Hermeneutic and Polemical Tradition of Late
Mahāyāna Buddhism:
Citations and hypothetical arguments in Haribhadra’s
Abhisamayālakārāloka (Ch.30-31)
Bill M. Mak
Introduction
This article examines the references and citations found in Ch.30-31 of
Haribhadra's (fl. mid-late 8th century CE) Abhisamay laṅk r lok (AAA), a
voluminous commentary on the Aṣṭas hasrik prajñ p ramit (AP) based on
the scheme of Abhisamay laṅk ra (AA), and the way they are employed in the
text.1 As with other learned pandits of his days, Haribhadra wrote in excellent
Sanskrit and in an encyclopedic style, making extensive references to orthodox
works such as s tras and commentaries, as well as those of his opponents.
Beside demonstrating the author's erudition, such references were sought as
corroborative supports to Haribhada's views on one hand, and as denouncement
on the other to those in contradiction to his.
The importance of the AAA in late Indian Mah y na Buddhism is reflected in
the subsequent Tibetan tradition where the Tibetan translation of the AAA
remains to date an important text to be studied.2 We may assume that at least in
the mind of Haribhadra’s audience, these various works being referred to were
reasonably well-known and considered authoritative in certain scholarly
milieux in eighth century India. An investigation of these quotations and
references should thus contribute to our understanding of the source and point
of reference of Haribhadra's ideas, his doctrinal position, as well as the role the
author saw himself as a commentator.
AAA Ch.30-31 is a commentary to the story of Sad prarudita, an isolated episode in the AP
which was placed outside the scheme of AA proper in AAA. For discussion of the relation
between AP, AA and AAA, see the author's “Haribhadra’s Commentary
(Abhisamay la k r lok ) on the Story of Sad prarudita (Ch. 30-31 of Aas hasrik
Prajñ p ramit )”. In Ñ nappabha : A Felicitation Volume in Honour of Venerable Dr.
Pategama Gnanarama Mah Thera, ed. by Rangama Chandawimala and Chandima
Wijebandara, Singapore: Ti-Sarana Buddhist Association, 2011, pp 84-87.
2
T hoku 3791 [Cha. 1b1-341a7].
1
1.0 Buddhist references in AAA Ch. 30-31
1.1 Quotations from other Buddhist Sūtras
As the AAA was set out to be a commentary on the AP based on the AA
scheme, the text was expectedly filled with references to the mūla presented in
a sequential order.3 While the contents of the AP was prima facie taken as
buddhavacana and their justification per se would not be deemed necessary,
justification for Haribhadra's elucidation of the implicit doctrinal import and
hidden structures of the meandering contents of the AP, especially of the rather
convoluted and apparently incongruent content of the Sad prarudita would
indeed be necessary. As seen in the examples below, the s tras which the
justifications are based on must be assumed by the audience to be authoritative.
1.1.1 Saṃyuktāgama
AP context:4 Following the description of the causally produced yet
insubstantial body of the Tath gata, the insubstantiality of phenomena
conditioned by the assemblage of factors (hetupratyayas magrī) was explained
through analogy of the vīṇ .
AAA position: Haribhadra went one step further to explain that this assemblage
of factors or the "casual complex" is not to be taken as the true cause
(t ttvikam) responsible for the generation of phenomena.5 In a long discursion
It is of interest to note that the mūla Haribhadra referred to is not identical to the extant AP in
Sanskrit, which represents the a later recension of the text and closely parallels the contents of
the Song translation by Shihu (T228) dated 985 CE. For example, the term upav ṇī (a
component of the vīṇ ) which Haribhadra glossed (upav ṇī p r vasthit tantrīvi e - W969,
together with other parts of the instrument such as upadh nī) is not found in the editio
princeps of the AP or any mss. I have access to so far.
4
W969; Conze 1973:292.
5
Even though sound is perceived as a result of convergence of all [components], by the
explanation of arbitrarily perceived sound, one rejects the “causal complex” (s magry s) to be
something real (t ttvikam) having productive nature. sarveṣ ṃ sam yog c chabda ḥ
prajñapyata ity anenâpi pr jñaptika- abda-nirde ena s magry s t ttvikaṃ janakasvabh vaṃ nirasyati (W969). Sparham translated the passage as “Thus, by giving an
exposition of sound that is labeled, he refutes that the own-being of a complete collection is an
absolute reality”. (Sparham 2011: 4.290). While the general impression Sparham gives is
correct, he missed the key term janaka-svabh vam or “productive nature”, a bahuvrīhi which
connects with t ttvikam. In other words, Haribhadra breaks the casual connection between the
phenomenon and its apparent casual complex, which led to his deconstruction of causality in
the following section.
3
158
(W969-976), Haribhadra tried to demonstrate the logical absurdity of causality
(k ryakaraṇabh va) through the deconstructive catuṣkoṭi of pairing
singular/multiple cause(s) with singular/multiple result(s).6 However,
Haribhadra defended himself against the accusation of denial of causality,
which underlies the fundamental Buddhist doctrine of pratītya-samutp da, as
expressed succinctly by the Sa ṃyukt gama verse: yad ut smin satīdam
bhavati.7
tattvataḥ pram ṇaA-sah yatvenpram ṇa-sah yasya k rya-k raṇabh vasynabhyupagam tB kathaṃ nâyath dar anamC abhyupagamaḥE.
