Philosophical Literature: South Asia

The Madhyamaka (Middle Way) school, along with the Yogācāra, is one of the two major schools of Indian Mahayana Buddhist thought, which flourished there from the 3rd century CE to the final destruction of Buddhism in India in about the 12th century. It was carried to East Asia and Tibet prior to this time and continues there to this day, surviving in scholastic Tibetan Buddhism, Zen, and even Pure Land, frequently regarded as the cornerstone of Mahayana thought. The name “middle way” refers to a fundamental claim in Buddhism that the teachings of the Buddha constitute a middle way between eternalism and annihilationism; that is, between the doctrine that things have a stable and eternal essence, and the doctrine that things pass utterly out of existence when they cease. “Mādhyamika” is the adjectival form, and refers to adherents of the Madhyamaka school. Though central Madhyamaka ideas such as the Two Truths and Emptiness can be found in Nikaya Buddhism and in Mahayana sutras, it is with the treatises of Nāgārjuna (2nd–3rd centuries CE) that we have a fully formed and distinct system of thought that we can call Madhyamaka. In Nāgārjuna’s texts, he subjects all phenomena, including the Abhidharma categories of dharmas and the structure of the Two Truths, to radical analysis, declaring all things, including the Four Noble Truths and the Buddha himself, to be empty of inherent nature. For the Abhidharmikas, dharmas possess their characteristics intrinsically, which make them uniquely what they are, despite accepting the paradigmatic Buddhist position that all things exist dependently. Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamikas assert that dharmas cannot possess their own nature precisely because they exist dependently. In place of inherent nature, Nāgārjuna asserts that things exist only dependently, at least in conventional terms, and that ultimately, emptiness of inherent nature is the truth and reality of all things. Not surprisingly, numerous interpreters arose to elucidate this difficult philosophy. The question of which commentator is definitive has occupied many generations of Indian, East Asian, and Tibetan Buddhists, and the issue remains very much alive in modern scholarship. Much of the interest in Western scholarship has come, unsurprisingly, from philosophy, but it warrants noting that the intent of Madhyamaka, like all Buddhist thought, is primarily soteriological in nature.

In the past the study of Asian philosophical traditions has often been approached by asking how the theories developed within these non- Western cultures would help us to solve problems in contemporary Western philosophy. The present account, which summarizes results of a research project funded by the John Templeton foundation in 2015, attempts to reverse this way of studying Asian philosophy by investigating which theories, approaches and models from contemporary Western philosophy can be used to support, analyse, refine, and advance insights into key questions discussed by Indian Buddhist Madhyamaka. Our discussion concentrates on six key philosophical areas that can contribute in important ways to the analysis and development of Madhyamaka thought: metaphysics, logic, semantics, cognitive science, philosophy of science, and ethics.

The Madhyamaka School of Buddhism is one of the most important and influential schools of thought in Buddhisrt philosophy. It is known for its emphasis on the concept of “emptiness” and formation of the Madhyamaka School, its sophisticated understanding of the nature of reality. This article explores the origin and formation of the Madhyamaka school, tracing its development from its earliest roots to its mature form. The origins of the Madhyamaka school can be traced back to the teachings of the Buddha himself, who emphasized the importance of avoiding extreme views and finding a middle path between them. However, it was not until the second century CE that the Madhyamaka school began to take shape as a distinct philosophical system. At this time, the Indian philosopher Nāgārjuna wrote a series of texts that would become the foundation of the Madhaymaka school. Nāgārjuna’s writings were characterized by a rigorous analysis of the nature of reality and a rejection of all extremes. He argued that all things are “empty” of inherent existence, and that the conventional distinctions we make between things are ultimately illusory. This radical view challenged many of the prevailing philosophical assumptions of his time, and would go on to become a cornerstone of Buddhist thought. Over the centuries, the Madhyamaka school continued to evolve and develop, as scholars and practitioners sought to refine and elaborate on Nāgārjuna’s teachings. One of the most important figures in this process was the philosopher Candrakirti, who lived in the 7th century CE. Candrakirti built on Nāgārjuna’s work, developing a sophisticated understanding of the nature of emptiness and the relationship between conventional and ultimate truth. In present day, the Madhyamaka School continues to be a vibrant and influential tradition within Buddhism, with practitioners and scholars around the world working to deepen their understanding of its teachings. While its origins and development may be complex, the insights of the Madhyamaka school continue to inspire and challenge those who seek to understand the nature of reality and the path to enlightenment. 3 In this article basically I would focus on the areas which relates to the Madhyamaka schools, such as the definition and interpretations of the term “Madhyamka” in this school, the great teacher also the founder of the Madhyamaka school, Acarya Nāgārjuna and his works in brief, late several scholars like Buddhapālita, Bhavaviveka, Aryadeva and Candrakirti, and discuss about the two main schools where origin in Indian Buddhism namely Svatrantika and Prāsaŋgika schools. Keywords: Madhyamaka, Nāgārjuna, Shunyata, Buddhapālita, Aryadeva, Bhāvāviveka, Svatrantrika, Candrakirti, Prasaŋgika.

Philosophical Literature: South Asia Kamalaśīla (740–795 CE?), one of the most outstanding figures in the history of Indian Buddhism, composed and glossed works on logic, epistemology, and Madhyamaka; commented on important Mahāyāna sūtras such as the Vajracchedikā and the Śālistamba; and, besides being versed in Tantra, authored treatises in defense of the view that salvation results from a gradual cultivation process extending over innumerable lifetimes. Mutatis mutandis, the same can be said of the most revered Indian Buddhist authorities, Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu, and Dignāga, who were first and foremost committed to the “transdisciplinary” scholastic project of harmonizing reasoning ( yukti) with faith and scripture (āgama) in order to build a coherent Buddhist view of the world, human understanding, and salvation. In the absence of any emic category corresponding to the philosophical (in contrast to the narrative, the ritual, the disciplinary, etc.), isolating a distinctly philosophical segment or moment in these authors’ scholastic output is methodologically problematic and may look purely arbitrary. Fortunately, (late) Indian Buddhist intellectuals themselves developed doxographical labels suggesting that they regarded Madhyamaka, Yogācāra, Sautrāntika, and Vaibhāṣika literature as reflecting a fairly homogenous intellectual enterprise, the outcome of which they sometimes call mata (religiophilosophical doctrine), providing the expression “philosophical literature” with a convenient if not entirely satisfactory content. Although the present article does not address Ābhidharmika literature, it partly conforms to this doxographical scheme when focusing on the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra text traditions, but it diverges from it when presenting Buddhist epistemology as a distinct school. Indeed the so-called pramāṇa tradition, at least as far as issues of practice and doctrine are concerned, has never been considered an independent school in its Indic environment. However, dealing with it as a distinct school is not entirely without historical foundation, since the Indian Buddhist monastic curricula, which reflect normative and maybe institutional divisions in terms of genres and disciplines, isolate the hetuvidyā (science of justifications, i.e. logic and dialectics, including epistemology) as an autonomous branch of knowledge. © Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2015 Also available online – www.brill Mādhyamika literature has been surveyed in D. Seyfort Ruegg’s monograph (1981), while for the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda literature, J. May’s article (1971) still provides an excellent overview. J. Powers (1991), J.A. Silk (2001), F. Deleanu (2006), and M. Delhey (2013) provide indispensable bibliographical information, especially on the research carried out by L. Schmithausen and his followers. For the chronology and the literature of the epistemological school, we have the systematic survey by E. Steinkellner and M.T. Much (1995). E. Frauwallner’s Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (1956; see also Franco & Preisendanz, 2010) remains one of the best introduction to Indian Buddhist philosophy ever written in a Western language. A very useful survey covering some of the same ground as the present one is found in the Japanese-language volume by K. Tsukamoto, Y. Matsunaga, and H. Isoda (1990). Much Indian Buddhist literature survives, if at all, only in classical translations into Tibetan and Chinese. Therefore, while recent discoveries are making more and more Sanskrit materials available, and there is good reason to expect this trend to continue, at present any survey of Indian Buddhist philosophical literature must also refer extensively to sources preserved in Tibetan and Chinese. Note that the present article does not deal with the origin(s) of Indian Buddhist philosophy (for this topic, see Watanabe, 1983; Bronkhorst, 1999). Early Mādhyamika Literature The rise of the Madhyamaka school is intimately connected to the name of Nāgārjuna (c. 200 CE?; see Walleser, 1923; Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 4–5n11; Mabbett, 1998; Walser, 2005, 59–88) and can be located at the confluence of universal emptiness (śūnyatā) as taught in the Prajñāpāramitā sūtras and a reaction to traditional Buddhist dogmatics’ tendency to realism and hypostatization. As its name indicates (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 1–3; maybe not in use before the 5th cent. ce), the Madhyamaka has gradually tended to understand itself as a middle way (madhyamā pratipad) between the extremes of existence and nonexistence. This middle way is nothing but causality or dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), BEB, vol. I 594 Philosophical Literature: South Asia radically reinterpreted in the sense that everything is empty of intrinsic, autonomous existence – not to be mistaken for unqualified nonexistence, hence nihilism, which the Mādhyamikas were frequently accused of, and which, according to another overall interpretation of the Madhyamaka, they indeed endorsed (see Vetter, 1982; Oetke, 1988; 1989; 1996). The scholastic works ascribed to Nāgārjuna testify to a dialectical method consisting in the reductio ad absurdum (prasaṅga) of every possible theoretical posit. Here as elsewhere, the critique is meant as a therapeutic method for defilements and suffering rather than as a self-contained philosophical inquiry. In stanza 10 of his Madhyamakaśāstrastuti (de Jong, 1962, 51), Nāgārjuna’s commentator Candrakīrti (6th–7th cents. CE?) mentions the following eight (categories of) works by Nāgārjuna, though the authenticity of some is disputed (see below): 1. the Sūtrasamuccaya (T. 1653; D 3934/P 5330; see Pāsādika, 1989, 2003; Lindtner, 1982a, 172– 178); 2. the Ratnāvalī (T. 1656; D 4158/P 5658; see Hahn, 1982; Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 23–26; Walser, 2005, 271–278); 3. the Saṃstutis (see Lindtner, 1982a, 121–161; Tola & Dragonetti, 1995a, 101–153); 4. the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (T. 1564; D 3824/ P 5224; see Saigusa, 1985; Ye, 2011; de Jong, 1977; Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 9–18; Siderits & Katsura, 2013); 5. the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā (T. 1575; D 3825/P 5225; see Lindtner, 1982a; Scherrer-Schaub, 1991; Tola & Dragonetti, 1995b; Ye, 2013; Li, Kano & Ye, 2014; Li & Ye, forthcoming; Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 19–20); 6. the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (D 3826, 3830/P 5226, 5230; see Kajiyama, 1965a; Tola & Dragonetti, 1995a); 7. the Śūnyatāsaptati (D 3827/P 5227; see Lindtner, 1982a; Tola & Dragonetti, 1995b; Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 20–21); and 8. the Vigrahavyāvartanī (T. 1631; see Tucci, 1929; D 3828, 3832/P 5228, 5232; see Lindtner, 1982a; Bhattacharya, Johnston & Kunst, 1998; Yonezawa, 2008; Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 21–23). The fountainhead of all Mādhyamika traditions is the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. This treatise is composed of 447 (or 449) stanzas distributed into 27 chapters (whose titles vary according to the commentaries), in which Nāgārjuna’s dialectics suc- cessively apply to the following (list according to Candrakīrti’s Prasannapadā): 1. causal conditions (pratyaya); 2. motion (gatāgata); 3. sensory bases (indriya); 4. constituents (skandha); 5. elements (dhātu); 6. defilements (rāgarakta); 7. conditioned being (saṃskṛta); 8. action and agent (karmakāraka); 9. past (pūrva); 10. fire and fuel (agnīndhana); 11. successive lemmas (pūrvāparakoṭi); 12. suffering (duḥkha); 13. conditioned things (saṃskāra); 14. connection (saṃsarga); 15. own being/intrinsic nature (svabhāva); 16. bondage and liberation (bandhanamokṣa); 17. action and retribution (karmaphala); 18. self (ātman); 19. time (kāla); 20. causal complexes (sāmagrī); 21. existence and nonexistence (sambhavavibhava); 22. the Tathāgata; 23. misconceptions (viparyāsa); 24. nobles’ truths (āryasatya); 25. nirvāṇa; 26. 