THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE BUDDHIST AND THE NAIYAYIKA PHILOSOPHERS

A BRIEF SURVEY

- Dr. Sanjit Kumar Sadhukhan

Philosophy is nothing but the human quest for truth. From very remote time Indians are blessed with the spontaneous curiosity about what truth is. The first literature containing the truth realized by the ancient Indians is the Vedas. The philosophy revealed in this literature was more or less tuned with human helplessness together with submission to nature Gods. This went on unchallenged till the Buddha preached his new doctrine which afterwards brought

about a head-on collision with the Vedic stricture, but the Buddha denied to give any positive answer to any Vedic approach and consequently in later period a gigantic philosophical system was built up against the Vedic philosophy or more accurately there rose a protest against the unverified doctrine.

In the BrahmajiilasuttaofDighanikiiya.Kathavatthu and the Upanisads we fmd that the philosophy has taken a challenging attitude by nowl . The people also were clearly divided into two major groups. On the one hand, the Brahmins were there with the Vedic philosophy and on the other, the Buddhists came forward with their new philosophical doctrines.

It was the beginning of the Christian era when such a situation was created that the Brahmin and the Buddhist philosophers considered their respective philosophical vi~ws unsuccessful if those were not directed against the opponent and at the same time not victorious. It is obvious that the introduction of the debate system was largely responsible for the creation of this situation. The fundamental difference in outlooks between realism and idealism led to

mutual confrontations which continued in an unbroken line for generations of scholars resulting in the growth of a rich and vigorous literature. In this way a section of the Brahmin philosophers developed a philosophical system predominantly with the science of reasoning (nyilya). Later the system was known as NytIya philosophy. The first systematic work on the Nfaya philosophy is the Nyllya-siitra of Gautama. It is supposed to be a work of about ISO A.D. Going through this work, we can undoubtedly say that much before the

composition of this work the Buddhists had already put forward a lot of strong arguments that helped their views to give birth to a concentrated self-sufficient system of philosophy. We find in the Nyaya-siitra that Gautama refutes seve~ doctrines of the BUddhiJt philosophy, such as, the wh~le is not separate from ~s parts , momentariness of things, denial of the external object , voidness of everything and so on. But it should be kept in mind that these doctrines could not a5$ume the highly sophisticated forms by that time. And Gautama's refutation also does not show much complicacy of thought to turn those down.

Then there is a century of silence. In this period the followers of these two schools obviously went on with their studies but. no remarkable work was composed. Now came ahead a Bud~ist scholar to protest against the views of Gautama. He is none other than Nagarjuna , who is the first outstanding philosopher to propagate the fundamental philosophy of voidness (sunyavaaa). Dr. Stcherbatsky seeks to explain the background of the advent of this school in this way, ..... Monism took the offensive and fmally established itself triumphantly in the very heart of a new Buddhism. Transplanted upon a fresh soil

the old Monism produced a powerful growth of various systems. In the schools of Nagarjuna and Deva it recei'7ed a dialectical foundation, in the way of a dialectical destruction of all other systems ". In the Madhyamika-Kiirika, Nagarjuna tries to establish his theory of voidness by contradicting many of the

actual Nyaya-slltra. He composed the oldest Buddhist treatises on the art of debate, viz., Vigraha-Vyflvartanl and Pramiina-vihetana. In Vigraha-vya vartani: going to prove the voidness of things Nagarjuna has shown his daring attitude of uprooting even the existence of the Pramil'!as. As he was an

exponent of a particular 'nihilistic' theory, naturally he could not also check the temptation of striking at the root of the categories proposed by Gautama. His Pramiu]a-vihe!ana is exclusively a refutation of the sixteen categories contained in the Nyaya-sutra. By applying his critical axe of

relativity he claims that all the sixteen categories are realational and therefore ultimately unreal. This Buddhist theory of voidness was one of the crucial points for a Nyaya exponent named Vatsyayana. Going to prove his theory,the Buddhist Nagarjuna

started with demolishing even the existence of the instrument of valid knowledge. But Vatsyayana started with a strong protest and a crucial defense of Pramana and the very first line of his commentary reads Prarriil1lato' rtha pratipattau prav[ttisiimarthyiid arthavat prama1am.