tath hy et van-m trakamF eva pratyakṣe pratibh sate. yad ut smin
satîdaṃ bhavatti, tac csm bhir aniṣiddhamG eva. yas tu
pram ṇopapanna-svar paḥ
k rya-k raṇaH-bh vo
varṇyateI,
sa
J
pratyakṣa-samadhigamyo na bhavati, nirvikalpakatvena pratyakṣasya
pram ṇopapanna-svar patvvadh raṇaH-s marthya-vaikaly t.8
A pramāṇa [NWT, prahāṇa P B bhāvasyānabhyupagamāt] W, bhāvasyābh°
NPTWpWc, khas mi len pa tib. C nāyathādarśanam [NWT, nayathārthadarśanam P D
6
For English translation of this passage, see Sparham 2009: 290-303. Further discussion and
more accurate interpretation may be found in Moriyama 1988, 1989. The four-fold argument
against causality is known as catuṣkoṭyutp dapratiṣedhahetu 四句制生因論 (mu bshi ske ba
‘gag pa’i gtan tshigs). Its earliest formulation extant appears to be Jñ nagarbha (early 8 th
century)’s SDK V14 (Eckel 1987Ś8,23). The formulation was adopted also in Kamala la
(contemporary of Haribhadra)’s MAL and SDNS. The catuṣkotyutp dapratiṣedhahetu appears
to be a critique to Dharmak rti’s view concerning causality as presented in his PVK and HB.
See Amano 1966, Amano 1967, Amano 1980, Moriyama 1988, Moriyama 1989. For the
general introduction of the tetralemma and its various application through the history of
Buddhist dialectics, see Robinson 1957Ś302. For studies of N g rjuna’s catuṣkoṭi and its
relation to ūnyat and pratītyasamutp da, see Katsura 2000; Westerhoff 2006. According to
N g rjuna, all the speakable nominal truths in Buddhist teachings fall under the sa ṃvṛti
category, whereas only the unspeakable truth of nyat falls under the param rtha category.
See Nagao 1990:76; 何建興 2007Ś10. See also Kanakura’s 金倉円照<印 の論証法>東北
大学文学部研究年報1.88.
7
In the context of exegetical literature, the phrase is usually followed by asyotp d d idam
utpadyate, together of which was synonymous to pratītyasamutp da as seen in
Catuṣpariṣatsūtra 7.4 and the Chinese translation of Prajñ p ramitopade a (所謂是 有故
是 有,是 生故是 生T1509.25.298a). However, as noted by Lamotte, the
pratītyasamutp da associated here does not necessarily entail the typical twelvefold chain. See
Lamotte, Étienne. Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse, Tome V (1980). Louvain: Institut
Orientaliste, 1949. 2191 fn.1. Cf. also de Jong, J.W. “A Propos du Nid nasaṃyukta”. In
Mélanges de Sinologie offerts à Monsieur Paul Demiéville. Vol. 2. 1974. 137-149.
8
W971-2.
159
abhyupagamaḥ] [NWT, abhyupagamam P F mātrakam] NPW, mātram ekam T G
aniṣiddham [NWT, aniddham P
H kārya-kāraṇa] NWT, ... [raṇa PI varṇyate]
WT, vaṇṇyate NP [J samadhigamyo]NpcPW, samādh° NacTWpWc, rtogs pa tib
Hsvarūpatvāvadhāraṇa]NPW, °dhāraṇā T
Because in reality (tattvatas), i.e., by being subject to valid means of
knowledge (pram ṇa-sah yatvena), causality which is subject to
invalid means of knowledge (apram ṇa-) is not accepted [by us, i.e.,
the M dhyamikas], how would the acceptance [of causality] not be
non-empirical?9 For in this way, in direct perception, only so much
manifests [itself]. As "if this is there, then that arises", that indeed we
do not deny.10 However, that which is to be realized (samadhigamyas)
through direct perception as described as causality, whose nature being
realized through valid means of knowledge, does not exist. This is
because, inasmuch as direct perception is free of imagination, the
capacity of determining (avadh raṇa-) nature realized through valid
means of knowledge is insufficient (vaikaly t).11
1.1.2 Ratnameghasūtra
AP context:12 In Ch.30, after Sad prarudita was informed by an “image of
Tath gata” (tath gata-vigraha) that the teaching of Prajñ p ramit may be
sought from Dharmodgata, Sad prarudita entered into many “doors of
meditative states" (sam dhi-mukh ni).13
AAA positionŚ As Haribhadra equates the story of Sad prarudita as an
illustration of the Mah y na path of enlightenment, conspicuous events such as
this need to be interpreted as signposts of spiritual attainment.14 The
An alternative reading in P gives opposite reading na yath dar anam. Here I take the rhetoric
question as confirming the non-empirical or false nature of causality.
10
Cf. NidS 14.2, SN II 25-27. 此 故彼 ,此無故彼無。 雜阿含經 T99.2.98b. Also MN
III.63.23.
11
My translation is somewhat different from Sparham's: "Direct perception does not know of a
cause and effect depicted as validated by valid cognition because it is non-conceptual, and
therefore devoid of the capacity to ascertain what valid cognition validates." (Sparham
2011:4.294).
12
W940-1; Conze 1973:281-2.
13
In the Sanskrit edition, 62 of sam dhis were described. The Chinese translations all varyŚ
T224/225-47; T227-52; T223-51; T228-60.
14
Mak 2011:91-92.
