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HARISH C. GUPTA

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## TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

Thanks to Dr. I. D. Serebryakov, we now possess a fine selection of the outstanding contributions of the Russian Indologists of the 19th and early 20th centuries, which, as edited and annotated by him is published under the title *Izbrannye trudy russkikh Indologov-filologov* (Moscow, 1962). Stcherbatsky's paper on *Scientific Achievements of Ancient India* has been translated by me from this volume. As regards the other papers included here, thanks are due to Prof. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya who, on his last visit to Russia, had the vision and the initiative to procure the microfilms of their Russian originals with a view to study and publish them.

In translating these papers, I have been fully aware of the presumptuousness of the task. And I might not have taken it up, if it were not for the boundless encouragement and learned guidance of Professor Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya himself—who, with his first-hand knowledge of the work of Soviet Indologists, was the most appropriate person to guide such a project. In the midst of his manifold activities, he very kindly scrutinised the manuscript, rectified my errors and suggested suitable revisions. And for this, I cannot adequately express my profound gratitude to him. The errors, which still survive, are obviously due to my own inadequacies.

Professor Chattopadhyaya was also kind enough to accede to my request for a comprehensive Introduction to this volume.

I am also indebted to Professor Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaa of Vidyasagar College, Calcutta, for kindly going through the entire mauscript and making very useful suggestions.

Calcutta
November 30, 1969

Harish C. Gupta


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*Among the innumerable Soviet friends and scholars from whom I have received help and active support in this venture, I am particularly anxious to express my deep gratitude to Professor V. V. Balabushevich, Professor V. I. Kal'yanov, Dr. I. D. Serebryakov, Dr. E. E. Tyomkin, Dr. A. D. Littman, Dr. G. M. Bongard-Levin and Dr. N. P. Anikeev. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the members of the Institute of Philosophy. Academy of Scinces USSR, on whose kind invitation I had the opportunity of visiting the Soviet Union in 1968 and of meeting the Soviet philosophers and Indologists.*

*Apart from Sri Harish C. Gupta—who insists on putting some highsounding words about me in his Translator's Preface and thereby makes it most embarrassing for me even to acknowledge the elementary fact that without his help it would have been simply absurd for mc to work on this project—1 am most grateful to Professor Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, Dr. Mahadevprasad Saha and Dr. Alaka Chattopadhyaya for help in various forms.*

*—Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya*

# INTRODUCTION

Theodore Stcherbatsky[1] was born on October 1 [September 19, o.s.], 1866, at Kielce, Poland, where his father was then working. He died on March 18, 1942, at Borovoi in North Kazakhstan. His epitaph, translated into English, reads : "He explained to his country the wisdom of the ancient Indian thinkers."

An epitaph is, of course, only an epitaph and it is not intended to be an exhaustive description of the total contribution of the person whose memory it cherishes. So are the words inscribed on Stcherbatsky's tomb, which are moreover chosen specially from the point of view of his countrymen. To the Indians, however,—and particularly to those of our countrymen who want to make a serious study of our own philosophical tradition—the urge to say a great deal more about Stcherbatsky is almost irresistible. Their gratitude to him is immense. In an important sense, Stcherbatsky did help us—the Indians—to discover our own past and to restore the right perspective of our own philosophical heritage. Yet this was only one aspect of his grand contribution to Indology, though at ths same time one cannot also help wondering how immensely the importance of this particular aspect of his contribution would have increased but for his personal fascination for the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and his consequent eagerness to read Kantian philosophy—or the potentials thereof—in medieval Indian texts where these could not have historically belonged.

Thus for example, the greatest tribute Stcherbatsky could think of paying to Dharmakīrti [c. 7th century A.D.],—his favourite Indian philosopher,—was to describe him as "the Indian Kant." Though eloquent was his personal admiration for both Dharmakīrti and Kant, such a description has not even a figurative value for those for whom Kant is not the measure of philosophical greatness. Taken in its literal sense, on the other hand, it is likely to interfere with an objective understanding of Dharmakīrti's actual philosophical position in its concrete historical context. But more of this later.

Notwithstanding this, however, it is impossible to underestimate in any way the significance of Stcherbatsky's recognition—and even a passionate defence—of the stupendous importance of Dharmakīrti or, more strictiy, of the epistemological and logical tradition associated with the names of Dharmakīrti and his grand preceptor

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1. According to Russian orthography—Fedor Ippolitovich Shcherbatskoi. The Russian name *Fedo* (Feodor) is derived from the Greek *Theodor*. Stcherbatsky himself used the form Theodore, which is retained here.

Dignāga [c. A.D. 500] in the development of Indian philosophical activity in its maturest phase. Perhaps in default of a more satisfactory description of it and also for the purpose of a convenient form of reference, Stcherbatsky called this the tradition of "Buddhist logic", though, rightly enough, without attaching any lop-sided religious significance to the word "Buddhist" in this particular context.[2]

Our knowledge of "Buddhist logic" is inextricably connected with the work of Stcherbatsky and we could have called him its only discoverer but for the fact that when he was working on the subject, the Indian historian of Indian logic, S. C. Vidyabhusana,—quite independently of Stcherbatsky but following the same line as followed by Stcherbatsky himself—worked as another pioneer worker on the subject.[3] While speaking of the discovery of "Buddhist logic", therefore, we have

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2. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* i. 2 : "The Buddhists themselves call this their science a doctrine of logical reasons ( *hetu-vidyā* ) or a doctrine of the sources of right knowledge (*pramāṇa-vidyā*) or simply, an investigation of right knowledge (*samyag-jñāna-vyutpādana*). It is a doctrine of truth and error. In the intention of its promotors the system had apparently no special connection with Buddhism as a religion, i.e. as a teaching of a path towards salvation".

3. It may be useful to have here a brief account of the works on the same subject by Satischandra Vidyabhusana.

"In 1901", wrote Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, "I had come across a monograph on *Hindu Logic as preserved in China and Japan* by Sadajiro Sugiura who had offered it as a dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Pennsylvania. This work seemed to me of fascinating interest as opening up a new field of investigation full of untold possibilities. I suggested to Satischandra, who at that time was engaged in the study of Tibetan, that he should undertake to explore the materials available from Tibetan sources." (Foreword to *A History of Indian Logic* by S. C. Vidyabhusana, Calcutta, 1921, pp. xix-xx). Evidently, Sir Ashutosh did not know at that time that this possibility was already being extensively explored by Stcherbatsky—1902 being the date of the publication of his first paper on the subject. However, Vidyabhusana, trained in Tibetan by no less a Tibetologist than Sarat Chandra Das himself, took up the suggestion of Sir Ashutosh in right earnest and, though showing no awareness of Stcherbatsky's works (perhaps because the earlier of these were in the Russian language), started reconstructing the "Buddhist Logic" from the Tibetan sources. His first monograph on the subject, *History of the Medieval School of Indian Logic* appeared

to add the name of Vidyabhusana to that of Stcherbatsky, though there had been some basic differences in the approach as well as in the outcome of the works of these two scholars. While Vidybhusana's approach had on the whole been that of a dry historian, Stcherbatsky wanted to rationalise "Buddhist logic" in modern terminology and to offer a vigorous philosophical defence of it. He severely criticised those European scholars who claimed "that the ancient Indians were incapable of exact thinking and lucid presentation and attributed these qualities exclusively to ancient Greek and modern science".[4] "There is a widely spread prejudice", he argued "that positive philosophy is to be found only in Europe. It is also a prejudice that Aristotle's treatment of logic was final ; that having had in this field no predecessor, he also had no need of a continuator. This last prejudice seems to be on the wane. There is as yet no agreed opinion on what the future logic will be, but there is a general dissatisfaction with what it at present is. We are on the eve of a reform. The consideration at this juncture of the independent and altogether different way in which the problems of logic, formal as well as epistemological, have been tackled by Dignāga and Dharmakīrti will possibly be found of some importance".[5] In thus trying to discover *and defend* "Buddhist logic". Stcherbatsky perhaps went to the extent of reading too much of later philosophical

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in 1909, and his *magnum opus, A History of Indian Logic* in 1921—nine years earlier than Stcherbatsky's maturest work on the subject, viz. the *Buddhist Logic*, in which therefore, Stcherbatsky freely used Vidyabhusana's rusults. Vidyabhusana also wrote a considerable number of articles on "Buddhist Logic" before the publication of his monographs. Thus : in the "Jouonal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal"—*Dignāga and his Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (1905), *Indian Logic as preserved in Tibet* (1907), *Nyāya-praveśa or the earliest work extant on Buddhist Logic by Dignāga* (1907), *Hetu-cakra-hamaru...of Dignāga* (1907) ; in the "Journal of the Buddhist Text Society"—*The Philosopher Dignāga, a contemporary of poet Kālidāsa* ( iv. 3, 1896 ), *The influence of Buddhism on the development of Nyāya Philosophy* ( vi. 3, 1898 ), *The Buddhist version of the Nyāya Philosophy* ( vii. 1, 1900 ) ; in the "Journal of the Mahabodhi Society"—*Life of Dignāga* ( 1899 ), *Influence of Buddhism on the development of the Hindu Nyāya Philosophy* ( 1902 ), etc.

4. Stcherbatsky's, *Theory of knowledge and Logic According to the Later Buddhist* ( in Russian ), quoted by N. P. Anikeev, *Modern Ideological Struggle*...34.

5. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*. i. perface xii.

significance in the writings of Dignāga and his followers, but the fact remains that this produced an impact on the academic world which it would have been otherwise difficult to produce. Secondly, as we shall presently see, Stcherbatsky trained a generation of briliant scholars to follow up his line of research, while in India there had practically been no outstanding scholar to continue Vidyabhusana's work, at least not in any big way.

The word *discovery* is being deliberately used, for the grand tradition of "Buddhist logic" was lost and forgotten in India. Excepting for a solitary text along with a commentary on it—about which we shall presently speak—nothing of the enormous literature produced by these logicians is so far known to have survied in India. Even this text remained as some kind of a sealed work at the time of its discovery and, after being discovered, it drew a desultory attention of the scholars then specialising in Indian philosophy. In the Indian philosophical trandition itself, the names of these Buddhist philosophers were remembered vaguely and often not without a stigma attached to them prompted by an intense sectarian animosity against the Buddhists. Only a few scraps of their statements remained qouted in the writings of their opponents ; but since these were quoted invariably for the purpose of being refuted and ridiculed, the statements, torn out of their actual contexts, were presented in the most adverse settings and necessarily not without the tendency of attaching some perverse significance to these.

Such a deplorable condition of the survival of "Buddhist logic" had the most serious repercussion on the understanding of the Indian philosophical situation as such, inasmuch as even the writings of the rival philosophers that survived in the country could not be fully understood in default of the knowledge of the writings of the "Buddhist logicians". In other words, the loss of "Buddhist logic" meant much more than a mere insufficiency of the knowledge of the Buddhist tradition itself. It meant also a serious insufficiency of the understanding of the other philosophers belonging particularly to the more developed phase of the history of Indian philosophy.

The reason for this is not difficult to see. In the more sophisticated period of the history of Indian philosophy. the significant texts of the rival philosophers were largely inspired by the zeal to refute the views of these "Buddhist logicians". Or, in Indian terminology, they represented the main *pūrvapakṣa* ("the position of the opponent") of the other philosophers. Evidently, it is impossible to understand fully any philosophical text without also having an adequate idea of the views which it is above all intended to refute.

Here is just an example. Uddyotakara [c. 6th-7th century A.D.] wrote his *Nyāya-vārtika* with the ostensible purpose of expounding the significance of Vātsyāyana's [c. 4th century A.D.] commentary on the *Nyāya-sūtra*. But the book was polemical throught and the polemics directed mainly against Dignāga, who

had made a bold effort to set up a new system of logic and epistemology by demolishing the position of Vātsyāyana. In such a circumstance, one cannot hope to understand the full significance of Uddyotakara's work by depending on it alone. One has also to study Dignāga in order to understand why Uddyotakara was taking so much pain to refute certain views, often digressing long and even apparently going out of his way for this purpose. Incidentally, from this text itself it is even difficult to form an adequate idea of the actual views he wanted to refute, for Uddyotakara himself did not maintain an exemplary objectivity in his writings, or, as Stcherbatsky put it, he "does not mind at all to distort the opinion of his adversary and to answer him with some bluffing sophistry".[6]

It follows, therefore, that not even the acutest analysis of Uddyotakara's work is by itself enough to understand it, not to speak of arriving at an actual idea of the philosophical situation of his. As Rahulla Sankrityayana puts the point : "The old masters are to be re-edited, giving the full quotations or references from their predecessors, where the hints are not clear enough. For Example, if an edition of the *Nyāya-vārtika* is published with copious quotations from the *Pramānā-samuccaya* and the *Nyāyamukha*, or if the student has already studied these two masterpieces of Dignāga before going to Uddyotakara, the study of the *Nyāya-vārtikā* will become a joy and not a cause of headache to the teacher and to the student".[7]

What is said of Uddyotakara's text is on the whole true of the stupendous works of Kumārila [c. 8th century A.D.], Akalaṅka [c. 750 A.D.], Vācaspeti Miśra [c. 9th century A.D.], Udayana [c. 10th century A.D.] and others, which owe one of their main impetus to the vital clash of ideas with the later Buddhist philosophers. Of these philosophers, Kumārila represented the Mīmāṃsā view, Akalaṅka the Jaina view, Udayana the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view, while Vācaspati Miśra was supposed to be a master of all the (Brahmanical) philosophies though perhaps with a pronounced bias for the Vedānta. Their names are specially mentioned, because during the maturest period of Indian philosophical activity, mainly these views retained full vigour. It was interaction and interconnection of these views with the philosophy of the later Buddhists that imparted real life and vigour to the philosophical situation as a whole. There was, therefore, no chance of understanding this philosophical situation in spite of remaining almost completely ignorant of the later Buddist philosophers. But the fact is that "only a few decades ago Vasubandhu, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti were mere legendary names, which were only heard, when the long forgotten tomes of the old masters were dusted on ceremonial occasions".[8]

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6. *Ib.* i. 49.
7. Rahula Sankrityayana, preface of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* (Allahabad 1943) p. 10.
8. *Ib.* p. 8-9.

We can now see the stupendous significance of the discovery of "Buddhist logic". Of the five living components of the comparatively later phase of the Indian philosophical thought as a whole, only four—viz. the Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta, Jaina and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika—actually survived in the country. But the fifth—i.e. the one represented by the later Buddhist philosophers—did not. As a result, even the surviving trends could at best be incompletely understood and there was no question of arriving at a picture of the total philosophical situation. Stcherbatsky, along with Vidyabhusana, lifted the veil of oblivion on "Buddhist logic". It was by itself the discovery of a long-forgotten but by the far the most vigorous aspect of the Indian philosophical activity. But it was something more than that. It created the first real possibility of restoring the correct perspective of the Indian philosophical situation.

Since I have been using the word *discovery* rather freely, I may as well try to be clearer about it.

Neither Stcherbatsky nor Vidyabhusana discovered any original text of Dignāga or Dharmakīti. As for Dignāga, the modern scholars have practically given up the hope of ever finding the Sanskrit original of his *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya* beyond some fragments of it.[9] A few decades after the major works of Stcherbatsky and Vidyabhusana surveying "Buddhist logic", efforts were made to reconstruct some other logical treatises of Dignāga.[10] We are a little more fortunate with regard to the original works of Dharmakīrti. The honour of first finding a copy of his *Nyāya-bindu* belongs to Bhagvandas Kevaldas,[11] though it was first edited and published by P. Peterson in 1889 as an appendix to Dharmottara's commentary on the text itself.[12] And the much greater honour of finding the Sanskrit original of Dharmakīrti's *magnum opus*, the *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, belongs to Rahula Sankrityayana, who discovered it during his expeditions[13] to Tibet (1934 and 1936) and published it in 1943. Besides these, some other writings of Dharmakīrti

9. H. N. Randle, *Fragments from Dignāga* (*Pramāṇa-samuccaya*), London, 1926.
10. G. Tucci, *Nyāya-mukha, the oldest Buddhist text on Logic after Chinese and Tibetan Materials*, Heidelberg 1930; *Nyāya-praveśa* (ed. Part I—Anandasankar B. Dhruva; Part II—V. Bhattacharyya). GOS No. 38-39, Baroda 1927-30.
11. P. Peterson, *Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā...*, Calcutta 1889, preface p. xiv.
12. P. Peterson, *Nyāya-bindu-ṭikā..., to which is added the Nyāya-bindu.* Calcutta 1889.
13. For the account of Rahula's Tibetan expeditions and of the discovery by him of the Buddhist manuscripts, see *Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 1935 & 1937.

are published by the modern scholars,[14] though compared to the literally staggering bulk[15] of the actual output of the "Buddhist logicians", their original writings so far recovered are really insignificant.

What is most remarkable about Stcherbatsky is that long before Rahula's discovery of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika*, practically the entire tradition of "Buddhist logic" was reconstructed by him and this based not only on the thorough study of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti but also of a large number of commentators and sub-commentators on them.

How could this be at all possible ? For an answer to this, we have to remember an old controversy among the European Indologists and this is perhaps best retold in the words of Stcherbatsky himself. "At the dawn of European Indology", he observed, "there has been a controversy between the great French scholar E. Bournouff and the great Russian scholar V. Vasil'ev on the question whether Buddhism could be better understood from the Indian or also from the Chinese and Tibetan sources. According to the first, only Indian sources provided evidence on genuine Buddhism ; according to the second, Buddhism in the totality of its development ean be best understood only from the Chinese and Tibetan sources in addition to the Indian ones".[16] And he added that working on the tradition of Vasil'ev and Minaev excellent results had already been reached by himself as well as his talented pupil O. Rozenberg [1888-1919], whose early death meant a great loss to the world of Indology.

This controversy is now dated, of course, and it is generally admitted that no study of Buddhism—particularly of the later phase of its history—can be satisfactory without depending on the Chinese and Tibetan materials. Several thousands of works produced by the later Buddhists are lost in their Indian originals but remain preserved mainly in Chinese and Tibetan translations. Of these translations, again, the Tibetan ones have a special importance. Whiie the Chinese translations are comparatively free, the Tibetan ones are not so. As a result, it is comparatively easier and even safer to return back to the lost Indian texts from their surviving Tibetan translations.

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14. L. de la Vallee Poussin, *Nyāya-bindu with commentary of Vinītadeva* ( Tibetan ), Calcutta 1907 ; Sukhalal Saṅghavi and Jinavijaya Muni, *Hetu-bindu-prakaraṇa with commentary of Arcaṭa Bhaṭṭa*, Baroda 1949 ; Dalasukha Bhai Malavaniya *Svārthānumāna-pariccheda with author's own commentary*, Benares 1959.
15. See Vidyabhusana, *A History of Indian Logic*, 270-346.
16. Stcherbatsky, Preface to the *Madhyānta-vibhaṅga* p. iv-v.

It is important to emphasise this point, particularly because in India to-day the study of classical Tibetan is on the decline and its bearing on the knowledge of Buddhism somewhat ignored. It will, therefore, be relevant here to have a few words on this.

Since the time of the first important Tibetan king Sroṅ-btsan-sgam-po[17], the entire Tibetan culture was sought to be consciously modelled on Indian culture : the Tibetan script was fashioned after the Indian script[18], the Tibetan grammar was modelled on Indian grammar[19], the academic ambition of the advanced Tibetan scholars was to be trained in some Indian centre of learning, the Tibetan centres of learning were simply the imitations of the Indian centres[20] and even Tibetan history was sought to be explained as a continuation of Indian history.[21] When, a few centuries later, translation work on a grand scale of the Indian texts—specially Buddhist texts—was taken up by the Tibetans under the patronage of the monk-ruler Ral-pa-can,[22] absolutely rigid and mechanical principles for choosing Tibetan equivalents for Indian words were legally enforced by the State, so that the supreme sanctity[23] of the Indian texts was not to be affected in any way. As a result, the Tibetan translations are some kind of mechanical replica of the Indian originals. As Stcherbatsky himself explained, "The importance of Tibetan

17. A. Chattopadhyaya, *Atīśa and Tibet*, Calcutta 1967, 180ff.
18. *Ib.* 198ff. 19. *Ib.*
20. Even the names of some of the Tibetan monasteries like Potala and 'Bras-spuṅs (= Dhānyakaṭaka) are simple imitations of Indian names.
21. A. Chattopadhyaya, *op-cit.* 152ff.
22. *Ib.* 250ff.
23. But the negative result of such a reverential attitude to the Buddhist texts must not be overlooked. See Rahula Sankrityayana in *Journal of Bihar & Orissa Research Society*, 1935, 22-3 : "The devout people consider it a great meritorious deed to enshrine the palm-leaf MSS inside a *stūpa* or image. In this way, hundreds of books are now beyond our reach. I heard at Sa-skya that a palm-leaf MS copy of Dharmakīrti's great work *Pramāṇa-vārtika* is enshrined in an image of him, kept in one of the chapels of the Lha-khaṅ-chen-mo of Sa-skya. A few years back, and old stucco image in bSam-yas had fallen down and inside it many such MSS were found. The image was reconstructed and the MSS were put back into it again. The other practice is more atrocious. In some of these monasteries, Lamas cut the MSS in pieces and offer them to those pilgrims who bring rich presents. These small pieces are said to possess the miraculous power of healing all kinds of diseases when a drop of water in which the piece has been dipped is administered to the patient."

translation for the right interpretation of the ancient Buddhist texts is generally admitted. These translations were always prepared by a committee composed of Indian *paṇḍita*-s and a learned Tibetan translator (*lo-tsa-ba*). The greatest care was bestowed on the right understanding of the original. Special expeditions were sent out to India for search of old and trustworthy manuscripts, translations were then corrected by the committee according to the new finds. Needless to say that both the Indian *paṇḍita*-s and Tibetan *lo-tsa-ba*-s were profoundly versed in the technical difficulties of Sanskrit grammar, poetics, philosophy and other medieval Indian sciences. For the sake of uniformity, bilingual dictionaries were prepared at an early date. The terminology established by them had been authorised by the Tibetan government and severe punishments were proclaimed against trespassers to the renderings enforced by the state law. Under these circumstances, the Tibetan translations afford invaluable assistance for establishing the text of every ancient Buddhist work of which insufficient or corrupt manuscripts are available".[24]

We can now easily see how Stcherbatsky could reconstruct "Buddhist logic" in spite of the deplorable condition of the availability of the original texts on it. His first article on the subject, *Logic in Ancient India*, appeared in 1902 and it was soon followed by the two volumes of *The Theory of Knowledge and Logic According to the Later Buddhists*, published during 1903-9. During these years, excepting for Dharmakīrti's *Nyāya-bindu* and Dharmottara's commentary on it, no original work on "Buddhist logic" was known to the academic world, and, though Peterson's edition of these appeared in 1889, in the words of Stcherbatsky himself, it "did not prove sufficiently reliable to allow a clear comprehension in many important passages. The task of an English translation attempted by the learned editor himself and after him by the late Professor C. Bendall, had to be given up for want of a sufficiently reliable text. Additional great help was then derived from the Tibetan translations. Accordingly, an edition of the Tibetan text and a new edition of the Sanskrit original were begun by me in this series [i.e. the *Bibliotheca Buddhica* Series] and at the same time a translation (in Russian) and an *analysis of the system* were published".[25]

The expression *analysis of the system* was of course a modest one. What it actually meant was much more than a mere exposition of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāya-bindu*. It meant the exposition of the entire tradition of epistemology and logic associated

24. Preface to Obermiller's *Index Verborum* ( Bibliotheca Buddhica 1927 ) p. i. Ital. added.
25. *Ib.* p. ii.

with the names of the later Buddhists based on the writings of Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and a host of their commentators—a reconstruction which received its final form in the first volume of the *Buddhist Logic*.

Thanks to the magnificent tradition of Sanskrit, Tibetan and Mongolian studies already set up in St. Petersburg and largely inspired by I. P. Minaev [1840-1890], Stcherbatsky acquired a grand proficiency in Tibetan, Mongolian and other languages and thus became much more than a first-rate Sanskritist. He moreover extensively toured Mongolia where, under the guidance of the learned Lamas, he vastly improved the knowledge of the Tibetan language and read the Buddhist texts preserved in the monasteries. It was a pity that the political considerations of of the time led the then Dalai Lama to refuse him the permit to visit Tibet,[26] though this could not prevent Stcherbatsky from acquiring the mastery of Tibetan language and thus to have a free access to the enormous literature on logic and epistemology produced by the later Buddhists.

Not that Stcherbatsky was the first Indologist who worked for the reconstruction of later Buddhism on the basis of the Tibetan materials. Already before him, Alexander Csoma de Koros, H. A. Jaschke, Sarat Chandra Das, I. J. Schmidt, W. V. Vasil'ev, A. Schiefner and others magnificently contributed to this reconstruction. What was nevertheless distinctive of Stcherbatsky was that while others before him used the Tibetan sources mainly for the purpose of understanding later Buddhism in its religious, metaphysical and mystical aspects, Stcherbatsky was the first to be seriously drawn to the essentially rational and logical contributions of the later Buddhists. In this he differed not only from the Tibetologists preceding him but also from the general run of the European thinkers taking notice of Indian philosophy, or, more broadly, of the Indian cultural heritage—from Schopenhaur, Hegel, Deussen, Max Müller and others—who were all building up a somewhat perverted picture of Indian wisdom by way of emphasising only the religious, "spiritual" and the most extravagantly idealistic tendency of the *Upaniṣads* and Śaṃkara Vedānta.[27] For them, the growth of these tendencies in Indian culture was so overpowering that the Indian mind could pay at best a desultory attention to the problems of logic and rational analysis, i.e. philosophy as fully emancipated from magic, mythology and religion. Of course, Stcherbatsky did not go to the other extreme of denying these trends in the Indian philosophical heritage. Acknowledging the fact that all these were there, he came out with a bold protest against the

26. See *infra* note 43.

27. I need not go here into much details of this, because N. P. Anikeev in his *Modern Ideological Struggle for the Ancient Philosophical Heritage of India*, Calcutta 1969, has discussed it.

essentially unscientific and non-objective tendency then prevailing in Europe of seeing only these in Indian wisdom. Thus he insisted that "there is a struggle between the purely religious and philosophical trends"[28] in Indian thought and he was happy that the Russian Indologists "were able to distinguish Buddhism proper from various alien, mystic and even fanatic theories which in the course of time fused into Buddhism and enwrapped it".[29]

But the importance of Stcherbatsky's work on "Buddhist logic" does by no means mean that he was disinterested in Buddhism in its totality. His admiration of the contributions of the later Bnddhists to logic and epistemology was of course very great. But he did not at all ignore the theological, metaphysical and evcn mystical views developed by the followers of this creed. Two of his works, *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the word 'Dharma'* and *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* still remain for us among the illuminating expositions of the theology and metaphysics of the so-called Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna Buddhism. His translation and exposition of the *Madhyāntavibhaṅga* attributed to Maitreya [c. 400 A.D.] is for us an indispensable work for the study of the philosophy of the Yogācāra school of Buddhism. So also are his edition of Maitreya's *Abhisamayālaṅkāra-prajñā-pāramitā-śāstra* and his exposition and translation of Dharmakīrti's *Santānāntara-siddhi.* And how vague indeed would have been our knowledge of Buddhist mysticism but for his work on Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-koṣa* along with Yaśomitra's commentary on it. Incidentally, when the greatest historian of Indian philosophy—S. N. Dasgupta—was working on the first volume of his *History*, he had to rely on the materials supplied by Stcherbatsky for the discussion of Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-koṣa.* As Dasgupta acknowledged, "I am indebted for the above account to the unpublished translation from Tibetan of a small portion of the *Abhidharma-koṣa* by my esteemed friend Professor Theodore Stcherbatsky of Petrograd. I am grateful to him that he allowed me to utilise it".[30]

All these give us some idea of the breadth of Stcherbatsky's interest in Buddhism. Surprisingly, however, his first published paper had nothing to do

28. Stcherbatsky, *Theory of Knowledge and Logic of the Later Buddhists* ( in Russian ) ii. p. ix.
29. Stcherbatsky, *S. F. Ol'denburg as an Indologist* ( in Russian ), Leningrad 1934, p. 80. Quoted by Anikeev, *op. cit.*, 35.
30. S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, Cambridge 1922-55, i. p, 117n.

with the Buddhist religion and philosophy. It was instead a technical study of an Indian inscription, published in the *Epigraphia Indica*, as a joint work with V. G. Ojha, who is now known as one of the foremost authorities on Indian paleography. And here are a few more examples to show what a broad range of the Indian cultural heritage he wanted to cover. He wrote on *The Theory of Poetry in India*, on *The Categorical Imperative in the Brāhmaṇas*, on *The Scientific Achievements of Ancient India*, and he was one of the first among the modern scholars to discuss *The History of Materialism in India*—a subject to which he later engaged his pupil M. Tubyansky [1893-1943] to work more intensively and by utilising the hitherto unutilised Tibetan materials.[31] Besides these, he translated Daṇḍin's *Daśakumāra-carita*, led a team of translators of Kauṭilya's *Arthaśāstra* and edited with a German translation the poetical work of Hari Kavi, *alias* Bhānudatta. And, notwithstanding the scope to differ on matters of evaluation and interpretation—which inevitably exists among the leading scholars—nowhere in this wide range of Indian studies covered by Stcherbatsky is there any scope of grading his contribution as second-rate or to view it as being based on secondary sources. That is why, no tribute paid to him as an Indologist runs the risk of exaggeration. And great tributes had indeed been paid to him by some of the leading scholars of our time. Thus, for example, Rahula Sankrityayana wrote, "In 1929, when I asked Professor Luders of Berlin, whom I met in Ceylon, 'Who is the greatest scholar in Europe of Indian—particularly Buddhist—philosophy ?', he, without a moment's hesitation said, 'Dr. Stcherbatsky'. In 1932, Sylvain Lévi also told me the same thing".[32] Rahula himself, while dedicating his edition of the *Prāmaṇa-vārtika* to the memory of Stcherbatsky, described him as "the greatest Orientalist of his time", adding in Sanskrit verse :

*ākarṇitaṃ tava yaśo vahuśaḥ suhṛdbhyo*
*'dhītāśca vismitatayā kṛtayastvdīyāḥ*
*vaiduṣyamīkṣitamaho nitarāṃ gabhīraṃ*
*lokottareva viditā tvayi kā vibhūtiḥ...*[33]

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31. Stcherbatsky refers to this in his *Buddhist Logic* i. 15n, though I have not been able to ascertain whether the work is published so far. If it still remains unpublished, the Soviet colleagues would to do an excellent service to Indian studies by making it available in print.
32. Rahula Sankrityayana, *Jin-kā main kṛtajña* ( in Hindi ), Allahabad 1957, p. 195.
33. In English translation : "I have heard of your fame again and again from the friends. I have studied your works with great amazement and am struck by your extremely profound scholarship. I wonder if you acquired some supper-normal faculty..."

But perhaps the greatest tribute to Stcherbatsky is the accomplished fact that after him it has become impossible to discuss Indian philosophy adequately and at the same time to remain innocent of his contributions to our understanding of it.

But the tribute paid to Stcherbatsky is also a tribute to his teachers, for he could acquire such an all-round proficiency in Indian studies largely because he had the fortune of being trained by some of the foremost scholars of his time. Among his teachers three must be mentioned in particular. They were I.P. Minaev, G. Bühler and H. Jacobi.

Minaev was one of the pioneers of Indian studies in Russia and it will be specially relevant to quote what Stcherbatsky himself said about him in 1934. "The study of Sanskrit began in Russia in the early forties of the last century. The first teacher was Kossovich.[34] He was succeeded by I.P. Minaev. He (Minaev) was not only a first-class Pali and Sanskrit scholar, to whom science is indebted for many valuable editions of texts and works on the history and geography of India, but he also was a great traveller and an authority on historical geography of the countries lying between India and the Russian empire. He visited India three times and only a premature death stopped his preparations for a fourth long journey to India through Afghanistan—a journey which if realised would have lasted four years. Under the cover of a rigid scholarship, with a rather sceptical, sarcastic turn of mind, I.P. Minaev concealed a warm heart, which was deeply concerned with the past, present and future destinies of India as well as with the destiny of his own country".[35]

At about the age of eighteen (in 1884), Stcherbatsky joined the University of St. Petersburg and became a pupil of Minaev. This was a turning point of his life. Before joining the University, he studied Gothic, Anglo-Saxon and Germanic languages under Professor F. A. Braun and the Church Slavonic and Serbo-Croatian languages under Professor I. V. Yagich. Under Professor Minaev he had his first lessons in Pali and Sanskrit and this in a sense determined the major interest for the rest of his life. Professor V. I. Kal'yanov, the seniormost of Stcherbatsky's personal disciples now living, observes : "It is not known if the scientific interests of Stcherbatsky would still have been directed to the study of Indian philology and

34. Sri H. C. Gupta tells me that, evidently enough, Stcherbatsky here has in mind only his *alma-mater*, the University of St. Petersburg, where in the Faculty of Oriental Languages, Kaetan Kossovich [1815-1883] was the first Professor of Sanskrit.

35. Stcherbatsky in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. x, pp. 811ff.

philosophy had he not come in contact with Professor Minaev in the faculty of comparative linguistics in the very early years of his student life".[36]

In 1889, Stcherbatsky completed his course at St. Petersburg University and went to Vienna to study under G. Bühler [1837-1898], another veritable giant in the field of Indology. I am tempted to quote here what Max Müller said about Bühler, particularly because the same words apply perhaps with an additlonal emphasis to Bühler's pupil Stcherbatsky : "It was the fashion for a time", said Max Müller, "to imagine that if one had learnt Sanskrit grammar and was able to construe a few texts that had been published and translated before, one was a Sanskrit scholar. Bühler looked upon this kind of scholarship as good enough for the *vulgus profanum*, but no one was a real scholar in his eyes who could not stand on his own feet, and fight his own way through new texts and commentaries, who could not publish what had not been published before, who could not translate what had not been translated before".[37]

Indeed, Stcherbatsky too could stand on his own feet and fight his own way through not only new texts and commentaries but even through those the originals of which were long lost to the Indians themselves. Of course, he could do this primarily because of his mastery of the Tibetan, with the knowledge of which his studies under Bühler had little to do. But this study was vitally important for the shaping of Stcherbatsky into an all-round Indologist. Under Bühler he studied Indian poetics, Pāṇini's grammar, the *Dharmaśāstras* and Indian palaeography—in short, those branches of Indian studies in which Bühler was then considered the most outstanding scholar in Europe.

