WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE HEFT 90 .1 DAVID HIGGINS AND MARTINA DRASZCZYK MAHĀMUDRĀ AND THE MIDDLE WAY POST-CLASSICAL KAGYÜ DISCOURSES ON MIND, EMPTINESS AND BUDDHA-NATURE VOL. I INTRODUCTION, VIEWS OF AUTHORS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN WIEN 2016 WSTB 90.1 WIENER STUDIEN ZUR TIBETOLOGIE UND BUDDHISMUSKUNDE GEGRÜNDET VON ERNST STEINKELLNER HERAUSGEGEBEN VON BIRGIT KELLNER, KLAUS-DIETER MATHES und MICHAEL TORSTEN MUCH HEFT 90 WIEN 2016 ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN DAVID HIGGINS AND MARTINA DRASZCZYK MAHĀMUDRĀ AND THE MIDDLE WAY POST-CLASSICAL KAGYÜ DISCOURSES ON MIND, EMPTINESS AND BUDDHA-NATURE VOL. I INTRODUCTION, VIEWS OF AUTHORS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS VOL. II TRANSLATIONS, CRITICAL TEXTS, BIBLIOGRAPHY AND INDEX WIEN 2016 ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN DAVID HIGGINS AND MARTINA DRASZCZYK MAHĀMUDRĀ AND THE MIDDLE WAY POST-CLASSICAL KAGYÜ DISCOURSES ON MIND, EMPTINESS AND BUDDHA-NATURE VOL. I INTRODUCTION, VIEWS OF AUTHORS AND FINAL REFLECTIONS WIEN 2016 ARBEITSKREIS FÜR TIBETISCHE UND BUDDHISTISCHE STUDIEN UNIVERSITÄT WIEN Herausgeberbeirat / Editorial Board Jens-Uwe Hartmann, Leonard van der Kuijp, Charles Ramble, Alexander von Rospatt, Cristina Scherrer-Schaub, Jonathan Silk, Ernst Steinkellner, Tom Tillemans Copyright © 2016 by Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien / David Higgins & Martina Draszczyk ISBN: 978-3-902501-28-8 IMPRESSUM Verleger: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitätscampus, Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 2, 1090 Wien Herausgeber und für den Inhalt verantwortlich: B. Kellner, K.-D. Mathes, M. T. W. Much alle: Spitalgasse 2-4, Hof 2, 1090 Wien Druck: Ferdinand Berger und Söhne GmbH, Wiener Straße 80, 3580 Horn CONTENTS Acknowledgement Introduction Current State of Research Politico-Historical Background Doctrinal Background Navigating the Middle Ways The Nature of Liberating Knowledge 12 14 17 22 25 29 41 Shākya mchog ldan Shākya mchog ldan and the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā Tradition Life, Writings and Influences Madhyamaka and the Dialectic of Emptiness: Rang stong and Gzhan stong The Three Natures (trisvabhāva) The Two Truths (satyadvaya) Mahāmudrā and Buddha Nature Direct Perception and Nondual Wisdom The Great Seal in Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā trilogy Mahāmudrā: What it is and What it is Not Madhyamaka, Mantrayāna and Mahāmudrā Mahāmudrā and What Remains (lhag ma : avaśiṣṭa) The Problem of Cessation Contested Methods of Realization Responses to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Criticism of Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā A Philosophical Defence and Justification of Mahāmudrā Defending Mahāmudrā Views The Self-sufficient White Remedy (dkar po gcig thub) Mental Nonengagement (amanasikāra) and the Fire of Wisdom Concluding Remarks 44 45 51 57 65 67 74 101 109 109 116 121 124 127 131 131 135 135 139 145 Karma phrin las Overview Life, Writings and Influences Madhyamaka Approach Extant Writings Views of Reality The Compatibility of Rang stong and Gzhan stong The Two Types of Purity Buddha Nature Endowed with Qualities On the Unity of the Two Truths “Thoughts are Dharmakāya” Understanding Coemergence: the Inseparability of Saṃsāra and Nirvāṇa 148 149 156 159 168 169 169 181 184 200 210 217 Concluding Remarks 223 Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje Overview The Differentiation and Identification Models Reconciling Affirmation and Negation Life, Writings and Influences Blending Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka Emptiness and Hermeneutics of the Three Turnings Core Soteriological Ideas and the Role of Philosophical Distinctions Buddha Nature Nature of Reality Nature of Mind The Problem of the Remainder (lhag ma : avaśiṣṭa) On the Prospect of a Groundless Ground On Whether or Not a Buddha has Wisdom Mahāmudrā as Mental Nonengagement (amanasikāra) Concluding Remarks 226 227 229 238 242 250 253 265 269 275 277 299 314 320 325 341 Padma dkar po Overview Life, Writings and Influences The Basic Framework: Mahāmudrā and the Unity of the Two Truths Emptiness and the Hermeneutics of the Three Turnings Hermeneutics of Mahāmudrā as Ground and Path The Two Faces of Mahāmudrā: the Modes of Abiding and Error Mahāmudrā as the Mode of Abiding (gnas lugs phyag chen) Mahāmudrā in the Mode of Error (’khrul lugs phyag chen) Yang dgon pa on the Two Modes of Mahāmudrā Padma dkar po’s Transposition of Yang dgon pa’s Distinction Interpretations of the Mahāmudrā Distinction Mahāmudrā and the Unity of the Two Truths Asymmetrical Unity and Rival Truth Theories (Jo nang and Dge lugs) The Ground of Truth Path Mahāmudrā and Liberating Knowledge Nonconceptual Knowing in the Shadow of the Bsam yas Debate Three Strands of Amanasikāra Interpretation in Indian Buddhism Padma dkar po’s Three Grammatical Interpretations of Amanasikāra Responding to Criticisms of Amanasikāra Concluding Remarks 342 343 347 350 352 356 357 359 363 369 376 378 382 385 393 398 399 403 413 422 426 FINAL REFLECTIONS 429 A C KN OW L ED G E MEN T The authors would like to gratefully acknowledge the many people who made this work possible. These two volumes are the result of research that was generously funded by the Austrian Science Fund (FWF) from 2012 to 2015 and that was conducted under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Klaus-Dieter Mathes. The project was entitled “‘Emptiness of Other’” (Gzhan stong) in the Tibetan ‘Great Seal’ (Mahāmudrā) Traditions of the 15th and 16th Centuries” (FWF Project number P23826-G15). As the majority of our research was undertaken in Vienna, we would first of all like to thank our colleagues in the Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies at the University of Vienna for their interest in our project and to acknowledge the excellent and congenial work environment provided in the Institute. Above all, we owe a debt of gratitude to Prof. Klaus-Dieter Mathes for launching this project and for the continuous encouragement and guidance he provided from start to finish. His previous in-depth work on classical buddha nature theories provided a major impetus to this project. In the early stages of the project, research trips were undertaken to India and Nepal (three weeks in 2012 by Martina Draszczyk and three months in 2013 by David Higgins) where the Vajra Vidya Library in Sarnath and the Karmapa International Buddhist Institute in Delhi were especially helpful in providing us with texts essential for our research. Dr. Higgins was able to obtain from the Vajra Vidya Library a xylograph copy of a rare edition of an early critical review of Tibetan tantric buddha nature theories by Mi bskyod rdo rje that the author originally referred to as Nerve Tonic for the Elderly (Rgan po’i rlung sman) but which appears in his Collected Works under the less irreverent title Sublime Fragrance of the Nectar of Analysis (Dpyad pa bdud rtsi’i dri mchog). This copy proved necessary for completing a proper critical edition and translation of this important text, parts of which appear in this publication. Our research in India and Nepal provided an invaluable opportunity to work closely with traditionally-trained scholars of Bka’ brgyud doctrine on resolving various difficult points (dka’ gnad) of Mahāmudrā exegesis in some of our main primary sources. In this regard, we would like to express our heartfelt thanks in particular to Mkhan po Tshul khrims rgya mtsho of KIBI Institute, Delhi in India and David Karma Chos ’phel of Thrangu Tashi Yangtse Monastery, Namo Buddha in Nepal, for taking the time to patiently address our many questions. Throughout the three years, a number of Mkhan pos held successive positions as lecturers at Vienna University: Dkon mchog rang grol (2011‒2012), Gyur med rdo rje (2012‒ 2013), and Dkon mchog bstan ’phel (2013‒2015). Our special thanks go to them for working with us through difficult sections of the texts included in our study. Although a work of this nature is very much a collaborative effort, we are solely responsible for any errors or deficiencies in the final product. Without the stimulating exchanges and encouragement of our colleagues, this monograph could never have come to fruition. We owe a particular debt of gratitude to the following individuals: Prof. Michael Torsten Much, Prof. Akiro Saito, Prof. Tom Tillemans, Prof. Kazuo Kano, Prof. Helmut Tauscher, Prof. Vincent Eltschinger, Prof. Roger Jackson, Prof. Carmen Meinert, Prof. Jiri Holba, Prof. Martin Adam, Dr. Anne MacDonald, Dr. Jim Rheingans, Dr. Philippe Turenne, and Dr. Volker Caumanns. INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION The Mahāmudrā teachings that form the doctrinal nucleus of the various Tibetan Bka’ brgyud sects in Tibet have stimulated a rich heritage of philosophical, poetic and didactic writings since their inception in the 11th century by the physician-turned-monk Sgam po pa Bsod nams rin chen (1079‒1153). Yet they have also been the target of unremitting criticism by other Tibetan Buddhist schools beginning with Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan’s (1182‒1251) denunciation of certain modern-day Mahāmudrā (da lta’i phyag rgya chen po) views early in the 13th century. As a result, the doctrinal history of Bka’ brgyud traditions has frequently been interwoven with polemics, and increasingly so as the expansion of their institutional networks and doctrinal influence brought them into closer dialogue and confrontation with other ascendant Tibetan Buddhist schools. In the midst of such exchanges, Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā teachings have always found able defenders, and not all of them having a primary affiliation with any Bka’ brgyud lineage. Apologists have included the likes of the Sa skya master Shākya mchog ldan, and many Rnying ma masters including Klong chen rab ’byams pa (1308‒1364), Rtse le Sna tshogs rang grol (b. 1608), and Zhabs dkar Tshogs drug rang grol (1781‒1851). The tradition was also to some extent validated by the Dge lugs polymath Thu’u kwan Chos kyi nyi ma (1737‒1802) who followed a standard Tibetan rhetorical strategy of defending the purity of the early Bka’ brgyud founders while accusing modern-day proponents of various misinterpretations of their original teachings.2 1 Attempts to legitimize the authenticity of Dwags po Bka’ brgyud teachings have generally proceeded from the contention that these teachings not only accord with authoritative Indian Buddhist doctrinal systems but also represent their ultimate import or definitive meaning (nges don). This placed the onus on defenders such as the four examined in this book to establish the continuity of Bka’ brgyud doctrines and practices with authoritative IndoTibetan traditions of exegesis (bshad lugs) and praxis (sgrub lugs) and also show how they offered a distinctive path beyond the many errors, deviations, and impasses that result from a wrong or partial understanding of such traditions. Against detractors who had raised questions about the Indian provenance of certain Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā doctrines such as Sgam po pa’s “White Panacea” (dkar po gcig thub), and also doubts about whether such teachings should even be considered Buddhist at all3, Mahāmudrā apologists stood united in promoting this tradition as a way firmly grounded in insights and methods of Indian Buddhist third 1 Dwags po is the name of a district situated south of the Gtsang po river and west of Kong po which was the birth-place of Sgam po pa, the “physician from Dwags po” (dwags po lha rje). The Dwags po Bka’ brgyud is the major subsection of the Bka’ brgyud tradition having numerous subsects which can all be traced back to Sgam po pa and his immediate disciples. 2 See R. Jackson 2006, especially 13. 3 For an illuminating full-length treatment of this controversy, see D. Jackson 1994. 14 INTRODUCTION turning sūtras, the tantras, and the dohās and upadeśas of the mahāsiddhas. It is presented as a path that distils from these traditions the most direct and effective means of reaching the Mahāyāna goal of spiritual awakening for the sake of oneself and others. Some of the most cogent expositions and defenses of Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā doctrines and practices were advanced during the post-classical era (15th and 16th centuries)4 following the overthrow of the Sa skya hegemony by the founder of the Phag mo gru dynasty, Ta’i Situ Byang chub rgyal mtshan (1302‒1364) in 1354.5 This was a period when several of the Bka’ brgyud lineages for the first time enjoyed sufficient institutional backing, religious authority, and intellectual freedom to begin replying to the criticisms of Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan (1182‒1251) and his Sa skya and Dge lugs advocates. If one considers the long list of scholars who critically replied to Sa paṇ’s Mahāmudrā criticisms by means of the standard methods of argumentation based on scripture (lung) and reasoning (rigs), one cannot fail to be struck by the fact that all belonged to the post-classical period or later.6 The sectarian and heatedly polemical climate of the time ensured that their responses did not go unchallenged for long; in due course the critical responses of Shākya mchog ldan, Mi bskyod rdo rje, and Padma dkar po in their turn provoked fierce rebuttals from defenders of Sa skya pa and Dge lugs pa doctrine.7 Such interactions must be seen as part of a broader post-classical 4 We have followed the periodization suggested by van der Kuijp 1989 who coins the term “post-classical” to refer to a period of Tibetan epistemology beginning in the 15 th century “characterized by a reappraisal of PreClassical [late 10th to late 12th centuries] tshad ma, by critiques of Sa-paṇ’s work, and by its defense” (6). Within the framework of our research, this period is characterized by an unprecedented increase in Bka’ brgyud polemical responses to Sa paṇ and later Sa skya and Dge lugs critics. 5 Van der Kuijp (2003) notes (431‒32), on the basis of Byang chub rgyal mtshan’s autobiography, that the Phag mo gru founder continued to face formidable resistance until at least 1361, during which time the Sa kya was still considered superior de jure, if not de facto. 6 The list of scholars who critically responded to Sa paṇ’s broadsides against Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā teachings includes ’Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal (1392‒1481), the Fourth Zhwa dmar Chos grags ye shes (1453‒ 1524), Karma phrin las Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1456‒1539), Chos rgyal bstan pa Dwags ram pa (1449‒1524), Shākya mchog ldan (1423‒1507), the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554), Dwags po Bkra shis rnam rgyal (1511‒1587), the Fourth ’Brug chen Padma dkar po (1527‒1592), the ’Bri gung Zhabs drung Chos kyi grags pa (1595‒1661), ’Brug pa mkhas dbang Sangs rgyas rdo rje (1569‒1645), Ngag dbang ’Phrin las (17th c.), and Rtse le Sna tshogs rang grol (b. 1608). For a discussion of different respondents to Sa paṇ’s Sdom gsum rab dbye criticisms of Bka’ brgyud views, which includes some of the names listed above, see Huber 1990, 400. Several of the authors named here responded to Sa paṇ’s critiques in the context of commentaries on Rang byung rdo rje’s Zab mo nang don. This largely unexplored commentarial literature which to date comprises thirteen extant commentaries (as well two minor works), the most recent being Zab mo nang gi don ’grel ba’i lus sems gsal ba’i me long of Thub bstan phun tshogs (b. 1955) published in 2004 (Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang), is an invaluable source for understanding doctrinal developments in Bka’ brgyud traditions during the formative 14th to 16th centuries. 7 For an “impressionistic” overview of Tibetan polemical literature during the 14 th to 16th centuries, see Cabezón and Dargyay 2006 (18‒33). A detailed survey of post-classical polemical literature concerning Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā traditions would go well beyond the scope of this book. Confining ourselves to some of the polemical works associated with the authors considered herein, we can mention the following. Shākya mchog ldan posed one hundred questions regarding Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Sdom gsum rab dbye in a work entitled Good 15 INTRODUCTION trend toward the consolidation and protection of representative views and practices of the major Tibetan schools. These were typically legitimized by claims of fidelity to Indian Buddhist sources and reinforced by the charisma and prestige of the traditions’ spiritual founders. This phase of doctrinal consolidation developed in tandem with the expansion of religious institutions and the forging of institutional identities. Because scant attention has hitherto been paid to post-classical Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā traditions, the state of knowledge of key philosophical developments and exchanges during the most mature stage of their development has been piecemeal and inchoate. The present work was motivated in part by the paucity of systematic knowledge about post-classical Mahāmudrā doctrinal and polemical trends, their major proponents, and their intellectual milieux. Our primary aim has been to critically examine the attempts to articulate and defend Bka’ brgyud views and practices by four leading post-classical thinkers and offer a selected anthology of their representative writings on Mahāmudrā. Their contributions Questions Concerning ‘Differentiation of the Three Codes’ (Sdom gsum rab dbye la dri ba legs pa, see SCsb(A), vol. 17, 4487‒4627). This was critically responded to by Go ram pa Bsod nams seng ge in his Sdom pa gsum gyi bstan bcos la dris shing rtsod pa’i lan sdom gsum ’khrul spong (see Jackson, David 1989b) and also by Glo bo mkhan chen Bsod nams lhun grub (1456‒1532), on which see Jackson, David 1991, 235‒237. On these works, see also Komarovski 2011, 20 and 313 n. 20 and 21. Rejoinders to Shākya mchog ldan’s criticisms of Tsong kha pa are found in the Chen po Shāk mchog pa’i rtsod lan by Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan, a subsection of the Zab mo stong pa nyid kyi lta ba la log rtog ’gog par byed pa’i bstan bcos lta ba ngan pa’i mun sel, in Dgag lan phyogs sgrigs, 175–385, on which see Cabezón and Dargyay 2006, 30 and n. 154. Mi bskyod rdo rje’s criticisms of Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā-related epistemological and buddha nature views are found in his MA commentary Dwags po’i shing rta (Zi ling ed.), 1920‒212 and 2610‒5416 and his Nerve Tonic for the Elderly (Rgan po’i rlung sman, 10102‒10231), on which see Volume II of present study, translation: 105‒9 and 111‒15, critical edition: 109‒11 and 115‒17. Mi bskyod rdo rje’s criticisms of Dge lugs pa interpretation of *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka in his aforementioned MA commentary were repudiated by Se ra rje btsun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan in his Gsung lan klu sgrub dgongs rgyan (in Dgag lan phyogs sgrigs, 69‒173). Padma dkar po’s criticism in his Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod that the Dge ldan pa “succumbed to an eternalist view regarding the ultimate and a nihilist view regarding the conventional” (examined in chapter four below) was countered by the Dge lugs scholar Sgom sde shar chen Nam mkha’ rgyal mtshan (1532‒1592) in his Byang chub sems 'grel gyi rnam par bshad pa'i zhar byung 'brug mi pham padma dkar pos phyag chen gyi bshad sbyar rgyal ba'i gan mdzod ces par rje tsong kha pa la dgag pa mdzad pa'i gsung lan (in Dgag lan phyogs sgrigs, 607‒645). Padma dkar po’s refutations of Sa paṇ’s criticisms of Mahāmudrā doctrine in the Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, a masterful exposition and defence of Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā, were countered by the Sa skya scholar Mang thos Klu sgrub rgya mtsho (1523‒1596) in his Sdom gsum rab dbye'i dka' 'grel sbas don gnad kyi snying po gsal byed phyag chen rtsod spong skabs kyi legs bshad nyi ma'i 'od zer, in Klu sgrub rgya mtho gsung skor vol. 5, 111‒206. As a counter-response to Mang thos’s rebuttal, Padma dkar po’s leading disciple Mang thos Sangs rgyas rdo rje (1569‒1645) in turn wrote a lengthy defence of his master’s Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod entitled Phyag rgya chen po’i man ngag gi bshad sbyar rgyal ba’i gan mdzod ces bya ba’i bstan bcos la rtsod pa spong ba’i gtam srid gsum rnam par rgyal ba’i dge mtshan, in Sangs rgyas rdo rje gsung ’bum vol. 4, 293‒636. For some of the Dge lugs responses to Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po, see Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 70‒71 and n. 160. Relevant parts of some of the above-mentioned works are considered in the chapters below. A balanced account of post-classical intersectarian debates concerning Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā doctrines would have to consider responses by Jo nang scholars to Bka’ brgyud, Dge lugs and Sa skya critics. See, for example, Gnyag dbon Kun dga’ dpal’s (1285‒1379) influential overview and defence of the Jo nang system entitled Bde gshegs snying po'i rgyan gyi 'khrul 'joms dang bstan pa spyi 'grel gyi rnam bshad in which he criticizes Sgam po pa’s precept that “thoughts are dharmakāya”. 16 INTRODUCTION represent a high-water mark in Mahāmudrā exegesis. The institutional expansions that occurred during this time undoubtedly exerted a ratchet effect on intersectarian dialogue and polemics, raising scholasticism to new levels of maturity and sophistication. It was a time when several Bka’ brgyud traditions, most prominently the Karma Bka’ brgyud, enjoyed unprecedented temporal power and religious influence thanks to the support of powerful Tibetan aristocratic clans. The scholars chosen for consideration are [1] Shākya mchog ldan (1423‒1507), a celebrated yet controversial Sa skya scholar who developed a strong affiliation with the Karma Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition in the last half of his life, [2] Karma phrin las Phyogs las rnam rgyal (1456‒1539), a renowned Karma Bka’ brgyud scholar-yogin and tutor to the Eighth Karma pa, [3] the Eighth Karma pa himself, Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒ 1554), who was among the most erudite and influential scholar-hierarchs of his generation, [4] and Padma dkar po (1527‒1592), Fourth ’Brug chen of the ’Brug pa Bka’ brgyud lineage who is generally acknowledged as its greatest scholar and systematiser.8 The book is divided into two volumes, with the first comprising an overview of the Mahāmudrā treatments of the authors based on a close reading of their seminal Mahāmudrā writings and the second presenting edited texts and translations of selected materials by these authors on Mahāmudrā and related doctrines. CURRENT STATE OF RESEARCH Although each of the authors considered in this work has received some attention in contemporary Buddhist studies, their views on Mahāmudrā have not been closely examined in light of the antecedent Buddhist philosophical views they built upon or in relation to the views of their coreligionists that they endorsed or opposed. What follows is a concise overview of previous work on these authors to define the parameters of our research. Shākya mchog ldan’s philosophical views have been the subject of several full-length studies including a book on his Yogācāra and Madhyamaka interpretations by Yaroslav Komarovski (2011). This author also published an annotated translation of three of Shākya mchog ldan’s short treatises on Madhyamaka (2000) as well as a few articles that will be noted below. An unpublished PhD dissertation by Philippe Turenne (2010) investigates how Shākya mchog ldan understood the Five Dharmas of Maitreya as keys to assimilating the divergent aspects of Mahāyāna, especially its tantric aspect, and why he regarded all five as being of definitive meaning. Mention should also be made of an unpublished PhD thesis by Volker 8 One conspicuous absence in this cast of characters is the Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho who was the main teacher of Shākya mchog ldan and Karma phrin las and predecessor of the Eighth Karma pa. His famous summary of Buddhist epistemology entitled Tshad ma rigs gzhung rgya mtsho is an important desideratum for future research which will require careful comparison with Indian pramāṇa sources. 17 INTRODUCTION Caumanns (2012) that offers a well-documented study of the life and works of Shākya mchog ldan. There have been a number of shorter treatments of Shākya mchog ldan’s position on buddha nature. David Seyfort Ruegg (1963, 74) briefly discusses Tibetan exegetes who attribute to both the Jo nang pas and Shākya mchog ldan the type of Gzhan stong buddha nature theory found in the Bṛhaṭṭīkā according to which the perfect nature is empty of the imagined and dependent natures. Van der Kuijp (1983, 43 and n. 157) translates a short passage from Shākya mchog ldan’s Dbu ma'i byung tshul, vol. 4, 2397‒ 2403 comparing Rngog Blo ldan shes rab’s (1059‒1109) ‘analytical’ Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV) tradition of defining buddha nature as a nonaffirming negation (med par dgag pa : prasajyapratiṣedha) with Bstan Kha bo che’s (b. 1021) ‘meditative’ interpretation of it as naturally luminous wisdom. 9 Bstan Kha bo che’s interpretation of buddha nature as natural luminosity of mind is also noted in Tillemans and Tomabechi 1995 (891–96). Kazuo Kano’s unpublished PhD thesis on Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (2006) cogently summarizes Shākya mchog ldan’s buddha nature position vis-à-vis that of Rngog and includes a translation and analysis of Shāk mchog’s classification of the major lines of buddha nature interpretation in Tibet. Mathes 2004 offers an interesting comparison of the Yogācāra-based buddha nature views of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292‒ 1361) and Shākya mchog ldan: while the former maintains that buddha nature is the perfect nature empty of the imagined and dependent natures, Shākya mchog ldan follows the Yogācāra definition of the perfect nature as the dependent nature empty of the imagined nature. This article includes a translation and discussion of Tāranātha’s account of an imagined dialogue between Dol po pa and Shākya mchog ldan on the nature and status of tathāgatagarbha. Mathes 2008 (32 and n. 143) makes reference to Shākya mchog ldan’s identification of Rngog’s buddha nature theory in terms of a nonaffirming negation. Komarovski 2006 includes translations of two of Shākya mchog ldan’s short treatises on buddha nature: the Sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i rnam bshad mdo rgyud snying po, SCsb(A), vol. 13, 124–136 and Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma, ibid., vol. 13, 113–124. This article also provides a useful listing of more than twenty texts of different genres by Shākya mchog ldan that discuss buddha nature. Komarovski 2010 discusses whether Shākya mchog ldan’s interpretation is ‘contemplative’ or ‘dialectical’ without, however, mentioning the researches by Seyfort Ruegg, van der Kuijp and Kano on this important issue. With regard to Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā writings, Seyfort Ruegg 1989 (105‒ 108) briefly discusses the author’s Mahāmudrā trilogy, seeing it as an attempt to harmonize tensions between Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticisms regarding Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā and the 9 See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 35‒37 for a discussion of the accounts of these two lineages by Sum pa mkhan po and Tāranātha. 18 INTRODUCTION Bka’ brgyud tradition’s own accounts of its views and practices. David Jackson 1994 (128‒ 33) also emphasizes this harmonizing element in a short overview of some of Shākya mchog ldan responses to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticisms of Dwags po Mahāmudrā from the Mahāmudrā trilogy. This harmonizing element is certainly evident in parts of the trilogy (especially the third work), yet other sections reveal a more openly critical style of engagement that explicitly takes issue with the criticisms of Sa paṇ, especially as reframed by his later advocates. The reader is referred to the translation and critical edition of this trilogy in volume II of the present study. The treatments of Jackson and Seyfort Ruegg illustrate the difficulty of making an unequivocal assessment of Shākya mchog ldan’s stance on this complex issue. Finally, Dreyfuss 1997 (27‒29) gives a relatively brief but illuminating treatment of some of Shākya mchog ldan’s Gzhan stong-oriented epistemological views in the context of commenting on some of the leading Sa skya Pramāṇa scholars in Tibet. Although Dreyfus (1997, 29) has observed that Shākya mchog ldan endorsed a Gzhan stong position only in works following his first meeting with the Seventh Karma pa (1454‒1506) in 1484, we have found textual evidence (see chapter one) to support an earlier date for his approval of Gzhan stong. Yet we have also documented a more ambivalent stance toward Gzhan stong that the author appears to have adopted in his later Mahāmudrā writings. The foregoing synopsis of previous scholarship on Shākya mchog ldan reveals the need for an inaugural study of the author’s views on Mahāmudrā in relation to those of his coreligionists and in light of his own complex and shifting philosophical affinities. This we have attempted in the first chapter. Turning to Karma phrin las, the limited range of his extant writings10 has so far hindered any balanced treatment of his thought. As early as 1969, Herbert V. Guenther published an English translation of Karma phrin las pa’s commentary on Saraha’s King Dohā, having earlier used material from the author’s dohā commentaries in his study of Nāropa (Guenther 1963). An unpublished MA thesis on Karma phrin las pa by Jim Rheingans (2004) offers a well-substantiated account of the author’s life based on various hagiographical and historical sources and includes a short overview of his writings.11 Jan Sobisch 2002 translates and interprets some Question and Answer (dris lan) materials by Karma phrin las pa on the Three Vow (sdom gsum) theories in Tibetan Buddhism and includes a brief summary of his biography.12 Karl Brunnhölzl 2009 contains a translation13 of a portion of the first chapter of Karma phrin las pa’s commentary on Karma pa III Rang byung rdo rje’s Zab mo nang don 10 For a survey of his extant writings which are traditionally said to have filled ten volumes but currently amount to a few commentaries, a collection of songs (mgur) together with replies to queries on a variety of topics, and a few miscellaneous texts on ritual, see the introductory remarks in chapter two. 11 Rheingans, 2004. 12 Sobisch, 2002, 217‒71. 13 Brunnhölzl 2009, 313‒23. 19 INTRODUCTION which elucidates the latter’s theory of buddha nature. Anne Burchardi 2011 includes a translation14 of an excerpt of Karma phrin las pa’s Discussion to Dispel Mind’s Darkness: A Reply to Queries of [Bsod nams lhun grub, the Governor of] Lcags mo 15 that addresses the relationship between Rang stong and Gzhan stong, identifying Rang byung rdo rje as a proponent of a Gzhan stong view in which Rang stong and Gzhan stong are understood to be without contradiction. Because this text contains inter alia the best available statement of Karma phrin las pa’s views on Self-emptiness and Other-emptiness, and their compatibility, we have included a complete translation of this text in volume II. The limited availability of the author’s extant Mahāmudrā works has not allowed for a comprehensive assessment of his thought on this subject. However, it has enabled us to give a cursory overview of his Mahāmudrā views and to trace lines of doctrinal continuity between Shākya mchog ldan who was one of his teachers and Mi bskyod rdo rje who was his most renowned disciple. The Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje’s status as a formidable Buddhist thinker was first brought to the attention of the scholarly community via two pioneering articles by Paul Williams (1983) and David Seyfort Ruegg (1988).16 Both were focused on the introductory section (spyi don) of the author’s late Madhyamakāvatāra commentary entitled Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta.17 Williams provided a cursory treatment of the author’s critique of Dge lugs pa positions, whereas Seyfort Ruegg offered a more substantial doxographical analysis of different Indo-Tibetan Madhyamaka views and their sūtric and tantric lines of transmission, focusing on the first few folia of this commentary. Subsequent doctrinal research on the Eighth Karma pa has largely confined itself to this opening portion of the introduction 18 and the sixth chapter19 of this commentary, as well as his early and influential Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary that was recently examined and partially translated by Karl Brunnhölzl as part of his wide-ranging study of Bka’ brgyud and Rnying ma commentaries on this śāstra20. This study contains some useful material on the Eighth Karma pa’s interpretations of the Mahāyāna gotra theory in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. Mention must also be made of an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation on Mi bskyod rdo rje by Jim Rheingans (2008) that offers the first systematic 14 Burchardi 2011, 317‒43. 15 KPdl, Dri lan yid kyi mun sel (ca 88‒92). See also Volume II, translation: 88‒91, critical edition: 91‒94. 16 See Williams 1983 and Seyfort Ruegg 1984. 17 Full title: Dbu ma la 'jug pa’i rnam bshad Dpal ldan dus gsum mkhyen pa’i zhal lung Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta. Seattle: Nitartha international, 1996. (733 p.) 18 See Broido 1985 and Brunnhölzl 2004. 19 See Goldfield et al. 2005. In this work four translators each translated “key portions” of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s commentary on the sixth chapter of the Madhyamakāvatāra according to their own “individual translation styles and choice of terms” under the guidance of Mkhan po Tshul khrims rgya mtsho (b. 1934). 20 For the Karma Bka’ brgyud commentaries, see Brunnhölzl 2010 and 2011a. 20 INTRODUCTION biographical study of the Eighth Karma pa based on careful analysis of a wide range of primary historical and hagiographical sources.21 In sum, the current understanding of the Eighth Karma pa’s philosophical views are based almost exclusively on portions of two early non-tantric Mahāyāna commentaries22, leaving the vast majority of his exegesis on tantric and Mahāmudrā systems a veritable terra incognita for research. These lacunae are noteworthy when one considers the preponderance of tantric over “sūtric” interpretations both in Mi bskyod rdo rje’s exegesis of buddha nature and in his criticisms of rival theories, not to mention his writings on Mahāmudrā. The result is that the vast majority of the Eighth Karma pa’s work on Mahāmudrā, buddha nature and other central topics has received little scholarly attention, and none at all has been devoted to his innovative efforts to relate Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā views to the broader currents of Buddhist doctrine and praxis, both sūtric and tantric. Our survey of the author’s Mahāmudrā exegesis vis-à-vis his philosophical views, and the accompanying selection of important expositions and defences of Mahāmudrā doctrines and practices, are intended as a first attempt to fill this gap. Padma dkar po’s Mahāmudrā views have advanced gradually over the past halfcentury beginning with Herbert V. Guenther’s pioneering use of the author’s writings to help clarify Bka’ brgyud views on mahāmudrā, the Six Doctrines of Nāropa (nāro chos drug), Four Yogas (rnal ’byor bzhi) and other tantric materials in the context of his study of Nāropa (Guenther 1963) and several articles from this period. A later work (Guenther 2005) includes as its second chapter (15‒24) an annotated translation and short discussion of Padma dkar po’s Explanation of the Four Yogas of Mahāmudrā: Eye for Seeing the Definitive Meaning (Phyag rgya chen po rnal ’byor bzhi’i bshad pa nges don lta ba’i mig).23 The only other scholar to critically engage with Padma dkar po’s thought is Michael Broido who composed a series of articles on this master in the early 1980s. These articles discuss Padma dkar po’s interpretations of tantra (rgyud) (Broido 1984) and yuganaddha (zung ’jug : yuganaddha) (Broido 1985), his contributions to Buddhist hermeneutics (Broido 1982, 1983 and 1984), and his critical replies to Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticism of Sgam po pa’s White Panacea (dkar po gcig thub) doctrine (Broido 1984a). The last of these articles and his paper on Padma dkar po’s view of the two truths (Broido 1985b) have provided some useful doctrinal background for our consideration of Padma dkar po’s Mahāmudrā exegesis. On the whole, the previous studies on Padma dkar po leave much to be said about how he developed the core elements of his Mahāmudrā exegesis in relation to their Indian and 21 See Rheingans 2008. 22 Of these, Mi bskyod rdo rje’s many digressions on buddha nature doctrine in his Madhyamakāvatāra commentary have received no attention. 23 In PKsb vol. 21, 423‒29. 21 INTRODUCTION Tibetan sources and the intellectual climate of his age. It is hoped that our analysis of his Mahāmudrā views and accompanying translations of pertinent materials reveals the extent to which he not only adopted subject matter such as Yang dgon pa’s distinction between mahāmudrā in the modes of abiding and error (gnas lugs phyag chen and ’khrul lugs phyag chen) and the amanasikāra interpretations of Maitrīpa (alias Maitreyanātha), but also adapted them to his own post-classical philosophical, polemical and soteriological concerns. The foregoing overview of previous studies on our authors has cast some light on areas of their Mahāmudrā exegesis in need of further research and clarification. With these in mind, our critical engagement with the authors’ treatments of Mahāmudrā has consecrated special attention to three pertinent issues: [1] how the authors related Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā teachings to prevailing Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophical views on emptiness, the nature of mind, nature of reality and buddha nature, [2] how they framed these teachings in relation to Indo-Tibetan Buddhist doxographical classifications such as Madhyamaka and Yogācāra, as well as hermeneutical categories such as the three dharmacakras and distinctions between provisional and definitive meaning, and [3] how they defended leading Mahāmudrā views and practices against charges of incoherence and even heresy (chos min, chos log) in an intellectual climate increasingly dominated and riven by sectarian exclusivism and religious conservativism. Before embarking on our survey of post-classical discourses on Mahāmudrā, it may be useful to begin by sketching in broad strokes the politico-historical and doctrinal backgrounds out of which they arose. POLITICO-HISTORICAL BACKGROUND While our focus in this work is primarily doctrinal, we have been repeatedly reminded that ideas never develop in isolation from the societies and institutions from which they emerge. In this regard, it may be worthwhile to shed a little light on the religious and sociopolitical background out of which post-classical Bka’ brgyud exegesis evolved. During the 15th and 16th centuries, Bka’ brgyud lineages, like other Tibetan Buddhist lineages, were in the midst of expanding their monastic networks to accommodate growing numbers of students. As the Tibetan Buddhist world transitioned from smaller local monasteries to larger monastic institutions, there was a proportionate increase in large fixed costs such as the construction and upkeep of monasteries and estates, the creation of artistic works and monuments, the performance of rituals, the commissioning and printing of sacred texts, and the authoring of biographies of important religious hierarchs.24 All this required a steady source of income. As a result, the growth and survival of monastic institutions depended more and more on the 24 See van der Kuijp and McCleary 2008, 2. 22 INTRODUCTION patronage of wealthy Tibetan aristocratic clans. The need to look locally for protection and financial backing was precipitated in part by the political transition in China from the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1271‒1368) to the Ming dynasty (1368‒1644). This regime change brought with it a significant shift in China’s foreign policy toward Tibet from the Yuan’s hands-on system of mutual benefit based on preceptor-patron (bla yon) relations25 to the more hands-off approach and the liberalization of local politics characteristic of the Ming rulers.26 The Ming dynasty’s disengagement of China from Tibet meant that the expanding Buddhist institutions were forced to look to wealthy domestic clans for protection and patronage if they were to survive in an increasingly competitive political-ecclesiastical environment. For a time, the Karma Bka’ brgyud sect seemed to be clear winners in this regard, securing the patronage of the powerful Rin spungs pa clan. They did so by building on and domesticating its long history of forging preceptor-patron relations with foreign powers beginning with the Tangut court and continuing, after its overthrow, with the succeeding Mongolian Yuan dynasty. In exchange for patronage and protection, the Karma Bka’ brgyud hierarchs, like their Sa skya counterparts, typically offered the emperor and his family spiritual counsel and tantric rituals such as Kālacakra or Mahākāla rites both to confer a measure of spiritual authority on the rulers and protect the state from calamity. Religious hierarchs of the Sa skya and Karma bka’ brgyud sects served not only as ritual officiants and spiritual advisors to their patrons but were often promoted to high positions in the court such as Imperial Preceptor (di shi 帝師, Tib. ti shri). A number of recent studies have demonstrated the close connection that existed between the institutionalization of Tibetan reincarnation lineages and the forging of clericpatron relations with foreign powers during the Yuan dynasty, and with Tibetan aristocratic clans from the Ming dynasty onward. Elliot Sperling (1987a) has observed that the first Karma Bka’ brgyud hierarchs forged close ties with the Tangut court as early as the 12th century. Indeed, the tradition’s founder Dus gsum mkhyen pa (1110‒1193) was said to have been invited by the emperor of the Tangut state of Xixia to give esoteric teachings but sent his disciple Gtsang po pa Dkon mchog seng ge (d. 1218/19) in his stead. Dkon mchog seng ge was the first Tibetan cleric to receive the honorific title Imperial Preceptor, a post assumed after his death by a cleric belonging to the ’Ba’ rom subsect of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud 25 On the importance of the ‘preceptor-donor’ relationship in the ecclesiastical history of Tibetan Buddhist orders, see Van der Kuijp 2004, Sperling 1987a, Manson 2009, and three articles by Seyfort Ruegg (1991, 1995, 1997). In Seyfort Ruegg 1997 (860), the author states that the earliest use of yon mchod “as a copulative compound designating the relation between a donor and preceptor” is in the Deb ther dmar po, but Manson 2009 (38‒39 n. 54) notes that Karma Pakshi’s autobiography already uses the term in that sense. 26 Van der Kuijp and McCleary 2008. See also Sperling 1983. 23 INTRODUCTION named Ti shri ras pa Shes rab seng ge (1164‒1236)27. Ti shri counted among his teachers a direct disciple of Sgam po pa, Darma dbang phyug (1127‒1203), and two Bka’ brgyud founders Zhang Brtson ’grus grags pa (1121/23‒1193), founder of the Tshal pa Bka’ brgyud sect, and ’Jig rten mgon po (1143‒1217), founder of the ’Bri gung Bka’ brgyud sect. ’Jig rten mgon po is said to have received lavish offerings from the Tangut emperor in exchange for his religious services. Among the clerics who survived the collapse of the Tangut state, was Ti shri ras pa’s successor in the ’Ba’ rom lineage, Gsang ba ras pa dkar po Shes rab byang chub (1198‒1262). That he was born in the Tangut state but later reappears as a Tibetan cleric in the Mongol emperor Qubilai’s retinue indicates, as Elliot Sperling has observed, the continuity between the cleric-patron models of the Tangut and Mongol courts. Tangut patronage of early Bka’ brgyud clerics and its institutionalization of the office of Imperial Preceptor preceded and likely served as a paradigm for the later Mongolian patronage of Sa skya and Bka’ brgyud clerics. Leonard Van der Kuijp (2004) has shown that the Bka’ brgyud Kālacakra system came to play a vital role in the forging of Tibetan-Mongolian relations during a critical stage in Tibet’s political history. The Kālacakra tantra’s strengthening influence on foreign relations can be largely attributed to its popular yet highly esoteric ritual system which proved instrumental in enabling high-ranking Karma bka’ brgyud preceptors to curry favour with the powerful Mongol court after the Mongolian conquest of 1240 and throughout the period of its control over China during the Yuan dynasty (1276‒1368). It is well-established, then, that the Karma Bka’ brgyud tradition proved remarkably adept at fostering relationships of mutual benefit with powerful families, first with foreign imperial dynasties and later with domestic aristocratic dynasties. The success of these reciprocal relations undoubtedly owed much to the prestige and stability associated with this tradition’s system of reincarnate bla mas known as Karma pas. Not only could a high ranking reincarnate bla ma command much higher prices for services rendered than other teachers but lineal reincarnations could conveniently be “found” in strategically important persons and places, whether Tibetan or foreign. The Dge lugs pa would later successfully imitate this paradigm by introducing their own system of reincarnate Dalai Lamas28 who were also 27 For information about this cleric who is also referred to as Sangs rgyas ras chen, see Sperling 1987b. Sperling suggests a possible Chinese precedent of this office of Imperial Preceptor in the Tangut state. A biography of the first Black Hat (zhwa nag) Dus gsum mkhyen pa relates that Dkon mchog seng ge was preceded by three previous reincarnations, the last of whom was also a preceptor to the Tangut emperor named Rgya (i.e., “Chinese”) Be bum ring mo or Rgya Byang chub sems dpa’. See Sperling 1987, 38. 28 According to van der Kuijp and McCleary 2008 (22‒23), “[t]he Gelukpa adoption of incarnates was an attempt to compete directly with the Karma pas. The increasingly hierarchical structure of Tibetan Buddhism meant that incarnates could command higher prices than other types of monks for their religious services. Thus, by taking on a unique feature of the Karma pa, the Gelukpa were benefiting from the prestige and economic success of the Karma pa incarnates.” 24 INTRODUCTION regarded not only as reincarnations of their predecessors but also as incarnations of the Bodhisattva of compassion Avalokiteśvara. Building on their long history of successful cleric-patron relationships, the Karma Bka’ brgyud, and to a lesser extent the other Bka’ brgyud sects, were able during the 15th and 16th centuries to establish unprecedented positions of temporal power and religious influence in central Tibet. Their ascendancy owed much to the patronage of the powerful Rin pung clan which in 1434‒1435 defeated the Phag mo gru dynasty who had supported the Dge lugs pa sect. During its hegemony (1435‒1565), the Rin spungs regime governed much of Western Tibet and some of Central Tibet. Indeed, it almost brought the Tibetan lands around the Tsangpo River under one central authority before its powers began to diminish after 1512. Following the final overthrow of the Rin spungs by the Tsang pa dynasty of Shigatse in 1565, the Karma bka’ brgyud sect was able to secure the new regime’s patronage up until its final defeat by the increasingly powerful militia of the ascendant Dge lugs sect in 1642. But prior to the ascendancy and eventual hegemony of the Dge lugs sect which has prevailed down to the modern period, the continuous patronage of the Karma Bka’ brgyud sect, and to a lesser extent the ’Bri gung and ’Brug pa sects, by a succession of powerful aristocratic clans allowed for unprecedented expansion not only of their temporal power but also of their scholastic achievements and doctrinal influence, all of which reached their apogee during the 15th and 16th centuries. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND To give a better sense of the main philosophical trends in the Mahāmudrā exegesis of the four authors, it is necessary to touch briefly on some of the key Buddhist doctrinal issues they engaged with. It will become clear that, despite evidence of sectarian and doctrinal dissent between some of these authors29, they shared much common ground when it came to the nexus of core Buddhist soteriological ideas concerning the nature of truth/reality, the 29 A letter by Padma dkar po entitled A Reply to the Queries of Bshes gnyen Rnam rgyal grags pa (Bshes gnyen rnam rgyal grags pa’i dris lan), Padma dkar po gsung ’bum vol. 12, 491‒508, provides an important source for understanding the at times strained relationships between the ’Brug pa, Sa skya and Karma bka’ brgyud schools in the post-classical era. Interestingly, the letter attests to Padma dkar po’s high regard for Shākya mchog ldan’s “unparalleled” knowledge of authentic Indian and Tibetan Buddhist scriptures which he then cites as a major influence on Karma bka’ brgyud scholasticism, but one that they unjustly repaid with criticism rather than open acknowledgement (ibid., 4981‒3). He also makes this interesting observation (ibid., 5072‒3): “Although [we] have no discord with those [in the] Sa[ kya], Dge [lugs], and Rnying ma [traditions], there is some discord with the Rje Karma teacher and disciples” sa dge rnying ma su dang mi mthun pa ma byung kyang | rje karma dpon slob dang ma mthun pa cig byung | In this regard, he registers his concerns (ibid., 5031‒5) about the incursion of armed Karma Kam tshang troops dispatched by the Karma political party (kar srid) into the Kong po district, their use of weaponry including guns and missiles (rgyogs dang me rgyogs), the poisoning of rivers, their burning down of one of his vihāras, and the general atmosphere of discord between the ’Brug pa and Karma Kam tshang traditions. On the prevalence of sectarian rivalry during this time, see Shakabpa 2010, 274‒75 and Sørensen and Hazod, 2007, 508. 25 INTRODUCTION nature of mind, buddha nature, and emptiness that had occupied centre stage in Tibetan scholasticism since the Royal Dynastic Period (8th to 9th c CE). A key finding in our research was that the major participants in post-classical Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā exegesis shared a common concern to reconcile two basic models of truth or reality (satya) that had long been discussed and debated by Indian and Tibetan Buddhists: [1] a differentiation model based on robust distinctions between conventional and ultimate truths (saṃvṛtisatya versus paramārthasatya) and their associated modes of cognition and emptiness, and [2] an identification or unity (zung ’jug : yuganaddha) model of the two truths and their associated modes of cognition and emptiness. Whereas the differentiation model was typically aligned with a strongly innatist view of the ultimate (buddha nature, the nature of mind, or the nature of reality) that underscored its “sublime otherness” (gzhan mchog) from all that is conventional and adventitious, the identification model, predicated on the view of a common ground uniting all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, emphasized the pervasiveness of the ultimate and its immanence within the conventional in order to indicate how the ultimate permeates the mind-streams of individuals in bondage. A central philosophical aim of our research was to consider and compare how the four representative authors and their colleagues sought to synthesize and reconcile these differentiation and identification models within pertinent traditional Buddhist theoretical contexts such as buddha nature (tathāgatagarbha), the two truths (satyadvaya), the three natures (trisvabhāva), the two modes of emptiness (rang stong and gzhan stong), the hermeneutics of the three turnings of the dharmacakra, and the related hermeneutical distinction between definitive meaning (nītārtha) and provisional meaning (neyārtha). A highly influential precedent for the differentiation model is a passage in Asaṅga’s Mahāyānasaṃgraha (I.45‒4830) where the author draws a sharp distinction between pure, supramundane mind (lokottaracitta) and the conditioned ālayavijñāna, thereby specifying an innate, unconditioned mode of cognition that is prior to and a precondition of the eight modes of consciousness (kun gzhi tshogs brgyad) as elaborated in the Yogācāra psychology. By contrast, influential examples of the identification model that are met with in the Laṅkāvatāra and Ghanavyūha sūtras explicitly identify buddha nature with the substratum consciousness (ālayavijñāna).31 One may also mention here a parallel nondifferentiation model of truth/ 30 Davidson 1985, 215 and Mathes 2008, 58. Sthiramati draws a similar distinction between ālayavijñāna and the supramundane gnosis (lokottarajñāna : jigs rten las ’das pa’i ye shes) that fundamentally transforms or sublates parāvṛtti) it in his commentary on Triṃśikā 29‒30. See Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Levi 1925), 44; Davidson 1985, 218 and n. 28. On replacement and elimination models of fundamental transformation (āśrayaparivṛtti), see Sakuma 1990. 31 On this interpretation and some of its Tibetan adherents such as the bKa’ brgyud scholars ’Gos lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal and ’Ba’ ra ba rgyal mtshan dpal bzang, see Mathes 2008, 18, 117 and 464 n. 612. ’Gos lo tsā ba noted (Mathes 2008, 341‒42) that the equation of ālayavijñāna with tathāgatagarbha is based on the acceptance of two aspects of the former: a stained ālayavijñāna which needs to be reversed in order to attain buddhahood and a purified ālayavijñāna taken as an unconscious vijñāpti or subtle inward mind which ’Gos lo identifies with the 26 INTRODUCTION reality that was widely adopted in many non-tantric and tantric discourses emphasizing the nonduality of the two truths (bden gnyis gnyis med), and the inseparability of appearance and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). In the context of Buddhist soteriology, the tension between these differentiation and identification paradigms had as its counterpart a longstanding dialectic between two competing views concerning the nature of goal-realization. One frames it as a developmental process of accumulating merits and knowledge that serve as causes and conditions leading to spiritual awakening, whereas the other characterizes it as a disclosive process of directly recognizing an unconditioned mode of being and awareness and then becoming increasingly familiar with it as the mind’s reifications and their obscuring effects subside.32 Faced with the task of reconciling these seemingly incommensurable ontological and soteriological paradigms, leading post-classical Bka’ brgyud thinkers adopted different versions of soteriological contextualism, a term we have coined to describe the view that the sense, relevance and efficacy of soteriological models can only be understood relative to the context(s) in which they are used.33 From this perspective, the differentiation and identification models with their contrasting categories and metaphorics—the first positing a basic difference between conventional and ultimate and comparing it to the sky and its clouds, the second positing their essential equality as illustrated by the ocean and its waves—came to be regarded not as contradictory but as complementary, relating as they do to different contexts of salvific theory and praxis. According to Mi bskyod rdo rje, for example, an aspirant on the Buddhist path is urged to conceptually distinguish between what is to be abandoned (adventitious mind) from what is to be realized (innate mind). But this path is said to transcend such oppositional constructs, culminating in a nondual nonconceptual wisdom (nirvikalpajñāna) of the undifferentiated nature of things (dharmadhātu) that recognizes antidotes (gnyen po) as being of the same unborn (skye med) and prediscursive (spros bral) nature as what is to be relinquished. This is the view of unity (zung ’jug) that is generally identified as a hallmark of Mahāmudrā teachings. On this view, the Buddhist path is ultimately self- dharmadhātu. Based on the identification of the ālayavijñāna with the tathāgatagarbha, the Laṅkāvatārasūtra interprets āśrayaparāvṛtti as the transformation or purification of the seventh consciousness (manas) which liberates the pure ālayavijñāna. See Lai 1977, 67 f. In a similar vein, the Ghanavyūhasūtra states (D 110, 55b1; L 113, 85a6-7): “The Tathāgata taught *sugatagarbha using the term ālaya[vijñāna].” bde gshegs snying po dge ba’ang de | | snying po de la kun gzhi sgras | de bzhin gshegs pa ston pa mdzad | 32 In a similar vein, the landmark comparative study of Seyfort Ruegg (1989) investigates the dual themes of “‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ in the twin realms of soteriology and gnoseology, a pair of topics that call for examination in terms of the notions of ‘innatism’, ‘spontaneism’ and ‘simultaneism’ as contrasted with graded acquisition and reinforcement through progressive cultivation.” (p. 3) 33 For a general account of contextualist views, which have been gaining popularity in contemporary philosophy, see Price, A. W. Contextuality in Practical Reason, Oxford University Press, 2008. 27 INTRODUCTION undermining insofar as the conceptual distinctions that are necessary to realize nondual nonconceptual wisdom necessarily consume themselves at the time of its realization.34 We have attempted in the chapters to follow to determine and explain how our four authors could be at once advocates of robust soteriological distinctions and at the same time proponents of the Mahāmudrā view of the unity (zung ’jug) nonduality (gnyis med) or inseparability (dbyer med) of truth/reality. For example, in Mi bskyod rdo rje’s commentary on Karma Pakshi’s Direct Introduction to the Three Kāyas that he composed in the last years of his life, the author defends the view that the two truths/realities are nondual inasmuch as all phenomena, conventional and ultimate, have always been beyond discursive elaboration (spros bral).35 In this regard, he maintains that the nonduality or inseparability of the two realities is a doctrinal cornerstone of both Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka philosophies, having been advocated by a long line of Indian Mahāmudrā and Madhyamaka masters including Saraha, Śavaripa, Nāgārjuna, Buddhapālita, Candrakīrti, Maitrīpa, Atiśa, and as well as by the 11th century Tibetan Rnying ma master Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po.36 34 Post-classical Mahāmudrā exegetes were keenly aware that the method of radical negation employed in Madhyamaka must be self-consuming: since conceptual reasoning is by definition conditioned and adventitious and therefore not beyond the scope its own critical surveillance, it must at some point deplete or consume itself, as suggested by the analogy from the Kaśyapaparivarta of the Ratnakūṭa that Kamalaśīla had famously cited: “The characteristic of discerning reality (bhūtapratyavekṣā) is here [in the Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī] considered to be mental nonengagement (amanasikāra). That [discernment] has the nature of being conceptual, but it is burned away by the fire of genuine wisdom arising from it, just as a fire kindled by rubbing two pieces of wood burns these very pieces.” Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭīkā (NPDhṬ), P: no. 5501, 157b5‒6: yang dag par so sor rtog pa’i mtshan ma ni ’dir yid la mi byed par dgongs so | | de ni rnam par rtog pa’i ngo bo nyid yin mod kyi | ’on kyang de nyid las byung ba yang dag pa’i ye shes kyi mes de bsregs par ’gyur te | shing gnyis drud las byung ba’i mes shing de gnyis sreg par byed pa bzhin no | | See also Kamalaśīla’s BK III (Skt. ed. Tucci 1971, 20) where the same example, and similar words, are used, and reference is made to the Ratnakūṭa. 35 Sku gsum ngo sprod, Mi bskyod rdo rje gsung ’bum vol. 21, 1484‒5: “Therefore, so long as the mind has not let go of [reifying the two truths in terms of true and false], and there is conceptualizing cognition that clings to and believes in [them], then it will never dwell in the lofty state of the equality of the two truths, inseparability of the two truths, single taste of the two truths and unity of the two truths. Then how does this equality of the two truths, and inseparability that is the unity of the single flavour of the two truths come about in a mind that does not take the two truths as objects, as mere established bases? As [truth] cannot be touched by thinking based entirely on linguistic representation [in terms of] subject and object, when it comes to the way of perceiving that which is other than mere talk stipulating ‘union’ as the consummate conclusion regarding the so-called “equality of the two truths,” where does there exist anything that can be posited as one or two, or equal or non-equal?” de ltar blos ma btang bar ji srid zhen 'dzin rtogs rigs yod pa de srid du bden gnyis mnyam nyid dang bden gnyis dbyer med dang bden gnyis ro gcig dang bden gnyis zung 'jug gi go 'phang la 'gar yang 'khod pa med do | | 'o na bden gnyis gzhi grub pa tsam du'ang yul du mi byed pa'i blo ngo na bden gnyis mnyam nyid dang bden gnyis dbyer med ro gcig tu zung du 'jug pa ji ltar 'ong zhe na | de ltar yul dang yul can kun nas smra brjod bsam pas reg par ma nus pa la bden gnyis mnyam nyid ces sogs zad par 'khyol ba'i zung chad pa'i gtam tsam las gzhan de lta'i tshul la gcig dang gnyis pa dang mnyam mi mnyam du bzhag tu ga la yod | See below 228‒29 and n. 642. 36 Ibid., 1443 f. Toward the end of his life, Mi bskyod rdo rje evidently became an advocate of Rong zom pa’s Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka views and especially those based on “classical texts maintaining the inseparability of the two aspects of reality” (bden pa rnam pa gnyis dbyer med par ’dod pa’i gzhung). He cites Rong zom pa six times in this late commentary but not in any previous works. Concerning Rong zom’s endorsement 28 INTRODUCTION Shākya mchog ldan similarly claimed that while realization of the unity of the two truths, and of appearance and emptiness, was the goal of the Buddhist path, it is nonetheless necessary to balance the divergent perspectives of consciousness and wisdom while on the path. Likewise, Padma dkar po uses Yang dgon pa’s distinction between mahāmudrā in its modes of abiding (gnas lugs phyag chen) and delusion (‘khrul lugs phyag chen) to underscore the need to discern the irreducible unity of the common ground (mahāmudrā in the abiding mode) from the reifications that distort and conceal it (the mode of delusion). NAVIGATING THE MIDDLE WAYS Interestingly, the common task of post-classical Mahāmudrā exegetes to reconcile the differentiation and identification models was in many cases accompanied by an attempt to chart a middle course, using Madhyamaka canons of dialectical reasoning, between the polarized Gzhan stong and Rang stong positions that had deeply divided most Tibetan schools since the 14th century, particularly the Jo nang pas37 and Dge lugs pas. To one side, the postclassical exegetes sought to avoid the type of eternalist view (rtag lta) of existence (yod pa) that had become associated in the minds of many Tibetans with Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan’s (1292‒1361) Empty of other (gzhan stong) doctrine that posited the ultimate as an eternal, transcendental truth above and beyond the causal complex of conventional truth/ reality, and that characterized the two truths as two “great kingdoms” (rgyal khams chen po) “having nothing to do with each other”.38 To the other side, they steered clear of the kind of “nihilist view of existence” that they associated with Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa’s (1357‒1419) Empty of own-nature (rang stong) doctrine which had wholly rejected positive appraisals of reality in favour of a purely negative account characterizing the ultimate exclusively in terms of a nonaffirming negation (med dgag). It is against this backdrop that the Fourth ’Brug chen Padma dkar po had, on the one hand, criticized the Jo nang Gzhan stong adherents for adopting an eternalist stance regarding the ultimate and nihilistic stance regarding the conventional 39 and, on the other hand, of Apratiṣṭhānavāda and the “inseparability of truth/reality” view which he termed “special Mahāyāna,” see Almogi 2009, 39‒42 et passim. 37 For a pioneering survey of the history and doctrines of this school and an analysis of Dge lugs pa criticisms of it, see Seyfort Ruegg 1963. 38 See for example Ri chos nges don rgya mtsho, Pecing ed. 1998, 4184 f.; Bka’ bsdu bzhi pa rang ’grel, Paro ed. 1984, vol. 1, 5996 f., 6125 f. et passim. In the words of Padma dkar po: “It is said [by Jo nang pas] that there is an immense dichotomy between the two truths, and between the pairs ‘saṃsāra and nirvāṇa’ and ‘consciousness and wisdom’, together with their respective self-manifestations.” Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, Padma dkar po gsung ’bum vol. 21, 1764‒5. 39 Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, Padma dkar po gsung ’bum vol. 21, 1882‒3: “This doctrinal position of yours has assumed a nihilist view vis-à-vis all that is [held to be] self-empty (rang stong) or conventional (kun rdzob) [but] an eternalist view in accepting all that is ultimate to be something real. Because it is thereby incompatible 29 INTRODUCTION criticized the Dge lugs Rang stong proponents for adopting an eternalist view of the conventional and nihilistic view of the ultimate.40 This assessment helps us to understand Padma dkar po’s rather unexpected admission that “my tradition is Rang stong” (bdag gi lugs ni rang stong) in contraposition to the views of “those who have fallen into a one-sided position known as Gzhan stong”. These he equates with opponents criticized by Candrakīrti in his Prasannapadā who falsely imagine conditioned things to be empty—i.e., nonexistent— while “falsely imagin[ing] an intrinsic essence (svabhāva) of things for the purpose of [establishing] a basis of that [emptiness].”41 Given that Padma dkar po had moreover identified Gzhan stong with Cittamātra, specifically the Alīkākāravāda strand, and that Cittamātra schools were said to be repudiated root and branch by the Apratiṣṭhāna-Mādhyamikas, his endorsement of a Rang stong view begins to appear all but inevitable. The case of Shākya mchog ldan is just as interesting. In his Mahāyāna philosophical works, he often explicitly gives the affirmative Gzhan stong and Alīkākāra-Madhyamaka methods and discourses priority over their negational Rang stong counterparts, and even with the impartial explanations concerning the ultimate (don dam) in both the synopsis of views of the chapter on Inner [Kālacakra] and the Summary of Yoga [i.e., Vimalaprabhā] it is not at all acceptable.” khyed kyi 'dod pa 'di rang stong ngam kun rdzob thams cad chad pa | don dam thams cad bden par khas blangs pas rtag ltar song bas | nang le'i lta ba’i mdor bsdus dang rnal 'byor bsdu ba gnyis kar don dam pa la phyogs med par bshad pa dang 'gal ba'i phyir gtan mi 'thad do | | 40 Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, ibid., 1052‒4: “[For] Dge ldan pas, ‘without nature’ (rang bzhin med pa) means that [1] ultimately there is nothing at all, like a barren woman’s son, and that [2] conventionally all entities never become nonexistent. For that reason, [the Dge ldan pas] say that “the extreme of existence is eliminated by appearance and the extreme of nonexistence by emptiness.” In this regard, [the Dge ldan pas] have fallen to the sides of both eternalism and nihilism. They have succumbed to an eternalist view regarding the ultimate and a nihilist view regarding the conventional. And by explaining the acceptability of maintaining these two stances, they do not know [how] to eliminate one-sided positions in terms of a single ground.” de yang dge ldan pa | rang bzhin med pa’i don gyis don dam par cang med mo gsham gyi bu lta bu dang | rang bzhin med pa’i don gyis kun rdzob tu dngos po tham cad med par nam yang mi ’gyur ba zhig ste | de’i rgyu mtshan gyis snang bas yod mtha’ dang | stong pas med mtha’ sel lo zhes zer ro | | ’di ni rtag chad gnyis ka’i phyogs su lhung ste | don dam chad pa dang | kun rdzob rtag ltar song zhing phyogs gnyis su gzung rung bshad pas gzhi gcig gi steng du phyogs lhung sel ma shes so | | 41 See Chos ’khor rim pa gsum gyi dogs gcod, Padma dkar po gsung ’bum vol. 7, 3303‒5 where the following passage from Prasannapadā is then quoted: “But one who, without seeing the distinction between the two truths, sees the emptiness of conditioned things—that person, seeing emptiness and aspiring to deliverance, may falsely imagine conditioned things to be nonexistent; or taking emptiness as something existent as an entity, he may also falsely imagine an intrinsic essence of things for the purpose of [establishing] a locus of that [emptiness]. In either case, emptiness wrongly viewed will certainly destroy him.”Prasannapadā, ed. La Vallée Poussin 1970, 495 (Vaidya 216): yas tu evaṁ satyadvayavibhāgam apaśyan śūnyatāṁ saṁskārāṇāṁ paśyati, sa śūnyatāṁ paśyan mumukṣur nāstitāṁ vā saṁskārāṇāṁ parikalpayed, yadi vā śūnyatāṁ kāṁcid bhāvataḥ satīm, tasyāś cāśrayārthaṁ bhāvasvabhāvam api parikalpayet | ubhayathā cāsya durdṛṣṭā śūnyatā niyataṁ vināśaṃ kuryāta | a addit. suggested by Prof. Akira Saito (personal communication); Mss. vīnaśam parikalpayet; LVP vināśayet; Tib. (May 1959 ed.): gang gis de ltar bden pa gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba ma mthong bar ’du byed rnams stong pa nyid du mthong ba des ni stong pa nyid mthong bas ’du byed rnams yod pa ma yin pa nyid du rtog par byed la | yang na stong pa nyid ’ga’ zhig dngos por brtags nas de’i rten gyi ched du dngos po’i rang bzhin yang rtog par byed de | de ni gnyis ga ltar yang stong pa nyid la lta nyes pas nges par phung bar byed pa yin no | | 30 INTRODUCTION stipulates that the very idea of “unity” has its inception in Gzhan stong traditions but is unattested in Rang stong traditions (as will be discussed in chapter one). However, in his Mahāmudrā exegesis, the author assigns both Rang stong and Gzhan stong to the dialectician’s system of severing imputations (sgro ’dogs bcad pa’i lugs) through studying and thinking, adding that both are intellectually fabricated (blos byas) and in this sense “poisoned” (dug can). He proceeds to explain how both are transcended by the Mahāmudrā yogin’s system of first-hand experience (nyams su myong ba’i lugs) based on meditation (sgom) that alone leads to the realization of unity beyond extremes. All this may also help to explain why Mi bskyod rdo rje, who was partisan to the same Madhyamaka traditions as Padma dkar po, became increasingly reluctant to side with polarized views of emptiness and instead ends up being as critical of the Gzhan stong views that had by his time become associated primarily with Dol po pa and Shākya mchog ldan as he is of the Rang stong views associated with Tsong kha pa and his disciples. This tone of reticence is conspicuous in the Karma pa’s lengthy response42 to Paṇ chen Rdo rgyal, a student of Shākya mchog ldan, who had asked him about the role of gzhan stong in the state of meditative equipoise: When it was explained [by Dol po pa] that the Gzhan stong of a permanent entity (rtag dngos gzhan stong) is superior whereas the Rang stong of freedom from elaboration (spros bral rang stong) is inferior, regarding such conceptual differentiations themselves, these distinctions [pertain] to the phase of distinction in the post-meditation state (rjes thob) but not to the phase of transcendence in the meditative equipoise (mnyam bzhag). [Now,] when the phase of transcendence in equipoise was not [properly] investigated, then the profound permanent entity of your Gzhan stong [was deemed] consistent with [post hoc] explanations of what was experienced by meditators. [But] by whom among them would [this] permanent [nature] constitute transcendence?43 The author goes on to clarify that “in meditative equipoise when there is transcendence and [unmediated] experience, no such distinctions between rang stong and gzhan stong are actually found” because this state not only uproots the stains to be relinquished but also severs all discursive elaborations, leaving behind no ‘indispensables’ (nyer mkho) (i.e., no ontological commitments). It is therefore a mistake, in the Karma pa’s eyes, to ontologize such post hoc observations by embedding them in the nature of things and using them to support a 42 This reply may match a dialogue reported to have taken place between the Karma pa and Paṇ chen dor rgyal in 1536 at ’Bri khung monastery in Central Tibet (dbus) when the former was twenty-nine years old. See Rheingans 2008, 137‒38. 