Impermanence and Time The Contemplation of Impermanence (anityata¯) in the Yoga¯ca¯ra Tradition of Maitreya and Asan˙ga

by Alexander von Rospatt

According to legend. the Buddha-to-be. the Bodhisattva, encountered the phe­nomena of old age. illness and death for the first time on an excursion to a pleasure grove. Until then he had led a sheltered and protected existence in the seclusion of his parental palace, so it was only on this occasion, the legend says, that he encountered these phenomena and came to realize that they form an intrinsic part of life that necessarily would afflict him too. These encounters had a devastating effect upon the prince and convinced him of the need to follow the example of a renouncer whom he encountered on yet another excursion with his trusted chari­oteer.

It is thus, according to this classical account of the Buddha's life stow, the realization of the impermanent nature of existence, of anityata} that forms the starting point of the entire Buddhist endeavour to leave home and strive for release from the cycle of death and rebirth. This is confirmed by the fact that generally the unsatisfactoiy nature of existence (duhkha) is deduced from anityata. Thus when the Four Noble Truths that summarize the Buddha's teaching are analysed. anityata is commonly dealt with first, because from it the unsatisfactory’ nature of existence (duhkha) and the non-existence of something to be identified as “self" or “mine” (anatman) follow.

The concept of impermanence, of anityata, is thus of pivotal importance for our understanding of Buddhism. Though rooted in the biological fact of the tran­sience of life, the concept of anityata proved flexible enough to accommodate further doctrinal developments. Thus to trace the treatment of anityata in Bud­dhism through the different schools and ages would amount to an enormous task, resembling that of writing a doctrinal history of Buddhism. Instead.

I here want to concentrate on the way anityata is envisaged in practice. Inasmuch as imperma­nence can be understood as a function of time, this will shed light on underlying notions of time. However, as I will tty to show, the contemplation of anityata developed in such a way that it came to refer not to the temporality of phenom­ena, but to their mode of existence, w ith the consequence that the aspect of time faded more and more into the background, and in a Mahayana context finally was obliterated completely.

For my enquiry I will draw in the main on materials from the early Yogacara tra­dition associated with the names of Maitreya and Asanga. As the name Yogacara (yoga practice) suggests, this tradition is particularly renowned for its emphasis on spiritual practice. Accordingly we find numerous works that treat the contempla­tion of anityata at great length. In order to supplement the Yogacara material I will first present a cursory review of how anityata is dealt with in the Pali canon. Rather than offering a detailed analysis, I will confine myself to a few salient points that are pertinent for the Yogacara material.

This brings me back to the three excursions and the devastating effect they had upon the Buddha-to-be. The classical form in which anityata is encountered here is old age, illness and death. What matters is not an abstract universal law of im­permanence, but the transience of life, and more concretely, that we ourselves are impermanent. Accordingly the legendary account spells out how the Bodhisattva came to realize that the old age, illness and death observed in the persons encoun­tered on the way to his pleasure grove prefigured his own inevitable lot.

This pattern of envisaging anityata by first observing it in others and then applying it to oneself is not unique to the story of the excursions. Rather, this approach is an important Buddhist technique. It finds its most notable application in the contem­plation of decaying corpses, a subject to which I w ill return below. There are more lessons we can learn from the account of the excursions.

In it, anityata is regarded typically as the certainty of decay and destruction. Though such a strong under­standing of impermanence is more plausible with regard to sentient existence than to inanimate objects, it show s to my mind that the common understanding of an­ityata in Buddhism is more than mere susceptibility to change, as the Pune scholar Mangala Chinchore has argued in her recent study of anityata. Finally, the legend of the Bodhisattva's excursions is notable in that there is no trace of the notion of rebirth and a cyclic conception of existence.5

Though clearly an awakening experience, the prince’s realization of the imperma­nence of life did not itself constitute an insight of a higher order that liberates one from the ties of existence and so brings salvation. Rather, it corresponds to the first member of the Eightfold Path, namely “Correct Views” (samyagdrsti) and accord­ingly led to the decision to renounce worldly life, which corresponds to the second member of the Eightfold Path, namely right resolve (samyagsamkalpa). It is there­fore fitting that the Abhinha-paccavekkhitabba-thanasutta of the Anguttara-nikaya (ch. V.57 = vol. III. 74)6 not only teaches monastics, but also householders - the text mentions specifically women and men - to continually reflect on the fact that they are subject to old age, to illness and to death.

This sutta is, moreover, note­worthy for the way in which it extends the contemplation of life’s transience. In the next step the adept turns to what is dear to him, realizing that all that - this includes both beings and things - is bound to change and become separated from him, and hence is not worthwhile clinging to. This corresponds to a specific form of suffer­ing identified in the First Noble Truth, namely the separation from what one holds dear (priyaviprayoga).

