Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
André Laliberté
Subject: Governance/Political Change, Political Values, Beliefs, and Ideologies
Online Publication Date: Feb 2019 DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.691
Summary and Keywords
Buddhists constitute a majority of the population in peninsular Southeast Asia, but the
largest concentration of Buddhists lives in East Asia. The delay between the times the
Buddha gave his teachings and they were transcribed in written form and the adoption of
the latter through centuries in countries with vastly different cultures hampered the
development of a unified Buddhist political thought. Two major trends within Buddhism
aspire to influence contemporary politics: “Buddhism for the human realm,” a reform
movement originating in Republican China, and “engaged Buddhism,” which is a
contemporary international network of activists rather than a systematic body of thought.
The three major schools of Buddhism do not differ fundamentally on matters of doctrine,
so the variety of Buddhist political orientations has more to do with the historical and
national circumstances of the religion’s diffusion. Buddhism has expanded out of its
country of origin, India, where it has almost disappeared but remains an important
source of soft power. The Mahayana school has spread to China, where it has developed
an eschatology that has inspired rebellions through history. The Theravada school has
spread to Southeast Asia and has provided a source of legitimation for many rulers. The
colonial era brought a key change, as lay Buddhists and monastics inspired many
nationalist movements. Only six governments give a “special place” to Buddhism in their
constitutions, but other countries with large Buddhist populations feel its influence on
politics through the sangha. In countries of the Theravada tradition, monastics play an
important role in politics, whereas in countries where the Mahayana school prevails lay
associations mobilize Buddhists. Very few Buddhist political parties have emerged and
only in Japan has one endured in a coalition government. In Southeast Asia, the politics of
Buddhism is often associated with nationalist intransigence, in contrast to the peaceful
and tolerant image of the religion’s politics promoted by many of its exiled leaders in the
“engaged Buddhist” network.
Keywords: Asoka, Buddhism for the human realm, Chakravartin, engaged Buddhism, politics and religion
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Introduction
Buddhism spread gradually from India, its land of origin, to other countries. It counted
among its followers people on all continents at the beginning of the 21st century, with an
overwhelming majority residing in Asia. Buddhism emerged more than 25 centuries ago,
but historians disagree about the exact circumstances of its beginning, including those of
its founder’s life. The only certainty is that it was one of many sramanas, or religious
movements, that repudiated the authority of the Vedic tradition in India. Archeological
evidence attests to the diffusion of Buddhist scriptures through China and elsewhere in
Asia, but much ambiguity remains about the circumstances of this transmission. In China,
for example, early Buddhism was indistinguishable from the ritual practice of Daoism.
Even today, monastic orders exist and an official Buddhist association manages their
temples and ordains state-sanctioned clergy, yet popular beliefs that include devotion to
the Buddha and bodhisattvas are not recognized as such by political and religious
authorities. As an institutionalized religion with recognized associations, Buddhism
represents one of the two main religions of Japan, alongside Shinto, and Mahayana
Buddhists comprise a plurality of believers in China, Vietnam, and Taiwan. Elsewhere in
peninsular Southeast Asia and in Sri Lanka, Theravada Buddhism represents the religion
of the majority.1 The Tibetan form of Buddhist practice has spread to Mongolia,
Southwest China, India’s periphery, and the bordering states of Nepal and Bhutan. In
Korea and Malaysia, Buddhists represent important minorities. An increasing number of
people claim to be Buddhists worldwide, including Asian minorities in other regions and
non-Asians.
China has the largest concentration of Buddhists on the planet, with more than 200
million people who claim to practice Buddhist rituals, most of whom identify with the
Mahayana schools of Chan and Pure Land. About 10 million Chinese Buddhists follow the
Tibetan tradition and a few million ethnic minorities are associated with the Theravada
school.2 With over 40 million followers, Japan is home to the second-largest concentration
of Mahayana Buddhists. Although less than a third of the population identifies as
Mahayana Buddhist in Vietnam, South Korea, Taiwan, and Malaysia, these countries
count more Buddhists than Laos. Thailand, with over 60 million followers, has the largest
percentage of Theravada Buddhists, followed by Burma, with over 40 million. Followers of
the Theravada tradition constitute a majority of the population in only three other states:
Cambodia, Sri Lanka, and Laos. Outside Tibet, a majority of the population practices the
rites of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia and Bhutan. A significant number of Tibetan
Buddhists live in India, including some refugees from Tibet and indigenous people in the
northeast. These populations are distinct from recent converts in Central India, who
practice their own version of a reformed Buddhism known as Navayana. Although less
than 1% of India’s population is Buddhist, their number exceeds the entire Buddhist
population of Taiwan. Likewise, the United States counts more Buddhists than Mongolia.
Because the methodologies to count Buddhists differ from country to country, these
numbers are just estimates. They nevertheless give a good sense of the importance of the
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
religion relative to nonbelief and affiliation with other religions within specific countries,
as well as the weight of different nations in the global Buddhist population.3
Buddhist Political Theory
Buddhism rests on the teachings of the historical figure of Siddhartha Gautama. Various
versions of his biography exist, which often conflict, and even the years of his life are
disputed: 563–483 BCE or 480–400 BCE. The general agreement is that during his life, he
taught his doctrine and founded a monastic order, a trend that was common at a time
when many other schools of thought emerged. Most sources depict Siddhartha as a noble
in the Republic of Shakya, a region straddling parts of present-day Nepal and Bihar, on
the margin of the kingdom of Magadha. He was destined to succeed his father as an
oligarch but renounced that fate. After years of ascetic practices, he reached
enlightenment in Bodh Gaya and henceforth he became known as the Buddha. He gave a
first sermon in Sarnath and passed away in Kushinagar after years of teaching and
debating with proponents of other schools of thought.
The tradition summarizes the essence of the Buddha’s teaching as the Four Noble Truths:
dukkha (sorrow, suffering), the cause of dukkha (samudaya), the end of dukkha (nirhoda),
and the path that frees us from dukkha (magga), also known as the Noble Eightfold Path.
