Articles by alphabetic order
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
 Ā Ī Ñ Ś Ū Ö Ō
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0


In Praise of Dharmadhatu/Part 4

From Tibetan Buddhist Encyclopedia
Jump to navigation Jump to search

Furthermore, even though they are noble ones, sravakas and pratyekabuddhas only like the expanse of their own peace. In order for them to enter the mahayana and take a rest from being worn out by sa?sara, the teachings in sutras such as the Saddharmapu??arika769 are given. In order for bodhisattvas on the path of seeing, on the sixth bhumi, and also on the eighth bhumi to not fall into this kind of peace, the point that the Buddha Bhagavats exhort them in a single moment also represents the point of the Buddha heart’s wisdom having to be revealed. For this reason, a sutra quoted in the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya says:

Just as in a sky tainted by clouds, here, you are not seen completely Even by those noble ones who have the pure eyes of insight, yet still limited discernment.

But, Bhagavat, those whose insight is infinite behold your dharmakaya in its entirety,

Which pervades the vast space of infinite knowable objects.770 This topic is also extensively discussed in other sources, but what I said so far is enough of an elaboration. In brief, you should not think that the dharmadhatu is nothing but empty.

2.2.3.4. Teaching that the basic element—the particularly pure abode—is to be unfolded

This has three parts:

1) Identifying the dharmas that make the basic element unfold 2) The manner in which enlightenment is accomplished due to that 3) Being guarded by the victors

2.2.3.4.1. Identifying the dharmas that make the basic element unfold The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 267 The next three verses teach that the ten paramitas 33b cause the unfolding of the nature of the basic element, which, in terms of its own essence, is already pure and attained. Something like the qualities of a gem unfolding through the removal of its coverings is what is referred to as “purity” here.771 Also, in the manner of dependent origination, something like a tree comes forth from a fruit, or, something like a harvest from seeds. Here, such is referred to by the conventional term “attainment.” The inseparability of these two —purity and attainment— is then called “wisdom-kaya,” which is nothing but the dharmakaya.

Therefore, the line Generosity’s multiple hardships, 66a

refers to the generation of bodhicitta endowed with aspiration, which is the activity of bodhisattvas and the principle of nonattachment in the generosity of material goods, the generosity of protecting others, and the generosity of dharma. The next line

Ethics gathering beings’ good, 66b

means that the ethics of bodhisattvas in terms of vows, their ethics of gathering virtuous dharmas, and their ethics of promoting the good of beings are not motivated by the wish for their own pleasures within sa?saric existence. And patience benefitting beings— Through these three, the dhatu blooms. 66cd

This refers to the patience of not taking offense with anyone who inflicts harm upon oneself, the patience of taking on the suffering that arises through practicing what is virtuous, and the patience of mind being certain about the dharma of emptiness, that is, not being afraid of it. The paramita of patience serves as an aide for the former two paramitas. Thus, these three, which are called “the accumulation of merit that originates from generosity and ethics,” are the dharmas that make the basic element of the rupakaya bloom.772

Enthusiastic vigor for all dharmas, Mind that enters meditative poise, Prajña as your permanent resort— These too make enlightenment unfold. 67


Through the armorlike vigor, the vigor of engagement, and the vigor of final emancipation,773 all qualities are brought forth. 34a Meditative poise is what makes one attain mundane and supramundane samadhis, connecting with the special abode of the form realm and also entering the formless meditative absorptions.774 Prajña is the threefold prajña that thoroughly discriminates mundane and supramundane phenomena, is not attached to anything in sa?sara and nirva?a, and merges into nonconceptual wisdom.

These three represent the special merit that originates from meditation and the accumulation of wisdom, which make the basic element in terms of both kayas unfold. Once these six paramitas are embraced by prajña, they all become the accumulation of wisdom. As for their essence, the two paramitas of generosity and ethics are the accumulation of merit, while prajña is the accumulation of wisdom. The three of patience, vigor, and samadhi represent both. As the Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

Generosity and ethics are the accumulation of merit, While prajña is the one of wisdom.

The three others are the accumulation of both, And all five can also be the accumulation of wisdom.775

Prajña that is joined with means, Aspiration prayers very pure, A firm stand in power, wisdom too— These four dharmas make the dhatu bloom. 68

Through being endowed with skill in means—the dedication of merit, imaginative willpower,776 and rejoicing in others’ virtue—prajña is made swifter and vaster. Aspiration prayers are the paramita connected to speech, in order to accomplish the skill in means for the arising and increasing of all qualities of the path, so that they become inexhaustible. As for power, it is the power of discrimination and meditation that makes the dharmadhatu unfold. Wisdom accomplishes the welfare of oneself and others through its two aspects of knowing suchness and variety. Therefore, these four make the completely pure basic element bloom.777

On the paths of accumulation and preparation, through the armorlike accomplishment and the accomplishment of engagement,778 one engages in practicing the paramitas in an approximate manner. 34b After that, they are practiced properly. That means, on the seven impure bhumis, they are practiced in a way that still entails some reference points and on the three pure bhumis, in a nonreferential manner. On the bhumi of a Buddha, they are said to be spontaneously present without effort.

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 269

As for their functions, generosity holds all sentient beings in your care. Ethics renders all harm nonexistent. Through patience, you bear with everything. Vigor makes the qualities increase. Through meditative poise, you introduce others to the dharma with the help of miraculous powers and so forth. Prajña liberates the mind streams of all beings. Means render everything virtuous inexhaustible. Through aspiration prayers, you always engage in pleasing the Buddhas. Through power, you are victorious over antagonistic factors. Wisdom brings sentient beings to complete maturity.

The Madhyantavibhaga says:

The functions are holding in one’s care, Not harming, bearing with such, Increase of qualities, being able to introduce, Leading to liberation, Being inexhaustible, always engaging, Securing, and enjoying as well as maturing.779

In Nagarjuna’s text here, the essences, the classification, and the functions of the ten paramitas are taught in brief. In detail, these are to be understood from what is said in his Ratnavali and Sutrasamucchaya, master Sura’s Paramitasamasa, and the chapter on the paramitas in the Mahayanasutrala?kara. In brief, since all practices of all bodhisattvas are contained in these paramitas, they are explained to be “the dharmas that make the basic element unfold.”

2.2.3.4.2. Explaining the manner in which enlightenment is accomplished due to that This is explained by four verses. The first teaches that bodhicitta is the cause of the dharmakaya.

“To bodhicitta,780 I pay no homage”— Saying such means speaking badly. Where there are no bodhisattvas, There will be no dharmakaya. 69

Enlightenment is buddhahood 35a and the accomplishment of a great many activities out of the wish and the striving for it is bodhicitta, which has the character of aspiration and application.

As the Abhisamayala?kara says:


The wish for completely perfect enlightenment For the welfare of others is bodhicitta.781

Bodhisattvas are those who, by relying on bodhicitta, engage in this means to realize the ultimate, which is to be personally experienced, and the inseparability of emptiness and compassion. Whoever has no respect and pays no homage to this bodhicitta, speaks badly and thus abandons the enlightenment of a Buddha. Therefore, if there are no bodhisattvas, there is no buddhahood that is the dharmakaya, since there is no result without a cause.

About this reasoning, some may think, “Since aspiration and application are conceptions, they are something newly produced. Therefore, also buddha wisdom is something newly attained that did not exist before.” Since this is not appropriate, I will explain. Aspiration is the very wish for buddhahood. Application means to apply oneself to the causes of buddhahood out of the wish for it. These causes are two: the actual cause and the cause that is a contributing condition. The actual cause is naturally luminous mind as such, which is called “the basic element.” The cause that is a condition is called both “the light rays of this very mind” and “the enlightened activity of the compassion of Buddhas, which is free from obscurations.” This refers to the paramitas, which are to be practiced with confidence and aspiration and have the character of determination, contact, and recollection.782 It is not justified that one of these two causes is realized and manifested, if the other is not present. Thus, this is the two realitiesown nature. Here, you should understand the meaning of what the Uttaratantra says: Through mind’s natural luminosity, they see that the afflictions are without nature.

Therefore, they truly realize that all beings are at peace, the ultimate lack of identity.

They see that perfect buddhahood is all-pervading, have an unobscured mind, 35b

And are endowed with the vision of wisdom that has limitless beingspurity as its object. I bow down to them, the noble sa?gha.783 Therefore, the second two verses instruct on how this is established through an example.

Some dislike the seeds of sugar cane But still wish to relish sugar. Without seeds of sugar cane, There will be no sugar. 70 The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 271 When these seeds of sugar cane Are well guarded, fostered, and refined, Molassis, sugar, candy too Will then come forth from them. 71

The following verse teaches the meaning of this example. If you guard bodhicitta, which is like sugar cane, all fruitions of qualities will come forth. With bodhicitta, it is just the same:

When it’s guarded, fostered, and refined, Arhats, conditioned realizers, Buddhas too Will then arise and spring from it. 72

In this way, in dependence upon bodhicitta and bodhisattvas, the arhats of the sravakas manifest through their afflictions and rebirths becoming exhausted. The arhats of the pratyekabuddhas manifest due to realizing enlightenment through conditions and thus become liberated on their own.

Omniscient Buddhas manifest through realizing the final ultimate. Thus they all spring from the mind of bodhicitta. This is also stated by master Candrakirti in his Madhyamakavatara:

Sravakas and middling buddhas issue from the mighty sages.

Buddhas are born from bodhisattvas.

A compassionate mind, nondual insight, And bodhicitta are the causes for the victors’ children.784

Furthermore, you may think here, “If even sravakas and pratyekabuddhas spring from bodhicitta in this way, what is the reason that they are not just like bodhisattvas?” This is to be explained as follows. The Abhisamayala?kara says: It is held that perfect buddhahood is easily realized By the sharp but difficult to realize by the dull.785

Master Haribhadra’s Abhisamayala?karaviv?ti instructs: Implicitly, this teaches that those with inferior faculties attain arhathood, those with medium faculties pratyekabuddhahood, and those with sharp faculties buddhahood.786

36a Here, it is said that there are five differences between sravakas and pratyekabuddhas on the one hand and bodhisattvas and Buddhas on the other. Maitreya states that Buddhas and bodhisattvas differ from the other two in five respects: (1) being nonconceptual, (2) unlimited, (3) nonabiding, (4) perpetual,787 and (5) unsurpassable. The wisdom of sravakas and pratyekabuddhas realizes sa?sara as what is to be relinquished and peace as what is to be adopted. Since it only focuses on the four realities, it is limited. Sravakas and pratyekabuddhas pass into nirva?a and remain there. Their skandhas discontinue without a remainder and their realizations are surpassed by buddhahood. From the perspective of what the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas realize, Buddhas and bodhisattvas are certainly similar to them. However, different from them, they do not conceptualize sa?sara and nirva?a, since these two are equal for them. Since they know all knowable objects, their wisdom is unlimited. They do not abide in either sa?sara or nirva?a. Since, after having become Buddhas, their kayas, wisdoms, and enlightened activities are inexhaustible for as long as788 sa?sara lasts, they are permanent. Since there is no one above them, they are unsurpassable. These five differences are discussed in the Dharmadharmatavibhaga.789 As for these differences and the certainty that bodhisattvas promote the welfare of sentient beings, the Sagaramatiparip?cchasutra790 says:

When compared to the example of a boy falling into a pit of filth, Sagaramati, the meaning of this example is as follows. “The pit of filth” stands for the three realms. “The only son” is an expression for sentient beings, since bodhisattvas think of all sentient beings as if they were their only son. “Mother and friends” are the terms for those who have entered the yanas of sravakas and pratyekabuddhas. They are those who, seeing the suffering of sa?sara, are in agony and wail but are incapable of making any efforts to pull sentient beings out of it. 36b “The householder who is a merchant” is an expression for bodhisattvas. They are those who are endowed with stainless minds in relation to what is pure and free from stains, who directly realize the unconditioned dharma, and who link up with the three realms as they please in order to completely mature sentient beings. Sagaramati, though they are utterly liberated from all linking up with sa?sara, this kind of taking rebirth in existence is due to the great compassion of bodhisattvas. Since they are skilled in means and fully embraced by prajña, they are not harmed by the afflictions. They also teach sentient beings the dharma in order to set them free from all fetters of the afflictions.

For this reason, there follows the

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 273

2.2.3.4.3. Instruction on being guarded by the victors Just as farmers guarding Seeds of rice and others, Thus, the leaders guard all those Who’re aspiring to the supreme yana. 73

For example, when one has put seeds of rice into a field, the fruits come forth from guarding them well. Thus, since aspiring to the supreme yana is the seed, the Buddhas and bodhisattvas guard those who have it. The manner of doing so is discussed in detail in the prajñaparamita sutras. Thus, the next point is the outcome of having taught the dharmas through which the basic element is to be unfolded.

2.2.3.5. The sequence of the manner in which it unfolds

This has four parts, with the first three representing the brief introduction:

1) The manner of seeing by way of engagement through aspiration 2) The example of unfolding in those who have entered the bhumis 3) The example for the ultimate 4) Detailed explanation


2.2.3.5.1. The manner of seeing by way of engagement through aspiration Just as, on the fourteenth day of waning, Just a little bit of moon is seen, Those aspiring to the supreme yana Will see a tiny bit of buddhakaya. 74

Just as in the example of the waning moon on the twenty-ninth day of a lunar cycle barely appearing, which is how it appears when being obscured, 37a those on the beginner’s bhumi of aspiration see the buddhakaya as something outside. One may even speak of nonappearance. This means that, through causes such as one’s own confidence, what appears as nirva?a and so forth appears just a little bit. However, since the appearance of the wisdom of one’s own basic element is not realized due to conceptual obscurations, it appears like that external buddhakaya.791


2.2.3.5.2. The example of unfolding once one has entered the bhumis 274 In Praise of Dharmadhatu Just as when the waxing moon Is seen more in every moment, Those who’ve entered on the bhumis, See its increase step by step. 75


On the first bhumi, the samadhi in which one’s own nonconceptual wisdom appears is the attainment of the appearance of the dharmakaya. Therefore, through the power of that, on the outside, there will be an appearance of the wisdom of subsequent attainment seeing one hundred Tathagatas, hearing them speak the dharma, retaining it, and so on.792 Likewise, it is said that, on the second bhumi, the same appears one hundred thousand times; on the third bhumi, ten million times; on the fourth, a hundred billion;793 on the fifth, ten trillion; on the sixth, a thousand times as much as that; on the seventh bhumi, ten quadrillion times as much; on the eighth bhumi, in a number equal to the minute particles in one hundred thousand trichiliocosms; on the ninth, in a number equal to one hundred thousand countless times that; and on the tenth, countless and inexpressibly many times that.794

2.2.3.5.3. Teaching the example for the ultimate On the fifteenth day of waxing, Eventually, the moon is full. Just so, when the bhumis’ end is reached, The dharmakaya’s full and clear. 76

The full moon’s own ma??ala is full and it spreads its light rays. Just so, once the end of the ten bhumis is reached, the stainless dharmakaya is full and 37b becomes equal with all Buddhas through the three equalities by fusing and becoming equal with all the ma??alas of the victors that display the three types of nirma?akaya that display arts and crafts, rebirths, or great enlightenment to the very limits of space.795

2.2.3.5.4. Detailed explanation This has eleven parts:

1) The bhumi of engagement through aspiration 2) Utter Joy 3) Stainless 4) Illuminating 5) Radiating 6) Difficult to Master 7) Facing The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 275 8) Gone Afar 9) Immovable 10) Excellent Insight 11) Cloud of Dharma 2.2.3.5.4.1. The bhumi of engagement through aspiration

Having generated this mind truly

Through continuous firm aspiration

For the Buddha, dharma, and the sa?gha,

Irreversibility shows time and again. 77

This is just as it is stated in the Uttaratantra. Through taking refuge in and cultivating irreversible firm aspiration for the three unsurpassable jewels from now until enlightenment, you generate this mind of bodhicitta, which has the character of aspiration and application. Then, you truly engage in the paramitas’ armorlike accomplishment and the accomplishment of engagement. Having done so, you will attain the irreversibility of the paths of accumulation and preparation, and the signs of being close to the irreversibility of the path of seeing will show.796 These two paths are the phases of the four applications of mindfulness, the four correct exertions, the four limbs of miraculous powers, the five faculties, and the five powers.797

2.2.3.5.4.2. Instruction on entering the first bhumi, Utter Joy Through the ground of darkness all relinquished And the ground of brightness firmly seized, It is ascertained right at this point. Therefore, it is designated “Joy.” 78

What has the nature of darkness are the six primary afflictions, among which view is fivefold. Therefore, there are ten factors to be relinquished through seeing, which are relinquished through realizing the four realities of the noble ones. 38a The ground of brightness is called “ascertainment.” To rely on the sutra collections of the mahayana is the cause for the calm abiding and superior insight that are proper mental engagement. Through seizing that, right at this point, ascertainment refers to attaining and experiencing suchness in the manner of the direct perception of the path of seeing. Upon such realization, a special supramundane joy about the welfare of sentient beings being accomplished through this is attained. Therefore, the first bhumi is called “Utter Joy.”798 The Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

Upon seeing that enlightenment is near And the welfare of sentient beings is accomplished, Utter joy will arise.


Therefore it is called “Utter Joy.”799

The meaning that is described here is the meaning of utter joy. Master Nagarjuna himself explains the meaning of this topic of the bhumis in detail, that is, in terms of the meanings of their names, their natures, their qualities, which paramitas constitute them, and the results of maturation of the rupakaya in his Ratnavali, which says:

The first of these is “Utter Joy,”

Since the bodhisattvas are overjoyed, Have relinquished the three entanglements,800

And are born in the lineage of the Tathagatas. Through the maturation of those qualities, The paramita of generosity becomes supreme, They shake a hundred worldly realms,801

And become great lords of Jambudvipa.802

2.2.3.5.4.3. Explaining the second bhumi, The Stainless What’s been tainted through all times By the stains of passion and so forth And is pure now, without stains, That is called “The Stainless One.” 79

On the second bhumi, bodhisattvas will be without the stains of the afflictions (passion and so forth), which means being without distorted ethics.

The Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

Since it is free from the efforts of distorted ethics, It is called “The Stainless Bhumi.”803

The Ratnavali states:

The second is called “The Stainless,” Since the actions of body, speech, and mind The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 277

Are all ten without stains And since the bodhisattvas naturally abide in them.804

Through the maturation of those qualities, 38b

The paramita of ethics becomes supreme, They become cakravartins who benefit beings And are masters over the glorious precious seven.805

2.2.3.5.4.4. Explaining the third bhumi, The Illuminating Once the afflictions’ web pulls back, Stainless prajña brightly shines. This dispels all boundless darkness And thus is The Illuminating. 80

On this bhumi, once most of the stains of the afflictions that are to be relinquished through meditation have pulled back too, the light of wisdom without any clinging dispels the darkness of the minds of infinite numbers of sentient beings. Thus, it becomes the vast radiance of the dharma.

The Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

Since it causes the great radiance of dharma, It is The Illuminating.806

The Ratnavali states:

The third bhumi is The Illuminating, Since the peaceful light of wisdom dawns, Samadhi and supernatural knowledge are brought forth, And desire and hatred are completely exhausted.

Through the maturation of those qualities, They engage most excellently in the practice of patience And become a skillful great sovereign of the gods Who puts an end to passionate desire.807

2.2.3.5.4.5. Explaining the fourth bhumi, The Radiant It always gleams with light so pure And is engulfed by wisdom’s shine, With all bustle being fully dropped.

Hence, this bhumi’s held to be The Radiant. 81


Through the thirty-seven dharmas that concord with enlightenment, here, bodhisattvas have far removed themselves from the bustle of the distractions of a mind that entails apprehender and apprehended. Therefore, they are endowed with the cause for the radiance of the wisdom that realizes that there is no difference between apprehender and apprehended.

The Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

Thus, the dharmas concordant with enlightenment Are like intensely burning light.

Because it is endowed with these, this bhumi Burns both obscurations, thus being The Radiant.808

The Ratnavali states:

The fourth is called “The Radiant,” Since the light of true wisdom shines 39a

And since the bodhisattvas particularly cultivate All dharmas concordant with enlightenment.

Through the maturation of those qualities, They become kings of the gods in Free from Strife809 Who are skilled in overcoming

Any arising of the views about a real personality.810

2.2.3.5.4.6. The fifth bhumi, The Difficult to Master It triumphs in science, sports, and arts and crafts, The full variety of samadhi’s range, And over afflictions very hard to master.

Thus, it is considered Difficult to Master. 82

The bodhisattvas on this bhumi perform the activities of all the means to mature sentient beings, such as arts and crafts, and accomplish discordant meditative states, such as peaceful samadhis and cessation, at the same time. Since this is hard to master but is accomplished by them, this bhumi is called “Difficult to Master.”811


As the Mahayanasutrala?-kara says:

Since they fully mature sentient beings

And guard their own minds,

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 279

This is difficult to master even by the intelligent.

Therefore, it is called “Difficult to Master.”812

The Ratnavali states:

The fifth is very Difficult to Master, Since all maras find it very difficult to overpower them, And since they become very skilled in knowing The subtle meanings of the realities of the noble ones and so forth.

Through the maturation of those qualities, They become kings of the gods who live in Tu?ita813

And put an end to the foundations

Of the afflicted views of all tirthikaras.814

2.2.3.5.4.7. The sixth bhumi, The Facing815

The three kinds of enlightenment, The gathering of all that’s excellent, Arising, ceasing too exhausted— This bhumi’s held to be The Facing. 83

Through their prajña, the bodhisattvas on this bhumi realize that the three kinds of enlightenment of sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas are equality. Therefore, by facing that existence and peace are without difference, they realize the very profound arising and ceasing.816 39b

The Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

Since sa?sara and nirva?a Are both faced here, It is said to be “the bhumi of Facing,” Which is based on the paramita of prajña.817

The Ratnavali states:

The sixth is called “The Facing,” Since they face the buddhadharmas And, through familiarity with calm abiding and superior insight, Attain cessation, by which prajña unfolds.

280 In Praise of Dharmadhatu Through the maturation of those qualities, They become kings of the gods in Liking Emanations,818

Are not surpassed by sravakas, And pacify those with the pride of superiority.819 2.2.3.5.4.8. The seventh bhumi, The Gone Afar Since it’s ever playing with a web of light That’s configurated in a circle And has crossed sa?sara’s swampy pond, This is labeled “Gone Afar.” 84

As the sign for having entered the secret place of the Buddhas, the bodhisattvas on this bhumi have configurated a circle. This means that they play with a web of light that is similar to the ma??alas of the Buddhas and also enter, in a single moment, the absorption of cessation.820 Therefore, by realizing the equality of that, they have gone afar and hence have crossed sa?sara’s swamp.

The Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

Due to being joined with the single path to travel, It is held to be the bhumi Gone Afar.821


The Ratnavali states:

The seventh is Gone Afar, Since the number of qualities has gone afar And they, moment by moment, Enter the absorption of cessation.

Through the maturation of those qualities, They become lords of the gods in Power over Others’ Emanations822

And become great leaders of masters, Who know the clear realization of the realities of noble ones.823

This explanation refers to the meaning of the paramita of skill in means. 2.2.3.5.4.9. Explaining the eighth bhumi, The Immovable Being cared for by the Buddhas, Having entered into wisdom’s ocean, 40a

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 281

Being without effort and spontaneous— By the hordes of maras, it’s Immovable. 85

When the eighth bhumi is attained, mentation, clinging, and conceptions have changed state. Therefore, being cared for by the Buddhas refers to what is stated in the Sarvabuddharahasyopayakausalyasutra824—once this bhumi is attained, bodhisattvas could display the attainment of unsurpassable great buddhahood in seven days, if they wish. Hence, having entered into the secret of the Buddhas on this bhumi, they dwell in the ocean of wisdom. That all maras cannot unsettle their spontaneous enlightened activity is the attainment of the paramita of aspiration prayers.825

The Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

Since it is unmoved by the two discriminations, It is named “The Immovable.”826

The two discriminations are the discrimination of having concepts about knowable objects and the discrimination of having concepts about suchness.

The eighth bhumi is not tainted by these, since both have become pure.

The Ratnavali explains:

Likewise, the eighth is the youthful bhumi. It is immovable, since it is not conceptualizing. Just like this immovability, the spheres Of their body, speech, and mind are inconceivable. Through the maturation of those qualities, They become a Brahma who is the lord of a thousand worlds,827

And sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and so on Cannot surpass them in ascertaining actuality.828

2.2.3.5.4.10. Explaining the ninth bhumi, Excellent Insight

Since those yogins have completed Their discourses teaching dharma In all awarenesses discriminating perfectly, This bhumi is considered Excellent Insight. 86

On this bhumi, bodhisattvas demonstrate their might over all dharmas, the completion of all perfectly discriminating awarenesses.829


Since they demonstrate this in an effortless way, it is the final equality of the nature of all buddha speech. 40b This is the paramita of power. The Mahayanasutrala?kara says:

The supreme mind of perfectly discriminating awareness

Is the bhumi that is Excellent Insight.830

The Ratnavali states:

The ninth is called “Excellent Insight,” Since they, just like a regent, Have attained perfectly discriminating awareness And therefore have supreme insight here.

Through the maturation of those qualities, They become a Brahma who is the lord of a million worlds,831

And arhats and so forth cannot surpass them In answering the questions sentient beings have in mind.832

2.2.3.5.4.11. Explaining the tenth bhumi, Cloud of Dharma The kaya with this wisdom’s nature, Which is stainless, equal to the sky,

Holds the dharma of the Buddhas.

From it, the “Cloud of Dharmaforms. 87

The bodhisattvas on this bhumi will be endowed with the enlightened activity that equals the activity of the kayas of all Buddhas whose wisdom has reached its culmination. Their enlightened activity consists of the incessant twelve deeds of a supreme nirma?akaya, which are the limitless abundance to guide disciples. This means that their wisdom of knowing suchness and variety has become equal to the sky. Therefore, this is called “the paramita of wisdom.” The Mahayanasutrala?kara says: The two that are like clouds pervade the spacelike dharma.

Therefore, it is the Cloud of Dharma.833

The Ratnavali states:

The tenth is the Dharma Cloud, Since it pours down a rain of dharma The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 283 And since the Buddhas bestow empowerment Upon these bodhisattvas through light rays. Through the maturation of those qualities, They become the lord of the gods in Pure Abode, The lord of the sphere of inconceivable wisdom, Who is supreme Mahesvara.834

Throughout this presentation of the ten bhumis, the respective first quotes came from the Mahayanasutrala?kara, and the latter are found in the Ratnavali.

As for briefly teaching these ten bhumisown essences, what obscures them are ten aspects of nonafflicted ignorance about ten aspects of the dharmadhatu, such as its actuality of being omnipresent. 41a In due order, these obscure the ten bhumis of bodhisattvas, since they are the antagonistic factors of these bhumis.

As the Madhyantavibhaga says:

They are the actuality of omnipresence, the actuality of the highest, The natural outflow as the highest to be strived for, The actuality of the lack of clinging, The actuality of mind streams not being different, The actuality of being neither afflicted nor pure, The actuality of nondifference, The actuality of being without decrease and increase,

And the matrix of fourfold power.

Ignorance about the dharmadhatu Consists of the ten nonafflicted obscurations. The bhumis are the remedies

Of the antagonistic factors of the ten bhumis.835

These ten kinds of nonafflicted ignorance are the cognitive obscurations. The thorough purifications to purify them are taught in detail in the prajñaparamita sutras.836

In brief, the intense rising of desire, hatred, and ignorance that brings about the desire realm is to be relinquished through the remedies of meditating on repulsiveness and so forth. The latencies of the three poisons that bring about the realm of form and the formless realm are to be relinquished through the supramundane paths. The ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance that exists in the mind streams of sravakas and pratyekabuddhas, the factors to be relinquished through seeing, the factors to be relinquished through meditation, as well as the factors to be relinquished on the seven impure bhumis and on the three pure bhumis are discussed by summarizing them into afflictive obscurations, cognitive obscurations, and obscurations of meditative absorption. The remedies for these obscurations are taught through the sequence as presented in the Avikalpapravesadhara?i of not mentally engaging in the four characteristics of factors to be relinquished, their remedies, suchness, and fruition.

Here, “nonconceptual wisdom” is used as the conventional term for the unfolding of the dharmakaya and “illusionlike wisdom” as the conventional term for the unfolding of the rupakayas. 41b In terms of their own essence, they are said to be inseparable dependent origination. As for the rupakayas being taught to be similar to the bodies of kings, it is to be understood that such is taught with the implication of referring to the aspect of the features of form that appear in the three realms, whereas the five powers are not like that. The *Vimalatejasvargaparip?cchasutra837 and the Silak?iptasutra speak of the following five838 powers: (1) the prajñas of bodhisattvas and Buddhas, (2) their wisdoms, (3) the samadhis in which they meditate, (4) their merits of having gathered the accumulations, and (5) their pure bodies.

From among these, the power of their bodies is discussed as follows. Take the power of ordinary elephants, puru?a-elephants, white elephants, lotus-elephants, white water-lily-elephants, wool-elephants, perfumeelephants, Vindhya-elephants,839 those who have weaponlike claws; ordinary lions and great lions; divine beings above the earth, Garland-Holders, Basin-Holders, Always Intoxicated Ones, Vina-Possessors,840 Kubera, and the gods from “the Thirty-Three.” Then multiply the power of all these by ten and multiply that by seven, all of which equals the power of a single Indra.

Again, multiply the power of the gods from Free from Strife, Tu?ita, Liking Emanations, and Power over Others’ Emanations by seven, all of which equal a single Maradeva. All of the above together equal half the power of Naraya?a,841 and two of these equal the power of a Mahapuru?a.842

Ten of the latter make up the power of arhats in their last existence, and one hundred thousand of them equal the power of one rhinoceroslike pratyekabuddha. 843 One hundred eons after having attained the path of seeing, bodhisattvas possess the power of ten pratyekabuddhas. In the same way, infinite multiplications are described in terms of their having stayed on this path for one thousand, ten thousand, hundred thousand, a million, ten million, a billion, ten billion, a hundred billion, a trillion, and countless eons; the eighth, ninth, and tenth bhumi; and their last existence as a bodhisattva.

42a In a similar way, merit is described in detail in the Ratnavali:

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 285

The merits that come from pratyekabuddhas, Those from learners and nonlearners, And those of all worlds without exception Are as infinite as these worlds.

Through multiplying that much by ten, Just a single pore of a Buddha is accomplished. . . .844

However, since I am afraid of being too wordy, I will not explain this here. Those interested should look it up in the Dasabhumikasutra and other texts.

2.3.845 Praising the dharmakaya free from all stains

This has four parts:

1) The dharmakaya’s own essence that is a change of state 2) Its inconceivability 3) The qualities of realization 4) Explaining enlightened activity

2.3.1. The dharmakaya’s own essence that is a change of state

The abode of buddhadharmas

Fully bears the fruit of practice. This fundamental change of state Is called the “dharmakaya.” 88

Once all ten bhumis have been completed, the vajralike samadhi destroys the alaya-consciousness, which is the ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance. At that point, bodhisattvas receive the empowerment of great light rays bestowed by all Buddhas and become Buddhas themselves. As for this stage, the abode of all dharmasultimate own essence, once the miragelike afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations are purified through the infinite practices of the activities of bodhisattvas on many bhumis, it fully bears the naturally luminous perfect nature. This is taught to be “the fundamental change of state,” which is called the “dharmakaya.”846 This point is discussed in detail in the Mahayanasa?graha:

First, how is this dharmakaya attained through contact? Through excellently cultivating the five aspects847 of the nonconceptual and


the subsequently attained wisdoms that have the dharmas belonging to the mahayana as their objects, on all bhumis, the accumulations 42b are well gathered. Then, through the vajralike samadhi (which bears that name, since it destroys the subtle obscurations so difficult to destroy), one becomes free from all obscurations right after coming out of that samadhi. Hence, the dharmakaya is attained due to the change of state through those. By how many kinds of masteries is the mastery of the dharmakaya attained? In brief, mastery is attained through five kinds. (1)

Through the change of state of the skandha of form, mastery over pure buddha realms, kayas, the excellent major and minor marks, infinite voices, and the invisible mark on the crown of the head is attained. (2) Through the change of state of the skandha of feelings, mastery over infinite and vast blissful states without wrongdoing is attained. (3) Through the change of state of the skandha of discrimination, mastery over the teachings is attained through all groups of words, groups of phrases, and groups of letters. (4)

Through the change of state of the skandha of formation, mastery over creation, transformation, gathering retinues, and gathering the immaculate dharmas is attained. (5) Through the change of state of the skandha of consciousness, mastery over mirrorlike wisdom, the wisdom of equality, discriminating wisdom, and all-accomplishing wisdom is attained.848

In how many ways is the dharmakaya to be understood as a support? In brief, it is a support in three ways. (1) As for it being the support of the various accomplished states of a Buddha, I offer two verses here:

Since the Buddhasown dhatu has been found, The joy with a fivefold nature is found, But those who have not attained that dhatu are deprived of such joy.

Therefore, those who wish for that, should attain it.

Power, all-accomplishment, the taste of dharma, And the consummations of its meanings and qualities 43a are boundless.

Through seeing this eternal inexhaustibility, The Buddhas find supreme joy without wrongdoing.

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 287 (2) It is the support of various sambhogakayas, since it brings bodhisattvas to maturity. (3) It is the support of various nirma?akayas, since it mainly brings the sravakas to maturity.

How many buddhadharmas constitute the dharmakaya? In brief, it is constituted by six. It is constituted (1) by the buddhadharma of purity, since the dharmakaya is attained by the alaya-consciousness having changed state; (2) by maturation, since the wisdom of maturation is attained by the material sense faculties having changed state; (3) by abiding, since the abiding through boundless wisdom is attained by our abiding in enjoying sense pleasures and so on having changed state; (4) by mastery, since mastery over the wisdom of supernatural knowledges that is unimpeded throughout all worldly realms is attained by our various purposeful activities having changed state; (5) by conventionalities, since mastery in knowing the teachings that satisfy the minds of all sentient beings is attained by the expressions of the conventionalities of what is seen, heard, asserted, and perceived by consciousness having changed state; (6) by removal, since the wisdom of knowing how to remove all misfortunes of all sentient beings is found by the removal of all misfortunes and flaws. One should know that the dharmakaya of the Buddhas is constituted by these six buddhadharmas.849

2.3.2. Its inconceivability This is explained by two verses. Free from latent tendencies, you’re inconceivable. 89a

43b Since the root of sa?sara consists of latent tendencies, being free from them is to be free from what is conceivable. Therefore, the dharmakaya is taught to be inconceivable. The next lines are given in order to explain this in detail.

Sa?sara’s latent tendencies, they can be conceived. You’re completely inconceivable— Through what could you be realized? 89bd

Beyond the entire sphere of speech, Outside the range of any senses, 90ab


Sa?sara consists of the five appropriating skandhas.850 When evaluating their latent tendencies through thinking, they are dependent origination, which has the defining characteristics of causes and conditions. This can indeed be examined and conceived by those who have the minds of ordinary beings, but you, buddha wisdom, are completely inconceivable. Though you have stains in the beginning, are in the process of removing these stains in between, and, finally, are free from all stains, you are unconditioned, not newly arisen, not something formed, nor a basis for stains,851 yet of unlimited power and compassion.

Therefore, through what could you be realized, since knowable objects and knower have fused into being equal? If knowable objects and knower are not different, words, phrases, and letters852 do not arise. Therefore, you are beyond the sphere of speech. What is not the sphere of mind and speech853 is not a part of the body either. Hence, you are outside the range of the senses (the five physical sense faculties, such as the eye, up through the mental one), since these are empty.

The same is found in the Uttaratantra:

Since it is subtle, it is not an object of study. Since it is the ultimate, it is none of reflection.

Since it is the profound nature of phenomena, It is none of worldly meditation 44a and so forth, Because childish beings have never seen it before, Just like a person born blind has never seen form.854

You may wonder, “If the dharmakaya is like that, is it then not something that cannot be realized at all?” The answer is stated in the next line. To be realized through mental knowing—90c

It is through the stains of mentation having become pure and it having become stainless mentation that the dharmakaya is something to be realized and to be aware of through your own personal experience, just as it was taught above. Therefore, the Buddhas know that the inexpressible can be expressed through anything possible, and they know all thinking about the unthinkable. Also, all of sa?sara and nirva?a is enacted in what is without action. I bow to and praise whatever’s suitable.855 90d

Likewise, the Uttaratantra says:

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 289 Even noble ones see it as a baby would glimpse The form of the sun from within its house of birth.856

Glorious Saraha declares in his Dohakosagiti: If the stains of mind have become pure, it is connateness.

At that point, nothing antagonistic can enter it.857 2.3.3. Explaining the qualities of the final realization of this

This has four parts:

1) The way in which mind becomes pure 2) The completeness of the body of wisdom 3) The qualities of purity 4) The qualities of attainment 2.3.3.1. The way in which mind becomes pure

In this manner of gradual engagement, The highly renowned children of the Buddhas, Through the wisdom of the cloud of dharma, See phenomena’s empty nature. 91

Once their minds are cleansed completely, They have gone beyond sa?sara’s depths. 92ab

Through bodhisattvas having gradually and excellently engaged in and attained all ten bhumis, they finally attain the bhumi of a Buddha through being granted empowerment. At that point, since they are praised by all Buddhas throughout the infinite reaches of space, they are highly renowned. 44b From the cloud of the Buddhasenlightened activity of the immaculate dharma—their compassion that equals space—the rain of the enlightened activity of great enlightenment and so on pours forth effortlessly, and nonconceptual wisdom becomes empty of the four characteristics of conceiving of factors to be relinquished, remedies, suchness, and fruition. Immediately at that point, the mind that is the support of the ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance—the alaya-consciousness—becomes pure and accomplished. This means that, since it has ceased, there is freedom from all factors to be relinquished. This is called “the peace of the Buddha Bhagavats.” Since mind has ceased in this way, the next six lines teach


2.3.3.2. The way in which the body of wisdom is complete They rest calmly on a throne, Whose nature is a giant immense lotus. 92cd

Everywhere they are surrounded By lotuses that number billions, In their many jewelled petals’ light, And with anthers of enthralling beauty. 93

Once their minds have ceased, they are liberated from sa?sara’s depths. Then, the throne upon which their body of wisdom rests is as follows. It is made of the boundless aspiration prayers of the Buddhas, with the stainless jewel of the heart of enlightenment at its heart. It is endowed with the light of inconceivably boundless precious substances, such as the mighty king,858 the wish-fulfiller, 859 the one held by Indra,860 blue beryl, sapphire, ruby, diamond, crystal, gold, coral, emerald, and gold from the river Jambu, which reach beyond all worlds and completely fill up the infinite reaches of space. In addition, this throne is embellished with all kinds of ornaments. In brief, even if one were to proclaim its praise and its arrangement with ten septillions of mouths for as many eons 45a as there are sand grains in the river Ga?ga, one would never reach an end. So the wisdom-bodies of the Buddhas reside on such a lotus that is surrounded everywhere by lotuses that number billions. In detail, this arrangement is as described in the Avata?sakasutra. As for the display of their bodies, it is like the display of the body that Samantabhadra, the son of the victors, saw under the bodhi-tree, but there is no room to speak about it here.861

2.3.3.3. Instruction on the qualities of purity They overflow with tenfold power, Immersed within their fearlessness, Never straying from the inconceivable Buddhadharmas without reference point. 94

This is the instruction on the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakaya: the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, and the eighteen unshared qualities. I will describe them here in the way in which the great noble Maitreya puts them succinctly in his Uttaratantra.

The ten powers:

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 291

What is the case and not the case, Maturation of karma, faculties, Constitutions, inclinations, The paths that lead everywhere, Samadhi and so forth when afflicted or stainless, Recollection of former birthplaces, The divine eye, and peaceKnowing these are the ten kinds of power.862 The four fearlessnesses:

All phenomena being completely realized, Putting an end to obstacles, Teaching the path, and teaching cessationFearlessness about these is fourfold.863

These four statements are expressions of a Buddha’s fearlessness,864 since they cannot be disputed by others, be they gods, demons, srama?as,865 or brahmans, by saying, “This is not the case.”

He lacks mistakenness and chatter.

The teacher’s mindfulness never deteriorates. He lacks a mind not resting in meditative equipoise, Lacks all kinds of discriminations, And lacks nonexamining indifference. 45b

His striving, vigor, mindfulness, Prajña, complete liberation, and the vision Of the wisdom of complete liberation never deteriorate. Actions are preceded by wisdom, And wisdom is unobscured with regard to time.

These eighteen are the qualities Unshared by the teacher with others.866

These eighteen are said to be the supreme qualities, of which a Buddha does not even share an atom with others. Since these are described in detail in the Tathagatamahakaru?anirdesasutra,867 you should look them up there.868

292 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 2.3.3.4. The qualities of attainment Through all their actions of outstanding conduct, Their merit and their wisdom are complete— This full moon’s surrounded everywhere By the stars that are its retinue. 95

The Buddhas’ outstanding conduct means that they have completely gathered the utterly bright actions that consist of the accumulations of merit and wisdom. Therefore, they appear in this way, being endowed with the thirty-two excellent marks of the rupakayas. The enumeration of these has already been taught above,869 but here, master Nagarjuna relates them to their causes. In detail, his Ratnavali says:

Through properly honoring stupas, Those to be worshipped, noble ones, and elders, You will become a cakravartin, Your glorious hands and feet marked with wheels.

O King, always firmly keep Your commitment to the dharma.

Through this, you will become a bodhisattva Whose feet are very well planted.

Through generosity, pleasant words, Benefitting, and conduct that matches your words,870 You will come to have long871 hands Whose glorious fingers are joined by webs.

Through abundant giving Of the choicest foods and drinks, Your glorious hands and feet will be supple. Your hands, feet, shoulders, And the nape of your neck will protrude,872 So that your body will be large, with these seven areas protuberant.

Through never doing harm and liberating those to be killed, Your body will be beautiful, upright, large, 46a And very tall, with long fingers

And broad heels.

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 293

Through making the dharmas to which you committed flourish, You will have the marks of looking splendidly, Excellent skin color, your ankles not protruding, And your body hairs pointing upwards.

Through respectfully assimilating and passing on Activities such as science, arts, and crafts, You will have the calves of an antelope, A sharp mind, and great knowledge.

Through the spiritual discipline of swift generosity, When others seek your wealth and possessions, You will have large and pleasant arms And become the leader of the world.

Through perfectly reconciling Friends who have become divided, You will become the foremost of those Whose glorious sexual organ is withdrawn in a sheath.

Through providing palaces And excellent comfortable carpets, Your skin color will be very soft, Just like stainless refined gold.

Through bestowing the unsurpassable powers of a kingdom And following a guru properly, You will be adorned with a glorious strand of body hair in each pore And the ur?a-hair on your face.

Through speaking in nice and pleasing ways And acting in accord with excellent speech, You will have round shoulder joints And a lionlike upper body.

Through nursing and healing the sick, You will have broad shoulders, Rest in natural ease, And all food will be of finest taste.

294 In Praise of Dharmadhatu Through encouraging activities In accordance with the dharma, Your u??i?a will be positioned well And your body well proportioned like a Nyagrodha tree.

Through pronouncing true and soft words For a long time, O lord of humans, Your tongue will be long, And you will have the voice of Brahma. 46b Through always and continuously873

Speaking words of truth, You will have jaws like a lion, Be glorious, and hard to overcome.874

Through showing excellent respect and service And following what is appropriate, Your teeth will be very white, Shining, and even.

Through being used to true and nondivisive Words over a long time, You will have a complete set of forty glorious teeth, Which are excellent and set evenly.

Through looking upon sentient beings with love And without desire, hatred, or ignorance, Your eyes will be bright and dark-blue, With eyelashes like a heifer.

Thus, in brief, know well These thirty-two marks with their causes, Which are the marks Of a lionlike Mahapuru?a.875

Here, it is taught that these marks appear in accordance with the attire of the pure aspect of the mind, which is their actual cause. Through the conditioning causes just described, this purity just becomes more and more consummate.

As the Ratnavali explains:

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 295

The merits that come from pratyekabuddhas, Those from learners and nonlearners, And those of all worlds without exception Are as infinite as these worlds.

Through multiplying that much by ten, Just a single pore of a Buddha is accomplished. All the pores of a Buddha Come about in this same way.

It is held that multiplying one hundred times The merit that produces All the pores of a Buddha Brings about a single minor mark. O king, through just that much merit, A single minor mark is completed.

The same applies to each of them Up through the eightieth. Through multiplying a hundred times The accumulation of merit that accomplishes The eighty minor marks, A single major mark of a Mahapuru?a is obtained.

Through multiplying a thousand times The vast merit that is the cause Of accomplishing thirty of the major marks, The ur?a-hair, resembling the full moon, comes forth.

Through adding up a hundred thousand times The merit of the ur?a-hair, A protector’s u??i?a is produced, Which rests invisibly on the crown of his head.876

One should understand this detailed instruction on the qualities of the rupakayas. Here, lines 95cd refer to them by saying, “This full moon is surrounded by the stars.”877 The same manner of appearance of the rupakayas is also found in the Uttaratantra:

296 In Praise of Dharmadhatu Just as the form of the moon in a cloudless autumn sky 47a

Is seen in the blue waters of a lake, So the form of the sovereign of the assemblies of the victors’ children Is seen in the ma??ala of complete buddhahood.878

This is discussed in detail in the Ratnadarikaparip?cchasutra879 and in the Samadhirajasutra’s section on recollecting the Buddha.

2.3.4. Explaining enlightened activity This has five parts:

1) The main enlightened activity of bestowing empowerment upon the children of the victors

2) The manner of performing enlightened activity in sa?sara 3) Exhorting those dwelling in peace 4) The meaning of nirva?a

5) Instruction on the meaning of effortless enlightened activity

2.3.4.1. The main enlightened activity of bestowing empowerment upon the children of the victors

In the sun that is the Buddhas’ hands, Stainless jewels shine their light.

Through empowering their eldest children, They bestow empowerment on them. 96

The deeds and enlightened activities of those who have become completely perfect Buddhas are indeed boundless, but the main one is the following. Without moving away from the dharmakaya, the sambhogakaya is displayed. An emanation that springs forth from the latter shows in the heavenly abode of Tu?ita as someone like Svetaketu.880 This one, in the form of a certain emanation of a bodhisattva and in the manner of performing the twelve deeds of a Buddha, simultaneously promotes infinite welfare in a billion four-continent worlds. Nevertheless, the main enlightened activity of these Buddhas is to empower their eldest children, such as the bodhisattva Maitreya.881 The Avata?sakasutra says:

Through deeds such as the display of bestowing empowerment by placing his hands on the crown of the head of the bodhisattva Samantabhadra, and through the blazing jewels free from all obscurations in the sun of wisdom of the Buddha’s hands, he bestows empowerment upon the ocean of the children of the victors continuously.

