In Praise of Dharmadhatu/Part 2

The Eighth Karmapa’s commentary on Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara,

The Chariot of the Tagbo Siddhas, quotes lines 82cd of the Dharmadhatustava to illustrate the fifth bhumi. More importantly, in the context of what various Buddhist schools take as the basis onto which the notion “person” is imputed, the Karmapa says that, in the common approach of the sutras, the Vaibha?ikas and Sautrantikas regard the five skandhas as this basis, while the Yogacaras pick the alaya-consciousness. For them, a “Buddha” is either imputed onto mirrorlike wisdom (the essence of the alaya-consciousness) or the perfect nature (the dharmadhatu empty of the imaginary and otherdependent natures). The Abhisamayala?kara identifies “Buddha” as emptiness,

the dharmadhatu free from reference points. Some Mere Mentalists explain the latter as nondual self-aware self-luminous consciousness, while the Madhyamikas explain it as the freedom from reference points in which naturally pure emptiness and dependent origination are inexpressible as either being the same or different. In the uncommon approach of the vajrayana,

the basis of imputation is the kayas and the wisdom of the stainless connate Sugata heart, which are present throughout ground, path, and fruition. This point, the Karmapa says, is also taught implicitly and in a hidden manner in the unsurpassable scriptural traditions of Madhyamaka that teach the definitive meaning of the sutras, such as Maitreya’s Uttaratantra and Nagarjuna’s Dharmadhatustava (quoting verse 37).356

The Fifth Shamarpa, Göncho Yenla’s357 (1525–1583) commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara quotes from three verses of the Dharmadhatustava.

Lines 8cd support the statement that, from the perspective of the disposition’s own nature, it is endowed with twofold purity. Therefore, ultimately, one cannot say that sentient beings have the Buddha heart, because they are nothing but the alaya-consciousness, which is mistakenness and has never been established right from the start. Nor is it the case that sentient beings are Buddhas, because adventitious stains are not permanent but certain to perish.

Nevertheless, from the perspective of convention, at the time of the ground, it is suitable to speak of the sheer existence of one part of this Heart—its aspect of natural purity—in sentient beings, without it however being contained in,

mixed with, or connected to the mind streams of these beings.358 Lines 75ac are used to illustrate the progressive growth of the paths of liberation after the adverse factors of the culminating training have been relinquished.359

Lines 76cd are quoted in the context of explaining the final full dawning of instantaneous personally experienced wisdom, which is primordially stainless and, during the vajralike samadhi at the end of the tenth bhumi, overcomes the very last and most subtle adventitious stains.360

The Eighth Situpa, Chökyi Jungné’s361 (1699–1774) commentary on Karmapa Rangjung Dorje’s Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra quotes ten verses from the Dharmadhatustava. Referring to verses 17 and 22, the text says that the basis for everything in sa?sara and nirva?a is the purity of mind, that is,

the basic element or Tathagata heart. This is the ground of purification but not what is to be purified, since in its own essence, there is not even an atom of a phenomenon to be purified. Verse 19 shows that mind has an impure and a pure aspect, the latter being lucid and empty. Since mind’s purity is natural luminosity, it cannot be tainted by adventitious stains.362 Once the means of purification have cleansed what is to be purified, the result of purification is just this fundamental nature of the ground, in which all adventitious stains consisting of apprehender and apprehended are completely relinquished, it thus becoming manifest as the dharmakaya. This is illustrated by verse 37.363

What is explained as being relinquished is the aspect of mind that is taught by the triad of mind (the alaya-consciousness), mentation, and consciousness (the six operating consciousnesses). But pure mind is expressed here as the dharmadhatu, great bliss, which is free from arising, abiding, and ceasing. Also omniscient wisdom is not different from the dharmadhatu and thus completely beyond the phenomena of impure mind. Since what are called “purified phenomena” are not established as something outside of this pure mind, through the progression of the mind streams of the beings to be guided becoming slightly pure and then mostly pure, nirma?akayas and sambhogakayas appear for them, respectively. This manner of ascertaining that all phenomena of sa?sara and nirva?a are one’s own mind comes from countless mahayana sutras, tantras, and the commentaries on their intention.

The quotations that follow this explanation include verses 46–47 from the Dharmadhatustava.364 However, as for the statements that the Buddha sees the dharmadhatu just as it is, and that mind is self-aware and self-luminous, the following must be understood. Not seeing even an atom of something that could serve as a characteristic within the dharmadhatu free from all reference points is expressed as “the great seeing of wisdom.” This being free from something to be aware of and something that is aware, or something to be made luminous and something that makes it luminous, is termed both “awareness” and “luminous.” One must understand this secret essential point and not take said statements as being equivalent to the seeing of worldly people and so on. Otherwise, mind being aware of itself by itself is self-contradictory, accruing the flaws that are exposed in the La?kavatarasutra, the Bodhicaryavatara, and other texts. However, the nature of the mind is not to be taken as utterly nonexistent or completely unobservable either. If the basic element of naturally pure mind were nonexistent, even on the level of what is merely seeming, it would be untenable for the appearances of sa?sara and nirva?a to occur, since one only speaks of sa?sara or nirva?a due to the distinction of whether this fundamental ground is realized or not. This is clearly expressed in verses 11, 16, and 17 of the Dharmadhatustava.365 Many Kagyü instructions on Mahamudra meditation emphasize that it is essential to forego pursuit of thoughts about the past, the future, or the present.

Indeed, there are some people who say about this, “Your Mahamudra is to stop all mental engagement in terms of the three times. Therefore, it is the meditation of the Chinese Hvashang.”366 However, these people just talk without having examined the issue, since this Kagyü lineage does not hold that one should rest within a state of thoughts having ceased through deliberately stopping all mental engagement. Rather, as just explained, it holds that the present mind is preserved in an uncontrived way. Still, these people may think, “Even if that is the case, you are not beyond the flaw mentioned, since all thoughts in terms of the three times will cease on their own through preserving the present mind in an uncontrived way.” This just shows that those who think like that are very attached to their thoughts and thus cannot let go of them. Since there seem to be very many people who have such a pure view, they are more than welcome to join in relishing their thoughts and have no need to analyze this here. As for us, Chökyi Jungné concludes, we have never embarked on any path other than the one taught by the Sugatas and traveled by the mighty siddhas. This is followed by a number of supporting quotes on nonconceptual samadhi from the sutras, tantras, and treatises, which include Dharmadhatustava verse 43.367

Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé’s commentary on Rangjung Dorje’s treatise Pointing Out the Tathagata Heart cites eleven verses from the Dharmadhatustava. Verse 17 illustrates that the dharmadhatu is the basis for all beings and phenomena, and that its purification finally results in buddhahood. Verses 18–19 show that, just as the sun and the moon, the Tathagata heart is endowed with the qualities of natural luminosity but temporarily obscured by adventitious stains. These stains do not taint the nature of this Heart, but it becomes unclear by their mistakenly appearing as if they were obscurations. Jamgön Kongtrul explains the five obscurations in these verses in almost literally the same way as Rangjung Dorje’s own commentary on them.368 Verse 46 is quoted in support for its being only by virtue of mind as such being realized or not that Buddhas and sentient beings, ultimate and seeming, sa?sara and nirva?a, and so on appear, respectively, and are labeled in these ways.369 Verse 22 is adduced in the context of asking why the Tathagata heart, which can only be perceived as it is by Buddhas, is taught to ordinary beings. The reason is said to lie in counteracting the five flaws of faintheartedness and so on as presented in Uttaratantra I.157.

Some people take this instruction on the purpose of the teachings on buddha nature as a proof for them to be of expedient meaning. However, in that case, all teachings on emptiness would be of expedient meaning too, since they were given in order to put an end to the clinging to identity, singularity, and single units. These people may think that this is a different case, since emptiness is the basic nature of all phenomena. But if even the sheer emptiness that they maintain, which is still within the sphere of the minds of ordinary beings, is regarded by them as the basic nature, why would the actual nature of phenomena that is beyond such minds—the nature of luminosity—not be that basic nature? Therefore, all that is said in the middle turning of the wheel of dharma on emptiness is that it is just this inconceivable expanse that lacks the characteristics of being conditioned (such as arising, abiding, and ceasing), but this is not a teaching that the basic element does not exist.370 Verse 48 (together with Mahayanasa?graha X.5 on the change of state of the skandha of form and a quote from the Hevajratantra) is given to rebut the following objection. Though it is reasonable for buddhahood to be nothing but mind’s stains having become pure, the body is what comes about from the conditions that are one’s parents, thus being of an impure and perishable nature. Consequently, it is unreasonable for unconditioned qualities to arise from something conditioned. There is no such flaw, Lodrö Tayé says, since this very body, which appears as the creative display of the mind, has the nature of the rupakayas with all their qualities. However, these only manifest upon the relinquishment of their being obscured by mind’s own mistaken imagination.

371 Verses 9–10 are given as corresponding to the progressive purification of the dharmadhatu as illustrated by the gradual cleansing of a beryl in the Dhara?isvararajaparip?cchasutra and other texts.372 Verse 16 is adduced to reject the wrong view that the buddha qualities arise from a nature of phenomena that is understood as nothing but emptiness, that is, without any cause.373 Verse 101 underlines that enlightened activity is without thoughts but still occurs in a spontaneous and effortless way.374 Finally, verse 24 is quoted in the context of explaining how the dharmadhatu is dissimilar from the notion of a self as imputed by the tirthikas.375

The same author’s commentary on the Third Karmapa’s Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom cites three verses from Nagarjuna’s text. Verse 2 illustrates that it is nothing but the manifestation of the unchanging, primordially and naturally abiding nature of the five wisdoms and the four kayas that is called “buddhahood.” Verses 18–19 are quoted upon saying that what obscures this Buddha heart is impure imagination.376

In the introduction to his commentary on the Uttaratantra, Lodrö Tayé follows Gö Lotsawa’s above fourfold layout of how tathagatagarbha is taught. He says that it is presented as (1) emptiness free from reference points, (2) the luminous nature of the mind, (3) alaya-consciousness, and (4) bodhisattvas and ordinary beings. From among these, (2) is taught in the middle and last wheel, the tantras, the Uttaratantra, Mahayanasutrala?kara, Dharmadhatustava, Cittavajrastava, and Bodhicittavivara?a.377 The only quote of the Dharmadhatustava in this commentary is verse 11, serving to illustrate the justification for the teachings on the manner of purification in order to manifest the naturally pure dharmadhatu, which is due to the existence of this dharmadhatu as the basic ground in which the stains are to be purified (this being the fourth vajra-point of the Uttaratantra, based on the order of these topics in the Dhara?isvararajaparip?cchasutra).378

As for non-Kagyü Tibetan sources that deal with the Dharmadhatustava, let’s start with the Sakya tradition. Its most famous representative and central authority, Sakya Pa??ita Kunga Gyaltsen379 (1182–1251), refers to Nagarjuna’s text in one of his final works, a commentary on some difficult points of the Hevajratantra, called Stainless Precious Garland.380 He starts by saying that the causal tantra refers to the true nature of one’s own mind—wisdom—being naturally stainless and pure, that is, free from all stains of imagination. But this wisdom is obscured by adventitious stains (afflictive and cognitive obscurations), with the term “adventitious” standing for what can be purified, like the oxidation on the surface of pure gold.380 Later, he says that the meaning of all classes of tantra is contained in five topics: fundamental change of state, wisdom-kaya, nonabiding nirva?a, nonduality, and uninterrupted activity. On the first, the text comments as follows:

In terms of essence, or the nature of phenomena, there is no fundamental change of state, since the nature of phenomena is free from reference points. With this in mind, Nagarjuna explained in his Mulamadhyamakakarika and so on that there is no fundamental change of state. In terms of qualities, there is a fundamental change of state, since the inconceivable buddhadharmas, such as the eighteen unshared qualities, are attained. With this in mind, Nagarjuna explained in his Dharmadhatustava that there is a fundamental change of state. Therefore, if these two teachings of the noble one are understood in this way, they are not contradictory. Consequently, the manner of fundamental change of state should be understood in this way.

Then, the text speaks about four ways of fundamental change of state: (1) the change of state of the five skandhas into mastery over the major and minor marks, pure buddha realms, and so on as described in the Mahayanasa?graha;382 (2) the change of state of the four ma??alas; (3) the change of state of body, speech, and mind into the three kayas; and (4) the change of state of the eight consciousnesses into the five wisdoms. This is followed by rejecting the positions that Buddhas do not have wisdom and that wisdom is primordially nonexistent, affirming that Tathagatas possess the wisdom of suchness and variety383 as well as the three kayas, with the latter and the five wisdoms being inseparable.384

As mentioned above, Gorampa’s Illuminating the Definitive Meaning briefly refers to the Dharmadhatustava when discussing Nagarjuna’s three scriptural collections. Another one of his works on the correct view385 refers to the Sakya authority Rendawa Shönu Lodrö386 (1349–1412) as rejecting the Jonang School’s claim that Nagarjuna taught rangtong in his collection of reasoning but shentong in his collection of praises. According to Rendawa, in the collection of praises, there is not a single word that indicates something ultimately existent. Rather, the collection of praises rejects all extremes in just the same way as Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka treatises. The first chapter of Gorampa’s versified Supplement to Differentiating the Three Vows387 extensively treats the topic of buddha nature, establishing it as the union of lucidity and emptiness, free from all reference points. After presenting Maitreya’s stance on it, verses 8–10 state:

In the collection of reasoning, noble Nagarjuna Determined through reasoning the manner of dependent origination Being empty of the reference points of the four extremes, And then said that emptiness is suitable to perform functions.

In the collection of praises, he eliminated That this emptiness is just nothing at all, And said that it is suitable to perform functions, Since the spontaneous presence of sa?sara and nirva?a is mind as such.

