Sources for the Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths
Sources for the Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths
In a recent study, I discuss Yogācāra critiques of the two truths on the basis of the
Yogācārabhūmi and related sources.i As a by-product of this study, the current
paper presents the Sanskrit, Chinese and Tibetan editions and my English
translation of some main passages that I discussed in my earlier study. I will
supply some annotations, which reveal the subtlety and difficulty of reading and
understanding classical Buddhist philosophical texts.
1) Yogācārabhūmi (The Tattvārthapaala section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi)
Sanskrit edition from Takahashi 2005ii
5.3.4 ato ya ekatyā durvijñeyān sūtrāntāniii mahā (N21b1) yānapratisayuktāiv gambhīrāv śūnyatāpratisayuktānvi ābhiprāyikārthanirūpitāvii śrutvāviii yathābhūta bhāitasyārtham avijñāyāyoniśoix vikalpayitvāyogavihitenax tarkamātrakeaivadayo bhavanty evavādinaxi prajñaptimātram eva sarvam (10etac caxii) tattva yaś caiva paśyati sa samyak paśyatītixiii teā i Zhihua Yao. (Forthcoming). Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths. ii Takahashi Koichi . (2005). Bosatsuji shinjitsugibon kara shoketchakubun chu bosatsuji eno shiso tenkai: Vastu gainen o chushin to
shite : vastu
Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin.
iii durvijñeyān sūtrāntān NKR; durvijñeyānā sūtrāntānā C. (C=Mss from Cambridge, K=Mss from Kyoto University, R=Mss of R. Sāktyāyana, N=Mss from Nepal, W=Woghihara ed.)
iv - C; -n NKR
v - C; -n NKR
vi śū- NKR; cchū- C
vii - C; -n NKR
viii śrutvā NKR; cchrutvā C
ix avijñāyā- NKR; anabhijñāyā- C
x vikalpayitvāyogavihitena; vikalpayitvā ayogavihitena NKR; vikalpyāyogavihitena C xi evavādina C; evamvādina NK; evavādina/ R xii etac ca NKR; etat C
xiii // K; / NR; om. C
prajñaptyadhihānasya vastumātrasyābhāvāt saiva prajñapti1 sarvea
sarva2 na bhavati//3 kuta puna prajñaptimātra4 tattva bhaviyati5//6
tad anena paryāyea tais (18tattvam api prajñaptir7) api tadubhayam apodita8
bhavati//9 prajñaptitattvāpavādāc ca pradhā (C21b1) no nāstiko veditavya//10
5.3.5 sa evan11 nāstika sann akathyo12 bhavaty asavāsyo bhavati13 vijñānā14
sabrahmacāriām//15 sa ātmānam api vipādayati16/17 (29lokam api yo 'sya
dyanumatam āpadyate18)//19 (Takahashi 2005: 99-100)
Chinese translation by Xuanzang, CBETA, T30, no. 157920
ΧΒΕΤΑ, Τ30, νο.1579 π. 488, β28∼χ10)
1 - NKC; -/ R
2 sarva KRC; sarvan N
3 //; / R; om. NKC
4 - RC; -n NK
5 -ti NKC; -tīti R
6 // K; / NR; om. C
7 tattvam api prajñaptir NC; tatva api prajñaptir K; tattva prajñaptir R
8 apodita NKR; apy āpādita C; cf. W: apy apavādita
9 // K; / NR; om. C
10 // K; / NR; om. C
11 -n NK; - RC
12 akathyo NRC; akatho K
13 bhavati NK; bhavati/ R; om. C
14 - NKC; -/ R
15 // K; / NR; om. C
16 vipādayati NKR; visapādayati C
17 / NR; // K; om. C
18 lokam api yo sya dyanumatam āpadyate NKRC; cf.W: loko 'pi yo 'sya dyanumatam
āpādyate.