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 297 47b The Uttaratantra states:

Without moving away from the dharmakaya, Through various forms that have the nature of emanations, He takes a divine rebirth, Leaves the abode of Tu?ita, Enters the womb, is born, Becomes skilled in the sciences of arts and crafts, Enjoys amusements among his retinue of spouses, Experiences renunciation, practices austerities, Proceeds to the heart of enlightenment,882 Vanquishes the hosts of Mara, Becomes completely enlightened, turns the wheel of dharma, And passes into nirva?a.

He shows these deeds in impure realms For as long as existence lasts.883

2.3.4.2. The manner of promoting the welfare of sentient beings in sa?sara Abiding in this yoga that’s so great, With divine eyes, they behold Worldly beings debased by ignorance, Distraught and terrified by suffering. 97

From their bodies, without effort, Light rays are beaming forth, And open wide the gates for those Who are engulfed in ignorance’s gloom. 98

Through having reached the culmination of calm abiding and superior insight, the great yoga is attained. With their unobscured divine Buddha eyes, the Buddhas who abide in this yoga behold the beings in in the lower realms who are debased by ignorance—not knowing their own Buddha heart—and terrifying in that they are distraught by suffering. From the bodies of these great supreme emanations, six sextillion light rays are beaming forth and open wide the gates of the path to liberation for those who are engulfed in the gloom of ignorance, thus causing them to travel on the path to peace. This is to be known in detail as it is presented in the sutra that teaches on the accomplishment of a hundred quadrillions of light rays.884 48a

2.3.4.3. Instruction on the enlightened activity of exhorting those dwelling in peace

It’s held that those in the nirva?a with remainder Into the nirva?a without remainder pass. 99ab

This verse here is not about the sravakasassertion of nirva?a with remainder or without remainder.885 Here, “with remainder” refers to attaining the arhathood of sravakas or the self-enlightenment of pratyekabudhas.

You may wonder, “In what way are these with remainder?” Since the alayaconsciousness that contains all seeds is not completely relinquished by sravakas and pratyekabudhas, there is still this very remainder. Through their prajña, they have eradicated the portion of this alaya-consciousness that constitutes the afflictions, in the form of possessing the seeds for being born in the three realms. Consequently, they dwell in a peaceful samadhi in the uncontaminated expanse, due to which they still have a body that is of mental nature. Therefore, this state is both something with remainder and nirva?a.


The Bodhicittavivara?a instructs:

So that those weary with the path of existence Can take a rest, the two wisdoms of sravakas and pratyekabuddhas, Which eventually merge into the mahayana, Were discussed by the Buddha, but they are not the ultimate.

For as long as they are not exhorted by the Buddhas, Existing in a body of wisdom, The sravakas stay in a swoon, Intoxicated by samadhi.

Upon being exhorted, in various forms, They will become devoted to the welfare of sentient beings, Gather the accumulations of merit and wisdom, And attain the enlightenment of Buddhas.886

Upon this, you may wonder, “Well, how could the eradicated887 seeds for being born in existence be reborn as a body in existence?” This is possible due to two factors: (1) the cause that is the support of latent tendencies— The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 299

the alaya-consciousness that contains all seeds—and (2) the condition that consists of the Buddhaslight rays, which make the arhats rise from their samadhi and enter the mahayana. The Bodhicittavivara?a continues:

Since there are the latent tendencies of those two, 48b

Their latent tendencies are said to be the seeds. These seeds, coming together with the conditioning entities, Produce the various sprouts of persons in existence.888


The Uttaratantra states:


Through the terms “impermanence,” “suffering,” “Lack of self,” and “peace,” the Buddhas who know all means Produce weariness for the three realms in sentient beings And cause them to enter into nirva?a.

Those who have fully entered the path to peace Have the notion that they attained nirva?a, But in the Saddharmapu??arikasutra and others The true reality of phenomena is taught.

Through this, the Buddhas put their previous clinging to an end, Make them fully adopt means and prajña, Thus mature them in the mahayana, And prophesy their supreme enlightenment.


These kayas are profound and of perfect power, Thus guiding childish beings in tune with their welfare. Therefore, in due order, they are called “Profound,” “vast,” and “great being.”889

Therefore, this kind of nirva?a without remainder is buddhahood, and what places you there is the enlightened activity of the Buddhas .890

2.3.4.4. Explaining the meaning of nirvana that is peace But here, the actual nirva?a

Is mind that’s free from any stain. 99cd The nonbeing of all beings— This nature is its sphere. 300 In Praise of Dharmadhatu The mighty bodhicitta seeing it Is fully stainless dharmakaya. 100

Here, the actual nirva?a that is called “the nirva?a of the Buddha Bhagavats” is to be understood as follows. This “mind free from any stain” first seems to be ensnared by the infinite millions of cocoons of the afflictions and then undergoes a fundamental change of state as taught above. Its nature dwells in all sentient beings, but the nature of this being, which is inconceivable for the thinking and evaluating of all beings, is like a reflection of the moon in water. Since this is the sphere of the supreme state of mind, the time of reaching final consummation by seeing it 49a is called “attaining the fully stainless dharmakaya.” As the Hevajratantra says: Mind is perfect buddhahood itself.

There is no teaching of buddhahood as anything else.891

This teaches mind’s stainlessness through the namemind.” What is expressed by the terms “mind,” “mentation,” and “consciousness” is stainless in every repect. Therefore, once the adventitious stains have become nonexistent, it is called “buddhahood.”892

2.3.4.5. Instruction on the meaning of effortless enlightened activity In the stainless dharmakaya,

The sea of wisdom finds its place.893

Like with variegated jewels, Beingswelfare is fulfilled from it. 101

The change of state in dependence on the stainless dharmakaya does not refer to having become nothing whatsoever. Rather, the oceans of the hordes of thoughts have changed state into the sea of wisdom,894 which is the final consummation of the emptiness that is endowed with the supreme of all aspects.

As for “all aspects” in this expression, they are all the above-mentioned dharmas, such as generosity, that make the basic element unfold. Through “the supreme” of these aspects, their unsurpassable consummation is expressed. These aspects are “emptiness,” since they, in terms of their own essence, are nothing but purity itself and thus inseparable from emptiness. This is described in detail in the Uttaratantra through the example of the portrait of a king, which will not become completely finished without all painters—each of whom knowing how to paint a particular part—coming together.


The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 301

The painters of these parts Are generosity, ethics, patience, and so on. Emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects Is said to be the form of the king. Since prajña, wisdom, and complete liberation Are illuminating, radiating, pure, And not different, they are similar to The light, the rays, and the orb of the sun. 49b

Therefore, without attaining buddhahood, Nirva?a is not attained, Just as you cannot see the sun, Once you take away its light and its rays.895

Thus, in the final picture, the nonconceptual prajña that the mind stream of a Buddha possesses is similar in its features to the sun’s luminosity, since it dispels the darkness that obscures the genuine true reality of all knowable objects. Since the prajña that is attained subsequently to this nonconceptual prajña engages all knowable entities without exception in every respect, it is similar in its features to a radiating web of light. Due to the basis of both these prajñas—the completely liberated nature of the mind—being utterly stainless and sheer luminosity, it is similar in its features to the completely pure orb of the sun. Through all three —nonconceptual prajña, subsequently attained prajña, and the liberated nature of the mindhaving the nature of being inseparable from the dharmadhatu, they are similar to the feature of the triad of the sun’s light, rays, and orb being inseparable. Consequently, complete liberation is not tenable, if just a single one of the above three elements is not realized. For this reason, the Uttaratantra teaches the example of not being able to see the sun, once its light and its rays are taken away. When the Buddhas’ way of performing the enlightened activities of their ocean of wisdom operates like that, their displays of great supreme nirma?akayas are like the reflections of Indra that appear in the blue beryl of his palace and inspire the beings on earth who see them. Their speech is like the drum of the gods that resounds with the four seals of the dharma without anyone playing it. Their omniscience and loving-kindness that pervade the entirety of existence are like clouds. The example of Brahma illustrates that nirma?akayas radiate from the sambhogakayas. The example of the sun illustrates that wisdom illuminates the stains by radiating everywhere but is untainted by these stains. Since enlightened activity that fulfills the hopes of sentient beings happens without the Buddhasminds entertaining any thoughts, it is like a wish-fulfilling jewel. The example of an echo illustrates that they do not utter any speech as such, but 50a what appears as their speech is something that accords with the individual kinds of cognizance of beings to be guided. Since their bodies are all-pervading, permanent, and unobstructed, they are like space. Since the Buddhas serve as the basis for all sentient beings giving rise to the completely bright dharmas, they are like the earth. This is a brief instruction on the nine aspects through which the Sarvabuddhavi?ayavatarajñanalokala?karasutra describes enlightened activity in detail.896 Maitreya summarizes this in his Uttaratantra:

That which, similar to Indra, the drum, clouds, Brahma, the sun, the royal gem of a wish-fulfilling jewel, An echo, space, and the earth, promotes the welfare of others Effortlessly until the end of existence is only known by yogins.

Bodies are displayed like the lord of gods appearing in the gem.

Their excellent instructions resemble the drum of the gods.

The cloud-banks of the sovereigns’ great knowledge and loving-kindness Pervade infinite numbers of beings up through the peak of existence.

Like Brahma, without moving from their uncontaminated abodes, They display many kinds of emanations.

Like the sun, wisdom radiates its brilliance.

Their minds resemble the gem of a pure wish-fulfilling jewel. Like an echo, the speech of the victors is without articulation.

Just as space, their bodies are pervasive, formless, and permanent.

Like the earth, the buddhabhumi is the ground for the medicinal herbs Of the immaculate dharmas of beings without exception and in all respects.897

Here, people with inferior intelligence may think, “Master Candrakirti does not assert these wisdoms,” but this is not the case. The Madhyamakavatara says:

The cessation of mind is revealed through this kaya.898

You may wonder what this is about. The Madhyamakavatara continues:

This kaya of peace is lucidly manifest like a wish-fulfilling tree And nonconceptual like a wish-fulfilling jewel. 50b

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 303

For the sake of the world’s affluence and until beings are liberated, It appears permanently within the freedom from reference points.899

Thus, Candrakirti teaches on the utterly stainless dharmakaya through its four features of being lucid, nonconceptual, permanent, and appearing.

Thereafter, he also instructs in detail on the dharmakaya’s natural outflow, that is, the rupakayas that are called “the profound dharmakaya.” He does so in the next thirty-one verses, from XI.19 up through XI.49:

In its natural outflow, a single rupakaya, The Mighty Sage displays simultaneously his own states of rebirth, Which have ceased before, in a clear and ordered way, Without exception, and very lucidly. . . . O victor, for as long as all worlds do not pass into supreme peace, All beings are not ripened, and space has not perished, Since you were born by the mother of prajña, and the nanny of lovingkindness Provides you with this approach of remaining for that long, how could you ever be at peace?

In brief, it can be shown in detail how the positions of all great masters, such as Aryadeva, Sura,900 Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka,901 and Jñanagarbha, are in accord on these points, but I do not present them here out of fear of too many letters. Also noble Asa?ga has spoken in accord with this.902 However, among others—the Mere Mentalists—there is the assertion that the wisdom of a Buddha is really existent as mere cognizance. This is refuted by noble master Nagarjuna with verses such as the following from his Bodhicittavivara?a:

When considering that there is No consciousness without a body, You must tell us of what kind Its own self-awareness is!903

Temporarily, 51a there may be dissimilar statements by these masters, but in terms of their meaning, they do not differ as to the basic nature. Likewise, the correct view of all yanas and what is to be realized and attained in them is to be explained and understood as just one.

The Samadhirajasutra says:

304 In Praise of Dharmadhatu In those with supernatural prajña, Buddha wisdom is inconceivable. In those who remain in clinging, Wisdom will not be found.

As for the many inconceivable dharmas That are taught by terms, Those who fixate on terms Do not understand what is explained with certain intentions.

Those who do not understand the intentions Of explanations given with certain intentions, Not being trained in the nature of phenomena, Explain nondharma as dharma.

The sutra collections that I taught In thousands of worldly realms Have different letters but one meaning— All of them cannot be proclaimed everywhere.

If you meditate on the meaning of a single word, You meditate on all of those Many dharmas that were explained By all the Buddhas, however many there are.

For people who are learned in the meaning Of the emptiness of all dharmas, Once they have trained in this word, The buddhadharmas are not hard to attain.

All dharmas are buddhadharmas, So those who have trained in the nature of phenomena Fully know the nature of phenomena And do not go against the nature of phenomena.904

In brief, what you should do is as follows. Examine your own body and mind that are covered by the cocoon of ignorance and understand the intention of the victors, the basic nature of the two realities. 51b Train in the two accumulations in union and attain the fruition of the inseparable two kayas.

The Third Karmapa and His Commentary on the Dharmadhatustava 305

This completes the Dharmadhatustava composed by the great being, noble Nagarjuna.

The last sentence was added by the translators. Thus, the entire text has been taught without remainder. The Dharmadhatustava—a praise to the marvelous Buddha heart—was composed by the great being, noble Nagarjuna.

Through relying on the power of aspiration and to the best of his abilities, it was elucidated through this detailed explanation by Rangjung Dorje, who was born in the northern snowy ranges during this degenerate age.

The profound and vast teachings of the victor Are held by the sons of the victor, Mañjugho?a and Ajita,905 In a dimension equaling that of space.

There are infinite numbers of scholars and siddhas here in Jambudvipa, But those who were prophesied by the victor as the supreme Are the two noble ones Nagarjuna and Asa?ga.

Their followers are the supreme ornaments of Jambudvipa, the friends of the teachings, And they are the glory of sutra, abhidharma, vinaya, and all beings. They dispel the gloom of plain dialectics through the light of scripture and reasoning.


A fraction of their enlightened compassion has dawned upon the snowy ranges, Making persons with insight practice and into bodhisattvas, And causing chatter even among childish students.906 This praise to the Heart of the victors—the Heart without stains— 52a Is understood by all the mighty ones on the ten bhumis. But for scholars of the five sciences, gods, sravakas, and pratyekabuddhas, Even devotion for it is difficult, let alone understanding. Though it lies not within the sphere of fools like me, Who bears the name Rangjung Dorje, great aspiration for it arose in me.

Thus, I have explained it according to the vast sutras and treatises. Through this virtue, may all beings become just like the Mighty Sage.

T Appendix I: Outline of Rangjung Dorje’s Commentary


1. The manner of engaging the treatise 1.1. The meaning of the title 1.2. Paying homage to the dharmadhatu

2. The actual treatise to be engaged, which demonstrates how the dharmadhatu resides during three stages 2.1. The way in which the dharmadhatu resides during the stage of sentient beings

2.1.1. Brief introduction to its nature 2.1.2. Detailed explanation by correlating this with examples 2.1.2.1. The way in which the dharmadhatu does not appear and then appears, exemplified by butter

2.1.2.2. The detailed explanation through the example of a lamp inside a vase, which teaches the gradual stages of sentient beings, the path, and the appearance of wisdom in buddhahood

2.1.2.3. The meaning of the dharmadhatu being changeless and free from arising and ceasing

2.1.2.4. Explaining through the example of a gem that the stages of sentient beings and Buddhas are not different

2.1.2.5. Explaining the nature of the basic element through the example of gold 2.1.2.6. The way in which the dharmakaya appears, illustrated by the example of rice and its husk

2.1.2.7. Explaining its natural outflow, the very profound dharmakaya, illustrated through the example of a banana tree

2.2. Instruction on the stage of those on the path 2.2.1. How the manner of it being justified to purify the stains and the sequence of that are to be known

2.2.1.1. The way in which the basic element of the dharmakaya itself is justified as the disposition

2.2.1.2. Teaching an example and its meaning in order to show the removal of the dharmadhatu’s obscurations 2.2.1.3. Brief introduction to the modes of being of what is to be relinquished and its remedy

2.2.1.3.1. Instruction on the dharmadhatu’s nature becoming pure through the purification of stains

2.2.1.3.2. Instruction that emptiness is the remedy 2.2.1.3.3. The manner in which the dharmadhatu is not empty of wisdom 2.2.1.3.4. The manner in which the dharmadhatu is empty of something to be relinquished and a remedy

2.2.1.3.5. Detailed explanation of the point that the dharmadhatu is empty of something to be relinquished and a remedy 2.2.1.3.5.1. Showing that the dharmadhatu abides within ourselves but is invisible

2.2.1.3.5.2. Showing that which obscures the dharmadhatu 2.2.1.3.5.3. The way in which wisdom realizes the dharmadhatu 2.2.1.3.5.4.The meaning of the imaginary nature 2.2.1.3.5.5. The meaning of the other-dependent nature 2.2.1.3.5.6. Instruction on dependent origination 2.2.1.3.5.7. Instruction on the mode of being of the perfect nature 2.2.1.3.5.8. The summary of those points

2.2.2. Instruction on the way to meditate, beginning with the paths of accumulation and preparation and so on

2.2.2.1. Explaining the way to make the dharmadhatu a living experience 2.2.2.1.1. How to meditate based on the five sense doors 2.2.2.1.2. Instruction on meditating on mentation that makes the connection with all the above, which depends on phenomena

2.2.2.1.3. The way to realize that the nonconceptual experience of the six consciousnesses is in itself the inseparability of being luminous and empty 2.2.2.1.4. Instruction that the nature of sa?sara and nirva?a consists in realizing or not realizing mind

2.2.2.1.5. Explaining the meaning of the rupakaya 2.2.2.1.6. Explaining the meaning of enlightenment 2.2.2.1.7. Instruction on the meaning of the sutras 2.2.2.2. Explaining the way in which the conditions for realizing the dharmadhatu—the three jewels—appear

2.2.2.2.1. Brief introduction 2.2.2.2.2. The way of not seeing Buddhas 2.2.2.2.3. Explaining the way of seeing Buddhas 2.2.2.2.4. Explaining inconceivable enlightened activity 2.2.2.2.5. The way in which enlightenment, due to such realization, is neither near nor far

2.2.3. Explaining how the manner of manifesting and attaining the path arises from having become familiar with the dharmadhatu in this way

2.2.3.1. Needing to understand the manner of adopting and rejecting

Appendix 1: Outline of Ranjung Dorje's Commentary 309 2.2.3.2. Instruction on the remedy for sa?sara 2.2.3.3. Instruction on the remedy for peace 2.2.3.4. Teaching that the basic element—the particularly pure abode—is to be unfolded

2.2.3.4.1. Identifying the dharmas that make the basic element unfold 2.2.3.4.2. Explaining the manner in which enlightenment is accomplished due to that 2.2.3.4.3. Instruction on being guarded by the victors 2.2.3.5. The sequence of the manner in which it unfolds 2.2.3.5.1. The manner of seeing by way of engagement through aspiration 2.2.3.5.2. The example of unfolding once one has entered the bhumis 2.2.3.5.3. Teaching the example for the ultimate 2.2.3.5.4. Detailed explanation 2.2.3.5.4.1. The bhumi of engagement through aspiration 2.2.3.5.4.2. Instruction on entering the first bhumi, Utter Joy 2.2.3.5.4.3. Explaining the second bhumi, The Stainless 2.2.3.5.4.4. Explaining the third bhumi, The Illuminating 2.2.3.5.4.5. Explaining the fourth bhumi, The Radiant 2.2.3.5.4.6. The fifth bhumi, The Difficult to Master 2.2.3.5.4.7. The sixth bhumi, The Facing 2.2.3.5.4.8. The seventh bhumi, The Gone Afar 2.2.3.5.4.9. Explaining the eighth bhumi, The Immovable 2.2.3.5.4.10. Explaining the ninth bhumi, Excellent Insight 2.2.3.5.4.11. Explaining the tenth bhumi, Cloud of Dharma 2.3. Praising the dharmakaya free from all stains 2.3.1. The dharmakaya’s own essence that is a change of state 2.3.2. Its inconceivability 2.3.3. Explaining the qualities of the final realization of this 2.3.3.1. The way in which mind becomes pure 2.3.3.2. The way in which the body of wisdom is complete 2.3.3.3. Instruction on the qualities of purity 2.3.3.4. The qualities of attainment 2.3.4. Explaining enlightened activity 2.3.4.1. The main enlightened activity of bestowing empowerment upon the children of the victors 2.3.4.2. The manner of promoting the welfare of sentient beings in sa?sara 2.3.4.3. Instruction on the enlightened activity of exhorting those dwelling in peace

2.3.4.4. Explaining the meaning of nirva?a that is peace 2.3.4.5. Instruction on the meaning of effortless enlightened activity

T Appendix II: Existing Translations of the Praises

Attributed to Nagarjuna in the Tengyur From among the eighteen praises attributed to Nagarjuna in the Tibetan Tengyur, to my knowledge, eleven have been translated into Western languages so far.907

• Dharmadhatustava

J. Scott in Shenpen Ösel, vol. 3, no. 2 (1999): 6–16

D. Lopez in Lopez 2004: 464–77

French:

Paraphrase in Ruegg 1971

German:

Brunnhölzl 2004, Nitartha Institute Hamburg (unpublished draft) • Catu?stava

G. Tucci in “Two Hymns of the Catu?stava,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1932: 309–25 (Niraupamyastava and Paramarthastava) C. Lindtner 1982: 128–61 (Lokatitastava and Acintyastava) F. Tola and C. Dragonetti 1985 (Lokatitastava, Niraupamyastava, Acintyastava, Paramarthastava)908

B. Shakya in Buddhist Himalaya 1, no. 2 (1988), (Niraupamyastava and Paramarthastava) Brunnhölzl 2007: 14–17 (Niraupamyastava)

French: La Vallée Poussin in “Quatre Odes,” in Muséon 14 (1913): 4–16 (Niraupamyastava, Lokatitastava, Paramarthastava, and Cittavajrastava) Silburn in Le Bouddhisme. 1977: 201–9 (Niraupamyastava and Paramarthastava)

Italian: R. Gnoli in Nagarjuna. 1961: 157–79 (Niraupamyastava, Paramarthastava, Lokatitastava, and Acintyastava) 312 In Praise of Dharmadhatu

Spanish: C. Dragonetti in “Niraupamyastava y Paramarthastava,” in Oriente Occidente. 1982: 259–71 F. Tola and C. Dragonetti in Boletin de la Asociacion Española de Orientalistas 24 (1988): 29–68; 25 (1989): 175–98

Danish: C. Lindtner in Juwelkaeden og andre skrifter. 1980 (Niraupamyastava and Paramarthastava) and Nagarjuna’s filosofiske Vaerker. 1982: 55–66 (Lokatitastava and Acintyastava)909

• Cittavajrastava

F. Tola and C. Dragonetti 1985 Brunnhölzl 2007: 17–18

Spanish: F. Tola and C. Dragonetti 1989 • Kayatrayastotra

G. Roerich in The Blue Annals, p. 2 Brunnhölzl 2007: 18–21 (including major parts of the autocommentary) • Dvadasakaranayastotra

Nalanda Translation Committee 1983 (as “Praise to the Buddha”) T. Dewar in Bodhi, vol. 5, no. 1 (2002): 33–34

• A??amahasthanacaityastotra

H. Nakamura in Indianisme et Bouddhisme. Mélanges offerts à Mgr. Étienne Lamotte. 1980: 264–65910 • Narakoddharastava

C. Lindtner in Acta Orientalia 40 (1979): 146–55911 • Prajñaparamitastotra (as a work by Rahulabhadra) E. Conze in Conze et al. 1999: 147–49 Brunnhölzl 2007: 4–7

French: E. Lamotte in Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Nagarjuna. Tome

Appendix III: Translations of the Remaining Praises

In Praise of Paying Homage to Sentient Beings (Sattvaradhanastava)912 To have respect for me means to act for the welfare of beings, not any other kind of respect.

Those who do not abandon compassion are the ones who have respect for me.

Those who have fallen, being in a state of abandoning compassion, Can be uplifted from that state only through compassion but not through anything else. 1

Those who take care of sentient beings with compassion Both please me and carry the load of the teachings.

Those who possess ethics, erudition, compassion, Insight, and clarity always venerate the Tathagata. 2

I reached accomplishment because I benefited sentient beings— It is only for the welfare of sentient beings that I have assumed this body.

Those who harbor harmful intentions toward sentient beings, Why would they resort to me, being the ones who disrespect me? 3

Looking after the benefit of sentient beings is veneration— It offers joy to my mind as the one being venerated. But any veneration whose nature is harmful or which hurts others Is not, even if well performed, as it does not comply with me as the one being venerated. 4

My wives, children, riches, grandeur, kingdom, Flesh, blood, fat, eyes, and body I sacrificed out of loving-kindness for these beings— So if you harm them, you harm me. 5


To promote the welfare of beings is the supreme way to venerate me, But to inflict harm on beings is the supreme way to harm me. Since sentient beings and I experience happiness and suffering in the same way, How could someone who is hostile toward beings be my disciple? 6

It was for sentient beings that I achieved virtuous deeds, pleased the protectors, And attained the paramitas, solely being grounded in the welfare of the assembly of beings.

Through my mind being eagerly engaged in the welfare of beings, I vanquished Mara’s power.

It was by virtue of how sentient beings acted in all kinds of ways that I became a Buddha. 7

If there had been no beings, cherished like friends, through all my lifetimes, On what basis had loving-kindness been established here, what had compassion focused on, What had been the object of equanimity, joy, and so forth, for whom had liberation and such occurred, And for whose sake had patience been cultivated for a long time with a mind set on compassion? 8

It was precisely those wandering through various forms of existence, such as elephants, to whom I showed generosity many times. It was these very sentient beings who approached me as the vessels for my gifts and whom I had take them.

By virtue of these sentient beings wandering through various forms of existence, my compassion flourished.

If I were not913 protecting these sentient beings, for whose sake was this welfare provided? 9

If there were no beings in sa?sara—which abounds with situations of them heading for disaster— Who have grown so accustomed to arriving nowhere but in the realm of Yama through playing their parts in spinning through their lives, Why would I—the Sugata, this amazing great being—wish to liberate them from sa?sara,

If there were no sentient beings whom I cherish? 10

Appendix 3: Translations of the Remaining Praises 315

For as long as my teachings that instruct the world are shining brilliantly

You people who long to benefit others should remain.

Studying again and again what I did for the sake of sentient beings, you who never grow weary of it, Without becoming exhausted, should apply this body so that it embodies the essence of my words. 11

This completes what the Bhagavat spoke to the sixteen great sravakas in the passage called “Alkaline River”914 in the Bodhisattvapi?akasutra, summarized in verses by master Nagarjuna as In Praise of Pleasing Sentient Beings.915

In Praise of The One Beyond Praise (Stutyatitastava)


The Tathagata who has traveled The unsurpassable path is beyond praise, But with a mind full of respect and joy, I will praise the one beyond praise. 1


Though you see entities being devoid Of self, other, and both, Your compassion does not turn away From sentient beings—how marvelous! 2

Not arisen by any nature And in the sphere beyond words— The dharmas that you taught Represent your being marvelous. 3

The skandhas, dhatus, and ayatanas You have indeed proclaimed, But any clinging to them too You countered later on. 4

Not coming from conditions, How could entities arise from conditions? Through saying so, O wise one, You cut through reference points. 5

316 In Praise of Dharmadhatu Coming about due to a collection of causes, Entities originate from this collection as their cause— That those who see it that way rely on the two extremes Is what you see very clearly. 6

That entities just come about in dependence on conditions Is what you have maintained indeed. But it being a flaw that they are truly produced that way You, O teacher, have seen like that. 7

Neither coming from anywhere, Nor going anywhere, All entities are similar to reflections— This is what you held. 8

In order to relinquish all views, O protector, you declared entities to be empty. But that too is an imputation, O protector—you did not hold that this is really so. 9

You assert neither empty nor nonempty, Nor are you pleased with both. There is no dispute about this— It is the approach of your great speech. 10

“There are no entities that are not other, Nor any that are other, nor both,” you said. Since being one or other is abandoned, No matter which way, entities do not exist. 11

If the triad of arising and so on existed, The characteristics of conditioned phenomena would exist, And all three of them, such as arising, Would be different as well. 12

On its own, each one of the three, such as arising, Is incapable of conditioned functioning.

Also, there is no meeting Of one coming together with another. 13

Appendix 3: Translations of the Remaining Praises 317

Thus, neither characteristics nor their basis exist.

Since they are not established this way, Conditioned phenomena are not established, Let alone unconditioned phenomena being established. 14

O lion of speech, your speaking like that Is just like a lion’s roar dispelling The self-infatuation of Vindhya-elephants With their trumpeting. 15

Just as people embarked on a path Do not rely on various harmful things Or bad paths of wrong views, through relying on you, We rely on neither existence nor nonexistence. 16

Those who understand properly

What you said with implications Need not understand again What you said with implications. 17

In those who understand All entities to be equal to nirva?a, How could any clinging to “me” Arise at such a point? 18

Through my merit of praising you, The supreme of knowers, The knower of true reality, May all beings in the world become supreme knowers. 19

In Praise of The Unsurpassable One (Niruttarastava) Having left behind this and yonder shore, You illuminate the supreme nature of all that can be known Through the power of your miraculous display of wisdom— To the unsurpassable, I pay homage. 1

In you, there is neither knowing nor nonknowing, Neither a yogin nor an ordinary person,

Neither meditation nor nonmeditation— To the unsurpassable, I pay homage. 2 Your luminous single wisdom Determines all knowable objects without exception, Thus being unequalled and immeasurable— To the unsurpassable, I pay homage. 3

Without any coarse or subtle, Heavy or light particles, Not having the nature of snake-feet—916

To the unsurpassable, I pay homage. 4

Just as when someone proceeds through a desert Through the power of fireflies, You eliminate our darkness through your light— To the unsurpassable, I pay homage. 5

For the dancers who move their feet Through the miraculous power of magical creation,917 You are the guide who sees the path— To the unsurpassable, I pay homage. 6 Nothing in you is fractional or meaningless, Rather, having relinquished both, You are the omniscient mighty sovereign—

To the unsurpassable, I pay homage. 7

All flaws utterly relinquished, Far away from what has the nature of stains, Free from being and nonbeing— To the unsurpassable, I pay homage. 8

In Praise of Venerable Noble Mañjusri’s Compassion (Aryamañjusribha??arakakaru?astotra) You have eliminated all flaws without exception, And your fame, sage, pervades the entire world.

Endowed with an utterly firm and glorious body, O glorious one, I always pay homage to you. 1

Appendix 3: Translations of the Remaining Praises 319

The whole world keeps crying out to you, And you protect it from all kinds of being destitute. Though I am suffering, I must be lowly— You, why do you not dispel it? 2

Bhagavat, it’s unfair that you always and everywhere Are of service to everybody in all respects, But do not favor me even with a glance— Therefore, I’m indeed of very low fortune. 3

If you who are endowed with qualities and dispel flaws Make efforts in protecting all beings with good minds, Though my mind holds on to you so tightly, How come I am tortured by being destitute? 4

You with the nature of compassion, With your two eyes, pure like lotuses, You benefit beings, but that you do not see That I am suffering, alas, this is so painful! 5

Those with devastated minds you always comfort For a long time with the lotuses of your hands, But through the heat of my faulty fortune, They remain invisible, so far away. 6

With your two ears, so sharp and pure, Though I lament loudly right in front of you, Agonized by the suffering in my body, Why do you not hear of my lowliness? 7

If you who you guide with compassion in every situation, Make even the kinds of beings who went to the hells happy, Couldn’t you have some compassion and kindness, O Bhagavat, for me, an evil one, as well? 8

If you, who benefit the lowly world, Are endowed with such youthful play And yet do not protect me, tormented here by suffering, It is the flaw of my evil thinking. 9

320 In Praise of Dharmadhatu “Who is suffering here? Which fools have used up their prosperity?” Asking like this, you keep roaming and protecting, But that you still do not see my destitution is most amazing. 10

“Some, I should favor with words, Others, with temporary vast prosperity”— Why does your superior knowledge That makes efforts in such ways not protect me? 11

Whoever has confidence in you is not unhappy. There is no one who has confidence in you and yet is low in merit. I have confidence in you too, but why is it that I suffer? This is the birth of a real miracle! 12

O great physician who cuts through suffering, If you abandon me as well, With all my merit being crushed, to whom else Should I turn for refuge then—you tell me! 13

Your mind is always full of loving-kindness for beings, As if they were an only child, and you engage in liberating them. If even you don’t dispel what harms me, I am without protector, simply trounced. 14

Bhagavat, if you, just by thinking of them, Shower all matchless fruitions upon beings, Though I serve you and pay every respect, Why do you always procrastinate on my side? 15

Through whatever virtue I have accumulated by expressing A mere fraction of your qualities through such lamentations, May I become the excellent vase of accomplishing The possession of the nature of vast merit by all beings. 16

May I turn into your youthful body,

Which is like a wish-fulfilling tree, with its two feet moving As belonging to a rupakaya resembling a wish-fulfilling jewel, And in all lifetimes be the one in charge of beings. 17

Appendix 3: Translations of the Remaining Praises 321

In Praise of the Stupas of the Eight Great Places (A??amahasthanacaityastotra) Having first generated bodhicitta,

You gathered the accumulations for three countless eons, Became a Buddha at enlightenment’s heart,918 and tamed the maras— To the stupa of great enlightenment, I pay homage. 1

In the city of Kapilavastu, the foundation of the dharma, You were born by your mother Maya into the Sakya clan of Suddhodana.

Upon raising your body, your right hip was supported by Brahma— To the stupa of auspiciousness, I pay homage. 2

You went to Vara?asi and so on for alms And tamed the mad elephants of king Bimbisara Through the power of a finger on your hand— To the stupa of taming the city, I pay homage. 3

While resting919 on a lawn, Halumañju offered you honey, Passed away in a well, and was born in the Trayastri?sa heaven— To the stupa of compassion arising, I pay homage. 4

Upon Brahma having offered a wheel, you turned the wheel of dharma, Tamed the six tirthika teachers through your power, And satisfied gods and humans through a great number of emanations— To the stupa of displaying miracles, I pay homage. 5

With hosts of nagas, such as Nanda, Paying their respects and girls providing milk, You subjugated all difficulties and the world without exception— To the stupa of peaceful victory, I pay homage. 6

Being surrounded by bodhisattvas, Pratyekabuddhas, and sravaka arhats, You established them in the vows and ethics— To the stupa of complete purity, I pay homage. 7


Having fulfilled your intention to guide impermanent beings And having descended from the gods, at the end of all your deeds, Being supplicated by Cunda, you completed your life three months later—920

To the stupa of entering nirva?a, I pay homage. 8

A Praise by Paying Homage (Vandanastotra) You have relinquished the web of harming, desire, hatred, And what bewilders in the wheel of existence.

Bestower of boons, supreme victor, Supremely born Buddha—I pay homage to you. 1

Perfect knower, complete Buddha, Worshipped by gods and nongods, Guru of the three worlds, Invincible and unequalled, Vanquishing mara’s power—I pay homage to you. 2

Born as the son of the king of Sakyas, Your dynasty is known as the lineage of the sun. Heroic and wonderful Buddha, Embodying the entire host of qualities— Gods, humans, and the wind-deities pay homage to you. 3

Your body resembles the tops of the golden mountains,921 Is endowed with eyes like the petals of a lotus, Possesses a golden hue, And has the thirty-two marks, The excellent auspicious signs—I pay homage to you. 4

Possessing an orb emitting fire, lightning, Sparks, and a thousand sun rays, You are adorned with power, Endowed with unequalled strength—I pay homage to you. 5

Highest glorious one, perfectly endowed With blazing merit and discipline, Supreme lord of sages, Appendix 3: Translations of the Remaining Praises 323

Having found perfect enlightenment, You are venerated even by the very haughty—I pay homage to you. 6

For the sake of benefitting beings and their happiness, You deal with them with compassion.

Since you entered true reality, You proceeded to the city of nirva?a—I pay homage to you. 7

Through whatever merit I have accumulated By my praising the victor— Venerated by uragas, kinnaras,922 Gods, and asuras—in this way,

May all sentient beings Come to realize enlightenment. 8

T Glossary: English–Sanskrit–Tibetan English Sanskrit Tibetan adventitious stains agantukamala glo bur gyi dri ma afflicted ignorance kli??avidya nyon mongs can gyi ma rigpa

affliction klesa nyon mongs afflictive obscuration kle?avara?a nyon mongs pa’i sgrib pa basic element dhatu khams bhumi of engagement through adhimukticaryabhumi mos pas spyod pa’i sa aspiration calm abiding samatha zhi gnas causal condition hetupratyaya rgyu rkyen clinging to reality/real existence *satyagraha?a bdendzin cognition buddhi blo cognitive obscuration jñeyavara?a shes bya’i sgrib pa cognizance vijñapti rnam par rig pa conception kalpana, vikalpa rtog pa, rnam rtog consciousness (vi)jñana (rnam par) shes pa correct imagination bhutaparikalpa yang dag kun rtog definitive meaning nitartha nges don dharmas that concord bodhipak?adharma byang chub phyogs chos with enlightenment

disposition gotra rigs emptiness endowed with sarvakaravaropetasunyata rnam kun mchog ldan the supreme of all aspects gyi stong pa nyid entity bhava/vastu dngos po expedient meaning neyartha drang don 326 In Praise of Dharmadhatu false imagination abhutaparikalpa yang dag ma yin kun rtog

four realities of the noble ones caturaryasatya ’phags pa’i bden pa bzhi freedom from reference points ni?prapañca spros bral (fundamental) change of state asrayapariv?tti gnas (yongs su) gyur pa ground of the latent tendencies avidyavasanabhumi ma rig bag chags kyi sa of ignorance

identity atman bdag identitylessness nairatmya bdag med imaginary (nature) parikalpita(svabhava) kun brtags (kyi rang bzhin)

immediate condition samanantarapratyaya de ma thag rkyen implicative negation paryudasaprati?edha ma yin dgag innate sahaja lhan skyes latent tendencies of listening srutavasana thos pa’i bag chags latent tendency vasana bag chags meditative absorption of cessation nirodhasamapatti ’gog pa’i snyoms ’jug meditative absorption asa?jñisamapatti ’du shes med pa’i snyoms without discrimination ’jug meditative equipoise samahita mnyam bzhag mental consciousness manovijñana yid kyi rnam shes mentation manas yid

mere cognizance vijñaptimatra rnam rig tsam Mere Mentalist — sems tsam pa mere mind (Mere Mentalism) cittamatra sems tsam mind citta sems

mindfulness sm?ti dran pa natural outflow ni?yanda rgyu mthun pa naturally abiding disposition prak?tisthagotra rang bzhin gnas rigs nature svabhava rang bzhin/ngo bo nyid nature of phenomena dharmata chos nyid nirva?a with remainder savase?anirva?a lhag bcas myang ’das nirva?a without remainder nirupadhise?anirva?a lhag med myang ’das nominal ultimate paryayaparamartha rnam grangs pa’i don dam

Glossary: English–Sanskrit–Tibetan 327

nonabiding nirva?a aprati??hitanirva?a mi gnas pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa

nonafflicted ignorance akli??avidya nyon mongs can ma yin pa’i ma rig pa nonconceptual wisdom nirvikalpajñana rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes nonentity abhava/avastu dngos med nonimplicative negation prasajyaprati?edha med dgag nonnominal ultimate aparyayaparamartha rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam nonreferential anupalambha, analambana mi dmigs pa, dmigs med object generality arthasamanya don spyi other-dependent (nature) paratantra(svabhava) gzhan dbang (gi rang bzhin)

other-empty — gzhan stong perfect (nature) parini?panna(svabhava) yongs grub (kyi rang bzhin)

personal identitylessness pudgalanairatmya gang zag gi bdag med personally experienced (wisdom) pratyatmavedaniya(jñana) so so rang rig (pa’i ye (svapratyatmaryajñana) shes)

phenomenal identitylessness dharmanairatmya chos kyi bdag med philosophical system siddhanta grub mthareality satya bden pa reference point prapañca spros pa reification bhavagraha dngos ’dzin seeming (reality) sa?v?ti(satya) kun rdzob (bden pa) self-aware(ness) svasa?vedana, svasa?vitti rang rig self-empty — rang stong

subsequent attainment p???halabdha rjes thob superior insight vipasyana lhag mthong three natures trisvabhava ngo bo nyid/rang bzhin gsum

three spheres trima??ala ’khor gsum true reality tattva de (kho na) nyid ultimate reality paramarthasatya don dam bden pa unfolding disposition paripu??agotra rgyas ’gyur gyi rigs 328 In Praise of Dharmadhatu unity yuganaddha zung ’jug views about a real personality satkayad???i ’jig tshogs la lta ba wisdom that knows suchness yathavatjñana ji lta ba mkhyen pa’i ye shes wisdom that knows variety yavatjñana ji snyed mkhyen pa’i ye shes T Glossary: Tibetan–Sanskrit–English Tibetan Sanskrit English kun brtags (kyi rang bzhin) parikalpita(svabhava) imaginary (nature) kun rdzob (bden pa) sa?v?ti(satya) seeming (reality) khams dhatu constituent, basic element ’khor gsum trima??ala three spheres gang zag gi bdag med pudgalanairatmya personal identitylessness grub mthasiddhanta philosophical system glo bur gyi dri ma agantukamala adventitious stains rgyas ’gyur gyi rigs paripu??agotra unfolding disposition rgyu mthun pa ni?yanda natural outflow nges don nitartha definitive meaning ngo bo nyid svabhava nature dngos po bhava/vastu entity dngos med abhava/avastu nonentity dngos ’dzin bhavagraha reification chos kyi bdag med dharmanairatmya phenomenal identitylessness chos nyid dharmata nature of phenomena ji snyed mkhyen pa’i ye shes yavatjñana wisdom that knows variety ji lta ba mkhyen pa’i ye shes yathavatjñana wisdom that knows suchnessjig tshogs la lta ba satkayad???i views about a real personality nyon mongs klesa affliction nyon mongs can gyi ma rig pa kli??avidya afflicted ignorance 330 In Praise of Dharmadhatu nyon mongs can ma yin pa’i akli??avidya nonafflicted ignorance ma rig pa nyon mongs pa’i sgrib pa kle?avara?a afflictive obscuration mnyam bzhag samahita meditative equipoise rtog pa kalpana conception thos pa’i bag chags srutavasana latent tendencies of listening de (kho na) nyid tattva true reality de ma thag rkyen samanantarapratyaya immediate condition don dam bden pa paramarthasatya ultimate reality don spyi arthasamanya object-generality drang don neyartha expedient meaning bdag atman identity bdag rkyen adhipatipratyaya dominant condition bdag med nairatmya identitylessness bden pa satya reality bdendzin *satyagraha?a clinging to reality/ real existence ’du shes med pa’i snyoms ’jug asa?jñisamapatti meditative absorption without discrimination gnas (yongs su) gyur pa asrayapariv?tti (fundamental) change of state rnam kun mchog ldan gyi sarvakaravaropetasunyata emptiness endowed with stong pa nyid the supreme of all aspects rnam grangs pa’i don dam paryayaparamartha nominal ultimate rnam grangs ma yin pa’i don dam aparyayaparamartha nonnominal ultimate rnam rtog vikalpa conception rnam par rig pa vijñapti cognizance rnam par shes pa vijñana consciousness rnam rig tsam vijñaptimatra mere cognizance spros pa prapañca reference point spros bral ni?prapañca freedom from reference points ’phags pa’i bden pa bzhi caturaryasatya four realities of the noble ones Glossary: Tibetan–Sanskrit–English 331 bag chags vasana latent tendency byang chub phyogs chos bodhipak?adharma dharmas that concord with enlightenment ma yin dgag paryudasaprati?edha implicative negation ma rig bag chags kyi sa avidyavasanabhumi ground of the latent tendencies of ignorance mi gnas pa’i mya ngan las aprati??hitanirva?a nonabiding nirva?a ’das pa med dgag prasajyaprati?edha nonimplicative negation mos pas spyod pa’i sa adhimukticaryabhumi bhumi of engagement through aspiration dmigs rkyen alambanapratyaya object condition dmigs med anupalambha, anupalabdhi nonreferential zhi gnas samatha calm abiding gzhan stong — other-empty gzhan dbang (gi rang bzhin) paratantra(svabhava) other-dependent (nature) zab mo lta rgyud — lineage of profound view zung ’jug yuganaddha unity yang dag kun rtog bhutaparikalpa correct imagination yang dag ma yin kun rtog abhutaparikalpa false imagination yid manas mentation yid kyi rnam shes manovijñana mental consciousness yongs grub (kyi rang bzhin) parini?panna(svabhava) perfect (nature) rang stong — self-empty rang bzhin svabhava nature rang bzhin gnas rigs prak?tisthagotra naturally abiding disposition rang bzhin gsum trisvabhava three natures rang rig svasa?vedana, svasa?vitti self-aware(ness) rang sangs rgyas pratyekabuddha pratyekabuddha rigs gotra disposition shes bya’i sgrib pa jñeyavara?a cognitive obscuration sems citta mind sems tsam cittamatra mere mind, 332 In Praise of Dharmadhatu Mere Mentalism

sems tsam pa — Mere Mentalist so so rang rig (pa’i ye shes) pratyatmavedaniya(jñana) personally experienced (svapratyatmaryajñana) (wisdom) lhag bcas myang ’das savase?anirva?a nirva?a with remainder

lhag mthong vipasyana superior insight lhag med myang ’das nirupadhise?anirva?a nirva?a without remainder lhan skyes sahaja innate T


Canonical Works

Aryadeva. Jñanasarasamucchaya. (Ye shes snying po kun las btus pa). P5251. ACIP TD3851.

Aryasura. Paramitasamasa. (Pha rol tu phyin pa bsdus pa). P5340. Asa?ga. Abhidharmasamucchaya. (Mngon pa kun btus). P5550.

——. Mahayanasa?graha. (Theg chen bsdus pa). P5549.

——. Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya or Mahayanottaratantrasastravyakhya. (Theg pa chen po’i rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos rnam par bshad pa). Sanskrit edition by E. H. Johnston.

Patna: Bihar Research Society, 1950. P5526.

——. Yogacarabhumi. (Rnal ’byor spyod pa’i sa). P5536. ACIP TD4035.

Atisa. Bodhipathapradipapañjika. (Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma’i dka’ ’grel). P5344. ACIP TD3948.

——. Dharmadhatudarsanagiti. (Chos kyi dbyings la lta ba’i glu). P3153/5388. ——. Madhyamakopadesa. (Dbu ma’i man ngag). P5324/5326/5381.

——. Ratnakara??odghatanamaMadhyamakopadesa. (Dbu ma’i man ngag rin po che’i za ma tog kha phye ba). P5325.

Bhavaviveka. Madhyamakah?dayakarika. (Dbu ma’i snying po’i tshig le’ur byas pa). P5255. ACIP TD3855.

——. Madhyamakaratnapradipa. (Dbu ma rin po che’i sgron ma). P5254. ACIP TD3854.

Candrakirti. Catu?sataka?ika. (Bzhi brgya pa’i rgya cher ’grel pa). P5266. ACIP TD3865. ——. Madhyamakaprajñavatara. (Dbu ma shes rab la ’jug pa). P5264. ACIP TD3863.