43 Paṇ chen rdo rgyal ba’i legs bshad, MKsb vol. 3, 2523‒5. 31 INTRODUCTION metaphysical absolutism. He concludes a detailed criticism of opposing Rang stong and Gzhan stong positions by saying “as for me, I don’t subscribe to these extreme positions and [therefore] don’t proclaim either Rang stong or Gzhan stong.”44 He concludes with an aspiration to follow the advice of his root teacher Bkra shis dpal ’byor (1457‒1525) “to relinquish views and destroy all tenets in line with the illustrious Dwags po Bka’ brgyud lineage.”45 In general, post-classical Mahāmudrā exegetes viewed the rapprochement between Mahāmudrā and anti-foundationalist strains of Indian Madhyamaka philosophy—specifically, the *Prāsaṅgika and Apratiṣṭhāna systems46—as critical to their philosophical aims. Our authors framed this synthesis in terms of the reconciliation of affirmative (cataphatic) and negative (apophatic)47 styles of thought and discourse. In the words of Mi bskyod rdo rje: “It is said that the instructions of Nāgārjuna were taught from a negative orientation (bkag phyogs) whereas those by Saraha were taught from an affirmative orientation (sgrub phyogs).”48 Following the Second ’Brug chen Rgyal dbang rje, Padma dkar po similarly distinguishes the negating orientation (dgag phyogs) emphasized in the sūtra-based Vehicle of Characteristics (mtshan nyid kyi theg pa) from the affirming orientation (sgrub phyogs) emphasized in the tantra-based Vajrayāna. Viewed in terms of their associated styles of discourse, the former emphasizes negative determinations (rnam bcad : vyavaccheda) whereas the latter emphasizes positive determinations (yongs gcod : pariccheda). The difference, as the Second ’Brug chen Rgyal dbang rje had explained, is that the former “annihilates (tshar gcad pa) by counteracting objects to be abandoned,” whereas the latter “assimilates (rjes su ’dzin pa) through the nonduality of objects to be abandoned and their counteragents.” Now, for Padma dkar po, negative determinations are integral to the Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka which dispenses with all epistemic and ontological foundations, whereas positive determinations are integral to Vajrayāna articulations of immutable bliss supreme (mahāsukha). The senses of both are combined in the term “emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects” (sarvākāravopetāśūnyatā) and this expresses the unity at the heart of the ’Brug pa Mahāmudrā tradition.49 This idea of fecund emptiness conveniently unites the via negationis 44 Paṇ chen rdo rgyal ba’i legs bshad, MKsb vol. 3, 2564‒5. 45 Ibid., 2571‒2. 46 As will be clarified below, both traditions claim that all phenomena are without any epistemic essence or ontological foundation, i.e., without any defining essence nor any inherently existent foundation on which all phenomena depend but which does not itself depend on anything. 47 For an adaptation of these western philosophical-theological terms to the description of the two currents of Buddhist thought that Schmithausen 1981 (214 ff.) has distinguished as “positive-mystical” and “negativeintellectualist”, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989, 8 et passim. 48 Glo bur gyi dri ma tha mal gyi shes par bshad pa’i nor pa spang ba, MKsb vol. 15, 10745‒10752. 49 This paraphrases a stanza in Padma dkar po’s Zhal gdams tshigs su bcad pa'i rim pa bdud rtsi’i gter, PKsb vol. 21, 24: “Negatively determined, [it is] without fixed standpoint; positively determined, [it is] immutable 32 INTRODUCTION of negative determinations and via eminentiae of positive determinations. A keynote in the Mahāmudrā philosophies of all four thinkers is that this inseparable unity of presence and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med) can only be fully realized through first-hand experience but not through deductive reasoning. This is because the goal itself is a fundamental mode of being or experiencing but not a judgement about that mode of being which is necessarily both derivative and contrived. By combining a disclosive Mahāmudrā path of first-hand experience with a rigorous Madhyamaka rejection of metaphysical foundations, the authors attempted to ply a middle course between the Scylla and Charybdis of eternalism and nihilism. A few words are in order concerning the Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka view that was endorsed by Karma phrin las, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po. The term apratiṣṭhāna has been subject to varying interpretations, having been taken as a characterization both of phenomena (i.e., that they lack fixed characteristics or foundation)50 and of the cognition that apprehends them (i.e., a cognition that does not abide, or is not fixed, in extremes of eternalism or nihilism).51 This latter interpretation is found in Maitrīpa’s Amanasikāra teachings. A case in point is the author’s Sekanirdeśa 29ab (“Not abiding/not to be fixed in anything is known as Mahāmudrā”52) and Rāmapāla’s explanation of it (SNP P 15b6‒7): “‘In anything’ means in the dependently arisen skandhas, dhātus, and āyatanas. ‘Not abiding/not fixed’ means nonsuperimposition (aropa) and mental nonengagement (amanasikāra).” Here it is precisely cognition which is “not fixed” on anything, but with the understanding that phenomena lack any fixed basis on which the mind may find purchase. Among the few extant attempts to summarize the Apratiṣṭhānavāda view and the epistemological issues involved, the clearest seems to be the one given by the great 11th century Rnying ma scholar Rong zom pa Chos kyi bzang po. This is of interest to us not only for purposes of clarification but also because the Eighth Karma pa in his later years became an advocate of Rong zom’s Madhyamaka view which based itself on “classical texts maintaining the inseparability of the two aspects of reality” (bden pa rnam pa gnyis dbyer med par ’dod pa’i gzhung). In his synopsis of Apratiṣṭhānavāda, Rong zom draws attention to two related senses of its view, viz., that all phenomena are [1] without any determinate characteristics despite the various names and other linguistic conventions used to denote them, bliss supreme. It is named ‘emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects’ (sarvākāravopetāśūnyatā). Although distinguished by [such] conceptual delimitations, [they have] the same meaning. Such is the mahāmudrā of our own tradition.” rnam gcod rab tu mi gnas te | | yongs gcod ’gyur med bde ba dang | | rnam kun mchog ldan stong nyid ming | | ldog pas ’byed la don gcig pa | | nged rang lugs kyi phyag chen yin | | 50 The term apratiṣṭhāna is defined in Böhtlingk as “ohne festen Ort,” “without fixed/permanent location”. See Monier-Williams s.v. pratiṣṭhāna: “n. a firm standing-place, ground, foundation… pedestal, foot”; Böhtlingk: “fester Standpunct,” “Grundlage,” “Fussgestell”. 51 sarvasminn iti pratītyasamutpannaskandhadhātvāyatanādau | apratiṣṭhānam amanasikāro ’nāropaḥ | See Mathes 2007, 555. 52 See Mathes 2007, 555. For Rāmapāla’s explanation, see also Isaacson and Sferra 2014, 321. 33 INTRODUCTION and furthermore [2] without any deeper foundation, any metaphysical bedrock, that makes them what they are. In short all phenomena are unfixed (or indeterminate) both in essence and origin. They have neither determinate essences that define what they are nor any ontological foundation on which they depend. Consequently, the investigating mind arrives at no determinate essence or foundation. This observation, says Rong zom pa, applies not only to positive determinations of objects of knowledge but also to the stage of buddhahood wherein the purified dharmadhātu is said to be characterized by the stilling of all discursive elaborations. In his Lta ba'i brjed byang, he states: “For Nonfoundationalists, [1] although all phenomena are described and established in terms of various characteristics such as names, symbols, and conventions, one does not establish a basis/locus (gnas pa) for any such characteristics. [2] Since [phenomena] are not founded on, and do not rely upon, a unitary foundation (gnas gcig)—not even an extremely subtle or extremely profound one, let alone (a cang che) a gross one—[they] are said to be completely ‘nonfoundational’. This [tradition] determines [phenomena] in this way also when positively determining (yongs su gcod pa) the objects of knowledge, and also claims that during the stage of a buddha as well the purified dharmadhātu is characterized by the complete pacification of discursive elaborations.”53 Notwithstanding the considerable disagreement over which Buddhist traditions or thinkers represented the Apratiṣṭhāna view, our three Mahāmudrā exegetes equally took its synthesis of Mantrayāna and Madhyamaka as a prototype for their own efforts to unite affirmative Mahāmudrā dohā discourses of Saraha and the tantras with the negative Madhyamaka discourses of Nāgārjuna and his successors. It is noteworthy that Karma phrin las cryptically equates the Great Madhyamaka tradition of Nonfoundational Unity (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa) with the ultimate view of Dignāga (480‒540) and Dharmakīrti (7th cent.) that he correlates with the Dwags po Mahāmudrā view.54 He further claims that Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā of Nonfoundational Unity is in accord with the five texts of Maitreya but “somewhat different” from both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika systems which, in their concern to “overturn the beliefs in real entities of the lower philosophical systems,” end up maintaining that meditation is just “the reliance on a continuous process of memory/reflection (dran pa) based on prior analysis”.55 We shall see that Mi bskyod rdo rje regarded both the so-called *Prāsaṅgika and Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka systems as the summit of Buddhist 53 Lta ba’i byang brjed (Almogi 2009, rab tu shin tu mi gnas pa ni chos thams cad la ming dang brda dang tha snyad kyi mtshan nyid sna tshogs su bstan cing | rnam par bzhag kyang ji lta bu'i mtshan nyid du'ang gnas pa mi 'grub ste | rags pa a cang ches kyi | tha na rab tu phra ba zhe'am | shin tu zab pa'i gnas gcig la yang mi gnas mi rten pas | rab tu shin tu mi gnas pa zhes bya'o | | 'di ni shes bya yongs su gcod pa'i dus na'ang 'di ltar gcod la sangs rgyas kyi sa'i dus na'ang chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa spros pa yongs su zhi ba'i mtshan nyid du 'dod do | | We follow the critical text of this passage as translated and discussed in Almogi 2009, 228‒29. See also Tauscher 2003, 209 & 244, n. 10. (translation our own) 54 KPdl, 1506. See also below 161. 55 See below, 160 and n. 441. 34 INTRODUCTION philosophical thought and frequently took them as the basis for critiquing other Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophical views. In his eyes, these systems not only serve as an ideal preparation for Mahāmudrā; they also share its basic view and goal of being free from discursive elaboration (spros bral : niṣprapañca). Padma dkar po sees the inseparable unity emphasized in Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka as an ideal model for reconciling the negative orientations and determinations of Nāgārjuna’s reasoning corpus (rigs tshogs) with the positive orientations and determinations contained in his hymnic corpus (bstod tshogs), as well as in the dohās and tantras. Putting it differently, he says that it is through “nonfoundationalism of mere discourse” (smra tsam rab tu mi gnas pa) that one realizes the “nonfoundationalism of unity” (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa) that is in his eyes the “greatest of great Middle Ways” (dbu ma chen po’i chen po).56 For the three Mahāmudrā authors, the Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka provided the philosophical underpinning of Maitrīpa’s Madhyamaka system of mental nonengagement (yid la mi byed pa’i dbu ma). Mi bskyod rdo rje identified three main practice-lineages of this tradition in his Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) commentary: Mantra-Madhyamaka, SūtraMadhyamaka and Alīkākāra-Cittamātra-Madhyamaka, the last of which was represented by the Indians Vajrapāṇi (b. 1012) and Kor Ni ru pa (aka. Ni ru pa ta, b. 1062), and the Nepali Bal po A su (aka. Skye med bde chen).57 Elsewhere in the commentary, and in his sixth Dgongs pa gcig pa (Single Intent) commentary, he further identifies two major lines of transmission of Amanasikāra-Mahāmudrā teachings from India to Tibet: [1] the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud doctrinal system passed down from Saraha and Śavari dbang phyug to Mar pa, Mi la ras pa etc., and [2] the Khro phu Bka brgyud tradition of instructions (gdams srol) on amanasikāra given by Mitrayogi to Khro phu Lo tsā ba etc. that contained the definitive meaning of sūtras and tantras.58 Mi bskyod rdo rje observes in his Single Intent commentary that the aim of these Amanasikāra-Mahāmudrā traditions is to realize in view and meditation profound emptiness, the pacification of discursive elaborations, which is simply the true nature (chos nyid) of cognition that is directly recognized when the conceptually-imputing cognition that gives rise to conceptually-imputed appearances of all phenomena resolves into its source, cognizant emptiness (or empty cognizance). “The [teaching] that primarily takes as its view and meditation the point where the nature of these two [awareness and emptiness] have resolved 56 KPdl, 5723‒4: don skyes bu la skyon med pa zhes dang | ’di ni legs pa’o zhes pa lta bu | zhe ’dod kyis lta ba bzang ngan du mi srma | | smra tsam rab tu mi gnas pa dang | zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa dang | dbu ma chen po dang | dbu ma chen po’i chen por ’jug pa’i khyad tsam yod ces lan du bgyis so | 57 See also Seyfort Ruegg 1984, 8‒9, and below 332‒33 and n. 959 for further details. 58 Dbu ma la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad, 32513‒21 and Dgongs gcig ’grel pa VI, MKsb vol. 6, 993‒1001. For further details on these lineages and authors, see below, 330‒36. 35 INTRODUCTION like water poured into water is called “sustaining natural awareness”.59 He adds that “if a profound emptiness other than that is taken as view and meditation, then some nonaffirming negation (med dgag) wherein the phenomenal awareness and the rest is never connected with its abiding nature is posited as a mental object. A view and meditation on emptiness that makes one inordinately attached to that [object] through the mode of apprehension is therefore not acknowledged by this [Mahāmudrā] approach to be totally pure.”60 The Eighth Karma pa notes in the MA commentary that many proponents of reasoning such as Gro lung pa were ill-disposed to the explanations of Madhyamaka in traditions such as Maitrīpa’s Amanasikāra, saying they were not in accord with Madhyamaka and should therefore be suppressed. Mi bskyod rdo rje adds that Sa paṇ and all sorts of Bka’ gdams pas developed a hostile attitude toward the Amanasikāra teachings of Saraha and Maitrīpa, in spite of their purity.61 In light of such criticisms, it is understandable why scholars such as Karma phrin las, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po devoted as much attention as they did to clarifying and legitimizing the sources and contents of these teachings. To form a clearer picture the view of Apratiṣṭhānavāda and its relation to other Buddhist philosophical systems, let us consider the following annotated overview of the different Tibetan Madhyamaka traditions given by Mi bskyod rdo rje in the third section of his first Dgongs gcig commentary: For Mādhyamikas, by negating the claim that mind is established as a real entity, the bases of designation of the two truths are not truly established as separate [things]. Hence, there is nothing to posit as two truths established in terms of intrinsic essences. {It is not the case that two truths are posited by truly establishing the mode of being of knowable objects in terms of two truths. Nonetheless, when they are established as “truths” in order to negate that the knowable is truly established, then if we analyze whether they [can be] established as ultimate truth or established as conventional truth, it is in order to negate that either can be established as true [or real].}62 However, in terms of mere conventional discursive practice, the designation “ultimate truth” was used to show just the aspect that all phenomena are not established by nature, discursive elaborations having been at rest from the very beginning. And the expression “conventional truth” [was used 59 Dgongs gcig ’grel pa VI, MKsb vol. 6, 994‒5: de gnyis rang bzhin chu la chu bzhag tu song ba’i cha de la gtso bor lta sgom du byed pa de la ni | tha mal gyi shes pa skyong ba zhes | 60 Dgongs gcig ’grel pa VI, MKsb vol. 6, 996‒1001: de las gzhan du zab mo stong pa nyid lta sgom du byed pa na chos can shes pa sogs dang rang bzhin gtan mi ’brel ba’i med dgag cig yid yul du bzhag cing de la ’dzin stangs kyis cher zhen par byed pa ni stong nyid kyi lta sgom rnam par dag par phyogs ’di pas mi bzhed pa’i phyir te | 61 See below, 330. 62 Interjected interlinear notations (which make up most of the quoted passage) are included in braces { }. 36 INTRODUCTION to show] simply the dependent arising of appearances that are only an illusion, being captivating only so long as they are not investigated. In this regard, there are two Madhyamaka [traditions]: the “Madhyamaka of the Illusory that is Verified by Reasoning” (sgyu ma rigs sgrub kyi dbu ma) and the “Madhyamaka of Nonfoundational Unity”63 (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma).64 In general, since the term “Tīrthika” (mu stegs pa; “one who holds to extremes”)65 means one who maintains extremes of eternalism or nihilism, it refers not only to non-Buddhists, but to Buddhist Tīrthikas as well, up to and including the Cittamātra. The Madhyamaka do not receive the name Tīrthika because they have uprooted all views and philosophical tenets. {Concerning the classification of Madhyamaka: in India, there were the three called Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka, Yogācāra-Madhyamaka66, and *Lokaprasiddha63 The division of the Madhyamaka into Sgyu ma lta bu and Rab tu mi gnas pa is already made by Sgam po pa Bsod nams rin chen (1079‒1153) in his Tshogs chos legs mdzes ma where he further subdivides the Rab tu mi gnas strand into Zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma and Rgyun chad rab tu mi gnas pa’i dbu ma. See Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 35 n. 60. See also Almogi 2010 for other 11th century sources on this distinction. 64 This classification of Madhyamaka is discussed by Stag tshang lo tsā ba in his Grub mtha’ kun shes (203), a work frequently cited by Mi bskyod rdo rje. Mkhas grub rje Dge legs dpal bzang (1385‒1438) maintained that the Madhyamaka of the Illusory Verifiable by Reasoning was advocated by Śāntarakṣita, Vimuktasena and Haribhadra who claimed that the illusion-like constellation (tshogs) of appearance and emptiness is the ultimate truth, whereas the Madhyamaka of Nonfoundational Unity was advocated by Candrakīrti et al. who believed that the nonaffirming negation (med dgag) consisting in the refutation of there being any truth to appearances is the ultimate truth. Mkhas grub then notes that Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059‒1109) “repeatedly explained in An Epistle Called a Drop of Nectar (Spring yig bdud rtsi'i thig le verse 14) that ‘to classify them in this way is to posit [something] that will astonish even the foolish’” (see edition of Kano 2007, 11). Because the illusionlike conjunction of appearance and emptiness in fact is a conventional truth, there is no single Great Mādhyamika who accepts it as the ultimate truth. Were it an ultimate truth, it would follow, absurdly, that everything established [by valid cognition] (gzhi grub) would be an ultimate truth, for it is impossible that a phenomenon not be empty of truth.” See Cabezón 2010 and 1993, 89. 65 This is an hermeneutical etymology of the Tibetan term mu stegs pa which was originally a more literal rendering of the Sanskrit tīrthika (“forders”), literally, ‘those belonging to, associated with’ (possessive suffix – ika) ‘stairs for landing or for descent into a river,’ ‘bathing-place,’ ‘place of pilgrimage on the banks of sacred streams’ (see Monier-Williams c.v. tīrtha,); the term may have originally referred to temple-priests at river crossings or fords where travellers propitiated a deity before crossing. The Sanskrit term seems to have undergone metonymic transfer in referring to those able to ford the turbulent river of saṃsāra (as in the Jain Tīrthaṅkaras, “Ford-makers”) and it came to be used in Buddhist sources to refer to teachers of rival religious traditions. The Sanskrit term is closely rendered by the Tibetan mu stegs pa: “those on the steps (stegs pa) at the edge (mu)”. Mi bskyod rdo rje follows a common Tibetan hermeneutical etymology of mu stegs pa as referring to those who (pa) dwell (gnas for stegs : avasthā) in extremes (mtha’ for mu : tīrtha). 66 Tibetan exegetes introduced two subclassifications of Madhyamaka―that is, the division into SautrāntikaMadhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka prevalent during the early propagation of Buddhism in Tibet and the division into Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka prevalent during the later propagation period―in order to systematically define and differentiate the various strands of Madhyamaka found in Indian sources. On these and other Madhyamaka subsclassifications, see Mimaki 1982, 27-38, Ruegg 2000, 55-58. 37 INTRODUCTION Madhyamaka.67 According to the Notes on the Oral Tradition (Gsung rgyun zin bris) by ’Brom ston, “there also existed in India one [called] Vaibhāṣika-Mādhyamika. When those in India who had abided by the two [early] Buddhist schools (rang sde) and the third, Cittamātra, joined the Mādhyamikas, then whatever conventions they previously posited regarding conventional-obscurational truth in their respective philosophies, they also maintained later on [when they became Mādhyamikas].” The illustrious Candrakīrti [said] “I don’t accept customary conventions according to the philosophical systems but accept only the consensus opinions of the world.” Here in Tibet, the tradition of Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti has been designated as “Prāsaṅgika” and the tradition of Bhavya as “Svātantrika”. As for the subclassification of Madhyamaka, the division into the Illusory [nature] Verifiable through Reasoning and Nonfoundational Unity appears to have been rejected by the Mahātma Translator father and son [i.e., Rngog Lo tsā ba and his disciple Gro lung pa].68 According to the Doctrinal Stages [Bstan rim chen mo] by the great Gro lung pa69, “Some fools present traditions of Madhyamaka as being two-fold: the Apratiṣṭhāna[vāda] and Māyopamādvayavāda. They claim that Ācārya Śāntarakṣita and others maintained that illusions are ultimate. [They further claim that] having negated by negative determination the true existence (bden pa) imputed by Substance Ontologists (dngos po[r] smra ba : vastuvādin), [they proceeded] on the basis of logical reasoning, to affirm a false existence (brdzun pa) [by] a positive determination. This is not at all what was said. According to the Madhyamakālaṃkāra:70 Hence, these entities Have the characteristic of [being] conventional. If one claims that [these conventional entities] are the ultimate, What can I do about it? So [Śāntarakṣita] considered that false existence to be only an object of perception, and stated that the positive determination subsumed under the four [kinds of] 67 Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 47‒48: “according to Pa tshab, Bhavya with his Svātantrika followers advocated a pramāṇa that is vastubalapravṛtta, whereas the Prāsaṅgikas Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti accepted only one that is lokaprasiddha.” This last designation was used by Candrakīrti to characterize his acceptance of worldly views on a conventional level. For further details, see Mimaki 1982, 32-39. 68 See also Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 32‒35. Tsong kha pa and his Dge lugs pa successors followed the lead of these two in denying the validity of this distinction. 69 On this passage from Bstan rim chen mo (Bde bar gshegs pa’i bstan pa rin po che la ’jug pa’i lam gyi rim pa rnam par bshad pa. Lhasa: Zhol par khang, n.d., 437b7‒438a3), see Almogi 2010, 164‒65. 70 See Ichigō 1989, 212. For English translation see ibid., 213. 38 INTRODUCTION affirming negation [applied to] the negation of origination, is the false conventional [truth]. If one posits that [something], be it existent or nonexistent, is verifiable on the basis of logical reasoning, one would be possessed by the great demon of extreme views, and thus far from the Middle Way. For he also stated inter alia that if [one posits] existence, [it results in] eternalism.}” 71 This quotation attests to the atmosphere of dissension among Tibetan schools over the acceptability of the late Indian distinction between Apratiṣṭhāna and Māyopamādvaya traditions and how it was to be aligned with existing Tibetan classifications of Madhyamaka. Orna Almogi (2010) has suggested that the widespread rejection of the classification within the Bka’ gdams pa community had to do with the fact that “the Indian proponents of this scheme, being strongly inclined towards Tantric teachings, did not enjoy much authority among Tibetan masters more inclined towards non-Tantric teachings.”72 She also notes that the scheme did not correlate in any straightforward manner with the widely accepted Tibetan subsclassifications of Madhyamaka into Sautrāntika-Madhyamaka and Yogācāra-Madhyamaka (in the early propagation period) or into Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and PrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka (in the later propagation period).73 The authors in our study reflect the widespread divergence of opinion on how best to combine these different classifications. The majority of Tibetan exegetes had identified Apratiṣṭhāna (or at least one strand of it) with *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka, and the Māyopamādvayavāda with Svātantrika-Madhyamaka.74 This group included many scholars from different traditions such as Mkhas pa Lde’u jo sras (13th c.), the Bka’ gdams pa scholar Bcom ldan Rig pa’i ral gri (1227‒1305)75, the Sa skya pa Stag tshang lo tsā ba (b. 1405)76, the ’Brug pa ’Ba’ ra ba Rgyal mtshan dpal bzang (1310‒1391)77, the Dge lugs scholars Mkhas grub rje (1385‒1438) and many of his successors78, and Rnying ma pa Mi pham Rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846‒1912)79. There were also a few scholars such as the Rnying ma pa scholars Rog bande Shes rab ’od (1166‒1244) and Klong chen rab ’byams pa (1308‒1364) who subsumed both Apratiṣṭhānavāda and 71 Dgongs gcig ’grel pa Ic, MKsb vol. 4, 9122‒9136. 72 Almogi 2010, 182. 73 See Almogi 2010, 182‒83. 74 On these classifications, see Almogi 2010 and Seyfort Ruegg 2000. 75 On these first two, see Almogi 2010, 170 and 180‒81. 76 See Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 34; Almogi 2010, 170. 77 See Mimaki 1982, 34; Seyfort Ruegg 200, 34. 78 See Seyfort Ruegg 1981, 58‒59, n. 174. 79 See Almogi 2010, 170. 39 INTRODUCTION Māyopamādvayavāda under the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka tradition80, thus implicitly according a higher status to *Prāsaṅgika.81 Still others, we have seen, rejected the classification of Madhyamaka into Apratiṣṭhānavāda and Māyopamādvaya entirely, among them the early Bka’ gdams pas Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059‒1109)82, his students Gro lung pa Blo gros ’byung gnas (b. 11th c.) and Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109‒1169)83, and the later Dge lugs pa founder Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa (1357‒1419).84 The positions of our three authors are less clear-cut since none of them composed a summary of philosophical systems (grub mtha’), the type of work wherein such classifications are typically delineated. We have indicated that Karma phrin las regarded the Apratiṣṭhānavāda tradition as superior not only to the Māyopamādvayavāda but also to both *Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika since meditation on unity beyond extremes transcends the analytical meditation of these two Madhyamaka traditions that is focused on undermining the varying beliefs in real entities characteristic of the lower philosophical schools. Mi bskyod rdo rje seems to have viewed the Apratiṣṭhāna as being on par with *Prāsaṅgika to the extent that both emphasize the absence of discursive elaboration (spros bral) and he regarded both as having decisively invalidated not only the foundationalist presuppositions of the so-called lower schools of philosophy but also the types of inferential reasoning in ascertaining the ultimate employed by the Svātantrikas and Māyopamādvayavādins. Padma dkar po appears to have stood alone in presenting both Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka traditions as subclasses of the Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka. In his treatise Elucidating the Three Exegetical Traditions of Madhyamaka (Dbu ma’i gzhung lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa), he explains his own somewhat atypical classification by suggesting that what both Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka traditions share in common with the Apratiṣṭhāna tradition is their objective to eradicate discursive elaborations (spros pa).85 Where they differ is that the Svātantrika believes that this can be achieved through reasoning based on reliable epistemic procedures, whereas *Prāsaṅgika does not, seeking instead to simply point out how opponents’ conclusions are at odds with their own 80 See Almogi 2010, 165‒68. 81 See Almogi 2010, 170. This may have had something to do with the fact that Rnying ma masters traced their teachings to a period two or three centuries before the Indian Māyopama and Apratiṣṭhāna distinction was introduced. It bears recalling, however, that the 11th century Rnying ma pa Rong zom Chos kyi bzang po was partisan to the Apratiṣṭhāna Madhyamaka tradition. 82 See Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 32‒33. See Almogi 2010, 165‒68. See Seyfort Ruegg 32‒33 and also n. 60 where the author notes that Tsong kha pa endorsed “Rngog’s criticism of the applicability of this pair of terms to the level of the paramārtha.” 83 84 85 See below, 354 and n. 1024. 40 INTRODUCTION original beliefs.86 What emerges clearly from examining the Madhyamaka views of the three authors is that the Madhyamaka-Mahāmudrā synthesis of the late Indian Apratiṣṭhāna view provided them with an ideal framework for integrating Mahāmudrā teachings on the luminous nature of mind with Madhyamaka teachings on emptiness. They therefore accorded this tradition the highest position in their doxographical systems. THE NATURE OF LIBERATING KNOWLEDGE In light of the authors’ philosophical affinities, it is hardly surprising that all four stood united in giving direct (yogic) perception (mngon sum) or personally realized wisdom (so sor rang rig pa’i ye shes) priority over rational inference. All would agree with Shākya mchog ldan’s assessment that an emptiness arrived at through analytical reasoning can only be an abstraction (don spyi) that is conceptually determined, and cannot be the nonrepresentational ultimate (rnam grangs pa ma yin pa’i don dam)87 which is amenable only to direct perception and personally realized wisdom. The reasons are largely phenomenological. Since discursive analysis derives from a prediscursive or nonconceptual mode of perception, it can at best play the preparatory role of eliminating reifications that obscure or distort the perception of reality. This assessment was crucial to the ways they individually distinguished the uncontrived type of knowledge arising from meditative experience (sgom) from the adventitious type of knowledge employed in studying and thinking (thos bsam). Distinctions of this kind proved integral to their differing attempts to specify the roles and relative efficacy of discursive and prediscursive modes of soteriological knowledge, an issue that in one form or another had been repeatedly discussed and fiercely debated in Tibet since the time of the Sino-Indian Bsam yas Debate hosted by the emperor Khri Srong lde btsan toward the end of the eighth century. The question at the heart of this debate was whether goal-realization occurs gradually through analytical meditation, as argued by the Indian participant Kamalaśīla, or all at once through contemplating the nature of mind, as proposed by his Chinese Chan adversary Heshang Moheyan (Tib. hwa shang mo ho yen). It is well known that the account of the debate preserved in Tibetan historical sources has Kamalaśīla roundly defeating his opponent, thereby securing Indian Buddhism as the official state religion and sanctioning the banishment of Chinese Chan practitioners and their suddenist teachings from Tibet. The reality must have been otherwise since Sino-Tibetan Chan communities are known to have existed in Tibet well into the tenth century CE. At any rate, the standard debate narrative soon assumed the status 86 Dbu ma’i gzhung lugs gsum gsal bar byed pa nges don grub pa’i shing rta, PKsb vol. 9, 87 On the translation of the term paryāya (Tib. rnam grangs) as it occurs in the distinction between a “represented ulimate” (rnam grangs [dang bcas] pa’i don dam : [*sa]paryāyaparamārtha) and “nonrepresented ultimate,” see below, 96 n. 241 and especially 102 n. 263. 41 INTRODUCTION of a comprehensive founding myth88 within the Tibetan cultural memory, one that has since been used, in various rhetorical contexts, both to valorize a standard Indian Buddhist scholastic model of reason-guided gradualism and to ostracize as ‘non-Buddhist’ (chos min) any subitist elements—especially those found in Mahāmudrā and Rdzogs chen teachings— that were thought to advocate a stuperous Chinese Heshang form of meditation. There were certain key epistemological and soteriological problems raised at the Great Debate that contined to smoulder in the centuries to follow and that often enflamed conflicts between Tibetan schools. By the post-classical period, a great deal of scholarly attention from all sides was fixed on a set of issues concerning [1] the relationship between view (lta ba) and conduct (spyod pa), or between insight (shes rab) and skillful means (thabs), [2] the transition from studying and thinking (thos, bsam) to meditation (sgom), [3] the function and scope of the more and less conceptually-mediated cognitive styles, [4] the proper contexts for gradual (rim gyis) versus simultaneous or all-at-once ([g]cig char) styles of pedagogy and realization, and [5] the connection between premeditated versus unpremeditated, or contrived (bcos) versus uncontrived (ma bcos), modes of altruistic activity. For our Bka’ brgyud exegetes, the key to understanding and resolving these problems lay in the insight that conceptual and nonconceptual modes of liberating knowledge are complementary rather than contradictory. It was crucial, however, to specify their respective roles within changing soteriological contexts. Padma dkar po consecrated considerable attention to showing that Mahāmudrā teachings on nonconceptual wisdom and mental nonengagement are fully compatible with the type of Madhyamaka teachings encouraging well-founded mental engagement (yoniśo manasikāra) and discerning reality (bhūtapratyavekṣā) promoted by Kamalaśīla, but also fully concordant with the kind of objectless meditation emphasized in Mantrayāna Completion Stage (utpannakrama) practices wherein the mind, deprived of any object with which to identify, reposes in luminous emptiness. In their attempts to mediate between these complex and contrasting views on truth, emptiness, buddha nature, the nature of mind, and styles of liberating knowledge, the four scholars each charted his own philosophical middle course between the prevailing eternalistic and nihilistic currents of Buddhist thought. If this meant avoiding the imputation of a permanent metaphysical reality, a view they linked with the Jo nang school, it also meant circumventing the kind of unwarranted depreciation of ultimate reality that they saw as the undesirable result of taking as the view of the ultimate an exclusive or sheer emptiness (stong pa rkyang pa)—a complete absence of anything whatsoever—that was the scope of a nonaffirming negation (med dgag), a view that they associated mainly with the Dge lugs pa school. It is in light of this shared concern to reconcile Gzhan stong-based and Rang stongbased Middle Way approaches within the framework of an affirmative but antifoundationalist 88 See Bretfeld 2004. 42 INTRODUCTION approach to goal-realization that we can broadly characterize the primary philosophical orientation of these leading post-classical thinkers as a “Mahāmudrā of the Middle Way”. Given our still fragmentary knowledge of post-classical developments in Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā philosophy and polemics, it is hoped that the present study will offer the reader a panoramic overview of some of the central religo-philosophical issues and debates that defined this most fruitful period of Tibet’s intellectual history through the lens of four of its most productive and influential thinkers. 43 SHĀKYA MCHOG LDAN 44 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN SHĀKYA MCHOG LDAN AND THE BKA’ BRGYUD MAHĀMUDRĀ TRADITION Shākya mchog ldan (1428‒1507) has long been regarded as one of the most prolific and learned scholars of his generation. As a testament to the breadth of his scholarship, his extant Collected Works fill twenty-four volumes and cover an impressively wide range of subjects, mostly of a philosophical nature. Within his own Sa skya tradition, Shākya mchog ldan’s erudition and influence as a teacher earned him the title Great Ācārya (slob dpon chen po) and garnered him the recognition of being one of the tradition’s Six Ornaments Beautifying the Snowy Land (gangs can mdzes pa’i rgyan drug). These accolades aside, Shākya mchog ldan has mainly been regarded as a controversial figure, even an apostate, whose probing reconsiderations of the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita, supreme authority of his own Sa skya school, and his vehement criticisms of the views of Tsong kha pa, founder of the Dge lugs pa school, led to the general neglect of his writings by his own school and their wholesale proscription by the Dge lugs pa establishment. It is only in the past four decades, with the resurfacing and distribution of the long-banned copy of his Collected Writings in 1975, that his works have begun to once again attract the attention they deserve. Most of our current state of knowledge of this important master derives from the aforementioned studies of Komarovski, Kano, Jackson, Seyfort Ruegg, Van der Kuijp, Turrene, and Caumanns.89 An important chapter in Shākya mchog ldan’s development as a philosopher and exegete that has hitherto received only cursory treatment (by Jackson and Seyfort Ruegg) is his productive engagement with the Dwags po Mahāmudrā tradition that developed and intensified during the last half of his life. This development found its culmination in a trilogy of writings dedicated to articulating and defending this tradition that are analyzed, critically edited and translated in volume two of this work. An assessment of Shākya mchog ldan’s treatments of the Dwags po Mahāmudrā tradition may be expected to fill a crucial gap in our understanding of his philosophy, a gap of no small magnitude given the author’s conviction that this tradition represents the summit of Buddhist thought and practice. Here, the question immediately arises: Why did a renowned Sa skya scholar and teacher choose to openly defend the validity, and even superiority, of a tradition that had come under relentless criticism by the supreme religious and scholastic authority of his own tradition, Sa skya Paṇḍita, and virtually all of the latter’s successors? As a first step toward making sense of the author’s growing allegiance to this contested tradition, we can take note of two controversial issues concerning Buddhist theory and practice that had long claimed his attention and briefly conjecture why he thought the Mahāmudrā tradition offered the best prospect of resolving them. One was the issue of how to reconcile philosophical analysis with contemplative experience by combining, within the traditional framework of study (thos), thought (bsam) and meditation (sgom), the key elements of the 89 For previous research on Shākya mchog ldan, see Introduction. 45 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN diverse, and sometimes seemingly divergent, vehicles of Buddhism, exoteric as well as esoteric. The second was the issue of how best to realize a unity (zung ’jug : yuganaddha) beyond extremes of existence and nonexistence, affirmation and negation, within the sphere of spiritual praxis, a unity sometimes referred to as the inseparability of manifestation and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). Of course, the very formulation of these issues makes use of conventional distinctions between view and practice, analysis and contemplation, and related rubrics that the author himself regarded as discursive constructs that must eventually be transcended. But, in the author’s eyes, such transcendence is possible only when one recognizes the abiding nature or prereflective source of conceptual thinking that itself eludes the appropriations of negative and positive determinations. And in his eyes, the most viable path to this goal was that outlined in the teachings of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā system. The present chapter looks at Shākya mchog ldan’s assessment and defence of this system and its teachings within the broader contexts of the author’s doxographical affiliations and philosophical views on buddha nature, mind, soteriological knowledge and emptiness. Although his Mahāmudrā trilogy forms the primary focus for assessing his contributions, we have also consulted a number of separate treatments of this tradition in his Replies to Queries (dris lan) texts and other writings. The trilogy consists of the following works which, in all extant editions of the author’s Collected Works, are presented in the following sequence: [1] Undermining the Haughtiness of Others: a Treatise Clarifying Mahāmudrā90, [2] Ascertaining the Intent of the Supreme Siddhas: A Treatise Called ‘Distinguishing Mahāmudrā’91: and [3] Distinguishing Mahāmudrā or the Great Ship of Unity: A Treatise Dispelling Errors in the Interpretation of Mahāmudrā of Scripture and Reasoning92. Only the second of these texts can be assigned a date; in its colophon the author records that he composed it when he was 76 years old (just four years before his death). It is not unlikely that all three works were composed at a relatively late date since they explore an integrated set of themes and to some extent balance each other thematically, but we have no way of confirming this thesis. It is noteworthy that the dated work is the most openly critical of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s condemnations of the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā system and its tone is less conciliatory than the other two. One plausible scenario is that this was the last of his Mahāmudrā works on the supposition that its candidly critical tone reflects a late point in the author’s life when he would have felt 90 Phyag rgya chen po gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos tshangs pa’i ’khor lo gzhan blo’i dregs pa nyams byed, (hereafter Undermining or PCdn), SCsb(B) vol. 17, 359‒3761. 91 Phyag rgya chen po’i shan ’byed ces bya ba’i bstan bcos grub pa mchog gi dgongs pa rnam nges, (hereafter Ascertaining the Intent or PCgn), SCsb(B) vol. 17, 3761‒3854. 92 Phyag rgya chen po’i shan ’byed or Lung rigs gnyis kyi phyag rgya chen po’i bzhed tshul la ’khrul pa sel ba’i bstan bcos zung ’jug gi gru chen, (hereafter Great Ship of Unity or PCks), SCsb(B) vol. 17, 3854‒4122. 46 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN less inhibited to speak his mind than previously. But without corroborating evidence, this can only be a matter of speculation. The Mahāmudrā trilogy reveals as clearly as any of the works in the author’s corpus how Shākya mchog ldan understood and formulated the above-mentioned issues of reconciliation and unity and how he thought they could best be resolved. The three works mark a high point in the author’s own development as a Buddhist thinker and open a window on some of the key soteriological issues that defined the vibrant but polemically tempestuous intellectual climate of his age. The distinctive doctrinal elements of his Mahāmudrā texts stand out most clearly when viewed against the background of the author’s philosophical oeuvre as a whole and in light of its central preoccupations. The author’s Collected Works reveal a highly independent thinker who intrepidly grappled with the “big problems” of Buddhist philosophy such as truth, emptiness, the nature of mind, buddha nature, and soteriological knowledge. What is perhaps most striking in his treatments of such issues is the extent to which he attempts not only to assess multiple Buddhist viewpoints on such problems but also to work out how they should be coordinated and reconciled with one another from the standpoint of individual assimilation and praxis. In short, he was a master both of dialogical and dialectical thinking.93 We have proposed that the task of clarifying the relationship between philosophical thinking and contemplative experience was at the heart of his philosophical project. He consecrated a great deal of attention to determining the proper role and relative efficacy of each based on the conviction that it was not only an issue of inestimable importance for combining the study and practice of Buddhism but also one that had generally been misunderstood by his contemporaries. In this regard, he identified two major strands of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought: [1] the dialectician’s system of severing imputations (sgro ’dogs bcad pa’i lugs) based on studying and thinking, which can be approached either via Self-emptiness (rang stong) or Otheremptiness (gzhan stong)94, and [2] the yogin’s system of first-hand experience (nyams su myong ba’i lugs) based on meditation. While Shākya mchog ldan considered both to be valid and important Buddhist approaches, he deemed it a serious mistake to privilege the former to the exclusion of the latter, to give methods and texts concerned with reasoning which investigates the ultimate priority over those concerned with first-personal attestation. The reasons he gives are largely phenomenological. As important or necessary as the elimination of reifications through rational investigation may prove to be, its result is always a deductive conclusion, a negative or positive determination, and should therefore never be taken as an 93 On these two styles of thinking, see below, 241‒42 and n. 677. 94 Like many other scholars of his time, Shākya mchog ldan used these Tibetan rubrics rang stong and gzhan stong to broadly characterize and distinguish between negating (apophatic) and affirming (cataphatic) strains of Indian Buddhist thought. 47 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN end in itself. To do so is to conflate the elimination of what is to be negated (dgag bya) with what is to be realized. For Shākya mchog ldan, the elimination of what is to be negated is not the goal itself but a preparatory clearing away of what conceals it. As Shākya mchog ldan sees it, any emptiness arrived at through radical negation can only be an abstraction (don spyi) that is conceptually determined, it cannot be the nonrepresentational ultimate (rnam grangs pa ma yin pa’i don dam) that is amenable only to direct perception or personally realized wisdom. On this view, conceptual analysis can at best play the propaedeutic role of eliminating reifications that obscure or distort the real and thus prevent the disclosure of personally realized wisdom and the buddha qualities. Because the Gzhan stong view makes room for a positive appraisal of what mahāmudrā is from the vantage point of first-hand experience, it is thought to come closer to the perspective of unity (yuganaddha), the cornerstone of the Mahāmudrā teachings, than Rang stong which is focused on objects of refutation (dgag bya). However, in his Mahāmudrā writings, both the negating Rang stong and affirming Gzhan stong traditions, useful as they may be as preliminary methods, remain confined to the sphere of the dialectician, a sphere that is transcended in the personally realized wisdom of the yogin who realizes a unity beyond extremes of existence and nonexistence. In this vein, Shākya mchog ldan rather boldly characterizes Mahāmudrā as a system of thought and practice independent of the approaches of Self-emptiness (rang stong) or Other-emptiness (gzhan stong) that are deemed to represent “poisoned”, i.e., conceptually fabricated, viewpoints. In articulating this relationship between conceptual analysis and nonconceptual realization, Shākya mchog ldan makes an important distinction between the actual view (lta ba dngos), which he regards as a prephilosophical view grounded in first-hand experience, and the myriad viewpoints (lta ba) or established conclusions (grub mtha’) that make up the universe of Buddhist and Non-Buddhist philosophical tenet-systems. Shākya mchog ldan maintains that one’s philosophical viewpoint should have the actual view based on first-hand experience as its point of origin and orientation. To give a philosophical viewpoint primacy over the prephilosophical view is to put the soteriological cart before the horse and to embark on a path of speculation and dogmatism. In sum, Shākya mchog ldan’s philosophical project was dedicated in large part to striking a balance between negating and affirming modes of Buddhist knowledge and discourse and this is in his view possible only when one restores the phenomenological primacy of first-hand attestation over theoretical deliberation. The goal is to realize a unity in which the entire spectrum of dialectical positions regarding truth, knowledge and emptiness have given way to the inseparability of manifestation and emptiness. For Shākya mchog ldan, the most efficacious and least convoluted path to this transcendent unity is the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā because it offers persons of requisite acumen a method of direct access to buddhahood, the abiding nature of mind, and 48 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN minimizes the need for conceptual and ritual mediation. Equating mahāmudrā with the unborn nature of mind, Shākya mchog ldan identifies it with unchanging buddha nature which is at once [1] the ground of the clearing process, [2] the clearing process itself which, through wisdom, clears away adventitious stains, and [3] its fruition as the transcendent qualities of purity, selfhood, bliss, and permanence.95 He adds “there is no difference between the element of sentient beings (sems can gyi khams) and that of buddhas (sangs rgyas kyi khams)”96: what characterizes sentient beings—the unfounded mentations based on the aggregates (skandhas), sense-bases (āyatanas), elements (dhātus), and sense-faculties (indriyas)—are purely adventitious and dependent upon the purity of mind.97 Accordingly, as the adventitious impurities subside, the nature of mind, i.e., primordial wisdom, becomes manifest. Shākya mchog ldan traces the view that forms the backbone of Mahāmudrā practice to three main exegetical traditions: [1] the Tathāgatagarbha discourses of the third turning, particularly the Ratnagotravibhāga, [2] the Siddha dohās, especially the Dohā Trilogy (do hā skor gsum) of Saraha, and their commentaries, and [3] the tantra corpus. These all affirm nondual wisdom as that which remains, or withstands critical assessment, when distorting dualistic reifications and afflictions have been dispelled. Concerning methods of realization, Shākya mchog ldan is emphatic that mahāmudrā is accessible only to nonconceptual, nondeluded direct cognition. Unlike the Rang stong and Gzhan stong systems of severing superimpositions (sgro ’dogs bcad pa) by studying and thinking which employ inferential knowledge, the Mahāmudrā practice is said to be a matter of directly perceiving the nature of mind, of familiarizing oneself with ultimate bodhicitta. Shākya mchog ldan neatly sums up the difference between the approaches of the dialectician and yogin by citing an unidentified quotation which states that “dialecticians (mtshan nyid pa) make outward observations, severing superimpositions outwardly, whereas yogins (rnal ’byor pa) make inward observations, severing superimpositions inwardly”. 98 In other words, the yogin redirects the capacity to find fault from externals to their inward 95 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 17‒18, critical edition: 29. “The element of *sugatagarbha is that which has been given the name mahāmudrā. In this which is the ground for the clearing (sbyang gzhi) of stains, the *sugatagarbha that is the cleanser (sbyong byed) of the nine kinds of stains that are the objects to be cleared (sbyang bya) clears them by means of the wisdom of awareness, whereby the fruition of the clearing process (sbyang ’bras) emerges, i.e., the transcendent qualities of purity, selfhood, bliss, etc.” 96 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 19, critical edition: 30. 97 The author bases himself on Ratnagotravibhāga I.52–57 which gives the analogy of the elements of earth which is supported by water, water by air, air by space but space not being supported by anything. Likewise, the psychophysical aggregates, sensory elements and sensory capacities are supported by actions and afflictive emotions, which are supported by unfounded mentations, which are in turn supported by the purity of mind which, however, is not itself supported by any of these phenomena. 98 Similar characterizations were employed by Karma phrin las (see chapter two) and the Second ’Brug chen Rgyal dbang rje and Fourth ’Brug chen Padma dkar po (see chapter four). 49 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN source, mind’s mistaken self-identifications. All this may strike the reader as intriguing, coming as it does from a Sa skya scholar who was renowned for his wide-ranging erudition in critically assessing the many systems of Buddhist philosophy. Given that the author had in his earlier writings referred to himself, with more than a little self-irony, as a “dry dialectician” (mtshan nyid pa skam po), we can take his endorsement of the yogin’s inward turn as indicative of his own changing orientation and shifting priorities.99 In his Mahāmudrā works, Shākya mchog ldan takes pains to clarify that his hierarchical ranking of the two systems of severing superimpositions and first-hand experience is by no means an attempt to advocate the latter at the expense of the former, to privilege knowledge based on direct experience over knowledge based on analytical reasoning. This would be to play into the hands of the dialectician. Rather his intent is to adequately characterize the relations of priority that exist between first-hand experience and critical analysis: all activities of reflection, thematizing and theorizing derive and deviate from a more basic nondiscursive mode of being and awareness and return to it at the moment of realization. To say that nonconceptual realization depends on conceptual analysis is to misunderstand the priority relation between them and take what is to be relinquished— conceptual fabrication—as the basis of the path. Mahāmudrā in his view restores the proper relation by recognizing the prereflective nature of thought and taking nondual wisdom as the basis of the path. From this standpoint, the wisdom of Mahāmudrā does not unequivocally depend on the logical reasoning of either the Rang stong or Gzhan stong strands of Madhyamaka, though both may prove necessary to the aspirant who stands in need of a preparatory purging of illegitimate imputations and unwarranted deprecations by means of studying and thinking. Nor does such wisdom in all cases require the tantric methods of empowerments and Generation and Completion stages, as effective as these may be for those requiring the elimination of deep-seated afflictions and attachments. While Shākya mchog ldan holds this tantric preliminary method to be even more efficacious than Madhyamaka reasoning, he nonetheless accepts, in contrast to Sa skya Paṇḍita Kun dga rgyal mtshan (1182‒1251), the validity of an upadeśa-based access to the experience of mahāmudrā that does not require the prescribed repertoire of tantric rituals and practices which may, to the most suitable recipients of these teachings, prove to be a distraction or even an obstacle.100 99 See Komarovski 2011, 35. 100 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 53, critical edition: 75. “In the words of some [others], it is said that there are two [types of practitioners], the gradualists and the simultaneists. To the first, this mahāmudrā is taught [once they have] adequately been made a suitable vessel for the Secret Mantra by taking refuge, developing bodhicitta, empowerment, blessing, and so on. To the simultaneists who, having thoroughly ripened their mind-streams during many previous lifetimes, do not need to rely on the sham of preliminary practices and so on in this life, the main practice is shown right from the start. In that regard, it is said that even though it is not possible to [directly] show them “mahāmudrā is this”, it will nonetheless come by simply instructing them to “rest naturally 50 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Shākya mchog ldan characterizes the realization of Mahāmudrā as a process which involves the whole person, bringing into play innate altruistic capacities for thinking, feeling and acting that have been obscured and distorted by the mind’s own self-objectifications. While studying and thinking may play a crucial role in orienting the mind toward what is essential, it is certain affective and intersubjective dispositions such as confidence and devotion which may prove most effective in triggering the disclosure of mind’s luminous nature.101 Mahāmudrā arises at the confluence of the student’s devotion and teacher’s blessings, whatever other preparatory measures may have preceded this emergence.102 LIFE, WRITINGS AND INFLUENCES To gain a clearer picture of the historical and doctrinal elements that shaped Shākya mchog ldan’s engagement with Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition, it may be useful to sketch in rough strokes the important milestones in his life, giving particular attention to his affiliations with Karma Bka’ brgyud teachers and teachings. 103 Shākya mchog ldan was born in 1428 in Central Tibet in the vicinity of the famous monastic seminary of Gsang phu ne’u thog.104 At age ten (1437), following a course of preliminary studies, he received pre-novice in uncontrived mind,” once they are acquainted with what the words mean.” la la’i gsung gis | gdul ba’i gang zag la | rim gyis pa dang gcig car ba gnyis | dang po la skyabs ’gro sems bskyed dbang byin brlabs sogs kyis gsang sngags kyi snod rung du byas | bzod phyag rgya chen po ’di ston pa yin no | | cig car ba tshe rabs mang por rgyud yongs su smin pa la tshe ’dir sngon ’gro sogs kyi mgo skor la ma ltos par dang po nyid nas dngos gzhi de ston pa ni | de yang phyag rgya chen po de ’di yin zhes ston nus pa ma yin gyi | ’on kyang sems ma bcos lhug par zhog shig ces bstan pa tsam gyis brda’ don ’phrod nas ’ong pa yin gsungs | 101 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 24, critical edition: 33. 102 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 35, critical edition: 43. “The emptiness of mahāmudrā is attained through devotion to the bla ma, blessings, karmic connection and the accumulation of merit.” phyag rgya chen po’i stong nyid ni | bla mar mos dang byin rlabs dang | las ’phro ba sod nams tshogs las yin | grub … 103 For a more comprehensive biography of Shākya mchog ldan based on various biographical and historical sources including the comprehensive biography of the master composed by Kun dga’ grol mchog (1507‒ 1565/66) based largely on accounts by Shākya mchog ldan’s disciples and grand-disciples, see Komorovski 2011, chapter one. This work additionally provides a valuable survey of the socio-political atmosphere in which Shākya mchog ldan lived and worked, a period characterized by increasing political and polemical tensions. More details about Shākya mchog ldan’s life are to be expected with the publication in 2015 of the rivised dissertation on the life and work of Shākya mchog ldan by Caumanns 2012, Der Mahāpaṇḍita des Klosters gSermdog-can: Leben und Werk des Sa-skya-Meisters Shakya-mchog-ldan (1428‒1507). 104 Gsang phu was a Bka’ gdams monastery established in 1073 by Rngog Legs pa’i shes rab (11 th c.), a disciple of the renowned Bengali master Atiśa alias Dīpaṃkaraśrijñāna (982‒1054) who founded the Bka’ gdams order. Gsang phu was the most important and influential of six seminaries (chos grva chen po drug) established between the 11th and 13th centuries in the Dbus province, the others being Skyor mo lung, Zul phu, Dga’ ba gdong, Bde ba can and Gung thang (i.e. Chos ’khor gling). Gsang phu was under the authority of the Rngog clan and started operations with 500 students. Sørensen and Hazod (2007, 685) note that the six learning centres played a vital role in the establishment of the major Dge lugs pa key monasteries in the 15th century, being incorporated into their network. On formative developments in Buddhist epistemology at Gsang phu, see Van der Kuijp 1983, 51 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN ordination (bar ma rab byung) along with the ordination name Shākya mchog ldan from the Sa skya master Rong ston shes bya kun rig (1367‒1449) who had by this time gained a reputation as a brilliant scholar and teacher, and a formidable critic of Tsong kha pa’s views. Rong ston identified the boy as the reincarnation of one of his own teachers, the Sa skya master Bag ston Gzhon nu rgyal mtshan (14th c.) and of the latter’s student Bag ston Shākya ’od zer. In the same year, Shākya mchog ldan entered the Sa skya ’Phan yul Gnas sgo college at Gsang pu ne’u thog, the seat of the great paṇḍita Don yod dpal ba who also became one of his most important teachers. The monastery was at this time supported by the powerful Phag mo gru pa clan and mainly played host to Dge lugs and Sa skya students.105 The young scholar began an intensive course of studies in classical Buddhist works on Vinaya, Abhidharma, Prajñapāramitā, Pramāṇa, and Madhyamaka, as well as ritual, tantra and meditative techniques. Not confining his studies to Gsang phu, he travelled to many other learning institutions in search of specialists in various fields to broaden his knowledge of the main Buddhist traditions of exegesis and practice. The biographical sources characterize his early teenage years as a period of extensive intellectual studies combined with dedicated meditative practice. These resulted in contemplative experiences of luminous clarity that are said to have had the effect, among other things, that he could read during the night without the need for additional lighting. During this early phase of study and meditation, Rong ston pa continued to be one of his principal teachers, introducing his student to all the major areas of Buddhist philosophy. At age thirteen (1440), Shākya mchog ldan received from him the novice vows (dge tshul). Despite his youth, he was already able to give instructions on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter (Treasure of the Science of Valid Cognition) and Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa and he soon became known as the “boy teacher” (slob dpon bu chung). When he was fifteen (1442), the Phag mo gru pa rulers, who at this time gave special patronage to the Dge lugs tradition, ordered the monks to study in Dge lugs institutions, a directive that did not sit well with Shākya mchog ldan, particularly as he did not approve of Tsong kha pa’s Madhyamaka interpretations.106 It is significant, for example, that in the spring of 1442, Shākya mchog ldan was required to go to the Dge lugs monastery of Se ra monastery to attend extensive teachings on Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā according to decrees issued from Ne’u sdong that made the attendance of Sa skya and Dge lugs pa monks mandatory. These events seem to have left a deep impression on the youth who would, later in life, frequently lament chapters 1 and 2. On the traditions of debate and logic at Gsang phu, see Onoda 1992, chapter 2. On abbatial succession at Gsang phu, see Van der Kuijp 1987, Onoda 1988, and Sørensen and Hazod 2007, 686 f. 105 See Shunzo Onoda 1988, “Abbatial Successions of the Colleges of gSang phu sNe’u thog Monastery”. 106 Komarovski 2011, 28‒29 52 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN the decline in understanding of the original Bka’ gdams traditions of exegesis and praxis by so-called “latter-day” proponents of Madhyamaka reasoning who took the goal of Buddhist thought and practice to consist in the realization of emptiness as a nonaffirming negation (med dgag). Although he would later comment that it was at age twelve that he first had the courage to differentiate his own philosophical view from those of rivals (mainly the Dge lugs pa), it was not until age thirty-two that he began writing his own refutations of Dge lugs pa views107, a trend that would continue for the remainder of his long life. Already by the age of eighteen (1445), Shākya mchog ldan began his teaching career at Gsang phu where he earned the epithet “adjunct instructor” (zur ’chad pa), and, a year later, “master” (slob dpon). At the age of twenty, he undertook the study of Sanskrit and became completely fluent in this language, able to converse in it and translate from and into it. From the age of twenty-two onward, he obtained the Lam ’bras and the tantric Mahāmudrā transmissions as well as extensive Bka’ gdams mental training (blo sbyong) teachings from different teachers. It was also during this time that he began receiving tantric transmissions and empowerments from teachers of various traditions, mainly Sa skya and Bka’ brgyud pa. Shākya mchog ldan received empowerments on the Cakrasaṃv ara and Vajravārāhī,teachings on the Hevajra and other tantras, and various other instructions, from the Karma Bka’ brgyud master Grags pa ’od zer (15th c.). From another famously nonsectarian Bka’ brgyud teacher, Spyang lung sdings pa Gzhon nu blo gros (1372‒1412), who had studied with Tsong kha pa and Red mda’ ba gzhon nu blo gros (1349‒1412) as well as many Sa skya and Bka’ brgyud masters, he received extensive Bka’ brgyud teachings.108 These are but two indications of the close ties he was beginning to forge with the Karma bka’ brgyud tradition, ties which would strengthen in the years to follow as he developed a growing familiarity with its systems of exegesis (bshad lugs) and praxis (sgrub lugs). When he was twenty-five (1452), Shākya mchog ldan received full monastic ordination from Kun dga’ bzang po (1382‒1456) who became another of his most important teachers. He excelled in his monastic examinations (grwa skor), greatly pleasing his ordination master. Shākya mchog ldan had by this time become one of the most learned scholars of his generation and was elevated to the title of a Sa skya Dge shes (sa skya pa’i dge shes) and then a “Great One” (chen po) at Gsang phu, the final step before becoming an Abbot (mkhan po). However, he seems to have become increasingly dissatisfied with the type of rote learning—the memorization of classical scripture by means of repetition—advocated at Gsang phu and in the summer of 1468, he left his teaching post in the hands of a high-ranking colleague and spent the next nine months in a Hevajra retreat at ’Od gsal rtse mo. He later 107 See Komarovski 2011, 34. 108 See Komarovski 2011, 30. 