19 // K; / N; om. C; illegible R
20 All the Chinese texts are my punctuation.
Tibetan translation, Derge 4037; Peking 5538 de bas na gang dag kha cig shes par dka' ba'i mdo sde theg pa chen po dang ldan pa zab mo stong pa nyid dang ldan pa/ dgongs pa'i don bstan pa dag thos na bshad pa'i don yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du ma shes na/ tshul bzhin ma yin pa rnam par brtags te/ rigs pa ma yin pas bskyed pa'i rtog ge21 tsam gyis 'di thams cad ni btags pa tsam du zad de/ 'di ni de kho na yin no// su 'di ltar lta ba de ni yang dag par lta ba yin no zhes de ltar lta zhing de skad smra'o/ de dag gi ltar na 'dogs pa'i gzhi'i22 dngos po tsam yang med pas/ 'dogs pa de nyid kyang thams cad kyi thams cad du med par 'gyur na/ btags pa23 tsam gyi24 de kho na lta yod par ga la 'gyur te/ de bas na rnam grangs des na de dag gis ni de kho na dang25 btags pa de gnyi ga la yang skur ba btab par 'gyur te/ btags pa dang/ de kho na la skur ba btab pas na/ med par lta ba'i gtso bo yin par rig par bya'o// de ltar med par lta ba de26 ni tshangs pa mtshungs par spyod pa mdzangs pa rnams kyis smos pa'i 'os ma yin pa dang/ 'grogs par mi bya ba yin te/ de ni bdag nyid kyang phung27 bar byed la/ 'jig rten gang de'i lta ba la phyogs pa yang phung28 bar byed do// (D4037: wi26a2-6; P5538: zhi31a1-6)
English translation
Therefore, when some people hear the difficult and profound Mahāyāna sūtras
that deal with emptiness and are considered to convey a meaning that needs to
be interpreted, they do not discern the correct meaning of that which is spoken
[in the sūtras]. They develop false concepts, and with mere logic (tarka) that is
unreasonably performed, they come to have the following view and make the
following statement: “All is nothing but a designation (prajñapti) and that is the
reality. Whoever sees it this way, sees correctly.” For these people there is no real
thing itself (vastumātra) to serve as the basis of designation. This means that there
22 gzhi’i D; gzhi P
23 btags pa D; btags P
24 gyi D; gyis P
25 dang D; dang/ P
26 lta ba de D; om. P
27 phung D; ‘phung P
28 phung D; ‘phung P
cannot be any designation at all. Moreover, how can reality be nothing but a designation? In this way, they come to deny (apodita)29 both designation and reality. Someone who denigrates (apavāda) designation and reality should be known as the worst kind of nihilist (nāstika). Since he is a nihilist, those who are wise and practice a religious life should not speak or share living community with him. He causes himself to fall, and people who follow his views to fall as well.
2) Yogācārabhūmi (The Tattvārthapaala section of the Bodhisattvabhūmi)
Sanskrit edition from Takahashi 2005
5.4.1 … yena hi śūnya30 (40tadasadbhāvāt31) yac ca śūnya32 tatsadbhāvāc33
chūnyatā34 yujyeta35//36 (K31b1) sarvābhāvāc ca kutra37 ki kena śūnya
bhaviyati//38 na ca tena tasyaiva śūnyatā yujyate//39 tasmād eva durghītā
śūnyatā bhavati//40
5.4.2 katha41 ca puna sughītā śūnyatā42 bhavati//43 yataś ca yad yatra na
(54bhavati tat tena śūnyam iti samanupaśyati/44 yat punar45) atrāvaśia46
29 The Chinese translation of bang and the Tibetan translation of skur ba btab pa support the
alternative reading of apavādita suggested by Woghihara and Dutt editions of the text.
30 - C; -n NK; illegible R
31 tadasadbhāvād NKC; illegible R
32 - C; -n NK; illegible R
33 -c C; -t NK; illegible R
34 chūnyatā C; śūnyatā NK; illegible R
35 yujyeta N; yujyaita K; yujyete C; illegible R
36 // K; / N; om. C; illegible R
37 kutra C; kuta NK; illegible R
38 // K; / N; om. C; illegible R
39 // K; / N; om. C; illegible R
40 // K; / N; om. C; illegible R
41 - C; -ñ NK; illegible R
42 śūnyatā C; om. NK; illegible R
43 // K; / N; om. C; illegible R
44 / RC
N; bhavayat punar K; illegible R 46 atrāvaśia NC; anyavaśia K; illegible R Sources for the Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths 247 bhavati tat sad ihāstīti yathābhūta prajānāti//47 iyam ucyate śūnyatāvakrāntir48 yathābhūtā aviparītā//49 (Takahashi 2005: 101) Chinese translation by Xuanzang, CBETA, T30, no. 1579
(CBETA, T30, no.1579 p. 488,
c24~ p. 489, a02)
Tibetan translation, Derge 4037; Peking 5538
gang gis stong pa de med pa dang/ gang stong pa de yod pa'i stong pa nyid ni rigs pa'i phyir ro// thams cad med na ni gang du ci zhig gang gis stong par 'gyur te/ des na de nyid stong pa nyid du 'gyur du ni mi rung ngo// de bas na de lta bu ni stong pa nyid la log par zin pa yin no// ji ltar na stong pa nyid la legs50 par zin pa yin zhe na/ gang gi51 phyir gang la gang med pa de ni des stong par yang dag par mthong la/ 'di la lhag ma gang yin pa de ni 'di ni52 yang dag par yod do zhes yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes pa de ni stong pa nyid la yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du phyin ci ma log par zhugs pa zhes bya ste/ (D4037: wi26b4-6; P5538: zhi31b5-8) English translation
[This (x)] is empty of that (y), because that (y) does not exist. And this (x) is empty, because this (x) does exist.53 In this way, emptiness is justified. If everything does not exist, what is empty? Where is it empty? What is it empty
47 // K; / NR; om. C
48 -ntir NK; -nti C; illegible R
49 // K; / NR; om. C
50 log D; legs P
51 gi D; gis P
52 ni D; na P
53 See Willis’s (1979: 162) translation: “One thing is empty of another because of that [other’s] absence and because of the presence of the void thing itself.”