——. Madhyamakavatara. (Dbu ma la ’jug pa). Sanskrit edition with Madhyamakavatarabha?ya by L. de La Vallée Poussin. Bibliotheca Buddhica 9. St. Petersburg, 1907–12. P5261/5262. ACIP TD3861.

——. Madhyamakavatarabha?ya. (Dbu ma la ’jug pa’i bshad pa). P5263. ACIP TD3862. ——. Mulamadhyamakav?ttiprasannapada. (Dbu ma’i rtsa ba’i ’grel pa tshig gsal ba). Sanskrit edition with Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika by L. de La Vallée Poussin.

Bibliotheca Buddhica 4. St. Petersburg, 1903–13 (Corrections publ. by J. W. de Jong, Indo-Iranian Journal 20 (1978): 25–59, 217–52). P5260. ACIP TD3860.


——. Sunyatasaptativ?tti. (Stong nyid bdun cu pa’i ’grel pa). P5268. ACIP TD3867.

——. Yukti?a??ikav?tti. (Rigs pa drug cu pa’i ’grel pa). P5265. ACIP TD3864.

Dharmakirti. Prama?avarttika. (Tshad ma rnam ’grel). P5709. ACIP TD4210.

Haribhadra. Abhisamayala?karanamaprajñaparamitopadesasastraviv?tti. (Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ces bya bai ’grel pa). P5191. ACIP TD3793.

——. A??asahasrikaprajñaparamitavyakhyanabhisamayala?karaloka. (Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa’i bshad pa mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan gyi snang ba).

Sanskrit ed. U. Wogihara. Tokyo 1932–35. P5189.

Jayananda. Madhyamakavatara?ika. (Dbu ma la ’jug pa’i ’grel bshad). P5271. ACIP TD3870.

Jñanagarbha. Satyadvayavibhaga. (Bden gnyis rnambyed). Not in P. T3881. ACIP TD3881.

Kamalasila. Bhavanakrama. (Sgom pa’i rim pa) Sanskrit edition of First Bhavanakrama by G. Tucci. Minor Buddhist Texts, Part 2. Serie Orientale Roma 9/2, 1958 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, reprint 1986, pp. 497–539). Third Bhavanakrama by G. Tucci. Minor Buddhist Texts, Part 3. Serie Orientale Roma 43, 1971. P5310–5312. ACIP TD3915–3917.

——. Madhyamakala?karapañjika. (Dbu ma rgyan gyi dka’ ’grel). P5286. ACIP TD3886. Maitreya. Abhisamayala?kara. (Mngon rtogs rgyan). P5148. ACIP TD3786. ——. Dharmadharmatavibhaga. (Chos dang chos nyid rnam par ’byed pa). P5523/5224. ——. Madhyantavibhaga. (Dbus dang mtha’ rnam par ’byed pa). P5522. ——. Mahayanasutrala?kara. (Theg pa chen po’i mdo sde rgyan). P5521. ——. Ratnagotravibhagamahayanottaratantrasastra. (Theg pa chen po’i rgyud bla ma). Sanskrit edition by E. H. Johnston. Patna, India: The Bihar Research Society, 1950 (includes the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya). P5525. ACIP TD4024. Nagarjuna. Acintyastava. (Bsam gyis mi khyab par bstod pa). P2019. ——. Aryamañjusribha??arakakaru?astotra. (Rje btsun ’phags pa ’jam dpal gyi snying rje la bstod pa). P2023. ——. Bhavanakrama. (Sgom pa’i rim pa). P5304. ——. Bodhicittavivara?a. (Byang chub sems kyi ’grel pa). P5470. ——. Cittavajrastava. (Sems kyi rdo rje bstod pa). P2013. ——. Dharmadhatustava. (Chos dbyings bstod pa). P2010. ——. Kayatrayastotra. (Sku gsum la bstod pa). P2015. ——. Lokatitastava. (’jig rten las ’das pa’i bstod pa). P2012. ——. Mahayanavi?sika. (Theg pa chen po nyi shu pa). P5465. ACIP TD3833. ——. Mulamadhyamakav?ttyakutobhaya. (Dbu ma rtsa ba’i ’grel pa ga las ’jigs med). P5229. Bibliography 335 ——. Niraupamyastava. (Dpe med par bstod pa). P2011. ——. Niruttarastava. (Bla na med pa’i bstod pa). P2021. ——. Paramarthastava. (Don dam par bstod pa). P2014. ——. Prajñanamamulamadhyamakakarika. (Dbu ma rtsa ba’i tshig le’ur byas pa shes rab ces bya ba). P5224. ACIP TD3824. ——. Pratityasamutpadah?dayakarika. (Rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba’i snying po’i tshig le’ur byas pa). P5236/5467. ——. Pratityasamutpadah?dayavyakhyana. (Rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba’i snying po’i rnam par bshad pa). P5237/5468. ——. Rajaparikatharatnavali. (Rgyal po la gtam bya ba rin po che’i phreng ba). P5658. ——. Sattvaradhanastava. (Sems can la mgu bar bya ba’i bstod pa). P2017. Sanskrit edition in Lévi 1929, p. 264. ——. Stutyatitastava. (Bstod pa las ’das par bstod pa). P2020. ——. Suh?llekha. (Bshes pa’i springs yig). P5682. ——. Sunyatasaptati. (Stong nyid bdun cu pa). P5227. ACIP TD3827. ——. Sutrasamucchaya. (Mdo kun las btus pa). P5330. ACIP TD 3934. ——. Vandanastotra. (Phyag ’tshal ba’i bstod pa). P2027. ——. Vigrahavyavartanikarika. (Rtsod pa bzlog pa’i tshig le’ur byas pa). Sanskrit edition by E. H. Johnston and A. Kunst in Bhattacharya 1978. P5224. ACIP TD3828. ——. Yukti?a??ika. (Rigs pa drug cu pa). P5225. ACIP TD3825.

Naropa. Paramarthasa?grahanamasekoddesa?ika. (Dbang mdor bstan pa’i ’grel bshad don dam pa bsdus pa zhes bya ba). Sanskrit edition by M. Carelli. Baroda: Gaekwad Oriental Series, 1941. P2068. D1351.

Saraha. Dohakosagiti. (Do ha mdzod kyi glu; “People’s Doha”). P3068.

——. Dohakosopadesagiti. (Mi zad pa’i gter mdzod man ngag gi glu; “Queen’s Doha”). P3111.

Vasubandhu. Abhidharmakosa. (Mngon pa mdzod). P5590. ACIP TD4089.

——. Dharmadharmatavibhagabha?ya. (Chos dang chos nyid rnam par ’byed pa’i ’grel pa). P5529. ACIP TD4028.

——. Madhyantavibhagabha?ya. (Dbus mtha’ rnambyed kyi ’grel pa). P5528. ACIP TD4027.

——. Tri?sikakarika. (Sum cu pa tshig le’ur byas pa). P5556. Tibetan Works

Bdud ’joms ’jigs bral ye shes rdo rje. 1991. The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism. Trans. Gyurme Dorje and M. Kapstein. 2 vols. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Blo gros grags pa, ’dzam thang mkhan po. 1993. Fearless Lion’s Roar. (Rgyu dang ’bras bu’i theg pa mchog gi gnas lugs zab mo’i don rnam par nges pa rje jo nang pa chen po’i ring lugs ’jigs med gdong lnga’i nga ro). Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives.

Blo gros rgya mtsho. 1984. Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa’i ’grel pa nges don zab mo’i gter gyi kha ’byed. (Dbu med manuscript). Bylakuppe: Publ. by Ven. Pema Norbu Rinpoche. TBRC no. W27521.

Bsod nams bzang po, gnyag pho ba. n.d. Dbu ma chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa’i rnam par bshad pa snying po gsal ba. (Dbu med manuscript). ’Dzam thang edition: 605–81. TBRC no. W27553.

——. n.d. Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa’i rnam bzhag bdud rtsi’i nying khu. n.p. TBRC no. W14074.

Bsod nams rgyal mtshan. 1987. Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa’i ’grel pa. In Dkar chag mthong bas yid ’phrog chos mdzod byed pa’i lde mig: A bibliography of Sa-skya-pa literature prepared at the order of H. H. Sakya Tridzin, based on a compilation of the Venerable Khenpo Apey and contributions by other Sakyapa scholars. Publ. by Ngawang Topgyal. New Delhi. TBRC no. W11903.

Bu ston rin chen grub. 1931. History of Buddhism. Trans. E. Obermiller. Heidelberg: Otto Harrassowitz.

Chos grags rgya mtsho (Karmapa VII). 1985. The Ocean of Texts on Reasoning. Tshad ma legs par bshad pa thams cad kyi chu bo yongs su `du ba rigs pa’i gzhung lugs kyi rgya mtsho. 4 vols. Publ. by Karma Thupten Chosphel and Phuntsok. Rumtek (Sikkim, India).

——. n.d. Mngon rtogs rgyan gyi ’grel pajig rten gsum gyi sgron me. Unpublished Nitartha international File (jigsumsgronmeK7).

Chos kyi ’byung gnas (Situpa VIII). n.d. Nges don phyag rgya chen po’i smon lam gyi ’grel pa grub pa chog gi zhal lung. Rumtek Monastery (Sikkim, India).

Chos kyi ’byung gnas (Situpa VIII) and ’Be lo tshe dbang kun khyab. 1972. Sgrub brgyud karma ka? tshang brgyud pa rin po che’i rnam par thar pa rab ’byams nor bu zla ba chu shel gyi phreng ba. 2 vols. Publ. by Gyaltsan and Kesang Legshay. New Delhi.

Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, Se ra rje btsun pa. 2004. Kar lan klu sgrub dgongs rgyan. Sarnath: Vajra Vidya Library.

Dbu ma gzhan stong skor bstan bcos phyogs bsdus deb dang po. 1990. Rumtek (Sikkim, India): Karma Shri Nalanda Institute.

Dkon mchog yan lag (Shamarpa V). 2005. Mngon rtogs rgyan gyi ’grel pa nyung ngu rnam gsal. Sarnath: Vajra Vidya Library. Also dbu med manuscript, n.p., n.d. Dngul chu thogs med bzang po dpal. 1979. Theg pa chen po mdo sde rgyan gyi ’grel pa rin po che’i phreng ba. Bir, India: Dzongsar Institute Library.

Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan. 1988. The Mountain Dharma Called The Ocean of Definitive Meaning. (Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho). Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

——. n.d. ’phags pa klu sgrub kyis mdzad pa’i chos dbyings bstod pa (’i mchan ’grel). Collected Works. Vol. 8. ’Dzam thang edition: 137–57. Also in Dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying

zhib ’jug khang 2005 (no. 015689). TBRC no. W21209. Dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba. 2003. History of the Dharma, A Feast for the Learned. (Dam pa’i chos kyi ’khor lo bsgyur ba rnams kyi byung ba gsal bar byed pa mkhas pa’i dga’ ston). 2 vols. Sarnath: Vajra Vidya Library.

Dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib ’jug khang. 2005. ’Bras spungs dgon du bzhugs su gsol ba’i dpe rnying dkar chag. 2 vols. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang. Dpal sprul ’jigs med chos kyi dbang po. 1997. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ces bya ba’i spyi don dang ’bru ’grel. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

Dvags po rab ’byams pa chos rgyal bstan pa. 2005. Dpal rdo rje’ tshig zab mo nang gi don gyi ’grel bshad sems kyi rnam par thar pa gsal bar byed pa’i rgyan. Seattle: Nitartha international.

Glo bo mkhan chen bsod nams lhun grub. Chos dbyings bstod pa’i rnam bshad don dam snying po (listed in Jackson 1987, vol. 2, p. 561).

Go bo rab ’byams pa bsod nams seng ge. 2004. Dbu ma’i spyi don nges don rab gsal. In Go bo rab ’byams pa bsod nams seng ge’i bka’ ’bum. Vol. 5. Dehradun: Sakya College, 1–417.

Gos lo tsa ba gzhon nu dpal. 1996. The Blue Annals. Trans. G. N. Roerich. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

——. 2003a. Deb ther sngon po. 2 vols. Sarnath: Vajra Vidya Library.

——. 2003b. A Commentary on the Uttaratantra. (Theg pa chen po’i rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi ’grel bshad de kho na nyid rab tu gsal ba’i me long). Ed. by Klaus-Dieter Mathes (Nepal Research Centre Publications 24). Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho. 1975. A Synopsis of the Heart of the Sugatas, Called Lion’s Roar. (Bde gshegs snying po stong thun chen mo seng ge’i nga ro). In Collected Writings of ’Jam-mgon ’Ju Mi-pham-rgya-mtsho. Vol. pa. Ed. by Sonam T. Kazi. Gangtok: fols. 282–304.

——. c. 1990. The Lion’s Roar Proclaiming Other-Emptiness. (Gzhan stong khas len seng ge’i nga ro). Collected Works (gsungs ’bum). Sde dge dgon chen edition. Vol. ga. Ed. by Dilgo Khyentse Rinpoche. Kathmandu: 359–99.

——. 1992. Dbu ma rgyan rtsa ’grel. Chengdu, China: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang. Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas. 2005. Rnal ’byor bla na med pa’i rgyud sde rgya mtsho’i snying po bsdus pa zab mo nang don nyung ngu’i tshig gis rnam par ’grol ba zab don snang byed. Seattle: Nitartha international.

——. 1982. The Treasury of Knowledge. (Theg pa’i sgo kun las btus pa gsung rab rin po che’i mdzod bslab pa gsum legs par ston pa’i bstan bcos shes bya kun khyab; includes its autocommentary, Shes bya kun la khyab pa’i gzhung lugs nyung ngu’i tshig gis rnam par ’grol ba legs bshad yongs ’du shes bya mhta’ yas pa’i rgya mtsho; abbr. Shes bya kun kyab mdzod). 3 vols. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

——. 1990a. A Commentary on the Treatise That Points Out the Heart of the Tathagatas, Called Illuminating Rangjung Dorje’s Intention. (De bzhin gshegs pa’ i snying po bstan pa’i bstan bcos kyi rnam ’grel rang byung dgongs gsal). In Dbu ma gzhan stong skor bstan bcos phyogs bsdus deb dang po. Rumtek (Sikkim, India): Karma Shri Nalanda Institute, 63–129.

——. 1990b. A Commentary on the Treatise on The Distinction between Consciousness and Wisdom, Called Ornament of Rangjung Dorje’s Intention. (Rnam par shes pa dang ye shes rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos kyi tshig don go gsal du ’grel pa rang byung dgongs pa’i rgyan). In Dbu ma gzhan stong skor bstan bcos phyogs bsdus deb dang po. Rumtek (Sikkim, India): Karma Shri Nalanda Institute, 130–90.

——. n.d. A Commentary on the Uttaratantra, Called The Unassailable Lion’s Roar. (Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos snying po’i don mngon sum lam gyi bshad srol dang sbyar ba’i rnam par ’grel ba phyir mi ldog pa seng ge nga ro). Rumtek Monastery (Sikkim, India).

Lo chen Dharmasri ngag dbang chos ’phel. n. d. Commentary on Ascertaing the Three Vows. (Sdom pa gsum rnam par nges pa’i ’grel pa legs bshad ngo mtshar dpag bsam nye ma). Bylakuppe, India: Ngagyur Nyingma Institute.

Mi bskyod rdo rje (Karmapa VIII). 1990. The Lamp That Excellently Elucidates the System of the Proponents of Other-Empty Madhyamaka. (Dbu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol legs par phye ba’i sgron me). In Dbu ma gzhan stong skor bstan bcos phyogs bsdus deb dang po. Rumtek (Sikkim, India): Karma Shri Nalanda Institute.

——. 1996. The Chariot of the Tagbo Siddhas. (Dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad dpal ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa’i zhal lung dvags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta). Seattle: Nitartha international.

——. 2003. The Noble One Resting at Ease. (Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i lung chos mtha’ dag gi bdud rtsi’i snying por gyur pa gang la ldan pa’i gzhi rje btsun mchog tu dgyes par ngal gso’i yongs ’dus brtol gyi ljon pa rgyas pa). 2 vols. Seattle: Nitartha international.

Ngag dbang kun dga’ dbang phyug. 1987. Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ’grel pa dang bcas pa’i tshig don snying po gsal ba’i me long. Bir: Dzongsar Institute Library.

Ngag dbang yon tan bzang po. 2000. Jo nang chos `byung dang rje jo nang chen po’i ring lugs. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

Rang byung rdo rje (Karmapa III). 1990a. The Treatise That Points Out the Heart of the Tathagatas. (De gshegs snying po bstan pa’i bstan bcos). In Dbu ma gzhan stong skor bstan bcos phyogs bsdus deb dang po. Rumtek (Sikkim, India): Karma Shri Nalanda Institute.

——. 1990b. The Treatise on the Distinction between Consciosuness and Wisdom. (Rnam shes dang ye shes rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos). In Dbu ma gzhan stong skor bstan bcos phyogs bsdus deb dang po. Rumtek (Sikkim, India): Karma Shri Nalanda Institute.

——. 2006a. Collected Works. (Dpal rgyal dbang ka rma pa sku phreng gsum pa rang byung rdo rje’i gsung ’bum). 11 vols. Lhasa: Dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib ’jug khang.

——. 2006b. Explanation of the Dharmadharmatavibhaga. (Chos dang chos nyid rnam par ’byed pa’i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa’i rgyan). In Collected Works, vol. cha, 488–613.

——. n.d. Aspiration Prayer of Mahamudra. (Nges don phyag rgya chen po’i smon lam). Rumtek (Sikkim, India).

——. n.d. Autocommentary on The Profound Inner Reality. (Zab mo nang gi don gsal bar byed pa’i ’grel pa). Rumtek (Sikkim, India).

——. n.d. An Explanation of In Praise of Madhyamaka-Dharmadhatu. (Dbu ma chos dbyings bstod pa’i rnam par bshad pa; dbu med manuscript). n. p. Republished in (a) Mdo sngags mtshams sbyor. 2003. Lan kru’u: kan su’u mi rigs dpe skrun khang: 219–321. (b) Mngon rtogs rgyan gyi sa bcad snang byed sgron me dang skabs brgyad kyi stong thun dang dbu ma chos dbyings bstod pa rnam bshad. 2004. Sarnath: Vajra Vidya Institute: 157–312. TBRC no. W24267.

——. n.d. The Profound Inner Reality (Zab mo nang gi don). Rumtek (Sikkim, India). Rma bya ba byang chub brtson ’grus. 1975. Dbu ma rtsa ba shes rab kyi ’grel pa ’thad pa’i rgyan. Rumtek Monastery (Sikkim, India): Publ. by Rang byung rig pa’i rdo rje, Karmapa XVI.

Rong ston shes bya kun rig. n.d. Chos dbyings bstod pa’i ’grel pa legs bshad rnam par g.yo ba’i sprin. In Rong ston sakya rgyal mtshan gyi gsung ’khor. Dehradun: Sakya College, 629–48.

Sa bzang ma ti pa? chen blo gros rgyal mtshan. 1977. Dam pa’i chos mngon pa kun las btus pa’i ’grel pa zhes bya ba rab gsal snang ba. Gangtok: Gon po Tseten.

Sakya mchog ldan. 1975a. Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa chos kyi dbyings rnam par nges pa. The Complete Works (gsu? ’bum) of gSer-mdog Pa?-chen Sakya-mchog-ldan, vol. 7. Ed. by Kunzang Tobgey. Thimpu, Bhutan: 303–92.

——. 1975b. The Origin of Madhyamaka. (Dbu ma’i ’byung tshul rnam par bshad pa’i gtam yid bzhin lhun po). The Complete Works (gsu? ’bum) of gSer-mdog Pan-chen Sakyamchog- ldan, vol. 4. Ed. by Kunzang Tobgey. Thimpu, Bhutan: 209–48.

——. 1975c. Distinction between the Two Traditions of the Great Charioteers. (Shing rta chen po’i srol gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba bshad nas nges don gcig tu bsgrub pa’i bstan bcos kyi rgyas ’grel). The Complete Works (gsu? ’bum) of gSer-mdog Pan-chen Sakyamchog- ldan, vol. 2. Ed. by Kunzang Tobgey. Thimpu, Bhutan: 471–619.

Sakya rgyal mtshan. n.d. Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa’i ’grel pa lta ngan mun sel. In A khu dpe tho MHTL 11446.

Sgam po pa. 1990. The Jewel Ornament of Liberation. (Thar pa rin po che’i rgyan). Chengdu, China: Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

Taranatha. 1980. History of Buddhism in India. Trans. Lama Chimpa and Alaka Chattopadhyaya. Calcutta: Bagchi.

——. 1983. The Collected Works of Jo-nang rje-btsun Taranatha. Leh, Ladakh: Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemdzod.

——. n.d. Collected Works. ’Dzam thang edition. TBRC no. W22276.


Tshal pa kun dga’ rdo rje. 1981. Deb ther dmar po. Beijing: Mi rigs dpe skrun khang.

Zur mang padma rnam rgyal. n.d. Full Moon of Questions and Answers. (Dri lan tshes pa’i zla ba). n.p.

Modern Works

Bareau, André. 1955. Les sectes bouddhiques du Petit Véhicule. Saigon: L’École Française d’Extrême-Orient.

Bhattacharyya, Bhaswati. 1978. The Dialectical Method of Nagarjuna (Vigrahavyavartani). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

Brunnhölzl, Karl, trans. 2002a. The Presentation of Grounds, Paths, and Results in the Causal Vehicle of Characteristics in The Treasury of Knowledge (Shes bya kun khyab mdzod, ch. 9.1 and 10.1). Mt. Allison, Canada: Nitartha Institute.

——, trans. 2002b. The Presentation of Madhyamaka in The Treasury of Knowledge (Shes bya kun khyab mdzod, selected passages from ch. 6.3, 7.2, and 7.3). Mt. Allison, Canada: Nitartha Institute.

——. 2004. The Center of the Sunlit Sky. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications. ——.

2007. Straight from the Heart: Buddhist Pith Instructions. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications. Burchardi, Anne. 2002. “Towards an Understanding of Tathagatagarbha Interpretation in Tibet with Special Reference to the Ratnagotravibhaga.” In Henk Blezer et al., eds., Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet. Tibetan Studies 2. Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the International Association for Tibetan Studies, Leiden 2000. Leiden: Brill, 59–77.

——. 2007. “The Diversity of the gzhan stong Madhyamaka Tradition.” Journal of the International Association for Tibetan Studies no. 3. www.thdl.org.

Corless, Roger. 1995. “The Chinese Life of Nagarjuna.” In Donald Lopez Jr., ed., Buddhism in Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 525–29.

Davidson, Ronald M. 1985. “Buddhist Systems of Transformation: Asraya-parivrtti/-paravrtti among the Yogacara.” Ph.D. diss., University of California.

Dragonetti, Carmen. 1979. “Some Notes on the Pratityasamutpadah?dayakarika and the Pratityasamutpadah?dayavyakhyana Attributed to Nagarjuna.” Buddhist Studies 6 (Delhi): 70–73.

Dreyfus, Georges B. J., and Sara L. McClintock, eds. 2003. The Svatantrika-Prasa?gika Distinction. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Duckworth, Douglas S. 2005. “Buddha-Nature and a Dialectic of Presence and Absence in the Works of Mi-pham.” Ph.D. diss., University of Virginia.

Frauwallner, Erich. 1951. “Amalavijñanam und Alayavijñanam.” Beiträge zur indischen Philosophie und Altertumskunde. Walther Schubring zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 7. Hamburg: 148–59.


Gyamtso, Tsultrim, Khenpo Rinpoche. 1988. Progressive Stages of Meditation on Emptiness. Trans. Shenpen Hookham. Oxford: Longchen Foundation.

——. 1999. “Commentary on In Praise of Dharmadhatu.” Shenpen Ösel 3 (2): 17–91.

——. 1999–2000. “In Praise of Dharmadhatu.” Bodhi, no. 4: 6–16 (verses 38–40); no. 5:

6–29 (verses 41–43).

Harris, Ian Charles. 1991. The Continuity of Madhyamaka and Yogacara in Indian Mahayana Buddhism. Leiden: Brill.

Hayashima, Satoshi. 1987. “Sanhokkaijuko.” In Nagasakidaigaku Kyoikugakubu Shakaikagakuronso, Nr. 36: 41–90.

Hookham, S. K. 1991. The Buddha Within. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Hopkins, Jeffrey. 1983. Meditation on Emptiness. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

——. 1998. Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.

——. 2002. Reflections on Reality. Berkeley: University of California Press.

——. 2006. Mountain Doctrine. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications.

Huntington, C. W. 1995. “A Lost Text of Early Indian Madhyamaka.” AS 49 (4): 693– 767.

Jackson, David P. 1987. The Entrance Gate for the Wise (Section III). 2 vols. Vienna: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.

Kano, Kazuo. 2006. “rNgog Blo-ldan Shes-rab’s Summary of the Ratnagotravibhaga.” Ph.D. diss., University of Hamburg.

Kapstein, Matthew T. 2000. “We Are All Gzhan stong pas.” Journal of Buddhist Ethics 7: 105–25. Karma Thinley. 1980. The History of the Sixteen Karmapas of Tibet. Boulder: Prajña Press.

Keenan, John P. 1989. “Asa?ga’s Understanding of Madhyamika.” JIABS 12 (1): 93–107. King, Richard. 1994. “Early Yogacara and Its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School.” PEW 44 (4): 659–83.

Lévi, Sylvain M. 1929. “Autour d’Asvagho?a.” Journal Asiatique 215: 255–85. Lindtner, Christian. 1982. Nagarjuniana. Indiske Studier 4. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag. ——. 1992. “The La?kavatarasutra in Early Indian Madhyamaka Literature.” AS 46 (1): 244–79.

——. 1997. “Cittamatra in Indian Mahayana until Kamalasila.” WZKS 41: 159–206. Lopez, Donald S., ed. 2004. Buddhist Scriptures. London: Penguin Books.

Mathes, Klaus-Dieter. 1996. Unterscheidung der Gegebenheiten von ihrem wahren Wesen (Dharmadharmatavibhaga). Swisttal-Odendorf, Germany: Indica et Tibetica Verlag.

——. 1998. “Vordergründige und höchste Wahrheit im gZhan stong-Madhyamaka.” Annähenrung an das Fremde. 26. Deutscher Orientalistentag vom 25. bis 29.9. 1995 342 In Praise of Dharmadhatu

in Leipzig. Ed. by H. Preissler and H. Stein. Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 11: 457–68.

——. 2000. “Taranatha’s Presentation of trisvabhava in the gZan sto? sñi? po.” JIABS 23 (1): 195–223.

——. 2002. “’Gos Lo tsâ ba gZhon nu dpal’s Extensive Commentary on and Study of the Ra tna?gotra?vibhagavyakhya.” In Henk Blezer et al., eds., Religion and Secular Culture in Tibet. Tibetan Studies 2. Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies, Leiden 2000. Leiden: Brill, 79–96.

——. 2004. “Taranatha’s ‘Twenty-one Differences with regard to the Profound Meaning’— Comparing the Views of the Two gzhan sto? Masters Dol po pa and Sakya mchog ldan.” JIABS 27(2): 285–328.

Meinert, Carmen. 2003. “Structural Analysis of the Bsam gtan mig sgron: A Comparison of the Fourfold Correct Practice in the Aryavikalpapravesanamadhara?i and the Contents of the Four Main Chapters of the Bsam gtan mig sgron.” JIABS 26 (1): 175–95.

Murti, T. R. V. 1955. The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, A Study of the Madhyamika System. London: George Allen and Unwin.

Pettit, J. W. 1999. Mipham’s Beacon of Certainty. Boston: Wisdom Publications. Rawlinson, Andrew. 1983. “The Ambiguity of the Buddha-nature Concept in India and China.” In W. Lai and L. Lancaster, eds., Early Ch’an in China and Tibet. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 259–79.

Ruegg, David Seyfort. 1969. La théorie du tathagatagarbha et du gotra. Paris: L’École Française d’Extrême-Orient.

——. 1971. “Le Dharmadhâtustava de Nâgârjuna.” In Études Tibetaines: Dediées à la Mémoire de Marcelle Lalou (1890–1967). Paris: Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient, 448–71.

——. 1976. “The Meanings of the Term Gotra and the Textual History of the Ratnagotravibhaga.” Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 39: 341–63. ——. 1981. The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India. Wiesbaden:

Otto Harrassowitz. Schaeffer, Kurtis R. 1995. “The Enlightened Heart of Buddhahood. A Study and Translation of The Third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje’s Work on Tathagatagarbha, The De bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po gtan la dbab pa.” M.A. thesis, University of Washington. Schmithausen, Lambert. 1971. “Philologische Bemerkungen zum Ratnagotravibhaga.” WZKS 15: 123–77.

——. 1973. “Zu D. Seyfort Rueggs Buch ‘La théorie du tathagatagarbha et du gotra’ (Besprechungsaufsatz).” WZKS 22: 123–60.

——. 1981. “On Some Aspects of Descriptions of Theories of ‘Liberating Insight’ and ‘Enlightenment’ in Early Buddhism.” In K. Bruhn and A. Wezler, eds., Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus: Gedenkschrift für L. Alsdorf. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 23. Wiesbaden: 199–250.

——. 1987. Alayavijñana: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Bibliography 343

Yogacara Philosophy. 2 vols. Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies. Schuh, Dieter. 1977. Erlasse und Sendschreiben Mongolischer Herrscher für Tibetische Geistliche. Monumenta Tibetica Historica, Band 1. St. Augustin: VGH Wissenschaftsverlag. Sparham, Gareth. 1993. Ocean of Eloquence. Tsong kha pa’s Commentary on the Yogacara Doctrine of Mind. Albany: State University of New York Press.

——. 2001. “Demons on the Mother: Objections to the Perfect Wisdom Sutras in Tibet.” In Guy Newland, ed., Changing Minds. Contributions to the Study of Buddhism and Tibet in Honor of Jeffrey Hopkins. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 193–214.

Stearns, Cyrus. 1995. “Dol-po-pa Shes-rab rgyal-mtshan and the Genesis of the gzhan stong Position in Tibet.” AS 49 (4): 829–52.

——. 1999. The Buddha from Dolpo. Albany: State University of New York Press. Takasaki, Jikido. 1966. A Study on the Ratnagotravibhaga. Serie Orientale Roma 33. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.

Tillemans, Tom J. F., and Toru Tomabechi. 1995. “Le Dbu ma’i byu? tshul de ?akya mchog ldan.” AS 49 (4): 891–918.

Tola, Fernando, and Carmen Dragonetti. 1985. “Nagarjuna’s Catu?stava.” Journal of Indian Philosophy 13: 1–54.

Tucci, Giuseppe. 1986. Minor Buddhist Texts, Parts 1 and 2. (Indian reprint. Originally published as Serie Orientale Roma 9 1956/58). Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Walser, Joseph. “Nagarjuna and the Ratnavali. New Ways to Date an Old Philosopher.” JIABS 25 (2): 209–62.

Wangchuk, Dorji. 2004. “The rÑi?-ma Interpretations of the Tathagatagarbha Theory.” WZKS 48: 171–213.

Wayman, Alex, and Hideko Wayman. 1974. The Lion’s Roar of Queen Srimala. New York: Columbia University Press.

Zimmermann, Michael. 2002. A Buddha Within: The Tathagatagarbhasutra. The Earliest Exposition of the Buddha-Nature Teaching in India. Bibliotheca Philologica et Philosophica Buddhica 6. Tokyo: International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University.


1 Tib. bstod tshogs.

2 The clearest passages that are usually quoted as prophesying Nagarjuna are found in the La?kavatarasutra (X.163–66; P775, p. 74.3.6–8) and the Mañjusrimulatantra (P162, p. 259.3.8– 259.4.2; see also Bu ston 1931, vol. 2, p. 111). Two further sutras are often mentioned as giving such prophecies. In the Mahameghasutra (P898, pp. 253.4.8–255.3.2), Nagarjuna’s actual name is not found in either of the translations of this sutra in the Tibetan and the Chinese canons, but appears in Candrakirti’s autocommentary on the Madhyamakavatara (ACIP TD3862@245A), when he quotes the Mahameghasutra in Twelve Thousand Stanzas (see also Bu ston 1931, vol. 1, p. 129, who is skeptical about that). The Mahabherisutra (P888, pp. 88.2.4, 97.5.4, and 98.5.7) likewise does not mention Nagarjuna by name, but refers to him as a reincarnation of a certain Licchavi youth in the same way as the Mahameghasutra does (another version is found in the Suvar?aprabhasottamasutra, ed. Johannes Nobel, pp. 12–17).

3 Unlike any Sanskrit and Chinese sources, almost by default, Tibetan accounts associate every great Indian master with the famous university of Nalanda, including also Rahulabhadra and Nagarjuna (usually, this university is said to only have flourished from the fifth century onward).

4 The Chinese sources speak of King “Righteous” and the Tibetan ones have bde spyod, which are understood variously as Satavahana (the name of the dynasty), or the personal names Udayana (there is, however, no king with that name in the said dynasty) or Jantaka (this may rather refer to the place name Dhanyakataka), etc. Walser 2002 identifies Yajña Sri Satakar?i (c. 175–204) of the Satavahana dynasty in the eastern Deccan as the most likely candidate.

5 Tibetan sources usually give Nagarjuna’s lifespan as about six hundred years due to his accomplishment of rasayana (the practice to extract nutrients even from stones or space). He is also presented as a great alchemist, turning rocks into gold and so on.

6 This place is located in the southeast of India near the delta of the river K???a (present-day Amaravati in Andhra Pradesh). The Buddha is said to have taught the Kalacakratantra and other tantras there.

7 The account of Prince Saktiman first appears in the Kathasaritsagara, a collection of Indian tales.

8 An asterisk * before a word indicates a Sanskrit reconstruction from the Tibetan.

9 Given Nagarjuna’s long life, the Tibetan tradition also lists Savaripa as his main tantric student.

In the Chinese sources, such a lifespan is not found and Western scholars usually distinguish two Nagarjunas (the early Madhyamika and the later tantric siddha in the sixth century).

T

10 He is the third of the five Pandava sons, who are the heroes of the ancient Indian epic Mahabharata. 11 Tib. gtam tshogs. 12 Tib. (dbu ma) rigs tshogs. 13 The same list is found at the end of the Prasannapada, adding the Ak?arasataka (P5234).

14 Both Avalokitavrata’s Prajñapradipa?ika (ACIP TD3859@05B) and Atisa’s Bodhipathapradipapañjika (ACIP TD3948@280B) explicitly identify the text as Nagarjuna’s autocommentary on the Mulamadhyamakakarika. In both the Tibetan tradition and Western scholarship, his authorship is often denied, mainly on the grounds that the text quotes a verse that is also found in Aryadeva’s Catu?sataka. However, given the well-known tendency of Indian texts to freely use verses from other authors, Aryadeva’s text may also have incorporated it from some common earlier source. In addition, Tsongkhapa (1357–1419) says that it cannot be Nagarjuna’s work, since if it were, it would have to be quoted by later Madhyamikas, such as Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka, and Candrakirti, which it is not. In itself, this does not seem to be a very conclusive argument, since it (a) contradicts the above attribution by at least two—generally considered reliable—Indian masters, and since (b) Buddhapalita’s commentary on the Mulamadhyamakakarika—which is referred to and quoted at length in Bhavaviveka’s and Candrakirti’s commentaries—incorporates large parts of the Akutobhaya (see the excellent work by Huntington 1995 on this; of course, (b) in itself is no proof that the text was authored by Nagarjuna). Thus, the Akutobhaya no doubt existed in the mainstream of early Madhyamaka exegesis and, via Buddhapalita’s text, exerted a considerable influence upon later commentators as well. Hence, a more thorough study of the Akutobhaya and its influence on the Madhyamaka approach to reasoning seems overdue.


15 The authorship of this text has been disputed by many, mainly based on the grounds that it speaks about the three natures and the alaya-consciousness, which are assumed by these critics to be later Yogacara notions. However, that Nagarjuna was familiar with the three natures is also evidenced by his Acintyastava, which mentions the first two natures in verses 44–45. As Lindtner 1992 (p. 253) points out, lines 45cd are moreover identical to La?kavatarasutra II.191ab. His article presents detailed evidence throughout Nagarjuna’s texts that the latter not only knew but also greatly relied on an early version of the La?kavatarasutra—which despite, no doubt, being a major source for later Yogacaras also criticizes (earlier) reifying versions of Yogacara/ Vijñanavada. Furthermore, verses 33–35 of the Bodhicittavivara?a on the alaya-consciousness almost literally correspond to three verses from the Ghanavyuhasutra (P778, fols. 49b7–50a2), which is also a major Yogacara source.

16 Chin. pu ti zi liang lun (Taisho 1660). The text is quoted twice in Candrakirti’s Catu?sataka?ika (P5266, fols. 103a and 215b) and also in Asvabhava’s Mahayanasa?grahopanibandhana (P5552, fol. 329b). It is listed as one of Nagarjuna’s texts by Butön (see below) and quoted with its title in Tsongkhapa’s lam rim chen mo (fol. 414b). For details, see Lindtner 1982.

17 This text is not preserved, except for six verses in Santarak?ita’s Madhyamakala?karav?tti (P5285, fol. 69b.1–5). Kamalasila’s Madhyamakala?karapañjika (P5286, fols. 123a–124b) states their source to be the Vyavaharasiddhi and comments on them in detail.

18 Tib. rnam par mi rtog pa’i bstod pa. This refers to the Prajñaparamitastotra, which is quoted under this name also in Vibhuticandra’s Bodhicaryavataratatparyapañjikavise?adyotaninama (see below). As Gorampa says below, Nagtso Lotsawa (born 1011)—who closely collaborated


with Atisa—also referred to the Prajñaparamitastotra by this name, obviously following a not uncommon Indian tradition.


19 P5388, fol. 128a.6–7. 20 P5254, fols. 358a–b (verses 91–96); 361a (101). 21 Verses 18–23 (Ed. Carelli, p. 66; D1351, fol. 281a.7–b4). 22 D3935, fol. 296b.7 (verse 27). 23 P4534, fol. 102a (verse 8). 24 These are verses 1–10, 12–13, 22, 24, 26–27, 30–32.


25 There are several Sanskrit editions of the Catu?stava (Tucci 1932, Sakei 1959, and Dragonetti

1982). Though there has been some dispute among modern scholars as to which four praises it contains, all Sanskrit manuscripts agree on the Lokatitastava (P2012), Niraupamyastava (P2011), Acintyastava (P2019), and Paramarthastava (P2014). These are also the four on which Am?takara comments (on this author, no further information is available). The Sanskrit edition of his text is found in Tucci 1986, pp. 238–46.


26 Ed. La Vallée Poussin, pp. 420, 488, 533, 573. 27 Ibid., pp. 359, 415, 417, 476, 489, 533, 583, and 587. 28 Ibid., pp. 420, 489. 29 Ibid., pp. 375, 528, 573. 30 ACIP TD3875B@143B (verse 7); @148B (9). 31 P4534, fols. 92b; 95a; 97a; 98b; 102a; 105a. 32 Ed. La Vallée Poussin, pp. 55, 64, 234, 413. 33 Ibid., pp. 23, 200, 310. 34 Ibid., pp. 299, 348, 381, 405, 441, 482, 490, 536. 35 ACIP TD3870–1@190B (verse 10); @214A (5); @293A/B (23). 36 P3099, fol. 182a (verse 15). 37 Ed. La Vallée Poussin, p. 215. 38 P5259, fol. 315a.

39 ACIP TD3948@259A (verse 21). 40 ACIP TD3870-2@302A (verse 7); @353 (21). 41 Verses 7 and 21 (in Shastri 1927, p. 22). 42 Ed. La Vallée Poussin, p. 36 (verses 18–19). 43 P5254, fol. 372. 44 P4531, fol. 39b.

45 Lines 43ab (ibid., p. 24). The Sekanirdesa (p. 28) also has two lines that correspond to Lokatitastava 12ab but are explicitly said to come from a tantra.


46 P3099, fols. 176b; 177b; 181b–182a; 182b; 184b–185a (verses 22; 13; 10–11 (9); 43; 37–42).

47 P5254, fols. 358a–b (verses 91–96); 361a (101).

48 ACIP TD3854@283B (verse 8).

49 Ed. La Vallée Poussin, p. 27 (III.1cd: evam stute namas te ’stu ka? stota kas ca sa?stuta?). Without giving any details, Tucci 1986 (p. 236) also mentions that there are quotations of the praises in the Pañcakrama. Lindtner 1982 (p. 180) says, “It is my general impression that Y? Yukti?a??ika, CS Catu?stava, and BV Bodhicittavivara?a are the most frequently quoted among all works ascribed to Nagarjuna in later Indian literature.” For a detailed list of quotations from the Catu?stava in Indian works, see ibid., pp. 125–27. 50 Ed. La Vallée Poussin, p. 200 (verse 3).


51 Carelli, p. 57. Naropa attributes the Kayatrayastotra to Nagahvaya (“the one called Naga”), which is not very specific, and exactly how Nagarjuna is referred to in the above prophecy in the La?kavatarasutra. Taranatha 1980 (p. 126) has the same attribution, obviously considering Nagahvaya to be a different person.


52 Ed. A. Thakur (Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1959), p. 503. 53 P5282 (ACIP TD3880@256B, verse 8; @266A, verse 17). 54 P4534, fol. 102b. 55 ACIP TD3948@285A. 56 Ed. La Vallée Poussin, p. 36 (niralamba namo ’stu te); the three stanzas appear right after the above-mentioned two verses from the Niraupamyastava, further suggesting their relation to Nagarjuna.

57 The Chinese Buddhist canon is comparatively very modest with its twenty-four works ascribed to Nagarjuna. Among these, the most important ones not contained in the Tengyur are the *Bodhisa?bharasastra (Taisho 1660), Mahaprajñaparamitasastra (1509), Dasabhumivibha?asastra (1521), Dvadasanikaya(mukha)sastra (1568; one of the three main texts of the Chinese Madhyamaka School), and Ekaslokasastra (1573).

58 The three collections and their correspondence to the three wheels of dharma may indeed be seen to have a scriptural basis in the Mahabherisutra (p. 98.5.7), which says, “ . . . initially, he will eradicate the great foundations of what is improper, proclaiming the great sound of the dharma. . . . Secondly, he will propound the sutras of the mahayana that discuss emptiness. Thirdly, he will give discourses that examine the basic element (dhatu) of sentient beings.”

59 These are the Prajñasatakanamaprakara?a (P5820), Nitisastraprajñada??anama (P5821), and Nitisastrajantuposa?abindunama (P5822).

60 Almost all Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan sources attribute this text to Rahulabhadra. It is found as authored by him at the beginning of three prajñaparamita sutras in Sanskrit: the A??asahasrika (ed. R. Mitra), Pañcavi?satisahasrika (ed. N. Dutt), and Suvikrantavikramiparip?ccha (ed. R. Hikata; neither the Tibetan nor the Chinese translations of these sutras contain that praise). In 1907, Haraprasad Shastri found an undated Nepali manuscript of the text, which also gives Rahulabhadra as its author (k?tir iya? rahulabhadrasya; Journal of the Proceedings of the Asiatic Society Bengal 6, no. 8 (1910); pp. 425ff.). The praise is quoted almost in its entirety (nineteen stanzas) in the Mahaprajñaparamitasastra attributed to Nagarjuna (trans. Lamotte, vol. 2, pp. 1363–65), but Lamotte (p. 1060) reports that Chi-tsang’s (549–623) Tchong kouan louen chou (Taisho 1824, k. 10, p. 168c4–5) says, “The stanzas of the Prajñaparamitastotra found in the 18th scroll of Nagarjuna’s Ta tche tou louen are the work of the dharmacarya Lo ho (Rahula)” (as per H. Ui, Indo-Tetsugaku-Kenkiu, 1 1934: pp. 431ff. and Matsumoto, Die Prajñaparamita Literatur, p. 54). Buddhapalita’s Mulamadhyamakav?tti (P5242, fol. 275b) quotes the praise with its name as being authored by Rahulabhadra. The Blue Annals (’Gos lo tsa ba gzhon nu dpal 1996, pp. 35, 344), Butön’s History of Buddhism (Bu ston rin chen grub 1931, p. 123), and Rongtön Sheja Künrig’s (1367–1449) commentary on the text also agree that its author was Rahulabhadra. The later Tibetan tradition rather tends to attribute this praise to Nagarjuna (see Gorampa and Jamgön Kongtrul below).

61 This text is mostly verbatim the same as P2014, thus obviously being just another version of it.

62 Despite the identical title, P2024 and 2025 are two different compositions (see below).

63 The available Sanskrit manuscripts of this text and the Derge and Cone Tengyurs have either -stava or -stotra (P has just -zhes bya ba). The above eighteen praises correspond to P2010–2028 (P2016 is the autocommentary on the Kayatrayastotra). Obviously, besides the texts in the three collections mentioned, there are quite a number of other works attributed by the Tibetan tradition to Nagarjuna that do not belong to any of these three collections, such as his Bodhicittavivara?a and *Bodhisa?bharasastra, as well as the many tantric works attributed to him, foremost among them the Pañcakrama (P2667), a commentary on the Guhyasamajatantra.


64 As for the praises, by now, the only full agreement seems to be that the Catu?stava is by Nagarjuna and that the Prajñaparamitastotra (P2018) is considered to be a work by Rahulabhadra. For further details on all the texts mentioned and the question of their authorship, see Ruegg 1981 and Lindtner 1982.

65 See the section “Who or What Is Praised in Nagarjuna’s Praises?” 66 XVIII.9; see also XXIV.8–10, 18. 67 Verse 35. 68 Verses 69cd–71, 109. 69 Verses 15–16. 70 Verse 3.

71 Verses 19–20, 22–23, 25. Verse 21 even speaks about a nocturnal emission due to a dream, without having actual intercourse, just as Vasubandhu’s Vi?satika (verse 4) does.

72 Verses 19–20. 73 Ibid., verse 34. 74 Lindtner 1982, pp. 264–65. 75 For details, see below. 76 Ibid., p. 279. 77 P5265, fol. 2b. 78 P5325, fols. 127b.2–128a.4. 79 The last two commentaries as well as the *Bodhisattvavataraprakasa and *Guhyasamajama??alabhi?ekavidhi are not preserved.

80 ACIP TD3948@280B.


81 Tib. rma bya ba byang chub brtson ’grus. Note that he is not to be confused with his contemporary Majaba Jangchub Yeshe (Tib. rma bya pa byang chub ye shes), one of the four main disciples of Patsab Lotsawa (Tib. pa tshab lo tsa ba; born 1055). Often, however, Jangchub Dsöndrü is listed instead of Jangchub Yeshe as one of the four sons of Patsab Lotsawa. In any case, Jangchub Dsöndrü first was a student of Chaba Chökyi Senge (Tib. phyva pa chos kyi seng ge; 1109–1169). Later, he became a disciple of Patsab Lotsawa, the main person to translate and introduce Candrakirti’s Madhyamaka texts in Tibet. Consquently, as a Madhyamika, Jangchub Dsöndrü followed the Prasa?gika approach and became an important figure in the early dissemination of this system in Tibet. This is also evidenced by his becoming a disciple and collaborator of two of Patsab Lotsawa’s contemporaries, the Kashmiri Madhyamika Jayananda and his Tibetan disciple Ku Lotsawa Dode Bar (Tib. khu lo tsa ba mdo sde ’bar). Majawa Jangchub Dsöndrü’s surviving commentary on Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika is an important, though hitherto largely unstudied, testimony of early Tibetan interpretations of Madhyamaka, especially in its Prasa?gika form.