Lastly, the Abhinha-paccavekkhitabba-thanasutta instructs the adept to reflect that he is the result of his previous actions and that accordingly he will inherit the good or bad actions that he commits. This appeal to the law of karman is particularly fitting here because it motivates continuous spiritual striving in the face of the impermanence of existence.

While counterbalancing the detri­mental effect that the contemplation of the transience of life may have (namely to suggest the pointlessness of spiritual striving), the appeal to the law of karman at the same time undemtines this contemplation to some extent, inasmuch as it intro­duces the idea that the present existence is followed by further forms of existence where the karman committed in this life will be experienced. Moreover, the law of kannan also introduces an element of permanence and stability, inasmuch as this

- By cyclic conception of existence I mean the principle that unless liberated one existence is in­evitably followed by the next one, death being not a terminal end but a stage that leads to yet another existence. This, of course, does not mean that exactly the same existences recur. Rather, what recurs are the modalities bound up with each and every existence, notably birth, old age, illness and death. To view the sequences of existences in a circular rather than linear fashion is in keeping with such emic representations as the wheel of existence (bhavacakra) often depicted in the vestibule of Tibetan monasteries.

Such a (weak) notion of the cyclic nature of existence does not imply that time is cyclic. Thus, it is taught that an aspirant to buddhahood, a Bodhisattva, has to live through more than three “immeasurable” world ages (asamkhyakalpa) after his first resolve to become a Buddha before he finally becomes such a fully awakened one (buddha). Despite the cyclic nature of the Bodhisattva’s existences and of the intervening world ages, the vast expanse of time unfolding between the initial aspiration and the final attainment is conceived of in linear terms. While the wheel travelling over the road revolves, the road itself does not.

6 All citations of Pali works refer to the editions of the Pali Text Society. law is - in contrast to the existence it governs - timeless. Neither in the context of the Buddha’s excursions nor in the Abhinha-paccavekkhi- tabba-thanasutta discussed above, does the understanding of the transience of life amount to a supramundanc realization of impermanence that would put an end to all craving and attachment, and thus liberate one from the cycle of rebirth, to­gether with the concomitant realization of the unsatisfactoriness and selflessness of existence.

Of course, such liberating insight into the impermanence of existence is not a simple intellectual understanding by way of ratiocination and discursive thinking. Rather it is an existential comprehension of a higher order that truly transforms the person.

Such a supramundane realization is the end rather than the starting point of the Buddhist path. Accordingly we find in the Pali canon many different techniques and practices aimed at inducing and cultivating direct expe­rience of the transience of existence. To gain such experience, it is not enough to become aware that death and decay is the inevitable end of all existence. On the contrary; this impermanence has to be immediately experienced in the present. One technique to achieve this was the aforementioned contemplation of death in the charnel fields.

Here the practitioner retires to a charnel field where human corpses are discarded, so as to observe the various states of decomposition. This he does with the keen awareness that his own body is of the same nature as the decaying bodies beheld in front of him, and hence will end up in the same way. In this manner, the adept comes to realize the impermanent nature of his body directly and immediately, even at a time when he is still strong and healthy. However, this is an extreme form of practice for which many monks were apparently not suited. The Pali sources even relate that this practice led to veritable waves of suicides (Samyutta-nikaya, vol. V. 320)

A less dangerous approach to relocating death in the immediate presence can be seen in the prominent practice of recollecting death (maranasmrti)J Here the stretch of time that a monk who is mindful of death should expect to live is suc­cessively reduced to the point where it is taught that the correct way to be mindful of death is not to take for granted that one is to live beyond the time taken for the single present inhalation or exhalation.

This is to ensure that the practitioner will not waste his time but always be mindful of the present, and so make use of possibly the last chance for spiritual advancement it offers. Even though death is not understood as the final end of all existence, it is envisaged in this practice in a linear manner as the final end of the present existence, and of the extremely rare opportunity to practise the dharma afforded by it. Fittingly, a technique typically employed when recollecting death in this way is to illustrate the brevity and tran­sience of life by referring to such examples as the vanishing dewdrop on the tip of

7 See, for instance, Anguttara-nikaya, vol. VIII, 73-74. a blade of grass, the instantly fading line that is drawn on water with a stick, or the bubble that disappears as soon as it has formed on water when rain falls.

A different approach to inducing a direct experience of impermanence was not to concentrate on death but on the impermanent nature of existence before death. For a closer look at this technique we can turn to the famous sutta on the establish­ment of mindfulness, the Satipatthanasutta. It teaches how mindfulness is to be ap­plied. starting with the observation of the body, then turning to feelings (vedana), thereafter to the mind (citta), and finally to other psychic factors {dharma).