12 links in the chain of causation (dvādaśāṅga); 27. false views (dṛṣṭi). Major breaks in the historical development of Indian Madhyamaka coincide to a large extent with the doctrinal innovations initiated by Mādhyamika philosophers while commenting on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. The importance of the work can also be measured by the fact that it has been commented on by non-Mādhyamika intellectuals such as Asaṅga (T. 1565; 順中論義入大般若波羅蜜經), Guṇamati (lost), and Sthiramati (T. 1567; 大乗中観釋論). Besides the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, four more scholastic works have been commonly ascribed to Nāgārjuna by both traditional and modern scholarship: the Śūnyatāsaptati, the Vigrahavyāvartanī, the *Vyavahārasiddhi, and the Yuktiṣaṣṭikā. In Candrakīrti’s opinion, the first two are mere appendices to the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (see ScherrerSchaub, 1991, xxxvi). The Śūnyatāsaptati consists of 73 verses and a(n auto)commentary (D 3831/P 5231). It deals with the conventionality and the emptiness of all dharmas; with defilements, action, wrong notions, and nescience; and with the access to the ulti- Philosophical Literature: South Asia mate. The treatise has been commented on by Candrakīrti in the Śūnyatāsaptativṛtti (D 3867/ P 5268; see Erb, 1997) and by Parahitabhadra in the Śūnyatāsaptativivṛti (D 3868/P 5269). The Vigrahavyāvartanī was written in mixed verses and prose. This important treatise contains “a searching critique of the opponents’ own logical and epistemological assumptions, and a demonstration of the validity of the Mādhyamika’s theory and method” (Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 21–22; against Nāgārjuna’s authorship, see Tola & Dragonetti, 1998). The lost *Vyavahārasiddhi (Tib. Tha snyad grub pa) is known to us through six stanzas quoted in Śāntarakṣita’s Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti and explicitly identified by Kamalaśīla (Ichigo, 1985, 213, l. 10). According to Bu ston (1290–1364), the *Vyavahārasiddhi was meant “to show that although there is no own being in the ultimate sense, still worldly transactional convention is justified at the superficial level” (see Lindtner, 1982a, 94, 94n127). The Yuktiṣaṣṭikā is yet another of Nāgārjuna’s treatises dealing with dependent origination. According to C. Lindtner (1982a, 100–101), its argument is that “reality is beyond all ontological and epistemological dualities while the empirical world of origination, destruction, and so on, is illusory and merely due to ignorance.” Nāgārjuna’s Yuktiṣaṣṭikā has been commented on by Candrakīrti in the Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti (D 3864/P 5265; see Scherrer-Schaub, 1991). As suggested by Tibetan classifications, Nāgārjuna’s(?) Ratnāvalī belongs to the genre of the epistles dedicated to spiritual edification. This important treatise in five chapters and about 500 verses is especially well known for its chapter 4, which provides ethical and political advice to a (Satavahana?) king. The 9th-century scholar Ajitamitra has provided the Ratnāvalī with a commentary, the Ratnāvalīṭīkā (D 4159/P 5659; see Okada, 1990). Ethical advice to a prince is also the subject matter of Nāgārjuna’s famous Suhṛllekha (T. 1672–1674; D 4182, 4496/P 5409, 5682; see Tenzin, 2002; Dietz, 1984, 18–30; 2012), which has been commented on by Mahāmati in his Suhṛllekhaṭīkā (D–/P 5690). In addition to the Suhṛllekha, three works devoted to ethics and royal conduct have been ascribed to Nāgārjuna (Hahn, 1985): the Prajñāśataka (D 4328, 4501/P 5820, 5414; see Hahn, 1990), the Nītiśāstraprajñādaṇḍa (D 4329/P 5821; see Campbell, 1919), and the Nītiśāstrajantupoṣaṇabindu (D 4330/P 5822). Four works traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna but of disputed authenticity deserve to be men- 595 tioned here (for yet other works, see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 28–30; Lindtner, 1982a, 180–248; Buescher, 2008, 26–40). 1. The Vaidalyaprakaraṇa is a treatise consisting of 73 sūtras and a prose commentary dealing with dialectics. As its initial stanza testifies, the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa targets non-Buddhist dialecticians advocating the self and “grinds to little pieces” their 16 categories (comp. Nyāyasūtra 1.1.1). As O.H. Pind (2001) has pointed out, the treatise’s indebtedness to Sautrāntika-like ideas makes Nāgārjuna’s authorship very unlikely. 2. The Pratītyasamutpādahṛdaya (D 3836, 4553/ P 5236, 5467; see Lindtner, 1982a; 1982b) seems to have originally consisted of five stanzas and a commentary of uncertain authorship, the Vyākhyāna (T. 1654; D 3837, 4554/P 5237, 5468). According to C. Lindtner (1982a, 171), the treatise “marks an exegetical attempt to reconcile the traditional twelvemembered formula of dependent origination with the doctrine of emptiness.” 3. The *Dvādaśamukhaśāstra (T. 1568; see Aiyaswami Sastri, 1954; Goshima, 2004; 2007; HermannPfandt, 2008, 334) bears on 12 typically Mādhyamika topics (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 27–28) in 26 stanzas. The fame of this treatise is due to its being the second of the three authoritative treatises of the East Asian Sanlun (三論) school. This treatise might be a compilation by the (Central Asian?) commentator Qingmu (青目)/*Piṅgal(ākṣ)a or a later compilation by Kumārajīva (334–413?), himself or a member of his circle (see Goshima, 2002; 2007; 2012). 4. The massive Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (T. 1509; 大智度論; see Lamotte, 1949; 1970), if it is an Indian text, apparently achieved more renown in East Asia (and the West) than in India, where it is never alluded to. This commentary on the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā – ascribed to Nāgārjuna by Kumārajīva, who translated it into Chinese in 402–404 ce – refers to Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, and Rāhulabhadra. It seems more likely, however, that this “Mahāyānistic replica of the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma” (Lamotte, 1970, xli) was the work of a monk of Sarvāstivāda background and Mahāyānistic persuasion in early 4th-century Gandhara or Kashmir, or of “Serindian scholars and Chinese redactors” (Seyfort Ruegg, 1982, 508). Next in importance only to Nāgārjuna is his likely disciple Āryadeva (mid-3rd cent. CE?; see Lang, 1986, 7–15). More than Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva endeavored to defend the Madhyamaka against the non-Buddhists. This makes his works important sources concerning early Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika, two of these 596 Philosophical Literature: South Asia non-Buddhist opponents. Āryadeva’s magnum opus is the Catuḥśataka (D 3846/P 5246; see Lang, 1986). The treatise’s 400 stanzas are distributed into 16 chapters, of which 1–8 and 9–16 form two homogenous units – Dharmapāla commented on chapters 9–16 alone (T. 1571; 大乘廣百論釋論), the likely reason why Xuanzang (玄奘; 602–664) limited his Chinese translation to these same chapters (T. 1570; 廣百論本). Chapters 1–8 are close in intent to Nāgārjuna’s two epistles and deal, as an ethical “preparation of those who practise the path” (Lang, 1986, 52), with the elimination of the four misconceptions (chs. 1–4; see Lang, 2003), the bodhisattva practice (ch. 5), the elimination of the defilements (ch. 6), the attachment to sensory objects (ch. 7), and the practice of the disciple (ch. 8). Chapters 9–16 are “a defense of the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness against its detractors” (Lang, 1986, 52) and negate permanent things (ch. 9; see May, 1980– 1984), the self (ch. 10), time (ch. 11), false views (ch. 12; see Tillemans, 1990), the sense organs and their objects (ch. 13; see Tillemans, 1990), the belief in extremities (ch. 14), and conditioned things (ch. 15) in addition to addressing logical and epistemological issues related to the doctrine of emptiness (ch. 16). Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka has been commented on by Dharmapāla (see above; see also Tillemans, 1990) and by Candrakīrti in the Catuḥśatakaṭīkā/ Catuḥśatakavṛtti (D 3865/P 5266; see Suzuki, 1994). At least in East Asia, however, Āryadeva’s fame is due mainly to the Śata(ka)śāstra (T. 1569; 百論; see Tucci, 1929b, 3–89), in 50 sūtras (sic), the third authoritative treatise of the Sanlun school. Of disputed authenticity (see de Jong, 1971, 110; Gard, 1954, 751–747), the Śata(ka)śāstra might have been a “rearranged and abridged version of the Catuḥśataka” (Lang, 1986, 13), possibly compiled by the (Central Asian?) commentator Vasu (Gard, 1954, 747). At least as far as their subject matter is concerned, the two works have much in common: 1. merit and demerit; 2. the self; 3. unity; 4. multiplicity; 5. sense perception; 6. sense objects; 7. the (Sāṃkhya) doctrine according to which the result preexists in the cause (satkāryavāda); 8. the (Vaiśeṣika) doctrine according to which the result does not preexist in the cause (asatkāryavāda); 9. permanence; and 10. emptiness. (Lang, 1986, 11–13) As pointed out by K.C. Lang, however, the two treatises differ in the arrangement of topics, in their arguments, and in their style (didactic stanzas vs. sūtras). Several other treatises have been ascribed to Āryadeva: the Hastavālaprakaraṇa, likely the work of Dignāga (see below); the Treatise on the Explanation of Nirvāṇa by Heterodox and Hīnayāna Teachers in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (T. 1640; Shì léng gā jīng zhōng wài dào xiǎo chéng niè pán lùn [釋楞伽經中外道小乘涅槃論]; see Tucci, 1926); the Treatise on the Refutation of Heterodox and Hīnayāna Theses in the Laṅkāvatārasūtra (T. 1639; Pò léng gā jīng zhōng wài dào xiǎo chéng sì zōng lùn [破楞伽經中外道小乘四宗論]); the Skhalitaprama[rd]anayuktihetusiddhi (D 3847/ P 5247; see Clarke & Jamspal, 1978), a short treatise in which naive versions of hedonism/materialism, naturalism, temporalism, and theism are criticized in the name of dependent origination; the Madhyamakabhramaghāta (D 3850/ P 5250), apparently a compilation of selected excerpts from Bhāviveka’s Tarkajvālā (see Lindtner, 1982b, 173n21); and the philosophically more substantial Akṣara śataka (T. 1572; D 3834, 3835/P 5234, 5235; see Gokhale, 1930), whose targets are Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika views, and whose topics parallel those of Śata(ka)śāstra 2–10. Rāhulabhadra, a contemporary and follower of Nāgārjuna (maybe of Āryadeva as well; see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 54n155), is the last important figure of the formative period of Indian Madhyamaka. He likely authored a now lost commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, which is referred to by early authorities such as Asaṅga and *Sāramati (in T. 1565, 1634; see Lamotte, 1970, 1374). But Rāhulabhadra is especially famous for his hymns – first and foremost for his Prajñāpāramitāstotra, which serves as a preface to several (Indian versions of ) Prajñāpāramitā sūtras and is quoted in the pseudo-Nāgārjuna’s Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (see Lamotte, 1949, 1060–1065, 1060n2). According to D. Seyfort Ruegg (1981, 55–56), Rāhulabhadra’s hymns betray his indebtedness to tathāgatagarbha ideas (i.e. the doctrinal stream accepting the existence of Buddha-nature in each sentient being). This may be the place to briefly mention a work that, although it bears no particular relationship to the Madhyamaka (but see Katsura, 1979) and is more closely connected with Abhidharmic ways of • • • • • • Philosophical Literature: South Asia 597 thinking, had a strong impact on the early history of Indian Buddhist philosophy and the development of Dārṣṭāntika/Sautrāntika thought – that is, Harivarman’s *Tattvasiddhi (also known as *Satyasiddhi; T. 1646; 成實論; see Aiyaswami Sastri, 1975, 1978; Potter, 1999, 255–312), composed