82 As presented above, Candrakirti speaks only about the relationship between the Mulamadhyamakakarika and the Yukti?a??ika on the one hand (main texts) and the Vigrahavyavartani and the Sunyatasaptati on the other (elaborations), but does not mention the Vaidalyaprakara?a and the Vyavaharasiddhi (this is also pointed out in Gorampa’s presentation below).

83 Rma bya ba byang chub brtson ’grus 1975, pp. 13–17.

84 Rang byung rdo rje n.d., fol. 1b. Unfortunately, folio 2 of the text with its discussion on the remaining two collections is missing. The last words on folio 1 are “based on which Isvara, puru?a, both, . . .” probably indicating that the collection of reasoning refutes arising from others, self, both, and neither. See the text’s following statements on the collections of reasoning and praises and their relationship.

85 Ibid., fol. 3b. What follows is an extensive explanation on Nagarjuna’s understanding of ground, path, and fruition, how that is in harmony with what Yogacara texts teach, and that there is no contradiction between the collection of reasoning and the collection of praises (see the translation of DSC below).


86 Verses 40–41. 87 Ibid., fol. 8a.

88 ACIP buston chosbyung@019B (my translation; see Bu ston rin chen grub 1931, vol. 1, pp. 50–51).

89 Tib. theg chen blo sbyong. There is no text by this name; Butön may refer here to the Mahayanavi?sika.

90 Ibid., @100A (Bu ston, vol. 2, pp. 125–27). 91 Tib. gnyag pho ba bsod nams bzang po.

92 Tib. dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan. He is considered to be the one who coined the terms “other-empty” (shentong) and “self-empty” (rangtong) and one of the most outspoken proponents of the superiority of the view of “other-emptiness.”

93 Bsod nams bzang po n.d., p. 606.

94 It is not clear whether this is taken to consist of five or six texts or exactly which these are. A list on p. 947 (’Gos lo tsa ba gzhon nu dpal 2003; 1996, p. 808) lists the collection of reasoning and the Ratnavali separately, thus indicating that the latter is not considered a part of the former.

95 Tib. shakya mchog ldan, aka gser mdog pan chen/zi lung pan chen.

96 Dbu ma’i ’byung tshul rnam par bshad pa’i gtam yid bzhin lhun po, pp. 219–20.

97 Shing rta chen po’i srol gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba bshad nas nges don gcig tu bsgrub pa’i bstan bcos kyi rgyas ’grel, fol. 6a–b (for details, see below).

98 Tib. go rams pa bsod nams seng ge. Both masters were fellow students of Rongtön Sheja Künrig (1367–1449) but later went different ways.

99 Here, Gorampa correctly quotes Majawa’s above presentation in abbreviated form.

100 Here, Gorampa again incorporates exactly what is said in the corresponding part of Majawa’s outline.


101 P760.12.

102 Go bo rab ’byams pa bsod nams seng ge 2004, fols. 7a.1–10a.3.

103 Tib. dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba.

104 Dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, p. 1442.

105 Taranatha 1980, pp. 108 and 126.

106 Tib. grub mtha’i rnam bshad rang gzhan grub mtha’ kun dang zab don mchog tu gsal ba kun bzang zhing gi nyi ma lung rigs rgya mtsho skye dgu’i re ba kun skong. Musoorie: Dalama, 1962), vol. ca, fols. 4a.2–6b.7.

107 Tib. ’jam dbyangs bzhad pa.

108 See also Hopkins 1983 (pp. 356–57) and 1998 (pp. 16–17).

109 The actual name of this text is Ratnagotravibhaga (“Elucidating the Disposition of the Three Jewels”). However, in nonacademic circles and among Tibetans, it is better known by the above name, so I will use it throughout. I refrain from reentering the historically undecidable dispute about whether Maitreya is really the author of this text and Asa?ga the composer of its Vyakhya (the main Indian commentary), but follow the Tibetan tradition on this (the Chinese has a certain *Saramati, whom modern scholars try to identify in various ways). However, that Maitreya’s authorship is not just a Tibetan invention is corroborated by the fact that the Ratnagotravibhaga is quoted several times as the work of the bodhisattva Maitreya in a Khotan-Saka script fragment (Stein CH 0047). As Takasaki 1966 (p. 7) points out, this shows that Maitreya was regarded as its author not only in Tibet but also in Central Asia and probably in India too, at least between the eighth and twelfth centuries. That there actually were at least some late Indian masters who explicitly considered Maitreya as this text’s author is evident from Ratnakarasanti’s Sutrasamucchayabha?ya and Abhayakaragupta’s Munimatala?kara. The former quotes and attributes verse I.27 to Arya Maitreya (D3935, fol. 296b.5–7) and also explains a part of the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya (ibid., fol. 325b; J 67.9–68.6). The latter also attributes the text (with the name Mahayanottaratantra) to Maitreya, while quoting a verse from the Vyakhya (D3903, fol. 150a.6 J 71.1–4). The colophon of Ngog Lotsawa’s translation of both texts in the Tengyur attributes the verses of the Ratnagotravibhaga to Maitreya and the Vyakhya to Asa?ga. In this, he most probably relied on an Indian tradition, since the translation was accomplished in Kashmir under the guidance of the local pa??ita Sajjana.


110 Tibetan edition in Hopkins 1983, pp. 9–10 (English, ibid., p. 590).

111 Tib. grub pa’i mtha’ rnam par bzhag pa bsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po’i mdzes rgyan.

112 ACIP lcang-grubmtha.4@03B–4A.

113 As explained above, Gorampa identifies this as the Cittavajrastava.

114 Gorampa identifies these two as the Sattvaradhanastava and the Prajñaparamitastotra, respectively.

115 As Gorampa says, this is the Kayatrayastotra.

116 As mentioned above, this list is found in both the Madhyamakasastrastuti and at the end of the Prasannapada.

117 Tib. khu lo tsa ba mdo sde ’bar. He was a student of the Kashmiri Madhyamika Jayananda, both collaborating with Majawa Jangchub Tsöndrü.

118 As for these arguments here, as mentioned above, there are many other texts—also accepted by Tsongkhapa and others as authentic works by Nagarjuna—that are not in this list in the Prasannapada either. There is indeed no known quote from the Vyavaharasiddhi by Nagarjuna’s direct disciples. However, both Santarak?ita and Kamalasila—whom nobody in Tibet considers as unreliable—cite six verses from it, the latter explicitly attributing it to Nagarjuna and even giving an extensive commentary.

119 TOK vol. 1, pp. 404–6. 120 Tib. blo gros rgya mtsho. 121 Blo gros rgya mtsho 1984, p. 9. 122 Ibid., p. 62.

123 As presented above, Gorampa indicates that others seem to add four more praises, thus making fifteen.

124 However, as mentioned above, the former is just another version of the Paramarthastava.

125 S. Lévi edited the Sanskrit of this praise under Asvagho?a’s name (see Bibliography), while Lindtner 1982 (p. 17) says that its style is most reminiscent of Mat?ce?a. 126 Skt. vasita can also mean “void.” The translation was chosen, since the Tibetan has gzhan dbang and the next term in the verse is “empty” (sunya).


127 Verses 13, 17, 21–24. 128 Verses 13–14. 129 Verses 3, 13, 22, 23, 37–40, and 43. 130 Verse 3. 131 Verse 2. 132 Verses 24, 26, 35, 64–65, 89, and 100. 133 VIII.15. 352 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 134 Verses 4, 9–10. 135 Verse 8. 136 Verses 1 and 3.


137 Verses 6, 15, 21–22. Interestingly, except for “yana” being replaced with “disposition” (gotra), lines 15ab correspond almost literally to Abhisamayala?kara I.39ab.

138 Verse 41 and lines 45ab (svabhava? prak?tis tattva? dravya? vastu sad ity api).

139 Verses 1–2. 140 Verses 20–21.


141 Verse 88. It should be noted that the mere occurrence of the term “fundamental change of state” in a text by Nagarjuna and especially its equation with the dharmakaya is quite remarkable. For, usually not even the term is used in the Madhyamaka tradition, let alone it being explained in this way, which is found in some sutras, but otherwise is a typical Yogacara presentation. For more details on the notion of fundamental change of state, see the section “A Terminological Map for the Dharmadhatustava and Its Commentaries.” 142 Verse 22. For more details, see below and the translation of DSC.

143 For further examples of Nagarjuna’s texts using positive and affirmative terminologies, see below in the section “An Overview of the Basic Themes of the Dharmadhatustava.” 144 Shing rta chen po’i srol gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba bshad nas nges don gcig tu bsgrub pa’i bstan bcos kyi rgyas ’grel, fol. 6a–b.

145 I translated the term sugata here in an attempt to retain the alliterative play on words. 146 Verses 9–11.

147 Murti 1955, p. 90.

148 Of course, this is a textual history and not one in terms of experience. From the latter point of view, any “history” of luminous mind and its adventitious stains is quite boring and in fact obsolete, since it is always the same and happens only in the present moment. 149 As quoted in Ngag dbang yon tan bzang po 2000, p. 115.

150 Literally, kli??amanas means “defiled mind,” but here I follow the Tibetan (lit. “plagued mind”), since it is not just a question of mind being defiled like a dusty but insentient mirror. Rather, as the above process shows, mind experiences mental and physical suffering through such defilement.

151 It can also refer to intellect, intelligence, perception, spirit, opinion, intention, inclination, and more.

152 Matters are somewhat complicated by “mentation” sometimes being used for the sixth— the mentalconsciousness as well and there being overlapping descriptions of and relationships between the afflicted mind, the immediate mind, pure mentation, the mental sense faculy, and the mental consciousness.

153 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary says that “concept” comes from Latin conceptus (collection, gathering, fetus) and is “something conceived in the mind : thought, idea, notion: as a philos : a general or abstract idea : a universal notion: (1) : the resultant of a generalizing mental operation : a generic mental image abstracted from percepts; also : a directly

intuited object of thought (2) : a theoretical construct . . .” About “conceive,” Webster’s says, “to take into one’s mind . . . to form in the mind . . . evolve mentally . . . imagine, visualize . . .” Thus, somewhat differing from “concept,” when “conceive” is understood in these latter senses in a very general way, it comes closer to the above meanings of kalpana and its related terms. 154 Tib. sgo ba. Here, this term may very well be understood in its double sense of making pregnant and being suffused or imbued with something.

155 As for the last term, most translations from the Tibetan say “thoroughly established nature” or the like. This is usually based on too literal an understanding of the Tibetan (while disregarding the original Sanskrit) and on certain Tibetan doxographical hierarchies, which consider this term as an exclusive feature of so-called “Mere Mentalism” with its alleged assertion of some ultimately existing consciousness. However, neither the Sanskrit term nor its understanding by all major Yogacara masters justifies any such wrongly reifying rendering. Also, it is misleading to say “perfected nature,” since there is nothing to be changed, let alone perfected, in this nature, its whole point being rather to signify primordial perfection and completeness.

156 Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 1, pp. 192–94.

157 These are the impulses and habits of listening to and engaging in the dharma that are the natural expression of one’s own buddha nature. Thus, the facts of the dharma, teachers, and texts appearing for oneself as well as being attracted to and engaging them come about through the main cause that is the revival of these internal tendencies appearing as if external, with the compassion and manifestations of Buddhas aiding as contributing conditions. 158 Skt. ?a?ayatanavise?a, Tib. skye mched drug gi khyad par.

159 For more details on this, see the section “Luminous Mind and Tathagatagarbha” below as well as the translation of DSC.

160 This is already found in the Trikayanamasutra and the Suvar?aprabhasottamasutra. Presenting the dharmadhatu as a fifth wisdom—dharmadhatu wisdom—has its origin in the tantras but later, especially in Tibet, became the predominant presentation. If the dharmadhatu wisdom is added, it usually represents the svabhavakaya.

161 This is basically the way it is presented in AC (fols. 99a–103b). NY and its commentaries treat this process in great detail (for further details/refinements, see below).

162 That said two terms were understood differently is also evident from several scriptures that deny the former, while frequently speaking about the latter, such as the La?kavatarasutra (X.568: “Mind cannot see mind, just as a sword cannot cut its own blade or a finger touch its own tip”).

163 See Zimmermann 2002, p. 90.

164 H. Isaacson (in Zimmermann 2002, p. 41, note 58) identifies at least three examples in rather late Indian commentaries (two on the Hevajratantra, one on the Tantraloka) that gloss garbha in this sense as h?daya and sara, respectively.

165 For a detailed analysis of the term tathagatagarbha, see Zimmermann 2002, pp. 39–46. 166 See also the discussion of buddha nature in the Eighth Karmapa’s commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara below.

167 The two examples of a seed in its husk and a cakravartin-baby in the womb seem to suggest some development or growth, but as their various sources and commentaries show, the meaning emphasized in both is something being enclosed in a covering, from which it must be freed (see also Zimmermann 2002, pp. 62–65).

168 One of the cuter anecdotes here (it actually happened) is the one of an enthusiastic Buddhist freshman, who—inspired by having been H.H. the Dalai Lama’s driver during a visit— returned to his apartment and set up with great care a nice Tibetan shrine with all its rich arrangements. He lit the incense and the candles, and solemnly sat down to meditate, his eyes closed. After a while he thought, “Wow, that’s it, I’m getting it, the clear light is dawning on me!”—just to open his eyes and see his shrine in flames.

169 To be sure, it is not being suggested here that this theme is understood in exactly the same way in all the sources to follow.

170 I.10 (pabhassaram ida? bhikkhave citta?/ ta? ca kho agantukehi upakkilesehi upakkili??ha?/ ta? assutava puthujjana yathabh ta? nappajanati/ tasma assutavato puthujjanassa cittabhavana natthi ti vadami ti/ pabhassaram ida? bhikkhave citta?/ ta? ca kho agantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta?/ ta? sutva ariyasavako yathabh ta? pajanati/ tasma sutavato ariyasavakassa cittabhavana atthi ti vadami ti/).

171 III.151.22–23; 31–32; and 152.8–9 (cittasa?kilesa bhikkave satta sa?kilissanti, cittavodana satta visujjhanti).

172 See Bareau 1955, pp. 294–95. 173 Taisho 2031, p. 15c27. 174 Trans. La Vallée Poussin, pp. 109–11. 175 P. 615.

176 Manorathapura?i (A?guttaranika-atthakatha) I.60; Dhammasa?ghani-atthakatha 140; Buddhagho?a’s Kathavatthu-atthakatha 193.

177 Ed. Wogihara, pp. 5 and 644. The Sanskrit for “element” here is again dhatu, which in its original sense can refer to a metal or mineral contained in ore. The dhatu as seed is also common (see the recurring example in the Tathagatagarbhasutra, Dharmadhatustava, Uttaratantra, and the explanation in Asa?ga’s Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya on I.26).

178 XXV.1 (P783, p. 238.5.6; ACIP KD0095@305B–306A). A similar verse is also found in the Pali canon.

179 Ibid., @270A. 180 Ibid., @345A–B. 181 Ed. Vaidya, p. 3.18 (ACIP KD0012@03A). 182 Ibid., @142B. 183 Ed. Dutt, p. 121.14–122.3 (ACIP KD0009-1@169A). The Satasahasrikaprajñaparamita (p. 495) contains a parallel passage. 184 ACIP KD0009-2@252B–253A. 185 Ed. Hikata, p. 85.

186 Ed. Dutt 1941–54, vol. 2.2, pp. 300.9–10 (yasya co m?duki sa?jña namarupasmi vartate/ ag?dhra? namarupasmi citta? bhoti prabhasvaram). “Name and form” is an expression for the five skandhas, the four mental skandhas being without form, just suitable to be named.

187 Ed. Rahder, p. 74D. 188 ACIP KL0107@135B. 189 ACIP KD0113@35A. 190 Ibid., @193B. 191 Ibid., @218B–219A. 192 As quoted in J, p. 49.9–12. 193 I.63. 194 I.17 and I.22. 195 XIII.19ab. 196 Lines 128–32 and 306–7 (ed. Mathes). 197 P5529 (ACIP TD4028@038B). 198 Sanskrit quoted in Ruegg 1969, p. 427. 199 J6 (P5526, fol. 77b.5–6). 200 This is the fourth point in the text’s first chapter on the knowledge of all aspects (verses I.38–40). 201 Some say this text was composed by Dam??rasena. 202 D3791, fol. 204b.3–5. 203 P5536–8 (ACIP TD4035@257A). 204 P5539 (ACIP TD4038-1@044A; further examples @005A and 058A). 205 P5213, fol. 7a.7–7b.7 (see also fols. 6b.7 and 7a.7). 206 P5866, verses 5, 23, 177–78. 207 Verses 37–38. 208 Taisho 1584, 1616 (esp. pp. 863b20f and 864a28), 1617 (esp. p. 872a1f). 209 P5709, II.208cd. 210 P5710, I.38 (ACIP TD4211@164B). 211 Ed. A. Thakur, pp. 405, 411, 431, 432, 491, 496, 530, 540. 212 III.279–80ab. 213 ACIP TD3854@279. 214 Ibid., @281A–B. 215 Ibid., @272A and 281A. 216 ACIP TD3859-3@83B. 217 Ibid., @283B. 218 P5764 (ACIP TD4266@125A and 129A). 219 P5285 (ACIP TD3885@81A). 356 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 220 ACIP TD3915@034B.


221 D3887, fol. 242b.4–7. To note, this text is the first one to incorporate the teachings on tathagatagarbha with a more positive meaning into the Madhyamaka tradition. Later, the same is done in Dharmamitra’s (eighth/ninth century) commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara (quoting the above-mentioned phrase of all beings possessing the Tathagata heart from the Adhyardhasatikaprajñaparamitasutra) and Abhayakaragupta’s Munimatala?kara (D3903, fol. 150a.6–7; quoting the same passage as the Madhyamakaloka, with an interspersed verse from the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya J71.1–4). Earlier, Bhavaviveka’s Tarkajvala (D3856, fol. 169a.1–2), referring to the La?kavatarasutra, says that “possessing the Tathagata heart” refers to emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness (the three doors to liberation) existing in the continua of all beings, but does not indicate something like an inherent, eternal, and all-pervading person (puru?a) as held in certain non-Buddhist Indian schools. The text also speaks about bodhisattvas having respect even for beings with no qualities, since they think that these beings will come to possess all qualities in the future due to being endowed with the Tathagata heart (fol. 50b.3–4). Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatarabha?ya (ACIP TD3862@281Af), by also quoting the La?kavatarasutra, clearly states that the teachings on the Tathagata heart are of expedient meaning, given for people who are afraid of emptiness and in order to guide the tirthikas who believe in an atman. Interestingly, the Madhyamakaloka (ibid., fol. 162b.3–7) quotes the same passage of the La?kavatarasutra as Candrakirti but only says that, depending on the different ways of thinking of those to be guided, the Buddha taught nothing but the dharmadhatu through a variety of means. Jayananda’s Madhyamakavatara?ika stands somewhat in between, since it refers to the Tathagata heart (quoting the Uttaratantra) as authoritative in establishing that there is only a single yana (D3870, fol. 354b.1–2), but otherwise equates its meaning with emptiness and, like Candrakirti, considers it to be of expedient meaning (fol. 213a.4–5).

222 Lines 12ab. This text is listed under Candrakirti’s works in the Tengyur and appears as an appendix to his Madhyamakavatarabha?ya. Its colophon gives “the great master Candrakirti” as its author, but also says that it was translated into Tibetan by the author himself and the translator ’gos khug pa lha btsas (eleventh century). There was indeed an eleventh-century master by the name Candrakirti (Tibetan tradition calls him “the lesser Candrakirti”) who was a disciple of Jetari (tenth/eleventh century), one of the teachers of Atisa.

223 P4535; 5573; 5579; 5586; D1424 (esp. fol. 153b).

224 Ed. La Vallée Poussin, p. 448.10 (missing in the Tibetan); ACIP TD3865@273B. 225 ACIP TD3862@322A–B. 226 Ibid., @343A. 227 ACIP TD3870-1@051A. 228 Ibid., @306A–307A. 229 ACIP TD3870-2@342A. 230 P5273 (ACIP TD3872@59B). 231 Ibid., @118B. 232 The last two lines allude to the above-mentioned verse in the Lalitavistarasutra. 233 P5325, fols. 107b.8–108a.2. Endnotes 357

234 P5324, fols. 105b.7–106a.6. It may be added here that Atisa’s Bodhipathapradipapañjika (ACIP TD3948@258B) speaks about all beings without exception possessing a single disposition, that is, the Tathagata heart, the disposition of the mahayana. His Ratnakara??odghatanamamadhyamakopadesa (P5325, fols. 116b.8–117a.3) says the same and further explains that beings are thus naturally endowed with great compassion and the qualities of the paramitas, meaning they possess natural ethics.


235 P5282 (ACIP TD3880@264A). 236 Skt. ed. B. Lal (Sarnath: Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Buddhist Studies, 1994), p. 136.26–28. 237 Lines 20–23. 238 Tib. lta ba mdor bsdus. 239 Lines 43–49. 240 Bka’ brgyud mgur mtsho. Rumtek ed. n.d., fol. 53b. 241 Mi la ras pa’i rnam mgur. 1981. Beijing: mi rigs dpe skrun khang, p. 466. 242 Verse 7. 243 Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 1, pp. 196–97.

244 According to Pawo Tsugla Trengwa’s History of the Dharma, the Eighth Karmapa considered Saraha and Nagarjuna as the final authorities to clarify the view (pp. 1254–55), which accords with what Mikyö Dorje himself says in his Chariot of the Tagbo Siddhas. Pawo Rinpoche also reports a statement by the Karmapa that it is not reasonable for the view of all teachings on valid cognition, abhidharma, Madhyamaka, and the Vajrayana to be other-emptiness (p. 1236). Still, Pawo Rinpoche says, the Karmapa’s early teacher Chödrub Senge (who fully ordained him and gave him extensive instructions on the view of “other-emptiness”) had requested the Karmapa to uphold this view (p. 1240). Thus, before his outspoken rejection of any kind of “other-empty” Madhyamaka in the Chariot, his first major commentary—on the Abhisamayala?kara—uses the term “other-emptiness” (and also Mahamudra) frequently, but one looks in vain for any reifying or absolutist interpretation of that term. Especially in comparison with other texts on “other-emptiness” (such as Dölpopa’s), one is tempted to call the Karmapa’s presentation “Shentong Lite.” In fact, his commentary presents the hidden meaning of the prajñaparamita sutras mainly in classical Yogacara terms, while emphasizing that this is not what Tibetans call “Mere Mentalism.” In general, it is regarded as one of the signs of a commentator of the highest caliber to expound each scripture according to its own system and context, without mixing different traditions or imposing one’s ownhighest” view. Pawo Rinpoche says that this approach is reflected in all commentaries by the Eighth Karmapa, since he always taught in accordance with the propensities of his disciples and by keeping to the principles that apply to the specific texts of sutras and tantras and not by just clinging to a single meaning throughout (p. 1254). Mikyö Dorje himself states that the systems of Madhyamaka and Yogacara must be treated independently in their own contexts. So far, there are hardly any systematic studies of the Eighth Karmapa’s scriptural legacy. Instead, unfounded claims about his view are often repeated (by both Tibetans and Westerners), such as that he was one of the greatest proponents of the system of other-emptiness in the Kagyü lineage. Even a brief overview of the Karmapa’s texts shows that this is definitely not the case. What is certain, though, is that he went to considerable pains to employ the language and technique of debate used by his opponents (often Tsongkhapa and his followers). In good Prasa?gika style, he often flings their own approach back at them to reveal its internal inconsistencies. This is also evidenced by his following presentation of buddha nature.

245 In terms of the meaning (if not the words), the same distinction is also made in Asa?ga’s Mahayanasa?graha, upon which the presentation by the Eighth Karmapa here greatly relies. Asa?ga distinguishes between the “alaya-consciousness” and “the supramundane mind” (Skt. lokottaracitta, Tib. ’jig rten las ’das pa’i sems), which is said to come from the latent tendencies of listening that are the natural outflow of the very pure dharmadhatu (which is said to be equivalent to the dharmakaya). The supramundane mind is equivalent to nonconceptual wisdom (see the quote from the Mahayanasa?graha below). In Tibet, the explicit distinction between “alayaconsciousness” (Tib. kun gzhi’i rnam shes) and “alaya-wisdom” (Tib. kun gzhi’i ye shes) seems to have been made first in the texts of Dölpopa (such as his Mountain Dharma, Fourth Council, and Kun gzhi’i rab tu dbye ba khyad par du ’phags pa; see also Stearns 1995). Also Dölpopa’s disciple Sabsang Mati Panchen (1294–1376)—an early teacher of Tsongkhapa—refers to these two types of alaya in his commentary on the Abhidharmasamucchaya at length (Sa bzang ma ti pan chen 1977, fols. 85b6–86a1 and 86a6–86b2). Sparham 2001 says on this: “His contribution is to show how such a doctrine, explicit in several sutra passages, is also implicit in the writings of Asa?ga.” Likewise, the Sakya master Sakya Chogden accepts this terminology in his Shing rta chen po’i srol gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba. The Third Karmapa’s AC (fols. 13bff.) also describes such a distinction—though without using the specific terms “alaya-consciousness” and “alayawisdom.” His EDV (pp. 501.4–502.2) says that “alaya” is a general label for the three natures, while the imaginary and other-dependent natures are referred to as “alaya-consciousness.” The eight consciousnesses are the obscurations, while the four wisdoms are the stainlessness of these consciousnesses, thus being the perfect nature, with dharmadhatu wisdom being the matrix of all of these. Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé’s commentary on ZMND quotes some passages from AC and elaborates on this topic (Kong sprul blo gros mtha yas 2005, pp. 23–27). He says, “Alaya-wisdom is the Sugata heart, which was discussed above. It is taught to be the nature of mind in the prajñaparamita sutras and the Uttaratantra.” In terms of meaning, Lodrö Tayé makes the same distinction also in his commentary on Rangjung Dorje’s NY (Kong sprul blo gros mtha yas 1990, pp. 101–2). In his Treasury of Philosophical Systems (p. 145), Longchen Rabjam distinguishes between “the alaya of the actual real nature, which is the dharmadhatu, natural luminosity, the Tathagata heart” and “beginningless basic unawareness . . . which is called ‘the alaya of various latent tendencies.’” In an exposition of the Jonang School (Ngag dbang yon tan bzang po 2000, pp. 113, 230–33), it is said that the actual alaya-consciousness is the support for all tendencies of afflicted phenomena that constitute sa?sara. It exists in ordinary beings and ceases as such a support in the case of arhathood as well as on the first bodhisattva bhumi. From this bhumi onwards, when one speaks about the alaya, what is meant is not the alaya-consciousness but the support for all tendencies of completely purified phenomena (the remedies). This support is alaya-wisdom. Thus, in the most general sense, alaya-wisdom—or buddha nature—is the fundamental basis for the alaya-consciousness too. This is to be understood in the sense that it accommodates all phenomena of sa?sara and nirva?a, just as the sky accommodates a greater or lesser density of clouds.

246 The three characteristics are the same as the three natures (imaginary, other-dependent, and perfect nature).

247 Lines 294–303. 248 ACIP TD4028 @037B. 249 That means being actual effective causes and results and not just nominal ones.

250 The verse gives suchness, the true end (bhutako?i), signlessness, the ultimate, and dharmadhatu as the synonyms of emptiness.

251 Skt. vipakavijñana, Tib. rnam smin gyi rnam shes (another name for the alaya-consciousness).

252 Asvabhava’s commentary (P5552, fol. 262a; Taisho 1598) gives the further example of the alaya-consciousness being like an attic in which all kinds of things are jumbled up, such as a panacea amidst all kinds of poison. Although these might abide next to each other for a long time, the medicine is not identical with the poison, nor are any of the poisons its seed. The same applies for the latent tendencies of listening.

253 In this distinction here between dharmakaya and vimuktikaya, the latter designates the removal of only the afflictive obscurations, as it is attained by the arhats of the sravakas and pratyekabuddhas too. The dharmakaya refers to the removal of the cognitive obscurations. (Without relating these two kayas to the distinction between bodhisattvas and arhats, the Uttaratantra describes them as the two aspects of the relinquishment of these two obscurations in complete buddhahood. When talking about the dharmakaya as the actual state of buddhahood in general, it is understood that both types of obscurations have been relinquished in it. In this sense, it then includes the vimuktikaya.)

254 Often this term is translated as “swan,” but the Sanskrit ha?sa clearly refers to a special type of white wild goose that is common in India.

255 I.45–49 (P5549, fols. 11b.1–12a.6).

256 Verses 62–63.

257 I.56–57. These verses say that the skandhas and so on rest on karma and afflictions, these on improper mental engagement, and the latter on the purity of mind, which does not rest on any of them.

258 Both Dölpopa’s Mountain Dharma and The Fourth Council speak about buddha nature or the naturally abiding disposition as being unconditioned and a support for buddha qualities.

259 According to Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche, “these” refer to the nature of phenomena (in general) and the dharmadhatu (the disposition in specific) two sentences above.

260 Skt. vyatireka, Tib. ldog pa (a technical term for a conceptual mental image).

261 In the above, the Karmapa has presented the three criteria to identify a teaching as being of expedient meaning: the intention behind it, its purpose, and the explicit statement being refutable through reasoning.

262 These and their relation to the disposition are taught under this fourth point of the disposition in the first chapter of the Abhisamayala?kara.

263 For further details on the alaya being conditioned or unconditioned, its relation to buddha nature, and the “distinctive feature of the six ayatanas,” see the introduction of Sparham 1993 (esp. p. 33).

264 The second aspect of purity means being pure of all adventitious stains.

265 These are the only two types of connection that Buddhist epistemology and logic allow. Below, the Karmapa discusses their applications in “nature reasons” and “result reasons,” respectively.

360 In Praise of Dharmadhatu

266 This refers to Uttaratantra I.105–7 and I.136 and Asa?ga’s commentary (J61; neither, however, has the explicit wordimputed”).

267 This is how the dharmakaya is often explained—as the kaya of the nature of phenomena (dharmatakaya). For example, see Arya Vimuktisena's Abhisamayala?karav?tti (D3787, fol. 192a.7–8).

268 AC fols. 13bff. (for more details, see the endnote on DSC’s comments on verse 1 of the Dharmadhatustava).

269 Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentary on ZMND (Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas 2005, p. 183) says: “The Omniscient Seventh Karmapa, Chötra Gyatso, maintains that the emptiness endowed with the supreme of all aspects and the Sugata heart are equivalent. That the Sugata heart actually possesses the sixty-four superior qualities of freedom and maturation means that it is endowed with the supreme of all aspects. That these are not established as anything identifiable or any characteristic is the meaning of emptiness. Therefore, he holds that making this a living experience—cultivating mind as being lucid, yet nonconceptual—is Mahamudra meditation.” (The thirty-two qualities of freedom are the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, and the eighteen unshared qualities of the dharmakaya. The thirty-two qualities of maturation are the thirty-two major marks of the rupakayas.)

270 In Buddhism, an entity is defined as “something that is able to perform a function,” which includes not only material things but also all types of mind as well as processes that are neither matter nor mind (such as persons and continua).

271 Just to note, that the Karmapa for the second time here refutes both this position—which is no doubt still maintained by many Kagyüpas today and regarded as the epitome of the view of “other-emptiness”—and the claim further above that the alaya-consciousness is refined into mirrorlike wisdom is quite remarkable (to say the least) for a text that is supposed to be written to uphold the view of “other-emptiness.”

272 Interestingly and unlike with other opponents, the Eighth Karmapa uses honorific terms when he quotes Dölpopa.

273 Now, the Karmapa shifts into debate mode, which becomes a bit technical but very interesting, since it leads up to the analysis of Uttaratantra I.28 on all sentient beings having buddha nature. A simple example for a “nature reason” would be “A squirrel is an animal because it is a mammal.” Mammals (the reason) and animals (the predicate) share the same nature, in this case fulfilling the definition of an animal. An example of the second reason—a “result reason”—would be “Behind this house, there exists a fire, since there exists smoke.” Here, one infers the existence of the cause, fire (the predicate), from the existence of smoke as its result (the reason).

274 In nature reasons, both verbs must be is (or are) and may never be exist (obviously, one cannot say something like “A squirrel is an animal because mammals exist”). In the above case, the full reasoning that the Karmapa refers to would run, “Sentient beings are Buddhas, since buddhahood exists in them.”

275 Skt. pak?adharmata, Tib. phyogs chos. This is the first criterion for a correct reason—the set expressed by the reason must include the set expressed by the subject (for example, squirrels are included in mammals). In the above case, if being a sentient being and being a Buddha are held to be mutually exclusive, any reason that uses Buddha or buddhahood contradicts the above criterion and can never establish that the one is the other either.

276 Skt. anvayavyatireka, Tib. rjes su ’gro ldog. These refer to the second and third criteria for a correct reason—the set of the reason must be included in the set of the predicate and may never be outside of it (for example, all mammals are necessarily animals, and there is no mammal that is not an animal).

277 I.28 (Skt. sa?buddhakayasphara?at tathatavyatibhedata?/ gotratas ca sada sarve buddhagarbha? sarira?a?; Tib. rdzogs sangs sku ni ’phro phyir dang/ de bzhin nyid dbyer med phyir dang/ rigs yod phyir na lus can kun/ rtag tu sangs rgyas snying po can).

278 This refers to the paths of accumulation and preparation.

279 As mentioned before, this triad represents the criteria qualifying a statement as being of expedient meaning.

280 There are many volumes in Tibet as well as by Japanese and Western scholars on how Uttaratantra I.28 and the compound buddhagarbha? in it can be interpreted, so I will highlight just a few things here. As for the somewhat differing Sanskrit and Tibetan versions (see the above verse), sphara?a literally means “quivering,” “throbbing,” “vibration” or “penetration.” Vyatibheda, rendered as “undifferentiable” above (which corresponds more to the Tibetan dbyer med), literally means “pervading.” The third line in the Tibetan says “because the disposition exists.” The fourth line ends in can, which literally means “to possess,” but is also a common way to indicate a bahuvrihi compound in translations from Sanskrit, as in this case here. The two most basic renderings of the Sanskrit of this line with its compound buddhagarbha? are “all beings are always such that they contain a Buddha/have a Buddha as their core” (thus, my above translation factually renders garbha twice in order to cover both facets). Interestingly, in the early Tibetan translations, the verse ended in yin (“are”), which was only replaced by can at a rather late point. The most obvious reason for this is trying to avoid the reading “all beings are the Buddha heart,” which is immediately suggested to readers of Tibetan unfamiliar with the underlying Sanskrit. Nevertheless, especially some later Tibetan (and Western) commentators make a big point out of beings actually possessing the Buddha heart or even full-fledged buddhahood. This is a point evidently denied by the Eighth Karmapa here and is even contradicted by the preceding verse I.27 in the Uttaratantra (the order of the two verses being reversed in the Tibetan):

Since buddha wisdom enters into the hosts of beings, Since its stainlessness is nondual by nature, And since the buddha disposition is metaphorically referred to by the name of its fruition, All sentient beings are said to contain the Buddha heart.

This explicitly says that the disposition is not actual buddhahood or dharmakaya—the fruition— but a case of labeling the cause with the name of its result. So, one way to look at these two verses is in terms of cause, fruition, and their fundamental equality. In this way, the disposition is the cause for the fruition of the buddhakaya, with suchness indicating that this “cause” is not different from the result (the nature of the mind being always the same in sentient beings and Buddhas or throughout ground, path, and fruition). This is underlined by Uttaratantra I.144ab:

Its nature is the dharmakaya, Suchness, and the disposition.

As the Eighth Karmapa demonstrates, it is impossible to establish verses I.27–28 as strict logical proofs for buddha nature actually existing in all beings (they may only serve as indications or metaphors). This is also highlighted by the fact that, in the Tibetan tradition, buddha nature is typically considered as a “very hidden phenomenon,” which by definition does not lie within the reach of inferential valid cognition but can only be approached through valid Buddhist scriptures. As for other explanations on Uttaratantra I.27–28, there is hardly anything in the three known Indian commentaries. Neither Asa?ga’s commentary nor Vairocanarak?ita’s (eleventh century) very brief Mahayanottaratantra?ippa?i (eight folios) elaborate at all on these verses. Sajjana’s Mahayanottaratantrasastropadesa just glosses the first line of I.28 by saying that the dharmakaya is twofold: (a) the completely unstained dharmadhatu and (b) its natural outflow, the instructions on the principles of the profound and the manifold (this distinction being based on Uttaratantra I.145). Line I.28 should be understood as (b) (dharmakayo dvidha jñeya? dharmadhatu? sunirmala?/ tann i?yandas ca gambhiravicitranayadesaneti/ sa?buddhakayasphara?at iti jñeyam/). Among Tibetan texts, there are a few that go into the details of explaining and justifying the “proofs” in I.28 on a more conventional level. Mipham Rinpoche’s Synopsis of the Sugata Heart (fols. 282–94) says rightly that the usual brief glosses on the three parts of this “proof” do not penetrate the essential point of the Uttaratantra’s explanation of buddha nature. A common interpretation is that the dharmakaya—whether it is regarded as emptiness or wisdom—pervades all phenomena, that the suchness of Buddhas and sentient beings is of the same type in being nothing but emptiness, and that the existence of the disposition refers to nothing but being suitable to become a Buddha. However, with regard to both the first and the second lines, since both omniscient wisdom or emptiness equally pervade all phenomena without a mind too, it is hard to see that point as a specific reason for the mind of sentient beings having the potential to become Buddhas, while other phenomena don’t. As for the third line, the disposition cannot just be a mere potential that may evolve into the result of buddhahood, since then that result would actually be produced by impermanent causes and conditions and thus—by definition—be impermanent too. (As the Karmapa explained above, this is impossible for something like buddhahood, since Buddhas would then inevitably fall back into sa?sara at some point, and there would be huge differences between ground, path, and fruition, contradicting a primordially pure nature of the mind that does not change from sentient beings to Buddhas.) In explaining the first three lines of verse I.28, Mipham Rinpoche joins them with the Buddhist standard set of the four reasonings of (1) dharmata, (2) dependence, (3) performing a function, and (4) justification. As for the first line, he says that, though there is actually no earlier cause or later result as far as buddha nature is concerned, from the perspective of how things (mistakenly) appear, the result of the manifestation of the dharmakaya proves the cause of the disposition (see also below in this introduction), thus applying reasoning (2). On the second line, the text says that the basic nature of all phenomena in sa?sara and nirva?a—emptiness—is primordially inseparable from great luminosity, due to which Buddhas and sentient beings too are equal ultimately. Therefore, reasoning (1) establishes that what is projected by adventitious delusion and looks like a sentient being never moves an inch from this ultimate nature of phenomena, thus having buddhahood as its Heart. Also the sutras say that all phenomena have the nature of primordial luminosity (see the above quote from the Pañcavi?satisahasrikaprajñaparamita). Of course, this seems to invite the above-mentioned consequence that stones and such would also have the disposition. Thus, Mipham Rinpoche says, what is called “disposition” must be presented as the infallible cause for buddhahood, that is, the unfolding of the mind that is unmistaken about the nature of all knowable objects, once the two obscurations that have arisen by virtue of mind’s power are relinquished. But since what is not mind (such as stones) is without any process of accomplishing this through the path, despite it being inseparable in terms of suchness conventionally, there is no need to present it as having the disposition. Also, stones and such equally appear by virtue of the power of the mind—it is not that they are mental appearances by virtue of the power of external stones and the like. This is to be understood through the example of the relationship between what appears in a dream and the consciousness that dreams. As for the third line, sentient beings have the disposition of being suitable to become Buddhas, since the adventitious stains are established to be relinquishable, while the dharmakaya with its primordial qualities is established to exist without any difference throughout all phases from an ordinary being up through becoming a Buddha. That sentient beings have such a disposition of being suitable to become Buddhas means that they definitely have the Buddha heart, since it is only for them that there is a phase of actually becoming Buddhas, while the unconditioned nature of the dharmakaya is without any differences in terms of before and after or better and worse. Through this third reasoning, one understands that a result is produced from a cause, thus applying reasoning (3). This is not just inferring that a result comes forth through the mere existence of the cause, which is due to the following essential points: The disposition that is suchness (the nature of phenomena) is changeless; at the time of fruition, its nature is still without being better or worse; since the adventitious stains are always separable from it, no matter how long they have been around, it is impossible that the disposition ever loses its capacity for becoming a Buddha. The Kagyü scholar Surmang Padma Namgyal’s Full Moon of Questions and Answers (Zur mang padma rnam rgyal, pp. 32–33) explains verse I.28 through linking it with the same four reasonings and even adding the nine examples for buddha nature in the Uttaratantra. It says that the first line proves the cause by way of the result, applying reasoning (3) and examples 1–3. As for the second line, the true nature of Buddhas and sentient beings is the same and without any distinction of purity and impurity, referring to reasoning (1) and example 4. The third line shows that the result of the three kayas depends on both the naturally abiding and the unfolding disposition, thus applying reasoning (2) and examples 5–9 (reasoning (4) is said to be contained implicitly in all three lines).

Pöba Tulku’s (1900/1907–1959) Notes on the Essential Points of Mipham Rinpoche’s above Synopsis (Stong thun gnad kyi zin thun; photocopy of a digital file from Shechen Monastery, p. 17.5– 18.1) follows the latter’s matching of the three lines with reasonings (2), (1), and (3), referring to result, nature, and cause, respectively. He adds that the first one is a result reason (’bras bu’i rtags), while the latter two are nature reasons (rang bzhin gyi rtags). Also, when it is said that “sentient beings are Buddhas,” this only refers to buddhahood in the sense of natural purity (but not in the sense of being endowed with twofold purity). Therefore, it speaks about the true nature of the mind but not its result. Hence, there is no flaw of the result already abiding in the cause (as in the Sa?khya system). A Sakya commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara by Ngag dbang kun dga’ dbang phyug (1987, pp. 197–98) says that the first three lines of I.28, in due order, refer to that which is suitable for (a) the condition of the Buddha’s enlightened activity engaging it, (b) relinquishing the adverse conditions of the obscurations, and (c) the arising of all buddha qualities as the fruition. Thus, the Sugata heart at the time of it being a cause for buddhahood is defined as the dharmadhatu that has these three features. The Third Karmapa’s AC (fols. 43b–44a) refers to this verse in the context of explaining that the stained minds of ordinary beings, which appear as the five skandhas, are tainted forms of the buddhakayas. Thus, upon the stains disappearing, the dharmakaya as well as, physically, the supreme nirma?akaya of a Buddha radiate. Differing from the Eighth Karmapa’s presentation here and without going through all the technicalities of reasoning, his Lamp That Elucidates Other- Empty Madhyamaka (pp. 14–31) justifies the three reasons at length. To summarize, as for “the buddhakaya radiating,” it says that the stained minds of sentient beings change state into stainless wisdom due to the power of both the blessings of the already stainless wisdom of all Buddhas and the factor of wisdom within the stainless aspect of their own minds. As for “suchness being undifferentiable,” “the Tathagata heart,” “dharmakaya,” and so on are just different names with the same meaning. It is just the unobscured manifestation of the Tathagata heart that is called “dharmakaya.” This is found in the three phases of sentient beings (impure), bodhisattvas (pure and impure), and Buddhas (completely pure), but in itself is never tainted by any stains and is pure by nature. Thus, it is taught that, in the Tathagata heart, there is neither any being tainted by stains in the beginning nor any relinquishment of them later. In this way, the Tathagata heart is what appears as the three jewels (Buddha, dharma, sa?gha), since it is capable of bringing forth the accumulations of merit and wisdom on a temporary level as well as the excellence of self-sprung wisdom ultimately. Thus, throughout all these phases, in the Tathagata heart, there is never any difference in terms of it being a cause that can be separated from its result. As for “the disposition,” strictly speaking, the support of the path is the Tathagata heart with stains, the supports of practicing this path are the persons in the three yanas, and the nature of the path is the disposition. If it did not exist, even if Buddhas have arrived in the world, there would be no basis for the growth of the roots of true reality and thus no attainment of perfect buddhahood. Without going into further details (which are indeed infinite in this issue), I would like to present another more path-oriented example that adds to the perspective on the three “proofs,” especially “the buddhakaya radiating.” As we saw, the respective first lines in the above three verses I.27, I.28, and I.142 of the Uttaratantra equate buddhakaya, buddha wisdom, and dharmakaya, clearly indicating that the dharmakaya is not just mere emptiness but—as buddha wisdom—actively engages and communicates with sentient beings (this is also clearly suggested by the above gloss on the first line of I.28 in Sajjana’s Mahayanottaratantrasastropadesa). Also, as mentioned above, the Sanskrit term for “radiates” literally means “vibrates.” So, as far as the “awakening” of buddha nature in sentient beings is concerned, one may think of both Buddhas and sentient beings as violins, with the “Buddha violins” being in perfect tune and playing (teaching the dharma in various ways), while the strings of the “sentient being violins” are covered by various kinds of cloth and are somewhat out of tune. Still, as we know, all strings with the same tuning start to vibrate if just one of them resounds. Even if some strings are a little bit out of tune and/or are covered by a very light cloth, they still vibrate slightly. Of course, the better they are tuned and the less they are covered, the louder and clearer they resound. So one may say that proceeding on the path is a matter of progressively uncovering and tuning the strings, but they already have the perfect capacity to resound properly and thus make themselves noticeable by vibrating right at the very beginning of the play of the “Buddha violins” (which is a 24/7 display anyway), even if ever so inconspicuously. Thus, the path is basically a matter of sentient beings tuning in to the concert of all Buddhas. In brief, the first line of Uttaratantra I.28 refers to the “Buddha violins” vibrating and the third line to the “sentient being violins.” The fact that the former can actually make the latter vibrate too is shown by the second line, which states that their strings are of the same nature. For further discussions of Uttaratantra I.28, see Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentary on that text (Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas n.d., fol. 44a–b), which also briefly presents Ngog Lotsawa’s explanation, Mipham Rinpoche’s Lamp of Certainty (Pettit 1999, pp. 384–87), and especially Kano 2006.

281 P5550, fol. 62b.4.

282 According to Uttaratantra I.14–18, the three qualities of awareness are (1) the wisdom that knows suchness, (2) the wisdom that knows variety, and (3) internal personally experienced wisdom. The three qualities of liberation are (1) freedom from afflictive obscurations, (2) freedom from cognitive obscurations, and (3) being unsurpassable in terms of irreversible realization. 283 Tib. bsam gtan sa drug. These refer to the preparatory and main stages of the four mundane dhyana levels of the form realm, which are temporarily also cultivated on Buddhist paths.