Professor Kal'yanov[38] says that the study of Indian poetics under Bühler helped Stcherbatsky to have a stable foundation for his subsequent research in Indian philosophy and that the intense interest he developed in Indian grammar added to his interest in Indian logic, the two being organically related. However, for the technical apparatus which enabled him to move freely through the maze of the abstruse arguments and counter-arguments of the Indian philosophical texts—which moreover were written in a peculiarly laconic form—Stcherbatsky must have been most indebted to H. Jacobi, the maker of a generation of specialists in Indian philosophy. "In Professor Jacobi", says Professor Kal'yanov, "Stcherbatsky found a scholar who was closer to him in spirit. To Professor Bühler, Indian

36. V. I. Kal'yanov in *Izvestiya AN SSR* ( in Russian ) 1946, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 245.
37. Max Müller in JRAS 1898. Reprinted in *Indian Studies : Past & Present*, Vol. i, p. 2.
38. Kal'yanov, *op. cit.*, 245-6.

philosophy was a supplement to the historical and literary studies, whereas to Jacobi it was an object of study in itself....By his studies under Professor Jacobi, he had a solid foundation for the study and interpretation of the Indian phiolosophical *śāstra*-s".[39]

Minaev, Bühler, Jacobi—howsoever imposing such a list of teachers may appear to us, Stcherbatsky's hunger for the knowledge of India was apparently insatiable and so in 1910 he made his long desired trip to India. We know something about it from his paper, *A Short Report on the Trip to India.* "The object of my tour of India", said he, "is, besides a general acquaintance with the country, primarily the quest of the relics of the Buddhist philosophical literature in the writings of the Buddhists themselves and also in those of the Brahmanas and Jainas, inasmuch as these throw light on the period of the flourish of Buddhism in the history of the Buddhist civilization (5th to 10th centuries A.D.). At the same time, I intended to familiarise myself with the presnt position in India of the study of Sanskrit language and literature, specially of those branches of literature which till now have not been taken up by European scholars and are for them more or less a riddle".[40]

The best way to accomplish this second purpose, Stcherbatsky evidently knew, was to study some Indian philosophical text in the traditional Indian style and under a traditional Indian *paṇḍita.* The language of these texts is often extremely cryptic while the points and counter-points raised particularly in their polemical parts are often most difficult to follow. It is only through the tradition of direct oral transmission from teacher to student prevalent in the country for centuries that the subtle significance of these texts has somehow or other survived. Hence, among the many other things Stcherbatsky wanted to do in India, one was to study Indian phiolosophy under an Indian *paṇḍita.* However, when Stcherbatsky came to India, this traditional mode of study had already much disintegrated and it was not easy to find a really competent *paṇḍita* who fully retained the age-old tradition. Fortunately for Stcherbatsky, he could find one in Bombay, whom he mentioned as the Maithila *paṇḍita.* "He hailed from Durbhanga", said Stcherbatsky, "and was in Bombay only by chance, because of the famine in his own province. This famine had made almost half the population to leave his province. The authority of this *paṇḍita* among the local Indian castes was so high that without prejudicing his own position in any way he could freely live with me. We lived in a completely Indian atmosphere in a locality where there was not a single European and where the only language of commnication was Sanskrit. Everyday, from morning till evening, we

39. *Ib.* 246.
40. Quoted by Kal'yanov, *op.cit.*, 248.

spent our time in philosophical discussions with only two breaks in a month—the days of the new moon and full moon".[41]

This shows how keen Stcherbatsky was to establish a real rapport with the Indian mind for the purpose of understanding traditional Indian thought. But his mission was also that of a scientific Investigator. Hence, he toured India extensively—visited Benaras, Calcutta, Mahabaleshwar and other places—and collected materials for his own studies. In Calcutta, for example, he found a new manuscript of his most favourite subject. As he said in the *Preface* to his Tibetan edition of the *Nyāya-bindu*, "At the time of my stay in Calcutta in 1910, I also discovered another manuscript of the *Nyāya-bindu-ṭīkā*—not used by Peterson—in the library of the Asiatic Society. Due to the kindness of the Secretary of the Society, Dr. Denison Ross, this manuscript was sent to us for my use in the Asiatic Museum, Academy of Sciences".[42]

He also went to Darjeeling in search of the Buddhist manuscripts and to collect information about the Buddhist monasteries there. Because of some political developments in Tibet, the Dalai Lama was at that time staying at Darjeeling. From the writings of Sir Charles Bell[43]—who referred to Stcherbatsky simply as "the Russian professor"—we learn how Stcherbatsky took the opportunity of meeting the Dalai Lama and entreated his best for a permit to visit Tibet. But the Dalai Lama could not grant him the permission, because of the then political considerations concerning the relation between China and Tibet.

What is unfortunately lacking in our knowledge of Stcherbatsky's relations with India is an adequate information of his personal Indian friends and colleagues. We have only some stray hints of this. Thus, from the description of Stcherbatsky's collection preserved in the Archives of the Academy of Sciences, USSR, we know of more than thirty eminent Indians whose personal letters to Stcherbatsky are preserved in the archives. These correspondents included Rabindranath Tagore, S. N. Dasgupta, D. R. Bhandarkar, V. Bhattacharyya, D. Kosambi, B. C. Law, N. N. Law, G. Jha, Raghu Vira, P. L. Vaidya, N. Dutta, S. K. Chatterji, Rahula Sankrityayana and others. Stcherbatsky was certainly keeping himself in close touch with the eminent Indians of his time and with their progress in the rediscovery of India. He must also have been writing back to his Indian friends, though we know of such letters only in scraps. S. N. Dasgupta quotes[44] one at length in his *History of Indian Philosophy*, in which Stcherbatsky wanted to explain

41. Quoted by Kal'yanov, *op. cit.*, 248.
42. Stcherbatsky, Preface ( in Russian ) to *Nyāya-bindu*, p. ii.
43. C. Bell, *Portrait of the Dalai Lama*, London 1946, p. 106.
44. S. N. Dasgupta, *History of Indian Philosophy*, i. 409n.

how he proposed to understand Dharmakīrti's conception of the *svalakṣaṇa*. But there is no reason to think that his letters to the Indian friends were necessarily impersonal. The last letter received by Rahula Sankrityayana[45] from him shows how deeply Stcherbatsky was moved by the purely personal concern for his Indian friend. It was written in 1941, when Rahula was in the British jail and Stcherbatsky would not simply believe the senselessness of indefinitely detaining such a fine scholar : "Are you still in jail ? Have you been informed how long you will be kept in detention ? How is your health ? You have written nothing about your health in your letter. You must know what is going to happen hereafter. Is it really possible that nothing has been intimated to you about the future ? Did you enquire ?..."

The Archives also contain letters to Stcherbatsky from the leading European scholars like L de la Vallée Poussin, M. Winternitz, W. Ruben, R. Garbe, S. Lévi, P. Pelliot, E. Sénart and many others. It thus appears that he worked in his own way to build up some sort of international coordination in Indology, aud though we do not fully know what he wrote back to his correspondents, there is enough indication to think that one of his points was to help his colleagues abroad with the materials of his own researches. Thus, when Winternitz was working on the second volume of his *History of Indian Literature*, very little was really known about the actual writings of Dignāga. But the author wanted to assure his readers that more knowledge was forthcoming. "Translations of Dignāga's works", he said, "are to appear shortly by Professor Stcherbatsky, who wrote to me on 26th April 1929 : 'You will be astonished to find among the Indians, specially Dignāga, a comprehensive system of critical philosophy. It has long been my conviction that we here have before us a most excellent achievement of the Indian mind ; this conviction has now grown stronger than even before, and I hope to be in a position to present it clearly' ".[46]

Correspondences apart, Stcherbatsky worked in direct collaboration with some of the leading Indologists of his time. After returning from India, he undertook a systematic study in Vasubandhu's *Abhidharma-koṣa* ( as preserved in Tibetan translation ) along with Yaśomitra's commentary on it. This study was facilitated by an Uigur translation of the work discovered by A. Stein in Central Asia.

45. Quoted by Rahula Sankrityayana in *Jin-kā Mem Kṛtajña*, Allahabad 1957, 195.

46. M. Winternitz, *History of Indian Literature*, Vol. ii, ( Eng. Tr. Calcutta 1933 ) 363n.

S. Lévi, L. de la Vallée Poussin, U. Wogihara, O. Rozenberg and D. Ross joined him in this great project. The result was the magnificent edition of the text published in the *Bibliotheca Buddhica* series.

This series— the *Bibliotheca Buddhica*— had indeed been a landmark in modern Indology and it cannot but remind us of another important colleague of Stcherbatsky—though a little senior one and, in a sense, one of his early teachers.[47] He was S. F. Ol'denburg [ 1863-1934 ], the original architect of the *Bibliotheca Buddhica*, which was started by the Academy of Sciences of Russia in 1897 to coordinate the work of the scholars all over lhe world devoted to the history, culture, literature of India, China, Tibet and Mongolia. A large number of significant works came out in this series during the lifetime of Ol'denburg and it is well known that shortly after the series was started, Stcherbatsky took an intense interest in it and worked jointly with Ol'denburg to make it a grand international success.

Ol'denburg's own work was primarily on the folk-lore, ethnology and art of the peoples of Russia, Western Europe and a number of eastern countries like Indonesia, China and Afghanistan and the subject of his doctorate dissertation was Buddhist legends. For twentyfive years [ 1904-1929 ], he remained the perpetual secretary of the Russian Acadeny of Sciences and in 1917 he beeame the Minister of Education of the Provisional Government.

However, from the point of view of the contemporary Soviet Indologists, one of the most important things to remember about Ol'denburg is that it was largely through him that Lenin himself maintained his connection with the Indologists of his time. "Lenin repeatedly took interest in the development of Russian Oriental studies and extended active help to the workers on his field. It is well known that Lenin received the senior Russian Orientalist S. F. Ol'denburg and discussed with him the significance of Oriental studies".[48] What Lenin is reported to have said to Ol'denburg still remains the main source of inspiration of the Indologists in the Soviet Union to-day. "Well", said Lenin, "here is your subject. It seems far away. Yet it is close. Go to the masses, to the workers, and tell them about the history of India···and see how they will respond to it. And you yourself draw inspiration from it for fresh research, work and study of great scientific importance".[49]

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47. Kal'yanov, *op.cit*,, 245.
48. N. P. Anikeev, *op.cit.*, 57.
49. V. V. Bonch-Bruevich, *V. I. Lenin in Petrograd and Moscow* (in Russian), Moscow 1956, p. 32. Quoted by Anikeev, *op. cit.*, 60-1.

In the Soviet period, when Indological studies in USSR took a new turn under the guidance and inspiration of Lenin, Stcherbatsky, along with a number of other old guards—V. V. Bartol'd, I. Yu. Krachkovsky, N. I. Konrad and others—enthusiastically responded to the call of the new tasks envisaged by Lenin and took active part in organising the new Institutes.

Maxim Gorky initiated the idea of setting up a new Institute for an allround study of the Orient and Lenin immediately decreed that the Peoples' Commissariat of Nationalities should take urgent steps to set up such an Institute. Accordingly were set up the Moscow Institute of Oriental Languages and the Petrograd Institute of Modern Oriental Languages. In the maturest period of his life, Stcherbatsky himself used to lecture in this new Leningrad Institute and thus worked to build np the new generation of Soviet Indologists.

From what is discussed it is allready obvious that the image of Stcherbatsky we have is much more than that of an individual scholar. Stcherbatsky became an institution, as it were. This becomes all the more obvious when we consider the number of brilliant scholars trained up by him. In this, his contribution differed significantly from that of S. C. Vidyabhusana, who, like Stcherbatsky, was one of the earliest scholars to have worked on "Buddhist logic" based on Tibetan materials but who, unlike Stcherbatsky, left practically no important scholar in India to continue the work in the same line. For the understanding of Stcherbatsky's full stature, therefore, it is essential to have a few words on the outstanding students he produced, who, moreover, quite early in life, worked their way up to become his able colleagues and collaborators.

The more significant names from this point of view are those of Professor O. Rozenberg, whose *Problems of Buddhist Philosophy* Stcherbatsky so much admired ; Academician B. Ya. Vladimirtsov, who worked mainly in the field of Mongolian studies and wrote extremely significant works on the language, history and culture of the Mongols ; P. V. Ernshtedt, who specialised in the Coptic and Classical languages ; A. A. Frieman, who worked in the field of Indo-Iranian languages ; V. I. Kal'yanov, who is now the Professor of Sanskrit in the Leningrad University and is continuing to produce first-rate studies on the different aspects of ancient Indian history and culture.

Stcherbatsky reared up indeed a whole generation of Russian Indologists. But I am specially anxious to speak here about the activities of two of them, because, though both of them died in their early thirties, both became so much proficient in Indian studies that Stcherbatsky himself substantially depended on them even in the maturer phase of his own activities. They were E. Obermiller [1901-1935] and A. Vostrikov [1904-1937].

Inspired and guided by Stcherbatsky, Obermiller took up the study of Buddhism at an early age and acquired for this purpose an excellent proficiency in Sanskrit, Tibetan and Mongolian languages. His health was extremely poor and his personal resources at best meagre. Still he extensively toured Transbaikal and Buryatia for studying the Buddhist texts preserved in the monastaries there. These were not merely the Indian texts preserved in Tibetan language but included texts written originally by the Tibetan scholars, who, after the practical extinction of Buddhism in India, preserved and continued the Buddhist tradition in a very important sense. Already in his early twenties, Obermiller prepared the *Sanskrit-Tibetan and Tibetan-Sanskrit 'Index Verborum' to Dharmakīrti's Nyāya-bindu and Dharmottara's Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā* (published in 1927-28), which was more exhaustive than Vidybhusana's Bilingual Index of the *Nyāya-bindu* published in 1917. He was accepted by Stcherbatsky as a collaborator for editing, translating and explaining Maitreya's *Abhisamaya-alaṃkāra-prajñā-pāramitā-upadeśa-śāstra*, published in 1929 and it was on this young student that Stcherbatsky entrusted the responsibility of seeing through the press the second *Koṣasthāna* of Yaśomitra's *Sphuṭārthā*. In 1935, the year of his death, was published his magnificent study of Tsoṅ-kha-pa, the great Tibetan scholar and religious reformer who founded the dGe-lugs-pa sect and who was also a voluminous writer on Buddhism. The year after this was posthumously published his work *How to study the Tibetan Medical Literature.* But Obermiller's greatest contribution to our knowledge of Buddhism was his magnificent English translation of Bu-ston's *chos-byuṅ* [ History of Buddhism ], a work undertaken directly under the advice of Stcherbatsky. "In the years 1927 and 1928", wrote Stcherbatsky in the Preface to this, "I have interpreted the work to my pupil E. E. Obermiller making it the subject of our seminary study. He then has made an English translation which was revised by me and is now published".[50] This translation work was much more than a mere matter of changing the language. Bu-ston was one of the redactors of the *bKa'-'gyur* and *bsTan-'gyur* great collections and his knowledge of the Buddhist texts was most profound. The work is full of quotations from the lost Indian texts. But, as was the practice of the Tibetan historians, Bu-ston referred to these texts by their abbreviated forms, from which it is most difficult to reconstruct their full titles. Obermiller not only reconstructed these titles but moreover traced to their sources practically all the passages quoted by Bu-ston—a feat which appears to us all the more incredible when we remember that he became an invalid at the age of twenty-seven : his right hand was paralysed and he had to remain completely bed-ridden up to the time of his death.

More imposing perhaps was Vostrikov's stature particularly as a Tibetologist, though his proficiency in Sanskrit and the mastery of the technicalities of Indian philosophical discussions were nothing short of being amazing.

50. Stcherbatsky, Preface to Obermiller's *History of Buddhism*, Vol. i, p. 4

It is well known that Stcherbatsky usually consulted him for the elucidation of the more difficult Tibetan texts, or, as Stcherbatsky himself acknowledged,[51] for the translation of "several hard passages" of the *Madhyānta-vibhaṅga*, he was indebted to Vostrikov. In the *Buddhist Logic*, again, Stcherbatsky said that, thanks to the researches of Vostrikov, the apparently baffling problem of the textual order of Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇa-vārtika* was no more baffling after all.[52] Vostrikov edited the Tibetan verson of the *Pramāṇa-vārtika* along with Debendrabuddhi's commentary on it, both of which he also translated. In 1935 appeared his study, *The Nyāya-vārtika of Uddyotakara and the Vādanyāya of Dharmakīrti.* It was Vostrikov's work on the *Logic of Vasubandhu*, again, that Stcherbatsky found most helpful for understanding the historical background of the thoughts of Dignāga. *The Grammar of Tibetan Language*, which Vostrikov left unfinished because of his early death, was later completed by Stcherbatsky.

In the field of Tibetan studies, however, the most significant contribution of Vostrikov was his *Tibetan Historical Literature*, published in the *Bibliotheca Buddhica* series in 1962, i.e. about twenty-five years after his death. This monumental study—a classic on the subject—could have easily been the life-work of any front-rank scholar, particularly of one who died so early. But Vostrikov was more versatile. He edited the text of the *Kālacakra* (in Sanskrit) based on two manuscripts (one of which was recovered by Minaev in India) and a Tibetan translation. Jointly with Ol'denburg, Stcherbatsky, Obermiller and Semichov, he worked on the translation of the *Arthaśāstra.* From the announcement of 1930 concerning the publications under progress in the *Bibliotheca Buddhica* series it appears that he also translated the enormous *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-ṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra, though the translation is not yet published.

We have thus some idea of Stcherbatsky as well as of his teachers, colleagues and pupils. What led him to take such an all-absorbing interest in the Indian cultural heritage is not fully known. This much is certain, however, that it was not any romantic fascination for the half unknown mystic East in which some of his European contemporaries were seeking an escape from the sickness and degradation of their own capitalist society. Certainly, again, it had nothing to do with the peculiarly perverted moral sanction for colonial exploitation which another section of his European contemporaries was trying to derive by depicting Indian culture as being inherently stunted in matters of science and rationalism : it helped them to feel superior by imagining that the Indians had never been any better than idle dreamers of the path leadlng to an escape from the world or *saṃsāra* and were therefore

51. Stcherbatsky, preface to the *Madhyānta-vibhaṅga*, p. iv.
52. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, i. 38.

naturally doomed to servitude and slavery. Stcherbatsky had positively and absolutely nothing to do with any such tendency.

On the contrary he showed definite distaste for any romantic fascination for the mystic East and he was the first among the European scholars to have insisted on the importance of recognising India's contribution to science and rationalism. Along with Ol'denburg, one of the remedies he suggested for the perverted but popular notion of the Indian cultural heritage was to work for making available more adequate and objective data about Indian thought, specially in its logical and scientific aspects. "At the suggestion of S. F. Ol'denburg", wrote he, "the Academy of Sciences decided to undertake the publication of translations of monumental works on Indian philosophy from Sanskrit and other Oriental languages....Our knowledge in this field still could not be deemed to be more than a mere conjecture on the nature of Indian philosophy....The main Indian philosophical system, the one that diligently worked out Indian logic and epistemology—the Nyāya system—still remained to be studied and its main treatises were yet to be translated into any European language. Buddhism and Jainism still remained primarily religious teachings, and their philosophical principles vague and inconsistent. The Indian thought on the whole still remained enveloped in the mist of Oriental fantasy and the orderly forms of its consistent logical theories were hidden from the keen sight of the historians of philosophy owing first to the inadequacy of the materials available to them and second to the lack of any systematic methods of its scientific study. Besides this stage of scientific knowledge, there could be discerned, in the wider circles of reading public, *a morbid interest in Indian philosophy* caused by the hazy state of our knowledge of the subject and the various fables of supernatural powers rampant therein. Of course, the latter circumstance also springs from the fact that compared to European philosophy, the Indian thought is pervaded by mystic moods, states of philosophical immersion into pure thought, ecstasy and similar states to a much greater extent. Ecstatic states almost invariably play some role in most of the Indian philosophical systems. But mysticism in the object of our study does not at all give us the right to convert our knowledge of it into some new mysticism".[53] Elsewhere he warned against an over-simplified view of Indian philosophy, pervaded throughout by mysticism as it were : "Just as the European mind is not altogether and always free from mysticism, so is the Indian mind not at all necessarily subjected to it. Not to speak about the numerous materialistic doctrines, the orthodox Mīmāṃsakas themselves held about *yoga* an opinion which probably represents just what all of us, so far as we are not mystics, think about it, viz. that *yoga* is sheer imagination, just as any other ordinary fanaticism."[54]

53. See the present collection of papers : Preface to *Santānāntara-siddhi.*
54. *Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, 19.

We have in these statements some idea of Stcherbatsky's approach to Indian philosophy in general. He did not overlook or ignore the influence of mysticism and religion in Indian philosophy, but he had absolutely nothing to do with those who saw only these in Indian philosophy. On the contrary, what made the Indian philosophical tradition really important for him was the solid logical core of it and the discussion of vital philosophical problems in terms of philosophy proper. To ignore this was to show only a "morbid interest in Indian philosophy"—the kind of interest which was most popular among his European contemporaries.

But what it was that helped Stcherbatsky himself to avoid such a morbid interest ? N. P. Anikeev suggests that at least an important factor that contributed to the mental make-up of Stcherbatsky was the growing strength of the democratic movement in Russia which heralded the October Revolution. The Russian intellectuals connected with this democratic movement—themselves struggling against exploitations and imperialist designs of the Czarist regime of their time—felt no need to evolve any rationale for colonial exploitation of the Indian people or to deny them the human dignity, to portray them as inherently stunted in science and rationalism. On the contrary, these intellectuals created in their country an atmosphere of broad sympathy for the oppressed people of India and thus helped the Russian Indologists to develop a different methodological approach to the Indian cultural heritage : "What is the reason for this advantage of Russian Indologists over most of their Western counterparts ? This question is in need of a detailed consideration. Yet we can mention here one obvious reason for this difference. Undoubtedly, it is because of the general atmosphere of sympathy and friendly feelings towards the oppressed peoples of the East nurtured in Russia in the 19th century under the influence of Russian revolutionary democracy in which the progressive intelligentia was brought up. It is sufficient to mention that the organs of revolutionary democrats like *Otechestvennye Zapisky* and *Sovremennik* regularly published in their pages materials and reviews on the life of the Eastern peoples, including that of India···N. G. Chernyshevsky and N. A. Dobrolyubov were highly interested in the East, particularly in India, and devoted many moving articles to India, in which, by exposing the groundlessness of Europeo-centrism, they highly estimated the achievements of the people of East in the field of culture, warmly supported them in their struggle for national independence and condemned the colonial rampage of the capitalist 'civilizers'···Chernyshevsky was one of the first Russian thinkers who, even in the middle of the 19th century opposed the then widely prevalent view-point that Greece was the homeland of philosophy. He emphatically argued that 'all this is only due to the lack of knowledge about the East in those times'. Like most of the Russian scholars, Chernyshevsky highly estimated the level of scientific and philosophical thoughts of the Indian nation.

In his opinion, the ancient Indians were not only in no way inferior to the ancient Greeks but in many respects were undoubtedly superior to them".[55]

Sharing as he did the intellectual atmosphere created by the Russian revolutionary democrats, Stcherbatsky could easily avoid "the morbid interest in Indian philosophy" and work for the grand reconstruction of the Indian logical tradition which was largely forgotten to the Indians themselves.

Yet we cannot help wondering to-day how immensely the importance of this reconstruction would have increased but for Stcherbatsky's personal bias for the philosophy of Kant. In the *Buddhist Logic* we freely come across "the thing-in-itself", "the schematism of the categories", "the synthesis of Apperception", the division of judgments into *a priori* and *a posteriori* as well as into analytic and synthetic—and so on. And not merely Kant. In the writings of the same medieval Indian philosophers, he reads Bergson's *duration,* Russell's *sense-data* and a whole host of ideas of European philosophy. All these create serious difficulty for an objective understanding of "Buddhist logic" in its concrete historical context, and, what is perhaps worse particularly from the point of view of the contemporary Soviet historians of world-philosophy, this tendency of Stcherbatsky tended to obscure the basic struggle in Indian philosophy, which was inevitably the struggle between idealism and materialism. But I need not go here into the details of all these particularly because the contemporary Soviet philosophers, with all their respect for Stcherbatsky as the builder of the generation of modern Indologists, have themselves discussed this limitation of Stcherbatsky and have given us sufficient critical caution against it.[56]

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Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya
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55. N. P. Anikeev, *op. cit.*, 38-40.
56. See for example, I. M. Kutasova, *Buddhist Philosophy and Logic in the works of Academician Stcherbatsky* (in Russian),—"Sovetskoe vostokovedenie", 1958, 3, pp. 136-143.

# A BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHER ON MONOTHEISM

*Text with Translation and Critical Introduction of*

## NĀGĀRJUNA'S

## *Īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākaraṇa-viṣṇoḥ-ekakartṛtva-nirākaraṇa*

### INTRODUCTION

Of the numerous works attributed to the famous Buddhist reformer Nāgārjuna, a small one[1], with the title *Refutation of the view of God being the creator of the world and of the view of Viṣṇu being the sole creator of the whole world,* is extant in Sanskrit original and Tibetan translation. It contains an exposition of the Buddhist view on monotheism,—a view which, as is evident from the title, is clearly negative.

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1. ...In the end of 1902, Academician S. F. O'ldenburg gave me a copy of a small treatise of the famous Buddhist reformer Nāgārjuna. The copy was made in Sanskrit and Tibetan languages by the late orientalist Wenzel from the London edition of the *bsTan-'gyur* (*Tanjur*). It was proposed to collate this *bsTan-'gyur* edition with the Tibetan and Chinese editions available in St. Petersburg and, if possible, to translate and publish it. Since Mr. Wenzel died soon after, the work remained unfinished and was passed on to S. F. O'ldenburg for being done by me. I have compared the London text with the *bsTan-'gyur* edition in the Asiatic Museum of the Imperial Academy of Sciences and have found that only with the exception of two or three places the London text, both in Sanskrit and Tibetan, is fairly accurate and clear. This made it possible for me to translate it. Unfortunately, however, when my paper was ready, though not yet published, F. W. Thomas printed the text both in Sanskrit and Tibetan (the latter in Roman translation) but without any translation. Nevertheless, we decided to publish the text over again, first because of its intrinsic interest and secondly because some portions of the translation depended upon the corrections in the reading of the text which we considered relevant.

It is known that Buddhism is an atheistic religion, which negates the existence not only of one God but also of all substances and facts in general which are not subject to the laws of *saṃsāra*, i.e. which are not subject to that causal relation which unites the entire world into a single whole. According to the Buddhist view, everything in the world is determined by necessity. The law of cause allows no exception and no freedom of self-determination. The only exceptions are the Buddha himself and those many Buddhas who preceded him or may come after him. But the Buddhas, liberated from the fetters of the *saṃsāra*, do not have any influence on the world of phenomena, which continues to flow as before.[2] As a French orientalist puts it, if the Buddha is something divine for the Buddhists, this divinity is a dead one.

All these propositions were proved by the Buddhists with the help of extremely sophisticated arguments and subtle psychological analysis. But the work of Nāgārjuna reproduced here does not discuss all these proofs in details. In all probability, Nāgārjuna himself did not even write it, since its colophon mentions that it was worked out by Nāgārjuna but written down by his disciple. Nevertheless, this small polemical work, in a light and lively form, expounds precisely the same arguments against monotheism which are already discussed by larger works by the same author in minute details and often with philosophical profundity.

The very fact that the Buddhists contested monotheism proves that the conception of monotheism was not unknown in India. The idea is widely prevalent that the civilized world is indebted to the Semitic people for the idea of monotheism and that, without the help of the Semitic people, the Aryans could not have arrived at this conception. As contrasted with the Aryans, the Semites created three world religions, the fundamental dogma of which is monotheism. According to Renan, almost all the great movements of the world—military, political and intellectual—belonged to the Aryans, though their activities were mainly directed to peaceful purposes. To the Semites, by contrast, belong the world-religions.[3] In world history, monotheism was the mission of the Semites in the sense that before or irrespective of the appearance of Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the idea of a single highest God could not be the property of the masses. Renan further claims that the idea of monotheism was, as it were, a substantial symbol of the Semitic people and of their ethnographic peculiarity and that it belonged to them from the

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2. Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* ix. 9, even describes the Buddha as without consciousness (*a-cittaka*).

3. "La race Indo-européenne préoccupée de la variété de l'univers, n'arriva pas d'elle-meme au monotheism. La race semitique au contraire, guidée par ses vues fermes et sures...atteignit la forme religieuse la plus épurée que l'humanité ait connue". *Etudes d'histoire religiuse*, p. 85 (Paris, 1858).

very first days of their national life.[4] The same writer, though in a different place, says that we are not indebted to the Semitic people either for our political institutions or for our art or poetry or philosophy or science ; we are indebted to them for religion.[5]

Such views are widely prevalent in some form or other. The idea of monotheism is considered as the sole property of the Semitic people, particularly of the Jewish people. Renan is of opinion that the Semites did not render any other service to humanity.

Without denying in any way the great historical role of that conception of monotheism which was put forward by the Semites, it is necessary to admit that the conception itself was not at all their exclusive possession. The contraposition of the Aryans and the Semites in the sense that the Aryans occupied themselves mainly with secular affairs while the Semites with religious ones is an untenable generalisation that has developed with some reference to India. On the contrary, the political weakness of this country is usually explained by the circumstance that the thoughts of her people were mainly directed towards speculation and religion. Max Müller rightly called India a laboratory in which the most diverse religious and philosophical systems were worked out. Among them, monotheism played a significant role.

In the Vedic hymns—the most ancient documents of Indian religion—we come across the conception of polytheism, though not in the same form as that of the classical antiquity. The Vedic religion is characterised by Max Müller as henotheism, i.e. the view according to which in the different gods people worshipped only one divine source and therefore each god could be a higher and the absolute God on which all others depended. In the Upaniṣads, the second of the most ancient documents of Indian religion, we come across an unmistakable conception of monotheism. God is viewed in these as omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient, the creator of all that is visible as well as invisible. God is conceived here in a dual aspect. On the one hand, He is conceived as a pure soul perceiving everything, though without a body. In this aspect, He is called *brahman*. On the other hand, He is conceived as a person possessing a definite will with which He creates the world. In this aspect, He is called *īśvara*, i.e. as distinct from the popular deities called the *deva*-s.[6] The latter (i.e. the *deva*-s) do not have any independent role,

4. Quand et comment la race sémitique arriva-t-elle a cette notion de l'unité divine, que le monde a admise sur la foi de sa predication. Je crois que ce fut par une intuition primitive et des ses premiers jours, *Ibid*, p. 86.
5. De la part des peuples semitiques dans l'histoire de la civilization. p. 21. (Paris 1862).
6. About theism, pantheism and other teachings found in the Upaniṣads in a mixed form, See Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie,* Vol. I, Part ii, pp. 143-162.

are created by God and are subordinate to Him, exactly like everything else in creation. Their significance, therefore, corresponds to the Christian conception of good and evil souls and does not at all contradict the spirit of monotheism.

In India—or the soil of Brāhmaṇism—we come across in historical times six main philosophical systems, of which three acknowledge monotheism and the other three deny it. The most widely propagated of all these is the pantheistic system of Vedānta. In the course of time, it ousted and absorbed almost all the remaining religions of the Aryan population of India. This religio-philosophical system was redacted sometimes about the birth of Christ, though the date of redactor Bādarāyaṇa is not precisely determined.[7] His work contains the main dogmas of the Vedānta, which, even at the present time, form the basis of the faith of the Indian followers of Brāhmaṇism.

However, it did not acquire such a wide prevalence all at once. During the first ten centuries of our era, there was no end to the heated debates between the followers of Brāhmaṇism and the Buddhists and also between the Vedāntists and the other Brāhmaṇical systems.

One of the questions on which these debates were centred was that of monotheism. Therefore, each system had to put forward arguments either in support or in refutation of the existence of God. Nāgārjuna's work discussed here presents to us Indian monotheism from the negative angle, as it were, i.e. from the angle from which the Buddhists tried to refute this conception.

Professor Deussen, one of the outstanding scholars of Vedānta of our time, argues that the Indian conception of one God is not inferior in loftiness to anything that we know of in this field. His view is based on the study of the original sources, on the personal experience of the position of Vedānta in India and on a profound study of the history of philosophy in general.[8] And Professor Deussen asserts that,

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7. It may be noted that this author belongs to a much later period than is usually supposed. In the *sūtra*-s (ii. 2.18-23), Bādarāyaṇa argues against the teachings of the Buddhists and devotes some *sūtra*-s (29-32) to the refutation of the idealistic trend in Buddhist philosophy known as the Vijñāna-vāda. The other trend, whose founder is usually considered to have been Nāgārjuna, cannot be earlier than the 1st or 2nd century of our era...

8. *System des Vedānta*, p. 132ff. Besides being a Sanskrit scholar, Professor Deussen occupies the Chair of Philosophy in Kiel University. In his lectures, as also in his works (*Die Elemente der Metaphysik. Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie*) he widens the scope of the generally accepted mode of teaching philosophy by way of including in it also Indian philosophy. Unfortunately, his familiarity with his subject is limited to one system only, which he considers the highest creation of the Indian intellect. Professor Garbe's position with regard to the Sāṃkhya system is also the same.

in its theoretical part, the Vedānta offers proofs for the existence of one God, which are somewhat reminiscent of those accepted in Christian theology.