of? And emptiness is not justified to mean this (x) itself (eva) is empty of this (x)
[itself]. Hence, this is the bad understanding of emptiness.
What, then, is the good understanding of emptiness?54 One rightly observes that
if something (y) does not exist in whatever place (x), this [place] (x) is empty of
that [thing] (y). Moreover, one knows in accordance with reality that whatever
remains in this place (x) [except for that thing (y)] still exists, and it is something
that exists in this place (x). This is called the unmistaken understanding
(avakrānti) of emptiness, which is in accordance with reality.55
3) Yogācārabhūmi (Viniścayasagrahanī section)
Chinese translation by Xuanzang, CBETA, T30, no. 1579
54 The Derge edition of the Tibetan translation reads “stong pa nyid la log par zin pa” (=durghītā śūnyatā), and should be corrected by the Peking edition, which reads “stong pa nyid la legs par zin pa” (=sughītā śūnyatā). 55 This definition of the good understanding of emptiness is a direct quotation from the Cūasuññatasutta, Majjhima-Nikāya III.104: “Iti ya hi kho tattha na hoti, tena ta suñña samanupassati, ya pana tattha avasiha hoti, Ta santa ida atthīti pajānāti.” The translation by Bhikkhu Ñāamoli and Bhikkhu Bodhi (1995: 966ff) reads: “Thus he regards it as void of what is not there, but as to what remains there he understands that which is present thus: ‘This is present.’” Sources for the Yogācāra Critiques of the Two Truths
(CBETA, T30, no. 1579, p. 713, b2-18)
Tibetan translation, Derge 4038; Peking 5539
theg pa chen po pa la la rang gi nyes ba gzung56 nas 'di skad ces kun rdzob tu ni thams cad yod la/57 don dam par ni thams cad med do zhes zer ro// de la 'di skad ces58 tshe dang ldan pa don dam pa ni gang yin/ kun rdzob ni gang yin zhes brjod par bya'o//
de skad ces59 dris pa na/ gal te de 'di skad ces chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa60 gang yin pa de ni don dam pa yin la/ ngo bo nyid med pa'i chos de dag la ngo bo nyid du dmigs pa gang yin pa de ni kun rdzob yin no/ /de ci'i phyir zhe na/ 'di ltar de ni yod pa ma yin pa dag la kun rdzob tu byed pa dang/ 'dogs pa dang/61 mngon par brjod pa dang/62 tha snyad du byed pa'i phyir ro zhes lan 'debs par gyur na/63 de la 'di skad ces brjod par bya'o// ci ngo64 bo nyid du dmigs pa de mngon par brjod pa dang kun rdzob kyi rgyu las byung ba yin par 'dod dam/ 'on te mngon par brjod pa dang/ kun rdzob tsam zhig yin par 'dod/ gal te mngon par brjod pa dang/65 kun rdzob kyi rgyu las byung ba yin na ni des na66 mngon par brjod pa dang/67 kun rdzob kyi rgyu las 56 nye bar bzung D; nyes pa gzung P
57 la/ D; la P
58 ces D; ces/ P
59 skad ces D; skad P
60 med pa D; med pa nyid P
61 dang/ D; dang P
62 dang/ D; dang P
63 na/ D; na P
64 ci ngo D; ngo P
65 dang/ D; dang P
66 des na D; de nas P
byung ba yin pas yod pa ma yin pa zhes byar mi rung ngo// gal te mngon par
brjod pa dang/ kun rdzob tsam zhig yin na ni des na gzhi med par mngon par
brjod pa dang/ kun rdzob ces byar mi rung ngo//
de la 'di skad ces tshe dang ldan pa ci'i phyir na gang dmigs pa de med pa yin
zhes kyang brjod par bya'o//
de skad dris pa na/ gal te de68 'di skad ces phyin ci log gi dngos po yin pa'i phyir ro zhes lan 'debs par gyur na/ de la 'di skad ces brjod par bya ste/ ci phyin ci log de yod par 'dod dam 'on te med par 'dod/ gal te yod na ni des na chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ni don dam pa'o zhes byar mi rung ngo// gal te med na ni des na phyin ci log gi dngos po yin pa'i phyir gang dmigs pa de ngo bo nyid med do zhes byar mi rung ngo// (D4038: zi42b5-43a4; P5539: ‘i46a7-46b7) English translation
Some nihilists among the Mahāyāna69 hold that [seen] from the [standpoint of the] conventional [[[truth]]], all things exist; [seen] from the [standpoint of the] ultimate [[[truth]]], nothing exists.