Therefore, as for the manner of asserting the ground Of the Madhyamaka system in the mahayana, These two system-founders—the regent Maitreya and Nagarjuna, Who was prophesied by the victor—accord in their intention. In verses 47–49ab, Gorampa cites verses 1–2 of the Dharmadhatustava to support his rejection of the claim that the two kinds of purity—natural purity and purity of adventitious stains—are mutually exclusive. Later, when refuting the Jonang claim that the dharmadhatu is buddhahood even when not purified of stains, Gorampa says that this contradicts the treatises of Maitreya and Nagarjuna, quoting Uttaratantra I.47 and Dharmadhatustava 12–13 and 36–37 (verses 73d–79), which clearly differentiate between the phases of the dharmadhatu being with and without stains.

More importantly still, there are five known Sakya commentaries on the Dharmadhatustava by Rongtön Sheja Künrig388 (1367–1449), Sönam Gyaltsen389 (1312–1375), Sakya Chogden (1428–1507), Lowo Khenchen Sönam Lhündrub (1456–1532),390 and Lodrö Gyatso (born nineteenth century).

Among the three that are available at present, Rongtön’s very brief interlinear commentary does not offer any detailed or general explanations.

Sakya Chogden’s commentary starts by discussing the significance of the Dharmadhatustava by giving “the reasons why this treatise must be explained in clear and precise terms”:

The wrong ideas that need to be eliminated here are as follows. 1

One may think that the conventional term “dharmadhatu wisdom” does not appear in the yana of characteristics. 2 The dharmadhatu of both sentient beings and Buddhas, which is explained in that yana, may be expounded as being nothing but the aspect of emptiness that is a nonimplicative negation. 3 One may identify the naturally abiding disposition, the svabhavikakaya, and the nonabiding nirvana all three solely from the aspect of emptiness that is a nonimplicative negation, but not know how to explain them from the aspect of luminous aware experience. 4 Instead, one may explain that this aspect of luminous aware experience at the time of the ground is nothing but consciousness and not know how to explain it as wisdom. 5 Even those who know how to explain the above in such a way may claim that this very wisdom is actual buddhahood and dharmakaya. They may claim that, for this reason, all sentient beings are Buddhas and hold that they possess the qualities of the definitive meaning, such as the major and minor marks, the powers, and so forth. They may assert that the actual Sugata heart exists at the time of the ground. Not understanding that just this luminous aware experience is explained as the heart of sentient beings at the time of the ground and as the Buddha heart at the time of the fruition, they may claim such an experience to be the Buddha heart at all times. Not understanding that just this luminous aware experience, through dividing it in three phases, is given the names “sentient being,” “bodhisattva,” and “Buddha,” they may explain it as “Buddha” throughout all these phases. 6 Others, who do not understand that the explanation of the true nature of mind with stains as “the Heart” is an explanation from the aspect of wisdom, explain it to be the aspect of emptiness alone. They think that wisdom is taught to be really established in this text here and say that the ways in which venerable Nagarjuna and venerable Asa?ga identify the naturally abiding disposition and the Sugata heart are totally incompatible. In particular, they do not explain that the dharmadhatu—which is to be praised by this text—is wisdom, but explain it to be nothing but emptiness. These are the wrong ideas that have arisen about this text and its topic.

The purpose of composing this explication here is to eliminate these ideas and then give rise to certainty in what the essence of dharmadhatu is, how it abides in the phases of sa?sara and nirva?a, and the ways in which our apprehending of characteristics labels it in each of these phases and so forth.391

Lodrö Gyatso’s commentary presents a thorough explanation of Nagarjuna’s verses and elaborates on a number of related topics. These include buddha nature not being invalidated through the teachings on emptiness; the nature of yogic consciousness in ordinary beings and bodhisattvas; the union of the two realities; buddhahood not being attained through viewing it as a nonimplicative negation; and the relationship between the texts of Nagarjuna and Maitreya, being essentially equal.392

In the Jonang tradition, there are two commentaries on the Dharmadhatustava by Dölpopa and Sönam Sangbo (1341–1433). Sönam Sangbo’s text is the only available commentary on this text that mentions the term “other-empty” at all (though just once), but otherwise frequently follows Rangjung Dorje’s commentary (sometimes literally). Interestingly, Dölpopa’s short commentary does not use said term either and exhibits only a few traces of his otherwise typical version of the shentong view. Dölpopa’s main text that presents this view, The Mountain Dharma Called The Ocean of Definitive Meaning, quotes twenty verses from the Dharmadhatustava (1–10, 18–23, 27, 36–37, and 45),393 saying that this text by Nagarjuna, through many examples, extensively teaches on the Tathagata heart, which is equivalent to the dharmadhatu, the dharmakaya, naturally luminous mind, self-sprung wisdom, and so on. Two other texts by Dölpopa, A General Commentary on the Teachings394 and The Fourth Council,395 allude to Nagarjuna’s text by referring to the masters who taught, through examples such as a lamp inside a vase, that the luminous Tathagata heart is present within adventitious afflictions.

Taranatha’s (1575–1635) Scriptural Foundation of The Ornament of Other- Emptiness396 cites seven verses of the Dharmadhatustava (1–2, 9–10, 22, and 52–53). His Essence of Other-Emptiness says that the Great Madhyamaka that is known in Tibet as “other-emptiness”397 is elucidated by the texts of Maitreya as well as by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu. It is also very clearly present in Nagarjuna’s Dharmadhatustava. Thus, the position of both supreme noble ones—Asa?ga and Nagarjuna—is “other-emptiness.”398

The contemporary Jonang scholar Dzamtang Khenpo Lodrö Tragba’s399 (1920–1975) Fearless Lion’s Roar400 states that Maitreya, Asa?ga, and Vasubandhu teach through integrating the final view of all three yanas. In accordance with this, noble Nagarjuna, through verse XV.7 of his Mulamadhyamakakarika (“Through his knowledge of entities and nonentities, in the instruction for Katyayana, the victor has refuted both their existence and nonexistence”) establishes that even the first turning of the wheel of dharma teaches Madhyamaka free from the two extremes. Through verse 35 of his Yukti?a??ika (“The victors have declared that nirva?a alone is true, so which wise one would think that the rest is not delusive?”), he also taught the final view of the middle turning to be the definitive meaning that is the Madhyamaka of “other-emptiness.” In his commentaries on the last wheel, the collection of praises—the Dharmadhatustava, Paramarthastava, Niraupamyastava, Lokatitastava, and so on—and in some texts on the vajrayana, he explains this excellently in accord with the view of the profound essential point of the supreme K?tyayuga teachings401 and the works by Maitreya and his followers.

As for the Nyingma School, Lochen Dharmasri’s (1654–1717) Commentary on Ascertaining the Three Vows402 says the following about the difference between the views in the middle and the final turning of the wheel of dharma that are to be made a living experience through meditation: According to the explicit teaching of the middle wheel as commented on by Nagarjuna in his collection of reasoning, since the definitive meaning is presented as a nonimplicative negation, not meditating on anything whatsoever is explained as meditating on 146 In Praise of Dharmadhatu emptiness, and not seeing anything whatsoever is realizing true reality. According to the intention of the final turning as commented on in the works by Maitreya and those by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu as well as in Nagarjuna’s collection of praises, it is this very wisdom without the duality of apprehender and apprehended that is explained as what is to be made a living experience through meditation, and this also accords in intention with the profound collections of the secret mantra.

Furthermore, the text says that the Nyingma tradition appears to accord with Nagarjuna as far as the way of taking the bodhisattva vows goes, but that such is not definite in terms of the view. The Nyingma view is surely not in contradiction to Nagarjuna’s collection of praises, but it mainly accords with Asa?ga’s and Vasubandhu’s way of exegesis, since it does not take the nonnominal ultimate as a nonimplicative negation but as emptiness that is an implicative negation, and since it holds the final turning of the wheel of dharma to be of definitive meaning.403

Ju Mipham Gyatso (1846–1912) says in one of his texts that his own system is rangtong.404 His Elimination of Doubts about the Genuine Dharma405(a reply to criticism of his commentary on the Madhyamakala?kara) clarifies that he does not have the burden of needing to establish the shentong view, since he follows Rongzom Pa??ita Chökyi Sangbo406 (1012–1088) and Longchenpa, who both accord with the texts of Nagarjuna, and that even someone inferior like him is one-pointedly inclined toward these. He continues that he felt forced to write his reply due to the words of others who regard shentong like an enemy. It was probably for the same reason that he wrote his Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Other-Emptiness. This text says that when one ascertains the philosophical system of “other-emptiness,” one must first ascertain that all phenomena lack a nature of their own, just as it is taught in Nagarjuna’s texts. If one does not understand this, one can neither ascertain the way in which the seeming is empty of its own nature, nor the way in which the ultimate is empty of something other. Therefore, in the beginning, freedom from reference points—the object that is to be personally experienced— is to be ascertained. Thereafter, one ascertains the nonconceptual wisdom that is the subject that realizes this ultimate object (freedom from reference points). In this way, both the object and the subject for which the way things appear and how they actually are concord, are called “the ultimate,” while the objects and subjects for which the way things appear and how they actually are discord, are called “the seeming.” Under analysis through the valid cognition that examines the conventional, there exist differences in terms of being deceiving or undeceiving and of being mistaken or unmistaken. Thus, what is undeceiving and unmistaken is presented as the ultimate and the opposite as the seeming. The well-known way of presenting the two realities as emptiness and appearance as well as the just-explained way of presenting them in terms of the way things appear and how they actually are, have both been taught in the sutras and the great treatises since the very beginning— they were not newly created by the proponents of other-emptiness. They are taught in the Dharmadharmatavibhaga, the Uttaratantra, and Nagarjuna’s Dharmadhatustava (quoting verses 20–22).407

Mipham Rinpoche’s Synopsis of the Sugata Heart describes buddha nature as follows:

The actuality of the dhatu of the two realities in union, which is free from the entire web of reference points and to be personally experienced, is called “naturally pure dharmadhatu” and “emptiness.” All sutras of the mahayana and the commentaries on their intention say that this is the buddha disposition that fully qualifies as such and the svabhavakaya endowed with twofold purity. Therefore, it is not tenable to assert this naturally abiding disposition as anything but unconditioned. Being unconditioned, it is furthermore not reasonable for this dharmadhatu to, through its very own nature, perform the activity of producing another result and then cease. Consequently, it is not tenable to assert the qualities of the dharmakaya as anything but a result of freedom.408 That it is like this is said by the regent, the great bodhisattva on the tenth bhumi, in his Uttaratantra and is also very clearly stated by the glorious protector, noble Nagarjuna, in his Dharmadhatustava. Hence, by following these scriptures, our own tradition asserts the unconditioned dharmadhatu as the disposition.

This dhatu is the basic nature of all phenomena, its essence is without arising and ceasing, and it has the character of appearance and emptiness inseparable, not falling on either side.409

The text continues with an extensive discussion of the threefold proof in Uttaratantra I.28 that all beings have buddha nature, explaining the first line—”since the buddhakaya radiates”—as follows:

The ultimate perfect buddhakaya—the dharmakaya with its qualities that equal the vastness of space—clearly shows or radiates or manifests later from what was previously an ordinary being, that is, the mind stream of a person that has been associated with the entire set of fetters. Since there is such a manifestation of the dharmakaya, the Tathagata heart exists in the mind streams of sentient beings from right now up through the point when this manifestation happens. There is a common and an uncommon justification for how this is established. As for the first one, if there are sentient beings who manifest this wisdom-dharmakaya, their minds necessarily have the disposition of being suitable to become Buddhas, while the same is not tenable for what completely lacks this disposition. As the Dharmadhatustava verse 11 says:

If this element exists, through our work, We will see the purest of all gold. Without this element, despite our toil, Nothing but misery we will produce.410

Later, the text emphasizes that the second and third turnings of the wheel of dharma, as well as the systems of Nagarjuna and Asa?ga, share the same essential point, which equally pertains to the vajrayana.

Following what the Omniscient Longchen Rabjam411 maintains, the emptiness taught in the middle turning of the wheel of dharma as well as the kayas and wisdoms taught in the last one must definitely be taken as the union of appearance and emptiness. Consequently, since there is nothing to discriminate or to eliminate with regard to the two cycles of definitive meaning in the middle and last turnings, both are to be taken as the definitive meaning. Then, there is not only no contradiction such that one of these turnings must be taken as being of expedient meaning, if the other is exclusively taken as the definitive meaning, but by considering them to be a union, this kind of Tathagata heart is regarded as the meaning of the “causal tantra,” thus emerging as the essential point of the pith instructions of the vajrayana. Therefore, one needs to understand that these teachings of the Buddha come down to the same essential point. All noble ones, such as Nagarjuna and Asa?ga, are single-minded with regard to this ultimate point, since this is clearly realized through texts such as the Dharmadhatustava and Bodhicittavivara?a, as well as Asa?ga’s commentary on the Uttaratantra and so on. As master Nagarjuna says in verse 22 of his Dharmadhatustava:

The sutras that teach emptiness, However many spoken by the victors, They all remove afflictions, But never ruin this dhatu.