9
160
justification for Sad prarudita's attainment of the Adhimuktic ryabhūmi by
means of numerous sam dhis was found in a rather obscure passage from the
Ratnameghasūtra, a popular Mah y na text whose Sanskrit version is no longer
extant.15
tatra
mṛdu-madhydhim tra-catur-nirvedhabh g ydhigama-bhed t
sarva-dharma-svabh va-vyavalokandi dv da a sam dhayaḥA. tannirj t s tv adhimukticary B-bh m v eva m y -vivarjita ity dayaḥ
pañc at sam dhaya câvagantavy ḥ. rya-ratnamegha-s tre câsy mC
evdhimukti-cary -bh mau vartam no bodhisattvaḥ pṛthagjano 'pi
sarva-b la-vipatti-samatikr nto
'saṃkhyeyaD-sam dhi-dh raṇ vimokṣbhijñdi-guṇnvitaḥ paṭhyata iti. aya-pari uddhi-bal d evaE
prathama-bh my-adhigamrthaṃF 16
samādhayaḥ]NW, samādhayas PT B nirjātāstvadhimukticaryā]NPWpT,
nirjātāstvadhimukta Wc, nirjātāś cādhimukticaryā W, tib. yang de las nges par 'byung
pa mos pas spyod pa
C
cāsyām]NPT, cāsyāṃ W D 'saṃkhyeya]NT, 'saṃkheya P E eva]NPWT, iva Wc,
nyid tib.
F
adhigamārthaṃ]NPT, adhigamārtha W
A
Amongst these [doors of meditative states], due to the distinction of
understanding (adhigama-bhed t) of the mild, medium and superior
fourfold penetration of insight (catur-nirvedhabh gīya-), there are
twelve concentrations such as the "All-dharma-nature-viewing" and so
on. Fifty concentrations such as "Illusion-abandoned" and so on should
be understood as the ones evolved out of these (tan-nirj t ḥ) [twelve
concentrations] in the Bhumi of Resolute Conduct (adhimukticary Though no longer extant in Sanskrit, the Ratnameghasūtra was translated into Chinese by
Mandrasena曼陀羅仙 in 503 CE - 大乘寶雲經 (T658), by Dharmaruci/Bodhiruci in 693 CE 佛說寶雨經 (T660) and by Dharmap la in 1023 CE (T489). It was translated also into Tibetan
(T hoku 231). Its popularity is attested by fact that it was quoted at least four times in the
Chinese translation of the Mah prajñ p ramitopade a as identified by Lamotte. Furthermore,
according to Lamotte, the text belongs to a group of individual texts which have not been
incorporated into bigger collections like the Prajñ p ramit , Avata ṃsaka, Ratnakūṭa and
Mah saṃnip ta. "l’auteur du Traité disposa des Mah y nas tra originaux parus en Inde
durant environ trois siècles et qui furent traduits en chinois entre 179 et 503 p.C. Il semble
qu’à son époque ces s tra se présentaient comme des publications autonomes et n’étaient pas
encore incorporés dans de vastes collections comme celles de la Prajñ , de l’Avata ṃsaka, du
Ratnakūṭa et du Mah saṃnip ta.” Lamotte, Étienne. Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de
Sagesse, Tome III (1970), XXXVII.
16
W960.
15
161
bhūmau) alone. And just as in the Noble Jewel Cloud Sutra17, a
Bodhisattva residing in the Bh mi of Resolute Conduct (adhimukticary -bhūmau), even though he is an ordinary being (pṛthagjanas), he
is taught to transcend all the adversities (vipatti-) resulted from
immaturity (b la-), and is accompanied by the virtues of innumerable
concentrations, dh raṇis, liberative power (vimokṣa-), supernatural
powers and so on (abhijñ di-)18.
1.1.3 Daśabhūmikasūtra
AP context:19 At the very end of the chapter of Dharmodgata, Sad prarudita
after listening to the teaching of Dharmodgata entered into numerous "doors of
meditative states" as he did earlier, but this time in the presence of
Dharmodgata. The actual number of "doors of meditative states" described this
time was actually less than before though the total number was supposed to be
60,000 (sa ṣṭiḥ sam dhimukh atasahasr ṇi).
AAA positionŚ The strange resemblance of Sad prarudita's meditative
experience in two occasions is difficult to explain. For Haribhadra the increased
number of "doors of meditative states" is taken as the justification of
Sad prarudita's spiritual progress. According to the scheme Haribhadra had
devised, Sad prarudita should have traversed the Adhimuktic ryabhūmi and
attained the Bodhisattva Bh mi of Joy (pramudit ), the first Bh mi of the ten
bh mi-system found in the Da abhūmisūtra (incorporated also as part of the
Avata ṃsakasūtra) where the experience of a hundred of sam dhis was
described, though Haribhadra could not take the number quite literally as he
had earlier.
yathoktṣṭbhisamaytmaka-prajñ p ramit -de anlambana-sam dhibal d bah ni sam dhi-mukh ni pratham y m eva bh m v adhigat nîty
Twelve Bh mis were described in the S traŚ 一未發菩提心地。 極喜地。三 垢地。四
發光地。五焰慧地。六極 勝地。七現前地。八遠行地。九不動地。十善慧地。十一法
雲地。十 普光明佛地 T660.16.300c. The passage described how a Bodhisattva-to-be
having gained the most supreme resolute dharma nature (增 最極增 信解法性), entered
into the first stage. The Bh mi is known as "unarisen Bodhicitta" and is considered a turning
point for an ordinary being becoming a Bodhisattva.
18
又於阿僧企耶諸 摩地。總持解脫神通智明。T600.16.300c.
19
W987; Conze 1973:298.