However, it is only their aspect of calm abiding that is used as a support for the cultivation of supramundane superior insight into identitylessness.

284 Tib. ’od gsal chub pa’i byang bya yin. Mikyö Dorje plays here on the two syllables of the Tibetan word byang chub (enlightenment, buddhahood), byang meaning “to purify” and chub “to fully realize.”

285 Mi bskyod rod rje 2003, vol. 1, pp. 208–29.

286 As was said above, both Vairocanarak?ita’s Mahayanottaratantra?ippa?i and Sajjana’s Mahayanottaratantrasastropadesa are just very brief summarizing commentaries.

287 SC, p. 329.

288 Tib. dbu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad (in ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1992, pp. 471–72). In this context, compare also sutra 7 of the Ma??ukya Upani?ad, characterizing the supreme Brahman in its ultimate aspect: “Fourth, it is considered to be invisible, beyond the conventional, ungraspable, without characteristics, inconceivable, undefinable, the single essential ground, the utter subsiding of reference points, peace, bliss, nonduality—it is to be understood as atman” (ad???am avyavaharyam agrahyam acintyam avyapadesyam ekatmapratyayasara? prapañcopasama? santa? sivam advaita? caturtha? manyate sa atma sa vijñeya?).

289 This is another name of the Jainas.


290 As quoted in ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1975, fol. 287a–b.

291 Schmithausen 1973, p. 136 (the English translation is mine); see also pp. 131–35 and 137–

38. For further references see Takasaki 1966, Schmithausen 1971, Hookham 1991, Mathes 1996 and 2002, Stearns 1999, Zimmermann 2002, and Brunnhölzl 2004.

292 The following is just a brief sketch (for more details, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 186–93, 308–20, and 576–84). 293 Zimmermann 2002, pp. 64–65.

294 In an attempt of addressing this dilemma and its consequences—and contrary to what even the Gelugpa system itself says about nonimplicative negations everywhere else—the nonimplicative negation that is the lack of real existence is then assigned a unique dual status of being suitable as an object of both a conceptual consciousness and yogic perception. That this creates more problems than it solves is obvious, but another issue (see Brunnhölzl 2004).

295 Mi bskyod rdo rje 1990, pp. 45–46.

296 Quoted in Tulku Thondup, Practice of Dzogchen (Snow Lion Publications 1996, pp. 245–

46) in an excerpt from Longchenpa’s Tshig don mdzod (ed. Tarthang Tulku, fols. 897.4–899.2).

297 There may be Sanskrit manuscripts, but I was unable to evaluate the possible sources.

A Descriptive Bibliography of the Sanskrit Buddhist Literature, Vol. III: Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, Yogacara, Buddhist Epistemology and Logic (K. Tsukamoto, Y. Matsunaga, and H. Isoda, 1990, Kyoto: Heirakuji-Shoten, p. 148) mentions a Sanskrit manuscript of the Dharmadhatustava (located at the Institute for Advanced Studies of World Religions, New York, MBB-II-292, Nepali paper, nine fols.). Also the microfilm title list of the NGMPP (Nepal- German Manuscript Preservation Project; title list on CD available at www.uni-hamburg.de/ ngmpp) contains several titles that bear the names Dharmadhatustava and/or -stotra (however, these titles obviously were also used for other texts than the one by Nagarjuna and at least some of the manuscripts in this list are much longer).

366 In Praise of Dharmadhatu

298 Tib. nag tsho lo tsa ba tshul khrims rgyal ba.

299 I am indebted to Mr. Kazuo Kano for drawing my attention to this and translating the relevant points from the Japanese and Chinese in Hayashima 1987.

300 Just to note, the Derge Tengyur contains a Dharmadhatugarbhavivara?a (D4101, fols. 222b.1–223a.4) attributed to Nagarjuna. However, it neither comments on dharmadhatu nor garbha, but only very briefly on the famous formula of the Tathagata having taught the causes as well as the cessations of phenomena that arise from causes (ye dharma hetuprabhava? . . . ; already found in Digha Nikaya I.40).

301 The translation is based on a careful edition of the text based on the Tengyur versions DNP and the various Tibetan commentaries, with reference to the Sanskrit of verses 18–23 (as quoted in Naropa’s Sekoddesa?ika). Significant variants from D in NP will be footnoted as in this case: D stava NP stotra.

302 This is is the homage by the Tibetan translator.

303 This example is also found in the Mahabherisutra (N mdo tsa, fols. 181a–182b) and the A?gulimaliyasutra (N mdo ma, fol. 310a).

304 This example is found in the Dhara?isvararajasutra (P814, fol. 176b), which is also quoted in Asa?ga’s Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya on I.2 (J 6).

305 This is the third of the nine examples for buddha nature in the Tathagatagarbhasutra (D258, fol. 250a.2–b.2) and the Uttaratantra (I.105–7).

306 D/DSC sangs rgyas NP snying po (core, essence).

307 Buddha nature as a seed is also described as the sixth of the nine examples in the Tathagatagarbhasutra (D258, fol. 252a.1–b.3) and the Uttaratantra I.115–17. 308 This is the order of this line in N, P, and DSC, with most commentaries matching it with the order of afflictions in the next verse. D has sprin dang khug rna du ba dang, which corresponds to the order of this line in Sanskrit.

309 In ancient Indian cosmology, solar and lunar eclipses are regarded as the sun or moon being swallowed by the demon Rahu, since he envies them for their light. However, he is not able to retain them in his body and thus has to release them very quickly.

310 Interestingly, the A?guttaranikaya (I, pp. 253–54, 275; III, p. 16) also speaks about mind needing to be freed from the same five obscuring stains in order to regain its natural state. Also, Vasubandhu’s Mahayanasutrala?karabha?ya says that mind is similar to the sky by virtue of its luminosity, since all manifold phenomena are as adventitious with regard to the mind as are dust, smoke, clouds, and mist with regard to the sky (ed. Nagao, p. 18.43–44).

311 DNP nyon mongs DSC dri ma (stains).

312 NP/DSC gdungs D ldongs (blinded).

313 This corresponds to the eighth of the nine examples for buddha nature in the Tathagatagarbhasutra (D258, fols. 253b.1–254a.5) and the Uttaratantra (I.121–23).

314 The Tibetan of this verse is somewhat ambiguous. Hayashima 1987 offers a helpful Sanskrit reconstruction (without considering the meter) based on both the Tibetan and the Chinese, with the Sanskrit terms for the four conceptions being sufficiently obvious from the Chinese:

aha?kara-mamakara-vikalpabhya?, namasa?jña-nimittabhya? ca/ catu?vikalpa bhavanti, bhutabhautikais ca rupa?i bhavanti (the last two words having no correspondence in the Tibetan). Nimitta can mean “sign,” “characteristic,” “cause,” or “reason.” The Tibetan has the latter (rgyu mtshan), while the Chinese has “object/referent.” For the different interpretations of this verse by the commentators, see below.

315 The Tibetan for “very own awareness” in verses 29, 46, and 56 is so sor rang rig (Skt. pratyatmavedaniya), otherwise translated here as “personally experienced (wisdom).” 316 NP/DSC yod D dmigs.

317 Tib. dbu ma nyid.

318 D yin NP yis. Following PN, this line would translate as “Through dharmadhatu being their nature, . . .”

319 D brtags pas NP rtag par (most commentaries agree with D). Following PN, this line would translate: “Always rest in your self!”

320 See Asa?ga’s Mahayanasa?graha I.49.

321 NP/DSC gnas D nas. 322 D/DSC ’phel NP rgyas. 323 Literally, “black.” 324 Literally, “white.” 325 NP, DSC, and SS zab; D and all other commentaries zad. 326 After this, NP mistakenly repeat line 92d of the translation (line 92c: pad ma chen po’i rang bzhin gyis). 327 NP/DSC las D lam.

328 Tib. sna tshogs nor bu (probably Skt. nanaratna, which means “various gems”). Traditionally, in India, the oceans were regarded as the source of a great variety of precious gems. Texts such as the Uttaratantra (I.42–43) apply this metaphor to the dharmadhatu or buddha nature, saying that its jewel-like qualities of buddha wisdom and samadhi resemble the ocean’s immeasurable precious qualities (the same metaphor is also applied to the ten bhumis and their enlightened activities in IV.8–9). However, at least the Tibetan term sna tshogs nor bu seems to bear the same ambiguity as the English word “variegated” (meaning both various and multicolored). Thus, it can also be taken to suggest a “wish-fulfilling jewel” (Skt. cintama?i), which is exactly what all commentaries except LG do (there are, however, no Sanskrit sources for corresponding terms, such as *citrama?i).

329 NP add ’phags pa (noble). 330 NP add dge slong (monk). 331 Tib. tshul khrims rgyal ba.

332 P5254, fols. 358a–b. Note that Bhavaviveka refers here to the typical (Yogacara) triad of mind, mentation, and consciousness (representing the eight consciousnesses).

333 Ibid., fol. 361a.

334 Ed. Carelli, p. 65–66 (D1351, fol. 281a3–b5). 335 As mentioned above, this verse is also quoted in Asa?ga’s Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya. 368 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 336 D3935, fol. 296b.5–7. 337 P5866, verse 13. 338 P4534, fols. 101b–102b. 339 P5388, fol. 128a.6–7.

340 Verses 46–47; 65–66 (the last verse condenses Uttaratantra I.94cd and II.21cd–23ab). Just as an aside, at least in this text, Atisa speaks far too much about the luminous nature of the mind and its qualities to qualify as an exclusive and “pure” Prasa?gika (as he is claimed to be in most of the Tibetan tradition). In addition, he also speaks quite favorably of other elements of the Yogacara tradition. For more details on Atisa’s view and a translation of the Dharmadhatudarsanagiti, see Brunnhölzl 2007, pp. 75–91.

341 Rang byung rdo rje n.d., fol. 19b.

342 Ibid., fols. 76a–77a (for more details, see the endnote on verse 47 in the translation of DSC below).

343 Ibid., fols. 119b–120b. 344 Ibid., fol. 168a–b. 345 Rang byung rdo rje 2006b, pp. 555–56. 346 ’Gos lo tsa ba gzhon nu dpal 2003b, p. 7. 347 Ibid., pp. 12 (verse 2); 33 (17ab, 66–68); 46 (38–43); 47 (30–33, 18–22); 72 (78–87); 103 (22); 119 (17); 121 (75–76, 5–7); 122 (8); 181 (10c); 215 (36–37); 260 (82); 323 (2); 445 (75–76);

and 456–57 (43–45). For some of Gö Lotsawa’s comments, see the endnotes to the translation of DSC.

348 Chos grags rgya mtsho n.d., p. 31. 349 Chos grags rgya mtsho 1985, vol. 2, pp. 516–19. 350 Tib. karma phrin las pa phyogs las rnam rgyal. 351 Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. tra?, pp. 36 and 50. 352 Mi bskyod rdo rje 1990, pp. 41–42. 353 Mi bskyod rdo rje 2003, vol. 1, pp. 33–34. 354 Ibid., p. 349. 355 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 423.

356 Mi bskyod rdo rje 1996, pp. 537–40. For a detailed treatment of this, the Karmapa refers to his own massive commentary on the Drikung master Jigden Sumgön’s (1143–1217) famous Single Intention of the Genuine Dharma (dam chos dgongs gcig).

357 Tib. dkon mchog yan lag.

358 Dkon mchog yan lag 2005, pp. 94–95. This is very similar to what the Eighth Karmapa’s above discussion of the disposition says. In brief, sentient beings neither have the nature of a Buddha, nor are they Buddhas. Since sentient beings are nothing but illusory adventitious stains that—other than as the delusions of a mistaken mind—never existed in the first place, how could such nonexistents possess anything, let alone buddha nature? Also, since the charipodd_ acteristics of such adventitious stains and buddha nature are contrary in every respect, the one possessing the other would be like darkness possessing light or hatred possessing love. Sentient beings cannot be said to be Buddhas either, because sentient beings—as adventitious stains—are impermanent and disintegrate, whereas buddhahood is unconditioned, thus absolutely changeless, and can never become nonexistent. Thus, they cannot be the same.

359 Ibid., p. 291. 360 Ibid., pp. 296–97. 361 Tib. chos kyi byung gnas (aka bstan pa’i nyin byed). 362 Chos kyi ’byung gnas n.d., pp. 24–26. 363 Ibid., pp. 30–31. 364 Ibid., pp. 38–39. 365 Ibid., pp. 41–42.

366 According to the “official” Tibetan account of the “debate at Samyé” between the Indian master Kamalasila and the Ch’an master Hvashang Mahayana from Tun-huang, the latter was refuted by the former. Hvashang is said to have advocated an exclusive cultivation of a thoughtfree mental state—as representing realization of the ultimate—along with a complete rejection of the aspect of means, such as the accumulation of merit and proper ethical conduct. However, there are at least two indigenous Tibetan versions of the “debate at Samyé,” with the more verifiable one presenting a different account of Hvashang’s position. Also, Tibetan and Chinese documents on this debate found at Tun-huang differ greatly from the “official” Tibetan story, eventually presenting Hvashang as the winner and not Kamalasila. In any case, in Tibet, Hvashang’s name and view became the favorite polemical stereotype that continues to be freely applied—justified or not—to the views and meditation instructions of other Tibetan schools.

367 Ibid., pp. 52–55. 368 Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas 1990a, pp. 135–36. 369 Ibid., p. 140. 370 Ibid., pp. 146–48. 371 Ibid., pp. 157–58. 372 Ibid., pp. 160–61. 373 Ibid., p. 167. 374 Ibid., p. 173.

375 Ibid., p. 181. The annotations to NT by the Fifth Shamarpa, Göncho Yenla, (in Selected Writings on Vajrayana Buddhist Practice 1979, vol. 1, pp. 459–74) quote the same verse here. The term tirthika (lit. “forders”) was originally a neutral expression in India, meaning “follower of a spiritual system.” Specifically, the Jainas refer to their founding gurus by the name tirthakara (“ford-builder”). In Buddhist texts, the term came to be a general—and rather pejorative— term for non-Buddhist schools. TOK (vol. 2, p. 335) explains its Tibetan equivalent mu stegs pa in a more positive way as referring to those who dwell within a part (mu) of liberation or on a stepping-stone (stegs) toward it, although their paths are not sufficient to grant actual liberation from sa?sara.

370 In Praise of Dharmadhatu

376 Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas 1990b, pp. 123 and 124. For further details, see my forthcoming translations of said two commentaries.

377 Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas n.d., fols. 11a–12b. 378 Ibid., fol. 29b.

379 Tib. sa skya pan ?i ta kun dga’ rgyal mtshan.

380 Tib. rin po che’i phreng ba dri ma med pa zhes bya ba’i rgya cher ’grel pa (aka dri ma med

pa’i rgyan).

381 Sa pan kun dga’ rgyal mtshan gyi gsung ’bum (bod ljongs bod yig dpe rnying dpe skrun khang, Hsinhua 1992), vol. 3, pp. 392–93.

382 X.5 (P5549, fol. 44a.8–45b.5).

383 The wisdom that knows suchness sees how all phenomena actually are, while the wisdom of variety sees suchness as it appears as all kinds of different phenomena.

384 Ibid., pp. 409–12.

385 Lta ba’i shan ’byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer (Sa skya pa’i bka’ ’bum, vol. 13 Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1969, p. 18).

386 Tib. re mda’ ba gzhon nub lo gros.

387 Sdom pa gsum gyi rab tu dbye ba’i kha skong gzhi lam ’bras gsum gsal bar byed pa’i legs bshad ’od kyi snang ba (ibid., vol. 14). Differentiating the Three Vows is one of Sakya Pa??ita’s most famous texts (trans. by Jared Rhoton as A Clear Differentiation of the Three Codes, State University of New York Press 2005).

388 Tib. rong ston shes bya kun rig. 389 Tib. bsod nams rgyal mtshan.

390 Tib. glo bo mkhan chen bsod nams lhun grub. Other sources give his dates as 1441–1525 (for more details, see the section “Other Tibetan Commentaries on the Dharmadhatustava”). 391 SC, pp. 304–6.

392 For further details on these and the other commentaries on the Dharmadhatustava mentioned just below, see the section “Other Tibetan Commentaries on the Dharmadhatustava” and the endnotes to the translation of DSC.

393 Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, pp. 45–46 and 411. 394 Tib. bstan pa spyi ’grel (verse 11; Bhutanese ed. 1984, vol. 1, p. 688). 395 Tib. bka’ bsdu bzhi pa (ibid., p. 398).

396 Tib. gzhan stong dbu ma’i rgyan gyi lung sbyor (Taranatha 1983, vol. 4, pp. 539–40).

397 As in this case, the shentong tradition is also often referred to as “Great Madhyamaka,” further names being “Yogacara-Madhyamaka,” “Vijñapti-Madhyamaka,” and “the meditative tradition of the dharmas of Maitreya” (byams chos sgom lugs). However—and this is often a source of confusion—the first three of these terms are equally applied to various Buddhist systems other than shentong. For example, Atisa speaks about “the Great Madhyamaka beyond existence and nonexistence” as referring to the meaning of prajñaparamita as taught by Nagarjuna as opposed to its meaning taught by Asa?ga (Bodhipathapradipapañjika, fol. 280a.4–7), while Tsongkhapa uses Great Madhyamaka to refer to his own interpretation of Madhyamaka. The term “Yogacara-Madhyamaka” started as one of the earliest subdivisions of the Madhyamaka School in general, later being widely used for the approach of Santarak?ita and Kamalasila. “Vijñapti-Madhyamaka” is often understood as a name for Ratnakarasanti’s later synthesis of Yogacara and Madhyamaka.

398 Tib. gzhan stong snying po (ibid., p. 499).

399 Tib. ’dzam thang mkhan po blo gros grags pa. Dzamtang is an area in far eastern Tibet, where a few monasteries of the Jonang tradition, including its scriptural legacy, survive to the present day.

400 Blo gros grags pa 1993, pp. 94–95.

401 This is Dölpopa’s specific term for the Buddhist teachings that present true reality just as it is. Judging from the quotes throughout his texts, for him, these include many scriptures, such as the Anuttarayogatantras, the sutras that teach buddha nature, and—among treatises—the works of Maitreya, Nagarjuna, Asa?ga, Vasubandhu, Naropa, and Saraha.

402 Lo chen Dharmasri n. d., p. 377.1–4. Ascertaining the Three Vows is a text by Ngari Panchen Bema Wangyal (Tib. mnga’ ris pan chen pad ma dbang rgyal; 1487–1542), translated into English as Perfect Conduct (Wisdom Publications 1996).

403 Ibid., 296.1–5. 404 Dbu ma sogs gzhung spyi’i dka’ gnad (Collected Works, vol. 22, p. 450.3). 405 Tib. dam chos dogs sel (in ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1992, p. 521). 406 Tib rong zom chos kyi bzang po. 407 ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990, pp. 361–63. For a translation of this text, see Pettit 1999. 408 This kind of result is defined as “the exhaustion or relinquishment of the specific factors to be relinquished through the force of the remedy that is prajña.” It thus refers not to the usual notion of a result as some phenomenon that is produced by causes and conditions but to the absence of afflictive and cognitive obscurations. In this context of buddha nature here, it specifically refers to the absence of adventitious stains, which reveals the buddha qualities, thus emphasizing that these qualities are not conditioned or newly produced.

409 ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho 1975, fol. 286a.2–b.1. For a translation of this text, see Duckworth 2005.

410 Ibid., fol. 286b.3–6. 411 Tib. klong chen rab ’byams. 412 Ibid., fols. 293b.2–294a.2. 413 Tib. nges shes sgron me. 414 Tib. khro shul ’jam rdor. 415 See Pettit 1999, pp. 364–65. 416 Ibid., pp. 284–85. 417 Tib. bod pa sprul sku mdo sngags bstan pa’i nyi ma. 372 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 418 Stong thun gnad kyi zin thun (photocopy of a digital file from Shechen Monastery, pp. 14.4–15.3).

419 Tib. dag gzigs tshad ma. This is one of the two conventional kinds of valid cognition introduced by Mipham Rinpoche, the other being “valid cognition of seeing only what is right in front of one’s eyes” (tshur mthong tshad ma). The two ultimate valid cognitions are to realize the nominal and the nonnominal ultimate, respectively.

420 To wit, following Mipham Rinpoche’s above statements, Pöba Tulku says elsewhere (lta grub shan ’byed gnad kyi sgron me’i grel pa, Si khron mi rigs dpe skrun khang 1996, pp. 92, 120ff.) that the general feature of Nyingma scriptures is that both the second turning of the wheel of dharma (including the Madhyamaka scriptures related to it) and the third one (including texts like the Uttaratantra) are of definitive meaning—the former due to teaching the ultimate as the union of appearance and emptiness and the latter through teaching the ultimate as the concordance between the way things appear and how they actually are.

421 Bdud ’joms ’jigs bral ye shes rdo rje 1991, p. 211. 422 Ibid., pp. 173 and 265. 423 Ibid., p. 196. 424 Ibid., pp. 930–31. 425 Ibid. p. 207. 426 Ibid., p. 216. 427 Ibid., p. 301–2. 428 Tib. nyan ston shakya rgyal mtshan. 429 Tib. mkhan zur pad ma rgyal mtshan.

430 Tib. zab don gdams pa’i mig ’byed gser gyi thur ma. Mundgod: Drepung Loseling Printing Press, 1984, vol. 3, p. 147.

431 The same goes for the other praises by Nagarjuna—if any of their verses are quoted in Gelugpa sources at all, then only those that speak about typical Madhyamaka notions, such as emptiness, nonarising, or interdependence.

432 Chos kyi rgyal mtshan 2004, pp. 40–48 (verses 1, 20–21, 26, 30, 43–44, 101).

433 For details, see my forthcoming translation of the Fifth Shamarpa’s commentary A Concise Elucidation of the Abhisamayala?kara, which also includes the crucial parts of the Eighth Karmapa’s commentary.

434 Tib. mang yul ding ri glang ’khor. 435 Tib. ston pa chos dpal. 436 Tib. jo mo g.yang ’dren. 437 Tib. u rgyan pa rin chen dpal. 438 Tib. khro phu ba kun ldan shes rab. 439 Tib. gnyan ras dge’ ’dun ’bum. 440 Tib. slob dpon shes rab dpal.

441 Tib. rgya sgom ye shes ’od. 442 Tib. gnam mtsho ba mi bskyod rdo rje. In particular, the Karmapa received the transmission of Cutting Through (Tib. gcod) from him. 443 Tib. gzhon nu byang chub. 444 Tib. dge ’dun rin chen. 445 Tib. gsang phu. 446 Tib. shakya gzhon nu. 447 Tib. snye mdo ba kun dga’ don grub. 448 Tib. tshul khrims rin chen. 449 Tib. sba ras. 450 Tib. bi ma snying thig. These are the main Dzogchen teachings by Vimalamitra. 451 Tib. ka rma yang dgon. 452 Tib. ka rma snying thig. 453 Tib. g.yag ston sangs rgyas dpal. 454 Tib. sgam po zang lung. 455 Tib. dvags po. 456 Tib. kong po.

457 Tib. rkungs (Chos kyi ’byungs gnas 1972 has spungs). 458 Tib. bde chen steng. 459 The only source that reports a meeting between the Karmapa and Dölpopa at all is Chos kyi ’byung gnas 1972 (p. 208.1–2), but there is no mention of the latter being a disciple of Rangjung Dorje.

460 Tib. lkog phreng. 461 Tib. ka rma dgon. The main Karma Kagyü seat in Kham, established in 1173 by the First Karmapa.

462 Tib. sog chu. 463 Tib. ri bo rtse lnga. 464 Tib. phyag rgya chen po’i smon lam. 465 Tib. phyag rgya chen po lhan cig skyes sbyor khrid yig. 466 Tib. sku gsum ngo sprod. 467 Tib. rlung sems gnyis med.

468 For extensive bibliographies, see www.tbrc.org and Schaeffer 1995, pp. 14–18 and 136–39. 469 Tib. rgyal ba g.yung ston pa. 470 Tib. grags pa seng ge. 374 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 471 1981, p. 200. 472 Rang byung rdo rje n.d., fol. 12b (NT) and fol. 18a–b (NY).

473 As for commentaries by others on Rangjung Dorje’s above works, there are several on his ZMND, including those by the Fifth Shamarpa, Tsurpu Jamyang Chenpo, Tagbo Rabjampa Chögyal Denba, the First Karma Trinlépa, Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé, and the Fifteenth Karmapa. The latter two and the Fifth Shamarpa also wrote commentaries on NT and NY. Finally, there is a commentary by the Eighth Situpa on MM (see also the bibliography).

474 1332 was another Monkey Year, but Rangjung Dorje was on his long journey to and stay at the Chinese court at that time and not in Upper Dechen.

475 In The Blue Annals (p. 492), Chos kyi ’byung gnas 1972 (p. 210.7), and Tshal pa kun dga’ rdo rje 1981 (p. 100), the entry of the year 1326 is followed by a number of events, the last one being the composition of DSC. The next explicit dates are 1328 in the first two texts and 1329 in the latter.

476 There is some unclarity here, since both the commentaries by Jamgön Kongtrul and the Fifteenth Karmapa (the latter basically throughout copying the former) gloss this as the Pig Year of the sixth sixty-year cycle of the Tibetan calendar, which would make it 1335, since this is the only Pig Year within that cycle during Rangjung Dorje’s lifetime. However, as this date is clearly contradicted by NY being explicitly referred to in AC, the only Pig Year before the AC’s indubitable composition in 1325 and after ZMND’s in 1322 is 1323, which fits well with the overall chronology. Of course, there are still earlier Pig Years in Rangjung Dorje’s life (1311 and 1299), but it seems highly unlikely that he composed NY eleven or even twenty-three years (at age fifteen) before ZMND. Also, while NY says itself that it was composed at Upper Dechen in Tsurpu (Central Tibet), all sources agree that, upon his return from the Chinese court, Rangjung Dorje went through Minyag and other areas of Kham in eastern Tibet in 1335, teaching the dharma extensively. Tshal pa kun dga’ rdo rje 1981 (p. 103), Dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003 (vol. 2, p. 941), and Situ Chos kyi ’byung gnas (fol. 111a) all say that he returned to Tsurpu only during the ninth month of that Pig Year (November/December) and then stayed at Chimpu in Samyé during that winter for six months.

477 Since this was written before the time of Tsongkhapa and his followers (who are well known to hold that buddha nature is nothing but sentient beingsemptiness in the sense of a nonimplicative negation), it refers to the position of Ngog Lotsawa and some of his followers, explicitly appearing in the former’s Theg pa chen po’i rgyud bla ma’i don bsdus pa (Dharamsala 1993, fol. 4a2–3).

478 AC fols. 10a–12b (the last line refers to NT). 479 Here, AC quotes the same passage from this text (P5549, fols. 11b.1–12a.6) as Mikyö Dorje’s above discussion on buddha nature. 480 AC fols. 13a–23b. 481 Ibid., fols. 25b–28b. 482 Ibid., fols. 116b–120b. 483 For a list and explanation of the eighteen emptinesses, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 117–22.

484 There is a nice ambiguity about this “distraction” here. In all the passages of Asa?ga’s commentary where this expression appears, it is always the compound sunyatavik?iptacitta, which can mean either a mind distracted by emptiness, from emptiness, or toward emptiness. From the various contexts in this commentary, it can be gathered that the ambiguity of this compound is probably not by chance. For, the point is always that beginner bodhisattvas are distracted by a wrong understanding of emptiness (either misconceiving it as destroying phenomena or as some separate entity to be focused on deliberately) and thus distracted from its correct understanding, which is explicitly identified as the principle of what emptiness means in terms of the Tathagata heart. This ambiguity is reflected in the various Tibetan versions of Asa?ga’s commentary in the Tengyur and its quotations in other texts (such as AC), which—in a rather inconsistent manner—take this Sanskrit compound to have either the one or the other meaning (respectively using la, las, or gyis after stong pa nyid).

485 Ibid., fols. 122a–124a.

486 It is interesting to note here that later commentators on ZMND, such as Tagramba and Jamgön Kongtrul, elaborate on a typical shentong doxographical hierarchy of Vaibha?ikas, Sautrantikas, Mere Mentalists, and Madhyamikas (rangtong), with the Great (Yogacara-) Madhyamikas (alias Shentong-Madhyamikas) at the top, while AC does not make any such distinctions beyond the first two schools. Rather, the text just refers to the Buddha’s teachings and presents exemplifying quotes from both Nagarjuna’s Bodhicittavivara?a and Maitreya’s Mahayanasutrala?kara on equal footing, thus highlighting the fundamental unity of Yogacara and Madhyamaka also with respect to this gradual approach. That this is nothing new or unusual can be clearly shown through the ample scriptural evidence that, at least in terms of the progressive stages of meditation in the mahayana, this approach is shared by almost all Indian Madhyamikas and Yogacaras (see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 295–310).

487 Rang byung rdo rje 2006b, p. 600.3–4 and n.d., fols. 99a–103b.

488 This means mental direct cognition, which perceives outer objects just like the five sense consciousnesses.

489 As mentioned before, depending on the perspective, the relationships and classifications of “immediate mind,” “afflicted mind,” and “stainless mentation” with regard to the sixth and the seventh consciousness vary (for more details, see the translation of DSC below).

490 In other texts, there are also explanations of the empty aspect of the alaya-consciousness changing state into the dharmadhatu wisdom and its lucid aspect into mirrorlike wisdom.

491 It may be noted that Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentary on NT supports this by frequently quoting the Uttaratantra (eleven times), the Mahayanasutrala?kara (ten), the Dharmadhatustava (eight), and the ZMND (five).

492 This is also evidenced by Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentary relating the above texts to the respective passages in NY by quoting the Mahayanasutrala?kara twenty-three times and the Mahayanasa?graha five times (the Uttaratantra also appears five times).

493 Interestingly, Düjom Rinpoche explicitly confirms that Rangjung Dorje’s presentation of the naturally abiding and unfolding disposition (the Tathagata heart), wisdom, and the eight consciousnesses in his AC, NT, and NY accords with the Uttaratantra, the Mahayanasa?graha, and also the Madhyantavibhaga (Bdud ’joms ’jig bral ye shes rdo rje 1991, p. 202).

494 The Eighth Situpa’s commentary on this verse says that the ground for everything in sa?sara and nirva?a is the purity of mind, that is, the basic element or Tathagata heart. This is the ground of purification but not what is to be purified, since in its own essence, there is nothing whatsover to be purified (quoting Dharmadhatustava verses 17 and 19). Also, mind’s nature is the unity of being lucid and empty, since there is no being lucid apart from being empty and no being empty apart from being lucid. Those who explain lucidity and emptiness as two separate things and their union as these two things becoming associated stand outside the teachings of the Tathagata. In terms of Mahamudra, Situ Rinpoche justifies the Kagyü approach of pointing out instructions with or without tantric empowerment and clarifies that it is in full accord with Madhyamaka. Adventitious stains are identified as the dualistic phenomena of apprehender and apprehended produced by the adventitious mistakenness of mind about itself. The dharmakaya is the manifestation of the fundamental nature of the ground in which all such adventitious dualistic phenomena are relinquished (quoting Dharmadhatustava verse 37). This is followed by the description of the eight consciousnesses changing state into the four wisdoms and the three kayas as explained in AC and NY (Chos kyi ’byung gnas n.d., pp. 24–31. To note, this commentary also often refers to ZMND and AC, particularly to their above description of how mind is deluded about itself).

495 Rang byung rdo rje 2006b, pp. 527, 525.5, and 528.4. 496 AC fols. 166a–169a.

497 See Kambala’s Alokamala and Prajñaparamitanavaslokapi??artha?ika; Ratnakarasanti’s Triyanavyavasthana, Madhyamakala?karav? tti-Madhyamapratipadasiddhi, Prajñaparamitopadesa, and Madhyamakala?karopadesa; Jñanasrimitra’s Sakarasiddhisastra (esp. p. 506.9) and Sakarasa?grahasutra (verse 2); and Abhayakaragupta’s Munimatala?kara. 498

Many of Santarak?ita’s and Kamalasila’s texts attempt to integrate Yogacara into Madhyamaka (and not the other way round, as Kambala and Ratnakasanti usually did), fitting the model of the three natures into the presentation of the two realities. The main feature of this approach is to equate the imaginary and the other-dependent natures with false and correct seeming reality, respectively (done before already by Bhavaviveka and Jñanagarbha). For details, see Santarak?ita’s Madhyamakala?kara and its autocommentary, in which he speaks about the existence of self-aware mind, as opposed to external objects, on the level of seeming reality (even quoting Yukti?a??ika, verse 34 as support). In the famous verses 92–93, he declares a true follower of the mahayana to be one who rides the chariots of both Yogacara and Madhyamaka (quoting La?kavatarasutra X.256–57). His Tattvasiddhi—not only assimilating Yogacara but also vajrayana to Madhyamaka—moreover says that mind is pure by nature and naturally luminous, like a crystal, which is to be personally experienced through self-awareness (svasa?vedya).

Ultimately, consciousness is unarisen, neither having nor lacking aspects (akara), since it is not the result of any inferior type of cognition under the sway of normal causality. In line with La?kavatarasutra X.257f, the highest cognition as the final result is wisdom that lacks appearance (nirabhasajñana), being at the same time nondual in terms of any subject and object of awareness. Kamalasila’s Madhyamakaloka equates the other-dependent nature with all three characteristics of correct seeming reality (P5287, fol. 162b.6–7) and says that mere mind, being established through itself, exists on the level of seeming reality, while external objects do not, being just mental aspects (fol. 185a.4–b.5). The text moreover reconciles the stances of the two classical sutras on which Madhyamikas and Yogacaras respectively rely in order to distinguish between the expedient and the definitive meaning (fol. 162a.7–b.6): “Nonarising and so forth have been taught as being the definitive meaning in the noble Ak?ayamati?nirdesasutra.

Therefore, it is certain that precisely these statements of nonarising and so on are called ‘ultimate.’ You may wonder, ‘If this is the case, then how could the Bhagavat teach in the noble Sa?dhinirmocanasutra that all phenomena lack a nature by intending the three natures, that is, the threefold lack of nature?’ There is no fault in this. . . . A mind that has fallen into either of the two extremes of superimposition and denial does not enter the very profound ocean of the way of being of the ultimate, which is free from the two extremes. Consequently, for that purpose, through pronouncing the teaching of nonarising and so forth exclusively in terms of the ultimate and also teaching its underlying intention of the threefold lack of nature, the Bhagavat taught the middle path free from the two extremes. Therefore, he established nothing but the definitive meaning in his scriptures. Thus, it is not the case that Madhyamikas do not accept the presentation of the three natures.” For further details on all this, see Lindtner 1997 (esp. pp. 192–97, 199–200).

499 Tib. gar dbang chos kyi dbang phyug. 500 Tib. rtogs brjod lta sgom spyod ’bras kyi glu (lines 132–35). 501 Tib. bdud ’dul rdo rje.

502 Tib. go nyams lta ba’i glu (lines 73–90). For complete translations of these two songs, see Brunnhölzl 2007, pp. 344–57 and 430–40.

503 Tib. bkra shis ’od zer.

504 Rang byung rdo rje 2006a, vol. ja, p. 128.

505 AC fols. 13bff. (for more details, see the endnote on DSC’s comments on verse 1 of the Dharmadhatustava).

506 Mi bskyod rdo rje 2003, vol. 1, p. 221. 507 Ibid., pp. 33–34. 508 TOK, vol. 3, p. 24. 509 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 461; vol. 2, p. 544.

510 In this context, it is interesting to note that Hopkins 2002 (pp. 308–9) reports H.H. the Dalai Lama having said that “the fundamental innate mind of clear light—a topic only of Highest Yoga Mantra—is what Maitreya is finally getting at in his Sublime Continuum of the Great Vehicle Uttaratantra” and that this “fundamental innate mind of clear light can be considered an other-emptiness bold by Hopkins in that it is empty of being any of the coarser levels of consciousness.” 511 Phyi nang grub mtha’i rnam bzhag bsdus don blo gsal yid kyi rgyan bzang (Collected

Works, ’Dzam thang ed., vol.10, fols. 243.7–244.1 and 270.6–7).

512 Blo gros grags pa 1993, p. 88.1–2. 513 TOK, vol. 2, pp. 546–49.

514 Yogacara texts usually say that the perfect nature is the other-dependent nature being empty of the imaginary. However, when considering their detailed descriptions of what exactly this means, the two statements often come down to the same purport (for more details, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 462–71 and esp. 485–86).

515 TOK, vol. 3, p. 61.

516 Skt. prayoga, Tib. sbyor ba. These four are as follows:

(1) outer objects are observed to be nothing but mind (upalambhaprayoga/dmigs pa’i sbyor ba)


(2) thus, outer objects are not observed (anupalambhaprayoga/mi dmigs pa’i sbyor ba)

(3) with outer objects being unobservable, a mind cognizing them is not observed either

378 In Praise of Dharmadhatu (upalambhanupalambhaprayoga/dmigs pa mi dmigs pa’i sbyor ba)

(4) not observing both, nonduality is observed (nopalambhopalambhaprayoga/mi dmigs dmigs pa’i sbyor ba).

These four steps are found in La?kavatarasutra X.256–57, Maitreya’s Mahayanasutrala?kara VI.8 and XIV.23–28, Dharmadharmatavibhaga (lines 182–85, 264–75), Madhyantavibhaga I.6–7ab, as well as in Vasubandhu’s Tri?sikakarika 28–30 and Trisvabhavanirdesa 36–37ab. Ratnakarasanti’s explanations in his Prajñaparamitopadesa (P5579, fols. 236.4–250.1), Prajñaparamitabhavanopadesa (P5580, fols. 250.1–251.2), Madhyamakala?karav?tti (D4072, pp. 234–

37), Kusumañjali (D1851, fols. 82.7–84.3), and Bhramahara (D1245, fols. 378.7–379.3) resemble these four steps more or less closely (he sometimes refers to them as the four yogabhumis). In addition to the La?kavatarasutra, he also relates them to the Avikalpapravesadhara?i (P810; Meinert 2003 confirms this as referring to fols. 5a.3–6b.2) and a verse from the Guhyasamajatantra.

Also some other Yogacara-Madhyamaka texts quote the La?kavatarasutra and refer to these four stages, commenting on the last one from a Madhyamaka perspective, such as Santarak?ita’s autocommentary on his Madhyamakala?kara (ACIP TD3885@079A–B) as well as Kamalasila’s Madhyamakala?karapañjika (P5286, fols. 137a–138a) and first Bhavanakrama (ACIP TD3915@033A–B).

517 These are the seven topics of presenting buddha nature in the Uttaratantra—Buddha, dharma, sa?gha, the basic element, enlightenment, its qualities, and its enlightened activity.

518 This refers again to buddha nature’s impure phase in sentient beings, its partly pure and partly impure phase in bodhisattvas, and the completely pure phase of Buddhas.

519 Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 81–82.

520 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 549–50. Interestingly, it is precisely this common distinction by shentongpas— Mere Mentalists asserting consciousness to be ultimately existent, while shentongpas hold wisdom to be ultimately existent—that Pawo Rinpoche Tsugla Trengwa’s commentary on Santideva’s Bodhicaryavatara considers as just an attempt to sell brass as gold, since it still means to entertain some reference point for the clinging to real existence, which does not get any better by just giving it a more sophisticated name. See also the above quote from Mipham Rinpoche’s Commentary on the Madhyamakala?kara on just using sophisticated labels without realizing the actual Dzogchen—personally experienced luminosity.

521 Tib. bem stong (lit. “material emptiness”). This refers to a mere blank nothingness as opposed to mind’s nature as the union of awareness and emptiness.

522 Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 550–51. The Jonangpa Lodrö Tragba’s Fearless Lion’s Roar says that, since the ultimate reality from the perspective of the wisdom of the noble ones is the primordially unchanging essence of the inseparability of dhatu and awareness, it is really established in the sense of being permanent, stable, and solid (Blo gros grags pa 1993, p. 50). Also Mipham Rinpoche’s Dbu ma sogs gzhung spyi’i dka’ gnad (Collected Works, vol. 22, p. 450.2–3) says that, in the rangtong system, it is impossible for anything to exist ultimately. In the shentong system, if something does not exist ultimately, it is the seeming, while what exists ultimately is the ultimate as such.

523 Dol po pa shes rab rgyal mtshan 1998, pp. 138–39 and 255.

524 Tib. padma dbang mchog rgyal po.

525 Thanks to Anne Burchardi for directing my attention to this rare text and providing me with a copy.


526 Zur mang padma rnam rgyal, pp. 60.3–61.6.

527 Tib. sa bzang ma ti pan chen blo gros rgyal mtshan.

528 Tib. ka? thog dge rtse pan chen. His personal name was Gyurmé Tsewang Chogdrub (Tib. ’gyur med tshe dbang mchog grub), and he was considered a reincarnation of several Nyingma masters, foremost of Katog Chenga Jambabum (Tib. ka? thog spyan lnga byams pa ’bum; twelfth century), a teacher of the Second Karmapa. Among his many teachers were Jigmé Trinlé Öser (Tib. ’jigs med phrin las ’od zer; 1745–1821)—one of the four main disciples of the great tertön Jigmé Lingba (1729–1798)—and the famous Gelugpa master Janggya Rölpé Dorje. Having been educated at Katog—one of the six main seats of the Nyingma School—he later founded Gédsé Dralé (Tib. dge rtse bkra legs) Monastery with a thousand monks in northern Tibet, spread the Katog tradition in Golog and numerous other parts of eastern Tibet, and restored many Nyingma monasteries there. Being a very prolific author on sutras, tantras, and termas (his collected works fill ten volumes) and having flourished at an important time of Nyingma revival, his writings indeed deserve close study.

529 This clearly echoes the statement in Dölpopa’s Mountain Dharma just above. In terms of the relation of rangtong and shentong to the two latter turnings of the wheel of dharma, Gédsé Panchen’s Rgyal bstan ’khor lo gsum dgongs pa gcig tu rtogs pa rton pa bzhi ldan gyi gtam (Sichuan ed., vol. 1, fol. 116) says that the second turning teaches the self-empty seeming (kun rdzob rang stong), while the third turning teaches the other-empty ultimate, the profound nature of phenomena (don dam gzhan stong chos nyid zab mo).

530 Padma Namgyal explicitly considers views (4), (6), and (7) to be good positions.

531 Lo chen Dharmasri n.d., pp. 373.5–374.5.

532 Apart from presenting both rangtong and shentong as ways to eliminate reference points (which—as can be seen below—is usually only said about rangtong), this passage is remarkable in several other ways. First, the text makes a distinction between Yogacara texts and the Uttaratantra, while most shentongpas take at least all works by Maitreya, Asa?ga, and Vasubandhu as a unit, though they often split the Yogacara tradition into “Mere Mentalists” (who are said to assert self-aware consciousness as ultimately existent) as opposed to the actual shentongpas (Maitreya and so on). That the latter approach is obviously not Lochen’s is indicated by the fact that he considers both kinds of texts as the works of Shentong-Madhyamikas, though his above twofold distinction of what is empty of what in terms of the three natures closely resembles the way in which most shentongpas set off Mere Mentalism from shentong proper.

533 These are by Kalkin Pu??arika’s commentary on the Kalacakratantra, called Vimalaprabha (Tib. ’grel chen dri med ’od); Vajragarbha’s commentary on the Hevajratantra, called Hevajrapi??artha?ika (Tib. rdo rje’i snying ’grel); and Vajrapa?i’s commentary on the Cakrasa?varatantra, called Lak?abhidanaduddh?talaghutantrapi??arthavivara?a (Tib. phyag rdor stod ’grel).

534 ’Ju mi pham rgya mtsho c. 1990, pp. 361–64. As mentioned above, despite treating the topic of shentong in several of his texts, Mipham Rinpoche declared himself repeatedly to be a rangtongpa/Prasa?gika. The issue of his affiliation with one or the other side—or simply lack thereof—is highly complex and hotly disputed among both Tibetan and Western scholars. However, in his case more than in anybody else’s, only a careful and exhaustive study of his works and the way in which he uses the terms rangtong and shentong can shed light on this. For, as Duckworth 2005 (p. 140) points out, according to the definitions of these terms by Dzamtang Khenpo Lodrö Tragba, Mipham Rinpoche is neither a rangtongpa nor a shentongpa, while according to the definitions by Lochen Dharmasri, he can be said to be both. For further details on Mipham Rinpoche’s position, see Pettit 1999, Duckworth 2005, and the English translations of his commentaries on the Madhyamakavatara and Madhyamakala?kara.

535 Tib. zab don khyad par nyer gcig pa (for a translation, see Mathes 2004). Not that Gelugpa scholars are the final authority on this, but it should be noted that, while they all agree on Dölpopa’s view being completely off the mark, there are some who say that Sakya Chogden’s approach of “other-emptiness” cannot be refuted.

536 Taranatha n. d., vol. 17: Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa’i snying po’i don rnam par bshad pa sngon med legs bshad (pp. 571–759) and Sher snying gi tshig ’brel (pp. 759–83).

537 It is interesting to note here that even someone like J. Hopkins, who so closely followed the Gelugpa tradition almost exclusively for nearly four decades, lately seems to have developed great fascination with Dölpopa’s view, speaking very favorably about it, showing that its usual Gelugpa critique often misses the point, and even translating Dölpopa’s Mountain Dharma (Hopkins 2006).

538 That some of the reasons to engage in such disputes were not only philosophical in nature or about “finding the truth” is another story. Apart from the mere doctrinal differences between the increasingly predominant Gelugpa tradition on the one side and the other Tibetan schools on the other, also as a result of hegemonic conflicts, the rangtong-shentong controversy sometimes came to be a strange mix of philosophical and political issues, including vying for significant sponsors for one’s own monastic seat. In this situation, the shentong view often served as a kind of common “corporate identity” for those who were opposed—both doctrinally and politically—to the Gelugpa hegemony. It would certainly go too far to say that the nineteenthcentury nonsectarian Rimé movement in eastern Tibet, which included many Sakya, Nyingma, and Kagyü masters, was a political movement or even “shentong-only,” but the sense of a common doctrinal ground was definitely one of its underlying forces.

539 Mi bskyod rdo rje 2003, vol. 1, pp. 313–14. 540 Ruegg 2000, pp. 80–81.

541 It should be noted that the very early Tibetan doxographies are more faithful to the Indian tradition, while they tend to become more and more removed, schematized, and ramified the later they are.