Accordingly, having scrutinized through analysis for the ultimate, the final outcome of this is the inseparability of the two realities. Since this vajralike point is the dhatu that is indivisible through dialectical minds, there is no basis for engaging in disputes with regard to the ultimate.412

A commentary on Ju Mipham Gyatso’s famous Lamp of Certainty413 by his student Troshul Jamdor414 quotes four verses of the Dharmadhatustava. Verse 22 is found as support for the primordially pure dharmadhatu and its self-radiance—the wisdom-kaya—being inseparable by nature, which results in the latter not being negated on the path or invalidated through analysis for the ultimate either. Moreover, just as gold is purified through fire, the more this wisdom is analyzed, the clearer its empty nature is seen, the two obscurations are purified, and the aspect of lucid appearance is seen as the emerging of the self-radiance of emptiness.415 Verses 74–76 are cited to underline the gradual increase and perfection of the realization of the nature of the dharmadhatu, just as the waxing moon, by bodhisattvas on the path of the mahayana. This is said to apply all the more to sravakas and pratyekabuddhas, who cannot simply suddenly leap into the supreme realization of the mahayana by following their respective paths. Otherwise, those with comparatively dull faculties would be the people with the potential for instantaneous realization, while those with sharp faculties would only have the potential of a strictly gradual progression.416

Pöba Tulku Dongag Denbé Nyima417 (1900/1907–1959), an important commentator on Mipham Rinpoche’s works, says the following in his Notes on the Essential Points of Mipham’s Synopsis of the Sugata Heart:418

Concurring with the meaning taught in the sutras that instruct on the disposition, the basic element, through the example of cleansing a gem, the Uttaratantra, the Dharmadhatustava, and so forth, according to what is found through the valid cognition of pure vision419 by way of whether there is invalidation through the valid cognition of pure vision or not, take the sutras that teach the final definitive meaning—the Sugata heart—to be of definitive meaning. Therefore, the final cycle of the Buddha’s words that teaches on the topic of the Sugata heart—the nature of appearance and emptiness inseparable, the ultimate in which the way things appear and how they actually are concord—is asserted as being of definitive meaning, since this Sugata heart is what is found through the valid cognition of pure vision.420

The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism by the late supreme head of the Nyingma lineage, H.H. Düjom Rinpoche (1904–1987), cites verses 20–21 of the Dharmadhatustava on the fireproof garment, saying that the ostentatious arising and ceasing of seeming reality does not harm true reality.421 Furthermore, the text says twice that the Tathagata heart or dharmadhatu abides in the minds of sentient beings in a way that is unaffected by all unreal adventitious stains, just as a precious gem in a swamp, each time quoting verse 23.422 On the three kayas as the fruition of the dharmadhatu, which is not just a nonimplicative negation, verse 101 is adduced.423 Düjom Rinpoche also quotes verses 15–18ab from Atisa’s Dharmadhatudarsanagiti, which in fact—as mentioned above—are verses 27, 24, 26ab, and 22 of the Dharmadhatustava. He says that Atisa (and thus Nagarjuna) has determined that the unconditioned dharmadhatu—which is empty of imaginary karma and defilements but inseparable from the enlightened qualities—is the disposition or Tathagata heart.424 The text also refers a number of times to the collection of praises in general. Once the conclusive nonnominal ultimate reality has been determined in accordance with the collection of reasoning, there is no reason to deny that, according to the intentions of the texts of Maitreya and the collection of praises, the kayas and wisdoms of a Buddha are naturally present and unconditioned, since they do not differ in nature from the dharmadhatu.425

It is in the texts of Maitreya and in Nagarjuna’s collection of praises that the meaning of Great Madhyamaka (shentong)—the supreme among all philosophical systems in the sutrayana—is revealed.426 Finally, Düjom Rinpoche says that the conclusive intention of Nagarjuna and Asa?ga abides without contradiction in the nature of the Great Perfection, this intention comprising Nagarjuna’s collection of reasoning (the commentaries on the second turning of the wheel of dharma) as well as his collection of praises, mainly the Dharmadhatustava, and the commentaries by Maitreya, Asa?ga, Vasubandhu, and so on (all commentaries on the third turning).427

As for the Gelugpa School, there is mention of a presently unavailable early commentary by Nyendön Sakya Gyaltsen428 (born fourteenth century). The above-quoted works by Jamyang Shéba and Janggya Rölpé Dorje are among the sources of the later default Gelugpa position on the collection of praises in general and the Dharmadhatustava in particular. To provide one of the rare quotes of this text in Gelugpa works, the contemporary scholar Kensur Padma Gyaltsen’s429 Eye-opening Golden Spoon That Instructs on the Profound Meaning430 typically quotes verses 74–76 just to illustrate the gradual nature of realization and qualities appearing on the path.431

A rather peculiar example of Gelugpa texts that quote the Dharmadhatustava is a polemical work by Séra Jetsün Chökyi Gyaltsen (1469–1546), called An Answer to the Karmapa, which disputes some parts of the Eighth Karmapa’s commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara. In Séra Jetsün’s section that rejects “nondual wisdom is the ultimate basic nature, exists ultimately, is a permanent entity, and is the final true intention of the third turning of the wheel of dharma, the texts by Maitreya, Asa?ga, and Vasubandhu, and—in particular— Nagarjuna’s collection of praises” and so on, he quotes eight verses from the Dharmadhatustava432 (and many verses from other praises by Nagarjuna). However, both the selection and interpretation of these verses are highly tendentious, solely geared toward making a case for orthodox Gelugpa positions.

There is no room here to go into the highly complex details of showing that the Karmapa’s explanations are often mispresented and/or oversimplified, while the “refutations” are limited only to default buzz-words and do not take into account the Karmapa’s frequent emphasis that at times he moves to another level of discourse altogether (as described below in the section on the Third Karmapa’s view, distinguishing between a conceptual “philosophical system” and a wider outlook from the perspective of direct realization in meditative equipoise).433 Three examples of this shall suffice here. First, by only quoting verses 30 and 43–44 of the Dharmadhatustava, Séra Jetsün concludes that the entire collection of praises fully accords with the collection of reasoning and the Madhyamaka system in general in saying that the ultimate basic nature is nothing but all phenomena’s lack of a nature, and that therefore emptiness must be a nonimplicative negation. Also, nondual wisdom is said to therefore not exist ultimately, which simply disregards the Dharmadhatustava’s verses (such as 23, 46, 63, 80–81, 87, and 101) that explicitly suggest wisdom’s ultimate existence. Of course, Séra Jetsün does not mention any of the verses here that speak of the examples for the luminous nature of mind existing unaffected within the obscurations (such as 3–15, 18–22, 27, 36–37, and 74–76) either. Secondly, lines 1cd are given as the only “scriptural proof” that sravakas and pratyekabuddhas realize emptiness. The same two lines are moreover claimed as teaching that nondual wisdom is not the ultimate basic nature. Thirdly, verses 20–21 are given as scriptural support for the existence of wisdom and luminosity at the level of a Buddha (contrary to Séra Jetsün’s claim, this is not something the Karmapa denies in the first place). At the same time, as stated above, it is denied that nondual wisdom exists ultimately, which of course begs the question how it exists then at the level of buddhahood. The standard Gelugpa answer is that it is a part of seeming reality, the only ultimate existent being emptiness. It should be obvious that this entails a number of problems, such as how a part of seeming reality could exist in the mind of a Buddha (the level of buddhahood being the very final level of ultimate reality), or how a Buddha’s wisdom as a perceiving subject that belongs to seeming reality could ever realize any ultimate reality, such as emptiness.

To summarize, as will also be clear from the parts of the commentaries on the Dharmadhatustava translated below, the Tibetan tradition (with the exception of the Gelugpa School) regards the Dharmadhatustava as an indication that Nagarjuna not only taught on emptiness but also on naturally luminous mind, the Tathagata heart, and nonconceptual wisdom. Some, like Dölpopa and Taranatha, consider this as clear evidence that Nagarjuna is a shentongpa, his final view being “Great Madhyamaka” or “other-empty Madhyamaka.” Others, like the Third Karmapa and Sakya Chogden, point out that the teachings in Nagarjuna’s collections of reasoning and praises are complementary and share the same essential point, with the same applying to the relationship between the Madhyamaka tradition of Nagarjuna and his followers on the one hand and the Yogacara tradition of Maitreya, Asa?ga, and Vasubandhu on the other.

The Third Karmapa , Rangjung Dorje ,

& His Commentary on the Dharmadh atustava

T The Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje, and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava

A Short Biography

Karmapa Rangjung Dorje was born on January 27, 1284 into a family of Nyingma tantric practitioners in the area of Mangyül Tingri Langkor434 in Tsang, Central Tibet. His father was Dönba Chöbal435 and his mother Jomo Yangdren.436 From the age of three onward, he would sit on rocks or other seats and teach his playmates. He also proclaimed himself to be the Karmapa. At the age of five, he visited the Second Karmapa’s main disciple and lineage holder, the great Drugba Kagyü siddha Urgyenpa Rinchen Bal437 (1230–1309), who had already had a dream about his arrival. He tested the young Karmapa, who then reported details of the meeting between Rinchen Bal and the Second Karmapa, Karma Pakshi. Rinchen Bal returned all the Karmapa’s possessions, including the Black Crown, bestowed the lay vows upon him, and gave him the name Rangjung Dorje, which had been Karma Pakshi’s secret name. Thereafter, he began offering the Karmapa empowerments and instructions. At seven, Rangjung Dorje was ordained as a novice by Tropuwa Künden Sherab,438 with whom he also studied the vinaya. Two years later, he arrived at the Karmapas’ main seat in Tsurpu, where, over the next nine years, he received the entire transmissions of both the Kagyü and Nyingma lineages from his principal tutor, the great siddha Nyenré Gendün Boom,439 as well as other teachers, such as Lopön Sherab Bal,440 Gyagom Yeshe Ö,441 and Namtsowa Mikyö Dorje.442 After a retreat on the slopes of Mount Everest at age eighteen, Rangjung Dorje received full monastic ordination from Shönu Jangchub443 and Gendün Rinchen.444

In the following years, he studied extensively with many great masters of all Tibetan traditions, thus gaining mastery of most of the Buddhist transmissions from India to Tibet. This included studying Madhyamaka, Yogacara, the five texts of Maitreya, abhidharma, and prama?a at the famous Kadampa monastic college of Sangpu445 with Sakya Shönu446 (then abbot of its “lower” monastic seat) and Lodrö Tsungmé (mid-thirteenth to mid-fourteenth century); detailed expositions and empowerments of the Kalacakratantra and many other “old” and “new” tantras from Nyedowa Kunga Döndrub447 (born 1268) and Tsültrim Rinchen;448 teachings on medicine from Lama Baré;449 and the Vima Nyingtig450 as well as the Six Dharmas of Niguma from the most eminent exponent of Dzogchen at the time, Rigdzin Kumararaja (1266– 1343), the main teacher of the great Nyingma master Longchen Rabjam (1308–1368). With the latter, Rangjung Dorje also shared a mutual teacherstudent relationship.

Throughout his life, the Third Karmapa spent considerable time in solitary meditation retreats but also traveled throughout Tibet, giving teachings and often acting as a mediator in local conflicts. He also had many visions of great masters of the past and deities. During a retreat in his early twenties at Karma Yangön,451 he experienced such a significant encounter with Vimalamitra and Padmasambhava, both melting into a point between his eyebrows. At this moment, he realized all the Dzogchen tantras of the Nyingma lineage. Thereafter, he wrote several volumes on Dzogchen, the most important being the Karma Nyingtig,452 thus unifying the teachings of the Kagyü Mahamudra and the Nyingma Dzogchen. Through this and the teachings he had received mainly from Rigdzin Kumararaja, the Karmapa became both a tertön (“treasure- revealer”) and a lineage holder in the Nyingma Dzogchen tradition. In 1310, he met with the famous Sakya master Yagdön Sangyé Bal453 (1348– 1414). Thereafter, he stayed in retreat on the slopes of Mt. Everest and at the hermitage of Gampo Sanglung454 in Tagbo.455 Altogether, he stayed for three years in Tagbo and Kongbo,456 teaching, meditating, founding hermitages,

and visiting holy places. In 1318, at the hermitage of Tsurpu Gung,457 he had visions of the outer and inner spheres of the Kalacakra teachings, upon which he composed a treatise on a revised system of astrology, which is transmitted to this day as the Tsurpu tradition of Tibetan astrology. In the same year, he founded the hermitage of Upper Dechen458 in the Tsurpu Valley, where he also wrote several of his most famous treatises, such as The Profound Inner Reality and The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom.

Rangjung Dorje is reported to have met Dölpopa once between 1320 and 1324 and prophesied that the latter would come to realize an especially sublime view unlike his present one.459 It was soon after that Dölpopa formulated his system of “other-emptiness.” In 1324, Rangjung Dorje returned for one year to Kongbo, teaching and establishing several monasteries and retreat facilities. While staying at Gogtreng460 in Kongbo—a place where Padmasambhava had meditated—he composed his autocommentary on The Profound Inner Reality in 1325. In 1326, the Karmapa quelled a feud between the Central Tibetan kingdom of Tsal and the Khampas. He proceeded to eastern The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 159 Tibet, restored Karma Gön,461 and had an iron bridge built over the Sogchu462 River in 1328.

Continuing the relationship of the Mongol imperial court with the Second Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje was invited to China by the emperor Toq Temür of the Yüan dynasty in 1331. He entered China in 1332, to learn that the emperor had just died. His nephew and successor Irinjibal (aka Ratnasri) urged the Karmapa to continue his journey, but he also died soon after Rangjung Dorje’s arrival at the court in Ta’i-tu. The Karmapa assisted in the complex matters of installing the next emperor Togan Temür—Irinjibal’s elder brother—and bestowed many teachings upon him. Having promised the emperor to return in two years, Rangjung Dorje left the court for Tibet in 1334. He visited Wut’ai- shan (the holy mountain of Mañjusri)463 and several places in Kham on the way, arriving in Tsurpu late in 1335. Upon being reinvited to the Mongol court, the Karmapa departed from Tsurpu in August 1336 and arrived in Beijing in 1337. During the eighth Tibetan month of that year (August-September), he prophesied a severe earthquake, making the emperor and his court camp on an open plain, thus saving many people. During the last two years of his life at the court, Rangjung Dorje functioned as spiritual and political advisor to the emperor, taught the dharma, and established some monasteries.

In the summer of 1338, at a meeting of Mongol officials, he announced, “I, a yogin, am like a cloud. May all who wish to grasp the meaning of my teachings do so swiftly.” On June 21 in 1339, Rangjung Dorje passed away, and it is said that his image appeared in the full moon on the night of that day.