Most of the Buddha’s teachings serve to elaborate on the Noble Eightfold Path, also
known as the Middle Way, to emphasize a balance between the extremes of asceticism
and hedonism. A key component of the Buddha’s teaching is the doctrine of dependent
origination, which states that all things arise in dependence of all other things. This
principle of dependent origination serves to explain the chain of causality that results in
the endless cycles of rebirth, or samsara, and dukkha. The soteriology of Buddhism rests
on the breaking of samsara through the attainment of nirvana (lit. “blow out,” as in the
flame of a candle), the only phenomenon that is not the consequence of dependent
origination. The Buddha is depicted as the one who set in motion the Dharmachakra
(wheel of the Dharma), and symbolized the chakravartin (wheel turner), the ideal king
who rules the universe and that each monarch on earth should emulate. A key belief
described in the Digha Nikaya, part of the Pali Canon, states that a chakravarti king
appears when people are virtuous.4
Moore (2016) has posited that Buddhist political theory assumes “that human beings are
not selves, that politics is necessary but not very important, and that ethics is advice for
living wisely but not a system of universal, obligatory rules.” Three issues make defining
a Buddhist political theory difficult. First, a significant gap exists between the life of the
tradition’s founder and the constitution of an authoritative canon in written form. Second,
besides whatever authenticity scholars can attribute to the original teachings of this
canon, it has received a variety of changing interpretations over centuries. Third, and in
relation to these interpretations of the early tradition, experts on Buddhist studies need
to add scriptures written in Sanskrit and Tibetan as well as various recensions of the
original to the canon, which is written in Pali. These gaps account, in part, for the
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disagreements and the disputes about the teachings of the Buddha. While academics,
officials, and others can infer some rudiments of a political Buddhist philosophy out of the
key elements of the Buddha’s doctrine, the emergence of the distinctive schools of
Theravada, Mahayana, and Vajrayana in the centuries that followed his life explains the
differences and diversity in political positions that people label as “Buddhist.”
Most scholars believe that the distinction between the three schools represents only a
difference in the expression of the same teachings, divergences about monastic life, and
variations in the implementation of the teachings rather than discrepancies in their
substance. Others note that a key contrast between the Theravada and Mahayana schools
rests on their respective soteriology: the Theravada school focuses on the responsibility
of the self to attain enlightenment, while the Mahayana school stresses the importance of
helping other sentient beings. An important Mahayana belief that is relevant to politics is
the devotion to the bodhisattva Maitreya, or the “Buddha of the future,” also known as
Milefo in China. According to some of the sutras, the Maitreya will appear in this world to
teach the pure dharma and achieve enlightenment. The scriptures announce his arrival at
a time in the future when the world experiences decay and the teachings of the dharma
have been lost. This eschatology has inspired many political rebellions, mostly in China
(Overmyer, 1976). The belief bears a resemblance to messianic beliefs in other religions
and it has been adopted by other Chinese religions such as Yiguandao (the Way of Unity).
However, the Chinese Buddhist tradition’s emphasis on doctrine stands apart from the
Southeast Asian one, which places little importance on scripture and much more on ritual
and the political legitimation conferred by the religious authority of monastics (Matthews
& Jerryson, 2016). That much is clear when considering the widely different approaches
adopted by monastics within Thailand and Burma, for example, which have ranged from
opposition to the regimes to support for the rulers.
One of the most relevant components of the contemporary Buddhist approach to politics
in Chinese societies is the development since the mid-20th century of the trend known as
“Buddhism for the human realm” (renjian fojiao), sometimes rendered as humanistic
Buddhism. Elaborated by the Chinese monk Taixu (1890–1947), this religious teaching
faced rejection by many of his contemporaries, but after the establishment of the People’s
Republic of China (1949) many monks left the country and transmitted renjian fojiao to
Taiwan and throughout the Chinese diaspora. Later, it was reintroduced by the Buddhist
Association of China. Among the most important associations that represent that trend
are Foguangshan and the Tzu Chi Foundation, which were both established in Taiwan.
Branches have been started in North America, Europe, Australasia, and China, and have
contributed to the shaping of Taiwan’s social policy via philanthropic activities (Laliberté,
2004).
Renjian fojiao promoted the modernization of Buddhism, and to achieve that end Taixu
encouraged a downsizing of the Sangha and a greater reliance on lay associations for the
revitalization of the religion. One of Taixu’s key goals was to renovate the teaching of the
Pure Land school to suggest that it was not a remote abode but a goal to attain in this
world through appropriate practices including philanthropy and service to society and,
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more broadly, selfless commitment to all (Pittman, 2001). This orientation resonates with
the modernizing agenda of the East Asian developmental states, which prefer the practice
of charity and family-based care to the provision of social services by a generous welfare
state. Chinese-speaking Buddhists see renjian fojiao as the main inspiration behind the
growth of large lay associations in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia since the
1960s. China’s Buddhist Association, the largest of its kind in the world, has embraced it.
The Soka Gakkai (Society for the Creation of Value), arguably the largest international
Buddhist association, also presents its teachings in Japan as “humanistic Buddhism.” The
society’s founder was Josei Toda, who was almost a contemporary of Taixu (Metraux,
1994).5
Some commentators have related renjian fojiao to “engaged Buddhism,” but the
conflation between the two is problematic. The former preceded the latter by decades
and mainly relates to Chinese societies. Moreover, and more important, “engaged
Buddhism,” a term devised by Western scholars such as Christopher Queen and Sallie
King, does not refer to a doctrine in particular but serves as an umbrella term for an
informal and loose network that brings together many movements and people who share
the belief that Buddhism lends legitimacy to the causes they promote. Engaged Buddhists
stress pressing social and political issues such as liberation from social injustice and
gender discrimination and protection of the environment. In contrast to renjian fojiao,
they do not shun activism and openly criticize authorities who stand in the way of justice
and equality. Authorities in the Buddhist Association of China, most of whom promote
renjian fojiao, vehemently disapprove of engaged Buddhist leaders such as the Dalai
Lama.
Several Euro-American philosophers, from Schopenhauer to Conolly, have engaged with
Buddhism, some seeing the germs of a political philosophy. Initially, Westerners who
expressed interest in Buddhism looked at it primarily as an alternative spirituality,
starting in the 19th century with the work of German scholarship and continuing with the
broad popularity of Zen in the 1960s. More recently, however, the popularity of spiritual
leaders such as the Dalai Lama and Thich Nath Hanh has led to an inflexion of this
interest in political concerns. These religious leaders are efficient communicators who
have interpreted and translated their respective traditions for their Western audience.
