‘jug la rgyas shing ‘phel ba dang yangs par ‘gyur ro // de la gzugs can gyi khams na ni len pa gnyi ga yod la / gzugs can ma yin pa’i khams na ni len pa gnyis su med do / This notion of a two-fold appropriation is elaborated in later parts of the Pravṛtti Portion (I.b)A.1) of the Yogācārabhūmi and in the Triṃśikābhāṣya, 19.7f,18f., where it is styled the ‘inner appropriation’ (ādhyātman upādānam). 159 Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, V.3. rnam par shes pa de ni len pa’i rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste / ‘di ltar des lus ‘di bzung zhing blangs pa’i phyir ro // kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste / ‘di ltar de lus ‘di la grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa’i don gyis kun tu sbyor ba dang rab tu sbyor bar byed pa’i phyir ro // sems zhes kyang bya ste / ‘di ltar de ni gzugs dang sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg bya dang chos [[[rnams]] kyis] kun tu bsags pa dang nye bar bsags yin pa’i phyir ro / (Emendation by Lamotte). We observed the ‘etymology’ of the term ‘ālaya’ above. The other attribute of this type of vijñāna, ‘ādāna,’ is virtually synonymous with ‘upādāna,’ whose functions it clearly performs.

The etymology for ‘citta’ is based upon the similarity of the term ‘cita,’ ‘accumulated,’ with ‘citta,’ ‘thought, mind,’ derived from the verbal root, ‘cit,’ ‘to observe, understand, think.’ The terms ‘ācita’ and ‘cita,’ deriving from the verbal root ‘ci’ and ‘āci,’ ‘to accumulate, to heap up,’ simply mean ‘heaped up, accumulated.’ This explanation is found in the AKBh as well (AKBh II 34a): “It is citta because it accumulates... because it is heaped up with pure and impure elements.” (cinoti iti cittam... citaṃ śubhāśubhair dhātubhir iti cittam). Yaśomitra adds that the Sautrāntikas or the Yogācāras consider it citta because it is imbued with the impressions (vāsanā). (Vyākhyā, Shastri ed., 208: vāsanāsanniveśayogena sautrāntikamatena, yogācāramatena vā). Also AKBh I 16a; MSg I.6,9; TRBh 3.2; Pāli passages touching on the meaning of citta include: D I 21, S II 95; Visuddhimagga II 452; see also MSg-L 4; MSg-N 92. Nagao (MSg-N 110) righfully calls this a ‘folk etymology.’ 160 Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra V.4-5. len pa’i rnam par shes pa de la rten cing gnas nas rnam par shes pa’i tshogs drug po ‘di... ‘byung ngo // de la rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa’i mig dang gzugs rnams la rten nas / mig gi rnam par shes pa ‘byung ste / mig gi rnam par shes pa [de dang lhan cig rjes su ‘jug pa dus mtshungs pa spyod yul mtshungs pa rnam par rtog pa’i yid kyi rnam par shes pa ‘ang ‘byung ngo ]//... len pa’i rnam par shes pa de la rten cing gnas nas / gal te mig gi rnam par shes pa gcig lan cig ‘byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na ‘ang mig gi rnam par shes pa gcig kho na lan cig ‘byung ngo // gal te rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga car gyi bar dag lan cig ‘byung ba’i rkyen nye bar gnas par gyur na ‘ang rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga car lan cig ‘byung ngo // (Emendations by Lamotte). The Sanskrit for much of this passage appears in a quote from this sūtra at TRBh 33.25-34. 161 Sanskrit reconstruction by Schmithausen (1987:385,n.629) based upon the Chinese and Tibetan versions and consistent with TBh 21.11, kārika 3a: asaṃviditaka-upādhi-sthāna-vijñaptikaṃ ca tat. 162 ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo / bālāna eṣo mayi na prakāśi mā haiva ātmā parikalpayeyuḥ // Also found in MSg I.4; Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, para.32; TBh 34; Siddhi 173. 163 We shall follow Schmithausen’s (1987:299,n.226) terminology here, except that I have emended his “VinSg Ālay. Treatise” to simply “Ālaya Treatise.” Although the section of the Yogāgācarabhūmi in which these texts are found are no longer extant in their original Sanskrit, a nearly identical version of the Proof Portion is found in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (ASBh). It has been studied and translated into Japanese in Hakamaya (1978) and English in Griffiths (1986). 164 Consistent with the aim and method of Schmithausen’s major work he has analyzed the eight arguments or ‘proofs’ into four distinct strata based upon the conceptual development of the ālayavijñāna relative to other texts, specifically the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi (within which the Initial Passage is found), the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, and the Ālaya Treatise within the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī of the Yogācārabhūmi. (1987:194-6). The first strata comprises the ‘somatic functions’ in Proofs #1 (appropriation of the basis), #6 (the multiplicity of bodily experience), #7 (the mindless, ācittaka, absorptions), and #8 (the gradual exiting of vijñāna from the body at death), and substantially agrees with the conception of the ālayavijñāna found in the Basic Section, prior to the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Likewise for the second strata, consisting of Proof #4, the possibility of mutual seeding. In these sections, the continuity of the ālayavijñāna is “not expressly stated, but it is unequivocally presupposed” (45). The third layer, Proof #2 on simultaneous functioning of the arising cognitions and Proof #3 on clear functioning of manovijñāna, presupposes the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and is “decisively advanced over the situation met with in Basic Section” (195). The fourth layer is simply the fifth proof, the various functions (karma) of cognition, where “the concept of the ālayavijñāna as an actual perception goes not only beyond the Basic Section of the Yogācārabhūmi but even beyond Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra V and, as regards preception of one’s corporeal basis, even beyond the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra as a whole. Hence, and also in view of the fact that it obviously presupposes the new manas... proof V represents rather a stage of development quite close to the Pravṛtti Portion” (196). 5 Proof Portion, 1a. “the ālayavijñāna has past saṃskārās as its cause, while the arising cognitions, visual, etc., have present conditions as their cause. As it is taught in detail: ‘the arising of the cognitions comes about due to the sensefaculties, the sense-fields and attention.’ This is the first reason. (b.) Moreover, the six cognition groups are experienced as wholesome or unwholesome. This is the second reason. (c.) Also, none of the kinds of the six cognition groups are considered to be included in indeterminate resultant states. This is the third reason. (d) Also, the six cognition groups occur each possessing a specific basis. Of these, it is not right to say that whatever cognition occurs with such and such a basis would appropriate only that [basis] while the remaining ones are unappropriated; nor is it right [that they are] appropriated, being without an [appropriating] cognition. This is the fourth reason. And there follows the fault of appropriating the basis again and again. For instance, sometimes a visual cognition occurs and sometimes it does not occur; similarly for the remaining [[[cognitions]]]. This is the fifth reason.” (ASBh:12,2f: ālayavijñānam pūrva-saṃskāra-hetukam / cakṣur-ādi-pravṛtti-vijñānaṃ punar vartamāna-pratyaya-hetukam / yathôktam— indriya-viṣaya-manaskāra-vaśād vijñānānām pravṛttir bhavati iti vistareṇa / idaṃ prathamaṃ kāraṇam / (b) api ca kuśalākuśalāḥ ṣaḍ-vijñāna-kāya upalabhyante / idaṃ dvitīyaṃ kāraṇam / (c) api ca ṣaṇṇāṃ vijñānakāyānāṃ s ā j ātir nôpalabhyante yā ‘vyākṛta-vipāka-saṃgṛhītā syāt / idaṃ t ṛtīyaṃ k āraṇam / (d) api ca pratiniyatāśrayāḥ ṣaḍ vijñāna-kāyāḥ pravartante, tatra yena yena āśrayeṇa yad vijñānaṃ pravartate tad eva tenôpāttaṃ syād avaśiṣṭasya anupāttata iti na yujyate, upāttata api na yujyate vijñāna-virahitatayā / idaṃ caturthaṃ kāraṇam / (e) api ca punaḥ punar āśrayôpādāna-doṣaḥ prasajyate / tathā hi cakṣur-vijñānam ekadā pravartate ekadā na pravartate evam avaśiṣṭāni / idaṃ pañcamaṃ kāraṇam /) 166 MSg I.23 discusses this point in more detail: “There is infusing in what is stable, indeterminate, infusable and connected with infusing, not in another. This is the characteristic of impression (vāsanā-lakṣaṇa). [The vāsanā are infused in the ālayavijñāna and not in the six cognitive modes] because the six cognitions are not connected (saṃbandha) [to each other] and there is dissimilarity between their three distinctive aspects [i.e. their supports (āśraya), objects (ālambana) and attention (manaskāra)]; because two [succeeding] moments [of cognition] are not simultaneous [and so cannot infuse each other].” (brtan lung ma bstan bsgo bya ba / sgo bar byed dang ‘brel pa la / sgo byed de las gzhan ni min / de ni bag chags mtshan nyid do / drug po dag la ‘brel med de / tha dad gsum dang ‘gal ba’i phyir / skad cig lhan cig med pa’i phyir /.) 167 Proof #4. “For what reason is is impossible for the six cognition groups to be each other’s seeds? Because an unwholesome [[[dharma]]] occurs immediately after a wholesome one, a wholesome one immediately after an unwholesome one, an indeterminate one immediately after both of these.... These [six cognitions] cannot properly be seeds [of each other] in this way. Moreover, the mental stream occurs after a long time, having long been cut; for this reason too [the mutual seeding of the six cognitions] is not tenable.” (kena kāraṇena bījatvaṃ na saṃbhavati saṇṇāṃ vijñānakāyānām anyonyam / tathā hi kuśalānantaram akuśalam utpadyate, akuśalānantaram kuśalam, tadubhayānantaram avyākṛtam... na ca teṣām tathā bījatvaṃ yujyate / dīrghakāla samucchinna api ca santatiś cireṇa kālena pravartate, tasmād api na yujyate //) 168 ASBh Proof 2a: “because two cognitions actually do function simultaneously. Why is that? Because it is not correct that the cognitions of one who simultaneously desires to see [etc.], up to desires to know, occur one after the other from the beginning, because in that case [there would be] no distinction between attention, the sense faculties and the sense-fields [of each respective cognition]. (tathā hi bhavaty eva dvayor vijñānayor yugapat pravṛttiḥ / tat kasya hetoḥ / tathā hy ekatyasya yugapad draṣṭu-kāmasya yāvad vijñātu-kāmasya ādita itaretara-vijñāna-pravṛttir na yujyate tathā hi tatra manaskāro ‘pi nirviśiṣṭa indriyam api viṣayo ‘pi //) Proof 6: “For what reason would bodily experience be impossible if there were no ālayavijñāna? ...the bodily experiences which occur in too there is an ālayavijñāna.” (kena kāraṇenāsaty ālayavijñāne kāyiko ‘nubhavo na yujyate /... kāye kāyānubhavā utpadyante ‘nekavidhā bahunānāprakārās te na bhaveyur upalabhyante ca / tasmād apy asty ālayavijñānam //) Nor, in fact, can the manovijñāna, the mental cognition which ‘perceives’ dharmas and the other cognitive processes, function clearly if it were not simultaneous with them (ASBh Proof 3): “For what reason is clarity of the mental cognition which follows upon visual cognition, etc., not possible if there is no simultaneous functioning of the cognitions? Because, when one remembers an object which has been perceived in the past, then the mental cognition which takes place is unclear, but the mind which takes place in regard to a present object is not unclear in this way. Thus, either the simultaneous occurrence [of the cognitions] is correct or [there is] lack of clarity of the mental cognition.” (kena kāraṇena astyāṃ yugapad vijñānapravṛttau manovijñānasya cakṣurādivijñāna-sahānucarasya spaṣṭatvaṃ na saṃbhavati / tathāhi yasmin samaye ‘tītam anubhūtaṃ viṣayaṃ samanusmarati tasmin samaye ‘vispaṣṭo manovijñāna-pracāro bhavati na tu tathā vartamāna-viṣayo manaḥ-pracāro ‘vispaṣṭo bhavati / ato ‘pi yugapat pravṛttir vā yujyate ‘vispaṣṭatvaṃ vā manovijñānasya //) Proof #5 below also rests upon the multi-faceted nature of experience as an argument for the ālayavijñāna. 169 ASBh Proof 5. caturvidhaṃ karma - bhājana-vijñaptir āśraya-vijñaptir aham iti vijñaptir viṣaya-vijñāptiś ca iti / etā vijñaptayaḥ kṣane kṣane yugapat pravartamānā upalabhyante / na ca ekasya vijñānasya ekasmin kṣane idam evaṃrūpaṃ vyatibhinnaṃ karma yujyate // 170 S III 131 speaks of the “subtle remnant of the conceit ‘I am,’ of the desire ‘I am,’ of the disposition toward ‘I am,’ still not removed [from the Ariyan disciple].” (anusahagato asmīti māno asmīti chando asmīti anusayo asamūhato). A I 133 and M I 47 describes the final eradication of these tendencies in those who are liberated and have acquired perfect view. See notes 10, 11, 39, above. 171 Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa-vaibhāṣya, by Sthiramati: “The causes of saṃsāra are karma and kleśa; of these two, the kleśa are foremost... even the action (karma) which has projected rebirth (punar-bhava) will not produce rebirth if there is no kleśa... because they are foremost the kleśas are the root of origination.” (Tib. Peking #5567 Hi 52b3-6: ‘khor ba’i rgyu ni las dang nyon mongs pa rnams so / / de gnyis las kyang nyon mongs pa ni gtso bo ste / ... yang srid ba ‘phangs pa’i las kyang nyon mongs pa med na yang srid pa ‘byung bar mi ‘gyur te / ... de ltar na gtso bo yin pa’i phyir nyon mongs nyid mngon par ‘jug pa’i rtsa ba ste /) 172 ASBh 11.1. ālīyante tasmin dharmā bījataḥ, sattvā vā ātmagrāheṇa iti ālayavijñānam. 173 AKBh ad I 39a-b: ahaṅkāra sanniśrayatvāc cittam ‘ātmā’ ity upacaryate. See Schmithausen (1987:55,n.386). 174 5.b)A.1. kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni / mdor na kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi rtsa ba yin no // ‘di ltar de ni sems can gyi ‘jig rten ‘grub pa’i rtsa ba yin te / dbang po rten dang bcas pa rnams dang / ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa rnam skyed par byed pa yin pa’i phyir ro // D.7a2f; P.8a4f; T.30.581a25f,1020a13f. 175 5.b)A.2. snod kyi ‘jig rten ‘grub pa’i rtsa ba yang yin te / snod kyi ‘jig rten skyed par byed pa yin pa’i phyir ro // ibid. D.7a2f; P.8a4f; T.30.581a25f,1020a13f. 176 5.b)C.2.(c) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi ‘jug pa’i rgyu. D.8a5f; P.9b5f; T.30.581c12f, 1020b15f. Therefore it is also the nature of the Truth of Suffering (duḥkha-satya) and what brings about the Truth of the Origin (of suffering) (samudaya-satya) in this life, and it is also what brings about the Truth of Suffering in the future. 5.b)A.4 de ltar na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de nyid ni sa bon thams cad pa yin pa’i phyir da ltar gyi dus na sdug bsngal gyi bden pa’i rang bzhin dang / ma ‘ongs pa’i dus na sdug bsngal gyi bden pa skyed par byed pa dang / da ltar gyi dus nyid ni kun ‘byung ba’i bden pa skyed par byed pa’ang yin no // D.7a5f; P.8a6f; T.30.581b5f, 1020a20f.