53 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN recounted that during this retreat he received indications that negativities had been purified and there arose many luminous visionary experiences (’od gsal gyi ’char sgo). From the age of twenty-seven (1454) onward, Shākya mchog ldan had begun composing treatises on a variety of topics, and would eventually leave for posterity enough writings, many of them philosophical, to fill twenty-four volumes. Regarding his own philosophical orientation, it is clear from his collected writings that he devoted considerable attention to the Niḥsvabhāvavāda or *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka system until approximately 1470 (age fortythree), the year following his Hevajra retreat. From this time onward, his view shifted more and more to what he called Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka, Great Madhyamaka (dbu ma chen po) or Gzhan stong, though he continued to teach the works of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti extensively and to regard the *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka methods of reasoning as important preparatory tools for dispelling doubts and wrong imputations. Although not opposed to *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka methods of reasoning per se, what he did object to was the tendency among his contemporaries to take such methods as an end in themselves and as the conditio sine qua non of goal-realization. As will become evident in the pages to follow, Shākya mchog ldan’s distinctive doxographical identification of Alīkākāravāda as a Madhyamaka tradition par excellence—one whose adherents were said to have included the likes of the famous epistemologist Dignāga—would leave him vulnerable to harsh criticism by other scholars, not least of all by the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554).109 It nonetheless gave Shākya mchog ldan a unique standpoint from which to make an important distinction within the doxographical universe of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophies between two major strands of Madhyamaka: [1] traditions such as the Niḥsvabhāvavāda that rejected the existence, even conventionally, of any kind of transcendent awareness or wisdom that can be said to withstand critical assessment and be left as a remainder upon the realization of buddhahood, and [2] traditions such as the Alīkākāravāda that not only affirmed that such transcendent awareness is indeed what remains but also explicitly identify this remnant nondual awareness with the ultimate truth, the dharmadhātu, itself.110 It was because this latter tradition also maintained that this transcendent cognition does not exist as a real entity (dngos po) that Shākya mchog ldan proposed that its view must be considered Madhyamaka rather than Cittamātra, an identification that many scholars such as Stag lo tsā ba Shes rab rin chen, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po would reject. In sum, this doxographical scheme, though controversial, provided Shākya mchog ldan with a philosophical-epistemological orientation that could be shown to be completely in harmony with the affirmative third turning Mahāyāna, Siddha, and Tantra discourses and their shared disclosive view of goal-realization common commitment to the Madhyamaka principle 109 For an analysis of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s criticisms, see chapter three. 110 See below, 59‒60 et passim. 54 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN of freedom from extremes of existence and nonexistence. His own philosophical viewpoint was based on the complementarity between the Yogācāra and Niḥsvabhāvavāda exegetical traditions and the reciprocity between their positive and negative determinations. In his forty-third year (1471), Shākya mchog ldan was given his own seat at the monastery of Gzi lung (aka Zi ling/Zi lung) in Gtsang that had originally been established by Don yod dpal ba (1398‒1484). In appreciation of his vast erudition and being the best of Don yod dpal’s students, the monastery was ceded to him by this master’s other students. Shākya mchog ldan renamed his new seat the “Golden Monastery” (thub bstan gser mdog can), after which he himself was sometimes referred to by the epithet “Great Teacher (mahāpaṇḍita) from the Golden Monastery” (gser mdog paṇ chen). It may be noted that this change of monastic venue signaled an important shift in Shākya mchog ldan’s political and spiritual alliances since this establishment was supported by the Rin spung pa clan. As powerful rivals of the Phag mo gru pa, the Rin spung pa had by the early fifteenth century become active supporters of both the Karma Bka’ brgyud and Sa skya traditions. From this time on, Shākya mchog ldan enjoyed the patronage of the Rin spungs family for whom he in turn gave teachings and tantric empowerments. At the same time, he seems to have increasingly fallen out of favour with the Sa skya establishment. At the age of fifty-seven (1484) Shākya mchog ldan met for the first time the thirtyone year old Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454‒1506), a renowned and highly influential scholar who received extensive patronage and land holdings from the Rin spungs family. Among much else, Chos grags rgya mtsho gave his senior student teachings on the Fourth Karma pa Rol pa’i rdo rje’s (1340‒1383) Great Madhyamaka Reasonings (dbu ma’i gtan tshigs chen mo).111 From this time onward, Shākya mchog ldan included in his teaching repertoire many Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā doctrines such as the Six Yogas of Nāropa (na ro chos drug) and Mahāmudrā of Coemergent Union (phyag chen lhan cig skyes sbyor). In 1502 and again in 1503, Shākya mchog ldan, now in his mid-seventies, reunited with the Seventh Karma pa, this time accepting him as his root guru.112 The last three decades of Shākya mchog ldan’s life were marked by a growing interest in the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition which had been so severely criticized by his own Sa skya tradition beginning with Sa skya Paṇḍita. It also marked a decisive shift in his own intellectual-spiritual vocation from that of a dialectician (mthan nyid pa) dedicated to the systems of severing superimpositions, Rang stong and Gzhan stong, toward that of the yoga-practitioner (rnal ’byor pa) devoted to systems of first-hand experience. 111 Komarovski 2011, 43 and n. 157. 112 This was reported by Chos grags rgya mtsho’s secretary and disciple Dpa’ bo Gtsug lag phreng ba (1504‒ 1564/66). For references, see Komarovski 2011, 49 and n. 185. 55 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Some of Shākya mchog ldan’s most striking philosophical insights resulted from his ongoing efforts to clarify the complex relationships between these two vocations. We can see these same concerns mirrored in the Mahāmudrā writings of Karma phrin las, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po. Shākya mchog ldan’s high regard for the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud tradition would eventually find expression in the trilogy of works dedicated to elucidating and defending its teachings113, especially from its Sa skya and Dge lugs detractors, at least one of that was composed shortly before his death.114 Shākya mchog ldan died at his monastery Gser mdog can in 1507 at the age of eighty. Because of his substantial contributions to Buddhist philosophy and his enormous, if not always adequately acknowledged, influence as a teacher, Shākya mchog ldan earned the distinction of being one of the Sa skya school’s so-called Six Ornaments Beautifying the Snowy Land (gangs can mdzes pa’i rgyan drug)115. He was also among the few Tibetan masters to receive the title Great Master (slob dpon chen po). Such tributes notwithstanding, Shākya mchog ldan’s openly critical comments about the views of such prestigious religious authorities as Tsong kha pa (1357‒1419) and his provocative reappraisals of the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita (1182‒1251)116 his latter-day adherents ensured that he would find few allies among the Dge lugs pa or his own Sa skya pa coreligionists. His outspoken criticism of socalled “modern-day” representatives of various traditions eventually earned him the dubious distinction of being one of Tibet’s most controversial thinkers. Sa skya scholars have tended to maintain high regard for the breadth of Shākya mchog ldan’s scholarship but a critical view of his reappraisals of the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita, his own tradition’s supreme authority and most acclaimed scholar. This together with his treatments of Yogācāra and Gzhan stong views as complementary to or even superior to Madhyamaka and Rang stong views led to the general neglect of his writings within the Sa skya establishment, which generally saw the latter two views as superior to the former. By the same token, these philosophical affiliations and especially Shākya mchog ldan’s unsparing criticisms of the views of Tsong kha pa, founder and supreme authority of the Dge lugs pa tradition, led to more serious reprisals. Long viewed as heretical by Dge lugs pa authorities, his works were, in the seventeenth century, included in a lengthy list of banned publications. 113 This trilogy is critically edited and translated in Volume II of this monograph, 11 ff. 114 The colophon informs us that Ascertaining the Intent of the Supreme Siddhas: A Treatise Called Distinguishing Mahāmudrā, PCgn, SCsb(A) vol. 17, 3464‒3551; SCsb(B) vol. 17, 3761‒3854; SCsb(C) vol. 17, 4572‒4683, was composed in the author’s seventy-sixth year. 115 Komarovski 2011, 3‒4. The other five are G.yag ston sangs rgyas dpal (1348‒1414), Rong ston smra ba’i seng ge (1367‒1449), Ngor can kun dga’ bzang (1382‒1456), Rdo rje ’chang kun dga’ bzang po (1382‒1456), and Rdzog pa kun dga’ rnam rgyal (1432‒1496). These Six Ornaments along with the Five Foremost Venerable Founders (rje btsun gong ma lnga) are considered to be the most important masters of the Sa skya tradition. 116 See Komarovski 2011, 37‒38. 56 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Dge lugs supporters confiscated copies of his writings and sealed the printery in which his blocks were kept, where they remained virtually unavailable for centuries. An exception was one copy of the twenty-four volumes of his Collected Writings which managed to survive in Bhutan thanks to the efforts of the Head Abbot of Bhutan, Shakya Rin chen (1710‒1759) who successfully petitioned the Tibetan Government for permission to obtain a copy of these writings on the pretext of his claim to being a reincarnation of the master.117 Based on this copy, a modern reproduction of Shākya mchog ldan’s works was published by Kunzang Tobgey in Thimphu, Bhutan in 1975 and have since become widely available to scholars. There is also anecdotal evidence that other copies of the master’s writings were preserved in certain Sa skya monastery in Tibet but that they were hardly ever consulted.118 MADHYAMAKA AND THE DIALECTIC OF EMPTINESS: RANG STONG AND GZHAN STONG Yaroslav Komarovski has observed in his Vision of Unity that Shākya mchog ldan’s writings reflected a general Sa skya interpretation of Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka until his late forties, during which time he maintained that the tenet of the Gzhan stong followers “does not surpass the view of Alīkākāravāda even a little”.119 During this earlier period, Shākya mchog ldan also endorsed the Tibetan consensus view that Alīkākāravāda was a Cittamātra subsect, though he would in later years come to regard it as a Gzhan stong Madhyamaka tradition on par with Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka, if not superior to it when it comes to meditation. It is therefore indisputable that Shākya mchog ldan changed some of his early views or, as Komarovski puts it, “broadened” and “clarified” his positions 120. It should also be noted, however, that despite the widely held view that Shākya mchog ldan became a proponent of the Gzhan stong view only in his fifties, certain remarks in his earlier works indicate that in his thirties he already endorsed Gzhan stong as an indispensable Madhyamaka view grounded in the Maitreya texts and their commentaries as well as the tantras. Consider the following quotation from his commentary on Sa skya Paṇḍita’s Mkhas pa la ’jug pa composed when he was thirty-eight years old121: 117 This was noted by Gene Smith in an unpublished article entitled “Banned Books in the Tibetan Speaking Lands”. 118 According to one informant, Ngor Mkhan po Bsod nams rgya mtsho, some copies had been kept in the libraries of the Sa skya monasteries Ngor Ewaṃ Chos ldan and Rta nag Thub bstan rnam rgyal but that hardly anybody took an interest in them. Volker Caumanns, “Tibetan Sources on the Life of Serdog Paṇchen Shākya Chogden,” as quoted in Komarovski 2011, 3 and n. 4, p. 307‒08. 119 Komarovski 2011, 104. 120 Komarovski 2011, 4‒5. 121 This seems to be the basis for the first difference mentioned in Tāranātha’s account of the imagined dialogue between Shākya mchog ldan and Dol po pa in Mathes 2004 (295‒96). 57 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN The identification of the Madhyamaka view is twofold, the Perfections system and Mantra system. The first has two [aspects]: The Rang stong Madhyamaka which takes the middle turning literally, and the Gzhan stong Madhyamaka which takes the third turning literally. As for the first, the classical texts are the reasonings corpus (rigs tshogs) and commentaries by the *Prāsaṅgikas and Svātantrikas which explain them in extenso. As for the second, the classical texts are the Maitreya works and all the commentaries by Asaṅga and his brother that explain them in extenso, as well as the Mantra Madhyamaka. [Now,] concerning [Gzhan stong Madhyamaka], when the extreme of eternalism is refuted, it is not at all the case that the entire spectrum of the conventional would not be explained as self-empty (rang stong). On the side of reasoning by way of study and thinking, the entire spectrum of ultimate truth is also ascertained as being empty of own [essence]. Therefore, the discipline for refuting the reification of all objects of knowledge is indeed exceedingly vast. At the time of meditative equipoise, whether this is explained in a convoluted or straightforward manner by anyone, be they learned or unlearned, there is no other way than identifying the view of Other-emptiness (gzhan stong) as it is taught in precisely these classical texts and their commentaries. 122 The author here presents Gzhan stong as a necessary corollary of Rang stong that becomes indispensable in the context of meditative equipoise when the aspirant is in a position to ascertain and affirm the ultimate. Shākya mchog ldan’s identification of Alīkākāravāda as a Gzhan stong Madhyamaka tradition can be roughly traced to the author’s fiftieth year. This was prior to his becoming a student of the Seventh Karma pa (1454‒1506) who, as Karma phrin las pa (1456‒1539) informs us, upheld the view that there is no contradiction between the Gzhan stong and Rang stong views.123 As Karma phrin las pa describes his teacher Chos grags rgya mtsho’s position: 122 Mkhas pa la ’jug pa’i rnam bshad, SCsb(C) vol. 24, 1142‒1151: dbu ma’i lta ba ngos ’dzin la gnyis te | phar phyin lugs dang sngags lugs so | dang po la gnyis te | ’khor lo bar pa’i sgra ji bzhin pa rang stong gi dbu ma dang | ’khor lo gsum pa’i sgra ji bzhin pa gzhan stong gi dbu ma dag las | dang po ni | gzhung rigs tshogs dang | ’grel ba thal rang du grags pa dag gis rgyas par bshad la | gnyis pa ni | gzhung byams chos dang | ’grel pa thogs med mched kyis rgyas par gang bshad de dag thams cad dang | sngags kyi dbu ma ni rtag pa’i mtha’ ’gog pa’i tshe kun rdzob mtha’ dag rang stong du mi ’chad pa ni gang na yang med la | thos bsam gyi rigs ngor don dam pa’i bden pa mtha’ dag kyang rang stong du gtan la phab pas shes bya mtha’ dag gi steng du rnam rtog gi ’dzin pa ’gog pa la chun shin tu che ba yin mod | sgom byung mnyam gzhag gi tshe na | mkhas mi mkhas su zhig gis ’khyog po dang drang po ji ltar bshad kyang | gzhung ’grel nyid las gsungs pa’i gzhan stong gi lta ba’i ngos ’dzin tshul las gzhan du ’das pa med do | 123 In the extant works of the Seventh Karma pa, difference between Gzhan stong and Rang stong is not explicitly discussed. For a brief presentation of the Seventh Karma pa’s Gzhan stong position according to Karma phrin las pa, see Burchardi 2011, 318‒31. 58 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN The ground of emptiness of gzhan stong is *sugatagarbha, mind’s nature, this very natural luminosity. What it becomes empty of, what is to be relinquished, are the adventitious stains that are referred to as the concepts of the apprehended and the apprehender. Therefore, ultimate truth is nothing but the nature of mind which is free from the concepts of the apprehended and the apprehender. [This], i.e., natural luminosity, unity, coemergence, the inseparability of the expanse and awareness, natural awareness itself, is the profound view of Gzhan stong.” Thus, my teacher explained that “even the so-called Rang stong and Gzhan stong are not incompatible”.124 By the time he met Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho for the first time in 1484 at the age of fifty-six, Shākya mchog ldan had already composed The Ocean of Scriptural Statements and Reasoning125 and Ascertainment of the Dharma Sphere126, two treatises which explicitly characterize the Alīkākāravāda view as Gzhan stong Madhyamaka.127 He had composed these texts in 1477 and 1479 when he was forty-nine and fifty-one respectively.128 In his later works, Shākya mchog ldan emphasized that Nāgārjuna and Maitreya/ Asaṅga, the pioneers of the two Mahāyāna traditions, developed complementary systems of exegesis and praxis. On this view, whether the wayfarer approaches the goal of buddhahood through the nonaffirming Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka system or the affirming Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka system, both offer conceptually-mediated approaches to the same meditative realization of nondual wisdom, the former dispelling reifications of its existence and the latter dispelling reifications of its nonexistence. The key difference between these two traditions, then, is that in post-meditation, the Niḥsvabhāvavāda Mādhyamikas deny that anything “truly established” remains upon realization, whereas the Alīkākāravāda 124 KPdl, 922‒3: stong gzhi bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po ni | | sems nyid rang bzhin ’od gsal ’di nyid yin | | stong byed spang bya glo bur124 dri ma de | | gzung dang ’dzin pa’i rnam rtog ’di la zer | | de phyir gzung ’dzin rnam rtog dang bral ba’i | | sems nyid kho na don dam bden pa ste | | rang bzhin ’od gsal zung ’jug lhan cig skyes | | dbyings rig dbyer med tha mal shes pa nyid | | gzhan stong zab mo’i lta ba yin zhes gsung | | des na rang stong gzhan stong zhes pa yang | | ’gal ba min zhes bdag gi bla ma bzhed | | 125 Theg pa chen po dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i bang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, SCsb vol. 14. This work was written in 1477. 126 Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa chos kyi dbyings rnam par nges pa, SCsb vol. 7. This work, a commentary on the Dharmadhātustava, was written in 1479. 127 Komarovski 2011, 43. 128 Dreyfus 1979, 29 attributes Shākya mchog ldan’s shift from a typical Sa skya Rang stong position to his own distinctive Gzhan stong position to the period after Shākya mchog ldan had met with Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho for the first time. He also points out that Shākya mchog ldan’s Gzhan stong view differed from that of Dol po pa sherab rgyal mtshan (1292‒1361). 59 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Mādhyamikas affirm the realization of the ultimate as stainless nondual wisdom, adding that this nondual wisdom eludes any kind of reasoning based on beliefs such as existence and nonexistence, or truth and falsity.129 Shākya mchog ldan claimed, perhaps most emphatically in his Mahāmudrā trilogy, that since both Rang stong and Gzhan stong depend on reasoning which is conceptual in nature, and since the nondual wisdom of dharmadhātu remains inaccessible to conceptual reflection and thematization, both approaches must ultimately be transcended. That said, the author is careful not to discount their effectiveness for those in the grip of mistaken perceptions and conceptions. In Replies to Queries of Rab dkar, he regards the Rang stong method of employing nonaffirming negation (med par dgag pa) in the phase of studying and thinking as a stepping stone on the path130 to the main practice of realizing unity (yuganaddha). In his Replies to Queries of Bshes gnyen mus pa rab ’byams, Shākya mchog ldan further explains that while the Gzhan stong and Alīkākāra views are relevant to the main practice phase (dngos gzhi) since they commonly endorse a conception of unity that is understood to be “without flaws of contradiction or conflation”, the Rang stong view falls short of the actual view (lta ba dngos) and thus pertains to the preliminary phase (sngon ’gro). Even if this Rang stong view proves indispensable while it is necessary to dispel the poison of total delusion, it is itself said to be “poisoned” in the sense of being conceptually-determined.131 Having explained the Rang stong view as preliminary in the phase of the view, the explanation of unity during the phase of the main practice is as follows. Since this [unity] which is also designated as being “without flaws of contradiction or conflation” is explained as something admissible in Gzhan stong, it is in accord with the Alīkākāra [system]. However, the preparation is said to be Rang stong because although it is not the actual view since it is poisoned [i.e. conceptually fabricated], one cannot do without it in the beginning because it is necessary to dispel the poison of total delusion. To give an example, to reach Vajrāsana [i.e., Bodhgāya, the seat of awakening], it is necessary to first get well-acquainted with the route.132 129 See Komarovski 2011, 74, 86, 172‒73. 130 Rab dkar gyi dris lan, SCsb(C) vol. 23, 4512‒4: “First, these [nonaffirming negation] are sought by means of studying and thinking.” dang po [= med par dgag pa] de dag ni thos bsam gyis btsal ba yin la | 131 See above, 31 et passim. 132 Bshes gnyen mus pa rab ’byams dris lan mthong ba don ldan gyi skor, SCsb(C) vol. 23, 4833‒4835: lta ba’i dus kyi sngon ’gro la rang stong gi lta ba bshad nas | dngos gzhi’i dus su zung ’jug bshad la | ’di yang ’gal ’dus skyon med ces pa’i ming can gzhan stong na chog cig la bshad pas rnam rdzun dang mthun la | sbyor ba rang stong du bzhed kyang | dug dang bcas pas lta ba dngos ma yin kyang thog mar mi dgos ka med yin te | kun tu rmongs pa’i dug sel dgos pa’i phyir | dper na rdo rje’i gdan du sleb pa la thog mar lam ngo shes dgos pa bzhin no | 60 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN As the analogy suggests, the Self-emptiness view may prove useful as a conceptual map to navigate one’s way toward the destination of awakening, but should not be confused with the actual view (lta ba dngos) which the author elsewhere characterizes as “the view grounded in first-hand experience that is the mainspring (gtso bo) of views” (lta ba’i gtso bor gyur pa nyams myong gi lta ba).133 What is at stake here is a difference between a philosophical “view” (lta ba : dṛṣti) in the sense of a doxographic belief-system to which one gives intellectual assent and a prephilosophical “de facto view” (lta ba dngos) grounded in the immediacy of lived experience. For Shākya mchog ldan, the task of the scholar-yogin is to ensure that one’s philosophical view does not lose touch with its prediscursive grounding in first-hand experience. It is precisely because the Gzhan stong and Alīkākāra views take the experience of unity as their point of origin and orientation in the main practice phase that they are deemed to be a step beyond the preliminary stage of negatively determining what is not the goal, namely all the speculations and misconceptions we have about it. It is evident from Shākya mchog ldan’s assessment of Self-emptiness and Otheremptiness that he thinks the Gzhan stong view brings one closer to the unity beyond extremes since it frankly acknowledges the transsubjective sources of morality and meaning that are the final aim of negation or affirmation. However, in his Mahāmudrā writings he argues that since both poles of the negation-affirmation dialectic remain within the horizon of oppositional yet reciprocally determined constructs, they are in this sense both “poisoned” from the vantage point of nondual wisdom, the Mahāmudrā of indivisible unity. On this view, Gzhan stong is accorded a preeminent position in the doxographical universe of exoteric Buddhist philosophical systems since it endorses a unity beyond extremes; yet it is relegated to the exoteric system of severing superimpositions from the perspective of the esoteric Mantra and Mahāmudrā systems of first-hand experience. We can discern in Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā trilogy the extent to which his distinction between the preliminary phase of studying and thinking by means of the dialectic of Self-emptiness and Other-emptiness and the main practice of meditation which realizes the underlying unity turns out to be integral to his philosophical emphasis on the primacy of mahāmudrā and the nondual wisdom with which it is equated. Provocatively, he asserts that the realization of mahāmudrā does not necessarily depend either on preliminary methods of analysis according to Madhyamaka canons of reasoning, nor on the elaborate sequence of 133 In his Rab dkar gyi dris lan, SCsb(C) vol 23, 5114, Shākya mchog ldan uses the term “actual view” (lta ba dngos) or “view based on first-hand experience that is the mainspring of views” (lta ba’i gtso bor gyur pa nyams myong gi lta ba) to demarcate the view of studying and thinking from the view connected with meditating. See above, 48. 61 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN tantric rituals, empowerments, and visualizations, powerful as these may be in cases where such preliminary “purifications” are deemed to be necessary: Moreover, from among the two, the system of severing superimpositions and the system of first-hand experience, this tradition of the [Mahā]mudrā practitioner is the latter. Concerning the former, there are the two great traditions, the system of Self-emptiness and the system of Other-emptiness. However, the [Mahā]mudrā practitioner follows neither. The view of severing superimpositions by means of studying and thinking is taken [by him or her] to be an intellectually fabricated view and a poisoned view. As for the arising of the wisdom of mahāmudrā, it is not asserted that this must unequivocally depend on the bestowal of the higher empowerments, let alone on the logical reasoning of the Madhyamaka.134 The point could scarcely be stated more emphatically: as important and effective as Madhyamaka reasoning and tantric ritualism may be for clearing the myriad obscurations and obstacles that impede the realization of mahāmudrā, neither can be regarded as obligatory for all persons and situations. We will see the extent to which this contrasts with the views of Sa skya Paṇḍita who regarded the sequence of empowerments and mudrās as indispensable to mahāmudrā realization without exception. From Shākya mchog ldan’s perspective, individuals vary tremendously in their interests and abilities and, most importantly, in their relative capacities to recognize the nature of mind. Consequently, there is no single prescribed method of preparation, no master key that fits all the locks, so to say. As for the main practice (dngos gzhi) phase, what triggers the actual realization of mahāmudrā may have much more to do with situational affective and intersubjective dispositions such as devotion and faith (or confidence) than with any prescriptive course of intellectual or ritual preparation. As Shākya mchog ldan explains: “Devotion” means having confidence in the qualities of realization. When this has arisen, self-luminous self-awareness, which one has had since beginningless time, becomes manifest. The great bliss of self-luminous self-awareness has pervaded all [beings] from the very beginning. The different ways of awakening in line with individual capacities are not unequivocally determined.135 At this juncture, it may be helpful to take stock of Shākya mchog ldan’s views of Rang stong and Gzhan stong in relation to other classical and post-classical thinkers. We have seen 134 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 68, critical edition: 83. 135 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 24, critical edition: 33. 62 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN that Shākya mchog ldan accorded high status to the so-called Alīkākāravāda view and that he controversially came to regard it not only as a Gzhan stong view but also as a Madhyamaka tradition par excellence. Shākya mchog ldan’s inclusion of Alīkākāra in the ranks of Madhyamaka traditions did not go unchallenged by Bka’ brgyud pa scholars. As will be discussed in chapter three, the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554) devotes a substantial section of his Madhyamakāvatāra (MA) commentary and other writings to a criticism of this view. To summarize the main lines of his argument, he rejects Shākya mchog ldan’s identification of Alīkākāra with Madhyamaka, as well as his parallel claim that the distinction between Satyākāra and Alīkākāra—i.e., those who believe representations to be true or false, respectively—should be understood as a distinction between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka respectively. According to the Eighth Karma pa, both these claims stand in flagrant contradiction to accepted Buddhist doxography. He argues that the distinction between Satyākāra and Alīkākāra was introduced to demarcate between two strands of Cittamātra philosophy that both took as their doctrinal basis (gzhi) the claim that mind is truly established as ultimate (sems don dam bden grub par ’dod pa gzhir byas) and diverged only on the issue of whether they affirmed or denied the existence of (true) mental representations (rnam pa yod med). As for the basic distinction between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, the Eighth Karma pa maintains that all lines of Cittamātra were said to have been decisively refuted and transcended by Madhyamaka philosophy, most decisively by the Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka-Mahāmudrā system of Maitrīpa and his colleagues that combined the Madhyamaka system of Nāgārjuna with the Mahāmudrā instructions of Saraha and his followers.136 Coming to the nub of his criticism, he states that since the Madhyamaka tradition is by definition a “Middle Way” which avoids the extremes of existence and nonexistence, eternalism and nihilism, it is best characterized as a tradition which has transcended all realist positions, not least of all the Cittamātra viewpoint that mind or wisdom can be truly established as a real entity, and even as ultimate truth.137 Bearing in mind that Mi bskyod rdo rje does not go so far as to dismiss Cittamātra models of mind and reality (he makes liberal use of both in his writings), and that he was a strong proponent of the Maitreya texts, his Madhyamakāvatāra 136 See below, 291‒95. 137 Dwags po grub pa’i shing rta, 218‒11: “Mind Only adherents claim that the factor of mind, knowledge, awareness, intellect, special knowledge, and wisdom—[treated as] synonyms having the same meaning—has the characteristic of the perfect [nature], being a knowable object that is truly established as ultimate. However, if one posits the characteristic of a perfect [nature] as a knowable object in this way, one falls into the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. Hence those who relinquish extremes of eternalism and nihilism and advocate [a view which] has superceded that philosophical system are called Mādhyamikas.”sems tsam pas sems dang shes pa dang rig pa dang blo dang mkhyen pa dang ye shes don gcig ming gi rnam grangs pa zhig don dam bden par grub pa shes bya yongs grub kyi mtshan nyid can du ’dod la | shes bya yongs grub kyi mtshan nyid de ltar ’jog na rtag chad kyi mthar lhung bas rtag chad kyi mtha’ spangs te grub mtha’ de las phul du byung bar smra ba de dbu ma pa’o | | 63 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN commentary nonetheless leaves little doubt that he regards Madhyamaka, especially the *Prāsaṅgika Madhyamka of Nāgārjuna and Apratiṣṭhānavāda Madhyamaka system of Maitrīpa, as the pinnacle of Indian Buddhist philosophies and that, among these, he regards its expositions of emptiness as more lucid (ches gsal) than the rest. 138 Shākya mchog ldan for his part recognized that the *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka method of ascertaining emptiness as a nonaffirming negation through conceptual analysis, which was fast becoming the default philosophical paradigm among his contemporaries, was endangering the necessary balance between negative-intellectual (cataphatic) and affirmative-experiential (apophatic) currents of Buddhist thought and praxis. His persistent concern about the privileging of an intellectual paradigm that systematically denied the validity and existence of the very modes of awareness (such as buddhajñāna) that had traditionally been regarded as the source and goal of the Buddhist path goes a long way toward accounting for his own endorsement of a cataphatic Gzhan stong approach to goalrealization that gives primacy to personally realized nondual wisdom. His position is well summarized by a statement in his Abhisamayālaṃkāra commentary (written at age seventyone) concerning the practice of deep insight (lhag mthong : vipaśyanā): “When the abiding mode as the aim of investigation is taken as a nonaffirming negation, it is designated as ‘a seeing that doesn’t see anything’, and when it is identified as the wisdom of emptiness, it is the ‘authentic unmediated seeing’ which is ‘personally realized wisdom’. 139 Put simply, the reconciliation and transcendence of the negative and positive determinations are both realized in the unity of nondual wisdom. In the polemically impassioned intellectual climate of his age, Shākya mchog ldan’s emphasis on recovering a unity beyond negative and positive determinations could not avoid sharp opposition from both sides of the spectrum. From one side, Rang stong *PrāsaṅgikaMadhyamaka proponents of emptiness as a nonaffirming negation rejected his Gzhan-stongoriented affirmation of nondual wisdom as Cittamātra-based hypostatization of the mental. 138 Dwags po grub pa’i shing rta, 416‒20: “The extensive doctrinal systems on emptiness, are found in the precious scriptures of the Madhyamaka and Cittamātra of Mahāyāna as well as in the countless tantras. But among all these, the vast range of teachings commentaries of the Madhyamaka are found to be far more lucid [than the rest] because, by teaching an emptiness that leaves behind not even the slightest remainder of discursive elaborations and characteristics, this tradition takes the emptiness that remains to be fully comprehensive in scope.” stong pa nyid kyi chos tshul rgyas pa ni theg chen dbu sems kyi gsung rab rin po che dang | rgyud sde mtha’ yas par bzhugs pa yin la | de’i nang nas kyang dbu ma’i bka’ bstan bcos mtha’ dag tu ches gsal bar bzhugs pa yin te | lugs ’dir spros mtshan gyi lhag ma cung zad kyang ma lus par stong nyid du bstan nas stong pa nyid kyi lus yongs su rdzogs par mdzad pa’i phyir | 139 Mngon par rtogs pa’i rgyan ’grel pa don gsal ba dang bcas pa’i rnam par bshad pa shing rta’i srol gnyis gcig tu bsdus pa’i lam po che, 1082‒3: “When the abiding mode that is the object of investigation is taken as a nonaffirming negation, it is designated as “a seeing that doesn’t see anything”. When it is identified as the wisdom of emptiness, it is an authentic direct seeing, which is the “personally realized wisdom”. rnam par brtags pa’i don gnas lugs med dgag la byas pa’i tshe | ci yang ma mthong ba la mthong ba’i ming gis btags pa dang | stong pa nyid kyi ye shes la ngos bzung ba’i tshe mngon sum du mthong ba mtshan nyid pa ste | so sor rang rig pa’i ye shes so | See Komarovski 2011, 271. 64 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN From the opposite side, Gzhan stong Jo nang proponents of a permanent metaphysical reality beyond temporality and dependent arising discounted his view of a momentary, impermanent wisdom, an idea we will examine shortly. To these opposed views we can add the criticisms of those such as the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje who were certainly in sympathy with Shākya mchog ldan’s avoidance of eternalistic or nihilistic strains of Tibetan Buddhist thought but who would nonetheless allege that his anti-metaphysical critique did not go far enough since it still complied with the Cittamātra absolutization of the cognitive factor.140 We have seen that a cornerstone of Shākya mchog ldan’s philosophy is the view that the Rang stong ascertainment of the ultimate through reasoning that establishes emptiness as a nonaffirming negation should be regarded only as a preliminary method of eradicating reifications and should not be taken as an end in itself. To take the elimination of obscurations as the final goal is to absurdly preclude the blossoming of wisdom and qualities that such purification is supposed to enable, at least according to tantric, Tathāgatagarbha and Siddha traditions. In Shākya mchog ldan’s word’s, “In the classical texts of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda, it is asserted that all phenomena are empty of an own-essence and that settling one-pointedly in this emptiness is wisdom. I would say this is like calling a mother a ‘barren woman’.”141 The analogy is clear: to regard the wisdom of goal-realization as a sheer absence (nothing whatsoever) misses out on its naturally occuring fecundity and dynamism. It should be clear by now that the author’s assessment of the Gzhan stong position is more complex and nuanced than his account of Rang stong. On the one hand, he approved of Gzhan stong’s positive appraisal of the ultimate, but on the other hand, rejected the tendency among its most influential proponents toward the extreme of existence or absolutism. In this regard, he was inclined, particularly in his Mahāmudrā works, to parameterize both Rang stong and Gzhan stong as dialectical positions to be transcended. To better understand this critical stance toward Gzhan stong, it may be useful to consider how he diverged from the most influential Gzhan stong paradigm of his day, that of the Jo nang system.142 The principal points of divergence are discernable in his accounts of the Yogācāra theory of three natures (trisvabhāva) and the general Buddhist theory of two truths (satyadvaya). THE THREE NATURES (TRISVABHĀVA) In line with the trisvabhāva theory as presented in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (MS) and Madhyāntavibhāga (MAV), Shākya mchog ldan maintains that the dependent (paratantra) 140 Mi bskyod rdo rje’s arguments are summarized below, 287 f. 141 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 40, critical edition: 46. 142 See Mathes 2004 for an illuminating comparison between the buddha nature interpretations of Dol po pa and Shākya mchog ldan. 65 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN nature is empty of the imagined (parakalpita) nature is the perfect (pariniṣpanna) nature. The object of refutation (dgag bya) is thus the imagined nature, or dualistic appearances, corresponding to the basis of negation according to the Niḥsvabhāvavāda view that conventional phenomena are nonarisen and thus self-empty. The basis of negation of emptiness is the dependent nature in which dualistic appearances operate, and the way in which this is empty of the imagined is the other-emptiness which constitutes the perfect nature or the absolute. However, the view of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292‒1361), which reflects more closely the Tathāgatagarbha theory as presented for example in the Bṛhaṭṭīkā, defines the perfect nature as the emptiness of the imagined and dependent natures.143 The difference between these two models is that the Yogācāra system distinguishes three natures, whereas the Jo nang Tathāgatagarbha model only discerns the perfect and the imagined nature. On this view, since the dependent nature is included in the object of refutation (dgag bya), there is in the final analysis no difference between the imagined and dependent natures.144 Shākya mchog ldan rejects the Jo nang model both on doxographical and logical grounds. As for the first, the Jo nang explanation of the perfect nature as the basis of negation and of the other two natures as the object of negation does not reflect the central Yogācāra view since it collapses the imagined and dependent natures into a single object of refutation and hence ends up being a two nature theory. As for the logical reason for rejecting the Jo nang model, Shākya mchog ldan argues that it relies on an invalid syllogism. According to Buddhist logic, a syllogism must have a subject (dharmin), a probandum or predicate to be proven (sādhyadharma), and a reason (liṅga). To take the classic example, in proving the thesis “sound is impermanent”, one must first establish the subject ‘sound’, then the predicate to be proven ‘impermanent’, and the reason ‘because it is produced’. One mark of an invalid syllogism is to import the probandum into the subject, e.g., “impermanent sound” and take that as the starting point; the proof is illegitimately included in the subject of the proof, thus presupposing what is supposed to be proven. This is considered to be the flaw in Dol po pa’s thesis that the perfect nature is empty of the imagined and dependent natures. By taking the perfect nature as the basis of emptiness (stong gzhi), Dol po pa establishes the subject (perfect nature) and the predicate to be proven (empty of imagined and dependent natures) at the same time, thus accepting in advance what the syllogism is supposed to establish. In Shākya mchog ldan’s words: “As for invalidating [this thesis]: if the reasoning that establishes emptiness has to establish emptiness of the imagined and dependent [natures] at the same time as the perfect [nature], which is the subject [of the syllogism], then it absurdly follows that the predicate to be proven [probandum] is 143 Komarovski 2011, 128‒29 and n. 57, 351. 144 Interestingly, this is similar to Candrakīrti’s view on the three natures in Madhyamakāvarabhāṣya on MA VI.96 66 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN already established at the time of determining the subject which is the basis of the argument. On the other hand, there could exist a correct reasoning which establishes the probandum without [pre]determining the subject, which is the basis of the argument.”145 In other words, one could establish the emptiness of the dependent and imagined nature without presupposing in advance a metaphysical ground (of emptiness) that is empty of these. This seems difficult to reconcile with the standard Tathāgatagarbha formulation that buddha nature is empty of adventitious stains. Yet, as Shākya mchog ldan argues on the basis of the Yogācāra theory of the three natures, it is not appropriate to interpret the dependent nature as self-empty, because its nature is the perfect nature which is other-empty.146 Hence, he maintains that while the dependent nature, consisting in states of mind in which dualistic appearances operate, are unreal and nonexistent, they do not lack an own nature, because their actual nature is the perfect nature. Denying their actual nature is thus tantamount to a denial of the perfect nature and is therefore at odds with the basic Gzhan stong position.147 In his One Hundred and Eight Dharmas, Shākya mchog ldan starts with the Cittamātra premise that all appearances are nothing but consciousness. The perfect nature which is the essence of consciousness in turn ‘seals’ all phenomena. Maitreya in this way considers the perfect nature to be the basis for all qualities. 148 We have given some idea of the extent to which Shākya mchog ldan’s Gzhan stong Madhyamaka-based account of the three natures diverged from that of Dol po pa. A number of parallel differences are discernable in his assessment of Gzhan stong and Rang stong views concerning the two truths. THE TWO TRUTHS (SATYADVAYA) While Dol po pa draws a clear line between conventional and ultimate truth, and between consciousness and wisdom, characterizing them as polar opposites like darkness and light, nectar and poison, or two different great kingdoms149, Shākya mchog ldan emphasizes 145 See Komarovski 2011, 353, n. 74: gnod byed ni stong nyid sgrub byed kyi rigs pas chos can yongs grub kyi steng du dgag chos kun btags dang gzhan dbang gis stong par sgrub dgos na rtsod gzhi’i chos can nges pa’i dus su bsgrub bya grub zin par thal ba dang | yang na rtsod gzhi’i chos can ma nges par bsgrub bya sgrub pa’i gtan tshigs yang dag srid par ’gyur ro | (translation our own) 146 Komarovski 2011, 134, and n. 75, 353. 147 Komarovski 2011, 134. 148 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 3066‒3071: “All appearances do not exist as something other than consciousness [and] the essence of consciousness is the perfect nature by which all objects of knowledge are sealed. Maitreya, [thus] considers the perfect nature itself to be the basis of all qualities ....” snang ba kun | | rnam rig tsam las gzhan yod min | | rnam rig ngo bo yongs grub kyis | | shes bya kun la rgyas ’debs byed | | rje btsun byams pas yongs grub nyid | | yon tan kun gyi rten yin par | | dgongs nas … 149 See Stearns 2010, 106‒10. 67 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN that the two truths or realities and their associated modes of cognition are neither the same nor different. For them to be the same or different they would each have to possess an intrinsic essence (rang gi ngo bo : svabhāva), an individuating principle that makes them what they are: “Conventional [phenomena] are self-empty (rang stong) and thus without essence, while the ultimate truth does not exist as a real existent and hence is [likewise] without essence.” 150 In this regard, he rejects the Dge lugs pa theory that the two truths are “two delimitations of a single essence” (ngo bo gcig la ldog pa tha dad), that the conventional and ultimate truths inhere separately in one and the same object. As he explains, “‘delimitation’ (ldog pa) is synonymous with ‘other-exclusion’ (gzhan sel : anyāpoha)... [and] to that extent, a sprout and its ultimate reality are not established as different.”151 To put it simply, although conceptions of conventional and ultimate truth are arrived at through conceptual delimitation—excluding in each case what they are not—there is no intrinsic difference between conventional phenomena and their ultimate nature. They are both equally devoid of intrinsic essence. Shākya mchog ldan also rejects the opposite Jo nang thesis that the two truths consists in a “difference that negates identity” (gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad), that the two truths represent separate spheres or “great kingdoms” (rgyal khams chen po) that have “nothing to do with each other” (Jo nang pa).152 Against this view, and in line with well-known arguments against identity and difference advanced in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra (SNS), he contends that if the two truths were different, it would absurdly follow that [1] the ultimate truth would not be the true nature of the conventional, [2] superimpositions would not be eradicated when the ultimate is realized, [3] that which is not found by analyzing the conventional is not ultimate truth, and [4] afflictions and purifications would be simultaneous. As for the identity thesis, he argues that it would entail the four absurdities that [1] when the conventional is seen, the ultimate is seen as well, [2] just as afflictions increase when one focuses on the conventional, they would likewise do so when one focuses on the ultimate, [2] there would be no ultimate to seek apart from the conventional, and [4] just as the conventional is discursive (spros bcas), the ultimate would be discursive as well.153 To validate his conception of a middle path that 150 Dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi dbang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, SCsb(A) vol. 15, 313: kun rdzob rnams ni rang stong yin pas ngo bo med la | don dam pa’i bden pa ni dngos por med pa’i phyir | ngo bo med do | 151 Ibid., SCsb(A) vol. 15, 324‒325: ldog pa zhes pa ni gzhan sel gyi ming gi rnam grangs yin la | … de tsam gyis myu gu dang de’i don dam bden pa tha dad du mi ’grub ste | … 152 For Bka’ brgyud refutations of the Dge lugs and Jo nang versions of these theories, see Mi bskyod rdo rje’s Dwags brgyud grub pa’i shing rta, 27612 ff. and 2922 ff. and below, 311 f. For Padma dkar po’s criticisms of these traditions, see below, 385 f. 153 See Dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi dbang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, SCsb(A) vol. 15, 336‒ 342 where Shākya mchog ldan summarizes arguments from the SNS: “Difference and identity each entail four fallacies. Regarding the first, it would absurdly follow that [1] the ultimate truth would not be the true nature of the conventional, [2] superimpositions would not be eradicated when the ultimate is realized, [3] that which is not found by analyzing the conventional is not ultimate truth, and [4] afflictions and purifications would be 68 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN avoids extremes of identity and difference, he quotes a passage from the SNS which states that “the characteristic of the conditioned realm and ultimate truth is the characteristic of being free from identity and difference. Those who conceive of them as either the same or different have succumbed to unfounded [speculation].”154 In his late commentary on the definitive meaning of the Ratnagotravibhāga, Shākya mchog ldan argues that consciousness is not validly established and hence does not exist, although it is postulated as existing on the basis of delusion.155 In this regard, he maintains that consciousness which deals with conventional phenomena and wisdom which cognizes the ultimate are radically different. Yet in his view, although they are incommensurable, having no common denominator (gzhi mthun), and are as distinct from one another as clouds and the sky or patina and gold156, they are nonetheless discernable as concurrent and interactive modes of cognition; each instance of consciousness is said to have an inwardoriented aspect of wisdom, even though “it is impossible for the clarity factor of wisdom to become the essence of consciousness and vice versa”: Among the whole spectrum of delusory phenomena of consciousness, each instance has the factor of inward-looking wisdom. However, it is impossible for the clarity factor of wisdom to become the essence of consciousness, and vice versa. Otherwise, it would absurdly follow that wisdom is the experiencer of joys and sorrows of worldly existence. It would also absurdly follow that those unreal reifications that are named “consciousness” are the basis of accomplishing the full simultaneous. Four fallacies are [likewise] ascribed to identity: It would absurdly follow that: [1] when the conventional is seen, the ultimate is seen as well; [2] just as afflictions increase when one focuses on the conventional, they would likewise do so when one focuses on the ultimate; [2] there would be no ultimate to search for apart from the conventional and [4] just as the conventional is has discursive elaborations, the ultimate would have elaborations as well.” tha dad pa la skyon bzhi | gcig pa la skyon bzhi | dang po ni | don dam bden pa kun rdzob kyi chos nyid ma yin par thal ba dang | don dam rtogs pas snang pa la sgro ’dogs mi chod par thal ba | kun rdzob rigs pas ma rnyed pa nyid don dam ma yin par thal ba | kun nas nyon mongs pa dang rnam par byang ba dus gcig tu thal pa’o | | gcig pa la brjod pa’i skyon bzhi ni | kun rdzob mthong ba na don dam mthong par ’gyur ba dang | kun rdzob la dmigs nas nyon mongs ’phel ba bzhin du don dam la dmigs nas kyang der ’gyur ba dang | kun rdzob las logs su don dam btsal du med par ’gyur ba dang | kun rdzob spros bcas yin pa bzhin du don dam yang spros bcas su thal ba rnams so | | 154 Dbu ma rnam par nges pa’i chos kyi dbang mdzod lung dang rigs pa’i rgya mtsho, SCsb(A) vol. 15, 335‒6: gnyis pa lung gi sgrub byed ni | mdo sde dgongs ’grel las | ’du byed khams dang don dam mtshan nyid ni | | gcig dang tha dad bral ba’i mtshan nyid do | | gcig dang tha dad nyid du gang rtog pa | | de dag tshul bzhin ma yin zhug pa yin | | zhes gsungs so | See also Lamotte (ed.) 1935, 47. See also Mathes 2008, 79 and n. 420. 155 Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma, SCsb(A) vol. 13, 1216‒1221: “In general, even though consciousness is not validly established, it is accorded the superimposition of existence on account of delusion. So there is no need to even speak about awareness for it is not accorded existence [at all] because it is precisely conventional truth.” spyir rnam shes ni tshad mas mi ’grub kyang | ’khrul pas yod par sgro btags pa nyid du khas len gyi | rig pa lta ci smos | yod par kyang khas mi len te | kun rdzob bden pa nyid kyi phyir ro | 156 Although patina (oxidation) does not occur on pure gold, it may form on alloys. 69 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN range of immaculate qualities. In the absence of primordial wisdom, adventitious consciousness does not arise as delusory appearances. Nonetheless, the possibility of a common ground of these two is not accepted because they are similar to clouds in the sky, patina on gold, and turbidity in clear water. 157 We may conclude that consciousness and wisdom are concurrent but nonconvergent modes of cognition; they do not blend with one another. As the author here intimates, they stand to one another in a relationship of asymmetrical ontological priority according to which wisdom is the condition of possibility of consciousness but not the reverse. Each instance of consciousness has within it the clarity aspect of wisdom which, however, does not partake of the nature of consciousness. This account reflects the Alīkākāravāda emphasis on the primacy of nondual wisdom within the framework of consciousness. The acuteness of the distinction between them also resonates to some extent with the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā differentiation between consciousness and wisdom, though the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje, as we will later see, accused Shākya mchog ldan’ and his disciples of inconsistency in this regard. The Karma pa objects that whereas Shākya mchog ldan claims in his Cakrasaṃvara Commentary that consciousness arises as the clarity factor of wisdom, his disciple Paṇ chen Rdo rje rgyal ba conversely claims that wisdom arises as the clarity factor of consciousness. 158 The sharpness of the distinction between wisdom and consciousness also invites comparison with the Jo nang view that posits the two as mutually exclusive, the former being truly established, permanent, ultimate, and beyond dependent rising and the three times (past, present and future)159 and the latter being adventitious, impermanent, conventional, and 157 Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don snon med nyi ma, SCsb vol. 13(A), 121: rnam shes ’khrul pa’i chos ji snyeda pa la nang blta ye shes kyi cha re re yod kyang | ye shes kyi gsal cha rnam shes kyi ngo bor ’gyur srid pa dang cig shos kyang der ’gyur srid pa ni ma yin te gzhan du na | ye shes srid pa’i bde sdug myong ba por thal ba dang | rnam shes kyi ming can yang dag pa ma yin pa’i kun tu rtog pa de dag zag med kyi yon tan mtha’ dag gi sgrub gzhi nyid du thal bar ’gyur pa’i phyir ro | | gdod ma’i ye shes de med par glo bur gyi rnam shes ’khrul snang du mi ’byung mod | gnyis po’i gzhi mthun srid par ’dod pa ni ma yin te | nam mkha’ la sprin dang | gser la g.ya’ dang | chu dangs ba la rnyog pa bzhin no | atext has nyid See Komarovski 2011, 239‒40. (translation our own) 158 See below, 297‒300, where Mi bskyod rdo rje assesses various mutually contradictory positions on the consciousness and wisdom relationship by Shākya mchog ldan and his disciples. A note on the relevant section of Mi bskyod rdo rje’s Rgan po’i rlung sman adds that “the teacher Shākya mchog ldan had asserted in his Cakrasaṃvara Commentary (Bde mchog rnam bshad) that consciousness (rnam shes) arises as the clarity factor (dvangs cha) of wisdom whereas his student Paṇ chen Rdo rgyal ba (a.k.a. Rdo rje rgyal mtshan, b. 15 th c.) asserted that wisdom is the clarity factor of consciousness. “Hence, the positions subscribed to by these two, master and disciple, are [as] opposed as East and West.” bla ma paṇ chen śaka mchog pas ni bde mchog gi rnam bshad du ye shes kyi dvangs cha la rnam shes ’char ba dang | bla ma paṇ chen rdor rgyal ba ni rnam shes kyi dvangs cha ye shes su smra ’dug pas | dpon slob gnyis kha ltar phyogs shar nub ’dzol ’dug go | | 159 See for example Tāranātha’s Zab don nyer gcig pa, Collected Works vol. 18, 2133‒4: “[Opponent:] It is said that nondual wisdom is momentary awareness, i.e., it is not permanent, and without any possibility for abiding. [Tāranātha:] That [wisdom] is not momentary. Since it is beyond the three times [past, present and future] it is 70 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN dependently arisen and time-bound.160 A key point of divergence, however, lies in Shākya mchog ldan’s contention (examined below) that wisdom is momentary and also impermanent in the specific sense that only the present moment can be said to exist but this is “instantaneously disintegrating”. Thus wisdom is in Shākya mchog ldan’s eyes not permanent and certainly not atemporal since it is itself simply the streaming present. All that said, wisdom is, in Shākya mchog ldan’s view unconditioned in that it shares no common ground with karma and the afflictions, and given that moments are not triggered by any causes and conditions independent of mind’s nature. It may be concluded that he on the one hand grants that wisdom must be accepted as impermanent on the ultimate level because as a real existent (dngos po) it is instantaneously disintegrating (skad cig gyis ’jig pa). Yet, he can on the other hand maintain that wisdom may conventionally be taken as permanent in the specific sense of having ‘continuity’ (rgyun) with the proviso that this is only a conventional designation, used, in contradistinction to impermanence, to ascribe permanence to a real existent such as wisdom whose continuity is uninterrupted (rgyun mi ’chad pa yi dngos po).161 Holding to a middle path that avoids interpreting the two truths as the same or different, Shākya mchog ldan arrives at the central philosophy of Buddhist tantrism and the Dwags po Mahāmudrā tradition: the inseparable unity of the conventional and ultimate. In the context of Sa skya Lam ’bras and Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā practices, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, and the conventional and ultimate truths are found to be inseparable. In his Discussions in the Presence of Mkha’ spyod dbang po addressed to the Fourth Zhwa dmar Chos grags ye shes (1453‒1542),162 Shākya mchog ldan proclaims that Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā and Sa skya tantric Lam ’bras teachings commonly emphasize the inseparability of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa: Here on this Snowy Plateau, the indistinguishability of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa which is emphasized by the Sa skya pas and the Mahāmudrā of Zla ’od gzhon nu [Sgam po pa] are the same in meaning despite being given different names. The object of realization (rtogs bya) is the unity of clarity and emptiness, the process of realization (rtogs byed) is realization through empowerment rituals and the Bla ma’s blessings… In short, because there are no other phenomena besides the lucid awareness—an experience that is empty of all concepts—this ‘Seal’ (phyag rgya : mudrā) is described as “Great” (chen po : mahā). When not realized, there is permanent and lasting.” gnyis med ye shes de rig pa skad cig ma yin | rtag pa min | gnas pa’i go skabs med pa cig yin gsung | de skad cig ma ma yin | dus gsum las grol bas rtag pa brtan pa yin gsung | 160 See Padma dkar po’s synopsis of this system in Volume II, translation: 157‒69. 161 Komarovski 2011, 231 and 380, n. 38. 162 Mkha’ spyod dbang po’i spyan drung du ’bul ba’i mol mchid, SCsb(B) vol. 17, 5244: ces chos rjes zhwa dmar pa’i ka’ shog gi lan du phul ba’o | 71 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN saṃsāra, and when realized, there is nirvāṇa. Because one does not observe anything apart from these, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are inseparable.163 In a reply to queries by Bshes gnyen Mus pa rab ’byams, he expresses the view most succinctly by stating that “in the main practice phase, the view is characterized as ‘unity’”.164 We are now in a position to look more closely at how Shākya mchog ldan frames the Rang stong and Gzhan stong positions in relation to the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā views and meditation. It is clear that he regarded the Mahāmudrā tradition’s emphasis on firsthand experience (nyams myong) and direct perception (mngon sum) as a decisive step beyond the more theory-bound Rang stong and Gzhan stong positions, which tended to be, at least when appropriated as oppositional doxographical categories, mutually implicated in a dialectic of denial or affirmation. By contrast, the Mahāmudrā tradition is seen as a path beyond affirmation and negation, existence and nonexistence. According to Shākya mchog ldan’s Undermining the Haughtiness, Sgam po pa taught a view that did not take Nāgārjuna’s method of severing elaborations or Asaṅga’s method of ending dualistic thoughts as compulsory for the most suitable recipient. Moreover, he cautions that a Mantrayāna attainment of mahāmudrā unsupported by the genuine experience of self-luminous self-awareness runs the risk of deviation (gol sa). As he explains: If one does not arrive at a genuine experience of self-luminous self-awareness, which is of definitive meaning, and realizes mahāmudrā based on the Mantra[yāna], there is the danger of falling into deviations. Thus, when mahāmudrā, which is the pervasive factor that runs through everything, is realized as [explained] previously, one should examine whether the realization of it is stable or unstable. When it is unstable, it is not incongruous to familiarize oneself with the methods of ending dualistic [thoughts and] discursive elaborations as taught by the two charioteers [Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga]. However, those with diligence who have the inclination to leave behind these very [methods] which [they already] understood previously may correctly familiarize themselves [with mind’s true nature in meditation] and familiarize themselves with the state of not grasping 163 Mkha’ spyod dbang po’i spyan drung du ’bul ba’i mol mchid, SCsb(C) vol. 17, 6294‒6301: gangs can ljong ’dir sa skya pas | | rtsal bton ’khor ’das dbyer med dang | | zla ’od gzhon nu’i phyag rgya che | | ming ’dogs ma gtogs don gcig nyid | | rtogs bya gsal stong zung ’jug de | | rtogs byed dbang gi cho ga dang | | bla ma’i byin brlabs kyis rtogs pa’o | | … | | mdor na rtog pa thams cad kyis | | stong pa’i myong ba gsal rig tsam | | ma gtogs chos gzhan med pa’i phyir | | phyag rgya ’di nyid chen por brjod | | ma rtogs tshe na ’khor ba dang | | rtogs tshe mya ngan ’das pa yang | | ’di las gzhan pa ma dmigs phyir | | ’khor ’das dbye ba med de yin | | 164 Bshes gnyen mus pa rab ’byams dris lan mthong ba don ldan gyi skor, SCsb(C) vol 23, 4833: lta ba … | dngos gzhi’i dus su zung ’jug bshad la | 72 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN things by means of concepts the appearances of manifold dependent arising in post-meditation. That is said to be the main point of this [Dwags po Mahāmudrā] teaching.165 With regard to the Rang stong or Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka system, it would be a serious error in Shākya mchog ldan’s eyes to either identify the nonaffirming negation of not finding anything upon analysis as mahāmudrā itself or to promote it as a necessary ‘upgrade’ to the Mahāmudrā view. This would contradict both the Ratnagotravibhāga and Saraha. “If you claim that mahāmudrā is a nonaffirming negation [deduced by] not finding anything by searching, this contradicts the Uttaratantra scripture as well as the works of Saraha. When the searching consciousness has not found anything by means of reasoning, the wisdom that is left behind as the remainder is identified as mahāmudrā.”166 Shākya mchog ldan elsewhere maintains that the very idea of unity—a cornerstone of the Dwags po Mahāmudrā teachings—is not attested within the orthodox Rang stong tradition, but rather had its inception in the Gzhan stong system. He adds that the luminosity taught in the Pañcakrama is also not in line with the Rang stong approach, nor is this tantra’s claim that adamantine nature of mind is of definitive meaning.167 It is in view of such considerations that Shākya mchog ldan aligns the Dwags po Mahāmudrā more closely with the Gzhan stong than the Rang stong tradition. That said, he does, in another Mahāmudrā text, grant that although what is experienced as a result of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka is not in accord with the root Mahāmudrā scriptures, “it is nonetheless acceptable to ascribe the ‘ascertainment of freedom from extremes leading to assimilation as unity’ explained in that [system] to this Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition”.168 As for the Gzhan stong- or Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka approach, emptiness is seen as the real (i.e. efficacious) existent of an affirming negation (ma yin par dgags pa’i dngos po) and can therefore be experienced directly in meditation. 169 Yet, this Gzhan stong 165 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 16, critical edition: 28. 166 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 26, critical edition: 34. 167 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan lta ba so so’i ngos ’dzin tshul nges don gnad kyi lde mig, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1044‒5: “In brief, within the orthodox (lhad med) Rang stong, the designation “unity” does not exist. Unity has its inception in the Gzhan stong system. Moreover the luminosity in the Five Stages (Pañcakrama) cannot be explained in line with the Rang stong texts. That which is the “vajra of mind” is explained in that [Pañcakrama] as being of definitive meaning.” mdor na rang stong lhad med la | zung ’jug zhes bya’i tha snyad med | | zung ’jug gzhan stong lugs las ’byung | | rim lnga pa yi ’od gsal yang | | rang stong gzhung bzhin ’chad mi nus | | sems kyi rdo rje gang yin pa | | de la nges pa’i don du bshad | | 168 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 51, critical edition: 74. 169 Komarovski 2011, 178. 73 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Madhyamaka approach falls short of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā as well170 since it requires the analytical steps of establishing the lack of intrinsic essence of outer objects, determining them to be but appearances of mind, and establishing that the inner apprehender (subject) doesn’t have any basis either. It now becomes understandable why Shākya mchog ldan assigns Gzhan stong a lower position in his Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā writings than in his other writings where he is more inclined to regard it as an experience-based meditation practice that is fully in line with the goal of unity of appearance and emptiness. From the Mahāmudrā perspective, the reasoning that establishes an absolute which is empty of the adventitious obscurations but not empty of buddha qualities has the clear advantage of endorsing a positive appraisal of the ultimate that draws attention to the actual dynamism and fecundity of lived experience in its most originary condition. Yet it stops short of the experience itself since the conceptual methods it employs keep it locked into a dialectic of reciprocal negation with those of the Rang stong position. In sum, it is evident that although Shākya mchog ldan was inclined, in some of his Buddhist philosophical writings, to treat Niḥsvabhāvavāda and the Alīkākāravāda on relatively equal terms, as self-sufficient philosophical tenets leading to an ultimate realization that is beyond the conceptual formulations of these tenets,171 there are clear indications that Shākya mchog ldan elsewhere, and perhaps most markedly in his Mahāmudrā works, not only ranked the affirmative Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka higher than the negative Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka but also framed both as stepping stones on the path of preliminary philosophical therapeutics to a higher unity that transcends the negative-affirmative dialectic altogether. Let us now turn our attention to Shākya mchog ldan’s position regarding the relationship between buddha nature and Mahāmudrā and then look at the complex views of buddha nature out of which this position evolved. MAHĀMUDRĀ AND BUDDHA NATURE For Shākya mchog ldan, Mahāmudrā and Tathāgatagarbha discourses similarly build on the premise that the nature of mind or buddha nature is both the condition of possibility of goal-realization and that which the Buddhist path progressively reveals. In a general sense, this disclosive paradigm is identified by Shākya mchog ldan as the doctrinal nucleus shared by Tathāgatagarbha discourses of the third dharmacakra, the Maitreya texts, the tantras, and 170 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 52, critical edition: 75. “In short, [mahāmudrā] is ascertained simply as the modes of abiding (gnas lugs), emptiness (stong lugs) and realization (rtogs lugs) that are of definitive meaning as these are found in the tantra corpus, the Maitreya works, and the Dohā Trilogy. It was in this sense that previous teachers of the Mudrā [tradition] used the designation mahāmudrā.]. In that instance, this was definitely asserted in the statement that [mahāmudrā] is similar to the Self-sufficient White Remedy.” 171 This is a point emphasized by Komarovski 2011, 272. 