The first of these is the cosmological proof so-called. According to it, God cannot have any beginning, because He is pure being. He cannot be created by anything else, because He Himself has created all. The second argument is the teleological proof so-called. It refers to the law which we experience to operate in the whole world. This law cannot be the creation of material factors. It can have its origin only in God, who is the ruler of everything and the designer of the world. However, as we shall presently see, from the same premise the Buddhists arrived at an opposite conclusion.

The third proof, which Deussen calls psychological, has much in common with the well-known formulation *cogito ergo sum*. The existence of God can never be negated, inasmuch as He is the all-pervading spirit,—pervading even that person who may think of negating Him. To negate God means to negate our own existence.

Such is the theoretical basis of monotheism in the Vedānta system. As for its practical importance, all the leading scholars of modern India agree that the Vedāntic view forms the basis of the great majority of the Aryan population of India. This belief is often called pantheistic. But the term can be easily mis-understood. Pantheism generally means the identification of the world with a single spiritual substance and the negation of the possibility of God having any special attribute. The doctrine of the *brahman*, on the other hand, implies the worship of the spiritual source as a personal being, the creator and designer of the world. The modern Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas worship Śiva and Viṣṇu as the sole and supreme God in the Vedāntic sense. The difference between them and the monotheism of the Semitic people is that, in the latter, the contrast between the human soul and God is more clearly emphasised. According to the teachings of the Vedānta, God as well as the human souls are appearances of the same all-pervading spiritual substance.

The Vedānta apart, there existed in ancient India another philosophical system which made the defence of monotheism its special peculiarity as it were. This school is known as that of the Naiyāyikas, to which also goes the credit of founding Indian logic.[9] In the teachings of this school, there is no shadow of pantheism. The spiritual substance is assumed to exist in two forms,—as God and

9. cf. S. V. Athalye's exposition of the view of the Naiyāyikas on this question—the *Tarkasaṃgraha*, Bombay 1897, p. 317ff. Cf. also *Kusumāñjali*, the work specially devoted to the proofs of the existence of God (ed. Cowell, Calcutta 1864).

human souls. The divine attributes are as follows : He is one, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent. He is the eternal creator and designer of the world. The feelings of joy and sorrow are unknown to Him. Of all these qualities, the human souls possess only two, namely eternality and all-pervasiveness.

Logic and dialectics being the specialities of this school, it devoted itself to the special task of offering proofs of the existence of God. Udayana-ācārya, one of the later writers, enumerated eight such special proofs. We need not re-enumerate all these. Instead of that, we shall mention only that which is important for following the Buddhist polemic against God.

The first of these corresponds to the cosmological argument of the Vedāntists and is formulated as follows : The world must have its cause, because nothing composite can exist without a cause ; but the cause of the whole world must be an omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent being.

The second argument is of particular importance because of its wide prevalence. It is to be found in the writings of the Greek and Muslim writers and also in the writings of the rationalists of modern philosophy. The argument begins with the consideration of the law of causation. A cause is something independent, i.e. existing independently of the effect. In order to combine the cause with the effect, a special power is necessary, because it cannot be there in the cause itself. If this special power existed in the cause, the cause would have come out of itself as it were and would have turned into an effect. However, as contrasted with the Vedānta view, it is assumed in this system that the cause is always a cause and the effect is always an effect. Further, according to this school, the material cause of the world consists of the atoms, which unite with each other for forming a body. But who unites them with each other ? Being unconscious, they themselves are not in a position to unite with each other in special forms. Therefore, each fact of the causal relation in the world is the result of the direct influence of the all-powerful will of God.

According to this theory, the influence of God on the world is not expressed only in the original act. Everything that takes place in the world is the result of direct and continuous intervention of the will of God. A similar theory, under the name of occasionalism, was widely popular in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, until Kant finally demolished it. He showed that a reference to God in this sense is not an explanation but the denial of all explanations.

In India, occasionalism was rejected by both the Vedāntists and Buddhists. According to the former, the relation between the cause and the effect is analytical while according to the latter it is an *a priori* relation existing only in our consciousness.

From all these it is clear that India was not merely familiar with monotheism ; monotheism was rather the supreme form of the Indian ideology. From the Semitic—particularly the Jewish—world, India differed in having at different times

other forms of religion besides monotheism, and among these even the atheistic religion.

The most ancient and originally atheistic system of India was known as the Sāṃkhya system. Its representatives decisively held that the existence of God was absolutely unprovable.[10] The decisiveness with which this unprovability was emphasised indicates how much significance was assigned to the problem by their contemporatries and how strong was the opinion against which this school struggled.

The main argument of the Sāṃkhyas was that if God existed as personal being and had a free will, He could never have created this world because that would have been pointless. Why create a world in which there is so much of evil ?

The Vedāntisıs held that God, as a merciful being, created the world for the love of creation. To this the Sāṃkhyas replied that if He was really kind, He would have created only the good. The undoubted fact, nevertheless, is that there is evil in this world.[11]

Besides the Sāṃkhya, the Cārvākas[12] or the Indian materialists were renowned for their atheism. They denied the primacy of consciousness and did not consider the human soul as different from organised matter.

Finally the Buddhists also were atheists. It is difficult to find out what opinion the founder of Buddhism—and in general early Buddhism or the Hīnayāna—held on this question. In the sermons said to have been delivered by the Buddha himself, there are many pieces in which the existence of the soul is denied. It is not clear, however, how consciousness was explained and what was the real attitude to the doctrine of transmigration. The modern scholars have not yet arrived at any agreed view on these points. On the other hand, the position is quite clear in later Buddhism or the so-called Mahāyāna. Of the two schools into which the Mahāyāna was split, one denied the reality of the external as well as of the internal world. The other school denied the reality only of the external objects and considered the whole world as consisting of our ideas only. Only these ideas were acknowledged to be fully real.[13]

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10. cf, *Sāṃkhya-sūtra* i. 92.
11. cf. R. Garbe, *Die Sāṃkhya philosophie*, pp. 191ff.
12. For an account of their teachings, see *Sarvadarśanasṃgraha*, ch. 1.
13. This idealistic (more properly critical) point of view was finally established in the works of Dharmakīrti, one of which has been translated by me into the Russian language. ( Published by the Faculty of Oriental Languages, No. 14. [Title translated into English] : "The Theory of Knowledge and Logic as Preached by the Later Buddhists." Part I ).

Nāgārjuna is regarded as the founder of the first of these two schools. In his bigger works, he liked to take recourse to antinomies in reasoning, owing to which some of his successors were called the antinomists (*prāsaṅgika*-s). By proving some position and at the same time proving its contradictory position, he showed the shallowness of all our ideas relating to the external and the internal world.

The present work, as already remarked, does not contain these dialectical subtleties and is only a brief and popular refutation of the idea of one God.

## Translation of NĀGĀRJUNA'S WORK

[ *Based on Stcherbatsky's rendering* ]

[It is claimed by some that] there exists a God, who is the creator [of the world]. Let he be critically examined [by us also].

The creator is one who creates. One who performs a [certain] action is called the creator [in relation to that action].

In this regard, we argue [as follows ].

He can create something which we know as existent (*siddha*) or which we know to be non-existent (*a-siddha*).

First, it may be remarked here that He cannot to be the creator of something which we know as existent, because the concept of the creator cannot be applicable to such an object. For example, we know that man exists. Creating him further cannot be an act of creation ; because his existence is already established [i.e. before this alleged creation by God].

But it may be argued that God creates something which is [already] known to us as non-existent. [To this we answer as follows]. Let it be that He also creates those objects : oil [crushed] out of sand, which is known to us as non-existent ; wool on a tortoise, which is known to us as non-existent. [Let God create all these also]. But He does not have the power of creating these objects. Why ? Because these are known to us as non-existent. And He [God] is also similar [i.e. God also is non-existent].

Now [ it may be argued that ] He makes non-existent existent [ i.e. God creates an object which was previously non existent but which becomes existent as a result of this divine creation ]. But this is also impossible, because of mutual contradiction [i.e. because the existent and the non-existent are mutually exclusive concepts]. Something which exists is existent [and in no case whatsoever being existent it can become non-existent]. And that which does not exist is never other than the non-existent. [Hence, in no case, being non-existent can it become existent]. Thus, between these two concepts, there is inevitable mutual contradiction,—like that between light and darkness, between life and death. In fact, where there is light there is no darkness and where there is darkness in no case can there be light. Who is alive, is alive [and not dead] and who is dead, is dead [and not alive]. Therefore, since there is no unity between the existent and the non-existent, in no case can God be the creator [of the existent out of the non-existent].

Besides, there will be further objections.

Does the creator, who creates something external to Him, create it being Himself born or unborn ?

He cannot create something external to Him being Himself unborn. Why ? Because He is Himself something unborn, like 'the son of a barren woman', who being unborn, cannot perform any action like the digging of the earth. God also is in such a position. [Being Himself unborn, He cannot create things external to Himself].

[Now, we shall analyse the other case]. He creates the external things after being Himself born. But wherefrom is He born ? Is He born out of Himself or from something else or from both [i.e. both from Himself and something external to Himself] ?

As regards the first of these alternatives, it needs to be observed that He could not have been born out of Himself, since one's own actions cannot relate to one's own self. The blade of a sword, howsoever sharp it may be, cannot cut itself. Even the most expert dancer, howsoever skilful he may be, cannot dance standing on his own shoulders. Besides, it is never observed that one and the same object is the produced *(janya)* and the producer *(janaka)*. A person, who is the father is himself also the son—such an assertion is quite unknown in common discourse.

Now let us assume that God originates from something else. But this cannot be assumed, because in the absence of God there will also be the non-existence of everything else.

But [may be] He originates [from something else not directly but] through a number of successive factors (*pāramparya*). However, in that case we would

have a number of infinite factors depending upon something else because God, according to His nature, has no origin (*anādi*). But if something really exists and is without beginning, we cannot assume that it would have a continuation. [Literally : "Where there is absence of beginning, this very absence of beginning is the refutation of the end"]. When there is no seed, there results also the absence of the sprout, trunk, branches, leaves, flowers, fruits, etc. Why ? Because of the absence of the seed itself. [Exactly, in the same manner, if God does not have a beginning, He must also be Himself non-existent].

Nor can [He be born] out of both [His own self and something else]. Because such an assumption would suffer from both froms of fallacies [i.e. both the fallacies involved in the first two alternatives].

Therefore, we cannot conceive the creator of the world as something existing.

Text in Transliteration

# Īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākṛtiḥ-viṣṇoḥ-ekakartṛtva-nirākaraṇaṃ nāma

guroḥ padāmvujaṃ natvā vajrasattvaṃ ca bhaktitaḥ /
suśiṣya-prativodhārthaṃ kṛpayā likhyate mayā //

asti punaḥ īśvarḥ kartā. sa eva vicāryatām. yaḥ karoti saḥ kartā. yaḥ kriyāṃ karoti saḥ kartṛ-saṃjñaḥ bhavati. atra ca vayaṃ brūmaḥ. kim asau siddhaṃ karoti atha asiddhaṃ vā. atra siddhaṃ tāvat na kurute. sādhanābhāvāt. yathā siddhe pudgale punaḥ kāraṇatvaṃ kartṛtvaṃ nāsti prāg eva siddhatvāt. atha asiddhaṃ karoti cet. vāluka-tailam asiddham. kūrma-lomādikam asiddham. etad eva karotu. punaḥ atra kartṛtvaṃ na śaknoti. kutaḥ. asiddhatvabhāvāt. evam asau. atha siddham asiddhaṃ karoti. tad api na ghaṭate paraspara-virodhāt. yaḥ siddhaḥ saḥ siddhaḥ eva. yaḥ tu asiddhaḥ saḥ eva asiddhaḥ. evaṃ tadanayoḥ paraspara-virodhaḥ syād eva. yathā ca āloka-andhakārayoḥ jīvana-maraṇayoḥ iva. atha yatra ālokaḥ vidyate tatra andhakāraḥ na asti. yatra andhakāraḥ tatra ālokaḥ na asti eva. yaḥ hi jīvati saḥ jīvati eva, yaḥ mṛtaḥ mṛtaḥ eva saḥ ataeva siddha-asiddhayoḥ ekatva-abhāvād īśvarasya kartṛtvaṃ na asti eva iti matam.

kiṃ ca aparam api dūṣaṇaṃ syat. kiṃ svayam utpadya parān karoti anutpannaḥ vā. anutpādya ca svayaṃ tāvat parān kartuṃ na śaknoti. kutaḥ. svayam eva anutpana-rūpatvāt. yathā anutpannasya vandhyā-tanayasya dāla-pātanādi-kriyā na pravartate. tathā īśvarasya api. atha ca svayam utpadya parān karoti. tadā kasmāt utpannaḥ. kiṃ svataḥ kiṃ parataḥ. ubhayataḥ vā. atra svataḥ tāvat na utpannaḥ. svātmani kriyā-virodhāt. na hi kharatara-karavāla dhārā svam ātmānaṃ chettum samarthā bhavati. na hi suśikṣitaḥ api naṭa-paṭuḥ svakīyaṃ skandham āruhya nartitum śaknoti. kiṃ ca svayam eva janyaḥ svayam eva janakaḥ iti evam dṛṣṭaṃ iṣṭaṃ vā svayam eva pitā svayam eva putraḥ iti na eṣaḥ vādaḥ loka-prasiddhaḥ.

atha bhavatu parataḥ. evam api na ghaṭate yāvatā iśvarasya vyatirekeṇa parasya abhāvāt. atha pāramparyād bhavatu. evaṃ ca parataḥ api anavasthā-prasaṅgaḥ syāt. anādi-rūpatvāt. sataḥ yasya ādeḥ abhāvaḥ tasya avasānasya dūṣaṇaṃ abhāva eva. vījasya abhāve aṃkura-daṇḍa-śākhā-patra-phalādīnām abhāvaḥ bhavati. kutaḥ. vījasya abhāvāt. na ubhayataḥ. ubhaya-doṣa-duṣṭatvāt. tasmāt assiddhaḥ kartā.

iti īśvara-kartṛtva-nirākṛtiḥ-viṣṇoḥ-ekakartṛtva-nirākaraṇaṃ samāptam. iti.

kṛtiḥ iyam ācārya-śri-ṇāgārjunapādānām iti tasya śiṣyeṇa likhitam.

# ON THE HISTORY OF MATERIALISM IN INDIA

Amidst the diverse philosophical systems which we find in India, ancient as well as modern, it is quite natural that there must have been some materialistic system too. Their main approach lies in reducing all the psychic processes to physical ones, negating the independent existence of soul, and affirming that the so-called soul is simply one of the properties of organized matter. This is philosophical materialism.

Another approach that we find in India is that of raising the practical question of the aim of human life and of the prevalence of material aims therein. Here, materialism is distinguished from all other trends by the fact that it negates the law of so-called *karma*, i.e. retribution for good or bad works. The greater abstraction of the Indian mind, as compared with other ancient civilizations is expressed in the fact that there the moral law is not embodied in the person of God, the judge, but in the form of impersonal *karma* which may be characterized as the law of moral progress, as the faith in the fact that the world is ruled by a special mechanism directing its evolution from the froms of low and unjust to good and perfection.

This law is fully negated by the extreme Indian materialists. Nowhere, perhaps, has the spirit of negation of and resentment to the fetters of traditional morals and the religion connected thereto been expressed so clearly as among the Indian materialists. This is evidenced, for instance, by the following verses of Indian materialism.

> The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, and smearing
> oneself with ashes,—
> Bṛhaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for those who have no
> manliness nor sense.[1]

> The three authors of the Vedas were
> The buffoon, the knave and the thief.[2]

> All the well-known formulae of the paṇḍita-s—jarpharī, turpharī, etc.
> And all the obscane rites for the queen commanded in the Aśvamedha
> Those were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of
> presents to the priests,
> While the eating of flesh was similarly commended by night-prowling demons.[3]

> There is no other hell than the mundane pain produced by purely mundane
> causes as thorns etc ;
> The only Supreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all
> the world's eyesight ;
> And the only liberation is the dissolution of the body.[4]

1. *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (*Bibl. Ind.*) p. 3. cf *Sarvasiddhāntasaṃgraha* ii. 15. [The English translations given here are of Cowell and Gough].
2. *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, p. 6.
3. *Ib.* p. 6.
4. *Ib.* p. 4.

According to the generally accepted system, in ancient India, the human life was regulated by three main aims : the property, love and duty. By the first were meant the various occupations giving means for life,—cultivation, cattle-breeding, trade and industry. The Government control with all its ramifications also came under this category. By the second aim was meant the family life, the children and also extra-family satisfaction of passions. What was meant by the third was mainly the religious duty, control of passions, with a view to secure award in the next life in one form or the other of eternal divinity. The normal life of man, according to the views of the orthodox Hindu, must have all these three aims in view. It is his duty to create family and to provide for it : this is interpreted as the service of love even to material aims. Later, having established his family, the Hindu may forsake it, become a *sannyāsī*, i.e. a poor homeless wanderer, directing all his thoughts to eternal bliss.

In individual cases, however, this equilibrium among the three aims of life was destroyed in favour of one of them. The materialists, naturally, did not give any importance to the aim of religious duty and openly proclaimed property and love as the only aims of man.

On the other hand, there were many people in India who fully renounced all property and avowed celibacy, rather complete annihilation of all desires. They formed communities of wandering poor monks. These communities sometimes became so numerous that they became a real calamity for the working population which had to support them somehow or other.

Like all other Indian teachings, Indian materialism was the speciality of a specific school, which preserved its traditions, developed its teachings and put them into practice. Its origin goes back to the hoary antiquity. As early as c. 1000 B.C., in the Upaniṣads, there is a reference to the teaching which does not acknowledge anything except matter.[5] Five hundred years before Christ, about the time of Buddha, there were certain schools which did not acknowledge anything except matter, or as put at that time, the four great elements : earth, fire, water and air. There were also some who added a fifth element, ether, thinner than air, and filling the whole space.[6]

Buddhism was, on the one hand, very close to materialism, since it also negated the existence of God and eternal soul. But the two differed sharply in that Buddhism accepted the law of *karma*, i.e. retribution for good and bad works. In all the proceedings of the initial sermon of Buddha, his hostile and sharp attitude towards all the theories which accepted the existence of soul is clearly manifest. But at the same time, it was with equal resoluteness that Buddha opposed Indian materialism which did not accept the moral law or the so-called *karma*.

Later, at a time when the Mauryas built a large and blossoming empire in

5. cf. H. Jacobi, *Ueber das Verhaeltniss des Vedānta zum Sāṃkhya*, E. Kuhn's Festschrift, p. 38.
6. F. O. Schrader, *Ueber den Stand der indischen Philosophie*, p. 53.

Northern India, the materialists worked out a specific philosophical school. Cāṇakya, the Minister to the King Candragupta, has left a treatise on politics,[7] in which he enumerates the existing philosophical systems. There, he refers to materialism as one of the main systems which the future ruler must study.[8]

In this epoch, all the three main aims of man in life—property, love and duty—are treated scintifically. During this period, we have the practical sciences (*arthaśāstra*), the science of love (*kāmaśāstra*) and the science of religious duty (*dharmaśāstra*). Among the practical sciences, that of governing the country occupies the first place. With his teaching, Cāṇakya himself marked the beginning of a special school of politicians. Quite independently of Cāṇakya and probably at the same time, there also was the theoretican Uśanas, whose political teaching differed considerably from that of Cāṇakya. The latter was the representative, so to say, of the official political doctrine, according to which it was necessary to support religion with all force and which was convinced that the temporal power was illuminated with religious basis. Uśanas, on the other hand, did not consider it necessary to found temporal power on religious base. According to him, there is only one science and that is the science of punishment, or literally, the science of rod (*daṇḍanīti*).[9] Bṛhaspati, to whom the main schools of Indian materialists are attributed, also was first a founder of a school of politicians. But his political school diverged from religion still further and remained known in history as the ardent hater of religion and advocate of theoretical materialism. It was called either Bṛhaspati school after the name of its founder, or Cārvāka's school, i.e. of the materialists proper who cared for daily bread alone.[10] Another name for it is Lokāyata, that is, the people who care only about the earth and not about the heaven. No complete texts or works of this school have reached us ; however, several extracts and passages preserved in the works of other schools, enable us to form a notion of its main aspects and the methods by which they are proved. A list (as complete as possible) of the works, in which there are references to the teaching of the Cārvākas and excerpts from their works, will be given below.

Now I shall dwell on two such works in which have been found extracts from the works of Cārvākas, unknown till now. The first of them is the *Nyāyamañjarī* by the well-known philosopher Jayantabhaṭṭa.[11] Here, the materialists have been mentioned twice. Speaking of the number of the sources of valid knowledge he refers to the first main aphorism or *sūtra* of their main work.[12] Some *sūtra*-s had already been restored from various sources by Prof. Hillebrandt.[13] It is now possible for us to restore the first one also. It reads :

*athā'tas tattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāma iti*

7. Kauṭilya, *Arthaśāstra* ed. Shamasastri, Mysore Sanskrit Series.
8. *Ib.* i.2. 9. *Ib.* i. 10. *Saḍdarśanasamuccaya*, ed. Suali, p. 300.
11. *Nyāyamañjarī* of Jayantabhaṭṭa, ed. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailanga, Benares, 1895, Vizianagram Series, Vol. viii. 12. *Ib.* p. 64.
13. Hillebrandt, *Zur Kenntniss der indischen Materialisten*, E. Kuhn's Festschrift, p. 24.

Here, the word *tattva* is set against the word *dharma*, which is prominent in orthodox schools. This *sūtra* means : In our work, we shall talk of reality and not of duty. From the interpretation of this *sūtra*, it is clear that the materialists then were divided into two camps : those who held the extreme view and fully negated consciousness and considered the human body a simple mechanism (*jaḍa*) without any consciousness, and those who were moderate in their views and acknowledged its existence but only in the form of special function of the body. Jayanta calls the former Sophists (*dhūrta*). It is latter whom he calls the real scholars.[14] And in fact, the discussions of the former appear to be of sophistic nature.

The fact (*tattva*) mentioned in the first *sūtra* cannot be either calculated or classified. Also, even the methods of its cognition cannot be found out, and all the attempts made in this connection proved futile. Thus, for instance, sitting in a dark room, we nevertheless know that there are fingers on our hands and that there is distance between them. We could not have known it by sight because it is dark. We did not know it by sense of touch too, for the skin is the organ of sense of touch and it cannot touch itself. We also cannot know it even from inference. Hence, it is proved by this method that all the accepted teachings about the sources of valid knowledge do not withstand criticism. Once it is seen that the cognition cannot be determined, it follows herefrom that is does not exist and that the processes however conscious, are in reality, mechanical phenomena (*jaḍa*).[15]

Jayanta distinguishes the highly educated materialists from these materialists-sophists. They claimed as follows : "There is undoubtedly a sole conscious element, localized in the whole living body. We also allow that this consciousness is subject to synthesis and other mental processes. One would hardly argue against this ; but that this continues to exist after death cannot be proved. The consciousness, leaving one body, naturally cannot settle in another. Had this been possible, we would have remembered about those things which we did in our previous births, exactly in the same manner as in this birth, we remember about things done in the childhood. We cannot show any reason why the same eternal soul, living now in one and sometimes in another body, has different memory : it remembers what it undergoes in one body and does not what it does in the other bodies. Having been convinced, therefore, that there is no soul after the death of the body it is necessary to do away with any talk of future life, which is traced back to the theory of eternal soul, and to try to live happily, according to the principle :

So long as we live, we shall be happy !
There is none here who will not die ;
When he dies and is turned to ashes,—
From where is he to appear again ?"

14. *suśikṣita*. cf. op. cit. p. 467.

15. *Ib*. p. 64.

Another extract, to which we would like to draw attention, occurs in the work of Vācaspatimiśra, in his interpretation of *Nyāyasūtra* 3. 2. 39.[16] The school of Indian realists supposes that matter consists of particles moving in and combining in the body. Like Aristotle, they assume that the natural motion of all particles is rotatory (*parispanda*). The conscious motion (*kriyā*), i.e. the following up and achievement of aims, is under the influence of impulse from the side of psychic elements. This impulse was represented in semi-anthropomorphic features. The main argument of the materialists was that a conscious act could be fully explained by the motion of particles of matter. The difference between the two motions is only superfluous. Just as the different material elements, connected with each other, may form such a substance as alcohol which does not resemble the substances of which it is made, in the same manner the different material elements, connected in the living body, develop a new quality, consciousness, which is not similar to them.

But to this, the Naiyāyikas raise the following objection : In a drink, each particle has alcohol, whereas in case of material elements of the body, each one individually does not have consciousness. Any property of the matter as, for instance weight, must be wherever matter is. If consciousness and will were also qualities of matter, they would then have been everywhere where there was matter. However, we do not see this, for instance, in a pot and similar objects. One cannot, therefore, contend that consciousness and will appertain to matter.

The materialist objects thus :[17] Consciousness and will are not at all such properties as belong to matter in general, as for instance weight. They belong to it only in known combinations. Just as the seed *kiṇva*, mashed and fermented, gives us alcohol, exactly in the same manner, the elements of matter, having formed a body, may be converted into a kind of consciously moving objects.

To this the Naiyāyikas reply[18] that every particle of alcohol, taken individually, has intoxicating effect. This power is not inherent in the known organized whole consisting of parts. Similarly, even the parts of the body would have to think, each taken separately. One cannot affirm arbitrarily that matter thinks as a whole but does not think in parts of the body. It is possible to separate out three or four members, and the thought will continue to work. If it be assumed that thinking is inherent in parts of a body, a whole series of thinkers would have to be there in one body.

"Let it be so", replies the materialist ;[19] "this does not contradict my principle."

"No", the Naiyāyika replies. We see that different people, if they are self-dependent, have different aims and all of them cannot do one work together, for there is no such law that many people accidentally should have one aim and would do one work. Besides, in case of one person, in one body, the separate thoughts are in

16. *Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-ṭikā*, Vācaspati Miśra, ed. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailanga, Viz. Series. Vol. xiii, p. 400ff.

17. *Ib.* p. 400, line 14. 18. *Ib.* p. 400 line 17. 19. *Ib.* p. 400, line 21.

agreement among themselves ; this is not the case with different bodies. This can be explained only by the fact that in one body, there is only one organ of thought. After the sensation and its object change, there remains, nevertheless, their cognition in memory and we have a right to conclude that the cognition is not a property of either the organ of feelings or its object. Exactly, in the same manner, although the body changes, as evidenced by changing age—infancy, youth and old age—nevertheless the same memory remains.

Therefore, one cannot affirm that consciousness is a property of bedy. Besides, speaking of conscious motion, we have in view not merely a motion which is possessed by all particles of matter, but a conscious attainment of aim, achievement of what is desired and avoiding of what is not desired. The materialist, not paying any attention to this difference, founds his thesis on motion, in general, and not on the facts of motion towards aim.

## LITERATURE ON INDIAN MATERIALISM


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7. John. Muir, in *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, 1861.
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9. Dahlmann, *Sāṃkhya*, p, 208.
10. Max Müller, *Six Systems*, p. 94.

# THEORY OF POETRY IN INDIA

## I

Poetics along with philosophy, grammar, astronomy and jurisprudence, occupied a prominent place among the sciences that flourished in ancient India. It was included in the subjects studied by the people of the higher castes—*brāhmaṇas*, *kṣatriyas*, etc. Its literature is voluminous, particularly in the later period—the decadent period of poetry—when almost every poet thought himself bound to state his view of the essence and forms of poetry, so much so that the number of works on the theory of poetry hardly does not exceed that of the poetical works.

It is very difficult to say as to which period the beginning of Indian poetics dates from. As in all other fields of knowledge, the Indians were interested exclusively in the essence of a subject—in the abstract truth—not at all touching upon the historical and geographical aspects. In spite of the voluminous literature on the subject, we seldom find any material on the gradual development of study of various fields of poetry. One can only picture this development, to some extent, by comparing the opinions expressed by various authors on the same question and closely following their polemics.

Unlike all other Indian sciences, Indian poetics is not presented to us in the form of a single, inflexible and universally accepted code. We know, for instance, that Pāṇini, the grammarian, had many predecessors ; but none of their works is now extant. Sanskrit grammar did not develop after Pāṇini ; his work, therefore, came to be regarded as sacred, and the authority of his study indisputable. The subsequent authors confined themselves only to commenting on his rules or expounding them in a special order for teaching purposes. This is not the case with poetics. Though the earliest writer on this subject, Bharata, has the prestige of a sacred writer—the later authors always refer to him as Muni, i.e. sacred—yet his work touched dramatic poetry only. Secondly, the analysis of poetics and essence of poetry developed so much after him that the later writers referred to him only cursorily—and that too very rarely. Thus, if the time of writing of the earliest extant treatises on Sanskrit poetics and rhetorics remains totally unknown to us, one cannot say that we know nothing of the time of the creation of the Sanskrit artificial poetry itself, written according to the rules worked out in the theory of poetry. Recently, we have come to know of a number of poetic works—small verses—carved on stones.[1] These inscriptions date back to the early centuries of our era and are composed with all the peculiarities of literary style, known to us from the treatises under the name of *Vaidarbhī* or Southern style. The *Vaidarbhī* style, nevertheless, was a reaction against the other style, Eastern or *Gauḍī*[2],—more bombastic, courtly. No monument of this

1. G. Bühler, *Die indischen Inschriften und das Alter der indischen Kunstpoesie*, Wien, 1890.
2. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa, sanskrit und deutsch hrsg.* von O. Bohtlingk, Leipzig, 1890, I, 40.

Eastern style is extant ; we know it only in theory. We know that it was the predecessor of the *Vaidarbhī* style and we are, therefore, right in assuming that the time when it flourished approximately covers the first three centuries before our era.

In explaining this, it is necessary to consider some facts of political history of India. In the most ancient period—the so-called Vedic period of Indian history (c. 3000-500 B. C.)—the scientific and literary activity, which was divided into branches or schools, was concentrated in the hands of priests who were *brāhmaṇas* by caste. Each of these branches or schools had its sacred literature, or a special editorial office of sacred songs and liturgical works. In this period, there was no personal poetic or literary work ; there existed only schools with traditional impersonal literary achievement.[3] The position is totally different in the subsequent period when all Sanskrit poetic and scientific literature was created by individuals—poets and *paṇḍitas*—who enjoyed the patronage of the rulers and received their means of subsistence from them.

In the court of every local ruler, howsoever insignificant he might have been, there used to be a whole group of court-poets and scholars whose professions were mostly hereditary. Besides the local so-called court-poets and scholars, there were also the wandering bards, who spent their time in travelling from one court to another trying to gain position for themselves and to get into favour with the rulers and, where possible, get permanent place as court-poets.[4]

Such position of Indian poets and scholars, generally continuing till this day, existed even before our era. And that is why the fate of poetry and science in India should be examined with due regard to the facts of political history.

In the three centuries before our era, the whole North of Hindustan was united under the sway of the mightly Maurya dynasty. Its power was spread far to the East. Probably it was in its court that the *Gauḍī* or the Eastern literary style was cultivated. The *Vaidarbhī* style, in which the whole classical literature of Sanskrit is written, was a reaction against this artificial style. Theoretical formulation of this style—poetics and rhetorics—also developed simultaneously.

Initially, poetics and rhetorics were two different sciences. The former covered the study of the forms of poetic works and the expression of different feelings in them, while the latter dealt with the study of the qualities of style, rhetoric figures and stylistic errors. Such a division continued upto the 10th century when the founder of the new

3. This is not contradicted by the fact that the Vedic hymns are attributed to individual singers. All subsequent literature developed on the basis of Vedas ; the so-called *Saṃhitās*, *Āraṇyakas*, and *Upaniṣads* are the property of the *Brāhmaṇa* schools. The period when the Vedic hymns themselves were composed preceded this literature and was obviously marked by greater freedom ; the hymns were composed not only by the *brāhmaṇas* but also by the rulers, warriors, merchants and even women.

4. G. Bühler, *Vikramāṅkadevacarita*, Bombay, 1875.

literary style, Anandavardhana, transferred the study of feeling and moods from the domain of dramatic to that of the narrative poetry,[5] and thus united both the sciences into one. From the time of Ānandavardhana, the theory of poetry—*alaṃkāraśāstra*—includes the study of poetic feelings, moods, style, rhetoric figures, forms of poetic works and the so-called *dhvani*, or the double suggested meaning of the poetic speech.

We shall now examine each of these subjects separately.

## II

### FEELINGS AND MOODS

The most original aspect of Indian poetics is the study of the poetic feelings—the so-called *rasa*. The word *rasa*, in fact, means "taste" ; *rasavat*—the thing or the work done with taste ; *rasika*—the man possessing taste. By this term we mean the feeling which a person is capable of partaking or experiencing when he acquaints himself with a poetic work. The origin of *rasa*, that is, of partaking of the feeling by the audience is explained as under : First, we have the feeling by itself, the mental effect (*bhāva*) ; it is distinguished from the mood experienced by the audience and serves as the source of the latter. Independently of it, there are so-called stimuli of feelings (*vibhāva*) —various tragic, happy or amorous positions and other facts—comprising the subject-matter of poetic works and capable of evoking some response from the side of the audience or the spectators. Besides these stimuli or factors of mood, in poetry are described presentations—the symptoms of feelings, such as tears, laughter, etc. (*anubhāva*). All this together is the feeling—factors and presentations. In the mind of the audience is born *rasa*, i.e. the partaking of a known feeling. The partaking of a feeling is not the feeling itself ; *rasa* always gives pleasure to an educated person, even when the feelings by themselves are sad and repulsive. Aristotle assumed that the essence of art lay in the imitation of nature, and that the pleasure obtained from art resulted from the satisfaction of natural aptitude of a person for imitation. This pleasure is what the Indians call *rasa*.