However, they also present an idealized dimension of Buddhism that is not necessarily
representative of Buddhism as experienced in most societies where it is the religion of
the majority (or a large minority) of the population. A review of the doctrinal diversity
among Buddhist thinkers can help to understand the ideational component of Buddhist
politics, but to appreciate fully its relevance to contemporary politics, an understanding
of its social embeddedness is necessary. This understanding requires an appreciation of
the historical trajectory of the religion as a social force, as populations in different
cultures have adopted its teachings over time and adapted it to their conditions and elites
have appropriated its teachings and at times added to its original content.
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Buddhist Early Political History
The doctrinal diversity among the three main schools of Buddhism does not reflect the
transmission of the teachings in time and space. Merchants and scholars have
contributed to the diffusion of the religion and many rulers have let Buddhist teachings
spread among those of other religions. The adoption of the religion by a ruler, moreover,
rarely meant the conversion of the entire population. Finally, the diffusion of the religion
in space has waxed and waned considerably: it has almost disappeared in India, where it
first emerged, and experienced the same fate in the Indonesian archipelago. The political
influence of Buddhism has contrasted with that of Islam in which the political and
religious authorities were mutually constituted from the beginning. Although Gautama
Sidharta was born a prince, his disciples and the promoters of what would become
Buddhism did not seek to fulfill political roles, and the subsequent evolution of the
religion generally bears more resemblance to the slow political rise of Christianity, which
emerged at the margins of Roman society before rising to prominence in the late imperial
period. It took more than two centuries after the passing of the Buddha for a political
ruler to decide that his teachings deserved patronage. As Buddhism spread in different
societies with different religious traditions it changed, and different traditions gradually
took shape. Under this variety of conditions, the political importance of Buddhism
fluctuated accordingly.
The historical trajectory of Buddhism across Asia’s main regions can be summarized as
follows. After its emergence in India, Buddhism virtually disappeared from most of the
subcontinent. The Theravada tradition remained important in Sri Lanka while the
Vajrayana gained influence in the Himalayan region to the north. Introduced early on in
China, the Mahayana tradition became an important influence that peaked during the
Tang dynasty but seldom achieved hegemony or political influence afterward.
Transmitted from China, the Mahayana tradition exercised an important influence in
Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. The Vajrayana tradition came to prevail and shape polities in
Tibetan and Mongolian Inner Asia. The Vajaryana, after gaining political clout in Sri
Lanka, spread to Southeast Asian countries when rulers associated the religion’s
institutions with their government.
From Emergence to Decline in South Asia
The conversion to Buddhism of the Mauryan emperor Asoka (273–232 BCE) represented a
major milestone for the religion’s political importance. Through his decision to follow the
teachings of the Buddha, Asoka signaled the end of warfare in the subcontinent. Although
recent scholarship has qualified this interpretation of Asoka’s policies (Jenkins, 2010), he
has nevertheless become the paradigm of the Chakravartins. The patronage of Buddhism
through the construction of stupas and pillars contributed to the propagation of the
religion, and emissaries sent by the emperor to Sri Lanka and Central Asia helped to
proselytize these regions. Asoka also sought to spread the religion in the Hellenistic
world, issuing edicts in Greek and Aramaic. The conversion of King Menander (r. ca. 160–
135 BCE) to Buddhism represented a rare case of the religion’s influence in the IndoPage 6 of 21
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
Greek kingdom. In Sri Lanka, the efforts of Asoka’s son bore fruit, as the Sri Lankan king
and the nobility converted to Buddhism. The Shunga dynasty (185–173 BCE) undermined
the legacy of Asoka within India, however, and the further expansion of Buddhism outside
the country resulted from monastic missions and proselytizing along trade routes.
Buddhism expanded again throughout India during the Gupta dynasty (321–550). The
first Gupta rulers of the dynasty were orthodox Hindus, but they encouraged Buddhist
and Jain institutions as well. Hence, under the patronage of Kumaragupta (ca. 414–455),
the Nalanda Buddhist monastery became a major center of learning. After the invasion of
the White Huns in the north, however, the religion’s influence waned in the Indian
subcontinent for two centuries. It remained important in southern Indian kingdoms and
Sri Lanka but almost disappeared in the North. The Pala dynasty, which was influential in
North India and Bengal from the 8th century, renewed state patronage of Mahayana and
Tantric Buddhism. It renewed support of the Nalanda academy, which became one of the
first universities in the world. After the overthrow of the Pala by the Hindu Sena dynasty
(1070–1200) and subsequent Turkic invasions, Buddhist influence vanished in the IndoGangetic plain and never recovered. The renewed importance of Buddhism in
contemporary Indian politics via the role of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar or the refuge granted to
the Dalai Lama constitutes a distant echo of that ancient legacy.
Transmission to China and Inner Asia
The early translation of the Buddhist canon to Chinese by central Asian monks during the
2nd century is significant to the future of the religion from a global perspective. The
religion gradually expanded though China and North Vietnam and by the end of the Han
dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE) it was part of the Chinese religious landscape, even though it
did not receive state patronage. Buddhism reached China in the 1st century CE, when the
empire entered into decline and faced peasant uprisings that involved Daoist societies.
For many people in these times of trouble, Buddhist teachings offered solace, but they
had not yet fully developed eschatological doctrines like their Daoist counterparts with
which they were sometimes confused. Conversely, during the period of social instability
and economic insecurity caused by the political divisions following the fall of the Han
dynasty, Buddhism grew in influence and represented one of the few unifying cultural
forces in the various kingdoms of China. The influence of Buddhism took many forms. It
was a source of legitimacy to rulers, but was also an inspiration for revolt against them
(Demieville, 1957).
Emperor Wen of the Sui dynasty (581–618) was aware of Buddhism’s popularity and saw
conversion as a way to legitimize his authority. Wen encouraged the spread of the religion
and consolidated its role in society. The Tang dynasty (618–907) saw the culmination of
that trend, but while emperors promoted Buddhism as a religious system they never did
so at the expense of Daoism. Although the latter was the religion promoted by the state,
Buddhist monasteries became major actors in the economy. They owned property and
employed citizens to help run a wide range of operations, including services such as
schools for children (Gernet, 1998). The early Tang dynasty represents the golden age of
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Buddhism in China and throughout Asia, when its influence reached its zenith and
represented an element of governance in many regions. Chinese political rulers, however,
took umbrage at this prominence. The Tang emperor Wuzong saw the tax-exempt status
of temples and convents as a drain on the economy and took measures in 805 that
drastically reduced the influence of Buddhism in Chinese society for centuries.
These constraints were enforced under the Song dynasty (960–1279), as the rulers
promoted a revival of Confucianism, whose intellectuals criticized Buddhism as a curse.