Then we should ask them: “The Venerables, what is the conventional [[[truth]]]? And what is the ultimate [[[truth]]]?” They would answer: “The fact that all dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature (svabhāva) is called the ultimate [[[truth]]]. The fact that intrinsic nature can be apprehended within the dharmas that are devoid of intrinsic nature is called the
67 dang/ D; dang P
68 te de D; te P
69 Literally, those among the Mahāyāna who understand emptiness badly (e qu kong , durghītā
śūnyatā, stong pa nyid la log par zin pa). The Tibetan translation reads differently as “theg pa chen po pa la
la rang gi nyes pa gzung nas” (Peking) or “theg pa chen po pa la la rang gi nye bar bzung nas” (Derge). Both
terms suggest a meaning similar to Paramārtha’s rendering of “some Mahāyānists who are attached
to [their own] wrong views” () in his translation of the same passage in the
- Buddhadhātuśāstra (Fo xing lun ) (See Text 4).
70 The interpolation of “truth” is supported by Paramārtha’s renderings of “conventional truth” (su di ) and “ultimate truth” (zhen di ) (See Text 4).
conventional [[[truth]]].71 Why? Because conventions (shisu , kun rdzob,
- savti), designation (jiashe , ‘dogs pa, *prajñapti), linguistic expressions
(mingyan , mngon par brjod pa, *abhilāpa) and verbal conventions (shuo , tha snyad, *vyavahāra) are imposed on nonexistents.
We should tell them: “Do you intend to say that linguistic expressions and
conventions arise from a causal relation and intrinsic nature can be apprehended
therein, or that they are merely linguistic expressions and conventions? If
linguistic expressions and conventions arise from a causal relation, then it is
unreasonable to regard [such] linguistic expressions and conventions, which
arise from a causal relation, to be nonexistents. If they are merely linguistic
expressions and conventions, then it is unreasonable that linguistic expressions
and conventions exist without a real thing (vastu) [as their basis (gzhi)].”73
Again we should ask them: “The Venerables, why is it that knowables (zhu kede
zhe , gang dmigs pa) are devoid of intrinsic nature?”74
Thus we have asked, they would answer: “Because of the perverted view of real
things (vastu).”
We should again tell them: “Do you intend to say that this perversion (phyin ci log)75 is existent, or that it is nonexistent? If the perversion is existent, then it is unreasonable to say that all dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature in the sense of the ultimate [[[truth]]]. If the perversion is nonexistent, then it is unreasonable [to say] that because of the perverted view of real things these knowables are devoid of intrinsic nature.”
4) *Buddhadhātuśāstra (Fo xing lun) 71 Paramārtha renders “the conventional truth” (su di ) (See Text 4), while the Tibetan translation reads “kun rdzob” (conventions).
72 To make sense Xuanzang’s translation, I have followed the Tibetan translation, which reads: “'di ltar de ni yod pa ma yin pa dag la kun rdzob tu byed pa dang/ 'dogs pa dang/ mngon par brjod pa dang/ tha snyad du byed pa'i phyir ro.”
73 The Tibetan translation reads alternatively: “without [a real thing as] their basis” (gzhi med par).
74 The Tibetan translation omits “of intrinsic nature.”
75 Xuanzang’s translation reads: “this perverted view of real things.” The simpler “this perversion” is supported by the Tibetan translation and Paramārtha’s rendering (See Text 4).