either between 250 and 350 (Katsura, 1978, 1063) or between 310 and 390 (Kritzer, 2005, 210). Besides an introductory chapter dedicated to the three jewels (the Buddha, the law, and the community) and the different points of controversy, the work consists of four chapters dealing with the four nobles’ truths. Whereas suffering consists of the five skandhas (corporeity, affective sensation, identification, conditioning factors, and cognitions), the origin of suffering is to be found in action and defilements. Harivarman defines the cessation of suffering as the cessation of the awareness of designations, of the awareness of factors, and of the awareness of emptiness (see Katsura, 1979). As for the path leading to the cessation of suffering, it consists of concentration and knowledge. Harivarman’s treatment of topics such as the existence of past and future factors (ch. 1; see Katsura, 1978) or the modalities of cognition (ch. 2) contains interesting controversies with Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya, the early Buddhist philosophers’ main opponents. (see Demiéville, 1954, 363–397; Deleanu, 1997, 34–35), “a literary as well as scholastic work written in a unique blend of poetic imagery . . . and technical discussions concerning the theory and practice of spiritual cultivation” (Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 158); 2. the 4th-century Yogācārabhūmi (also known as The Meditation Scripture [Taught] by Dharmatrāta; T. 618; Dá mó duō luó chán jīng [達摩多羅禪經]; see Demiéville, 1954, 362–363; Deleanu, 1993; Yamabe, 1999, 72–76) by the Kashmirian meditation master Buddhasena; and 3. the so-called Yogalehrbuch, a Mūlasarvāstivāda work (Schmithausen, 1970, 109, 113n257), Sanskrit fragments of which were discovered in 1906 in Kizil near Kucha and edited by D. Schlingloff (1964; see Hartmann, 1996; Yamabe, 1997; Yamabe, 1999, 60–72; see also Bretfeld, 2003). The number of these digests was apparently so important that Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda Literature As noted by P. Demiéville (1954, 349–350, 354, 362), D. Schlingloff (1964, 54–56), D. Seyfort Ruegg (1967, 160–161), and N. Yamabe (1999, 73–74), these originally purely Śrāvakayānist works were supplemented with Mahāyānist elements or appendices from the 3rd to 4th century on. This is the case with chapters 28–30 of Saṅgharakṣa’s Yogācārabhūmi, maybe an originally independent treatise, with chapters 4–7 of Buddhasena’s Yogācārabhūmi, and with the bodhisattva ideal that made its way into the Yogalehrbuch. Properly Mahāyānistic treatises circulated as well, such as the Vīradattaparipṛcchā (also known as *Bodhisattvayogācārabhūmisūtra; T. 330; 菩薩修行經; comp. T. 331; 無畏授所問; comp. also T. 310; 大寶積經; XCVI, 540a–543a), which deals with the practice of the perfections (six, sometimes ten behavioral, ethical, and cognitive norms/ideals), the meditation on the human body, and so on. According to P. Demiéville, the “mahāyānization” that took place between the 2nd and the 4th century reflects “a new need born . . . of the gradual increase of the Mahāyānists: the Yoga masters could no longer ignore this clientele” (Demiéville, 1954, 397). A very similar blend of Śrāvakayānist and Mahāyānist materials can be observed on a much The origin of what came to be known as Yogācāra, Vijñānavāda, or *Vijñaptivāda – that is, Buddhist idealism – is commonly traced to a (Mūla)sarvāstivāda community of meditators or yoga practitioners (yogācāra) that, from the 1st century onward “commences to be active in the production of meditation treatises and manuals” (Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 162; references in Deleanu, vol. II, 2006, 212n53). Its views are regularly discussed in the Mahāvibhāṣā (see Silk, 2000, 286–287; Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 213n60). Not infrequently entitled Yogācārabhūmi ([Treatise on] the Levels of Those Who Engage in Spiritual Training; Delhey, vol. I, 2009, 3n2; Delhey, 2013, 501), the most ancient among these Yogācārabhūmis form the “prototypes” (Demiéville, 1954) or “forefathers” (Deleanu, 2006) of the Yogācārabhūmi that served as the foundation of classical Buddhist “mind-only” (vijñaptimātratā) idealism. The most famous among these and later meditation digests are the following: 1. the 1st- to 2nd-century Yogācārabhūmi (T. 606; 修行道地經; T. 607; 道地經; translated into Chinese in 148–170 ce but incomplete) by the Kashmirian Sarvāstivāda patriarch Saṅgharakṣa in the early 5th century, in order to compile a Yoga treatise destined to his Chinese disciples, Kumārajīva used, besides Saṅgharakṣa’s Yogācārabhūmi and Aśvaghoṣa’s Saundarananda, all sorts of ‘dhyāna summaries’ . . . that were the works of other Sarvāstivādin patriarchs: Vasumitra, Upagupta, Saṅghasena, Pārśva, Kumāralāta. (Demiéville, 1954, 396; see also Yamabe, 1999, 78–79) 598 Philosophical Literature: South Asia larger scale in the Yogācārabhūmi(śāstra) (see Schmithausen, 1969a; Deleanu, 2006; Delhey, 2013; Kragh, 2013), which serves as a doctrinal authority of semi-canonical character to the Yogācāra/ Vijñānavāda. One of its parts, the Śrāvakabhūmi (T. 1579; D 4036/P 5537; see Yugaron Shōmonji, 1998; 2007; Deleanu, 2006), belongs to the same “ascetic current” (Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 158; see also Yamabe, 2013) as the one underlying Saṅgharakṣa’s Yogācārabhūmi. This massive work – 100 juan (fascicles) in its Chinese translation – has been ascribed to either Maitreya (East Asian traditions) or Asaṅga (late Indic and Tibetan traditions), but its compilatory character has been demonstrated by L. Schmithausen (1969a). The Yogācārabhūmi has come down to us in two complete translations – one in Tibetan (D 4035– 4042/P 5536–5543) and one in Chinese (T. 1579; partial translation of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī [T. 1584]; on Dharmakṣema’s 418 ce translation, see below). Important parts of the so-called Maulī Bhūmi (Basic Section; see below), including the Śrāvakabhūmi and the Bodhisattvabhūmi (T. 1579; D 4037/P 5538; see Wogihara, 1930–1936; Dutt, 1978; Takahashi, 2005), have been preserved in Sanskrit manuscripts and fragments (see Delhey, 2009, 15n45; 2013, 507–540). The Yogācārabhūmi consists of five parts (six in Tibetan; Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 43–50): 1. the Maulī Bhūmi (Basic Section; or maulyo bhūmayaḥ; maybe originally referred to collectively as Yogācārabhūmi) consisting of 14 chapters expounding 17 levels/stages and representing about one half of the whole work; 2. the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (Collection of Clarifications; see Schmithausen, 1969b; Kramer, 2005); 3. the *Vyākhyā[na]saṃgrahaṇī or *Vivaraṇa saṃgrahaṇī (Collection of Exegeses; see Nance, 2012, 167–212); 4. the Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī (Collection of Synonym Terms); and 5. the Vastusaṃgrahaṇī (Collection of [Scriptural] Bases[?]). According to F. Deleanu, the basic part . . . deals with the three paths towards Liberation . . . as well as with various psychological and doctrinal aspects related directly or indirectly to spiritual cultivation, [whereas] the rest of the text represents collections of various doctrinal definitions, lists, exegetical materials dedicated to canonical scriptures, and so on. (Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 43–44) Except for the Bodhisattvabhūmi, the whole basic part is of Śrāvakayānist orientation. As for the four Saṃgrahaṇīs, they are essentially Śrāvakayānist as well, except for the Sandhinirmocanasūtra, quoted extensively in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (see Delhey, 2013, 535–538), and for the rest of the Bodhisattvabhūmiviniścaya. As F. Deleanu puts it, the Yogācārabhūmi became a fundamental treatise of one of India’s major Mahāyāna traditions in spite of the fact that a large part of it contains or presupposes no teachings peculiar to the Great Vehicle. (Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 182) Even in its Mahāyānist parts, the Yogācārabhūmi recurrently targets misconceptions of emptiness that reflect ideas close to the Prajñāpāramitā if not to early Madhyamaka (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1969, 322– 323; Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 162–163; 170–171; Buescher, 2008, 173–176). This fivefold macrostructure is reflected in the emic classifications of the Yogācārabhūmi as an Abhidharma work. Thus according to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (T. 1579, 654b3–6; D Zhi 188b2–3/P Zi 195b6), the Abhidharma piṭaka (basket; called mātṛkā [matrix] in a Mūlasarvāstivāda environment) consists of 17 levels and four collections. In other words, the Yogācārabhūmi is an Abhidharma matrix. The Yogācārabhūmi has also been described as an Abhidharma piṭaka revealed by Maitreya (Delhey, vol. I, 2009, 3n3; Delhey, 2013, 502nn9–10). From a doctrinal and literary point of view, L. Schmithausen distinguishes three main layers in the Yogācārabhūmi: 1) portions – probably the oldest layer(s) – not containing any reference to ālayavijñāna: parts of the Basic Section, esp. the Śrāvakabhūmi and the Bodhisattvabhūmi, and the Vastusaṅgrahaṇī; 2) the rest of the Basic Section, with sporadic occurrences of ālayavijñāna but no reference to the Sandhinirmocana sūtra; 3) the Viniścaya saṅgrahaṇī containing a detailed treatment of ālayavijñāna and at the same time quoting and making use of the Sandhinirmocana sūtra. (Schmithausen, vol. I, 1987, 14) The gradual elaboration of the ālayavijñāna in the Yogācārabhūmi is to be seen as genetically and doctrinally independent of Mahāyāna and vijñaptimātratā (mind-only; Schmithausen, vol. I, 1987, 33), a notion that only occurs in the quotation of the Sandhinirmocanasūtra (8.7–9; see Lamotte, Philosophical Literature: South Asia 1935) in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, the first literary expression of the vijñaptimātratā (Schmithausen, 1984, 455; vol. I, 1987, 88–89). As for well-known Yogācāra doctrines, such as the three lakṣaṇas (character[istic]s) or svabhāvas (natures) of all phenomena, the Buddha’s not permanently fixed nirvāṇa and his three bodies (body of the law, body of magic transformation, and enjoyment body), and the notion of false imagination (abhūtaparikalpa), they are nowhere to be found in the Yogācārabhūmi (see Schmithausen, 1969a, 820–821; Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 175). As F. Deleanu (vol. I, 2006, 172; see also Buescher, 2008, 202) puts it, “philosophically, it is the formation of the Sandhinirmocanasūtra that marks the actual birth of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda as a distinct Mahāyāna school.” In a vehemently antiPrajñāpāramitā stance, the Sandhinirmocanasūtra (7.30) presents itself as a third turning of the dharma cakra surpassing the dispensation of the four nobles’ truths and the revelation of emptiness (see Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 175). The chronology of the Yogācārabhūmi is a difficult point (see Delhey, vol. I, 2009, 10–13). Whereas its terminus post quem corresponds to 1st- to 2ndcentury ce works such as those of Aśvaghoṣa and Saṅgharakṣa, the terminus ante quem for most of its parts would be Dharmakṣema’s 418 ce Chinese translation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (T. 1581; see Delhey, 2013, 524n130), whose numerous crossreferences suggest that several additional parts of the Yogācārabhūmi were already extant by that time. F. Deleanu (vol. I, 2006, 155, 195) distinguishes six phases in the compilation of the Yogācārabhūmi: 1. the formation of the Śrāvakabhūmi (200–270?); 2. the formation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (230– 300?); 3. the formation of the rest of the Maulī Bhūmi, of the Vyākhyāsaṃgrahaṇī, and of the Paryāyasaṃgrahaṇī (270–340?); 4. the formation of the Sandhinirmocanasūtra (300–350?); 5. the formation of the early parts of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī (320–350?); 6. the citation of the Sandhinirmocanasūtra in the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, the compilation of the late parts of the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī, and the final redaction of the entire Yogācārabhūmi (350–380?), a process in which Asaṅga could have taken part. (Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 155, 195). The Yogācārabhūmi has been made the object of numerous Indic commentaries (see Deleanu, vol. I, 599 2006, 248–251). Some have been preserved in Tibetan translation: the incomplete and anonymous (or Jinaputra’s?) *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā (D 4043/P 5544); Guṇaprabha’s *Bodhisattvabhūmivṛtti (D 4044/ P 5545; 5th cent. CE?) on parts of the Bodhisattvabhūmi and his *Bodhisattvaśīla parivartabhāṣya (D 4045/P 5546) on the Śīlapaṭala; Jinaputra’s *Bodhisattvaśīlaparivartaṭīkā (D 4046/ P 5547), a subcommentary on the Śīlapaṭala; and *Sāgaramegha’s *Yogācārabhūmau Bodhisattva bhūmivyākhyā (D 4047/P 5548; c. 750–800?). Other exegetical works are alluded to or partly preserved in Chinese materials: Nanda’s *Yogācārabhūmivyākhyā (c. 500?) and the commentaries by alleged disciples of Dharmapāla (530–561?), namely Viśeṣamitra, Jñānacandra, and Jinaputra (e.g. *Yogācāra bhūmivyākhyā, of which Xuanzang translated the introductory part [T. 1580; 瑜伽師地論釋]). As pointed out by L. Schmithausen (1969a, 821–822, 822n48), all the works belonging to the “Maitreya-Asaṅga complex” – the next layer of Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda literature – depend on the Yogācārabhūmi, but no influence of either of these works on the Yogācārabhūmi can be convincingly argued for. The authorship of five of these works is one of the most vexed problems of modern Buddhist scholarship (see Ui, 1929; Frauwallner, 1952; Demiéville, 1954, 380n4; Frauwallner, 1956, 255–258, 296–309; Seyfort Ruegg, 1969, 39–55; May, 1971, 281– 293). In a nutshell, ubiquitous Indian and Tibetan traditions ascribe a group of five works to Maitreya: 1. Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (T. 1604; D 4020/ P 5521; see Lévi, 1907; 1911; Jamspal et al., 2004); 2. Madhyāntavibhāga (T. 1601; D 4021/P 5522; see Nagao, 1964; Frauwallner, 1956, 320–326; D’Amato 2012); 3. Dharmadharmatā(pra)vibhāga (D 4022, 4023/ P 5523, 5524; see Mathes, 1996, 61–67, 99–103, 104–114; Nozawa, 1955); 4. Abhisamayālaṃkāra; and 5. Uttaratantra (= Ratnagotravibhāga; T. 1611; D 4024/P 5525; see Johnston, 1991; Obermiller, 1991, 96–111; Frauwallner, 1956, 255–264; Takasaki, 1966; Seyfort Ruegg, 1969). According to these traditions, Asaṅga redacted these five works under the direct inspiration of the bodhisattva Maitreya residing in the Tuṣita heaven. Following H. Ui, E. Frauwallner regards Maitreya(nātha) as the name of Asaṅga’s historical rather than celestial • • • • • • 600 Philosophical Literature: South Asia teacher. He also ascribes, in accordance with East Asian traditions, the Ratnagotravibhāga not to Maitreya but to *Sāramati (c. 250?; see Lamotte, 1987, 92, 93n2; Silk, forthcoming), the alleged author of the *Dharmadhātvaviśeṣatāśāstra (T. 1626, 1627; 大乘法界無差別論) and the *Mahāyānāvatāraśāstra (T. 1634; 入大乘論). The Ratnagotravibhāga, one of the most authoritative sources of tathāgatagarbha ideas, likely had a strong impact on Maitreya’s three genuinely Yogācāra works. In the Ratnagotravibhāga, *Sāramati/Maitreya “professes a monistically coloured form of Buddhism in which the immaculate and radiant thought becomes a supreme entity” (Lamotte, 1987, 92n2). This doctrine foreshadows the pseudo-Aśvaghoṣa’s (*Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda; T. 1666, 1667; 大乘起信論; see Hakeda, 1967), “a Chinese apocryphon composed perhaps around the mid-6th century ce and presenting an ingenious . . . synthesis of the main Mahāyānistic theses that had reached China by that time” (May, 1971, 284–285). The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra comprises 21 chapters, of which the doctrinally most attractive are chapter 1 (apology of the Mahāyāna; see Nōnin et al., 2009), chapter 9 (buddha nature), and chapter 18 (systematic demonstrations of momentariness and selflessness; see Eltschinger, 2010b). As a whole, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra is “an exposition of Yogācāra theories in connection with the religious practice and conduct of the Bodhisattva” (Obermiller, 1931, 86). Maitreya equates his positive, all-pervading absolute with the naturally immaculate and radiant mind whose impurities are strictly adventitious. Inasmuch as it consists in mind, this supreme entity resides in all beings as a seed or element out of which appears false imagination (viewed as the dependent nature). False imagination is the origin of the phenomenal world characterized by subject-object duality – here identified with the imagined nature. In Maitreya’s system, the perfect nature refers to the purified mind. In a Vedānta-like manner, this purified absolute is equated with the supreme self (paramātman). The Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra has been commented on in the following: Vasubandhu’s Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya (T. 1604; D 4026/P 5527; see Lévi, 1907; see Nōnin et al., 2009; 2013); Sthiramati (510–570?) wrote a massive subcommentary, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃ kāravṛttibhāṣya (D 4034/P 5531; see Hayashima, 1977–1983), and Vairocanarakṣita (11th–12th cent.?) • wrote a cursory gloss, the *Sūtrālaṃkāravivṛti (see Kano, 2008, 343); *Asvabhāva’s Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāraṭīkā (D 4029/ P 5530; early 6th cent. CE?); Parahitabhadra’s Sūtrālaṃkārādiślokadvaya vyākhyāna (D 4030/P 5532; 11th cent. CE?); and Jñānaśrīmitra’s Sūtrālaṃkārapiṇḍārtha (D 4031/ P 5533; early 11th cent. CE?). The Madhyāntavibhāga “contains an idealistic interpretation of the doctrine of the middle way . . . and of the doctrine of emptiness” (May, 1971, 289; see Frauwallner, 1956, 320–326). This interpretation likely derives from the Bodhisattvabhūmi and appears to be intended as a critique of Mādhyamika views on the subject. The treatise has been commented on by Vasubandhu in his Madhyānta vibhāgabhāṣya (T. 1599, 1600; D 4027/P 5528; see Nagao, 1964), and Vasubandhu’s explanations have been in turn expanded on by Sthiramati in his Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā (D 4032/P 5534; see Yamaguchi, 1934). Both commentaries have been glossed by Vairocanarakṣita in his Madhyāntavibhāga katipayapadavivṛti (see Kano, 2008, 343). The Dharmadharmatā(pra)vibhāga consists of two parts. The treatise first demonstrates the nonexistence of external phenomena by reducing them to false imagination, inasmuch as they entail a subject-object duality and are nothing but appearances that conform to language. Its second part teaches that the path of nonconceptual insight results in one’s identification with the nondual and inexpressible true nature (dharmatā) of phenomena, namely the immaculate thusness (tathatā). It has been commented on by Vasubandhu in his Dharmadharmatāvibhāgavṛtti (D 4028/P 5529; see Mathes, 1996) and, together with Vasubandhu’s gloss, by Vairocanarakṣita in his Dharmadharmatā vibhāgavivṛti (see Kano, 2008, 358–373). Asaṅga (315–390 ce in Frauwallner, 1956, 326 but 330–405 ce in Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 196; 244n266) contributed decisively to the dogmatic systematization of Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda (see Frauwallner, 1956, 326–350; May, 1971, 289–293). He achieved this by accommodating “idealistic” doctrines to traditional Śrāvakayāna dogmatics and by integrating the “old scholastics of liberation” (Frauwallner, 1956, 327) into this new doctrinal framework. If this tendency toward the “appropriation of the conceptual world of Hīnayāna dogmatics” (Frauwallner, 1956, 328) can be said to permeate most of Asaṅga’s literary output, his works nevertheless betray significant • • • Philosophical Literature: South Asia differences in terms of confessional orientation. He authored the following: 1. the Abhidharmasamuccaya (T. 1605; D 4049/ P 5550; see Gokhale, 1947; Pradhan, 1950); 2. the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (T. 1592–1594; D 4048/ P 5549; see Lamotte, 1973); and 3. the *Āryadeśanāvikhyāpanaśāstra (T. 1602; 顯揚聖教論; see Schmithausen, vol. II, 1987, 261n99; von Rospatt, 1995, 219–251; Potter, 1999, 433). The Abhidharmasamuccaya is a work “written from the standpoint of traditional realistic Hīnayāna ontology” (Schmithausen, 1972, 158), in which typically idealist notions such as cittamātra(tā) or vijñaptimātra(tā) do not occur. The doctrine of the three natures is interpreted against the purely Śrāvakayānist background of the selflessness of the person. Whereas the dependent nature consists of the constituents (skandha), sensory bases (āyatana), and elements (dhātu), the imagined nature consists in the superimposition of a self on them and the perfect nature in their very selflessness. The Abhidharmasamuccaya has been commented on by *Jinaputra(?) in his Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya (D 4053/P 5554; see Tatia, 1976; Schmithausen, 1969b, 101ny; de Jong, 1973, 340–341), which might be the same as the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā ascribed to Sthiramati (T. 1606; D 4054/P 5555). The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (T. 1592–1594; D 4048/ P 5549; see Lamotte, 1973) is fairly different from the Abhidharmasamuccaya. It presents itself as an apology for the Mahāyāna, whose ten superiorities with regard to the Śrāvakayāna coincide with the gnoseological, ontological, and soteriological program of Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda: 1. store consciousness (ālayavijñāna); 2. three natures (svabhāvatraya); 3. mind-only (vijñaptimātratā); 4. the perfections (pāramitā); 5. the stages (bhūmi); 6. the discipline (saṃvara) of the bodhisattva; 7. the specific concentrations (samādhi) of the bodhisattva; 8. nonconceptual (nirvikalpaka) knowledge; 9. unfixed (apratiṣṭhita) nirvāṇa; and 10. the three Buddha-bodies (kāya). According to J.W. de Jong, whereas the Mahāyānasaṅgraha is a compendium of the specifically Mahāyānistic doctrines of the Yogācāra school, the Abhidharmasamuccaya is a systematic guide of the Abhidharma part of the said school’s doctrinal system (de Jong, 1973, 339) 601 The Mahāyānasaṃgraha has been commented on by Vasubandhu in his Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (T. 1595–1597; D 4050/P 5551) and by *Asvabhāva in his Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana (T. 1598; D 4051/P 5552). E. Frauwallner characterizes the *Āryadeśanā vikhyāpanaśāstra (T. 1602; 顯揚聖教論; see Schmithausen, vol. II, 1987, 261n99; von Rospatt, 1995, 219–251; Potter, 1999, 433) as “a systematic summary of the doctrines of the bulky Yogācārabhūmiśāstram” (1956, 327–328). The next decisive figure for Yogācāra/ Vijñānavāda is Vasubandhu, whose name is associated with innumerable works on topics ranging from tathāgatagarbha to Vaibhāṣika and from Sukhāvatī to Yogācāra (see Nakamura, 1980, 268– 273; Mejor, 1991, 7–13). E. Frauwallner (1951) notoriously distinguishes two Vasubandhus: 1. Vasubandhu the Elder (320–380 ce), a Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika (referred to as Sthaviravasubandhu or Vṛddhācāryavasubandhu; see Mejor, 1989–1990, 277–281), who, on the inspiration of his (half-)brother Asaṅga, turned to Mahāyāna and composed Yogācāra and Mahāyāna commentaries; 2. Vasubandhu the Younger (400–480 ce), who authored the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (as a heterodox, Sautrāntika-oriented Vaibhāṣika), the Paramārtha saptatikā, and, later in his life, the Viṃśikā and Triṃśikā. Many objections have been raised against E. Frauwallner’s hypothesis (see Griffiths, 1986, 164–165n9; Skilling, 2000, 29n2; Kritzer, 2005, xxv; Deleanu, vol. I, 2006, 234n205). The chronological gap between the two alleged Vasubandhus has narrowed since L. Schmithausen (1992) demonstrated that the Laṅkāvatārasūtra as translated into Chinese by Guṇabhadra as early as 443 ce presupposes Triṃśikā 20 and 28. Moreover, R. Kritzer (2005) has convincingly shown how deep the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya’s indebtedness to the Yogācārabhūmi is, thus suggesting a strong Yogācāra impact already on the young Vasubandhu. The prevailing scholarly consensus concerning the works that can be regarded, mainly because of their “Sautrāntika presuppositions” (Schmithausen, 1967), as authored by Vasubandhu is as follows: 1. the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya; 2. the Vyākhyāyukti (D 4061/P 5562; see Lee, 2001; Cabezon, 1992; Skilling, 2000; Verhagen, 2005; 2008; Horiuchi, 2009; Nance, 2012; commented on in Guṇamati’s Vyākhyāyuktiṭīkā; D 4069/ P 5570); 602 Philosophical Literature: South Asia 3. the Karmasiddhi(prakaraṇa) (T. 1608, 1609; D 4062/P 5563; see Lamotte, 1936; Muroji, 1985); 4. the Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā; 5. the Pañcaskandhaka (T. 1612; D 4059/P 5560; see Li & Steinkellner 2008; Buescher, 2010); 6. the Viṃśikā (T. 1588–1590; D 4056, 4057/ P 5557, 5558; see Lévi, 1925; Kellner & Taber, forthcoming); and 7. the Triṃśikā (T. 1586; D 4055/P 5556; see Lévi, 1925; Schmithausen, vol. II, 1987, 262, 263n101). To the above, the lost Paramārthasaptatikā is certainly to be added as well as the Pratītyasamutpādā divibhaṅganirdeśa (D 3995/P 5496; commented on in Guṇamati’s Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa ṭīkā; D 3996/P 5497). However, Vasubandhu’s authorship of the commentaries on the aforementioned Madhyāntavibhāga, Dharmadharmatāvibhāga, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, and Mahāyānasaṃgraha as well as of the Trisvabhāva nirdeśa (see below) and the Gāthā(rtha)saṃgraha (D 4102, 4103/P 5603, 5604; see Skilling, 2000, 305–307) cannot be categorically dismissed. The issue simply awaits further research. According to F. Deleanu (vol. I, 2006, 187; see also