Nivṛtti Portion 5.b)B.1: “One should understand that the ālayavijñāna which is the root of the defilements (saṃkleśamūla) ceases (vinivṛtta) through the cultivation of wholesome dharmas like this.” ( kun nas nyon mongs pa’i rtsa ba kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de ni ‘di ltar dge ba’i chos bsgoms pas rnam par ldog par rig par bya’o.) D.7b5; P.9a4; T.30.581b22f, 1020a28f. 178 5.b)C.1. “As soon as the basis is revolved, the ālayavijñāna must be said to have been abandoned (prahīṇa); because it has been abandoned, it must be said that all the defilements have also been abandoned. (5.b)C.2.) One should know that the revolution of the basis conflicts with and so counteracts (pratipakṣa) the ālayavijñāna. [From Chinese (T.30.581c8); Tib. reads: “one should know that the basis, which is the ālayavijñāna, is revolved by [its] enemy.”] (a) The ālayavijñāna is impermanent and accompanied by appropriation (sopādāna), while the revolved basis is permanent and without appropriation because it is transformed by the path which takes true reality as its object. (b) The ālayavijñāna is accompanied by spiritual corruption (dauṣṭhulya), while the revolved basis is forever removed from all corruption. (c) The ālayavijñāna is the cause of the continuance of the afflictions (kleśa-pravṛtti-hetu)... while the revolved basis is not the cause of the continuance of the afflictions..... (5.b)C.3.) As for the characteristic of the elimination (prahāṇa) of the ālayavijñāna, as soon as it is eliminated the two aspects of appropriation are abandoned and the body remains like an apparition (nirmāṇa). [Ch. adds: Why is that?] Because the cause which makes suffering occur again in the future has been abandoned, the appropriation which creates rebirth (punarbhava) in the future is eliminated. Because all the causes of defilements (saṃkleśa) in this life have been abandoned, the appropriation of the basis of all the defilements in this life is eliminated. [From Ch. (T.581c21); Tib. reads: “all the spiritual corruptions of the defilements in this life are eliminated.] Free from all the spiritual corruption (dauṣṭhulya), only the mere conditions of physical life remain. If this occurs, one experiences the feeling of the end of the body and the end of life.” (5.b)C.1. gnas ‘gyur ma thag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa spangs par brjod par bya ste / de spangs pa’i phyir kun nas nyon mongs pa thams cad kyang spangs par brjod par bya’o // (2) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de’i gnas ni / gnyen po dang / dgra bos bsgyur par rig par bya’o // (a) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni mi rtag pa dang / len pa dang bcas pa yin la / gnas gyur pa ni rtag pa dang len pa med pa yin te / de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa’i lam gyis bsgyur ba’i phyir ro // (b) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni gnas ngan len dang ldan pa yin la gnas gyur pa ni gnas ngan len thams cad dang gtan bral ba yin no // (c) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi ‘jug pa’i rgyu... gnas gyur pa ni nyon mongs pa rnams kyi ‘jug pa’i rgyu ma yin... (5.b)C.3.) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de’i spangs pa’i mtshan nyid ni de spangs ma thag tu len pa rnam pa gnyis spong ba dang / sprul pa lta bu’i lus kun tu gnas pa ste / phyi ma la sdug bsngal yang ‘byung bar byed pa’i rgyu spangs pa’i phyir / phyi ma la yang ‘byung bar byed pa’i len pa spong ba dang / tshe ‘di la kun nas nyon mongs pa’i rgyu thams cad spangs pa’i phyir / tshe ‘di kun nas nyon mongs pa’i gnas ngan len * thams cad spong ba dang / gnas ngan len thams cas dang bral zhing srog gi rkyen du gyur pa tsam kun tu gnas so // de yod na lus kyi mtha’ pa dang / srog gi mtha’** pa’i tshor ba myong bar byed de / D.8a3-b2; P.9b1-10a4; T.30.581c6-23, 1020b10-25. [* Schmithausen (366) amends to: ‘gnas len pa’ following Ch.].[**P.; D. reads: ‘mthar’] 179 I.e. M I 292: vijānāti... viññāṇan ti. AKBh II 34a: vijānāti iti vijñānam. See also note #225 below. 180 They are quite similar to those found in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. The inner appropriations differ in that the Sūtra’s “predispositions towards profuse imaginings in terms of conventional usage of images, names and conceptualizations” (nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā; mtshan ma dang ming dang rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad ‘dogs pa’i spros pa’i bag chag len pa) is replaced with “the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated” (parikalpita-svabhāvābhiniveśa-vāsanā). Pravṛtti Portion 1.b)A.1. “‘The inner appropriation (adhyātman upādāna)’ means the predispositions toward attachment to the falsely discriminated and the material sense faculties along with their bases (sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpam).” (de la nang gi len pa ni kun brtags pa’i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa’i bag chags dang rten dbang po’i gzugs so ). D.3b7f; P.4a8f; T.30.580a4f, 1019b1f.

1.b)A.2. de la phyi rol gyi snod rnam pa yongs su ma bcad pa rnam par rig pa ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nang gi len pa’i dmigs pa gang yin pa de nyid la brten nas / rtag tu rgyun mi ‘chad par ‘jig rten dang snod kyi rgyun rnam par rig pa ste / D.4a1f; P.4b1f; T.30.580a7f, 1019b4f. 182 1.b)A.3. “Thus, one should know that the way the ālayavijñāna [occurs] in regard to the object of inner appropriation and the external object is similar to a burning flame which occurs inwardly while it emits light outwardly on the basis of the wick and oil.” ‘di lta ste / dper na mar me ‘bar ba ni snying po dang snum gyi rgyus ni nang du ‘jug par ‘gyur la / phyi rol du ni ‘od ‘byung bar byed pa bzhin du nang gi len pa’i dmigs pa dang / phyi rol gyi dmigs pa ‘di la yang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i tshul de dang ‘dra bar lta bar bya’o // D.4a2f; P.4b2f; T.30.580a9f, 1019b5f. 183 We shall remember that “upādāna” also means “fuel, supply, substratum by means of which an active process is kept alive or going.” PED:149. See note 25, above. 184 1.b)B.1. “Because it is difficult to discern (duṣpariccheda) even by the wise ones of the world, the object [of the ālayavijñāna] is subtle (sūkṣma).” (dmigs pa de ni ‘jig rten gyi mkhas pa rnams kyis kyang yongs su gcad par dga’ ba’i phyir phra ba yin no). D.4a3f; P.4b3f; T.30.580a13f, 1019b7f. 185 2.b)A. “What is establishing the arising [of the ālayavijñāna] by association (saṃprayoga-pravṛtti-vyavasthāna)? This means that the ālayavijñāna is associated by association with the five omnipresent factors conjoined to mind (citta-saṃprayukta-sarvatraga): attention (manaskāra), sense-impression (sparśa), feeling vedanā), apperception (saṃjñā), and volitional impulse (cetanā). (B) These dharmas then are 1) included within [the category of] resultant states (vipāka); 2) are subtle (sūkṣma) because they are hard to perceive (durvijñānatva) even for the wise ones in the world; 3) are always functioning in the same manner regarding a single object (ekālambana). Moreover, among those mental factors (caitta) the feeling (vedanā) which is associated with the ālayavijñāna is: 4) neither exclusively pain or pleasure (aduḥkhāsukha); 5) and is [[[karmically]]] indeterminate (avyākṛta). The other mental factors (caitta-dharma) are also explained in just this way.” (2.a) de la mtshungs par ldan pas ‘jug pa rnam par gzhag pa gang zhe na / (2.b)A.) ‘di la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa mtshungs par ldan pas na sems dang mtshungs par ldan pa kun tu ‘gro ba lnga po yid la byed pa dang / reg pa dang / tshor ba dang / ‘du shes dang / sems pa rnam dang mtshungs par ldan no // (B) chos de dag kyang (1) rnam par smin par bsdus pa dang / (2) ‘jig rten gyi mkhas pa rnams kyis kyang rtogs par dka’ ba’i phyir phra ba dang / (3) gtan du dmigs pa gcig la mtshungs par ‘jug pa yin no // sems las byung ba de dag las kyang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa’i tshor ba gang yin pa de ni (4) gcig tu sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa dang / (5) lung du ma bstan pa yin no // de nyid kyis de las gzhan pa’i sems las byung ba’i chos rnams kyang rnam par bshad pa yin no // *(P.; D. omits ‘pa’i.’) D.4b2f; P.5a5f; T.30.580a29f, 1019b16f. See also the treatment of this in TBh 19.3, note #225 below 186 4.b)A.3. “The ālayavijñāna also occurs sometimes intermingled with the feelings of suffering (duḥkha), pleasure (sukha), and neither pain nor pleasure (aduḥkhāsukha), because, depending on the arising cognitions, [the ālayavijñāna] occurs depending on whatever feeling they are. Of these, amongst human beings, the gods of the Desire Realm, animals and some of the hungry ghosts, the stream of those feelings (vedanā-santāna) of the arising cognitions, either suffering, pleasure, or neither suffering nor pleasure, simultaneously occurs and functions intermingled with the innate (sahaja) feeling [of the ālayavijñāna], which is neither suffering nor pleasure....” 4.b)A.4. “Sometimes the ālayavijñāna occurs simultaenously with wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate mental factors (caitasikadharma) which belong to the arising cognitions.” 4.b)A.3. kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de yang res ‘ga’ ni bde ba dang / sdug bsngal ba dang / sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa’i tshor ba rnams dang ‘dren mar ‘jug ste / ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa la brten nas / tshor ba gang dag yin pa de dag de la brten nas ‘byung ba’i phyir ro // de la mi rnams dang ‘dod pa na spyod pa’i lha rnams dang / dud ‘gro dang / yi dwags kha cig gi nang na ni lhan cig skyes pa’i tshor ba sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang na yin pa de dang / ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa’i tshogs kyi tshor ba bde