17
162
haŚ evaṃ pramukh nty di. atra sam dhy-abhinirh rop y eva
sam dhi-mukh ni, na tu sam dhayaḥ. pramudit y ṃ bh mau sam dhiataṃ labhata iti da abh make bhihitatv t. sam dhi-svabh v ny eva v
sam dhi-mukh ni.
tatra
ata-grahaṇasyopalakṣaṇatv d
iti
pratipattavyaṃ.20
Due to the force of sam dhis which depends on the teaching of
Prajñ p ramita whose essence is the Eight Abhisamayas as described,
many “doors” (mukh ni) to the sam dhi were acquired even in the first
bh mi. And it is therefore said in the s ta, “thus the foremost
[sam dhis]” and so on. With respect to this, the means (up ya) of
generating the sam dhis (sam dhy-abhinirh ra-) are the “access” to
sam dhi (sam dhi-mukh ni), but not [actually] the sam dhis. That is
since as it has been explained in the Ten Bh mis (da abhūmake)
[S tra] that in the Bh mi of Joy (pramudit y m), one obtains a hundred
of sam dhis.21 Alternatively, the “faces” of sam dhi (sam dhimukh ni) have precisely the nature of sam dhis. With regard to that, it
should be understood that it is due to the word “hundred” ( atagraha ṇasya-) being a figure of speech (upalakṣa ṇatv t)22.
1.2 Quotations from other texts of known authors
As evident throughout the text, Haribhadra has a certain technique of picking
up patterns in the AP selectively and interpret them in various ways, sometimes
ingeniously and sometimes arbitrarily as we have seen in 1.1. Haribhadra did
so, however, with the sole purpose of fitting the different ideas into his
integrated scheme of Mah y na doctrines. According the opening of the text
itself, the explanations given in AAA were based on four previous works,
namely Asaṅga's Tattvavini caya, Vasubandhu's Paddhati, rya Vimuktisena's
Vṛtti and Bhadanta Vimuktisena's V rttika.23 However, as far as Ch.30-31 of
our editiones principes, no quotations from Hairbhadra's four sources could be
identified and the quotations which we can identify come from in fact a much
wider source. The Mah y na doctrines Haribhadra adopted in the AAA as
20
W988.
Gaṇḍavy has tra (Vaidya ed.) 206. 勤行於精進即得百
經 T286.10.504a.
22
Technically, a synecdoche.
23
Conze 1978:51.
21
163
昧⋯是初菩薩地名之為歡喜
十住
evinced by his choice of quotations in Ch.30-31 come most from the three
exegetical traditions of i) M dhyamaka, ii) Yogac ra, and iii) Bauddha-ny ya
(Pram ṇa).
Amongst the twenty-five quotes identified in these two chapters, most of them
are from the last two traditions described above. The authors and works quoted
are listed as follows (in chronological order):24
(i) Maitreya. Abhisamay laṅk ra stra.
(ii) Asaṅga. Mah y nasūtr laṅk rabh ṣya.
(iii) Asaṅga. Mah y nasaṃgraha.
(iv) Vasubandhu. Mah y nasaṃgrahabh ṣya.
(v) Dign ga. Ny yamukham.
(vi) Dharmak rti. Pram ṇav rttika.
(vii) Dharmak rti. Hetubindu.
(viii) Kamala la. Bh van krama.
In the case of (i), as we have already seen earlier, Haribhadra attempted to map
the abhisamaya system of the Larger PP to AP, thus giving a watertight
structure to the Lesser PP. In the case of (ii), (iii) and (iv), it appeared the
author had taken the various Yogacara doctrines such as trisvabh va for
granted and tried to read various details in the mūla in the light of these
doctrines. In the case of (v), (vi) and (vii), the author was concerned with
logical procedures and the various pram ṇa axioms which provided a point of
reference for author’s own proposition. As for (ix), along with digressions on
subjects such as whether multiple Tath gatas are possible in one world system,
24
In our selection, only one quote was explicitly indicated by the author, namely Vasubandhu’s
MSBh. Other than AA and MSA which were abundantly quoted throughout AAA, these
citations were simply inserted into the text without elaboration. In the case of parallel materials
with other works such as BhK and various commentaries on PV, while there is no absolute
certainty which way the borrowing goes, it appears more probable that the materials in AAA are
not the most original due to their fragmented nature. Along with all the unidentified source of
passages marked by the invariable ity eke and ity anye, a comprehensive study of all citations of
the entire is highly desirable in order establish the true relation of AAA with other works,
especially those of his contemporary.
164
and a lengthy exposition on the fallacy of causality (1.1.2), these passages
where various views were embedded, do not actually contribute directly to the
commented passages in the mūla per se, but were learned fanciful diversions
where Haribhadra engaged himself in philosophical speculation.
2.0 Refutation of heterodox and non-Buddhist views
2.1 Reference to anonymous quotations and Nyāya
AAA was interspersed with anonymous quotations marked with ity eke and iti
anye. And indeed some of the sources of Haribhadra’s cited materials as we
have seen were not even marked by iti. However, whenever ity eke and iti anye,
they seem to suggest some kind of alternative ideas which could possibly be the
author’s own without committing to them.25
(ix) Interpretation of redundant examples
Context of mūla: In the opening speech of Dharmodgata to Sadāprarudita, the Tathāgata
was described as not coming from anywhere nor going anywhere. It was further equated
to a list of terms such as tathatā, bhūakoṭi, śūnyatā, virāgatā, nirodha, ākāśadhātu and so
on, to illustrate the oneness and non-dualistic of tathatā.