Franco & Preisendanz, 2010, xv–xvii), Vasubandhu’s dates are 350–430 ce. The issue of the number of Vasubandhu(s) remains open (see Mejor, 1989–1990; Buescher, 2013). In his Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, Vasubandhu explains, against the Vaibhāṣikas and the Āryasāṃmitīyas, psychophysical continuity (memory, karmic retribution, etc.) by resorting to a Sautrāntika version of the ālayavijñāna, its seeds, and the subtle transformation of the series. The work has been commented on by Sumatiśīla (Karmasiddhiṭīkā, D 4071/P 5572; late 8th cent.?). The Pañcaskandhaka consists of an enumeration of dharmas accompanied by short definitions and “can be roughly characterised as a summary of Abhidharma in accordance with the Yogācāra/ Vijñānavāda tradition as was presented by Asaṅga in chapter 1 of his Abhidharmasamuccaya” (Li & Steinkellner, 2008, vii–viii). It has been glossed by Sthiramati (T. 1613; D 4066/P 5567; see Kramer, forthcoming), by Guṇaprabha in his Pañcaskandha vivaraṇa (D 4067/P 5568), and by *Pṛthivībandhu in his Pañcaskandhakabhāṣya (D 4068/P 5569). The Trisvabhāvanirdeśa (D 4058/P 5559; see La Vallée Poussin, 1932–1933a; Tola & Dragonetti, 1983) explores in 38 verses the respective characteristics, the mutual relationships, and the soteriological (ir)relevance of the three natures, which it compares with a magical elephant (imagined nature, subject- object duality) whose form or appearance (dependent nature, false conception) is created from a piece of wood (perfect nature, thusness) by the force of magic formulas (the root consciousness). Vasubandhu’s most important works are without doubt Viṃśikā (or Viṃśikāvṛtti; on the title, see Kano, 2008, 345, 350) and Triṃśikā (see Frauwallner, 1956, 350–390; May, 1971, 301–318). Rather than positively and systematically expounding Vasubandhu’s idealism, the Viṃśikā constitutes a sort of defensive propaedeutic in which Vasubandhu answers Buddhist objections pertaining to the place of the object in cognition and dismisses the Vaiśeṣikas’ and the Vaibhāṣikas’ atomistic accounts of the external objects. It has been commented on by Dharmapāla (T. 1591; 成唯識寶生論), by Vinītadeva in his Viṃśikāṭīkā (D 4065/P 5566); the root-text together with Vinītadeva’s commentary have been commented upon by Vairocanarakṣita in his Viṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti (see Kano, 2008, 348–358). Unlike the Viṃśikā, the Triṃśikā provides a systematic account of mature Buddhist idealism. In an Abhidharma-like manner, Vasubandhu describes the store consciousness, the defiled mind, and all the concomitant factors including defilements; he further discusses the three natures before concluding with soteriology. Only two Indic commentaries of the Triṃśikā have been preserved: Sthiramati’s Triṃśikābhāṣya (D 4064/P 5565; see Buescher, 2007) and Vinītadeva’s Triṃśikāṭīkā (D 4070/P 5571; see Jaini, 1985). Both commentaries have received cursory explanations by Vairocanarakṣita in his Triṃśikāṭīkāvivṛti (see Kano, 2008, 343). But as Xuanzang’s famous, and in China hugely influential, commentary on the Triṃśikā (T. 1585; 成唯識論; see La Vallée Poussin, 1928–1929; Wei, 1973) makes clear by quoting and discussing the views of the ten scholars Bandhuśrī, Citrabhānu, Guṇamati, Sthiramati, Nanda, Śuddhacandra, Dharmapāla, Viśeṣamitra, Jinaputra, and Jñānacandra (see Lévi, 1932, 18–22; Dignāga should be added), Vasubandhu’s treatise had been the focus of intensive exegetical activity by mid-7th century ce. Its proper interpretation was at stake during the 6th-century debate between the Nālandā-based Dharmapāla and the Valabhi scholar Sthiramati (see Frauwallner, 1956, 394–407; May, 1971, 298–299). Epistemological Literature The philosophical tradition known as “Buddhist (logic and) epistemology” has close connections with Philosophical Literature: South Asia Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda. Dignāga’s Hastavālaprakaraṇa and Ālambanaparīkṣā demonstrate the unreality of the phenomenal world. His Pramāṇasamuccaya had a strong impact on Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda thinkers such as Sthiramati, Dharmapāla, and Xuanzang. The “perception” sections of Dharmakīrti’s Pramāṇavārttika and Pramāṇaviniścaya draw idealistic conclusions from the apories of external realism. Chapter 23 of Śāntarakṣita’s and Kamalaśīla’s Tattvasaṃgraha(pañjikā) neutralizes Śubhagupta’s demonstration of the existence of external objects. Śaṅkaranandana’s Prajñālaṃkāra, a work aimed at demonstrating mind only (see Ratié, 2011, 390– 391; Eltschinger, forthcoming a), Jñānaśrīmitra’s Advaitabinduprakaraṇa (Thakur, 1959), which bears on the identity between cognition and its object, the same author’s Bhedābhedaparīkṣā (Thakur, 1959), and finally Ratnākaraśānti’s Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (D 4259/P 5756; see Umino & Kelsang, 1982) are little known but likely belong to the same broad category. This inclination is also evidenced by the fact that these authors developed new arguments in favor of mind only, among which the so-called sahopalambha niyama (the necessary coperception [of the object and the cognition]), shaped first by Dharmakīrti and later defended in Prajñākaragupta’s Sahopalambha niyamasiddhi (D 4255/P 5753; see Iwata, 1991) and Jitāri’s Sahopalambhaprakaraṇa (see Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 89), among others. Moreover, Dignāga’s earliest works exhibit doctrinal affinities with Maitreyan idealism (see below). However, the epistemologists’ accounts of idealism are far from homogeneous. Apart from putting forward different types of philosophical arguments (see Arnold, 2008; Ratié, forthcoming a), these philosophers disagree on the issue of solipsism, some accepting the existence of other minds (e.g. Dharmakīrti in his Santānāntarasiddhi, at least on the level of ordinary existence) and others rejecting it (e.g. Ratnakīrti in his Santānāntaradūṣaṇa; see Thakur, 1975; Kajiyama, 1965b; Wood, 1991, 149– 159, 223–230). Furthermore, noted epistemologists defend the existence of the external world. Finally, several authors acknowledge idealism as a provisionally true account of conventional reality but adopt the Madhyamaka as their ultimate standpoint (see below). In his Sugatamatavibhaṅgabhāṣya (D 3900/P 5868; see Shirasaki, 1984–1987), Jitāri even attempted to interpret Dharmakīrti as a Mādhyamika (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 100; Steinkellner, 1990). This should dissuade us from understanding Buddhist epistemology as a “school” without further qualification. 603 This tradition is a school neither in the sense that its representatives would share definite metaphysical and/or practical commitments nor in the sense that they would exhibit institutional and/or sectarian unity. Buddhist logic is a school in the looser sense of an intellectual tradition applying a(n apparently) consensual methodology to a set of problems that it partly shares with its opponents (not only the orthodox Brahmanical systems of Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, and Vyākaraṇa but also Sāṃkhya, Śaivism, Vaiṣṇavism, materialism, and Jainism), and this with a view to defend the rationality of Buddhism as a salvational system. Besides a common reliance on the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya’s account of Buddhist dogmatics, epistemologists take the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti as a canon, the conformity to which is the stake of internal controversies. In its polemical spirit and targets, Buddhist epistemological literature is reminiscent of the following: Aśvaghoṣa’s Buddhacarita (against the self [chs. 12, 16; see Eltschinger, 2013] and against god, nature, or time as ultimate principles [ch. 17]); Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (see above); the Yogācārabhūmi ’s critique of the allodoxia (paravāda; see Eltschinger, forthcoming b); Vasubandhu’s lost Paramārthasaptatikā (against the Sāṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin; see Eltschinger & Ratié, 2013, 159); and the end of Abhidharmakośabhāṣya’s chapter 9. The origin of Buddhist epistemology is to be sought in the so-called Buddhist dialectical tradition (vāda and hetuvidyā; see Kang, 2003, 10–16). Like its non-Buddhist counterpart (e.g. Nyāyasūtra, books 1 and 5, Carakasaṃhitā Vimānasthāna 8.15–66; see Frauwallner, 1984; Preisendanz, 2000; Kang, 2003), this tradition concerned itself with enumerating and discussing eristic-dialectical items (e.g. types of logical fallacies, false objections, points of defeat, means of valid cognition [pramāṇa]), namely all that a monk or a bodhisattva was to master before engaging in scholarly disputation or catechetic/ didactic dialogue. Important remnants of this tradition have come down to us in works such as the following: the *Upāyahṛdaya (also known as *Prayogasāra; T. 1632; 方便心論; see Tucci, 1929b; Kajiyama, 1991; Gillon & Katsura, forthcoming); the so-called Spitzer Manuscript (see Franco, 2004); chapter 10 of the Sandhinirmocanasūtra (see Kajiyama, 1984; Yoshimizu, 1996; 2010); • • • • • • • • 604 Philosophical Literature: South Asia Hetuvidyā section of the Yogācārabhūmi • (Dthe4035, Tshi 187a7ff./P 5536, Dzi 214b6ff.; see Yaita, 2005; Wayman, 1958; Eltschinger, 2012, 456–466); the pseudo-Nāgārjuna’s Vaidalyaprakaraṇa (see above); parts of Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya (Sāṅkathyaviniścaya section; see Schmithausen, 1972; Todeschini, 2011; Eltschinger, 2012, 456–466); the *Tarkaśāstra (T. 1633; 如實論; see Tucci, 1929b; Frauwallner, 1957) and the dialectical treatises ascribed to Vasubandhu: the Vādavidhi, the Vādavidhāna, and the *Vādasāra, all of which are lost (see Frauwallner, 1933; 1957). Dignāga’s Nyāyamukha, whose structure is borrowed from the Vādavidhi’s, is to be counted as a dialectical rather than an epistemological work. Dignāga (480–540 ce; or a few decades earlier?) is credited with the dialectical tradition’s logico-epistemological turn. The turn toward logic was made possible by Dignāga’s “discovery” of the wheel of logical reasons (hetucakra), a theoretical device displaying the (types of) acceptability or unacceptability of any given reason. Dignāga’s theorem drew on an earlier doctrine, the trairūpya (the three properties [of a logical reason]), aimed at defining the necessary requirements of an acceptable reason (see Frauwallner, 1959, 85–91; Hattori, 1968, 4n22). Dignāga’s new ideas found expression in a short tract entitled Hetucakraḍamaru (D 4209/P 5708; D–/P 5708; see Frauwallner, 1959) and later in the Nyāyamukha and the Pramāṇasamuccaya. This tradition’s epistemological turn was due to Dignāga’s new focus on the means of valid cognition, likely inspired by recent developments within the Sāṃkhya system (see Frauwallner, 1958; 1959, 96–98). Dignāga’s account remained the standard hetuvidyā system in Buddhist educational centers such as Nālandā until the 7th century (see Takakusu, 1896, 186–187). While describing Buddhist learning in Nālandā, Yijing (義淨; 635–713 ce) provides a list of eight works by Dignāga (see Frauwallner, 1959, 139; Hattori, 1968, 10n57; on Dignāga’s writings, see Frauwallner, 1959; Hattori, 1968, 1–11; Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 1–15): 1. the Traikālyaparīkṣā (D 4207/P 5705; see Frauwallner, 1959); 2. the *Sāmānyalakṣaṇaparīkṣā (T. 1623; 觀總相論頌); • • • 3. the Ālambanaparīkṣā(vṛtti) (T. 1619, 1624; D 4205–4206/P 5703–5704; see Frauwallner, 1930; 1959, 130–132; Yamaguchi, 1929; Tola & Dragonetti, 1982); 4. the Hetumukha (nonextant); 5. the *Hetvābhāsamukha (nonextant); 6. the Nyāyamukha (T. 1628, 1629; 因明正理門論; see Tucci, 1930; Frauwallner, 1959, 91–96; Katsura, 1977–1987); 7. the *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa (T. 1622; 取因假設論; see Kitagawa, 1952; Frauwallner, 1959, 121–126; Hattori, 1977); and 8. the Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti) (D 4203/P–; D 4204/P 5701 [i.e. Vasudhararakṣita’s translation]; D–/P 5700; D–/P 5702 [i.e. Kanakavarman’s translation]; see Steinkellner, 2005; Lasic, forthcoming; Katsura et al., forthcoming; Pind, forthcoming; see Hattori, 1968; Kitagawa, 1973; Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 8–15). The Traikālyaparīkṣā, one of Dignāga’s earlier works, is nothing but an excerpt from the Samban dhasamuddeśa (vv. 53–85) of Bhartṛhari’s Vākyapadīya (early 5th cent. CE?) meant to demonstrate, via slight lexical changes (and the lost autocommentary?), the potencies of the Yogācāra mind instead of those of Bhartṛhari’s śabdabrahman (word absolute). The *Sāmānyalakṣaṇaparīkṣā consists of a critical examination of realist accounts of universals. In the lost Hetumukha, Dignāga developed – in order to solve problems pertaining to inference – the theory of language and concepts that would become the subject matter of chapter 5 of Pramāṇa samuccaya, dedicated to the theory of conceptual exclusion (apoha; see Frauwallner, 1959, 98–104; Hattori, 1982; Hayes, 1988; Pind, forthcoming). The lost *Hetvābhāsamukha