ba’am / sdug bsngal ba’am / sdug bsngal yang ma yin / bde ba yang ma yin pa* de dag gi rgyun ‘dren mar lhan cig tu ‘byung zhing ‘jug go //... (4.b)A.4) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa res ‘ga’ ni ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes par gtogs pa’i sems las byung ba’i chos dge ba dang mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa rnams dang lhan cig ‘byung zhing ‘jug ste / *P.; D. reverses the order: “bde ba yang ma yin / sdug bsngal yang ma yin.” D.5b6f; P.6b5f; T.30.580c14f, 1019c17. 187 4.b)B.1. de ltar na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa rnam dang yang lhan cig ‘byung zhing ‘jug go // glo bur gyi tshor ba rnams dang / glo bur gyi chos dge ba dang / mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa rnams dang yang lhan cig ‘byung zhing ‘jug ste / de ni de dag dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin par ni mi brjod do // de ci’i phyir zhe na / dmigs pa mi mtshungs pa la ‘jug pa’i phyir te / D.6a4f; P.7a4f; T.30.580c26f, 1019c24. 188 The Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, paras. 38-9, explicitly defends the idea of two distinct types of mental stream within a single individual on the grounds that the two occur inseparably as cause and effect and because the stream of the resultant consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) is infused (paribhāvita) by the arising cognitions. (de gnyis ni rgyu dang ‘bras bu’i dngos po dang tha dad pa ma yin par ‘jug pa nyid kyi phyir dang / rnam par smin pa’i rnam par shes pa’i rgyud la cig shos kyis kyang yongs su sgo bar byed pa’i phyir ro /) 189 We shall remember that the bhavanga-citta of the Theravādins is a neutral, resultant state and therefore capable of conditioning the occurrence of dharmas of all natures. See note 123 above. 190 The following applies to the Yogācāra model of mind as well: “Just because they have different names does not mean that they are separate entities. The names, id, ego and superego, actually signify nothing in themselves. They are merely a shorthand way of designating different processes, functions, mechanisms, and dynamisms within the total personality.” Hall, C., A Primer of Freudian Psychology. (1961:34f). 191 1.b)B.2. dmigs pa de ni rtag tu yod pa yin te / lan ‘ga’ gzhan du ‘gyur la / lan ‘ga’ gzhan du ‘gyur ba ma yin no // ‘on kyang dang po pa’i len pa’i skad cig la brten nas / ji srid ‘tsho’i bar du rnam par rig pa* ro gcig pas ‘jug par ‘gyur ro // (3) kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de ni dmigs pa la skad cig pa yin par blta bar bya ste / skad cig pa’i rgyun gyi rgyud kyis ‘jug pa yin gyi / gcig pa nyid ni ma yin no // *P.; D. reads ‘shes par rig.’ D.4a4f; P.4b5f; T.30.580a15f, 1019b8f. 192 AKBh ad II 53: anyonyaphalārthena sahabhūhetuḥ. Vyākhyā (Shastri ed. 307): cittaṃ caittasya phalam, caitto ‘pi cittasya ity anyonyaphalam iti tena arthena sahabhūhetuḥ. See note 56, above. The Sautrāntikas also considered body and mind interdependent. The ASBh also states that the concomitant cause is the necessary concomitance of anything, specifically of the citta and caitta, which cannot exist separately. (ASBh 37.6f: sahāyanaiyam yena sahabhūhetur vyavasthāpitaḥ / bhūtāni bhautikaṃ ca ity udāharaṇamātram etad veditavyam, cittacaitasikānām anyonyam avinābhāva niyamāt /.) 193 3.b)A.2. de la rten byed pa ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pas zin pa’i dbang po gzugs can rnams la brten nas / rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga po dag ‘byung bar ‘gyur gyi ma zin pa dag las ni ma yin no // rnam par shes pa’i tshogs lnga po dag gi gnas mig la sogs pa dang ‘dra ba yid dang yid kyi rnam par shes pa’i gnas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa yod na / yid dang yid kyi rnam par shes pa yang ‘byung bar ‘gyur gyi med na ni ma yin no // D.5a1f; P.5b4f; T.30.580b12f, 1019b26. This is in some contradiction with MSg I.7a.2) which states that the kliṣṭa-manas is the simultaneous support (sahabhū-āśraya) of the mano-vijñāna. 194 ASBh 11.9: “Increasing [or “fattening”] their seeds when the aggregates, etc. are present is called “impression.” (skandhādīnāṃ samudācāre tadbījaparipuṣṭir vāsānā iti ucyate.) 195 3.b)B. de la ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa ni rnam pa gnyis kyis kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i rkyen gyi bya ba byed de / tshe ‘di la sa bon yongs su brtas par byed pa dang / tshe phyi ma la de mngon par ‘grub pa’i sa bon yongs su ‘dzin pa skyed par byed pas so // (B.1.) de la tshe ‘di la sa bon yongs su brtas par byed pa ni / ji lta ji ltar kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la brten pa ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa dge ba dang / mi dge ba dang / lung du ma bstan pa ‘byung bar ‘gyur ba de lta de ltar rang gi rten la rten de dang lhan cig skye ba dang ‘gag pas bag chags sgo bar byed do // rgyu de dang rkyen des na ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa rnams kyang phyir zhing phyir zhing dge ba la sogs pa’i dngos pos shin tu brtas pa dang / shin tu sbyangs pa dang / shin tu ‘od gsal ba dag tu ‘byung bar ‘gyur ro // (B.2.) de’i bag chags kyi rigs gzhan ni phyi ma la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de dag nyid kyi rnam par smin pa yongs su ‘dzin pa’i phyir ‘jug par ‘gyur ro // D.5a3f; P.5b7; T.30.580b17f, 1019b27f. 196 Except for the explicit idea of rebirth, there is nothing unusual or mysterious about this process, nor even necessarily profound. Character traits, dispositions, memory, mental and physical skills, etc. (not to mention the stages of normal growth and development) are all processes of acquisition and learning that develop over extended periods of time, building up a repertoire of subroutines which exercise those very skills and dispositions, and form the basis upon which further skills and habits are practiced and acquired. And all of these subsist, moreover, relatively independently of, though continually conditioned by, the moment to moment processes of conscious perception. Merleau-Ponty (The Structure of Behavior:13, as quoted in Varela, 1991:174.) puts it in much the same fashion: Since all the movements of the organism are always conditioned by external influences, one can, if one wishes, readily treat behavior as an effect of the milieu. But in the same way, since all the stimulations which the organism receives have in turn been possible only by its preceding movements which have culminated in exposing the receptor organ to external influences, one could also say the behavior is the first cause of all the stimulations. 197 4.b)A.1.(a). kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni (a) res ‘ga’ ni ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa gcig kho na dang lhan gcig tu ‘jug ste / ‘di lta ste yid dang ngo // ‘di ltar ngar ‘dzin pa dang / nga’o snyam pa’i nga rgyal dang / rlom pa’i rnam pa can gyi yid gang yin pa de ni sems yod pa dang / sems med pa’i gnas skabs dag na yang dus rtag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cig ‘byung zhing ‘jug ste / de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la nga’o snyam pa dang / bdag go snyam du dmigs shing rlom pa’i rnam pa can yin no // D.5a7f; P.6a5f; T.30.580b29f, 1019c6f. 198 4.b)B.4. gang sngar bstan pa’i yid gang yin pa de ni dus rtag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang lhan cig ‘byung zhing ‘jug ste / de ni yang dag par ma bcom gyi bar du dus rtag pa kho nar lhan cig skyes pa’i rang bzhin ‘dra ba’i kun nas nyon mongs pa rnam pa bzhi po ‘jig tshogs la lta ba’i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / nga’o snyam pa’i nga rgyal gyi kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / bdag la chags pa’i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang / ma rig pa’i kun nas nyon mongs pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa yin par blta bar bya’o // kun nas nyon mongs pa rnam pa bzhi po de dag kyang mnyam par bzhag pa dang / mnyam par ma bzhag pa’i sa la dge ba la sogs pa dag la ‘gal ba med par ‘jug pa dang / bsgribs la lung du ma bstan pa yin par blta bar bya’o // D.6b5f; P.7b7f; T.30.581a17f, 1020a8f. See Schmithausen (1987:325,n.357) for the “intrusive” character of this section. 199 MSg I.7a.6 (T.31.133c19-134a1; D.4048.4a4-b1: dge ba dang mi dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa’i sems rnams la yang ngar ‘dzin pa dus thams cad du kun tu ‘byung bar dmigs pa’i yang phyir ro / / gzhan du na ni mi dge ba’i sems kho no dang de mtshungs par ldan pas nga’o snyam pa’i nyon mongs pa kun tu ‘byung gi / dge ba dang lung du ma bstan pa dag la ni ma yin no / / de’i phyir lhan cig ‘byung bar kun tu ‘byung ba dang / mtshung par ldan par <ma yin par> kun tu ‘byung bas skyon ‘di dag tu mi ‘gyur ro /) This emendation, <ma yin par>, follows Lamotte (MSg-L:21) based upon the three Chinese translations. 200 Bh 326a2-3; bh: 151b1f: (ji ltar sbyin ba la sogs pa dge ba’i sems ‘byung bar ‘gyur / de dang mtshungs par ldan pa las te). This passage actually comments on ignorance unaccompanied by other afflictions (avidyā-āveṇekī), but the point still applies since it too “always obstructs the citta which attends the true object and is present at all times,” (MSg I.7b: yang dag don la ‘jug pa yi // sems kyi bgegs su rtag gyur dang / dus rnams kun tu ‘byung ba de // ma ‘dres pa yi ma rig ‘dod).