By concentrating on these objects the practitioner gains a direct experience of their instability. He comes to realize by introspection that the body is in constant flux, that there is no moment without change. The same truth dawns upon him when he observes how his feelings and sensations constantly change, and how the states of his mind and the content of his consciousness never remain the same.

With the repeated prolonged and deepening application of mindfulness the yogin’s ex­perience of anityata becomes more and more subtle and penetrating, and thereby weakens and eventually eliminates all forms of gross and subliminal attachment. To be sure, this is a very complex process and also entails the realization of the ultimate unsatisfactoriness of all existence, and of the non-existence of anything that could be identified as constituting a self or as belonging to a self.

The contemplation of anityata by way of introspection implies a significant shift. Anityata is no longer decay and annihilation, as suggested in particular by the con­templation of decomposing corpses. Instead the focus is on the impermanence that characterizes the nature of existence at all times. In this way anityata comes to re­fer to the changing modes of existence within time rather than to an absolute end of existence.

This shift not only follows from the need for an immediate experience of impermanence in the present, but is also related to a cyclic notion of existence.

If death is not envisaged as the terminal end. but only as a stage passed on the way to a further existence (as happened at an early stage in Buddhism, but possibly not at the very outset), it ceases to be the sole focus of impermanence. Rather, the notion of an endless series of existences in the past, and of an indefinite number of further existences in future that can only be halted through the attainment of nirvana and salvation, means that the obvious referent of anityata is not the ces­sation of existence but the impermanent nature of existence within samsara. This is particularly clear in the Yogacara tradition.

Thus the Abhidharmasamuccaya by Asanga teaches that the impermanence of the universe does not consist in its cosmic dissolution alone, but in the ongoing process of periodic dissolution and re-evolution, a process that covers unimaginably long stretches of time.8 Similarly the impermanence of sentient existence refers to the fact that “it does not break off within the cycle of existence (samsara)'” that is. according to the commen­tary, to “its mode of restless moving to and fro within samsara”.w

Thus anityata comes to be associated with the infinitude rather than the finitude of existence. Hence it comes as little surprise that in another work of the Yogacaras, namely the Mahayanasutralamkara-bhasya, the same phenomenon is referred to as “per­manence by way of series” (prabandhena mtyatap namely when espousing that the earthly, supematurally produced body of the Buddha, the nirmanakava, can be said to be permanent inasmuch as “when it disappears |at the time of death], again and again a [new] supematurally produced [[[body]]] manifests itself."11

The imper­manence of the series differs from this form of permanence only insofar as stress is laid not on the non-cessation of the series within sainsara, but on its fluctuating and in this sense impermanent mode of existence (ajavamjavtbhavena vrtti). We can identify such a shift in the focus of anityata also in the Pali material. There quasi-synonyms used frequently in the suttas lo gloss anitya. duhkha (“un­satisfactoriness”) and anatman (“selflessness”), the three aforementioned marks of conditioned existence (trilaksana), were compiled into a standard list of forty attributes.

This list is already found in a later stratum of the canon, namely the Cula- and Mahaniddesa (vol. I, 52f and II. 277). the Milindapanha (p. 418) and the Patisambhidamagga (vol. II, 238). According to Buddhaghosa (Visuddhimagga. ch. 20: Cattansakara-anupassanakatlia). ten of these forty attributes are glosses of anitya that highlight certain aspects of impermanence - a common literary device in the canon. While such adjectives as tdvakdlika (temporary ), addhuva (non en­during) or pabhahgu (perishable) are hardly more Ilian synonyms of anitya. there are also a few truly instructive glosses which desen e closer scrutiny.

Among them is the attribute “subject to birth, old age. illness and death” (jatijarabyadhimarana- dhamma~). To equate anityata with birth is different from identify ing it with orig­ination in the past. Birth is not alluded to as a past event, but - in accordance with the formulation of the law of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) - as a phenomenon intrinsic to existence that has to be suffered again and again until liberation. Thus anityata has come to refer here to the recurring originations and destructions within the cycle of existence, it is denotative of existence within time rather than of the irreversible termination of existence.

When anityata is addressed in this way. the focus is not on discrete entities but on the continuum that is commonly identified as a distinct sentient being. By con­trast, when the focus is on discrete entities rather than on series of such entities, the common understanding of anityata remained their short-livedness.

This un­derstanding underlies another interesting gloss of anitya from the aforementioned list of quasi-synonyms, namely the attribute “limited by origination and destruc­tion” (uppadavayaparicchinna)}4 Here origination refers to the very beginning of entities in time. They are not only impermanent because they will not indefinitely persist, but also because they have not always existed. This perspective displays an acute awareness of existence in time, as extending both into the past and the future.