Gautama formulated the sutras but NagaIjuna flayed them mercilessly and Viitsyllyana who belonged to the lineage of the Naiyayika was prompted to write a commentary on the Nyiiya-siitra in about the late 4th century or early 5th century. The commentary bears the title Nyaya-bhasya . . In course of explaining

the Nyiiya-sutras, Vatsyayana raises objections against NagDrjuna's doctrine of voidness of things which is discussed in the Miidhyamika-karika according to which our means and objects of knowledge are as unreal as things appearing in a dream or exhibited in jugglery or as the city of the celestial choirs or

as a mirage. VfU:sytlyana argues against the VijmmavlIda philosophy (i.e., the theory of idealism) on the Nyllya-siUras iv. 2. 26-7 and iii. 2. 11 and against the momentariness on the Nyiiya-siitras iii. 2.11-13.

To answer the objections raised by Vatsyayana, a Buddhist philosopher, Vasubandhu (c. A.D. 410-490), composed three works, vizg' Vada-vidhi. ViJda-vidhana and Vadahrdaya. But unfortunately all the works are lost. This philosopher however became also famous for propounding a fundamental doctrine of some

Buddhists, the doctrine of idealism (Vijnanavada), as a sophisticated philosophy. As to the advent ofVijilanavada, Dr. Stcharbatsky says, "When NlIgarjuna's standpoint of extreme relativism was forsaken, the brothers Asatiga and Vasub~mdhu took up the study of Nyaya l~gic and the work of its adaptation to the idealistic foundations of this philosophy" . As all the logical works of Vasubandhu has been lost, so the complete assessment of his view

on logic is not possible at present. From the later works it is found that Vasubandhu opposing the nature of perception and inference, the number and nature of the mgmbers of syllogism recommended in the Nyaya-sliJr.a,. gave new definitions of them} . He wrote his Vilda-vidhi challenging the laws regulatinifthe debate as advocated by Gautama. This dispute between the realism of the Nyaya school and the dogmatic idealism of the Vijnanavada school of

Buddhist philosophy went on. But it was the 5th century A.D. when India gave birth to her glorious philosopher-logician son, Dignaga. In his hand Buddhist idealism assumed a critical shape. Dignaga'sPrama~a-samuccaya. perhaps the most outstanding one of his five worull, shook the world of Indian logic. Notwithstanding the truth the Buddhists realized, Buddhist philosophy was suffering from insufficiencies of details in logic for their own to establish

their realization. Now with Dignaga, Buddhist philosophy got the elixir of life. Dr. S.C. Vidyabhusana writes, "Both in matter and in manner his works marked a distinct departure from those of his predecessors. The keenness of his insight and the soundness of his critical acumen combined tostamp him with an individuality all his own. No praise seems !-w. high for him. Indeed he may fittingly be styled as the first and last of Indian logicians ". Pramalla-

samuccaya is a logical work written in An~~ubh metre. In this work Dignaga explains his own theories of Buddhist logic. By this Dignaga pushed the Buddhist philosophy in the duel ground where the Naiyayikas were the chief opponents. He criticizes a Nyllya view : Nyaya-siltra i. 1.12, enumerating the sense-organs, does not mention the mind, but the Naiyayikas admit it as a separate sense-organ. In support of their view they say that the mind can

unhesitatingly be admitted as a sense-organ because nowhere in the Nyaya-sutra the view is contradicted. Now Dignaga says, well, if absence of contradiction means admission, there would have been no necessity at all of formulating this sutra because the group y~ sense-organs as mentioned there has not been contradicted anywhere in the Nyij~~-s14tra . A few more objections like the above can be found which are nothing but trivial 4.

The crucial points of dispute are the definitions of perception pratyaksa and inference anumlina also with the definitions of probans (he~t) etc. given by Gautama. Refuting those Dignaga formulated fresh definitions of them} . Comparison (upamOna) and verbf testimony (Sabda) are not separate instruments ofvalidknowledge in the Buddhist viewl . It is Digonga (¥ho for the frrst time draws attention to the theory of Apoha, i.e., the law of contradiction . It

contains the view opposite to 'the view of knowledge gathered in a direct way'. According to this Apoha theory, the law of cognizance is explained as "we can actively cognize or determine a thing only by opposing it to what it is not".