The second major commentary to the MSg, the Upanibandhana, also comments on the ubiquity of self-grasping: “Wholesome states, too, are endowed with self-grasping, because one thinks ‘I am praticing giving.’ Self-grasping does not occur without ignorance. Since ignorance is a mental factor (caitta) too, it does not occur without a support (āśraya). But there is no other support except the afflictive mentation (kliṣṭa-manas). A wholesome citta cannot be the support of ignorance.” (U 384c24-28; u 242b8-243a3: dge ba’i gnas skabs ni sbyin pa la sogs pa la ngar ‘dzin pa dang ldan te / nga sbyin pa byed do snyam du ngar sems pa’i phyir ro / ngar ‘dzin pa dang ldan pa ni ma rig pa med na mi ‘byung ngo / / ma rig pa yang sems las byung ba yin bas gnas med par mi ‘byung ste / nyon mongs pa can gyi yid ma gtogs par gnas gzhan med do / / dge ba’i sems ni ma rig pa’i gnas su mi rung ngo /) 201 Similar ideas, as discussed above, are found in S III 29 where a subtle remnant (anusahagata) of the conceit and latent disposition to “I am” remains even in advanced disciples. AKBh V 19 (note 84, above) describes an innate and indeterminate view of self-existence, both in the Desire Realm and in birds and beasts, in constrast to that which is deliberated and thus unwholesome. Similar ideas are found in Yogācāra literature. “The innate (sahaja) view of self-existence (satkāyadṛṣṭi) in the Desire Realm is indeterminate, because it always occurs again and again and because it is not a support for harm to self or to others. That which is attachment through deliberation, however, is unwholesome.” Y Tib. Derge #4038, Shi 110b3-4: ‘dod pa na sbyod pa’i ‘jig tshogs la lta ba lhan cig skyes pa gang yin pa de ni lung du ma bstan pa yin te / yang dang yang kun tu ‘byung ba’i phyir dang / bdag dang gzhan la shin tu gnod pa’i gnas na ma yin pa’i phyir ro / rtog pas mgnon par zhen pa gang yin pa de ni mi dge ba yin no /). The corresponding Chinese for this passage also mentions that birds and animals have this innate view of self-existence, in constrast to that which is deliberate. Y Ch. T.30.621c7. Schmithausen (1987:440,n.931). 202 The ASBh states that the view of self-existence is also present even in Aryans and Disciples who have reached the Path of Seeing (ASBh 62.3ff: yām adhiṣṭāya utpanna darśanamārgasya api āryaśrāvakasya asmimānaḥ samudācarati.) Cf. Pravṛtti Portion, 4.b)B.4, cited above. The Upanibandhana asks where the latent afflictions which are to be eliminated by the path of cultivation would reside, if there were no ālayavijñāna, when the manifest afflictions are suppressed by one who has engendered the counteractant (kleśa-pratipakṣa-vijñāna) to them upon gaining the fruit of a stream-winner at the first moment in the Path of Seeing (darśana-mārga), especially considering that they are in contradiction with the pratipakṣa, the counteracting mind. (U 391c26-29; u 256b3-5: gal te kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med na gang gyi tshe thog ma nyid du rkyun du zhugs pa’i ‘bras bu la ‘jug pa la mthong pas spang bar bya ba’i nyon mongs pa’i gnyen bo la ma skyes pa de’i tshe ‘jig rten pa’i shes pa thams cad ni ‘gags na bsgom pas spang bar bya ba’i nyon mongs pa’i bag la nyal gang du gnas par ‘gyur / gnyen bo nyid mi mthun pa’i phyogs kyi sa bon dang ‘brel par ni mi rung /) 203 MSg I.7a.4) “[If afflictive mentation did not exist] there would also be the fault that there would be no distinction between the absorptions of non-apperception (asaṃjñi-samāpatti) and of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti), because one who is in the absorption of non-apperception is characterized by afflictive mentation while one who is entered into the absorption of cessation is not. Otherwise these two would not be distinguished.” (Tib: [[[nyon mongs pa]] can gyi yid de... med du zin na] ‘du shes med pa dang / ‘gog pa’i snyoms par ‘jug pa bye brag med pa’i skyon du yang ‘gyur te / ‘di ltar ‘du shes med pa’i snyoms par ‘jug pa ni nyon mongs pa can gyi yid kyis rab tu phye ba yin gyis / ‘gog pa’i snyoms par ‘jug pa ni ma yin te / gzhan du na ‘di gnyis bye brag med pa nyid du ‘gyur ro /) The commentary (U 384c4) states that it is the presence of afflictive mentation within the mental stream that differentiates an ordinary worlding from an Arya. Cf. AKBh ad II 44d (Poussin, 210; Shastri, 244): evam anayoḥ samāpattyor... viśeṣaḥ... santānato ‘pi, pṛtagjanāryasantānatvāt.) 204 MSg I.7a.5). (gal te ‘du shes med pa pa de na ngar ‘dzin pa dang / nga’o snyam pa’i nga rgyal med na ‘du shes med par skye ba thog thag tu nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa’i skyon du yang ‘gyur ro/). Vasubandhu’s commentary (Bh 75 How Innovative is the ĀLAYAVIJÑĀNA by William S. Waldron

326b7-11; Lamotte, 1935:194) elaborates: “If there were no klisṭa-manas, then it properly follows that there would be no self-grasping (ātmagrāha) amongst beings belonging to [the realm of] non-apperception (āsaṃjñika); [they] would no [longer] be ordinary worldlings (pṛthagjana), [that is, they would be Aryans] and their mental stream (santāna) would be temporarily free of self-grasping.” The Pravṛtti Portion, I.4.b)A.1.(a), mentioned manas in connection with the absorption of cessation, stating that the manas “always occurs and functions with the ālayavijñāna in conscious states (sacittaka) and in unconscious states (acittaka).” See Schmithausen (1987:481, n.1232). 205 MSg I.19. The Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā, by Sthiramati, calls these the pravṛtti-lakṣaṇa and the saṃkleśa-lakṣaṇa, respectively, viz. the momentary, simultaneous causality, such as pertains between the ālayavijñāna and the functioning cognitions, and the temporal, sequential causality, as depicted in the twelve-member formula. (ad MV I.911. D.#4032. 205a2f: ‘dir ni skad cig brgyud mar ‘jug pa ‘jug pa’i tshan nyid du bshad ba’o / / tshe rabs bzhan du ‘jug pa’i ‘jug pa ni kun nas nyon mongs pa’i mtshan nyid du ‘og nas ‘chad do /... gcig ni rkyen gyi rnam par shes /... kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ste/ rnam par shes pa lhag ma bdun rnams kyi rgyu’i rkyen gyi dngos pa’i rgyu yin pas rkyen gyi rnam par shes pa’o). As cited in MSg-N, 149f. The AKBh ad III 24d discusses dependent origination as both momentary (kṣaṇikaḥ) and relating to the twelve members as distinct temporal states (āvasthikaḥ). 206 The Upanibandhana relates these two types of dependent origination. The ālayavijñāna corresponds to the first, because it differentiates the nature of all defiled dharmas which are originated, while the second is the traditional twelve-limbed formula, ignorance, etc. which distinguishes the destinies through being the principal condition (pradhāna-pratyaya); this is because when the saṃskārās, etc. arise from the ālayavijñāna, they differ as to being meritorious, non-meritorious, or neutral because of ignorance, etc. (U 388c3-8; u 250b5-8: kun gzhi rnam par shes pas kun nas nyon mongs pa’i chos kyi rang bzhin skye ba can thams cad rnam bar ‘byed par byed pa’i phyir ro / ... lus sna tshogs ‘grub pa la gtso bo’i rkyen gyis rab tu phye ba’i ma rig pa la sogs pa’i yan lag bcu gnyis te / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa las ‘du byed la sogs pa ‘byung ba na ma rig pa la sogs pa’i dbang gis bsod nams dang / bsod nams ma yin pa dang / mi gyo ba tha dad pa’i phyir ro /) 207 MSg I.27 explains that “these two cognitions (vijñāna) are mutually conditions of each other.... through being always mutually the fruit and cause of each other.” (T.31.135b13-16; D.4048.7b5f: rnam par shes pa de gnyis ni gcig gi rkyen gcig yin te/... phan tshun ‘bras bu’i dngos po dang/ rgyu yi dngos por rtag tu sbyor). MSg I.28: “In the first Dependent Co-arising these two cognitions are mutually causal conditions (hetu-pratyaya) of each other.” (T.31.135b17; D.4048.7b6f: rten cing ‘brel par ‘byung ba dang po la rnam par shes pa dag phan tshun du rgyu’i rkyen yin). Hsüan Tsang’s Chinese (T.31.135b17) explicitly states “two vijñānas,” while the Tib. indicates only the plural: “rnam par shes pa dag.” 208 MSg I.33. U 392a12-16; u 257a2-5: ‘du byed kyi rkyen gyis rnam par shes pa mi rung ba’i phyir ro / / zhes bya ba ni ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa rnams la las kyi kun nas nyon mongs ba mi srid bar ston to / / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med na (Der. 209b3) mig la sogs pa’i rnam par shes pa ‘dod chags la sogs pa dang lhan cig skyes pa ‘du byed kyi rkyen las byung par ‘dod na de yang mi rung ste / rnam par shes pa’i rkyen gyis ming dang gzugs zhes ‘byung ba’i phyir ro / / mig la sogs pa’i rnam par shes pa ni skad cig gyis ‘jig pa’i tshul can yin pas ‘gags nas yun ring ba’i phyir ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen du mi rung ste / nyes pa mang du ‘gyur ro /. 209 MVBh, ad I.10, states that the saṃskārā place the karma-vāsanā within the vijñāna (saṃskārair vijñāne karmavāsanāyāḥ pratiṣṭānāt). The passages in Yogācāra texts which describe the ālayavijñāna as conditioned by the saṃskāra are legion: for example, in the Proof Portion, Proof #1.a., note 165, above.