AAA: Haribhadra after suggesting that the eight terms mentioned in relation to Tathatā
were in fact the eight abhisamaya-s, continued to describe another view:
anye tu hetd haraṇdhiky d dhikyaṃ nigraha-sth naṃ kṣudranaiy yikairA apy ucyate, tat kathaṃ ny ya-parame varo bhagav n
ud haraṇdhikyamB uktav n iti codyaṃ kṛtv , yatra n maikaḥ
pratip dyas tatra tat-prasiddhasyikasyiv bhidh naṃC yuktaṃD, tatra
tu parṣan-maṇḍale bahavo bhinna-matayaḥE saṃniṣaṇṇ iti tadadhik reṇa yuktam anekod haraṇaF-vacanaṃ, vikalpena vm G
dṛṣṭ nt H na samuccayenety evaṃ sarvatrdhika-vacaneI parih raṃ
25
Such approach is occasionally observed in works of other encyclopedic writers. For example, in
Var hamira's Bṛhajj taka (6th century CE), the author etymologized the words hor (which in
fact came from Greek ὥρα, an technical term in astronomy/astrology translated usually as
"ascendent") as an abbreviation from ahor tra (horety ahor travikalpam eke v ñchanti
pūrv paravarṇalop t - 1.3a). The author attributed such view to an unidentified eke to
distinguish it from his own; yet without refuting it, the author gives the impression of a tacit
agreement. Such ambivalence may reflect the fact that the author could not yet provide a
conclusive statement regarding to a particular view, but included it because he considered it to be
an important reference, a "footnote" for himself or his future readers to consider.
165
varṇayanti. tath dṛṣṭ ntasyiva kathan t prat tyasamutpannatv diko
hetuḥ pr jñair abhy han n nokta iti.26
B
naiyāyikair]NWT, naiyānikair P
°dhikyam]NWT, °dhikam PWc C
prasiddhasyaika-syaivābhidhānaṃ]
PT, °dhāṇaṃ W, °dhānaḥ N D yuktaṃ]PW, yuktam T, ukt° Wc, yuktaḥ N, rigs pa
yin no tib.
E
matayaḥ]NWT, matayo P F anekodāharaṇa]NPWT, adhik° Wc, dpe mang po tib.
G
vā'mī]NPTWpWc, cāmī W, 'di dag kyang tib. H dṛṣṭāntā]NPWT, °nta Wp, °ṣṭākā
Wc
I
vacane]NT, °netu Wp, °neṣu W, °naṃ P, - Wc
A
Others, however, on account of the excess of reasons or examples,
claim that, as even the petty logicians teach redundancy ( dhikyam) to
be a fault (nigraha-sth nam), how could the Blessed One, the Lord of
Reasoning, have uttered an excess of examples? They then explained
the refutation with regard to all cases of superfluous expression in such
a way: Wherever there is indeed one person to be taught, the naming of
things that is well-known only to that [person] is appropriate. However,
in such case as in a circle of audience where many people of different
minds have gathered together, the utterance of many examples with
reference to those [people] were appropriate. Alternatively, those
examples [are put forth] optionally and not collectively. [Furthermore,]
based on the explanation of precisely the example, the cause [of the
premise] being dependent origination and so on was not stated since it
may be inferred by the wise ones.
Here an alternative solution of a certain “other” was given. As this solution
rejected to read the enumerated examples exclusively, it contradicted with
Haribhadra’s interpretation of the eight examples being precisely the eight
abhisamaya-s. The reader was therefore left to wonder what Haribhadra’s exact
position was and why he included this alternative view which seemed to weaken
his claim.
According to this view, the Buddha was praised for his excellence in reasoning
(thus ny yaparame vara) and the kṣudra-nyaiy yikas,27, presumably the orthodox
non-Buddhist ones, was mentioned in passing to point to the exigency of the
argument. According to this view, since redundancy is a type of Nigraha-sth nam-
26
W964.
166
s (faulty positions) which lead to defeat in a debate, one should give an
explanation to this otherwise blatant fault.28
The handling of redundant expressions appear, however, one of the recurring
themes throughout the AAA. Thus in explaining the redundant expression pakṣī
akuni, both of which mean “bird”, Haribhadra explained,
pakṣiṇaḥ akuner iti. pakṣau dv v asyeti pakṣ , naro 'pi mitr ri-pakṣasadbh v t pakṣ sy d iti. akuni-grahaṇaṃ. iv dir api akuniḥ sy d iti
pakṣ ti vacanaṃ.29
With regard to “pakṣiṇaḥ akuner”, pakṣin is one that has two wings,
but so can a person be a pakṣī due to the presence of “sides” such as
those of friends and enemies. Therefore the word akuni [was used].
Since iva and so on can also be akuni, therefore the word pakṣin
[was used].
While such explanation might seem trivial to the readers, it appeared to address
a certain concern in Haribhadra’s mind, that is, the redundancy characteristic of
the mūla. In this particular case, the redundant examples helped to pinpoint the
intended meaning, in a way similar to the “other’s” view earlier which favored
an optional, non-exclusive reading (vikalpena). It seems therefore Haribhadra
was indeed concerned with this problem of redundancy – on one hand, a literal
interpretation of the mūla was always prioritized when available, suggesting
Haribhadra’s somewhat orthodox positionś when an alternative view was
available, it would be presented as “other’s view” when in fact it could very
well be the author’s own, addressing his logical concerns.
2.2 Reference to Sāṃkhya
(x) S ṃkhya's view of causality
A more common term would possibly be kut rkika (lit. one with bad reason, cf. Lank 10.91).
The pejorative term in particular is used by both Buddhists and non-Buddhists to describe each
other. See Krasser 2004:140; Acharya 2007:45.
28
Ny yasūtra 5.2.13. From a contemporary perspective, however, redundancy is considered a
lapse in dialectic rather than in logic. It should be noted also that in Dharmak rti’s V dany ya,
eighteen faults of example (dṛṣṭ ntadoṣa) were mentioned without any reference to dhikyam
(VN 21.14; Much 1986:136).
29
W645.
27
167
The s mkhya-s were referred to twice in the passages we are examining. Here I
would refer to the catuṣkoṭi we have seen earlier (1.1.1) where the view of
S ṃkhya was refuted in passing.