542 Even Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé’s Treasury of Knowledge says that the conventional terms “real aspect” and “false aspect,” which are based on the system of the Mere Mentalists, are just applied by Tibetans as they please. All that is found in the original texts are the two types of passages that establish the consciousness that appears as an outer referent as being a real or a false aspect of consciousness (TOK, vol. 2, p. 545; Elizabeth Callahan informed me that a similar statement is found in Sakya Chogden’s Nges don gcig tu grub pa, p. 538.2–4). In Indian philosophy in general, the distinction between “Aspectarians” (sakaravadin) and “Non-Aspectarians” (nirakaravadin) is very common. Somewhat simplified, the former assert that mind apprehends an object via or as a mental “aspect” or image that appears to consciousness, thus being mind’s actual cognitive content. Non-Aspectarians deny such an aspect (or at least its real existence). The Tibetan tradition often refers to the former as “Real Aspectarians” (rnam bden pa) and the latter as “False Aspectarians” (rnam brdzun pa). Among Buddhist schools, the Sautrantikas and certain Yogacaras are usually said to be Aspectarians, while the Vaibha?ikas and certain other Yogacaras are held to be Non-Aspectarians (or False Aspectarians). With regard to the Yogacaras, however, the situation is rather complex and there are variipodd_ ous (later) interpretations as to what exactly the terms Aspectarian and Non-Aspectarian refer to. Often, Yogacaras such as Dignaga and Dharmapala are classified as the former and Asa?ga, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Kambala, and so on as the latter (for further details on the distinction, see Lindtner 1997, pp. 175–82, 198–99). However, there is no mention of either such names or the corresponding positions in their own writings, and it is highly questionable whether the standard descriptions of these terms adequately represent their view (for example, Asa?ga, Vasubandhu, and others say that, in being the imaginary nature, both the apprehended and apprehending aspects are equally unreal, while not asserting any ultimately real or independent kind of consciousness). Also, it seems that, in their treatment of all beings except Buddhas, all Yogacaras must be considered Aspectarians, just differing as to whether they take these aspects to be conventionally real as a part of consciousness (that is, as part of the other-dependent nature) or not even conventionally real (in being just the imaginary nature). Later Indian Madhyamikas, such as Jñanagarbha, Santarak?ita, Kamalasila, and Haribhadra, refer to the notion of a really existent consciousness or self-awareness in both the Aspectarian and Non- Aspectarian versions and unanimously refute them (without, however, mentioning specific persons). It is mainly in a number of late Indian works dating from the eleventh and twelfth centuries—usually written as or containing doxographies from a Madhyamaka point of view— that the explicit distinction between Aspectarians and Non-Aspectarians with regard to the Yogacaras is found (though by no means always described in the same way). These texts include Jitari’s Sugatamatavibhagabha?ya (D3900, fols. 46a.8ff.), Bodhibhadra’s Jñanasarasamucchayanibandhana (P5252; ACIP TD3852@43B), Maitripa’s Tattvaratnavali (P3085, fols. 128a.1– 129a.3), Sahajavajra’s Sthitisamucchaya (P3071, fols. 100b.3–101b.5) and Tattvadasaka?ika (P3099, fol. 179b.3–4), Ratnakarasanti’s Prajñaparamitopadesa (P5579, fol. 168a.4f), and Mok?akaragupta’s Tarkabha?a (P5762; ed. R. Iyengar 1952, pp. 69.11–19: despite not explicitly mentioning the names Aspectarian and Non-Aspectarian, the text distinguishes them in almost literally the same way as Jitari’s Sugatamatavibhagabha?ya and also includes parts of Jñanasrimitra’s Sakarasiddhi, followed by a Madhyamaka refutation). Both the Tattvadasaka?ika (P3099, fols. 180a.5–181b.1) and the Prajñaparamitopadesa (P5579, fol. 168a.4f) apply this distinction not only to the Yogacaras but even to the Madhyamikas. The Nirakarakarika (P5294)— a Madhyamaka text by the Nepalese pa??ita Nandasri—is devoted solely to a refutation of consciousness without aspects. However, when looking at the ways in which the distinction between Aspectarians and Non-Aspectarians is described in some of these texts, one wonders what fundamental difference is at stake here, since they rather seem to represent just two slightly different ways of describing the same fact—pure self-aware consciousness being ultimately free from all stains of the imaginary aspects of both apprehender and apprehended. For example, the above-mentioned passage in both the Sugatamatavibhagabha?ya and the Tarkabha?a says, “Here, some say that everything that is commonly known as the natures of the body and objects is this very consciousness. Since this consciousness is self-awareness, it is in no way apprehender and apprehended. Rather, the natures of apprehender and apprehended are superimposed through imagination. Therefore, the consciousness free from the natures of imaginary apprehender and apprehended is real. Others say that, ultimately, consciousness is unaffected by all the stains of imagination, resembling a pure crystal. These imaginary aspects are nothing but mistaken, appearing only due to being displayed through ignorance. Thus, a so-called ‘apprehended’ is entirely nonexistent. Since this does not exist, an apprehender does not exist either.” In any case, apart from all such doxographical references in Madhyamaka texts, there is only one explicit and rather late (eleventh century) Indian dispute about various issues within the distinction between Aspectarians and Non-Aspectarians that is actually recorded. Here, the Non-Aspectarian stance is advocated by Ratnakarasanti in his Madhyamakala?karopadesa


(P5586), Triyanavyavasthana (P4535), and Prajñaparamitopadesa (to wit, just as Asa?ga and others, he considers both the apprehended and apprehending aspects as false, while saying that it is solely mind’s underlying sheer lucidity—prakasamatra—free from these two that is real; P5579, fol. 161a.5–161b.4). The Aspectarian position is mainly represented by Jñanasrimitra’s Sakarasiddhi and Sakarasa?graha (ed. A. Thakur, mainly pp. 368.6–10 and 387.8–23) and also by Ratnakirti’s Ratnakirtinibandhavali (ed. A. Thakur, 1976, esp. p. 129.1–12; none of the texts in these two editions are contained in the Tengyur), both quoting and rejecting Ratnakarasanti’s Non-Aspectarian approach in the Prajñaparamitopadesa. However, it is hard to regard this as a dispute purely within the Yogacara School itself, since at least Ratnakarasanti consistently exhibits a clear synthesis of Yogacara and Madhyamaka, being more often than not considered as a Madhyamika. Also, it should be noted that the issues at stake in all these texts are rather complex and not just a matter of whether consciousness has aspects or not (which might be real or illusory). Thus, much more research needs to be done to correctly understand such debates within their respective contexts and perspectives. For example, as the title of Ratnakirti’s Citradvaitaprakasavada (Thakur, pp. 129–44) suggests, it elaborates on mind’s lucidity (prakasa) manifesting or appearing in both a nondual (advaita) and a manifold way (citra). It says that whatever appears within a nonconceptual consciousness (nirvikalpajñana) is nondual or one, but at the same time is a complex and ever-shifting collection of diverse aspects (vicitrakarakadambakam), such as the color white, the sound “ga,” a sweet taste, a fragrant smell, a soft tangible object, and a feeling of happiness or its opposite. In other words, both awareness and what appears in it—which are essentially not separable in terms of a nonconceptual experience—are nondual and manifold (p. 129.19–21). As this shows, the meaning of Ratnakirti’s term citradvaita—despite it literally corresponding to the Tibetan sna tshogs gnyis med pa (nondual variety)—obviously does not really match what Tibetan doxographers understand by it as characterizing one of the “subschools” of “Real Aspectarian Mere Mentalists” (Tib. sems tsam rnam bden pa), that is, perceiving consciousness being one, while the aspects of its perceived object are many. Another example is Santarak?ita’s autocommentary on his Madhyamakala?kara (verses 22–60), which extensively refutes both the Aspectarian and the Non-Aspectarian stances. This includes the three possible epistemological relationships among Aspectarians (a single coarse object being perceived by a single consciousness, all the many distinct aspects of that coarse object being perceived by a single consciousness, and these many objective aspects being perceived by a corresponding number of aspects of consciousness). Throughout, however, Santarak?ita never refers to his refutations as applying only to Yogacaras (in fact Kamalasila’s Madhyamakala?karapañjika relates a great number of the above verses to various other Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools), let alone taking said three relationships between subject and object as Yogacara “subschools” with distinct names. In any case, the much later Tibetan labels “Real/False Aspectarian Mere Mentalists”—with all their respective subclassifications— refer to the objective aspect that appears to consciousness as being really existent as mind or just being an illusory and mistaken appearance, respectively. However, there are numerous discrepancies in various Tibetan doxographies as to which Indian masters belong to these categories and their supposed subschools (moreover, the adduced scriptural sources—especially for the latter—are usually rather flimsy).

543 To be sure, all of the above are commonplace in Western and Japanese academia, of course with the exception of those—mostly American—scholars who just copy and repeat the default positions of Tibetan (in particular Gelugpa) doxographies with their own agendas like mantras. This fact can hardly be overemphasized, especially since there are still reputed scholars who—despite ample historical and scriptural evidence to the contrary—rely on ramified artificial distinctions of subschools of Madhyamaka and “Mind-Only” (understood as the “idealist” chool that asserts mind or the other-dependent nature to be ultimately really existent), even claim that such a “school” was founded by Asa?ga, and use unattested fantasy terms such as “Cittamatrin” for the followers of such a “school” as if all such imputations were hard and fast facts accepted by everyone (for more details, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 333–73 and 457–501).

544 Madhyamakala?karapañjika (ACIP TD3886@88A).

545 To be sure, there are some (late) Indian precursors who divide all Buddhist views into these four schools, but this is by no means the only classification (and arguably not even the main one) found in Indian texts.

546 Verse 7. 547 2000, p. 122. 548 In Dreyfus and McClintock 2003, p. 71.

549 Apart from Rangjung Dorje not even using the terms rangtong and shentong, while they are the cornerstones of Dölpopa’s discussions, there are many other differences between the views of these two masters. For details, see Schaeffer 1995 (esp. pp. 25–36), Stearns 1995 and 1999, Hopkins 2002 (pp. 273–315) and 2006, Mathes 1998 and 2004, Burchardi 2007, and my forthcoming more extensive study of the Third Karmapa’s view (titled Luminous Heart).

550 As is explained below in DSC, “the very profound dharmakaya” refers to the two rupakayas.

551 Rang byung rdo rje 2006b, pp. 509.2–510.3. 552 Ibid., p. 501.5. 553 Ibid., p. 611.3. 554 Ibid., p. 497.2–3. 555 Ibid., p. 514.4–6. 556 Rang byung rdo rje n.d., fol. 116b.

557 This is amply documented in works such as his Distinction between the Two Traditions of the Great Charioteers and The Origin of Madhyamaka. Similar statements are found in TOK and, for Prasa?gika-Madhyamaka and the Madhyamaka taught in the third turning of the wheel of dharma, respectively, in Lo chen Dharmasri n.d., pp. 377–78.

558 This refers to the tantras.

559 As quoted in TOK vol. 2, p. 553. For more details on the shentong issue, see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 445–526.

560 The same expression is found in the title of Sönam Sangbo’s commentary too.

561 It would be especially interesting to gain access to the latter commentary to see how someone during the very formation of the Gelugpa School explains the Dharmadhatustava and whether this might differ from the other commentaries and/or the fully established stance of the later Gelugpa tradition.

562 For details, see Stearns 1999. 563 Tib. rong ston shakya rgyal mtshan. 564 Tib. ’phan po na len dra. 384 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 565 Tib. mthong ba don ldan. 566 Tib. mtshal chen dgon pa.

567 Tib. ri khrod pa. It is not clear who this pa??ita was. There is mention of a Savari dbang phyug in the biography of Pa??ita Vanaratna as one of the teachers of the latter, but to my knowledge there are no records of a Savari ever having come to Tibet or Sönam Sangbo having traveled to India (there is also no mention of any Savari in the extensive list of Indian pa??itas who visited Tibet in Dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba 2003, p. 510ff.). Vanaratna himself only came to Tibet in 1426, that is, eight years after Sönam Sangbo wrote his commentary. Incidentally, in 1418, another Indian pa??ita—Sariputra from Bodhgaya —is reported to have visited Tibet.

568 Bsod nams bzang po n.d., p. 631.

569 Tib. rdzong sar. 570 Tib. khams bye bshad grva. 571 Tib. ’jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse chos kyi blo gros. 572 Tib. sangs rgyas gling pa. 573 Tib. dpang lo tsa ba blo gros brtan pa. 574 Tib. ’khon. 575 Tib. sa skya rin chen sgang bla brang. 576 Tib. rgyal tshab dar ma rin chen. 577 Tib. ’jam dbyangs don yod dpal ldan.

578 Mr. Kazuo Kano reported that this commentary also is listed in Dpal brtsegs bod yig dpe rnying zhib ’jug khang 2005 (unfortunately, he did not record the entry no.), so it might be published in the not so distant future.

579 Tib. rgyal tshab dam pa kun dga’ dbang phyug. 580 Tib. e va? chos ldan. 581 Tib. r(v)a yon tan dpal. 582 Tib. yon tan chos rgyal. 583 Tib. tshul khrims rgyal mtshan. 584 Tib. ’jam dbyangs kun dga’ bsod nams. 585 Tib. dkon mchog lhun grub. 586 The other commentary is by Sakya Chogden.


587 The translation of this commentary is based on a careful edition (published in a separate volume) of the single extant dbu med manuscript, comparing it with the various available typeset or digitized versions, which are all based on that manuscript (see Bibliography). However, the quotes in the text often vary considerably from what is found in the Tibetan canon (in some cases, they are completely corrupted). Thus, if not otherwise indicated, in translating them, I follow DP, only indicating significant variants in DSC (for all these variants, see the Tibetan editions in the bibliography, which usually just reproduce whatever is said in the manuscript). 588 Numbers in refer to the folio numbers of the manuscript.


589 The last two sentences correspond to the Mahameghasutra (except for the reference to Sukhavati, which is only found in the other three sutra sources mentioned in the introduction). 590 In all available editions of DSC, fol. 2 is missing in its entirety. Thus, everything that follows in up through the first verse of the Dharmadhatustava is inserted here, with the outline and its wording being inferred with the help of Dzogchen Ponlop Rinpoche from the traditional style of Tibetan commentarial outlines and from what follows below in the text. 591 All Tibetan versions of DSC have just sems, but the context and the root text clearly suggest sems can, which literally means “one who has a mind” or “mind-bearer.”

592 As presented above, Rangjung Dorje’s ZMND (ch. 1, lines 1–12) explains the whole process of delusion—mind being unaware of its own nature—in a similar way. Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentary on this section of ZMND (pp. 27–28) elaborates: What is mind as such ignorant of? It is ignorant of mind as such, the Buddha heart, which just resides as the play of the three kayas. Through what is it ignorant? Through mind as such itself. With regard to mind’s own essence, which is not established as anything whatsoever, its two facets that actually are a union—the unborn fundamental ground and its unceasing radiance—are misconceived as self and other respectively. Therefore, mind is ignorant of this essence through its own unimpeded creative display of appearing as if it were distinct subjects and objects. In which way is it ignorant? The alaya is stirred through mind being formed in a way that it moves toward objects, which is done by the seventh consciousness of mentation. This movement, which is like water and waves, gives rise to the afflicted mind, which is always embraced by the set of four afflictions that are associated with it—self-conceit, attachment to the self, the views about a real personality, and ignorance. Thus, sa?sara appears for false imagination. . . . The repetitive formation through this movement of the afflicted mind and the alaya stirring each other mutually is false imagination. Since the phenomena of sa?sara, which do not exist by their nature yet appear as if they were solidly real, are brought about due to that process, it is the way in which mind is ignorant. Therefore, the lucid aspect of mind as such is referred to here by the term “the seventh consciousness of mentation,” and the aspect of not recognizing its own essence is taught to be ignorance, which identifies innate ignorance. Thus, through the movements of the seventh consciousness of mentation, also the bright remedial actions are formed, which represent correct imagination. What abides as its own unstained essence is “stainless mentation,” which is contained in the unfolding disposition and represents the wisdom of equality at the time of the ground, as well as the cause of a Buddha’s qualities of freedom {the phrase starting with “as well” is inserted here from below, when this point is discussed again}. . . Therefore, the seventh consciousness of mentation that is explained here in the ZMND and shapes mind in such a way that it moves toward objects is presented as mentation in general, without differentiating it into the afflicted mind and stainless mentation. When the other six collections of consciousness arise and cease, it inputs their potencies into the alaya . . . Therefore, the autocommentary repeatedly refers to it as the “immediate mind” as its synonym.

. . . In brief, out of the ocean of the alaya, mentation moves like waves on water and shapes the mind, which brings about sa?sara. So the alaya is sa?sara’s basis or cause, while mentation is its condition. For more details on the process of delusion in terms of the eight consciousnesses, especially on the two aspects of mentation—afflicted and immediate mind—see also below. 593 SC (pp. 306–7) glosses “dharma” in “dharmadhatu” as nonabiding nirva?a and the “dhatu” of that as its cause, that is, the wisdom that is ever-present throughout all the phases of ground, path, and fruition. If this wisdom is not seen, the cart of the afflictions draws it onto the paths of sa?sara. However, if the dharmadhatu is explained to be just a nonimplicative negation, its being identified here as circling in existence and residing in all beings is meaningless, since a nonimplicative negation cannot be drawn into sa?sara by karma and afflictions and pertains equally to everything that is not a sentient being. On the opposite pole, Döl (p. 138)—of course being far from identifying the dharmadhatu as a nonimplicative negation—glosses it as pervading all of the inanimate world and its inhabitants.


594 Traditionally, every Indo-Tibetan Buddhist treatise has to fulfill four criteria, the first three of which are explicitly stated here. (1) Proper subject matters from a Buddhist point of view are as described in Asa?ga’s Viniscayasa?graha?i (fol. 205a.3–7). He speaks about six types of specious and three kinds of proper treatises. The former include meaningless texts (such as on whether crows have teeth), those with wrong meanings (from a Buddhist perspective, such as discussing an eternal soul), treatises on cheating others, heartless ones (such as on warfare or killing animals), and those that mainly focus on study or debate. Proper treatises are meaningful ones (in a Buddhist sense), those that lead to relinquishing suffering, and those that mainly focus on practice. (2) The purpose of the text means that it must serve as a convenient avenue for penetrating the intended meaning of the teachings. (3) The essential purpose is to engage in this meaning with enthusiasm and eventually attain a Buddha’s omniscience. (4) The proper connection refers to the one between the purpose and the essential purpose. Also, in terms of the subject matter, the earlier parts of the contents of the text must be properly connected with the following ones.

595 This is a paraphrase that combines parts of Asa?ga’s commentary on Uttaratantra I.32–33 and I.153–55 (J29, 74, 76; P5526, fols. 92a.6–b.3, 117a.1–3, 118b.4–8). The immediately following passages in DSC on the four obscurations and their four remedies are paraphrases of fol.

92b.1–6.

596 I.32–33ab. As for my translations from the Uttaratantra and the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya, if the English varies from the Tibetan, I have followed the Sanskrit in J. 597 I.33cd. 598 As mentioned before and just below, “the very profound dharmakaya” refers to the two rupakayas.

599 IV.11 (the same four are found in Uttaratantra I.34).

600 Tib. pa tshab lo tsa ba (born 1055). As mentioned in the introduction, he was the main person to translate and introduce Candrakirti’s Madhyamaka texts in Tibet.

601 Tib. dbu ma’i snying po bsdus pa. Apart from what is available in a few quotations, this text is not preserved.

602 Due to a scribal error in the manuscript, fol. 5 has been numbered no. 6. The same continues for fols. 6 and 7. After this, the mistake was obviously noticed, with fol. 8 being numbered as “upper 9” (dgu gong ma). From fol. 9 onwards, the correct numbering is resumed. I abstained from repeating this confusion here.

603 XXIV.18–19. 604 P774, III.6 (ACIP KD0106@14B). 605 This is an explanatory tantra of the Guhyasamajatantra (P84).

606 The same quote is also given—sometimes slightly differing—in ZMND (lines IX.6–9), AC

(fols. 117b–118a), TOK (vol. 3, p. 40), and Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas 1990a (p. 76) and 2005

Endnotes 387 (p. 227). 607 XXIV.8–9. 608 ACIP TD3829@89A.

609 Lines 19–22 and 26–29 (ed. Mathes 1996). DSC has a paraphrase in prose in a different order, somewhat corresponding to the prose version of the text in the Tengyur (P5523; lines 13–14 and 16–17, ed. Mathes): gnyis dang ji ltar mngon par brjod pa ni yang dag ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa ste chos kyi mtshan nyid do/ gsung ba dang/ ’dzin pa dang/ brjod par bya ba dang/ brjod par byed pa khyad par med pa ni de bzhin te chos nyid kyi mtshan nyid do.

610 III.10d. 611 Lines 3cd.

612 Lines 7bd–8ac. In the Tibetan Tengyur, this text is listed under the well-known master Candrakirti’s (sixth/seventh century) works and appears as an appendix to his Madhyamakavatarabha?ya. However, the text itself says that it was translated into Tibetan by Candrakirti himself and the translator ’Gos khug pa lha btsas, who lived in the eleventh century. There was indeed an eleventh-century master by the name Candrakirti (the Tibetan tradition calls him “the lesser Candrakirti”), who was a disciple of Jetari (tenth/eleventh century), one of the teachers of Atisa.

613 The quote is actually Mulamadhyamakakarika XXV.19a.

614 The Tibetan yongs su grub pa usually renders the Sanskrit parini?panna—the “perfect nature” that stands for the ultimate reality among the three natures presented in the Yogacara teachings, the other two being the “imaginary nature” and the “other-dependent nature.” Just above, the Third Karmapa lists “what abides ultimately, the ultimate in terms of seeing this mode of being, the ultimate in terms of practice, and the ultimate in terms of being free from stains,” which he then below equates to the three kinds of the ultimate—in terms of object, practice, and attainment—as presented in Maitreya’s Madhyantavibhaga. Moreover, he uses the terminology of the three natures throughout DSC in an extensive way. Given this, the most natural reading here is to understand yongs su grub pa as referring to the perfect nature in the sense of the actual ultimate. However, literally, that Tibetan term means “perfectly established” and thus could also be understood as being established by reasoning. Taking into account the above considerations and that Rangjung Dorje here quotes from a Madhyamaka text, the obvious pun may very well be intended. In other words, the ultimate may be seen as being perfectly established in the sense of being the perfect nature and/or as being perfectly established by reasoning.

615 Yukti?a??ika, verse 45.

616 Ibid., verse 54. 617 Lines 63ab. The first line in DSC varies (nga la bsgrub bya med pas na), saying, “Since I have nothing to prove, . . .” 618 Verse 71.

619 DSC don dam, which is strange. Also, just below, DSC clearly says that these two are instances of seeming reality.

620 III.11–12. In Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Madhyantavibhaga (Sanskrit ed. Nagao

1964, p. 41, lines 18–21. ACIP TD4027@012A–B), the “ultimate” (lit. “supreme object or goal”; Skt. paramartha) is shown to have three different meanings that depend on the three possible


ways of analyzing this compound in Sanskrit. (1) Tatpuru?a: “The ultimate in terms of the object is suchness in the sense of being the object of supreme wisdom.” (2) Karmadharaya: “The ultimate in terms of attainment is nirvana in the sense of being the supreme object.” (3)

Bahuvrihi: “The ultimate in terms of practice is the path in the sense that the supreme is its object.” Here, the path is primarily understood as nonconceptual wisdom. This corresponds exactly to Bhavaviveka’s presentation of the meaning of paramartha found in his Tarkajvala (ACIP TD3856@59B).

621 Usually, the unchanging perfect nature is said to be the nature of phenomena and the unmistaken perfect nature the nondual nonconceptual wisdom that realizes it.

622 Verse 12 (DSC line 2: nus pa’i phyir dang don byed dag).

623 Verse 32 (DSC las kyi ’bras bu yod pa dang/ ’gro ba dag kyang shin tu brjod/ de’i rang bzhin yongs shes dang/ rnam par dben pa dag kyang bstan).

624 For the discussion of the two realities in Rangjung Dorje’s AC (fols. 116b–124a), see the above introductory section on his view.

625 XVIII.39. 626 This is Chapter XVI of that text.

627 These are the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, and the eighteen unshared qualities of a Buddha (for details, see below).

628 This refers to the thirty-two major marks of a Buddha (for details, see below). 629 Ratnavali, III.12–13ab. 630 In the latter, this is found mainly in Chapter XI on the fruition. 631 I.9–10. 632 Verse 38. 633 Verse 28. 634 Verse 29 (DSC omits line 1). 635 I.4 and I.6.

636 Skt. dravya, Tib. rdzas. 637 Verses 40–41 (line 4 in DP has de rdzogs pas instead of de rtogs pas, but Skt. tadbodhad confirms the latter).

638 DSC ’khor ba’i gnas lugs ’khor ba. This could also be read as “The basic nature of sa?sara, sa?sara, . . .”

639 This is Nagarjuna’s autocommentary on his Pratityasamutpadah?dayakarika. 640 P761. This passage is also quoted in Asa?ga’s Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya (J 22; P5526, fol. 88a.2–4). 641 I.85–86.

642 This sutra is only preserved in Chinese translation (Taisho 668). 643 The nonconceptual and the illusionlike samadhis refer to the mind of a bodhisattva in meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment, respectively. The latter term is usually transipodd_


lated as “postmeditation,” which at best seems to be too neutral a word and has the connotation of just taking a break. Rather, “subsequent attainment” refers to the level of realization of emptiness that is attained as a result of having rested in meditative equipoise. Subsequent to rising from such equipoise, the realization of emptiness that has been gained while resting in it informs and enhances the seeing of the illusionlike nature of all appearances and experiences while actively engaging in the six paramitas during the time between the formal sessions of meditative equipoise. This is the reason why “illusionlike samadhi” is often used as a synonym for this phase. For more details on the bhumis and their qualities, see verse 75ff. 644 XIV.45–46.

645 Mikyö Dorje 1990 (p.33) agrees on the first two paramitas and explains the latter two as follows. The meaning of bliss is to be free from all aspects of movements of body and mind that occur for as long as one is an ordinary being all the way through the end of the mind stream of a bodhisattva on the tenth bhumi. The meaning of permanence is to neither cling to the impermanent and deceiving world nor to solely conceive of permanent nirva?a. 646 P760.48 (for parts of the above paragraph, see Wayman, trans. 1974, pp. 101–2 and 97).

“The eight realities of the noble ones” refer to two ways—produced (k?ta) and unproduced (ak?ta)—of explaining the usual four realities of the noble ones. Unlike sravakas and pratyekabuddhas, the Tathagatas also accomplish the unproduced set of these four realities, which is based on buddha nature and culminates in the full revelation of all its qualities (ibid., pp.

96–98). 647 I.35ab. 648 I.51cd.

649 P810 (DSC rnam par mi rtog pa la ’jug pa’i mdo), fol. 4a.4–5a.1. The Avikalpapravesadhara?i itself uses the example of a wish-fulfilling jewel instead of a beryl, and the first and fourth of the four characteristics are called “nature” (Skt. prak?ti; indicating the five skandhas as what is to be relinquished) and “attainment” (Skt. prapti), respectively. For more details, see below. 650 P761.31.

651 P814, fol. 176ff. The actual name of that sutra is Tathagatamahakaru?anirdesasutra, but it is usually better known as the Dhara?isvararajaparip?cchasutra. In that text, the coarsest stains of the beryl are removed with a woven cloth and by soaking it in an alkaline solution. The next layer is cleansed through soaking it in an acid solution and wiping it with a woolen towel. Finally, the most subtle stains are removed through soaking it in pure water (or a herbal solution) and polishing it with the finest cotton. In due order, these steps correspond to the Buddha first teaching the vinayadharma to make beings who are fond of sa?sara renounce it; secondly teaching on emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness; and finally teaching the irreversible wheel of dharma free from the three spheres (agent, recipient, and action) in order to make beings engage the actual object of the Buddhas. This passage is also quoted in Asa?ga’s Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya on I.2 (J 6) and Nagarjuna’s Sutrasamucchaya (ACIP TD3934@189B–190A). 652 This quote is also found in Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya on I.2 (J 6; P5526, fol. 77b.5–6). 653 I could not locate the quote as it stands, but the sutra abounds with statements of the same meaning.

654 I.22. 655 DSC dang po DNP mngar po. 390 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 656 Verse 37. 657 DSC ma rig bag chags kyis; em: ma rig bag chags kyi sa (las). 658 According to what was said before, one would rather expect “being confined in ore” here.

659 DSC omits the fifth obscuration. 660 Details on this can, for example, be found in the Uttaratantra’s first chapter.

661 Skt. *svabhavavibhaga? pratityasamutpada?, Tib. ngo bo nyid rnam par ’byed pa can gyi rten ’brel (I.19).

662 Skt. *priyapriyavibhaga? pratityasamutpada?, Tib. sdug pa dang mi sdug pa rnam par ’byed pa can gyi rten ’brel. The Mahayanasa?graha (I.28) mentions a third kind of dependent origination, “the dependent origination of experience” (Skt. *upabhoga? pratityasamutpada?, Tib. nyer spyod can gyi rten ’brel) without elaborating on it. According to TOK (vol. 2, pp. 427–28), this describes the way in which the six consciousnesses (the primary minds) arise and cease based on the four conditions. Here, the experiencer is the mental factor of feeling, and what is experienced is the mental factor of contact between object and consciousness. Feeling further produces the mental factor of impulse in the following way. In the case of a pleasant object, a pleasant feeling arises, which in turn leads to desire and the impulse of not wishing for the mind to become separated from that object. In the case of unpleasant or neutral objects, respectively, aversion and the wish to be separated from such objects or indifference and no such wish arise. Together, the three mental factors of feeling, contact, and impulse are said to blemish the primary minds.

663 Skt. vipakavijñana, Tib. rnam par smin pa’i rnam par shes pa. This is another term for the alaya-consciousness.

664 In DSC, the passage from here up to the end of this paragraph is erased. It is inserted from Mahayanasa?graha I.48.

665 The above is an abridged paraphrase of I.45–48 (P5549, fols. 11b.1–12a.4). 666 J 72 (P5526, fol. 116a.4–5).

667 II.27–28. In DSC, line 2 of the second verse says sbyor bstan pa’i dbang don la, and DP also have bstan pa’i. However, the Sanskrit reads dhiranam, suggesting brtan pa’i, which is confirmed by Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentary on the Uttaratantra.

668 Pratityasamutpadah?dayakarika, verse 7. Some scholars hold that verses 6–7 are not part of the original stanzas but were added later. In any case, both verses are found in Nagarjuna’s text as it appears in the Tibetan canon and in an eighth-century Tibetan manuscript from Tunhuang (PT 769), with verse 6 being identical to Yukti?a??ika 12. In general, the above verse is among the most famous and often-cited ones in the literature of the mahayana. Gampopa’s Ornament of Precious Liberation (Sgam po pa 1990, p. 289) says that it originally stems from the Gaganagañjaparip?cchasutra (P815). Except for the third line, it is also found in the Srimahabalatantra (P36, fol. 34a.6–7). It features as one of the most essential verses in both Maitreya’s Uttaratantra (I.154) and Abhisamayala?kara (V.21). To my knowledge, there are at least nine more works in which it appears: Buddhagho?a’s Suma?galavisara?i I.12 (in Pali;

attributes the contents to the Buddha); Nagarjuna’s Kayatrayastotranamasyavivara?a (P2016, fol. 83a.7); Asvagho?a’s Saundarananda (paraphrase XIII.44) and Suklavidarsana (a summary of the Salistambasutra that begins with this verse); Nagamitra’s Kayatrayavataramukha


(paraphrase verse 106); the Bodhisattvabhumi (Wogihara ed., p. 48; prose); Sthiramati’s Madhyantavibhaga?ika (P5534, fol. 36a.5); the Namasa?giti?ika ad VI.5 (which attributes it to Nagarjuna); and the Mahayanasraddhotpada (Suzuki’sutrans., p. 57; prose).

669 The Tibetan literally says “washed,” so this may refer to cleansing cotton (LG silk) with hot steam.

670 Skt. kha?ika, Tib. rdo rgyus. Monier Williams has “chalk” and Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo says “a mineral that, when beaten, becomes like vulture downs.” All this matches the features of asbestos, which is a white, fibrous mineral that is fire-resistant and can easily be spun into yarn (see also Webster’s International Dictionary, p. 126). RT (p. 633) also has rdo rgyus, Döl (p. 142) has rdo dreg (pitch).

671 DSC ’dod chags las skyes dri ma can DNP ’dod chags la sogs dri ma can.

672 As mentioned before, “correct imagination” refers to increasingly more refined—but still more or less dualistic—mental processes or creations that serve as the remedies for respectively coarser kinds of obscuring mental creations and misconceptions (false imagination). Initially, on the paths of accumulation and preparation, such remedial activities are conceptual in a very obvious way, such as meditating on the repulsiveness of the body as an antidote against desire. More subtle approaches would include meditating on momentary impermanence or on personal and phenomenal identitylessness. From the path of seeing onward, all coarse conceptions of ordinary sentient beings (even the remedial ones) have ceased. However, as mentioned above, during the first seven bhumis, there are still subtle concepts about suchness, and on the last three bhumis, about attaining the final fruition of buddhahood. In other words, to realize that the dharmadhatu is naturally unarisen, unceasing, empty, peaceful, and luminous is the remedial fire of wisdom that consumes any ideas to the contrary. However, since that fire of wisdom still depends on what it relinquishes (and still has some reference points with regard to the dharmadhatu), it must eventually and naturally subside too, once even its most subtle fuel (the apprehending of said characteristics on the bhumis) is burnt up. At this point, buddhahood— complete freedom from all reference points—is revealed, unblurred by anything to be relinquished or a remedy. (In the example of washing a stained garment, remedial wisdom would correspond to the detergent used to wash away the dirt. Obviously, after the detergent performed its function, both it and the dirt would be removed from the garment in order for it to be clean.

) 673 LG (pp. 20–22): You may wonder, “Since what is to be relinquished and the remedies are equally nonexistent, why is it not the case that there is no basic nature at all either?” It is like demonstrating that both being born and dying in a dream are delusive, which does not serve to show that the appearances of the waking state are delusive. Just as in this example, all affirmations and negations from the perspective of mistaken minds have never been objects to be negated that are established by a nature of their own in the first place. It is for this reason that they are demonstrated to be delusive, but how could that be a teaching on the nonexistence of the inconceivable wisdom, in which mistaken appearances have become exhausted through the fundamental change of state? Otherwise, . . . all the explanations in the sutras and tantras of the definitive meaning including the commentaries on their intention would be just as meaningless as explanations about the horns of a rabbit, since both the basic element and the stains would be alike in being adventitious. . . . They are also not just some expedient means to temporarily produce certain reference points . . . in those to be guided. If the basic nature did not exist at all, since it needs to be pointed out in the end, at that point, nothing but disappointment would be created. Therefore, to conceive of it that way is just a joke. Therefore, the point to demonstrate


that both what is to be relinquished and the remedies do not exist is that the modes of apprehending existence and nonexistence, which are contrived by dualistic mind, are empty. But this is not a demonstration that the dharmakaya beyond such a mind is nonexistent. “Well, then it exists as something that is really established.” Forget about it being really established, it is not even asserted to exist as something that lacks real existence. No matter whether it is accepted to be existent, nonexistent, real, delusive, or anything else, that can be invalidated through reasoning. Since all of these are mutually dependent, none whatsoever can be asserted.

Saraha’s Dohakosopadesagiti (“Queen’s Doha”), lines 21–22 says:

Whoever clings to entities is like cattle, But who clings to the lack of entities is even more stupid.

. . . If the basic element too did not exist, there would be no final fruition of the path, just as the nihilistic Lokayatas assert. Consequently, having practiced the path would be pointless, and since there is no fruition of buddhahood, one’s mind stream would afterwards simply become extinct. Such and many other flaws would accrue. Therefore, what is taught here is that this is not like a sprout arising after its seed has ceased, but that what happens during the phase of the path is merely the extinguishing of the stains, while the basic element is without increase or decrease. SS (pp. 626–31) explains that, in the prajñaparamita sutras, there are two manners of being empty. The first is that form is empty of form, which is said to pertain to all phenomena up through omniscience. The second is (mainly, but not exclusively) found in the Maitreya chapter of the Pañcavi?satisahasrikaprajñaparamitasutra, which uses the terms “imaginary form” (Skt. parikalpitarupa, Tib. kun tu brtags pa’i gzugs), “conceived form” (Skt. vikalpitarupa, Tib. rnam par brtags pa’i gzugs), and “form in terms of the nature of phenomena” (Skt. dharmatarupa, Tib. chos nyid kyi gzugs). In due order, these terms correspond to the imaginary nature, the other-dependent nature, and the perfect nature. From among these, the first two are empty of a nature of their own, while the nature of phenomena—the perfect nature—is empty of the imaginary and the other-dependent natures, that is, adventitious stains. In this context, SS says, to state that what does actually exist is existent and what does not exist is nonexistent is not equivalent to the extreme views of permanence or extinction. Rather, to hold what does actually exist to be nonexistent and what does not exist to be existent is what characterizes such views. Through quotes from various sources, SS affirms the ultimate existence of buddha nature’s inseparable qualities, summarizing: “Since the Tathagata heart is empty of the adventitious stains, it is other-empty (gzhan stong), but it is never at any time empty of its unconditioned qualities, such as the powers.” GL (pp. 47–50) comments on verses 18–22 as follows. No matter how the dharmadhatu is labeled as emptiness through teaching the lack of any nature in the collection of reasoning, the luminosity that is inextinguishable despite its being associated since beginningless time with the afflictions cannot be negated through all the many sutras and reasonings that teach it as emptiness. Therefore, the view here is as follows. Without considering the actual way of being of phenomena, if one takes just the way they appear as what is valid, they indeed exist in the form of sa?sara and nirva?a, matter and consciousness, the world and its inhabitants, and so on. However, if one takes their actual way of being as what is valid, this is the prajña that knows that there is absolutely nothing other than mind, and that this mind itself is “ordinary mind” (tha mal gyi shes pa), which is not established as a phenomenon that has any characteristics. What abides as the emptiness arrived at through reasoned analysis and as luminosity, and what cannot be destroyed by anything is the Tathagata heart. The reasonings that establish the lack of any essence whatsoever and the fact of mind abiding in the manner of luminosity indeed appear in many teachings of the Buddha, but especially in the detailed explanations in the Ghandavyuhasutra and the La?kavatarasutra. The teachings on


being empty of any nature as found in the Madhyamaka treatises no doubt apply here in just the same way too. However, consider that a cloud that appears like a mountain from afar does not exist that way, once you have arrived at it. The flickering of a mirage is not observable, once you have reached it. There is no person in a cairn, once you have come close to it. In just the same way, if minds and mental factors that consist of afflictions and conceptions are thoroughly examined through direct perception, even without relying on reasoning, they are nothing whatsoever. Therefore, even the features of a correct and false seeming reality are difficult to distinguish. Still, if one takes the world as what is valid, they can be distinguished. These points were also taught by the gurus of old . . . There follow extensive quotations from three early Kagyü masters. Mind’s not being established as either affirmation or negation is not a nonimplicative negation but mind as such that is not established as any characteristic whatsoever. . . . The clinging to a personal identity is explained in the great treatises to be clinging to the mind. But since one clings to nothing but this very mind that appears in various ways as being a self, and since this variety is nothing other than mind’s very lack of characteristics, any basis or root of a self is cut through. As for the clinging to a phenomenal identity, if it is any clinging to the existence of mind’s nature, it is said that “luminous mind is without basis or root.” . . . Since mind that has no characteristics and appearances that are unceasing arise together, this is called “connate.”

674 Verse 5. 675 Verse 4. 676 XIII.18–19ab. 677 These three characteristics of the Buddha’s teachings are described in detail in Uttaratantra I.10–12.

678 SC (p. 312) says that the prajña that realizes that the skandhas are impermanent, suffering, and empty (which includes being identityless) purifies the afflictive obscurations, since it overcomes their root, the clinging to a personal identity. The remedy for the cognitive obscurations is the prajña that realizes that all phenomena lack a nature, since it overcomes the clinging to phenomenal identity. RT (p. 634) and SS (p. 634) basically agree with this. 679 This is, for example, found in the Pañcavi?satisahasrikaprajñaparamitasutra (ACIP KL0009-2@289A), the Dasabhumikasutra (ACIP TD3915@26B; Rahder ed., p. 65), and the Tathagatagarbhasutra.

680 The above is a summary of D258, fol. 253b.1–5. This is the eighth of the well-known nine examples in this sutra for how buddha nature is present in all beings. These examples are also found in the Uttaratantra, the example above being described in I.121–23. 681 “The four names” is a common term for the four mental skandhas (except form) mentioned just before.

682 Tib. kun byung.

683 As mentioned above, the Tibetan of this verse being somewhat ambiguous, various commentators offer different interpretations. As for the way of glossing “reasons” in the second line, it seems that both meanings of Skt. nimitta are retained, since the “reasons” for certain names are the “characteristics” or definitions of what these names refer to. Obviously, DSC speaks not only about one but two sets of four conceptions. Though not as explicit as in SS (see below), the first set consists of conceptions about (1) a self, (2) mine, (3) the names of the four skandhas except form, and (4) the reasons for these names (thus not referring to the term “discriminaipodd_


tions” in line 2 of verse 28 and relating (4) “reasons” directly to “names”). From these four, the second set of the four well-known mistaken conceptions of ordinary sentient beings arises. As for DSC’s interpretation of the last line of verse 28, comparison with the other commentaries confirms that it is not the most obvious one. SS (p. 635) largely follows DSC in this (and not his teacher Dölpopa), speaking of the same two sets of four conceptions but spelling out (3) and (4) more clearly: “(1) We conceive of consciousness as a self and (2) conceive of form and such as mine. (3) We conceive of the nature of the four names—feelings, formations, discriminations, and consciousness—and (4) we conceive of the reasons of these four names: feelings are so called, since they experience pleasure and displeasure; formations have their name, since they propel us toward karmic results; discriminations are so named, since they apprehend characteristics; and consciousness has its name, since it apprehends objects. Based on these four conceptions, . . .” Thereafter, SS follows DSC’s remaining explanation almost verbatim. Döl (p. 144), RT (p. 635), and SC (pp. 312–13) all identify just one set of four conceptions—those about (1) a self, (2) mine, (3) discriminations of names, and (4) reasons. Here, SC replaces “afflictions” in verse 27 with “conceptions” and says that there are two kinds—conceptions that are discriminations of names (such as, “This is a vase”) and conceptions that are discriminations of the reasons for these names (such as, “It has a round belly”). These obviously refer to conceptions (3) and (4) in verse 28. LG (p. 25) has also just a single set of four conceptions about (1) self, (2) mine, (3) names, and (4) conceptions due to the reason of discriminating these names. Döl, SC, and LG all take “The elements and their outcome” to refer to the four elements of earth, water, fire, and wind and their derivatives, that is, the various kinds of material forms. RT takes it to mean past and future events (the Tibetan expressions for both are almost the same). 684 Again, “lacking appearance and characteristics” is interpreted in different ways by the commentators. Döl (p. 144) says, “The aspiration prayers of the Buddhas lack the appearance of a self and the clinging to a self as well as the characteristics of conceptions.” SC (p. 313) explains, “The aspiration prayers of the Buddhas as well as the form kayas and the various buddha realms arising under their influence do not appear within a Buddha’s own appearances and lack any characteristics that would characterize anything.” LG (p. 26) states, “The appearance of the form kayas due to the power of the aspiration prayers of the Buddhas lacks any specifically characterized appearance and is not in the slightest way established as any characteristics.” SS (p. 636) comments, “The aspiration prayers of the Buddhas . . . lack the appearance of self and mine as well as the characteristics of apprehender and apprehended.” RT does not comment on this.

685 As mentioned before, the Tibetan for “very own awareness” in some of the verses (29, 46, 56) and the corresponding passages of DSC is so sor rang rig (Skt. pratyatmavedaniya), otherwise translated here as “personally experienced (wisdom).”

686 The dharmakaya is said to be permanent by nature, since its essential character is the ultimate freedom from arising and ceasing. The sambhogakaya is permanent through its inexhaustible continuum, since the enjoyment of dharma is a continuous stream. The nirma?akaya is permanent due to its uninterrupted continuum of performing altruistic activity despite the appearance and disappearance of its various manifestations.


689 SC (p. 314) presents the objection that the example of the horns of a rabbit does not apply to the phenomena of sa?sara and nirva?a, since—as a nonexistent—it lacks any specific charipodd_ Endnotes 395 acteristics, while the specific characteristics of those phenomena exist. However, any specific characteristics of the horns of an ox are not observable either, since they cannot be found as being of the nature of minute particles. For the very same reason, these horns also do not exist as coarse objects, since there cannot be any specific characteristics of a phenomenon that is just imputed onto a nonexistent basis of imputation. LG (p. 28) has someone object that, if all phenomena are just imagined and imputed, then the basic nature—the dharmakaya—would be superimposed as well. He answers that this is true, if you cling to it as existent or nonexistent, but it is a different situation, once such clinging collapses. 690 DSC omits lines 1–2 of this verse.

691 V.23–26 (note that the Tibetan translation of the Madhyantavibhaga inserts three verses from Vasubandhu’s commentary before these verses, thus counting them as V.26–29). These verses list twenty-eight conceptions about extremes (two sets of seven pairs) to be avoided on the middle path (that DSC speaks of twenty extremes just below seems to be based on a different way of counting). The commentaries by Vasubandhu (P5528; ACIP TD4027@023B–025B) and others extensively quote the well-known passages from the Kasyapaparivartasutra (P760.43, §§52–71), which are also the standard source in the Madhyamaka tradition for “practicing the middle path of eliminating all extremes.” The gist of this is that the “middle” is not something between these extremes, but simply stands for the very freedom from any possible extremes or reference points, which include the notion of a “middle.”

692 SC (p. 315) comments that the mere imputations made by consciousness and expressions exist even for nonexistents like the horns of a rabbit, while an intrinsic nature of its own does not even exist in the horns of an ox. Finally, when having deeply reflected with Madhyamaka reasonings, there is nothing whatsoever that could be called “a phenomenon that is established through valid cognition.” For that reason, it is nothing but being free from the two extremes of permanence and extinction that is labeled by the conventional term “middle.” GL (p. 47) has a unique variant of verse 33 in four lines (skye bar brtags pa’i mtshan nyid dag/ ri bong ba lang rva yi dpes/ dbu ma ru ni rtogs bya ste/ bde gshegs chos nyid ji bzhin no):

The characteristics imputed as arising, Through the examples of rabbit and ox, Are to be realized as the middle, Just as the Sugata’s true nature is.

(The last line could also be read as “Just as the Sugata realized the nature of phenomena.”) GL’s comment on verses 30–33 is that the bodhisattvas’ generation of ultimate bodhicitta greatly enhances their practice through the view. Thus, what is taught in Nagarjuna’s collection of reasoning is also asserted here—all phenomena of sa?sara and nirva?a are primordially without any nature of their own, free from the eight extremes of reference points. 693 Lines 47–51 (DSC omits the first line).