likely consisted of a monograph on fallacious logical reasons. Dignāga’s most influential work is his late Pramāṇasamuccaya(vṛtti). It consists of six chapters dedicated to the following: 1. perception (pratyakṣa); 2. private inferential judgement (svārthānumāna); 3. proof (parārthānumāna); 4. example (dṛṣṭānta); 5. conceptual/verbal exclusion (apoha); and 6. false objections ( jāti). Each chapter is divided into an exposition of Dignāga’s own opinion and a critical examination of his opponents’ views. Dignāga’s adversaries are not only early representatives of the Sāṃkhya, Philosophical Literature: South Asia Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā schools but also coreligionists such as Vasubandhu (esp. against his Vādavidhi). According to Dignāga himself (see Frauwallner, 1959, 84nn4–7; Hattori, 1968, 9n51), the Pramāṇasamuccaya summarizes earlier polemical tracts that he composed against Sāṃkhya (*Sāṃkhyaparīkṣā), Vaiśeṣika (*Vaiśeṣikaparīkṣā), and Nyāya (Nyāyaparīkṣā; see Much, 1991b). Prior to his interest in logic and the theory of knowledge, Dignāga had authored stotras and stotra commentaries (see Hattori, 1968, 6–7). As a follower of Maitreya(nātha), he dedicated himself to Prajñāpāramitā exegetics in the Prajñāpāramitā piṇḍārthasaṃgraha (T. 1518; D 3809/P 5207; see Tucci, 1947; Frauwallner, 1959) and to the paths of vision and cultivation of nonduality in a short monograph on yoga, the Yogāvatāra (D 4074/P 5575; see Frauwallner, 1959). Later, Dignāga, inspired by Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika ideas, turned to the problem of the (non)existence of the external world and the impossibility of extranoetic objects in the following works: 1. the Hastavālaprakaraṇa (T. 1620, 1621; D 3848, 3849/P 5248, 5249; see Frauwallner, 1959), in which he attempted to show, with the Viṃśikā’s critique of atomism, that the phenomenal world merely exists as a designation; 2. the *Upādāyaprajñaptiprakaraṇa, in which Dignāga demonstrated that composite wholes do not exist since they are neither the same as nor different from their parts and merely consist in dependent designations (upādāyaprajñapti); 3. the Ālambanaparīkṣā(vṛtti), in which Dignāga critically examined the concept of an object of cognition by assigning it two necessary conditions: (1) to be the cause of the cognition and (2) to be isomorphic with it; atoms obviously satisfy the first condition but not the second, while aggregate wholes satisfy the second but not the first; as a consequence, the object is nothing but the appearance of an object in cognition itself. Dignāga’s familiarity with Vasubandhu (of whom he has been traditionally considered a pupil; see Hattori, 1968, 1–3) is also evidenced by his commentary on Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośa, the Abhidharmakośamarmapradīpa (D 4095/P 5596; see Frauwallner, 1959, 126–127). Dignāga also composed a Vādavidhānaṭīkā (lost; see Frauwallner, 1959, 84n7; Hattori, 1968, 9–10). Dignāga’s student Śaṅkarasvāmin (500–560; or a few decades earlier?) composed an influential work, the Nyāyapraveśaka(śāstra) (T. 1630; D–/P 5706; 605 D 4208/P 5707; see Jambuvijaya, 2009). It has been commented on by the Jain polymath Haribhadra (late 8th cent.?) in the Nyāyapraveśakaṭīkāśiṣyahitā (see Jambuvijaya, 2009). This work in 27 sūtras seems to have enjoyed enormous popularity as a logic primer. The works of Dignāga seem to have been infrequently commented on in post-Dharmakīrti times. But as his system permeated the hetuvidyā curriculum in Nālandā, these works must have been more frequently glossed. Dharmakīrti’s likely teacher, Īśvarasena (early 6th cent. CE?), is reported to have commented on the Pramāṇasamuccaya (see Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 22), and Dharmakīrti himself polemicizes against a Nyāyamukhaṭīkākāra (see Tillemans, 2000, 177–179). A commentary on the Nyāyamukha is ascribed to Dharmapāla by Huili (慧立; 615–? ce), Xuanzang’s biographer (see Tillemans, vol. I, 1990, 11). The Ālambanaparīkṣā has been commented on by Dharmapāla (T. 1625; 觀所縁論釋) and by Vinītadeva (710–770 ce?) in his Ālambanaparīkṣāṭīkā (D 4241/P 5739). The Prajñāpāramitāpiṇḍārthasaṃgraha has been glossed by Dignāga’s friend Triratnadāsa in his Vivaraṇa (T. 1517; D 3810/P 5208). The Yogāvatāra was commented on by Dharmendra(?) in his Yogāvatāropadeśa (D 4075/P 5576). The most important among the extant exegetical works is, however, Jinendrabuddhi’s Viśālāmalavatīpramāṇa samuccayaṭīkā (8th–9th cent.?; D 4268/P 5766; see Steinkellner et al., 2005; Lasic et al., 2012; Katsura et al., forthcoming; Krasser & Lasic, forthcoming). Inasmuch as he created a Buddhist system of the world, language, cognition, and action out of Dignāga’s logic and epistemology, Dharmakīrti (c. 550 CE?; see Krasser, 2012) is the instigator of the mature pramāṇa school (see Vetter, 1964; Dunne, 2004; Eltschinger, 2010a). In the field of metaphysics, Dharmakīrti improved on Vasubandhu’s demonstration of momentariness by devising a new proof strategy, the sattvānumāna (inference [of momentariness] from existence). As regards logic, in addition to settling the number of valid logical reasons to three (intrinsic nature, effect, and nonperception), he attempted to give a more rigorously deductive or analytical orientation to Dignāga’s system by vindicating a natural connection between the two properties involved in an inference. Dharmakīrti made the apoha theory the foundation of his system by showing how reliable conceptual constructs and language ultimately go back to the real things’ causal efficiencies and how inference is called for in order 606 Philosophical Literature: South Asia to correct the errors for which nescience is responsible. Moreover, Dharmakīrti strongly insisted on scripture’s lack of reliability and discarded all attempts at grounding scriptural, especially vedic, authority in naturalistic accounts of language. His system also mirrors strong apologetic concerns in its defense of Buddhism and the possibility of salvation against materialism and Mīmāṃsā. Dharmakīrti is the author of seven treatises (see Frauwallner, 1954; Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 23–44; comp. Lindtner, 1980; Steinkellner, 1991): 1. the Pramāṇavārttika (D 4210/P 5709; see Miyasaka, 1971–1972; see also below); 2. the Pramāṇaviniścaya (D 4211/P 5710; see also below); 3. the Nyāyabindu (D 4212/P 5711; see La Vallée Poussin, 1907; Stcherbatsky, 1918; 1930; Malvania, 1971); 4. the Hetubindu (D 4213/P 5712; see Steinkellner, 1967; Krasser, forthcoming); 5. the Santānāntarasiddhi (D 4219/P 5716; see Stcherbatsky, 1916; Chu, 2011); 6. the Sambandhaparīkṣā(vṛtti) (D 4214, 4215/ P 5713, 5714; see Frauwallner, 1934); and 7. the Vādanyāya (D 4218/P 5715; see Much, 1991a). The Pramāṇavārttika, Dharmakīrti’s first and principal work, contains Dharmakīrti’s philosophical system in almost its entirety. The treatise’s chapter 1 (Svārthānumānapariccheda), originally an independent work in mixed prose and verses, the Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti (D 4216/P 5717a; see Gnoli, 1960; Eltschinger, 2007; Eltschinger et al., 2012; Steinkellner, 2013), is dedicated to the three kinds of valid logical reasons (i.e. intrinsic nature, effect, and nonperception), although about 70% of the chapter bears on apoha and scriptural authority. Chapters 2 to 4 consist of verses alone and present themselves as a loose and innovative commentary on Dignāga’s Pramāṇasamuccaya: 1. Pramāṇavārttika 2 (or Pramāṇasiddhi) comments on the Pramāṇasamuccaya’s initial stanza (homage to the Buddha) and outlines Dharmakīrti’s Buddhology and apologetic line (see Vetter, 1990; Franco, 1997); 2. Pramāṇavārttika 3 (or Pratyakṣapariccheda) comments on Pramāṇasamuccaya 1 and contains Dharmakīrti’s doctrine of perception, its types, the apories of external realism, and the turn to idealism (see Tosaki, 1979); 3. Pramāṇavārttika 4 (or Parārthānumāna) comments on Pramāṇasamuccaya 3 and spells out Dharmakīrti’s conception of a thesis, of valid and invalid reasons, and of Dignāga’s wheel of reasons (see Tillemans, 2000). The Pramāṇaviniścaya’s three chapters are dedicated to the following: 1. perception (see Steinkellner, 2007; Vetter, 1966); 2. private inferential judgement (see Steinkellner, 1973; 1979; 2007); and 3. proof (see Hugon & Tomabechi, 2011). This work does not add anything really significant except for a gradual turn to the new proof of momentariness and the neglection of apoha, scriptural authority, and Buddhology. The Nyāyabindu is a three-chapter summary of the Pramāṇaviniścaya composed of 209 sūtras. As its abundant commentaries and subcommentaries testify, the Nyāyabindu enjoyed great popularity as an introduction to Dharmakīrti’s logic. The four remaining works are short monographs dealing with various topics: 1. The Hetubindu turns back to the three kinds of valid logical reasons. 2. The Santānāntarasiddhi presents itself as a polemical dialogue among Sautrāntikas, Vaibhāṣikas, and Yogācāras on the issue of solipsism. 3. The Sambandhaparīkṣā(vṛtti) refutes the existence of real relations among things and among properties. 4. The Vādanyāya presents Dharmakīrti’s account of debate and dialectics via a systematic confrontation with Nyāya on the points of defeat. A significant part of the Buddhist epistemologists’ literary output consists of commentaries and (sub)subcommentaries on the seven treatises of Dharmakīrti. The Pramāṇavārttika’s chapter 1, together with the autocommentary, has been glossed by Śākyabuddhi in his Pramāṇavārttikaṭīkā (660–720 CE?; D 4220/ P 5718; see Inami et al., 1992) and by Karṇakagomin in his Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛttiṭīkā (c. 800?; see Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 1943), the latter of which is in many respects an update of Śākyabuddhi’s commentary. The verses of chapters 1 to 4 have been commented on by Manorathanandin (12th cent. CE?) in his Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (see Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 1938–1940; with Vibhūticandra’s [c. 1200?] marginal notes). Chapters 2 to 4 have been commented on by Devendrabuddhi (630–690 CE?), perhaps a direct pupil of Dharmakīrti, in his Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (D 4217/P 5717b), and by Prajñākaragupta (c. 800 CE?) in his Pramāṇavārttikālaṃkāra (D 4221/P 5719; see Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 1953; Franco, 1997; Ono, 2000; Philosophical Literature: South Asia Moriyama, forthcoming). Chapters 2 and 3 have been commented on by Ravigupta (early 9th cent.?) in his Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (D 4224, 4225/P 5726, 5722). Śaṅkaranandana’s (early 10th cent.?) Pramāṇa vārttikānusāriṇī (D 4223/P 5721) covers both the stanzas and the prose autocommentary of the first chapter (at least), but its extant Tibetan translation stops with stanza 128. The Pramāṇaviniścaya has been commented on by Dharmottara (740–800 CE?) in his Pramāṇa viniścayaṭīkā (D 4229, 4227/P 5752; see Sakai, 2010; Ishida, 2011; Watanabe, forthcoming), by Śaṅkaranandana in the nonextant Viniścayānusāriṇī (see Eltschinger, forthcoming a), and by Jñānaśrībhadra (late 11th cent. CE?) in his Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā (D 4228/P 5728). The Nyāyabindu has received detailed explanations by Dharmottara in his Nyāyabinduṭīkā (D 4231/ P 5730; see Stcherbatsky, 1918; 1930; Malvania 1971) and Vinītadeva in his Nyāyabinduṭīkā (D 4230/P 5729; see La Vallée Poussin, 1913), and cursory ones by Kamalaśīla in his Nyāyabindupūrvapakṣasaṃkṣipta (D 4232/P 5731; see Tosaki, 1984) and Jinamitra (c. 800 CE?) in his Nyāyabindupiṇḍārtha (D 4233/ P 5732). The Hetubindu has been commented on by Arcaṭa (also known as Dharmākaradatta; 730– 790 CE?) in his Hetubinduṭīkā (D 4235/P 5734; see Sanghavi & Jinavijayaji, 1949) and by Vinītadeva in his Hetubinduṭīkā (D 4236/P 5735). The Santānāntarasiddhi has been commented on by Vinītadeva in his Santānāntarasiddhiṭīkā (D 4238/P 5724; see Stcherbatsky, 1916). The Sambandhaparīkṣā(vṛtti) has been commented on by Vinītadeva (Sambandhaparīkṣāṭīkā; D 4236/P 5735), by Śaṅkaranandana in his Sambandhaparīkṣānusāriṇī (D 4237/P 5736), and by the Jain scholar Prabhācandra (9th cent.?; see Shastri, 1972). The Vādanyāya has been commented on by Vinītadeva in his Vādanyāyaṭīkā (D 4240/P 5735) and by Śāntarakṣita (725–788 CE?) in his Vādanyāyaṭīkāvipañcitārthā (D 4239/P 5725; see Sāṅkṛtyāyana, 1935–1936). Several among these glosses have in turn been commented on by later scholars such as the Jain Mallavādin (9th–10th cents. CE?), Devabala (10th cent. CE?), Durvekamiśra (970–1030 CE?), Jayanta (mid-11th cent. CE?), and Yamāri (1000–1060 CE?; see Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 91, 97, 102–103, 119). Dharmakīrti’s ideas were soon made the object of digests and manuals. Chronologically first may have been the works of (Bhadanta) Śubhagupta 607 (720–780 CE?), who authored concise treatises (only the stanzas are extant) on