Context of m laŚ Haribhadra was attempting to show the fallacy of a singular
result generated by multiple causes. The opponent proposed a concept of
inherent cause in another object which entails an endless chain of causation and
an infinite regress (anavasth ). Haribhadra dismissed such view because for the
M dhyamakas, whose view the author uphold, causality (hetuphalabh va) is
not accepted and therefore cannot be presupposed, unlike the S ṃkhya who
claim that all effects are inherent in their causes in a theory known as
satk ryav da, e.g., the form of a pot is inherent in the mud and the potentiality
is released by the collaborating factors.30
abhedâvi eṣe 'piA hetu-dharma-s marthy d yath na sarvaṃ sarvas dhakaṃB, tadvad bhedâvi eṣe 'pi na sarvaṃ sarva-s dhakam ity
evam-abhyupagata-hetu-phala-sambandhaṃC s ṃkhyâdikaṃ praty
ucyam naṃ obh mD dhatte. yas tuE tattvato hetu-phala-bh vâpav d F
m dhyamikas taṃ prati svabh vâti ayas teṣ ṃ svahetor iti hetudharma-s marthyaG-lakṣaṇo hetur asiddhaḥH sva-pakṣa-siddhaye
siddhavat katham up d yate.31
B
abhedāviśeṣe 'pi]NPWT, - tib.
sarvasādhakaṃ]NWT, sarvāsādhakaṃ P
sambandhaṃ]NWT,
D
E
sambandhaḥ| P
śobhām]NPTWc, śobhāṃ W
yas tu]NPW, vastu T F
bhāvāpavādī]NWT, bhāvādī P
G
H
sāmarthya]NPWT, °rthye Wp, - tib.
asiddhaḥ]NWT, asiddhāḥ P
A
C
Just as everything does not produce everything32, due to the power of
the property (dharma) of the cause33 [which is present in something,
but absent in others], even though [all these things are] equal (avi eṣe)
It may be noted that the S ṃkhyas, unlike the M m ṃsakas, are not always considered
archrivals of the Buddhists. In fact, one S ṃkhya text, Suvar ṇasaptati stra 金七十論 by
varakṛṣṇa (4th-5th century CE) was translated into Chinese by Param rtha and is included into
the Chinese Tripiṭaka (T2137).
31
W971.
32
Haribhadra's rephrasing of the opponent's argument, the criticism of which was stated already
earlier, possibly a reference to Dharmak rti - yath ’bhed vi eṣa’pi na sarvaṃ sarvas dhanam /
tath bhed vi eṣe’pi na sarvaṃ sarvas dhanam. PVK 3.173/ PVSV 87 (sv rth um na-pariccheda
173).
33
The extra feature svabh v ti aya of the opponent is reduced here by the siddh ntin to hetudharma, which is created out of the yet unestablished assumption of causality.
30
168
in being non-different [from each other] (abheda-), in the same manner
even though there is no difference [among all these things] in being
different [for each other], everything would not produce everything.
[Such explanation with] the relation between cause and result accepted
in such way works well ( obh m dhatte) for someone such as the
S ṃkhyas.34 As for the M dhyamika, who rejects the relation of cause
and effect (hetu-phala-bh va-) as real (tattvatas), for him a reason,
which is characterized by a capacity of a property of the cause [which
consists in] the “extra feature”35 of these [things] which is due to its
own cause (svahetos), [such a reason] is not established; how could it
be employed for proving his own position (svapakṣa-siddhaye) as if it
were established (siddhavat)?
2.3 References to Mīmāṃsā
(xi) Kum rila – lokav rttika (Niralambanav da 108-109ab)
Context of mūla: Dharmodgata described to Sadāprarudita that the Tathāgata does not
come from anywhere or go to anywhere, just as what one sees in the dream does not truly
exist. Sadāprarudita acknowledge that no dharma in dreams can be considered as fully
substantial (pariniṣpatti) as dreams are deceptive (mṛṣ v da).
sarvatr lambana ṃA b hyaṃ de a-k lnyathtmaka ṃ |
janmany anyatra tasmin v tad k lntare 'pi v |
A
tad-de o 'nyaB-de o v svapna-jñ nasya gocaro ||36
sarvatrālambanaṃ]PWT, sarvatrālambanaḥ N
B
nya]NPT, anyad W
In all instances [of dream cognition], the natures of external objective
supports differ in terms of space and time, namely in some other birth
Literally, “one adds glory”. According to Karṇakagomin and akyabuddhi’s commentary to
PVK, first half of the verse refers to S ṃkhy view and the second half Buddhist (i.e.,
Dharmak rti’s). Amano 1966Ś346 n16.
35
Svabh v ti ayaŚ “special excellence” has the sense of something additional in the own nature.
36
SV nir lambanav da 108-109ab. 108c: janmany ekatra bhinne vā. 109a taddeśo vā ‘nyadeśo
vā. Wogihara identified only the first four padas as verse. In fact they were followed by two more
padas (W967). In both mss N and P, v was missing in pada e and gocara in pada f was
euphonized with na bhavati, suggests very likely that somewhere along the transmission the scribe
has missed the pausa and dropped the v as well. Note also the third pada in AAA is slightly
varied from the extant janmany ekatra bhinne v (in one lifetime or a different one) though the
meaning is essentially the same.
34
169
or this one, or whether it is present [at time of dream] or another time.
The domain of dream-cognition is either in this place or in another
place.