The inclusion of origination also makes sense inasmuch as the impermanence of things in the future is commonly deduced from their origination at a certain point in the past. This origination must be due to particular causes (lest the entity be present already before its origination), and this conditioned production is adduced by Buddhists as a logical reason that proves impermanence. (To give a customary example: because it is causally produced sound must be impermanent rather than, as the Munaimsakas held, eternal.)

It is in line with the importance of this argu­ment that “conditioned” (sahkhata) features in the mentioned list of glosses as a further way of referring to impermanence. Presumably this line of thinking also underlies the identification of straightforward origination (utpada) as one aspect of anityata, as attested in a Yogacara work, namely the Viniscayasamgraham of the Yogacarabhumi.

• * *

As I have shown, the soteriological need to induce a direct experience of imper­manence in the present gave rise to different strategies. Besides the relocation of death in the present, I identified the shift of impermanence away from old age and death, so that the analysis of impermanence came to focus on existence within time rather than on the irreversible termination of existence. As mentioned, this shift goes hand in hand with a cyclic notion of existence that emphasises the law of karman and relativizes death. I now want to concentrate on the Yogacara school as­sociated with the names of Asanga and Maitreya because of the detailed treatment of anityata found in the works of this school. This treatment shows particularly clearly how anityata may be sought within existence rather than by focusing only on decay and cessation.

The most basic work of this tradition is the aforementioned Yogacarabhumi. a vast compilation of heterogenous materials ascribed to Asanga, who flourished in the 4th/5th century C. E. More pertinent than the ViniscayasamgrahanFcited above is another part of this work entitled Sravakabhumi and dedicated to the traditional path of the “Hmayana” follower, the listener (sravaka)) Here it is laid down in detail how the practitioner, the yogin, is to proceed on the supramundane path (lokottaramarga) that culminates in the direct vision and insight into the Four No­ble Truths. As a preparation towards such a realization, the practitioner envisages the Four Holy Truths under sixteen aspects (akara). In this way he becomes, in a preliminary manner, convinced of their validity .

As the first of these sixteen aspects, he envisages impermanence (471.8-492.7). In the main part of this section, which itself is clearly the product of compilation, the yogin contemplates anityata by having recourse to one valid means of knowl­edge (pramana) after another. This begins with an appeal to the practitioner's faith in the words of the Buddha (471.8-473.9). After quoting the stock phrase that all conditioned factors are impermanent (sarvasamskara amtyah). two further canonical passages are adduced. In the first one. the Buddha narrates his vision of how sentient beings pass away and are reborn again according to their karman. This passage is cited in order to establish that all sentient beings are impermanent.

Thus, in accordance with the development that I have traced above, the transience of life is envisaged by referring not to old age. illness and death but to the cycle of death and rebirth. The second canonical citation, proffered as confirmation that the material universe, too. is impermanent, relates to the dissolution of the cos­mos. Arguably, with this quote the text points to the recurring cosmic dissolution and re-origination of the universe. In support one may recall the above-cited pas­sage from the Abhidharmasamuccaya. a related text, which identifies the repeated destruction and origination of the inanimate world (bhajanaloka) as one form of impermanence (cf. Abhidhannasamucca-bhasya 50.20-22).

After this recourse to the canonical teachings of the Buddha as a means of knowl­edge, the Sravakabhumi instructs the yogin to move on and contemplate imperma­nence by way of another means of knowledge, namely direct perception (pratyak- sa). It does so in terms of change and transformation, and hence refers to the anityata envisaged here as the anityata of change (yiparinamanityata).

For a start, eight factors causing change (viparinamakarana) are distinguished. Then fifteen and sixteen forms of change are identified. The fifteen pertain to sentient beings, the sixteen to insentient matter. Though meant to complement each other, these three lists overlap to a considerable extent and have clearly been drawn together from different contexts, in a way typical of this compiled work.

Most of the eight causes of change (474,20-476.19) relate specifically to insentient matter. Significantly, the first form of change is that which is simply brought about by the passage of time (kalaparivasa), and hence intrinsic to existence, ft is fol­lowed by the changes that matter suffers (2) due to external force (paropakrama), (3) because it is being consumed (upahhoga) and (4) owing to the change of seasons (rtuviparinama).

The next three forms of change are brought about by (5) fire (agnidaha). (6) water (udakakleda) and (7) wind (yayusosa). Though this sequence is clearly taken from the great cosmic dissolution when the world is first burnt, then flooded and finally parche by hot w inds, the context requires that observable examples be given, and hence the text mentions the burning and in­undation of settlements, and the drying of wet earth. The last cause of change is the (8) encounter with varying conditions (pratyayantarasamudgama) that cause feelings, mental states and direct perceptions to alter.