After the 10th century, Buddhism became both a source of legitimacy and of dissent. This
made it an important oppositional political force. After the Maitreyan teachings inspired a
revolt in 1047, authorities felt threatened enough to proclaim the Maitreya sect to be
heretic and executed tens of thousands of its followers. Although Buddhism lost its ability
to represent a credible countervailing source of power, its eschatology was the source of
legitimation for dissenting sects for centuries. The religion fared much better in the
periphery of the Chinese empire. In Vietnam the dynasties of Din and Le (968–1009)
granted it official status and the two dynasties of Ly and Tran (1009–1400) promulgated
Buddhism as the state religion. Moreover, as Tibet became integrated into the same polity
as China for the first time under Mongol rulers, Tibetan Buddhism experienced a
significant expansion through inner Asia during the Yuan dynasty (1206–1368), which
promoted the religion but did not grant it official status at the expense of others. In 1351,
the Red Turban rebellion broke out against the Yuan, the first of many among what some
historians collectively label the White Lotus rebellions, a name drawn from Buddhist
teachings. The rebellion contributed to the overthrow of the Yuan and led to the
establishment of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) under which the Chan School of the
Mahayana tradition rose to prominence.
During the Qing dynasty (1644–1911), the rulers reproduced the earlier policies of the
Yuan. Tibetan Buddhism remained as one of the established religions and was practiced
by Tibetans, Mongols, and Manchus (Tuttle, 2005). Meanwhile, Mahayana institutions
prospered in China proper and maintained cooperative relations with the government.
The heterodox teachings of the White Lotus and others inspired rebellions against the
central government, but none succeeded in overthrowing the regime. Intellectuals such
as Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) promoted, in vain, the
renewal of the nation through the infusion of Buddhist philosophy. Taixu advocated the
compatibility of Buddhism with nationalism and socialism. In the 20th century, these two
ideologies and the political forces that they inspired largely supplanted Buddhism as a
source of political value among the Chinese. The situation was different for Tibetan
Buddhists. They were inspired by the Dalai Lama who has acted for decades as both
spiritual and political leader. Similar dynamics have unfolded in Vietnam, where Buddhist
texts constituted an important contribution to the public debate under colonial rule
(McHale, 2004), inspired resistance to authoritarian rulers during the Diem regime,
protest against the American intervention, and a critical stance against the socialist
regime. Two religious movements emerged when Vietnam came under French colonial
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rule: the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao. These groups are seen by their adherents and others as a
patriotic appropriation of Buddhism.
Appropriation in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan
Monks promoting the teachings of the Mahayana tradition introduced them to Korea in
372 and Japan in 552. The religion flourished in Korea and benefited from state
patronage during the North and South States Period (688–935), even becoming the state
religion in the kingdom of Balhae (698–926). This attitude toward the religion was
maintained after unification, when the rulers of the Goeryo period (918–1392) proclaimed
Buddhism as the state religion. Under the Joseon dynasty (1392–1910), however, the
rulers sought to undermine the power gained by Buddhist institutions in previous
centuries. The religion lost political prominence and its capacity to influence society.
Buddhism went through a broadly similar experience in Japan, albeit the religion’s
influence in the latter proved more enduring. After the Heian period (794–1185),
Mahayana Buddhism became a dominant religion for eight centuries. In the Tokugawa
period (1600–1868) rulers sought to limit the influence acquired by Buddhist institutions.
The nationalist orientations of most Buddhists in Japan took a very different turn. Some of
the Buddhist orders, under the name of pan-Asian solidarity against Western colonialism,
promoted the imperialist ambition of Japan up to the country’s defeat in World War II
(Victoria, 2006). Only a few others, such as the adherents of the Soka Gakkai founded in
1930, refused to adopt that approach and were punished for their dissident attitude. After
the war, the Soka Gakkai became a major supporter of pacifist values in Japan. For the
postcolonial governments of South Korea and Taiwan, who did not have policies hostile to
Buddhism even during periods of authoritarian rule, the international networks and the
continued vitality of their respective sangha serve as a demonstration that their
governments respected religious freedom, a claim that helped in diplomacy during the
Cold War. In South Korea, however, Buddhists were also participants in a movement of
social contestation that stressed a critique of the social and economic status quo (Park,
2012).
Predominance in Peninsular Southeast Asia After Near-Extinction in
the Malay World
Buddhism initially thrived in the kingdoms of Shailendra (ca. 650–1250) and Mataram
(732–1006), as well as the Srivijaya empire (650–1377), which covered large parts of the
Malay world. It gradually reached into peninsular Southeast Asia via trade routes, but the
adoption of Hinduism as the religion of the regionally dominant Khmer empire limited its
expansion in Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia. In the decades before the onset of the
colonial era, Southeast Asia would experience a remarkable reversal of situation.
Buddhism had declined to near-complete disappearance in the Malay archipelago while it
expanded in the continent. After Srivijaya fell in the 13th century, Buddhism lost political
support and Islam gradually supplanted it in succeeding thalassocracies. The expansion
of Theravada Buddhism in Burma, Cambodia, Thailand, and Laos, was gradual. It first
entered Burma in the 7th century and expanded after the Kingdom of Pagan (849–1297)
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granted it official patronage. Although Buddhism was present early on in the early Khmer
empire (802–1431), it was only in the 13th century that its ruler proclaimed it as the
official religion of Cambodia. In Thailand, Buddhism would gain prominence with the
emergence of the Sukhothai kingdom (1238–1438). In 1527, Laotian King Photisarath
proclaimed Theravada Buddhism as the official religion of the Lang Fang kingdom (1354–
1707).
From the 15th century onward, colonialism influenced some societies that had an
important Buddhist tradition. In the first stage, Christian missions in the wake of traders
and administrators sought to convert people through the establishment of schools to
promote literacy in the colonial languages. In the second stage, the transmission to elites
of new ideas originating from Western Europe such as the right to self-determination,
socialism, and secular philosophy shaped the nationalist movements of South and
Southeast Asia. One side effect of Christian missions’ proselytizing via education was to
undermine the social role of the sangha, which had provided education in the vernacular
languages. The diminished social status of monastics that resulted from such change
made them receptive to nationalist ideas, so that by the end of the colonial era they lent
their support to Buddhist lay leaders who became major actors in anticolonial struggles.