The view that Haribhadra tried to defend against is the M m ṃs view that
dreams might have some kind of objective basis and are real in some sense. The
fact that verses were quoted verbatim suggested that Kum rila’s work, or at least
this particular passage was well known to amongst Haribhadra’s
contemporaries.37 Kum rila’s original idea is that dreams have some kind of
connection to the external reality both in terms of space and time. Thus as the
commentator Sucarita pointed out, one’s past experience constitutes the dream
object’s “substratum”.38 Kum rila in the same chapter later enumerated a number
of examples such as ra mitaptoṣaram, suggesting that even illusive phenomena
have some basis in the external reality.
Haribhadra's refutation went as follows:
na bhavaty. anyâk ra-jñ nasyânyâlambaneA 'tiprasaṅg t. na cnyadB
b hyaṃC r pam upapadyate, alp yasy api ve mani bahu-yojanaparim ṇ n ṃ giri-taru-s gard n ṃ sa-pratigh n m upalambh t.
tasm d bhr ntam eva tath vidhaṃ jñ nam upaj yata ity al kaḥ
svapnaḥ.39
ālambane]NpcPWT, ālambanene Nac B cānyad]NPWT, - tib.
Wc, vāpt Wp, phyi rol gyi tib.
A
C
bāhyaṃ]NPWT, vāky
[The above statement by Kum rila] cannot be true, because it would be
an over-extension (atiprasa ṅg t) if the cognition of one form becomes
the objective support of another thing. No other external forms are
possible because [in the dream], we perceive mountains, trees, oceans
and so on which are of big-size and are tangible, despite being in a
smaller house. Therefore, this kind of [dream-]cognition arises as only
false. So, dreams are false.
Also Kamala la’s TSP 101.
Jha, Ganga Nath. Slokavartika. Second Edition. Delhi: Sri Satguru, 1983. See also Teraishi,
Yoshiaki 寺石悦章(2000). シ ローカヴァールティカ シ ーニ ヴァーダ章の研究(4):
和訳と解釈.九州竜谷短期大学紀要, 46-48.
39
W967.
37
38
170
It should be noted that the dream analogy had a long tradition in India 40 and both
Mah y na Buddhists and Advaita Vedantists developed this idea into a form of
idealism. Mayopama was repeated throughout the AP and Haribhadra was obliged
to defend such view. While for Kum rila, even an illusion could be real, whereas
for Haribhadra it cannot because it leads to errors. In the case of a dream, the
dream perception contradicts the objective reality and the two cannot co-exist.
A summary of sources and citations found in AAA Ch. 30-31
Conclusion
In the foregoing discussion we have seen how Haribhadra creatively and quite
ingeniously handled the structural and doctrinal incongruities of the PP texts,
exemplified by Ch. 30-31 of the AP, by justifications from a variety of sources.
These sources are not limited to s tras whose authority was well established, but
40
indrajlamiva mymaya svapna iva mithydaranam (Mait. Up. iv.2).
171
also commentarial works of both the M dhy maka, Yog c ra and Pram ṇa
traditions. From the examples we have seen, it appears quite clear that Haribhadra
firmly subscribed to M dhy maka and Yog c ra views and doctrines but
remained critical to Pram ṇa works such as those of Dharmak rti. While the AAA
was set out to be a commentary to the AP, it is clear that Haribhadra took the
work as a mere springboard to his two-fold intent: firstly, to elucidate his unique
amalgamation of M dhy maka-Yog c ra doctrinesś secondly, to refute in passing
opponents such as the Ny yas and the M m ṃsakas, who were no doubt active
participants of the vibrant scholarly society of eighth century India, of which the
learned Buddhists were also a part of.
Appendix A
List of commentarial works cited in AAA Ch.30-3141
Abbreviations
AKB
BhKI
Abhidharmako abh ṣya of Vasubandhu. Pradhan, P. (ed.). Patna: K.
P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1967.
First Bh van krama of Kamala īla. Tucci, G. (ed). Minor Buddhist
Texts, Part II. Serie Orientale Roma. Vol. IX. Rome: 1958.
C
Catuh ataka of rya Deva. Jain, Bhagchandra (ed.). Nagpur: Alok
Prakashan, 1971.
HB
Dharmakīrti's Hetubinduḥ. Ernst Steinkellner (ed.). Teil I: Tibetischer
Text und rekonstruierter Sanskrit-Text; Teil II: Ubersetzung
und Anmerkungen. Wien: Verlag der Osterreichischen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1967.
MSA
Mah y nasūtr laṃk ra. Lévi, S. (ed.). Paris: 1907.
41
Amongst the citations I have identified in AAA Ch. 30-31, the source of three verses remain
unidentified (W983.11-16):
na kṛp mandatêd n ṃ na ca me dharma-matsaraḥ | nâc ryamuṣṭir nâ aktir na ca me duḥkhalat ||
na ca me niṣṭhitaṃ straṃ tarkay mi na cântik t | jñ tuṃ na ca me akt viney na ca s dar ḥ
||
na de ay mi yenêti jñ payan paritarṣayan | dvau m sau pratisaṃl no bhagav n ardham eva ca ||
172
MSABh
PVK
PVSV
Mah y nasūtr laṃk ra-Bh ṣya. Lévi, S. (ed.). Paris: 1907.
Pram ṇav rttikak rika of Dharmakirti. Miyasaka, Y. (ed.).
Pramanavarttika-Karika (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta
Indologica 2, 1971/72.
The Pram ṇav rttikam of Dharmakīrti. The First Chapter with the
Autocommentary. Gnoli, Raniero (ed.). Roma: Instituto
Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1960.
V
TS
lokav rttika of rī Kum rila Bhaṭṭa with commentary of
Ny yaratn kara. Ganga Sagar Rai (ed.). Varanasi: Ratna,
1993. 173-4.
Tattvasa ṃgraha of ntarakṣita with the commentary of Kamala īla.