As for the Karmapa’s scriptural legacy, besides the texts mentioned, further important works that are still available are his autocommentary on The Profound Inner Reality, The Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra,464 an Instruction Manual on Uniting with Connate Mahamudra,465 Pointing Out the Three Kayas,466 The Nonduality of Pra?a and Mind,467 a commentary on the Hevajratantra, commentaries on Saraha’s three cycles of Doha, Tilopa’s “Ganges Mahamudra,” and the Cakrasa?varatantra, several texts on the Cakrasa?varatantra, the Kalacakratantra, and Cutting Through (gcod), The Treatise on Pointing Out the Tathagata Heart, and, of course, his commentary on the Dharmadhatustava.468

Rangjung Dorje’s main disciples were Gyalwa Yungdönba469 (1284–1365), who was his successor as a lineage holder, the First Shamarpa, Tragba Sengé470 (1283–1349), and Yagdön Sangyé Bal.

Some Preliminary Remarks on Rangjung Dorje’s View

In the Tibetan tradition and Western scholarship alike, the Third Karmapa is often unequivocally identified as a major—if not the main—Kagyü shentongpa, that is, a proponent of the view of “Shentong-Madhyamaka.” No doubt a lot of research on the details of his view still needs to be done, but the fact is that not even the terms shentong or rangtong can be found in his works, let alone any discussions of them or what they refer to. This is particularly noteworthy with respect to those of the Third Karmapa’s texts that clearly present his view and in which one would expect to find these terms and their explanations, if they had any significance for him. Therefore, to avoid looking at Rangjung Dorje’s view through the filter of the somewhat “loaded” categories of rangtong and shentong, in the following, I will first present a preliminary outline of his view that is primarily based on his own writings and, only thereafter, address the question of what a shentongpa is exactly.

The methodological basis for looking at any philosophical or religious text, without merely trying to find confirmations of one’s own or others’ pre-established interpretations of such scriptures, is aptly stated by L. Schmithausen: I presuppose that the texts I make use of are to be taken seriously, in the sense that one has to accept that they mean what they say, and that what they mean is reasonable within its own terms.471

In this vein, the following sketch of the Third Karmapa’s view suggests that, based on his own writings, he cannot be claimed as a one-sided adherent of the view of shentong as opposed to rangtong, since his explanations are squarely based in both the classical Yogacara and Madhyamaka systems, providing a synthesis that emphasizes both their complementarity and their sameness with regard to the essential points. This balanced approach is moreover confirmed by a number of later Kagyü authorities (for details, see below).

My outline is based on seven of Rangjung Dorje’s texts (including their commentaries) that speak in varying detail about his view, exhibiting a striking consistency in its basic traits that seems to justify a sketch of his position. These seven texts are the following:

(1) The Profound Inner Reality (ZMND) (2) its autocommentary (especially on Chapters One, Six, and Nine) (AC) (3) The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom (NY) (4) Pointing Out the Tathagata Heart (NT) (5) the commentary on the Dharmadhatustava (DSC) (6) Explanation of the Dharmadharmatavibhaga (EDV) (7) The Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra (MM)

In the Kagyü tradition, the first four texts are considered as a unity, with the Karmapa’s magnum opus—ZMND with its AC—being an extensive general commentary on the tantras. Its first chapter is a general discussion of The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 161 the nature and origin of sa?sara, as well as the nature of the mind—the Tathagata heart—as the basis for nirva?a. Chapter Six includes the change of state of the eight consciousnesses into the five wisdoms. Chapter Nine contains a presentation of the two realities and the progressive steps of the path of both the sutras and tantras. To be sure, ZMND and AC are primarily works on the tantras, but the just-mentioned explanations in them apply in general and are also found in the same way in NT, NY, and DSC. This clearly suggests that they indeed represent Rangjung Dorje’s basic position as being the view that underlies sutras and tantras in common.

NT and NY are works that supplement ZMND and AC, respectively, elaborating on buddha nature and the characteristics of the eight consciousnesses and the four (five) wisdoms, with the former changing their state into the latter (both works are also referred to in AC).472

As will be seen in the translation of DSC below, it also contains an extensive discussion of the two realities in the context of ground, path, and fruition, drawing on numerous sources from both the Yogacara and Madhyamaka traditions, as well as a demonstration that these two traditions are not mutually exclusive but come down to the same essential point.

EDV is primarily a commentary on the Dharmadharmatavibhaga, saying that—among the five texts of Maitreya—this one describes the manner of practically engaging in the Tathagata heart. EDV clearly treats all these five texts as a unity and states that it is based on the works of both Asa?ga and Nagarjuna, which is reflected in its many quotations from all these texts. Among all of Rangjung Dorje’s works, EDV gives the most detailed presentations of the three natures, nonconceptual wisdom, and the notion of complete change of state. It also extensively explains the four “yogic practices” (prayoga) found in many mahayana texts (for details, see below), and—like DSC and NT—the relinquishment of the four conceptions in terms of factors to be relinquished, remedies, suchness, and fruition, as explained in the Avikalpapravesadhara?i.

Of course, MM does not give a systematic presentation of the view but still highlights some crucial points.473

As for a tentative chronology of these texts, EDV’s colophon says that it was written in a Tibetan Monkey Year at Upper Dechen, which can only be 1320.474 The colophon of ZMND has a Tibetan Year of the Dog, which according to Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentary (“Water Male Dog Year”) is 1322. As for AC, its colophon gives 1325 as the year of composition. DSC was probably written in 1326 (possibly in 1327).475 There is no date available for NT, while the colophon of NY says that it was authored at Upper Dechen in a Year of the Pig, which can only be 1323.476 In any case, since both it and NT are referred to by Rangjung Dorje in his AC, they must have been composed before the latter and, given their overall context, in all likelihood after ZMND. Consequently, it seems that Rangjung Dorje laid out his basic view by way of these interrelated texts between 1320 and 1326/7, starting with EDV, followed by ZMND, NT, NY, AC, and finally DSC.

To present some key elements of Rangjung Dorje’s view, his ZMND starts by explaining the purpose of its composition as being the realization of the stainless Tathagata heart, which abides throughout the three phases of impurity (sentient beings), both impurity and purity (bodhisattvas on the path), and utter purity (Buddhas). AC comments that these phases represent ground, path, and fruition, or ground-tantra, means-tantra, and fruition-tantra. The stainless Tathagata heart is the subject of the vajrayana, which is most difficult to realize. “Vajra” refers to changeless buddhahood and “yana” is what makes bodhisattvas proceed there. In other words, since the indestructible Tathagata heart is the basis from which nothing in sa?sara and nirva?a moves away, it is the vajrayana. Since it is the very nature of buddhahood, it is called “Buddha heart.” It entails the four inconceivable points that are also presented in the Srimaladevisutra and the Uttaratantra. AC says:

The inconceivable point of the “basic element” is that the Buddha heart is not tainted by any stains, but does not become buddhahood until all afflictive and cognitive stains have been relinquished. The inconceivable point of enlightenment is that the basic element is associated with these stains since beginningless time, but because these stains are adventitious, they are not established as any real substance. The inconceivable point of the qualities of enlightenment is that the sixty-four qualities of buddhahood exist in all sentient beings right now in a complete way, but if they are not triggered through the condition of the immaculate dharma (the natural outflow of the utterly stainless dharmadhatu), their power does not come forth. The inconceivable point of enlightened activity is that there is no difference in enlightened activity’s effortless, spontaneous, and nonconceptual operation in terms of all sentient beings and Buddhas being the same or different. Thus, being free from all expressions yet serving as the basis for all expressions is being inconceivable . . . Though it is said that this mode of being is difficult to realize by sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and even bodhisattvas who have newly entered the mahayana, for the time being, it shall be taught by way of an example. When a big precious gem of blue beryl is encrusted . . .

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 163 Not understanding these reasons, others explain that the fruition exists already right now, that the afflictions are not to be relinquished, that new remedial wisdom cannot be produced, and that natural purity is the partial aspect of nothing but a nonimplicative negation.477 Such explanations are a far cry from the vajrayana.

Therefore, one should know that this inconceivable matrix—the very essence of what dependently originates (such as ultimate and seeming, Buddhas and sentient beings, appearance and emptiness)— is contained in the three phases of sentient beings, bodhisattvas on the path, and Buddhas . . . In detail, I have already explained this in my Treatise Determining the Buddha Heart.478 The first chapter of ZMND begins with presenting the process of sa?saric delusion as mind being unaware of its own nature: The cause is beginningless mind as such.

Though it is neither unbalanced nor biased, Due to the unimpeded play of that very mind, Empty in essence, lucid in nature, And unimpeded in manifesting, it appears as everything. That very mind, being ignorant of itself, Is stirred by formational mentation.

Due to being stirred like waves on water, Referents and apprehenders appear as two. Mind itself projects onto itself and grasps at that.

Due to the factor of mind moving outward, Objects are taken to be referents, and the consciousnesses arise. Since these lines on how mind falls into delusion are essential and the basis for all following explanations as well as for Rangjung Dorje’s commentary on the Dharmadhatustava, it seems appropriate to present the most crucial comments in AC:

The general terminology of all yanas speaks of “mind as such.” However, this mind has to be understood as being twofold—pure and impure. As for teaching mind’s pure aspect as mind, the Uttaratantra . . . expresses the Buddha heart as mind, and this has the meaning of it being the basis of everything in sa?sara and nirva?a. . . . The A??asahasrikaprajñaparamitasutra says: The mind is no-mind. The nature of the mind is luminosity.

. . . To express mind’s impure aspect as mind refers to what is taught as the “alaya-consciousness.” . . . This alaya-consciousness embraced by false imagination consists of the minds and mental factors in the three realms, is the root of all obscurations, and is to be overcome by buddha wisdom. . . . As for the so-called “alaya,” if the term “consciousness” is not explicitly stated, since it is suitable in certain contexts to express suchness as “alaya” too, the term “consciousness” is added here. . . . It is fine to use the conventional term “purified phenomena” due to the alaya-consciousness having become pure, but it is not suitable to explain the alaya-consciousness as being the cause for the buddha wisdom of nirva?a.

“But isn’t it that also the conceptuality that is based on the correct view of the immaculate dharmas being inseparable from the enlightenment of a buddha is input into the alaya-consciousness?

How are these purified phenomena produced?” They rely on the above-stated purity of mind, the dharmakaya, the Tathagata heart, . . . which is explained in detail in Mahayanasa?graha I.45–49.479

. . . Some may think that the unfolding disposition arises newly, but this is not the case. To present the naturally abiding disposition— the dharmadhatu—as the eight consciousnesses, such as the alaya-consciousness, is a presentation and classification in terms of false imagination. Accordingly, the very own stainless essence of these eight collections of consciousness exists as the nature of the four wisdoms, and this is the presentation by way of correct imagination.

Due to the previous stains having been overcome through the immaculate dharma that is based on the enlightenment of a Buddha, the mistakenness of the eight collections does not exist anymore later. Therefore, this is given the name “the wisdom of the fundamental change of state.” For this reason, . . . mind without stains should be regarded as being wisdom and mind with stains to be consciousness. . . .

Having explained pure and impure mind in this way, the meaning of “beginningless” in the first line of the verse above is as follows. Since a beginning and an end in time are conceptual superimpositions, mind’s own essence—be it with stains or stainless—is free from being the same as or other than dependent origination. Since there is no other beginning than that, this is called “beginningless time.” In the very moment of being aware (rig pa) of our realizing mind’s own essence, it is liberated, while not being aware (ma rig pa) of it is the beginning of mistaken mind, which is called The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 165 “ignorance.” . . . Moreover, there have been infinite moments in past times apart from just this present moment of not realizing mind’s nature, which are connected as a continuum all the way up to this moment. Therefore, to express this infinite continuum of ignorance through the term “beginningless” is fine too.

However, thoughts that, right from the beginning, mind with stains exists as something permanent or that it arises out of nothing are just instances of the views about a true personality. If mind were permanently connected with the stains, they would be impossible to relinquish. The other possibility means that mind would arise without a cause. Since such thoughts entail these flaws, they also contradict reasoning. . . . Since this mind is inexpressible as being either the same or different with regard to Buddhas and sentient beings, it is not unbalanced. Since it does not fall into bias, such as permanence or extinction, it is unbiased. Therefore, this is the teaching on the very nature of mind.

As for how mind manifests, that very mind, due to the unimpeded play of its own essence through momentary consciousnesses, while its nature abides as emptiness and natural lucidity (which is the basis for everything), the individual manifestations of the collections of mental factors and the seven collections of consciousness appear in an unimpeded and momentary way from that nature. Therefore, during the phase of mind being impure, it is taught as “mind,” “mentation,” and “consciousness.” Once it has become pure, it is expressed by the names of the three kayas and the wisdoms. This is also stated by noble Nagarjuna in verse 37 of his Dharmadhatustava:

Covered by the web of the afflictions, It is called a “sentient being.” Once it’s free from the afflictions, It should be expressed as “Buddha.”

. . . As for this mind being ignorant of itself, of what is it ignorant, through what is it ignorant, and in which way is it ignorant? It is ignorant of its own naturally pure essence. Through what is it ignorant? It is ignorant of its own essence through the unimpeded creative display of its own essence appearing as if it were distinct subjects and objects. In which way is it ignorant? Due to being stirred by formational mentation, it seemingly appears as causes and conditions, based on which it is rendered afflicted. This gives rise to ignorance, and through false imagination, it becomes the basis and the conditions of sa?sara. Since this mentation manifests as mutual causes and conditions in relation to the alaya- consciousness, just like water and waves, it is incessantly stirring and forming. Therefore, it is ignorance. This is explained as “mentation.” . . . This being associated with afflictions —the afflicted mind— . . . is the root of all the mistakenness of circling in the three realms. . . .

What happens due to the above-mentioned movement of mind and mentation, which is like waves on water? . . . Referents (the six objects) and the six consciousnesses that apprehend them, though not really existing as something different ultimately, arise such that they appear as two . . . Due to the factor of mind moving outward, objects are taken to be referents, and the consciousnesses arise.