74 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN the Mahāmudrā discourses of the siddhas. The state of research on Shākya mchog ldan’s buddha nature view has advanced considerably in recent years with Yaroslav Komarovski’s translation and analysis of two of his short treatises on buddha nature 172 and Kazuo Kano’s analysis of his buddha nature position vis-à-vis that of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab which contains useful classifications of Tibetan buddha nature views as presented in two of Shākya mchog ldan’s Reply to Queries texts. Replies to Queries of Blo mchog pa173 and Replies to Queries of Mus rab ’byams pa.174 Our attention in the present chapter is focused on the relationship Shākya mchog ldan draws between Tathāgatagarbha and Mahāmudrā views in his Mahāmudrā trilogy as seen in light of his own rather complex views of buddha nature. To gain a preliminary sense of how Shākya mchog ldan understood and articulated this relationship, let us examine in some detail a passage from the first work in his Mahāmudrā trilogy, Undermining the Haughtiness. Shākya mchog ldan begins by stating that “the element which is buddha nature (*sugatagarbha) has been given the name mahāmudrā”.175 He then explains that mahāmudrā is the element of both sentient beings and buddhas, and is what the tantras describe as the continuum (rgyud) of ground, path, and fruition. The author then equates mahāmudrā with [1] “mind’s luminous nature” as distinguished from ordinary mind in the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra (ASP), [2] the beginningless element (dhātu) characterized as the source of all phenomena in the Abhidharmasūtra, [3] the purity of mind which is said in the Ratnagotravibhāga to be the founding basis of all unfounded mental engagements (ayoniśomanasikāra)176 due to deluded perceptions, and [4] mind as such which Saraha’s Dohākoṣa declares to be the seed of everything (saṃsāra and nirvāṇa) and a supreme wish-fulfilling gem since it grants all the fruits of one’s desires. When the meaning of the 172 Translations of these two works—the Sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i rnam bshad mdo rgyud snying po, SCsb(A), vol. 13, 124–136 and Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma, ibid., vol. 13, 113–124—are included in Komarovski 2006. This also provides a useful listing of more than twenty texts of different genres by Shākya mchog ldan that discuss buddha nature. One of the latest of these was a Cakrasaṃvara commentary Bde mchog rnam bshad dpal dang po'i sangs rgyas rab tu grub pa (SCsb vol. 8, 1‒193) which Shākya mchog ldan composed at the age of seventy-seven (1504), three years before his death. This work appears to have met with critical reception since he also composed a short reply to objections concerning this text (Dang po’i sangs rgyas grub pa’i gzhung gi brgal lan). This text’s buddha nature theory was also the subject of a critical review by the Eighth Karma pa, on which see chapter three. 173 Blo mchog pa’i dri lan, SCsb(C) vol. 17, 739‒57. 174 These two works—Blo mchog pa’i dri lan, SCsb(C) vol. 17, 739‒57 and Mus rabs 'byams pa'i dris lan, in SCsb(C), vol. 23, 5356‒5515 (in Rab dkar gyi dris lan, ibid., 391‒630)—are examined in Kano 2006, 235‒36 which came to our attention only after completing a draft of this chapter. We are most grateful to the author for kindly clarifying the different positions outlined in this work and in his latest research during his tenure as Numata visiting professor at the University of Vienna. See also Kano 2006, 235‒49 for a comparative overview of Shākya mchog ldan’s Tathāgatagarbha views in relation to those of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab and other Tibetan masters. 175 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 17 f., critical edition: 29 f. 176 On various interpretations of this term, see below, 418 f. 75 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN statement in [ASP 5b.1‒2] “That mind is no mind, mind’s nature is luminous” 177 and the statement in the Abhidharmasūtra “the beginningless element is the basis of all phenomena”178 are commented upon, it is said [in the Ratnagotravibhāga] that unfounded mental engagements due to the skandhas, āyatanas, dhātus, and indriyas etc., “depend upon the purity of mind”.179 Hence, because all saṃsāric phenomena have arisen from tathāgatagarbha, there is no difference between the element of sentient beings and the element of a buddha. In this context, the scriptural source for explaining [the element] as mahāmudrā was uttered by Saraha [Dohākoṣa, DK 41ab] “Mind alone is the seed of everything”.180 This was proven by [saying] that it gives rise to all the good things of worldly existence and nirvāṇa and that it is therefore “like the wish fulfilling jewel”.181 In explaining the rationale182 behind these characterizations of mahāmudrā, Shākya mchog ldan employs the distinction between consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes) which plays a key role in his philosophy. Interestingly, he maintains that the wisdom of mahāmudrā comprises both deluded consciousness and the undeluded wisdom of realization. Consciousness is said to be “in the grip of delusion or error (’khrul pa)” which perpetuates both the negative actions (karma) fueled by attachments and aversions and the bright actions motivated by virtue which lead, respectively, to the heights and depths of saṃsāra. By contrast, the wisdom (ye shes) of realization is precisely the buddha element or mahāmudrā which remains invariant amidst the flux of appearances. Although it is drawn into saṃsāric states with all their joys and sorrows, it remains incorruptible by them. And it is precisely because this mahāmudrā remains ever-present as the “very possibility to one day be separated [from such states]” that it is referred to not only as the “element of buddhas” but the “element of sentient beings” as well.183 177 ASP, 3a3: The line in the original Sanskrit (Schmithausen 1977, 41, E.b.1‒2), reads tathā hi tac cittam acittam | prakṛtiś cittasya prabhāsvarā | which is rendered in the D as sems de ni sems ma mchis pa ste | | sems kyi rang bzhin ni ’od gsal ba lags so | | Note that the Tibetan edition Śakya mchog ldan and many other Tibetan masters consulted had the erroneous locative particle sems la instead of the demonstrative sems de which corresponds to the tac cittam in the extant Sanskrit ms. We have followed the Sanskrit reading. 178 On this oft-quoted passages, see below, 111, 192 and Volume II, translation: 19. 179 See also RGV I.57a‒b: ayoniśomanaskāraś citta śuddhi pratiṣṭhitaḥ | | 180 Dohākoṣa, DK 41ab: “Mind alone is the seed of everything, from which existence and nirvāṇa spring forth.” cittam ekaṃ sakalabījaṃ bhavanirvāṇe-api yasya visphurataḥ | Tib. D2224, 41cd: sems nyid gcig pu kun gyi sa bon te | | gang la srid dang mya ngan 'das 'phro ba | | 181 Dohākoṣa, DK 41cd: “Homage to the mind which, like a wish-fulfilling jewel, grants all the fruits of one’s desires.” tac cintāmaṇirūpaṃ praṇamata [tat] icchāphalaṃ dadāti | | D2224, 42ab: 'dod pa'i 'bras bu ster bar byed pa yi | | yid bzhin nor 'dra'i sems la phyag 'tshal lo | | 182 The term shes byed has two related senses: [1] reason (rgyu mtshan) and [2] proof (sgrub byed). 183 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 19, critical edition: 30. 76 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Although mahāmudrā amidst the accumulation of happiness and suffering has been drawn into saṃsāric states, it is impossible for it to mix inseparably with saṃsāric phenomena. Therefore, because it is present as the very possibility to one day [367] be separated [from these states], mahāmudrā is the element of sentient beings too. As for the delusion-free wisdom pertaining to this element, since it is mixed inseparably with mind as such which is cultivated through familiarization with it, the element of buddhas is mahāmudrā as well. In this way it is understood both through scriptural authority and reasoning that all sentient beings are sealed by mahāmudrā. However, by these alone it is not realized. As is stated [in the Ratnagotravibhāga]: “The ultimate truth of the self-arisen [i.e., the Buddhas,] is to be realized through faith”184.185 It is in line with the distinction between consciousness and wisdom that Shākya mchog ldan next interprets the above ASP 5b.1‒2 passage “That mind is no mind, mind’s nature is luminous”. Here, “that mind” refers to wisdom in the ground phase, whereas the mind which mind as such or wisdom is said to be absent of is identified as “the eightfold ensemble of consciousness, the entire range of mental factors and the delusory habitual tendencies of dualistic appearances” which obstruct and obscure wisdom and luminosity. It is when the dichotomies between the obscuring and obscured have given way to self-luminous selfawareness that one realizes the nondual mahāmudrā which is the “dharmadhātu experienced by the personally realized wisdom of the noble ones”: The expression “That mind” (tac cittam) in the [Aṣṭasāhasrikā]prajñāpāramitā refers precisely to wisdom in the phase of the ground, while the “is no mind” (acittam) refers to the eightfold ensemble of consciousness, the entire range of mental factors and the delusory habitual tendencies of dualistic appearances, whereby [luminous mind] is not attained. Even an understanding that clings to a partial aspect of the purifications (vyavadāna) is something which obscures luminosity as well. When the respective essences of these obscuring factors have given way to self-luminous self-awareness, then there is no more dichotomy between the obscured and the obscurer. As long as there are notions that cling to the dualism between obscured and obscurer, because the essence of the obscuration is not recognized and one clings to a partial luminosity, there is no realization of mahāmudrā. … 184 See also RGV I.153ab: śraddhayā eva anugantavyaṃ param arthe svayaṃbhuvām | | Tib. rang byung rnams kyi don dam de | | ’dad pa nyid kyis rtogs bya yin | | 185 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 19‒20, critical edition: 30. 77 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN This meaning [as emphasized] in the texts of the master Maitreya is that there exists no other phenomenon (dharma) apart from the expanse of phenomena (dharmadhātu). And since this dharmadhātu is experienced by the personally realized wisdom of the noble ones, it is the nature of mind.186 Here Shākya mchog ldan differentiates the luminosity of mahāmudrā, which is accessible only to personally realized nondual wisdom, from the partial or biased luminosity, i.e., a concept of luminosity imputed by and to the mind, which one clings to so long as dualistic beliefs in subject and object, obscurer and obscured, persist. He identifies this mahāmudrā as what remains (lhag ma) when all reifications that make it something it is not have been eliminated. This is the perfect nature, the definitive meaning, considered in the third dharmacakra to be empty of conventional phenomena and yet not a mere negation either. In other words, it is not something, but neither is it nothing. The author gives the example from the Dharmadhātustava187 of a banana-plant which is found upon close analysis to be empty of any substantial core but which nonetheless bears sweet fruits. On this account, the discovery of emptiness goes hand in hand with the disclosure of its unimpeded dynamism and fecundity. When one experiences that definitive meaning which constitutes the remainder left behind in the wake of such analysis according to that [reasoning corpus], then that is also designated as such [i.e., as the definitive meaning]. To illustrate with an example, [the Buddha]—after explaining in the middle dharmacakra that all phenomena are simply empty of own-nature—taught in the third dharmacakra that the unchanging perfect nature which is empty of that [self-emptiness] is the definitive meaning. Likewise, one doesn’t find any core of a banana plant when one searches for it, yet in the middle of the unfolded leaves [bananas] nonetheless ripen as sweet fruits.188 Mahāmudrā is encountered in the immediacy of direct perception but never as an object of thought. Its cultivation is characterized as the union of calm abiding and deep insight. 189 186 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 20, critical edition: 30. 187 Dharmadhātustava, D1118, verse 15‒16, 64a. 188 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 21, critical edition: 30. 189 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 21, critical edition: 31. “As for the way of familiarizing oneself with practice, there are the ways of calm abiding when settling in meditative equipoise and of irreversibly sustaining deep insight in both equipoise and post-meditation. First, what is to be seen is luminosity. So long as this is an object of thought, mahāmudrā is not seen. Seeing a mere abstraction is not advocated here. Consequently, in seeing it directly, one remains settled in it in one-pointed equipoise [and maintains] its continuity without 78 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN One method of Mahāmudrā meditation described by Shākya mchog ldan involves intentionally engaging the reflexivity of self-awareness in a kind of infinite regress: any thoughts that arise are seen by another conceptual analysis or “looker” which, in turn, is witnessed by a third looker, until the seer and seen mingle into the very essence of deep insight (lhag mthong). In this way, all conceptual fabrication comes to a standstill, including the grasping, reifying activities of thought which take subject and object, thoughts and their antidotes, to be different things.190 To better understand the connections Shākya mchog ldan draws between the Mahāmudrā discourses of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud and the Tathāgatagarbha discourses of the third dharmacakra, it may be useful to look at how he classified the foremost Tibetan positions on buddha nature during his time and determine how he framed his own viewpoint in relation to these. A good starting point for this inquiry is his classification of Tibetan buddha nature theories presented in his Replies to Queries of Blo mchog pa which has been translated and discussed in Kano 2006.191 Among the great chariots [of Buddha nature doctrine] in the Land of Snow [Tibet] there were two traditions: [1] the tradition which maintains that all sentient beings are endowed with buddha nature and [2] the tradition which maintains that they are not. The first is twofold: [1.1] those who in identifying buddha [nature] maintain it is an instance of a nonaffirming negation which is not distinguished by qualities such as the [ten] powers, and [1.2] those who maintain it is an instance of an affirming negation which is distinguished by these [qualities]. [1.1] The first [view] is that of the great Rngog Lo tsā wa and his followers. [1.2] The second is that of the omniscient Dol po pa together with his predecessors and successors. [2] The second tradition, which maintains that sentient beings do not have buddha nature, is that of the venerable Sa skya Paṇḍita and the second omniscient one Bu ston, among others. distraction. Then there is the unity of calm abiding and deep insight because, when the eight preparations for abandoning [obstacles] come to the fore, the flaws of calm abiding and deep insight are eliminated.” 190 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 21, critical edition: 31. “As for the way to cultivate deep insight, there is meditative equipoise and post-meditation. In meditative equipoise, when any concepts of existence and quiescence that spring up are looked at by another conceptual analysis (rtog dpyod), the former dissolve in the expanse. When that conceptual analysis, the looker, is seen by the third insight, then seer and seen both mingle into the very essence of deep insight. On that occasion, one speaks of ‘the realization of deep insight that is clear and nonconceptual’. At that time, all unreal conceptualizations cease, not to mention the concepts on the side of the antidotes, which must also cease because they are precisely the grasping for [and believing in] discursive signs.” 191 See Kano 2006, 235‒36. 79 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Also in this regard, the identification of buddha nature 192 comprises [1.3] those who maintain it is the feature of natural purity alone and [1.4] those who maintain it signifies a combination of that [natural purity] and qualities that are inseparable from it. As for this second [view], there are moreover [1.4.1] those who claim that these qualities fulfil the function of being qualities of the dharmakāya in terms of realization and [1.4.2] those who claim they are the qualities of natural dharmakāya [itself]. [1.3] The first tradition represents the majority of the well-known latter-day reciters193 in the Land of Snow. [1.4.1] The second includes the master Phag mo grub pa and the many adherents of the Bka’ brgyud lineage of the master from Dwags po [Sgam po pa]. [1.4.3] The third are a few [masters] such as Paṇ chen Phyogs las rnam rgyal.194 A few points in this classification of Tibetan Buddha nature positions warrant further comment. The first point is that Rngog Blo ldan shes rab is identified as a representative of the view that identifies buddha nature as an instance of a nonaffirming negation which is not distinguished by qualities such as the ten powers, whereas Dol po pa’s Gzhan stong lineage is said to represent the view of buddha nature as an affirming negation which is distinguished by qualities. In Shākya mchog ldan’s view, Rngog’s position reflects a second dharmacakra interpretation of buddha nature which is incompatible with the Ratnagotravibhāga, a work which, in his eyes, unquestionably reflects the affirmative stance of the third dharmacakra. By contrast, the Gzhan stong interpretation is generally said by the author to accord with the positive appraisal of the ultimate advocated by the third dharmacakra though he was critical of its tendency to absolutize buddha nature. 192 These are a subset [1A] of those who maintain that sentient beings are endowed with buddha nature [1]. 193 The term klog pa pa (“literally those who recite [texts]”) is often used pejoratively by Shākya mchog ldan with reference to those who uncritically parrot the words of others. 194 Blo mchog dri lan, SCsb(C) vol. 17, 7485‒7495: gangs can gyi shing rta chen po dag la lugs gnyis te | sems can thams cad sangs rgyas kyi snying po can yin par bzhed pa’i lugs dang | ma yin par bshed pa’i lugs so | | dang po la gnyis te | snying po’i ngos ’dzin stobs sogs yon tan kyis khyad par du ma byas pa’i med dgag gi cha la bzhed pa dang des khyad par du byas pa’i ma yin dgag gi cha la bzhed pa’o | | dang po ni | rngog lo tswa ba chen po rjes ’brang dang bcas pa’o | | gnyis pa ni | kun mkhyen dol po pa gong ’og gi brgyud pa dang bcas pa’o | | lugs gnyis pa sems can la sangs rgyas kyi snying po med pa bzhed pa ni | rje btsun sa skya paṇḍi ta dang | kun mkhyen gnyis pa bu ston la sogs pa’o | | yang ’di ltar | snying po’i ngos ’dzin rang bzhin rnam dag rkyang pa’i cha la bzhed pa dang | de dang yon tan dbyer med kyi tshogs don la bzhed pa’o | gnyis pa la’ang | yon tan de dag rtogs pa chos sku’i yon tan go chod por ’dod pa dang | rang bzhin chos sku’i yon tan du ’dod pa’o | | lugs dang po ni | gangs can du phyis grags pa’i klog pa pa phal che ba dag go | | gnyis pa ni rje phag mo grub pa sogs rje dwags po’i bka’ brgyuda ’dzin pa mang po dang go | | lugs gsum pa ni | paṇ chen phyogs las rnam rgyal la sogs pa kha cig go | | atext has rgyud See Kano 2006, 236‒38. Translation is our own. 80 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN A second noteworthy point in the above classification is the author’s inclusion of Sa skya Paṇḍita in the camp of those who deny that sentient beings have buddha nature, alongside Bu ston rin chen grub. This is a view Shākya mchog ldan endorses in the majority of his buddha nature works, but seems to have abandoned in his Mahāmudrā expositions where he unequivocally characterizes buddha nature as an ever-present and unchanging element in sentient beings, bodhisattvas and buddhas. The last and most important point to note is the author’s identification of Phag mo gru pa and many Mahāmudrā masters as representatives of the view that buddha nature “signifies a combination of that [natural purity] and qualities that are inseparable from it” and that “these qualities fulfil the function of being qualities of the dharmakāya in terms of realization”. This is a position which strikes a balance between recognizing the natural purity of buddha nature (and dharmakāya) and also acknowledging its soteriological efficacy in functioning as the ground of buddha qualities disclosed through realization. We shall see that this middle view, positioned between the extremes of nonaffirming Rang stong and affirming Gzhan stong positions, best exemplifies the view of buddha nature presented in Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā writings. It is a view which emphasizes the unity of manifestation and emptiness (snang stong dbyer med). What is striking about this Mahāmudrā view of buddha nature is its incompatibility with the view of buddha nature the author generally endorses in his buddha nature exegesis. Shākya mchog ldan’s more typical position on buddha nature has been aptly summarized by Tāranātha as follows: “Buddha nature does not exist in the mind-stream of sentient beings. The natural luminosity of the mind of sentient beings is merely the cause and basic element of buddha nature… Thus, statements that this nature is endowed with the very nature of essentially inseparable qualities are [made in] the context of fruition [result] alone.” 195 And Shākya mchog ldan himself states in his commentary on the Dharmadhātustava 15‒16 that “while it is explained that the buddha element (sangs rgyas kyi khams : buddhadhātu) exists in sentient beings, it is not explained that buddhahood itself is the element of sentient beings”.196 It is worth noting that ‘Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal, in his Deb ther sngon po, had traced the Tibetan interpretation of ultimate truth as a nonaffirming negation which is an object of conceptual analysis to Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge, and distinguished this from the views of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059‒1109) and Gtsang nag pa Brtson ’grus seng ge (b. 195 Tāranātha, Zab don khyad par nyer gcig pa, 790.3–4: sems can gyi rgyud la bde gshegs snying po med sems can gyi sems rang bzhin 'od gsal de | bde gshegs snying po'i rgyu dang khams tsam yin pas | ...; ibid, 790.7–791.1: snying po la yon tan ngo bo dbyer med rang bzhin nyid ldan du gsungs pa 'bras bu kho na'i skabs yin la |. See Mathes 2004, 307–308 and Kano 2006, 238‒39. 196 Chos kyi dbyings su bstod pa zhes bya ba’i bstan bcos kyi rnam par bshad pa, 3105‒6: sem can la sangs rgyas kyi khams yod par bshad kyi | sangs rgyas nyid sems can gyi snying por ma bshad do | See also Mathes 2008, 53. 81 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN 12th c.) who considered buddha nature or ultimate truth to be a nonaffirming negation inaccessible to conceptual thought. According to ‘Gos Lo tsā ba, whereas “Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge maintained that a nonaffirming negation in the sense that entities are empty of reality (bden pas stong pa) is ultimate truth and thus an object of linguistic-conceptual conception,” Blo ldan shes rab and Gtsang nag pa conversely stated that “so-called ‘buddha nature’ is ultimate truth but explained, on the other hand, that not only is ultimate truth not an actual object of language and thought, it is not even a conceived object (zhen pa’i yul).”197 For his own part, Shākya mchog ldan ascribes the nonaffirming negation interpretation to those who explained Maitreya’s teachings in accordance with systems studying and thinking and the affirming negation interpretation to those who explained them in accordance with the system of meditation. Now, the equation of buddha nature with emptiness (or selflessness) can be traced in Indian Buddhism to the Laṅkāvatāra and works of several prominent thinkers such as Candrakīrti, Bhāvaviveka, Kamalaśīla,Jñānaśrīmitra and Jayānanda.198 Shākya mchog ldan identifies Rngog as the major Tibetan proponent of this line of thought. In a subsection of his Dri ba lhag bsam rab dkar gyi dris lan man ngag gi dgongs rgyan entitled Replies to Queries of Mus rab ’byams pa199, the author outlines the two exegetical traditions of Maitreya’s teachings: According to the teachings of former masters, people who identified buddha nature as emptiness of duality [either] as an instance of a nonaffirming negation or as an instance of a affirming negation were said to be distinguished according to whether they explained the Maitreya teachings in line with studying and thinking or in line with the system of meditation (sgom lugs). In the root[-text] and the commentary, the latter system is clearly attested.200 Here it is unmistakable that the author considers the meditative tradition’s affirming negation interpretation of emptiness and buddha nature—a view he associates with the Jo nang tradition of Dol po pa—to be the one that is in accord with the import of the Maitreya 197 See Mathes 2008, 27 and n. 121. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969, 302‒3. 198 The history of their views is discussed at length in Kano 2006, Introduction and Final Consideration. 199 Mus rabs 'byams pa'i dris lan, in SCsb(C), vol. 23, 5356‒5515. Shākya mchog ldan’s analysis of Tibetan nature views in this work is examined in Kano 2006, chapter five. As Kano notes, this text appears to be a reply to criticisms of the buddha nature theories presented in his commentary on the Sdom gsum rab dbye entitled Gser gyi thur ma (composed 1481). We wish to thank the author for making a draft of the forthcoming revised version of his thesis available to us. 200 Mus rabs 'byams pa'i dris lan, SCsb(C) vol. 23, 5393‒4: slob dpon snga ma dag gi gsung nas | gnyis stong med dgag gi cha dang ma yin dgag gi cha la snying po’i ngos ’dzin du byed pa | byams chos thos bsam ltar ’chad pa dang | byams chos sgom lugs ltar ’chad pa’i khyad yin gsung | rtsa ’grel na ni lugs phyi ma de nyid gsal bar bzhugs | 82 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN works. Of the two main traditions of exegesis of Maitreya’s works―Rngog’s analytical tradition which explains emptiness as a nonaffirming negation and the Bstan Kha bo che’s meditative tradition which explains it as an affirming negation―it is the latter which is said to accord with the teachings of the Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV).201 To summarize, the meditation tradition of Bstan Kha bo che and the Gzhan stong explains buddha nature in accordance with the system of meditation (sgom lugs) of the Maitreya works, a system Shākya mchog ldan considered to be clearly evident in RGV and RGVV. However, a closer look at Shākya mchog ldan’s earlier buddha nature writings reveals the extent to which he had developed an interpretation of buddha nature that diverged from both the major Tibetan strands of Buddha nature exegesis based on the RGV: [1] the so-called “analytical tradition” (mtshan nyid lugs) of the RGV of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (1059‒1109) which equates buddha nature with a nonaffirming emptiness and [2] the so-called “meditation tradition” (sgom lugs) of the RGV of Btsan kha bo che (b. 1021) which by way of an affirming negation asserts that all sentient beings are endowed with buddha nature replete with all buddha qualities.202 Why does Shākya mchog ldan align the nonaffirming and affirming traditions of Tathāgatagarbha interpretation with the hermeneutical distinction between discourses of the second and third turnings of the dharmacakra respectively? In his Sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i rnam bshad (Explanation of Buddha Nature) composed when he was forty-seven (1474), Shākya mchog ldan explains that according to the second promulgation of the Buddha’s teachings, buddha nature is considered to be the purity from adventitious stains and thus a nonaffirming negation. However, “according to the final turning, the underlying purport (dgongs gzhi) of ’buddha nature’ (*sugatagarbha) is the so-called ‘natural luminosity which is free from all extremes of elaborations’. Because it is that which is clearly explained as the object of experience of wisdom that is personally realized, it is necessary to characterize it as an affirming negation.”203 This latter interpretation is, for Shākya mchog ldan, the definitive 201 Shākya mchog ldan mentions in this connection (ibid., 5395‒6) two other conflicting interpretations of buddha nature: that of certain sūtras belonging to the final dharmacakra (such as the Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra) which teach that buddha nature is buddhahood itself (sangs rgyas nyid), and that of the RGV which teaches that it is the dharmatā of buddha (sangs rgyas kyi chos nyid). Shākya mchog ldan states that it is the former of these two corresponds to the third dharmacakra (ibid. 4093–4). See Kano 2006, 249 n. 106 202 Btsan kha bo che’s exegetical tradition goes back to Sajjana who is said to have instructed both Gzu Dga’ ba’i rdo rje and Btsan Kha bo che in all of the five works of Maitreya, having given them the key-instructions (gdams ngag) for the associated meditation practice. See Kano 2006, 53‒54. Kong sprul Blo gros mtha’ yas (1813‒1899) refers to this tradition as the meditation tradition (sgom lugs) or Btsan tradition (btsan lugs) and describes it as “a superior lineage of extraordinary exegesis and practice.” See Mi ldog pa seng ge’i nga ro, 1213‒ 14: thun mong ma yin pa’i bshad pa dang nyams len gyi rgyun khyad par ’phags pa yin 203 Sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i rnam bshad mdo rgyud snying po, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 1336‒1346: “According to the final turning, the underlying intent of *sugatagarbha is the so-called natural luminosity that is free from all extremes of elaborations. Because it is that which is clearly explained as the object of experience of wisdom that 83 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN meaning of the RGV and sūtras of the third turning in general.204 In a later short treatise on the definitive meaning of the RGV,205 he defines buddha nature as both the purity from adventitious stains during the phase of a bodhisattva, and the natural purity on the level of buddhahood where it is said to be inseparable from all buddha qualities. In his late Cakrasaṃvara Commentary, he explains that there were two primary currents of Buddha nature exegesis, one based on the natural purity (rnam dag rang bzhin) of buddha nature and the other on its purity from adventitious stains (glo bur rnam dag) and that both exegetical traditions are attested in the RGV.206 Although Shākya mchog ldan finds the affirmative “meditation system” of RGV interpretation to be consistent with the RGV and RGVV, the majority of his works on buddha nature present views which pose difficulties for this interpretation. In these works, sentient beings do not have buddha nature. Only buddhas have buddha nature inseparable from all buddha qualities. In fact, buddha nature only ‘comes into existence’, so to speak, when the so called exalted (ārya) bodhisattva first sees ultimate truth on the first spiritual level at the beginning of the path of seeing. While bodhisattvas have the buddhagarbha purified of adventitious stains, only buddhas have buddhagarbha of natural purity inseparable from all buddha qualities. In the Sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i rnam bshad, Shākya mchog ldan interprets the three phases of buddha nature—impure, pure-impure, and pure—as distinguished in Ratnagotravibhāga 1.47 as specifying that [1] sentient beings of the impure phase do not possess buddha nature at all (but only a gotra that is different from buddha nature known as “essence of sentient beings” (sattvagarbha)), [2] bodhisattvas of the partly pure-partly impure phase have only a part of a buddha nature, while [3] buddhas have it completely.207 Komarovski has drawn attention to an early exception to this view in the author’s Abhisamāyālaṃkāra (AA) commentary (1454) where he follows his teacher Rong ston Shes bya kun rig’s (1367‒1449) view that all beings possess one and the same buddha nature, here is personally realized, it is necessary to characterize it as a nonaffirming negation.”’khorlo tha ma yis | bde gshegs snying po’i dgongs gzhi ni | spros pa’i mtha’ kun dang bral ba’i | rang bzhin ’od gsal ces bya ba | | so so rang gis rig pa yi | | ye shes kyi ni myong bya la | | gsal bar bshad pa nyid yin phyir | | ma yin dgag par ’chad dgos so | | See a complete translation of this text in Komarovski 2006, 539‒56. 204 Komarovski 2010, 6. 205 Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 121‒32:. See a complete translation of this text in Komarovski 2006, 556‒66. 206 Bde mchog rnam bshad dpal dang po’i sangs rgyas rab tu [text: du] grub pa, SCsb(B) vol. 8, 1986‒1991: “There arose two exegetical traditions concerning whether or not sentient beings are pervaded by buddha nature: They were distinguished as two traditions of explaining the identification of that [buddha nature] in terms of natural purity and purity of the adventitious. Both traditions occur in the Uttaratantraśāstra.” snying pos sems can la khyab ma khyab kyi bshad srol gnyis byung ba ni | de’i ngos ’dzin rang bzhin rnam dag dang glo bur rnam dag la ’chad pa’i srol gnyis kyi khyad par yin | srol de gnyis ka yang rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos su byung | 207 Komarovski 2006, 526. 84 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN described as the natural purity of mind, which is called the spiritual potential (gotra) or element (khams) in sentient beings and the *sugatagarbha in buddhas. In a later work, however, the author acknowledged that this interpretation was based on former Abhisamāyālaṃkāra commentator’s explanations and was made with a middle dharmacakra interpretation of buddha nature in mind. 208 It would seem that an obvious precedent for Shākya mchog ldan’s view that sentient beings do not possess buddhagarbha was Blo ldan shes rab’s (1059‒1109) interpretation of Ratnagotravibhāga I.27c in which he takes tathāgata in the compound tathāgatagarbha as existent (dngos) but takes sentient beings’ possession of it as merely nominal (btags) on the rationale that “their ‘being pervaded by it’ has been metaphorically applied to the existence of the opportunity to attain it [i.e., the kāya of perfect buddhahood]”.209 In other words, the statement that “sentient beings have buddha nature” is a case of designating a cause on the basis of the effect. On Rngog’s view, buddha qualities are not present in the causal state but nonetheless have a kind of conventional existence. They are not innate but acquired. As Rngog puts it, the realization of the ultimate brings the qualities into existence: they “gather as if summoned when you realize the dharmadhātu”.210 This image of the qualities showing up en masse at the time of realization seems compatible with a disclosive model of buddha nature and should be kept in mind when assessing Shākya mchog ldan’s identification of Rngog as a proponent of the nonaffirming negation interpretation of buddha nature. It is here worth noting that Shākya mchog ldan considered himself to be a reincarnation of Rngog Blo ldan shes rab (among other past masters) and reported having recollections of his past life as this teacher.211 That said, in several works including his late commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga, he is openly critical of Blo ldan shes rab’s identification of buddha nature with the sheer emptiness of the mind possessing stains on the grounds that it is necessary to identify buddha nature from the standpoint of its buddha qualities, but this is impossible where a sheer emptiness (stong pa nyid rkyang pa) is concerned: “The Great Translator [Rngog Blo ldan shes rab] took the sheer emptiness of mind possessing stains as [buddha] nature. This is not felicitous because it is necessary, in identifying [buddha] nature, to explain it from the perspective of the qualities, but this identification is impossible where sheer 208 See Komarovski 2006, 526, n. 13 where the author notes that Shākya mchog ldan in his late Gser gyi thur ma acknowledged that he had followed the lead of scholars in the past who, when commenting on the Abhisamāyālaṃkāra with its commentaries, had explained that all sentient beings have buddha nature, an interpretation that was made with buddha nature as taught in the Middle Wheel in mind. 209 See Kano 2006, and 2010, 260‒61, and Mathes 2008, 28 and n. 125. 210 See Rngog’s commentary on RGV I.151b where he states “The realization of the ultimate is the cause of all qualities, because all buddha qualities gather as if summoned when you realize the dharmadhātu.” As quoted in Mathes 2008, 31. Translation altered slightly. 211 Komarovski 2011, 50. 85 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN emptiness alone is concerned.”212 This critique, as noted, must be reconciled with Rngog’s view that although the qualities are acquired or emergent rather than innate, they nonetheless become fully manifest upon realization. Let us summarize the main features of Rngog’s view of tathāgatagarbha: buddha nature is nothing but emptiness of intrinsic nature (rang bzhin gyis pa stong nyid), being the purity of dharmakāya which pervades all beings213; it is thus defined as “the mental continuum which has emptiness as its nature (sems kyi rgyud stong pa nyid kyi rang bzhin)”.214 It exists only as a cause in sentient beings, and is therefore only a “sentient beings’ essence” (sems can gyi snying po) or potential (rigs), i.e., the causal dharmakāya, but not the buddha-essence (sangs rgyas kyi snying po), i.e., the resultant dharmakāya, which only buddhas and realized bodhisattvas possess. Further, because buddha nature qua emptiness cannot, on Madhyamaka terms, be considered a real, causally-efficacious entity, it must be considered as an efficient cause (upādāna) of dharmakāya only in the sense of being a conventional object (tha snyad kyi yul) devoid of real existence, in other words, as an instance of a nonaffirming negation (prasajyapratiṣedha).215 Rngog’s view of buddha nature is best viewed against the wider background of Madhyamaka tathāgatagarbha interpretations which rejected, on the basis of Buddhist principles of impermanence and selflessness, the characterization of tathāgatagarbha as a permanent entity which pervades all beings and is thus akin to the Self (ātman) of the non-Buddhists.216 In clarifying Rngog’s attempt to explain how buddha nature is both empty and yet causally efficacious, Kazuo Kano states that Rngog “accepts neither that dhātu and dharmakāya should be entities in order to be causes nor that the causation in question is a causation of the type that occurs between a seed and a sprout. Even though all phenomena are empty by nature, everything is able to exist and function conventionally. In this sense Buddha-nature 212 Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma, SCsb(A), vol. 13, 1225‒6: lo tsā ba chen po dri ma dang bcas pa’i sems kyi stong pa nyid snying por byas pa ni legs pa ma yin te | snying po’i ngos ’dzin ni yon tan gyi cha nas ’chad dgos kyi | stong pa nyid rkyang pa la ngos ’dzin de mi rung ba’i phyir | 213 See Kano 2010, 258, where the following passage from Rngog’s Rgyud bla don bsdus is quoted: “As for the previous case [i.e., dharmakāya], since the intrinsic nature of the pure state itself exists [in buddhas], the pure state is also present in sentient beings [for buddhas’ dharmakāya pervades all sentient beings]. Therefore, this very purity [i.e., emptiness] was called “the essence” (snying po). As for the present case [i.e., tathatā], though [ordinary beings] have no [such final resultant state] which is accomplished by accumulation of purifications, only the emptiness of intrinsic nature is called “essence.” (Kano’s translation). sngar ni rnam par dag paʼi gnas skabs de nyid kyi rang bzhin yod pas | rnam par dag pa’i gnas skabs kyang sems can la yod pa yin la / des na rnam par dag pa de nyid snying por brjod pa yin noα | da lta ni rnam par dag paʼi tshogs las ya􀓚 dag par grub pa de med kyang | rang bzhin gyis stong pa nyid kho na snying por brjod pa yin no | | 214 See Kano 2010, 259. 215 Kano 2010, 261‒62. 216 See Kano 2010, 249‒50. 86 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN can fulfill a causal function.”217 Shākya mchog ldan for his part summarizes Rngog’s position on buddha nature in the following way: According to the explanation of Rngog Lo tsā wa, the great charioteer in the Land of Snow, buddha and buddha nature do not mean the same thing. “‘Buddha’ refers to the completion of qualities such as the powers etc., and the dharmakāya itself wherein all impurities are relinquished, whereas ‘buddha nature’ does not need to be characterized in terms of such relinquishment and realization. It is an instance of nonaffirming negation, the natural purity of the [dharma]dhātu which pervades all the phases of ground, path, and fruition”. All the latter-day reciters in the Land of Snow reiterated, like an echo, that “all sentient beings have the nature of those [buddhas]” without undertaking the investigation of what this buddha nature (buddhagarbha) is.218 In attempting to specify what this buddha nature is, Shākya mchog ldan warns against taking the second dharmacakra view of buddha nature as the last word on the matter since a nonaffirming negation precludes the buddha qualities with which buddha nature is said in RGV to be inseparably united: In short, in identifying buddha nature, it is not sufficient to posit it only from the perspective of natural purity. Rather, it must be presented from the perspective of its inseparability of the qualities such as the [ten] powers. 219 As is stated [in RGV I.29cd]: “Unchangeability [and] being inseparable from qualities is the intended meaning of the ultimate sphere”.220 217 Kano 2010, 262. The author distinguishes (262 n. 43) two senses in which buddha nature may be considered a cause which we can call soteriological and phenomenal. It is the soteriological cause of becoming a buddha and the phenomenal cause of the existence of all phenomena (saṃsāra and nirvāṇa) on the conventional level. 218 Blo mchog dri lan, SCsb(C) vol 17, 7424‒7431: gangs can gyi shing rta chen po rngog lo tswa ba’i gsung gis | sangs rgyas dang de’i snying po don gcig pa ma yin te | sangs rgyas ni stobs sogs yon tan rdzogs shing | dri ma mtha’ dag spang pa’i chos kyi sku nyid yin la | sangs rgyas kyi snying po ni de lta bu’i spangs rtogs kyis khyad par du byed dgos pa ma yin pa | gzhi lam ’bras bu’i gnas skabs thams cad du khyab pa’i dbyings rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa med dgag gi cha de’o | zhes gsung | gangs can ljongs kyi klog pa pa phyi ma thams cad kyang | sangs rgyas kyi snying po ci la zer gyi dpyod pa mi ’jug par | sems can thams cad de’i snying po can no zhes brag cha bzhin du sgrog par byed do | | 219 “Powers etc.“ presumably refers to the ten powers (stobs bcu, daśabala), the four fearlessnesses (mi ’jigs pa bzhi, catvaravāiśāradya), the eighteen unshared qualities of a buddha (sangs rgyas kyi chos ma ’dres pa bco brgyad, aṣṭādaśāveṇikabuddhadharma), and the thirty-two major marks (mtshan bzang po sum cu rtsa gnyis, dvatriṃśadvaralakṣaṇa). For details of these, see Takasaki 1966, 120–121. 220 Blo mchog dri lan, SCsb(C) vol. 17, 7445‒7451: mdor na snying po’i ngos ’dzin ni | rang bzhin rnam dag tsam gyi cha nas gzhag pas chog pa ma yin gyi | stobs sogs yon tan dang dbyer med pa’i cha nas bzhag dgos pa yin te | de nyid las | ji skad du | rtag tu mi ’gyur yon tan dbyer med ni | | don dam dbyings kyi dgongs don yin zhes bya | | 87 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN We might do well to remind ourselves here that Shākya mchog ldan had identified a Tibetan view which regards buddha nature as a combination of natural purity and its inseparable buddha qualities with the Bka’ brgyud tradition of Phag mo gru po and other Dwags po Bka’ brgyud masters. From this standpoint, Shākya mchog ldan criticizes Rngog’s buddha nature position for applying an interpretation of nonaffirming emptiness—which Shākya mchog ldan associates with the middle dharmacakra—to a text and commentary which reflect a third dharmacakra hermeneutic: The great Rngog Lo primarily asserts that among the five Maitreya works, only the Uttaratantra (RGV) is a śāstra of definitive meaning and that what is taught is only freedom from elaborations as an instance of a nonaffirming negation. However, to primarily explain that the content of this treatise is the very emptiness [or absence] which is the main teaching of the middle dharmacakra is not in accord with either the treatise or commentary.221 On what philosophical grounds did Shākya mchog ldan consider it infelicitous to equate buddha nature with a nonaffirming negation? His principal objection is that a nonaffir-ming negation is nothing more than a deductive conclusion based on reasoning which investigates the nature of concepts. Ergo, because of its conceptually-determined nature, such deductive reasoning is dependent upon the network of the concepts it negates and thus remains constitutively separate from the sphere of direct perception which recognizes the unborn preconceptual nature of thought. From a soteriological standpoint, taking buddha nature as a nonaffirming negation is tantamount to taking sheer absence as the basis of the path and disregarding the disclosive qualities which are said to be constitutive of tathāgatagarbha’s mode of being. This is a view which his own Mahāmudrā tradition cannot accept. To whatever extent one analyzes the essence of concepts by means of reasoning which investigates the ultimate, the factor of clarity and knowing which directly recognizes the abiding nature of those [concepts] is not thereby discovered. The aspect of emptiness as a nonaffirming negation that is thereby discovered is not their abiding nature because it is impossible for it to [enter] the sphere of direct zhes gsungs pas so | Translation of RGV I.29cd follows the Sanskrit (RGV, p. 26 14‒15): sadāvikāritva guṇeṣv abhede jñeyo ’rthasaṃdhiḥ paramārtha dhātoḥ | | 221 Mus rabs 'byams pa'i dris lan, in Rab dkar gyi dris lan, SCsb(C) vol. 23, 5396‒5402: rngog lo chen pos byams chos lnga’i nang nas rgyud bla ma kho na nges don gyi bstan bcos dang | spros bral med dgag gi cha kho na bstan bya’i gtso bor bzhed mod | ’khor lo bar pa’i dngos bstan gyi stong pa nyid de bstan bcos ’di’i brjod bya’i gtso bor ’chad pa ni gzhung ’grel gnyis ka dang ma mthun no | | 88 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN perception which sees their abiding nature. Because that knowing cognition is conceptual and thus in error, it does not qualify as a perception that beholds the abiding nature. To explain the instance of nonaffirming emptiness as buddha nature is to superimpose nonexistence onto [that] nature. To thus explain [buddha nature] in this way is the tradition of the great Rngog Lo tsā ba. However, our own [Mahā]mudra followers do not accept this.222 However uncharitable this passage may be to Rngog’s buddha nature view, it gives us a clear indication of Shākya mchog ldan’s endorsement of the Mahāmudrā tathāgatagarbha interpretation which recognizes the unity of emptiness and buddha qualities. Notwithstanding his reservations about Rngog Blo ldan shes rab’s buddha nature theory, it is undeniable that Shākya mchog ldan did endorse this master’s, and Sa paṇ’s, repudiation of the view that buddha nature replete with all major and minor marks exists in sentient beings.223 It would appear, then, that Shākya mchog ldan followed Blo ldan shes rab’s lead in maintaining that the statement that sentient beings have buddha nature is to be understood metaphorically, i.e., as a statement having a veiled intent (dgongs pa can : ābhiprāyika). It thus is a statement of provisional meaning (drang don : neyārtha) that cannot be taken literally (sgra ji bzhin ma yin). It would seem that he also endorsed Blo ldan shes rab’s interpretation of the statement in Ratnagotravibhāga RGV I.27b “Because “result” was metaphorically (nye [bar] btags [pa] = upacāra) ascribed to the buddha potential, all sentient beings are said to possess the buddhagarbha”224 as implying that sentient beings do not actually have buddha nature. It is worth noting here that this view was criticized by Mi bskyod rdo rje who, in a critical review of the Tathāgatagarbha theories of ‘Gos Lo tsā ba and Shākya mchog ldan225, takes this passage as explaining not that sentient beings do not have buddha nature—which he regards as a serious exegetical error—but rather that characterizations of this buddha nature in terms of cause or result are only metaphorical since buddha nature is equally present and unchanging in buddhas and sentient beings and unaffected by causal processes. Hence, in 222 Rab dkar gyi dris lan, SCsb(C) vol. 23, 4524: rtog pa’i ngo bo don dam dpyod byed kyi rigs pas ji tsam dpyad kyang | de’i gnas lugs yin ngo shes pa gsal rig gi cha de ni des mi rnyed la | des rnyed pa’i stong nyid med dgag gi cha de ni de’i gnas lugs ma yin te | de’i gnas lug mthong ba’i mngon sum gyi spyod yul du mi rung ba’i phyir | rig shes de yang rtog pa nyid kyis na ’khrul pa’i phyir gnas lugs mthong ba’i blo mi rung ngo | | stong nyid med dgag gi cha bde gshegs snying por ’chad pa ni snying por med pa la snying por sgro btags nas de ltar ’chad pa rngog lo tswa ba chen po’i lugs yin gyi | nged phyag rgya pa de ltar mi ’dod do … | | 223 See Sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i rnam bshad, SCsb(B), vol. 13, 132‒46. 224 RGVV, 263: bauddhe gotre tatphalasyopacārād uktāḥ sarve dehino buddhagarbhāḥ | On different interpretations of this passage, see Mathes 2008, 89‒91. 225 Nerve Tonic for the Elderly (Rgan po’i rlung sman). Relevant excerpts are given in Volume II, translation: 105‒9 and 112‒15, critical editions: 109‒11 and 115‒17. 89 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN his reading of RGV I.27, it is the positing of buddha nature as a result, and not beings’ possessing buddha nature per se, that is said to be metaphorically ascribed (upacāra) since buddha nature has nothing to do with causal production. As will be seen in our discussion of the Eighth Karma pa’s buddha nature views in the third chapter, a key point in his rejection of the view that the existence of buddha nature depends on the removal of adventitious stains is that this deprives buddha nature of any agency (nus pa) or autonomy (rang dbang) and instead accords these to the stains themselves, since it is the latter’s nonexistence or existence which determines whether or not buddha nature exists. One reason for Shākya mchog ldan’s espousal of the view that sentient beings do not have buddha nature is specified in his short text responding to objections about his aforementioned Sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i rnam bshad. In this response, he states that if primal buddha[hood] did exist in sentient beings, then it would be unnecessary to build up stores of merits and wisdom (i.e., the prerequisites of the Buddhist path). 226 In short, were buddha nature fully present and efficacious in all the ways it is traditionally deemed to be, with unlimited powers and other capacities, there should be no need for Buddhist soteriology at all since buddha nature could easily dispel all the superfluous factors that obscure it. This is an important point on which more will be said shortly. Another point he raises in his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Dharmadhātustava is that it is impossible for sentient beings to have buddha nature and yet not see it.227 In a similar vein, he states in his Commentary on the Cakrasaṃvara the following: [Query:] Who is the one who directly sees the natural purity which is the continuum in the ground phase? [Reply:] [1] It is impossible for ordinary sentient beings in the impure phase to see it. [2] It is seen directly during meditative equipoise of the nobles ones in the partly pure and partly impure phase, which is of the nature of purification from adventitious [stains]. [3] As for the fully perfect [phase of complete purification], there is only the wisdom of buddha.228 To put it somewhat differently, from the perspective of aspirants on the Buddhist path, buddha nature is not innate but acquired, and its acquisition occurs precisely at the start of the Path of Seeing when a bodhisattva first beholds ultimate truth or reality. From the perspective of goal-realization, however, buddha nature is innate, it is the natural purity of mind. These 226 Dang po’i sangs rgyas grub pa’i gzhung gi brgal lan, SCsb(A) vol. 13, 1436‒7. 227 Komarovski 2011, 105. 228 Bde mchog rnam bshad dpal dang po’i sangs rgyas rab tu [text: du] grub pa, SCsb(B) vol. 8, 241‒3: ’o na gzhi dus kyi rgyud rang bzhin rnam dag de mngon sum du mthong ba po su zhig ce na | ma dag pa so so skye bos ni de mthong mi srid cing | dag la ma dag pa ’phags pa’i mnyam gzhag gis rgyud de mngon sum du mthong la | glo bur rnam dag gi chos nyid dang bcas te | yongs su rdzogs pa ni sangs rgyas kyi ye shes kho na’o | 90 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN two perspectives, or levels of understanding and discourse, are mirrored in the author’s construal of consciousness (rnam shes) and wisdom (ye shes) as two entirely different ways of seeing and relating to reality; while the former is in the grip of dualistic perception, the latter is nondual and sees things as they are. From the premise that a sentient being’s dualistic perception cannot see buddha nature Shākya mchog ldan concludes that sentient beings do not have buddha nature. This account was vulnerable to the criticism that it confuses the inscrutability of buddha nature with its nonexistence: just because buddha nature is (temporarily) imperceptible does not mean it is not present. For example, the sun does not come into existence when it appears from behind clouds any more than it ceases to exist when clouds obscure it. From the innatist standpoint, buddha nature remains ever-present and available when obscured by adventitious factors, even if it is not at this time readily accessible to direct perception. This is why Mi bskyod rdo rje in his criticisms of the buddha nature views of ‘Gos Lo tsā ba and Shākya mchog ldan goes to such lengths to emphasize that the three phases of sentient beings are the three “states” of buddha nature outlined in RGV I.47—impure, partly pure, and completely pure corresponding to sentient beings, bodhisattvas and buddhas respectively—should be seen as “a classification made with the intention to distinguish the three-fold [gradation of] thick, thin and cleansed on the part of [ordinary] consciousness, i.e., that aspect involving deluded perceptions of phenomena.” And conversely, they should not be interpreted as “three states of buddha nature [according to how much this] essence is itself adulterated or unadulterated with the influence of the impurities.”229 In short, the three phases should be seen as conventional rubrics used to describe the progressive thinning of the accreted stains, rubrics which remain relevant only until the unchanging buddha nature is fully disclosed, at which point such distinctions are no longer applicable. We have proposed that one seemingly intractable problem that a strongly innatist understanding of buddha nature—the view that it is present replete with all qualities including the ten powers in every sentient—posed for many scholars, Shākya mchog ldan and ‘Gos Lo tsā ba included, is that it had difficulty explaining why the Buddhist path of awakening should be necessary at all. If sentient beings have full-fledged buddha nature replete with all qualities such as the powers from the outset, why aren’t they already fully awakened? More to the point, how can a soteriologically omnipotent buddha nature co-exist with superfluous adventitious factors? It is comparable to the impossibility of a base (e.g., alkali) being added to a strong acid (e.g., hydrochloric acid) without being dissolved by it.230 A standard innatist response to this coexistence problem was to offer an error theory sufficiently robust to account for the capacity of innate or coemergent ignorance (lhan cig skyes pa’i ma rig pa) to induce 229 Rgan po’i rlung sman, MKsb vol. 15, 10244. See below, 272. 230 This useful analogy was proposed by Klaus Dieter-Mathes in personal communication. 91 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN the lack of recognition of mind’s unborn nature (or buddha nature). The error theory would then account for how this reflexive misrecognition derives from the basic nature itself and can be dispelled by recognizing this nature for what it is. Stated concisely, it is not enough to say that buddha nature or the nature of mind is the condition of possibility of both the formation and dissolution of adventitious obscurations, just as the sun is the condition of possibility of both the formation and dissolution of clouds. A creditable error theory must also clarify the efficacy of soteriological knowledge in effecting this dissolution and show how this efficacy belongs to the nature of mind itself. Such considerations helped shape the innatist views of mind and buddha nature underlying Bka’ brgyud and Rnying ma soteriologies which were grounded in similar boot-strapping models of the self-obscuration and self-disclosure of mind’s nature. Such models aimed at clarifying how mind can recognize its own nature precisely by catching itself in the ongoing act of its own self-obscuring self-reification. These models worked with the possibility of a fundamental shift in perspective within the reflexive nature of consciousness itself. The nature of mind is only obscured by adventitious factors from a certain perspective, just as the sun is only obscured by clouds from a certain perspective. These reflections may help us to understand the distinctive, albeit controversial, differentiation between conventional and ultimate buddha nature that Shākya mchog ldan develops in his later buddha nature treatises such as his text on the Definitive Meaning of the Uttaratantraśāstra (Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don) and the Commentary on Cakrasaṃvara (Bde mchog gyi rnam bshad). Operating from the axiom that “the entire range of phenomena are subsumed under the principle of the two truths”, he explains in the former work that the abode (gnas)—buddhas and sentient beings—as well as the abider (gnas pa)—buddha nature itself—have conventional and ultimate aspects. In the latter work, he expands the range of phenomena which he designates as conventional and ultimate to include saṃsāra, nirvāṇa, as well as a wide range of tantric phenomena such as deities, maṇḍalas and the like. To understand the author’s rather baroque application of these categories, which resulted in such oddities as “ultimate saṃsāra” and “conventional buddha”, it is important to bear in mind that Shākya mchog ldan followed the lead of certain Madhyamaka authors such as Śāntideva who regarded the two truths as spheres of operation (gocara) of the two different types of cognition which make them possible: conventional truth is the sphere of consciousness (rnam shes) or intellect (blo), whereas ultimate truth is the sphere of wisdom (ye shes). Thus, any phenomenon is, in principle, either conventional or ultimate depending on the mode of cognition from which it is perceived. The opening section of his Definitive Meaning of the Uttaratantraśāstra gives a lucid synopsis of the basic framework: Having expressed the invocation and [indicated] the purpose of the composition, one should gain knowledge about the following: [1] What is the main topic of the 92 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Uttaratantraśāstra? [2] How and wherein does [buddha nature] abide? and [3] [In what sense are] the entire range of knowable objects subsumed under the principle of the two truths? [1] As for the first: It is the wisdom of the dharmadhātu that primordially and innately exists [with] all the qualities such as the powers, etc. [2] Secondly, wherein it resides: in buddhas and in sentient beings. [3] [Thirdly,] both the abode [i.e., sentient beings and buddhas] and the abider [buddha nature] are also of two types: conventional and ultimate. The conventional [buddha] nature is the possessor of newly acquired qualities. The ultimate [buddha] nature is the possessor of primordially existent qualities.231 Conventional sentient beings are the six types of migrators. Ultimate sentient beings are their mode of being, the wisdom of the dharmadhātu. 232 On the basis of this interpretive scheme, Shākya mchog ldan proclaims that sentient beings do not have buddha nature and are only metaphorically said to possess it. For bodhisattvas, buddha nature is conventional. Their wisdom provides them with the remedy against adventitious stains allowing the buddha qualities to come forth. Buddhas are ultimate buddha nature. Ultimate sentient beings, however, are buddhahood itself and thus identical with ultimate buddhas; in fact they are not sentient beings.233 From this perspective, ultimate buddha nature is the wisdom of the dharmadhātu which exists primordially and replete with all qualities such as the ten powers in buddhas and sentient beings alike. Conventional buddha nature is the possessor of newly acquired qualities. Likewise, conventional sentient beings are the beings of the six realms whereas ultimate sentient beings consists in their actual mode of abiding, the wisdom of the dharmadhātu. Ultimate buddha nature is the state of perfect awakening itself. Ordinary sentient beings merely have the potential (rigs : gotra), traditionally distinguished into the naturally present (prakṛtistha) and unfolded or blossomed (paripuṣṭa) spiritual potentials, neither of which qualify as buddha 231 On this view, it would seem that the question of whether buddha qualities are innate or acquired can be reframed according to the types of cognition that perceive them: while consciousness beholds acquired qualities, wisdom beholds innate qualities. 232 Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma. SCsb(B) vol. 13, 1223‒1232: zhes mchod par brjod cing rtsom par dam bca’ nas | rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi brjod bya’i gtso bo gang yin pa dang | de ’dra de gnas gang du bzhugs tshul ji ltar yin pa dang | shes bya mtha’ dag bden pa gnyis kyi tshul du ’du ba la mkhas par bya’o | | dang po ni | | stobs sogs yon tan mtha’ dag gdod ma nas rang chas su yod pa’i chos dbyings ye shes so | | gynis pa de gang du bzhugs pa ni | | sangs rgyas dang sems can mtha’ dag go | | gnas dang gnas pa gnyis ka la yang kun rdzob dang don dam gnyis gnyis te | kun rdzob pa’i snying po ni gsar du blangs pa’i yon tan can dang | don dam pa’i snying po ni gndod ma nas grub pa’i yon tan can no | kun rdzob pa’i sems can rigs drug po rnams dang | don dam pa’i sems can ni de dag gi gnas tshul du gyur pa’i chos dbyings ye shes so | See also (tr.) Komarovski 2006, 557. 233 Komarovski 2006, 531‒35. 93 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN nature. The potentials are properties of sentient beings not of buddhas. 234 These distinctions pertain only to the conventional domain. From an ultimate perspective, “ultimate” sentient beings are the wisdom of the dharmadhātu and are thus not sentient beings, but rather their mode of abiding (gnas tshul); this is the ultimate buddha nature, precisely in the sense that ultimate reality is inseparable from buddha qualities and free from all obstructions. Although this labyrinthine scheme not surprisingly attracted strong criticism, even during the author’s lifetime, a charitable interpreter might find some value in its attempt to ground the ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ lines of buddha nature exegesis in the two different possible modes of cognitive access to buddha nature: consciousness and wisdom. According to the binary hermeneutic outlined in his Cakrasaṃvara Commentary, the ‘nature’ view is grounded in the perspective of wisdom (ye shes) which has access to the natural purity of buddha nature and discovers primordially present buddha-qualities. The ‘nurture’ view is grounded in the perspective of consciousness (rnam shes) which has access to buddha nature through the purification of the adventitious and the pursuit of newly acquired buddha-qualities. This distinction would seem to align perfectly with the distinction between the naturally present and unfolded spiritual potentials except that Shākya mchog ldan instead argues, with some justification, that both, being only “potentials” and not the actual buddha nature, are identified as “possessing stains” and hence applicable only to unawakened beings, whereas [buddha] nature is said to be free from stains.235 Mi bskyod rdo rje’s reaction to this scheme was less than charitable. He thinks it involves an erroneous, and potentially determinental, conflation of useful soteriological conventions. The gist of the Eighth Karma pa’s line of criticism is this: Buddhist soteriological distinctions are only linguistic conventions which nonetheless perform the important function of enabling one to distinguish what is to be relinquished from what is to be realized. To blur the boundaries of such distinctions is to commit serious category mistakes which are, in Mi bskyod rdo rje’s words, comparable to confusing medicine and poison. Left unchecked, they unavoidably result in “the collapse of all linguistic conventions” and in profound soteriological confusion.236 To give one example, he says of Shākya mchog ldan’s idea of ‘ultimate saṃsāra’ that “it is a mistake to identify ‘ultimate saṃsāra’ with the saṃsāra appearing before conventional consciousness. Given that both the apprehended aspect—i.e., 234 According to Mathes, this is in direct contradiction to the RGV which explains (see RGV I.49 f. and the corresponding vyākhyā) that the buddha element (i.e., buddha-nature) is identical in all states, those of ordinary beings, bodhisattvas and Buddhas (RGV I.51: “Because it is endowed with the state of having adventitious faults, and naturally endowed with qualities, it is of an unchangeable nature—as it was before, so it is after.”). In other words Shākya mchog ldan goes here against the main dictum of Tathāgatagarbha literature, namely that all sentient beings possess buddha nature. 235 Rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos kyi nges don sngon med nyi ma, SCsb(A) vol. 13, 1226‒7. 236 See below, 230. 94 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN the outward orientation of consciousness—and the inward-looking self-awareness are adventitious stains, it is untenable to distinguish them in line with the two truths.”237 Shākya mchog ldan was of course no longer alive when the Eighth Karma pa advanced such criticisms but we can well imagine him defending his liberal use of the qualifiers ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’ on the grounds that oppositional categories such as ‘saṃsāra’ and ‘nirvāṇa’ have no determinate reference anyhow. Hence, the states of affairs to which they refer are wholly determined by the particular mode of cognition—wisdom or consciousness—which takes them in. If precisely because of our predilection for unambiguous clear-cut concepts and categories we fool ourselves into thinking there is something determinate to which such conventions correspond, the road to nonduality will be a long one indeed. Against the background of this rather extended discussion of Shākya mchog ldan’s intricate interpretations of buddha nature, let us finally specify how they relate to the buddha nature views he presents in line with his Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā exegesis. It is noteworthy that in Undermining the Haughtiness, he explains that the three phases of buddha nature of RGV I.47 describe three phases in the successive purification of the adventitious stains which shroud the luminous nature of mind or luminosity which is unchanging like space: Should one ask what is explained in the Uttaratantra [RGV], the answer is that it explains the element of *sugatagarbha, the nature of mind, luminosity, which is unchanging like space, showing [by means of] analogies [its] obscuration by nine types of stains. This, at the time of the ground is in an impure [state], while on the path it is in a partially pure [state], and at the time of fruition it is in an entirely pure [state]. Thus there does not exist any phenomenon which would not be encompassed by these three. Even though the nature of the three [states] is undifferentiated, the subdivision into three phases is made from the perspective of how things appear to the impure worldly mind co-existing [with ignorance and] its latent tendencies for mistaken perception.238 Not surprisingly, this account is consistent with Shākya mchog ldan’s aforementioned characterization of the meditative tradition (sgom lugs) of Ratnagotravibhāga exegesis which defines emptiness and buddha nature in terms of an affirming negation. It is noteworthy that the stance advocated here is precisely that from which Mi bskyod rdo rje criticized the buddha nature theories of ‘Gos Lo tsā ba and Shākya mchog ldan himself. What is striking is the extent to which the interpretation Shākya mchog ldan outlined in his Mahāmudrā texts contrasts with that which he delineated in most of his buddha nature works, namely, that 237 See Volume II, translation: 113, critical edition: 116. 238 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 17, critical edition: 29. 