Afterwards the text moves on to deal with the fifteen kinds of changes (477,1- 482.10) affecting sentient beings. The sequence of enumeration follows the course of life. The changes between the different stages of life, from being youth up to old age (no. 1: avasthakrta viparinamanityata), are mentioned first. Next the text refers to the (accompanying?) changes of the texture and complexion of the skin, such as shrivelling (no. 2: varnakrta viparinamanityata). Though seem­ingly alluding to facets of ageing, these changes of the skin are not dealt with as irreversible.

On the contrary; change is here treated as the recurring alterna­tion between different states. Thus, rather than working with a linear conception of decay as the phenomenon of ageing suggests, the text takes a cyclic notion of time as its starting point. For the other changes on this list, the same approach is maintained wherever possible. In the case of referring to the phenomenon of illness, for example, the text deals with it in terms of the alternation between states of good and poor health (no. 12: vyadhikrta viparinamanityata).

Thus a circu­lar view that regards recovery as the sequence of illness takes precedence over a linear conception that would have viewed illness as the irreversible erosion of the body that will eventually lead to death. Similarly, changes in the figure (no. 3: samsthanakrta viparinamanityata) and physical changes brought about by exer­tion (no. 6: parisramakrta viparinamanityata). injury (no. 7: paropakramakrta viparinamanityata), and heat and coldness (no. 8: sit<osn>akrta viparinamanitya- ta) are viewed in terms of alternating states (upon injury a state follows where the injury' has disappeared, etc.). Likewise, one form of change consists in the alter­nation between the thriving and the decline (no. 4: sampattivipattikrta viparinam­anityata) of one’s kinsfolk, one’s wealth and one’s religious practice (free ren­dering of siladrsti).

Furthermore, the four poses which a body can assume are subject to change inasmuch as they first cause pleasant sensations when first as­sumed. whereas they may cause discomfort later if maintained too long (no. 9: iryapathakrta viparinamanityata). The text also identifies the changes between pleasant and painful feelings brought about by contact (no. 10: sparsakrta vipari­namanityata), and the changing states of mind in the mental continuum (no. 11: samklesakrta viparinamanityata).

The same types of changes have already been addressed by the previously mentioned "encounter with varying conditions” (pratyayantarasamudgama). featuring on the list of eight causes of change. This suggests that the list of eight causes and the list of fifteen transformations pertain­ing to sentient beings were developed separately before being incorporated into the Sravakabhumi.

It is conceivable that in their original context the fifteen changes addressed here were changes for the worse, viewed linearly, and that when incor­porated into the Sravakabhumi (or into a forerunner of it), they were reworked ac­cording to a cyclic notion of time. While this was possible in the cases of changing skin, illness, injury, fatigue and the loss of wealth etc., some of the fifteen enumer­ated changes did not allow for such a cyclic conception of change.

This applies to mutilation (no. 5: angapratyanga<sakalyavaikalya>krta viparinamanityata). death (no. 13: maranakrta viparinamanityata). the putrefaction and decomposi­tion of corpses (no. 14: vindakadikrta viparinamanityata) and their eventual com­plete dissolution (no. 15: sarvena sarvam asamprakhyanapariksayakrta vipari­namanityata). These are - as far as common perception without access to the phenomenon of rebirth can inform - irreversible processes, and hence could not be conceptualized in terms of recurring alternations between different states in the context of the present passage (one does not commonly observe that a deceased person later revives, etc.).

In all fifteen cases of change the focus is not on the process of transformation as such. Rather, change is treated as the replacement of one state by another. This reflects the stance that entities cannot undergo change without losing their identity. What appears to be change is in truth the destruction of an old and the origination of a new. dissimilar entity that replaces the old one. This analy sis of the process of change (and the consequence drawn from it, namely that all entities must be momentary) is explicated in the Sravakabhumi after all the different aspects of observable change have been dealt with.

In the list of sixteen changes that concludes the treatment of anityata by way of direct perception (482,13-484.20), the focus is on linear change for the worse. This is clearly in order to inspire disgust and revulsion, so that the adept may be­come detached from the objects whose mutability he confronts. Hence in this list, which relates (with some borderline cases) to inanimate matter, particular empha­sis is laid on the changes that affect potential objects of attachment and are for the worse.

Thus food items and drinks as well as fragrant substances, garlands and ointments (the items that are prohibited in the eighth siksapada [= monastic rule of conduct]), objects of use such as clothes, ornaments, pots and vehicles, and even sexual activity and the performance of music, songs and dances (prtyagiiavaditra, corresponding to the seventh siksapada, prohibiting the attendance of such per­formances) are viewed as being subject to change for the worse, each in its own way. Similarly, the changes suffered by mountains are viewed linearly in terms of erosion.

Nonetheless, it may be argued that all this does not per se exclude a cyclic conception of existence. Indeed, in the cases of seasonal change, the desiccation of ponds and streams, the thriving and decline of professional work, the growth and decrease of hoarded riches, the alternation between darkness and light, and in the aforementioned cases of the presence and absence of sexual activity and of music and dance, it is obvious that the addressed changes are not irreversible, even if the focus is on those alterations that are for the worse.