Those who do not know that all phenomena are mind entertain the thought that, though these consciousnesses are their own minds, outer objective referents are produced by subtle particles or hidden entities. In order to demonstrate that this is not the case, the manner of mind itself projecting the aspects of subject and object onto itself and grasping at them as self and other is to be taught.480

Later in that chapter, AC comments on the four conditions that give rise to everything produced by mind: the alaya-consciousness as the causal condition; the sense faculties as the dominant conditions; forms, sounds, and so forth as the object-conditions; and the immediate mind as the immediate condition. Ultimately, the text says, these conditions are tenable as sheer dependent origination, but they are all nothing but expressions for particular events of imagination.481

Rangjung Dorje’s extensive discussion of the two realities in the ninth chapter of AC482 states that all notions of ground, path, and fruition are just superimpositions. What exists ultimately is naturally pure mind, the Buddha heart endowed with the two realities, free from the entire web of imaginary reference points. The text then comments on the passage from the Vajrajñanasamucchayatantra in ZMND (also found in DSC’s complementary section on the two realities), which is phrased here as follows: The seeming is dualistic appearance, with its reality being like a reflection of the moon in water, while the ultimate is the eighteen emptinesses,483 with its reality being nondual wisdom. Discussing the two realities largely in classical Madhyamaka style, Rangjung Dorje cites Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika, Akutobhaya The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 167 (a rather long quote that also includes the passage in DSC’s section on the two realities), Mahayanavi?sika, and Bodhicittavivara?a, as well as Maitreya’s Madhyantavibhaga and Uttaratantra, and the Guhyasamajatantra. He addresses the objection that the explanation of the two realities as the Buddha heart is fine in Yogacara and vajrayana texts, but that the Madhyamaka texts teach the lack of nature of all phenomena and thus do not contain any instructions that the Buddha heart exists. Cautioning that one should not be mistaken about the words of the Madhyamikas, Rangjung Dorje replies that precisely this Buddha heart is taught at length in the Dharmadhatustava, quoting its verses 16–21.

DSC’s introductory section on the two realities starts with objections to verse 2 of the Dharmadhatustava, saying that it is not tenable that the fruition of nirva?a (dharmakaya) manifests through the cause of sa?sara having become pure, since these two are mutually exclusive. Also, any form of existence of sa?sara and nirva?a contradicts Nagarjuna’s statements in his collection of reasoning that all phenomena are without nature. Rangjung Dorje answers by first quoting the Uttaratantra and Asa?ga’s commentary on it, identifying those who do not see the inconceivable object of the Buddhas (the Tathagata heart) as ordinary beings, tirthikas with views about a self, sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and even beginner bodhisattvas whose minds are distracted from the correct realization of emptiness484 through conceptualizing suchness and the fruition. Thus, the factors to be relinquished and their remedies must be understood in terms of both the Madhyamaka system of the two realities and the Yogacara system of the three natures (supported by quotes from both traditions).

As for the two realities, it is the nature of dualistic appearances to appear like a reflection of the moon in water, which is seeming reality. Ultimate reality means that precisely these mere appearances are naturally free from all reference points. In this way, the two realities are completely free from being the same or different. At the same time, both are just conventional, and neither is independently real. The point of Madhyamaka is to bring every kind of clinging to reality, unreality, entities, and nonentities to an end. In this way, since the seeming is deceiving and illusionlike, it is merely false imagination that appears as the abodes, objects, and bodies of sentient beings, all consisting of the eight consciousnesses. Since these consciousnesses arise in dependence on false imagination, they are not real. But since they originate dependently and appear, they are not totally nonexistent either and thus called “otherdependent.”

As for the discriminations and labels on the basis of these otherdependent appearances, they are like a mirage and thus called “the imaginary nature,” since what is nonexistent is imagined as existent. The root of such mistakenness is the stainless dharmadhatu being unaware of itself, but there is nothing in all of this that is really established. When these teachings on the two realities are practiced as the path, they represent the two accumulations, and their fruition is the union of the two kayas.

Therefore, since the stained dharmadhatu as the “cause” of sa?sara has become pure, there is no problem in calling it “nirva?a.” In the collection of reasoning, Rangjung Dorje says, Nagarjuna negates the clinging to characteristics, but he definitely does not refute the teachings on the way of being of the Buddha and the dharma, wisdom, great compassion, or enlightened activity. The Dharmadhatustava is a teaching on the very essence of pure mind, which is stained by apprehender and apprehended in just an adventitious way.

After its presentation of the two realities, AC485 gives an overview of the gradual nature of the teachings of the Buddha, in which respectively coarser notions have to be progressively replaced by more subtle notions, extensively citing Nagarjuna’s Bodhicittavivara?a and Maitreya’s Mahayanasutrala?kara. That means, notions such as minute material particles or hidden objects, as held by the Vaibha?ikas and Sautrantikas, respectively, are of course mistaken from the perspective that all seemingly external objects are just mental appearances emerging from the alaya-consciousness. Nevertheless, as a remedy for misconceptions that there is an atman or a creating agent, the Buddha taught about minute particles in his presentation of the skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas. Similarly, the realization that all phenomena are nothing but appearances in the mind, which come about through the causes and conditions represented by the eight consciousnesses, has its value in that the just-mentioned wrong views are relinquished through it. However, the notion that all phenomena are nothing but mind needs to be abandoned too. This makes one see true reality, which is either taught as mind too being unborn (the identitylessness of all phenomena) or as the dharmadhatu free from the duality of apprehender and apprehended. Thus, all levels of the Buddha’s teachings are justified as expedient progressive means leading to the final realization of ultimate reality.486

EDV and the sixth chapter of AC (in brief)487 as well as NY (in great detail) present the classical Yogacara format of how the eight consciousnesses change state into the four wisdoms and the three kayas. This means that the alaya-consciousness manifests as mirrorlike wisdom, the afflicted mind as the wisdom of equality, the mental consciousness as discriminating wisdom, and the five sense consciousnesses as all-accomplishing wisdom. Mirrorlike wisdom represents the dharmakaya, the wisdom of equality and discriminating wisdom make up the sambhogakaya, and all-accomplishing wisdom is the nirma?akaya. However, AC adds that, though the change of state of the mental consciousness represents the sambhogakaya, both the change of The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 169 state of the aspect of this consciousness that perceives outer objects488 (which shows as the display of pure buddha realms) as well as the change of state of its conceptual part (unimpeded wisdom and enlightened activity at all times) are aspects of the nirma?akaya. NY then identifies the conceptuality that changes state into discriminating wisdom as the immediate mind.489 AC and NY agree that both the part of the mental consciousness that perceives outer objects and the five sense consciousnesses change state into all-accomplishing wisdom. AC says that “dharmadhatu wisdom” refers to the very essence of these four wisdoms, that is, the utter purity of being free from all reference points (in other words, it is the fundamental luminous expanse of mind’s nature—the dharmadhatu—in which the above changes of state take place, while always being inseparable from it). NY explains that the three kayas and their activities (the fundamental change of state of the eight consciousnesses) are the ma??ala of the dharmadhatu free from reference points. The svabhavakaya means that everything in sa?sara and nirva?a is primordially free from being one or different.490

As for NT and NY, both contain all of the above elements in greater or lesser detail, often having a more experiential tone geared toward meditation. The whole structure of NT greatly relies on the Uttaratantra and the Mahayanasutrala?kara, even literally incorporating six verses from the former and several from the latter (as well as two from Nagarjuna’s Mahayanavi?sika).491 Like the Dharmadhatustava, DSC, ZMND, and AC, NT speaks about the Tathagata heart as the ground of everything in sa?sara and nirva?a, being naturally pure and merely obscured by adventitious stains (thus existing as the three phases of sentient beings, bodhisattvas, and Buddhas). Just as AC, it says that delusion always starts right now and repeats ZMND’s above explanation on how mind is mistaken about itself. Similar to DSC, it presents the three natures and false imagination. It treats the thirtytwo qualities of the dharmakaya and the thirty-two of the rupakayas, agreeing with the Dharmadhatustava and AC that all these qualities are within one’s own body. Like DSC and EDV, it speaks about the freedom from the fourfold clinging to characteristics as per the Avikalpapravesadhara?i. Ultimately, since there is no arising, there is no liberation either. Thus, both Buddhas and sentient beings are just like space.

The layout of NY is primarily based on Maitreya’s Mahayanasutrala?kara and Asa?ga’s Mahayanasa?graha,492 thus being squarely placed in classical Yogacara presentations.493 At the same time, this short text says three times (!) that all phenomena do not arise from themselves, from something other, from both, or without a cause. It also states that phenomena are nothing but dependent origination, with this very dependent origination being empty of a nature of its own, free from being one or different, and unaffected by being real or false, just like an illusion or the moon in water, thus incorporating typical and crucial Madhyamaka elements. All seemingly outer objects are said to be just appearances in one’s own mind, while adding the typical Madhyamaka stance on the teachings on “mere mind,” that is, them being given in order to eliminate any idea of an external creating agent. The text also presents ZMND’s above explanation on how mind is mistaken about itself, discussing the details of the eight consciousnesses. The presentation of the change of state of these eight into the wisdoms and kayas corresponds to and elaborates on what is said in AC. It concludes by stating that buddhahood is the manifestation of the five wisdoms and the four kayas, with the dharmadhatu (wisdom) representing the svabhavakaya. The alaya-consciousness is what possesses the stains of mind, mentation, and consciousness, while its stainlessness is called the Tathagata heart.

Like parts of NT, MM is more oriented toward meditative practice, but it also contains most of the above-mentioned elements, such as the identification of what ground, path, and fruition are (verse 6). It speaks about appearances being mind, mind being empty yet displaying unimpededly, and mind free from object and subject being the luminosity to be realized (verses 9 and 18). In terms of the view, verse 7 is central: Within the ground of purification—mind as such, lucid and empty in union— May the means to purify—the great vajra-yoga of Mahamudra— Purify what is to be purified—the adventitious stains of delusion— And the result of purification—the stainless dharmakaya— manifest.494

Rangjung Dorje’s treatment of the three natures, mainly found in EDV and DSC, greatly accords with how these were explained above in the introduction. In particular, EDV connects them with the threefold lack of nature, explicitly states that both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures are not really established, and says that the complete change of state of the other-dependent is the perfect nature.495 In general, the Tathagata heart is equated with the stainless nature of phenomena, nonconceptual wisdom, dharmakaya, the perfect nature, and prajñaparamita.

To summarize, all these texts by Rangjung Dorje share many of the same quotes or paraphrases from both Madhyamaka and Yogacara works to support the same points. Moreover, throughout all his presentations, the Third Karmapa obviously not only sees no contradiction between Madhyamaka and Yogacara but clearly suggests that they supplement each other and essentially come down to the same point. This matches his explicit statements at the The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 171 end of DSC on how the masters of these two systems may sometimes make dissimilar statements but always agree on the vital meaning (the ultimate nature), and that the correct view, realization, and fruition of all yanas are to be understood as just one. In the same vein, as for the fruition of buddhahood in terms of the three kayas and so forth, in his AC, Rangjung Dorje quotes extensively from the Mañjusrinamasa?giti, Uttaratantra, Dharmadhatustava, and Madhyamakavatara, saying that he does so in order to eliminate the wrong ideas of people who think that the presentations of the fruition of buddhahood in the mantrayana, by Asa?ga, Nagarjuna, Candrakirti, and others do not accord.496

In brief, there can be no doubt that Rangjung Dorje’s explanations are always equally based on the major Yogacara texts by Maitreya, Asa?ga, and Vasubandhu as well as the Madhyamaka texts by Nagarjuna, Candrakirti, Bhavaviveka, Jñanagarbha, and so on. This balanced approach of the Third Karmapa not only has some Indian precursors (such as Kambala, Ratnakarasanti, Jñanasrimitra, Abhayakaragupta,497 and, to some extent, Santarak?ita and Kamalasila)498 but is also repeatedly confirmed by later Kagyü masters. Thus, if one wants to use the categories of rangtong and shentong at all, one could say that Rangjung Dorje’s view takes them to be anything but mutually exclusive and represents a creative synthesis of them. For example, this is exactly what a song on view, meditation, conduct, and fruition by the Sixth Shamarpa, Chökyi Wangchug499 (1584–1630) says:

Indeed, the learned set up mere presentations Of “self-empty” and “other-empty,”

But the great victor, glorious Rangjung Dorje, Holds these two to be noncontradictory.500

Likewise, a song about the view by the Thirteenth Karmapa, Düdül Dorje501 (1733–1797)—and he of all should know what the Third Karmapa’s view is—states:

Secondly, the system of Asa?ga and his brother who follow the final wheel of dharma

Is known as “False Aspectarian Mere Mentalism” in the land of the noble ones

And as “other-empty Madhyamaka” in Tibet.

The meaning of these two names is the same.

This is the completely pure system that, Through mainly teaching the luminous aspect of the mind,

Holds that the fruitions—kayas and wisdoms—exist on their own accord.

As for its necessity, it is asserted that it is taught in order to Relinquish any arising of fear of emptiness and to awaken those with indefinite disposition.

When commenting on its meaning, venerable Rangjung Dorje says

That it is one with the system of Candrakirti. Others assert that the ultimate is existent and really established And that emptiness is really established.

As for the mahayana’s sutra portion, both the middle and the final wheel of dharma Have the purport of the Sugata heart, the unity of emptiness and luminosity.