Monastics in Burma and Sri Lanka under colonial rule proved susceptible to these trends,
but those in other Southeast Asian countries, whether independent Thailand or colonial
Cambodia and Laos, did not experience a comparable decline. Influenced by his
knowledge of Western societies, the Thai King Mongkut (r. 1851–1868) and his son
Chulalongkorn (1868–1910) sought to transform Thailand into a constitutional monarchy,
presenting themselves as patrons of Buddhism and thereby abandoning the notion of
divine kingship sanctioned by the clergy. This modernizing agenda, similar in many
respects to the contemporary approach adopted by Japan under the Meiji restoration
(1868–1912), served to shield Thailand from colonial control.
The situation in the societies that had experienced British and French colonial rule
varied. Starting from the 1880s, Sinhalese patriots such as Dharmapala sought to identify
the Sri Lankan nation as Buddhist in response to early Tamil revivalist movements,
thereby sowing the seeds of further confrontation. In Burma, in the years leading to
independence in 1948, the sangha took the lead in articulating resistance to colonial rule
and advocated a discourse that promoted unity among ethnic groups. But Buddhists
failed to prevent ethnic conflicts that would poison the country for decades afterward. A
few Buddhist leaders, such as Burmese President U Nu, embraced socialism, but other
socialist regimes in the region did not reciprocate. Briefly under the Khmer Rouge (1975–
1979), political leaders aimed for the eradication of all religions as a feudal force. After
the overthrow of Pol Pot and the departure of Vietnamese troops from the country, the
Truth and Reconciliation reports on the massacre of Buddhist monks during the Khmer
Rouge regime inspired political and lay support for Buddhism in the country. In Laos, a
more moderate policy by the ruling Pateth Laohas made the continued existence of the
religion possible. Evans (1998) has argued that despite the socialist nature of that
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
regime, the prerevolutionary nexus between the monarchy and Buddhism has continued
to shape the worldview of citizens.
Buddhists and Contemporary Politics
Buddhism represents the religion of the majority in very few states, and even when it is
considered the official religion some important nuances reveal that there is no Buddhist
equivalent to the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Only four
states have established Buddhism as a state religion: the Republic of the Union of
Myanmar, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Cambodia, and
the Kingdom of Bhutan, whose constitution states that Buddhism is its spiritual heritage.
The Constitution of Burma (or Myanmar since 1989) recognizes the special status of
Buddhism and Sri Lanka gives Buddhism special privileges. In both countries, where
significantly large minorities of non-Buddhists exist, this state patronage of Buddhism
under authoritarian rule, combined with the promotion of an aggressive ethnic
nationalism that articulate the idea of the Burmese and Sinhala nations under siege, has
fueled civil wars and ethnic insurgencies.6 In Cambodia, the Constitution declares
Buddhism as the state religion, but a clergy decimated by the genocidal Khmer Rouge
regime did not benefit much from this promotion of Buddhism. The same holds true in
Laos, where official recognition of Buddhism does not come with particular privilege. In
Thailand, the king must be a Buddhist of the Theravada tradition and monks benefit from
some privileges such as free passage on public transportation. However, the Constitution
proclaims freedom of conscience and there is no state religion.
The principle of a Buddhist monarchy perpetuates an ancient tradition in Southeast Asia
of state protection of the religion as well as government supervision of temples and
clerics. Monks, nuns, and novices cannot run for office or vote. No formal law forbids
such participation in politics, but a declaration made by the Council of Ministers of
Thailand in 1958 made the rule on the grounds of appropriateness. In the Lao People’s
Democratic Republic and Mongolia, Buddhist institutions remain under close state
supervision, which is the legacy of decades of socialist rule, even though the current
regime has opened the political space.
In the East Asian liberal democratic countries of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the
Republic of China (Taiwan), where governments have established to various degrees the
principle of freedom of conscience along with separation of religion and the state,
Buddhism benefits from a status of legal recognition and the general climate of religious
pluralism. This situation, however, came after complicated processes of political
transition. Buddhism in Japan recovered after a long period of persecution under a Shinto
quasi-establishment that endured from 1900 to 1945. In 1957 the Japan Buddhist
Federation was formed. The federation represents the interests of most affiliated
denominations and prefectural associations, and is independent from the state. Many
Japanese, however, see the participation in coalition governments of the Komeito, a party
affiliated with the lay Buddhist association Soka Gakkai, as a breach of the constitutional
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
provision of separation between religious institutions and the state. In South Korea, the
authoritarian ruler Park Chung-Hee (1961–1979) sponsored a national Buddhist
association in an attempt to solve a conflict within the Korean sangha between orders of
celibate monks and orders of married monks; the latter was a legacy of Japanese colonial
rule. Park’s effort failed. Later, during the process of democratization, South Korean
presidents Chun Doo-Hwan (1980–1988) and Lee Myung-Bak (2008–2013) could not
prevail or manage the divisions between the two main Buddhist orders. In Taiwan, the
state oversight of Buddhism through the monopoly of the Buddhist Association of the
Republic of China during the period of martial law (1949–1987) gave way to the de jure
recognition of the de facto institutional pluralism that had existed since the 1970s.
Taiwan does not have a state-sponsored Buddhist association.
The Republic of India, which proclaims in its constitution the principle of secularism, has
adopted the Dharmic wheel, also known as Asoka’s wheel, in the national flag, but it has
not instituted preferential treatment for Buddhism. However, it hosts the Dalai Lama and
his government in exile in Dharamsala, and it maintains its territorial claim over the
Ladakh, a region of Kashmir populated by Buddhists. Even when coalition governments
advocating policies favoring the interests of the Hindu majority ruled India (1998–2004,
2014–), Buddhists did not endure discrimination. The ideology of Hindu supremacy
considers Buddhism—along Sikhism and Jainism—as a Hindu tradition because of its
Indian origins. However, many of the apologists for the Bharatiya Janata Party, which is
the political party that advocates the ideology of Hindu nationalism, or Hindutva, trace
one of the sources of their movement to the need to stem mass defection from Hinduism.
For example, in 1956 so-called untouchables converted to Buddhism en masse under the
leadership of Dr. Ambedkar, who was a secular nationalist. The Federal Democratic
Republic of Nepal, the only other nation where Hinduism represents the religion of the
majority, was a state with a religious establishment associated with the monarchy until
2006. It has since become a secular state. These changes have favored the development
of Buddhism, often indistinguishable from Hindu worship in its practice in Nepal.