nearly all topics of the system: omniscience, in his Sarvajñasiddhi (D 4243/ P 5741; see Watanabe, 1987); revealed word, in his Śrutiparīkṣā (D 4245/ P 5743; see Eltschinger, 1999); apoha, in his Anyāpohavicāra (D 4246/P 5744; see Mikogami, 1993); refutation of the existence of god, in his Īśvarabhaṅga (D 4247/P 5745; see Watanabe, 1977); proof of the possibility of rebirth, in his Paralokasiddhi (lost; see Steinkellner, 1985); and demonstration of selflessness, in his Nairātmyasiddhi (lost). Śubhagupta is especially well known for his Bāhyārthaparīkṣā (D 4244/P 5742; see Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 53–54), whose attempt to refute Dharmakīrti’s mind-only was in turn severely criticized by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in chapter 23 of their Tattvasaṃgraha(pañjikā). The most interesting among the extant works dedicated to expounding Dharmakīrti’s philosophy is indeed the Tattvasaṃgraha(pañjikā) (D 4266/ P 5764; D 4267/P 5765; see Krishnamacharya, 1926; Shastri, 1968; Funayama, 1992; Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 56–63; McClintock, 2010; Ratié, forthcoming b). The treatise covers the whole of Dharmakīrti’s philosophy in 26 chapters (summary in Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 89–90). It is at the same time a brilliant attempt at legitimating Dharmakīrti’s program by integrating it into the wider framework of Mahāyāna Buddhism. Far from being a servile introduction, the Tattvasaṃgraha elaborates on and updates its model while applying Dharmakīrti’s methodology to new or insufficiently examined problems. Remnants of a commentary on the Tattvasaṃgraha have been preserved (see Harimoto & Kano, 2008). Other later digests include Jitāri’s Bālāvatāratarka (940–1000 CE?; D 4263/P 5760; see Shirasaki, 1983), Mokṣākaragupta’s Tarkabhāṣā (11th–13th cents.?; D 4264/P 5762; see Krishnamacharya, 1942; Kajiyama, 1966), Vidyākaraśānti’s Tarkasopāna (12th cent. CE?; see Dorjee, 1994), and the anonymous Tarkarahasya (see Yaita, 2005). However, the followers of Dharmakīrti did not limit themselves to commenting, summarizing, and updating his treatises, for they actually never ceased to identify new problems, to refine their methodology, and to adapt to new religio-philosophical environments – especially to Tantrism, of which many of them were noted specialists (Śāntarakṣita, • • • • • • 608 Philosophical Literature: South Asia Kamalaśīla, Jitāri, Ratnākaraśānti, etc.). In the 9th to 10th centuries at the latest, Kashmir became the center of an intense philosophical interaction involving Buddhists, Naiyāyikas, Vaiyākaraṇas (Grammarians), and Śaivas. Śaṅkaranandana, a Brahman by birth and a Buddhist layman by conviction, likely was Buddhism’s main representative (see Krasser, 2001; Eltschinger, forthcoming a). And from the second half of the 10th century, the Magadhan center of Vikramaśīla produced several generations of polyvalent intellectuals: Jitāri, Durvekamiśra, Ratnākaraśānti (970– 1030?), Jñānaśrīmitra (980–1040?), and Ratnakīrti (990–1050?). In the field of the theory of knowledge, research and polemics were carried out regarding the number, the scope, and the validity of the pramāṇas (the means of valid cognition). Arcaṭa had presumably written a Pramāṇadvitvasiddhi (lost), a work whose subject matter – the reduction of all pramāṇas to two – possibly coincided with that of Ratnakīrti’s Pramāṇāntarbhāvaprakaraṇa (see Thakur, 1975) as well as with that of an anonymous treatise bearing the same title (see Nyayacharya, 1969). Candragomin’s *Nyāyasiddhyāloka (mid-8th cent. CE?; D 4242/P 5740) is apparently devoted to the means of valid cognition as well. The validity of the(se) means of cognition is the object of Dharmottara’s two Prāmāṇyaparīkṣās – a long one (D 4248/ P 5746) and a short one (D 4249/P 5747; see Krasser, 1991) – and of three treatises by Śaṅkaranandana, Bṛhatprāmāṇyaparīkṣā, Madhyaprāmāṇyaparīkṣā, and Sūkṣmaprāmāṇyaparīkṣā. Post-Dharmakīrti authors also dedicated several treatises to the defense of a nominalist ontology and the concomitant language theory. Monographs on apoha were composed by Dharmottara (Apohaprakaraṇa [D 4250/P 5748; see Frauwallner, 1937]), Śaṅkaranandana (Anyāpohasiddhi [D 4256/ P 5754]), Jitāri (Apohasiddhi [lost]), Jñānaśrīmitra (Apohaprakaraṇa [see Akamatsu, 1983; McCrea & Patil, 2010]), and Ratnakīrti (Apohasiddhi [Mc Allister, 2011]). The refutation of the non-Buddhists’ real universals is the subject matter of Jitāri’s Jātinirākṛti (see Bühnemann, 1982) and Paṇḍita Aśoka’s Avayavinirākaraṇa and Sāmānyadūṣaṇa (early 11th cent. CE?; see Thakur, 1974; Tola & Dragonetti, 1994). Later philosophers showed great interest in various aspects of the theory of logic and inference. Besides his Hetutattvopadeśa (D 4261/P 5758; see Tucci, 1986), a primer of Buddhist logic, Jitāri wrote two treatises on issues related to logical pervasion, a Dharmadharmiviniścaya (D 4262/P 5759) and a Vyāpakānupalambha (sic). Pervasion is also the subject matter of two monographs by Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti – the Vyāpticarcā (see Lasic, 2000b) and the Vyāptinirṇaya (see Lasic, 2000a). Ratnākaraśānti’s Antarvyāptisamarthana (D 4260/ P 5757; see Kajiyama, 1999) belongs to the same category. In addition to pervasion per se, much attention was paid to logical reasons. Śaṅkaranandana composed two treatises on the identity relation – the Pratibandhasiddhi (D 4257/P 5755, stanzas only) and the Laghupratibandhasiddhi. Jñānaśrīmitra devoted a treatise to the issue of the establishment of the causality relation (Kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhi [D 4258/ P 5763; see Thakur, 1959]) and wrote two monographs on nonperception (Anupalabdhirahasya and Sarvaśabdābhāvacarcā [see Kellner, 2007]). One of the topics often encountered in later epistemological literature is the proof of momentariness (kṣaṇabhaṅga), which is hardly surprising granting that momentariness is the cornerstone of Buddhist ontology and soteriology. Treatises entitled Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi were flourishing. Works on this topic have been composed by Arcaṭa (lost; see Steinkellner & Much, 1995, 64), Dharmottara (D 4253/P 5751; see Frauwallner, 1935), *Muktākalaśa (D 4254/P 5752), Jitāri, Durvekamiśra (lost), and Ratnakīrti (see Woo, 1999; McDermott, 1969). Jñānaśrīmitra’s treatise on the same topic is entitled Kṣaṇabhaṅgādhyāya (see Thakur, 1959; Kyuma, 2005). Ratnakīrti is the author of a Sthirasiddhidūṣaṇa (see Mimaki, 1976). Chapters 1 and 3 of Śaṅkaranandana’s Dharmālaṃkāra deal with momentariness and the rebuttal of objections raised against momentariness. Thematically connected with the proofs of momentariness are the proofs of selflessness (nairātmya) – another soteriologically relevant aspect of Buddhist ontology. Whereas Karṇakagomin’s Nairātmyasiddhi is lost, Jitāri’s short treatise of the same title has survived (see Bühnemann, 1982); the proof of selflessness is the subject matter of chapter 2 of Śaṅkaranandana’s Dharmālaṃkāra. More Buddhologically connoted aspects of epistemology, such as omniscience and yogic perception, are comparatively little represented. We owe Sarvajña siddhis to Śaṅkaranandana (Sarvajñasiddhi [see Eltschinger, 2008] and Sarvajñasiddhisaṃkṣepa), Jitāri (see Bühnemann, 1982), Jñānaśrīmitra (lost; see Steinkellner, 1977), and Ratnakīrti (see Thakur, 1975; Philosophical Literature: South Asia Bühnemann, 1980), and a Yoginirṇayaprakaraṇa to Jñānaśrīmitra (see Woo, 2006; Franco, 2008). As Śubhagupta before him, Dharmottara composed a short monograph demonstrating the possibility of rebirth against materialism, the Paraloka siddhi (D 4251/P 5749; see Steinkellner, 1986). Later Kashmirian and Magadhan authors also criticized various non-Buddhist accounts of religious authority. While Śaṅkaranandana’s Āgamasiddhi and Jitāri’s Śrutikartṛsiddhi and Vedāprāmāṇyasiddhi (see Bühnemann, 1982; Eltschinger, 2003) criticize Mīmāṃsaka doctrines concerning the authorlessness of the Veda and the permanence of the relation between word and meaning, two treatises by Śaṅkaranandana, the Īśvarāpākaraṇa and the Īśvarāpākaraṇasaṃkṣepa (with an anonymous commentary; see Krasser, 2002), Jitāri’s Īśvarādimataparīkṣā (see Bühnemann, 1982), Jñānaśrīmitra’s Īśvaravāda (see Thakur, 1959), and Ratnakīrti’s Īśvarasādhanadūṣaṇa (see Thakur, 1975; Patil, 2009) refute the existence of a creator god revealing the Veda. Jitāri’s literary output includes a critique of Digambara Jainism, the Digambaramataparīkṣā (or Anekāntavādanirāsa?; see Iyengar, 1952). Late Mādhyamika Literature From about 500, the Madhyamaka underwent indepth transformations that eventually led to the rise of two mutually contentious streams. Some, like Buddhapālita (c. 500 CE?), denied any relevance to Dignāga’s new methodology while establishing the Mādhyamika position and advocated the prasaṅga type of argument. Others, like Bhāviveka (or Bhavya, 500–570 CE?), advocated the use of independent inferences (svatantrānumāna) and probative syllogisms, thus allowing reasoning to positively function side by side with scripture as a justification for establishing positions. From at least the early 11th century on, Tibetan doxographers labeled the first *Prāsaṅgika-mādhyamikas and the second *Svātantrika-mādhyamikas. Further refinements in this classification reflected the *Svātantrikas’ attitude toward the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda. Those who, like Bhāviveka, strongly rejected idealism and thus accepted external objects on the conventional level, were referred to as *Sautrāntikasvātantrikas, whereas those who, like Śrīgupta (7th cent. CE?), Jñānagarbha (early 8th cent. CE?), and especially Śāntarakṣita, accepted cittamātra as a provisionally true and useful device in order to 609 grasp Madhyamaka-like emptiness, were labelled *Yogācāra-svātantrikas (see Dreyfus & McClintock, 2003). Buddhapālita’s commentary on the Mūla madhyamakakārikā, the Mūlamadhyamakakārikāvṛtti (D 3842/P 5242; see Saito, 1984; Ye 2011b) has come down to us in a Tibetan translation and an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript. It exhibits close similarities with another old commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the *Akutobhayā (D 3829/P 5229; see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 47–48; Huntington, 1986) – never alluded to by Buddhapālita, Bhāviveka, and Candrakīrti. Bhāviveka’s own commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the Prajñāpradīpa (T. 1566; D 3853/P 5253; see Kajiyama, 1963; Eckel, 1980; Ames, 1982; 1986; 1993–2000), which is commented on by Avalokitavrata (7th cent. CE?) in his Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā (D 3859/P 5259), contains a sharp criticism of Guṇamati’s and Buddhapālita’s ideas as well as refutations of Sāṃkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Jaina, and Ābhidharmika conceptions. Bhāviveka’s critique of competing Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist systems is the focus of his most original work, the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā (stanzas: D 3855/P 5255; see Lindtner, 2001; prose commentary: D 3856/P 5256; see Heitmann, 2004, 2009; Eckel, 2008; Krasser, 2011). This work, which became an inexhaustible source for Tibetan doxographers, is composed of 11 chapters (the first three possibly formed an originally independent treatise, the Tattvajñānāmṛtāvatāra): 1. the thought of awakening (Bodhicittāparityāga); 2. Buddha’s vow (Munivratasamāśraya); 3. reality (Tattvajñānaiṣaṇā); 4. critique of the Śrāvaka view of reality; 5. critique of the Yogācāra view of reality; 6. critique of the Sāṃkhya view of reality; 7. critique of the Vaiśeṣika view of reality; 8. critique of the Vedānta view of reality; 9. critique of the Mīmāṃsaka view of reality; 10. omniscience (Sarvajñasiddhinirdeśa); and 11. praise (Stutilakṣaṇanirdeśa). Excerpts from chapter 4 became an independent treatise dedicated to the doxography of the Buddhist sects, the Nikāyabhedavibhaṅga vyākhyāna (D 4139/P 5640; see Teramoto & Hiramatsu, 1935). The question whether the prose commentary on the Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā, the Madhyamakahṛdayavṛttitarkajvālā (D 3856/ P 5256), is also the work of Bhāviveka or the work of a later author (named Bhavya?) remains debated (see Ejima, 1990; Seyfort Ruegg, 1990; Krasser, 2011). 610 Philosophical Literature: South Asia Three other treatises have been ascribed to Bhāviveka. 1. The *Karatalaratna (T. 1578; 大乘掌珍論; see La Vallée Poussin, 1932–1933b) summarizes the Mādhyamika doctrine while discussing two syllogisms, criticizes non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist views (e.g. Yogācāra’s dependent nature), and deals, in its final part, with soteriological topics. 2. The Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha (D 3857/ P 5258; see Ejima, 1980, 18–34) presents itself as a monograph on the two truths, which it subdivides into a true/untrue conventional level (the criterion being the pseudo-things’ possessing causal efficiency or not) and a modal/nonmodal ultimate level. It is most certainly the work of a later Bhāviveka/ Bhavya. 