The middle wheel explains this mainly by teaching emptiness, While the final wheel elucidates it mainly by teaching luminosity. I understand that, in actuality, these are not contradictory.502 The beginning stanzas of paying homage in a commentary on the Uttaratantra— which is based on Rangjung Dorje’s lost summary of this text—by Dashi Öser503 (born 1474), a close disciple of the Seventh Karmapa and teacher of the Eighth, state:

I pay homage to the dharma lord Rangjung Dorje, Who commented on the intention of the victor and his regent Maitreya

By combining in a noncontradictory manner The essential points of the intentions of both Asa?ga and Nagarjuna.504

As presented above, the Eighth Karmapa’s commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara—this commentary itself being allegedly a shentong text—strongly denies the ascription of one of the most classical shentong positions to the Third Karmapa:

Some fools say, “The Omniscient Karmapa Rangjung Dorje asserts the intention of the Mahayanottaratantra to be that the Tathagata heart exists in the dharmadhatu of the mind of sentient beings in an inseparable manner.” This wise being did not assert such. In his The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 173 autocommentary on The Profound Inner Reality he makes a twofold classification of mind as such, saying, “what is pure is expressed as mind, and what is impure is also expressed as mind.”505 By explaining that those who possess impure mental impulses are sentient beings, he elucidates that the dharmadhatu does not exist in such sentient beings. He presents these very sentient beings as being the adventitious stains that are produced by false imagination, which mistakenly strays from the dharmadhatu. By giving the pure mind names such as “ordinary mind,” “original protector,” and “original Buddha,” he says that it is exactly this mind that possesses the mode of being inseparable from the buddha qualities.506

The Eighth Karmapa’s commentary also discusses the question of whether the ways in which the third turning of the wheel of dharma as classified by Maitreya and Nagarjuna, respectively, come down to the same essential point. He refers to the Third Karmapa as saying that these two cycles share the same essential point in a general way in that they both teach freedom from reference points. In particular though, Nagarjuna speaks only about the mere freedom from reference points, while Maitreya explains the personally experienced wisdom free from reference points. However, Nagarjuna and his spiritual heirs do not reject this wisdom, since it is taught in Nagarjuna’s collection of praises and Aryadeva’s Catu?sataka.507 The exact same passage is also found in Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé’s Treasury of Knowledge.508

In the same vein, it is interesting and noteworthy that none of Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentaries on ZMND, NT, and NY ever mention the terms “selfempty” or “other-empty.” This is all the more striking for a number of reasons. First, Jamgön Kongtrul otherwise identifies Rangjung Dorje repeatedly as a shentongpa.509 Secondly, ZMND, NT, and NY lend themselves easily to an interpretation purely from the point of view of shentong. Thirdly, Jamgön Kongtrul never hesitates to give such an interpretation in the same contexts in his own works and usually clearly presents himself as a shentongpa, frequently relying on Taranatha, who was one of the most outspoken proponents of this approach. However, in contradistinction to all that, in his commentaries on the above three texts, Jamgön Kongtrul faithfully follows Rangjung Dorje’s approach of a synthesis of classical Yogacara and Madhyamaka, supporting it with many further quotations that identify the sources (mostly Yogacara) of Rangjung Dorje’s compositions and often exactly correspond to the citations that Rangjung Dorje himself uses in his AC, DSC, and elsewhere.

To come to the question of whether someone is a shentongpa or not, in order to be able to make any sense of it, let alone answering it, the underlying issues of what exactly shentong means and what a shentongpa is need more attention. This seems to be very obvious, but more often than not the terms rangtong and shentong and their differences are referred to with the tacit implication of their meaning and scope being totally clear and unequivocal for everybody. In fact, however, what is called “the shentong tradition” is anything but a monolithic system (as is true for most Buddhist “schools”).

For various masters, shentong obviously means something very different, as evidenced by their giving their own distinct views on its meaning and its relation to rangtong. Certain Tibetans use the term shentong to refer to a doctrine with set positions (which can differ greatly as well). Others speak about it in the sense of a philosophical or an experiential outlook. Some refer to it as a tradition of how to practice meditation (sgom lugs), and others take it to be a combination of theory and practice, that is, view and meditation. Some even argue that rangtong and shentong represent sutrayana and vajrayana, respectively.510

To give a few examples of how shentong can be presented, the contemporary Jonang scholar Khenpo Lodrö Tragba’s Synopsis of Philosophical Systems511— basically following Dölpopa—gives his definitions for rangtongpa and shentongpa:

Someone who says that a nonimplicative negation whose object of negation is “being really established” is the ultimate emptiness, is therefore called a “rangtongpa.” . . . Someone who says that (1) the basis of emptiness—the ultimate, nondual wisdom—is not empty from its own side but empty of what is other—all reference points, such as apprehender and apprehended—and (2) that all phenomena that consist of what is seeming and adventitious are not only empty of the ultimate—whose essence is other—but that these seeming phenomena themselves are also empty of a nature of their own is therefore called a “shentongpa.”

The same author’s Fearless Lion’s Roar clarifies the relationship between the seeming and the ultimate:

The final mode of being is not just a sheer emptiness in the sense of everything being nonexistent and not established. Rather, within the ground that is the nonimplicative negation of being empty of all reference points of the seeming, the ultimate suchness of luminosity— which is an implicative negation—abides primordially.512 Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé’s Treasury of Knowledge explains his version of the shentong view by combining classical Indian Yogacara presentations The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 175 (as in Maitreya’s Madhyantavibhaga and Mahayanasutrala?kara), the explanations in the Uttaratantra, and many of the shentong positions held by the Tibetan masters Dölpopa, Taranatha, and Sakya Chogden. The essential point here is that the perfect nature (also referred to as buddha nature, emptiness, dharmadhatu, or nondual wisdom) is only empty of what is other than it—both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures—but not empty of its own nature with all its enlightened qualities, thus being really existent ultimately. From the point of view of cutting through reference points, the following is taught. On the level of seeming reality, consciousness that appears as various appearances—mere false imagination— exists. Since the apprehending part and the apprehended part that appear within this false imagination are merely something mentally imputed, they are not existent even on the conventional level. Thus, seeming reality is free from the two extremes. Through accepting the mere existence of false imagination on the level of seeming reality, it is free from the extreme of nonexistence and the extreme of extinction. Through lying beyond all dependent and imputed phenomena—such as an apprehending and an apprehended aspect, it is free from the extreme of permanence and the extreme of existence. Wisdom free from reference points really exists within consciousness (false imagination) as being the mode of the true nature of this consciousness. In the phase with stains, consciousness—that which bears this true nature—exists within the nature of phenomena as separable adventitious stains, that is, as the nature of stains that do not really exist and are the factors to be relinquished. Thus, it is said that ultimate reality is also free from the two extremes. It is beyond the extremes of existence, nonexistence, permanence, and extinction, because emptiness is really established, and all phenomena that consist of the duality of apprehender and apprehended—such as imagination—do not really exist.

The seeming is merely an appearance of mistakenness and empty of a nature of its own.

The nature of phenomena is unchanging and not empty of a nature of its own.

. . . The imaginary does not exist, while the other-dependent exists seemingly.

The perfect does not exist on the level of the seeming, but it exists ultimately.

One may wonder, “Is it not said in the sutras that also the dharmadhatu is empty?” Generally speaking, it is empty or emptiness, but that does not mean that it has to be empty of its own nature. It is called “emptiness” because it is empty of everything that has characteristics other than wisdom itself, that is, empty of the reference points of apprehender and apprehended.

Here, as for the three characteristics—the imaginary, the otherdependent, and the perfect natures—the imaginary consists of all nonentities, such as space; the aspects that appear as conceptual objects, such as form; the connections of names and referents, that is, clinging to a name as being the corresponding referent and to mistake a referent for the corresponding name; and all that is apprehended through mental superimposition, such as outer, inner, end, middle, big, small, good, bad, direction, time, and so on. The other-dependent nature is mere consciousness that appears as the entities of apprehender and apprehended, because these are appearances under the influence of something other, that is, the latent tendencies of ignorance. The perfect nature is self-luminous self-awareness free from all reference points. Its synonyms are the nature of phenomena, dharmadhatu, suchness, and the ultimate. The imaginary and the other-dependent are equal in that they do not really exist, that they are appearances of mistakenness, and that they are something seeming and false. Nevertheless, it is necessary to classify them separately through their characteristics. The imaginary does not even exist on the level of the seeming, while the other-dependent exists on the level of the seeming. The perfect does not exist on the level of the seeming, but it exists as the ultimate. Therefore, it really exists.

These three are nominally existent, substantially existent, and existent without reference points, respectively. They are the emptinesses of the nonexistent and of the existent, and the ultimate emptiness.

They are the lack of nature in terms of characteristics and arising, and the ultimate lack of nature. . . . Therefore, it is asserted that all knowable objects are pervaded by emptiness.

The perfect nature’s own essence is not connected with seeming phenomena.

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 177 . . . It is free from reference points, permanent, partless, and omnipresent. . . . It is said that most of the other presentations of ground, path, and fruition accord with those of the Mere Mentalists.513 Differing from most Yogacara texts, Jamgön Kongtrul explicitly states that the perfect nature is empty of both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures.514

The basis of negation—the perfect nature—is the dhatu or suchness, which is beyond being an object that is a reference point. The object of negation consists of both the imaginary and the otherdependent characteristics. The way of being empty is that the basis of negation is empty of this twofold object of negation. Therefore, the perfect nature itself is empty of something other.515

The practical approach of determining and realizing this perfect nature is presented as the classical “four yogic practices”516 found in many mahayana sutras and Yogacara texts. However, the fourth phase of realizing the nonduality of apprehender and apprehended (nondual dharmadhatu) is explicitly equated by Jamgön Kongtrul with recognizing buddha nature, which is said to be really established and beyond dependent origination, thus clearly differing from the unity of dependent origination and emptiness in classical Madhyamaka.

The Yogacara-Madhyamikas are those among the followers of Madhyamaka philosophical systems who are adorned with many secret essential points that are special and uncommon. Their way to determine the view through studying and reflecting is described by the great regent Maitreya as in Mahayanasutrala?kara VI.8: The mind is aware that nothing other than mind exists.

Then, it is realized that mind does not exist either.

The intelligent ones are aware that both do not exist And abide in the dharmadhatu in which these are absent.

Accordingly, it is first resolved that all phenomena are not established as something other than merely mind or as something outside of it. Through this reason, it is established that a nature of the apprehended does not exist. Then, it is resolved that also a nature of the apprehender does not exist. Thus, the dharmadhatu as such, empty of the duality of apprehender and apprehended, is determined. It is without stains, its nature is luminosity, and it possesses the seven vajra points.517 . . . This is called “suchness” or “Sugata heart.” It encompasses and resides in all phenomena—sentient beings, Buddhas, and so on—as equality. However, in sentient beings, it resides as their Heart, while it does so in a directly manifest way in Buddhas. Therefore, it is also called “Buddha heart” because its nature does not change. In all regards, it is not comparable to a permanent, singular, and independent personal self, since it is free from all extremes of reference points. In its own nature, sa?sara and nirva?a are undifferentiable, but in dependence on certain phases it is presented as threefold.518 It is also free from the plain view that the lack of a personal self is nothing but emptiness. Rather, it is established as the one and only ultimate reality. It is free from appearance and nonappearance or entities and nonentities. Therefore, it is called “the actual unconditioned” or “the unconditioned that is ultimate reality.” Since it is said that this ultimate is even beyond interdependence, in this system, the ultimate is not presented as interdependence. . . . It is said that this Heart is empty of all adventitious flaws or stains. However, it is not empty of the attributes of unsurpassable qualities but possesses them in a spontaneously present way. Therefore, with regard to its nature, there is nothing to be removed in terms of stains or to be added in terms of qualities. This is precisely what is not realized through mere one-sided study and reflection, but is gradually realized through the personally experienced wisdom that results from meditation, that is, stainless self-sprung awareness.519

The main difference between shentong and “Mere Mentalism” is explained as follows:

In the system that is known in Tibet as that of the False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists, it is said that the nature of the alaya-consciousness is really established. Due to this explanation, it is consciousness that is mind’s object. Therefore, this is a form of realism. But in this system here, it is asserted that the nature of wisdom itself—which lies beyond consciousness and is free from all reference points—is really established. However, since this wisdom free from reference The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 179 points is not conditioned, it is said that ultimate reality is free from all mistakes of realists.520

Jamgön Kongtrul says that there are no differences between rangtong and shentong with regard to their positions on seeming reality and when resting in meditative equipoise. The differences primarily pertain to the conceptual analyses during subsequent attainment.

Between the two systems of Madhyamaka that are known as selfempty and other-empty, there is no difference with regard to the manner in which they determine that all phenomena consisting of seeming reality are emptiness and the cessation of all extremes of reference points in meditative equipoise. But the differences lie for one in the way in which conventions of consciousness and expression are used during subsequent attainment, that is, during the phase when philosophical systems are clearly distinguished. As a mere conventional position at this time, it is either said that the nature of phenomena—suchness—exists or that it does not exist. The second difference is with regard to the view that whether, at the time of the final analysis through reasonings that analyze the ultimate, nondual wisdom is really established or not. Therefore, the followers of the other-empty system assert that both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures are seeming reality, and that the perfect nature is ultimate reality. As for the latter, it is asserted that the view of regarding it as a mere nonimplicative negation in the sense of the nonestablishment of any nature represents a dead emptiness.521 Such is merely the way in which the seeming is empty, but not the basic nature of ultimate emptiness. In brief, the latter is presented as personally experienced wisdom empty of the duality of apprehender and apprehended. Since this system accords very much with the great tantra collections, it is also asserted as the profound view that links sutra and mantra, that is, as the pinnacle of the doctrinal systems of Madhyamaka.522

Dölpopa’s Mountain Dharma says something very similar: When making a combination of the latter two turnings of the wheel of dharma and the meaning of the vajrayana a living experience, the conclusive resolve is to rest in meditative equipoise within the profound nature of phenomena in accordance with the middle turning of the wheel of dharma in a nonconceptual manner free from reference points. After that, during subsequent attainment, when correctly discriminating phenomena at the time of clearly differentiating them, this is pointed out by distinguishing well in accordance with what is said in the final turning of the wheel of dharma and the vajrayana. If one does so, one’s entire practice of the profound meaning of all mahayana teachings will be unerring and completely pure.