A spark which ignited the criticism in the realistic philosophy is Dignaga's 'defmition of perception'. If the difference in the very basis appears too serious then that in the consecutive stages of development obviously turns to not only doctrinal dispute but also bitter relation in life. And exactly this

happened in the later period. In the Nyiya philosophy being a realistic philosophy 'the knowledge resulting from sense-object contact' if also associated with terms is given the respect of nothing but perception and real knowledge. But reality, accord ing to Dignaga, is inextricably involved in causal efficiency. A fire which burns and cooks is a real fire. A fire which is absent, which is imagined, which neither really bums nor cooks nor sheds any

light,is an unreal fire. A reality which is stripped off from every relation and every construction, which has neither any position in time and space nor any characterizing quality, cannot be expressed because there is in it nothing to be expressed. If we express that sensation in words, the thing to be expressed must be attached with some kind of mental imagination which pushes it to the real of unreality. Representing this view Dignaga's defmition of

perception pratyaksam kalpanapo~ham has got the perpetuity. • In this way his observation of the truth rendered him into a perpetual enemy to the realistic group of philosophers. But whatever harm might have been to him, we have touched with a thrilling sensation of his revolutionary ideas. Unfortunately Infa could not protect any of the serious wolks of her worthy son from being lost for ever} .

Time rolled on. Then came the seventh century. During this intervening period the Naiyayika philosophers exercised with their philosophy and logic but there was no one to put pen to paper. A Bharadvllja Brahmin Uddyotakara wrote an extensive commentary on Gautama' s Nyflya-siitra and Vatsyayana' s Nyi1ya-

bhii~ya under the title of Nyaya-vartika. The very purpose of composing the work, as the author himself declared, was to write & expository treatise on the Nyllya-sutra to remove the veil of error cast by the quibblers . Th~ qu~iblers are none but Nilglhjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaga chiefly and other Buddhist logicians .

It is quite natural that there are many things to be said for and against both the realists and the idealists. Uddyotakru'a carried out his duties as a realist But he is much more vociferous against the Buddhist doctrines. His temper can only be compared with that of Udayana.

The first thing to be mentioned is Uddyotakl.ra's discussion and refutation of Nlg1lrjuna's doctrine of voidness in Nyaya-viJrtika under NS ii. 1. 8-19. In our world of cause and effect we cannot think of such a situation where there is no pramii,!a. The allpowerful pramG'!O can by no means be discarded. Only

what he has done is that he has set the pramanas on an invulnerable foundation. The definitions of perception and inference given by Vasubandhu and those as given by Oignaga are vehemently criticized in Nyllya-vrJrtika under NS i. I. 4-5. Oignaga is his Pramilna-samuccaya recorded a number of views regarding what actually is inferred in an inference and fmally expressed his own view. ~ this is discussed and Oign'!lga's views are criticized in Ny71ya-viirtika under NS i. 1. 52 . The definitions of proposition (pratijnal, probans (hetu) and example (dcs.~7mta) given by Vasubandhu and Dignaga are refuted in

Nyiiya-vartika under NS i. 1. 33-37. Uddyotaknra criticizes the law of debate as suggested by Vasubandhu, in Ny1lyavartika under NS i. 2. 1. Apoha theory has been refuted by him in Nyoya-vo.rtika under NS ii. 2.65. He also criticizes the denial of the evidences of comparison (upama.na) and verbal testimony (sflbda) in Nyiiya-vartika under NS i. 1. 6-7. He is actually on a criticizing spree

to refute the Buddhist theory in which the whole is viewed as identified with its parts, in Nyaya-v(Jrtika under NS ii. 1.33. He also records a series of pi1rvapak~a arguments. The later Naiyayika 10¥icians took up this Buddhist theory by the expression' identity of quality and the qualified' 2. The essence of the Buddhist philosophy lies in the doctrine of momentariness. In Nfoya-vartika under NS iii. 2. 10-17, Uddyotakara shows his erudition to

refute the doctrine. In Nyaya-vartika under NS iv. 2. 26-37, Uddyotakara criticizes the Buddhist theory of 'Denial of the external objects'. Some remarkable passages from this discussion may perhaps be quoted : "pleasure or pain is quite different from knowledge (jniina), for pleasure or pain is an 'object to be cognised' (griihya), while knowledge means its comprehension (graha,!a). The object cognised and the act of comprehension can never be

identical. Secondly, the admission of illusory knowledge necessarily entails the acceptance of its opposite, i.e., valid knowledge also. An object which is never known rightly can also be never known falsely. Thirdly, one who does not admit the reality of any object other than mere consciousness will not be in

a position either to defend one's own position or to refute that of other's, because one will not be able to communicate or explain anything to others with one's own mere consciousness which is intelligible to everyone else, just as the dream-experiences of a particular person are known to himself alone. To this, it may be replied that when a person defends his own thesis or refutes that of others he employs words and with the aid of 'consciousness as endowed