Already in the earliest treatise known to us, the so-called *Bhāratīyanāṭyaśāstra*, we find the theory and classification of feelings in full development. Here, *rasa* is identical to the taste of *sharbat*, which has for its composition sugar and aromatic herbs. Thus, the poetic feeling is embodied in the actor and displayed in dramatic mimicry ; it infects the aesthetically developed mind of the spectator and gives pleasure. The later treatises on poetics—*Daśarūpa*, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*—also give the same definition of *rasa*.

5. R. Pischel, *Śṛṅgāratilaka Suhṛdaylīla*, Kiel 1880.

According to *Daśarūpa*, the *rasa* is the result of the permanent dominant feeling which pervades the entire work and is so expressed in word and mimicry that it may infect the audience and the spectators with the same feeling. This feeling is purely subjective and can be experienced only by the spectator. The author never experiences *rasa*; he is only one of the *vibhāva*, or the factors that stimulate *rasa*. The question as to whether the author must experience the feelings represented by him is decided in India negatively.

To the Indians, poetry was something sacred. It was the vocation of the highly educated people of the higher castes—*kṣatriyas* and *brāhmaṇas*. The caste of the actors was one of the poorest and most despised in India. It was not for the poor actor, who worked for his daily bread, to have the pleasure of poetry; only the *brāhmaṇas* and the rulers were considered capable of experiencing the higher celestial joy from it. This joy is celestial (*alaukika*)—strictly transcendental—as distinct from the usual worldly joy or grief.

How does the feeling expressed in a poetical work infect the reader or the spectator? What psychological process takes place in the mind of the listener? This question engaged the attention of the Indian critics of poetry as much as that of the aestheticians of the modern time; the question was no less difficult for them and excited no less differences of opinion. Thus, the author of *Rasatarañginī*[6] seeks an explanation of this phenomenon in the theory of transmigration of souls widely prevalent in India. The soul of every person has the embryos of all shorts of feelings, experienced by him in his previous births, the so-called *saṃskāra* or *vāsanā*-instincts. These nuclei are called forth to life by poetry and, as a result, arouse poetic mood in the mind of the listener or spectator. Generally, every author tries to solve this difficult question in conformity with one of the philosophical doctrines prevalent in India. Thus Śaṅkuka,[7] the protagonist of the Nyāya philosophical school, compares the origian of *rasa* to the inference in syllogism in which the premises are the stimuli of feelings and their manifestations (*bhāva, vibhāva, anubhāva*). Bhaṭṭanāyaka[8], the advocate of the Sāṃkhya philosophical system, proceeds from the notion prevalent in India that the mind of a person consists of good or lofty and bad or rough origin; the poetry giving lofty joy to the mind calls for the predominance of good principle over the evil. Viśvanātha, the protagonist of pantheistic philosophy of Vedānta, sees, in the poetic mood, the manifestation of the idea of divinity—the spirit of the universe. The condition of a person experiencing celestial charm from the beauty of poetry is, in his opinion, close to that of a person engrossed in contemplation of divinity when his individual soul becomes identical with the spirit of the universe. Finally, Ānandavardhana and his follower Abhinavagupta, who developed the study of double meaning of poetic

6. See the *Appendix* in P. Regnaud, *La rhétorique sanscrite*, Paris, 1884. p. 56 et suiv.
7. See Mammaṭa *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Bombay, 1891, b. IV. 8. *Ibid.*

speech—the direct, in which there is no poetry ; and the implied, or suggested, which is the essence of poetry—saw, in the feeling, nothing but the special hidden meaning of words, and reduced the process of being infected by feeling to the understanding of the hidden meaning.

The Indian mind generally has a tendency to establish more or less artificial classifications in all fields of knowledge ; the poetic feelings and moods also were not treated without classification. There are nine prime or durable feelings which are capable of pervading the whole work and arousing the corresponding mood or *rasa* in the mind of the listener. Besides, there are thirty-three ancillary feelings which cannot arouse a particular mood independently and serve only for intensification or for contrast with one of the prime moods. These prime feelings, the so-called *sthāyi-bhāva*, which it is necessary to distinguish from the subjective mood or *rasa*, are : love, laughter, grief, anger, courage, fear, repulsion, charm, and renunciation of the world. The last of these feelings is not regarded as independent by all the critics. The ancient treatises totally omit it ; the later works argue whether it should be accepted as independent or not. It was, in all probability, introduced into the system of feelings under the influence of the later Buddhist and Jain poets, who presented their favourite ideas on the renunciation of the world in the form of poems. However, Viśvanātha considers even the *Mahābhārata* permeated by the feeling of renunciation of world—meaning here probably the philosophical part of this epic. Generally, a feeling is regarded as independent or durable if it is capable of pervading the whole work—small or large—and arousing one dominant mood in the listener. Ānandavardhana compares this dominant feeling with the thread of the garland of flowers. The dominant mood must, like the thread, be felt in all the positions and episodes of the narrative and must dominate the ancillary feelings. The nine prime feelings enumerated may be the principal ones at one time and ancillary at another, depending upon the role they play. In a poem that sings of love, comic pieces can also be there ; but the comic here must be transient and must serve only for a contrast with the prime feeling—love. Here, the comic or laughter will be the ancilary feeling, but there are cases where it may be the prime one. On the other hand, the thirty-three ancillary feelings cannot, from the Indian viewpoint, be dominant even in the smallest work and are not capable of evoking in the listener any particular mood, such as joy, pride, shame, disappointment, etc. The ancillary or the episodic feelings also include madness, illness and death. Mention of death, according to the Indians, generally spoils the mood of the listener, and in such cases, the poets are advised to take special care. Death may threaten the hero, but he must be kept from it—or, the desperate lover-hero might wish for death but should not die, etc.

For arousing a specific mood in the listener, a poetic work, as has already been said, must contain the description of factors which inspire this feeling. Such a factor, Viśvanātha[9] thinks, is anything that, even in the everyday life, inspires some feeling :

9. *Sāhitya-darpaṇa*, Bombay, p. 36 p. fol.

for instance, the feeling of love may be caused by an imposing hero or a beautiful heroine. In the theory of poetry, therefore, they belong to the category of stimuli of mood of love. Thus, Rāma and Sītā actually missed each other in their separation ; the *Rāmāyaṇa*, which describes their life, is full of sad feeling, and Rāma and Sītā are its inspirers. The inspirers of feeling are divided into the main ones and the secondary ones : the main ones are those with which the feeling is inseparably linked and without which, the feeling cannot arise—for instance, that of love—cannot arise without the hero and heroine. The secondary stimuli are the accidental factors which only increase the effect of the main stimuli

The tendency of regulating and classifying everything had highly ruinous effects for Sanskrit poetry. The literary compositions, with the passage of time, were put in such tight frames that the freshness of poetry could not help disappearing ; and in fact, the time of great flourishing of theory of art coincides with that of deep fall in the poetic works. The poetic inspiration gasped for breath in the death and lifeless forms. For a drama, the earliest treatise on dramatic art *Bhāratīyanāṭyaśāstra* allows only four categories of heroes who are capable of exciting *rasa* in the spectators. The hero may be exalted and noble or haughty and cruel, or debauchee, or philosopher, judged from the fact as to what extent these main features of his character appear—weak, average or strong—and also from the fact as to how they react on the feeling of love—strongly or feebly. These main types of heroes are further divided into various categories ; the later theories enumerate forty-eight types of heroes permissible in a drama. The heroines are divided with regard to the hero into three main categories—his wife, concubine, and courtesan. There are too many divisions of these three types ; Viśvanātha enumerates 384 types of heroines, permissible in an Indian drama.

The circumstances of time and place, accompanying the prime stimuli are regarded as the ancillary stimuli of feelings. For instance, in the feeling of love and erotic mood, the hero and the heroine are regarded as the prime stimuli ; their dresses, the venue of their meeting—the ancillary ones. The spring, moonlight, river bank, garden, the ruins of a temple, cave or the house of some close friend of the heroine are particularly conducive to the development of feeling. All manuals of poetry enumerate these objects, which are the necessary *apparatus poeticus* of every Indian poem or drama. Many of them have the same significance in the European poetry also ; others are the distinctive features of Indian poetry, for they are met with only in Indian nature—for instance, monsson clouds, the singing of peacocks, the spring wind from the Malabar Coast, sandal wood growing in the South from where the spring wind blows, the lotus flower, Aśoka tree, etc. There are others which are more or less a poetic convention, for instance, the notion that to every feeling, there corresponds a certain colour : to love—red, to anger—black, to laughter—white, etc.

Besides the stimuli of feeling (*vibhāva*), the Indian exponents of poetics distinguish the manifestations, or symptoms, of feelings (*anubhāva*) ; these also serve to further the

stimulation of mood in the listener and are enumerated in detail in various treatises on poetics. There are, for instance, ten symptoms of love—ranging from tender looks to specifically Indian symptoms : a person in love, according to Indian concepts, starts closing his eyes, then blushes, yawns ; the hairs on his body stand in ecstasy and are flared up.[10]

The stimuli, symptoms and ancillary feelings all taken together arouse mood, or *rasa*, in the mind of the listener. The feeling of love arouses erotic mood, that of the comic—gay mood, grief—sad mood ; each with the help of specific stimuli, symptoms and ancillary feelings. If from this theory of poetic feelings and moods, we may remove what is specifically Indian—viz., the endless regulations and classifications,—it will essentially be exactly the same analysis of poetic impressions as has been given by Leo Tolstoy in his book on art.[11] The activity of art, according to Tolstoy, consists in the fact that a feeling once experienced is so conveyed through movements, sounds and images represented in words that the others are infected by it. The Indians say that the essence of poetry lies in that the feeling (*bhāva*) is so expressed through stimuli, symptoms and ancillary feelings (*vibhāva*) that the listener tastes the *rasa*, or mood.

## III

### DHVANI

Besides the study of feelings and moods, the most distinctive feature of Indian poetics should be regarded as the study of the so-called *dhvani* or poetic suggestion—rather, the suggested meaning of the poetic speech. That suggestion plays a big role in poetry is now universally accepted. It is often shown that a poet has the power of drawing a whole picture in a few words or of creating a living type by a trait that he successfully notices. But neither Aristotle nor the modern aestheticians analyzed, either minutely or broadly, this power of the language to evoke pictures, images and feelings in the listener through a number of associations.

The Indians formulated the concept of the so-called *dhvani*, or poetic suggestion, and thoroughly analyzed this power of the language.

According to the doctrine of Ānandavardhana and his school, a poetic speech, in which the words are used in their literal sense only and express nothing more, cannot

10. Thus, at least till now, the Sanskrit words *pulaka* and *romāñca* were always translated as : *horripilation, das stauben des Harchen, herissement des poils.* This symptom also expresses love or feeling of astonishment, and it would be more accurate to translate it simply as *shudder.*

11. Leo Tolstoy, *Chto takoe iskusstvo* ? [What is Art ? ], St. Petersburg, 1897, Chapter V, p. 42.

be called poetry. For a poetic description of love, it is not enough merely to state the fact of its existence and name the feeling of love ; one must use such turns of speech that may make love felt without being directly named.

From this point of view, the Indians distinguish between the three meanings of words—direct, figurative and suggested. For instance, if we say : "a hamlet on the river Ganges", the direct meaning would be that the hamlet is located on the water of the river Ganges ; but the word 'river' is used here in the figurative sense of the 'bank of the river'. But besides, these words also have another suggested meaning : "the river Ganges is sacred ; the hamlet located on its bank symbolizes a special joy"—such is the idea formed in the mind of every Indian when these words are mentioned.

According to the Nyāya philosophical school, which formulated logic and also made a philosophical study of the meaning of words, this suggested meaning of a word does not belong to the word itself. It is the result of inference. All that is on the river Ganges is sacred ; the hamlet is situated on the river Ganges, and therefore it is sacred. To this, the rhetoricians objected. They argued that the concept of syllogism was not applicable to all cases of suggestion in poetry. Thus, sometimes it is enough to emphasize only one word for giving a special meaning to the whole pharse ; the presence of syllogism in such a case is unthinkable.

The word *dhvani* literally means "sound." According to the concept of the Indians, sound does not come in direct contact with our organ of hearing but only through a number of vibrations of air. On the other hand, in the case of the visual sense, as per Indian concept, the eye comes in direct contact[12] with the object of vision. Therefore, a poetry in which everything is clear as in a picture [i.e. which is without any suggested element] is called a *citra.* On the other hand, a poetry where the direct meaning of the words says one thing but the suggested one totally another, is called *dhvani* or echo. The latter form of poetry, *dhvani,* is regarded as the higher, true poetry. As in everything else, here too a classification was made. Ānandavardhana gives a detailed classification of the varieties of suggested meaning. The suggested meaning falls into two main categories : (1) The direct meaning of the words is not at all intended [to be conveyed] by the poet (*avivakṣita-vācya*), i.e. what the poet wants to say is different from the direct meaning of the words ; the latter expresses something which is impossible or does not actually happen ; (2) The direct meaning of the words should also suggest another meaning (*vivakṣitānyapara-vācya*), i.e. the words represent facts which are possible and which have actually taken place ; but the poet thereby suggests another fact, not directly expressed by the words.

12. Properly speaking, fiery element (*tejas*) proceeding from the eye.

An example of the first category :

"Ramble, O hermit, confidently ;
That dog is today killed
By the fierce lion that dwells
In the wild thickets yonder
On the banks of the river Godā !"[13]

This has been spoken by a young girl who has made an appointment with her lover on the bank of the river Godāvarī. She does not want anyone to come to disturb this meeting. Here, the facts directly expressed by the words do not at all take place and do not constitute the thoughts of the speaker.

Another example :

"Persons three will reap the earth
That yields flowers of gold—
He who is bold,
He who is learned
And he who knows how to serve."[14]

Since there are no flowers of gold in reality, the poetic meaning here is obviously different from what is expressed by the words.

An example of the second category :

"On which mountain and for how long
Did this one perform penance ?
And what might be the name of that penance too ?
For, the young parrot is able to peak
At the fruit so red as your lips."[15]

In this case, though the parrot actually touches the lips of the girl, what the poet has in mind is not the happiness of the parrot but that of the person who would have been in its place. In the opinion of Ānandavardhana, the suggested meaning here is as important as the expressed one, for the latter corresponds to the world of reality. Here, the suggested meaning is the main object of the poet and the literal one only serves as a method for expressing it.

Classical Sanskrit poetry often resorts to suggestion. Stating one's thoughts in a florid style by a remote snggestion was regarded as a great achievement—the greater the difficulty in understanding a poet, the higher the rating of his poetry.

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13. [*Gāthāsaptaśati*, No. 175 in Weber's edition. Translation—K. Krishnamoorthy].
14. [*Pañcatantra*, I. 45. Tr.—K. Krishnamoorthy].
15. Tr.—K. Krishnamoorthy.

In the period of decadence, the whole creative power of the poet lies only in his attempts at expressing himself as obscurely as possible. Contrary to this, in the epic poems *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* which, in all probability, existed in their present form long before the beginning of our era—before the science of Indian poetics came into being—the suggestion is not found at all, at least in the form in which it was cultivated in the classical poetry. On this basis, some exponents of poetics deny the existence of *dhvani* in epic ; this is at least pointed out by the polemic which Ānandavardhana started against the view. He says that it is only at first glance that the epic style appears simple and devoid of suggested meaning. A minute analysis will show that it is full of suggestion. This is seen, for instance, in the following verse from the *Mahābhārata* :

"When it is night for all creatures,
The saint doth keep wide awake ;
When the creatures awaken,
It will be night for the truth-perceiving sage."[16]

Here, the words "day" and "night" are not used in their actual meaning but contain a suggestion of knowledge and ignorance of the true meaning of life. The words "day" and "night" could neither have been used in figurative sense from Indian viewpoint, where the figurative meaning implies something totally different. Ānandavardhana opines that such simplest form of suggestion, amply found in the epic, is distinguised by the fact that suggested meaning in it is represented to the mind of the listener simultaneously with direct one, whereas in other forms of *dhvani*, the mind grasps the suggested meaning gradually through a number of associations.

We shall now examine the varieties of the two main categories of suggested meaning. The first category, as has already been said, consists in that the meaning expressed in the words is not at all intended [to be conveyed] by the poet. This, in its turn, has two sub-divisions depending upon whether the literal meaning is only altered or disappears completely. Given below is an example of the former where the expressed meaning of the words is altered and becomes amalgamated with another implied—and so the main—meaning :

"The quarters all are painted deep
With the glistening black of clouds,
And the cranes in circles fly (with excitement) ;
The breezes are mositure-laden
And these friends of clouds, the peacocks,
Send their joyous notes in the wind.
Let them all confront me !

16. *Ib.*

I shall bear them all, as I am Rāma
Whose heart is adamant to be sure.
But how will Sītā fare !—
Alas ! Alas ! My dear queen !
Be bold, I beseech thee".[17]

These lines show, in the first instance, that the spring is drawing near ; soon it will be time for love, the signs of which are the clouds, the cranes, the rain, and the joyous notes of the peacocks. Rāma, languishing in his separation from Sītā, addresses her in his thoughts and wishes her to bear this separation with courage while he himself is feeling grieved. Here, the author does not wish to say that Rāma pronounces these words, since this is even otherwise clear from the context. The word *Rāma*, as an individval with that proper name, does not express the intention of the author ; it has the nominal significance of a "person hardened" [by the circumstances]. This suggested meaning is there in the poet's mind, and is his main thought, which merges with the word *Rāma* as a proper name.

Another example of this type :

"Merits become merits indeed
When critics of culture receive them so.
Lotuses will be lotuses
Only when sunshine shelters them".[18]

The colours of a lotus are revealed with sunrise ; i.e. when the rays of the sun fall on them. Only this revealed beauty of a lotus enables it to attract the attention of the people. Besides, in Indian mythology, the lotus is identified with Lakṣmī, the Goddess of joy, riches and beauty, and so the opening of a lotus flower signifies the attainment of riches. The sense of the verse quoted is like this : Like sun, which imparts to the lotus flowers its true value, the rulers, by giving awards to the scholars, make their merits obvious for all. Here, the word "lotuses" repeated a second time does not have the sense of lotus flowers but that of all those representations which are associated with them in the mind of an Indian.

The second sub-division of the first main category of *dhvani* consists in that the expressed meaning of the words totally disappears.

"[ Now, in winter ][19]
All his charm to the sun hath fled[20]

17. *Ib.* 18. [From *Viṣamabāṇalīlā*. Tr.—K. Krishnamoorthy.
19. [Addition Stcherbatsky's].
20. Usually, all people—especially the lovers—prefer moon to the broiling sun, but in winter, the role of the moon passes over to sun.

All his orb is hid in snow ;
Like a mirror by breath blinded,
The moon now does not glow".[21]

Here, the direct meaning of the word "blinded" totally disappears.

Another example of the same type :

"[In spring[22]][23]
The sky with dizzy cloud,
The woods with rain drops dripping loud,
And nights with moons not proud,[24]
Though black in hue,
They capture you".[25]

The direct meaning of the words "dizzy" and "not proud" totally disappears here.

The second main category of *dhvani* is one in which the literal meaning is a part of what the poet wants to say ; but this meaning also suggests another sense. This, in its turn, falls into two main sub-divisions. In addition to the meaning expressed by the poet, the words have yet another sense which also is the intention of the poet rather his main intention. This intention can be grasped by the listener either immediately or gradually. In the latter case, besides the direct meaning, another hidden meaning is felt in the words like the buzzing of a bell. The reader gets at this suggested meaning gradually through a number of associations.

In studying the first sub-division where the suggested meaning is grasped simultaneously with the literal one, one has to bear in mind that the feelings and moods in a poetic speech are grasped by the mind together with its literal meaning. We have already seen that the feeling expressed in words and the mood experienced by the listener are not the same. The words contain a description of the feelings—their factors and symptoms (*bhāva, vibhāva, anubhāva*)—but what the listener tastes is mood (*rasa*). It would, therefore, be possible to assume that this mood is also a form of the suggested meaning of the words. On the other hand, the rhetoric figures, insomuch as they serve to adorn the speech, are distinguished from the facts represented in words. Hence, it should be possible to regard them as a special form of *dhvani.* But in such a case, any difference between the suggested meaning of the words as a distinctive trait of the higher poetry on the one hand, and moods and rhetoric figures on the other, would disappear. Ānandavardhana draws the following line of demarcation between them : If the facts

21. Description of winter in *Rāmāyaṇa* (iii. 16. 3). [Tr.—K. Krishnamoorthy].
22. i e. at the time of monsoon rains.
23. [Addition Stcherbatsky's].
24. In rainy season, the moon, hidden by clouds, does not shine so brightly.
25. Tr.—. Krishnamoorthy.

expressed in the words are the chief thought, i.e., if the feeling or its figures are subordinated and serve only for adornment, we do not have *dhvani* but only the actual figures and moods. If, on the other hand, it is mainly these feelings that the poet has in view, and the factual aspect is only the cause for transmission, we are concerned with *dhvani*. If the mood and figure, therefore, are contained not in the direct but in the suggested implied meaning and the latter is the chief object of the poet, only then is *dhvani* obtained.[26] In the following example, in the opinion of Ānandavadhana, we have rhetoric figure and mood, but no *dhvani* :

"Why this joke ?
Thou shall not certainly part again from me,
Having returned after so long.
O' ruthless one ! whence this flare for travel ?—
Thus in dreams do the wives of your enemy speak,
Clasping fast the necks of their beloved lords ;

26. With regard to this type of *dhvani*, Ānandavardhana's views on the relation between the outer verbal aspect of poetry and its internal aspect—feelings, moods and *dhvani*—are noteworthy. He advises the poets not to bother themselves about too much virtuosity of words, for it spoils the mood and diverts the attention from the essence of poetry. According to Ānandavardhana, in good poetry, the poetic thoughts penetrate into and pervade the words of the poet and are not expressed by him directly. Here, the verbal aspect should not become too prominent, otherwise the dominance of the suggested meaning will not be felt—or, in any case, the mood will be spoiled. This is why Ānandavardhana protests against the passion for rhythm and any other verbal virtuosity. The Indian poetry too was, at one time, keen on rhythm. The poets were not satisfied with the repetition of like sounds or words. They composed acrostics and other special verses which could be read from left to right and from right to left. Later on, they also composed the so-called round verses (*cakrabandha*)—the verses where the various syllables were put along the diameter of a circle, and formed particular words in the outer circle and the internal concentric circle. Sometimes two verses were composed in such a way that they could be read in a zigzag manner from left to right and right to left and from the first syllable of the first line to the second syllable of the second line, then to the third syllable of the first, to the fourth syllable of the second, and so on. This type of versification, in all probability, flourished especially in 7th-8th centuries A.D. This is not so either in the period when classical Sanskrit poetry flourished or in the later period. From the works of the four poets, whom the Indians themselves consider the greatest representatives of their literature—Kālidāsa (4th cent ), Bhāravi (6th cent ), Māgha (8th cent.), and Śrīharṣa (12th cen.)—it is found that in Kālidāsa, the rhythm is met with comparatively rarely, but in Bhāravi more frequently. Māgha is a great virtuoso in all types of verses—including even the round verses. Such type of versification is, however not found in Śrīharṣa. It is, therefore, highly probable that Ānandavardhana's views influenced his contemporaries and their immediate successors. In the latter period, his authority was very great, for it is highly probable that the literary tastes have changed under his influence. Ānandavardhana's views proceed directly from his system. Since in good poetry, the main role is played by the suggested meaning which pervades the verbal cover of the speech and its literal meaniug, too much labour need not be bestowed on the latter. For, otherwise, the poet will digress from the main thing—the real poetry, for which the verbal aspect is only an outer cover.

But soon they awake
Only to find their arm-rings empty
And to so lament loud".[27]

Here, the direct meaning simultaneously expresses the intention of the author too. Though the mood is there, it plays only a secondary role ; it arises from the fact communicated by the poet. The rhetoric figures also play the same role in a poetic work. The Sanskrit word *alaṃkāra,* which properly means "decoration", corresponds to the word "figure". The figure and mood can also serve for decoration, but they will not constitute *dhvani* if they do not contain the main thought of the poet and are only a decoration of what he wants to say. We have *dhvani* only when the poetic meaning—or, the intention of the poet—is not expressed directly but seems to echo through his words. If the feeling or the mood is this snggested intention, it also will play the role of *dhvani.* The example cited above expresses the feeling of grief on the loss of the loving husband ; the stimulus of this feeling is the dream in which the wives see that they are holding their husbands alive in their arms. The poet's intention is to describe the condition of the wives awaiting the return of their husbands who have been killed in war. The sad mood here is a subordinate circumstance—poetic decoration ; there is, therefore, no *dhvani* in this example.

On the other hand, in the following example, the factual aspect and the rhetoric figures are not the main object of the poet. His intention is to describe the anger of the jealous young woman who has discovered the unfaithfulness of her lover : the latter tries to pacify her and win her love again :

"Protecting [your face from my kisses] with your hand, you
are wiping out the drawings[28] on your cheek,—your
lips have dried up by your warm breath,—your
sobbings reach your throat and thus raise your high
breast. You do not wish to reconcile ; you have
loved your own jealousy more than myself."[29]

All the facts described in this verse are not important in themselves and serve only as the means for expressing the feeling of jealousy. Here, therefore, we have that type of *dhvani,* in which the suggested meaning is grasped by the mind simultaneously with the literal one,

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27. Tr.—K. Krishnamoorthy.
28. In India, the women carry on their cheeks thin drawings, made mostly with rosy sandal colour.
29. The latter part of this verse, in Sanskrit, can also be translated differently : "It is jealousy that has become your lover and not I. It is repeatedly pressing your neck tightly and thus making your breasts (where tears are accumulated) heave up and down." This play on the words is also a decoration and not the main object of the words of the poet.

In the following example, we find rhetoric figures, but they do not comprise the chief intention of the poet. They are only the means of indicating the suggested aim, which is the stimulation of the mood.

"Her moving-corner'd eye
Trembling as in pain, thou touchest oft and oft ;
Like secret whisperer,
Tenderly thou hummest, flitting by her ear ;
She waving both her hands,
Thou dost drink her lip, be-all of pleasure soft,
We, searching for truth,
Are undone, O drone ! thou, yea, are lucky here !"[30]

Here, the comparison of the lover with the bee sitting on the face of the beloved forms a special figure (so-called *svabhāvokti*). But this is not the main object of the poet and serves only as the means for expressing the feeling of love and stimulating erotic mood in the reader. This suggested intention of the poet is a special form of *dhvani.*

Another example of the same type :

"He is indeed the Lord
Who, by his brisk order to her discus to smite,
Made the amorous sport of Raghu's wives,
Devoid of its wild frolic of embraces
And left with only kisses forsooth."[31]

Here too, the poet has used a special rhetoric figure—the description of the effect instead of that of cause (*paryāyokti*)—but his main object is to express the sad feeling and stimulate the respective mood in the listener. This is the suggested poetic meaning that is intended [to be conveyed] by the poet and is grasped simultaneously with the literal one. These examples illustrate the *first* sub-division of the *second main* category of *dhvani.*

The second sub-division, where the suggested meaning intended by the poet is not grasped simultaneously with the literal one (likened to the resonance of a bell) falls, in its turn, into two types, depending upon whether this suggested meaning will be the function of the verbal aspect of poetic speech or that of its meaning. The former of these latter types of *dhvani* can be easily confused with the special rhetoric figure, called the "play of words" ( *śleṣa* ). If a word has two or several meanings—Sanskrit language being rich in synonyms—the poet may make use of this fact for a play of words ; this is the special rhetoric figure. It should be distinguished from the three

30. Kālidāsa's *Śakuntalā*, ed. by R. Pischel, Kiel, 1877, 1,20. [Present English translation—Roby Datta's].
31. Tr.—K. Krishnamoorthy.

cases where the verbal aspect of speech does not directly express some thoughts, but allows the second suggested meaning indirectly. It is only in the latter case, that we have a form of *dhvani*, i.e. such suggested meaning as is intended by the poet and is understood by the listeners after the literal one. The very name of *dhvani* has originated in this way, for it is like the resonance of a bell after it is struck ; the word *dhvanana* or *dhvani* means "resonance". The difference between the figure called the "play of words" and that form of *dhvani* which is based on the considered ambiguity of the verbal aspect of poetic speech, is seen more clearly from the comparison in the following examples :

"Reeling, jadedness, and laziness ;
Sinking, swoon and stupor ;
Slenderness of body and death itself—
All these are perforce brought upon wives-in-separation
By the poison (also, water) of cloud-like snakes
(also, of snake-like clouds)".[32]

Here, the Sanskrit word meaning "liquid" (*viṣa*) is equally applicable to snake poison and rain. The coming of rain causes the parted lovers the same acute pain as the biting of a poisonous snake. The symptoms of both the phenomena are the same. The equating of rain to poison is a special figure, the so-called identification (*rūpaka*). Besides, here, there is also a play on the word "liquid" (*viṣa*), which also is a special figure (*śleṣa*). But there is, however, no suggested meaning in this example, for both the figures are indirectly expressed in words.

In the following example, on the other hand, there is a description of the advent of spring. This description is given in such a manner that one can feel, through the veil of words, the meaning which is intended by the author and which accompanies the literal meaning like the buzzing that follows the stroke of a bell.

"At the advent of spring,
Do come forth at once
Longings in lover's hearts
And buds in the mango-tree".[33]

Given below is an example where the Sanskrit words have been selected so skilfully that the second meaning is felt through them :

"Śiva, after having destroyed both his enemies—the demons, Madhu and Mādhava, appeared in all his might, and his loud white[34] laughter reminded one of the blooming jasmine flower".

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32. *Ib.* 33. *Ib.*
34. In Sanskrit poetry, laughter is considered white and is compared with white objects—snow, geese, lotuses, etc.

As is seen, the difference between the play of words forming the special figure and that comprising the form of suggested meaning is very minute. All depends on the intention of the poet. If he wants to express two meanings by play of words, we get the rhetoric figure called the "play of words". If, on the contrary, in describing a fact, he uses such words that express the other meaning indirectly, or—to use the Indian expression—through which resounds another meaning, which has no direct relation to the subject mentioned and if in such a case, the second suggested meaning is the aim of the author, gives poetic power to its movement, what we have then is *dhvani.*

Another example of the same type :

"Buxom ( also, louring ), and adorned with a garland
( also, showering a downpour ),
And dark as the black aloe,
Whom would not the lady's heavy breast
( also, the heavy clouds )
Make passionately desirous ?"[35]

Here, the comparison of breast with clouds is not directly expressed but it is felt through the verbal form created by the poet. The words "heavy breast" also denote, in Sanskrit, "monsoon clouds"—they move at a height, they cause rain, and they (monsoon clouds) are black as the crust of a black aloe.

Coming to the last type of *dhvani*, where the suggested meaning proceeds from the literal one and is not felt simultaneously with the latter but accompanies it like the resonance after the stroke of the bell, and is based on a literal meaning of the text and not on its verbal aspect, we give the following example :

"As the divine sage [ Ṛṣi ][36] said this,
The down-faced Pārvatī by her father's side
Counted the petals of the toy-lotus
She held in her hands".[37]

Here, the fact that Pārvatī counts the petals of the lotus is not of any interest by itself. It has been mentioned to show the joy and embarrassment of Pārvatī at the words of the envoy asking for her hand. This meaning is suggested, because it is distinct from the literal one but it does not destroy the latter completely. It is based on the meaning expressed in the words and not on the verbal (phonetic) aspect of the text.

If, however, the poet directly states that he has in view the suggestion to the known meaning, or in other words, he himself explains the connection between the literal meaning and the one that results from it, what we get is a simple figure and not *dhvani.*

35. Tr.—K. Krishnamoorthy.

36. *Ṛṣi*—a sage. This verse from Kālidāsa's poem states that Śiva sends a *ṛṣi* to Himālaya for asking for Pārvatī's hand. The latter is confused and counts the petals of the lotus to hide her embarrassment.

37. Tr.—K. Krishnamoorthy.

For instance :

"The artful lady understood
The lover's mind for the time of tryst ;
And with eyes that smiled meaningfully,
She closed the lotus-petals in her hand."[38]

The lotus flowers close up at sunset ; the closing of petals, therefore, indicates that the meeting will be 'after sunset.' Although, even here, there is a suggestion to the time of meeting, but since this suggestion is directly described by the poet and not meant, there is no *dhvani* here.

This last form of *dhvani*, in its turn, falls into two categories depending upon whether the suggested meaning is indebted to the bold gust of fantasy only or is a fact possible in the world of reality. Of these, the former again falls into two types depending upon whether the bold turn originates from the poet or from the character represented by him. In the following example, we have a bold turn from the poet himself :

"The spring prepares and yet not hurls down the darts of Cupid at the targets, viz. youthful ladies ; darts whose tips are fresh *sahakāra* flowers and feathers (at the back) are new sprouts and leaves."[39]

The example of such a turn put in the mouth of another person is there in the verse already quoted in this article, viz., "On which mountain etc."

Another example : A young man pays compliment to his sweetheart, saying that anybody looking at her lovely breasts, must fall in love with her. This thought is expressed like this :

"By your rising breast, so fondly
Served by the handmaid, youth,
Cupid seems welcomed warmly
Through gesture of rising for courtesy."[40]

The other form of this *dhvanī* where the suggested meaning is a fact, possible in reality, is manifest in the following example :

"Decking her ears with peacock's plumes,
The wife of the hunter moves in pride
In the midst of all her rivals
With their ornaments of pearls."[41]

This verse means : So long as the hunter loved previous wives, he had sufficient time and strength for hunting elephants, which made it possible for him to bring pearls for them. The present young wife, however, has possessed him to such an extent that

38. *Ib.* 39. *Ib.* 40. *Ib.* 41. *Ib.*

because of exhaustion and shortage of time, he can now hunt birds only ; this is proved by the peacock plumes with which she has decorated herself.