. . . As for the meaning of being free from the extremes of existence and nonexistence, it is twofold. While deeply resting in meditative equipoise within the profound nature of phenomena, all reference points (such as existence and nonexistence) fall away and this state is without speech, thought, and expression. But during subsequent attainment, while determining how the basic nature is, there is no flaw in clearly deciding in accordance with that basic nature that what exists is “existent,” and what does not exist is “nonexistent.” In the opposite case, however, there will be the flaw of falling into extremes. As for the meaning of “buddhahood being neither existent nor nonexistent,” this is stated in terms of it not being existent for ordinary minds and not being nonexistent for wisdom.523

At the behest of the Eleventh Situpa, Pema Wangcho Gyalbo524 (1886– 1952), the Kagyü scholar Surmang Padma Namgyal (twentieth century) wrote a text called Full Moon of Questions and Answers,525 which lists seven different kinds of views held by various Jonang, Sakya, Kagyü, and Nyingma masters on the distinction between rangtong and shentong.526 According to this text, (1) Dölpopa and his followers hold consciousness to be rangtong and wisdom to be shentong. (2) Sakya Chogden considers phenomena—appearances— as rangtong and the nature of phenomena—luminosity—as shentong.

(3) Sabsang Mati Panchen Lodrö Gyaltsen527 (1294–1376) maintains subject and object to be rangtong and expanse (dbyings) and wisdom to be shentong. (4) The Thirteenth Karmapa, Düdül Dorje, considers sa?sara to be rangtong and nirva?a to be shentong. (5) The Eighth Karmapa, Mikyö Dorje, and his followers take the pure kayas and wisdom to be rangtong in terms of their actual mode of being and to be shentong in terms of the way they appear. (6) The Eighth Situpa, Chökyi Jungné, considers the side of negation as rangtong and the side of affirmation as shentong. (7) The Nyingma master Katog Gédsé Panchen528 (1761–1829) regards the phase of conclusive resolve during meditative equipoise to be rangtong and the phase of clearly distinguishing during subsequent attainment to be shentong.529

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 181 Summarizing these seven views into three, Padma Namgyal says that Dölpopa asserts wisdom to be “other-empty,” Sakya Chogden holds the expanse to be “other-empty,” and all others take both wisdom and expanse to be “otherempty.” When summarized into two, the first five are said to present rangtong and shentong mainly by way of what is to be determined, while the latter two do so primarily by way of the means to determine that.530 To complicate matters further, these seven distinctions are obviously based on three very different categories of comparison. The first—and most common—category takes rangtong and shentong to refer to phenomena as belonging to two different levels of reality (seeming and ultimate), underlying views (1)–(5). Category two refers to rangtong and shentong as two approaches to conceptually determine the subject in question (6). Category three considers rangtong and shentong as distinct (nonconceptual) experiences or phases in the process of attaining realization (7).

The Nyingma master Lochen Dharmasri’s Commentary on Ascertaining the Three Vows531 presents yet another way of comparing rangtong and shentong— as two ways of cutting through reference points:

As for cutting through reference points, there are two ways—rangtong and shentong. Rangtong means to assert the emptiness that is a nonimplicative negation as the ultimate, since all subjects in question—no matter how they appear—are empty of a nature of their own right from the point of their mere appearance. As for the Madhyamikas that determine shentong, due to the difference of asserting all knowable objects as the three characteristics the imaginary, other-dependent, and perfect natures or summarizing them into two—the imaginary and the perfect natures—there are two dissimilar ways of identifying the subject in question. In the Yogacara scriptures, the perfect nature is explained as the otherdependent (the basis of emptiness) being empty of the imaginary (the object of negation). In the Uttaratantra and so on, it is said that the nature of phenomena—the perfect nature—is empty of the imaginary (the object of negation). Therefore, in the essence of this perfect nature—the true nature of mind, the ultimate dhatu— there are no stains to be eliminated and no previously nonexistent qualities to be accomplished newly, since it is primordially and naturally pure, and the qualities are spontaneously present.532 Mipham Rinpoche’s Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Other-Emptiness starts by listing the sources of the shentong view—the sutras of the third turning of the wheel of dharma, which teach the definitive meaning; Maitreya’s Uttaratantra; the profound teachings by Asa?ga and Vasubandhu; the commentaries on the definitive meaning, such as Nagarjuna’s collection of praises; the tantras, such as the Kalacakratantra; and the commentaries on their intention, such as the trilogy of bodhisattva commentaries533—saying that they all share the same essential meaning. The Lion’s Roar primarily explains the difference between rangtong and shentong as pertaining to seeming reality and ultimate reality, respectively, thus largely following category two above. However, Mipham Rinpoche repeatedly emphasizes that such a distinction only applies to the conventional level and not to the sphere of the nonconceptual wisdom of meditative equipoise that directly realizes what is called “ultimate reality.” He says that the statement that ultimate reality “is not empty from its own side” must be understood in terms of the two realities being mutually exclusive, but definitely not as being of the same nature and just different isolates. According to his above-mentioned distinction of the two realities in terms of the way things appear and how they actually are being discordant or concordant, respectively, seeming reality is what appears from the perspective of mistakenness, thus being delusive. Ultimate reality is established as it appears from an entirely unmistaken perspective. Since this is not invalidated through valid cognition, it is said to exist ultimately and to be really established. However, this does not mean that ultimate reality has to be a really established appearance different from emptiness. Rather, it is primordially established as the emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects (the union of dharmadhatu and emptiness), that is, the ultimate reality that is the essential nature of all phenomena. Since this very dharmadhatu, which is directly realized in an individual’s experience, is in itself beyond any negation and proof, it is simply said to be conventionally established as existing as ultimate reality. For, just as a rope and the snake for which that rope may be mistaken, seeming reality and ultimate reality should be differentiated as being conventionally established and not established, respectively, since they cannot be either both mistaken or both real. Thus, “not being empty of itself” simply means that ultimate reality is not empty of being ultimate reality, otherwise it would be seeming reality and therefore deceiving. What this ultimate reality is empty of are the subjects and objects that make up the mistaken appearances called “seeming reality.” Consequently, conventionally speaking, ultimate reality is not empty of its own nature, since it entails both an unmistaken subject and object; since what exists on this level cannot be invalidated by any valid cognition; since it is what is established after the reasonings that establish emptiness have already been applied; and since what is established through the correct valid cognition that analyzes what is conventionally real cannot be disputed in accordance with the dharma.534

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 183

As for further distinctions within the shentong tradition, one of Taranatha’s works outlines twenty-one criteria as to how Dölpopa’s (and his own) interpretation of “other-emptiness” differ from Sakya Chogden’s position,535 which provide a useful grid to compare the views of other shentongpas as well. The Kagyü School sometimes distinguishes between “the other-emptiness of luminosity” (gsal ba gzhan stong) and “the other-emptiness of the dhatu” (dbyings gzhan stong). Briefly speaking, the first refers to buddha nature’s wisdom being empty of adventitious stains (the “other”), and this wisdom itself not being empty but existing as the ultimate nature of luminosity. Thus, the ultimate existence of the luminous nature of mind and its innate buddha qualities are emphasized. Typical proponents are Dölpopa, Taranatha (who even wrote two commentaries on the Heart Sutra from the perspective of “otheremptiness”), 536 and Jamgön Kongtrul. “The other-emptiness of the dhatu,” means that, in and as itself, the nondual nonconceptual experience of the wisdom that realizes the dharmadhatu as mind’s true nature is free from reference points. This view is found, for example, in the Eighth Karmapa’s commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara and in the works of the Sixth Shamarpa.

In brief, as this by no means comprehensive sketch already shows clearly, the various takes on what rangtong and shentong mean may differ greatly, depending on which perspectives they are evaluated from to begin with. Thus, the study of the specific presentations of individual masters seems mandatory, rather than just following highly generalized doxographical schemes. In this context, one of the crucial points that often was and continues to be overlooked by later proponents of other-emptiness as well as their opponents is that Dölpopa’s original presentation of rangtong and shentong (such as in his main work, Mountain Dharma) clearly distinguishes between a “philosophical system” (Skt. siddhanta, Tib. grub mtha’) based on certain explanations and arguments and a “point of view” in the sense of a wider outlook (Skt. darsana, Tib. lta ba). For him, the latter is understood as not only dealing with scholarly ascertainments but also—and more importantly so—including what is directly experienced in meditative equipoise (often in the context of advanced vajrayana practices).

It is the entirety of this that he calls “Great Madhyamaka” and “other-emptiness,” that is, the outlook of noble beings who directly see the nature of phenomena just as it is. As such, it is clearly contrasted with Madhyamaka or “self-emptiness” as a mere philosophical system. Thus, on these two levels, the entire perspective of how mind perceives and, consequently, the way of discourse are quite different. Therefore, despite the claims of his later opponents, Dölpopa’s use of this distinction is primarily epistemological in nature and not ontological or reifying. Also, Dölpopa himself never spoke about “proponents of selfemptiness” as opposed to “proponents of other-emptiness.” Rather, he sees self-emptiness as a philosophical system that he accepts himself as far as it goes, that is, on the level of philosophical analysis but not as adequately portraying the level of ultimate and direct meditative insight.537

For a number of reasons, many later proponents of other-emptiness and their opponents do not follow the above epistemological distinction and often take both rangtong and shentong to be philosophical systems, pertaining to ontological concerns. Thus, a major part of the later rangtong-shentong controversies is based on the issue—and the confusion—of whether the contrast pertains to the level of philosophical systems or the level of a direct vision of true reality. Both Dölpopa and many later shentongpas say that shentong includes and is based on rangtong as a form of analytical rigor, but that shentong supersedes this level of discourse. Nevertheless, some of these later shentongpas argue for the supremacy of shentong even on the level of philosophical systems, which is then fiercely denied by others. Thus, it was on this level that the sometimes highly polemical disputes about this issue and the ensuing attempts to establish the supremacy of one such system over the other started to proliferate. In this process, shentong became a highly “loaded” term and also quite often a source of serious confusion, at least for those who try to understand the actual content of these traditions apart from the mere sectarian elements.538

Despite all of this, in itself, the term shentong does not necessarily entail any substantive ontology. The Eighth Karmapa’s commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara refers to the proper way of using the term “other-empty” primarily as a pedagogic means to point out that the nature of phenomena— the dharmadhatu—is empty of adventitious stains. But he emphasizes that the nature of phenomena itself is neither self-empty nor other-empty to start with, let alone really existent. As the following excerpt illustrates, the Karmapa’s explanations in this commentary are often somewhat tantalizing, since he constantly plays with the terms “self-empty” and “other-empty,” shifting their perspectives and setting up paradoxes. Being a pedagogic approach in itself, this can only be understood as cutting through any attempts to adhere to either the one or the other as something to hold onto, in order to realize what a mind free from all reference points would be like.

There is no such flaw that the nature of other-emptiness itself is not empty, since the name “other-empty” is applied to emptiness in the sense that the other features within this basis emptiness are empty of their own respective natures. Therefore, the other-empty’s own nature does not become nonempty. The reason for this is that the name “other-empty” is only applied to the compound meaning that this basis emptiness is empty of such and such and not The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 185 to this basis being other-empty in itself. However, it is not asserted that this basis—the nature of phenomena—is empty of its own nature. Likewise, as was just said, this basis itself is not otherempty either. Therefore, if it is not other-empty, forget about it being self-empty since these two are mutually dependent. . . .

There is also another reason for the other-empty’s own nature being self-empty. The subject in question—the other-empty, in being empty of what is other (the adventitious bearers of the nature of phenomena)—is what entails being empty of the adventitious stains that are other than this basis in that their own nature does not remain even for an instant, because these bearers of the nature of phenomena are seeming reality. For this reason, one definitely needs to accept that whatever is other-empty is necessarily self-empty. But if one claims the emptiness that is claimed to be self-empty as being the fully qualified emptiness, it is not tenable to accept some otherempty that is other than self-empty. So, this basis—the nature of phenomena—is neither other-empty nor self-empty, because let alone being other-empty or self-empty, it is not even suitable as a mere emptiness that is not specified as being empty or not empty of itself or something other. The reason for this is that it has the essential character of being the utter peace of all reference points in terms of being empty or not being empty. Thus, from the perspective of the actual freedom from reference points, no characteristics whatsoever of being empty of itself or something other transpire within the basis that is the nature of phenomena.539

In brief, controversies on “self-empty” and “other-empty” seem to be only a problem if these notions are regarded as belonging to the same level of discourse and realization, and to be mutually exclusive on that level. However, in pertaining to different such levels, they lack the basic criteria for meaningful comparison. As Ruegg says:

One could assume an incompatibility, at one and the same level of reference, between two philosophical propositions, both of which cannot be true in accordance with the principle of contradiction. Alternatively, one might perhaps suppose a complementarity — perhaps even an incommensurability — between two doctrines that relate to different levels of reference or discourse, and which are accordingly not mutually exclusive or contradictory.540

This leads to the issue of Buddhist—and particularly Tibetan—doxographical classifications and hierarchies in general. I am fully aware that many people will hate me for saying this, but I am not the first one to caution that, despite the classical Tibetan doxographical systems usually portraying the positions and affiliations of various Indian Buddhist schools and masters as facts that are cast in stone, often going into the minutest of details of various levels of subschools, all these systems have their own agendas superimposed onto many of the historical developments, relations, and teachings of Indian “schools,” thus often failing to properly describe them.541 This is particulary obvious when one looks at the strikingly different presentations and classifications of the Yogacara and Madhyamaka traditions (including the so-called “Shentong- Madhyamaka”) in different Tibetan schools. Fundamentally, the very notions of different Indian Buddhist “schools” and even “subschools” are largely superimpositions in themselves, since Indian masters usually did not regard themselves as belonging to some factions with solidly established boundaries set off from others, especially within the Yogacara and Madhyamaka traditions. Of course, different scholars had varying opinions on certain matters and engaged in debates. However, it should be more than clear to everyone who has looked just a little bit into the Indian Yogacara tradition without Tibetan doxographical lenses that there never existed a so-called “Cittamatra School.” Also, it is very hard to find any Yogacaras who considered themselves as “False Aspectarians” or “Real Aspectarians,” or even any of their writings that would clearly match these terms as understood in Tibetan doxographies, let alone the (Tibetan) classifications into “subschools” such as “Half-Eggists.” 542 Likewise, Indian Madhyamikas saw themselves simply as followers of Nagarjuna—even the terms Madhyamaka or Madhyamika appeared rather late with Bhavaviveka and only became common still much later—and definitely not as adherents to the later Tibetan labels rang rgyud pa (*Svatantrika) or thal ’gyur pa (*Prasa?gika) with all their ramifications.543