3. The Madhyamakaratnapradīpa (D 3854/P 5254; see Lindtner, 1982b, 172–182; Ejima, 1982; Seyfort Ruegg, 1990, 62–67), which refers to Candrakīrti, Dharmakīrti, and tantric literature (e.g. Mahāvairocanābhisambodhisūtra, Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa, and Pañcakrama) is probably also the work of that later Bhāviveka/Bhavya. No less important for the history of the IndoTibetan Madhyamaka is Candrakīrti who, through recurrent critiques of Bhāviveka, Dignāga, and the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda, “sought to establish once for all the prasaṅga method of reasoning” (Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 71), or, to be more precise, took advantage of his defense of Buddhapālita’s use of prasaṅgas to update to paraprasiddhānumānas (inferences that are established for the opponent) on the basis of his conviction that reliance on just prasaṅgas was outdated. Candrakīrti’s first major work is the Madhyamakāvatāra (D 3861–3863/P 5261–5263; see La Vallée Poussin, 1912; Li et al., forthcoming). The first ten chapters of this introduction to Madhyamaka deal with the ten levels of the resolve to awaken associated with the ten stages and the ten perfections of a bodhisattva. Its chapter 6 (on the Prajñāpāramitā) divides itself into two parts. The first part, the exposition of dharmanairātmya (the selflessness/insubstantiality of the factors of existence), provides an opportunity to criticize Bhāviveka and Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda in order to analyze the two truths and to emphasize the provisionality of the ālayavijñāna dispensation. The second part, dedicated to pudgalanairātmya (the selflessness/insubstantiality of the person), argues against Buddhist and non-Buddhist views on the personalistic belief. Chapters 11, 12, and 13 contain an account of the qualities of a bodhisattva, an account of the buddha stage, and a conclusion. The work has been commented on by Jayānanda (Ṭīkā; D 3870/ P 5271; see van der Kuijp, 1993). Candrakīrti is also well known as a commentator of Nāgārjuna’s Śūnyatāsaptati and Yuktiṣaṣṭikā and Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka (see above). His most famous commentary, however, is his Prasanna padāmūlamadhyamakavṛtti (D 3860/P 5260; see de Jong, 1949; 1978; May, 1959; La Vallée Poussin, 1903–1913; MacDonald, 2000; forthcoming; Seyfort Ruegg, 2002), the only commentary on Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that has been preserved in its Sanskrit original. It contains a defense of Buddhapālita’s prasaṅga method and a detailed critique of both Bhāviveka’s independent reasoning and Dignāga’s two pramāṇas (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 74–81). Śrīgupta and his likely student Jñānagarbha appear as the forerunners of Śāntarakṣita in the elaboration of the *Yogācāra-mādhyamika synthesis. Śrīgupta is the author of a Tattvāvatāravṛtti (D 3892/P 5292), in which he subjected both material/atomic things and cognition to the neitherone/simple-nor-many/multiple (ekānekaviyogahetu) argument for emptiness. Idealism is here considered provisionally true as a step toward the elimination of the belief in material entities and the realization of nonsubstantiality. Jñānagarbha, who may have been Śāntarakṣita’s teacher, wrote the Satyadvayavibhaṅga and its commentary, the Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti (D 3881, 3882/P–; see Eckel, 1992), which were in turn commented on by Śāntarakṣita in his Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā (D 3883/P 5283; see Eckel, 1992, 105–150). Jñānagarbha shares Śrīgupta’s basic views on idealism. In close agreement with the pseudo-Bhāviveka’s Madhyamakārthasaṃgraha (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1990, 67–68), Jñānagarbha subdivides the two truths according to whether they conform to mere appearances (saṃvṛti), which are divided into nondelusive and delusive, or to reasoned argument and syllogisms (paramārtha). In both authors’ view, that which is tenable if examined by reasoned argument is considered to be paramārtha; as for mere appearances in a cognition, they are regarded as a saṃvṛti, which is not tenable if examined by reasoned argument. Another important early 8th-century Mādhyamika master is Śāntideva (also known as Akṣayamati), the author of the celebrated Bodhi(sattva)caryāvatāra (D 3871/P 5272; see La Vallée Poussin, 1904–1912; Vaidya, 1960) – commented on by Prajñākaramati (c. 950– 1000 CE?) in his Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā (D 3872/ P 5273; note also Vibhūticandra’s Tātparyapañjikā Philosophical Literature: South Asia [D 3880/P 5282]). The current version of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, which is enlarged from an earlier version found in Dunhuang (see Saito, 1996, 258; Harrison, 2007), comprises ten chapters and focuses on the six perfections. Chapters 1 to 5 concentrate on various aspects of the resolve to awaken (bodhi citta); chapters 6 to 9 deal with forbearance (kṣānti), energy (vīrya), meditation (dhyāna), and insight (prajñā); and chapter 10 focuses on the dedication of merit (puṇya). From a philosophical point of view, chapter 9 (on the Prajñāpāramitā) is by far the most important. Its critique of the pramāṇas and refutation of the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda tenets point to Śāntideva’s likely inclination toward Candrakīrti’s interpretation of the Madhyamaka. The work’s success is testified to by the high number of its commentaries and abridged versions (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 84–85). Śāntideva’s Śikṣāsamuccaya (D 3939, 3940/P 5235, 5236; see Bendall, 1902; Hedinger, 1984; Harrison, 2007), probably composed between the two versions of the Bodhicaryāvatāra, consists of 19 chapters and 27 stanzas, which the author elucidates by quoting numerous Mahāyāna sūtras and selfauthored stanzas, thus making the Śikṣāsamuccaya a treasury of Sanskrit fragments of the Mahāyāna sūtras. Śāntarakṣita is generally considered the systematizer of the *Yogācāra(-svātantrika)-mādhyamika, “a school which elaborated a synthesis of the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra/Vijñānavāda on the level of the philosophical analysis of surface-level process” (Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 87). Mind only is considered by Śāntarakṣita to be “a philosophical propaedeutic leading up to the Madhyamaka’s goal of establishing the insubstantiality of all factors including the mind” (Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 90). Śāntarakṣita develops this doctrinal program in his Madhyamakālaṃkāra and Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti (D 3884, 3885/P 5284, 5285; see Ichigo, 1985; Blumenthal, 2004), whose 97 stanzas are organized along two parts – reasoning (the neither-onenor-many argument) and scripture. The treatise’s speculative part I successively discusses corporeality (atoms, etc.) and the mind (realistic-dualistic accounts such as those of Vaibhāṣikas, Sautrāntikas, and non-Buddhists and nondualistic accounts such as those of the various branches of the Yogācāra/ Vijñānavāda). In addition to the tantric Tattva siddhi (D 3708/P 4531), the logico-epistemological Tattvasaṃgraha and Vādanyāyaṭīkā, and a commentary (Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā) on Jñānagarbha’s Satyadvayavibhaṅga (see above), Śāntarakṣita is 611 also the author of the Saṃvaraviṃśakavṛtti (D 4082/ P 5583), a work that discusses a bodhisattva’s ethical practice taking as its background the Bodhisattvabhūmi. Śāntarakṣita’s famous disciple Kamalaśīla (740–795 CE?) closely followed in the footsteps of his master, not only by joining him in journeying to Tibet but also in a literary way by first commenting on Śāntarakṣita’s Tattvasaṃgraha (see above) and Madhyamakālaṃkāra (D 3886/ P 5286; see Ichigo, 1985) and then by composing an independent *Mādhyamika-yogācāra treatise, the Madhyamakāloka (D 3887/P 5287; see Keira, 2004). In addition to discussing the Yogācāra’s three natures and mind only, two doctrines regarded as propaedeutic inasmuch as they help neutralize superimposition, negation, and the subject-object dichotomy, Kamalaśīla’s Madhyamakāloka alludes to the doctrines of the one vehicle (ekayāna), the tathāgatagarbha, and the gotra. His important literary output includes commentaries on the Saptaśatikāprajñāpāramitā and Vajracchedikāprajñā pāramitā (D 3815/P 5215; D 3817/P 5216), as well as on the Śālistambasūtra (D 4001/P 5502; see Schoening, 1995), and other independent tracts (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 99). Historically important are Kamalaśīla’s three Bhāvanākrama treatises (D 3915/P 5310; see Tucci, 1986; D 3916/P 5311; see Goshima, 1983; and D 3917/P 5312; see Tucci, 1971), which contain the documents and arguments that served as a basis for Kamalaśīla’s defense of gradualism during the famous Council of Lhasa/bSam-yas. The postclassical period of Indian Madhyamaka witnesses two other important syntheses. The first synthesis connects Madhyamaka and Prajñāpāramitā. Although the connection between Prajñāpāramitā and Madhyamaka dates back to Nāgārjuna, it found a specific scholastic expression in the synthesis of Madhyamaka and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra formulated by the (6thcent.?) scholar Ārya Vimuktisena, the author of a Vṛtti on Maitreya’s Abhisamayālaṃkāra (D 3787/ P 5185). Other famous representatives of this synthesis include Bhadanta Vimuktisena, the author of the Abhisamayālaṃkāravārttika (7th cent. CE?; D 3788/P 5186), and Haribhadra, the author of the huge Abhisamayālaṃkārālokāprajñāpāramitāvyākhyā (D 3791/P 5189; see Wogihara, 1932). Buddhajñānapāda, the tantric master who founded the Jñānapāda lineage of the tradition based on the Guhyasamāja, authored the Saṃcayagāthāpañjikā (D 3798/P 5196). Abhayākaragupta (d. 1125) 612 Philosophical Literature: South Asia composed the Marmakaumudī (D 3805/P 5202) on the Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā. The second synthesis connects Madhyamaka and Tantrism. Several representatives of this movement bear the same names as the founders of Madhyamaka. Ārya Nāgārjuna (8th cent. CE?), who founded the Ārya lineage of the tradition based on the Guhyasamāja, is the presumed author of the Bodhicittavivaraṇa (D 1801/P 2666) and of the Pañcakrama. Āryadevapāda might be the author of the Cittaviśuddhiprakaraṇa (D 1804/P 2669; comp. D–/P 5028 [ascribed to Indrabhūti]) and the Jñānasārasamuccaya (D 3851/P 5251; see Mimaki, 1976). Candrakīrtipāda composed a commentary on the Guhyasamāja, the Pradīpoddyotana (D 1785/ P 2650). Kambalapāda’s Ālokamālā (D 3895/P 5866; see Lindtner, 2003) deserves to be mentioned for its close connection with Yogācāra. Advayavajra (or Maitrīpāda), Kṛṣṇapāda, and Vimalamitra are other significant figures of this doctrinal trend (see Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 106–108). Finally, mention should be made of a few late Mādhyamikas whose biographies time and again testify to the ever greater impact of Tibet as a dynamic center of Buddhist intellectual life. Atiśa (also known as Dīpaṅkaraśrījñāna; 982– 1054 CE?), who was schooled by the best Magadhan teachers (Bodhibhadra, Jitāri, Kṛṣṇapāda, and Ratnākaraśānti) as well as by Dharmakīrti/ Dharmapāla of Suvarṇadvīpa (i.e. Indonesia), occupies a prominent place among them. Atiśa left Vikramaśīla, where he likely wrote his Satyadvayāvatāra (D 3902, 4467/P 5298, 5380), for western Tibet, where he collaborated with the famous translator Rin chen bzang po (958–1055 ce), and central Tibet (see Eimer, 1977). His works include the important Bodhipathapradīpa (D 3947, 4465/P 5343, 5378; see Eimer, 1978), “a short guide to the path of awakening” (Seyfort Ruegg, 1981, 111), in which Atiśa outlines the history of Madhyamaka and summarizes its main arguments for emptiness. Among Atiśa’s teachers, Bodhibhadra composed the Jñānasārasamuccayanibandhana (D 3852/P 5252; see Mimaki, 1976) and the more Vijñānavādainclined Dharmakīrti/Dharmapāla of Suvarṇadvīpa the Abhisamayālaṃkāraṭīkā (D 3794/P 5192). Ratnākaraśānti also sided more with the Yogācāra/ Vijñānavāda than with the Madhyamaka (see Isaacson, 2013). Besides his tantric and logico-epistemological works (see above), this influential teacher authored a Madhyamakālaṃkāravṛtti (D 4072/ P 5573), the Madhyamakālaṃkāropadeśa (D 4085/ P 5586), the Triyānavyavasthāna (D 3712/P4535), and a Prajñāpāramitopadeśa (D 4079/P 5579), a “manual of the Yogācāra doctrine” (Katsura, 1976, 484). Other important figures of late Indian Madhyamaka are Jayānanda (late 11th cent. CE?), the author of the Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā and a short work on logic, the Tarkamudgara (D 3869/P 5270), and especially Abhayākaragupta. 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