Thus, according to Ānandavardhana, the varieties of suggested meaning of a poetic speech are as follows :

A. The literal meaning is not the one intended [ to be conveyed ] by the poet.
   I) The literal meaning passes over into another sense and is altered.
   II) The literal meaning totally disappears and is replaced by another.

B. The literal meaning is intended [ to be conveyed ] by the poet but it also suggests another sense.
   I) The suggested meaning is grasped direct—simultaneously with the literal meaning.
   II) The suggested meaning is grasped gradually—like the reasonance of a bell.
      1) It arises from the verbal aspect.
      2) It arises from the meaning :
         a) It is an imaginative one fancied by the author.
         b) It is based on something that is possible in the world of reality.

## IV

### STYLE

Because of the variety of uses to which it is put, the word "style" itself can easily lead to inconsistency in the concepts related to it. We have already seen that the Indians differentiated between various schools of literary art, each of which had its own style (*rīti*). In this sense, the word denotes the totality of characteristics which distinguish the poetic work of a specific period and place. This difference has no practical significance, for all Sanskrit poetry that has reached us is written in the *Vaidarbhī* style which replaced and ousted all others. Thereafter, it has been generally accepted that style is applicable to an orderly speech and that the poetic style is opposite of the prose one. It is in this sense that Aristotle examines the merits of style ; some qualities make a style poetic and the others prosaic. But in this case, a study of style is imperceptibly converted to a study of poetry in general. The Indian theoreticians speak only of the quality of poetic style as the characteristic symbol of poetry in general—only those qualities, which make an orderly speech poetic, engage their attention. Prose or the scientific style does not have all these signs, though there is nothing that may check it from using some of them at times. In a scientific work, we can find metaphor, suggestion, a living style or an imaginary one—but these will be sporadic appearances and not characteristic. The difference of degree here can never become absolute. We find that versification—i.e. rhyme and rhythm—which plays

such an important role in our notion of poetry, is not at all a characteristic of poetry for an Indian. In India, the scientific works were written in rhythmic verses exactly like the poetic ones. The rules—philosophical and also grammatical—of a composition were stated in verses. On the other hand, there are ancient monuments of Sanskrit literature where we find epic narrations which are not in verse. In the early stages of the classical period of Sanskrit literature, the dialogues in a drama were not usually in verse ; there were big novels written with all the characteristic of high poetic style but without rhythm.[42] Thus, if the rhythm is set aside, we shall be left with such characteristics of the work as have always been considered innate to poetic speech. These are harmony, clarity, figurativeness and liveliness. Aristotle, Quintilian, and the Indian rhetoricians all regard them as the qualities of good style.[43] But if we go into the details, we find that what Aristotle and the classical rhetoricians after him meant by virtue of style was considerably different from the concept of the Indians. What according to Aristotle is the conformity of style to feeling and mood was studied by the Indians quite separately from style in the form of the theory of feelings and moods which we have just now examined. What Quintilians means by *emphasis*, i.e. the expression of a thought not by direct words but by more or less a distant suggestion, rather corresponds to what for the Indians is a special and highly original study of poetic suggestion or hidden meaning of poetic speech. On the other hand, clarity, liveliness, loftiness and elegance are accepted as the qualities of style both by Aristotle and the Indians. The earliest Indian rhetoricians, Vāmana[44] and Daṇḍin [45] enumerate ten qualities of poetic speech. Daṇḍin[46] remarks that these qualites are the characteristics of *Vaidarbhī* style ; the difference between some of them is very minute, that is, it can be rather felt than precisely defined. *Gauḍī* style is mostly distinguished by qualities which are directly opposite. For giving a definition of style Vāmana takes recourse to comparison : Just as a woman having the right features of face and being well-dressed, but devoid of the charm of youth, does not produce an impression of beauty, similarly poetic speech decorated with rhetoric figures but expressed in dry syllables which do not have the qualities of style cannot be liked. This comparison is already there in *Agnipurāṇa*[47] and was probably well-known to the ancient rhetoricians.

A great difference is noticed between the earlier and the later views of the

42. Professor A. Weber opined that the predominance of verse forms in ancient Indian literature—even in prosaic works—was explained by the caste interests of the Brāhmaṇas, in whose hands the scientific literature was concentrated. This opinion does not appear very well-founded. First, we have very ancient specimens of speech, which are not in verse, both in prose and poetical works. What stikes us is not the fact that the literature, which is not in verse, is poor but the fact that the dictionaries and works on grammar and jurisprudence are in verse.

43. The Sanskrit word *guṇa*, which properly means "quality" or "nature (of poetic speech)", has been translated by us by the word "style."

44. Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, iii, 1, 4.

45. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa*, Calcutta, 1863, 1, 41. 46. *Ibid.*, i, 40.

47. *Agnipurāṇa*, ed. by R. Mitra, vol. 1-3, Calcutta, 1873, 345, 1-3.

Indians on the significance of style. For the later rhetoricians, the main thing in poetry is the feeling expressed and the mood aroused by it, whereas the style is only a mode of expressing the feeling—for, some feelings require a simple and clear style, others elegent, lively and even sharp. The earlier Indian rhetoricians examined the style independently of the feeling and did not endow the mood with the significance that it got later on. When the study of feelings was transferred from the domain of dramatic to that of narrative poetry, the style in the eyes of the theoreticians became one of the means of expressing feeling and lost its previous independent significance. Therefore, the Kashmir school which flourished in about 8th-9th centuries, did not regard the style as Daṇḍin and Vāmana had done. It distinguished only three main qualities of style—clarity which is a pre-requiste for any poetic work, whatever feeling it might express ; elegance (sweetness—Th. Stch.) of the style which is a necessary condition in all cases where love is sung of : liveliness, or energy and brilliance of style which is necessary where heroism or fear and terror are celebrated. Ānandavardhana says that the essence of poetry lies in the mood aroused by it, and the style is only an ancillary means for attaining the required mood. Just as heroism decorates the mind of a man, style decorates a poetic work the essence of which lies in the poetic mood aroused by it.

Why this difference is there in the opinions of the earlier and the later rhetoricians is quite clear. So long as the feeling and the moods were examined independently of the style as a distinctive feature of the dramatic poetry, style remained an essence of narrative poetry. When the feelings began to be given the primary importance, the style became the quality exclusively of sound system of the language. The author of the *Kāvyaprakāśa*[48], in his polemic with Vāmana says : "Imagine an entire work written in elegent style with sweet sounds (which, for a Indian means the abundance of vowels and labials, absence of palatals, sibilants, etc.—Th. Stch.). If here the subject-matter of a work and its predominant mood have nothing in common with the feeling of love etc. one cannot say that the style of such a work is elegant. Therefore, the elegance of style is only an external characteristic of the sound aspect of language and accompanies the expression of known feeling, not having any independent significance." Still later rhetoricians, therefore, directly defined style as the character of prevalent sounds—for a sweet style, abundance of vowels and labials without difficult-to-pronounce groups of consonants, and in a fiery style—an abundance of sibilants, particularly the combination *ca*.

Thus it is quite clear to us what the Indian theoreticians—the writers of the period when the poetics covered the study of moods, suggested meaning, figures and style—meant by the qualities of style (*guṇa*).

The view of the later theoreticians is not clear in many respects. Among the ten qualities of style, they have mentioned sweetness (*mādhurya*) and tenderness

48. Mammaṭa, *Kāvyaprakāśa*, Calcutta, 1891, b viii.

(*saukumārya*) as special qualities ; but from the examples given, it is difficult to have any specific idea as to what precisely the difference between them is. Dāṇḍin[49] defines sweetness as the presence of sweet mood in words and subject-matter. Here, the word "mood" (*rasa*) evidently has a far narrower significance ; it is the opposite of roughness, unrefinedness of expression. For instance, in the words "O girl, why do you not love me when I love you ?", there is neither sweetness of style nor mood. But the same thought can be expressed differently · "O beautiful girl with wonderful eyes ! You are lucky that the cruel God of love does not display his cruelty towards you. But to me, he is very unkind". Here we have the sweetness of style and mood. Tenderness, on the other hand, is defined by Daṇḍin[50] as the absence of the sharp difficult-to-pronounce sounds and cites the following example :

> "When the sky is covered with clouds, the peacocks dance merrily, winging their tails in their air and singing sweet song".

In this example, in Sanskrit, there are actually no difficult-to-pronounce sounds. In this connection, Daṇḍin remarks that the factual aspect here is not of much significance, but the tenderness of its sturcture, on the other hand, strikes the heart of a person who has a developed aesthetic taste. Here, obviously, he has in mind what later received the name of *dhvani*, viz., that form of hidden meaning of poetic speech, in which the direct expression of a fact is of secondary importance, and the latent figures or the mood are the main object of the poet. Vāmana[51] defines sweetness as the clarity of words, or the absence of long complex words, and tenderness as the absence of sharp sounds. No less difficult is the drawing of a line of demarcation between clarity (*prasāda*) and fluency (*śleṣa*). According to Daṇḍin, the former consists in the absence of difficult-to-understand words[52], and the latter in avoiding the difficult-to-pronounce sounds. Besides, Vāmana also distinguishes the sound clarity consisting in pronouncibility and sound fluency consisting in that the whole sentence is pronounced with the same fluency as if it were one word.[53] Vāmana also distinguishes the ten qualities of literary aspect of poetry and ten such qualities of the aspect of subject-matter, which taken together become twenty qualities.[54] Of course, in actual practice, it is not possible to draw any line of demarcation whatsoever ; Vāmana himself found it difficult to give suitable examples for this.

From the exposition of Daṇḍin, it is clear that the problems of various qualities of style were the subject of polemic between the different schools (*rīti*). By character or quality of style is meant the subject-matter and sometimes its external sound aspect. By fluency, for instance, *Vaidarbhī* school means the neighbourhood of sounds which are homogeneous or which are close in articulation. The Eastern school *Gauḍī* went still further and required alliteration (*anuprāsa*), since this gave to the style the character

49. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa*, i, 51.
50. *Ibid.*, i, 69.
51. Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkāra* iii, i, 18.
52. Daṇḍin, *Kāvyādarśa*, i, 45.
53. Vāmana, *Kāvyālaṃkāra*, ii, 2, 1-11.
54. *Ibid.*, iii, 1, 1-16.

of artificiality. This school generally preferred an unnatural, bombastic and pedantic style. *Vaidarbhī* school also equally preferred words which were clear in meaning ; the *Gauḍī* school liked words which were not in common use and had an obscure etymology. In all probability, the theory of poetry developed in various schools. Each of them developed the study of some special aspects of poetics. For instance, the Kashmiris became famous for their study of the suggested meaning of poetic speech. There were others who looked on everything from the point of view of stylistic qualities of errors. Some schools probably specialized further in the sound aspect of poetry and developed the study of sound sense (*vṛtti*). Finally, the theoretical study of drama gave rise to the study of feelings and moods, which was later transferred to the general domain of poetry. The study of rhetoric figures is the common achievement of all the schools.

It is clear that every school regarded that aspect of poetic speech, which it had studied, as the characteristic and substantial sign of poetry in general. Thus Vāmana considers style most important, Daṇḍin—rehetoric figures, Viśvanāthā—feelings (*rasa*), Ānandvardhana—*dhvani* or suggestion. In this, all of them quote the example of a human being. Just as a human being cansists of mind, body, organs and dress, poetry also consists of style, rhetoric figures, *rasa* and *dhvani*. Vāmana says that the soul of poetry is style ; Daṇḍin says that it is figures ; Viśvanātha—*rasa* ; and according to Ānandavardhana, *dhvani* is the soul of poetry, style—its body, feeling—organs, figures—dress.

We have tried above to show those aspects of Indian poetics and rhetorics which distinguish it from poetics and rhetorics of peoples of classical antiquity and also from modern poetics more or less sharply. Such aspects we regarded as the study of expression of feelings and moods in poetry and of suggested meaning of poetic speech. We also made a passing reference to the syncretism of Indian poetics developed from the combination of rhetorics on the one hand and theory of drama on the other.

This, however, does not exhaust the scientific interest of Indian poetics. Besides the sections mentioned, the Indian poetics has also worked out the study of rhetoric figures upto the minutest detail. The best treatises enumerate upto seventy main figures ; this does not include the mixed figures. Each figure is based on some comparison which, in its turn, is based on an associaton of ideas ; but the methods of expressing the comparison are infinite. The Indian rhetorics analyzed and systemized them in much greater detail than anywhere else.

On the other hand, the theory of Indian drama is of great scientific interest as an independent and original study of the method of development of theme in dramatic form. There have been some futile attempts to explain the development of Indian drama by Greek influence. It developed from the songs and dances which accompained, the mimicry, which is found mentioned in *Ṛgveda*—i.e. at the dawn of Aryan culture in India. Later, this theory worked up specific forms of Indian drama where each trifle was regulated by pedantic rules. The rules touched mainly the development of action or dramatic theme. Initially, the prologue gave either the so-called "seed" of the action, i.e. the conjectural information or the fact which is explained in the whole that is

developed later on and then leads to the "fruit". Just as a powerful plant, which carries the fruit, grows from the seed, a drama also is something that grows from a seed and ends with a fruit. The theoreticians enumerate as many as sixty-four acts and episodes, or the various stages of the development of the drama. Each of these has its own specific characteristics but it is not necessary that all of them should be present in every drama.

All these are the characteristics of Indian poetics. These apart, Indian poetry offers no less interesting material for historical poetics. The Indian literature covers historical development over almost fifty centuries and is worth the attention. It does not at all harmonize with the nature of historical development of literary genres, which was based primarily on the history of Greek literature. In Greece, the literary genres developed in the order : epic, lyric, drama. In India, however, this order is different : The development is based on the lyrical song—hymn, composed by an individual, a *ṛṣi* inspired by God. We do not find any indication that such personal work was preceded by chorus. It is true that the Indian culture was very rich even as early as about three thousand years B.C.[55] ; this is proved by the existence of singers, authors of sacred hymns and besides, by the references to the professional dancers who gave their performances in some special places suitably adapted for the purpose (*sabhā*). The period when the great epic poems, *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata*, were composed, is separated from the beginning of Vedic period by not less than twenty centuries ; the poetics, the main features of which we have just discussed, was formulated still ten centuries earlier.

The first traces of poetry, written according to the rules of the theory of poetry, goes back to 150 years B.C.[56] Its full development, however, did not take place earlier than 4th-6th centuries A.D. The poetics developed simultaneously with poetry itself ; when the forms of epic, lyric and drama were formulated, they were accepted as something essential. Just as Aristotle and Horatius generalised the forms of classical poetry and made them binding for the posterity, the Indian poetics too, having once created the rules of poetic genres, developed them in the minutest details and transformed them into an inflexible code, which completely arrested the freedom of poetic creation in the posterity.

Thus a study of the historical development of poetry in India also gives us the features of its likeness with the development of poetics in Greece and Rome and besides, its distinctive features which make it worthy of the same attention—that has heretofore been given to the poetry of Greece and Rome.

55. That the beginning of Vedic period of Indian culture dates from this time has been shown on the basis of astronomical data. *cf.* H. Jacobi, *Ueber das Alter des Ṛgveda.*—"*Festgruss an Rudolf von Roth*", Stuttgart, 1893 ; B. G. Tilak, *The Orion or Researches into the Antiquity of the Vedas*, Bombay, 1893.

56. We find extracts from poetry in Patañja]i's work (*Mahābhāṣya*, Calcutta, 1901) which dates from this period.

# SCIENTIFIC ACHIEVEMENTS OF ANCIENT INDIA

## INTRODUCTION

The progress of a nation, viewed in historical perspective, does not always proceed along a continuously advancing straight line. At times this progress is arrested, and the reverse process sets in. Though this phase may be more or less temporary, it may sometimes lead to even complete annihilation of the native population from the arena of history and its replacement by the aliens. The historical development of the peoples is checked by wars—external and especially internal—particularly when they continue too long. But, then, they also do some good provided they are followed by spells of peace and order—sometimes on a larger territory than that involved in war. The history of the Indian peoples, as that of no other people on earth, for four thausand years of which more or less accurate data are available, is full of such examples of zigzag advance and arrest of culture. We see clearly that during these four thousand years of India's history, in the few epochs when the country was united under one power, was well governed, and was not subject to foreign yoke, it made rapid advance in all directions. The remarkably rich and large territory of the country and the high degree of competence of the people apparently secured the possibility of its rapid progress. And in fact, when in the fourth century B.C., in the course of its aggressive advance on the East, the Greek civilization reached India, it met resistance from the high Brahmin culture which was in no way inferior to the Greek civilization. Alexander's forces were found inadequate for conquering even a small part of Indian territory. The towns founded and the population left behind by him were fast submerged in the surrounding Indian environment, exerting little or almost no influence.

There are, on the whole, two distinct periods in the history of India when large territory of the country was united under one power, was well governed, and was strong enough not only to repel any foreign attack but also to march on the path of progress. The first of these is that immediately following Alexander's invasion ; the other—and a more prolonged one—is that from the fourth to the seventh century A.D. During all other periods, India appears to us a picture of disorder, internal discord and weakness as compared to her neighbours, who flowed into her territory in a continuous stream and dominated the country one after another. The Persians, the Greeks, the Scythians, the Parthians, the Turks, the Huns, the Arabs, the Afghans, the Mongols, and then the Portuguese, the Dutch, the French and lastly the British,—all avidly strove for the domination of the country, whose legendary riches, high culture and unusual weakness held out promises of rich gain,—until the British finally overpowered all the rivals and united the whole country under their sway. But the most terrible and irreparable blow that India, like many other countries, received was that from the snow-slip of the Muslim conquest and destruction. As also in other countries, nothing in India could withstand the energy of Islam. What happened in many other countries did not, however, happen

in India. The Indian culture did not vanish once and for all. What happened in India was something unusual and almost singular in the history of humanity : the national life withdrew within its ancient heritage and preserved itself within the so-called caste structure and in particular alliances of religious character imbued with the spirit of extreme conservatism, culturally absolutely static, inaccessible to any outside influence, and at the same time highly submissive to any power, resigned to any foregin aggression —not having the capacity to show any resistance whatsoever. Under this strict caste system, no progress could have been possible.

## CHARACTER OF THE PEOPLE

The scientific achievements of the Indians are closely related to their national character, which has left its imprint on all their work. What strikes most a student of the history of Indian scholarship is the excessive development of the imaginative powers of the Indians. In any work, some imagination is absolutely essential. Not to speak of poetry and philosophy, no hypothesis is possible without imagination. Its exceptional or prominent development, however, becomes a setback : it alienates a person from reality, that is from truth and may lead him so far away that the gulf between fantasy and reality may become unbridgeable. It would be unfair to say that the flight of fantasy in India was absolutely unchecked. Normally, proceeding from a rational basis and developing with inexorable logic, this fantasy works in a known direction along specfic lines ; the idea is worked out upto the end till it leads either to a blind alley or to absurdity. The remark made by the leading modern mathematician-philosopher, Bertrand Russell, that one wishing to be a philosopher must learn not to be scared of absurdity, is fully applicable to the Indian methods of work. The Indians never feared carrying things to absurdity if their inexorable logic so demanded. Such disposition of the people, it is clear, made them take up primarily those sciences which were dominated by the method of speculation—the method *a priori*—viz. inference of a result theoretically from some principles established or accepted beforehand on belief. This is why philosophy has been the strongest side of Indian scholarship. This field is still far from being fully known to us ; one might even say that the veil has hardly been lifted from the colossal riches of Indian philosophical thought. And nevertheless, we have witnessed what revelation the first light of Indian thought has brought to Europe in spite of its having reached through the prism of bad translations. Schopenhaeur's system, as its author himself acknowledged, was much indebted to Indian influence. But the pioneer work in this field is still only in its infancy. The greatest Indian thinkers, Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, are almost still unknown to Europe.

As regards experimental sciences, one cannot say that the Indians did not at all know experiment and observation. On the contrary, they were very good observers. We have highly significant embryos of a majority of experimental sciences during the

glorious period of Indian scholarship. However, in this respect, they lag behind other nations particularly the Greeks. During the period of decadence and difficult living condititions, the experimental sciences completely vanished whereas the favourite contemplation of Indians went on.

## PHYSICS

Indian physics represents the transition state from pure philosophical speculation to experimental science. We have a number of theories about the structure and evolution of the material world from the primary substance. From the most ancient times, we find in India a number of cosmogonic systems, gradually passing over from mythological conceptions to distinctive scientific theories. The earliest system that is fit to be called scientific is the Sāṃkhya. According to it, the whole world with all its diversity—everything of the nature of unorganised matter, all the plants and the entire world of animals—everything is basically and essentially material. This diversity includes not only the inert mass but also the active forces and conscious processes, yet all this is derived by evolution from one primeval matter. This system cannot be called fully materialistic, for here the conscious processes do not invariably arise out of the material ones, and a special conscious constituent is assumed to exist separately from matter. This conscious constituent is present in the process of evolution of matter, as it were, but it does not participate in it. By itself, it is absolutely inactive. All psychical processes are the processes of matter and special material forces. But among the constituents of matter, there is one that is akin to the spiritual one and is capable of perceiving and reflecting its static being. This spiritual element can, however, be safely ignored, for it plays no role in the process of evolution of matter. In all other respects, the system is fully materialistic, for the whole complex process of evolution is accomplished by matter from out of its own forces without any outside interference or control of the conscious will. Therefore, in the beginning of the universe, we have only one shapeless, indivisible, unbounded, all-pervading, indestructible, eternal primeval matter which none has created and none control. But its unity and immobility are caused only by the fact that the forces flowing in it are linked in a state of equilibrium. When this equilibrium is destroyed under the influence of undetermined transcendental causes, the primeval matter is found to have three different constituents—i.e. the constituent mentioned above, which is capable of developing into consciousness ; the opposite constituent of inert mass ; and the active consituent of forces or energies, under the influence of which the whole process takes place. These energies are conceived as a constituent, which has no mass or weight but has a quantum in every real product of matter. All the three constituents—mass, energy and conscious—are inseparably linked to each other. The primeval matter is a continuous limitless substance consisting of infinitely small particles of these three inter-acting constituents. The nature of their interaction is such that one cannot exist independently of the others. Energy cannot exist without mass ; the conscious presentations do not occur without

energy. The presentation finally obtained however, depends on the constituent that is predominant. Thus, for instance, a material body in a state of rest shows the predominance of mass ; the energy is linked here but the conscious constituent is not at all developed. The same body in motion shows the dominance of the constituent of energy ; the mass i.e. resistance is overcome and the conscious constituent is not developed. In a conscious wilful motion, the appearance of energy is due to the predominance of conscioue constituent and the presence of the inert constituent is expressed in the overcoming of hindrances. In the primeval matter also, all the three constituents do not come into being, for which it is necessary that here and there one of them should become dominant and thus release a part of the interlinked constituents. The process begins when the individual particles of the three constituents scattered indifferently in the primeval matter, arrange themselves to form a whole under the influence of natural affinity. This results in uneven pressure in various parts of matter, and the single undifferentiated matter yields to various bodies which go on forming gradually—all different from each other.

Unlike in other atomistic systems, evolution does not take place here by the accumulation of atoms. The atoms are there but they are formed later : there are still three stages of infra-atomic development and the atom is not the first one. Every atom has all the three universal constituents of primeval matter. The evolution generally takes place in the matter as a whole ; it is described as the process of transformation of homogeneous, indeterminate and undifferentiated mass into heterogeneous, determinate and organised bodies. In the process of evolution, nothing is added or taken off ; matter can be neither created nor destroyed. The sum-total of matter as a whole—its three constituents—remains constant, if all its states, actual and potential are taken into account. The elements of matter are in eternal motion, which cannot stop even for a single moment. Any material process—any growth or decay—is nothing but a redistribution of the particles of matter, its transition from past to present, from present to future or from potential to actual state. The redistribution of mass and energy gives rise to all the diversity of material world, plants and animals. The process of evolution of primeval matter begins when its three component constituents are seperated from each other. Later, this separation becomes obvious. All the Indian systems are formulated on the basis that matter, fully determinate and cognisable, consists of a number of sensual qualities—of smells, tastes, touches, colours and sounds. We know of no other matter outside these qualities. Therefore, there are five forms of matter corresponding to our five senses. Though they are called earth, water, fire, air and ether, what is however meant by these is only the various agents causing their respective sensations. Thus, in the evolution of matter, bifurcation takes place along two different lines : one—for the products with the predominance of the element capable of forming consciousness, thus giving rise to substances with consciousness and sense organs ; and the other—where inert matter is predominant, and we get its five forms corresponding to

five senses. First, matter is formed—though differentiated yet subtle, containing only the capacity of showing the respective qualities. Thereafter, further evolution takes place, when these elements are condensed into real sensual qualities.

This is how this process takes place : At first, in the most subtle rarefied primeval matter, are formed separate points of rotatory motion—whirlwinds of its type—containing potentially the capacity of sound. Then, these points are so condensed that the real atom of ether is formed out of them. This atom having its special energy decomposes under the influence of the same primeval released energy and creates a new centre of new energy, generating the possibility of touch in it, which then forms an atom of matter of touch. The material atoms of fire and of taste and smell are also formed in the same manner. Thus every subsequent atom possesses all the qualities of the previous ones so that the atom of hard matter possesses all the sensual qualities—sound, taste, touch, heat and finally smell.

## VAIŚEṢIKA SYSTEM

Other Indian atomistic systems originated from the notion of infinitely small dimension. In the most ancient literature, there are speculations on the infinitely small bodies. The soul, conceived as the body having absolutely no dimension, was at that time considered such an entity. In the Vaiśeṣika system, the atoms are divided into complex—having minimum dimension—and simple dimensionless mathematical points. These points, however, have potential qualities,—corresponding to the four main senses—on the basis of which they are divided into four categories. In this system, sound and its corresponding element, ether, do not have atomic strueture. Ether only fills the empty space between the dimensionless points of simple atoms. In order to form a complex atom, it is necessary to have at least six such dimensionless points which, together with ether filling the space between them, form something like a prism. It is only homogeneous atoms of the same category that can form a complex atom ; the heterogeneous simple atoms cannot form anything. Since in simple atoms, the qualities are only potential—in the form of imperceptible forces—it is necessary that some homogeneous points should arrange themselves in a special compound, which is called creative and is analogous to the chemical one. In matter as existing in the universe, atoms cannot exist freely without combination with others. Any specific quality is always traced back to a compound of two atoms with potential qualities of the same type. The only exception is air which, some scholars opine, is the aggregate of free atoms—which, so to say, do not join the chemical compound. The Vaiśeṣika system did not in any way negate the fact that bodies consist even of heterogeneous atoms having different qualities ; but this so-called extraneous qualities will have only subordinate and secondary importance in the formation of the body. A body consists mainly of matter ; the atoms of other categories only further the main process of formation of the body. The temperature developed in the chemical processes always presupposes the existence of solid so-called earth atoms. Neither air nor water can heat up by itself.

## THE ATOMIC THEORY OF THE JAINAS

The theory of the Jainas is distinguished from the Vaiśeṣika system in that the former assumes the existence primarily of the homogeneous atoms only—those of matter, in general. Each atom is an infinitely small quantity and is, by itself, devoid of qualities. These qualities, however, do exist potentially ; each atom thus possesses taste, smell, colour, temperature and other special tangible qualities which can cause amalgamation of atoms forming new bodies. For this, mere neighbourhood of the atoms is not enough ; more of mutual conjunction is necessary, for which they must have opposite qualities. Two homogeneous atoms cannot blend together. One must be, so to say, positive and the other negative—or, if they are homogeneous, the intensity of one quality must be at least more than twice that of the other. When two atoms of opposite qualities blend together, something like mutual attraction takes place between them. If the amalgamation is caused by the intensity of one element, the higher degree of intensity absorbs the lower one. All changes in the qualities of compounds are explained by the nature of their mutual attraction.

## THE ATOMIC THEORY OF THE BUDDHISTS

The most interesting atomic theory in India is perhaps that of the Buddhists. They generally start by negating the existence of every eternal substance. They pictured the world as a photoplay consisting of unique flashes of light. Strictly speaking, there is no matter ; there exist only forces. At first, it was the existence of spiritual substance only that was denied. This gave rise to a controversy between the Brāhmaṇas and Buddhists on the existence of soul. The Buddhists, on the whole, were great negaters. They negated the existence not only of God and soul, but also of every substance. The soul was replaced by separate mental elements or ideas and matter by individual forces. Thc flashes of these forces were not in any way connected with each other ; they did not belong to any substance. They were linked to each other in the regular whole of the universe only by the fact that their appearances or flashes were regulated by laws of strict causality. Just as the light of a lamp appears to an observer as a lasting object—in reality, there is a new flash of light every moment —exactly so, all other material elements, i.e. colour, sound, taste, smell and touch are nothing but a chain of recurring flashes. Thus, an atom is nothing but a momentary flash, appearing according to specific laws in relation to all other flashes which the world consists of. But not a single atom like this is ever met in nature. We have in nature only complex atom, each atom having at least eight parts of which four are of the nature of primary forces, and the other four—of dependent secondary forces. The primary forces are earth, water, fire and air, but what we actually mean by these is the forces of reflection, adhesion, heating and movement. Thus the complex atoms and everything that consists of them possess these four forces. For instance, a flame has a motion, a temperature, an arrangement of particles and a certain elasticity because of the presence of these forces in the basic element—the complex atom.

Besides these four basic forces, each such atom has four secondary qualities, namely, the atom of colour, the atom of taste, the atom of smell and the atom of touch. Each of these secondary qualities is an individual element, linked to the rest only in the sense that it appears simultaneously—or in other words, simultaneously flashes out. Here, there should be four basic atoms for every secondary atom. The atom of organized matter, which the living bodies consist of, is still more complex in structure. The whole living body is represented as covered with thin matter, which is compared with the light matter appearing in scintillation, when emanating from a precious stone. It has no weight ; it cannot be dissected since a hard object can pass freely through it. After death, it vanishes without leaving any residue ; no trace of it is found in the dead body. It also has atomic structure. In the same way, we have secondary atoms of matter, which is living, visual, auditory, and which can perceive the smells, the tastes and the touches. In this case too, each moment of such matter cannot appear without the support of the four basic forces.

## MEDICINE

Coming to the field of experimental sciences, it is necessary first to note the advancement of the Indians in chemistry and botany. Both these sciences had practical importance as necessary branches of medicine. The Indians regard medicine as the oldest of the sciences and, in all probability, its sources were borrowed from the Babylonians. The Indian medicine originated from the notion that a body remained healthy if there was equilibrium of the three basic secret fluids, which are there in a human and animal body and are controlled by the normal performance of its functions.

These concepts, on the whole, corresponded to Hippocratic humoral pathology. They were passed on by the Arabs to medieval Europe where they held sway right upto the beginning of the nineteenth century. But it is difficult to say whether these notions were borrowed by the Greeks from the Indians, or reversely, by the Indians from the Greeks. It is probable that their medical concepts, as those, of the other peoples, have been taken from ancient Babylon. In any case, there has been an active exchange of medical knowledge between both the cultured peoples of that time, which is evident from the large number of important prescriptions for various diseases. In fact, these ideas of humoral pathology were only the theoretical side of the affair. They did not at all interfere with accurate observation, not to speak of experimentation. The Indian medical literature gives us a number of fine descriptions of various diseases and of the medicinal effects of various herbs and preparations. However, the specialists in the field opine that Indian achievements are far behind those of the Greeks. The physiological concepts of the Indians are not based on observation, for the Indians were afraid of touching a dead body because of their religious convictions. In this field, they did not have the precise knowledge ; the whole picture of human body and its physiological functions was drawn purely on the basis of the theory and the most irrepressible oriental fantasy.

## SURGERY

Surgery was the most illustrious aspect of ancient Indian medicine. Since olden days, the Indian doctors were renowned for their surgical operations. In plastic surgery, they had achieved such perfection that the European surgery of the nineteenth century had to borrow some methods from them. Comparatively large number of cases of chopping of noses in punishment for various crimes had made it necessary that a nose be created artificially. Same is the case with the creation of artificial ears and lips. In the field of opthalmology, the cataract was well known to the Indians ; they had described it in detail and had also given a method for removing it surgically. They were also fully acquainted with and widely applied the most daring operations in cases of abnormal delivery, various methods of laporotomy and enterorrhaphy. The number of sharp instruments used in these cases was 20 and that of the blunt ones 181. It is remarkable that in the decadent period of Indian culture, even surgery fell into decay. Though popular medicine generally continued to exist—and it exists even now along with modern medicine taught in the universities on European model—yet it is evident that the living conditions in the period of decadence were not conducive to its development. The atmosphere heretofore, in which the complicated operations were possible, was no longer there ; the complex surgical methods, therefore, gradually fell into oblivion.

## BOTANY

The advancement of madicine would have been unthikable, if the sprouts of two other subsidiary sciences—botany and chemistry—were not there. The rich Indian flora gave rich meterial for gathering medicinal plants and studying their effects. In the treatises on medicine dating from the ancient period, we find descriptions of about five hundred herbs and their uses in pathology. We also find various attempts at their classification, but these are very elementary and superficial. The Indian botany of the glorious period did not reach the stage when a scientific classification could be made.

During the later decadent period, when medicine itself started falling into oblivoin, there was still less chance of having such a scientific classification. A specific branch of study was that of the toxic means—poisons and various herbs. In the still earlier period, when all was not quiet—viz. in the Maurya period (contemporary of the period of Alexander Macedonian) when the Maurya dynasty was in power—poison was the usual means of political struggle of various groups in the courts. And we know that in the kitchen of every ruler, there always used to be a learned *brāhmaṇa*—an expert in poisonous substances—who was responsible for examining the food prepared for the ruler, so that there was no possibility of any poisonous substance being mixed.