In the other societies where Buddhists constitute an important part of the population,
nominal constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion mean little when governments
have deployed a preferential option for another religion or for authoritarian secularism.
Hence, in archipelagic Southeast Asia, where significant minorities of Mahayana
Buddhists live, the condition of coexistence with Muslim majorities and state protection of
religious minorities is fragile. Singapore is an exception. Buddhism represents the largest
religion by number of adherents and its devotees are active in philanthropy, but no
religion enjoys a distinctive legal status (Kuah-Pearce, 2009). In the Federation of
Malaysia, where close to one-fifth of the population claims affiliation to Buddhism, Islam
is the only official religion. The Republic of Indonesia’s principle of “Pancasila” implicitly
recognizes Buddhism as one of six legitimate religions of the country, but that designation
alone may not suffice to protect the small Buddhist minority against the rise of radical
Islamist movements. The People’s Republic of China, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam,
and the Democratic Peoples’ Republic of Korea have created systems of multiple religious
establishments. Their constitutions officially recognize Buddhism along with a limited
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
number of other religions. In all three cases, the state has granted national Buddhist
associations a regulatory monopoly to administer their own affairs and transmit state
directives. These religious institutions and conditions for worship are vulnerable to
changes in the ruling party’s views on religious affairs.
Buddhist Actors
Buddhists can influence politics in many ways, through a variety of channels. As
individual voters, they may express their choice according to their conscience, the latter
informed by how people decide to interpret Buddhist teachings. However, in the absence
of large n-comparative studies undertaken in societies where Buddhists constitute a large
proportion of the electorate, conclusions about how Buddhist ideas inspire voters remains
pure speculation. We can, however, infer the influence of Buddhism on politics by paying
attention to its institutions. The capacity of the latter to mobilize people and the
programs these organizations promote are robust indicators of how Buddhism can be a
factor in the politics of democratic countries as well as authoritarian regimes. Three
types of actors are salient: the sangha, lay associations, and Buddhist political parties.
The sangha, as the more religiously inclined of the three, often provides leadership and
aspires to the direction of the entire Buddhist community. Lay associations pursue a
variety of actions: material support of the sangha, transmission of the religion through
education, including propagation of the Buddha’s teachings among non-Buddhists, and
training people in the hope that they become involved politically to support Buddhist
values in civil society organizations and political parties. Finally, in societies where the
main parties are not supportive of Buddhist goals and views, clerics and laypeople have
created their own.
The Sangha
Buddhist ecclesiastic orders are different from those of Christianity and Islam. They are
primarily monastic and they are often living on the margins of society. Most countries
have sought to establish a national body for the sangha and unify ordination procedures
to present a unified front to articulate the interests of the sangha and the broader lay
community. The creation of a unified sangha has coincided easily with the objective of
party-states such as China, Vietnam, and North Korea, which favor state corporatist
arrangements that grant the monopoly of representation to a single association. It has
been much more difficult to obtain in other countries with pluralist political culture.
There is no unified national sangha for all Buddhists in Japan, so ordination procedures
vary and, in contrast to most other Buddhist communities, monastics can marry. Another
characteristic of the Japanese sangha is that the authority of its leaders pales when
compared with that of lay leaders such as the president of the Soka Gakkai International,
Daisaku Ikeda. In South Korea, the divisions of the sangha have emerged as a
consequence of Japanese colonialism. It remains split between two monastic orders, the
Jogye and Taego, which oppose each other over the issue of married clergy. This
opposition, which has even led to violence, has discredited the religion. In Taiwan,
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
divisions of the sangha are a result of the emergence of clerical entrepreneurs, such as
Hsing Yun, Cheng Yen, and the late Sheng Yen, who emerged as influential public
personalities. Overall, these clerical leaders tended to favor moderate policies and were
not disruptive actors. They have held mostly conservative views on social matters. This
prudence reflects the fact that in these societies, where the Mahayana tradition prevails,
Buddhists constitute minorities in the population, even if large ones.
In countries where a majority of the population identifies with the Theravada tradition,
the sway of the sangha carries more weight than in societies where the Mahayana school
is dominant, and therefore more is at stake in the struggle to gain authority within the
community. In Thailand, the sangha has faced splits caused by reform movements from
within for decades. Earlier movements, such as the Dhammakaya, established in 1906,
sought mostly religious reform. More politically radical movements have emerged when
Thailand entered a period of political uncertainty. In 1989, activist monks founded the
Sekhiya Dhamma Sangha to focus on issues such as deforestation, poverty alleviation,
and social work. In Myanmar, the previous authoritarian regimes set up corporatist
arrangements similar to those found in socialist states. Since 1990, the Myanmar regime
has recognized nine monastic orders and the State Sangha Maha Nayaka Committee, an
organ of senior monks appointed by the government, supervises and regulates their
activities. Since 2012, an ominous trend has emerged, with the 969 Movement and the
MaBaTha (Organization for the Protection of Race and Religion) promoting virulent antiMuslim nationalism. In Cambodia, a division between two factions of the sangha has
endured since the colonial era between modernists (Maha) and traditionalists
(Dhammayuttika). The former deploys greater influence in the population than the latter,
but the government supports the latter, even if it is much smaller group. In Sri Lanka,
sectarian divisions within the clergy date from the 18th century. They do not reflect
doctrinal divisions, but the different lineages of the founders in Thailand or in Myanmar.
In principle, the sangha benefits from its prestige as custodian of the religious tradition,
but its political influence depends on the extent of the resources it can mobilize within lay
associations.
Lay Associations
Many religions experienced a major transformation in the early 20th century as lay
organizations gained greater prominence, a turn that mirrored the emergence of mass
political parties that seek the support of a majority of the population. Large lay
associations serve the sangha and seek either to influence society to ensure that the
population abides by the precepts of the religion when a majority of the population
identifies with Buddhism, or reinforces cohesion within its ranks when a minority of the
population adheres to its principles. Some of these associations have a very long history.
In colonial Ceylon and Burma, activists adopted the model of the YMCA to promote
Buddhist interests and established the Young Men’s Buddhist Association in the late 19th
century. While in Sri Lanka it remains active, it has dissolved into other groups in Burma.
In Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos, where monks make up a large proportion of the
population because of the prevailing expectation that every young man should be
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
temporarily ordained, lay associations exist as functional branches within existing
monastic orders. This situation can lead to tension when reform movements within
Buddhism emerge. Hence, the Thai Supreme Sangha Council denounced in 1989 the
breakaway Santi Asoke, which is primarily a lay movement, after it attempted to ordain
monks. The courts eventually imposed prison term on the group’s leader. Considered by
some circles to be a politically radical movement, Santi Asoke, however, joined the
opposition to the People’s Alliance for Democracy, the party associated with the populist
president Thaksin Shinawatra.