Moreover, since all these categorizations usually rely on just a single criterion (or a very limited set thereof), depending on which of them are employed, certain masters end up in the same or very different camps. For example, in terms of their approach to reasoning, Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti are considered Svatantrika and Prasa?gika, respectively. However, in terms of conventionally not rejecting outer objects as a part of seeming reality, they belong to the same group. Similarly, the Svatantrika Jñanagarbha and the Prasa?gika Candrakirti, in terms of both explicitly saying that they follow common worldly consensus as far as seeming reality is concerned, find themselves on the same side as well. Also, just in terms of reasoning, both Bhavaviveka and Santarak?ita are considered Svatantrikas (though they exhibit major differences even in this regard), but their extensive and greatly differing presentaipodd_ The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 187 tions of seeming reality (somewhat simplified, at least partly corresponding to the Sautrantrika and Yogacara systems, respectively) makes one wonder why a rather limited similarity should justify putting them into the same camp, thus overruling a great number of more substantial differences. One of the most striking examples here is Dharmakirti, who has been variously classified as a Sautrantika, Mere Mentalist, Yogacara, Madhyamika, or shentongpa, depending on which part of his work with its—as McClintock puts it—”sliding scales of analysis” one focuses. Alternatively, to do justice to each point in the usually complex and finely discriminated explanations of individual masters, one would have to string together long lists of such classifying names. For example, the writings of someone like Kamalasila include many Yogacara elements, but he refutes both the Aspectarian and the Non-Aspectarian approach. He greatly employs the system of Dignaga and Dharmakirti with regard to reasoning and epistemology, but also explicitly lists numerous cases in which the sole use of (absurd) consequences is sufficient.544 Finally, as mentioned above, he also speaks favorably about mind’s luminosity and buddha nature (and many more features could be added). So does that make him a Neither-Aspectarian-nor-Non-Aspectarian-Yogacara-Svatantrika- Prasa?gika-Shentong-Madhyamika?

To be sure, I am not saying all this to discredit Tibetan doxography altogether (it no doubt contains pedagogical value), but because there are so many—and typically always the same—misunderstandings triggered by these presentations (followed by endless and pointless discussions), when they are taken to represent actual Indian schools and masters, with each one nicely tucked into their assigned drawers. Often, this just serves as a basis for further enhancing mind’s tendencies for reification and solidified belief systems, while the whole point of ascertaining the proper view is to undermine exactly these tendencies. In addition, the fact that doxographies from different Tibetan schools, depending on their own preferences and in glaringly contradictory ways, arrive at affiliating individual masters with all kinds of schools with widely differing positions, and then claim the very same teachers as being part of their own opposing camps just shows how problematic all this can be. When abstracting from the by now almost unavoidable polemics in such doxographies and the people who adhere to them as the sole truth, ideally, it seems that these systems are better understood and more helpful as retrospective pedagogical overviews and/or classifications of the immensely rich variety of Indian Buddhist thought. As such, they may range from just presenting possible or alternative ways of thinking about certain issues, over identifying progressively more subtle manners of reifying and/or relating phenomena (often embedded in the overall framework constituted by mind as the cognizing subject and the objects it perceives), up to standardized

outlines of a Buddhist practitioner’s progressive development of meditative experiences and realizations.

From such a more pragmatic perspective, it does not matter then whether the views presented were ever held by historical schools or persons (and who held what among these), since the main purpose is to sharpen one’s own view against other, typically progressively more subtle models. Unfortunately, this important distinction with regard to such doxographical presentations is more often than not left unsaid. One of the very few positive examples is Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche’s book Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness, which lists the five meditation stages of (1) Sravaka, (2) Cittamatra, (3) Svatantrika, (4) Prasa?gika, and (5) Shentong-Madhyamaka according to classical Kagyü doxography. However, as the text says at the outset, despite these stages being given the names of these schools, in terms of actually practicing the steps of analytical meditation, the point is not to ascertain the precise positions of these schools, nor to look for the exact historical and philosophical correspondences between these five stages and the views of the schools whose names they bear. Rather, the presentation of these stages is meant as a pedagogical and soteriological model for the progressively evolving personal insights of practitioners meditating on emptiness. This is also evident from the above five “schools” actually standing for meditating on (1) personal identitylessness, (2) mere mind without the duality of an internal subject and external objects, (3) emptiness as a spacelike nonimplicative negation, (4) emptiness as utter freedom from reference points, and (5) emptiness and luminosity inseparable.

Thus, such hierarchical doxographical models may either be helpful as simplified overviews of the vast diversity of the works of Indian and Tibetan masters and their views and/or for refining one’s own view against the background of progressively more subtle philosophical systems. However, it cannot be overemphasized that mixing or confusing a historical account of actual Indian and Tibetan schools and teachers (based on what their texts actually present and how they interrelate), with a primarily pedagogic and soteriological approach to practice can—and constantly does—only lead to confusion. One of the most obvious reasons is that the historical evolvement of the various—particularly Indian—Buddhist schools simply does not match the progressive and hierarchical model from “lower” to “higher” views in Tibetan doxographies. Also, individual masters or developments that do not readily fit into the four standard schools of Vaibha?ika, Sautrantika, Yogacara, and Madhyamaka545 are either often omitted or made to fit into one or another category, depending on the overall hierarchy intended. As with all overly broad or schematic descriptions and classifications, there is a danger of not studying the original texts anymore but just following what the “politically The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 189 correct” default schemes of the respective Tibetan schools say, often obscuring attempts to look at the more subtle aspects of the issues at hand. This does not even consider the fact that many teachers, when commenting on scriptures from different Buddhist philosophical systems, such as Yogacara or Madhyamaka, attempt to do so by faithfully following the approaches of these very systems and not by superimposing their own agenda. Furthermore, both style and content of what individual masters teach in certain situations may vary considerably to the point of seeming mutually exclusive, since they are usually adapted to the capacities and needs of the respective audiences. This may even mean that some authors defend a certain position for rhetorical purposes or to reveal that its critiques by others do not hold water, without though holding this position themselves. Usually, in Buddhism, philosophical considerations come in response to practical and soteriological issues, that is, from the Buddha’s fundamental agenda of removing afflictions and suffering, and not primarily as systems of thought to be fortified in one way or another, especially since clinging to any reference point is considered as the very problem that lies at the root of sa?saric suffering. The most obvious example for this is the Buddha himself, who gave a vast range of teachings to many different beings in very dissimilar situations. Thus, it seems moot to classify him in any way as a Vaibha?ika, Sautrantika, Madhyamika, Yogacara, rangtongpa, shentongpa, adherent of Mahamudra or Dzogchen, or anything else. As Nagarjuna’s Niraupamyastava says:

Nothing, not even a single syllable, Has been uttered by you, O lord, But every person to be guided Has been satisfied by your rain of dharma.546

Considering all these issues and the above-mentioned differences even within what is called “the shentong tradition,” let alone the different approaches within the classical Madhyamaka tradition, one may wonder about the benefit of categorically classifying certain masters as shentongpas or rangtongpas. Kapstein aptly summarizes this discussion:

I would suggest, therefore, that . . . doxographic labels such as gzhan stong pa and rang stong pa are best avoided, except of course where they are used within the tradition itself. Our primary task must be to document and interpret precise concepts and arguments, and in many cases the recourse to overly broad characterizations seems only to muddy the waters.547

What Huntington says on the early Indian mahayana equally applies here as well:

In working to develop a critical intellectual history of early Indian Mahayana, then, the focus of our attention must shift from “tenets” and “schools” . . . to individual authors and their own original words.548

In the end, all the various views and presentations may be taken as “role models” that serve as aids to figure out “the correct view,” but the process of figuring-out can only be accomplished by relying on one’s own intelligence and wisdom—simply following traditions is of no benefit (this is, by the way, what the Buddha is reported to have often said himself). Thus, if one looks at the controversies between great masters or schools in this way, they can be helpful as yardsticks to gauge and refine one’s personal insights. I remember Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche engaging in formal Tibetan debate with some advanced Kagyü students from the Tibetan Institute for Higher Learning in Sarnath, India. They kept urging him to present the “official” Kagyü position on various issues. Every time Rinpoche replied that it does not matter what the commonly acknowledged stance in a certain camp is, but that they have to honestly investigate for themselves what they personally think is correct. In this vein, the function of doxographical materials and controversies resembles that of a lighthouse signaling on both sides of a dangerous maritime passage to alert us of rocks, shoals, and so on, but the task of steering clear of such obstacles still lies with ourselves alone.

To return to the question whether Rangjung Dorje is a “shentongpa,” when considering the very distinct explanations in his above-mentioned texts and comparing them with Dölpopa’s presentation, they clearly and repeatedly contradict the rather commonly held position that Dölpopa’s view was greatly influenced by Rangjung Dorje’s, let alone the claims that the Karmapa “invented” the shentong view, that Dölpopa may have received his terminology of rangtong and shentong from the Karmapa, or even that Rangjung Dorje was very much influenced by Dölpopa and his shentong view.549 I could only find three passages in the Third Karmapa’s works from which “typical” shentong statements could be pieced together. The first one appears in EDV as one of its explanations of the two aspects of the perfect nature—the unchanging and the unmistaken: How is the perfect nature to be understood as twofold? The unchanging perfect nature is expressed by the name “emptiness” because it is empty of the characteristics of both the imaginary and the other-dependent. Since this is never other, it is called “suchness.” The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 191

Because it is the unmistaken actuality to be realized, it is “the true end.” Because the characteristics of the above two have ceased, it is “signlessness.” Because it is the sphere of the noble ones, it is “the ultimate.” Because it is the cause of the dharmas of the noble ones, it is the “dharmadhatu.” . . . The unmistaken perfect nature is the nature of the wisdom of the noble ones, produced by perfect prajña . . . In brief, they are to be understood as the following classification: the former is the dharmakaya that is the stainless dharmadhatu, and the latter is the very profound dharmakaya,550 which is the natural outflow of this stainless dharmadhatu.551

The perfect nature being not empty of itself but of both the imaginary and other-dependent natures is a classical shentong position. However, the above passage relates the perfect nature being empty of the other two to only one aspect of the perfect nature—the unmistaken—and makes it clear that “emptiness” (not “other-emptiness”) is just one among many labels for the perfect nature and does not entail any reification. The latter is explicitly stated in the other explanations on the perfect nature in EDV, such as that its unchanging aspect—suchness—is the nature of the two realities that abides in all knowable objects, which is the lack of nature of all phenomena.552 Also, the perfect nature is said to be absolutely without any arising or ceasing in terms of itself, others, both, or neither.553 Elsewhere, EDV matches the three natures with the well-known example of mistaking a rope for a snake. The imaginary nature is like the snake for which the rope is mistaken, that is, a nonexistent that nevertheless seems to appear. Just as the rope, the other-dependent nature appears but is not real in the way it appears as a rope, since all that appears is a mere collection of threads with a certain color and shape. The perfect nature is the snake’s and the rope’s very own nature of lacking any reality as well as unmistaken self-awareness, since it is without being mistaken about what appears.554 When establishing that phenomena and the nature of phenomena cannot be said to be different, the text gives the following reason. The direct appearance of the nature of phenomena is nothing but mere dualistic cognizance— the imaginary and the other-dependent natures—appearing without the characteristics of such cognizance, and the nature of phenomena is characterized by nothing but the lack of phenomena. In the inseparability of appearing and being empty, phenomena and their nature are not established as different.555

The second passage relates to the same issue, pertaining to two headings in DSC, which speak of “the manner in which the dharmadhatu is not empty of wisdom” and “the manner in which the dharmadhatu is empty of something to be relinquished and a remedy” (fols. 15b–16b). There are several passages in DSC that indirectly identify the dharmadhatu with the perfect nature, though only referring to its fruitional aspect by saying that “naturally luminous dharmakaya” (fol. 14a) or “wisdom with its enlightened activity” (fol. 21a) are the perfect nature, or that “the abode of all dharmas”—the dharmakaya—”fully bears the naturally luminous perfect nature.” At one place (fol. 20a), “imaginations in terms of factors to be relinquished and remedies” are equated with both the imaginary and the other-dependent natures. Thus, put together, it may be said that the dharmadhatu as the perfect nature is not empty of wisdom but empty of the imaginary and the other-dependent natures. However, when Rangjung Dorje says that the dharmadhatu is not empty of wisdom, he immediately makes it perfectly clear that the dharmadhatu is not like the self of the tirthikas, and that this wisdom is neither empty nor nonempty, neither arisen from itself, something other, both or neither, thus also being without abiding and ceasing and so on.

The third case is the beginning of AC’s discussion of the two realities, which—when read on its own—might be regarded as another “typical” shentong position:

Ultimately, what are labeled as causes, results, and the path, as well as thinking and imagining, are all merely superimpositions by our imagination—they do not exist ultimately. So what does exist ultimately? The Buddha heart—the basic element of sentient beings, which is naturally pure mind beyond the entire web of imaginations— exists. Therefore, I say:

The basic element of sentient beings is the Buddha’s Stainless Heart endowed with the two realities.556

The crucial point in terms of how buddha nature exists obviously lies in the phrase “endowed with the two realities,” since AC continues by discussing these two realities primarily in classical Madhyamaka style. It elaborates on the above-mentioned passage from the Vajrajñanasamucchayatantra (also found in DSC), which speaks of ultimate reality as being free from all characteristics, its locus thus being the eighteen emptinesses.