Moreover, the text introduces a cyclic notion of change when dealing with the changes suffered by earth. First a patch of earth is empty, later it is built up into settlements, while still later these settlements decay and are destroyed by fire, water etc., with the apparent implica­tion that the patch of earth reverts to its original state of emptiness. (In our times it is be tempting to view this change in a linear fashion, with more and more land being - apparently irreversibly - built up in one way or another.)

With the enumeration of these sixteen forms of changes, the Sravakabhumi con­cludes its treatment of impermanence on the basis of direct perception, ft next appeals to inference (anuniana) as the third means of knowledge with which the yogin is to meditate on impennanence. The object of inference is that form of impermanence which commonly cannot be observed (and has not been explicitly taught by the Buddha). but has to be arrived at by reasoning, namely the momen­tariness of all conditioned factors of existence (485,6-485,15).

The Sravakabhumi takes the previously examined forms of observable changes as its starting point and argues that they are only possible because the macroscopic entities of our ev­eryday experiences are in fact constituted by chains of momentary entities that originate in order to pass out of existence in the very same moment.

This claim is based on the premise that if an entity were not momentary, it would have "to persist in exactly such a way [as it has done before]” (tathaivavasthita), i.e. with­out any modifications. Hence change only consists in the qualitative dilference between distinct entities and never in the difference between an earlier and later state of one and the same entity. In other words, the subject of change cannot be a distinct entity but only a series constituted by a succession of distinct entities. As mentioned, this analysis of change underlies the preceding treatment of the various forms of perceptible changes in terms of the replacement of one state by another.

The Sravakabhumi moves on to apply inferential reasoning in a second step also to the continued existence beyond death and to the law of karman governing such existence (486,16-488,5). It argues that the differences between sentient beings can only be explained by their different actions in previous existences. In this con­text, it also proves the logical impossibility of a supreme deity who alternatively could have accounted for the way sentient beings are. The proof of an existence beyond death is inserted here because, like the imperceptible rise and fall of all en­tities at every' moment, it cannot be observed but has to be inferred.

Comparable to the Abhinha-paccavekkhitabba-thanasutta cited above, it serves to counterbalance the detrimental effect which the realization that everything is subject to constant destruction may have, namely when momentariness is wrongly understood to en­tail the complete disruption between the present and the past and future, so that any striving for emancipation becomes pointless.

This interpretation accords with the Tattvasiddhi. a work related to the Yogacara tradition, which teaches that the view of momentariness guards against the erroneous view that things are eternal (sasvatavada), whereas the contemplation of series (objects arise serially, rather than as isolated events that do not connect to the past or future) stresses continuity and ensures that momentariness is not wrongly viewed as implying total destruc­tion (ucchedavada).

Next the Sravakabhumi departs from the approach of envisaging anityata by way of a particular means of knowledge. Instead it deals with impermanence by dis­tinguishing particular aspects of it. First it identifies the various forms of observ­able change treated before as the anityata of change, and the previously inferred momentariness as the anityata of destruction.

It then adds three more forms of anityata, namely that consisting in separation (no. 3: visamyoganityata, 488,11- 19), that which is immediately perceived in the present (no. 4: sannhitdnityata, 489,5-8) and that which occurs in the future and follows from having the (same destructible) nature (as the decaying corpse observed in the present) (no. 5: dhar- matakaranityata) (488,19-489,5). The differentiation between the two latterforms of impermanence is based on the contemplation of decaying corpses, a phenomenon already covered by the list of fifteen changes.

As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, here the yogin beholds the decaying corpse in front of him with the awareness that his body will eventually decay in the same way. As to the anityata of separation, it not only pertains to the separation from objects because they are stolen, lost etc. or decay by themselves, but also includes the separation from a state one may previously have enjoyed, as when one is a free man, a master of others, and then loses this status and becomes enslaved. Separation is, as in the case of change, dealt with in terms of the replacement of one state by another. A reversal of these changes, though conceivable (to be later released from serfdom, find something previously lost, etc.), is not addressed, because it would be at odds with the separation that this form of anityata is essentially about.

To sum up, clearly in the Sravakabhumi too the focus is on the experience of impermanence. Again this happens on the one hand by envisaging death on the charnel grounds, and on the other hand by seeking anityata within existence, with the consequence that impermanence is dealt with as the mode of existence that characterizes phenomena at all times. While ordinary perception fails to regis­ter the subtle destructions occurring at every' moment, it has at least access to the phenomenon of change. As the different forms of change identified in the Sravakabhumi bear out, everything is subject to change.