Hundreds of lay Buddhist organizations exist in Japan, some of which have played an
important role in shaping politics by sponsoring their own party or lobbying the dominant
Liberal Democratic Party. The better known among these associations, the Soka Gakkai,
has sponsored the political party Komeito, and can ensure constant mobilization outside
of the electoral cycle. Other large associations established before the World War II, such
as the Rissho Kosei-kai, and Reiyukai, each include more than five million members and
have established branches abroad, but they have not sponsored political parties.
However, they do exercise political influence. The Rissho Kosei takes part in humanitarian
projects, encourages interfaith dialogue, and fosters peace activism. Conversely, the
Reiyukai joined the Nippon Kaigi (Japan Conference), a neonationalist group that
promotes the revision of the constitution and advocates values that oppose those of Soka
Gakkai. In South Korea, lay associations are closely aligned with monastic orders. The
popular (minjung) Buddhism movement is an exception. It is affiliated with a broader
movement that opposed the dictatorship of former South Korean President Park ChungHee, which is a rare example of left-leaning lay Buddhist activity. While the minjung
movement’s advocacy of democratization during the period of martial rule contributed to
its growth, the continued advocacy of reunification with North Korea partly explains its
decline since the 1990s. In Taiwan, large lay associations founded in the 1960s such as
the Tzu Chi Foundation, the Buddha Light International Foundation, and the Dharma
Drum Mountain are not involved in formal politics and have intervened in electoral
contests to express their views on matters of national interest. They oppose the
movement for Taiwan’s self-determination and they indirectly assist the government
through their delivery of social services. The nominally socialist states of China, Vietnam,
and North Korea allow national Buddhist associations to represent both monastic
communities and lay believers. Buddhist lodges (jushilin) have emerged to accommodate
the needs of lay devotees, but the law only authorizes one such lodge per provincial or
municipal jurisdiction.
Buddhist Political Parties
Buddhists have formed very few significant political parties and those that have existed
promoted generally conservative policies. One of the earliest examples of Buddhist
parties in Theravada countries is the Eksath Bhikku Peramuna, founded by monks
worried about the decline of Buddhism and Sinhala culture in Sri Lanka. The party
promoted a mixture of religious revivalism and ethnic nationalism through the 1950s.
Solomon Bandaranaike seized upon this trend and won the 1956 election as head of the
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
Mahajena Eksath Peramuna (People’s United Front) electoral alliance, implementing a
“Sinhala only” language policy that initiated a crisis escalating decades later into civil
war. Bandaranaike’s party was a left-of-center organization whose policies have
legitimized the growth of parties campaigning on platforms that promote the Buddhist
identity of Sri Lanka. The Jathika Hela Urumaya (National Heritage Party), which took
part in its first campaign in 2004, has received support from monks and young Buddhist
associations, but it also generated divisions among the sangha when some of the clergy
denounced monks’ entry into politics. The Jathika became party of the Ratnasiri
Wickremanayake government, when the prime minister appointed one of its lay members
as cabinet minister in 2007. Other Buddhist political parties, such as the Bodu Bala Sena
(Buddhist Power Force) and the Ravana Balaya, emerged in the wake of these events and
forged an alliance with the Jathika to facilitate the election to parliament of Buddhist
monks. In other countries where the Theravada tradition prevails, this dominance lessens
anxiety about the future of the religion and religious activists rely on their lay
associations or the Sangha to promote their objectives. The Palang Dharma (Moral Force)
Party was a Buddhist-inspired political party in Thailand founded by Chamlong Srimuang
in 1988 that was associated with the Santi Asoke. The Palang Dharmahe went into decline
when business leader Thaksin Sinawatra gave it to a more secular orientation. The party
dissolved in 2007. Through all these travails, the Dhammakaya has remained an
important force in Thai politics. As recently as 2017, the army and police officers had to
pull back from the siege of its temple when they failed in their case against one of its
leaders. In Cambodia, ephemeral parties with a Buddhist ideology have failed to establish
a durable presence, such as the Sangkum (1955–1970), which promoted a conservative
policy loyal to Prince Sihanouk, and the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (1993–1991),
which primarily served as a vehicle for the anticommunist former Prime Minister Son
Sann (1967–1968). However, despite these weaknesses, Buddhism remains an important
factor as a moral force. The massacre of Buddhist monks during the Khmer Rouges’ rule
had an impact on lay support for Buddhism in the country, and moreover, the Buddhist
conception of reconciliation, which stresses the importance of “truth” and “healing,” may
prove essential in moving forward in the process of transitional justice (Capeloto, 2008).
The most successful Buddhist political party is arguably the Japanese Komeito (Party of
Fairness), founded in 1962. The party initially faced controversy because the Soka Gakkai
openly supported it, a link that the constitutional provision of separation between religion
and politics prohibits, albeit ambiguously. The Komeito and Soka Gakkai formally severed
links in 1970, but the Soka Gakkai remains a key constituency and continues to support
the party. For two decades, the Komeito has campaigned on a platform of pacifism, and
has tended to support the Japan Socialist Party. In 1993 it joined a left-of-center coalition
government opposed to the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled Japan since
1955. After the coalition failed and following a brief dissolution caused by internal
disagreements over whether to team up with the LDP, the Komeito rebuilt in 1998 and
within a year joined the LDP in a coalition government that lasted for ten years. They
joined forces again in 2012. Although Komeito consistently campaigned for pacifism, in
2015 it approved Prime Minister Abe’s plan to amend the constitution and authorize an
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expansion of the self-defense force’s mandate, which would include the right to intervene
militarily abroad. In sum, the Komeito started out as a left-of-center party and has
recently become conservative. No such organization exists in South Korea or Taiwan,
where Buddhists prefer to join existing parties to advocate their views or count on
charismatic monastic leaders to do so. The political structure of the socialist systems in
China, Vietnam, and North Korea, which allowed the creation of satellite parties
representing constituencies based on criteria such as professional affiliation or links with
allied prerevolutionary parties, has not allowed for the formation of Buddhist political
parties.