MSg I.33. The Bhāṣya states that this is because in the case of the vijñāna which is infused by saṃskārās, it is by the force of attachment or appropriation (upādāna-bala), that the predispositions (vāsanā) increase and existence arises. Bh 331b24-27; bh 159a4f: len pa’i rkyen gyis srid pa yang mi rung ste / gang gi phyir ‘du byed kyis yongs su bsgos pa’i rnam par shes pa len pa’i dbang gyis bag chags rgyas pas srid pa ‘byung bas so / 211 U 393a29-b9; u 259b2-7: de la ming ni gzugs can ma yin pa’i phung bo bzhi’o / / gzugs ni nur nur bo’o / / ‘di gnyis kyi rkyen rnam par shes pa gang yin pa skad cig gcig nas gcig du brgyud de gnas nyid du gyur ba de yang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa las gzhan ma yin no / / ming smos pas ni ‘jug pa’i rnam par shes pa bzung na rnam par shes pa smos pas ci zhig gtso bor bstan par bgyur /. 212 Schmithausen (1987:169-177,ns.1075-1145) discusses this “doubling” of vijñāna and dismisses it as compelling reason for introducing a new type of vijñāna called “ālaya,” since the ālayavijñāna is not mentioned in this context in earlier discussions on dependent origination in the Yogācārabhūmi and is not found problematical by other contemporary writers. 213 The Bhāṣya further correlates the other non-material āhāras with the basic dimensions of mind within the Yogācāra scheme: the sensation-sustenance (sparśāhāra) with the six cognitive modes, and the sustenance which consists of mental volitions or motivational impulses (manaḥsaṃcetanāhāra) with mentation (manas). (Bh 332b14-20; bh 160b26: rnam par shes pa’i zas ni nye bar len ba dang ldan ba na ste / gang gis de blangs pa nyid kyis rten gnas pa ste / de las gzhan du na shi ba’i ro bzhin du rul bar ‘gyur ro / / de lta bas na rten la phan ‘dogs par byed pa’i phyir rnam par shes pa’i zas nyid ni kha blang bar bya’o / / de la reg pa’i zas ni rnam par shes pa’i tshogs drug gang yin ba’i’o / yid la sems ba’i zas ni yid kyis bsams pa’i’o / / gzhan ba rnam par shes pa’i zas nyid du bstan pa gang yin ba ni sems med pa’i gnyid dang / brgyal ba dang / ‘gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa na rnam par shes pa drug ni ‘gags par gyur na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med na lus blangs pa ni ‘drul bar byed pa gzhan gang yin /.) 214 MSg I.11b. dge ‘dun phal chen sde’i lung las kyang rtsa ba’i rnam par shes pa zhes ‘byung ste / rnam grangs des kyang de nyid bstan te / rtsa ba de la brten pa’i shing ljon pa bzhin no / (11.c) sa ston gyi sde’i lung las kyang ‘khor ba ji srid pa’i phung po rnams zhes ‘byung ste / rnam grangs des kyang de nyid bstan te / la lar res ‘ga’ gzugs dang sems rgyun chad par snang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la de’i sa bon ni rgyun mi ‘chad pa’i phyir ro / (11.d) ‘phags pa gnas brtan pa rnam kyi lung las kyang / srid pa’i yan lag lta ba dang / shes pa dang ni gtod pa dang / gyo ba dang ni rtogs pa dang / bdun pa ‘jug par byed pa yi / zhes ‘byung ngo / (12.) de’i phyir gang shes bya’i gnas la len pa’i rnam par shes pa nyid dang / sems nyid dang / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa nyid dang / rtsa ba’i rnam par shes pa nyid dang / ‘khor ba ji srid pa’i phung po dang / srid pa’i yan lag tu bstan pa de ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ste / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa’i lam chen po btod pa kho na yin no /. 215 MSg I.32. * “And secondary afflictions” in Ch. (T.31.135c19) only. (nyon mongs pa’i gnyen po’i rnam par shes pa byung na de ma yin pa gzhan ‘jig rten pa’i rnam par shes pa thams cad ni ‘gags na / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med par gnyen po’i rnam par shes pa de ni nyon mongs pa dang nye ba’i nyon mongs pa’i sa bon dang bcas par mi rung ste / ngo bo nyid kyis rnam par grol ba dang nyon mongs pa rnams dang lhan cig ‘byung ba dang ‘gags pa med pa’i phyir ro / / kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med na / de’i ‘og tu yang ‘jig rten pa’i rnam par shes pa ‘byung ba na bag chags de gnas dang bcas te ‘das nas yun ring ste / med pa’i phyir sa bon med pa las skye bar ‘gyur ro /. 216 MSg I.40. U 393c11-16; u 260b1-4: de nyid na zhes bya ba la sogs pa ni gzugs med pa rnams su ‘jig rten las ‘das pa’i sems zag ba med pa de mngon du byed de de skyes ba na gang zag pa med pa de las gzhan pa’i sems ‘jig rten pa ‘byung ba de med par ‘gyur te / ‘gags pa na ‘gro bas bsdus pa’i rnam par smin pa med pas ‘gro ba de ldog pa nyid du ‘gyur te / gnyen po mngon (D.212b3 and Ch.) sum du gyur na mi mthun pa’i phyogs thams cad spangs pa’i phyir sgrim mi dgos par phung po’i lhag ma med pa’i mya ngan las ‘das pa thob par ‘gyur ro /.