Krishnamacharya, Embar (ed.). Gaekwad's Oriental Series
No.30, 31. Baroda, 1984-88.
Reference
W928.16
W929.2
W936.22
W938.1-2
Text
dharma-srotasi buddhebhyo'vav daṃ
labhate tad |
tath hi sam dhi-guṇeṣv
abhisaṃpratyaya-lakṣaṇay
raddhay yogina chandaḥ
samutpadyate…atas tatpratipakṣeṇopekṣ bh van y
parijñ yai prah ṇ ya punaḥ
s kṣ tkriy ṃ prati | nyatdisam dh n ṃ tridh rthaḥ
parik rtitaḥ ||
dhy n-'bhijñ bhinirh r l lokadh t n sa
gacchati | p jrtham
apramey ṇ ṃ buddh n ṃ
ravaṇ ya ca || apramey n
up syâsau buddh n kalpair
ameyagaiḥ | karmaṇyat ṃ
par m eti cetasas tad-up san t ||
173
Author / Work
Asaṅga / MSA
14.3
Kamala la /
BhKI 518
Asaṅga / MSA
18.79
Asaṅga / MSA
14.17-18
W939.24-25
W940.5-6
W940.7-8
W967.4-5
W967.14-5
W968.6
W969.18
W970.5
W970.26
W971.7
W971.14
42
tmani sati para-saṃjñ sva-paravibh g t parigraha-dveṣau |
anayoḥ saṃpratibaddh ḥ sarva-kle ḥ
praj yante ||
bodhisattv hi satataṃ bhavanta
cakravartinaḥ | prakurvanti hi
sattv rthaṃ gṛhiṇaḥ sarvajanmasu ||
kle o bodhyaṅgat ṃ y taḥ saṃs ra ca
amtmat m | mahop yavat ṃ
tasm d acinty hi jinâtmaj ḥ ||
sarvatrlambanaṃ b hyaṃ de ak lnyathtmakaṃ | janmany
anyatra tasmin v tad k lântare
'pi v | tad-de o 'nya-de o v
svapna-jñ nasya gocaro ||
l d api varaṃ bhraṃ o na tu dṛṣṭeḥ
kad cana | lena gamyate
svargo dṛṣṭy y ti paraṃ padam
||
karma-jaṃ loka-vaicitryam
yad artha-kriy -samarthaṃ tad atra
param rthasad
nityaṃ sattvam asattvaṃ v sy d ahetor
anynapekṣaṇ t
na vai bh v n ṃ k cit prekṣ -p rvak rit …tath bhavanto
nop lambham arhanti
et vat tu sy tŚ kuto 'yaṃ
svabh vâti ayas teṣ m iti…
an dirT hetu-paraṃpar tasm d
ya evobhaya-ni cita-v c hetuḥ, sa eva
She-dacheng-lunben
攝大乘論本
T31.1594.150c.
174
Dharmak rti /
PVK
219cd/220ab
Asaṅga / MSA
20.3
Asaṅga /
Mah y nasaṃgra
ha
(Sanskrit text not
extant)42
Kum rila / V
108-109ab
ryadeva / C
25:11/286
Vasubandhu /
AKB 5.1a/277.1
Dharmak rti /
PVK 3.3
Dharmak rti /
PVK 2.180
Dharmak rti / HB
9.6-10
Dharmak rti /
PVSV 84
Dign ga /
s dhanaṃ d ṣaṇaṃ ca
W971.14-5
W972.7
W988.1820
43
abhedvi eṣe 'pi hetu-dharmas marthy d yath na sarvaṃ
sarva-s dhakaṃ, tadvad
bhedâvi eṣe 'pi na sarvaṃ sarvas dhakam
artha-kriy -k ritvaṃ satyatvanibandhanam
evaṃ trayastriṃ at kalpâsaṃkhyeyair
buddhatvaṃ pr pyata
She-dacheng-lun-shi
攝大乘論釋
Ny yamukham
(Sanskrit text not
extent)
Dharmak rti /
PVSV 87 (cf.
PVK 3.173)
Dharmak rti /
PVK 2.3a
Vasubandhu /
MSBh (Sanskrit
text not extant)43
T31.1595.218a (cf. T31.1593.126b).
175
Abbreviations of editions of texts used
AA
AAA
AP
N
P
PP
PvP
T
W
Abhisamay laṃk ra-Prajñ p ramitopade a stra. Maitreya.
Stcherbatsky and Obermiller (ed.). Bibliotheca Buddhica XXIII,
1929.
Abhisamay laṅk r lok (Editions T, W and mss. N, P)
Aṣṭas hasrik prajñ p ramit . Mitra, Rajendralala (ed.).
Ashtas hasrik Ś A Collection of Discourses on the Metaphysics of
the Mah y na School of the Buddhists Bibliotheca. Indica, [110].
Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1888.
Nepalese ms. of AAA. NGMPP A 37/7
Tibetan ms. of AAA. Wang Sen Catalogue No. 67 from
minzugongcang fanwenxieben 民族宮藏梵文寫本collection.
Prajñ p ramit (See AP, PvP)
Pañcaviṃ atis hasrik praj p ramit I-VIII. Takayasu, Kimura
(ed.). Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin, 1986-2007.
Tucci, Giuseppe (ed.). The Commentaries of the Prajñ p ramit sŚ
The Abhisamay laṅk r lok of Haribhadra. Gaekwad's Oriental
Series, no. 62, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1932. Based on three mss
A, B, N.
Wogihara, U. (ed.). Abhisamay laṅk r lok
Prajñ p ramit vy khy Ś Haribhadra together with the Text
Commented on. Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1932-35.
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Buddhist and Pali College - Singapore 2013
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