Moreover, most of these changes are processes that take place constantly. Hence the observation of change leads to the understanding that everything is in flux, that there is no form of ex­istence that can escape change. Much more penetrating than this understanding of impermanence is the realization that there is no continuity even in change, that there are no selfsame entities that undergo change, that the constant transformation of things implies that entities do not persist beyond origination. By contemplating anityata in terms of momentariness, it becomes possible to understand imperma­nence in the original strong sense of destruction and annihilation, and yet apply this understanding to every moment of existence.

Inasmuch as the contemplation of the anityata of phenomena came to be an inquiry into how they exist at every moment, it is dependent upon and reflects doctrinal de­velopments. In the case of the doctrine of momentariness this worked particularly well. To take the momentary mode of existence of phenomena, their destruction at each moment, as what truly constitues their impermanence made perfect sense.

Much more problematic is the situation once the practitioner operates in the doctri­nal framework of the Mahayana tradition, and hence does not accept the existence of discrete momentary conditioned entities that have, despite their temporal and spatial minuteness, an innate own-being (svabhava). When he analyses the exis­tence of phenomena in terms of sunyata, that is, of their emptiness, he arrives at the conclusion that they do not exist substantially by way of a svabhava.

Unlike in the case of the doctrine of momentariness, this understanding is at odds with the Buddha’s teaching on anityata inasmuch as this teaching implies that there are really existing phenomena which are subject to origination and destruction. The authoritative status of this teaching made it difficult for Buddhists to dismiss out­right the characterization of conditioned entities as anitya. The ensuing dilemma is concisely expressed in a Mahayana work, only preserved in Chinese, with the reconstructed Sanskrit title Mahaprajnaparamita-upadesa:

Question: “Mahayana propounds that the phenomena (dharma) do not arise and do not perish, that they have but one characteristic (laksana), namely not to have a characteristic. Why is it said here that the phrase ‘all conditioned entities are impermanent’ is one (of the four) seals of the doctrine (dharmamudrayl How do these two teachings not con­tradict each other?”

The early Mahayana tradition itself found an ingenious solution to this problem. To be a-nitya (im-permanent) was interpreted to mean nityam a-sat (“permanently, i.e. forever, non-existing”). This denial of existence does not refer directly to the char­acterized entity as such, but to its supposed own-being or essence (svabhava).

Thus, the Buddha’s teaching that all entities are anitya comes to af­firm the Mahayana teaching that all entities are devoid of substantial existence and in that sense empty (si/nya)

I do not think that this is mere sophistry and a simple play on words. Indeed it makes sense in that the analysis of phenomena as sunya is related to their imper­manence. It does so not only because impermanence is a reason for the selflessness of phenomena, which in turn is related to their emptiness (sunyata). Rather, and more importantly, such a link also follows from spiritual practice, particularly, if anityata is radicalized in terms of momentariness.

As we have seen, the analysis of anityata had shifted from the contemplation of eventual decay and annihilation to focus on changes that occur all the time, and eventually arrived at a point where phenomena were seen to perish at every moment. It seems almost inevitable that in a Mahayana setting this undermining of substantial existence was taken even further, and that the point to which existence had become reduced was finally also erased. This process may be documented by way of the following passage, drawn again from the Mahaprajnaparamita-upadesa (229b 14-22):

Question: “What is the full meaning of anityata?

Answer: “To see the conditioned entities arising and perishing in ev­ery moment as dust blown by the wind, as water flowing from a moun­tain, as flames fading away one after another. All conditioned entities are devoid of solidity, devoid of energy; they can neither be grasped nor be clung to. As illusions, they deceive fools. Through this an­ityata one obtains entry into the gate of sunyata'.'

It can thus be witnessed that the perception of momentariness may operate in two ways. In a Sravakayana setting with an Abhidharmic ontology of finite distinct entities it is the most penetrating form of insight into the impermanent nature of existence. In a Mahayana context it serves to undermine the substantial existence of phenomena and paves the way for a realization of their intrinsic emptiness.

Unlike the Sravakabhumi, which operates within the framework of Abhidharmic realism and hence accepts the existence of discrete momentary conditioned entities as real, the VrniscayasamgraharrTbelongs to the Mahayana strand of the Yogacara school and accordingly denies the substantial existence of conditioned phenomena on the level of the highest truth. It (and related Yogacara works) therefore adopted the Mahayana understanding of anityata as the permanent non-existence of an own-being. This, however, did not happen at the complete expense of the tradi­tional understanding of anityata in terms of impennanence.

Rather, in those works with a pronounced Mahayana orientation the traditional form of anityata was up­held as valid in a preliminary' sense, be it by assigning it to the conventional level of truth, or by correlating it with the “dependent character” {paratantralaksana') within the Yogacara scheme of the three natures {trisvabhava). By contrast, in those Yogacara works of the Asanga/Maitreya complex that do not have such a pronounced Mahayana orientation, the two understandings of anityata were jux­taposed to each other under the assumption that they are each valid within their respective doctrinal framework.