## CHEMISTRY

In ancient India, chemistry served medicine on one hand—in the preparation of a number of medicines—and technology on the other—for preparing colours, steels,

cements, spirits, etc. Of the metallic medicines, mercury was particularly popular. The Indians could extract and purify mercury and use it for various complex preparations. Its medicinal effect was considered very strong. There was an assumption that it was possible to obtain such a perfect mercury compound that could give not only health but also immortality. The number of various mercury compounds known was as high as 18. There also existed a special school of chemists and alchemists, which endowed mercury with the importance of being the basic element of the universe. The Indians generally had knowledge of even metals and their oxides. They also knew that some of these were chemical compounds. They had various theories of chemical affinity and described practical preparation of various metallic salts. Fine sheets of metal were covered with salts and then heated. The well-known author of the Indian treatise on metallurgy, Nāgārjuna, gives directions for preparation of complex metallic salts and amalgams, and for the extraction, purification and precipitation of metals. He is, however, particularly known for his mercury compounds. Another famous chemist, Patañjali, is known for his invention of a special mixture (called *vidas*) which contained nitric acid. The chemists diligently engaged themselves in the preparation of complex substances from the simple and in the decomposition of the complex into simple ones. Various chemical processes generally described in the ancient treatises are those of extraction, purification, tempering, calcination, powdering, liquxefying, precipitation, washing, drying, steaming, melting, filing, etc. Later, all these processes were applied to various metals, using special apparatuses and reagents and heating to different degrees—high, average and low. Though these methods had not been perfected, they did give the desired results, maintly by the use of various strong reagents containing nitric, sulphuric and hydrochloric acids. The method of preparing, silver nitrate from the ashes of plants and that of preserving caustic alkali in a metallic vessal so amazed the French chemist, Berthelot, that he doubted the authenticity of the Indian source. He surmised that the prescriptions had probably been borrowed from Europe and inserted in an ancient Indian treatise as a later addition. But it can be easily proved against him that the method has been described in all the earliest treatises ; the information on the use of silver nitrate has been taken from the ancient Buddhist literature.

## TECHNOLOGY

The progress of chemistry also influenced its practical application in technical production. Various methods for preparing cements had already been known to India since olden days. In the 7th century, a special method was invented for manufacturing cement. Its unusual strength, as seen in the old structures which are still not ruined even in the smallest degree, amazes us. The Indians say that it can withstand destructive influence for a milliard years. In the seventh century, we come across references to various specialists in structure of machines and apparatuses, in preparation of dyes, colouring matter, and also sprits and cosmetics. Three technical inventions have particularly enhanced the reputation of the Indian industrial technology and secured

for it such excellence as that of the British industry of the 19th century. It is difficult to form even the slightest notion of the huge commerce that India conducted with the West in the ancient times. Not being in a position to export anything to India, the Roman Empire was economically shattered because of the huge amount of gold that had to be sent to India in payment for the Indian goods. Recently, a store house of Roman coins which had in it eighteen man-loads of gold coins was discovered in one place in India. The flourishing of this export trade was due to the superiority of Indian technology. Two of these three main inventions were the fast red dye prepared from a combination of madder with alums ; and the blue dye extract prepared from indigo by a method which is analogous to modern chemical processes. Because of these inventions, India started meeting the demand for dyes of the whole cultured world of that time. In this respect, it had the same position at that time as that of Germany after the invention of anyline dyes. The third invention was an advanced method for tempering steel—which gave the so-called Damask-steel to the middle ages.

## MATHEMATICS

The greatest progress that the Indians made was in the field of mathematics, especially algebra and arithmetic. They have to their credit such achievements that were much in advance of those of the Greeks and are close to modern European science.

In the field of geometry and astronomy, on the other hand, they were far behind the Greeks, and that is why they were strongly influenced by the latter. Since it is widely believed that Pythagoras borrowed his mathematical knowledge and his whole philosophy from India, it appears that this influence was reciprocal in the early stages. The famous Pythagorian theorem was known to the Indians in the most ancient—the so-called Vedic—age. But in the 2nd century A.D., we already see clear traces of Greek influence. Indian astronomy was completely under Greek influence—borrowing from the latter everything right upto the whole range of terminology which was not even translated. In the 8th and 9th centuries, the Indians became teachers of the Arabs. The Indian astronomers were invited to the court of the Caliph in Baghdad. The Arabs then passed on the knowledge so acquired to the European West. Like all other sciences, the glorious period of Indian astronomy and mathematics dates from 5th-7th centuries—the time of the great Indian astronomers, Āryabhaṭṭa (5th cent.) and Varāhamihira (6th cent.). Their works were translated also into the Arabic language and are studied even now by the special school of Indian astronomers, which continues to exist despite a totally different modern European astronomy taught in the universities. After 7th century, like all other fields of Indian life, astronomy too has its period of decadence—a static period—all under the influence of the same political conditions and war to which everything else had fallen a victim. Nevertheless, pure mathematics—algebra and especially arithmetic—continued to develop even in these difficult times.

After the 11th century, however, with the complete disappearance of Buddhism from India, the leading mathematicians also disappeared.

The last well-known astronomer and mathematician, Bhāskara, lived in the 11th century. In this field, the Indians were apparently found to be more gifted by nature than all other peoples of the past. This special natural disposition of the Indians resulted in the amazing development of mathematical art. They invented a system of calculation by figures, to which values were assigned—depending upon their relative position alongside other figures. The Indians then passed on this indisputable invention of theirs to the Arabs and, through them, to the whole civilized world. The most important step in this system of figures was the invention of *zero* which we come across in the 5th century. It was, in all probability, invented a little earlier, but was, like all other Indian inventions, kept a secret—confined to the special school of scholars only. In the beginning of the 18th century, when the Russian system of education came in contact with the Tibetan system in Trans-Baikal, the system of figures was surprisingly found to be the same in both of them. Coming from India, this system completed a full cycle of migration and returned to India from the opposite end. As compared to all other nations, the Indian mind devoted much more attention to figures. This is seen from a study of Sanskrit where there are, from the olden times, special words for much higher numbers (this is not so in the languages of other peoples) in addition to the general Indo-European words for denoting "hundred" and "thousand". In the most ancient epic, *Mahābhārata*, we find special words denoting such numbers as hundred-thousand-billion.

Archimedes is known to have studied the problem whether the symbols available with the Greeks would be found adequate if it were necessary to count the particles of sand which our planet consists of. For the Indians, this would have been the least difficult, for there are words in Sanskrit language which can denote the highest numbers. Thus, it is not merely a matter of chance that the concept and the symbol of *zero* together with the whole decimal system of figures were invented in India and not anywhere else. Comparing Indian mathematics with all other Indian sciences—physics, atomic theory, psychology, epistemology, metaphysics—we find that the Indian mind always approached the concept of maximum value from all aspects, irrespective of whether the value was intensive or extensive, and that it was this train of thought that ultimetely found expression in the invention of *zero* for denoting the concept which had already been prepared and worked out from all angles. One of the later Indian mathematician defined the value of *zero* as follows (his words are, of course, applicable even to the earlier period of Indian mathematics) :

> If we go on decreasing the divisor successively, the quotient will correspondingly go on increasing. If the divisor is reduced to the maximum possible limit, the quotient also increases to the maximum. But so long as the latter has some specific value, however high, it cannnot be considered to have increased to

maximum limit, for one can still find a higher value. The quotient is, therefore, an undefined value and is rightly called infinite.

This is also the modern mathematical concept of maximum value. With its establishment, the transition of Indian science to the field of higher mathematics was completed. We find the same train of thought even in the field of physics—in the atomic theory. In the ancint Indian systems, an atom was regarded as the minimum possible value. But so long as it is still a specific value, it cannot be regarded as the minimum. The Buddhist and Brahmanical systems, therefore, considered an atom a complex molecule—the result of the action of infra-atomic forces. Such infra-atomic forces are real mathematical points ; they are infinitely small and have neither dimension nor time nor value. The real atom is formed by their special integration. We come across a similar course of thought in Indian psychology which states the complex character of even the simplest thought. If in a thought, there is no generalisation, no synthesis of past and present, or of the individual and the whole, it is totally empty—the so-called pure thought, which does not contradict any object, every object being the result of synthesis. Thus every thought, howsoever primitive, is the result of the synthesis of elements which have no psychic content or where the content is infinitely small. This thought is called emptiness or *zero* ; both the contents are denoted by the same Sanskrit word *śūnya*. Indian epistemology and metaphysics both use the concept of maximum value as the point of departure in the formulation of their systems. In this connection, it is not surprising that Indian astronomy was familiar with the principles of differential calculus. This information took the British astronomers by great surprise. But, after additional data were placed before them, they had to acknowledge that the method employed by the Indians in the 12th century for finding out the longitude of the planets was closely similar, if not identical, to the formula employed in modern mathematical astronomy.

The Indians differentiated between the velocity of a planet measured roughly and that measured accurately. They had special technical terms for denoting velocity during a small indefinite interval of time. The difference between finite time and indefinite or infinitely small time is also mentioned. The Indian astronomers had a special term for denoting a particular small unit of time, approximately equal to 1/34000th part of a second. For calculating the so-called momentary motion of a planet, i.e. the motion during a mathematical moment, Bhāskara compares the successive positions of the planet. For this, he regards the velocity of the planet as constant during the respective interval of time, which is thus not more than 1/34000th part of a second but approximately may be even less. This momentary motion is, therefore, a differential concept—the differential planetary longitude. It is thus clear that the concept itself of the momentary motion and the method of determining it were known to Bhāskara ; he can, therefore, be acknowledged as the predecessor of Isaac Newton in the discovery of the principle of differential calculus.

In Sanskrit, the scientific exposition was almost always in metric form. For almost every concept, therefore, it was necessary to have a number of synonyms so that the word, most befitting to the verse, could be selected. All the mathematical concepts and figures have a whole mass of synonyms, determined on the basis of some associations. For instance, the word for 'eye" denotes the figure 2, and the word for "season"—the figure 3. In one of our earliest sources, *zero* has been called emptiness, that is, it is denoted by the same word (*śūnya*) which, almost in the same period, has been used in one of the Buddhist systems for denoting the concept of limit with regard to the relativity and changeability of the whole empirical world. In this source, *zero* is still not denoted by a circle but by a point. But among the many synonyms used for denoting *zero*, the word *ambara* which means 'sky' or 'empty space' became more widespread subsequently. Probably this is how *zero* came to be represented by a circle—empty from inside.

Though the progress in the field of mathematics—especially calculus—continued in India somewhat longer than that in all other sciences, this too nevertheless came to an end. No more distinguished mathematicians are found after the 12th century—the period following the Muslim conquest. However, the Indian achievements in this field are acknowledged as highly significant. The Indians are rightly considered the direct predecessors of J. Lagrange. The Indian arithmetic enumerates six simple arithmetical rules. Raising to the second and third power and taking square-root and cubic root are included in simple rules. Of the higher mathematical rules, the Indians were familiar with the summing up of arithmetical series, geometrical progressions, irrational square-root, solving of definite and indefinite equations of first degree right upto the solving of indefinite equations of the second degree. At this point, their achievements came to an end ; their direct successor here is J. Lagrange who had to discover again and develop this process further. Thus, in the field of mathematics, the achivements of the Indians are the greatest as compared with those of the other ancient peoples. It is to them that the whole civilized world is indebted for the invention of our system of figures—so unjustly called Arabic. It is high time that their real name—the Indian—is restored to them. From what has been stated above, it is clear that these achievements were not merely a matter of chance, but had been worked out by incessant hard work in all provinces of abstract thought.

By thus reviewing the history of India, we see that it had its epoch of cultural progress, which, however, was soon arrested under the effect of unfavourable historical conditions. Undoubtedly, we are at present at a sharp turn in the history of Indian scholarship...

# ESTABLISHMENT OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MINDS

A free translation of Dharmakīrti's *Santānāntara-siddhi*
and Vinītadeva's *Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭīkā*

## PREFACE

The publication of this series was conceived by Academician S. F. Ol'denbug and myself as early as 1914. At the suggestion of S. F. Ol'denburg, the Academy of Sciences decided to undertake the publication of translations of monumental works of Indian philosophy from Sanskrit and other Oriental languages into Russian or other languages of Europe. Such a series, it then seemed, had to appear to meet the growing demand of the Russian and European scholarship on the one hand and that of the Russian reading public on the other. Our knowledge in this field still could not be deemed to be more than a mere conjecture on the nature of Indian philosophy. Though the works of Professor Garbe on Sāṃkhya system and those of Professors Thibaut and Deussen on the Vedānta had laid a stable foundation for an accurate knowledge of the two Indian philosophical systems, yet viewed from the immense vastness of this province of knowledge, their works had done no more than merely lifting the veil from the unknown. The main Indian philosophical system, the one which diligently worked out Indian logic and epistemology—the Nyāya system—still remained to be studied and its main treatises were yet to be translated into any European language. Buddhism and Jainism still remained primarily religious teachings, and their philosophical principles vague and inconsistent. The Indian thought on the whole still remained enveloped in the mist of oriental fantasy and the orderly forms of its consistent logical theories were hidden from the keen sight of the historians of philosophy owing first to the inadequacy of the material available to them and second to the lack of any systematic methods for its scientific study. Besides this stage of scientific knowledge, there could be discerned, in the wider circles of reading public, a morbid interest in Indian philosophy caused by the hazy state of our knowledge of the subject and the various fables of supernatural powers rampant therein. Of course, the latter circumstance also springs from the fact that compared to the European philosophy, the Indian thought is pervaded by mystic moods, states of philosophical immersion into pure thought, ecstasy and similar states to a much greater extent. Ecstatic states almost invariably play some role in most of the Indian philosophical systems. But mysticism in the object of our study does not at all give us the right to convert our knowledge of it into some new mysticism. Indian mysticism has been systematized by the Indians themselves with remarkable precision and is fully logical ; its study naturally is confined to fully rational forms. Translation of works of such an author as Vasubandhu—the works, speckled with the comments of a sharp and sobre mind on ecstatic states—would assist, more than any other studies in this line, in widening the horizons and taking an objective view of Indian mysticism.

This is why we felt that the publication of a series of translations, made in keeping with the specfic principles of accurate rendering not of words but of the meaning of Indian texts, with appropriate elucidations, would meet the growing demand of the Russian reading public. These were our proposals in 1914.

The works selected for translation in the first instance were those of Vācaspatimiśra on all Indian philosophical systems, the main treatises of the Nyāya system, seven treatises of Dharmakīrti, Dignāga's work on logic and Vasubandhu's *Abhidharmakośa* containing the system of early Buddhism. Of these, the *Nyāyakaṇikā*, the work of Vācaspatimiśra on Mīmāṃsā system and the present treatise by Dharmakīrti, *Santānāntarasiddhi* ( Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds ), were ready for the press.

The war, the revolution, and an almost complete impossibility of continuing the publishing work of the Academy shattered this promising start. It now after the expiry of almost six years, when it was so difficult to publish anything, even a small part of the previous plan can be accomplished, this is primarily due to the services of those scholars, who in spite of all difficulties and privations, did not think of fleeing from their motherland, believed all along in its inevitable and quick reconstruction and spared no endeavours to combat the devastation. Let this small volume serve as the beginning of the accomplishment of the programme conceived by the Academy in 1914.

This first issue of the series *Monuments of Indian Philosophy* contains translations of works of two authors, devoted to the same subject—Dharmakīrti's *Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds* and Vinītadeva's commentary thereon ; the latter being put immediately after the passages of the text of Dharmakīrti which are explained by it. Dharmakīrti's work has been spaced out while Vinītadeva's commetary has been printed in the usual type. [In the present translation, the former is given in comparatively shorter paras.] The *Appendix* gives a literal translation of both the texts. [The *Appendix* is not reproduced here.]

The principles followed in the translation of Indian philosophical texts, often written laconically and speckled with a mass of technical terms, have already been enunciated by us in the preface to the translation of Dharmakīrti's treatisee on logic (St. Petersburg, 1903). The difficulties encountered in the translations of Indian scientific treatise are mostly philological ; the literal translation often being totally obscure and not a translation for purposes of reading but a treatise for a philological study of the text. Usually, because of the shortage of space, this literal translation is given only in special cases, when there is wide divergence between the words of the original and their meaning as expressed in the language of translation. The small size of the works published in this issue has enabled us also to give their full literal translation, which I repeat, may be important only to those who are in a position to use the Tibetan original.

The data on the period, life and works of both the authors have been given by

me in the first volume of my work *Teoriya Poznaniya i Logika po Ucheniyu Pozdneishikh Buddistov ( Theory of Knowledge and Logic According to Later Buddhists*, St. Petersburg, 1903 ). The data on the third author who has written on the same subject, the Mongol savant Dandar (bsTan-dar) Lha-rampa, have been given by me in the preface to the publication of the respective texts (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, xix).

The question as to what forms the basis of our belief in the existence of other conscious beings besides our own selves is one of the most difficult in philosophy, though our commonplace thinking refuses even to see any problem whatsoever therein. We are indebted to Professor I. I. Lapshin for his fine essay on the history of this question and the replies to it given from time to time. From this review, it is clear that the question is important not so much for its own sake but as a testing stone for philosophical systems to which the reply to it refers either more or less successfully. In India, this question arose naturally in connection with the establishment of spiritualistic monism in the later Buddhist philosophy or, as it is usually called, idealism. Once this idealistic view of the world—according to which there are no external objects at all outside our representations—was established in philosophy, it gave rise to the view that even living beings did not exist outside us, that they too were merely our representations or, in other words, to the point of view directly leading to solipcism. But since for many reasons mankind is not inclined to reconcile itself with such a result, realism, apparently victorious, proudly raises its head and poses the question of external mind, not so much for the establishment of its existence as for refuting idealism by showing that it leads to absurdity.

Dharmakīrti's treatise also opens with the polemic against ordinary realism. According to the rules of Indian dialectics, the author may not express his own view at once but may confine himself to showing the unacceptability of the viewpoint of the opponent, resulting from his very views, or from some other principles. When the question is examined on this plane, the whole difference between idealism and realism is reduced to that of language. All that the Realist affirms in his language,—that is, if there are no purposive movements and speech in the external world, the external mind too cannot exist,—can be repeated by the Idealist in his language, affirming that if we did not have any representations of other's movements and speech there would also be no external mind causing them and since we do have such representations, there must also be some cause or other for them.

Examining the question on this plane is, in the opinion of Dharmakīrti, a futile verbal wrangling, which cannot lead to any positive result. The following argument of the Realist is supposed to be more substantial. Since inference presupposes the establishment of an invariable connection between two facts, argues the Realist, the Idealist

may speak only of subjective connection—the connection between his will and his movements—and not of any connection between other's movements and other will, for the other will is not directly observed by him. To this, the Idealist replies that this, indeed, is not directly observed. But it is observed by the Realist no more than by the Idealist. Hence, even here both the parties are at least on equitable positions. The Realist also attempts to establish that the fact of an invariable connection between the will and the movements would have to be restricted to the case of the movements and speech accomplished within the limits of one's own self, so that the concept of purposive movement, in general, would have purely subjective content, signifying only one's own movements and speech. To this, the Idealist objects that there exist on the one hand movements which take place outside our body caused by our will, while on the other hand there are movements which take place within the limits of our body though caused by other will. Hence the general concept of purposive action and its invariable connection with some conscious will does not have an exclusively subjective significance, inasmuch as such a concept of purposive action and of its connection with a conscious will are established by experience and observation. The "purposive action" is not *eo ipso* "my purposive action." Finally, the Realist shows that for his opponent, there cannot be any difference between the states of consciousness in the normal waking condition and in dreams, since for him there is no external reality at all even in the waking state, as it is never there in dream. Equating all the representations to dreams is one of the general theses of Indian idealism. In Indian philosophical and polemical literature, there are numerous references to this thesis. The Idealists themselves maintain that our congnition takes place as in a dream (*svapnavat*). The idealistic outlook appeared in the history of Indian philosophy exactly in the same manner as in that of European philosophy ; but since it appeared often in different combinations and with different shades, the basis of this comparison does not always become clear to us, especially because in the heat of polemics, the Indian philosophers were highly inclined to attribute to their opponents all that they never thought. From our treatise, it is clear that Dharmakīrti looked on dream as an abnormal and feeble state of consciousness, though basically not distinct from the consciousness of the waking state. Therefore, if in the waking state, we have representations of other's movements and speech—of other consciousness—exactly the same representations may appear even in dream. If in waking state they are caused by the external presentations or are only representations of external presentations, the same is applicable to the dreams also.

The only difference is that in dreams, there is an interval of time, whatever it might be, between this reality and the representations, but in the waking state, there is no such interval. But if the question be examined on another plane and it be asked if our representations in dream and in waking state are, in general, adequate in reality, here too Dharmakīrti forsakes the position of naive idealism and sides with the viewpoint of his own system. It, then, transpires that our representations, in general, are not capable of giving us adequate knowledge of the external reality ; they are

estranged from reality, are not in a position to comprehend life truly, and consequently occur as in a dream. The extreme Realists, the Vaibhāsikhas, did not fail to use the thesis of the equality of representations in waking state and in dream with a view to distort and represent idealism in a funny form. Dharmakīrti disowns them. In such exaggerations and distortions, there is no need to see the real opinion of the opponents, but only a tendency to reduce it *ad absurdum*, there being no want of the means for this purpose.

Thus the true life is not cognizable for our understanding so long as it takes place in clear and separate representations. What is it exactly that, in the opinion of Dharmakīrti, differentiates for us the truly-real life from the false course of representations ? In this work, he does not discuss this question but we know from other works of his that his reply is : *in sensual cognition, in individual moments of sensibility*. There exist two and only two sources of knowledge : sensibility and understanding. In their essence, they are opposite to each other. Pure sensibility is free from understanding and pure understanding does not contain elements of sensibility. But these two sources of truth are not known to us in experience in their pure form. The sensibility gives us direct knowledge, or rather a sensation of reality. Understanding builds its representation over this sensual element. So long as sensual perception in its final result gives us an obvious representation, it belongs to the province of understanding. In it, only the individual moment of sensation ( *kṣaṇa* ) remains sensual. It contains live sense of reality. The real fire is that which burns. In it, only an individual moment of sensibility—the moment free of any attributes and relations—is real. The fire conceived or the representation of fire cannot burn ; this is a subjective construction of thought, in which there is no moment of reality. However, even the understanding—or inference in which it is expressed—has an indirect relation, if not a direct one, to the cognition of reality, so long as it is capable of regulating our purposive activity, that is, of foreseeing and controlling the individual moments of sensibility. If on the basis of the presence of smoke, we infer the presence of fire, this subjective process of understanding may lead us to an individual sensation of reality, which we shall call fire. Thus in experience, perception differs from understanding in that in perception, we have the representation of fire on the soil of undefined moment of sensibility, whereas in understanding or inference, we proceed from a representation of fire to its real sensation.

Applying this theory to the fact of perception of other mind, we see at once that the source of direct knowledge for us in this case is closed. We cannot cognize other's mental movements directly. Every time that we speak of the cognition of other mind, we only substitute our own in its place. We cognize other mind only on the basis of its likeness or analogy with our own.

But this does not mean that such an analogy or inference is of no importance in cognizing reality. It nevertheless is significant for its indirect cognition, though not the

direct one, so long as it regulates our purposeful actions. Such actions are those by which the living world, in general, is distinguished from dead nature. The living world is composed of individual moments of sensibility. All actions that we characterize as intercourse of people among themselves—for instance, the dialogue, the meeting of a guest, his reception, entertainment etc.—pertain to such moments. Hence, the inference of the existence of other mind in spite of the fact that we cognize it only on the basis of an analogy with our own is, like any understanding, important for us—though not for direct but for indirect and nevertheless undoubted cognition of reality, or in other words, of the truly real.

But this raises the following question. Dharmakīrti specifically calls himself an Idealist, for whom "there exist only the representations" ; there are no external objects, and "everything cognizable lies inside us". On the other hand, he agrees that sensibility gives us true knowledge, that in an individual moment of sensibility, we have sensation of reality, cognition of what is truly real. This would appear to mean that in these moments of sensibility, our cognition is concerned with the external material world, lying outside us. This is how many understood the teaching of Dharmakīrti. The author of *ṭippaṇī* (*Bibl. Buddh.*, xi, p. 18-9) speaks directly that on this point, Dharmakīrti digresses from the point of view of later idealism and accepts the view-point of the Realists—the Sautrāntikas. The same view is also repeated in the so-called Tibetan *Siddhāntas*. However, from the present treatise, it is clear that Dharmakīrti thinks that this viewpoint does not acknowledge any external object whatsoever. Consequently, even in the individual moments of sensibility, in which we find a living sensation of the real world, the truly-real moments are not created by the influence of external reality on our sensibility. The course of these moments comprises our life and this life develops exclusively from its own self. For explaining the change of these moments, it is assumed that alongside the pure stream of consciousness in general (*ālaya-vijñāna*), there also exists a special force (*vāsanā*) which eclipses it.

The pure consciousness does not know the object and the subject. It is an individual spiritual mood, accessible only to the cognition of the absolute mind, or as expressed by the Buddhists, to the cognition of the omniscient Buddha. We, however, cannot conceive this absolute state of cognition. Our consciousness is destined to be bifurcated into object and subject by the force of transcendental illusion (*avidyā*). The world examined on that [i.e. the former] plane is indivisible and spiritual whereas the world of experience is an illusion. Alongside consciousness, the assumption of the presence of such a force, which is the moving spring of the whole process of phenomenal life, is the distinctive feature of almost every Indian philosophical system ; even the commonplace thinking of an Indian wields this idea. Under the name of *karma*, this idea has already started infiltrating the European religious, philosophical and theosophical literature. To a layman, it is something like our power of fate. In the sacrificial religion of the Indians, it embodies the power or influence of sacrifices perfected according to all the rules of the cult. It also plays a great role in the philosophical

systems of the realistic trend, inasmuch as the influence of the external objects is considered inadequate for explaining the alternation of repersentations and yet another force of "previous acts"—the force of "previous knowledge"—is required for it. In the idealistic systems, this force itself, without the influence of external objects, is considered adequate for explaining the change in representations.

So the basis of everything is the indivisible consciousness accessible only to the penetration of the absolute mind, or rather not at all accessible to cognition. On its basis, the "biotic force" creates individual "currents", that is, individual personalities with limited cognition, conceiving everything in the double form of subject and object. These individual currents are like individual limited worlds. Each one has its own "biotic force", or force of "previous actions", force of "previous knowledge", its *karma*. The agreement between them, that is, the mutual understanding of individual personalities is thus something accidental, inexplicable, like the agreement of two persons suffering from the same eye disease, each one of which, independently of the other, sees two moons on the basis of his own illusion. This is reminiscent of the theory of the pre-established harmony of Leibnitz. Any individual stream of conciousness is developed from material which is the basic consciousness ; it is the true source, the *causa materialis* of any course of representations comprising a personality. The mutual relation of individual streams of consciousness is expressed by a special term (*adhipati-pratyaya*) which we, for lack of a better word, have translated as "some cause", that is, the additional factor distinct from the material or basic cause.

Vinītadeva explains to us that Dharmakīrti uses here alien terminology. For the Vaibhāṣikas, who acknowledge the existence of the mass of individual elements in each moment of life, this term denotes, in general, the relation of each element to all others existing at the time. In case of Dharmakīrti too, as we have seen, there is no mutual influence of individual streams of consciousness at all, and everything is explained by the inter-action of basic consciousness and the power of transcendental illusion.

Since the composing of this book was done some years back, it is being printed as per old orthography.[1]

1. By a decree of Octoqer 10, 1918, the Soviet Government introduced some reforms in the spellings of Russian words. These included, *inter alia*, complete purge of three letters of alphabet from the Russian script.—Tr.

## TEXT

Dharmakīrti's *SANTĀNĀNTARA-SIDDHI* With Vinītadeva's *COMMENTARY*

### 1. INTRODUCTION

If by observing the purposeful actions outside ourselves, we infer the existence of other minds on the analogy of what we observe in ourselves,—this inference does not contradict the idealistic outlook.*

*Commentary*

"Everything real is a thought",
So said the Teacher of the world.
I invoke him and proceed
To comment on the treatise
*Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds.*

In the abve introductory words, Dharmakīrti, the author of the present treatise, points out the content and aim of his work and also the relation between them. Its content is devoted to the existence of other mind. The aim is to prove it. And the relation between them is self-evident, for this work is the means for attaining the present aim.

The controversy between realism and idealism on this question is well known. The Realist contends that from the point of view of idealism, the existence of other mind cannot be proved. This is how he argues : One, for whom there exist only some representations and there are no externnl things, cannot consider perception to be the means of cognizing other mind, because the objects of perception lie exclusively in our consciousness, or because there are generally no real [extra-mental] objects of perception. In this case, inference also is not possible. It would have been possible to infer the existence of other mind from its external marks,—viz. other's speech and purposive actions. But from the point of view of idealism, the latter do not exist. No inference based on these is, therefore, possible.

The authority of the scripture too is of no help ; for what is this scripture but an external material object ? The scripture is composed of words or of individual

* Translator's Note :—

H. Kitagawa ( in "Journal of the Greater India Society", xiv, 57n ) mentions that the *śloka* in its Sanskrit original is quoted by Rāmakaṇṭha in *Nareśvara-parīkṣā-vṛtti*. It reads—

*buddhi-pūrvāṃ kriyāṃ dṛṣṭvā svadehe 'nyatra tad-grahaṇāt /*
*jñāyate yadi dhīścitta-mātre 'py eṣa nayaḥ samaḥ //*

Literal translation of this *śloka* as made by Stcherbatsky from Tibetan is as under :

"Seeing the actions,—which are preceded by [our own] thoughts,—in our own body, if we cognize the thoughts in another [person] on the ground that this (actions) are perceived, this way [of inferring] is the same even in the case of one who (acknowledges) thought alone."

[ Translated from Russian ]

sounds that form a word. And both these are external material objects, which do not exist for an idealist. For him, even the existence of the scripture itself is not an idealist. For him, even the existence of the scripture itself is not an authoritative proof of their existence. As a result, he cannot know about other mind even in this way.

Our reply to this attack of the Realists is this :

There is no doubt that other mind cannot be perceived by the senses. We agree to this. And this is based on the fact that we do not possess transcendental perception. As regards the scripture, we do not recognize that its essence consists of the articulate sounds. It lies in the representations which appear to us in particular sentences, words, and sounds. These representations belong to our consciousness, although they appear in us under the influence of the builders of philosophical systems : Buddha, Kapila, Kaṇāda. On this basis, these representations of ours are given the title of the words of Buddha, etc. All of us Buddhists agree that the word by itself, as an individual sound, expresses nothing ; but when we say that the word expresses something, we mean our representation containing the general concept associated with the word. An individual sound cannot contain what was there earlier ; but the general concept, which it supposedly denotes, unites in it the past and the present. On this basis, we deny the capacity of such individual sounds to serve as symbols of thought.[1] Nevertheless, even we do not claim that our knowledge of other mind is based on the evidence of the scripture. But we assert that it is based on inference. What form this inference will assume in spite of the fact that the external marks are not considered existent, is what the author tells us in his introductory words. In this lies their general significance. In particular, the author tells us about the thoughts—that is, about the consciousness—which precedes actions. By these are meant the volitional acts, the tendencies to come, to go, to speak. They are the causes of purposive actions. If the Realist, acknowledging the existence of external objects, infers the existence of such tendencies in another [person] on the basis that he sees his purposive actions, and does it because he, in his very self, directly and by inference, sees the relation between the intentions and the actions—this conclusion then does not contradict idealism. The marks of [inferring] mind are not only the actions but also the expressions of the face : [rush of] blood, etc. The word *if* indicates that the inference mentioned on behalf of the Realists is not actually offered [by them].[2]

## 2. THE PROBLEM STATED

After pointing out that both the sides acknowledge the significance of inference [in proving the other mind] the author says :

1. The author probably has in view the theory of Mīmāṃsā school, which holds that the sounds of speech constitute essence of scripture and that they exist eternally and express thoughts directly by themselves.
2. Probably because they allowed even direct cognisability of other mind.

1. Realism infers the existence of the other mind on the basis of analogy with itself.

Observing, in others, exactly the same physical movements and speech as he himself has, the Realist infers that they must be preceded by the same internal motivations as he observes in himself. But this inference is possible even from the point of view of idealism. The Idealist also can, therefore, infer the existence of other mind.

Here, by motivation is meant the tendency to activity ; by physical movements and speech—the physical and verbal marks of mind. The meaning, therefore, is this : If it is noticed in one's own self that the movements and speech are preceded by a desire to act and to speak, and an inference is then drawn about the existence of such motivations also in another person on the ground that similar physical movements and speech are observed in him, the Idealist also can possibly have a similar train of thought. Hence, even he can infer the existence of other mind.

The question arises : The basis of this inference is the external speech and movements, which serve as the external marks of other mind. The Realist acknowledges their existence. For the Idealist, however, they do not exist. Here, what sort of analogy can be possible ?

2. The Idealist also accepts that those representations, in which other's actions and speech appear to us, would not have existed, if the special processes of other consciousness were not there.

The representations containing images of external marks of other mind—the ones which appear to us in the form of other's movements and speech—do not, in the opinion of the Idealist, exist independently of the special processes of other consciousness.

Consciousness, which is distinct from our own, is called *the other.* The *processes* comprising it are the presentations of other consciousness. By *special processes* is meant the motivation to actions and the desire to speak.

### 3. REALISM REFUTED BRIEFLY

The Realist objects :

3. If you do not accept the perceptibility of the activity of other consciousness, you do not then have the right to infer its existence [i.e. of other consciousness].

The Idealist :

You too do not have this right, since you are also in the same position.

The Realist says : "You, the Idealist, never perceived such representations containing images of movements and speech as preceded by the activity of other consciousness. How can you, therefore, infer its existence ?"