95 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN sentient beings do not possess buddha nature. The fact that at least one text in the author’s Mahāmudrā trilogy and his Cakrasaṃvara Commentary belong to the same late period of his life leads us to surmise that he endorsed two quite different buddha nature views in line with two different doctrinal contexts: [1] One was a view reflecting his Sa skya heritage (and the Gsang phu scholastic tradition) which maintains that only buddhas and realized bodhisattvas possess buddha nature. [2] The other was a tantric, third dharmacakra, and Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā view which holds that buddha nature, and by extension mahāmudrā, is ever-present and unchanging in all beings, and that the only difference between buddhas and sentient beings is whether they recognize it or not. The author’s liberal and rather extravagant deployments of the qualifiers ‘conventional’ and ‘ultimate’ with respect to buddha nature and related phenomena may perhaps be understood as an attempt to parameterize two otherwise irreconcilable interpretations. We may recall that in the previously quoted Mahāmudrā text, Shākya mchog ldan equates buddha nature with mahāmudrā: “As for the delusion-free wisdom pertaining to this element, since it is mixed inseparably with mind as such which is cultivated through familiarization with it, the element of buddhas (buddhadhātu) is mahāmudrā as well.”239 Elsewhere in this text he explicitly states that “the element of *sugatagarbha is that which has been given the name mahāmudrā”.240 It also bears noting that in his commentary on the Ratnagotravibhāga (written in 1474, age 46) Shākya mchog ldan equates buddha nature with the imperishable great bliss (mahāsukha) of tantrism—both being descriptors of ultimate truth— and proceeds to list synonyms which include coemergent wisdom (sahajajñāna), a key term in Mahāmudrā discourses: “The great imperishable bliss that is totally beyond all elaborations is *sugatagarbha because it is ultimate truth. Synonyms241 for it are ‘emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects’ (rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong pa nyid : sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā), ‘coemergent wisdom’ (lhan skyes ye shes : sahajajñāna), ‘Hevajra nature’, ‘Vajrasattva’ ‘dharmadhātu wisdom’, ‘svābhāvikakāya’, “imperishable great bliss”, ‘Heruka of definitive meaning’ and ‘buddha nature’.”242 By noting various synonyms of buddha nature 239 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 19, critical edition: 30. 240 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 17, critical edition: 29. 241 The idea of “synonymy” (ming gi rnam grangs) employed in Buddhist texts refers rather loosely to a near identity or ‘approximation’ (paryāya : rnam grangs) of semantic reference and meaning for two or more terms. In the present case, the terms in question are clearly not ‘absolute synonyms’ in the sense of having a strict identity of sematic reference in all contexts. John Lyons has noted that terms “may be described as absolutely synonymous if and only if they have the same distribution and are completely synonymous in all their meanings and in all their contexts of occurrence. It is generally recognized that complete synonymy of lexemes [i.e., their having the same descriptive, expressive, and social meaning in a specified range of contexts] is relatively rare in natural languages and that absolute synonymy, as it is here defined, is almost nonexistent.” Lyons 1981, 148. 242 Rgyud bla’i rnam bshad sngon med nyi ma sogs chos tshan bzhi bzhugs so, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 1433: spros pa kun lasa rab ’das pa’i | | zag med bde ba chen po ni | | bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po ste | | dam pa’i don gyi bden pa’o | | de la ming gi rnam grangs ni | | rnam kun mchog ldan stong nyid dang | | zung du ’jug pa’i ye shes dang | | rang 96 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN drawn from diverse Buddhist discourses, non-tantric as well as tantric, Shākya mchog ldan wishes to draw attention to their shared semantic reference: an implicit invariant mode of being and awareness that is discoverable through soteriological praxis. We have seen that a centerpiece of Shākya mchog ldan’s tathāgatagarbha interpretations is his rejection of the view which equates buddha nature with a nonaffirming negation. He elsewhere explicitly states that buddha nature must be understood as that which is empty and inseparable from buddha qualities, a view which matches his depiction of Bka’ brgyud buddha nature theory. In his Replies to Queries of Blo mchog pa, he attempts to validate this view by means of scripture and reasoning as follows: When identifying buddha nature, to explain the nature of reality as an instance of a nonaffirming negation is not reasonable because [1] there are no scriptural citations which verify [this] but [2] there is reasoning which invalidates it. [1] As for the first, within the entire range of teachings and treatises which identify buddha nature, these are exclusively identifications from the perspective of [its] inseparability from qualities such as the [ten] powers.243 But there is not a single bzhin dgyes pa rdo rje dang | | rdo rje sems dpa’ zhes bya dang | | chos kyi dbyings kyi ye shes dang | | ngo bo nyid kyi sku dang ni | | ’gyur med bde ba chen po dang | | nges pa’i don gyi he ru ka | | sangs rgyas snying po zhes kyang bya | | atext has la 243 See RGV I.155: “The [buddha] element is empty of adventitious [stains], which have the defining characteristic of being separable; but it is not empty of unsurpassable qualities, which have the defining characteristic of not being separable.” RGV I.155, p. 763‒4: śūnya āgantukair dhātuḥ savinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ | aśūnyo ’nuttarair dharmair avinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ | | As Asaṅga explains in the Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā: “What is taught by that? There is no characteristic sign of any of the defilements (saṃkleśa) whatsoever to be removed from this naturally pure buddha element, because it is naturally devoid of adventitious stains. Nor does anything need to be added to it as the characteristic sign (nimitta) of purification, because its nature is to have pure properties that are inseparable [from it]. Therefore it is said [in the Śrīmālādevīsūtra]: “Buddha nature is empty of the sheath of all defilements, which are separable and recognized as something disconnected. It is not empty[, however,] of inconceivable buddha qualities, which are inseparable [in that it is impossible] to recognize [them] as something disconnected, and which surpass in number the grains of sand of the river Gaṅgā.” One thus perceives that ‘when something that does not exist in that [place],’ then ‘that [place] is empty of that [thing]’, and comprehends that something which remains exists [permanently] there as a real existent.” RGVV, 76.5‒7: kim anena paridīpitam | yato na kiṃcid apaneyam asty ataḥ prakṛtipariśuddhāt tathāgatadhātoḥ saṃkleśanimittam āgantukamalaśūnyatāprakṛtivād asya | nāpy kiṃcid upaneyam asti vyavadānanimittam avinibhāgaśuddha dharmatāprakṛtitvāt | tata ucyate | śūnyas tathāgatagarbho vinirbhāgair muktajñaiḥ sarvakleśa-kośaiḥ | aśūnyo gaṅgānadīvālikāvyativṛttair avinirbhāgair amuktajñair acintyair buddhadharmair iti | evaṃ yad yatra nāsti tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati | yat punar atrāvaśiṣṭaṃ bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūtaṃ prajānāti | Tib., D4025: 2267‒2274: ’dis ci bstan zhe na | gang gi phyir rang bzhin gyi yongs su dag pa de bzhin gzhegs pa’i khams ’di las | bsal bar bya ba kun nas nyon mongs pa’i rgyu mtshan ni ’ga’ yang med de | blo bur ba’i dri ma dang bral ba ni ’di’i rang bzhin yin pa’i phyir ro | | ’di la rnam par byang ba’i rgyu mtshan bzhag par | bya ba chung zad kyang yod pa ma yin te | rnam par dbye ba med pa’i chos dag pa’i chos nyid ni rang bzhin yin pa’i phyir ro | | des na de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po ni rnam par dbye ba yod pa bral shes pa | nyon mongs pa’i sbubs thams cad kyis ni stong pa yin la | rnam par dbye ba med pa bral mi shes pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa’i sangs rgyas kyi chos gang gā’i klung gi bye ma las ’das pa ni mi stong ngo zhes gsungs so | | de ltar na gang zhig gang na med pa de ni des stong ngo zhes yang dag par rjes su mthong la | gang zhig der lhag mar gyur pa de ni de la rtag par yod do zhes 97 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN explanation from the perspective of a nonaffirming negation. In the Uttaratantraśāstra three points are presented by way of reasoning.244 … [2] Secondly, as for the invalidation, the aspect of such nonaffirming negating does not go beyond being an abstraction [object universal]245 and a conceptual exclusion of other. Because it is therefore [merely] imagined, it does not qualify as the perfect [nature]. Inasmuch as it does not qualify as that, it cannot be explained as the actual [buddha] nature. The actual nature is explained as the essence of purity, bliss, permanence, and selfhood.246 On this view, the actual buddha nature is nothing but the perfect nature inseparable from buddha qualities; it is the naturally pure dharmadhātu. As he explains: The identification of [buddha] nature may be explained unerringly as follows: That naturally pure sphere which is inseparable from the qualities such as the [ten] yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes so | | The last sentence Asaṅga quotes is found with minor variation in the Śūnyatānāmamahāsūtra, D290 (i.e., Cūḷasuññatasutta, Majjhimanikāya 121), 5001: gang la gang med pa de des stong ngo zhes bya bar yang dag par rjes su mthong yang | de la lhag mar gang yod pa de de la yod do zhes bya bar yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes te | | Though the wording is taken from the Cūḷasuññatasutta, Mathes argues (Mathes 2007, 12) that the meaning is different. The itaretaraśūnyatā as presented in that sūtra implied that a specific area is empty of elephants without negating elephants per se, whereas the emptiness of adventitious stains negates the existence of them altogether. On Mi bskyod rdo rje’s interpretation of the CS passage, see below, 302 f. 244 See RGV I.28: “Because the saṃbuddhakāya embraces, because suchness is undifferentiated and because they have the potential, all beings are always endowed with buddha nature.” saṃbuddhakāyaspharaṇāt | tathatāvyati bhedataḥ | gotra taś ca sadā sarve buddhagarbhāḥ śarīriṇaḥ | | Shākya mchog ldan seems to read the term buddhagarbhaḥ in RGV I.28 as the “seed (garbha) of a buddha” and not as “buddha nature”. 245 See Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti ad 1.2, in Hattori 1968, 177 where he identifies direct perception and inference as the two epistemic instruments or means of valid cognition and explains “it is direct perception which has objects which are particulars, whereas it is inference which has objects which are universals.” rang gi mtshan nyid kyi yul can ni mngon sum yin la spyi’i mtshan nyid kyi yul can ni rjes su dpag pa’o | Stated concisely, direct perception is a bare nonconceptual apprehension of reality, whereas inference deals with conceptual abstractions (universals) which Dignāga viewed as fictions created through a process of exclusion (apoha) that perceives an imputed sameness shared by similar things while disregarding their actual differences. For example, the concept “red” appears to correspond to some real feature of reality which all red things share (blueness) but is only a fiction constructed through excluding all that is not red. 246 Blo mchog dris lan, SCsb(C) vol. 17, 7431‒6 : sangs rgyas kyi snying po’i ngos ’dzin chos nyid med dgag gi cha la ’chad pa de ni rigs pa ma yin te | sgrub byed kyi lung med pa dang | gnos byed kyi rigs pa yod pa’i phyir | dang po ni | sangs rgyas kyi snying po ngos ’dzin pa’i bka’ dang bstan bcos mtha’ dag na | stobs sogs yon tan dang dbyer med pa’i cha nas ngos ’dzin pa sha stag tu yod pa yin gyi | med dgag gi cha nas ’chad pa gcig kyang med pa’i phyir | rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos na | don rnam pa gsum rtags su bkod nas | rigs can kun khams bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po dang ldan par bsgrubs pa zhig yod pa …| gnyis pa gnod byed ni | de lta bu’i med dgag gi cha de | spyi mtshan dang | ldog pa gzhan sel las ma ’das pas kun btags yin pa’i phyir na yongs grub tu mi rung la | der mi rung ba ni snying po dngos su ’chad mi nus te | snying po dngos ni gtsang bde rtag bdag gi ngo bor bshad pa’i phyir | 98 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN powers is called “buddha nature” (buddhagarbha). As is stated in the Uttaratantra treatise: [Query:] What is the tathāgatagarbha explained as a mode of emptiness? [Reply:] “Having the defining characteristic of being separable, the element is empty of the adventitious, but having the characteristic of not being separable, it is not empty of unsurpassable qualities”247. Also, that which is inseparable does not exist as something other than complete buddhahood. Thus, according to the same [text]: “The characteristic of liberation is to be inseparable from its qualities—complete, innumerable, inconceivable, and stainless as they are. That liberation is called tathāgata”.248 And “In brief, since the meaning of this uncontaminated sphere is divided into four [aspects], it should be known from the four synonyms for it [such as] dharmakāya etc.”249.250 Shākya mchog ldan’s vehement criticism of the “latter-day” theory of buddha nature as a nonaffirming negation was primarily directed at his Dge lugs pa coreligionists, though he also complained in his Mahāmudrā works that most of his Sa skya colleagues had come under the influence of this view. Also, in his One Hundred and Eight Dharma Topics, Shākya mchog ldan explicitly states that the reduction of the emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects (sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā) to a nonaffirming negation is the tradition of Tsong kha pa and his followers and that it stands in contradiction to all scripture, reasoning and the spiritual instructions251. 247 RGV, I.155, p.763‒4: śūnya āgantukair dhātuḥ savinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ | aśūnyo ’nuttarair dharmair avinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ | | 248 RGV I.87, p. 568‒9: sarva ākārair asaṃkhyeyair acyntyair amalair guṇaiḥ | abhinna lakṣano mokṣa yo mokṣaḥ sa tathāgata iti | | 249 RGV I.85, p.558‒9: dharmakāya ādi paryāyā veditavyāḥ samāsataḥ | catvaro anāsrave dhātau catur artha prabhedataḥ | | The four aspects are the [1] dharmakāya in the sense that the inconceivable qualities of a buddha have never been separated from buddha nature, [2] tathāgata in the sense that the innate qualities are perfected, [3] ultimate truth in the sense that the quality of buddha nature is never failing, and [4] absolute nirvāṇa, that right from the beginning buddha nature is pure. See Takasaki 1966, 259‒60. 250 Blo mchog dri lan, SCsb(C) vol. 17, 7436‒7445: snying po’i ngos ’dzin ma nor bar bshad pa ni | dbyings rang bzhin gyis rnam par dag pa de nyid stobs sogs yon tan gyi chos rnams dang dbyer med par gyur pa de la sangs rgyas kyi snying po zhes zer ba yin te | ji skad du | rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos las | stong pa nyid kyi tshul la brjod pa’i de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po de gang zhe na | rnam dbyer bcas pa’i mtshan nyid can | | glo bur dag gis khams stong gi | | rnam dbyer med pa’i mtshan nyid can | | bla med chos kyis stong ma yin | | zhes gsungs pas so | | dbyer med pa de yang rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas las gzhan la yod pa ma yin te | de nyid las | rnam pa thams cad grangs med pa | | bsam med dri med yon tan dang | | dbyer med mtshan nyid thar pa ste | | thar pa gang de de bzhin gshegs | | zhes dang | mdor na zag med dbyings la ni | | don gyi rab tu dbye ba bzhis | | chos kyi sku laa sogs pa yi | | rnam grags bzhir ni rig par bya | | zhes gsungs shing | | atext has las 251 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 3345: “Identifying emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects as a nonaffirming negation is the system of the great Tsong kha pa and his followers. [This] contradicts all scripture, reasoning, and the upadeśas.” rnam kun mchog ldan stong pa nyid | | med par dgag la ngos ’dzin pa | | tsong kha pa chen rjes ’jug lugs | | lung rigs man ngag kun dang ’gal | | 99 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN The idea that buddha nature and buddha qualities are inseparable from each other is fundamental to the author’s view of the Buddhist path. As a practitioner settles into self-aware wisdom as it is personally realized and accumulates boundless merit, the qualities of buddha nature manifest with the attainment of buddhahood. This understanding of the path as the progressive disclosure of buddha nature and its qualities is clearly articulated in a stanza from his Profound Thunder252 along with the relevant explanation from its auto-commentary, The Rain of Ambrosia: [1] Having understood that the mere awareness of clarity-emptiness, [2] Free from the subject and object, is the abiding mode of all phenomena, [3] One unites [this realization] with the boundless collection of merit, [and] [4] Spontaneously accomplishes the three kāyas, as [taught in] Asaṅga’s texts. The explanation [is as follows]: [1] View: to sever superimpositions by the reasoning of Gzhan stong; [2] Meditation: to rest in equipoise in personally realized wisdom; [3] Conduct: to thereby unite [that realization] with the collection of merit; [4] [Fruition:] to thereby spontaneously accomplish the svābhāvikakāya replete with all buddha-qualities, and the two formkāyas which manifest for others.253 Here, Shākya mchog ldan explicitly equates buddha nature with buddha qualities and specifies Gzhan stong as the view allowing the aspirant to pare away the reifications that obscure and distort it in order to reveal it. Once such superimpositions are eliminated root and branch, one settles into the wisdom of equipoise whereby the accumulations of merit are brought fully into play and the goal of the three kāyas replete with all qualities (svābhāvikakāya) and manifestations for others (rūpakāya) are spontaneously realized. This represents the fruition of the Mahāmudrā buddha nature view, a view consisting in the unity of manifestation and emptiness, of buddha nature’s natural purity and its inseparable buddha qualities. 252 Verses from Nges don rgya mtsho’i sprin gyi ’bru sgra zab mo, SCsb(B) vol. 2, 3993‒4: gsal stong gzung ’dzin bral ba’i rig pa tsam | | chos rnams kun gyi gnas lugs yin shes nas | | mtha’ yas bsod nams tshogs dang zung ’brel ba | | sku gsum lhun gyis grub pa thogs med gzhung | | 253 Commentary and verse from Nges don rgya mtsho sprin gyi ’brug sgra zab mo’i rgyas ’grel bdud rtsi’i char ’bebs (The Rain of Ambrosia). See Komarovski 2011, 371, n. 93, and Shing rta chen po’i srol gnyis kyi rnam par dbye ba bshad nas nges don gcig tu bsgrub pa’i bstan bcos kyi rgyas ’grel, SCsb(B) vol 2, 6261‒4: lta ba gzhan stong gi rigs pas sgro ’dogs bcad cing | sgom pa so sor rang gis rig pa’i ye shes la mnyam par gzhag nas | spyod pa bsod nams kyi tshogs dang zung du sbrel bas ’bras bu ngo bo nyid kyi sku yon tan kun tshang dang | gzhan snang du gzugs kyi sku gnyis lhun gyis grub bo zhes ’chad pa ni | gsal stong gzung ’dzin bral ba’i rig pa tsam | | chos rnams kun gyi gnas lugs yin shes nas | | mtha‘ yas bsod nams tshogs dang zung ’brel ba | | sku gsum lhun gyis grub pa thogs med gzhung | | ces pa’o. See also tr. Komarovski 2011, 190. (translation is our own). Note that the Tibetan text has the root stanza after the commentary but is reversed in our translation. 100 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN DIRECT PERCEPTION AND NONDUAL WISDOM For Shākya mchog ldan, access to mahāmudrā is possible only through personally realized wisdom which is devoid of the dichotomy of apprehending subject and apprehended object. We may recall his repeated admonitions that mahāmudrā is beyond the domain of what is expressible in language and thought (sgra bsam du brjod pa’i yul) and can never be an abstraction or object-universal (don spyi) deducible by reasoning which investigates the ultimate. Central to Shākya mchog ldan’s understanding of soteriological knowledge, the type of knowledge which realizes mahāmudrā, is the old Buddhist concept of personally realized wisdom (conveyed by the Tibet term so sor rang rig pa’i ye shes) which had been in circulation from the time of the Pāli Canon onwards254 and was widely adopted by Indian and Tibetan Buddhist scholars of virtually all traditions ever since.255 The concept encapsulates the long-standing Buddhist conviction that the state of goal-realization (in this case, jñāna but elsewhere the paramārthasatya, the pariniṣpanna256 etc.) must be ‘personally experienced’ to be fully understood.257 On this understanding, wisdom is a matter of direct acquaintance and not discoverable in any other fashion.258 In Shākya mchog ldan’s words: “In particular, in [Sa skya Paṇḍita’s] Treasure of the Science [of Valid Cognition] it is explained that “nondual wisdom” (gnyis med ye shes) is without object. In general, in the Mahāyāna it is explained that the term “personally realized” (so sor rig pa) [means that] apart from what arises in one’s 254 See for example Kapstein 2000 (112 f.) where the following passage from Majjhimanikāya I 265 (PTS ed.) is quoted: upanītā kho me tumhe bhikkhave iminā sandiṭṭhikena dhammena akālikena ehipassikena opanayikena paccattaṃ veditabbena viññūhi| “Monks! You have been guided by me by means of this visibly true dhamma, that is timeless, ostensible, conducive [to the goal], and to be personally realized by the wise.” (translation modified for the sake of consistency). Here, paccattaṃ veditabba is equivalent to the Sanskrit pratyāmaveditavya (o-vedanīya) and to Tibetan so sor rang gis rig par bya ba. 255 The compound can be rendered as ‘wisdom as it is personally realized’ where the so sor rang rig pa’i-o (Skt. pratyātmavid-o) element of the compound is not intended adjectivally or nominatively but rather as a adverbverb combination that qualifies the abstract noun ye shes/jñāna. 256 It occurs a few times in Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā, as for example its explanation of Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā V.5 where a Yogācāra opponent takes the perfectly established nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva) to be an object of personal realization (pratyātmavid) in contrast to the imagined nature (parikalpitasvabhāva) which is an object of worldly knowledge. 257 We can consider, for example, Candrakīrti’s characterization of ultimate truth as the nature of things (svabhāva) that is to be known by each individual personally: “The ultimate reality of the buddhas is the nature of things itself. Because it is, moreover, non-deceptive, it is the ultimate truth (paramārthasatya). It is to be known by each one personally.” (don dam pa’i bden pa). sangs rgyas rnams kyi don dam pa ni rang bzhin nyid yin zhing | |de yang bslu ba med pa nyid kyis don dam pa’i bden pa yin la | |de ni de rnams kyi so sor rang gis rig par bya ba yin no| | MA 108, 16–19. 258 Thus when the vyākhyā on Ratnagotravibhāga 1.7 characterizes “self-awareness” using the term so so rang gis rig par bya ba (pratyātmavedanīya), it is specifying a mode of awareness that must be personally realized to be known. See Mathes 2008, 542 n. 1838. 101 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN own cognition there is nothing else to be realized (rtogs bya).”259 He also observes that mind’s nature is luminous in precisely the sense that it is known through the validity of one’s own experience (rang myong tshad ma)260 and that it is therefore a matter of directly perceiving it in oneself, as opposed to inference.261 The author repeatedly emphasizes the indispensability of this self-validating first-personal attestation in the application of Buddhists teachings. Shākya mchog ldan identifies this personally realized wisdom as a common thread running through tantric and non-tantric methods of goal-realization. In this regard, he cites the early Sa skya master Rje btsun Grags pa rgyal mtshan’s (1147‒1216)262 assertion that personally realized wisdom constitutes the common denominator of both the emptiness of the Yogācāra tradition and the coemergent nature (rang bzhin lhan skyes) of the Mantra tradition, but adds that a crucial distinction must nevertheless be made between the nondual wisdom realized through studying and thinking, which is only the so-called represented ultimate (rnam grangs pa’i don dam)263, and that is realized through the third tantric empowerment which is the nonrepresented ultimate (rnam grangs pa min pa’i don dam).264 259 Zab rgya’i snying po bsdus pa rin chen gter mdzod chos tshan brgyad pa, SCsb(A) vol. 13, 1875‒6: khyad par gnyis med ye shes la | | yul med rig pa’i gter las bshad | | spyir yang theg pa chen po las | | so sor rang rig ces bya ba | | rang nyid rig par skyes tsam las | | rtog bya gzhan med pa la bshad | | See Komarovski 2011, 245‒46 who, however, translates so sor rig pa as “individual cognition” and reads the last two lines as referring to a grammatical subject (“mind”) which is not included in the text and therefore misses the point of the definition. 260 Zab rgya’i snying po bsdus pa rin chen gter mdzod chos tshan brgyad pa, SCsb(A) vol. 13, 1871‒2: “Mind’s nature is luminous because it is known through the validity of one’s experience” sems kyi rang bzhin ’od gsal ba | | rang myong tshad mas rig pa’i phyir | | 261 Ibid., 1873‒4: “Because that luminous mind is precisely the valid means of direct perception, it does not logically follow that one’s own mind remains hidden from [or imperceptible to] itself.” od gsal ba yi sems de nyid | | rang la mngon sum tshad yin phyir | | rang blo rang la lkog gyur du | | thal bar ’gyur ba ma yin no | | 262 One of the Five Venerable Founders (rje btsun gong ma lnga) of the Sa skya tradition who all lived during the 12th and 13th centuries. 263 The term paryāya (Tib. rnam grangs) as it occurs in the distinction between a represented ultimate (rnam grangs [dang bcas] pa’i don dam : [*sa]paryāyaparamārtha) has a basic meaning of revolution, repetition, iteration, succession (s.v. MW) and refers, in lexical semantics, to a synonym (śabdaparyāya) and, by extension, to the conceptual representation of things. In regard to the two types of ultimate reality, the two senses of an approximation (or Ersatz) of reality and a conceptual representation are combined. Our rendering of these two as representational and nonrepresentional attempts to capture these two senses, namely, that [*sa]paryāya-paramārtha is both a conceptualization of the ultimate truth and also a mere approximation or facsimile of it. Standard translations of the pair as conceptual/actual, interpretive/noninterpretive capture only the second sense of paryāya. On the meaning of these terms see Seyfort Ruegg 2000, 98, 229‒30 and Tauscher 2003. 264 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 3572‒4: “The noble Rje btsun Grags pa said that because the emptiness of the Yogācāra and the coemergent nature of the Mantra[yāna] both have a common ground, it is called “personally realized wisdom”. However, the nondual wisdom that is realized through the logic of studying and thinking is the representational ultimate whereas the wisdom that is realized through the third empowerment is the nonrepresentational ultimate.” rnal ’byor spyod pa’i stong nyid dang | | sngags kyi rang bzhin lhan skyes la | | gzhi mthun yod phyir gnyis ka la | | so sor rang rig ye shes zer | | ’on kyang thos bsam rigs 102 pa yis | | rtogs pa’i SHĀKYA MCHOG LDAN The idea that the wisdom which is personally attested is without subject and object rekindles the question of what remains when objectifying and subjectivizing activities have ceased. It is clear from Shākya mchog ldan’s criticisms of the nonaffirming negation view of the Dge lugs pas and affirmative metaphysical absolutism of the Jo nang pas that the answer can, strictly speaking, neither be a something nor a nothing. What remains is only the indivisible moment of cognition devoid of subject-object duality (gzung ’dzin gnyis med kyi shes pa skad cig gi cha med): [Query:] If it is the case that there is no duality of apprehended [object] and apprehending [subject], then what is there that remains? [Reply:] All that exists is only the indivisible moment of knowing devoid of the duality of the subject and the object. 265 Intriguingly, while Shākya mchog ldan identifies this indivisible moment of nondual wisdom as the essence of the dharmadhātu 266, he maintains that being a real existent (dngos po), it must be considered impermanent. This idea that nondual wisdom is an impermanent indivisible moment stands in stark contrast to Dol po pa’s belief that wisdom lies beyond moments and even beyond time itself. 267 In his One Hundred and Eight Dharma Topics, Shākya mchog ldan distinguishes the emptiness which is accessible to direct perception by way of an affirming negation from the emptiness deductively established by ways of a nonaffirming emptiness which is an abstraction (or object-universal) and therefore inaccessible to direct perception. Here, the former emptiness is provocatively specified by Shākya mchog ldan as a real entity or existent gnyis med ye shes la | | rnam grangs pa yi don dam dang | | gsum pa’i dbang las rtogs pa yi | | ye shes de la rnam grangs pa | | min pa’i don dam zhes byar ni | | rje btsun grags pa’i zhabs kyis gsungs | | 265 Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi rnam bshad pa sde bdun ngag gi rol mtsho, SCsb(A) vol. 19, 475‒76: gzung ’dzin gnyis ka med pa de lta na | | lhag ma ci zhig yod ce na | | gzung ’dzin med kyi shes pa skad cig gi cha med pa cig kho na yod do | See also (tr.) Komarosvki 2011, 231‒32. Tsong kha pa had explained that an indivisible moment (skad cig cha med : nirvibhāgakṣaṇika) is characterized as a state of affairs (dngos po) which individually lacks previous or later moments, in contrast to its antonym ‘continuity’ (rgyun) which is characterized as a state of affairs which individually comprises a multiplicity of moments (e.g., “a year”). See Alex Wayman, A Millenium of Buddhist Logic (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1999), 262. The Vaibhāṣika school identified partless particles and partless moments as ultimate truth, a view rejected by Mahāyāna schools. 266 Mi bskyod rdo rje is more specific in identifying dharmadhātu as the ultimate object, self-awareness as the ultimate subject, and their integration as nondual wisdom. See his remark in Rang la nges pa’i tshad ma zhes pa’i ’grel pa gnas lugs bdud rtsi’i nying khu In: Rnal ’byor rgyud kyi rnam bshad, vol. 3, 3536‒3542: “The ultimate object is the dharmadhātu and the [ultimate] subject is self-awareness. When these become mingled, it is designated as nondual wisdom.” don dam gyi yul ni chos dbyings yin la | yul can ni rang rig yin zhing de ’dres par gyur tshe gnyis med kyi ye shes su ming ’dogs so | 267 This and other Jo nang views are examined in chapter four in light of Padma dkar po’s criticism of them. 103 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN (dngos po), adding that this term signifies something efficacious. In other words, emptiness is something capable of performing a function (don nus byed pa), specifically the function of engendering buddha qualities. As he explains: Because emptiness as a nonaffirming negation is nothing more than an abstraction [universal], there will never be a direct perception which cognizes it. Because any emptiness which constitutes a conceptualized object is an imputation, it is insufficient as a basis for [buddha-]qualities and only conventionally true. The emptiness which is a basis for qualities is explained in terms of the direct perception of yogins and the direct perception of self-awareness which are the cognizers of this [emptiness]. When through familiarization with such direct perception, it culminates in utmost vividness (gsal ba rab), the countless kāyas and wisdoms unite in this real existent (dngos po), emptiness. At that time, the two truths merge into one and this is called the unity of no more learning. There are many such explanations. Although many declare that it is untenable to [call] emptiness a real existent (dngos po), they should not sing the senseless song of those who don’t understand the Maitreya teachings or the Mantra doctrinal system. In the Maitreya teachings, the identification of emptiness is explained in the sense that [buddha nature] is empty of adventitious stains and not empty of the qualities such as the [ten] powers. In the Mantra [system], emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects is emphasized. Even this emptiness is the capacity to perform a function [efficacy], there being no explanation other than this. Should one ask what kind of function it performs, it is to engender all qualities on the level of buddhahood. Nothing else is required.268 Now, because emptiness construed as a nonaffirming negation cannot function as a basis for engendering qualities, it is nonefficacious, viz., a nonexistent (dngos por med), and 268 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 4293‒4302: med par dgag pa’i stong pa nyid | | spyi mtshan nyid las ma ’das phyir | | de ’jal byed pa’i mgnon sum ni | | nam yang yod pa ma yin no | | rtog pa’i yul du gang gyur pa’i | | stong nyid kun tu btags pa’i phyir | | yon tan rten du ma rdzogs shing | | kun rdzob nyid kyi bden pa’o | | yon tan rten gyur stong pa nyid | | de ’jal byed po rnal ’byor pa’i | | mngon sum nyid dang rang rig pa’i | | mngon sum nyid du bshad pa yin | | mngon sum gang yin de goms pas | | gsal ba rab kyi mthar phyin tshe | | sku dang ye shes bgrangs yas pa | | stong nyid de’i dngos por gcig | | de’i tshe na bden pa gnyis | | gcig tu ’dres par gyur pa dang | | mi slob pa yi zung ’jug ces | | mang por ’chad pa de yin no | | dngos la stong nyid mi rung zhes | | zer ba mang mod byams chos dang | | gsang sngags chos lugs ma shes pa’i | | ’chal gtam dbyangs su blang mi bya | | byams pa’i chos su stong nyid kyi | | ngos ’dzin blo bur dri ma yis | | stong dang stobs sogs yon tan gyis | | mi stong pa la bshad pa yin | | sngags su rnam kun mchog ldan pa’i | | stong pa nyid la gtso bor mdzad | | stong nyid de yang don byed par | | nus las gzhan la bshad pa med | | don gang byed par nus zhe na | | sangs rgyas sa yi yon tan kun | | bskyed la de las gzhan mi dgos | | 104 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN hence cannot lead to goal-realization, as useful as it might be for eradicating reifications. “Consequently, this nonexistent emptiness is taught in order to dispel superimpositions whereas the existent emptiness is taught in order to dispel deprecations. The emptiness as a real existent is identified as that wisdom which is free from apprehended and apprehender.” 269 Moreover, “although this emptiness is beyond all elaborations on the side of reasoning, it is experienced through personally realized wisdom and is thus ultimate truth as the ground of all qualities.”270 Shākya mchog ldan acknowledged that one cannot accept ultimate emptiness and the wisdom which realizes it as a real efficacious existent (dngos po) without also accepting its impermanence. This would appear to contradict statements in Buddha nature discourses that nondual wisdom or dharmadhātu is permanent, stable and enduring. As the author explains, however, the permanence alluded to in these contexts signifies the permanence of continuity (rgyun gyi rtag) which is, in Shākya mchog ldan’s eyes, not inconsistent with the view of indivisible moments (skad cig cha med) which disintegrate instantaneously upon arising: Hence it is necessary to accept that [wisdom] is impermanent, because it is a real existent and must therefore be accepted as instantaneously disintegrating (skad cig gis ’jig pa). Nevertheless, this does not contradict its being explained as permanent in other contexts. It is explained that way with the permanence of continuity (rgyun gyi rtag pa) in mind.271 Shākya mchog ldan’s view of the momentary yet continuously present wisdom is indebted to the view of universal momentariness upheld in the Abhidharma philosophy of the Sarvāstivādin school according to which all phenomena only persist momentarily. 272 This is 269 Ibid., 4274‒5: de phyir dngos med stong nyid ni | | sgro ’dogs sel ba’i phyir gsungs te | | dngos por gyur pa’i stong nyid ni | | skur ’debs sel ba’i phyir du’o | | de ltar mtha’ gnyis las grol ba’i | | stong pa nyid kyi dngos po ni | | gzung dang ’dzin pa las grol ba’i | | ye shes nyid la ’chad pa yin | | … stong nyid de yang rigs pa’i ngor | | spros pa kun las ’das gyur kyang | | so so rang rig ye shes kyis | | myong phyir yon tan kun gyi bzhi | | de nyid don dam pa’i bden pa | | 270 Ibid., 4282: stong nyid de yang rigs pa’i ngor | | spros pa kun las ’das gyur kyang | | so so rang rig ye shes kyis | | myong phyir yon tan kun gyi bzhi | | de nyid don dam pa’i bden pa | | 271 Sdom gsum gyi rab tu dbye ba’i bstan bcos kyi ’bel gtam rnam par nges pa legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, SCsb(A) vol. 6, 4983‒4: de’i phyir mi rtag par yang khas len dgos pa yin te | | dngos po yin pas skad cig gis ’jig par khas len dgos pa’i phyir | de lta na yang | skabs gzhan du rtag par bshad pa dang mi ’gal te | | rgyun gyi rtag pa la bsams nas de ltar ’chad pa’i phyir | Tr. Komarovski 2011, 231. See also Komarovski 2006, n. 39. 272 “This view offered a scholastic interpretation of the Buddha’s doctrine that all things in the world of sentient beings were subject to causes and conditions, and therefore impermanent. Buddhists rejected the notion of substances with changing qualities, and affirmed instead that change was logically impossible. One can see how the impossibility of change, coupled with the doctrine of impermanence, served to prove that all things persisted for only a moment. Vasubandhu certainly shared this view, and he drew upon the premises of impermanence and the impossibility of change to establish momentariness in his own works. Yet he added a new twist to the 105 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN established both by the fact that all phenomena are impermanent inasmuch as that they are produced by causes and conditions and that change is impossible given that there are no substances with changing qualities (which would contradict the Sarvāstivādin view that an existent must have inalienable properties). For Shākya mchog ldan, an important corollary of this view is the supposition that the present moment of consciousness is alone existent and efficacious, whereas temporal segments—the past and future—are only nominally existent (prajñaptisat); they are imputations of the mind.273 Viewed according to the standard Abhidharma mereological (part-whole) analysis, just as seemingly partless atoms can be subdivided into smaller units on account of their spatial extension, it would seem to follow that apparently partless moments can by subdivided into smaller segments in terms of their temporal extension being divisible into past, present and future segments. Yet in contrast to spatially extended atoms, there are in fact no adjacent past and future segments co-existing with the present moment in that this latter is instantaneously disintegrating upon arising. The point here is not that past and future are fictional in the sense that the past no longer exists, and the future does not yet exist, but that they never could exist in the first place since there truly is only the instantaneously arising and disintergrating present moment. And conversely, the logic which tries to analyze this subtle and fleeting present moment of mind is unable to refute it. What withstands critical assessment then is the present moment of awareness without subject and object and devoid of past and future, and nothing besides it is established.274 Shākya mchog ldan explains in his One Hundred and Eight Dharma Topics: Though the adamantine [nature] of mind (sems kyi rdo rje) does not exist from the standpoint of analysis by the reasoning based on studying and thinking, it cannot be posited as nonexistent either because it is beyond the domain of language and argument. What he added was that things must self-destruct, for destruction cannot be caused. And why not? Because a cause and a result are real entities, and the ostensible object of a destruction is a nonexistent. How, he asks, can nonexistence be a result?” See Jonathan Gold, “Vasubandhu”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition, online), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Last accessed Nov. 24, 2015. 273 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 1854‒7: “[Query:] What is the past and the future? [Reply:] The past and the future are nominally existent (prajñaptisat). That is clear from the classical texts of the Śrāvaka school. Their tradition claims that the perdurance of a single moment in which temporal segments do not exist is the ultimate and is capable of performing a function. This being so, by deprecating all ‘existents’, isn’t there the flaw of falling into the extreme of nihilism? If one queries whether they are only conventionally existent, the answer is that “conventionally existent and ultimately nonexistent” was taught by the Buddha as a skillful means to distinguish between the two truths.” ’das dang ma ’ongs ci zhe na | | ’das dang ma ’ongs btags yod du | | nyan thos sde pa’i gzhung na’ang gsal | | dus kyi cha shes yod min pa’i | | skad cig gcig tu gnas pa ni | | don dam don byed nus pa zhes | | ’dod pa de yi lugs yin no | | de lta yin na dngos kun la | | skur pa btab pas chad pa’i mthar | | ltung ba’i nyes pa yod min nam | | tha snyad bden pa ci zhe na | | tha snad du yod dam par med | | ces pa bden gnyis rnam ’byed kyi | | thabs mkhas sangs rgyas gyis gsungs pa | | 274 See also Komarovski 2011, 231‒38. 106 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN concepts. [Query:] Then what is the use of emphasizing the reasoning of selfemptiness? [Reply:] It is in order to relinquish the clinging to the adamantine [nature] mind which is the perfect [nature]. 275 To summarize, by characterizing the temporality of wisdom as both momentary (since past and future cannot exist) and continuous (since it is ever-present as the capacity to function as the basis of qualities), Shākya mchog ldan plies a middle course between extremes of existence and nonexistence. Thus he can affirm, in the context of Kālacakra exegesis, that wisdom is the permanence of continuity given that “it is free from the centre and limits of origination and destruction inasmuch as it has no beginning and yet never ends”. But he can at the same time concede that wisdom is also momentary because it does not perdure apart from the streaming present, and in this sense does not exist as a real existent (dngos por med). Yet, one cannot help but notice that this latter claim explicitly contradicts the author’s thesis that wisdom and ultimate emptiness is a real existent because it has the efficacy to engender buddha qualities whereas emptiness as a nonaffirming negation is not because it lacks such efficacy. It would seem that in alternately characterizing wisdom as permanent yet impermanent, continuous yet momentary, and existent yet nonexistent, Shākya mchog ldan has painted himself into a metaphysical corner: Since this [nondual wisdom] is free from a centre or limit of origination and destruction inasmuch as it has no beginning and yet never ends, it is precisely the permanence of continuity. Yet because it is wisdom itself, it does not perdure for a moment and it therefore does not exist as a real existent (dngos por med). There are no objects of knowledge other than E and Vaṃ and these alone are the cause and basis of the qualities of buddhahood. These alone are ultimate truth. All phenomena from these are conventional. … Because all conventional realities are empty of their own essences, they do not exist. However, this one ultimate truth is not empty of its own essence. Nonetheless, grasping it as any of the four extremes, obscures it. E Vaṃ is free from all concepts and words. 276 275 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 1871‒2: sems kyi rdo rje’ang thos bsam gyi | | rigs pas brtags pa’i ngor med kyang | | med par bzhag nus ma yin te | | sgra rtog yul las ’das phyir ro | | ’o na rang stong rigs pa la rtsal du bton pas ci bya na | | yongs grub sems kyi rdo rje la | | zhen pa spong pa’i phyir yin no | | See Komarovski 2011, 233. (translation our own) 276 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad, SCsb(B) vol. 13, 4636‒4643: ’di la thog ma yod min zhing | | nam yang zad pa med pa’i phyir | | skye ’jig mtha’ dbus dang bral bas | | rgyun gyi rtag pa nyid dang ni | | ye shes nyid phyir skad cig tu | | mi gnas phyir na dngos por med | | e vaṃ gnyis las ma gtogs pa’i | | shes bya gang yang yod min cing | | ’di nyid kho na sangs rgyas kyi | | yon tan rnams kyi rgyu dang rten | | de de kho na don dam bden | | de las gzhan chos kun rdzob bo | | … kun rdzob bden kun rang rang gi | | ngo bo stong phyir yod min mod | | don dam bden gcig rang ngo bos | | stong pa min mod mtha’ bzhi po | | gang du bzung kyang de la sgrib | | e vaṃ rtog brjod kun bral ba | | 107 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN By concluding that only conventional truth is empty of own essence, whereas ultimate truth alone is not empty of its own essence, Shākya mchog ldan seems to endorse a strong Gzhan stong position. Yet, as we may recall from our assessment of his view of the two truths, he elsewhere maintains that both conventional and ultimate truths are empty of own essence. The foregoing examination of Shākya mchog ldan’s views on soteriological knowledge indicates some of the problems he faced in articulating a view of wisdom that could account for its enduring yet momentary character while avoiding the extremes of existence and nonexistence. In some ways, his accounts of wisdom in the Mahāmudrā works at least have the virtue of circumventing various perplexities about the ontological status of wisdom and instead emphasizing its soteriological value and efficacy. For in the Bka’ brgyud he encountered a tradition which accords first-hand experience and direct perception primacy over conceptual analysis and rational inference, a tradition in which the role of personally realized wisdom takes center stage. In a certain sense this wisdom is self-validating—it must be experienced to be known—and questions of its ontological status are secondary to this ‘truth’ of first-personal attestation. As Shākya mchog ldan states in his Undermining the Haughtiness: As for the way to cultivate deep insight, there is meditative equipoise and postmeditation. In meditative equipoise, when any concepts of existence and quiescence that spring up are looked at by another conceptual analysis (rtog dpyod), the former dissolve in the expanse. When that conceptual analysis, the looker, is seen by the third insight, then seer and seen both mingle into the very essence of deep insight. On that occasion, one speaks of “the realization of deep insight which is clear and nonconceptual”. At that time, all unreal conceptualizations cease, not to mention the concepts on the side of the antidotes which must also cease because they are precisely the grasping for [and believing in] discursive signs.277 It is from this perspective that Shākya mchog ldan strongly rejects the criticism that settling the mind directly in the mere “experiencing awareness”, the lucid and luminous mind, without prior analysis amounts to a kind of voluntary stupefaction, a stagnant tranquility which lacks the capacity to counteract the afflictions. On the contrary, this settling meditation, if properly applied, elicits the wisdom of first-hand experience which alone has the capacity to eradicate the ‘great delusion’ underlying all afflictions until not a trace of them remains: 277 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 21, critical edition: 31. 108 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN It is said that settling the mind in the mere experiencing awareness (myong rig) without having undertaken prior analysis, is [just] a stagnant (lteng po) calm abiding which does not function as a remedy against afflictions. My response to that is if that were the case, then the stages of luminosity of Cakrasaṃvara and Guhyasamāja would also be just that [state of blankness] because there is no analysis in these contexts [either]. Thus this luminous mind is indeed great wisdom. When the realization of this intensifies, there is no trace of great delusion (rmongs chen) which remains.278 THE GREAT SEAL IN SHĀKYA MCHOG LDAN'S MAHĀMUDRĀ TRILOGY We are now in a position to examine in some detail how Shākya mchog ldan articulates and defends the views and practices of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition. More specifically, we shall consider why he came to the conclusion that this tradition represented the culmination of all Buddhist paths and offered the best prospect of resolving two central issues in the interpretation and practice of Buddhism which he repeatedly drew attention to in his philosophical writings: [1] the reconciliation of philosophical analysis and meditative experience in the context of coordinating the diverse teachings and methods delineated in the tantric and non-tantric vehicles of Buddhism; and [2] the realization, within the arena of spiritual praxis, of a unity (zung ’jug : yuganaddha) of manifestation and emptiness which transcends the extremes of existence and nonexistence, affirmation and negation. Our assessment of the author’s Mahāmudrā exegesis is largely confined to his Mahāmudrā trilogy, though parallel treatments in other works will be considered where they cast additional light on key subjects treated in the trilogy. MAHĀMUDRĀ: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT IS NOT Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā trilogy consists of three independent works which present and defend the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā teachings. Listed by their abbreviated English titles in the sequence they occur in the different editions of the author’s collected writings, they are: Undermining the Haughtiness of Others (PCdn), Ascertaining the Intent of the Supreme Siddhas (PCgn) and The Great Ship of Unity (PCks).279 The works were 278 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan lta ba so so’i ngos ’dzin tshul nges don gnad kyi lde mig, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1036‒1041: dpyad pa sngon du ma song bar | | myong rig tsam la sems ’jog pa | | de ni zhi gnas lteng po ste | | nyon mongs gnyen po mi ’gro zer | | de la kho bos lan gdab pa | | de ltar yin na bde mchog dang | | gsang ba ’dus pa’i ’od gsal gyi | | rim pa’ang de nyid du ’gyur te | de skab dpyad pa med phyir ro | | des na rang sems ’od gsal ba | | ’di nyid ye shes chen po ste | | ’di yi rtogs pa gong ’phel na | | rmongs chen gud du lus pa med | | 279 The full titles are: [1] Undermining the Haughtiness of Others by the Wheel of Brahma: A Treatise Clarifying Mahāmudrā (Phyag rgya chen po gsal bar byed pa’i bstan bcos tshangs pa’i ’khor los gzhan blo’i dregs pa nyams byed) (PCdn), [2] Ascertaining the Intent of the Supreme Siddhas, a Treatise Called Distinguishing Mahāmudrā, 109 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN all written at the behest of disciples whose names are mentioned but whose identities remain largely unknown. Taken collectively, the three works may be regarded as a series of attempts to clarify both what Mahāmudrā is and what it is not. Let us consider each of these points in turn. For the author, mahāmudrā is a cover term which, like various other doxographical rubrics such as prajñāpāramitā, madhyamaka, and rdzogs chen, refers not only to a Buddhist tradition of exegesis and practice, but also to an integrated set of soteriological methods, and the state of goal-realization they lead to. As a descriptor of goal-realization, mahāmudrā refers to certain deep features of human reality—nonduality, luminous clarity, imperishable great bliss—that are thought to characterize this realization. In Undermining the Haughtiness, Shākya mchog ldan identifies mahāmudrā as the allpervading natural luminosity of mind which is both the definitive meaning of Pāramitāyāna and the doctrinal nucleus of the Mantrayāna. Since the luminous nondual wisdom with which Mahāmudrā is chiefly concerned is the conditio sine qua non of sūtras and tantras alike, Shākya mchog ldan argues that this tradition deals directly with one of the key points of both Pāramitāyāna and the Mantrayāna: “When this key point is understood, then regardless which of the distinct paths of means for realization of the definitive meaning as taught in the Pāramitā[yāna] and the Mantra[yāna] are entered, it will be the very best.”280 In line with these two traditions, “the wisdom of mahāmudrā which, untouched by distraction due to all sorts of intellectually contrived elaborations… is explained as [1] the very wisdom free from subject and object which is the definitive meaning of the third dharmacakra in the Pāramitā[yāna] and [2] the E and Vaṃ, and the emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects (sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā) of the Unsurpassed [Yoga] tantras and what is identified as the essence in the Hevajra and other [tantras]”.281 In the same text, the author also equates mahāmudrā with ultimate bodhicitta of Mahāyāna and the adamantine mind (cittavajra) which he says is identified as a concept of definitive meaning in the Guhyasamāja tantra. We may recall that the author equates mahāmudrā with various soteriological ideas endemic to third dharmacakra discourses such as the unchanging *sugatagarbha, the nature of mind, and luminosity, especially as these ideas are elucidated in the RGV.282 We may also (Phyag rgya chen po’i shan ’byed ces bya ba’i bstan bcos [or] Grub pa mchog gi dgongs pa rnam nges) (PCgn); [3] Distinguishing Mahāmudrā or The Great Ship of Unity: A Treatise Dispelling Errors in the Interpretation of Mahāmudrā of Scripture and Reasoning (Phyag rgya chen po’i shan ’byed [or] Lung rigs gnyis kyi phyag rgya chen po’i bzhed tshul la ’khrul pa sel ba’i bstan bcos zung ’jug gi gru chen) (PCks). For details concerning the dating, literary form, authorship, and copying of these works, see Volume II, 11‒13. 280 See PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 15, critical edition: 27. 281 Shākya mchog ldan starts for example his Undermining the Haughtiness of Others with the following words: “I pay homage to the unwavering mahāmudrā, the naturally pure perfect buddha-mind—unadulterated by the host of adventitious stains—which has been ever-present in all for all time”, see PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 14, critical edition: 27. 282 See PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 17 f. 110 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN recall that in Undermining the Haughtiness, Shākya mchog ldan explained that “the element which is buddha nature (*sugatagarbha) has been given the name mahāmudrā”283 because it is the element of both sentient beings and buddhas. In terms of Buddhist tantras, mahāmudrā is equated with the continuum (rgyud) of ground, path, and fruition and, as he adds elsewhere, with imperishable great bliss (mi zad pa’i bde ba chen po) which marks the culmination of the tantric empowerments. More specifically, he explains that Sgam po pa described Mahāmudrā as the Self-sufficient White Remedy (dkar po gcig thub) with the understanding that “when one has arrived at the supramundane path, all the qualities of purification such as the [thirtyseven factors conducive to] awakening, loving kindness, compassion etc., which carry the name of “great bliss” are of one taste with the essence of dharmadhātu wisdom”.284 In establishing family resemblances between the concept of mahāmudrā and kindred soteriological ideas from different currents of Buddhist exegesis, we have noted that Shākya mchog ldan equates mahāmudrā with: [1] “mind’s luminous nature” as distinguished from ordinary mind in the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā, [2] the beginningless element (dhātu) characterized as the source of all phenomena in the Abhidharmasūtra, [3] the purity of mind which is said in the Ratnagotravibhāga to be the basis of all the unfounded mental engagements stemming from delusion, and [4] mind as such (sems nyid) which Saraha’s Dohākoṣa declares to be the seed of everything (saṃsāra and nirvāṇa) and to be a supreme wish-granting gem since it bestows all the fruits of one’s desires. Indeed, Saraha’s Dohā Trilogy and related works are regarded as the loci classici of this tradition, while the Maitreya works and tantras are regarded as sharing the same affirmative viewpoint.285 To further elucidate the meaning of mahāmudrā, Shākya mchog ldan distinguishes between mahāmudrā as perceived object and mahāmudrā of the perceiving mind.286 The former comprises luminosity that is the innate nature of mind, known also by the terms natural coemergent wisdom, *sugatagarbha, great bliss and natural dharmakāya. The latter, which he characterizes as “the wisdom which experiences mahāmudrā as [its] object,” comprises [1] a mimetic or counterfeit (rjes mthun pa) wisdom that exists even in ordinary people and [2] an authentic one (mtshan nyid pa) that is present in noble beings. This unusual distinction is perhaps best viewed in conjunction with Shākya mchog ldan’s view that sentient beings do not have buddha nature (buddhagarbha) but only a potential (rigs) or nature of sentient beings (sattvagarbha). This comparison is supported by a related distinction he draws between two modes of cognition which mahāmudrā-wisdom is said to comprise: [1] consciousness (rnam 283 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 17, critical edition: 29. 284 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 52, critical edition: 75. 285 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 17, 20, 50 etc. 286 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 50‒51, critical edition: 73‒74, under the heading 2.1.1.2: What is mahāmudrā in terms of the perceived object, and 2.1.1.3. What is mahāmudrā in terms of the perceiving mind? 111 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN shes) which is in the grip of delusion and [2] the wisdom (ye shes) of realization which is without delusion.287 This distinction enables the author to specify, in line with Rnog Blo ldan shes rab’s buddha nature interpretation, how beings in the grip of dualistic perceptions and conceptions have within them the possibility to be liberated from saṃsāric states. Shākya mchog ldan on this basis explains that although mahāmudrā “has been drawn into saṃsāric states, it is impossible for it to mix inseparably with saṃsāric phenomena.” Moreover, since it is “therefore present as the very possibility to one day be separated [from these states], mahāmudrā is the element of sentient beings (sattvadhātu) too.” Next, he explains that since the delusion-free wisdom “is mixed inseparably with mind as such which is cultivated through familiarization with it, the element of buddhas (buddhadhātu) is mahāmudrā as well.”288 To put it somewhat differently, mahāmudrā is in the world but not of the world; it is the wisdom which is a precondition of, and therefore available within, all conscious states, though not readily accessible to sentient beings. Concluding his discussion of immanent buddha nature or mahāmudrā-wisdom, the author states: “In this way it is understood both through scripture and reasoning that all sentient beings are sealed by mahāmudrā.”289 At various points in the trilogy he elaborates on the meaning of this ‘sealing’ or ‘marking’. In his The Great Ship of Unity he states that “both the subject and object are called Great Seal (mahāmudrā), because one does not perceive anything knowable at all that is not marked and sealed by this mudrā.”290 Elsewhere in the trilogy he explains: “There is nothing anywhere that is not sealed with the seal of this [wisdom]. Consequently, in designating this with the name ‘Great Seal’, the proper name (dngos ming) has both an explanation and application. There is no contradiction in it being [both] a metonymic term [based on its association with a seal] and a proper name [based on the actual nature of reality denoted].”291 Stated simply, mahāmudrā refers both to the mahāmudrā experience itself and the comprehensive and enduring impression it is said to make upon the person who has had it.292 287 PCdn, see Vol II, translation: 18, critical edition: 29 “The wisdom of mahāmudrā is [both] the consciousness which is seized by delusion and the wisdom of realization which is without delusion.”. 288 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 19, critical edition: 30. 289 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 20, critical edition: 30. 290 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 51, critical edition: 73. 291 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 20, critical edition: 30. 292 This invites comparison with Heidegger’s statement in On Time and Being: “Being, by which all beings as such are marked, is presencing,” where he understands presencing to refer to the disclosure or letting-be present which is Being itself. See Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, tr. Joan Stambaugh (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), 5. 112 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Shākya mchog ldan regards mahāmudrā and the many synonyms of it gathered from the sūtras and tantras as being of definitive meaning (nges don), and not of merely provisional meaning (drang don), and as referring to ultimate reality not the conventional. On this view, mahāmudrā, luminosity, buddha nature, and the nature of mind are precisely the goal which the practitioner discovers by way of first-hand experience once the reifications that obscure it are dispelled. Such concepts refer not to superimposed conventional epiphenomena that are eliminated in the realization of nonaffirming emptiness, but rather to deep features of reality which withstand such elimination and with which the aspirant becomes directly acquainted in meditation. They are, to borrow a distinction of N.S.C. Northrop, concepts by intuition rather than concepts by postulation293 in that their sense derives from phenomena that are immediately apprehended rather than from postulates in a deductively formulated theory. Defining mahāmudrā as nothing less than ultimate truth, Shākya mchog ldan takes pains to distinguish it from a variety of misinterpretations he attributes to his coreligionists. In his Ascertaining the Intent, the author specifies five mistaken identifications and indicates why each should be rejected: [1] The first is the identification of mahāmudrā with meditation on emptiness by means of analysis employing *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka reasonings which is rejected on the grounds that it takes mahāmudrā as a nonaffirming emptiness, a mere conceptual abstraction or other-exclusion (gzhan sel), where it is actually primordial wisdom free from extremes. [2] The second is the Buddhist tantric identification of mahāmudrā with the unity of bliss and emptiness attained by filling the cakras via the stages of ‘blessing from within’ (svādiṣṭhāna) which is rejected on the grounds that tantric means were not primarily emphasized by Sgam po pa. [3] The third is the identification of mahāmudrā with “seeing naked mind free from all thoughts” found among certain proponents of the three Great Ones (Madhyamaka, Mahāmudrā and Rdzogs chen)294 which is rejected on the basis of Sgam po pa’s contention that the three “are not uncontrived because they are understood only through extraneous conditions, whereas the self-sufficient [white remedy], the self-occuring wisdom is…not something newly contrived.” [4] The fourth is the identification of mahāmudrā with meditation in which “the seeing mind is not found by searching for it” advocated in the Zhi byed (Pacification) system which he rejects on the grounds that it has its own separate line of transmission (from Dwags po Mahāmudrā) and tends to reify naked awareness along the lines of the Sāṃkhya absolute Consciousness-Spirit. Finally, [5] The fifth is the identification of 293 According to Northrop, a concept by postulation is one the meaning of which in whole or in part is designated by the postulates of the deductive theory in which it occurs. An example is the concept “blue” when taken in the sense of the frequency or wavelength in electromagnetic theory. A concept by intuition is one which denotes, and the complete meaning of which is given by, something which is immediately apprehended. An example is the concept “blue” in the sense of the perceived colour. See Northrop 1947, 82‒83. 294 On the three Great Ones (chen po gsum), see 115, n. 299. 113 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN mahāmudrā with the all-ground (kun gzhi) construed as the “creator of all” (kun byed)295 in the Rdzogs chen Mind series (sems sde) tradition which he rejects on the grounds that a mahāmudrā equated with the ālayavijñāna which classical texts regard as “unreal conceptualizing” ends up being “the laughing-stock of all scholars”. Some of these mistaken identifications are especially noteworthy. The first one reflects the author’s persistent worry about the encroachment of the nonaffirming emptiness view into the Mahāmudrā hermeneutics of his time. It is by now clear that he considered this to be one of the most widespread and pernicious intellectual trends of his age. At different points in his Mahāmudrā trilogy, he objects to the growing acceptance of this position not only among his fellow Dge lugs pa and Sa skya pa colleagues at Gsang phu, but also among the so-called latter-day Bka’ brgyud pa adherents. In the closing remarks of his Great Ship of Unity, he says of latter-day Sa skya interpreters that “although there have been many eloquent expositions by the author [Sa paṇ] himself as well as his bright followers, they became saturated with the stains of exegetical fallacies imputed by many people with inferior intelligence”. He goes on to state that these people assert that “the object of the view of Mahāmudrā of unity is nothing but self-emptiness, a nonaffirming negation. [Yet] to claim that great bliss taken as an object of a nonaffirming negation is a [mere] concept is not the doctrine of [Sa paṇ].”296 When Shākya mchog ldan later turns his attention to how latter-day Bka’ brgyud adherents had misrepresented their own tradition, the first targets of his criticism are those who think emptiness as the object of the Mahāmudrā view should be taken as a nonaffirming negation in line with the Rang stong tradition and that such realization should be preceded by logical analysis according to Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka canons of reasoning. This, he argues, is completely at odds with Saraha’s dohās which far from emphatically negating selfaware wisdom after the fashion of Bhāviveka and Candrakīrti emphatically affirm it: [Assertions:] Some of the latter-day Dwags po pa Bka’ rgyud tradition-holders think that the identification of emptiness, the object of this Mahāmudrā view, is explained as the aspect of a nonaffirming negation in accordance with the Rang stong Madhyamaka tradition. And they think that as an adjunct to giving rise to the view which realizes that, it must be preceded by the logical reasonings of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda [Mādhyamikas]. Others still appear to be of the opinion that although the object of the view must be characterized as coemergent wisdom, as an adjunct to realizing this, it must be preceded by the analysis through the 295 See Volume II, translation: 35, critical edition: 44. 296 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 69, critical edition: 84. 114 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN reasoning that at first there is no object, and subsequently that, since there is no object, there must also be no subject, and so on. [Refutations:] It is not tenable to [construe] emptiness which is the object of the view presented in the dohās as a nonaffirming negation because while the claim that this Madhyamaka view is self-aware wisdom was emphatically negated by the teachers Bhāviveka and Candra[kīrti], it was emphatically affirmed in these [dohās]. Neither do [the dohās] conform with Rang stong vis-à-vis the method of negating the object of negation because in this Rang stong system, even coemergent wisdom when analyzed by reasoning about one and many turns out to be nonexistent, along with [its] aspects of mere bliss and clarity, whereas in the [dohās], “mind as such alone” is not negated and a statement [stanza 20ab] from [Saraha’s] Dohā in Forty [Stanzas] outlined the grave drawbacks of ascertaining self-luminous self-awareness in terms of self-emptiness: By analyzing mind in terms of one and many, Abandoning luminosity, one goes into worldly existence.297 Were it necessary that this view be preceded by logical reasoning, this would contradict the statement that “since the three Great Ones are views that are intellectually fabricated, we do not maintain them here.”298 It is worth recalling that the author attributed the assertion that “Mahāmudrā is not touched by the three Great Ones (chen po gsum)” to Sgam po pa himself.299 In his Undermining the Haughtiness, the author provides a short explanation of this statement: 297 Caryādohākoṣagītikā (Spyod pa'i do ha mdzod kyi glu) D2263, verse 20a‒b, p.27b6‒7. gcig dang du ma sems la dpyad pa yis | | gsal ba spangs nas srid pa dag tu ’gro | | 298 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 67, critical edition: 82‒83. 