694 RT (p. 636) says that, from the perspective of their appearing, reflections are not something extinct, while from the perspective of their essence, they are not permanent. This provides the complete picture of the characteristics of all phenomena as well. Döl (p. 145) states that the complete seeing of the characteristics of the middle is like that. LG (p. 29) explains that, from the very moment of its appearing, a reflection of the moon in the water never exists as a specifically characterized phenomenon in the first place, yet the mere appearance of the moon’s color and shape is unimpeded. So if we realize that this reflection is appearance and emptiness inseparable, and that the characteristics of the moon in the water are empty, our clinging to


that moon there is liberated in its own place. Likewise, from the very moment of their appearing, the characteristics of sa?sara and nirva?a, which are complete and appear unmixed and distinctly on the level of seeming reality, never really exist in the first place. Still, while lacking any reality, they appear unimpededly as mere appearances. So if we realize that they are appearance and emptiness inseparable, and that their characteristics are empty, our clinging to these appearances is liberated in its own place. Therefore, realizing the nature of phenomena is just as in this example. SS (p. 638) summarizes this as being the complete characteristics of the union of appearance and emptiness. SC (p. 315) explains that, when we see a reflection of the moon, all we see is a mere reflection but not its actual nature, just as it is. Likewise, the fully complete characteristics of the phenomena of seeming reality are something to be experienced through meditation but cannot be fully demonstrated as objects of ordinary consciousness. 695 P795. I could not locate these lines in the sutra. 696 DSC omits this line.


698 RT (p. 636) glosses “virtuous through beginning, middle, end” as the generation of bodhicitta, the actual path, and the fruition of that path, respectively. SC (pp. 315–16) says that the dharmadhatu is undeceiving, since it is in perfect harmony with what the noble ones see. It is a steady continuum throughout all the phases of ground, path, and fruition. You may wonder, “If it is the case that the dharmadhatu wisdom pervades all these three phases, why is it not taught that way in all the teachings of the Buddha?” For those who need to be led up to the definitive meaning gradually, he needed to teach through the progression of initial, intermediate, and final instructions. First, in order to establish them in the virtue that is conducive to merit, he taught in a manner that accords with the existence of a personal identity and an identity of phenomena. In the middle, in order to establish them in the virtue that is conducive to liberation, he taught in the manner of both these identities not existing. Finally, he taught that the basis for purifying the two obscurations and gathering the two accumulations—this very dharmadhatu wisdom—pervades all three phases of ground, path, and fruition. Since this teaching is pure through the three kinds of analysis through perceptual, inferential, and scriptural valid cognition, it is undeceiving. “If something like that is taught in the end, it is the same as the teaching on a self as imputed by the tirthikas, since there is no difference to the way of explaining such a self.” How could the dharmadhatu wisdom taught by the Buddha be conceived of as a self or mine, since there is this progression in the way the victor taught the dharma, and within this virtue of beginning, middle, and end, the lack of a self has been taught already? 699 This refers again to the two aspects of the perfect nature, with the unchanging perfect nature being the nature of phenomena and the unmistaken perfect nature the nondual nonconceptual wisdom that realizes it.


700 DSC omits the last two lines. 701 I.155. 702 J 76; P5526, fol. 118b.4–8 (for the quote from the Srimaladevisutra, see Wayman, trans. 1974, pp. 99–100).

703 GL (pp. 215–16) comments on verses 36–37 that nothing but the basic element or Heart of sentient beings is ignorance, desire and so on—desire does not exist anywhere else than in this Heart. Therefore, for those who are skilled in the path, this Heart is to be searched for right within desire—it is not that pure phenomena are obtained from anywhere else than just such


afflicted phenomena. Therefore, the statement, “The essence of desire is the Heart, but desire is adventitious” is truly inconceivable.

704 This paragraph addresses the manner in which practitioners on the path of preparation realize ultimate reality. The Eighth Karmapa’s commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara (Mi bskyod rdo rje n.d., pp. I.182–83) elaborates on this as follows. The point when the freedom from all characteristics of apprehender and apprehended is directly realized in this way is the path of seeing, which has the character of yogic direct valid cognition. These meditative equipoises of the path of preparation are unmistaken self-aware direct valid cognitions that are approximately concordant with the unmistaken wisdom that lacks the duality of apprehender and apprehended. . . . During the path of preparation, these meditative equipoises are not something other than self-aware direct valid cognition, because both what is aware and what it is aware of arise as the nature of a single clear and aware experience. AC (fol. 163b) says that, when embraced by the correct yoga, sense perception, mental direct perception, and self-aware direct perception are all yogic direct perception, connate wisdom’s own nature (for further details, see the comments on verses 43–47 and 74 below).

705 SS (p. 640) comments that when yogins whose familiarization with samadhi is stable, in dependence on their eyes, form, and mental engagement, directly see some form with their eye-consciousness, right upon such seeing, that form appears as appearance-emptiness, lucidity- emptiness, and awareness-emptiness and is directly seen as the unborn and unceasing basic nature. Therefore, the superior insight of directly seeing the dharmadhatu dawns on its own. Based on that, during subsequent attainment, appearances are known to be without reality, just like a city of gandharvas. LG (p. 31) says that while form is appearing, it is emptiness. It comes about due to conditions, such as the dominant condition and the object condition, but upon analysis, the nature of dependent origination is established as emptiness—being unarisen and unceasing. From this, the dharmadhatu is known. Döl (p. 146) has someone ask, “From what is the nature of phenomena known?” In dependence upon the eye and form of the nature of phenomena, the appearance of luminosity without a stain occurs for the yogin. Due to seeing the unborn and unceasing luminous mind, it will be known from the dharmadhatu, that is, through nonconceptual wisdom.

706 SC (p. 318) says that, based on sound and ear, the nonconceptual consciousness that appears lucidly as sound is the dharmadhatu, which has no other characteristic than pointing out true reality. However, through being linked with subsequent thought, we cling to that dharmadhatu as being us having heard a sound. SS (p. 641) and LG (p. 31) agree with that. LG explicitly confirms that “three” in line 3 refers to sound, ear, and consciousness, while Döl (p. 146) explains this as the three aspects—object, subject, and pure self-awareness—of a consciousness that is pure of apprehender and apprehended.

707 DNP chos kyi dbyings la rtog par byed. Due to the unfortunate and frequent confusion of rtogs pa (realize) and rtog pa in Tibetan texts, the commentators differ here according to which version they adhere to. DSC has chos kyi dbyings su rtogs par byed in both line 4 of verse 40 and its commentary (which in itself makes perfect sense and is in line with DSC’s manner of commenting on the other verses on sense perception here). SC (p. 318) and SS (p. 641), following their comments on the other verses here, confirm “conceptualizes” (rtog pa). LG (p. 32) states that the nose-consciousness serves as an aid for realizing the dharmadhatu; Döl (p. 146) says that the dharmadhatu is realized through discriminating wisdom by way of the nose-consciousness; and RT has rtogs pa in both verse 39 and 40 (it is to be noted that LG, Döl, and RT all have chos kyi dbyings la rtogs par byed, which suggests rtogs pa just being a typo for rtog pa in the root texts they used, since rtogs pa is never connected with la to its object).

398 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 708 This could also be read as “empty and void of nature.” 709 Some other sources speak of the fine down on such a bird.

710 Döl (p. 146) says that the eighteen ultimate dhatus, (the six objects, six sense faculties, and six consciousnesses) free from the conditions of seeming reality, are the dharmadhatu. 711 Together, these five kinds of form are also referred to as “imperceptible form” (Skt. avijñaptirupa, Tib. rnam par rig byed ma yin pa’i gzugs) or as parts of the “form of the ayatana of phenomena” (Skt. dharmayatanarupa, Tib. chos kyi skye mched kyi gzugs). They are phenomena that appear as aspects of form that are solely experienced by the mental consciousness, not demonstrable to the eye consciousness, and intangible. Aggregational form refers to the form of the minutest material particle. Circumstantial form includes, for example, the space in between things or reflections. Form originating from correct commitment and symbols refers to vows. Imputed form includes, for example, appearances in a dream or skeletons appearing through the samadhi of repulsiveness. Mastered form appears through mastery over certain samadhis, for example, the entire universe appearing as earth or red due to the samadhi of the totality (Skt. k?tsnayatana, Tib. zad par kyi skye mched) of earth or red and such. 712 This is the meditative absorption that stops coarse discriminations and feelings. It represents the cessation of all primary minds and mental factors with an unstable continuum as well as some with a stable continuum, that is, the first seven consciousnesses (except the alayaconsciousness) and their mental factors. This absorption is used as the culminating meditative absorption in the process of ninefold progressive abiding (various alternating ways of entering in and rising from the four samadhis of the form realm, the four formless ones, and this meditative absorption).

713 This is the highest type of meditative absorption within the fourth dhyana of the form realm, during which primary minds and mental factors with an unstable continuum (the five sense consciousnesses, the mental consciousness, and their accompanying mental factors) temporarily cease. However, the latent tendencies for the arising of these consciousnesses are not eliminated. Thus, mistaken appearances will occur again, once one rises from this meditative absorption. When performed for a long time, it leads to rebirth in the highest level of the gods of the form realm. 714 Skt. pratisa?khyanirodha, Tib. so sor brtags pa’i ’gog pa. This refers to the result of freedom from the factors to be relinquished on the path of seeing through thoroughly analyzing all the aspects of the four realities of the noble ones.

715 Skt. apratisa?khyanirodha, Tib. so sor brtags pa ma yin pa’i ’gog pa. This refers to something not happening due to its specific causes and conditions not being complete. Instead of these two cessations, DSC reads so sor brtags pa ma yin pa’i snyoms ’jug. 716 In accordance with the Sarvastivada system, Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakosa lists only (4), (7), and (8), while his Pañcaskandhaprakara?a gives the same plus suchness. The above list of eight unconditioned phenomena originated with the Mahisasakas and is later found in the Yogacarabhumi and the Abhidharmasamucchaya.


717 Verse 16. 718 I.17ab. 719 Skt. mano dhatu, Tib. yid kyi khams. 720 Skt. mana ayatana, Tib. yid kyi skye mched. 721 There are very detailed and complex presentations on the factors to be relinquished through


seeing and meditation in texts such as the Abhidharmakosa, the Viniscayasa?graha?i, and the Abhisamayala?kara and their commentaries. Basically, there are ten afflictions to be relinquished in general: ignorance, desire, anger, pride, doubt, and the five wrong views (the views about a real personality, the views about extremes, wrong views, the views to hold a view as paramount, and the views to hold ethics and spiritual conduct as paramount). These are then relinquished as they relate to the three realms and in terms of being imputed (path of seeing) and connate (path of cultivation). For detailed charts, see Brunnhölzl 2002a (Appendices I-II). 722 As mentioned in the introduction, the Sanskrit word manas (Tib. yid) is used to refer to both the sixth and the seventh consciousnesses (strictly speaking manovijñana; Tib. yid kyi rnam shes). Thus, not only terminologically but also in terms of content, depending on the perspective, one finds overlaps between the descriptions of these two consciousnesses with regard to the “immediate mind,” “afflicted mind,” and “stainless mentation.” Rangjung Dorje’s AC explains the following about the various aspects of mentation: This immediate mind . . . operates by being based on the alaya, and when the other six collections of consciousness arise and cease, it inputs their potentials into the alaya. Therefore, it is called “mental consciousness.” In his Prama?aviniscaya, Dharmakirti states that its own essence is valid cognition . . . The other aspect of “mentation,” which focuses on the alaya-consciousness, has the character of regarding the alaya as “me” and is called “afflicted mind.” Since this aspect of mentation thinks of the alaya as a self and is always tainted by a set of four afflictions, it is the locus of the afflictedness of consciousness. Therefore, it lacks any valid cognition and gives rise to all minds that are nonvalid cognition. This “mentation” in general has both aspects: the one —the immediate mind— is said to be consciousnessown essence and the other —the afflicted mind— is expressed from the perspective that, based on it, mistakenness is caused. Thus, they are said to be like a rope and taking that rope to be a snake respectively. Here, others explain the immediate mind as a part of the sixth, the mental consciousness, and some explain that, ultimately, it does not exist. However, those people, by clinging to the presentation of the sravakas who assert that there are only six collections of consciousness, do not understand the mahayana’s presentation of the eight collections of consciousnesses, which is given in detail in the Mahayanasa?graha: “Among those, mentation is twofold. Since it is the support that acts as the immediate condition, the ‘mentation that is the consciousness that has just ceased’ is the support for consciousness. The second is the afflicted mind, which is always associated with the four afflictions of the views about a real personality, self-conceit, attachment to the self, and ignorance. This is the support for the afflictedness of consciousness. Thus, consciousness is produced by virtue of the first aspect of mentation as its support, while the second one makes it afflicted. Mentation is a consciousness because it cognizes objects. Since it is both immediately preceding and self-centered, mentation has two aspects.” I.6 (D4048, fols. 3b.5–4a.1) “Afflicted” is a term of possession. For this reason, this is the root of all mistakenness of circling in the three realms. Therefore, this afflicted mind neither exists in the meditative absorption of cessation that transcends the three realms, nor in the meditative equipoises of the paths of arhats and supramundane bodhisattvas. However, in the meditative absorption without discrimination, which is the cause for being born as long-living gods without discrimination, the afflicted mind exists. Thus, one will understand the difference. Furthermore, if one takes the immediacy of the arising and ceasing of the consciousnesses that dwells in the alaya to be a part of the sixth, the mental consciousness, then at the time of being able to dwell in the meditative absorption of cessation, since there is nothing except the alaya and the six other collections of consciousness, there would only be seven collections altogether, since the afflicted mind does not exist in that meditative absorption. If some people then think that thus the “stainless mentationtaught by the Bhagavat must be presented as a ninth collection


of consciousness, this is not justified either. {As mentioned in the introduction, this refers to the amalavijñana held by the Indian Yogacara Paramartha and some of his Chinese followers. Since there are no Indian but only Chinese scriptural sources for this, the Tibetans seem to have obtained their informations on this from the latter, including the Chinese commentary on the Sa?dhinirmocanasutra—translated into Tibetan (P5517)—by the Korean master Wonch’uk (aka Yüan-ts’e; 613–696). Following AC’s above quote from the Prama?aviniscaya, Tagramba Chögyal Denba’s commentary on the ZMND explicitly equates the immediate mind with nonconceptual mental direct valid cognition, which perceives outer objects (Dvags po rab ’byams pa chos rgyal bstan pa 2005, p. 104).} You may wonder then, “Due to what is this seventh consciousness of mentation that is also explained as the immediate mind presented as the afflicted mind and due to what is it presented as stainless?” It is good to say that it becomes afflicted, once it is embraced by the four afflictions mentioned above, but to express it as stainless mentation, once it is embraced by the immaculate dharma that is grounded in the enlightenment of the Buddha. It is said that, as long as these two have not undergone the completely pure change of state, they stay mixed together (fols. 20a–22a). Jamgön Kongtrul’s commentary on the ZMND (Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas 2005, p. 28) says: The seventh lord Karmapa holds that mentation has three parts. From the perspective of immediacy, it is presented as the seventh consciousness of mentation; from the perspective of being embraced by the set of four afflictions, it is the afflicted mind; and from the perspective of being embraced by the immaculate dharma, it is stainless mentation. The relationships between the three aspects of mentation as well as between the sixth and the seventh consciousness are also described in the Third Karmapa’s NY and its commentary by Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé (Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas 1990, pp. 90–97). The latter says: As for what is called “immediate mind,” whenever the six collections of consciousnesses arise, it functions as the condition for their immediate arising, and whenever the six collections cease, it functions as the condition for immediately planting the seeds, which are the potentials of these six collections, into the alaya. Due to this, it is the immediate condition for both the arising and ceasing of the six consciousnesses. When the six collections cease, the immediate consciousness—which is explained to be the same as the dhatu of mentation—carries them into the alaya and immediately, just like the condition of waves arising from water, from the alaya which possesses all the seeds, mentation that abides in the alaya stirs again and operates, and in that way the immediate mind arises. . . . Thus, once the earlier instances of the six collections have ceased, it immediately triggers their following instances; hence, it is the immediate mind. Therefore, matching the number of moments that cause the arising and ceasing of the six collections, the immediate mind arises in a way of being connected to them by equaling their number. If one were to ask where knowledge of these principles comes from, this mentation is realized through the direct perception of a mind immersed in the yoga of the unity of calm abiding and superior insight, and through the inferences based on the principles presented in the profound and vast words of the victor. . . . If the immediate mind produces a purified instance of consciousness, such as devotion, then the afflicted mind does not move. Therefore, the immediate mind is called “stainless mentation” in the sutras (p. 93–96).


723 Döl (p. 147) explains that once conceptions and what they conceptualize—which entail characteristics with regard to ultimate phenomena, the principal among which is ultimate mind (Samantabhadra)—are relinquished in the state of profound meditative equipoise, these ultimate phenomena lack a nature of reference points. Through apprehending it as anything whatsoever becoming exhausted, this should be cultivated as the dharmadhatu. LG (p. 32) says that once all reference points of a thinker—the mind—and the objects it thinks about are relinquished, one should rest effortlessly by conducting one’s analysis right within the state of being free from refipodd_


erence points and thus cultivate phenomena’s lack of nature—emptiness—as the dharmadhatu. SS (pp. 641–42) explains that the mental consciousness free from thought arises in dependence on three conditions—the immediate condition being a sense consciousness, the dominant condition being the mental sense faculty, and the object-conditions being form and so on. GL (pp. 46–47) comments as follows on verses 38–43. When one trains in the conduct of bodhisattvas by relying on having generated ultimate bodhicitta, this training becomes very much advanced. Once one has familiarized oneself with ultimate bodhicitta—mind focusing on the nature of mind—the nature of the six operating consciousnesses will be realized to be luminosity. Here follows the quote of verses 38–43. When the eighteen kinds of movement of mind toward the eighteen dhatus—the six consciousnesses, six sense faculties, and six objects—occur, one familiarizes oneself with these very movements being luminosity. Due to being familiar with this, these very eighteen dhatus appear as luminosity. Once they appear that way, this is called “accomplishment.” Based on this, one attains the qualities of the completely pure six sense ayatanas as taught in the Saddharmapu??arikasutra ACIP KD0113@218B–219A; see Introduction, which says that there arise twelve times hundred or eight times hundred qualities in each of these ayatanas. It may be noted here that also Kambala’s Prajñaparamitanavasloki (P5210) and its autocommentary (for a translation, see Brunnhölzl 2007, pp. 60–62) mainly consist of similar instructions on a progressive meditation on emptiness that focuses on the six kinds of consciousness and their objects, culminating in spacelike wisdom free from any subject-object duality, which is just mind’s natural luminosity.


725 Lines 252–63. DSC again has prose in slightly different order, somewhat similar to the text’s prose version (P5523; lines 133–39, ed. Mathes): yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa sa bon thams cad pa med pa gnyis snang ba’i rgyu de la brten pa’i rgyud gzhan de bzhin nyid ma shes pa las yin te/ de’i phyir rgyu dang bcas pa’i bras bu ni/ snang du zin kyang yod pa ma yin no/ ’di snang ba las chos nyid mi snang zhing/ ’di mi snang ba las ni chos nyid snang ba yin no/ zhes de ltar yid la byed pa’i byang chub sems dpa’ ni rnam par mi rtog pa’i ye shes la ’jug pa yin no. 726 LG (p. 33) says that once yogins realize all phenomena in this way, the ultimate characteristics of meditation are complete (SS agrees in slightly different words). RT (p. 638) glosses that such yogins completely realize the basic nature that is phenomena’s very own characteristic. Döl (p. 147) states that then the characteristics of the dharmadhatu, true reality, are complete. SC (p. 319) says that when all inner and outer phenomena are realized to be empty of an essence of their own, phenomena are realized to be of one taste as the dharmadhatu. At that point, the characteristic of phenomena is seen in a complete way.


728 Skt. k?anti, Tib. bzod pa (lit. “patience,” “endurance”). In a general sense, this refers to being mentally ready for the direct realization of emptiness, aka “the dharma of nonarising” (Skt. anutpattidharmak?anti, Tib. mi skye ba’i chos la bzod pa). Thus, in this context, “poised or open readiness” does not mean passively enduring or bearing something but rather indicates an active openness and receptiveness to integrate the experience of emptiness into one’s mind stream and to be able to live within this utter groundlessness. In a more specific sense, “poised readiness” stands for reaching the level of poised readiness among the four levels—heat, peak, poised readiness, and supreme dharma—of the path of preparation. Here, the practitioner newly attains some degree of poised readiness—or openness in the sense of lack of fear—with respect to profound emptiness. Strictly speaking, the complete extent of this kind of poised readiness is only attained from the path of seeing onward, when the nature of phenomena is


directly seen, and then an increasing familiarity with that is gained on the path of cultivation. 729 SC (p. 321) says that the two aspects of mind are clinging to a self and natural luminosity. Once personally experienced wisdom is aware of the latter, it becomes that very wisdom. SS (p. 643) explains that once one is aware of the nature of phenomena through personally experienced meditative equipoise, this is the mind beyond the world. This remedial wisdom extinguishes all three types of obscurations—afflictive obscurations, such as desire, hatred, and ignorance; cognitive obscurations, such as conceptions about the three spheres; and obscurations to meditative absorption, such as dullness and agitation. Due to that, the final fruition of buddhahood is attained. LG (pp. 33–34) elaborates that sravakas relinquish only the afflictive obscurations, pratyekabuddhas the afflictive obscurations and the one half of the cognitive obscurations that pertains to apprehended objects (but not the apprehending subject), and bodhisattvas have to relinquish both types of obscurations fully. AC (fols. 76a–77a) quotes verses 43–47 as support for the following. The connate wisdom of our own mind is empty in essence, lucid in nature, and unimpeded in its manifestation. All these three being free from reference points is the dharmakaya, lucidity is the sambhogakaya, and the compassionate display that can show as anything is the nirma?akaya. The indications that the three kayas in this sense are present right now are as follows. The indication of the dharmakaya is that all entities appear as empty now too, since their nature does never go beyond emptiness. The indication of the sambhogakaya is the appearance of the ten signs of expanse and awareness inseparable as visual objects. The indication of the nirma?akaya is that the distinct energies of the appearances of the objects of the six consciousnesses are manifested individually. The indication that all three are undeceiving appears in objects right now, since wisdom (the perceiving subject) is the very nature of the consciousnesses connected with these objects. Nonconceptual yogic direct perception right within these consciousnesses means to sustain the continuum of nonconceptual direct perception, which is given the conventional term “meditation.” Later, AC (fol. 163b) elaborates that when sense perception, mental direct perception, and self-aware direct perception are embraced by the correct yoga, they all are yogic direct perception, connate wisdom’s own nature. Through all aspects of knowing and what is to be known being embraced by the perfect view, in terms of its functions, this wisdom then manifests as the five wisdoms. These are the wisdom that discriminates all causes and results; the wisdom of being empty of a nature of its own (mirrorlike wisdom); all-accomplishing wisdom, which displays wisdom’s power due to having gained mastery over it; the wisdom of seeing the equality of all this; and the principle of not moving away from suchness, which pervades all of this (dharmadhatu wisdom). 730 XI.34–35.

731 SS (p. 643) and Döl (pp. 147–48) both gloss “realization” as wisdom and “its lack” as consciousness. Since there is no difference apart from that, all of sa?sara and nirva?a is complete within this body. Nirva?a is fettered by our thoughts, but when nirva?a’s nature is known through personally experienced wisdom, we are free from these thoughts. 732 Paraphrase of the beginning of X.5 (P5549, fol. 44b.1).

733 SS (p. 644) says that enlightenment is neither near to a Buddha’s rupakaya nor far from someone in sa?sara. Nevertheless, since sentient beings are overpowered right in the midst of their afflictions, they do not see it, but once they become free from afflictions, they do. Therefore, enlightenment appears as if it were near or far. Döl (p. 148) explains that enlightenment is not far, since it exists in sentient beingsown mind stream. Nor is it said to be near, since it is buddhahood itself. It neither goes somewhere else outside of sentient beingsmind stream, nor does it come in front of what is buddhahood itself. The only difference in speaking about


Buddhas and sentient beings is that the former clearly see that enlightenment exists in the midst of the afflictions within this body, while the latter do not. SC (p. 323) comments that enlightenment is not near to sentient beings, since the dharmadhatu of mind does not become enlightenment for as long as its stains have not become pure. Nor is it far, since they need not search for it outside of mind’s dharmadhatu. Rather, once it has become pure of those stains, it is presented as enlightenment.


735 LG (p. 35) explains buddhahood as the “supreme peace” by saying that it is unlike the realization of sravakas and pratyekabuddhas, which is a mere negation of existence. Rather, bodhisattvas need to meditate in a way that is free from all reference points, be they existence, nonexistence, or whatever. Through the incomplete view of a mere nonimplicative negation, buddhahood is not attained, just as with any result whose causes are not complete. LG, SS (p.644), and RT (p. 639) take “self” to mean our ordinary mistaken notion of a self, while Döl (p. 148) glosses it as “buddhahood that exists in our own body.” SC simply omits it. 736 SS (p. 644) identifies those who see the Buddhas in this way as practitioners on the greater path of accumulation, having purified their karma a little bit.


738 The other four are vigor, mindfulness, samadhi, and prajña. They specifically pertain to the latter two of the four stages (heat, peak, poised readiness, and supreme dharma) of the path of preparation. During its first two stages, the same group of five is practiced as the “five faculties,” the difference being that they can still be overpowered by their opposites. 739 SC (p. 325) adds that, for such beings, the Buddhas may appear in the form of Brahma, Vi??u, or Mañjusri to benefit them. In order to benefit those for whom they cannot even appear like that, they show as ordinary spiritual friends, merchants, ferrymen, and so on. It is not that the Buddhas simply give up on such beings. 740 DSC and SS ’od kyi rang bzhin dpal ldan pa’i. 741 This is the Indian fig tree, also called banyan. 742 Abhisamayala?kara VIII.13–17. Note that this is just one from among a considerable number of more or less differing lists of these thirty-two marks that are found in various sutras and treatises.

743 DNP, SS, LG, and Döl all have tha dad gyur pa lags. DSC and RT have tha dad gyur ma lags (“not different”) and comment accordingly. LG (p. 37) says that the dharmadhatu, in its essence, is inconceivable as one or different, but in terms of its mode of appearing, may show as various differences. SC (p. 325) obviously saw both versions, thus commenting on both. First, he says, the dharmadhatu wisdom itself appears as different, that is, arising and ceasing upon entering nirva?a, but that the Tathagatas possess neither arriving nor abiding. Secondly, the Tathagatas appear as if arising and ceasing from the perspective of those to be guided, but the dharmadhatu itself, the actual Tathagata, does not possess any differences in terms of arising or ceasing. According to SC, the gist of this is as follows. When a nirma?akaya appears to sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, or ordinary sentient beings, the aspects that appear as form and speech are a part of the dharmadhatu of the mind of the person to whom they appear, having been unfolded through their merit. Therefore, these aspects are included in the phenomena of their own minds. But the dominant condition that displays these appearances in that way, is the very dharmadhatu of the Buddha, which is without any arriving, departing, increase, or


decrease. Therefore, from the perspective of those who see the dharmadhatu directly, there is no appearance of a rupakaya passing into nirva?a. That it may appear that way from the perspective of those who do not directly see the dharmadhatu is just due to the fluctuations in their individual merits, such as having confidence.

744 The six doors are the six consciousnesses as just mentioned, with the sixth, the mental consciousness, being specifically referred to as prajña. As shown in detail in verses 38–45, the true nature of both these consciousnesses and their objects is the dharmadhatu or nonconceptual wisdom. Thus, it is said here that this wisdom is the actual object of the mind—the latter being understood as personally experienced self-aware wisdom—no matter how this may appear superficially, such as sense consciousnesses seeming to dualistically apprehend forms or sounds. Thus, Döl (p. 149) says, “Ascertaining the object of ultimate bodhicitta, one engages in the wisdom that is the object to be realized in a way that this is of equal taste with the consciousnesses of the other objects. Once your very own pure awareness—the wisdom that engages in the wisdom that is the object—has become pure, you dwell in the nature of the wisdom of the bhumis. SC (pp. 326–27) agrees with that. LG (p. 38) says that mind’s object or basic nature is the dharmadhatu, in which the consciousness that realizes identitylessness engages. Once that personally experienced wisdom has become pure, finally, it abides as the nature of all bhumis. SS (p. 648) gives a different interpretation, saying that the Buddhas first ascertain the objects for which the minds of those to be guided aspire, and then, in accordance with the mind-set of these beings, the wisdom of the Buddhas—the consciousness that promotes the welfare of beings—engages them. Once the personally experienced wisdom in the meditative equipoise of these beings has purified their stains, they dwell on the paths and bhumis, whose nature is the nature of phenomena. In essence, dhatu and awareness are inseparable, but from the perspective of those to be guided, they may appear as if they were different.

745 The dharmakayas of all Buddhas are equal, since their support—the dharmadhatu—is not different. Their sambhogakayas are equal, since their intention is not different. Their nirma?akayas are equal, since they serve as a common enlightened activity. 746 This is a term that may designate either the phase of both the paths of accumulation and preparation or just the latter.

747 Tib. adhyasayavisuddhibhumi, Tib. lhag pa’i bsam pa dag pa’i sa. This is a collective term for the first seven bhumis of bodhisattvas.


748 Being somewhat cryptic and multi-layered, verses 57–60 indeed enjoy the greatest diversity of comments. As for verse 57, RT (p. 640) says that the triad of the bhumis, the state of buddhahood (the supreme abode of the great and mighty ones), and Akani??ha fuse as the single dharmadhatu. Döl (p. 149) takes the supreme abode to be the dharmakaya, while Akani??ha stands for the sambhogakaya and the nirma?akaya. The three consciousnesses of the three kayas fuse into a single taste. SS (pp. 648–49) speaks of the beautiful dharmakaya in the dharmadhatu (the supreme abode), the beautiful sambhogakaya in Akani??ha, and implicitly, the nirma?akaya. These three consciousnesses or kayas fuse into the nature of the wisdom that is single. SC (p. 327) says that the triad of the sambhogakaya (the supreme abode), the richly adorned buddha realm of Akani??ha, and the consciousnesses of the dharmadhatus of bodhisattvas on the ten bhumis fuse into one. The gist of this, SC says, is that the aspect that appears as the sambhogakaya and its abode is contained in the nature of the wisdom of those very ones for whom it appears. The reason it appears fragmented is that it happens under the influence of this wisdom being contaminated by the latent tendencies of dualistic appearances.


The causal condition for its appearing that way is one’s own wisdom, but the dominant condition for it is the wisdom of the Buddhas. On the eleventh bhumi, since one’s own wisdom and the wisdom of all Buddhas fuse into one, there are no distinctions in the ultimate kaya. However, under the influence of different previous aspiration prayers, the appearances of the rupakayas appear differently. LG (p. 38–39) explains that the supreme abode is the place where a Buddha’s sambhogakaya is surrounded by bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi, which is also known as Akani??ha. There, in bodhisattvas at the very end of their path, immediately upon having engaged in the vajralike samadhi, the threefold consciousness that involves agent, object, and action becomes of a single taste in that these three spheres are not observable anymore, with meditative equipoise and subsequent attainment thus fusing. This is called “the final realization of the dharmakaya.” In general, when the path of seeing is attained, the clinging to real existence is ended; on the three pure bhumis, the clinging to characteristics; and on the bhumi of buddhahood, all conceptions about the three spheres in dualistic appearances.


751 Döl (pp. 149–50) says that the first line of verse indicates the appearance of the nirma?akaya, the second that of the sambhogakaya, and the third that of the dharmakaya, infinite in time. The fourth line represents a question about the cause for the lifetimes of rupakayas lasting many eons (which is the dharmakaya). RT (p. 640–41) agrees on the first two lines but says that the great and mighty one in line three is Amitayus. The cause for their lifespans lasting many eons is the realization of the dharmadhatu. SC (p. 328) explains that the first line indicates whichever qualities of merit and wisdom there are in the mind streams of ordinary sentient beings; the second line refers to the features of the paths and bhumis in the mind streams of noble ones;

and the third line to the dharmakaya of a perfect Buddha. The cause for these three extending over eons is the wisdom of the dharmadhatu, which is an ever-unbroken continuum. LG (p. 39) says that the dharmakaya dwells among ordinary sentient beings by way of the all-pervasive nature of the wisdom of the dharmakaya, since they do not realize the dharmakaya in its manifest way. Among noble ones, it manifests in various ways, such as the sravakas directly realizing personal identitylessness; the pratyekabuddhas, in addition to that, the one half of phenomenal identitylessness that pertains to apprehended objects; and the bodhisattvas the freedom from all reference points of apprehender and apprehended, either partially or fully. The dharmakaya free from stains, which is endowed with twofold purity, is also the cause for the great and mighty sambhogakaya with its duration of infinite eons. SS (pp. 648–50) comments on verses 58–60 together, agreeing with Döl and RT on the first two lines of verse 58 but saying that the cause for these two to abide many eons is the great and mighty one. The causes for beings with great desires to live for eons are that they previously have protected other beingslives, refrained from killing them, and given them food and medicine. Thus, by way of not observing these causes, one should engage for the sake of attaining the prajña that is aware of suchness and variety. 752 This Sanskrit word has a wide range of meanings, such as imperishable, unalterable, syllable, letter, word, vowel, sound, and, in particular, the syllable O?. 753 LG (p. 40) and SC (p. 328) agree that, in brief, the dharmadhatu (wisdom) is the nature or very life-force of all phenomena in sa?sara (afflicted phenomena) and nirva?a (pure phenomena). SC adds that pure phenomena are inseparably mingled with the dharmadhatu, thus being incorporated in it, whereas afflicted phenomena are present in it in a manner of being separable from it.


754 SC (pp. 328–29) says that both inexhaustible fruitions—sa?sara and nirva?a—come from the inexhaustible cause that is the dharmadhatu. Under the influence of the condition of ignorance, one engages oneself for the sake of sa?sara. But through the particular trait of the prajña that realizes that nothing whatsoever appears, one engages oneself for the sake of pure phenomena, the inexhaustible fruition of the dharmadhatu. RT (p. 641) explains that one engages in realizing the dharmadhatu for the sake of the prajña during subsequent attainment, which discriminates all phenomena that bear the nature of the dharmadhatu. Due to the particular trait of the degree of being able to realize the dharmadhatu without appearance, there is the trait of the degree of that discriminating wisdom unfolding. Döl (p. 150) states that the cause for the inexhaustible enlightened activity that engages in sa?sara is the dharmakaya without appearance. Through that particular trait, the rupakayas engage in their activities for the sake of bringing forth the prajña of those to be guided. LG (p.40) comments that the dharmadhatu free from stains, which is the fruition of the Tathagata heart—the nature of phenomena without exhaustion or increase—is without the appearance of the latent tendencies of apprehender and apprehended. It is just through the particular trait of realizing this well or not that prajña engages in an object that seems to have three degrees in terms of being superior or inferior (corresponding to the prajñas of sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas).


756 Döl (p. 150) says it is not that Buddhas earlier have cast away sa?sara and gone off somewhere far way, just to return later for the sake of sentient beings. Rather, not moving away from the world even a little bit, yet lacking the appearances of the six kinds of objects of the mistakenness of apprehender and apprehended, they are aware of reality just as it is—the true nature of sa?sara. According to LG (p. 40), the first two lines of this verse teach that there is only one yana ultimately. Apart from just the temporary fact that realization is gained in a swifter or slower way by bodhisattvas, sravakas, or pratyekabuddhas, in the end, they all attain buddhahood. On the latter two lines, LG and RT (p. 641) basically comment in the same way as Döl. SS (p. 650) states that the prajña that is aware of suchness and variety does not conceive of near or far. It is nonconceptual and the six kinds of objects are not appearing or observable for it, being aware that they are empty of essence, just as it accords with the correct view. According to SC (p. 329), the gist of this is as follows. If one has the remedies to relinquish the stains, there is no need to search for enlightenment somewhere outside or far away. But if one does not use these remedies, enlightenment is not near, since the mere existence of the dharmadhatu is not enlightenment. You may wonder, “But isn’t it necessary to assert this dharmadhatu wisdom as natural buddhahood?” That is indeed so, but this in itself does not qualify as actual buddhahood, since the three kayas are not complete. “But aren’t the three kayas complete naturally?” They are indeed complete, but that too does not qualify as actual buddhahood, since these are not the kayas that serve as the ultimate welfare of others. Therefore, what is called “natural buddhahood” refers to the cause of actual buddhahood. Otherwise, if actual buddhahood existed just through what is called “natural buddhahood,” one would assert the philosophical system of the Sa?khyas. For then, during the time of sentient beings, buddhahood would reside in them in a nonmanifest way and would need to be made clearly manifest later through the power of the path.


758 Verses 54–55. As Lindtner 1997 (p. 164) points out, all the verses of this text (with some interesting variants) are found in Chapter X of the La?kavatarasutra (the two verses above are X.256–57; ACIP KL0107@270A). As for the last line of verse 55, Nagarjuna’s Bhavanakrama


says de yis theg pa chen po mthong (“sees the mahayana”), while DSC has de yis theg chen mi mthong ngo (the Tibetan versions of the La?kavatarasutra also have this negative). In his translation of the sutra, Suzuki (1979, Prajña Press, p. 247) says that most Sanskrit manuscripts have na (“not”), but that one has sa (“he”). B. Nanjio’s edition (Bibliotheca Otaniensis 1. Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923) also has sa. The above two verses are also quoted in Santarak?ita’s own Madhyamakala?karav?tti (P5285; ACIP TD3885@79B) as well as in Kamalasila’s Madhyamakala?karapañjika (P5286, fols. 137a–138a) and his first Bhavanakrama (ACIP TD3915@033A), the latter two giving a detailed explanation (see Brunnhölzl 2004, pp. 300–302). In these three texts too, the last line appears and is commented on as in Nagarjuna’s Bhavanakrama.


761 As was said before, to meet, study, and practice the dharma is just an expression of the latent tendencies of listening that are a natural outflow of one’s own buddha nature, the causal condition. The teaching of the dharma is the natural outflow of the compassion of the Buddhas, the dominant or contributing condition. Fundamentally, all of this happens nowhere else and as nothing else than appearances in our own mind, which in this case are not stained by afflictions. As for wisdom dwelling in this body, the Hevajratantra (part 2, I.12) says:

In the body, great wisdom dwells, Which has abandoned all thoughts, Pervades all entities, Dwelling in the body, yet not born from the body. The Tantra of the Completion of the Lion’s Prowess (Tib. seng ge rtsal rdzogs kyi rgyud; not in Tengyur) declares: In the bodies of all sentient beings, The shine of pure wisdom dwells.


The La?kavatarasutra (ACIP KL0107@135B) states: “As for the Tathagata heart that the Bhagavat taught in the sutra collection, the Bhagavat said that it is completely pure natural luminosity. Thus, since it is completely pure right from the beginning, this primordial complete purity is endowed with the thirty-two major marks and exists within the bodies of all sentient beings.” 762 Buddhism makes a clear distinction between “person” (Skt. pudgala, Tib. gang zag) and “self” (Skt. atman, Tib. bdag), which is important for understanding the notion of “lack of self.” The “person” is understood to be just a label imputed onto the five skandhas, which is in itself not a problem or to be refuted. The notion of a “self,” however, refers to a completely fictitious entity that we relate in one way or the other to the five skandhas. The root of sa?sara is the clinging to that notion, which makes us behave accordingly in terms of what seems to benefit or harm this self, thus leading to karmic actions and suffering. Therefore, it is the clinging to a self that is to be scrutinized and relinquished.

763 For example, this is stated in the A??asahasrikaprajñaparamitasutra (ACIP KD0012@3B; byang chub as the last entry) and the Pañcavi?satisahasrikaprajñaparamitasutra (ACIP KL0009- 1@171A; sangs rgyas kyi sa as the last entry).

764 SC (p. 330) comments that one must rest in the yoga of realizing the two kinds of identitylessness, because childish beings think of the dharmadhatu—which serves as the ground for buddhahood, nirva?a, purity, permanence, and virtue—as the twofold ignorance of clinging to


an identity. LG (p. 41) glosses buddhahood as the nirva?a of the mahayana, which is the ground of purity, since the latent tendencies of the two obscurations are relinquished; of permanence, since the equality of sa?sara and nirva?a is realized; and of virtue, since uncontaminated bliss arises. Childish beings think of apprehender and apprehended as two, but yogins of the mahayana rest in the yoga of their nonduality. For SS (pp. 651–53), the reason why yogins adopt wisdom is that buddhahood is the ground for purity, permanence, and virtue (the first two are glossed as in LG, and the third refers to natural virtue and purity). The reason why ignorance is to be left behind is that childish beings, despite the nonexistence of the two kinds of identity, superimpose and cling to them. Therefore, yogins rest in the wisdom that realizes the two kinds of identitylessness. The four notions of ordinary beings, who take the five skandhas to be pure, permanent, pleasant, and a self, are mistaken. Compared with these, the opposite notions of sravakas and pratyekabuddhas are unmistaken. But compared to the dharmakaya of the Buddhas, the latter are mistaken too, since the dharmakaya is endowed with the four paramitas of genuine purity, permanence, bliss, and self. You may object that the dharmakaya is not tenable as a self, since it is taught that all phenomena are without a self. This is taught while having personal and phenomenal identitylessness in mind, but it is also stated that the dhatu free from the reference points of a self existing or not is the genuine self. As the Uttaratantra says: “The reference points of self and no self being utterly at peace is the genuine self” (I.37cd). SS adds further similar quotes from the Mahaparinirva?asutra and the Mahayanasutrala?kara. 765 Skt. vasitaprapta, Tib. dbang thob pa. This refers to the ten masteries of bodhisattvas over (1) lifespan, (2) mind, (3) necessities, (4) karma, (5) birth, (6) imaginative willpower, (7) aspiration prayers, (8) miraculous powers, (9) wisdom, and (10) dharma.

766 This is an abridged passage from the Ratnagotravibhagavyakhya (J 33; P5526, fol. 95a.5– b.2). The Srimaladevisutra is not mentioned by name there, and the passage as it stands in Asa?ga’s text is not found in the available Tibetan and Chinese versions of that sutra. It does, however, speak about all the topics mentioned in the above passage in different places (see Wayman, trans. 1974, pp. 87, 102, and so on).

767 XXIV.11. Awareness-mantras (Skt. vidyamantra, Tib. rig sngags) can be used to propitiate mundane and supramundane deities in order to partake of their activity. If these mantras are used improperly, however, these deities might turn against the person who supplicates them.


771 SS (p. 654) says that this refers to what is called “unfolding/blooming” here. 772 Döl (p. 151) says that, since the dharmadhatu free from adventitious stains is nirva?a, the naturally abiding disposition—the dharmadhatu—growing and unfolding more and more through the progression of the ten bhumis (the virtuous conditions of practicing the ten paramitas), is the unfolding disposition. Therefore, just as the factors that obscure the new moon dwindle to the very same extent that it grows and unfolds, this is the reason for the dharmadhatu being referred to as the unfolding disposition. SS adds that this does not refer to some phase during which the dharmadhatu’s essence would grow. GL (p. 33) says that the expansion that comes about through the roots of virtue that concord with the ten paramitas is called “the unfolding disposition” or “correctly adopted disposition.” 773 Skt. nirya?a, Tib. nges par ’byung ba.


774 The phrase starting with “connecting” is tentative, since the Tibetan seems to be corrupt (DSC gnas khyad par can dang/ ’brel pa gzugs med pa yangs mal ’jug pa; emended to gnas khyad par can dang ’brel la gzugs med pa la yangjug pa). “The special abode” probably refers to any one of the five pure abodes of noble bodhisattvas above the three levels of mundane gods dwelling in the fourth dhyana of the form realm. Since the uppermost of these five is the highest state within the form realm, it is called Akani??ha (however, this is not to be mixed up with the “Richly Adorned Akani??ha” just above it, which is a sambhogakaya realm). Or, “special abode” may indicate the mental state of this fourth dhyana in general. The fourth dhyana of that realm is the main meditative concentration cultivated by bodhisattvas, since it is special in not only being tranquil but also very lucid. Thus, it represents the kind of calm abiding that is most suitable as a foundation for performing the Buddhist vipasyana meditations on the two kinds of identitylessness. Since the formless absorptions are much more dull, they are normally not cultivated as supports for such vipasyana meditations. However, in order to enhance their skill in samadhi and the stability of their insights, advanced bodhisattvas on the bhumis train in accomplishing vipasyana even in such dull samadhis.


776 Tib. mos pa. In the context of the paramita of power, this term probably refers to one of the ten masteries of bodhisattvas mentioned above. It means that they can manifest whatever is beneficial to others through their sheer mental power, including filling the entire universe with an infinite number of Buddhas.

777 SC (p. 331) summarizes verses 66–68 by saying that the first three paramitas unfold the accumulation of merit. Through that, temporarily, bodhisattvas see rupakayas, and finally, their own rupakayas are accomplished. The second three paramitas unfold the accumulation of wisdom. Through that, temporarily, bodhisattvas see the dharmakaya pure of adventitious stains within their own mind streams, and finally, their ultimate kaya is accomplished. The last four paramitas unfold the accumulation of the full capacity of the wisdom of dharmadhatu. Through that, temporarily, bodhisattvas do not become weary of promoting the welfare of others, and finally, their own full-fledged enlightened activity is accomplished. These ten paramitas are called “the unfolding disposition” because they are the disposition that makes the full capacity of the naturally abiding disposition unfold. 778 These two accomplishments are explained in detail as the seventh and eighth points of the first topic—the knowledge of all aspects—of the Abhisamayala?kara.


780 Except for DSC and RT, all other commentaries interpret this to mean bodhisattva.


782 In due order, these three terms (as explained in Dharmadharmatavibhaga lines 276–87) refer to the practice of the paramitas on the paths of accumulation and preparation (“determination” there is nges par ’byed ba; DSC nges par rtogs pa), the first bhumi (the path of seeing), and the remaining nine bhumis (the path of cultivation).


786 ACIP TD3793@113B (DSC paraphrase). 410 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 787 DSC gzhan du ba nyid; Dharmadharmatavibhaga/DP gtan du. 788 DSC ji snyed. 789 Lines 228–33.