The Idealist replies : "This is no objection, for you too can be reproached for this". In fact—

4. The Realist also has never directly observed other mind. It means that he has not seen such movements and speech as preceded indeed by other consciousness. That is why he cannot know it.

If the Idealist never perceived such representations, the Realist also did never directly perceive such movements and speech as preceded by the processes of other consciousness. That is why he cannot know it.

However, this mutual altercation is not of much importance. It is rather very unpleasant even to listen. In a philosophical debate, a set of related concepts generally acceptable to both the parties should first be determined and the desired thesis should then be derived from it.

But in this case, the antagonist's objetions stand refuted by the simple fact that these are also equally applicable to himself. This is why the author has the same limitations here.

## 4. DETAILED CONTROVERSY BEGINS. FIRST ARGUMENT OF THE REALIST AND ITS INADEQUACY

Assuming that he has found out a method for proving the existence of other mind, the Realist launches his attack :

5. Since one's own consciousness cannot be the cause of what exists in another person,[3] we shall thereby know of the existence of yet another consciousness.

Since our own consciousness cannot be the cause of those physical movements and speech that belong to another person, we also infer the existence of another consciousness.

The Idealist : "Why can it not be ? Please show why our consciousness cannot be the cause of other's movements".

The Realist :

6. Because we do not clearly experience in ourselves the individual personal intentions which precede other's movements.

Here we are faced with a dilemma. The cause of other's movements and speech exists either in our own consciousness or in another. The first assumption is eliminated, because we do not experience in our consciousness such thoughts as would have provoked other's movements.

3. Dandar explains it differently. See literal translation.

Why ?

7. And because what results from our consciousness is also perceived as belonging to our own person.

Those movements and speech, the cause of which exists in our consciousness, are also perceived as belonging to our own person : "I go", "I speak."

What follows from this ?

8. Had other's movements also resulted from our consciousness, these too would have been perceived as our own and would not have been those of the other.

Had the cause of movements and speech belonging to another person been in our consciousness, they too would have been perceived as our own.

But this is not so. How do we then perceive these ?

9. We perceive these differently. The existence of another cause thereby stands already proved.

These are perceived in external space as objects distinct from our body : "He goes", "He speaks". And the moment [it is admitted that] these do not result from our consciousness, the existence of another consciousness stands proved.

The Idealist replies :

10. Even from my point of view, the result obtained is the same beeause in these cases, I too do not clearly experience personal motivations in myself.

He, to whom everything cognizable consists of representations, also has representations in which the movement and speech appear to him as projected on external space. But he does not clearly experience in himself the respective individual motivations which prompt these movements and speech.

And the ground here is the same as that of the Realist—

11. The representations, in which the external marks of our own mind appear to us, are perceived by us subjectively. Therefore, the ones perceived objectively must have another cause.

The representations, in which the movements and speech proceeding from the motivations of our consciousness, appear to us are those perceived subjectively in ourselves : "I go", "I speak." We cognize them as external marks related to our mind. On the othe other hand, those which belong to another person are perceived by us as objective presentations : "He goes", "He speaks." Hence, it is shown that they result from another cause.

## 5. OUR REPRESENTATIONS OF OTHER'S MOVEMENT PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MIND

The Realist doubts that the objective representations are caused by internal motivations.

12. Why do you not agree to accept that presentations of other's external movement have no cause at all ?

Why should it not be accepted that the representations, in which other's speech and movements appear, do not have such a cause—i.e., are not caused by conscious processes ? ( Why should they not be considered automatic ? ).

The Idealist answers :

13. [Because] if they do not have such a cause no presentation, in general, of purposive movements and speech will have it.

If the representations containing images of movements and speech, which appear to us as objective, could exist independently of the internal promptings of consciousness, our own movements and speech appearing to us subjectively would also have similarly existed.

The idea expressed here is that if any representation whatsoever, not being caused by consciousness, can contain images of movements and speech, then all such representations must appear independently of consciousness unless there are any special reasons to the contrary.

The question is put as follows : There is, no doubt, that such representations are divided into objective and subjective ones (the external and one's own). Of these are the former independent of the activity of consciousness, while the latter caused by it ? To this, he says :

14. The difference between objectivity and subjectivity is not a difference in the sense of having origin in the activity of consciousness.

One cannot say that the automatic action is represented as the other's and that the conscious action, on the other hand, is one's own. Such a division of representations depending upon their origin in consciousness does not exist. In other words, one cannot accept this dependence in one case and deny it in another.

What does this come to ?

15. It follows herefrom that if other's movements were not caused by consciousness, one's own too would not have been thus caused, for there is no difference between the two.

Since in this respect, there is no difference between the presentations of physical

movements and speech—the difference which would have determined the distinction between the representations with regard to their origin—it follows that either in both the cases they do not result from consciousness, or in both the cases, they do.

Having thus proved that the two categories [of presentations] do not differ from each other in origin, the Idealist concludes :

16. It cannot, therefore, be claimed that only one category of these presentations —our own movements and speech—is caused by the activity of consciousness.

Since it has thus been shown that both the categories of these representations are alike with rcgard to their origin, it cannot be claimed that only one variety of these—namely, the presentations of physical movements and speech perceived subjectively has its cause in consciousness.

17. On the contrary, the variety of movements, which appears to us outside our body is also undoubtedly the mark of mind.

And thus, the position of the Idealist is reduced to the following. Consciousness is the source of everything in general that may appear to us in the form of purposive actions and speech, irrespective of whether it is outside our body or not.

Experience shows that though some presentations of movement appear in external space outside the body of the given person, these are caused by the activity of his consciousness. On the other hand, there are others which are in our own body but are not caused by the action of our consciousness. The example is that of :

18. Flight of arrow or stone, motion of projectile, actions or conversation under the influence of hypnotism, swinging of somebody, *et cetera.* They are represented to us as other's movements ; acts of our will, however, precede them.

The words *et cetera* pertain, for instance, to the movements in magical shows, caused by a certain person. All these varieties of movement consist in displacement from one place to another and other forms of movement or activity. Thus the movement of a stone thrown and the action of a projectile consist of displacement ; but the action of a person under influence of hypnosis is involuntary. Rocking of some other person is an example of movement in one place. Though the representations, in which the flight of an arrow and similar varieties of movement appear to us, give us objective presentations existing outside our body, they are nevertheless caused by our will.

Thus, these examples show that other's movement is not invariably connected with the fact of its not being dependent on our will.

There are examples even to the contrary.

19. For instance, when somebody else rocks me, though the movement is mine yet it is not caused by my will.

When somebody rocks or whirls me, though this movement is inseparable from my body, yet we see that it is not caused by my will. Thus, this example shows that there are actions which though connected with our body, are still independent of our will.

Having shown the possibility of exceptions in both the cases, he makes the following inference :

20. Thus, we have the right to infer the existence of mind on the basis of the fact of purposive activity in general.

Since it has been shown that in both the cases there are exceptions, we may infer the existence of other mind from the presentations of purposive activity and speech in general, and not from the fact that these presentations seem to us as our own or as beloging to others. Here, by speeial purposive activity is meant the presentations of external marks of mind—physical as well as verbal. The words *in general* indicate that the difference between our own and other's purposive activity is not important here.

The fact that there are other's movements caused by our will, and our movements caused by other's will, leads to the following :

21. If the absence of mind is assumed in one case, it should be assumed in both the cases, since there is no difference between the two.

If in some case,—for other's activity or for our own,—it is assumed that the purposive activity is independent of mind, it will be so in all the cases. Why ? Because there is no difference between them. This is clear.

The inference drawn from this is as follows :

22. The general essence of what we call purposive activity is invariably connected with the general essence of what we call a conscious will.

So, on the strength of what has been stated above, having ignored any difference between our and other's purposive activity, we, on the basis of its general essence, will infer the existence of what comprises the general essence of mind (since there exists an invariable connection between these two concepts).

The words *general essence of mind* indicate that we (will not get direct and clear knowledge, but) will have only general concept (of motivation), irrespective of the specifications—i.e. of love, of hatred, of pride, and of such other details. When we have ascertained only the fact of pronunciation of words in general, we cannot infer : "He speaks out of love, or out of hatred, or out of pride, etc".

Summing up what has been said above, it is possible to conclude the following : From the presence of actions and speech in general, it is possible to infer the existence of mind in general, but one cannot specifically know what motivations are caused by

what [specific consciousness], since there is no adequate mark of specific actions and speech.

Having thus established his point of view, the Idealist now shows its agreeement with that of the Realist :

23. The Realist thinks that he perceives real actions of other [person] and, not noticing the corresponding motivations in himself, infers the existence of other mind. The Idealist infers the same, considering, however, that it is not real movements of the other but only their images that are perceived.

Just as the Realist, perceiving purposive actions without perceiving their motivations in himself, *eo ipso* infers their existence in another, exactly in the same manner the Idealist, from his point of view, perceives only the images of other's actions and without perceiving any motivation in himself, *eo ipso* infers their existence in another.

Earlier, the Realist raised the following objection against the Idealist : "To you, if the other's actions are only your representations of these, why not then assume that these representations of yours have no relation with other will ? The Idealist refers to the equality of both the categories :

24. Our opponet too does not deny that other's actions and other's speech cannot but proceed from consciousness. In this, we think alike.

In this way, even the Realist agrees that the actions and speech, which appear to us as belonging to another person, cannot be independent of consciousness.

So, what the Realist does not accept is that the actions and speech could appear without a special cause ; consequently—

25. What can be said for certain is this : Since other's actions and speech are caused by other mind, they could not have appeared if the latter were not there.

To conclude this discussion, the Realist must acknowledge the correctness of this position : Since the other's action and speech are such that are caused by the activity of consciousness, these actions too would not have been there if other consciousness were not there.

What does this lead to ?

26. Since the Realist has to accept that our representations of other's actions, from the point of view of their origin, are absolutely in the same position as these actions themselves, had they existed ; there is then no difference between idealism and realism in inferring the existence of other mind.

Like the Realist, the Idealist also maintains that our representations, in which the actions and speech appear to us as transported to external world, are such that these seem to be caused by the activity of other's consciousness and therefore if the latter were not there, these too could never have appeared.

In this respect, therefore, the Idealist does not differ from the Realist. In fact, just as the Realist affirms that *the essence of actions and speech* belonging to another person lies in that they are caused by the activity of consciousness, and could not have appeared without it—exactly in the same manner, the Idealist considers that *the representations in which the actions and speech appear to us* as perceived outside us, are caused by the activity of corresponding consciousness and cannot appear without it.

So it is proved that there is no substantial difference between both the points of view on this question.

## 6. ON DREAMS

The Realist objects :

27. If you contend that the representations in which other's movements and speech appear to us are caused by other mind, why not then assert the same with regard to dreams ?

The Idealist thinks that our representations of other's movements and speech are caused by other mind. But the representations of other's movements and speech are there even in dreams ; why should they also not be regarded as caused by other mind ?

The Idealist replies :

28. These dreams are also explained in the same manner as the representations in our waking state.

The analogy is not confined only to the representations of other mind in waking state explained above. On the other hand, dreams are also explained exactly like the representations in waking state. Pointing this out, he continues :

29. Why do you think that other's movements and speech, which appear in dreams, are not caused by other mind ?

The Realist replies :

30. May be because such a thing does not exist at that time.

If the other's movements and speech appearing in dreams do not exist at all, how can their cause—the other mind—exist ?

The Idealist :

31. But the representations in a dream are just like those in the waking state.

In the waking state, we cognize other's movements and speech in [the form of] our representations. In dreams, we have similar representations. Why then do they not exist in the later case ?

The Realist :

32. Because a person is under the influence of sleep and his representations at that time are without the corresponding objects.

A person is weakened by sleep ; so the representations that appear to him are without the corresponding objects and are illusory. That is why these objects are not there in dreams.

The Idealist :

33. In my opinion also, this is precisely the reason why [in dreams] the representations of other's movements and speech appear without the direct influence of other mind.

The Idealist also accepts that it is precisely due to sleep that illusory representations of other's movements and speech appear without direct influence of other mind.

## 7. REFUTATION OF THE VIEW OF THE VAIBHĀṢIKAS

So far, the focus was on agreement with the Sautrāntika Realists. The view of the Vaibhāṣika Realist is as follows :

34. The external objects, which correspond to the representations in dreams, are just like those in the waking state. Therefore, the living beings perceived in dreams are also, in fact, other minds [i.e. real].

Since what we cognize in sleep is the same real object [as in the waking state], the living beings that we see in dreams exist in reality. Where is the analogy here ?

The Idealist :

35. You have come to such a point of absurdity as contradicts both scripture and logic, and this for the sake of contradiction only. But it is clear that nothing will make me accept the real existence of living beings of this kind.

If the Vaibhāṣikas resort to such arguments for refuting idealism, it is clear that the latter is irrefutable. Nothing will make the Idealist accept the reality of other mind of this kind [i.e. as perceived in dream]. However, in this case, if such objects really exist, the Idealist will have to think that he can have representations containing presentations of movements and speech under the influence of those living beings which someone else sees in sleep ! This view has nothing in common with idealism, and it contradicts both scripture and logic. The scripture says : "The objects which we see during sleep arise from nothing." From the standpoint of logic also, this is impossible. The material objects seen during sleep would then have to be impenetrable, as when visible to others in waking state. This would mean that when I see in a dream an elephant entering my room through a chink in a window, the elephant has really entered

the room. If, however, it be assumed that there are material objects which have neither visibility nor impermeability, they will no longer be real material objects. The real marks of mind are also not there in dreams. We deny this. If I see in sleep that I have gone out, it would be found that there are two different persons in my place. And if in my sleep, I see someone else, it would turn out that this other person had emerged from nothing. If I saw in sleep that I had committed an immoral act, it would be known that I had actually profaned myself. Such are the numerous absurdities that result from the acceptance of truth of dreams.

The Idealist had already found out where exactly his viewpoint was analogous to that of the Realist.

Now he shows that it does not contradict either scripture or logic.

36. It is from our point of view alone that it is possible to affirm the dependence of all representations of other's movements and speech on other mind. The only difference between them [i.e. between the states of waking and sleeping] is that this dependence is either direct or indirect.

We can proudly say that it is exclusively from our point of view that the representations of movements and speech in sleep can be regarded as dependent on other mind—exactly as in the waking state. The only difference is that in the waking state this dependence is direct (obvious), in dreams it is mostly indirect.

[To show that] direct influence is possible even in sleep, [he says] :

37. In any case, we accept that at times, what we see in a dream takes place under direct influence of others.

38. [For,] the dreams may [sometimes] be true by divine grace or for some other reason.

The case of Atinanda, a merchant who had a dream under divine influence is well-known. [ The words *for some other reason* imply that] the inflence of ecstasy, concentrated thinking, demons, etc is [also] possible.

39. Besides these exceptional cases, we do not give any importance to the absurd thesis of the Vaibhāṣikas.

## 8. REFUTATION OF THE SAUTRĀNTIKAS IN PARTICULAR

Addressing the Sautrāntika Realists in particular, the Idealist again—and in another way—establishes the analogy between both the viewpoints.

40. You claim that real movements of others lead to cognition of other mind. But why ?

We shall, for the time being, defer the question that our representations alone enable us to infer the existence of other mind and discuss with you the following question : On what basis can the real movements, whose existence you assume, lead to the cognition of other mind ?

The Sautrāntika Realist ponders and replies :

41. Because they are its effect.

The Idealist :

42. But then even in our representations of other's movements, there is exactly the same causal relation with regard to other mind ; why then can they not lead to its cognition ?

If therefore the movements, being the result of the mind, lead to its cognition, our representations in which other's movements appear to us also proceed from the other mind. Consequently, why then can they not lead to the same result ?

Wishing his opponent to have to accept that he himself conceives other mind only on the basis of his representations of other's movements, the Idealist says :

43. It is asked how other's movements lead to the cognition of other mind. Does the consciousness here remain purely passive as in the case of sense perception, or does it realize the significance of other's movements ? In the former case, they would have led to the cognition of other mind by virtue of the mere fact of their existence even if we had not recognized their relation to it.*

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* Translator's Note :

The literal translations of this sūtra and the commentary as given by Stcherbatsky are as under :

Sūtra 43

Yet another [point] : If this movement produces the knowledge of one's own mind by its mere existence, it would produce such knowledge even without being itself cognized.

Commentary

Does this movement produce the knowledge of other mind by its mere existence or [only] when it is itself cognized ? First, if this is so by mere existence, then the living beings—even without cognizing the movement—will have knowledge of the other mind.—[Translated from Russian]

H. Kitagawa (in "Journal of the Greater India Society", xiv. 68) gives the explanatory translation as follows :

"Realist : [The representations of the bodily actions and speech are not necessarily required when we cognize the existence of mind. For,] one can cognize one's own *santāna* on the basis of the mere existence of one's [bodily] actions (second part of *Sūtra* 43).

Even if [the answer of the Realists is as above, the Idealists reply as follows : ] (first part of *Sūtra* 43). Idealists : Then, [you must admit that] even those who do not perceive the bodily actions of another person would be able to cognize another *santāna* (third part of *Sūtra* 43).

Are other's movements so significant directly by virtue of the mere fact of their existence or only indirectly by virtue of the fact that we recognize their significance and know of their relation to the mind ? In the former case, people would have to cognize other mind even without claiming that they observe other's movements.

The Realist :

44. In general, the logical ground ( middle term ) [ i.e. the probans ] leads to inferential knowledge only when it is itself perceived.

The logical mark [ probans ] never leads to inference directly by virtue of its mere existence but only when it is perceived. Your objection is, therefore, unfounded.

The Idealist :

45. It means that you are assuming that other mind first leads to movements, the movements to our knowledge of them and finally to our knowledge of the other mind. But, then, it will be asked : What does the establishment of such a chain of causal relations achieve ?

If you also accept that the logical mark can lead to inference only by depending upon the fact that it has been cognized, there is not the slightest necessity of complicating the question by assuming the existence of other's cognitions which proceed from other mind and create our representations of them—and which, in turn, create our knowledge of other mind.

## 9. EVEN DREAMS PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER MIND

And so, precisely what view should be considered true ?

46. It is only our representations of other's movements that lead to the knowledge of other mind, for the causal relation exists only between them.

Only those representations of ours in which other's movements appear to us, have the characteristic of being causally dependent on other mind. It should, therefore, be accepted that they alone lead to the knowledge of its existence.

What exactly is the difference between the two viewpoints ? Are we to assume the existence of other's movements or only that of our representations of them ? In any case :

47. Cognition of other mind is ultimately based only upon these representations.

Even if the existence of other's movements be accepted, since the cognition of other minds depends solely upon our representations of these, these alone are important. It is no use thinking of the existence of movements themselves.

Having thus refuted his opponent, the Idealist states his own theory :

48. Between the concept of mind in general and that of its external manifestations in [ the form of ] movements and speech, there is a causal relation, and on the basis of the effect, we shall cognize the cause.

We admit that there is a general essence (concept) of representations, in which the movements and speech appear to us. We also believe that its cause is without exception the mind, in general. Therefore, if we contend that we infer the existence of mind generally on the basis of the representations of movements, what we mean thereby is merely that it is possible to cognize its cause on the basis of the effect. By using the expression *general essence* ( concept ) of movements, we are bypassing all difference between other's movements and those of our own. Speaking of *mind in general*, we are ignoring all details and all difference caused by love and other [such] feelings.

Having thus established the causal relation in general, he points out the various types of effects.

49. Of these, the ones which have their own mind as the cause, are perceived subjectively ; others objectively. This difference has been established on the basis of a majority of cases.

Those representations of movements which are caused by one's own mind have their own person as the object ; those which are caused by other will have the other person as the object. Our own and other's personalities are the objects of such represntations. There are some exceptions too ; as, for example, the flight of an arrow. Although caused by our will, it is perceived objectively and is represented in space. On the other hand, there can be such movements of our own as takes place under outside influence.

This causal relation mentioned here is understandable in the normal state, but how should it be understood in dreams ?

50. This causal relation is the same in dreams as well as in waking state.

The causal relation mentioned is the same in dream and in waking state. It is the same even when consciousness is under the influence of a strong effect of passion or grief.

But in dreams, the other will causing movements and speech is absent. How, then, is it found that the causal relation is the same ?

51. In [cases of] illusions, the course of our representations is under the influence of special causes, the nature of which determines the content of the representations. The representations may also be caused by other mind and [various] other factors, in which case there is sometimes an interruption in time between these factors and the representations ; but these representations cannot appear quite independently of them.

By [cases of] illusions are meant the states in which consciousness is weakened by sleep and other such factors. Their nature is that of the content of what we see in a dream and to them appertain the life in hell and [other] such sufferings, as are merely the experiences of these representations which are the result of the previous acts of a person.[4] The *special causes* in illusions are the sleep, etc. They are the ground for causing illusions. Other mind is the aggregate of other's mental presentations comprising the personality. By [*various*] *other factors* causing illusions is meant the predisposition always to see pleased faces or, on the contrary, bloody visions. The *other mind and* [*various*] *other factors* are the cause—the regulating cause—of the respective representations.[5] The representations of physical movements, which are of such nature that their cause lies in the other mind, comprise the usual course of representations; it is a special function of our consciousness.

The other mind is a factor participating in the creation of such representations. Other factors existing at this time are also taken into account here. They sometimes are removed in time ; but the dreams may sometimes be true because of the interference of the gods. In fact, they are the force, which is capable of creating representations in which other's movements appear. Thus the Idealist says that in illusions, the usual course of our repersentations caused by another person will appear under the influence of special causes. This influence of another person took place sometimes in the past, but such representations cannot appear absolutely without it.

Having thus shown that even in dreams, the representations in which other's physical movements appear to us have their cause in other mind, the Idealist concludes :

52. So, in all the states, we can undoubtedly infer the existence of other mind from its external marks—the physical movements.

It is thus established that there are no exceptions. [ Both ] in the waking state and in sleep, we can undoubtedly infer the existence of other mind on the basis of our representations of physical movements and also of other's speech, [ rush of ] blood and similar marks.

## 10. REFUTATION OF THE REALISTIC VIEW OF DREAMS

Having thus proved his theory, the Idealist shows the inconsistency of the Realist :

53. If the physical movements point to [the existence of] mind, either they always point to it and hence also in the sleep as in the waking state, or they never do so.

4. According to the Idealists, the suffering of the beings in hell is only illusory experience of one's own representations, so that other persons, who fall in hell accidentally do not suffer there.

5. The basic cause (*causa materialis*) is one's own mind (*ālayavijñāna*), and finally consciousness in general, or basic consciousness (*mūlavijñāna*).

If one agrees to the assumption that [the existence of ] mind can be inferred from the physical movements, either this will apply to all the representations, including even the dreams, or if this does not apply to dreams, this will also not apply to the representations in the waking state. For, then, one will not be able to infer the existence of mind from physical movements in any case [ whatsoever ].

Why ?

54. For, in such a case, the cognition of physical movements can take place even when there is no mind.

For, in a dream, we cognize the physical movements independently of the mind, and if one fact can exist independently of the other, it cannot be claimed that the presence of the first gives the right to infer the existence of the second.

The Realist raises an objection :

55. What appears in dreams is not other's movements but only the ideas of them ; only we infer the existence of mind on the basis of facts of purposive movement. In illusions, the movements of bodies appear only as representations ; they are devoid of the corresponding objects. Seen from this angle, we cannot be accused of inconsistency.

In dreams, there appear representations which are not created by mind. There are no real physical movements at that time. Only we assume that the real physical movements point to [ the existence of ] mind and that they do not exist in illusions, because then the representations will appear without the real object corresponding to them. Thus, there is no inconsistency in our theory.

The Idealist answers :

56. Who has given you such a power that by your decree, one set of representations will have objects and another set will not ? This [ i.e. the term representation ] is a specific concept which always must have the same content.

When one term covers all the forms of a certain object, this term alone can be applied to all these forms. As the term is the same for all the forms wherefrom have you got such a knowledge or such a power, on the basis of which [ you may claim that ] in sleep, the representations are without object and in the waking state, they do have an object ?

Thus, if in sleep—just as in the waking state—there are visual and all other representations, why do you then declare that they do not have an object ?

The Realist :

57. Sleep and other such causes produce special change in representations.

The Idealist :

58. Once such cases are possible, this is explained by the existence of transcendental illusion and by the scantiness of our knowledge in general.

If you accept the possibility of representations without objects corresponding to them—since in illusions, the representations have a different meaning—you will have to acknowledge that all the representations exist without the external objects corresponding to them, since there exists transcendental illusion, the Universal Monarch of illusory mundane existence.

What is the use of solving the problem in this manner ?

59. In this case, the Realist must accept his defeat and side with idealism. Confronted with great difficulty and thus not being in a position to defend the weak points of his theory, by this one acceptance alone, he finally denies his point of view and rids himself of all the difficulties.

Realism is thus refuted and it is unacceptable, since it is eliminated from the number of true world outlooks, which are in favour of salvation.

The Realist is not in a position to defend many of his weak points. He cannot reply to the many objections raised against him. He is at a great loss. If he offers one reply, it raises new and newer absurdities. Then what he proposes is as follows : Let us assume that all the representations are distorted by the illusoriness of our knowledge in general and that none of these has a corresponding external object. The Realist who could not defend himself and was in a highly embarrassing situastion, straightaway withdraws himself finally, and once for all.

## 11. THE ESSENTIALLY UNSETTLED PROBLEM

Thus, the existence of other mind is virtually established. Still, the antagonists offer more arguments against the viewpoint of idealism. To show their superficiality, the author continues :

60. The Realist persists and says : I agree that by observing speech and movements, it is possible for us to infer the existence of mind that causes them. But if my listener has representations, in which my speech and actions appear to him, these representations of his have no right to be regarded as the marks of my mind, for there is no direct causal relation between the two.

*Persists* : this word shows that the Realist continues to defend his stand.

He asks : If the representations of physical and verbal marks of mind are present, do you (the Idealist) then not agree that this gives the right to infer the existence of mind ? Here, the Realist ponders : Let us assume that here I agree with the Idealist.

Then he continues : A person who listens to me has representations of my speech—the mark of my mind. These representations, in the opinion of the Idealist, give the right to infer the existence of the respective one i.e. my mind. But how does the Idealist regard them as real indications of my mind ? Here, for the listener, *the other* implies the personality of the subject, the person who is himself speaking. Why, then, does the Idealist not have the right to regard them as the marks of mind ?

Because there cannot be a direct causal relation between the representations which arise in the listener and the thoughts of the speaker. This is the antagonist's objection.

The Idealist replies :

61. I do not maintain that the representations, the contents of which are other's movements and speech, are directly related to other mind ; and that on the basis of such a direct relation, one can infer the existence of the latter from that of the former. What I say is simply that there is some causal relation between them.

We (the Idealists),—who maintain that on the basis of perceptions of other's speech, it is possible to infer other mind,—do not at all claim that our representations of other's speech are directly related to other mind. What then do we maintain in such a case ? Simply that between them, there is in general some causal relation.

The representations, which contain marks of other mind, lead to the cognition of the latter, for they are (some of its) actions. The antagonist asks : If you thus accept that those representations of a person who listens to you, in which he cognizes your movements and speech, are not the real marks of your mind, what do the other real marks of mind then consist of ?

62. We regard only those representations as the real marks of mind, in which our own movements and speech resulting from the volitional acts of our consciousness appear to us.

The representations in which our own movements and speech resulting from the volitional acts of our consciousnes appear to us, are taken as the marks of mind. So what is stated here is this : Only those representations, whose content consists of movements and speech of the snbject—the moving and the speaking person—are the real marks of mind.

( It has been said above that between the representations of other's speech and movements and other mind, there is some causal relation ; now ) it is shown what is the essence of this causal relation between our own and other's mind with its external manifestations.

63. The mind, that creates its external manifestations, is precisely their direct cause. With regard to the marks of other mind, other consciousness is the regulating ( indirect ) cause.

( The previous life in the same stream of life ) is alone called the direct cause. The consciousness which gives rise to ( certain external manifestations ) is just their direct cause with respect to them. In regard to ( our representations ) of the manifestations of other mind, the latter is only the regulating ( collateral ) cause.

Speaking of the *direct cause*, the author here uses the terminology of the Realists, since from his point of view the direct cause of the representations is not the volitional acts but consciousness, in general.

Thus, it is first proved that only our own movements and speech can be the external marks of mind. For establishing the application of this term to other's movements and speech also, the author says :

64. Other's movements and speech are the marks of the mind [only] conventionally, because of the association of resemblance with our own.

When from the depths of our mind, there arise representations which contain images of other's movements and speech—the latter, owing to the association in the form of resemblance with our own, are called the marks of other mind.

The antagonist asks : You, the Idealist, regard only those marks of mind as real which point to our own mind. In reality, the listener does not perceive the representations of the speaker and *vice versa*. In such a case, where then is the agreement between them on the strength of which both, without knowing each other, are equally aware that certain external presentations are caused by the mind ( that is, understand each other without knowing about the existence of each other ) ?

In reply to this, ( the Idealist ) says :

65. Though each [ person ] experiences his representations only in himself, the name 'mark of mind' is given to one's own and also to its other manifestations, since they originate from the same source. The reason for this lies in the special nature of phenomenal life. It consists of the constantly repeated process of experience of such illusory representations, which does not have any beginning in time ; as if the same external objects are perceived specifically. This is just as two persons, suffering from the same eye disease, are convinced that both perceive the same two moons which are not at all there in reality.

I myself and the other, i.e. the speaker and the listener, experience our representations independently—I mine and the listener his. Exactly thus, when two persons suffering from the same eye disease see two moons in place of one, each of them experiences his representation independently.

We think that when two persons cognize the same object in the form of a clear and distinct representation, this is a similar accidental coincidence of their representations.

The previous experiences of consciousness, at times preceeding its present existence, serve as the direct cause of this phenomenon. They create the character of our consciousness, which essentially is a special force—the function of mind in general. The phenomenal life is the successive manifestation of this force—a process marked by birth and death. The special essence of this process lies in its capacity to create representations, in which the different persons are convinced that they perceive the same external object. This process does not have any beginning in time. The mind unites the movements, speech, etc.—its own as well as of others—in one concept of 'mark of mind', which is a clear and distinct representation. Thus the speaker thinks : The listener will understand what I speak. The listener, in his turn, thinks : I have understood what he has said. Here lies the confidence that the same external object is perceived. These representations have one cause, namely the volitional acts. The representations containing the images of speech and movements in the speaker as well as in the listener are the marks of our own and other's mind, and are therefore given the general name 'mark of mind'. Thus, although the speaker and listener both experience their representations separately, the representations containing the images of speech and actions appear in both from the same source. They are converted to one general concept which receives the name of 'mark of mind'. The cause of this confidence is that the same thing is perceived, and that this is rooted in the very essence of phenomenal life which does not have any beginning in time and which consists of the constantly repeated process of experience of such representations.

Here, the perception of two moons by the two persons suffering from the same eye disease serves as an example. One says to the other : Look ! and points to the second moon. The other replies : I see ! Then, pointing to the second moon with pride he thinks : This is what I have shown him ! And the listener thinks : He showed me this ! Nevertheless, each of them experiences his perception independently without the corresponding external object.

In accordance with this, even here the general name of the 'mark of mind' is given to one's own and other's representations, because we have a clear and distinct representation about them as a special object.

## 12. CAN INFERENCE OF OTHER MIND ON THE BASIS OF ANALOGY WITH OUR OWN BE REGARDED AS A SOURCE OF RELIABLE KNOWLEDGE ?

The Realist, it appears, catches the last straw and says :

66. The above-mentioned inference, by which the existence of other mind is established, presupposes the existence of the object to be cognized. If the object is there, it is the external object. If the object is not there, how then is one to affirm the cognition of external mind ? If there is no knowledge of its real existence, it should not be considered to have been established.

There exist representations, in which the purposive movements and similar marks of other mind appear to us. They serve as the basis for inferring the cause that produces them by taking the effects as the ground. What is the object of this knowledge ? There are only two possibilities. Either it is itself other mind as really existing, or it is not. The first admission is not possible for the Idealist, for such an object must exist independently of the subject. The second too is infested with absurdity, for how can one know of the existence of other mind, if it is not the object of cognition ? Why ? Because one can attribute existence to something only when there is cognition of the real existence of that object. If this is not there, such an object does not exist. This is what the opponent says.

The Idealist replies :

67. The same objection on the same basis can be raised against you too.

In fact :

68. In your opinion, other mind is cognized on the basis of the corresponding movements and speech. But it can also be said here that if its real existence becomes the object of knowledge, its form must be represented as clearly as our own consciousness. If this is not so, one cannot maintain that its real existence is cognized.

The Realist assumes that the existence of other mind is cognized on the basis of the marks of movements and speech. But in such a case, does its real existence become an object for him or not ? If it does, he would have to know its exact form also. If it remains inaccessible in its unique reality, what is then cognized by this inference ? What [sort of] mind has the Realist cognized ?

The Realist objects :

69. I assume that on the basis of logical connection, what is cognized by inference is only the general concept and not an individual form.

Since the middle and major terms of syllogism are general concepts, the external 'marks of mind' are invariably connected only with the general concept of mind and not with its individual form. Therefore, it is only other mind in general and not its individual reality that is cognized by me.

The Idealist asks :

70. Is this general concept identical with other mind or different from it in some way, or sometimes identical and sometimes different (that is, identical on the one hand and not so on the other) ?

Having established such a dilemma, he indicates successively the impossibility of each of the solutions. The last two solutions are eliminated first.

71. The second and third solutions are, in their essence, similar. Proceeding from them it is only the general concept that is cognized and not the other mind itself. Consequently, it (the other mind) cannot be cognized by inference.

If we stick to the point of view that general concept is somewhat different from the real object itself, it is only this general concept and not the other mind that can be cognized by inference. If, however, we stick to the point of view that one can say neither this nor that, even then the same result is obtained.