This juxtaposition continued in the elaborate lists of various aspects and forms of anityata that were drawn up on the basis of such material as the treatment of anityata in the Sravakabhumi, surveyed in this paper. Rather than tracing the different stages in the composition of these lists, I briefly want to introduce you here to the "finished product” in the form of the list found in Asanga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya, on which I have drawn before.

The Abhidharmasamuccaya identifies 12 kinds of anityata (Peking-Tanjur no. 5550, li 89a4-90a4). The list is headed by (1) the anityata of non-existence {asallaksana) demonstrating the prominence of the Mahayana interpretation of anityata even in this work with an explicit Abhidharmic orientation. The next five forms of anityata are those identified in the Sravakabhumi, namely the anityata (2) of destruction (vinasalaksana). (3) of transformation (yiparinatilaksana), (4) of loss (viyogalaksana), (5) of the immediate present (sannihitalaksana) and the an­ityata (6) of the inherent nature (i.e. the anityata to come in the future; dhar- matalaksana).

The remaining six forms of anityata have their origin in another context or contexts, with the consequence that there is some overlap. They are the anityata (7) of the moment (ksanalaksana), (8) of the series {prabandhalaksana), (9) of illness, old age and death (yyadhijaramaranalaksana), (10) of the various forms of mental activity {cittacitrakaravrttilaksana), (11) of the ruin of worldly riches {bhogasampattivipattilaksana), and finally (12) of the dissolution and evo­lution of the material world {bhajanalokasamvarttavivarttalaksana).

This list may serve as a convenient way to summarize our findings. Old age, illness and death {anityata no. 9) are the most basic form in which anityata is en­countered. To live with the awareness of death and our finitude is not as banal as it may sound, given that it is very' human to block out this awareness. However, this awareness is not sufficient to liberate one from the bonds of samsara. It needs to give way to a direct experience of the impermanence of existence. One way of gaining such an experience is the observation of death on the charnel grounds {anityata no. 5), with the awareness that this is how one will end up oneself {anityata no. 6).

Another, more important approach is a shift of focus, so that im­permanence is no longer primarily identified with decay and annihilation, but with the unstable nature of existence at all times. In this way, change {anityata no. 3) be­comes the most prominent form in which anityata is encountered. Closely related are the forms of impermanence consisting in the constant fluctuation of mental activity (anityata no. 10), in the ruin of worldly riches (anityata no. 11) and in loss (anityata no. 5). The concentration on change and the implied relativization of death is related to a circular notion of existence which views death not linearly as a final and absolute end but as a state which in turn will give way to rebirth and further forms of existence.

Accordingly, the Abhidharmasamuccaya relates the anityata of the series (no. 8) and of the dissolution and evolution of the material world (no. 12) (bhajanalokasamvarttavivarttalaksana) to this circular non-finitude of conditioned existence within samsara (rather than to a temporal limitation of existence). This relativizes death and allows for the operation of the law of kar- man, and thereby motivates spiritual striving directed beyond death. Moreover, the daunting vision of the endlessness of impermanent (and unsatisfactory) existences within samsara may also sen e to strengthen the aspiration to release.

The shift to locate anityata in every moment of existence, and to do so in particular in terms of change, is directly related to the radical understanding of anityata as momentariness, which also found entry into the list (anityata no. 7, and no. 2. if we follow the original context in the Sravakabhumi). The anityata of momentari­ness refers to the final irreducible entities that underlie the objects of our even day experience.

It restores the original meaning of cessation of existence to anityata. Momentariness also introduces an element of epistemic stratification, inasmuch as it relativizes the other forms of anityata, which generally refer to macroscopic objects and operate with a conventional understanding of impermanence, one not as valid as that of momentariness. However, it is only by prefixing the Mahayana understanding of anityata in terms of non-existence (no. 1) that the list comes to harbour two divergent and to a point even contradictor} notions of impermanence - a contradiction that is resolved by relating them to different levels of truth.

In the case of the conventional understanding of impermanence, anityata operates over a span of time. By contrast, when anityata is dealt with in terms of momen­tariness the adept reduces the existence of entities to infinitesimal, point-sized in­stants without any temporal extension. In this way the temporality of anitya fades into the background. This development is taken to its extreme with the Mahayana understanding of anityata in terms of non-existence.

As the qualification of this non-existence as nityam. that is. as being valid "forever” bears out, here anitya has come to refer to a non-temporal characteristic of phenomena. We can thus witness how the experience of the impermanence of phenomena within time gave way to an experience of the timeless emptiness of phenomena. In the process such a time-related attribute as "impermanent” eventually came to refer to a quality that is beyond time.