299 Shākya mchog ldan summarizes the “three Great Ones”, Madhyamaka (dbu chen), Mahāmudrā (phyag chen), and Rdzogs chen in his Sdom gsum rab dbye’i le’u gsum pa rig ’dzin sdom pa’i skabs kyi ’bel gtam rnam par nges pa legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, SCsb(B) vol. 6, 854‒6: “This Mahāmudrā view cannot be touched by the three Great Ones: [1] It is not touched by Great Madhyamaka which is the pinnacle of the Vehicles of Characteristics. [2] It is also not touched by Rdzogs chen which is called “Atiyoga,” [representing] the culmination the Ancient Ones (rnying ma) from among the Ancient and New Secret Mantra [traditions]. [3] And it is also not touched by the Mahāmudrā, the signless Completion Stage (mtshan med kyi rdzogs rim) which [represents] the culmination of the New [Secret Mantra tradition]. The three Great Ones can be evaluated by the intellect and expressed in words, whereas the realization of mind as such (sems nyid) of our [tradition] is beyond the domain of the intellect.” phyag rgya chen po’i lta ba ’di la | chen po gsum gyis ma reg pa bya ba yin te | de yang mtshan nyid theg pa’i yang rtser ’gyur pa | dbu ma chen pos ma reg | gsang sngags la gsar rnyinga gnyis las | rnyingb ma’i mthar thug ni | a ti yo ga zhes bya ba rdzogs pa chen po yin la | des kyang ’di la ma reg | gsar ma’i mthar thug ni | mtshan med kyi rdzogs rim phyag rgya chen po yin la | des kyang ’di la ma reg ste | chen po gsum ni | blos gzhal | tshig gis brjod pa yin la | nged kyi sems nyid rtogs pa ’di ni blo’i yul las ’das pa’i phyir | zhes gsung ngo | atext has snying; btext has snying See also D. Jackson 1994, 35 and Karmay 1988, 197 where the statement that mahāmudrā is superior to the three “great ones” attributed to Sgam po pa is examined based on the Dgongs gcig commentary of Rdo rje shes rab (pp. 403‒4) which Karmay attributes to Shes rab ’byung gnas. The Dgongs pa 115 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN It is said that the Mahāmudrā of this tradition is not touched by the “three Great Ones”300 of Buddhists and is therefore superior to them. In that regard, some say that what is thought to be untouched by the “three Great Ones” would make it ipso facto inferior. This qualm requires [careful] consideration. [1] [Great Madhyamaka:] Taking a space-like nonaffirming emptiness analytically deduced as an object by means of reasoning does not qualify [as mahāmudrā] because it is not beyond words and concepts. [2] [Great Seal:] Because the realization of mahāmudrā elucidated in this [Dwags po tradition] does not necessarily depend upon the path of Mantra[yāna], it is not explained here as the wisdom of the Mantra[yāna]. [3] [Great Perfection:] The wisdom of the Great Perfection is also not taught here because its actualization is accomplished by means of many preparations and ritual arrangements.301 In a certain sense, this interpretation of Sgam po pa’s claim that Mahāmudrā is not touched by the three Great Ones summarizes three broad trends of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought that Sgam po pa and his successors, not least of all Shākya mchog ldan himself, considered to be at odds with Mahāmudrā aims and principles: [1] taking nonaffirming emptiness analytically deduced through Madhyamaka reasoning as the object of Mahāmudrā meditation; [2] taking Mantrayāna aims and procedures as prerequisites of Mahāmudrā realization; and [3] taking ritualistic methods—via ritual preparations and paraphernalia—as necessary means of Mahāmudrā realization. MADHYAMAKA, MANTRAYĀNA AND MAHĀMUDRĀ It remains for us to offer some preliminary conjectures why a leading scholar of the Sa skya tradition came to hold the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā system in such high regard and defend it against no less an authority than Sa skya Paṇḍita. To provide doctrinal background for Shākya mchog ldan’s view that this system represents the summit of Indo-Tibetan traditions, it may be helpful to look at an overview of central Tibetan soteriological systems the author sketches in a work entitled Replies to Queries of the Great Meditator Ye shes bzang gcig pa (2009, 233) of ’Jig rten sum mgon (1143‒1217) who was a direct student of Sgam po pa contains the following line regarding “the great ones” which seems to be the earliest extant occurrence of chen po gsum: “Not being touched by the three Great Ones is the highest realization.” chen po gsum gyis ma reg rtogs pa’i mchog | 300 See also Volume II, translation: 36. 301 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 16, critical edition: 28. 116 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN po.302 There he identifies three principal “views dedicated to dispelling the great darkness of delusion” by means of “understanding which realizes selflessness”. These are the views of Madhyamaka, tantras and pith-instructions (upadeśa). Although he reasons that all three traditions share the goal of realizing selflessness, he draws attention to crucial differences in how they understand the nature of this selflessness or emptiness and the means to its realization. Shākya mchog ldan subdivides the Madhyamaka tradition into the Yogācāra and the Niḥsvabhāvavāda. Of these two, the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka explains the intent of Prajñāpāramitā according to the third dharmacakra and emphasizes Maitreya’s works and Nāgārjuna’s hymnic corpus.303 Summarizing the Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka tradition, he again stresses its espousal of the view of emptiness as a nonaffirming negation ascertained through reasoning and its rejection of personally-realized wisdom. The type of knowledge which this tradition does attribute to buddhas is an omniscience which possesses the power to predict future events and other supernatural faculties. The tradition’s goal of sheer emptiness is realized through studying, thinking and a type of “familiarization through dedicated mental engagement” which Shākya mchog ldan refrains from calling “meditation”. The views of both Bhavya and Candrakīrti are ultimately in accord. Because even the emptiness to be experienced is not explained as other than what is ascertained through reasoning, it is only a nonaffirming negation. … Because it is nothing more than a nonaffirming negation, they do not accept self-aware wisdom. In this case, they acquiesce with whatever conventional appearances are commonly known. From accumulating the stores [of merits and knowledge], the two bodies which manifest for others are spontaneously present at the time of fruition. As for the wisdom of perfect buddhahood, it does not arise in conventional personal perception (rang snang). However, because by knowing the abiding mode of everything, there is the capacity for prediction, there is omniscience. The method 302 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan lta ba so so’i ngos ’dzin tshul nges don gnad kyi lde mig, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 99‒104. Written in 1491 at the age of 63. 303 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 994‒6: “All [Tibetan masters] agree that the great darkness of delusion is to be dispelled by means of understanding that realizes selflessness. Selflessness, the means of realizing it, and the identification of realizing selflessness [have] three subdivisions: the Madhyamaka exegetical tradition, the tantras, and pith-instructions. The first, which comments on the intent of the middle dharmacakra, has two subdivisions: the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka and the Niḥsvabhāva-Madhyamaka. The first explains the intent of the Prajñāpāramitā according to the third dharmacakra and emphasizes the texts of Maitreya and the hymnic corpus of Nāgārjuna.” kun kyang bdag med rtogs blo yis | | rmongs pa’i mun chen sel bar mthun | | bdag med pa dang de rtogs pa’i | | thabs dang bdag med rtogs pa yi | | ngos ’dzin dbu ma’i gzhung lugs dang | | rgyud dang man ngag dbye bas gsum | | dang po ’khor lo bar pa yi | | dgongs ’grel dbye bas rnam gnyis te | | rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma dang | | ngo bo nyid med smra ba’o | | dang po ’khor lo gsum pa yis | | sher phyin dgongs pa bkral ba dang | | byams pa’i gzhung dang klu sgrub kyi | | stod pa’i tshogs kyi dbang du byas | | 117 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN of realizing the space-like nonaffirming negation is studying, thinking and familiarization through dedicated mental engagement. Thereby the wisdom of the Path of Seeing arises. In that instance, it is explained as the view which intellectually understands emptiness directly, but because the object-possessor [i.e., subject] mingles with emptiness, it is described as ‘seeing yet not seeing’. 304 Turning to the Mantrayāna tradition, Shākya mchog ldan explains how its account of emptiness and the means of realization are superior to sūtric paths in general, but fully compatible with view of third dharmacakra scriptures which likewise emphasize wisdom. What differentiates both these strands from the Niḥsvabhāvavāda Madhyamaka view is that their object of meditation is not the emptiness arrived at through analysis, but is rather the nondual adamantine wisdom, or what the tantras call the causal continuum (rgyu’i rgyud). Secondly, the experience of emptiness explained in the tantric scriptures of the Mantra [tradition] should here be explained as being in accord with the scriptures of the Maitreya doctrine (byams chos) and [those of] his followers. In these, the emptiness of analysis by means of reasoning is not taught as the object of meditation. Rather, by familiarizing oneself with emptiness which is precisely the adamantine wisdom (ye shes rdo rje), conceptualizing of subject and object is dispelled. The primordial knowing (gdod ma’i shes pa) which is free from the subject-object duality is the causal continuum…305 The author goes on to explain that the Mantrayāna path proceeds through the Generation Stage (bskyed rim) which realizes a simulated wisdom (dpe’i ye shes) which recognizes the unity of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa and culminates in the Completion Stage (rdzogs rim) which realizes innate or coemergent wisdom (lhan cig skyes pa’i ye shes) through the 304 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1002‒7: legs ldan zla ba grags pa ste | | gnyis po’i lta ba mthar thug mthun | | nyams su myong bya’i stong nyid kyang | | rigs pas gtan la gang phab pa | | de las gzhan du ma bshad phyir | | med par dgag pa kho na’o | |… med par dgag las ma ’das phyir | | rang rig ye shes khas mi len | | de lta na yang kun rdzob kyi | | snang ba ji ltar grags pa bzhin | | tshogs bsags pa las ’bras dus su | | gzhan snang sku gnyis lhun grub bo | | rdzogs sangs rgyas kyi ye shes la | | rang snang kun rdzob mi ’char yang | | kun gyi gnas tshul mkhyen nas ni | | lung ston nus phyir thams cad mkhyen | | med dgag nam mkha’ lta bu de | | rtogs pa’i thabs ni thos bsam dang | | mos pa yid byed kyis goms pa | | de las mthong lam ye shes ’byung | | de tshe stong nyid mngon sum du | | rtogs blo lta bar ’chad mod kyang | | yul can stong nyid du ’dres pas | | ma mthong ba la mthong zhes brjod | | 305 Ibid., SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1011‒2: gnyis pa sngags kyi rgyud gzhung nas | | bshad pa’i nyams myong stong pa nyid | | byams chos rjes ’brang dang bcas pa’i | | gzhung dang mthun par ’dir bshad bya | | ’di la rigs pas dpyad pa yi | | stong nyid sgom byar ma bshad de | | stong nyid ye shes rdo rje nyid | | goms pas gzung ’dzin rtog pa sel | | gzung ’dzin gnyis dang bral ba yi | | gdod ma’i shes pa rgyu yi rgyud | | 118 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN blessing from within (rang gi byin rlabs), a distinguishing feature of Mantrayāna which nontantric traditions do not possess.306 The author finally turns his attention to the various traditions of pith-instructions (upadeśa) that flourished in Tibet and identifies Mahāmudrā as supreme among these. That said, he maintains that the view of Zhi byed, Rdzogs chen, and Mahāmudrā have as their common frame of reference one’s own mind in its luminous clarity which is primordially uncontaminated by adventitious stains, and which accords with the sūtras and tantras. The pith-instruction traditions also stand united in maintaining that the means of realization is personally-realized wisdom: Thirdly, there appeared many renowned pith-instruction traditions in the Snowy Land such as Rdzogs chen, Mahāmudrā, Zhi byed, Lam ’bras, the Five Stages (Pañcakrama), and the Six-limbed [Yoga] (Ṣaḍaṅgayoga) and so on… As for the view of Mahāmudrā, since it is untouched by the three Great Ones, it is superior to all. The means of realizing it is devotion to the teacher. 307… The object of the view of Zhi [byed], Rdzogs [chen], and Mahāmudrā is ascertained to be the same. It is declared to be one’s own mind alone, luminosity, which is uncontaminated by adventitious stains from the very beginning. This is in accordance with all sūtras and tantras. The insight which realizes it is the view which is explained in the sūtras and tantras as “wisdom which is personally realized” and “that which is endowed with the excellence of all aspects”.308 Shākya mchog goes on to explain that the goal of coemergent wisdom may be approached via the Pāramitā system which requires preliminary reasoning through studying and thinking or the Mantra system which requires preliminary empowerments and other ritual preparations. He concludes that if neither is followed, the student may succumb to a fool’s 306 See Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1015‒6. 307 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1022‒4: gsum pa gangs can ’dir grags pa’i | | man ngag lugs mang snang gyur pa | | rdzogs dang phyag rgya che zhi byed | | lam ’bras rim lnga sbyor drug sogs | | … phyag rgya chen po lta ba la | | chen po gsum gyis ma reg pas | | kun las khyad ’phags de rtogs pa’i | | thabs ni bla ma’i mos gus so | | 308 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1031‒2: zhi phyag rdzogs pa rnam gsum gyi | | lta ba’i yul ni gcig tu nges | | gcig bu rang sems ’od gsal ba | | gdod ma nyid nas blo bur gyi | | dri mas gos pa med der ’chang | | ’di ni mdo rgyud kun dang mthun | | de rtogs pa yi shes rab ni | | lta ba yin te mdo rgyud las | | so sor rang rig ye shes dang | | rnam kun mchog ldan nyid du bshad | | rtogs byed thabs la sa skya pas | | dpyad pa ’ga’ zhig mdzad pa dang | | gzhan gyis kyang ni dpyod pa’o | | dang po lhan skyes ye shes de | | rtogs byed pha rol phyin pa dang | | gsang sngags gang gi lugs su byed | | gnyis ka min na blun po yi | | zhi phyag rdzogs gsum bsgom par song | | pha rol phyin pa’i lugs byed na | | thos bsam rigs pa sngon ’gro dgos | | gsang sngags yin na dbang bskur dang | | rjes su ’brel ba dgos shes gsungs | | 119 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN meditation of Zhi byed, Rdzogs chen or Mahāmudrā.309 In the Mahāmudrā trilogy, however, he explicitly states that the Mahāmudrā view elicited through tantric means does not in all cases need to be preceded by analysis of discriminating insight. In the Great Ship of Unity, he contends that the tantric preparation is superior because “it discovers in an instant the nonpoisonous view [resulting from] the three means [i.e., the teacher’s blessing, invitation of wisdom beings, and empowerments] and because the former tradition’s discovery through discriminating insight remains bound up with conceptualization.” 310 Elsewhere in the same text Shākya mchog ldan goes so far as to say that ideal recipients of Mahāmudrā teachings—simultaneists (cig char ba) who have gained maturation through familiarization in past lives—“do not need to rely on the ruse (mgo skor) of preliminary practices and so forth in this life” and can be shown the main practice (dngos gzhi) right from the start.311 Regarding the method of teaching Mahāmudrā to a suitable recipient, Shākya mchog ldan has this to say: Not only are there no explanations that [these] require the preliminary analysis by means of discerning insight, but more [significantly] there are many explicit statements that if there is such analysis, mahāmudrā becomes intellectually fabricated. These [instructions] do not explain the necessity of the preliminary conferral of empowerments to introduce one to the ground of the clearing process and the clearing process [itself]. Not only is that explanation not given, but they also do not consider [Mahāmudrā] to be the sort of view that derives from empowerment. Rather, during the main practice phase, at the moment when there appears nothing other than simply resting in the state of nongrasping called “not thinking of or pondering on anything”, such an individual who is generally [thought to be] of dull capacity—[i.e.,] one who has neither gone through the purification of studying and thinking about the view of the Pāramitāyāna nor experienced even the preparations for embarking on the path of the Vajrayāna—is then shown this Mahāmudrā view by the teacher. When this [view] has indubitably arisen, then to such a student whom it is not appropriate to categorize as “stupid”, the teacher without imparting any of the sequence of trainings [according to different] capacities shows [him], in the preliminary phase of preparation, [how] to let the triad of body, speech, and mind rest naturally in their uncontrived state.312 309 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1033‒4. 310 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 51, critical edition: 74. 311 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 51, critical edition: 75. 312 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 59, critical edition: 78. 120 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Noteworthy in the above passage is the author’s explicit endorsement, in the case of the simultaneist candidate, of a relatively unmediated pedagogical method and learning style which circumvents Pāramitāyāna intellectualistic preparations as well as Vajrayāna ritualistic preparations. With this he takes a clear stand against Sa skya Paṇḍita’s central claim that tantric empowerments are a necessary condition of mahāmudrā realization. In the Bka’ brgyud tradition, such preparations may be sufficient but they are not necessary. That said, the author does at this point sound a warning that “if by that [absence of thought] alone one has become immersed in a state of nongrasping such that it appears to be something called ‘the real Mahāmudrā,’ then that which has the character of a mental factor in a phase of “not pondering and not thinking anything” belonging to the mind stream of a stupid person is [just plain] ignorance because it is a mental factor which is diametrically opposed to the wisdom of awareness.”313 Returning to Shākya mchog ldan’s concluding remarks concerning the traditions of pith-instructions, he cautions that if one looks at the pith-instruction traditions through the lens of general treatises, one can easily form the mistaken impression that one is dealing here with a Cittamātra doctrinal system. It is therefore imperative to look at the pith-instruction traditions as a sui generis category emphasizing the unity of clarity and emptiness and not as an offshoot of the traditional Buddhist philosophical systems: When all the pith-instruction systems are explained according to the ordinary classical scriptures, they [seem to be] nothing more than the Cittamātra tradition. [However] when they are explained here in accordance with the pith-instruction traditions [themselves], it is stated that the luminous mind in the ground phase consists in illusory appearances and is described as “luminosity”. [Yet] however things appear, their nonexistence is described as “empty”. These are precisely what [is known as] unity.314 MAHĀMUDRĀ AND WHAT REMAINS (LHAG MA : AVAŚIṢṬA) At the start of this chapter, we drew attention to a distinction Shākya mchog ldan makes between [1] traditions such as the Niḥsvabhāvavāda which negate the existence, even conventionally, of any kind of any mode of cognition or wisdom that withstands critical 313 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 59, critical edition: 78. 314 Sgom chen ye shes bzang po’i dris lan, SCsb(A) vol. 23, 1041‒4: man ngag pa kun mthun mong kyi | | gzhung bzhin ’chad na sems tsam pa’i | lugs las gong du ’das pa med | | man ngag lugs bzhin ’dir bshad na | | gzhi dus ’od gsal ba yi sems | | sgyu ma’i snang bar bshad pa la | | gsal ba zhes ni brjod pa yin | | ji ltar snang ba der med pa | | de la stong pa zhes su brjod | | zung du ’jug la’ang de nyid de | | 121 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN assessment or remains (lhag ma) upon realizing buddhahood, and [2] traditions such as the Alīkākāravāda and Siddha Mahāmudrā traditions which not only emphatically affirm this remnant transcendent awareness but also explicitly identify it with buddhahood itself. Let us now consider how Shākya mchog ldan evaluates this remainder in relation to Buddhist philosophies and the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā in particular. We have seen that Shākya mchog ldan found the idea of the remainder fruitful for differentiating between affirmative (cataphatic) and negative (apophatic) strains of Buddhist thought. At the same time it provided him and many other Tibetan exegetes with a powerful hermeneutical instrument for addressing a set of overlapping issues concerning the nature and character of goal-realization: what, if anything, remains upon realizing emptiness and what this remainder it like? Among these were the problems of [1] whether phenomena are best deemed to be empty of own [nature] (rang stong) or empty of other (gzhan stong), [2] whether a buddha can be said to have any cognition or wisdom at all, [3] what happens during states of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), particularly the cessation of mind (cittanirodha), and [4] whether realization is ineffable and in what sense.315 In a text entitled Elucidating the Definitive Meaning of the Five Maitreya Teachings, Shākya mchog ldan distinguishes Rang stong and Gzhan stong according to their views of the remainder: There are two ways of explaining the Middle Way of the Great Vehicle: by means of self-emptiness (rang stong) and by means of other-emptiness (gzhan stong). As for the first, the nonexistence of any remainder whatsoever of any real existent (dgnos po) called a “middle one” that is left over when all extremes of discursive elaboration have been negated is simply designated as “middle” on account of the impossibility of there being any object that is not empty of intrinsic essence. As for the second, subject and object do not exist but nondual wisdom does exist because it is that existent real entity which is left over following the elimination of the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation of such [wisdom]. It is [also] called a “middle”. 316 315 See the third chapter on Mi bskyod rdo rje where these points are examined against the background of traditional Indian Buddhist views on the remainder which have their inception in the Cūḷasuññatasutta (The Lesser Discourse on Emptiness) of the Pāli Canon. 316 Byams chos lnga’i nges don rab tu gsal ba, SCsb(A) vol. 11, 15‒16: theg pa chen po’i dbu ma ’chad tshul la gnyis te | rang stong gi sgo nas dang | gzhan stong gi sgo nas ’chad tshul lo | | dang po ni | spros pa’i mtha’ thams cad bkag pa’i shul na dbus ma zhes bya ba’i dngos po ci yang lus pa med pa zhig la dbu ma zhes bya ba’i tha snyad btags pa tsam yin te | rang gi ngo bos mi stong pa’i shes bya mi srid pa’i phyir | gnyis pa ni | gzung ’dzin gnyis med pa dang | gnyis med kyi ye shes yod pa ste de lta bu’i sgro skur gyi mtha’ gnyis bsal ba’i shul na yod pa’i dngos po zhig la ni dbu ma zhes bya | Tr. by Komarovski 2011, 216, with minor changes just for the sake of consistency in terminology. 122 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN The distinction could scarcely be drawn more sharply: the Rang stong Madhyamaka tradition rejects any remainder at all, any middle left over when the extremes are negated, whereas the Gzhan stong Madhyamaka accepts a remainder, nondual wisdom, as a real entity, a “middle”, that is left over following the elimination of extremes of superimposition and deprecation. It is evident by now that Shākya mchog not only favours the pro-remainder position over the contra-remainder position but that he regarded the latter as a powerful paradigm for understanding the Mahāmudrā view. Shākya mchog ldan maintains that the Mahāmudrā system, like the Gzhan stong Madhyamaka system, offers a fruitful avenue for discovering and affirming the remainder, which is mahāmudrā itself. In Undermining the Haughtiness, he explains that mahāmudrā is precisely the remainder left over when consciousness fails to find anything at all with which to identify itself. “When the searching consciousness has not found anything by means of reasoning, the wisdom that is left behind as the remainder is identified as mahāmudrā. Having understood this properly, it should be realized.”317 In proceeding to identify this remainder with Saraha’s description of mind alone as the seed of everything which grants all the fruits of one’s desires, it is evident that the remainder, mind as such, is the fertile fons et origo of all realizations. Far from being a sheer emptiness devoid of anything whatsoever, the remainder is characterized, paradoxically, as an emptiness of fullness and fecundity which is deemed to be of definitive meaning. This idea that what remains in the wake of Madhyamaka reasoning or the Mahāmudrā investigation of consciousness is a fecund emptiness, an “emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects” (sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā), is clarified in the author’s Undermining the Haughtiness: When one experiences that definitive meaning which constitutes the remainder left behind in the wake of such analysis according to that [reasoning corpus], then that is also designated accordingly.318 To illustrate with an example, [the Buddha]— after explaining in the middle dharmacakra that all phenomena are simply empty of own-nature—taught in the third dharmacakra that the unchanging perfect nature which is empty of that [self-emptiness] is the definitive meaning. Likewise, one doesn’t find any core of a banana plant when one searches for it, yet in the middle of the unfolded leaves [bananas] nonetheless ripen as sweet fruits319.320 317 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 26, critical edition: 34. 318 In other words, one experiences what remains, wisdom, which is of definitive meaning, and then designates it accordingly, i.e., as being of definitive meaning. 319 The example is found in the Dharmadhātustava, D1118, verse 14, 64a. 320 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 21, critical edition: 31. 123 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN We can conclude this brief assessment of Shākya mchog ldan’s view of Mahāmudrā and the remainder by reiterating that, for him, what the ascertainment of the ultimate reveals is better described in terms of sheer presence than sheer absence, and this presence simpliciter is precisely what is known as mahāmudrā. THE PROBLEM OF CESSATION The Great Seal meditation of the ignorant, It is taught, usually becomes a cause of animal birth. If not that, then they are born in the formless realm, Or else they fall into the śrāvakas’ cessation.321 Sa skya Paṇḍita, Sdom gsum rab dbye An important soteriological implication of the thesis that nondual wisdom is left as a remainder following the ascertainment of the ultimate is that the cessation of mind (cittanirodha)322 and its associated mental factors comes to be seen not as a condition of cognitive oblivion but rather as a condition of cognitive disclosure since it allows an unconditioned state of lucid awareness undistorted by subjectifying and objectifying activities to reveal itself. This is a point which has long been emphasized and defended by Bka’ brgyud and Rnying ma thinkers.323 The idea that there is a structurally primary mode of awareness that comes to light precisely in the absence of reifying activities allowed Shākya mchog ldan and other scholars to view the state of cessation as a precondition of goal-realization. This he clarifies in Undermining the Haughtiness where, in response to the query “isn’t it impossible to end such [dualistic] appearances without employing analysis by means of reasoning?,” he answers that it is indeed possible: “For example, when deep insight is realized in the state of cessation (nirodasamāpatti), there is no opportunity for the eightfold [consciousness to operate].”324 To put it simply, nondual wisdom kicks in the very moment that mind and mental factors, or the eightfold consciousness, shut down. 321 Sdom gsum rab dbye, III.161: blun po phyag rgya che bsgom pa | | phal cher dud 'gro'i rgyu ru gsungs | | min na gzugs med khams su skye | | yang na nyan thos 'gog par ltung | | See Rhoton 2002, 303 (tib.); 117 (Eng.). 322 For a most interesting study of cessation of mind (cittanirodha) theories in Indian Buddhism with particular attention to Abhidharma and Yogācāra meditative systems, see Griffiths 1991. There has not yet been a study of such doctrines in Madhyamaka, tantric or indigenous Tibetan contemplative systems though such a study would be of considerable interest. 323 Some Rnying ma arguments are discussed in Higgins 2013, chapter three. 324 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 22, critical edition: 31. 124 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Arguing along these lines, Shākya mchog ldan can offer a cogent reply to Sa paṇ’s claim that Mahāmudrā meditation may cause its practitioners to “fall into the śrāvakas’ cessation:”325 “this refers not to the state of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti) and the nirvāṇa without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa)326, but to a nirvāṇa of annihilation or to the state of nonideation (asaṃjñāsamāpatti).”327 In his Great Ship of Unity, however, he says that “in the statement that through meditating on mahāmudrā one falls into cessation, what cessation does that pertain to? Does it pertain to the state of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti) and the nirvāṇa which is without remainder? In any case, since actualizing these requires a path of transcendence, the view would be pure.”328 Here the author distinguishes the transcendent state of cessation or “nirvāṇa without remainder” in which only dualistic thoughts and superfluous afflictions cease, allowing the underlying nondual wisdom to manifest, from the annihilating state of cessation alluded to by Sa paṇ which suggests a more comprehensive termination of mental activity, akin to turning off a main breaker switch so that “all the lights go out”. While this latter state is seen as a kind of voluntary state of oblivion which leaves habitual tendencies dormantly present and ready to be reactivated once suitably stimulated following the return to consciousness, the former is equated with spiritual awakening in which all dualistic thoughts and tendencies are shut down once and for all. Interestingly, the author goes on in Undermining the Haughtiness to suggest that the annihilationist version of cessation which is “not linked with the two stages of Mantra[yāna] has to be the Madhyamaka view.” As he explains: If [this view] is not linked with accumulating merits for incalculable eons, then it is termed “śrāvakas’ cessation” which means passing into a nirvāṇa of annihilation. This is because whatever defficiencies (nyes dmigs) remain [intact] in attaining the limit of reality (bhūtakoṭi) insofar as one has not engaged in the triad of perfecting, maturing, and purifying are [still] present in that [nirvāṇa of annihilation]. It is also because it is explained that even [bodhisattvas] when they have 325 Sdom gsum rab dbye III.161d: yang na nyan thos 'gog par ltung | | See Rhoton 2002, 303 (Tib.); 117 (Eng.). This again continues from the preceding quotation. 326 To account for the gap between the buddha’s attainment of nirvāṇa at age thirty-five and his final parinirvāṇa upon his death some forty-five years later, the Early Buddhist scholastic tradition distinguished between a “nirvāṇa with remainder” (sopadhiśeṣanirvāṇa) or “nirvāṇa associated with afflictions,” a state achieved prior to death where “the remainder” refers to the mind and body of this final existence, and a “nirvāṇa without remainder” (anupachiśeṣanirvāṇa) which is attained at the time of death when the causes of all future existence have been extinguished, ending once and for all the chain of causation of both physical form and of consciousness and leaving nothing to be reborn. 327 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 61, critical edition: 79. 328 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 50, critical edition: 73. 125 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN for a long time stagnated in the equipoise of emptiness on the eighth level, not to mention beginners, need to be aroused from that [state] by the victors [buddhas]. 329 To put it concisely, a state of cessation unsupported by the means of familiarization with nondual wisdom leads to a state of self-induced cognitive annihilation. Finally, on the basis of this distinction between liberating and annihilating states of cessation, Shākya mchog ldan is able to repudiate the charge that not thinking and mental nonengagement will invariably result in the type of mental and moral quietism that Tibetans had long associated with the Sino-Tibetan Chan meditative teachings of Heshang Moheyan. In his reply to a question whether the allegedly nonconceptual character of mahāmudrā is not also itself a concept about directly perceiving the innate (sahaja), the author states: Not exclusively. Because [mahāmudrā] is free from all unreal conceptualizing, it is comparable to the transworldly direct perception. For example, during the state of cessation (nirodhasamāpatti), since the seven groupings of consciousness along with their associated factors cease, there is mental nonengagement and freedom from all grasping of characteristics. The meditation of Heshang is not like that. In this regard, some proclaim that the state of cessation in the Cittamātra tradition is wisdom in the Madhyamaka. [The response is:] the state of cessation of the Niḥsvabhāva is a nonaffirming negation, [whereas] because there is wisdom in the state of cessation of the Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka, this is called the “state of cessation of concomitant [mental factors]”. This is taken as something rotten by the latter-day people.330 Notable here is the contrast the author draws between the Niḥsvabhāva-Madhyamaka interpretation of the state of cessation as a nonaffirming negation and the (in his eyes) muchmaligned Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka interpretation which regards it only as a “cessation of concomitant mental factors” which allows wisdom to surface. The author has here turned the table on *Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka-based critics of amanasikāra by showing that it is precisely the Niḥsvabhāva version of “cessation of mind” that leads to Heshang-like oblivion. By contrast, the Alīkākāravāda version of cessation clears the way for the recovery of transworldly direct perception and nondual wisdom. 329 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 61, critical edition: 79. 330 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 39‒40, critical edition: 46. 126 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN CONTESTED METHODS OF REALIZATION As the pedagogical methods of Dwags po Bka’ brgyud tradition came increasingly under fire during the classical period of Tibetan Buddhist exegesis, a primary target was Sgam po pa’s endorsement of siddha-based nongradual means of direct introduction (ngo sprod) to the nature of mind which seemed to call into question the indispensability of various tantric or non-tantric preliminaries. It may be recalled that Shākya mchog ldan entertained the possibility that certain suitable recipients of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā teachings, the so-called simultaneist (gcig char ba) type, may directly realize the nature of mind, mahāmudrā without recourse to tantric or non-tantric preliminaries. For others, however, preliminaries of either the outer Pāramitāyāna or inner Mantrayāna were considered indispensable. In his Great Ship of Unity, he explains that “there are two types of learned persons: those who trained their mind-stream through the Perfections Vehicle and those who fully matured through the authentic bestowal of empowerments. Where this Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā is taught by a bla ma known as the “teacher” to either of these two, not only is there not the slightest fault [in it], but individuals who are worthy vessels are directly introduced to profound suchness.”331 Elsewhere in this text, Shākya mchog ldan provides a more detailed analysis of these two preliminary methods. He begins by distinguishing the Vehicle of Perfections or Characteristics into the Self-emptiness (rang stong) system of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda and Otheremptiness (gzhan stong) system of the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka. As he explains in his Great Ship of Unity: Although there exist no phenomena that are not sealed by this mahāmudrā, there are nonetheless two methods that serve as preliminaries to it: [1] the tradition of the outer Vehicle of Characteristics (lakṣaṇayāna) and [2] the tradition of the inner yogins. [1] The first, [i.e., the outer Vehicle of Characteristics] consists in ascertainment by reasoning involving studying and thinking. On the basis of such ascertainment, there are also two different methods of recognizing this mahāmudrā which is the mode of abiding that one experiences through knowledge based on meditation: [A] The Niḥsvabhāvavāda-Madhyamaka which maintains it is a spacelike nonaffirming negation and the [B] Yogācāra-Madhyamaka which claims that it is coemergent wisdom. Regarding these two assertions, there are also two different methods of ascertainment through reasoning based on studying and thinking: [the former] by means of self-emptiness (rang stong) and [the latter] by means of other-emptiness (gzhan stong). Although that which is experienced based on the first system [i.e., self-emptiness] is not in accord with the root texts of Mahāmudrā, 331 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 62, critical edition: 79. 127 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN it is nonetheless acceptable to ascribe the “ascertainment of freedom from extremes leading to assimilation as unity” explained in that [system] to this Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition.332 Although the author argues that what is experienced by the Rang stong system (i.e., a nonaffirming emptiness) is not in accord with Mahāmudrā texts, he does consider it justifiable to correlate this tradition’s “ascertainment of freedom from extremes leading to assimilation as unity” with the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā tradition. It is worth bearing in mind that the author considered that the mahāmudrā realized through the skillful means of the Mantra tradition—namely, the teacher’s blessing, invitation of wisdom beings, and empowerments— does not require preliminary analysis by means of discriminating insight and is in fact superior because it can instantaneously discover the nonpoisoned view, whereas the Lakṣaṇayāna’s discovery through analysis is conceptually fabricated.333 The author next turns his attention from the experiencer’s view to the experienced object and concludes that the Mantra system, as well as Maitreya works such as the Ratnagotravibhāga deal with the ultimate (don dam) coemergent wisdom which is of definitive meaning, whereas the Niḥsvabhāvavāda-Mādhyamikas of the Lakṣaṇayāna deal with conventional (kun rdzob) objects which are postulates and nonexistent and thus of merely provisional meaning: Not only is there a difference in terms of the view of the experiencer but the latter [system] is also superior in terms of the definitive meaning of the experienced object because the emptiness as a nonaffirming negation of the former tradition, [i.e., the Niḥsvabhāvavāda-Mādhyamikas of the Lakṣaṇayāna] is explained as conventional truth since it is nothing other than nonexistence and abstraction. Hence it does not qualify as being of definitive meaning and does not go beyond the conceptualizing mind of the subject (yul can). On the other hand, when the mode of abiding of coemergent wisdom is explained as mahāmudrā as object—as it is claimed in the works of Maitreya such as the Uttaratantra [RGV]—this is no different from the Mantra system.334 The author concludes that although “there is a qualitative gradation in the subject-oriented wisdom of self-awareness that stems from the qualitative gradation in the means of actualizing it, all these [types of] wisdom of self-awareness which are actualized by these outer and inner 332 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 51. 333 Volume II, translation: 21. 334 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 51, critical edition: 73. 128 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN skillful means are alike in being the wisdom of mahāmudrā because they consist in the wisdom of the union of bliss and emptiness.”335 In his Ascertaining the Intent, Shākya mchog ldan objects to equating the Niḥsvabhāvavāda-Madhyamaka with Mahāmudrā: the Madhyamaka of the reasoning corpus takes emptiness as a nonaffirming negation and the nature of things (dharmatā) as a mentalistic-linguistic object and thus as a conceptual universal or “other-exclusion” (gzhan sel). By contrast, the Mahāmudrā tradition understands emptiness in terms of primordial wisdom free from extremes and specifies the nature of things as an object of direct perception, a particular which is accessible to wisdom. “Moreover,” he concludes, “regarding the respective means to realize them, the emptiness known in the Madhyamaka is comprehended through reasoning which validates one’s own scriptures and castigates those of others. The emptiness of mahāmudrā is attained through devotion to the bla ma, blessings, karmic connection and the accumulation of merit.”336 In Undermining the Haughtiness of Others, the author sheds further light on the means of realizing mahāmudrā, indicating the necessary and sufficient conditions: [Query:] Then by what means is it to be realized? [Reply:] Unmediated direct [perception] which stems from [1] karmic connection from previous [lives] which is the dominant condition, [2] devotion to the bla ma which is the objective condition, and [3] prior reception of knowledge and awareness. It is for this reason that in this [tradition] we do not make the distinction between “studying and thinking on the path of accumulation and seeing a mere conceptual abstraction337 on the path of application”. As for the noble path of direct seeing, having in mind that there are no subdivisions, it was stated that there is no divisions into levels and paths. However, this does not deprecate the methods.338 When the appropriate conditions are in place, mahāmudrā realization is said to occur easily and with little need for intellectual or ritual preliminaries. This is because unmediated access to mahāmudrā is a matter of direct acquaintance, not inference, and does not depend on scripture and reasoning. In Shākya mchog ldan words, “coemergence (sahaja) which is 335 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 52, critical edition: 74. 336 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 35, critical edition: 43. 337 Literally an object-universal (don spyi : arthasāmānya), one of two types of universals distinguished by Dignāga, the other being the word-universal (sgra spyi : śabdhasāmānya). The term don spyi is frequently used in Tibetan works in the more general sense of conceptual representation or abstraction, the general idea we have of something as opposed to the thing itself. 338 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 15, critical edition: 27. 129 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN experienced by personal knowledge and not taken as an object of words and concepts does not require recourse to scripture and reasoning”. Thus, being abundant in meaning yet succinct in words, [Mahāmudrā] is easy to practice for those with a karmic connection. If one realizes what is easy to realize, the two [types of] belief in self along with their seeds are easily destroyed. This coemergence which is experienced by personal knowledge and not taken as an object of words and concepts does not require recourse to scripture and reasoning. It also does not depend on honoring the teacher with set observances339. However, being the Mahāyāna, encompassing everyone and comprising the definitive actuality of everything, it is without contradiction during the phase of the main practice. Although in the phase of preparation for its realization, various methods of accomplishment are not necessary, during the main practice phase, the aim to be accomplished is seen to be in accord with all sūtras and tantras.340 What is seen at the time of mahāmudrā realization is primordially present wisdom which is not something newly established. This marks the culmination of Sgam po pa’s Four Yogas comprising one-pointedness (rtse gcig), freedom from elaborations (spros bral), one-flavour (ro gcig), and no-meditation (sgom med), which unfold naturally as the unity of meditation and post-meditation. What is to be seen (mthong bya) is primordially present wisdom which is not newly established. Being similar to a wish fulfilling gem, if for the time being one can settle evenly in [this state] which is free from drowsiness and agitation, this is termed “one-pointedness”. When there is freedom from grasping either phenomena or persons, it is termed “freedom from elaborations”. As for the enhancement in the post-meditation of that unity of calm abiding and deep insight of the main practice, when there is no [more] grasping whatever personal and phenomenal appearances arise as “this” or “that”, then even if, on the side of consciousness, the dualism of subject and object have not ceased, on the side of wisdom, both “selves” [personal and phenomenal] are naturally taken over [by] wisdom which 339 Compare with Hevajratantra I.viii.36b which states “Coemergence that is not expressed by others is also not found elsewhere. It is revealed by honouring (upasevayā : bsten pa yis) the Guru with set observances (parva : dus thabs) and from one’s own merit”. See Skt. nānyena kathyate sahajaṃ na kasminn api labhyate | ātamanā jñāyate puṇyād guruparvopasevayā | | Tib. gzhan gyis brjod min lhan cig skyes | | gang du yang ni mi rnyed de | | bla ma’i dus thabs bsten pa yis | | bdag gis bsod nams las shes bya | | 340 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 38, critical edition: 45. 130 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN is free from grasping anything at all. At that time, the entire phenomenal world becomes “one taste” with mahāmudrā. Once this manifests effortlessly, one senses that it is what has been given the name “no-meditation”.341 The foregoing overview of Shākya mchog ldan’s views on Mahāmudrā pedagogical methods has confirmed his endorsement of Sgam po pa’s siddha-based nongradual methods for those who are deemed suitable recipients, that is, those having the simultaneist potential. At the same time, we have seen that he considered it a mistake to view such methods as appropriate for all or as precluding the practice of skillful means. Even for the ideal recipient, skillful means are not abandoned but neither are they a matter of willful exertion; rather, they unfold effortlessly within the direct realization of the luminous and empty nature of mind as the unity of means and insight. It may be recalled that those who have not gained a stable realization are said to require familiarization with the methods of eliminating discursive elaborations according to the methods of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. Shākya mchog ldan adds, however, that diligent persons having the “inclination to leave behind such methods which [they already] understood previously may correctly familiarize themselves [with mind’s true nature in meditation] and familiarize themselves with the state of not grasping by means of concepts the appearances of manifold dependent arising in post-meditation. That is said to be the main point of this teaching.” 342 RESPONSES TO SA SKYA P AṆḌITA’S CRITICISM OF BKA’ BRGYUD MAHĀMUDRĀ A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE AND JUSTIFICATION OF MAHĀMUDRĀ Shākya mchog ldan’s defence of Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā teachings and practices proceeds from a systematic reconsideration of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s wide-ranging criticisms of certain views and practices espoused by some of his Dwags po Bka’ brgyud contemporaries. David Jackson has identified three views that were the principle targets of Sa paṇ’s criticisms: “1. That a single method or factor (even insight into Emptiness presented as the Great Seal) could suffice soteriologically, 2. That the Gnosis (ye shes: jñāna) of the Great Seal could arise through an exclusively nonconceptual meditative method 3. That the Great Seal could ever be taught outside of the Mantrayāna.”343 It may be noted that specific doctrines were associated with each of these positions: [1.] Sgam po pa’s Self-sufficient White Remedy (dkar po gcig thub), [2.] Maitrīpa’s Mental Nonengagement (yid la mi byed pa : amanasikāra) doctrine, and [3.] the Simultaneist or All-at-once (gcig char ba) ideal. Even in the parts of his Mahāmudrā 341 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 38, critical edition: 45. 342 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 16, critical edition: 28. 343 Jackson 1994, 72. 131 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN trilogy which are most charitable to Sa skya Paṇḍita, Shākya mchog ldan claims that all three points and their associated doctrines are defensible by reasoning and also that they are wellattested in sūtras and tantras. While the simultaneist ideal has been treated in some detail already, we will devote the remaining pages of this chapter to an examination of Shākya mchog ldan’s defence of the first two doctrines, the Self-sufficient White Remedy and Amanasikāra. Before turning to these, it will be helpful to take a broader view of the author’s repudiation of Sa paṇ’s general claim that “this present-day Mahāmudrā is largely a Chinese religious system”344 on the grounds that both advocate mental and ethical quietism. Shākya mchog ldan rejects this criticism with the rejoinder that Sgam po pa’s doctrinal system, which blended Bka’ gdams scholasticism and tantric Mahāmudrā teachings of the siddhas, included extensive teachings on the perfection of insight. Thus he observes in his Great Ship of Unity that “the view of Heshang and the view of the master Sgam po pa are not the same because in the Ornament of Liberation of the Supreme Path composed by the master Sgam po pa he taught in detail the preliminary methods of analysis through discriminating insight in the context of the Prajñāpāramitā view.”345 Elsewhere in the text, he indicates that Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā followers accord the utmost importance to Mahāyāna teachings on “loving kindness, compassion, the first five perfections and the cultivation of bodhicitta” which need not conflict, however, with their adherence to the traditionally-accepted innatist view that “the six perfections are all subsumed under the perfection of insight.” 346 In his Golden Lancet, Shākya mchog ldan draws a clear line between the types of conduct (spyod pa) advocated in the systems of Heshang and Sgam po pa, despite certain apparent similarities in view (lta ba). In this regard, he underscores Sgam po pa’s well-attested emphasis on karmic causes and effects, as well as on the three ethical disciplines. 347 Finally, in Ascertaining the Intent, he contends that, unlike the Bka’ brgyud masters, “the Chinese abbot did not make the distinction between conventional and ultimate and likewise did not distinguish, within their respective contexts, view and application; wisdom and conscious344 Sdom gsum rab dbye, III.175cd: da lta'i phyag rgya chen po ni | | phal cher rgya nag chos lugs yin | | See Rhoton 2002, 305 (tib.); 119 (Eng.). 345 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 50, critical edition: 72. 346 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 49, critical edition: 72. 347 Sdom gsum rab dbye’i le’u gsum pa rig ’dzin sdom pa’i skabs kyi ’bel gtam rnam par nges pa legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, SCsb vol. 6(B), 863‒4: “Although there does not appear to be a qualitative difference in view between this Bka’ brgyud and the Chinese Abbot, there are differences in conduct in the following ways: This is because followers of this [Bka’ brgyud] system emphasize very emphatically the karmic causes and results and the three ethical disciplines, which becomes abundantly clear when one looks at their authoritative scriptures.” ’on kyang bka’ [b]rgyud ’di pa | rgya nag mkhan po dang lta ba la bzang ngan mi snang yang | spyod pa la khyad par yod pa’i tshul ni | lugs ’di pas ni | las rgyu ’bras dang tshul khrims gsum gyi bslab bya la shin tu nan tan du mdzad par | de dag gi gsung rab la bltas pas shin tu gsal ba’i phyir | 132 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN ness; study, thinking and meditation; and provisional and definitive meaning. He said that simply not engaging the mind in anything at all is the essence.”348 A key to understanding Shākya mchog ldan’s justification of the Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā system is his claim that although there is no single prescription for approaching goalrealization given the plurality of possible avenues delineated in the Buddhist teachings, the actual view realized is alone sufficient for relinquishing afflictions. Thus while he maintains that “the different ways of awakening in line with individual capacities are not unequivocally determined,”349 he at the same time defends the view that Mahāmudrā realization offers a comprehensive remedy for the myriad afflictions. It is appropriate to think of Shākya mchog ldan as a soteriological pluralist in the sense that he allows for considerable latitude in the types of teachings, pedagogical methods, and modes of application that may be deemed appropriate to the needs, abilities and inclinations of a given student. This view brought him into direct conflict with a major platform in Sa skya Paṇḍita’s diatribe against Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā: the contention that realization of mahāmudrā is impossible without the tantric preliminaries of empowerments, the Generation and Completion Stage practices, and the first three seals. In his Sdom gsum rab dbye, Sa paṇ had declared that a meditation “not endowed with the empowerments and two stages is not a Vajrayāna teaching.” 350 Further, a so-called “mahāmudrā” attained without the previous seals does not warrant the name: The Mahāmudrā of Nāro and Maitrīpa is held to consist precisely In that which is taught in the secret mantra tantras. In his Caturmudrā[nvaya], noble Nāgārjuna said this: If, through not having known the karmamudrā, One remains ignorant of the dharmamudrā, It is impossible for one to understand Even the name mahāmudrā.351 348 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 39, critical edition: 45. 349 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 24, critical edition: 33. 350 Sdom gsum rab dbye, (III.134) dbang dang rim gnyis mi ldan pas | | rdo rje theg pa'i bstan pa min | | See Rhoton 2002. 302 (tib.); 113 (English). 351 Sdom gsum rab dbye, (III.176‒78) na ro dang ni me tri ba'i | | phyag rgya chen po gang yin pa | | de ni las dang chos dang ni | | dam tshig dang ni phyag rgya che | | gsang sngags rgyud nas ji skad du | | gsungs pa de nyid khong bzhed do | | 'phags pa klu sgrub nyid kyis kyang | | phyag rgya bzhi par 'di skad gsung | | las kyi phyag rgya rna shes pas | | chos kyi phyag rgya' ang mi shes na | | phyag rgya chen po'i ming tsam yang | | rtogs pa nyid ni mi srid gsung | | See Rhoton 2002, 305 (tib.); 119 (English). 133 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN As will be clarified in chapter four, Padma dkar po would later demonstrate in his Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod352 that the above passage finds no support in the Caturmudrānvaya which instead claims that only the uncontrived dharmamudrā (identified with the coemergent nature), and not the contrived sexual union with a karmamudrā (a tantric consort), can be the cause of mahāmudrā, in the same way that it is only from a cause of a specific kind (e.g. a rice grain) that a result (fruit) of this same kind (e.g. a rice sprout) can arise. Put simply, something contrived cannot be the cause of something uncontrived, so sexual union with a contrived karmamudrā or tantric consort cannot be a direct cause of mahāmudrā, whereas the uncontrived dharmamudrā can.353 For his part, Shākya mchog ldan makes a more general observation that the Caturmudrānvaya was actually not written by Nāgārjuna as Sa skya Paṇḍita had claimed.354 He adds that in Tibet it was quite common to employ the term mahāmudrā for a wide range of Buddhist views independent of the Vajrayāna context. Not only was the Madhyamaka view itself at times identified as Mahāmudrā, but the following had been as well: [1] the realization that all appearances are mind, [2] the realization of self-luminous self-aware wisdom devoid of both subject and object, and [3] the realization that all phenomena are empty of intrinsic essence.355 In Shākya mchog ldan’s eyes, to confine a term as rich in its range of applicability as mahāmudrā to only one doxographical context is unnecessarily restrictive. He also adds, not uncontroversially, that it is incorrect to say that the term mahāmudrā does not appear in the Perfections Vehicle. He defers to Maitrīpa’s use of the term mahāmudrā in the context of the Perfections Vehicle and notes its occurrence in the samādhi which is called the “Jewel-seal” (ratnamudrā).356 352 Phyag chen rgyal ba’i gan mdzod, 61.8‒66.10. 353 See below, 364‒65 as well as Mathes 2013 who gives a detailed account of this controversy based on a revised interpretation of the Caturmudrānvaya passage in a Sanskrit edition of the text which accords with Padma dkar po’s revision. 354 Sdom gsum rab dbye’i le’u gsum pa rig ’dzin sdom pa’i skabs kyi ’bel gtam rnam par nges pa legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, SCsb(B) vol. 6, 826‒831: “The śāstra Caturmudrānvaya which is considered to have been written by Nāgārjuna was not written by Nāgārjuna.” klu sgrub kyis mdzad par grags pa’i bstan bcos phyag rgya bzhi pa de klu sgrub kyis ma mdzad do. See Mathes 2015 where the problem of authorship is discussed. 355 Sdom gsum rab dbye’i le’u gsum pa rig ’dzin sdom pa’i skabs kyi ’bel gtam rnam par nges pa legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, SCsb(B) vol. 6, 844‒6: “In Tibet, those known as Mudrā adherents take the view of Madhyamaka as Mahāmudrā. Among those, some take the realization that appearances are mind as Mahāmudrā. Some others take the realization of self-luminous self-aware wisdom devoid of both subject and object as the Mahāmudrā view. Others yet take the realization that all phenomena are empty of intrinsic essence as the Mahāmudrā view.” bod du phyag rgya bar grags pa rnams kyis | dbu ma’i lta ba la phyag rgya chen por mdzad pa yin la | de la yang | ’ga’ zhig gis ni | snang ba sems su rtogs pa la phyag rgya chen por mdzad | ’ga’ zhig gis ni | gzung ’dzin gnyis med kyi ye shes rang rig rang gsal bar rtogs pa la phyag rgya chen po’i lta bar mdzad | yang ’ga’ zhig gis ni | chos thams cad rang gi ngo bos stong par rtogs par la phyag rgya chen po’i lta bar mdzad | 356 Sdom gsum rab dbye’i le’u gsum pa rig ’dzin sdom pa’i skabs kyi ’bel gtam rnam par nges pa legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, SCsb(B) vol. 6, 846‒851: “Moreover, it is not the case that the term mahāmudrā does not exist in the Pāramitāyāna. The occurrence of the term mahāmudrā in the Pāramitāyāna was explained by Maitrīpa and taught in the so-called Ratnamudrā nāma samādhi.” de yang phar phyin gyi theg pa na | phyag rgya chen po’i tha snyad 134 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN We may now turn our attention to Shākya mchog ldan’s attempts to justify the doctrines of the Self-sufficient White Remedy and mental nonengagement, two principal targets of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s critique of Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā. DEFENDING MAHĀMUDRĀ VIEWS THE SELF-SUFFICIENT WHITE REMEDY (DKAR PO GCIG THUB) No substantial difference exists between the present-day Great Seal And the Great Perfection of the Chinese tradition, Other than a change in names from ‘descent from above’ And ‘ascent from below’ to ‘simultaneist’ and ‘gradualist’.357 Sa skya Paṇḍita, Sdom gsum rab dbye At several points in the Mahāmudrā trilogy, Shākya mchog ldan takes pains to defend Sgam po pa’s controversial characterization of Mahāmudrā as a Self-sufficient White Remedy358 from its detractors. Although this clearly put him on the other side of the fence from Sa skya Paṇḍita (the earliest and most influential critic of the idea359), we may also observe the extent to which Shākya mchog ldan attempts, especially in the last and longest work in his trilogy, to shift the target of accusation away from Sa paṇ and onto his latter-day Sa skya supporters who are charged with misinterpreting not only Sgam po pa’s doctrine but also Sa paṇ’s criticisms of it. This effort to save Sa paṇ from his followers in the third work bears comparison with the more sweepingly critical rejoinders in the other two. We have noted that Shākya mchog ldan rejected the idea that there is any single prescription for goalrealization since it is open to a plurality of individual approaches. Yet we also hinted at his acceptance of the view that the actual realization of mahāmudrā cures all afflictions, rendering individual treatments for their myriad causes and symptoms superfluous. Let us begin by considering how Shākya mchog ldan characterizes the import of Sgam po pa’s doctrine. In his Great Ship of Unity, he states that the realization of mahāmudrā “is such that when one has arrived at the supramundane path, then the entire spectrum of qualities med pa ma yin te | par phyin theg pa nas phyag rgya chen po’i tha snyad ’byung bar mai trīpas bshad pa dang | rin chen phyag rgya zhes bya ba’i ting nge ’dzin gsungs pa… This of course raises the pertinent question of whether it is illegitimate, and even anachronistic, to speak of a “sūtra Mahāmudrā”. 357 Sdom gsum rab dbye, III.167: da lta'i phyag rgya chen po dang | | rgya nag lugs kyi rdzogs chen la | | yas 'bab dang ni mas 'dzegs gnyis | | rim gyis pa dang cig char bar | | ming 'dogs bsgyur ba rna gtogs pa | | don la khyad par dbye ba med | | See Rhoton 2002, 303 (tib.); 118 (Eng.). 358 See Jackson 1994. 359 For Sa skya Paṇḍita’s critiques, see Sdom gsum rab dbye, verses III.171, 347‒49, 447, 610, 638‒39. 135 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN conducive to purification such as the [thirty-seven factors] of awakening, loving kindness, compassion and the rest, which are termed ‘great bliss’ are of one taste with the essence of the dharmadhātu wisdom. In that instance, this was definitely asserted in the statement that ‘[Mahāmudrā] is similar to a Self-sufficient White Remedy’.” 360 In his Golden Lancet Shākya mchog ldan explains that Sgam po pa did not use the term self-sufficient remedy in the sense of “a view of emptiness divorced from skillful means”361 as the equation with Heshang’s alleged ethical quietism had suggested, but simply as an analogy (dpe)—as in the statement “this, my realization of the nature of mind, is like the Self-sufficient White medicine”362. The analogy here implies that the Mahāmudrā view offers a potent broad-spectrum cure against afflictions since it eliminates their root cause, delusion. Hence, in his Undermining the Haughtiness, Shākya mchog ldan explains that “the expression “Self-sufficient White Remedy” (dkar po gcig thub) refers exclusively to the ‘view’ but is not a term which denigrates the accumulation of merits. Rather, its precise meaning is that one does not need to strive for different antidotes to each of the emotional afflictions and discursive thoughts as mahāmudrā alone is sufficient [as a remedy].”363 On this understanding, Shākya mchog ldan can argue in his Great Ship of Unity that if this “view of mahāmudrā as ‘Self-sufficient White Remedy’ is inadmissible, then this contradicts the [standard] explanation that the six perfections are all subsumed under the perfection of insight.” In other words, the controversial depiction of Mahāmudrā as a self-sufficient remedy turns on the age-old Buddhist controversy over whether the perfection of insight contains within itself the other perfections364 and can therefore be considered as a comprehensive soteriological method. Elsewhere in the Great Ship of Unity, Shākya mchog ldan formulates Sa skya Paṇḍita’s position as a chain of arguments before offering his own response to the main points of controversy. Sa paṇ’s view turns on the assumption that Sgam po pa’s “Self-sufficient White 360 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 52, critical edition: 75. 361 Sdom gsum rab dbye’i le’u gsum pa rig ’dzin sdom pa’i skabs kyi ’bel gtam rnam par nges pa legs bshad gser gyi thur ma, SCsb(B) vol. 6, 1814: “The meaning of the self-sufficient remedy refers to the view of emptiness that is divorced from skillful means.” dkar po gcig thub kyi don ni | thabs dang bral ba’i stong nyid kyi lta ba la zer ba yin la | 362 Ibid, 861‒2: rjes sgam po pas | sman la dper mdzad nas | nga’i sems nyid rtogs pa ’di sman dkar po gcig thub dang ’dra | 363 PCdn, see Volume II, translation: 25, critical edition: 33. 364 See Gombrich 2011 (chapter 4) which discusses the somewhat different controversy in Pāli canonical and post-canonical sources over whether intellectual insight (paññā)—correct discernment of the true situation— without meditation is sufficient for attaining awakening. See also Gethin 1998 (262) on the early Buddhist debate over whether “at the time of awakening, the four noble truths are seen gradually (as the Sarvāstivādins argued) or in a single instant (as the Theravādins, amongst others, argued): ultimate truth is not something one can see part of; one either sees it complete, or not at all.” 136 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Remedy” constitutes a view of emptiness divorced from skillful means, which he identifies as a Neo-Mahāmudrā (da lta’i phyag rgya chen po) based on a quasi-Chinese Rdzogs chen system comparable to the latter’s “descent from above” view. Sa skya Paṇḍita’s arguments are framed as follows: Does your “descent from above” view require training in the conduct of the six perfections or not? If it is not required, then [this view] has become [equivalent to] the religious tradition of the Chinese abbot. If it is required, then does one train gradually or simultaneously? In the first case, how would there be any difference from the “conduct that ascends from below”? And if it simultaneous, would there be a distinction between the practices of view and conduct or would conduct be included within the view? In the first case, this view would contradict it being a Self-sufficient White Remedy. In the second case, is this tradition of inseparability of view and conduct practiced according to the Mantra-tradition or according to the Pāramitā tradition? In the first case, it is in contradiction with [the Mantra system] in not taking empowerments and the two stages [of Generation and Completion] as being of crucial importance. In the second case, it is not admissible to have a teaching which [allows] beginners to awaken within a single lifetime. The thrust of Sa paṇ’s reconstructed arguments is that if Sgam po pa’s “descent from above” view does not require the perfections, then it must be akin to Heshang’s teaching. If it does require them and is gradual, it cannot be considered different from the so-called “conduct that ascends from below”; but if it is simultaneous, then the question of whether conduct is independent of view or subsumed under it must be answered. The first possibility contradicts it being a self-sufficient remedy, whereas the second, the inclusion of conduct in view, will either end up contradicting the Mantra system’s prerequisite empowerments and two stages of Generation and Completion or the Pāramitā system’s exclusion of any teaching enabling beginners to awaken within a single lifetime. Shākya mchog ldan’s first line of response to these arguments is to state that “there are those who in this life did not previously go through the two stages, but who have faith in this teaching and have had the blessing of the teacher enter their mind-streams. Since they have already gone through the purification by the empowerments and the two stages in previous lives, they are ‘those who have the simultaneist potential’ (cig car ba’i rigs can).”365 He then defers to his earlier rebuttal (summarized above) where he had argued that the rejection of the view of the self-sufficiency of Mahāmudrā contradicts the widely-accepted view that the perfection of insight (prajñāpāramitā) comprises the other five perfections which are the 365 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 58, critical edition: 77. 137 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN skillful means. Shākya mchog ldan emphasizes that the primacy of mahāmudrā or prajñāpāramitā should not be confused with a denial or disregard of the skillful means: “Were there no difference between the ‘descent from above’ (yas ’bab) view of Mahāmudrā and the ‘simultaneist’ (cig car ba) path of Heshang, it would follow that Mahāmudrā followers would not accept loving kindness, compassion, the [first] five perfections and the cultivation of the mind of a bodhisattva and so on as the path. If this is claimed, it would contradict the elaborate explanations by these Mahāmudrā followers of the utmost importance of these aspects of skillful means.”366 According to Shākya mchog ldan, not only are skillful means not forsaken by the Mahāmudrā view, but they are said to unfold naturally upon its realization as uncontrived spontaneous activities: “In the words of others yet, it is said that the practice of the simultaneists is what is called ‘descent from above view’ and that the view of the gradualists is the ‘ascent from below conduct’. [But] when the view is realized, the conduct is spontaneously present, even without striving for it.” 367 To underscore the point that Mahāmudrā teachings are grounded in the unity of insight and skillful means, Shākya mchog ldan reminds his interlocutor that Sgam po pa’s Stages of the Path (lam rim) summary Jewel Ornament of Liberation extensively outlined the “preliminary methods of analysis through discriminating insight in the context of the Prajñāpāramitā view”.368 Intriguingly, Shākya mchog ldan was of the opinion that many of his Sa skya colleagues had misunderstood the import of Sa paṇ’s criticism when they reinterpreted the Selfsufficient White Remedy as a license to accept the conventional—delusory phenomena —just as it is. In a section of his Great Ship of Unity devoted to presenting and refuting modern-day Sa skya misrepresentations of the early Sa skya masters, he states: Those [Sa skya pas] who do not correctly understand the point of [Sa paṇ’s] refutation of the Self-sufficient White Remedy think that the whole collection of practices [that make up its] conduct must be practiced by leaving the conventional, however things appear, just as it is without negating it. Thus, when everything is determined to be emptiness, they absurdly conclude that this is the Self-sufficient White Remedy. Having this in mind, they promote this version of the dharma. They do not differentiate between the categories of the two vehicles. In the case of the Pāramitāyāna, the following words [from Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaṅga 21ab] apply just as [they] stated: “Because [the conventional] corresponds to 366 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 49, critical edition: 72. 367 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 53, critical edition: 75. 