MSg I.48. “Inasmuch as the weak, medium and strong [[[impression]] from having heard the Dharma] gradually increase (vardhate), so much does the resultant consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) diminish and the basis is revolved (āśraya-parāvṛtti). When the basis is revolved in all aspects the resultant consciousness which possesses all the seeds (sarvabījaka-vipākavijñāna) also becomes without seeds and is also eliminated in all aspects.” (T.31.136c24f; D.4048.11a4: chung ngu dang ‘bring po dang chen po ji lta ji lta bur rim gyis ‘phel ba de lta de lta bur rnam par smin pa’i rnam par shes pa yang ‘bri zhin gnas kyang ‘gyur ro / / gnas rnam pa thams cad du gyur na rnam par smin pa’i rnam par shes pa sa bon thams cad pa yang sa bon med par gyur pa dang rnam pa thams cad du spangs pa yang yin no). MSg I.49. “When one is freed from the mundane passions (laukikavītarāga), the impressions of the unconcentrated stages (asamāhitabhūmika-vāsanā) gradually diminish, the impressions of the concentrated stages (samāhitabhūmikavāsanā) gradually increase and the basis is revolved (āśraya-parāvṛtti).” (‘jig rten pa’i ‘dod chags dang bral ba na / mnyam par bzhag pa ma yin pa’i sa’i bag chags ‘grib ste / mnyam par bzhag pa’i sa’i bag chags ‘phel nas gnas gyur pa bzhin no /) 218 Schmithausen (1987:184): “from the historical point of view, scepticism seems to be justified as a matter of principle.” 219 A more extended interpretation of the ālayavijñāna in comparison with modern psychology has been attempted by this author elsewhere and so will not be discussed further here. (See Waldron 1988, ‘A Comparison of the Ālayavijñāna with Freud’s and Jung’s Theories of the Unconscious.’ Annual Memoirs of the Otani University Shin Buddhist Comprehensive Research Institute, 6:109-150.) 220 There is a long passage describing the process of rebirth in the Yogācārabhūmi in which the resultant ālayavijñāna which possesses all the seeds is portrayed as merging with the newly congealed egg and sperm and, being thus established in the body, brings about actual reconnection of birth. (24,1-10: yatra tat sarvabījakaṃ vipākasaṃgṛhitaṃ āśrayôpādātr ālayavijñānaṃ saṃmūrcchati... tasyāṃ ca avasthāyāṃ pratiṣṭhitaṃ vijñānaṃ baddhaḥ pratisandhir ity ucyate). Schmithausen (1987:127f). MSg I.34 argues that it must be the ālayavijñāna and not a mental cognition (mano-vijñāna) that coagulates in the womb, carrying with it all the seeds. 221 Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, para.34; MSg I.5. “the five material sense-faculties are appropriated by this [[[cognition]]] without perishing for as long as life continues.” (T.31.133c1f; D.4048.3b4: tshe ji srid par rjes su ‘jug gi bar du des dbang po gzugs can lnga po dag ma zhig par nye bar gzung pa). MSg I.35: no vijñāna other than the resultant vijñāna (vipāka-vijñāna, i.e. ālayavijñāna) can appropriate the material sense-faculties, because the other cognitions have individual, specific bases and are not constant. (T.31.136a13f; D.9a6: dbang po gzugs can ‘dzin par byed pa yang de las gzhan rnam par smin pa’i rnam par shes par mi ‘thad de/ de ma yin pa’i rnam par shes pa gzhan rnams ni gnas so sor nges pa dang mi brtan pa’i phyir ro). 222 Proof Portion, Proof 7 on the impossibility of nirodha-samāpatti without the ālayavijñāna (ASBh:13,13f); MSg I.50 “because it is also taught that ‘even for those in the absorption of cessation (nirodha-samāpatti) consciousness does not leave the body,’ it is correct that it is the resultant consciousness which does not leave the body.” (T.31.137a2f; D.4048.11a6f: ‘gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa rnams kyang rnam par shes pa dang mi ‘bral lo zhes gsungs pa’i yang phyir de ni rnam par smin pa’i rnam par shes pa dang/ mi bral bar rigs te); MSg I.51-54 discusses reasons that it cannot be a mental cognition (mano-vijñāna) that occurs during this absorption; Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, paras. 22-32. 223 Proof Portion, Proof 1.c.; Pravṛtti Portion (2.b)B.1), 3) and 4.b)A.); MSg I.32 defends the ālayavijñāna in the context of purification on the grounds that it allows for the coexistence of diverse seeds and states. It is said, for example, in MSg I.46, that supramundane dharmas can co-exist with mundane dharmas within the ālayavijñāna like milk and water. MSg I.62 succintly states the general principle that “being indeterminate and unobscured (anivṛtāvyākṛta) is not in contradiction with being wholesome or unwholesome, while being wholesome and esome are mutually contradictory.” (T.31.137c15f; D.4048.13a1: ma bsgribs la lung du ma bstan pa ni dge ba dang mi dge ba dang ‘gal ba med de/ dge ba dang mi dge ba ni phan tshun mi mthun no). Generally speaking, the ālayavijñāna, together with all of the seeds, facilitates the immediate succession of many kinds of diverse states, whether between those of different karmic nature, wholesome, etc., or those between different realms of existence. This is the Yogācāra response, built upon the Sautrāntika notion of seeds, to the tension between heterogeneous fruition (vipāka-phala) and homogeneous succession (samanantara-pratyaya). 224 MSg I.14. “it is present at all times” (T.31.134b28; D.4048.6a2: dus thams cad du nye bar gnas pa yin no). 225 TBh 19,5f parallels sections of the Pravṛtti Portion: ālayavijñānaṃ dvidhā pravartate / adhyātam upādānavijñapito bahirdhā ‘paricchinnākāra-bhājana-vijñaptitaś ca. Also ASBh:21,9f. TBh:19,14f explains “unperceived.” The cognitive nature and functions of the ālayavijñāna are also outlined: TBh:18,26: “it is a cognition since it cognizes,” (vijānāti iti vijñānaṃ) which has aspects and an object since (19,3f) “there ought not to be a cognition (vijñāna) without an aspect or an object” (na hi nirālambanaṃ nirākāraṃ vā vijñānaṃ yujyate). TBh:19,5-10 (3a-b) then describes much the same objects for the ālayavijñāna as the Pravṛtti Portion does, which are also subtle and unperceived, and concludes that indeed the ālayavijñāna is a type of cognition (TBh:19,26: tatra ālayākhyaṃ vijñānam ity uktaṃ), since it has the requisite associated mental factors (vijñānaṃ ca avaśyaṃ caittaiḥ saṃprayuktam ity ato vaktavyaṃ katamaiḥ katibhiś ca taccaittaiḥ sadā saṃprayujyate.), the five omni-present ones (sarvatraga), as in the Pravṛtti Portion. They too have a neutral feeling tone and are karmically indeterminate (TBh:21, verse 4a-b: upekṣa vedanā tatra anivṛtāvyākṛtaṃ ca tat), being resultant (vipākatvāt). See also Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, para.36. 226 ASBh:11: sarvabījakaṃ cittam. MSg I.2. “the cognition containing all the seeds is the receptacle (ālaya) of all dharmas,” (chos kun sa bon thams cad pa’i / rnam par shes pa jun gzhi ste/), etc. This is probably the most common synonym of the ālayavijñāna. 227 This is particularly so for such texts as the Pravṛtti Portion in which the ālayavijñāna is explained in terms of its objects (ālambana), associated factors (samprayukta), its reciprocal conditionality (anyonya-pratyayatā) and simultaneity (sahabhāva) with the six momentary cognitions. MSg I.28 describes the relationship between the ālayavijñāna and the ordinary cognitive modes in terms of the causal-condition (hetu-pratyaya) and the predominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya). The ālayavijñāna, together with all the seeds, is the causal condition of the momentary types of mind, while the appropriate sense-organs, etc., which directly condition the momentary cognitions themselves, comprise the predominant condition, etc. See note #207 above. 228 Thus, the ālayavijñāna is not merely ad hoc, in the sense that it does not address only the single issue for which it was initially devised (the literal meaning of “ad hoc”), i.e. the continuity of mind within the absorption of cessation, if Schmithausen’s analysis is well-founded, since it also 1) addressed many of the other problems that vexed Abhidharma theory; and 2) is at the center of a systematic innovation in the theory of mind, resulting in a complete paradigm shift; and moreover, 3) it expresses a self-conscious return to, or at least rearticulation of, authoritative canonical doctrines which had become marginalized by Abhidharma doctrine. It may perhaps be just old wine in new bottles, but this too argues against a purely ad hoc nature, since the “dogmatical and exegetical factors” (Schmithausen, 1987:182) leading to its articulation, in addition to appeals to empirical experience, constitute multiple and overlapping grounds for just such an innovative structure of mind, the very opposite of ad hoc. 229 Only from this perspective can one approach such doctrinally dense passages as that in the ASBh, “Fattening the seeds when the aggregates, etc. are present is called ‘impression’ (vāsanā). It is called ‘having all the seeds’ (sarvabījakam) because it is endowed with the seeds for the arising of just those aggregates, etc. Since dharmas dwell (ālīyante) there as seeds, or since beings grasp [to it] as a self, [it is called] the ālaya-vijñāna. Because it is formed by past action [it is] the resultant consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna). Because it appropriates personal existence (ātmabhāva)