Chinese translation by Paramārtha, CBETA, T31, no. 1610
[Quotation of the entire passage from the Viniścayasagrahanī:
(CBETA, T31, no. 1610, p. 793,
c8-p. 794, a2)
English translation
[Quotation of the entire passage from the Viniścayasagrahanī skipped]
Why [does the text give the above criticism of the two truths]? We cannot say
that the two truths exist or do not exist, because they are neither existence nor
nonexistence. As for the fact that we cannot say that the ultimate truth exists or
does not exist: 1) we cannot say that [[[the ultimate truth]]] exists, because there is
no persons or dharmas; [but] 2) we cannot say that [[[the ultimate truth]]] does not
exist, because of the demonstration of the emptiness of the two [i.e., persons and
dharmas]. The same is true of the conventional truth. Because of its imagined nature, we cannot say that [the conventional truth] exists. Because of its dependent nature, we cannot say that it does not exist. Moreover, the ultimate truth is not definitely existent or nonexistent. Persons and dharmas do not exist, and yet they are not nonexistents. The emptiness of the two [i.e., persons and dharmas] exists, and yet it is nonexistent. The conventional truth is likewise. It is not definitely nonexistent because of its imagined nature. Nor is it definitely existent because of its dependent nature. 5) *Madhyamkānusāra (Shun zhong lun ) Chinese translation by Bodhiruci, CBETA, T30, no. 1565
(CBETA, T30, no. 1565, p. 45, a13-b10)
English translation
Answer (=the proponent): What dharma does not cease? What dharma does not
arise?
Question (=the opponent): The ultimate truth.
Answer: If this is the case, then there are two truths, i.e., the so-called conventional and ultimate truths. If there are two truths, then your thesis will be proven.
Question: If there is ultimate truth distinct from conventional truth, then it proves my thesis. What is wrong with that? As [[[Nāgārjuna]]] says in the following verses:
“When the Tathāgata teaches the dharma, he relies on the two truths: first, conventional truth; second, ultimate truth. Those who do not know the two kinds of reality (liang zhong shi ) [illustrated] by the two truths cannot understand the real truth (shi di ) of the Buddha’s profound teaching.”81
81 Cf. MMK 24.8-9: dve satye samupāśritya buddhānā dharmadeśanā/ lokasavtisatya ca satya ca
parmārtha// ye ’nayor na vijānanti vibhāga satyayor dvayo/ te tattva na vijānanti gambhīra
Answer: Your thesis is pleasing; but so is mine; it is based upon the two truths, a
doctrine expounded by the Tathāgata. When [the Tathāgata] teaches the thusness
of dharmas through the two truths, he does not destroy non-duality. If there were
two [[[truths]]], then the conventional thusness of dharmas would be distinguished
from the ultimate thusness of dharmas. Now, even one thusness of dharmas is
non-apprehensible; how, then, could one know two thusnesses of dharmas? If we
are to talk about the two truths, we should say that there is no ultimate truth
other than the conventional truth, because there is only one characteristic, which
is no characteristic at all. This meaning is implied in Master [[[Nāgārjuna’s]]]
following verse:
“Those who do not know the meaning (yi ) of the two truths cannot understand the true reality (zhen shi ) of the Buddha’s profound teaching.”82
Question: What (yunhe ) is this truth?
Answer: That which is not destroyed (rou ci bu po ).
Question: What is not destroyed by the two truths?
Answer: One characteristic, which is no characteristic and no intrinsic nature, just like the emptiness of own nature. Such is the truth, as the characteristic of the truth is explained in [[[Nāgārjuna’s]]] following verse: “These two dharmas (=two truths?) are both nonexistent, and are not fabricated by mental fabrication. They are neither imagined nor separated. This meaning is the characteristic of the truth.”83 If following this verse, how can the Tathāgata teach on the basis of the two truths? The Tathāgata has nothing at all to rely on, neither the conventional truth buddhaśāsane//. I have translated these verses literally by closely following the Chinese, which apparently overinterprets them by holding that there are “two kinds of reality” (liang zhong shi ) illustrated by the two truths.
82 The proponent refers to MMK 24.9 again with a different translation that does not imply two levels of reality.
83 Cf. MMK 18.9: aparapratyaya śānta prapañcair aprapañcitam/ nirvikalpam anānārtham etat tattvasya lakaam//. The beginning part of the verse “these two dharmas are both nonexistent” does not agree with the extent Sanskrit version of MMK, and the context of this verse does not support its relation to the two truths either. nor the ultimate truth. When the Tathāgata teaches, his mind has nothing to rely on. What else can we say?