791 Döl (p. 153), SS (p. 657) and RT (p. 643) all agree that bodhisattvas on the path of preparation see a tiny bit of the dharmakaya, since they have a tiny bit of a clear appearance of the dharmadhatu. SC (p. 333) comments on “seeing a tiny bit of buddhakaya” as meaning that ordinary beings, sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas who have newly entered the path see the dharmakaya just in the manner of an object-generality (that is, a conceptual mental image), since they have confidence in the qualities of the Tathagata. LG (p. 44–48) agrees that bodhisattvas on the paths of accumulation and preparation see the dharmakaya just in that manner. He then elaborates that the type of mind that arises in meditative equipoise during these two paths is self-awareness but not yogic valid cognition. On these paths, similar to seeing a part of the sun between clouds, it is possible to realize a mere absence of thoughts free from reference points, but this is not capable of stopping one’s clinging to real existence during the phase of subsequent attainment. Therefore, this kind of realization is not yogic direct valid cognition, since it is unlike the yogic valid cognition of the noble ones (which is capable of stopping such clinging to real existence). Since ordinary beings have to rely mainly on conceptions, they work with object-generalities involving great aspiration. As for noble ones, during subsequent attainment, they too need to evaluate the nature of phenomena through aspiring for it by way of object-generalities, but it is not that they realize the nature of phenomena only through object-generalities. LG also refers to Sakya Pa??ita and other early scholars and siddhas as having stated that the realization of someone on the path of preparation is self-awareness. When most of these masters refute other assertions, this is in order to put an end to the wrong ideas of those fools who, by explicitly asserting that this realization on the path of preparation is already yogic direct cognition, consequently just point to a path of seeing that lacks any qualities of relinquishment and realization. However, it is not that these masters absolutely do not assert any nonconceptual wisdom in ordinary beings. The Eighth Karmapa’s commentary on the Abhisamayala?kara (Mi bskyod rdo rje n.d., pp. I.182–83) says something very similar: The point when the freedom from all characteristics of apprehender and apprehended is directly realized in this way is the path of seeing, which has the character of yogic direct valid cognition. These meditative equipoises of the path of preparation are unmistaken self-aware direct valid cognitions that are approximately concordant with the unmistaken wisdom that lacks the duality of apprehender and apprehended. This is as it is taught in the Madhyantavibhaga:

“Approximately concordant and yet mistaken, . . .” IV.12 During the path of preparation, these meditative equipoises are not something other than self-aware direct valid cognition, because both what is aware and what it is aware of arise as the nature of a single clear and aware experience. The way in which such wisdom that lacks the duality of apprehender and apprehended is more eminent than the view of the pratyekabuddhas is stated by the earlier Tibetan masters as follows: “It has to be explained that the pratyekabuddhas realize merely the emptiness of an apprehender and apprehended that are substantially other. However, they do not realize true reality that is empty of any duality of apprehender and apprehended.” 792 On the first bhumi, bodhisattvas attain twelve times a hundred qualities: In one single moment,

(1) they see the faces of one hundred Buddhas, (2) are blessed by them, (3) send forth one hundred emanations, (4) live for one hundred eons, (5) engage through wisdom from beginning to end of one hundred eons, (6) are absorbed in and rise from one hundred samadhis,


(7) mature one hundred sentient beings, (8) shake one hundred realms of existence, (9) illuminate one hundred realms of existence with light, (10) open one hundred doors of dharma, 11) display one hundred of their own body, and (12) display one hundred excellent retinues that surround each of these bodies. Here, “to engage from beginning to end of one hundred eons

(5) means that bodhisattvas, for the sake of helping sentient beings to become free from their negative actions, demonstrate the way in which ordinary beings wander in sa?sara through their karma. Through shaking worldly realms (8), they induce aspiration in those to be guided. Through seeing the illumination of realms (9), sentient beings are matured. Opening one hundred doors of dharma (10) means that bodhisattvas, for the sake of ripening their own insight, reflect about the meaning of the various specifications of dharma (Dpal sprul ’jigs med chos kyi dbang po 1997, p. 162).

793 DSC omits the fourth bhumi.

794 These numbers vary greatly in different sources, the main sutras being the Buddhavata?sakasutra and the Dasabhumikasutra. SS (p. 657) says that, though the dharmakaya’s own essence is without increase or decrease, it is seen by bodhisattvas on the bhumis as if it gradually increases. However, what increases is just the mind that sees the dharmakaya but not the dharmakaya itself. RT (p. 643) comments that, here, “dharmakaya” refers to the relinquishment of obscurations, which is the manner of seeing the nature of phenomena becoming free from adventitious stains but not the way of seeing its natural purity. 795 SC (pp. 333–36) summarizes as follows. The phase when dharmadhatu wisdom is not purified from any afflictions at all is called “sentient being.” The phase when it has become pure to some degree but the aspiring bodhicitta has not arisen, is called “sravaka” or “pratyekabuddha.” The phase when this bodhicitta has arisen and the dharmadhatu is realized merely through confidence but not seen directly, is called a “person who aspires to the supreme yana.” The phase of the process of eliminating a part up to all of the cognitive obscurations that obscure the dharmadhatu is called “bodhisattva.” Once all obscuring stains have been completely purified, this is called “perfect buddhahood.” Therefore, it is from the phase when a part of the dharmakaya has been attained onward that the namebodhisattva” is applied. Otherwise, if all sentient beings had the actual dharmakaya, the individual bases for applying the terms “bodhisattva,” “sentient being,” and “Buddha” would be indefinite. Also, merely being pure of some portion of the afflictions is not sufficient for presenting the phase of bodhisattvas as a part of the dharmakaya, because both this kind of purity and generating bodhicitta for supreme enlightenment must come together. The reason for this is that one is not able to present the basic element as “the Buddha heart” if bodhicitta has not arisen. This is because there are still the four obscurations—aversion to the dharma, views about a self, fear of sa?sara’s suffering, and not considering the welfare of sentient beings—that prevent the basic element being presented as this Heart. Starting with the phase when this Heart is seen directly, one can be said to possess it because from that point onward, the true nature of one’s mind may be presented as “Tathagata” and “dharmakaya.” The meaning of “Tathagata” refers to having realized suchness directly. Therefore, it is only those persons for whom buddhahood and being a Tathagata have become their Heart that can be said to “possess that Heart.” However, to give the nature of buddhahood and the Tathagata—emptiness—the name “the Heart of buddhahood and the Tathagata,” and then to explain that the inseparability of this and the true nature of sentient beings is the sense in which the statement “All sentient beings have the Tathagata heart” is to be understood, is the great Ngog Lotsawa’s position. But I do not think it is a good one, since through this alone all five purposes of teaching that all sentient beings have the Buddha heart are not realized. You may wonder, “But is it not noble Asa?ga’s explanation that, from the first bhumi onward, one sees that all sentient beings too possess the Buddha heart?”


What he expresses by that is the following. From the first bhumi onward, when one sees a part of the dharmakaya in one’s own mind stream, one sees that the dharmadhatu of the minds of all sentient beings, just like one’s own true nature, is suitable to become free from stains, because at that time, one sees that they all have the disposition for that. Otherwise, if one always just takes the above explanation literally, then perfect buddhahood would actually dwell in all sentient beings, because it is seen from the first bhumi onward that it dwells in them. You may object, “But in that case, it is not justified to explain that the dharmadhatu, when pure of stains, is that Buddha heart and when impure is not.” This is not unjustified, because in order for the dharmadhatu to be presented as the “Buddha heart,” all ten aspects of its presentation that are given in (the first chapter of) the Uttaratantra must be complete; and for them to be complete, it must already be pure of a part of the four stains mentioned above, and the conditions that awaken the basic element’s power must have caused that element to unfold somewhat. Thus, during the phase of the ten bhumis, there are distinct portions of dharmakaya, Tathagata, and buddhahood, but they are not fully complete. Therefore, it is difficult to present this phase as the fully qualified dharmakaya and so on. For example, in the one portion of the moon that appears on the first day of a lunar month, all its fifteen portions that appear until the full moon are not complete. Hence, it cannot be presented as the full orb of the moon. “However, isn’t it explained that all sentient beings have the Buddha heart but just don’t see it by themselves?” For as long as they do not see that it exists in them, it cannot be presented as their having it, just like the honey in a lotus garden. GL (p. 122) comments on verses 75–76 that it is only the factor of the dharmadhatu being more or less pure of adventitious stains that accounts for the seeming increase in qualities while progressing on the path, but the dharmadhatu itself never turns into something whose nature undergoes any change. This is just as when the space confined within a house becomes vast unrestrained space once this house collapses. However, just through that, space does not become something whose nature changes.

796 All these signs on the paths of preparation, seeing, and meditation are discussed in detail in the eighth point (“the signs of irreversible learners”) of the fourth topic (“the training in completing all aspects”) of the Abhisamayala?kara.

797 Skt. Catu?sm?tyupasthana (Tib. dran pa nye bar bzhag pa bzhi), catvari samyakpraha?ani (Tib. yang dag spong ba bzhi), catvara ?ddhipada? (rdzu ’phrul gyi rkang pa bzhi), pañcendriya?i (dbang po lnga), and pañcabalani (Tib. stobs lnga). The first three sets belong to the path of accumulation and the latter two to the path of preparation. Together with the seven branches of enlightenment (Skt. saptasa?bodhya?gani, Tib. byang chub kyi yan lag bdun) on the path of seeing and the eightfold path of the noble ones (Skt. arya??a?gamarga, Tib. ’phags pa’i lam yan lag brgyad) on the path of cultivation, they make up the thirty-seven dharmas that concord with enlightenment.

798 LG (p. 49) glosses “the ground of darkness” as a portion of the alaya-consciousness, the ground of the latent tendencies of sa?sara. “The ground of brightness” is a portion of mirrorlike wisdom, the ground of all excellent qualities.


800 Skt. sa?yojana, Tib. kun sbyor. These are the views about a real personality, the view of holding ethics and spiritual conduct as paramount, and doubt. 801 This refers to the above-mentioned twelve times a hundred qualities. 802 V.41–42. The last line means that bodhisattvas on the first bhumi usually take rebirth as a cakravartin king that rules over the southern continent of Jambudvipa in the ancient Indian


four-continent world (in translating DSC’s quotes from the Ratnavali, I have generally followed the text’s critical edition in Hopkins 1998).


804 DSC omits this line. 805 IV.43–44. The precious seven attributes of a cakravartin are his precious wheel, jewel, minister, horse, elephant, queen, and general. On the second bhumi, bodhisattvas usually take birth as cakravartin kings who rule over all four continents of the ancient Indian world-system.


807 IV.45–46. Bodhisattvas on the third bhumi mostly take rebirth as the god Indra, who rules over the second heaven of the desire gods called “The Thirty-three” (Skr. trayastri?sa, Tib. sum cu rtsa gsum).


809 This is the third heaven of the desire gods (Skr. yama, Tib. ’thab bral).


811 GL (p. 259) comments that the reason for the name of this bhumi is that bodhisattvas engage in all kinds of activities, such as sciences and sports, but still manage to triumph over the afflictions difficult to overcome that proliferate during such activities.


813 This the fourth heaven of the desire gods.


815 Skt. abhimukhi, Tib. mngon du gyur pa/mngon du phyogs pa. 816 In line four, SS (p. 661) also has “profound arising and ceasing,” commenting that there is no arising and ceasing ultimately, but on the level of seeming reality, phenomena cease right upon having arisen. Since this is difficult to realize, profound actuality is faced. All other commentators have “arising and ceasing exhausted.” SC (p. 338) glosses this as the bodhisattvas having gained mastery over the principle of dependent origination, which is difficult to fathom, thus facing both sa?sara and nirva?a on this bhumi. LG (p. 50) says that all mundane and supramundane excellences are gathered in such a manner that the progressively superior realizations incorporate the inferior. Through realizing the equality of sa?sara and nirva?a, the arising and ceasing of sa?sara are exhausted, and the bodhisattvas directly face the qualities of the level of buddhahood.


818 Skr. nirma?arati, Tib. ’phrul dga.’ The fifth heaven of the desire gods, where the gods enjoy the sense pleasures that they themselves have emanated at will.


820 SC (p. 338) says that, on this bhumi, the bodhisattvasincessant flow of entering into and rising from the dharmadhatu resembles a wheel. Ever playing with a web of wisdom-light means that they have attained the unimpeded power to perform such entering and rising.


414 In Praise of Dharmadhatu 822 Skr. paranirmitavasavartin, Tib. gzhanphrul dbang byed. The sixth heaven of the desire gods, in which the gods have the power to even enjoy the sense pleasures emanated by their fellow gods.


825 SC (338–39) says here: On this bhumi, if bodhisattvas do not rise from resting in meditative equipoise within the dharmadhatu, they have the power to manifest the dharmakaya, in which the cognitive obscurations are relinquished (that is, the completion of their own welfare). However, since they have not yet fully completed the accumulation of merit, they do not have the power to promote the welfare of others through the two rupakayas in an effortless, spontaneous, and uninterrupted way. By considering this possible flaw, the Buddhas make these bodhisattvas rise from their meditative equipoise of cessation. This flaw exists already from the first bhumi onward, if bodhisattvas do not rise from the dharmadhatu. But since they always have some unrelinquished afflictions on the impure bhumis, despite not needing to rise from the dharmadhatu, bodhisattvas are always capable of doing so. On the eighth bhumi, since all afflictive obscurations are relinquished, without any prior impulse of thinking, “I should rise from this meditative equipoise,” it is possible that these bodhisattvas cannot rise from it through their own power. Therefore, the Buddhas need to make them come out of it.


827 Here, this name does not refer to the well-known god (Maha)brahma himself, but to those gods who are rulers over one thousand four-continent worlds (a chiliocosm) and reside in the heaven called “Brahma.” This is the first of the three heavens of the first dhyana level in the realm of form gods, with all three of these heavens being part of Mahabrahma’s retinue. 828 IV.55–56. DSC mistakenly replaces these last two lines by the last two lines of IV.58. 829 Skt. pratisa?vedana, Tib. so so yang dag par rig pa. These are usually presented as a set of four. (1) The discriminating awareness of the dharma is to teach the eighty-four thousand doors of dharma as various remedial means in accordance with the different ways of thinking of sentient beings. (2) The discriminating awareness of meaning is to know the meanings that are expressed by the words and statements about the general characteristics of phenomena—impermanence, suffering, emptiness, and identitylessness—and their ultimate characteristic—the lack of arising and ceasing. (3) The discriminating awareness of semantic explanation (Skt. nirukti, Tib. nges tshig) is not to be ignorant about any of all beings’ designations and languages as well as their meanings. (4) The discriminating awareness of self-confidence (Skt. pratibhana, Tib. spobs pa) is to be unobstructed in teaching the dharma and cutting through doubts.


831 This refers to those gods who are rulers over one million four-continent worlds (a dichiliocosm), residing in “Brahmapurohita,” the second of the three heavens of the first dhyana level.


834 IV.59–60. Bodhisattvas on this bhumi usually take birth in one of the five pure abodes (Skt. suddhavasa, Tib. gnas gtsang)—the highest heavens of the form realm—as the god Mahesvara (better known as Siva), who rules over a trichiliocosm.


835 II.14–16 (note that the Tibetan translation of the Madhyantavibhaga inserts two verses from Vasubandhu’s commentary before these verses, thus counting them as II.16–18). 836 These are treated in detail as one of the difficult subjects under point eight (“the accomplishment of engagement”) of the first topic (“The knowledge of all aspects”) of the Abhisamayala?kara (I.49–71).

837 There is no sutra with this name in the Kangyur. However, in the Sarvapu?yasamucchayasamadhisutra (P802), there is the story of the super-athlete Vimalatejasvarga, who attempts to challenge the physical powers of the Buddha. 838 DSC bzhi.

839 Vindhya is the range of hills that separate northern and middle India from the Deccan, and the elephants there are considered to be especially powerful.

840 All of the above are names of certain divine beings in the first heaven of the desire realm, called “The Four Great Kings.”

841 In Hindu cosmology, this is the son of Mahapuru?a, the latter being the primeval man as the soul and original source of the universe. Also, Naraya?a is variously identified as Brahma, Vi??u, or K???a.

842 In general, the term mahapuru?a also designates someone who has the thirty-two major marks (such as the rupakayas of a Buddha and cakravartins), but here it specifically refers to said primeval man.

843 There are two kinds of pratyekabuddhas, the parrotlike and the rhinoceroslike. Similar to these animals, the former live and practice together in groups, while the latter stay alone.


846 Döl (p. 155) comments that the state of the dharmadhatu being with stains has changed into its being without stains. LG (p. 52) says that the first two lines of verse refer to bearing the ultimate fruit of enjoying the abode of the buddhadharmas, such as the ten powers. The final fundamental change of state of the entire alaya-consciousness including its accompanying mental factors is called the “dharmakaya of a Buddha.” Someone may argue, “Does the omniscient wisdom of Buddhas exist or not? If it exists, does it know the phenomena of sa?sara? If it does know them, it follows that it entails mistakenness, but if it does not, the Buddhas would not be omniscient.” Though this wisdom is beyond any reference points ultimately, conventionally, it needs to be asserted as belonging to the set of existents. However, it is difficult to gauge through the minds of ordinary beings. If they are already incapable of, for example, gauging the mind of the waking state through being in a dream, forget about the level of a Buddha with its wisdom of the fundamental change of state. SC (p. 340) glosses the first line of verse as the dharmakaya of the buddhadharmas that are profound and the second as the rupakayas enjoying the dharmas that are vast. He then discusses the difference between the notion of “fundamental change of state” being refuted in Nagarjuna’s Bodhicittavivara?a and being explained here. The Bodhicittavivara?a (verses 32–35) refutes the alaya-consciousness, which is the abode of all that is to be relinquished, thus refuting the explanation of certain Yogacaras that the meaning of “fundamental change of state” is that the alaya-consciousness was the abode of these factors before, but then has turned into something that is not their abode later. In this text here, Nagarjuna does not say that “change of state” refers to being without qualities before, while posipodd_


sessing qualities later. In brief, the essence of the ten bhumis is the dharmakaya being pure of the respective portions of adventitious stains, and the essence of that is dharmadhatu wisdom. SS (pp. 665–68) agrees with DSC and Döl and then also discusses the notion of “fundamental change of state.” Quoting the Suvar?aprabhasottamasutra (P174–176), the Uttaratantra, and Candragomin, he says that the dharmakaya is obtained from the naturally abiding disposition and the two rupakayas from the unfolding disposition. Implicitly, these sources speak about a fundamental change of state in terms of relinquishment and a fundamental change of state in terms of nature. The fundamental change of state of the alaya-consciousness, mentation, and the six operating consciousnesses in the above texts is of the latter kind. Upon the objection that Nagarjuna does not assert the notion of “fundamental change of state,” since his Bodhicittavivara?a refutes it, SS (like SC) says that this is just a refutation of said notion as held by the Mere Mentalists, while Nagarjuna obviously speaks about a “fundamental change of state” here in his Dharmadhatustava. Another objection adduced is that Madhyamikas do not assert an alaya-consciousness and that the assertion of eight consciousnesses is the system of the Mere Mentalists, it thus being untenable that the fundamental change of state of the alaya and so on is taught here. SS says this is not correct, since Nagarjuna’s Bodhicittavivara?a refutes a really existent alaya as held by the Vijñaptivadins, but then says that an illusionlike likeness of it appropriates the three realms (verses 32–35). Also, since Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara refutes an alaya that resembles the notion of a creator like Isvara, it is well known everywhere that master Candrakirti does not assert an alaya-consciousness. However, he just does not assert an alaya-consciousness that is a real entity as held by the Vijñaptivadins. But that does not mean that he asserts that there is absolutely no alaya-consciousness, for his commentary on the Guhyasamaja—which is the central yidam-practice of master Nagarjuna and his spiritual heirs—speaks about the eight consciousnesses and their purification. Also, master Haribhadra says in his commentary on the Prajñaparamitasa?cayagatha (P5196): “The essence of the alaya-consciousness, which serves as the cause, is the kaya that has the nature of mirrorlike wisdom.” {I could not locate this sentence in Haribhadra’s text, but it does speak about the alaya-consciousness (ACIP TD3972@069B) in the context of the “momentary training” (topic 7 of the Abhisamayala?kara).} Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that Madhyamikas do not assert an alaya-consciousness. {In this context, it may be added that Bhavaviveka’s Madhyamakaratnapradipa (P5254, fol. 358b.3–4), in the context of bodhisattvas passing from the tenth bhumi to buddhahood (quoting Dharmadhatustava 91–96), uses the typical (Yogacara) triad of mind, mentation, and consciousness, which represents the eight consciousnesses. He says: Right upon that, . . . being free from mind, mentation, and consciousness, in the expanse of suchness, everything without exception is nondifferent and of one taste. This is called “buddhahood.”}

The final objection here is that Madhyamikas do not assert self-awareness (rang rig), as it is refuted in the Bodhicittavivara?a (verses 36–39), the Bodhicaryavatara (IX.17–24), and other texts. SS says that all of these refutations negate the position of the Vijñaptivadins, who assert a really existent consciousness that is aware of itself, but that does not mean that Madhyamikas absolutely do not assert self-awareness, since Nagarjuna speaks about it in verse 56 of our text here. {The last comment needs to be taken with a grain of salt, since the Tibetan of Nagarjuna’s text—also in verses 29 and 46—consistently says so so rang rig and never just rang rig. As explained in the introduction on terminology, these two terms cannot simply or necessarily be equated, especially not in the case of a translated Sanskrit original.} 847 These are nonarising, nonceasing, primordial peace, natural nirva?a, and lack of nature. 848 The change of state of the eight consciousnesses into the four wisdoms (or five, if the dharmadhatu is presented as dharmadhatu wisdom) is treated in detail in Rangjung Dorje’s NY


855 SC (p. 340) says that the latent tendencies of sa?sara are conceivable, since upon consideration with discriminating prajña, one is able to understand that they are of one taste with emptiness. The dharmadhatu is inconceivable, since it is beyond the range of speech and the senses. Nevertheless, this does not stand in the way of praising it. Conventionally, one may bow to and praise whatever of the following two is suitable—either the conventional term “dharmadhatu” that is to be realized through the mental consciousness by way of an object-generality or the actual dharmadhatu that is beyond all knowing and expression. So this verse does not teach that the dharmadhatu is to be realized by the mental consciousness, since the latter only knows generalities, which is not what is to be realized here. In brief, the words “whatever is suitable” stand for both the dharmadhatu during the phase of engagement through aspiration, which can be realized by way of mere confidence, and the dharmadhatu once the bhumis have been attained, which is directly seen by way of personally experienced wisdom. LG (pp. 52–54) comments that buddhahood—the freedom from latent tendencies—is inconceivable, while apprehender and apprehended—the latent tendencies of sa?sara—can be grasped by the minds of ordinary beings. Thus, buddhahood means that all mistakenness has stopped. Someone may argue, “Then it would not be omniscience, since it does not perceive sa?sara.” Merely seeing that mistakenness, which is not established ultimately, does not exist is not the realization of true reality. But on the other hand, if mistaken appearances existed even from the perspective of a Tathagata’s seeing, they would not be established as mistaken appearances. “This is just the meaning of apprehender and apprehended being without difference as in Yogacara but not the meaning of the lack of appearance as in Madhyamaka.” Well, then it would follow that for persons who are freed from the disease of blurred vision, the strands of hair that they saw before now appear as the nonduality of apprehender and apprehended. Also, take those beings who have just awoken from sleep or been freed from the disease of blurred vision and happen to see in a —relatively speaking— unmistaken way that is, not seeing dream appearances or strands of hair. It would absurdly follow from your objection that they all go blind right at that moment, since they do not see any dream appearances or strands of hair. “In that case, this contradicts what is taught as the union of appearance and emptiness, which means that being empty is not obscured by appearance and appearance is not obscured by being empty.”

There is no contradiction. As for the meaning of what is taught as union—in the sense of the aspect that is the inseparability of the aspect of appearance (sa?sara) and the aspect of being empty (nirva?a)—when taking the perspective of sentient beings on the level of seeming reality, for their minds, which sometimes grasp the two realities, appearance and emptiness appear as different. But this is just their subjective mode of apprehension, since neither empty nor nonempty are established ultimately. When having the basic nature (the nonnominal ultimate) in mind, what is taught as union (the aspect of being inseparable) is taught with the implication that, during the time of meditative equipoise of noble ones, all reference points of any mode of apprehension have ceased. However, this does not mean that they cognize mistaken appearipodd_ ances. This is just as in the example of people with blurred vision. While these persons are not yet freed from this disease, when a physician points out that the strands of hair that they see are just due to this disease, at times, the persons may already think, “These strands of hair do not exist ultimately.” However, once they are relieved from that disease, they are also liberated from any mode of apprehension as to whether such strands of hair exist or not. As Candrakirti says in his commentary on the Yukti?a??ika: “Also the two realities are presented from the perspective of the seeming.” His Madhyamakavatara (VI.29) declares:

Some mistaken nature, such as strands of hair, Is imagined under the influence of blurred vision, While its actual nature, as seen by pure eyes, is true reality. You should understand this distinction between the two realities in the same way.

A sutra says:

The ultimate nature is just a single reality, But some call it “the four realities.” {One could add here verse 17 of Nagarjuna’s Mahayanavi?sika: Just as when awakening, one does not see The objects experienced in a dream, Upon awakening from the sleep of the darkness of ignorance, Sa?sara is no longer seen.}

As the dharmadhatu is beyond the range of speech and senses, through relying on the stainless words of the Tathagata, it is something to be realized as a mere object-generality by the mental consciousness. Thus, I bow to and praise whatever is suitable—either what is inconceivable (the dharmadhatu just as it is), or what is conceivable (its mere object-generality). As for line 90c, RT (p. 646) quotes Nagarjuna’s Ratnavali IV.64ab: You may wonder, “Through what is true reality seen?” Conventionally, it is said to be the mind.

On line 90d, RT comments that both the dharmadhatu (the cause for attaining buddhahood) and its result (buddhahood) are worthy of praise. Döl (p. 155) says that there is nothing in the dharmakaya that is unsuitable, such as ultimate worlds and their inhabitants.


858 This refers to the king of all gems, the wish-fulfilling jewel.

859 This is both a name for the wish-fulfilling jewel and the wish-fulfilling tree. 860 A particular precious gem.

861 Döl (p. 155) says that the giant lotus is the flower of the dharmadhatu, that is, a pure self-appearance of wisdom. SC (p. 342) and LG (p. 56) provide an abbreviated version of the explanation in the Dasabhumikasutra (P761.31; a part of the Avata?sakasutra), which says that the bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi dwell on a throne that has the size of a million trichiliocosms and is ornamented by many jeweled lotuses. This throne is surrounded by as many lotuses as there are atoms in a million trichiliocosms, on which the bodhisattvas on the other nine bhumis sit.


864 The Sanskrit vaisaradya means self-confidence, expertise, wisdom, or infallibility. 865 Lit. “those who toil” (Tib. dge sbyong). Originally, this was a term for all mendicants of nonbrahmanic origin who followed any kind of spiritual path not relying on the Vedas. In Buddhist literature, it came to be mainly used for Buddhist monks, whether mendicants or not. 866 III.11–13.

867 This sutra is better known under the latter part of its title, that is, the Dhara?isvararajaparip?cchasutra


868 SC (p. 342) relates all the qualities described in verses 94–95 to bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi. Both SC and SS (p. 673) gloss “buddhadharmas without reference points” as the qualities of a Buddha lacking any identifiable characteristics.

. 870 These are the four means to attract the beings to be guided on the path (Skt. Catu?sa?grahavastu, Tib. bsdu ba’i dngos po bzhi).

871 DSC phyag ring PD phyag ris.

872 DSC omits lines 4–5 of this verse.

873 DSC omits this line.

874 DSC conflates the last two lines into the single line seng ge’i ’gram ’dra thub dkar ’gyur.

875 II.77–96. Unlike in the context of describing the physical strength of a rupakaya above, here, the term Mahapuru?a refers to a being who possesses these thirty-two marks.


877 As for “the full moon surrounded by stars,” Döl (p. 156) identifies it as the two accumulations of merit and wisdom; SC (p. 342) as the bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi, being surrounded by a retinue of bodhisattvas on the other nine bhumis; SS (p. 674) as the kaya that is adorned with the major and minor marks and surrounded by pure retinues as the recipients of its enlightened activity, such as teaching them the dharma; LG (p. 57) as the Buddha’s qualities of perfect relinquishment and realization, surrounded by the bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi; and RT (p. 647) as buddhahood—the fruition of the two previously gathered accumulations— surrounded by these two.


879 DSC has khye’u rin chen gyi zhus pa’i mdo instead of the usual bu mo rin chen gyi zhus pa’i mdo (the Ratnadarikasutra is the Uttaratantra’s main source for the qualities of a Buddha). 880 This was the name of Buddha Sakyamuni while dwelling in the heaven of Tu?ita before his birth on earth.

881 Döl (p. 156) and SS (p. 674) say that the Buddha’s hands in this empowerment are like a sun that dispels the darkness of ignorance. Based on the Dasabhumikasutra, SC (pp. 342, 343), SS (pp. 671–73), and LG (pp. 57–58, 59) elaborate that countless light rays radiate from the soles, the kneecaps, the navels, the ribs, and the palms of these bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi, which gradually illuminate the realms of hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans,


gods, and asuras, pacifying their sufferings. Countless light rays from the bodhisattvas’ shoulders, backs, necks, and mouths illuminate the sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas— from those who generate bodhicitta for the first time up to those on the ninth bhumi—in the ten directions, making them gradually practice the gate that illuminates the dharma, peaceful samadhis, and the various approaches of means and prajña. The countless light rays that issue from the ur?a-hair of the bodhisattvas outshine all maras in the ten directions and illuminate the bodhisattvas that receive empowerment, melting into their bodies. Then, from the crowns of the heads of these bodhisattvas, light rays equal in number to the atoms of countless millions of trichiliocosms radiate, illuminating all the ma??alas of the Tathagatas in the ten directions, circling the universe ten times, and forming a ma??ala of a web of light rays in the sky above, thus venerating all Tathagatas, promoting the welfare of sentient beings, and finally melting into the soles of the Tathagatas. Through this, the victors and their children see that the time for the empowerment of these bodhisattvas has come. All the countless bodhisattvas on the first nine bhumis approach, gaze at, and venerate these bodhisattvas, entering many thousand samadhis. From the endless knots, the vajras, and the auspicious signs of the bodhisattvas who are to receive empowerment, a single light ray—called “victory over the enemies of the maras”— streams forth, surrounded by many millions of light rays, all illuminating the ten directions and displaying infinite magical feats. Through these rays melting back into the bodhisattvasendless knots, vajras, and auspicious signs, their power increases greatly. From the ur?a-hairs of the Tathagatas, a single light ray—called “being endowed with the clairvoyance of omniscience” and surrounded by countless other light rays—illuminates the ten directions, circles the universe ten times, pacifies the lower realms, and outshines all maras. Finally, it melts simultaneously into the crowns of the heads of the bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi, with its surrounding light rays melting into the crowns of the heads of the bodhisattvas in their retinues. All these bodhisattvas thus attain many thousands of samadhis that they had not attained before. As mentioned above, Bhavaviveka’s Madhyamakaratnapradipa (fol. 358a.1–358b.8) quotes verses 91–96 in the context of bodhisattvas passing from the tenth bhumi to buddhahood. He says: When mighty bodhisattvas in their last life on the tenth bhumi look at sentient beings, they see that there is no decrease in their number and think . . . “Without having manifested the dharmakaya, I am not able to lead sentient beings out of sa?sara. Therefore, I will manifest the dharmakaya.”

After that thought, they are empowered by the Tathagatas of the ten directions and thus attain the qualities of a Buddha, such as the ten powers, in a complete way. This very point is stated by master Nagarjuna in his Dharmadhatustava . . . Right upon that, just as the sunlit autumn sky at noon free from dust, all the dust of characteristics is no more. Being free from mind, mentation, and consciousness, in the expanse of suchness, everything without exception is nondifferent and of one taste. This is called buddhahood. . . . Buddhahood means to have awoken from the sleep of ignorance, while the bodhicitta of the nature of phenomena—great self-sprung wisdom—knows and fully realizes the entire ma??ala of knowable objects in a single instant. 882 DSC omits this line.


884 The Kangyur does not contain a sutra by this name, only three dhara?is whose titles contain the words “light rays,” called Maricinamadhara?i (P182/613), Rasmivimalavisuddhaprabhanamadhara?i (P218/607), and Samantamukhapravesarasmivimalo??i?aprabhasasarvatathagatah?dayasamayavilokatenamadhara?i (P206/608/3512/3892). According to SC (p. 343),

Döl (p. 156), and LG (p. 59), those who “abide in this great yoga” and so on are the bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi. Döl adds that, through abiding in the state of being empowered by the Buddhas, these bodhisattvas radiate light, thus opening the pure gates of worldly beings. LG states


that, during the tenth bhumi’s phase of subsequent attainment, the manner in which bodhisattvas promote the welfare of beings is almost the same as the one of Buddhas. Like DSC, SS (p. 675) says that these two verses refer to Buddhas. He glosses the gates of the path to liberation as the teachings on the four seals of the dharma and so on.

885 Usually, the nirva?a with remainder refers to the analytical cessation in the mind stream of an arhat who is still endowed with the five skandhas that are the remainder impelled by former karma and afflictions. Analytical cessation means that all karmas and afflictions as well as their root—the clinging to a personal self—that could serve as causes for further rebirth have been eradicated through a thorough meditative analysis of all the aspects of the four realities of the noble ones. The nirva?a without remainder is then reached at death, that is, upon leaving the skandhas of one’s last existence in sa?sara behind. Thus, practitioners may attain arhathood while still being alive and then just shed their skandhas at death, passing from the nirva?a with remainder into the nirva?a without remainder. There are also people who attain arhathood at the moment of death and do not go through the phase of the nirva?a with remainder.


889 II.57–60. DSC omits lines 57c and 59c, while line 59b is inserted between 58b and c. 890 RT (p. 647) says that enlightened activity first places beings in the nirva?a with remainder and later in the one without remainder, nirva?a being identified as a mind free from stains. According to SC (p. 344), it is held that the nirva?a without remainder is manifested, if all the karmic formations of one’s last lifetime have been relinquished. However, this is just a case of applying the conventional term “nirva?a” to nothing but the extinction of sa?sara, but it is not the actual nirva?a, since it is not the dharmakaya. To speak of the dharmakaya, the mere relinquishment of the afflictions is not sufficient. The reason is that, though sa?sara has ceased through just that relinquishment, if the dharmadhatu has not become pure of the second kind of obscurations—the cognitive ones—it is not seen; and one cannot speak of “not seeing the dharmadhatu” as being the dharmakaya. SS (pp. 676–77) explains the difference between the nirva?as with and without remainder as described above. He says that the latter is not the fully qualified nirva?a either, since the arhats who dwell in the uncontaminated expanse are exhorted by the light rays of the Buddhas at some point to enter the path of the mahayana and promote the welfare of sentient beings. According to LG (p. 60), it is held that the bodhisattvas at the end of the tenth bhumi, who have not yet fully completed relinquishment and realization, are those in the nirva?a with remainder. Right after the vajralike samadhi in the last moment of the tenth bhumi, they attain the dharmakaya of a Buddha, which is the nirva?a without remainder. 891 Part 2, IV.77cd.

892 RT (p. 647) says that the nature of the nonbeing of sentient beingsafflictions is the actual nirva?a, which is the basic nature of mind. Döl (pp. 156–57) explains that the actual nirva?a is the mind free from stains, which has undergone its fundamental change. The nature of the nonbeing of all seeming sentient beings is mind’s natural luminosity, which is nirva?a’s sphere. Those who fully see this luminosity are the mighty bodhisattvas on the tenth bhumi who are empowered. Upon having reached the very end of the tenth bhumi, this is the fully stainless dharmakaya. SC (pp. 344–45) states that, here, the dhatu of mind having become free from stains is called “nonabiding nirva?a,” since it is the wisdom that, due to being free from the stains of the afflictions, does not abide in sa?sara and is also liberated from the obscuration of not conipodd_


sidering sentient beings with compassion. The nature of this dharmadhatu wisdom—the total nonbeing of any obscurations of sentient beings—is the sphere of this very wisdom. Therefore, it can only become a living experience by personally experienced wisdom but is beyond any object of terms or thoughts. Those who directly see this dharmadhatu that is endowed with twofold purity are the mighty bodhisattvas. The dharmadhatu endowed with twofold purity is also called “dharmakaya,” since it is the body of all qualities such as the powers. SS (pp. 677–78) says that the actual nirva?a of the mahayana is the mind that is free from all adventitious stains, through these having been vanquished by remedial wisdom. This mind has the character of the kayas and wisdoms. Once this manifests, in accordance with the thinking of all sentient beings and following the progression of the yanas, the Buddhas see that these beings are to be guided in terms of whether their sphere is the nonbeing of self and mine, the nonexistence of real outer entities, or the nature of the nonbeing of apprehender and apprehended and so on. Through teaching them the dharma accordingly, they lead them to maturation and liberation. Finally, the mighty supreme bodhicitta that is the ultimate bodhicitta—the fully stainless union of the two realities—is the dharmakaya. LG (pp. 60–61) states that there is no final nirva?a other than buddhahood, and that the manifestation of the basic nature of one’s own mind, free from the two obscurations and their latent tendencies, is the final change of state of the five wisdoms. In addition, the nature of the nonbeing of all sentient beings—the profound basic nature that is emptiness—is the fundamental state of phenomena, the equal taste of sa?sara and nirva?a. As Buddhas realize this, it is their sphere, since the nature of phenomena is without difference, and, upon becoming a Buddha, sa?sara and nirva?a are inseparable. When this basic nature is seen, the mighty bodhicitta is the final consummation of mind’s full capacity to generate bodhicitta. Since its nature is primordially pure, without any stains ever having entered this fundamental state, it is the fully stainless dharmakaya, which resembles space and is inseparable from the final consummation of the two accumulations.

893 DSC first two lines: dri ma med pa’i chos sku las/ ye shes rgya mtshor gnas gyur nas (this phrasing is repeated in the commentary just below) DNP dri ma med pa’i chos sku la/ ye shes rgya mtsho gnas gyur nas.

894 DSC uses the expression “change of state” (gnas gyur pa) twice here, obviously interpreting gnas gyur nas in line 101b of DSC’s version of Nagarjuna’s text in this sense. The standard version of lines 101ab as found in DNP is explained by all other commentaries (except SS, who follows DSC’s version of lines 101ab but gives a different commentary) as the sea of wisdom abiding/resting (gnas par gyur nas) in the dharmakaya, which also seems to be a more natural reading. Following this, DSC’s above sentence could also be read: “Rather, the oceans of the hordes of thoughts find their place/have come to rest in the sea of wisdom.” In any case, both come down to the same meaning.


896 Döl (p. 157) comments that the sea of wisdom always abides in the stainless dharmakaya in such a way that it fills all of space and is inexhaustible. Like a variegated jewel that showers down everything desired like rain, from the dharmakaya, enlightened activities issue that fulfill the welfare of all sentient beings in a simultaneous and spontaneous manner for as long as sa?sara lasts. SC (p. 345) says that the sea of wisdom, such as the powers, rests within the dharmakaya free from adventitious stains. From this, the two rupakayas incessantly fulfill the welfare of sentient beings, just like a wish-fulfilling gem with its variegated color and shape. LG (p. 61) explains that the stainless dharmakaya is like the ground, in which the oceanlike two wisdoms that know suchness and variety abide. From that state, just as all kinds of various jewels come forth from the ocean,


while not moving away from the single dharmakaya, the sambhogakayas and nirma?akayas fulfill the welfare of pure and impure beings in a permanent, all-pervading, and spontaneously present manner. According to SS (p. 678), the manner in which enlightened activity issues from the stainless dharmakaya is as follows. By way of abiding in the sea of the wisdom that knows suchness and variety, without conceiving of anything or relying on efforts, variegated enlightened activities appear. Just as is the case with a wish-fulfilling jewel or a wish-fulfilling tree, from the dominant condition that is the dharmakaya, what appears as the two rupakayas is produced. Through that, the welfare of beings is fulfilled spontaneously and incessantly.

897 IV.85–88 (verses IV.13–84 and 89–98 explain all of these examples in great detail). 898 XI.17d. RT (p. 648) points out that some people’s assertion that Buddhas do not have wisdom, which they try to base on Madhyamakavatara XI.17ab (“The dry firewood of knowable objects having been burned entirely, this peace is the dharmakaya of the victors”), is untenable, since it contradicts the last verse of Nagarjuna’s text here. RT declares, “Keep it very well in mind that this text here states that an ocean of wisdom dwells in the dharmakaya!” The colophon of RT says that Nagarjuna’s Dharmadhatustava properly explains the meaning of all vast and profound dharmas in a condensed way. Since it is difficult to understand, not a single explanation on it has appeared in Tibet. This last statement seems strange, since at least the commentaries by Rangjung Dorje, Dölpopa, and Sönam Gyaltsen (1312–1375) had been written long before Rongtön wrote his (according to the colophon, it was composed in the year of his ordination, which took place when he was about twenty-one, thus around 1387). One can hardly imagine that Rongtön was unaware of these commentaries. 899 XI.18.

900 In the Tibetan tradition, Acarya Sura (Tib. slob dpon dpa’ bo) is considered to be just another name of Asvagho?a.

901 DSC bhyakara. In terms of the historical order of the above masters, taking the unclear Tibetan to mean Bhavya seems to make the most sense (Bhavya probably was the actual name of Bhavaviveka, who is often referred to by that name). Verse 101 is also quoted in Bhavaviveka’s Madhyamakaratnapradipa (P5254, fol. 361a) in the context of outlining the three kayas: In brief, what consists of the buddha qualities (such as the powers, the fearlessnesses, and unshared qualities) and is nondual with and not different from prajñaparamita is the dharmakaya. What springs from its blessings and is supported by that basis of the dharmakaya is the sambhogakaya. What comes from its blessings and appears in accordance with the inclinations of those to be guided is the nirma?akaya.

902 LG’s colophon (pp. 62–63; paraphrase of the original verses) agrees that the oral streams of explanations on the Buddha’s intention by Maitreya and Nagarjuna may appear different but gather and fuse into one in the ocean of definitive meaning. This is what all honest scholars and siddhas assert. If the ocean of the Buddha heart, in which the two realities are of one taste, fits into the hub of analysis, which is as wide open as the sky, this is called “realizing that the two traditions are not contradictory.” But this is not seen by the biased eyes of those who say that Nagarjuna does not assert the change of state of the Tathagata heart being purified of stains, that the middling three texts of Maitreya are Mere Mentalism, and so forth. Rather, the Abhisamayala?kara and the collection of reasoning teach the inseparability of the two realities, being just like space free from reference points. The three middling texts of Maitreya Mahayanasutrala?kara, Madhyantavibhaga, and Dharmadharmatavibhaga, the collection of speeches, and the collection of praises teach the union of the two accumulations, being just like


two wings. The collection of praises and the Uttaratantra mainly teach the notion of the basic element of the two kayas, the result of union. Therefore, with regard to the single essence of the path, these texts just bring out clearly the notions of lucidity and emptiness, respectively. Nagarjuna does not hold that nothing but plain emptiness is the final view, and Maitreya’s texts do not speak about something being really established. Therefore, they agree on the change of state that is nothing but the mistakenness of apprehender and apprehended vanishing within the dharmadhatu—the union of appearance and emptiness. In addition, it is impossible for Madhyamaka and Mere Mentalism to be contradictory with regard to the aspect of vast means. Any remaining root of phenomenal identity that may not be severed in Mere Mentalism is cut into pieces through the weapons of Madhyamaka reasoning. In brief, if all the countless various methods, from the most basic yana of gods and humans up through the fruitional vajrayana, are not divorced from the elixir of profound means and prajña, just as the tools of an expert craftsman, they are one in essence in that they serve as helpful means to the same end. If this essential point is realized, the conventional term “realizing that all intentions of the victor are without contradiction” applies. But since this point is difficult to evaluate, while attempting to affirm the basic nature, one may go astray into what is conceptual in nature; while trying to cut through reference points, one may fall into the extreme of extinction and get lost in the conventional words “freedom from reference points”; and even if one speaks of “union,” it may just be an object of conceptual understanding. Also, LG’s introduction (pp. 3–6) says that there is no dispute about Nagarjuna’s scriptural tradition being Madhyamaka, while different opinions as to which Buddhist philosophical system the five texts of Maitreya represent abound. He then goes into the details of refuting the claim that the three middling texts of Maitreya are just Mere Mentalism and makes it clear that these texts can be explained very well according to Madhyamaka. {By the way, this also is the position of most Kagyü and Nyingma masters (in particular Ju Mipham Rinpoche), as well as Sakya Chogden’s.} Thus, when Maitreya teaches the manner of affirming the Tathagata heart, he does so by mainly teaching on the notion of lucidity—the seeming—while Nagarjuna’s cutting through all reference points by way of “nonarising from the four extremes” and so on mainly teaches the notion of emptiness—the ultimate. Therefore, if one does not understand these two notions as the single inseparability of the two realities, one may assert some blank emptiness as the fundamental nature of phenomena and then explain the Buddha heart as being of expedient meaning. Or, just as the Mere Mentalists, one may take the Buddha heart as something really established, thus asserting these two aspects of lucidity and emptiness to be separate. In any case, one falls from the path of the two realities in union, hence destroying the root of the path to liberation.


904 XXXII.2bd–8 (the translation mainly follows the Sanskrit); DSC omits the first line. 905 Lit. “the invincible,” an epithet of Maitreya. 906 This line could also be understood as “causing chatter even among childish beings who hear about it.”

907 If no language is mentioned, the translation is into English. For publication details not mentioned here, see the bibliography.

908 As mentioned above, the Aryabha??arakamañjusriparamarthastuti (P2022) is almost identical to the Paramarthastava and thus can be counted as translated too. 909 There is also a Japanese translation of the Catu?stava (including Am?takara’s Catu?stavasamasartha) by S. Sakei in “Ryuju ni kiserareru Sanka” (Hymns Attributed

to Nagarjuna). The Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association 24 (1959): 6–9 (Lokatitastava), 10–16 (Niraupamyastava), 29–33 (Acintyastava), 38–41 (Paramarthastava). 910 Nakamura’s article also includes a translation of the Chinese Sutra That Describes the Names of the Eight Spiritual Stupas (Taisho 1685), which contains some similar passages. 911 Lindtner says that there are neither external nor internal criteria to support this text’s attribution to Nagarjuna. His edition is based on several Sanskrit manuscripts (none of which mention an author), “a fact which indicates that it has had a certain popularity.”

912 Except for the first two verses (which are not available in Sanskrit) and the colophon, the translation follows the Sanskrit. Like most praises by Nagarjuna in the Tengyur, all of the following save the last one start with the translator paying homage to Mañjusri. The Vandanastotra begins by paying homage to all Tathagatas.

913 Unlike the Tibetan, the Sanskrit has no negative here.

914 Skt. k?aranadi, Tib. ba tshva’i chu klung. This is a river in one of the hells.

915 This is the colophon found in the Tengyur. The Sanskrit merely says, “This concludes the mahayana sutra spoken by the completely perfect Buddha, called Paying Homage to Sentient Beings.”

916 This is an Indian metaphor for something delusive—when certain snakes are squeezed, little protrusions appear that may be mistaken for feet.

917 This obviously refers to illusionlike beings swirling through sa?sara like apparitions created by a magician, in this case their own mind.

918 This refers to the bodhi tree in Bodhgaya.

919 Since DP bsnyel so (“remembering/reminding”) does not make much sense here, I took it to be ngal gso.


920 This refers to Cunda—one of the Buddha’s disciples—supplicating him not to pass away, upon which he extended his lifespan for another three months. 921 In the ancient Indian four-continent world, the central Mount Meru is surrounded by seven ranges of golden mountains.

922 Uragas are serpent demons living below and on the earth. Kinnaras usually have a human body with the head of a horse and live at the court of Kubera (the god of wealth). Together with the gandharvas, they are the celestial musicians of Indian mythology.