However, the point of view of identity is also unacceptable.

72. General concept [ of other mind ] is not identical with other mind itself. If it were so, we would have cognized the form of other mind as clearly as that of our own. This has already been mentioned.

General concept of other mind is not [ the same as ] its real existence. Why ? If we assume that there is no difference between them, we should have, as already indicated, cognized the form of other mind as directly as that of our own.

Let us assume that it is so : what difference does it make ?

73. This is not the role of inference in cognition.

Inference does not have that significance which you are attributing to it by maintaining that other mind is cognized by it in the same form in which it really exists.

For explaining this, he says :

74. Inference ( or thinking ) does not cognize the real existence of objects ; otherwise the rational cognition would not have differed from the sensual one, and its own special field of knowledge etc. would not have been there.

We assume that inference ( thinking ) cannot cognize the individual essence of a real object. It is opposed to sense perception, a source of knowledge through which the individual real existence of objects is cognized. Why ? Because otherwise it would have transpired that thinking does not take place in special representations peculiar to it, and inference would have given the same clear visual representations as perception does. Other effects too would have been obtained. [ Thus ], thinking would not have been in a position to cognize the result of perception[6] in [ the form of ] a clear and distinct representation and would be unable to know past and future objects.

6. Perception is pure only in the initial stage, when the bare fact of presence of some object before our senses is cognized. The result of perception is, however, a ready representation already created by thinking. See Dharmakīrti's treatise on Logic.

Here, having in view the fact that there are some who believe that inference is not confined to special representations (and that both inference and perception are generally equitable in the sense of being the sources of cognition of the real), the Idealist says :

75. Inference is a source of true cognition, but not because it gives the knowledge of the real.

If it is considered that the representations of inference are not distinguished from the visual ones, and if it is assumed that inference is the source of true knowledge because the real existence of the object is accessible to it, this is not correct.

If, however. one sticks to the view that only the knowledge of individual real essences is true knowledge, in what sense then is inference, which does not impart such knowledge, still the source of truth ?

76. Though inference does not actually reveal the real existence of an object, it is still the source of cognition of truth, for it leads to the attainment of the desired aim.

Though inference (thinking) does not actually reveal the real essence of an object, it leads unfailingly to the object that we strive for. And this is why we accept it as a source of knowledge.

The expression *and this is why it is not the source of truth* is sometimes interpreted like this : As thinking has its own province, which is distinct from perception, it is not the source of knowledge. That is, inference is regarded as a source of knowledge, but not because it cognizes the real essence of the objects. But why ? Although it also is not in a position to reveal the true essence of the objects, it is nevertheless a source of knowledge, but again not because it cognizes the individual realities but because it is the basis of purposive activity.

Now the question arises : Once [ it is admitted that ] no thinking, in general, can reveal the individual real essences, is not the inference through which we cognize other mind thereby discredited ?

Therefore, he says :

77. When we see smoke and infer the existence of fire, our thinking does not deal with the real existence of fire ; otherwise there would have been no difference between fire as perceived by the senses and the fire as represented in thinking. And if there were no difference between them, our thinking could not have been directed towards fire—past, future or imaginary—which does not have real existence. On the other hand, the fire inferred would have to have the effect of real fire ( that is, burning ).

We assume that when on the basis of a certain mark, for instance smoke, the

thinking establishes its own object—fire—, it does not have for its object the real fire. Why ? For, had inference revealed the individual real essence of its object, it would have been identical with sense perception. It could not have dealt with the past, future, and such objects as are devoid of the essence of real objects. Moreover, the image thought of in inference, would have its effect exactly as the image perceived by the senses.

So, inference ( thinking ) directs purposive activity (and leads to the cognition of truth only indirectly). But is this feature there in the inference of other mind or not ?

78. In inferring the existence of other mind, one is also to take into account the fact that it directs our activity in accordance with the desired aim.

Later, the author indicates more clearly that his theory of inference applies to the given case.

79. Having known, through this inference, the existence of other mind, the mind as subject successively produces the effects which lead it to the desired aim.

When some person, by inferring other mind, recognizes the existence of another person, and undertakes the corresponding actions—strives for them, seeks them, goes here and there—he will, in the ultimate end, attain the aim, for instance, that of talking to this person. An example of such successive purposive activity can be : greeting the other person, inviting him home, then spreading a carpet before him, entertaining him with viands and drinks, preparing his bed, serving water for washing of his feet, cleaning and massaging his feet, etc.

What more can one mention in support of the fact that the attainment of the aim is a sufficient ground for accepting inference as the source of truth ?

80. The world of living beings is an animated one only in the sense that in it, the aims are pursued and results achieved. In particular, there also exists activity directed to other animated beings, whose existence we infer.

Any attainment of aim invariably presupposes [ the existence of ] mind. If we maintain that there are consciousness and life in the phenomenal world, it simply means that this result of inference—that is, the pursuit of aims and their attainment—is there in it. It is thus shown that by inferring the existence of other mind is understood the attainment of such aims as may arise only because of the existence of other animated beings.

But why is it so ?

81. Because a person feels satisfaction only when he directly experiences the perception, in which the future aim of his aspirations first appeared to him.

The idea expressed here is this : A person can be satisfied only when following

the perception of fire, he directly experiences the perception in which the burning and the other aims which he strived for appear to him.

Let him feel satisfied. Does it then mean that his previous thinking, which led him to this aim, is true knowledge ?

82. Since the previous thinking leads to the accomplishment of the aim, it ( indirectly ) is real and is, therefore, also true.

The previous thinking ( i.e. inference ) fully accomplishes the purposive activity by the above method. And so it is real ( actual ) and therefore also true.

The antagonist points out the exception : ( It was shown above that the inference of other mind took place even in dreams ; it was then explained as to in what sense the inference was the source of knowledge. Now, the question arises whether the inference occurring at the time of dream can be a similar source of truth ).

83. Have you, the Idealist, really not proved that even in dreams, we have representations in which the subsequent aim appears to us on the basis of previous knowledge ? But this alone is not sufficient for accepting the previous representations as sources of truth. In this state, all the representations are false.

In dreams, there also appear representations, in which the attainment of the given aim is shown to us—representations, which have the previous knowledge as their source. But it would not be correct to consider the previous representations as the sources of truth on this basis alone. Why ? Because in dreams all the representations are certainly false. This is the antagonist's objection. The Idealist replies :

84. We have already shown above that the external marks of mind are never represented to us without the influence of the respective volitional acts, and so we infer the existence of the latter from that of the former. The difference between the representations in waking state and those in a dream is that whereas in the former there is a direct influence of other will, in the latter, it is indirect. There is confusion only because of the interval between the representations and their causes and not because the latter are not at all there.

The representations containing the images of movements and speech do not appear independently of the corresponding volitional acts. Therefore, we infer the existence of the latter from that of the former. The only difference is that in the abnormal states—as for example, in sleep—the relation between them is indirect, whereas in the waking state, it is direct. This has already been explained. So, in both the states—in that of waking and of sleep—the images of the animated beings are related to their respective volitional acts. Having shown this, the author points out how in dreams, the representations

following the inference of the existence of another person, are dependent on the volitional acts of the same person.

85. In dreams, the previous representations of the marks of other mind—the former being indirectly dependent on the latter—appear to us. Exactly thus, all the subsequent representations of some activity of ours, directed to these persons, have the same indirect dependence on other mind.

Just as in dreams the appearance of our previous representations of marks of other mind depends—though not directly—on the acts of other will, exactly in the same manner, the subsequent representations are also formed under the same influence. The subsequent mutual relation of the representations here is like this : First, under the influence of other mind, the representations of its external marks are formed, on the basis of which the existence of the other animated being is inferred. Then, there appear representations of the acts coeresponding to them, followed successively by the representations of greetings and compliments, conversation, spreading of carpet, reading, and acts of repetition after the teacher and learning by rote. Then, there comes a time when the representation of the cot appears followed by sleep. But even in sleep, on the strength of the usual representations assimilated earlier, there also appear representations of marks of other mind followed by the inference of the presence of another animated being and later by the representation of the purposive activity, conversation, etc.

The representations of the response on meeting another animated being etc. appear in dreams in the same order as in waking state. Pointing this out, he says—

86. And in sleep also, it is the existence of the other person that is inferred first. Then, the representations of further actions of the same person are developed in the same order as in waking state.

In waking state, there appear representations of the marks of mind, the basis of which is the motivation of other will. Then, after the presence of the other person has been inferred, there appear states of consciousness, which may create representations of the usual actions, conversation, etc. in these cases. This forms a certain sequence of representations, experienced in the waking state ; exactly on its basis, the same sequence of representations appears in dreams also—the response to meeting another person, etc.

Nevertheless, these representations are undoubtedly false !

87. It is clear to anybody that as the inference is, so will be the attainment of aim, and so also the subsequent purposive activity.

Those inferences of other mind which are made in sleep are possible only in such a state ; exactly thus, the attainment of aim—the conversations, etc.—which take place in sleep, are [also] possible only at this time. But since at this time is possible such an activity as is not contradictory, has mutual bond and is logical, there is no

inconsistency in our theory. There are others who explain it (somewhat) differently. As the inference is, so also will be the actions based on it, since the result corresponds to its cause. For, the inference of other mind is the cause, and the attainment of aim its result. There is an interruption in time between the usual activity represented in dreams and its direct experience. But who will not understand that it takes place on the basis of accurate inference and has, in any case, the mark of purposiveness ?

## 13. CAN YOGIC PERCEPTION KNOW THE OTHER MIND ?

Though the Realist is defeated also in this way, he does not stop his attempts at defending his point of view in some way or other.

88. So, direct knowledge of other mind cannot be achieved through inference. Let us assume, however, that it is nevertheless the source of correct knowledge, since it is on its basis that we accomplish purposive actions. But what should be said of the direct penetration of clairvoyant-yogis into the other consciousness ? If they directly cognize the real essence of other consciousness, the latter will be an external object for them. If not, how can one then claim that they cognize directly ?

The reason given is as under :

89. You regard the penetrating perception of a yogi as a special form of sense cognition. But if it does not perceive the real essence of the object—it, according to you, stops being a source of knowledge.

You think that in sense perception, we cognize the very reality of the object. If this is not so in the given case, what sort of perception is this ? If it does not cognize the real essence of the object, it is eliminated from the number of sources of knowledge, for it is accepted as a source of knowledge only because it perceives the real essence. Here lies the objection of the Realist.

The Idealist replies :

90. These clairvoyant-yogis do not attain the state of absolute knowledge ; they are not free from rational thinking, which differentiates between the object and the subject. Although their thinking also penetrates into the other consciousness, yet, in the given case, it is not differentiated from the cognition of some ( covered ) object, and its accuracy results from the fact that it leads them to purposive actions.

The clairvoyant-yogis are not free from rational thinking, which differentiates between the object and the subject. Their penetration into the other consciousness is

regarded as accurate knowledge, because it unerringly leads to the respective purposive actions, like our perception of the material objects ;—but not because it could penetrate into the true esssence of other consciousness. Here, a reason is also given as to why these yogis are not free from rational thinking, which differentiates between the object and the subject, and why they do not attain absolute knowledge. The essence of basic consciousness [ *mūla-vijñāna* ] ( the basis of mind ) was not manifest in them.

With its appearance, the course of representations of the rational thought, which distinguishes the subject from the object, is stopped—the course which comprises the very essence of phenomenal life.

If they also do not attain penetration into the true essence of the other consciousness, how can the other feature of directness of knowledge—clarity and obviousness of representation—develop in them ?

91. The concentration of thought ( yoga ) gives them such strength that clear representation, in which the features of the form of other consciousness are clearly drawn, appear in them. Like this, we can see truth in sleep by grace of god and will of fate.

The concentrated thought develops in the yogis the capability of conceiving other consciousness, in which case the features of its form clearly appear to them. Like this, by virtue of fate and by divine grace, we [ sometimes ] see truth in dream ; the representations, which give clear form to the object, are then obtained.

Does it mean that cognition of other consciousness in case of yogis is distinguished only because of the strength of their concentrated attention, and that they still do not cognize its true essence ?

92. In their case also, there is no penetration into the other consciousness itself. They too cognize it only on the basis of analogy with their own. They have a certain represented concept which they call the other consciousness.

Though the penetrated knowledge of the yogis is also created by virtue of concentrated attention ( yoga ), it is not in a position to convert the other mind into an object of this penetration. The reason is that such clairvoyants are not free from rational thinking, which differentiates between the object and the subject. Though they do not cognize the true essence of other mind, they still conceive the established concept of the other consciousness. What is the content of this concept ?

This concept in case of yogis is formed in the same manner as in us, viz. depending on as to how our own consciousness of the clear image in which we conceive other consciousness appears to us. It is such a concept that is termed as other consciousness.

If the perception of yogis does not cognize truth, what sort of perception is this then ? What source of knowledge is this, on the whole ?

93. We regard it as perception, for it gives a clear representation that corresponds to the form of other consciousness. We regard it as a source of right cognition, for it unerringly leads to purposive actions.

## 14. CAN BUDDHA KNOW THE OTHER MIND ?

The Truly-Real Buddhas are free from rational thought, which distinguishes the subject and the object ; they cognize other mind.

Does their knowledge have its true essence as the object or not ? If it has, one cannot but infer that this object is the external object. If it does not, will it mean that the knowledge of Buddha does not correspond to truth ?

94. The penetration of Buddha into all the existing objects is not comprehensible for us, for in all respects it is beyond what we can know and what we can speak of.

What is an object for the Highest of the Clairvoyants, the Truly-Real Buddha, is not comprehensible for our thinking.

It is not only Their knowledge of other mind that is incomprehensible for our intellect but also Their knowledge of all things without exception. Why ? Because the position in which the Truly-Real is cannot be conceived in a specific concept ; it is not accessible to any other knowledge except the knowledge of Buddha himself and so it is beyond something cognizable, For the same reason, it it beyond anything that can be spoken of, for we do not know the true essence of absolute knowledge.

Besides, there is also another view. There exist two forms of Omniscience of Buddha : the higher direct knowledge like mirror and higher rational knowledge. By means of the first, Buddha cognizes only true essence of all things. By the second, he cognizes everything individually. Of these, the first knowledge is absolutely free from rational thinking, which differentiates between the object and subject ; it knows the hidden nature of all phenomena—their essence. Such omniscience is actually the absolute knowledge ; this is Reason (intellect) which has nothing in common with the empirical. The higher rational knowledge is achieved after the absolute Reason has been attained. It distinguishes between the object and the subject. It cognizes, in all respects, all presentations of the phenomenal world—things which are infinitely small, hidden and remote—for, though it is also achieved after the absolute reason, it is, in its essence, empirical knowledge. Therefore, the form of omniscience, which belongs to the higher rational knowledge, does not contain anything contrary. We accept that it differentiates between the object and the subject, and is nevertheless not false ( not illusory ) because Buddha sees its falsity.

There are still two more forms of omniscience of Buddha, but they are reduced to the previous ones.

The higher knowledge of equality, among themselves, of all the objects is, in its essence, the knowledge of relativity of phenomenal life. It is based on absolute knowledge which, like a mirror, directly reflects the sole essence of everything. Besides, there is also the Reason of Buddha who creates ( such ) things ( as the sermon for saving all beings from the fetters of birth and death ). This Reason distinguishes the individual and general essences and is based on the higher rational knowledge. Thus, the higher reason of the Truly-Real has four forms. Of these, the higher reason, likened to mirror, is the absolute reason—super-empirical. The remaining forms are attained on the basis of the first but they are the forms of empirical reason. Therefore, when we speak of the omniscience of the Buddha, one of the four of its forms is correspondingly meant.

Here ends the treatise of the teacher Dharmakīrti, under the title *Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds.*

The translation, editing and correction of the text are by the Indian *paṇḍita* Viśuddhisiṃha and the grand translator ( *lo-tsa-ba* ) Śrīkuṭarakṣita ( dPal-brtsegs-rakṣita ).

I have explained the work *Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds*, analyzing it literally.

The follower of the Budddist philosophy, Vinītadeva, wrote this commentary on the work, in which the existence of other mind is finally established ; every word in it has been explained.

Here ends the *Commentary on Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds*, the work of the teacher Vinītadeva.

The translation, editing and correction of the text are by Indian *paṇḍita* Viśuddhisiṃha and the grand translator (*lo-tsa-ba*) Śrīkuṭarakṣita (dPal-brtsegs-rakṣita).

# Appendix A

## A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY OF Th. STCHERBATSY'S WRITINGS

### PART I

### MONOGRAPHS, ARTICLES, TRANSLATIONS, ETC

*Only the first editions are listed. Entries under each heading are in chronological order*

#### A. MONOGRAPHS

1. *Teoriya poznaniya i logika po ucheniyu pozdneishikh buddistov* [Theory of knowledge and Logic According to Later Buddhists]. St. Petersburg, 1903-1909 (Izd. fak. vost. yazykov Imp. Sankt-peterburgskogo universiteta. No. 14).

   *Contents.*—Pt. I. *Uchebnik logiki Darmakirti, s tolkovaniem na nego Darmottary* [Russian translation of Dharmakīrti's *Nyāyabindu* and Dharmottara's *Nyāyabindu-ṭikā*]. Pt. II. *Uchenie o vospriyatii i umozaklyuchenii* [Study of Perception and Inference].

2. *The Central Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of the Word "Dharma"*. London, Royal Asiatic Society, 1923. 112p. (*Prize Publication Fund.* Vol. VII).

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4. *Buddhist Logic.* 2 vols. Leningrad, AN, SSSR, 1930-1932. (*Bibliotheca Buddhica.* xxvi).

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#### B. ARTICLES

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10. *Nauchnye dostizheniya drevnei Indii* [Scientific Achievements of Ancient India]. In *Otchet o deyatel' nosti Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk za 1923 god* [Report on the Work of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the Year 1923], compiled by S. F. Ol'denburg and read at the meeting of the Academy held on 2nd February, 1924. Leningrad, 1924, pp. 1-25.

11. *K istorii materializma v Indii* [On History of Materialism in India]. "Vostochnye zapiski Leningr. instituta zhivykh vostochnykh yazykov", Leningrad 1927, vol. 1, pp. 1-10.

12. *Ueber den Begriff vijñāna im Buddhismus.* "Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik", Leipzig, 1929, Bd. 7, Hf. 1, s. 136-139.

13. *Dignāga's Theory of Perception.* "Journal of Taisho University", Tokyo, 1930, vol. 6-7.

14. *The Doctrine of the Buddha.* "Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies", London, 1932, vol. 6, pt. 4, pp. 867-896.

15. *Die drei Richtungen in der Philosophie des Buddhismus.* "Rocznik orientalistyczny", Lwow, 1934, vol. 10, pp. 1-37.

16. *Selbstanzeige.* "Rocznik orientalistyczny", Lwow, 1934, pp. 179-185.

17. *The "Dharmas" of the Buddhists and the "Guṇas"* of the *Sāṃkhyas.* "Indian Historical Quarterly", Calcutta, 1934, vol. 10, pp. 737-60.

C. ADDRESSES, LECTURES, ETC

1. *Filosofskoe uchenie buddizma* [Philosophical Study of Buddhism]. Petrograd, 1919, 48 p.

A Speech made at the inauguration of the first Buddhist exhibition in St. Petersburg on 24th August, 1919.

D. TRANSLATIONS

1. Dharmakīrti. *Obosnovanie chuzoi odushevlennosti. S tolkovaniem Vinītadeva* [Establishment of the Existence of Other Minds. With Vinītadeva's Commentary]. Translated from Tibetan. Petrograd, 1922, xv, 79 p. ( *Pamyatniki indiiskoi filosofii.* No. 1 ).

   A double translation into Russian—one free and the other literal—of Dharmakīrti's *Santānāntara-siddhi* and Vinītadeva's *Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭīkā.*

2. Daṇḍin. *Priklyucheniya desyati printsev.* [Adventures of Ten Princes]. Translated from Sanskrit. "Vostok", Moscow-Petrogrd, 1923, No. 3, pp. 50-82 ; Moscow-Leningrad, 1924, No. 4, pp. 65-96 ; 1925, No. 5, pp. 16-46.

   A Russian translation of *Daśakumāracarita.*

3. Maitreya, Bodhisattva. *Madhyānta-Vibhaṅga. Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes, ascribed to Bodhisattva Maitreya and commented by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati.* Translated from Sanskrit. Moscow-Leningrad, AN, SSSR, 1936, viii, 106 p., 58 p. ( *Bibliotheca Buddhica,* xxx ).

E. PREFACES

1. *Indices Verborum Sanskrit-Tibetan and Tibetan-Sanskrit to Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti and the Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā of Dharmottara.* Comp. by E. Obermiller with a pref. by Th. Stcherbatsky. From the edition of Sanskrit and Tibetan texts by Th. Stcherbatsky. 2 vols.—Leningrad, AN, SSSR, 1927-28. (*Bibl. Buddhica,* xxiv, xxv).

2. Bu-ston. *History of Buddhism* (*chos-'byuṅ*). Pt. 1-2—Leipzig-Heidelberg, 1931-32. *Materialen zur kunde des Buddhismus.* Hrsg. von M. Walleser. Hft. 18-19).

   Pt. I.—*The Jewellery of Scripture.* Transl. from Tibetan by E. Obermiller. With an introd. by Th. Stcherbatsky. 187 p.

PART II

SANSKRIT/TIBETAN TEXTS EDITED & PUBLISHED

*Entries arranged under the names of the authors of the texts*

Dharmakīrti

*Nyāyabindu : Buddiiskii uchebnik logiki, sochinenie Dharmakirti i tolkovanie na nego Nyayabindutika, sochinenie Dharmottary* [Nyāyabindu : A Buddhist Treatise on Logic by Dharmakīrti, along with Dharmottara's Commentary Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā].

Fasc. I [Sanskrit text, published with introduction and notes by Th. Stcherbatsky]. Petrograd, 1918. ii, 95 p. (*Bibliotheca Buddhica,* vii).

Fasc. I & II [Tibetan translation, published with introduction and notes by Th. Stcherbatsky]. St. Petersburg, 1904. iv, 222 p. (*Bibliotheca Buddhica,* viii).

*Santānāntara-siddhi. Tibetskii perevod sochinenii Santānāntara-siddhi Dharmakīrti i Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭīkā Vinītadeva vmeste s tibetskim tolkovaniem, sostavlennym Agvanom Dandar-lkharamboi.* [Santānāntara-siddhi. Tibetan translation of Dharmakīrti's Santānāntara-siddhi and Vinītadeva's Santānāntara-siddhi-ṭīkā, together with another commentary in Tibetan by Agvan Dandar Lha-rampa].

Fasc. I & II [Published with introduction by Th. Stcherbatsky]. Petrograd, 1916. xviii, 129 p. (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, xix).

? *Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā-ṭippaṇī. Tolkovanie na sochinenie Darmottary Nyāyabinduṭīkā.* [Nyāyabindu-ṭīkā-ṭippaṇī : A Commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā]. Sanskrit text, published with notes by Th. Stcherbatsky, St. Petersburg, 1909, iv. 43, 5 p. (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, xi).

This work is anonymous.

Maitreya, Bodhisattva

*Abhisamayālaṅkāra-prajñāpāramitā-upadeśa-śāstra. The Work of Bodhisattva Maitreya.* Ed., expl. and translated by Th. Stcherbatsky and E. Obermiller.

Fasc. I [Contains Introduction, Sanskrit text and Tibetan translation]. Leningrad, AN, SSSR, 1929. xii, 112 p. (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, xxiii, fasc. I).

Vasubandhu

*Tibetskii perevod Abhidharmakoṣakārikāḥ i Abhidhharmakoṣabhāṣyam sochinenii Vasubandhu.* Izd. F. I. Shcherbatskoi [Tibetan translation of Abhidharmakoṣa-kārikā and Abhidharmakoṣa-bhāṣyam, the works of Vasubandhu. Published by Th. Stcherbatsky].

Part I [Tibetan text. Edited by Stcherbatsky]. Petrograd, 1917. pp. 1-96. (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, xx, pt. i).

Part II. Leningard, AN, SSSR, 1930, pp. 97-192 (*Bibliotheca Buddhica.* xx).

Yaśomitra

*Sphutārthā Abhidharmakoṣa-vyākhyā, the work of Yaśomitra.*

First Koṣasthāna [Sanskrit text. Edited by Sylvain Levi and Th. Stcherbatsky]. Petrograd, 1918. vii 96 p., (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, xxi).

Second Koṣasthāna [Sanskrit text. Edited U. Wogihara and Th. Stcherbatsky and carried through the press by E. E. Obermiller. Leningrad, AN, SSSR, 1931, 96 p. (*Bibliotheca Buddhica*, xxi).

Hari Kavi, son of Nārāyaṇa Sūri, also styled Bhānubhaṭṭa

*Ueber das Haihayendracarita des Harikavi.* "Zapiski Imp. AN Po ist.-fil. otdeleniyu", St. Petersburg, 1900, v. 4, No. 9, pp. i-xii, 1-112.

Publication of Sanskrit text, its translation into German, and study of the epic poem of Hari, the Indian poet who lived in the second half of 7th century.

# Appendix B

## EXTRACT FROM THE CATALOGUE OF MATERIALS FROM STCHERBATSKY'S COLLECTION PRESERVED IN THE ARCHIVES OF THE ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, USSR

Reproduced from
*Arkhiv Akademii nauk SSSR. Obozrenie arkhivny materialov.*
Moscow-Leningrad, 1959
( Translated from Russian )

[ These materials from the personal collection of Th. Stcherbatsky were received by the Archives of the Academy of Sciences, USSR from Stcherbatsky's widow in 1942 and from the Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Seiences USSR in 1954. A brief catalogue of this collection, compiled by Profesor V. I. Kal'yanov, appeared in *Arkhiv Akademii nauk SSSR. Ohozrenie arkhivnykh materialov* (v. 4, Moscow-Leningrad, 1959). The scope of this catalogue can be seen from the following note of the Editors :

> "It is not possible at present to give complete and accurate bibliographical particulars of the materials included here, for without a careful investigation it is not possible to know whether these materials have been published—in the from in which they are preserved in archives. This would have held up the publication of this preliminary survey for a considerably long time. Therefore, the remarks 'not published' are made only for those items for which there is absolute certainty that they have not yet been published" ].

### I
### ON INDIAN EPIGRAPHY

( Joinly with V. G. Ojha )—*Lunsaḍī Plates of Śilāditya II*

### II
### ON INDIAN THEORY OF POETRY

Sanskrit poem *Haihayendracarita* (text in Sanskrit language with variant readings); German translation of Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* and an extract from the Russian translation of this work ; Russian translation (in part) of Jagannātha's *Rasagaṅgādhara.*

### III
### ON SANSKRIT GRAMMAR AND LANGUAGE

Russian translation of *Grammar of Sanskrit Language* by Varadarāja (incomplete); *Sanskrit-Russian Glossary to Bühler's Text Book* ( in part ) ; Lexicographical materials

on Sanskrit language ( for various masterpieces of Sanskrit literature—in separate note books ).

## IV
## ON TIBETAN GRAMMAR AND LANGUAGE

*Opredeliteli kornei v tibetskom yazyke* [Root Determinants in Tibetan Language] ; Materials on Tibetan grammar and language.

## V
## ON INDIAN ( BUDDHIST ) PHILOSOPHY

*Buddiiskii filosof o edinobozhii* [A Buddhist Philosopher on Monotheism] ; *Notes de littérature boudhique. La littérature Yogācāra d' après Bouston* ; *Kratkii uchebnik logiki Darmakirti s tolkovaniem Darmottary* [Dharmakīrti's treatise on logic, with Dharmottara's commentary] ; *O vospriyatii posredstvom vnutrennego organa chuvstv* [On Perception by Internal Sense Organ] ; *Buddhist Logic* (Loose sheets of the manuscript in English along with author's own reviciw of the work in German language) ; *The Doctrine of the Buddha* ; *Dignāga's Theory of Perception* ; *There is no soul* (Buddhism II) ; *Das Hinayāna* (a preliminary draft of the article *Die drei Richtungen in der Philosophie des Buddhismus*) ; *Madhyānta Vibhaṅga* (Loose sheets of the manuscript in English ) ; *The Problem of the Reality of Relations in Indian Philosophy* (a rough copy with notes) ; *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (in Russian) ; *Nyāya-Bhāṣya* (in German and English) ; *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha* (English translation) : *Nyāya-kārikā* (in English ) ; Translations, notes and studies on Buddhist logic (in English and partly in Russian) ; *Vyatireka* (Russian translation of a passage, in *ślokas*, on "contraposition") ; *Kṣaṇikatva I-II* (*Causality*) (A Study in English ) ; *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* (in English ) ; *Apoha. Jinendrabuddhi I-III* (English translation of the philosophical treatise) : Notes to *Kaṇikā-bhāṣya* and passages from English translation of *Nyāya-kaṇikā* ; *Preface* to the English translation of *Koṣasthāna* ; Prajñākaramati's commentary on *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (Tibetan text with Russian translation) ; English translation of an article by A. I. Vostrikov on *Vādavidhi* ; Introduction to E. E. Obermiller's *Prajñāpāramitā-ratnaguṇa-saṃcaya-gāthā* (or *Saṃcaya*) ; Russian translation (in part) of *Nyāya Sūtra* and *Bhāṣya* ; Russian translation of (*Śabda-vyāpāra-vidhi*) ; *On the school of Mīmāṃsakas* (in German) ; Passages from German translation of *Nyāya-kaṇikā* ; *Study of the Theory of Knowledge and Logic* (in Russian) ; Russian translation of the Tibetan work of Vasubandhu—*Abhidarmakoṣa* ; English translation of *Madhyānta vibhaṅga-śastra-bhāṣya-ṭīkā* and the relevant materials ; *Ācārya-Bhavyasya Mādhyamika-hṛdayam* (*Tarkajvālāparābhidhānam*) ; *Ācārya-Śervāskī-Vostrīkophābhyāṃ sampādtiaṃ sampūritañca* (Sanskrit manuscript of *Mādhyamika-hṛdayam*, prepared by F. I. Stcherbatskoi and A. I. Vostrikov) ; *Śākyabuddhi* (Tibetan text), and also *Kārikā* and *Vṛtti* ; Polemic with Īśvarasena (Tibetan text and English translation) ; Russian translations of individual portions from *Abhidharmakoṣa* ; English translations of

individual portions from *Abhidharmakoṣa-bhāṣya* : Excerpts and Engiish translations of individual sections and chapters of Buddhist philosophical works (*Nyāyabindu, Madhyānta-vibhaṅga* etc.) ; German translation of philosophical works *Pātañjala-darśanam* ; Russian translation of the third chapter from *Mādhyamikavṛtti* (entitled *Cakṣurādīndriyaparīkṣā*) ; *The Conception of Buddhistic Nirvāṇa* (an article in English language) ; *Vācaspatimiśra on the Reality of Relation* (An extract from Russian translation of *Nyāya-kaṇikā*) ; Sanskrit and Tibetan indices to various texts.

## VI

### ON HISTORY OF INDOLOGY

*S. F. Ol'denburg as an Indologist* (An article and obituary).

## VII

### TRANSLATIONS OF LITERARY MASTERPIECES

Daṇḍin's *Daśakumāracarita* (Daṇḍin's *Adventures of Ten Princes*)—content of second chapter, Russian and German translations of its extracts and a vocabulary to the text, Russian translations from Chapters I, V and VI, translation of Chapter VIII and the conclusion ; Russian translation of *Pañcatantra* (beginning) ; a translation in verse of the first 7 verses from Kālidāsa's lyrical poem *Meghadūtam* (The Cloud-Messenger) ; translation of 22 verses from Kālidāsa's epic poem *Raghuvaṃśa.*

## VIII

### TEXTS OF MANUSCRIPTS ( SANSKRIT AND TIBETAN )

*Amarakoṣa* (Tibetan text, re-written by F. I. Shcherbatskoi) ; *Abhisamaya I. Pramāṇa-samuccaya* (Tibetan text and loose sheets of the manuscriptt in English) ; *Koṣa-Kārikā II* (Tibetan text) : *Prajñā-pāramitā* (Tibetan and Sanskrit text) ; *Amṛta-kaṇikā* (Sanskrit text) ; *Pramāṇa-viniścaya* and *Hetubindu-prakraṇam* (Tibetan text) ; Tibetan text of Russian-British agreement of 18/31 August, 1907 on Tibet ; *Kṣaṇabhaṅga-siddhi* (Sanskrit text in Latin transcription) ; photocopies from Sanskrit, Tibetan and Pali manuscripts and also from the manuscripts in Kharoṣṭhī script and articles in Hindi and Urdu ; photocopies of wall paintings from Buddhist temples.

## IX

### ON EXPEDITIONARY ACTIVITY

Notes made at the time of travels in Urgu (note-book) ; *A Short Report on the Trip to India* (a rough manuscript) ; photocopies throwing light on the life and customs of the Mongols (made at the time of travels in Mongolia).

## X

### COMMENTS ON THE WORK OF OTHER SCHOLARS

*On* S. Agrell's works on *Accents in Russian Language* (in German) ; *On* A. I. Vostrikov's *Tibetan Historical Literature* ; *On* V. I. Kal'yanov's *Slozhnye slova v*

*Sanskrite* [Complex words in Sanskrit] ; *On* W. Ruben's *Die Nyāyasūtras* (in German) ; Stanislaw Schayer's *Ausgewahlte Kapital aus der Prasannapadā* ; *On* A. A. Stael Holstein's work on the restoration of text of three Sanskrit hymns—submitted by him to the Faculty of Oriental Languages for obtaining an academic degree ; A review of the research work done by E. E. Obermiller ( A review made jointly with I. Yu. Krachkovsky when Obermiller's name was being considered for Associate Membership of the Academy of Sciences.

## LETTERS

*From Th. Stcherbatsky*

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