again and again during the rebirth-connection, [it is] the appropriating consciousness (ādānavijñāna). Furthermore, it is called mind (citta) since it has accumulated (*cita) the impressions of all dharmas.” ASBh 11,9-14 (T.31.701a26-b3; D.4053.9b4-6): skandhādīnāṃ samudācāre tadbījaparipuṣṭir vāsanā ity ucyate. sarvabījakaṃ teṣām eva skandhādīnām utpattibījair yuktatvāt. ālīyante tasmin dharmā b ījataḥ, sattvā v ā ātmagrāheṇa ity ālayavijñānam. pūrvakarma nirmitatvāt vipākavijñānam. punaḥ punaḥ pratisaṅdhibandhe ātmabhāvôpādānād ādānavijñānam. tat punar etac cittam ity ucyate, sarvadharmavāsanā*cittatvāt. This last *’citta’ is read as ‘cita,’ ‘accumulated’ on the basis of Hsüan Tsang’s Chinese (“chi chi”, T.31.701b2f) and the Tibetan (bsags pa, D.4053.9b6). 230 The Yoga school of Patañjali also discussed various issues and concepts similar to those presented herein. None of these schools, however, fully differentiated a distinct, simultaneous and interactive type of mind on the level of complexity of the ālayavijñāna. See Eliade (1973:36-46) and La Vallée Poussin (1937b) for similarities and comparisons. As for the other, mostly minor or unfortunately insufficiently preserved schools who proposed such concepts, the MSg I.11 asserts that the following concepts are synonyms (paryāya) of the ālayavijñāna: the ‘root-consciousness’ (mūlavijñāna) of the Mahāsāṃghikas; the ‘skandha which lasts for as long as saṃsāra’ (āsaṃsārika-skandha) of the Mahīśāsakas; the bhavaṅga-citta of the Sthavira (the Theravādins). See notes 140, 214, above; also Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, paras. 18-20, 35. Of these, Theravādin Abhidhamma, as least in its commentarial stage, offers the most comparable concepts to those found affiliated with the ālayavijñāna complex, as we have noted above. The bhavaṅga-citta, though intermittent and not simultaneous with the supraliminal cognitive modes, functions as a neutral ‘buffer-state’ allowing the succession of heterogeneous elements and serving as an immediate condition for cognitive processes. There is also the abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇa, with the dual characteristics of cause and effect, i.e. as a constructive and a constructed type of consciousness conditioned by the saṅkhāra, whose reversal and cessation is the end of saṃsāra. It is also used to interpret canonical passages referring to seeds, thus bearing some resemblance to the ālayavijñāna, although Collins (1982:208) specifically warns that “one should not think that this construction-consciousness refers to some special type or level of consciousness which is different from the ordinary element viññāṇa. It is, rather, a means of describing that ordinary element.” These concepts, however, unlike in the Yogācāra, remain relatively unrelated to each other. See note 125, above. 231 Yogācārabhūmi 61,17 (T.30.292a1; D.4035,31a5; P.5536.35a3): bījaṃ hetupratyayaḥ; 110 (T.302a19f; D.4035.57a2f; P.5536.66b8): bājaṃ pratyayādhiṣṭhānam ādhisṭhāya hetupratyayaḥ prajñāpyate; Yogācārabhūmiviniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (T.30.583b21f; D.4038.13b1f; P.15b5f): “What is the causal condition? The two, the material sense faculties together with their bases and vijñāna, are called, in short, ‘that which possesses all the seeds.’” (de la rgyu’i rkyen gang zhe na / dbang po gzugs can rten dang bcas pa gang yin pa dang / rnam par shes pa gang yin pa ‘di gnyis ni mngon nas sa bon thams cad pa zhes bya’o.) The ASBh:35 (D.4053.26a4-6), in explaining hetu-pratyaya, states that the ālayavijñāna has two aspects, the resultant and the constructive. The first is the causal condition of that which has taken birth. The second should be seen as the causal condition of that which arrives through effort and of the other ālayavijñāna in the future. The constructive ālayavijñāna is, moreover, impressed (“perfumed,” vāsita) by the arising cognitions which are present in this life. (ālayavijñānaṃ punar dvividham—vaipākikam ābhisaṃskārikaṃ ca / tatra (a) vaipākikam upapattiprātilambhikānāṃ hetupratyayaḥ / (b) ābhisaṃskārikaṃ prāyogikānām āyatyāṃ ca ālayavijñānāntarasya hetupratyayo drṣṭavyaḥ / ābhisaṃskārikaṃ punar ālayavijñānaṃ tajjānmika pravṛttivijñāna-samudācāravāsitaṃ veditavyam). This is very similar to the dual nature of the abhisaṅkhāra-viññāṇa of the Theravādin Abhidhamma, as discussed above. PSkPBh, P.5567.45b5: “The causal condition is the impressions which abide in the ālayavijñāna.” (rgyu’i rkyen ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la gnas pa’i bag chags te.) Sthiramati, the author of the PSkPBh, after explaining the other

conditions, the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya), the predominate condition (adhipati-pratyaya), and the homogeneous antecedent condition (samanantara-pratyaya), comments on the traditional conditions for the occurrence of a sense-cognition, i.e. the object, an unimpaired sense-organ and appropriate attention, adding that “the causal condition is not mentioned since it always exists and is hard to discern.” (45b8: rgyu’i rkyen rtag tu gnas pa dang / shes par dka’ ba’i phyir ma smos so). This bears comparison to the Theravādin Abhidhamma doctrine, mentioned above (note 123, Visuddhimagga XV.39), that the bhavaṅga-citta is also one of the conditions for the arising of a cognition. 232 ASBh above. Pravṛtti Portion (3.b)B.1.). Mizuno (1978:403) cites a passage from the Hsien-yang-sheng-chiao-lun (T.1602.31.481a) in which saṃjnā arises dependent on the seeds of the ālayavijñāna. 233 In addition to its central place in describing the seeds and perfumations within the AKBh, such expressions (along with sāmarthya) are used throughout the Yogācāra literature. To cite a few: 1) MSg I.16: “the ālayavijñāna which is arisen in such a way that it has the special capacity for the [[[defiled]] dharmas] to arise (utpāda-śakti-viśeṣaka) is called “having all the seeds” (sarvabījakam). (gang de ‘byung ba’i mthu’i khyad par can kun gzhi rnam par zhes pa de / de bzhin du ‘byung ba la sa bon thams cad pa zhes bya’o.); 2) ad MSg I.16, u 249b1: “‘Propensity’ means special power.” (bag chags zhes bya ba ni nus pa’i khyad par te); 3) ad MSg I.16, bh 154a3f: “‘Having the special power for them to arise’ means being connected with having the special power for producing those defiled dharmas. ‘Having the power to produce them’ also means ‘having all the seeds.’... Since [the ālayavijñāna] has the power for producing all the dharmas,it is called ‘having all the seeds.’“(de ‘byung ba’i mthu’i khyad par can zhes bya ba ni kun nas nyon mong pa’i chos de dag rnams bskyed pa’i nus pa khyad par can gyi sbyor ba dang ldan pa ste / de bskyed ba’i nus pa dang ldan pa yang sa bon thams cad pa zhes brjod do / .... kun gzhi rnam par shes pas chos thams cad skyed pa’i nus pa yod ba’i phyir / des na nus ba dang ldan las sa bon thams cad pa zhes brjod do /); 4) Vasubandhu defines the ālayavijñāna as “a consciousness having the special power (sāmarthya or śakti viśeṣa) to produce those [[[dharmas]]].” (ad MSg I.14, bh 153a5f: de skyed pa’i nus pa’i khyad par can gyi rnam par shes pa). 234 MSg I.22 “All the seeds are considered to have six characteristics: [they are] momentary (kṣaṇika), simultaneous (sahabhūka), they continue in an uninterrupted stream (saṃtānāvṛt, or saṃtānapravṛtta), are determinate (niyata), require conditions (pratyayāpekṣa) and are completed by their own fruit (svaphala).” (sa bon rnam pa drug tu ‘dod / skad cig pa dang lhan cig ‘byung / de ni rgyun chags ‘byung bar ‘dod / nges dang rkyen la ltos pa dang / rang gi ‘bras bus bsgrubs pa’o /.) 235 AKBh IX (Poussin, 300; Shastri, 1232: karma tadbhāvanāṃ tasyā v ṛttilābhaṃ phalam / niyamena prajānāti buddhādanyo na sarvathā/). Also, Stcherbatsky, 1976:76. Visuddhimagga XIX.17: “The succession of kamma and its result... is clear in its true nature only to the Buddha’s Knowledge of Kamma and Its Result.” See also A II 80 and the Milindapañha (Miln. 267f; 189 in Pāli) where the fruition of karma (kammavipāka) is considered incomprehensible (acintiyā).