368 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 50, critical edition: 72. 138 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN appearances, don’t subject it to analysis.”369 However, in the Mantra[yāna], all ways of conduct, whether one is in meditative equipoise or not, must be practiced from within the state of emptiness.370 In other words, far from acquiescing to conventional appearances, Mantrayāna adepts deal with a world transfigured, one seen from within the continuous state of emptiness. With this point we have come full circle to Shākya mchog ldan’s explanation of Self-sufficient White Remedy as a metaphor for the view which comprehensively ascertains emptiness, a view which offers a broad-spectrum and long-lasting cure for the afflictions which give rise to delusory phenomena. MENTAL NONENGAGEMENT (AMANASIKĀRA) AND THE FIRE OF WISDOM Shākya mchog ldan critically reappraises several of Sa skya Paṇḍita’s condemnations of Dwags po Bka’ brgyud contemplation practices that were advanced in writings including the Sdom gsum rab dbye, Thub paʼi dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba and Skye bu dam pa rnams la spring baʼi yi ge.371 In such works, Sa paṇ had identified amanasikāra as a doctrine of the Chinese Heshang Moheyan (late 8th c.) advocating the suspension of all thoughts and activities in order to attack, by way of analogy, certain non-tantric “Neo-Mahāmudrā” (da ltaʼi phyag rgya chen po) practices which he deemed to be of Chinese provenance and therefore heretical or non-Buddhist (chos min). Sa paṇ’s critique was primarily directed at certain nongradual Mahāmudrā teachings associated with Sgam po pa endorsing a direct introduction (ngo sprod) to the nature of mind by means of unmediated perception. Such teachings were criticized on the grounds that [1] they were being taught independently of the Tantric system of four mudrās elaborated by Nāropa and transmitted in Tibet by his disciple Mar pa, that [2] they represented newly introduced doctrinal innovations (rang bzo) of questionable (i.e., nonIndian) provenance and that [3] they advocated an erroneous nonconceptual, nongradual approach to goal-realization.372 In general, Bka’ brgyud defences of Mahāmudrā amanasikāra teachings countered these allegations with arguments to the effect that the amanasikāra of their tradition [1] is a valid Buddhist doctrine and soteriological aim backed by extensive scriptural support in both the sūtras and tantras, [2] forms the doctrinal nucleus of Maitrīpa’s authoritative cycle of 369 Satyadvayavibhaṅga 21ab. See Eckel 1987, 89 and clarification of Lindtner 1990, 256‒57. 370 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 64, critical edition: 80. 371 The relevant sections are translated in Jackson 1994, 159 ff. 372 Jackson 1994, 72 f. Sa skya Paṇḍita’s source appears to have been the Sba bzhed since he refers to a Dpaʼ bzhed, Dbaʼ bzhed, or ʼBaʼ bzhed in his discussions of Heshang’s doctrines. 139 S H ĀK Y A M C H OG LD AN Amanasikāra teachings (yid la mi byed pa’i chos skor), [3] consists not in a perpetual and total suspension of thought activity, but rather in the stilling of conditioned dualistic thoughts (in specific soteriological contexts such as calm abiding and goal-realization) in order to allow nondual wisdom to arise, and thus [4] has nothing in common, either historically or doctrinally, with the type of amanasikāra practices attributed to Heshang Moheyan. Although Shākya mchog ldan’s Mahāmudrā triology does not treat the topic of amanasikāra in nearly as much detail as other post-classical masters such as Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po 373, and does not even mention the Maitrīpa tradition, he does make a number of illuminating observations regarding its role in Buddhist meditation and goal-realization. In general he considered it a mistake to confuse the Bka’ brgyud amanasikāra with the practice of auto-stupefaction attributed to Heshang Moheyan. But it would appear that he was also critical of those who associated Mahāmudrā only with the amanasikāra taught in the Tathāgatagarbha texts since he says in his Ascertaining the Intent that “some others confuse [Mahāmudrā] with explanations of mental nonengagement in [Tathāgata]garbha texts. With their prattle about devoting themselves assiduously to the mere emptiness as a nonaffirming negation, they disparage the wisdom of those having realization.”374 In the Great Ship of Unity, Shākya mchog ldan specifies certain conditions when mental nonengagement and not thinking anything may be considered hallmarks of goalrealization. In this regard, he describes a type of Madhyamaka direct introduction 375 to profound suchness given to those whose minds have previously been suitably prepared either through the Pāramitāyāna reasoning and/or tantric empowerments. The Madhyamaka view of profound suchness is precisely mental nonengagement, the uncontrived sponteneous state in which one does not think of anything at all and even discriminating insight must cease, as in the famous example of the flame that arises from rubbing two sticks together376: 373 Their views are given detailed treatment below in chapters three and four below. 374 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 42, critical edition: 47. 375 An example of a Madhyamaka upadeśa on amanasikāra is found in Bhavya II’s Madhyamakaratnapradīpa on which see below, 409‒10. 376 This analogy from the Kaśyapaparivarta was famously cited in Kamalaśīla’s Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇīṭīkā (NPDhṬ), Peking Kanjur no. 5501, 157b5‒6 to describe how conceptual discernment is burned away at the time of nonconceptual realization and thereby establish the connection between the discernment of reality and mental nonengagement: “The characteristic of discerning reality (bhūtapratyavekṣā) is here [in the Nirvikalpapraveśadhāraṇī (NPDh)] considered to be mental nonengagement (amanasikāra). That [discernment] has the nature of being conceptual, but it is burned away by the fire of genuine wisdom arising from it, just as a fire kindled by rubbing two pieces of wood burns these very pieces.” yang dag par so sor rtog pa’i mtshan ma ni ’dir yid la mi byed par dgongs so | | de ni rnam par rtog pa’i ngo bo nyid yin mod kyi | ’on kyang de nyid las byung ba yang dag pa’i ye shes kyi mes de bsregs par ’gyur te | shing gnyis drud las byung ba’i mes shing de gnyis sreg par byed pa bzhin no | | 140 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN [It follows] because, at the time of teaching the Madhyamaka view, when the time is ripe to show learned people who have previously trained in studying and thinking the view of the main practice, this is nothing other than settling spontaneously into the uncontrived state—not thinking anything, not mentally engaging in anything (gang du yang yid la mi byed). It is also because, in this context, it has been explained that even discriminating insight itself must cease, as in the example of the flame that arises from rubbing two sticks together.377 The author goes on to state that Atiśawas a chief proponent of this line of Madhyamaka pith-instructions which he himself had traced to Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti. 378 Based on these pith-instructions, Atiśa is credited with composing “the treatise entitled Madhyamakopadeśa379 wherein the main practice—the way of settling into meditative equipoise—was set forth exactly in the way it was presented in the written instructions on that [topic] by the Mahāmudrā proponents.”380 In his Great Ship of Unity, the author dismisses the belief that “the main practice of the Bka’ gdams view is conceptual comprehension (zhen pa’i blo) because it is a mode of apprehension which opposes the view of self (ātmadṛṣ ti)” by noting that “the glorious Atiśataught not thinking, not pondering, and not being mentally engaged as the main practice of the view”.381 That said, Shākya mchog ldan elsewhere expresses reservations about simply equating Atiśa’sMadhyamaka amanasikāra pith-instructions with those favoured in Dwags po Mahāmudrā texts. In Ascertaining the Intent he remarks that “some who are mistaken regarding [Sgam po pa’s] talk about ‘uniting the two streams of Bka’ [gdams pa] and [Mahā]mudrā,’ devote themselves assiduously to the Madhyamakopadeśa by Atiśa[even though] the Madhyamaka of that [work] is [largely a matter of] conceptual [knowledge] and not a domain of nonconceptual knowledge.”382 This comment strikes the reader as rather atypical given the author’s usual strategy of underscoring commonalities between the Madhyamaka and Mahāmudrā strands of amanasikāra. It does, however, reflect his general reservations about the tendency amongst Tibetan to take an analytical mode of Madhyamaka investigation and meditation as a soteriological end in itself. He traces such an interpretation to Po to ba Rin chen gsal (1027‒1105). Consider, for example, the following remark from his Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad pa: 377 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 62, critical edition: 79. 378 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 62, critical edition: 79. 379 D3829. 380 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 62, critical edition: 79. 381 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 70, critical edition: 84. 382 PCgn, see Volume II, translation: 42, critical edition: 47. 141 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Po to ba has explained the intent of the Madhyamakopadeśa scripture as follows. When adherents of pith-instructions have searched by means of another insight which inquires ‘wherein lies the very essence of all mind-states of subject and object?,’ it is said that settling evenly in a state wherein one does not find anything apart from luminosity is known as the “unity of calm abiding and deep insight”. According to the sequence of these systems [of meditation] Tibetans referred to them as analytical and settling meditation. Both are reasonable, but it was [considered] necessary to take analytical [meditation] as the preliminary. Even so, in the main practice phase, there is never any distinction between analytical and settling meditation. In terms of that reasoning, one makes the distinction between reasoning [by] self-emptiness (rang stong) and other-emptiness (gzhan stong) and the distinction between the nonaffirming or affirming negation [regarding] the object of meditative equipoise.383 The author offers a more targeted and detailed criticism of Sa paṇ’s equation between the amanasikāra advocated by the Bka’ brgyud and the meditative teachings of the Chinese abbot384 in his Reply to the Rin spungs sde pa Shākya rgyal mtshan. After attributing the above equation to both Sa skya Paṇḍita and Gro lung pa blo gros ’byung gnas (b. 11th cent.), Shākya mchog ldan proceeds to underscore the central role of mental nonengagement and nonconceptuality in traditional Buddhist meditation practices and to argue, against Sa paṇ, that amanasikāra functions as an antidote to self-grasping, no less than the direct yogic perception or buddha’s wisdom which both involve the stilling of dualistic thoughts: First, if mental nonengagement does not work as an antidote to self-grasping, and if deep insight necessarily entails discriminating insight, then direct yogic perception in general and a buddha’s wisdom of things as they are in particular would not be an antidote to self-grasping, nor would it be deep insight. This is because when it comes to settling into direct yogic perception, it is definitely necessary to be free from concepts, not to mention in the case of the meditation of noble ones. Yet, even in the meditation of ordinary persons, as in the case of the Mahāyāna 383 Chos tshan brgya dang brgyad pa, Dbu ma’i lta khri, vol. 13, 2141‒2153: dbu ma’i man ngag gzhung gi ni | | dgongs par pu to ba yis bshad | | man ngag pa rnams gzung ’dzin gyi | | sems rnams kun gyi ngo bo de | | gang du gnas zhes tshol byed kyi | | shes rab gzhan gyis btsal ba na | | ’od gsal ba las gang du yang | | ma rnyed ngang du mnyam ’jog pa | | zhi lhag zung ’jug yin zhes gsungs | | lugs ’di dag la go rim bzhin | | bod rnams dpyad dang ’jog sgom zer | | gnyis ka la yang rigs pa yi | | dpyad pa sngon du song dgos kyang | | dngos gzhi’i dus su dpyad ’jog gi | | dbye ba nam yang yod ma yin | | rigs pa de yang rang stong dang | | gzhan stong rigs pas phye ba dang | | mnyam par bzhag yul ma yin dang | | med par dgag pa’i dbye bas phye | | 384 From among Sa skya Paṇḍita’s criticism in the Sdom gsum rab dbye, the verses III.161, 161, 167 and 175 address this issue. 142 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Path of Application, it is necessary to remain free from the clinging of mental engagements. [This is] clearly taught in the works of the noble Maitreya comprising the Two Ornaments and the Two Distinguishers385.386 Shākya mchog ldan proceeds to argue that neither the deep insight (lhag mthong) which is equated with discriminating insight born of thinking nor the abiding calm (zhi gnas) which is equated with nine methods of settling the mind represent the union (yoga) born of meditation which alone realizes the unity (yuganaddha) of calm abiding and deep insight. Consequently, the discriminating insight (so sor rtog pa’i shes rab) which many scriptures equate with deep insight (lhag mthong) is insight stemming from thinking, but not the actual union (rnal ’byor) stemming from meditation. Likewise, the nine methods of resting the mind387 which many scriptures equate with calm abiding, are preparations for engaging in meditation but are not the actual union stemming from meditation. Regarding these two, it is [only] the phase wherein the two so-called “deep insight without having attained calm abiding, and calm abiding without having attained deep insight” are inseparably united that is called “union born of meditation”.388 385 The two ornaments (ālaṃkāra) are the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (AA) and Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (MSA). The two distinguishers (vibhāga) are the Madhyāntavibhāga (MV) and Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (DhDhV). 386 Sa chen skyong mdzad rin spungs sde pa shākya rgyal mtshan gyi zhus lan, SCsb(B) vol. 17, 6401‒3: dang po yid byed dang bral ba bdag ’dzin gyi gnyen por mi ’gro ba dang | lhag mthong la sor rtog shes rab kyi khyab na | spyir rnal ’byor mngon sum dang | bye brag sangs rgyas kyi ye shes ji snyed pa bdag ’dzin gyi gnyen po dang | lhag mthong ma yin par ’gyur te | rnal ’byor mngon sum du ’jog pa la rtog pa dang bral ba zhig nges par dgos pa’i phyir ro | de bas na ’phags pa’i sgom lta ci smos | theg chen gyi sbyor lam lta bu so so skye bo’i sgom yang yid byed zhen pa dang bral bar bzhag dgos pa rje btsun byams pa’i gzhung rgyan gnyis dang ’byed gnyis las gsal bar gsungs so | | 387 These nine methods were taught in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, D4049, 99a4‒5: “What is calm abiding? It is like that: [1] to settle the mind inwardly, [2] to settle [the mind] continuously, [3] to settle [the mind] firmly, [4] to settle [the mind] intensely, [5] to tame [the mind], [6] to pacify [the mind], [7] to pacify [the mind] completely, [8] to [stabilize the mind] in a one-pointed [state], and [9] to settle [the mind] in equanimity.” zhi gnas gang zhe na | ’di lta ste | nang nyid la sems ’jog pa dang | rgyun tu ’jog pa dang | blan te ’jog pa dang | nye bar ’jog pa dang | ’dul bar byed pa dang | zhi bar byed pa dang | rnam par zhi bar byed pa dang | rtse gcig tu byed pa dang | mnyam par ’jog pa’o | 388 Sa chen skyong mdzad rin spungs sde pa shākya rgyal mtshan gyi zhus lan, SCsb(B) vol. 17, 6403‒6: de lta yin pa de’i phyir lung mang po lhag mthong du bshad pa’i so sor rtog pa’i shes rab de ni bsam byung gi shes rab yin gyi sgom byung gi rnal ’byor dngos ma yin | de bzhin du lung mang po zhi gnas su bshad pa’i sems gnas pa’i thabs dgu yang sgom la ’jug pa’i sbyor ba yin gyi | sgom byung gi rnal ’byor dngos ma yin | gnyis po de la zhi gnas ma thob pa’i lhag mthong dang | lhag mthong ma thob pa’i zhi gnas zhes bya | gnyis po zung du ’jug pa’i gnas skabs de la sgom byung gi rnal ’byor dngos zhes bya | 143 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN Coming to the main practice phase of meditation, Shākya mchog ldan is in a position to argue that positive mental engagements such as mindfulness and vigilance, important as they are for dispelling flaws in meditation are not the actual meditation. The analogy of the fire of wisdom which burns away the conceptual resources used to kindle it is again used to support his claim that amanasikāra forms a central place in the main practice (dngos gzhi) phase of Buddhist meditation: Now, during the main practice of meditation, the sentinel of mindfulness (dran pa) and vigilance (shes bzhin) are indeed necessary. [Mental engagements] such as these may dispel flaws in the meditation389, but they are not the actual meditation. During the main practice of meditation, by the example of the fire generated by rubbing two sticks that consumes these very [sticks] and [thus] itself, it is explained that this discriminating insight must be burned away by the fire of wisdom. If that calm abiding which is free from mental engagements has the lethargic [character] known as “stagnant” (ltengs po), then why wouldn’t it absurdly follow that the discriminating insight has the [character of] restlessness or hysteria?390 As much as Shākya mchog ldan endorses amanasikāra as a valid system of meditation, he also emphasizes that nonconceptuality unsupported by wisdom may turn into its opposite, the mental factor of ignorance. We may recall his statement in his Great Ship of Unity (see above, p. 121) that immersing one’s mind in a blank mental state characterized by not thinking anything at all, although at times mistaken for the “real Mahāmudrā”, is only the mental factor of ignorance which is diametrically opposed to the wisdom of awareness.” Elsewhere in this work he adds that “the [state of] not thinking or pondering anything at all by an ignorant person in these phases is subsumed under the ignorance at the time of the ground. Among the two types of ignorance—afflicted (nyon mongs pa can) and nonafflicted—it is the latter and [characterized as] a disorientation regarding suchness.”391 Shākya mchog ldan adds that it was the actions motivated by the afflictive type of ignorance which Sa paṇ had in mind when he 389 See for example also the Jñānālokālaṃkāra: “The [mental] factors involved in becoming mentally disengaged are beneficial. Those involved in becoming mentally engaged are not beneficial.” As translated in Mathes 2013, 279. 390 Sa chen skyong mdzad rin spungs sde pa shākya rgyal mtshan gyi zhus lan, SCsb(B) vol. 17, 6406‒6412: sgom dngos gzhi’i dus su dran pa dang shes bzhin gyi mel tshe ba dgos mod | de ’dra de sgom skyon sel byed yin gyi | sgom dngos ma yin | sgom dngos gzhi’i dus su ni | shing gnyis drud pa las byung ba’i mes shing de nyid kyang bsreg pa’i dpes | so sor rtog pa’i shes rab nyid kyang ye shes kyi mes sreg dgos par bshad pa yin | yid byed dang bral ba’i zhi gnas de ltengs po zhes bya ba’i bying rmugs can ’gyur na | so sor rtog pa’i shes rab de yang g.yer po’am rgod bag can du ci’i phyir mi thal | 391 PCks, see Volume II, translation: 59, critical edition: 77‒78. 144 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN said that “the Great Seal meditation of the ignorant, it is taught, usually becomes a cause of animal birth” based on the traditional explanation that “individual actions associated with each of the three poisons are actions that establish the three lower destinies”. For Shākya mchog ldan, it is imperative that one distinguishes the luminous amanasikāra of wisdom typical of the Madhyamaka or Mahāmudrā meditator who settles in a state of nonconceptual equipoise, lucidly not pursuing thoughts, from the lethargic amanasikāra of ignorance characteristic of the benighted meditator who languishes in a state of stagnant tranquility. While the mental nonengagement of wisdom is equated with nonconceptual realization and mahāmudrā itself, the mental nonengagement of ignorance is regarded as a deviation that stands in the way of such realization. CONCLUDING REMARKS Shākya mchog ldan’s productive engagements with the Dwags po Mahāmudrā teachings which evolved during the last half of his life culminated in a trilogy of works articulating and defending this tradition’s leading views and practices. In these and related Mahāmudrā treatments, the author sought to show that these teachings were commensurate with the definitive meaning of the sūtras and tantras and thus marked the denouement of Buddhist soteriological objectives. In terms of view, Mahāmudrā philosophy reflects the unity of manifestation and emptiness (snang stong zung ‘jug) beyond extremes of existence and nonexistence which is generally regarded as the goal of Buddhist thought and meditation. This unity is also discernable in the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud view of buddha nature as the unity of natural purity and its inseparable buddha qualities discovered as the dharmakāya of realization. Finally, it is also conspicuous in its view of meditation as the unity of appearances and non-apprehension (’dzin med), or of thoughts and their unborn nature. Although biographical sources confirm that Shākya mchog ldan lectured and wrote extensively on the Madhyamaka tradition of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, his philosophical writings reveal deep and lasting reservations about the tendency among many of his Dge lugs, Sa skya and Bka’ brgyud contemporaries to take its method of ascertaining emptiness as a nonaffirming negation through reasoning as an end in itself. In Shākya mchog ldan’s view, this nonaffirming emptiness can be nothing more than a mere conceptual abstraction (don spyi) or other-exclusion (gzhan sel). To confuse its elimination of imputations with goalrealization itself is, in his words, comparable to mistaking a mother for a barren woman inasmuch as it fatally overlooks the fecundity and efficacy of what is to be discovered. The fecundity of emptiness, buddha nature, and nature of mind, is captured in the formulation “emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects” (sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā), a term attested both in tantras and sūtras. As Shākya mchog ldan explains, the identification of this sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā as a nonaffirming negation, as was done in the system of Tsong 145 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN kha pa and his followers, contradicts all scripture, reasoning, and the upadeśas. Properly understood, this locution reflects the inseparability of luminosity and emptiness, of the natural purity and soteriological efficacy of buddha nature. In terms of praxis, it is striking that Shākya mchog ldan characterizes Mahāmudrā as the yogin’s system of first-hand experience (nyams su myong ba’i lugs) which he considers superior to the dialectician’s (mtshan nyid pa) two systems of severing superimpositions (sgro ’dogs bcad pa’i lugs) ‒ the negating Self-emptiness and affirming Other-emptiness systems. These latter two systems were regarded as useful preliminary measures for clearing away discursive superimpositions to allow for the direct perception of the nature of mind and reality. They were nonetheless described as “poisoned” (dug can) or conceptually fabricated and thus distinct from unconditioned personally realized wisdom. In this regard, the Other-emptiness tradition was considered a major step beyond the Self-emptiness system since it emphatically affirms, rather than denies, the presence of nondual wisdom as what remains (lhag ma) in the wake of eliminating discursive elaborations. This affirmative stance is precisely what distinguishes third dharmacakra discourses of definitive meaning from second dharmacakra discourses on emptiness and selflessness which are thought to be of merely provisional meaning, in need of further interpretation. Hence, to accept that there is something important to be discovered by Buddhist soteriological activities is to accept the core hermeneutical standpoint of the scriptures of the third dharmacakra, the tantras and the dohās of the mahāsiddhas. This affirmative, cataphatic approach is therefore thought to bring the Gzhan stong adept much closer to the goal of unity than his or her Rang stong counterpart. We may in this regard recall Shākya mchog ldan’s comment that the very idea of “unity” has its inception in works he broadly classifies as Gzhan stong and Alīkākāravāda Madhyamaka, but is not attested in the classical texts of the Rang stong tradition. That said, it would be wrong to call Shākya mchog ldan’s support for the Gzhan stong tradition unequivocal. For, as much as he criticized the Rang stong tendency toward a nihilistic interpretation of emptiness, buddha nature, and ultimate truth in terms of a nonaffirming negation, he also criticized the Gzhan stong tendency toward an eternalist interpretation, associated with the Dol po pa’s Jo nang tradition, which defines emptiness, buddha nature, and ultimate truth as a permanent absolute lying beyond time and dependent arising. While Dol po pa describes a perfect nature which is empty of the dependent and imagined natures, Shākya mchog ldan interprets the perfect nature as the dependent nature which is empty of the imagined nature. Self-luminous self-awareness, the personally realized nondual wisdom, which is cultivated through direct yogic perception, actualizes this true nature of mind in the immediacy of the present moment (which alone is real), whereas Dol po pa maintains that the perfect nature is a permanent, unconditioned entity that lies beyond time and matter. It is intriguing that while Shākya mchog ldan’s works generally reflect his endorsement of Gzhan stong views and methods, his Mahāmudrā works reflect a more ambivalent 146 S H ĀK Y A MC H OG LD AN view which frames Self-emptiness and Other-emptiness as oppositional positions within a dialectic of reciprocal determination. It is clear that he saw Mahāmudrā as the best way to break out of this dialectic. After all, the primary focus of Mahāmudrā views and practices is to gain first-hand experience of mind’s abiding nature in meditation in order to undermine dualistic perceptions and beliefs and to thereby discover the unity of appearances and emptiness in post-meditation. In short, by restoring the primacy of knowledge grounded in first-hand experience over the type of inferential-representational knowledge favoured in Buddhist philosophical traditions, the Mahāmudrā tradition reawakened the possibility of making Buddhist soteriology a matter of direct acquaintance rather than abstract positive or negative determinations. It will be seen that Karma phrin las pa, one of Shākya mchog ldan’s foremost students, shared with him the view that Mahāmudrā and buddha nature are best understood in terms of the unity of emptiness and manifestation, or natural purity and buddha qualities. He also agreed that a Gzhan stong path of affirming negation offers the best prospect of realizing this unity since it acknowledges the importance of what is to be discovered. It will hopefully become clear to the reader that philosophical differences between Shākya mchog ldan and many of his post-classical Bka’ brgyud coreligionists, including the three masters examined in the chapters to follow, had more to do with doxographical affiliations than central aims and viewpoints. Compared with Shākya mchog ldan, Karma phrin las pa’s extant writings give little attention to the Alīkākāra (Nonrepresentationalist) tradition, while Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po’s works emphatically reject it, along with Shākya mchog ldan’s claim that it can be considered Madhyamaka tradition. Still, the doxographical divide separating Shākya mchog ldan from many of his Bka’ brgyud counterparts had far-reaching philosophical ramifications. Unlike Shākya mchog ldan, Karma phrin las, Mi bskyod rdo rje and Padma dkar po were all proponents and defenders of the so-called Nonfoundationalist (apratiṣṭhāna) Mantrayāna-Madhyamka tradition of Maitrīpa and his colleagues which claimed to transcend the mentalistic presuppositions of all strands of Cittamātra thought (Representationalist and Nonrepresentationalist alike). Karma phrin las for his part considered this Apratiṣṭhāna tradition to be the Great Madhyamaka that supersedes not only the Cittamātra schools but also the Madhyamaka schools designated in Tibetan Buddhist doxographies as Svātantrika and *Prāsaṅgika. He and the other two masters con-sidered in the chapters to follow take this Nonfoundationalist Madhyamaka as the basic philosophical paradigm for approaching Mahāmudrā views and meditation, a paradigm which underscores the unity of manifestation and emptiness but leaves no room in it for the Cittamātra construal of consciousness as a real entity having real properties. 147 KARMA PHRIN LAS 148 K A RM A P H RI N L A S OVERVIEW It is surprising that a scholar as erudite as Karma phrin las pa (1456‒1539), when looking back on his academic career in the later part of his life, took a rather self-deprecatory view of the many scholarly accomplishments of his younger years. He confides in one of his spiritual songs that all his studies of countless sūtric and tantric scriptures made him attain only superficial assumptions392 but not the confidence of ascertaining luminous emptiness. 393 As he muses in another stanza, unless the subtle divisions of philosophical tenets are fully penetrated, in which case they are, in fact, assimilated into mahāmudrā, they remain only the confused prattle of a lunatic who loses himself in endless verbosity.394 Mahāmudrā is for him the ultimate essence of all the sūtras and tantras395 or, more simply, the reality that is one’s own mind.396 Stated concisely, “the essence of self-awareness is mahāmudrā”397. In other words, mahāmudrā is discovered not in conceptual analysis but in momentary self-awareness, self-luminosity, and freedom from the impurity of clinging to concepts, which together constitute the realization of the dharmakāya.398 As Karma phrin las explains, when settling in the uncontrived, natural essence, this ground (gzhi) having nothing to remove and nothing to add is the dharmakāya. The path (lam) of Mahāmudrā is a matter of internalizing the great 392 Chos kyi rje Karma ’phrin las pa’i gsung ’bum las rdo rje mgur kyi ’phreng ba rnams, [hereafter KPdg] (ga 1‒86), 72‒3: “In the past I attended many teachers [and] looked over countless scriptures of the sūtras and the tantras, but even though [I] advanced many refutations and verifications in the context of scripture and reasoning, [they] resulted only in a path of outward assumptions.” ngas sngon chad bla ma mang du bsten | | mdo rgyud kyi glegs bam dpag med mthong | | lung rigs la dgag sgrub mang byas kyang | | phyi yid dpyod kyi lam du lus nas thal | | Karma phrin las pa contrasts the path of outward assumptions with “cutting reifications from within” (Ibid., 73‒4: sgro ’dogs nang nas chod) through the process of meditation. 393 Ibid., 556: “Previously, cutting and cutting through the elaborations of dualistic beliefs, I did not attain the confidence of ascertaining luminous empti[ness]. Now, as self-liberation naturally dawns [I] have taken hold of the wisdom of nonduality.” sngar gzung ’dzin spros pa gcod gcod nas | | stong gsal la nges pa’i gdeng ma thob | | da rang grol ngang gis shar ba na | | gnyis med kyi ye shes lag rtser lon | | 394 Ibid., 74‒5: “Verbal expressions are endless. Yet the moment all the subtle hair-splitting divisions of philosophical tenets are deeply understood, they are included within Mahāmudrā. When not understood, they are [but] the confused prattle of lunatics.” tha snyad kyi tshig la zad pa med | | grub mtha’ yi spu ris thams cad kyang | | rtogs tsa na phyag rgya chen por ’dus | | ma rtogs na smyon pa’i slab chol yin | | 395 Chos kyi rje Karma ’phrin las pa’i gsung ’bum las thun mong ba’i dri lan gyi phreng ba rnams, [hereafter KPdl] (ca 87‒223), 1363: “The treatises and upadeśas of Mahāmudrā are the ultimate essence of all the sūtras and tantras.” phyag rgya chen po’i gzhung dang gdams ngag rnams | | mdo rgyud kun gyi snying po’i mthar thug yin | | 396 KPdg, 834: “The expression ‘Mahāmudrā teaching’ ̶ its meaning [and reality] is said to be one’s own mind.” chos phyag rgya chen po skad pa de | don rang gi sems la zer ba yin | | 397 Ibid., 852: rang rig pa’i ngo bo phyag rgya che. 398 Ibid., 77‒81: “Without the impurity of clinging to concepts, this momentary naturally luminous self-awareness is realized as the dharmakāya of self-liberated great bliss.” rnam rtog la zhen pa’i sel med pa | | skad cig ma rang rig rang gsal ’di | | rang grol bde chen gyi chos skur rtogs | | 149 K A RM A P H RI N L A S unity through which the fruition, the perfection of the twofold aims of oneself and others, is accomplished.399 In Karma phrin las pa’s Mahāmudrā works we encounter an author who combines a brilliant philosophical mind with the experiential orientation of a dedicated yogin. This fits with his view of himself as a practice-focused kusulu-yogin400 of the Karma Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā lineage who was also conversant with the Sa skya Lam ’bras tradition.401 In his eyes, both traditions transmitted the same essential meaning, i.e., the indistinguishability of saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, the unity of appearance and emptiness402 or, in terminology specific to the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud system, the unity of thoughts and dharmakāya. Reflecting upon his own experience, Karma phrin las reports that he was able to eliminate superimpositions from within, and not through recourse to the outer path of philosophical speculation. In this way he realized the ground—mind’s true nature—as unborn, this nonarisen nature as dharmakāya, and the dharmakāya as transcending all verbal expression. As divisive thoughts were liberated in the dimension of self-awareness, dualistic perceptions simply evaporated in the expanse of nonorigination.403 399 KPdg, 852‒3: “Settle in the uncontrived natural essence; the ground [where there] is nothing to remove and nothing to add is the dharmakāya. Practice the path as the great unity and you will accomplish the fruition which is the perfection of the twofold benefit.” ma bcos rang babs kyi ngang la zhog | | gzhi bsal gzhag bral ba chos kyi sku | | lam zung ’jug chen por nyams su long | | don gnyis mthar phyin gyi ’bras bu bsgrubs | | 400 Kusulu is an alternative term for kusāli, a term of unknown origin which is virtually synonymous with rnal ’byor pa (yogin). See Chos kyi rje Karma ’phrin las pa’i gsung ’bum las rdo rje mgur kyi ’phreng ba rnams, (ga 1‒86), 805: “He who is a master of discursive conventions takes the four qualities of view, meditation, conduct, and fruition separately. For me, the kusulu, they are undifferentiated. This is the mode of abiding wherein ground and fruition are the same. In the case of propounding mahāmudrā meditation, were Lord Buddha to appear in person, it is impossible that [he would] proclaim any meaning other than this. Considering this to be true, put it into practice!” chos lta sgom spyod pa ’bras bu bzhi | | khong tha snyad mkhan po so sor ’dod | | nged ku su lu la khyad par med | | ’di gzhi ’bras gcig pa’i gnas lugs yin | | khyed phyag rgya chen po sgom bzhed na | | rje sangs rgyas dngos su byon gyur kyang | | don ’di las gzhan pa gsung mi srid | | ’di bden par dgongs la nyams su long | | 401 See Rheingans 2004, 70. 402 KPdl, 2071‒3: “Since the two, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa, are an inseparable unity, the key point of the view of this Bka’ [brgyud] is known in the saying ‘thoughts are dharmakāya’. The nature of saṃsāra is nirvāṇa. Thus Saraha said to the ignorant ones in the Dohā[koṣ aa] that this is to be understood. The key point of the view of the glorious Sa skya pas which claims that saṃsāra and nirvāṇa are inseparable is identical to the key-point that thoughts are dharmakāya.” ’khor ’das gnyis po dbyer med gcig yin pas | | bka’ brgyud rin chen ’di yi lta ba’i gnad | | rnam rtog chos sku zhes byar grags pa yin | | ’khor ba’i rang bzhin mya ngan ’das pa zhes | | rmongs pa rnams la mda’ bsnun gyis smras pa | | tse ne shes par gyis shes do har gsungs | | dpal ldan sa skya pa rnams lta ba’i gnad | | ’khor ’das dbyer med nyid du bzhed pa dang | | rnam rtog chos skur bzhed pa gnad gcig pas | | aThis remark pertains to the People Dohā, verse 102, Dmangs dohā’i rnam bshad sems kyi rnam thar ston pa’i me long, 1098‒9: “[For] one who ascertains that this saṃsāra is nirvāṇa, they are not thought of as different. Since they are of one nature, one gives up distinguishing [them]. Thus have I realized the stainless [reality].” gang zhig ’khor ba de ni mya ngan ’das par nges | | dbye ba gzhan du sems pa ma yin te | | rang bzhin gcig gis dbye ba rnam par spangs | | dri ma med pa nga yis rab tu rtogs | | 403 KPdg, 73‒4: “Now I have cut reifications from within. I have realized the ground, mind’s nature to be unborn. I have seen the unborn as the dharmakāya. I have understood the dharmakāya to be beyond words and 150 K A RM A P H RI N L A S To be sure, Karma phrin las pa does not deny the importance of cultivating a correct view through conceptually scrutinizing reality, mind, and its nature. However, he emphasizes that attachment and aversion to philosophical tenets must be avoided. It is for this very reason that the polemicism so prominent in the other scholars considered in this study play a lesser role in the extant works of Karma phrin las pa. Giving scant consideration to the critical appraisal of specific rival views, he continually emphasizes the need to abandon attachments to views altogether and to integrate an unbiased view with the practice of meditation. “Views based on philosophical hair-splitting, when discussed, may seem eloquent, but they are just plain conceitedness.”404 In any case, he says, clinging to philosophical tenets is what should be relinquished through the path of vision, for such clinging was said by the Buddha to constitute the obscuration of conceptual imputation. Clearly, for Karma phrin las pa, there is only one path to buddhahood405 and the understanding that all Buddhist teachings are without contradiction constitutes a special feature of the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud tradition. Because the intent of the Buddha is the same throughout all his seemingly diverse teachings, their underlying unity can and should be appreciated by means of an impartial pure perception.406 It is from this standpoint that Karma phrin las pa maintains that self-emptiness (rang stong) and other-emptiness (gzhan stong) do not contradict each other, citing as his principle authority his root teacher, the Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454–1506). On this view, Self-emptiness—in the sense that all phenomena are empty of an own self-essence—implies the wisdom of nonduality. He thus presents Rang stong not in terms of a nonaffirming negation but in line with the Bṛhaṭṭīkā.407 expressions. Thoughts are freed in the dimension of self-awareness. Subject and object have evaporated in the expanse of nonarising.” dus da res sgro ’dogs nang nas chod | | gzhi sems nyid skye ba med par rtogs | | skye med de chos kyi sku ru mthong | | chos sku smra [b]rjod las ’das par go | | rnam rtog rang rig gi ngang du grol | | gzung ’dzin skye med kyi dbyings su yal | | 404 KPdg, 122‒3: grub mtha’i spu ris ’byed pa’i lta ba de | | smra tshe legs legs ’dra yang pho tshod tsam | | 405 KPdl, 1575: mthar thug sangs rgyas lam du gcig yin | 406 KPdl, Dri lan yig kyi mun sel, 884‒895: “All attachments and aversions [in the context of] clinging to philosophical tenets are to be given up through the [path of] vision. The victor taught that they are obscurations of conceptual imputations.… The so-called “greatness of realizing that the diversity of teachings do not contradict each other” is renowned in this tradition.… Even though there appear to be distinctions in views and tenets, the intent of the Buddha is all the same. All being in accord, they should all be held equally. It is crucial to cultivate an unbiased pure perception.” grub mtha’ la zhen pa’i | | chags sdang mtha’ dag mthong bas spang bya ste | | kun tu brtags pa’i sgrib par rgyal bas gsungs | | … bstan pa mtha’ dag ’gal ba med rtogs pa’i | | che ba zhes bya brgyud pa ’di la grags | |… lta grub so sor dbye ba ltar snang yang | | rgyal ba’i dgongs pa gang yin thams cad gcig | | … thams cad mthun rnams thams cad bzhin du gzung | | phyogs ris med pa’i dag snang bsgom pa gces | | … See also Volume II, translation: 88, critical edition: 92. 407 Śatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā (=Br̥haṭṭīkā), D3808, 206a5‒6: “Empty [means] being devoid of what is other, such as a vase being called ‘empty’, because it is devoid of water. Likewise, phenomena are thought to be ‘empty’, because they are devoid of a nature such as specific characteristics.” stong pa ni gzhan bral ba ste | dper na chu dang bral ba’i phyir bum pa stong pa zhes bya ba lta 151 K A RM A P H RI N L A S His view of Other-emptiness is that mind’s nature is empty of what is different from it, i.e., adventitious obscurations, whereas not being aware of mind’s true nature is the source of the dichotomy between the apprehended and the apprehender. In the state of an ordinary sentient being, the sixty-four qualities of dissociation and maturation408, though inherent to mind’s nature, remain obscured by the adventitious stains, of which mind’s nature nonetheless remains intrinsically empty. When these obscurations are finally done away with, buddhahood endowed with these sixty-four qualities manifests. Properly considered, Gzhan stong encapsulates the innatist view that when mind as such is recognized as it really is—empty of adventitious obscurations—inherent buddha qualities blossom naturally. Gzhan stong does not establish a permanent, enduring, ultimate entity, but draws attention to ultimate truth which is simply natural luminosity, the inseparability of expanse and awareness. This is also called natural awareness (tha mal gyi shes pa)409, a key term in the terminology of Dwags po Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā which indicates a momentary awareness aware of its own true nature. Karma phrin las pa attributed this way of understanding Rang stong and Gzhan stong to Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje and he also pointed out its conformity with the view of Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho. He considered this reconciliatory approach to be superior to the kinds of Rang stong and Gzhan stong predominantly known in Tibet. 410 With this remark he appears to make a veiled reference to both the Rang stong views of Tsong kha pa (1357–1419) and his followers who emphasized a nonaffirming negation and the Jo nang Gzhan stong views of Dol po pa (1292–1361) and his followers who emphasized an unchanging absolute bu’o | de bzhin du rang gi mtshan nyid la sogs pa’i ngo bo nyid dang bral ba’i phyir chos de dag nyid la stong pa zhes kun tu rtog go | On the question of authorship of the Br̥haṭṭīkā, see Brunnhölzl 2011b, 9‒12 408 The sixty-four qualities of dissociation and maturation are the qualities of buddhahood. They comprise the thirty-two qualities of the dharmakāya and the thirty-two qualities of the form kāyas respectively. See for example Brunnhölzl 2009, 218‒23. 409 KPdl, Dri lan yig kyi mun sel, 917‒923: “The thirty-two qualities of dissociation from all obscurations and the thirty-two of maturation that unfold as enlightened activity, are special qualities exclusive to perfect buddhahood. They are not asserted to be present at the time of the ground. The sixty-four qualities present in the ground are veiled by obscurations. When these stains are vanquished, [one] becomes an immaculate victor. Thus, the ground of emptiness of gzhan stong is *sugatagarbha, mind as such, this very natural luminosity. [This], i.e., natural luminosity, unity, coemergence, the inseparability of the expanse and awareness, the natural awareness itself, is the profound view of Gzhan stong.” sgrib kun bral ba’i yon tan so gnyis dang | | phrin las rgyas pa’i rnam smin sum bcu gnyis | | rdzogs pa’i sangs rgyas kho na’i khyad chos te | | ’di ni gzhi la bzhugs par mi ’dod do | |gzhi la bzhugs pa’i yon tan drug bcu bzhi | | sgrib pas bsgribs shing dri ma de bcom pas | | dri med rgyal bar ’gyur phyir gzhan stong gi | | stong gzhi bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po ni | | sems nyid rang bzhin ’od gsal ’di nyid yin | | … rang bzhin ’od gsal zung ’jug lhan cig skyes | | dbyings rig dbyer med tha mal shes pa nyid | | gzhan stong zab mo’i lta ba yin zhes gsung | | See also volume II, translation: 91, critical edition: 93‒94. 410 KPdl, 1603: “Both the gzhan stong and rang stong as asserted by Rang byung rdo rje are superior to the rang stong and gzhan stong as they are mostly known here in Tibet. His and the intent of the mighty victor [i.e., the Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho] are one and the same.” rang byung rdo rje bzhed pa’i gzhan stong dang | | rang stong gnyis ka bod ’dir grags che ba’i | | rang stong gzhan stong las ni khyad par ’phags | | de dang rgyal ba’i dbang po dgongs pa gcig | | 152 K A RM A P H RI N L A S beyond dependent arising. Charting a course between such extremes of radical negation and affirmation, his Mahāmudrā philosophy follows the Great Middle Way of Nonfoundational Unity (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas [pa’i] dbu ma chen po). His unequivocal commitment to a view which reconciles negative and affirmative orientations through the meditative realization of freedom from all eternalist and nihilist metaphysical views made Karma phrin las pa a leading paragon of the postclassical Bka’ brgyud Mahāmudrā of the Middle Way. Nondual wisdom which he equates with mind as such (sems nyid)—natural luminosity, the inseparability of the expanse and awareness, or natural awareness (tha mal gyi shes pa)411—is the ground, the inseparability of appearance and emptiness, which gives rise to both saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. On this view, saṃsāra, the world of appearances—the perception of which confines sentient beings to the framework of their delusions, their impure minds—is nothing but adventitious defilement. It is through this understanding and the relinquishment of obscurations that the inseparability of appearance and emptiness is realized. As for the question of how to bring about this realization, he declares that the unity of compassion and insight, or merit and wisdom, is indispensable to the path of awakening. While compassion devoid of a genuine understanding of emptiness does not bring about liberation from cyclic existence, emptiness devoid of compassion represents an inferior ideal which falls far short of the Mahāyāna altruistic ethos.412 As for the method, although Karma phrin las pa favours the tantric path which he holds to be more expedient than the sūtric, he sees no substantial difference between these two when it comes to the view. According to him, there is a general agreement among scholars the likes of Sa skya Paṇḍita, Rang byung rdo rje and others that the pāramitāyāna and the mantrayāna 411 KPdl, Dri lan yig kyi mun sel, 922‒3: “Ultimate truth is nothing but the nature of mind that is free from the concepts of the apprehended and the apprehender. [This], i.e., natural luminosity, unity, coemergence, the inseparability of the expanse and awareness, natural awareness itself, is the profound view of Gzhan stong.” Thus, my teacher explained that “even the so-called Rang stong and Gzhan stong are not contradictory.” gzung ’dzin rnam rtog dang bral ba’i | | sems nyid kho na don dam bden pa ste | | rang bzhin ’od gsal zung ’jug lhan cig skyes | | dbyings rig dbyer med tha mal shes pa nyid | | gzhan stong zab mo’i lta ba yin zhes gsung | | des na rang stong gzhan stong zhes pa yang | | ’gal ba min zhes bdag gi bla ma bzhed | | KPdl, see also Volume II, translation: 90, critical edition: 93. 412 Dmangs dohā’i rnam bshad sems kyi rnam thar ston pa’i me long, 2114‒224: “One who takes up the path of emptiness alone divorced from the method of great compassion will not discover the supreme path of the Great Vehicle. [Query:] Then is freedom attained if one cultivates only compassion divorced from emptiness? [Reply:] In that case, one will dwell here in saṃsāra but will not attain liberation [from it]. Because compassion alone which involves [sentimental] attachment is markedly inferior, it is not a cause of liberation. In short, it is inappropriate to cultivate emptiness alone divorced from compassion… [But] one will not become free through compassion alone divorced from emptiness.” thabs snying rje chen po dang bral ba’i stong pa nyid rkyang pa’i lam du zhugs pa gang yin pa des ni theg pa chen po’i lam mchog rnyed pa ma yin no | |… stong pa dang bral ba’i snying rje ’ba’ zhig bsgoms na grol ba thob bam zhe na | de yang ’khor ba ’dir gnas par ’gyur gyi | thar pa thob par mi ’gyur te | ’dzin pa dang bcas pa’i snying rje rkyang pa ni shin du dman pa’i phyir thar pa’i rgyu ma yin no | | mdor na snying rje dang bral ba’i stong rkyang bsgom du mi rung ste | … stong pa bral ba’i snying rje rkyang pas grol bar mi ’gyur te | … 153 K A RM A P H RI N L A S convey the same meaning in terms of the view.413 How this tantric method relates to the traditions of Maitrīpa and Sgam po pa who deliberately taught a Mahāmudrā approach that is not purely tantric is not specified, but he does affirm that “the treatises and upadeśas of Mahāmudrā represent the culminating essence of all sūtras and tantras”414. To be sure, Karma phrin las pa emphasizes that ultimately, compassion is to be understood as great nonreferential compassion which is indivisible from emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects (sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā).415 He also calls it the unity which is emptiness endowed with the 413 KPdl, Dri lan drang ba dang nges pa’i don gyi snang byed ces bya ba ngo gro bla ma’i dris lan (ca 108‒139), 1323‒5: “Although Madhyamaka, Rdzogs chen, and Mahāmudrā are without difference in terms of the object of the view, with respect to the aspect of the method, the Mantra paths are superior. The learned and realized masters such as Sa skya Paṇchen and Rang byung rdo rje and others say that the view of the Pāramitāyāna and of the Vajrayāna is the same. The scholars agree that the object of the view and the moment [this view] is realized are the same. But when it comes to the means of realizing this view, the Secret Mantra is supreme. When it is made manifest in realization, the Secret Mantra is distinctly superior when it comes to the methods to realize the view.” dbu ma rdzogs chen phyag rgya chen po rnams | | lta ba’i yul la khyad par med na yang | | thabs kyi cha nas sngags lam khyad par ’phags | | sa skya paṇ chen rang byung rdo rje sogs | | mkhas grub du mas pha rol phyin pa dang | | rdo rje theg pa lta ba gcig par ni | | gsungs pa de yang lta ba’i yul dang ni | | rtogs pa mngon du gyur tshe gcig pa’i don | | yin gyi lta ba rtogs pa’i thabs la ni | | gsang sngags khyad par ’phags shes mkhas rnams mthun | | 414 KPdl, ibid., 1363: phyag rgya chen po’i gzhung dang gdams ngag rnams | | mdo rgyud kun gyi snying po’i mthar thug yin | | 415 Zab mo nang don gyi rnam bshad snying po. In Rang byung rdo rje’i gsung 'bum, [thereafter RDsb] vol. 14, 82: “The method consists in the nonduality of nonreferential compassion and insight, i.e., emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects.” thabs dmigs pa med pa’i snying rje chen po dang shes rab rnam pa kun gyi mchog dang ldan pa’i stong pa nyid gnyis su med pa … | | On the meaning of “emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects,” in the general tantric context where the excellence of all aspects pertain to the sixtyfour qualities of dissociation and maturation, see ibid., vol. 14, 3294‒6: “The assertion of my bla ma, the mighty victor [Seventh Karma pa] is that emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects and *sugatagarbha are of one meaning. Therefore, it is maintained that *sugatagarbha being actually endowed with the sixty-four qualities of dissociation and maturation means ‘endowed with the excellence of all aspects’ and that these are not established as [something] identifiable and as characteristics [means] emptiness. Thus, integrating these, i.e., the very cultivation of nonconceptual lucidity, is asserted to be the meditation of mahāmudrā.” bdag gi bla ma rgyal ba’i dbang po’i bzhed pa la | rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong pa nyi dang bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po don gcig pas | bde snying la bral rnam smin gyi yon tan drug bcu rtsa bzhi dngos su ldan pa ni rnam kun mchog ldan dang | de yang ngos bzung dang mtshan mar ma grub pa ni stong nyid kyi don du bzhed pas de’i nyams len gsal la mi rtog pa bsgom pa nyid phyag rgya chen po’i sgom du bzhed do | For further explanations on the term “emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects” see also for example Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas in The Treasury of Knowledge, book 8, part 4: “In general, the conventional designation of the term mahāmudrā (phyag rgya chen po, Great Seal) is used only in the Mantra [Vehicle]. The meaning is that the unity is ‘Seal’ (phyag rgya). Since all phenomena are pervaded by the nature of that seal, it is ‘Great’ (chen po) in the sense that no phenomena go beyond it. In this case, the full range of outer appearances is the unity of appearance and emptiness; the full range of inner awareness is the unity of awareness and emptiness, and the full range of feelings when awareness and emptiness meet is the unity of bliss and emptiness. Of these, the first two are called ‘emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects’ (rnam kun mchog dang ldan gyi stong nyid) and the last is called ‘supreme and unchanging great bliss’ (mchog tu mi ’gyur ba’i bde ba chen po). … The comprehensive meaning is this: emptiness endowed with all aspects is the object to be known. When the knowledge of this emptiness in its entirety as unchanging great bliss is the knowing subject, then both object and subject are said to blend into one.” Shes bya kun khyab, smad cha, 37912‒3802: spyir phyag rgya chen po zhes bya ba’i tshig gi tha snyad ni sngags kho nar gsungs shing don ni zung du ’jug pa la phyag rgya de’i rang bzhin gyis chos thams 154 K A RM A P H RI N L A S nature of compassion or compassion endowed with the nature of emptiness. 416 It cultivation leads to fruition consisting in the indivisibility of the two kāyas, the ultimate aspect being the dharmakāya and the conventional appearance for the benefit of others being the two form kāyas. The dharmakāya and the form kāyas are not distinct from each other just as the sun is not separate from its rays.417 All this raises the question of how the aspirant is to succeed in shifting from conceptual knowing to nondual awareness. A remark in one of his vajra-songs418 echoes the Dwags po Bka’ brgyud maxim that a devoted disciple may be able to swiftly recognize his or her own innate abiding nature upon encountering an authentic spiritual guide thanks to latent tendencies inculcated through having become familiar with this nature at an earlier stage in the present life or during past lives. However, in documenting the answers to questions raised by a Dpal Ngag gi dbang po to the contemporary ’Brug pa kun legs (1455‒1529) in Questions and Answers: the Mirror of White Silver, Karma phrin las pa takes up the well-known Bka’ brgyud distinction between three successive stages in realization as an adept’s awareness gets successively more and more refined: intellectual understanding (go ba), experiencing (nyams pa), and realizing (rtogs pa). The author explains that in order to progress from intellectual comprehension to experiential understanding and direct realization, unremitting perseverance in meditation (rdo rus gtugs nas bsgom pa) is required. In the context of the path of direct perception of mahāmudrā, intellectual knowing may at first involve forming an abstraction or a mental image of emptiness and clarity. As the practitioner subsequently applies himself to analytical and settling meditation, all kinds of experiences may crop up in the meditator’s mind, just as all sorts of plants may crop up in a summer meadow. The point is that the meditator’s capacity to deal with these experiences with the support of the teacher’s blessing, indications, methods and the practitioner’s own virtue allows the experiences to ripen into a cad la khyab pas chen po ste chos thams cad de las mi ’da’ ba’o | | de’i tshe phyi’i snang ba mtha’ dag snang stong zung ’jug | nang gi rig pa mtha’ dag rig stong zung ’jug | snang rig phrad pa’i tshor ba mtha’ dag bde stong zung ’jug yin pa las dang po gnyis la rnam kun mchog ldan gyi stong nyid ces bya | phyi ma la mchog tu mi ’gyur ba’i bde ba chen po zhes gsungs shing | … don yongs rdzogs ni rnam pa kun ldan gyi stong pa nyid de yul shes par byas | de mtha’ dag ’gyur med kyi bde ba chen por shes pa de yul can shes par byas nas yul yul can de gnyis ’dres shing gcig tu gyur pa zhig la brjod de | 416 Rgyal po dohā’i ṭīkā ’bring po 20723‒2081: de lta bu’i zung ’jug de la stong nyid snying rje’i snying po can nam | snying rje stong nyid kyi snying po can zhes kyang bya ste | 417 Zab mo nang don gyi rnam bshad snying po. In RDsb, vol. 14, 84‒5: “The indestructible ultimate dharmakāya and the pure conventional form kāyas which manifest for others are inseparable like the sun and its rays, [all of them] pertaining to the mind as such.” gzhom du med pa’i don dam chos kyi sku dang | gzhan snang kun rdzob pa gzugs kyi sku dag nyi ma dang ’od kyi tshul … du mi phyed pa … sems nyid de la’o … 418 KPdg, 85‒6: “Through your skillful means and compassion and [my] tendencies due to familiarization in previous lives, or familiarizing myself with it in this life, I realized the innate abiding nature in this way.” khyed kyi thabs mkhas thugs rje dang | | sngon nas ’dris pa’i bag chags sam | | tshe ’dir goms pa’i nyer len gyis | | gnyug ma’i gnas lugs ’di ltar rtogs | | 155 K A RM A P H RI N L A S direct and decisive realization of the unchanging abiding condition which Maitreya describes in the Ratnagotravibhāga419.420 This Mahāmudrā path of direct realization is a touchstone of the author’s available writings to which he repeatedly returns. In one of his vajra-songs describing his own realization, he declares that by simply knowing the true face of emptiness in the absence of adventitious stains, emptiness is recognized as being imbued with unsurpassable qualities.421 This invites comparison with ’Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal’s endorsement of a Mahāmudrā path which employs direct perception right from the beginning without analysis. 422 LIFE, WRITINGS AND INFLUENCES Karma phrin las pa, also known as Dpal phyogs thams cad las rnams par rgyal ba’i lha, was an outstanding master who trained intensively in both the Bka’ brgyud and Sa skya schools and studied under many teachers representing a wide range of Tibetan Buddhist 419 RGV 4121, I.51cd: yathā pūr vaṃ tathā paścād avikāritvadharmatā | | “It (i.e., the dhātu) is of an unchangeable nature—as it is before so it is later.” 420 KPdl, Dri lan dngul dkar me long, (ca 198‒210), 1993‒7: “Of the three factors termed understanding, experiencing, and realizing, ‘earlier’ is inferior and ‘later’ is supreme. They are widely known in this precious Bka’ brgyud [tradition]. Propounders of the exegetical tradition of epistemology state that understanding and realizing are syonymns. Experiencing exists in all who have minds. This statement is due to habituation to the Pāramitā[yāna]. When it comes to taking direct perception as the path via Mahāmudrā, the meaning of understanding is to initially [grasp phenomena] as mere abstractions [or object universals]. By internalizing [them], there is nothing at all in the shimmering and effervescent visionary experiences that does not arise. Therefore it is as well-known as the wind that just as there is nothing amidst the variegated greenery that does not grow on a summer meadow, so too there is nothing that does not arise in a yogin’s experiences. By integrating these experiences in the analytical and settling meditation through the power of interdependent factors such as the teacher’s blessing and one’s own merit, and through symbols, methods, examples, and diligence, the mode of abiding will be seen by the eye of direct perception. At that time, experiences are enhanced and become realizations. The saying by Maitreya “It (i.e., the dhātu) is of an unchangeable nature—as it is before so it is later”, is a statement that truly puts its finger on that unchanging realization. Blo gros seng ge who also perfected wisdom repeatedly said that realization is nothing produced.” go ba nyams dang rtogs pa zhes bya gsum | | snga ma dman zhing phyi ma mchog yin zhes | | bka’i brgyud rin chen ’di la yongs su grags | | tshad ma’i gzhung lugs ’chad rnams go ba dang | | rtogs pa rnam grangs sgra yin nyams zhes pa | | nyams myong yin na sems yod kun la yod | gsung ’di pha rol phyin la zhen pas yin | | phyag chen mngon sum lam du byed pas na | | thog mar don spyi tsam du go ba’i don | | nyams su blang pas nyams kyi snang ba la | ban bun lang long mi ’char ci yang med | | de phyir dbyar pa’i sa la sna tshogs sngo | | mi skye med pa bzhin du rnal ’byor pa’i | | nyams la mi ’char med ces rlung ltar grags | | nyams de bla ma dam pa’i byin rlabs dang | | rang gi bsod nams la sogs rten ’brel gyi | | mthu dang brda thabs dpe dang brtson ’grus kyis | | dpyad dang ’jog sgom nyid du nyams blangs pas | | gnas lugs mngon sum mig gis mthong bar ’gyur | | de tshe nyams rnams rtogs par bogs thon pas | | byams pas ji ltar sngar bzhin phyi de bzhin | | ’gyur ba med pa’i chos nyid ces gsungs pa | | ’pho ’gyur med pa’i rtogs pa de la ni | | dngos su phyag mdzub btsugs pa’i gsung yin la | | shes rab mthar phyin blo gros seng ges kyang | | rtogs pa skyed med pa shes yang yang gsung | | 421 KPdg, Yin lug sgrog pa lta ba’i mgur stanza 15, see Volume II, translation: 96, critical edition: 98. 422 See Mathes 2008, 397. 156 K A RM A P H RI N L A S traditions.423 His name was at times abbreviated as Phyogs las rnam rgyal or even just Phyogs las pa. In appreciation of his erudition and in reference to his birth place, he was sometimes called Dwags po Paṇ chen gsum pa.424 Karma phrin las pa was born in Gtsang in 1456 in the Dgyer family in the area of Dwags po as the son to an official of the local governor. 425 The first meditation teachings Karma phrin las pa received, on Mahāmudrā and Rdzogs chen, were from one of his uncles, Zur mkhar mnyam nyid rdo rje (1439‒1475), a famous physician and author of commentaries on the “four Tantras of Medicine”. Zur mkhar mnyam nyid rdo rje’s main teacher was the Fourth Zhwa dmar pa Chos grags ye shes (1453‒1524)426, a teacher of Karma phrin las as well, who had advocated mahāmudrā in the sense of an affirming negation: “I do not categorically make the criticism ‘this nonaffirming negation is totally untenable’. Yet for those who wish to realize the reality of this mahāmudrā via an affirming negation, that [nonaffirming negation] is precisely what has to be given up.”427 From Zur mkhar mnyam nyid rdo rje Karma phrin las also received Rnying ma instructions on the “male gcod” (pho gcod) tradition that can be traced back to the 11th century Indian saint Pha dam pa sangs rgyas. He also studied Tibetan medicine with him. At age seventeen, Karma phrin las received novice ordination from the master Lhun grub bzang po in Gnyal. The full monastic ordination was given to him by the Fourth Zhwa dmar pa Chos grags ye shes428. According to biographical sources, after his novice ordination, Karma phrin las first travelled in the region of Gtsang to study with various masters of the Sa skya tradition where he received a comprehensive philosophical education based on classical Buddhist scriptures on Vinaya, Abhidharma, Prajñāpāramitā, and Madhyamaka. This course of studies was largely undertaken in the monastery of ’Bras yul skyed tshal. According to the Mkhas pa’i dga’ ston, his teacher during this period was Byams chen rab ’byams Sangs rgyas ’phel (1412‒1485), the founder of this monastery and student of both Ngor chen Kun dga’ bzang po (1382‒1456) and Rong ston Shes bya kun rigs (1367‒1449). Karma phrin las also studied with the students of Sangs rgyas ’phel, ’Jam dbyangs Kun dga’ chos bzang (1433‒ 423 See Rheingans 2004, 56. 424 Ibid., 187. In the colophon of his Zab mo nang don commentary, he is called, shar dwags po’i paṇḍita gsum pa dpal phyogs thams cad las rnam par rgyal ba’i lha | ming gzhan karma phrin las pa. The text was available in form of a blockprint in dbu can in the possession of Gene Smith, TBRC. It was newly published in the Collected Works of Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje (vol. 14, traṃ) in Zi ling in 2006. The other two Dwags po Paṇ chens likely refer to his uncles Dwags po Rab ’byams chos rgyal bstan pa (1449‒1524) and Dwags po Bkra shis rnam rgyal (1511‒1587). 425 Ibid., 52. 426 Ibid., 54. 427 See Phyag rgya chen po drug bcu pa, verse 12, Zhwa dmar bzhi pa spyan snga chos kyi grags pa’i gsung ’bum, vol. 6, 32021‒3211. med dgag ’di ni kun tu mi rung zhes | | gcig tu bdag ni smod par mi byed kyang | | phyag rgya chen po ma yin dgag ’di’i don | | rtogs par ’dod pas spang bar bya ba nyid | | 428 See Rheingans 2004, 68. 157 K A RM A P H RI N L A S 1503) and Paṇ chen ’Bum phrag gsum pa (1433‒1504). It is with the latter that he studied the works of Maitreya. Another of his Sa skya teachers was Gong dkar Rdo rje pa Kun dga’ rnam rgyal (1432‒1496), founder of the Gong dkar rdo rje gdan monastery south of Lhasa in Central Tibet. Karma phrin las pa received the Sa skya Path as Result (lam ’bras) transmission from Mus chen Sangs rgyas rin chen (1450‒1524), abbot of the Ngor monastery, as well as from Steng dkar chos rje blos gros rnam rgyal and Rje btsun kun dga’ bkra shis. Another of his important Lam ’bras teachers was Shākya mchog ldan (1428‒1507). Among the various Bka’ brgyud teachers he studied under, the most important belonged to the Karma bka’ brgyud tradition. From the Fourth Zhwa dmar, he received tantric empowerments and explanations on the Six Dharmas of Nāropa (1016–1100)429. Under the Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho (1454‒1506), who became his root teacher, Karma phrin las studied Mahāyāna philosophy as well as tantric topics, with special attention given to Rang byung rdo rje’s (1284–1339) Zab mo nang don. He also learned from him the Six Doctrines of Nāropa and the Mahāmudrā instructions of Sgam po pa.430 As we learn from some of Karma phrin las pa’s vajra songs, another important Mahāmudrā teacher was ’Khrul zhig Sangs rgyas bsam grub (15th cent.), another disciple of the Seventh Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho, who was closely connected with the Ras chung Bka’ brgyud tradition. Unfortunately, little is known about this master other than that he was a highly experienced yogin wellversed in the sahaja teaching system431 in the tradition of Par phu pa. According to the Blue Annals, he was an expert in the dohās of the mahāsiddhas and is said to have composed eight textbooks on them.432 With him, Karma phrin las studied among other things Saraha’s Dohā Trilogy, on which he would later compose his famed commentary.433 Karma phrin las pa dedicated some of his spiritual songs to this master, addressing him as his spiritual father and praising him as the embodiment of the Buddha’s nirmāṇakāya due to whose kindness he was 429 See Rheingans 2004, 68. 430 Ibid., 69. 431 Dmangs dohā’i rnam bshad sems kyi rnam thar ston pa’i me long, 718‒23: “My spiritual teacher ’Khrul zhig chen po said ‘When teaching the dohās, it is very good to explain [them] according to the outer [aspect] by means of metaphors; according to the inner [aspect] by means of experiences; according to the secret [aspect] by means of the ḍākinīs’ sign language. From among [these] three, the first is explained by means of the thirtyfive metaphors such as the sky and the jewel; the second by means of the results of the view, the meditation, and the conduct; and the third by means of [the four mahāmudrā yogas] mindfulness, beyond mindfulness (dran med), non arising and beyond the intellect (blo ’das).’” bdag gi bla ma ’khrul zhig chen po’i zhal snga nas | do hā gsung ba’i tshe na | phyi ltar du dpe’i sgo nas ’chad pa | nang ltar du nyams myong gi sgo nas ’chad pa | gsang ba ltar du mkha’ ’gro ma’i brda skad kyi sgo nas ’chad pa dang | gsum las | dang po ni nam mkha’ nor bu sogs dpe so lnga’i sgo nas ’chad pa dang | gnyis pa ni | lta ba | sgom pa | spyod pa | ’bras bu’i sgo nas ’chad pa dang | gsum pa ni | dran pa | dran med | skye med | blo ’das kyi sgo nas ’chad par mdzad do | shin tu legs so | | 432 Roerich 1979, 864. 433 See Rheingans 2004, 61‒63. 158 K A RM A P H RI N L A S able to free himself from all doubts and to eradicate the roots of delusion. 434 Karma phrin las pa studied as well with other students of the Seventh Karma pa including ’Jam dpal rgya mtsho (15th c.) who taught him the Gcod (“cutting through [attachment]”) system.435 For many years, Karma phrin las held various positions as abbot and teacher at different Sa skya and Bka’ brgyud institutions, and was active in various regions of central and southern Tibet.436 Initially, the Seventh Karma pa installed him as the abbot of the monastery Chos ’khor lhun po which ran two philosophical and two mantra colleges. Later he headed the Karma grwa tshang (Karma college). In 1504, he founded the temple Legs bshad gling, a place where he gave a great number of teachings and where eventually the printing blocks of his collected works were kept. For a period of time Karma phrin las pa also acted as the abbot of the Sa skya monastery Na lendra in the so-called Gzims khang ’og or Gzim skyil ’og ma, the “lower residence”. In 1532 he also set up a tantric college in Byang chub gling focusing on the Hevajratantra.437 He furthermore set up a hermitage at a place called Dza ri dmar. The most prominent of his many disciples were the Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554) and the Second Dpa’ bo Gtsug lag ’phreng ba (1504‒1556). His well-attended teachings on Buddhist classics such as the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, and works from Pramāṇa, Abhidharma, and Madhyamaka438 traditions, ensured that his views on Madhyamaka and Mahāmudrā would profoundly influence the subsequent history of the Bka’ brgyud mahāmudrā tradition. MADHYAMAKA APPROACH Karma phrin’s interest in Rang stong and Gzhan stong was undoubtedly stimulated by the views of these theories advanced by two of his teachers, Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho and Shākya mchog ldan. Yet it is evident that his own view is aligned most closely with that of the Seventh Karma pa rather than that of Shākya mchog ldan who had (as was noted in the previous chapter) controversially equated Gzhan stong with the so-called AlīkākāravādaMadhyamaka, and who had clearly distinguished the philosophical tenets of Rang stong and Gzhan stong from the Mahāmudrā practice of direct experience. We may recall that although Shākya mchog ldan considered Gzhan stong to be closer to the Mahāmudrā view of unity, when it came to actual Mahāmudrā practice, he regarded both Rang stong and Gzhan stong 434 Rheingans 2004, 60. 