Policies
In peninsular Southeast Asia and Sri Lanka, Theravada Buddhism plays an ambiguous
role, as an inspiration for peaceful social change, a source of legitimation for the
monarchs of Thailand and Cambodia, and as a foundation of nationalist activism in
Myanmar and Sri Lanka. In Thailand, the lay Buddhist and scholar Sulak Sivaraksa, a
major promoter of engaged Buddhism, has spearheaded social, humanitarian, and
ecological movements since the late 1970s. Sivaraksa advocated environmentally
sustainable ways of life but repeatedly faced accusations of lese-majesty for his criticism
by the conservative politicians who were targeted by his views. Prominent members of
the clergy, however, such as the high-ranking monk Phra Buddha Issara, had an opposite
attitude and stood at the forefront of the movement that led to the 2014 military coup
d’état in Thailand. Some have even condoned anti-Malay violence in the south (Jerryson,
2011). Buddhist values have inspired opposition to the military regime of Myanmar since
the “People Power Uprising” of 1988, when Aung San Suu Kyi emerged as a major figure
of engaged Buddhism for her peaceful advocacy of reform, and when monastics protested
against the authoritarian government during the so-called Saffron revolution in 2017. Yet
Aung San Suu Kyi has been unable to halt the ethnic cleansing of the Royinga minority
instigated by extremist Buddhist associations since 2016. Moreover, as Walton (2016) has
explained, promoters of democracy in Myanmar have often tried to express their views in
terms that appear inherent to Buddhism, with some using that approach to limit rather
than legitimate democracy. A similar ambiguity characterizes Sri Lanka, where Buddhist
activists have long promoted ideologies of ethnic nationalism based on religious and
linguistic markers of identity and even condoned violence to advance their cause.
Meanwhile the Sinhalese Sarvodaya movement has promoted nonviolence,
comprehensive development, and interethnic reconciliation since 1958. The group also
acted as a major provider of relief after the 2006 tsunami.
Mahayana Buddhism constitutes a religious system for the majority of East Asians, but it
does not shape the political discourse to the extent observed in Southeast Asia, with the
notable exception of Japan. The Soka Gakkai, which has branched out across the world,
and the political party it supports, the Komeito, offer a version of what Buddhist politics
might entail. Viewed from afar, it projects the impression of a tradition that promotes
peace and encourages environmental protection. Inside Japan, public opinion remains
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
divided, as suggested by the limited electoral support the Komeito receives, at just over
13% of the total. A majority of Japanese supports the secular institution of their country
and they do not feel comfortable with a religious party in a coalition government. The
rapid rise and fall of minjung theology in South Korea illustrates the perils faced by the
Buddhist sangha and lay associations when they embrace secular ideologies such as
ethnic nationalism. In South Korea, this ideology implies the advocacy of unification with
North Korea, which many South Koreans consider naive. For a majority of Taiwanese, the
denial by many well-known local Buddhist leaders of their right to national selfdetermination amounts to a betrayal.
Outside of Asia, the network of engaged Buddhists, which includes leaders who are exiled
from their countries of birth, greatly influences the perception of Buddhism as a
progressive source of political guidance. Founded by Thich Nhat Hanh, this informal
group of monastics, lay devotees, and academics promotes a view of Buddhism as the
source of liberation movements all over Asia, ranging from the emancipation of Dalits in
India and the ordination of women as nuns to self-determination for Tibet (Queen & King,
1996). The importance of the Dalai Lama, Thich Nhat Hanh, Sulak Sivaraksa, and other
leaders admired in North America, Western Europe, and Australia, is undeniable, even
outside of Buddhist communities. Their advocacy of a less materialist culture,
nonviolence, greater care for the global common good, and social justice is admirable,
but it is not representative of the politics of the Asian societies where most Buddhist
devotees live. Asian Buddhists do not always approve of what their very demanding ethics
require of them in their daily lives.
Conclusion
Ontologically, research on the politics of Buddhism remains handicapped by the nature of
its subject: the absence of a single definition of policies that outsiders can define as
Buddhist and the challenge of defining empirically how Buddhist institutions and ideas
shape the evolution of policies. Epistemologically, the focus on the exegesis of Buddhist
scripture in the field of religious studies overlooks the connection between the evolution
of the doctrine and its political context. Conversely, scholarship in social sciences rarely
pays attention to the hermeneutical dimensions of Buddhism. Political scientists seldom
pay attention to religion as a dimension of identity, as an institution shaping the evolution
of states and regimes, and even less so as an aspect of social life relevant to political
economy. The few political scientists who do pay attention to religion in the framing of
politics mostly focus on Christianity, increasingly on Islam, sometimes on Hinduism, and
rarely on Buddhism. Among the latter, most social scientists who have considered
Buddhism as a legitimate object of study have focused on the trend of socially engaged
Buddhism, which they interpret broadly as a progressive trend (Jones, 2003; Queen &
King, 1996; Queen, Prebisch, & Keown, 2003). Very few have looked at the negative
aspects of Buddhist politics (Jerryson, 2011; Tambiah, 1992; Victoria, 2006).
Methodologically, researchers who want to arrive at a grasp of Buddhist politics properly
contextualized in its historical and sociological dimensions face the challenge of dealing
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Religious Traditions in Politics: Buddhism
with textual evidence that emanates from widely different scriptural traditions. Scholars
must also find ways to overcome the institutional obstacles imposed by authoritarian
regimes that either rejects altogether the politics of any religion as a proper object of
scholarly research, or that attempt to shape its conclusions.
Further Reading
Harris, I. (Ed.). (1999). Buddhism and politics in twentieth century Asia. London, U.K.:
Pinter.
Harris, I. (Ed.). (2007). Buddhism, power and political order. London, U.K.: Routledge.
Lahiri, N., & Singh, U. (Eds.). (2017). Buddhism in Asia: Revival and reinvention.
Singapore: Manohar Publishers.
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Notes:
(1.) Peninsular Southeast Asia refers to Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and
Vietnam.
(2.) The numbers for Tibetan and Theravada Buddhists in China are inferred from the
numbers for the ethnic minorities who are identified with these two traditions.
(3.) These numbers are taken from the Pew Research Center.
(4.) This is presented in the Cakkavatti Sutta (the wheel-turning emperor).
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(5.) Scholars of Buddhism disagree on placing the Soka Gakkai as “humanistic Buddhism”
and prefer to see it as a contemporary variant of Nichiren Buddhism.
(6.) Monks are even part of the Sri Lankan government in 2017.
André Laliberté
Department of Political Studies, University of Ottawa
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