435 Ibid., 56‒69. 436 Ibid., 70‒71. 437 Ibid., 71‒74. 438 Ibid., 112. 159 K A RM A P H RI N L A S as “poisonous” in the sense of being conceptually determined.439 By contrast, Karma phrin las emphasizes that, correctly understood, Rang stong and Gzhan stong are seen to be fully commensurable. He moreover equates the Great Madhyamaka of Nonfoundational Unity with the ultimate view of Dignāga (480‒540) and Dharmakīrti (7th cent.) and correlates this with the view of Mahāmudrā.440 Karma phrin las pa maintains that according to previous Dwags po Bka’ brgyud masters, the five dharmas of Maitreya are Mahāmudrā treatises that teach the ApratiṣṭhānaMadhyamaka of Unity (zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas dbu ma) which is superior to the Niḥsvabhāva-Madhyamaka propounded by the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika Mādhyamikas. Because the Niḥsvabhāva-Madhyamaka relies on the continuity of (mnemic and thematic) reflection (dran pa) based on prior analysis, thus limiting meditation to mind’s own discursive reflections, it cannot escape the sphere of superimpositions and deprecations. By contrast, the ‘nonfoundationalist’ Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka ‘is not fixed upon (rab tu mi gnas pa) any extremes of superimposition or deprecation.441 He concludes that the ultimate Madhyamaka view of masters such as Nāgārjuna, Maitreya and Saraha in their works such as the Bodhicittavivaraṇa, the Dharmadhātustava, the Maitreya texts, and the Dohā Trilogy, are unanimously 439 He still takes gzhan stong and thus the Yogācāra-Madhyamaka perspective as an essential stepping stone into meditation, as the focus here lies on the direct experience through meditation, while the Niḥsvabhāvavāda Mādhyamikas’ focus is on putting an end to the clinging to characteristics through the media of reasoning. See also Brunnhölzl 2010, 88. 440 KPdl, 1506: “The ultimate view of the great siddhas Dignāga and of Dharmakīrti is the Great Madhyamaka that is the Apratiṣṭhāna of Unity. The scriptural tradition that shows [this] clearly as it is consists exclusively in [Dharmakīrti’s] Seven Treatises and [Dignāga’s] Pramāṇasamuccaya.” grub thob chen po phyogs kyi glang po dang | | chos kyi grags pa’i lta ma mthar thug pa | | zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas dbu ma che | ji bzhin gsal bar ston pa’i gzhung lugs ni | | sde bdun mdo dang bcas pa kho na’o | | The way in which the Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka is viewed by a famous contemporary, Padma dkar po, sheds further light on this perspective: “The ApratiṣṭhānaMadhyamaka determines the ultimate through not taking the illusion-like appearances during subsequent attainment as primary, but regarding the very insight during meditative equipoise as primary. Therefore, master Nāgārjuna and his followers guide [beings] as the masters who teach the profound view. The actuality [of this] must be internalized as the unity of view and activity.” Brunnhölzl 2010, 89. (translation altered for consistency) 441 KPdl, Dri lan snang gsal sgron me shes bya ba ra ti dgon pa’i gsims khang ba’i dris lan, (ca 145‒161), ca 1552‒3: “The previous masters of the glorious Dwags po Bka’ brgyud claimed that because both the Prāsaṅgika and Svātantrika [Madhyamaka] propound [only] the lack of intrinsic essences, the Five Dharmas of Maitreya go beyond both of these. The Mahāmudrā scriptures teach the Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka of Unity.” dpal ldan dags po’i bka’ brgyud gong ma rnams | | thal rang gnyis ka ngo bo nyid med du | | smra phyir rgyal ba byams pa’i chos lnga po | | de gnyis las ’das phyag rgya chen po’i gzhung | | zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas dbu mar bzhed | | Ibid., 1482‒ 3: “Because the Niḥsvabhāvavāda-Madhyamaka counteracts the beliefs in real entities of the lower philosophical systems and because it claims that reliance on the continuous process of memory/reflection based on prior analysis is meditation, it is somewhat different [from Mahāmudrā].” ngo bo nyid med smra ba’i dbu ma ni | | grub mtha’ og ma’i dngos ’dzin bzlog pa’i phyir | | rnam par dpyad nas dran pa’i rgyun bsten pa | | sgom du bzhed phyir khyad par cung zad yod | | 160 K A RM A P H RI N L A S considered by previous Bka’ brgyud masters to communicate the Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka of Unity, the so-called Great Madhyamaka which is not different from Mahāmudrā.442 It is important to understand why Karma phrin las pa considered Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya and Dharmakīrti’s Seven Treatises to convey the ultimate intent of the Great Madhyamaka which he identifies with Mahāmudrā. He does not consider these scholars to be Cittamātra proponents as was often, though not unanimously, assumed.443 Rather, he explains that they deliberately used a philosophically pluralistic approach that mixed Madhyamaka with Sautrāntika and Yogācāra tenets in order to progressively guide trainees 444 toward the ultimate.445 This ultimate is identified as the focus of the famous quotation from the Pramāṇavārttika “Mind is naturally luminous; its stains are adventitious”446, just as it is the focus of the Ratnagotravibhāga passage “Mind’s nature is luminous and immutable just like 442 KPdl, 1481‒2: “The ultimate assertion of Nāgārjuna and the glorious Saraha, the Madhyamaka [presented in works such as] the Dohā Tricycle, the Bodhicittavivaraṇa, the Dharmadhātustava etc., as well as [in] the Dharmas of Maitreya along with everything connected with these have one key-point. The key-point which is the intent of all the previous Bka’ brgyud masters which was communicated with a single voice and melody is the Madhyamaka which is the Great Madhyamaka. There is no difference between that and Mahāmudrā.” dpal ldan sa ra ha dang klu sgrub kyi | | bzhed pa’i mthar thug do hā skor gsum dang | | byang chub sems ’grel chos dbyings bstod pa sogs | | byams chos rjes ’brang bcas dang gnad gcig par | | bka’ brgyud gong ma rnams kyi dgongs pa’i gnad | | mgrin dang dbyangs gcig nyid du gsungs pa yi | | dbu ma de ni dbu ma chen po ste | | phyag rgya che dang de la khyad par med | | In the Dmangs dohā’i rnam bshad sems kyi rnam thar ston pa’i me long, 11011‒15 the author succinctly describes Mahāmudrā meditation: “Our mahāmudrā meditation is neither meditation with nor without objective reference, but involves settling into a genuine state of mental nonengagement. Being thus untainted by the stains of these, [one] is liberated in personal self-awareness, i.e. a nonreferential samādhi having the nature of the aspect of great joy, allowing for suchness that is freedom from all pain.“ kho bo cag gi phyag rgya chen po bsgom pa la ni dmigs pa dang bcas pas bsgom du’ang med la | dmigs med kyis kyang bsgom du med de | de gang yang yid la mi byed pa gnyug ma’i ngang du bzhag pas de nyid kyi skyon gyis ma gos par so so rang rig tu grol ba ni dmigs pa med pa’i ting nge ’dzin bde ba chen po’i rnam pa’i rang bzhin can yin no ste | zug rngu thams cad dang bral ba’i de kho na nyid yin pas so | | 443 Even though Dignāga and Dharmakīrti are often considered Yogācāras, there is a group of later Indian commentators in particular Jītari (ca. 940‒1000) and Mokṣākaragupta (1050‒1292) as well as some early Tibetan scholars, who interpret Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika. See Dreyfus 1997, 21 and n. 19, p. 467. See also Shirasaki 1984, “The Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāsya of Jītari”. See as well Steinkellner 1990, “Is Dharmakīrti a Mādhyamika?” Steinkellner argues that the material available at present does not provide sufficient evidence to establish Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika. 444 KPdl, Dri lan snang gsal sgron me shes bya ba ra ti dgon pa’i gsims khang ba’i dris lan, (ca 145‒161), ca 1504‒5: “The root [texts] of [Dharmakīrti’s] Seven treatises along with [Dignāga’s] Compendium are the ultimate intent, the Great Madhyamaka. However, temporarily, in order to train the respective trainee, they were taught as if Great Madhyamaka was mixed with the tenets of Cittamātra and Sautrāntika.“ sde bdun rtsa ba mdo dang bcas rnams kyang | | dgongs pa’i mthar thug dbu ma che yin mod | | gnas skabs gdul bya gang la gang ’dul du | | dbu ma che dang sems tsam mdo sde pa’i | | grub mtha’ ’dres pa lta bur gsungs pa la | | 445 On the views of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, see also Dreyfus 1979, 20. 446 PV 1.208ab: prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittaṃ prakṛtyā’ ’gantavo malāḥ | | Tib. D: sems ’di rang bzhin ’od gsal te | | dri ma rnams ni glo bur ba | | On differing interpretations of what Dharmakīrti may have meant by this passage, see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 425‒28, 435; Schmithausen 1987: 160‒62; Franco 1997: 85‒93; and Wangchuk 2007: 208. 161 K A RM A P H RI N L A S space”447 and the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra passage “Mind is no-mind, mind’s nature is luminosity”448. In Karma phrin las pa’s view, these all point to the ultimate soteriological goal of luminous emptiness. In one of his spiritual songs, he declares that “natural luminosity, unity, coemergence, the inseparability of the expanse and awareness, natural awareness are precisely what is called the profound view of Gzhan stong. Thus, my teacher explained: ‘even the so-called Rang stong and Gzhan stong are not contradictory’.”449 One rather idiosyncratic feature of Karma phrin las pa’s philosophy is his attempt to correlate the principle of other-exclusion (gzhan sel; anyāpoha)450 as it developed within the Buddhist epistemological (pramāṇa) tradition of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti with the view of Mahāmudrā. Here he once again defers to his teacher Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho who is said to have taught that other-exclusion implies an affirming negation. Chos grags rgya mtsho criticizes those Tibetans who understand this exclusion to consist only in a process of conceptual elimination in the sense of a nonaffirming negation. This in his mind leads inescapably to a wrong concept of emptiness, a mere conceptual negation which is then misconstrued as profound emptiness. In Chos grags rgya mtsho’s words: Hence, the Tibetans who do not understand the meaning [of other-exclusion] intellectually superimpose outwardly [an absence] with the term “exclusion of other”, a nonaffirming negation, clinging to it as profound emptiness. They thus mistake a reflection of emptiness for emptiness itself, and arrogantly assume this to be the teaching of the noble master Nāgārjuna and his students. Because the profound emptiness which evolved in this [Mahāmudrā tradition] is not akin to that, it was [wrongly] rejected as being on the side of the Vijñānavādins.451 447 RGV 439‒10, I.63a: cittasya yāsau prakṛtiḥ prabhāsvarā na jātu sā dyaur iva yāti vikriyām | | For an English translation see Takasaki 1966. 448 ’Phags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa, 3a3: sems nyid sems ma yin | | sems kyi rang bzhin nyid ’od gsal ba yin | | Aṣṭasāhasrikaprajñāpāramitā 5b.1–2. The corresponding passage from the Sanskrit is given in Schmithausen 1977, 41 as lines E.b.1–2 tathā hi tac cittam acittam | prakṛtiś cittasya prabhāsvarā | | see n. 174. 449 KPdl, Dri lan yig kyi mun sel, (ca 88‒92), 922‒3: rang bzhin ’od gsal zung ’jug lhan cig skyes | | dbyings rig dbyer med tha mal shes pa nyid | | gzhan stong zab mo’i lta ba yin zhes gsung | | des na rang stong gzhan stong zhes pa yang | | ’gal ba min zhes bdag gi bla ma bzhed | | See also Volume II, translation: 90, critical edition: 93. See also (tr.) Burchardi in Jackson, Kapstein (ed.) 2011, 317‒40. 450 The apoha or exclusion theory is usually closely associated with the issue of universals and discussed in the context of epistemology. See for example a broad range of papers on apoha in Apoha, Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition, (ed.) Siderits, Tillemans, Chakrabarti, 2011. Karma phrin las pa has here redeployed exclusion of other in a quite different, soteriological context, similar to the Eighth Karma pa who at times equates buddha nature with the particular (svalakṣaṇa). 451 Rigs gzhung rgya mtsho vol. 1, 35117‒21: des na don ’di khong du ma chud pa’i bod dag ni | blos phar la sgro btags nas bzhag pa’i gzhan sel ba’i ming can med par dgag pa zhig la zab mo stong pa nyid du zhen par byas nas stong pa nyid kyi gzugs brnyan la stong pa nyid du ’khrul ba de nyid slob dpon ’phags pa klu sgrub yab sras 162 K A RM A P H RI N L A S Karma phrin las considers his teacher’s interpretation of anyāpoha as an affirming negation to be a crucial strategy for avoiding the mistake of falling into the extreme of nihilism. Such a mistake is characteristic of those who misinterpret the other-exclusion to be a nonaffirming negation and who consequently cling to a mere reflection of emptiness, taking it to be the actual emptiness. It is clear that Chos grags rgya mtsho’s reinterpretation of anyāpoha is completely in line with the Gzhan stong affirmative stance and Karma phrin las moreover emphasizes the extent to which it accords with the view of Mahāmudrā: This profound view called “exclusion of other” is in accordance with the view of Mahāmudrā. However, most of the Tibetans who are intoxicated by the poisoned water of intellectualism superimpose [an absence] outwardly with their own intellect and maintain that this imputed other-exclusion is just a nonaffirming negation. Clinging to that as profound emptiness they mistake this reflection of emptiness as [the real] emptiness, and think that this is the assertion of Nāgārjuna and his followers. … They fetter themselves with the chains of clinging to extremes. My mighty victorious lama, knowing well that mental exclusion is [a matter of] an affirming negation and therefore in accordance with the view of Mahāmudrā, counselled again and again that ‘dharmatā, suchness, the ground for all saṃsāra and nirvāṇa is affirmative’.452 Karma phrin las pa’s adherence to his teacher’s unusual redeployment of the anyāpoha principle and the latter’s contention that Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were primarily Mādhyamikas undoubtedly reinforced his own philosophical emphasis on the inseparability of appearance and emptiness, i.e., the view of unity (yuganaddha) which can be realized only via an affirming negation which excludes adventitious stains or reifications but makes room for natural luminosity, the nature of mind which prevails when what obscures it is dispelled. To get a sense of Karma phrin las pa’s statement that “other-exclusion is in accordance with the view of Mahāmudrā”, it may be useful to bear in mind that he follows his teacher Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho in underscoring the harmony of the teaching traditions of kyis bzhed par rloms nas ’dir ’byung ba’i zab mo’i stong pa nyid ni de dang mi mthun pas na rnam par shes pa smra ba’i phyogs su ’dor bar byed do | | 452 KPdl, Dri lan snang gsal sgron me shes bya ba ra ti dgon pa’i gsims khang ba’i dris lan, (ca 145‒161), ca 1506‒1513: gzhan sel zhes bya’i lta ba zab mo ’di | | phyag rgya chen po’i lta ba dang mthun yang | | rtog ge’i dug chus myos pa’i gangs can pa | | phal cher rang blos phar la sgro btags nas | | gzhag pa’i gzhan sel med dgag nyid du ’dod | | de la zab mo stong nyid du zhen nas | | stong pa nyid kyi gzugs brnyan stong nyid du | | ’khrul pa de nyid klu sgrub yab sras kyi | | bzhed par rlom nas … de dag mthar ’dzin sgrog gis rang nyid bcings | | bdag gi bla ma rgyal ba’i dbang po yis | | gzhan sel ma yin dgag tu legs mkhyen nas | | de dang phyag chen lta ba mthun pa’i phyir ’khor ’das kun gzhi chos nyid de bzhin nyid | | sgrub pa yin zhes yang yang ’doms par mdzad | | 163 K A RM A P H RI N L A S Asaṅga and Nāgārjuna, reasoning that there is no divergence between proponents of Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka when it comes to the view of the absolute.453 As he later clarifies, the masters in the Great Madhyamaka lineage of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (which, for him, includes Dignāga and Dharmakīrti), in consideration of those having the capacity to realize that manifold appearances are empty by nature, emphasized luminosity from the standpoint of mind (sems phyogs), stressing that mind as such having the nature of emptiness is luminous by nature. On the other hand, those in the Great Madhyamaka lineage of Nāgārjuna, having in mind those with the capacity to realize that it is precisely the emptiness of subject and object which is luminous by nature, emphasized luminosity from the standpoint of emptiness (stong pa’i phyogs), stressing that mind appearing in manifold aspects cannot be established as it appears.454 Since both Great Madhyamaka traditions have the inseparability of emptiness and luminosity as their common frame of reference, they should be seen as complementary. This principle of complementarity is also evident in Karma phrin las pa’s interpretation of the Yogācāra three natures (trisvabhāva) doctrine. According to the Mahāyānasaṁgraha 453 Rigs gzhung rgya mtsho vol. 1, 1384‒13: “Therefore, the great Yogācāra-Mādhyamikas who follow Ārya Asaṅga and his brother ascertain that the dualistic appearances of subject and object, which obscure true reality, are not established in the way they [appear], and thus mainly teach the wisdom that realizes self-aware self-luminous mind. Ārya Nāgārjuna and his spiritual heirs, by thoroughly analyzing the clinging to real [existence] and its objects that obscure true reality through the great [Madhyamaka] arguments, mainly teach that the nature of luminous mind abides as emptiness. In this way, they ascertain that [subject and object] are without nature. Both systems do not differ in teaching the final true reality, since this very nature of luminous mind is primordially emptiness, and this emptiness is present from the first as the nature of luminosity.” des na ’phags pa thogs med sku mched kyi rjes su ’brang ba’i rnal ’byor spyod pa’i dbu ma chen po rnams kyi de kho na nyid la sgrib par byed pa’i gzung ba dang ’dzin pa gnyis su snang ba ltar du ma grub par gtan la phab nas sems rang rig rang gsal rtogs pa’i ye shes gtso bor ston par mdzad la | ’phags pa klu sgrub yab sras kyis ni de kho na nyid la sgrib par byed pa’i bden ’dzin yul dang bcas pa rnams gtan tshigs chen po rnams kyis legs par dbyad nas rang bzhin med par gtan la phab ste | sems gsal ba’i ngo bo stong pa nyid du gnas pa gtso bor ston par mdzad do | shing rta’i srol gnyis ka’ang mthar thug de kho na nyid ston pa la khyad par yod pa ma yin te | sems gsal ba’i ngo bo de nyid dang po nyid nas stong pa nyid yin la | stong pa nyid de’ang dang po nas gsal ba’i bdag nyid du gnas pa’i phyir ro | 454 Ibid., 35220‒3536: “The glorious Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the Great Mādhyamikas in the lineage stemming from the masters Ārya Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, primarily ascertained that mind as such abiding as emptiness is luminous by nature. Thus, having in mind those having the capacity to realize that any aspects whatsoever that manifest from the play of natural luminosity, are in essence, emptiness—not being established as this or that—[these masters] primarily ascertained [this luminosity] from the standpoint of mind (sems phyogs). However, the great Mādhyamikas in the lineage stemming from Ārya Nāgārjuna primarily emphasized that mind as such [in its] appearing as manifold aspects is not established as it appears. Thus, having in mind those having the capacity to realize that it is precisely the emptiness of subject and object which is luminous by nature, they primarily ascertained [luminosity] from the standpoint of mind (stong pa’i phyogs).” slob dpon ’phags pa thog med sku mched nas nye bar brgyud pa’i dbu ma pa chen po dpal phyogs kyi glang po dang | chos kyi grags pa rnams kyis stong pa nyid du gnas pa’i sems nyid rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba gtso bor gtan la phab pas rang bzhin gsal ba’i rol pa las rnam pa ci dang cir snang yang de dang der ma grub par ngo bo stong pa nyid du rtogs par nus pa la dgongs nas gtso bor sems phyogs gtan la ’bebs par mdzad la | slob dpon ’phags pa klu sgrub nas nye bar brgyud pa’i dbu ma pa chen po rnams kyis ni | sems nyid rnam pa sna tshogs su snang ba ’di snang ba ltar du ma grub par gtso bor gtan la phab pas gzung ba dang ’dzin pas stong pa de nyid rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba de nyid rtogs nus pa la dgongs nas gtso bor stong pa’i phyogs nas gtan la ’bebs par mdzad pa yin no | 164 K A RM A P H RI N L A S II.4, the dependent nature empty of the imagined nature is the perfect nature.455 Seen from the perspective of the unity of the Yogācāra and the Madhyamaka tenets, the very essence of the perfect nature or luminosity is primordially empty of any dualistic notions. This nonexistence of duality is understood as a positive quality which exists as the perfect nature or emptiness.456 Taken together with the idea of buddha nature, it is moreover proposed that this emptiness empty of adventitious stains is primordially imbued with buddha qualities.457 For Karma phrin las, emptiness has the essential character of luminosity and is the very ground which is empty of a perceiver and the perceived; it is not a phenomenon posited by the intellect. It cannot be divided and analyzed, but is beginningless, limitless, unceasing, and unfathomable––it is the indestructible vajra of mind (sems kyi rdo rje), the dharmadhātu or tathāgatagarbha. When this particular method of other-exclusion––the exclusion of dualistic notions––is realized, and when thus the universal characteristic (spyi mtshan; sāmānyalakṣaṇa) of the imputed nature (kun brtags; parikalpita) is relinquished, the particular characteristic (rang mtshan; svalakṣaṇa) or dependent nature (gzhan dbang; paratantra) is realized as it actually is. In this sense, the exclusion of other, of all notions of duality, is in accordance with Mahāmudrā. Karma phrin las pa has here developed Chos grags rgya mtsho’s equation of other-exclusion and affirming negation into a Gzhan stong-like affirmative view of Mahāmudrā. The Eighth Karma pa Mi bskyod rdo rje (1507‒1554), one of the main disciples of Karma phrin las pa and certainly one of the most outstanding thinkers of Tibetan Buddhism, adopts the nomenclature of sāmānyalakṣaṇa versus svalakṣaṇa in some of his Gzhan stong related works. His Lamp that Eloquently Highlights the Tradition of the Gzhan stong Madhyamaka Proponents (hereafter Lamp), for example, starts out with “the particular, i.e., the mystery of mysteries, which is in no way mixed with universals, is never realized by the adventitious mind”.458 Moreover, in Nerve Tonic for the Elderly (hereafter Tonic), a polemical 455 MS II.4 “Finally, what is the perfect nature? It is the complete absence of any objective nature in the dependent nature.” (tr. from the French, Lamotte 1973, 90‒91). MS II.15c “If the perfect nature (pariniṣpannasvabhāva) is the complete absence in the dependent nature (ātyantikābhāvalakṣaṇa) of this [imaginary nature in the dependent nature], how is it absolute and why does one call it absolute? Because it is immutable (avikāra), it is absolute. Because it is the object of the purified [mind] (viśuddhālambana) and the quintessence of all good dharmas (kuśaladharmaśreṣṭha), on calls it is rightly absolute.” (tr. from the French, Lamotte 1973, 107‒8). 456 See for example Sthiramati’s Triṁśikābhāṣya, TŚBh 404‒5: “The fact that the dependent [nature] is always, at any time, entirely free from the perceived object and perceiving subject is the perfect nature.” tena grāhyagrāhakeṇa paratantrasya sadā sarakālam atyantarahitatā yā sa pariniṣpannasvabhāvaḥ (tr.) Mathes 2012, 2. 457 In a number of publications, Mathes has pointed to this systematic and consistent synthesis of buddha-nature thought and Madhyamaka with Yogācāra. See Mathes 2000, 2004, 2012 and his forthcoming paper “The Original Ratnagotravibhāga and its Yogācāra Interpretation as Realistic Indian Precedents of Gzhan stong”. 458 Dbu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol legs par phye ba’i sgron me, 131: rang spyi gang dang ma ’dres gsang ba’i gsang | gloa bur sems kyis nam yang rtogs min par | atext has blo 165 K A RM A P H RI N L A S critique of ’Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal’s (1392‒1481) and Shākya mchog ldan’s (1428‒ 1507) presentations of buddha nature459, Mi bskyod rdo rje explains that from the standpoint of actuality (song tshod), buddha nature is the particular characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), i.e., the true mode of abiding whereas from the standpoint of assumption (rlom tshod) “sentient being” is the imputed universal characteristic (sāmānyalakṣaṇa). In his eyes this particular is nothing less than perfect awakening, which, even though it is designated by the term fruition, can in fact not be posited in terms of a cause-effect relationship because it is unconditioned.460 In the same text he explains that the particular is profound emptiness, better phrased as buddha wisdom or buddha nature.461 Likewise he says, again in his Lamp that “the essence of a tathāgata and the purity from stains in terms of its inherent essence and particular characteristic are referred to as tathāgatagarbha free from adventitious stains.”462 In equating the Great Madhyamaka with the Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka, Karma phrin las pa, in fact, followed in the footsteps of another of his teachers, the Fourth Zhwa dmar pa Chos grags ye shes, who seems to have had a decisive influence on his view as well. In his 459 See below, 269‒70 and n. 757. 460 Rgan po’i rlung sman, 9823‒9831: “Let us further describe the way the tathāgatagarbha exists in all sentient beings: If, from the standpoint of assumption (rlom tshod), the universal “sentient being” is apprehended, then from the standpoint of actuality (song tshod), buddha nature is precisely what is shown to be the particular. As for buddha, there exists no difference between own and other natures, [or between] the categories of universals and particulars. Yet, from the standpoint of not simply relinquishing the [sense of a] potential (rigs) to be liberated from what is other than itself, or the way the nature is, or its own essence, we designate it as “buddha nature” and as “fruition that is complete awakening.” Although designated in this way [i.e., in terms of fruition], because this [buddha nature] is unconditioned, one cannot posit it in terms of a cause-result relationship. Having ascertained by these three reasons that all beings are universals, this buddha nature, the non-deceptive object, is taught to exist in all phases of being obscured and non-obscured, contaminated and not contaminated, by stains, and of being or not being a sentient being.” sems can thams cad la bde bar gshegs pa’i snying po yod pa’i tshul brjod na | rlom tshod sems can gyi tshogs spyi bzung na | song tshod kyi sangs rgyas kyi snying po nyid rang gi mtshan nyid du zhugs par bstan pa dang | sangs rgyas la spyi dang bye brag gi rigs rang dang gzhan gyi ngo bo la tha dad pa med cing de nyid gzhan las dgrol ba’i rigs sam rang bzhin gnas lugs sam rang gi ngo bo mi ’dor ba’i cha de la sangs rgyas kyi snying po mngon par byang chub pa’i ’bras bu zhes ming gis btags pa dang | de ltar btags kyang de nyid ’dus ma byas yin pa’i phyir rgyu ’bras su ’jog mi nus pa dang | rgyu mtshan de gsum gyis ’gro ba thams cad spyi mtshan du gtan la phab nas mi bslu ba’i yul sangs rgyas kyi snying po nyid bsgribs ma bsgribs dang dri mas gos ma gos dang | sems can pa yin min kun gyi gnas skabs su yod par bstan pa’o | | 461 Rgan po’i rlung sman, 9832‒4: “[Query:] Well then, what is present as the mode of abiding or particular characteristic of all phenomena? [Reply:] As it appears in the Mother of the Victors [Prajñāpāramitā sūtras], only profound emptiness is present, this being stated in accordance with the vision of those who abide on the spiritual levels. To describe it this way is not bad but according to the vision of the tathāgata, from the viewpoint of actuality, only buddha wisdom (sangs rgyas kyi ye shes; buddhajñāna) or [buddha] nature is fully present [in these beings].” ’o na chos thams cad gnas tshul lam rang gi mtshan nyid du gang zhugs zhe na rgyal ba’i yum las ’byung ba ltar | sa la gnas pa rnams kyi gzigs ngo dang bstun nas | zab mo stong pa nyid kho na zhugs zhes brjod na’ang mi bzang ba ma yin mod kyi | de bzhin gshegs pa’i gzigs ngo dang bstun nas | song tshod sangs rgyas kyi ye shes sam snying po de kho na rjes su zhugs pa yin te | 462 Dbu ma gzhan stong smra ba’i srol: 313‒317: des na de bzhin gshegs pa’i snying po dang rang gi ngo bo rang gi mtshan nyid kyis dri mas dag pa ni gloa bur dri bral gyi de bzhin gshegs snying dang … atext has blo 166 K A RM A P H RI N L A S Sixty Stanzas of Mahāmudrā, Chos grags ye shes draws parallels between the ApratiṣṭhānaMadhyamaka and the Mahāmudrā ornamented with the bla ma’s pith instructions which reveals the key points of the final dharmacakra of the Pāramitānaya in accordance with the Mantrayāna.463 To substantiate this point, Chos grags ye shes cites a passage from Maitrīpa’s Tattvādaśaka: “Somebody who wishes to know suchness for himself [finds it] neither in [terms of] sākāra nor nirākāra; even the middle [path], (i.e., Madhyamaka) which is not adorned with the words of a guru is only middling.”464 By thus distinguishing a kind of direct introduction to suchness from positions that can be interpreted as clinging to views of eternalism and nihilism, the Fourth Zhwa dmar indirectly criticizes nihilistic Rang stong and eternalist Gzhan stong theories of Tibetan Buddhism.465 Karma phrin las in a similar fashion maintains that the views of Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka and Mahāmudrā are concordant.466 It is from this perspective that he characterizes Mahāmudrā meditation as the internalizing (nyams su len) of *sugatagarbha by cultivating a lucid and nonconceptual state of mind. Revealed in this way, *sugatagarbha, which he equates with “emptiness endowed with the excellence of all aspects,”467 is endowed with the sixty-four qualities of dissociation and 463 See Phyag rgya chen po drug bcu pa, verses 4‒5, Zhwa dmar bzhi pa spyan snga chos kyi grags pa’i gsung ’bum, verse 4‒5, vol. 6, 3207‒10: “Those who, having completely identified [suchness] as only sākāra [with aspects] or nirākāra [without aspects], lose hold of the reality of the Middle. They do not understand the supreme Apratiṣṭhāna-Madhyamaka of Unity. The noble persons of this [Mahāmudrā] lineage have maintained that the mahāmudrā ornamented with the bla ma’s pith instructions reveals the key points of the last [dharma]cakra of Pāramitā[yāna] in accordance with Mantra[yāna].” rnam bcas rnam med nyid du yongs gzung nas | | dbu ma’i de nyid dgrol bar byed pa dag | | rab tu mi gnas zung du ’jug pa yi | | dbu ma mchog ni shes par ma gyur to | | bla ma’i man ngag gis brgyan phyag rgya che | | sngags dang rjes ’brel pha rol phyin pa yi | | ’khor lo phyi ma’i gnad rnams ston pa ni | | brgyud pa ’di yi dam pa rnams bzhed do | | 464 TD, 92: na asākāranirākare tathatāṁa jñatuṁ icchataḥ | madhyamā madhyamā caiva guruvāganalaṅkṛtā | | According to Bhattacharya’s edition. The Taishō U. study group proposes sākārā nirākārā tathatā. See ed. and tr. of Mathes 2006, 209. a 465 Phyag rgya chen po drug bcu pa, verse 9‒10, Zhwa dmar bzhi pa spyan snga chos kyi grags pa’i gsung ’bum, vol. 6, 32015‒19: “In the case of proclamations of such deceitful words as: “[we] don’t maintain any thesis, [and] are free from all extremes,” since there is no certainty [in] their own view—whether [because] it is ineffable or a path of error—they are unable to see the ultimate. Like some of the non-Buddhist proponents of eternalism, they cling to [and believe in] a dualism which proclaims some ultimate factor which is permanent and enduring, whereas everything else is deception. Mistaking [this dualistic belief] for *sugatagarbha is a source of laughter.” Phyag rgya chen po drug bcu pa, verse 9‒10: gang du’ang khas len med pa mtha’ bral zhes | | g.yo tshig ltar sgrog ’di yang brjod bral la | | ’khrul lam yang na rang lta nges med pas | | ’dis kyang don dam mthong bar mi nus so | | phyi rol rtag par smra ba la la ltar | | don dam cha gang rtag dang brtan pa ste | | cig shos brdzun par smra ba’i gnyis ’dzin du | | bde gshegs snying por ’khrul pa bzhad gad gnas | | 466 KPdl, Dri lan snang gsal sgron me shes bya bar ra ti dgon pa’i gzims khang pa’i dris lan (145‒161), vol. ca 1596‒7: “The views of Nonfoundationalist Madhyamaka, i.e., of unity, and Mahāmudrā are claimed to be in accord.” zung ’jug rab tu mi gnas dbu ma dang | | phyag chen lta ba mthun par khas blangs ... 467 The Ratnagotravibhāga (RGV I.92) clarifies the sense of sarvākāravaropetaśūnyatā using the analogy of a painting. While the painting of a king is compared with emptiness, the painters who paint his image are compared with the excellence of all aspects, i.e., the perfections of giving, ethics, patience, diligence, meditation, and insight. RGVV, 5716‒17: lekhakā ye tadākārā dāna śīla kṣamādyaḥ | sarvākāravaropetā śūnyatā pratimocyate | | 167 K A RM A P H RI N L A S maturation which are empty in that they are not identifiable and without characteristics. Emphasizing the continuity of view, meditation, and conduct, the author declares in one of his vajra-songs: “Looking at mind’s nature is the view; remaining undistracted from it is meditation; and dealing with whatever arises is the supreme conduct.”468 EXTANT WRITINGS The extant literary legacy of Karma phrin las pa is confined to a number of commentaries, a collection of spiritual songs (mgur) and Replies to Queries (dris lan) on a variety of topics469, and a few miscellaneous texts on ritual. According to the hagiography of the master in the Zla ba chu shel gyi phreng ba by Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi ’byung gnas (1699‒ 1774) and ’Be lo Tshe dbang kun khyab470, Karma phrin las pa composed all in all more than ten volumes (po ti). We may conclude that there existed a Gsung ’bum of which little is currently extant. Among his commentaries, all that is available at present are those on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, Rang byung rdo rje’s Zab mo nang don, and Saraha’s Dohā Trilogy.471 Additionally Kong sprul’s (1813‒1899) Gdams ngag mdzod contains a ritual text composed by Karma phrin las pa in the context of the Vinaya as well as short instructions for the precepts for householders.472 Karma phrin las pa is also credited in historical and biographical sources with a commentary on Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje’s work on the Ratnagotravibhāga473, a 468 KPdg, 443‒445: sems nyid blta na lta ba yin | | de la ma yengs sgom pa ste | | gang shar spyod na spyod pa’i mchog | | 469 These songs and replies to queries are included in a single volume edited by Ngawang Topgay: Chos rje Karma ’phrin las pa’i gsung ’bum las rdo rje mgur kyi ’phreng ba rnams, The Songs of Esoteric Practice (Mgur) and Replies to Doctrinal Questions (Dris-lan) of Karma-’phrin-las pa. New Delhi, 1975. The margins have ga and ca, indicating that they belonged to the Collected Works (Gsung ’bum) of Karma phrin las pa which is however not extant. 470 Zla ba chu shel gyi phreng ba. Si tu Paṇ chen Chos kyi ’byung gnas, ’Be lo Tshe dbang kun khyab. Sgrub brgyud karma khams tshang brgyud pa rin po che’i rnam par thar pa rab ’byams nor bu zla ba chu shel gyi phreng ba. 2 vol., reprod. based on the Dpal spungs edition of D. Gyaltsan a. Kesang Legshay. Delhi: 1972. 471 In 2004, the commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Mngon rtogs rgyan rtsa ’grel gyi sbyor ṭīkā ’jig rten gsum sgron la ’jug pa) was published in Varanasi, Vajra Vidya Library. The author’s Zab mo nang don commentary (Zab mo nang don rnam bshad snying po gsal bar byed pa’i nyin byed ’od kyi phreng ba) was until recently available only in the form of a blockprint in dbu can in the possession of Gene Smith, TBRC. The text was marked with the letter ka at the margin; thus it might have been the first in his Collected Works. It was newly published in the Rang byung rdo rje gsung ’bum, vol. 14, 1‒553, in Zi ling in 2006. A copy of a manuscript of the Dohā commentaries (Do hā skor gsum gyi ṭīkā ’breng po) from O rgyan chos gling in Bum thang (Bhutan) was published in 1984. 472 ’Dul ba’i las chog mthong ba don ldan. In Gdams ngag mdzod, vol. 8, p. 555‒618, and Khyim pa la phan gdags pa’i slad du ’dul ba’i zhar las byung ba’i slab pa la sbyor tshul cung zad tsam, ibid., vol. 8, p. 618‒29. 473 See Rheingans 2004, 192. See also Kong sprul Yon tan rgya mtsho. Rgyud bla ma’i bshad srol theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma’i bstan bcos snying po’i don mngon sum lam gyi bshad srol dang sbyar ba’i rnam par ’grel pa phyir mi ldog pa seng ge’i nga ro. Sarnath: Kagyud Relief & Protection Committee (KRPC), 1999, p. 12 17‒18: “The summary of the overview of the Ratnagotravibhāga that was composed by the [Third Karma pa] was 168 K A RM A P H RI N L A S commentary on the Hevajratantra474, as well as an explanation of the various classes of tantra.475 Unfortunately, all of these works which would be of obvious interest in the context of this project, are not currently available. The following analysis of Karma phrin las pa’s views on reality, emptiness, buddha nature and truth draw upon his spiritual songs and replies to doctrinal queries, his commentary to the Zab mo nang don476 and his commentary on Saraha’s People Dohā and Queen Dohā.477 VIEWS OF REALITY THE COMPATIBILITY OF RANG STONG AND GZHAN STONG The clearest statement of Karma phrin las pa’s view on Rang stong and Gzhan stong is contained in Discussion to Dispel Mind’s Darkness: A Reply to Queries of [Bsod nams lhun grub, the Governor of] Lcags mo 478. His main points may be summarized as follows: First he clarifies that from his perspective Rang stong as understood in genuine Madhyamaka should not be equated with a nonaffirming negation and thus with the view of extinction that establishes mere nonexistence. He reasons that a nonaffirming negation denotes only an absence of existence and is therefore a mere abstraction, i.e., the result of conceptually excluding the notion of existence. Being a conceptual notion about reality, it is not what is experienced by a valid direct yogic cognition that operates without concepts and that perceives reality as it truly is instead of through mental constructs about it. From Karma phrin las pa’s perspective, the correct understanding of rang stong is that while everything conventional, i.e., the dualistic appearances of the apprehended and the apprehender, is empty of an own self-essence, wisdom which is free of this duality exists. We may recall that Karma phrin las pa here follows the Seventh Karma pa in taking the abstract suffix nyid in the Tibetan stong pa nyid479 in an affirmative sense, as an indication that we are dealing not with a sheer nothingness or absence of existence. To illustrate his point Karma phrin las pa uses the example from the Br̥haṭṭīkā of an empty vase, that is to say, a vase empty of water, to clarify the sense in which the elucidated in detail by Karma dkon gzhon and others. The great Karma phrin las pa wrote a commentary on it.” rang byung rdo rjes rgyud bla ma’i sa bcad bsdud don mdzad pa la | karma dkon gzhon sogs kyis rgyas par bkral zhing | karma phrin las pa chen pos sbyor dag bkod pa’i ’grel pa mdzad | See also Burchardi 2000, 68. 474 Ibid., 192. Dgyes rdor rtags gnyis kyi ’grel pa. See Dpa’ bo gtsug lag phreng ba, Mkhas pa’i dga’ ston, 699. 475 Rheingans 2004, 192. Rgyud sde rnam bshad. 476 Zab mo nang don gyi rnam bshad snying po, in RDsb, vol. 14, 1‒553. Mtshur phu Mkhan po Lo yag bkra shis: Zi ling, 2006. 477 Dmangs dohā’i rnam bshad sems kyi rnam thar ston pa’i me long, 8‒118 and Btsun mo dohā’i ṭīkā ’bring po sems kyi rnam thar ston pa’i me long, 119‒94. 478 For this text, see Volume II, translation: 87‒90, critical edition: 90‒93. 479 Rendering -tā (from the Sanskrit śūnya-tā) and translated as -ness (in the English emptiness). 169 K A RM A P H RI N L A S emptiness of own-nature (rang stong), that is, the absence of any intrinsic natures such as the real particulars of the Buddhist substance realists (Sarvāstivādins), need not take the form of a nonaffirming negation: Empty [means] being devoid of what is other, such as a vase being called “empty,” because it is devoid of water. Likewise, phenomena are imagined to be “empty,” because they are devoid of a nature such as particular characteristics.480 Karma phrin las pa, taking the Seventh Karma pa as a reference, says: My omniscient lama [i.e., Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho481] has explained, “this emptiness which is empty of an own-nature is indeed genuine Rang stong, but emptiness is not said to be a nonaffirming negation.”482 Thus, for Karma phrin las pa rang stong in short means the “emptiness of an own-nature” of all phenomena and not their complete nonexistence as the consequence of a nonaffirming negation. This is how the extreme of nihilism is avoided. Conversely, Gzhan stong should not be understood as a view of eternalism. According to Karma phrin las pa, it is wrong to take gzhan stong as establishing an ultimate, permanent, enduring, and unchanging truly existent entity. This, he says, is tantamount to reifying the ultimate and is thus at odds with the non-entitative character of the ultimate described in the sūtras. As he explains in his commentary to the Zab mo nang don: In the ultimate sense, since the three-fold designation cause, fruition, and path is mere superimposition accompanied by concepts, it is actually nonexistent. And, in the case of what does exist, it is said that *sugatagarbha, the element of sentient beings which is beyond concepts, exists. Thus, it is the nature of mind which is unconditioned and spontaneously present. It is the dharmakāya which, being beyond the entire net of elaborations, has an all-encompassing nature that is like the sky. This is the meaning of the expression “existent as ultimate truth”, which 480 Śatasāhasrikāpañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitābṛhaṭṭīkā (=Br̥haṭṭīkā), D3808, 206a5‒6: stong pa ni gzhan bral ba ste | dper na chu dang bral ba’i phyir bum pa stong pa zhes bya ba lta bu’o | de bzhin du rang gi mtshan nyid la sogs pa’i ngo bo nyid dang bral ba’i phyir chos de dag nyid la stong pa zhes kun tu rtog go | 481 Regarding Karma pa Chos grags rgya mtsho’s Gzhan stong view, see Burchardi in Jackson, Kapstein (ed.) 2011, 317‒40. 482 KPdl, Dri lan yid kyi mun sel, see Volume II, translation: 89, critical edition: 93, see also excerpt in Burchardi 2011, 320, 11‒14. 170 K A RM A P H RI N L A S did not, however, indicate that *sugatagarbha is something truly established, permanent, stable, and enduring.483 This passage reflects the author’s views concerning Rang stong and Gzhan stong without making use of these terms. The ultimate is the all-encompassing, spontaneously present, nature of awareness and reality—immanent buddha nature; it is what remains when all conceptual constructs superimposed on phenomena have been dispelled. But what remains can, on this account, never be taken as something truly established and permanent without reducing it to the very conceptual reifications it is said to be free from. In this way, just as Karma phrin las distinguishes the genuine Rang stong in the sense of an affirming negation from the mistaken Rang stong which consists in a nonaffirming negation, he differentiates his nonreified Gzhan stong view from the “eternalist” version of it as upheld by Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan. The latter had employed the two terms of rang stong and gzhan stong to designate two modes of being which for him constitute two mutually exclusive opposites, the ultimate and the relative.484 In line with the Tathāgathagarbha scriptures, he considers the absolute, buddha nature or the dharmakāya, to be eternal and unchanging; in Dol po pa’s view, the absolute is empty of other (gzhan stong), i.e., the conventional or adventitious. The conventional comprises all dualistic phenomena which are empty of an own-essence (rang stong). As these two, the absolute and conventional, are in this way completely unrelated to each other, no actual identity or difference between them can be determined. Therefore he calls their relationship one of “a difference which negates their identity” (gcig pa bkag pa’i tha dad pa). Dol po pa emphasizes that as the absolute or the dharmakāya is unchanging, permanent or rather beyond time, it cannot possibly be the actual nature of something that is conventional, i.e., changing. As what is conventional and spurious is unreal, it can have nothing whatever to do with ultimate reality. Dol po pa consequently makes a clear-cut distinction between the two domains of saṃsara and nirvāṇa, the relative and the ultimate, and on this basis rejects Sgam po pa’s Mahāmudrā dictum that the true nature of mind or thoughts is the dharmakāya, i.e., dharmatā. The gist of his critique is that this dictum neglects the categorical difference between wisdom and consciousness which he compares to the differences between light and darkness or nectar 483 Zab mo nang don gyi rnam bshad snying po, RDsb vol. 14, 3962‒4: don dam par rgyu ’bras lam gsum ming don la rtog pa dang bcas pa sgro btags tsam yin pas don la med cing | gang yod na rtog pa las ’das pa’i sems can gyi khams bde gshegs snying po ni yod pas shes gsungs pa ni ’dus ma byas shing lhun gyis grub pa’i sems nyid chos kyi sku spros pa’i dra ba thams cad las ’das pa nam mkha’ lta bur kun la khyab pa’i rang bzhin can de ni don dam pa’i bden par yod ces pa’i don yin gyi | bde gshegs snying po bden grub rtag brtan ther zug tu bstan pa ni ma yin no | 484 For a critical assessment of this system by Padma dkar po, see Volume II, translation: 157 f. 171 K A RM A P H RI N L A S and poison. In this sense, the views that afflictions are distorted manifestations of wisdom and that saṃsara and nirvāṇa are inseparable were not tenable for Dol po pa.485 Rang byung rdo rje had, by comparison, argued that conventional reality is mere appearance (snang tsam), like the reflection of the moon on the surface of water. Through it, the practitioner may come to recognize the representational or ersatz ultimate reality (rnam grangs kyi don dam) which is neither the same as nor different from final ultimate truth (mthar thug gi don dam). According to the Sa skya Master Mang thos Klu sgrub rgya mtsho, Dol po pa developed his Gzhan stong system after having met with Rang byung rdo rje and after a Kālacakra retreat in Jo nang.486 At the time of their meeting which according to historical records took place some time between 1320 and 1324, 487 Dol po pa was still maintaining a Rang stong view whereas Rang byung rdo rje had already developed his view advocating a positive appraisal of the ultimate which later Gzhan stong advocates would identify as gzhan stong, though it bears emphasizing that Rang byung rdo rje (like many of his classical contemporaries) refrained from using this term to refer to his own view. In any event, it is important to understand the difference between his and Dol po pa’s position. 488 In regard to the three natures, Dol po pa stipulates that the perfect nature (pariniṣpanna) is empty of both the imagined (parikalpita) and the dependent nature (paratantra). By contrast, Rang byung rdo rje asserts in line with the Madhyantavibhāga that the dependent nature empty of the imagined nature is the perfect nature. This was also the position maintained by Shākya mchog ldan and Karma phrin las. Moreover, as for the distinction between the ālayavijñāna and a supramundane mind according to the Mahāyānasaṁgraha, Rang byung rdo rje considers the pure aspect of the dependent nature, i.e., the purity of the eight consciousnesses—that is, the four wisdoms—or mere appearance (snang ba tsam) to be part of the perfect nature. This pertains to the unity of appearances and emptiness (snang stong zung ’jug). When not recognized for what they are, appearances are saṃsara. If recognized, they are nirvāṇa. From this perspective, appearance and emptiness are one in essence. And it is on this basis that the true nature of mind can be said to function as the ground of everything. A neophyte who studies and practices Buddhist teachings proceeds within the framework of his ālayavijñāna, a mundane state of mind. However for the aspiring bodhisattva, the seeds (or germinal capacities) of study are held to have their inception in the dharmakāya.489 The further a bodhisattvas progresses on the path, the more stains are purified until the point where all defilements are totally relinquished triggering the full disclosure of mind’s inherent 485 See Stearns 2010, 106‒10. 486 Stearns 2010, 49. 487 Ibid., 49. 488 See also Mathes 2008, 56. 489 Mathes 2008, 59. 172 K A RM A P H RI N L A S qualities. Karma phrin las pa’s teachings on Gzhan stong reflect the exegetical tradition of the Third Karma pa Rang byung rdo rje with the important difference that Karma phrin las pa, unlike his predecessor, does make explicit use of the terms Rang stong and Gzhan stong. In this regard, he attempts to show, with reference to his teacher the Seventh Karma pa, how there is no contradiction between them. For Karma phrin las, the consequences of getting emptiness right extend far beyond the theoretical sphere to that of soteriological praxis. And the traditional Buddhist axiom that correct views are the foundation of correct contemplative practice is nowhere more acute than in the case of realizing emptiness. It is in this regard that the author, in one of his spiritual songs, warns his disciples not to get caught either in the extreme of a nonaffirming negation or in the extreme of superimposing a putative existence on the ultimate: Since the conventional is not apprehended as characteristics, Do not meditate on sheer emptiness or a nonaffirming negation! But just be untainted by the fetter of believing in entities. Unvitiated by a nihilistic view, let the mind be joyful. Since the ultimate is not grasped as [something] real, Do not make superimpositions where nothing exists. But just behold the nature of the clear and empty mind. Unvitiated by an eternalist view, let the mind be joyful.490 Karma phrin las pa in another spiritual song advises Slob dpon Sangs rgya ma that Madhyamaka is just a label for a view which eschews extremes of eternalism and nihilism, a view which in reality “neither has nor lacks extremes and is also not a middle, [these being] only imputations.” Nonduality, a mode of being and awareness beyond the apprehending awareness and apprehended objective appearances, is irreducible to extremes of permanence or annihilation. And it is through the inseparability of the nature of mind and reality in the context of view, and of calm abiding and deep insight in the context of meditation, that there arises an uninterrupted experience of nondual awareness which prevails throughout meditative equipoise and post-meditation, and is sustained by mindfulness consisting in the inseparability of stillness and movement.491 490 KPdg, 395‒6: kun rdzob la mtshan mar ma bzung bas | | stong rkyang dang med dgag ma sgoms kyang | | dngos ’dzin gyi ’ching bas ma gos tsam | | chad lta yis ma slad blo re bde | | don dam la bden par ma zhen pas | | med bzhin du sgro btags ma byas kyang | | sems gsal stong gi rang ngo mthong ba tsam | | rtag lta yis ma slad blo re bde | | 491 KPdg, 416‒424: “Do not be distracted [even] for moments [but] look at your mind. Relax it in the natural state in which there is nothing to remove and nothing to add. May the awareness of the one who relaxes be naked! Let the cloud formations of concepts disperse, just don’t get lost in the shallows of nonconceptuality. Enlist the sentinel of nongrasping mindfulness. Diligently sever the ground and root of mind as such. Settle harmoniously 173 K A RM A P H RI N L A S In yet another song, Karma phrin las pa vividly describes his own liberation from the mire of dualism and realization of nonduality and proceeds to give his disciples a direct introduction to self-awareness which culminates in recognizing one’s own mind in its unborn nature and unimpeded manifestation as the display of the three spiritual embodiments (kāya): Previously, distinguishing dogmatically between being and nonbeing, existence and nonexistence, [my] elaboration-free mind sank into the quagmire of discursive elaborations. Now, through the self-expressive energy of knowing my own nature, I have soared into the sky of great emptiness, the essence… Previously, due to hardening my own mind, [I] was strongly attached to outer objects as [something] apprehended. Now that [I] am aware of the true face of my mind, [I] transcended them, having severed the fetters of subject and object. Previously, by superimposing buddha as something to be attained, [I] deprecated delusion as something primordially nonexistent. Now, having found the mystery of the dharmakāya to be mind as such, the superimposing and deprecating of delusion and freedom have vanished in the expanse. … Fortunate faithful disciples, not analyzing objects by looking outward, listen to this direct introduction to self-awareness: mind in its twofold purity is the in the natural state of self-awareness. The mind [being] empty and clear is free from identification. That freshness of awareness that is beyond the intellect - leaving it unadorned, see it nakedly [for what it is]. The natural expression of mind’s nature is a grand display. It is natural awareness (tha mal gyi shes pa) pure and simple. The natural state, unvitiated by contrivance, this moment by moment self-luminous self-awareness is the primordial buddha. Some folks point out the view with words. Other people point to the atmosphere with their finger. Most describe it as a view free from extremes. This mode of being is beyond expression in thought and language. Since the view is not a matter of grasping characteristics, one doesn’t fall into the extremes of eternalism and nihilism. Yet, [the view] neither has nor lacks extremes and is also not a middle, [these being] only imputations. The outer apprehended object-appearances are the creative energy of mind. The inner awareness that apprehends them is the natural state of mind. As for their inseparability, it is this natural way of being which does not conceptualize them as distinct that arises in [one’s] heart; or it is the inseparability of calm abiding and deep insight which flows uninterruptedly in meditative equipoise and post-meditation. Mindfulness as well, selfliberated, is the dharmadhātu. Experience this inseparability of stillness and movement.” dus skad cig ma yengs sems la ltos | | de bsal gzhag med pa’i ngag du glod | | glod mkhan gyi rig pa gcer bur zhog | | rnam rtog gi sprin tshogs dengs su chug | | mi rtog pa ltengs por ma shor tsam | | ’dzin med dran pa yi rgyang so tshugs | | sems nyid kyi gzhi rtsa ’bada kyis chos | | rang rig gi ngang du chams kyis zhog | | sems stong gsal ngos gzung dang bral ba | | blo ’das kyi rig pa so ma de | | rjen pa ru zhog las gcer gyis ltos | | sems nyid kyi rang zhal ltad mor che | | tha mal gyi shes pa rang kha ma | | bzo bcos kyis ma slad dbyings kyi ngang | | skad cig ma rang rig rang gsal ’di | | gdod ma yi sangs rgyas yin lags so | | khong ’ga’ zhig lta ba tshig gis mtshon | | mi la la bar snang ’dzub mos ston | | phal mo che mtha bral lta bar smra | | yin lugs ’di smra bsam rjod las ’das | | lta ba la mtshan ’dzin ma mchis pas | | rtag pa dang chad mthar ma lhung kyang | | mtha’ bcas dang mtha’ bral gnyis ka min | | dbu ma yang min du btags pa tsam | | phyi yul snang gi gzung ba sems kyi rtsal | | nang de ’dzin gyi rig pa sems kyi ngang | | dbyer med la so sor mi rtog pa’i | | rang babs ’di thugs la shar lags sam | | zhi gnas dang lhag mthong rnam dbyer med | | mnyam gzhag dang rjes thob rgyun mi ’chad | | dran pa yang rang grol chos kyi dbyings | | gnas ’gyu dbyer med ’di nyams su long | | atext has bad 174 K A RM A P H RI N L A S original ground. Cultivating the expanse without grasping is the best of paths. Beholding one’s own nature is the best of fruitions. These three continua are the mystery of the mind free from extremes. … The mind upon removal of the host of concepts is the perfect buddha. The purity of awareness and empti[ness] is the noble dharma. The manifold arising is the noble sangha. Thus the infallible refuge is the primordial mind as such. The innate, unborn mind is the dharmakāya. The clarity of unimpeded radiation is the sambhogakāya. The arising of energy in whichever way is the nirmāṇakāya. Thus the three kāyas are nothing other than mind. Though discussed in many ways, it is [but] the natural state of mind. When [its] meaning is pointed out in a few [words] it is the basic nature of awareness. When there is a lot of analysis, examination, and excessive elaboration, look at your own nature and just relax!492 Karma phrin las pa next advises his disciples to let go of the conscious or subconscious habituations to extremes of existence and nonexistence which lead to eternalist and nihilist views. The best remedy against this conditioning is a vivid and clear state of mind which he equates with the uncontrived natural awareness (tha mal gyi shes pa). It is difficult to realize the view through bad mental conditioning that is fixed on the extremes of existence and nonexistence. Therefore without clinging intentionally to eternalism and nihilism, let whatever arises continue nakedly [in its] nonartificial [state]. It is difficult to succeed in meditation when there is bad mental conditioning that is fixed on a mental object and characteristics. Therefore without clinging intentionally to a state of abiding, let whatever arises continue nakedly [in its] nonartificial [state]… Being free from identification is nonartificality. Clear and vivid awareness is nakedness. Joining these two in unity without flaw is implementing the natural awareness.493 492 KPdg, 556‒571: sngar yin min yod med ’byed ’byed nas | | sems spros med spros pa’i ’dam du bying | | da rang ngo shes pa’i rang rtsal gyis | | ngo bo stong chen gyi mkha’ la ’phags | | … sngar rang gi sems la a ’thas pas | phyi yul la gzung bar mngon par zhen | | da sems kyi rang ’tshang rig pa na | | gzung ’dzin gyi ’ching ba chad nas thal | | sngar sangs rgyas thob byar sgro btags pas | | ’khrul pa ye med du skur ba btab | | da sems nyid chos sku’i gsang rnyed pas | | ’khrul grol gyi sgro skur dbyings su yal | | …skal ldan gyi bu slob dad pa can | | kha phyir ltas yul la mi dpyod pas | | rang rig gi ngo sprod ’di la gson | | sems dag pa gnyis ldan gdod ma’i gzhi | | dbyings ’dzin med du skyong ba lam gyi phul | | rang ngo bo mthong ba ’bras bu’i mchog | | rgyud ’di gsum mtha’ bral sems kyi gsang | | … sems rtog tshogs sangs pa rdzogs sangs rgyas | | rig stong du dag pa dam pa’i chos | | sna tshogs su ’char ba ’phags pa’i tshogs | | skyabs slu med gdong ma’i sems nyid rang | | sems gnyug ma skye med chos kyi sku | | gdangs ma ’gags gsal ba longs spyod rdzogs | | rtsal cir yang ’char ba sprul pa’i sku | | sku ’di gsum sems las gud na med | | manga por smra kyang sems kyi ngang | | don nyung ngur mtshon pa rig pa’i gshis | | rtog dpyod dang spros spros ma mang bar | | rang ngo la lta zhing glong la zhog | | atext has dmang 493 KPdg, 743‒6: yod med kyi mtha’ la a ’thas pa’i | | blo ngan goms des lta ba rtogs dka’ bas | | rtag chad la ched du ma ’dzin par | | gang shar de bzo med rjen par bskyongs | | dmigs gtad dang mtshan mar a ’thas pa’i | | blo ngan goms de sgom du ’gyur dka’ bas | | gnas cha la ched du ma ’dzin par | | gang shar de bzo med rjen par bskyongs | 175 K A RM A P H RI N L A S Deferring once again to Chos grags rgya mtsho, Karma phrin las pa reiterates that nondual wisdom established as ultimate truth should not be asserted to be truly existent, permanent, stable, and enduring. Those who do so have, in his eyes, not given sufficient thought to what “true” here signifies. To say that nondual wisdom is established as ultimate truth is not to say that it is truly established (bden grub) in the sense of a permanent, stable and enduring entity. By the same token, to say something is established as conventional truth is likewise not to say that it is truly established. This, he says, is the point on which Rang byung rdo rje and other Gzhan stong proponents differ.494 With these remarks, Karma phrin las pa undoubtedly alludes to the teaching tradition of Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292‒ 1361) who, as previously noted, was said to have developed his Gzhan stong view during a Kālacakra retreat and thus in the context of his tantric practice. Dol po pa stresses that buddha nature, i.e., the ultimate exists as an entity that is empty of the adventitious but not empty of an own-nature. He declares it to be permanent and unconditioned, but, in fact, beyond the category of time, being free of moments. In contradistinction to ultimate truth, he considers conventional truth to be empty in and of itself. According to Dol po pa, ultimate truth is thus ultimately true whereas conventional truth is false and deceptive. Here, it once again becomes evident that Dol po pa maintained a much sharper distinction between the ultimate and the conventional than Rang byung rdo rje and his successors. | … ngos gzung dang bral ba bzo med yin | | gsal dangs su rig pa rjen pa yin | | zung ’jug dang gnyis sdebs ma nor bar | | tha mal gyi shes pa nyams su long | | 494 Zab mo nang don gyi rnam bshad snying po. In RDsb, vol. 14, 3964‒3973: From the Rigs gzhung rgya mtsho: “While the statement that ‘nondual wisdom is established as ultimate truth’ means ‘established as what is ultimate truth’, it does not assert it is ‘truly established’, [i.e.,] permanent, stable, and enduring”. [Quote not identified] Some think that if [something] is established as ultimate truth, then it must be truly established. These [people] did not investigate [the matter]; they are just confused about the term ‘truth’. It is for example just [as follows]: Even though [something is] established as conventional truth, it is not required that it is therefore truly established. Hence, the general gzhan stong proponents these days and the writings of the glorious Rang byung differ. Also the statement of my bla ma, the All-knowing One, that self-emptiness and other-emptiness are not in contradiction, is well-taught so that this meaning can be understood. So, buddha nature that is existent as the unity of the two truths, the inseparability of appearance and emptiness, the great freedom from extremes, is to be explained in this way.” rig[s] gzung rgya mtsho las | gnyis med kyi ye shes don dam pa’i bden par grub par gsungs pa yang | de don dam bden pa yin par grub ces pa’i don yin gyi | de bden grub rtag brtan ther zug tu bzhed pa ma yin no | | kha cig | don dam pa’i bden par grub na bden par grub dgos so snyam pa de dag ni ma brtags pa ste | bden pa zhes pa’i ming tsam la ’khrul par zad pas so | dper na | kun rdzob pa’i bden par grub kyang bden par grub mi dgos pa bzhin no | | de’i phyir | ding sang gi gzhan stong smra ba phal dang | dpal rang byung gi bzhed pa la khyad par yod pa ste | bdag gi bla ma thams cad mkhyen pa’i zhal snga nas | rang stong gzhan stong mi ’gal zhes gsung pa’ang don ’di thugs su byon pa’i legs par bshad pa’o | | de ltar na mtha bral chen po snang stong dbyer med bden gnyis zung ’jug tu yod pa’i sangs rgyas kyi snying po de’i tshul brjod par bya’o | Likewise he explains in his commentary on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra V.20: Mngon rtogs rgyan rtsa ’grel gyi sbyor ṭīka ’jig rten gsum sgron la ’jug pa 6145‒7: “The wisdom of the nonduality of object and subject, moreover, is of the nature that it does not exist as an ultimately true own-being, because it is dependently arisen, as in the example of a magical illusion.” gzung ’dzin gnyis med kyi ye shes de yang chos can | don dam par bden pa’i ngo bo nyid du med pa yin te | rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba yin pa’i phyir | dper na sgyu ma bzhin du’o | 176 K A RM A P H RI N L A S In his commentary on Rang byung rdo rje’s Zab mo nang don, Karma phrin las explains that as the true nature of mind, natural luminosity, the dharmakāya, is emptiness, it is unchanging throughout all phases. Therefore, the suchness of sentient beings in the ground [phase], the suchness of bodhisattvas during the path, and the suchness of buddhas in the fruition is undifferentiated; value judgements such as better and worse, or higher and lower, do not obtain.495 The ground of emptiness of Gzhan stong is *sugatagarbha which is nothing other than the natural luminosity of mind’s nature, the coemergent unity of the expanse and awareness, or natural awareness (tha mal gyi shes pa). Hence, ultimate truth is nothing but mind’s true nature. Again in his commentary on Rang byung rdo rje’s Zab mo nang don, Karma phrin las pa explains that there are no buddhas and sentient beings at all who have not arisen from the preexisting state of natural purity. Yet, this natural purity does not exist as a real substance and is of the very essence of dependent arising; therefore, there is no beginning, either in the sense of initially occurrent time and a real substance.496 This inseparability between natural purity or emptiness and dependent arising provides a valuable key to understanding Karma phrin las pa’s views on the compatibility of Rang stong and Gzhan stong. In his discussion on these views of emptiness in the Zab mo nang don commentary, he explains that at the time of the ground, when the mind is defiled and unaware of its true nature, we speak of “adventitious stains” or, in other words, “sentient beings”. The sixty-four qualities, even though inseparable from mind’s true nature, are not functionally present in this ground phase and it is only as a concession to linguistic conventions that one may refer to this state as an “obscured buddha[hood]”. Moreover, Karma phrin las explicitly refers to Rang byung rdo rje’s Gzhan stong— though, we may recall, the latter never used this term to identify his own view—as genuine in that it accords with Maitreya’s teachings, the sūtras, and the tantras. He finds substantiation for Rang byung rdo rje’s view in Ratnagotravibhāga I.154‒155: There is nothing to be removed from it and nothing to be added. 495 Zab mo nang don gyi rnam bshad snying po, RDsb, vol. 14, 401‒403: “As the essence of mind’s nature, natural luminosity, the dharmadhātu, is emptiness, it is unchanging throughout all phases. Therefore, the suchness of sentient beings in the ground [phase], the suchness of bodhisattvas during the path and the suchness of buddhas in the fruition is indivisible in terms of distinctions between better or worse, higher or lower etc.” sems nyid rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba chos kyi dbyings kyi ngo bo stong pa nyid yin pas gnas skabs thams cad du ’gyur ba med pa’i phyir | gzhi sems can gyi de kho na nyid dang lam byang sems kyi de kho na nyid dang ’bras bu sangs rgyas kyi de kho na nyid rnams la bzang ngan nam mtho dman la sogs kyi sgo nas tha dad du dbye ba med de | … 496 Ibid., 404‒406: “There are no buddhas and sentient beings at all who have not arisen from the preexisting state of natural purity. Yet it does not exist as a real substance because it is of the nature of dependent arising. There is no beginning of initially occurrent time and there is no beginning of a real substance.” rang bzhin rnam dag de yi snga rol na de las ma byung ba’i sangs rgyas dang sems can ’ga’ yang med la | bden pa’i rdzas su grub pa med pa rten cing ’brel bar ’byung ba’i ngo bo nyid yin pa’i phyir | dang por byung ba’i dus kyi thog ma dang bden pa’i rdzas kyi thog ma dag med de | 177 K A RM A P H RI N L A S The real should be seen as real, and seeing the real, one becomes liberated.497 The [buddha-]element is empty of adventitious [stains], which have the defining characteristic of being separable; But it is not empty of unsurpassable qualities, which have the defining characteristic of not being separable.498 All this brings Karma phrin las to conclude, as had the Seventh Karma pas, that there is no incommensurability between a Rang stong understood as the emptiness of an own nature of all phenomena—with the implication that there remains nondual wisdom that is free from subject-object dichotomy—and a Gzhan stong understood as the affirmation of this nondual wisdom as being empty of the adventitious stains of dualistic perception. Thus, the compatibilist Rang stong and Gzhan stong views attributed to Rang byung rdo rje and propounded by Chos grags rgya mtsho are understood by Karma phrin las pa to be superior to the oppositional Rang stong and Gzhan stong positions which Tibetan scholastics from the 14th century onward mainly associated with the Jo nang and Dge lugs pa schools.499 It is perhaps worth noting that a quite similar view regarding the unity of Rang stong and Gzhan stong was later maintained by the hermit Gshong chen Mkhas btsun bstan pa’i rgyal mtshan (16th‒17th c.).500 He maintained that “being empty of the stain of conceptualization is Gzhan stong and being empty of reifications of natures is Rang stong. Since being empty does not negate the nature that is empty, it is taught that emptiness is not empty in and of itself.”501 In other words, emptiness whether of own-natures or extraneous conceptual projections cannot be taken as an end in itself. He furthermore explains: “If empty of ownnature (rang gi stong pa) were not [also] empty of other (gzhan gyis mi stong), then such selfempti[ness] would be a partial emptiness, i.e. one thing being empty of another (nyi tshe’i 497 RGV I.54, 76.1–2: nāpaneyam ataḥ kiṃcid upaneyaṃ na kiṃcana | draṣṭavyaṃ bhūtato bhūtaṃ bhūta darśī vimucyate | | 498 RGV I.55, 76.3–4: śūnya āgantukair dhātuḥ savinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ | aśūnyo ’nuttarair dharmair avi nir bhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ | | 499 KPdl, Dri lan snang gsal sgron me zhes bya ba ra ti dgon pa’i gzims pa’i khang pa