with the word-fonn' (i'abdiikiira-citta) communication· orexpianation becomes possible, consciousness as endowed with the word-fonn is not unintelligible to others. The reply however does not fit in, for the Vijrumavadins do not admit the reality of sabda as an external object and hence, they cannot speak of consciousness as endowed with the word-fonn. Fourthly, on the claim that no external object apart from consciousness eXists really, no distinction can be

made between the states of dream and waking, for, in that case, objects will be equally non- existent always". What Uddyotakafa says against the soul the9!Y of the Buddhist has been more or less followed by the Nyaya logicians of later period 3. Uddyotakiira criticized the Buddhists a lot. But he never mentioned the name of any particular work or philosopher except in a single case where the names

of the two works Viida-vidhi and Vada-vidhiina-tika are mentioned. Though in most of the cases we come to know whlMhat particular philosopher or logician is, he perhaps thought it would be sufficient to know that the refutation was directed against the Buddhist whoever he might be, an eminent one or an ordinary one.

Some argue that the mode of Uddyotakara's refutation of the Buddhists is concerned more with verbal trickery than with true philosophical insight. It is found that while refuting a Buddhist theory he poses a number of alternative as to the opponent's theory, as if he is asking the opponent in front to

answer those. But, he tries to show, not a single alternative is per missible and the only alternative which is found left does nothing but prove the Nyaya view. Probably this charge against Uddyotakiira is partly true. Though &enerally Uddyotakaraallows this kind of style and sometimes does not hesitate to distort the opponent's view, still in some cases he sticks to actual philosophical stand, which is found to be adopted continuously by the Nyaya logicians of later period.

But Nyi'Jya-wirtika could not reign unchallenged in the field of Indian philosophy for a long time. In the middle of the. 7th century challenges came from one of the famous Buddhist philosophers, Dharmakirti.

This philosopher has written seven logical works, the celebrated "seven treatises", which have become the fundamental works for the study of logic in the Buddhist community and have more or less surpassed the works of Dignaga. Among the seven works the Praml1nu-l'iirtika is the chier one, written in mnemonic

verse; the next work PramcIJa-vinisca);a is an abridgment of the first, written in stanzas and prose; the Nyayabindu is a further abridgment of the same subject; Hew-bindu is a short classification of logical reasons; Samballdha-parik!i.a or an examination of the problem of relation is a small tract in stanzas with the author's own comment; Vada-nyaya is a treatise on the art of carrying on disputation and Sallfanallfara-siddhi is a treatise on the

reality of other minds, directed against solipsism. The Pram'(lIJa-vartika was lost in India but we are lucky enough that the manuscript of this work hasbeen discovered by Rahul Sankrityayana from Tibet. In this pioneering work, Dharmak1rti discusses his own philosophy of idealism, generally by giving up the temptation of pricking the opponent's view. Though some refutations of the Nyaya views are found there, still its own remarkable philosophy and logic spontaneously inundated the castle of Ny1\ya philosophy, built by Uddyotakarn.

He criticizes the Nyaya view of the existence of God in the chapter calledPramli1}asiddhi (verse Nos. 12-18). The Nyaya view of perception is criticized in Pralyak~a chapter (verse Nos. 136-40). The theory of generality (verse Nos. 145-48) and the theory of the existence ofthe whole also (verse Nos. 149-53) are refuted. The Nynya definition of Paksa is refuted in Pararthiinumiina chapter (verse Nos. 164-71). In the same chapter the definition of pratijlia also (verse Nos. 172-75) is criticized. But all these are matters of general logic.

"Although produced by a stimulus coming from an external object, but from an absolutely property-less pure object, is it indeed a reality? It is supposed to be absolutely stripped off from every vestige of an imaginative or constructive element. But is it not pure imagination ?" No. "A single moment, just as

an absolute particular, is not something representable in an image, it cannot be reached by our knowledge, that is to say, it is not something empirically real. But it is the element which imparts reality to all the others. It is the indispensable condition of all real and consistent knowledge._ It is Q'ansempirical, but it is not metaphysical, it is not a 'flower in the sky' .... Dharmakirti proposes to prove its reality by an experiment in the way of

introspection. The metaphysical entities are metaphysical just because they are pure imagination, just because there is no point of reality, no moment of pure sensation to which they could be attached. They are 'unattainable as to place, time and sensible quality'. But this point and this sensation are present, directly or indirectly, in every act of empirical reality and empirical cognition. This we can indirectly prove by introspection. Dharmakirti says

That sensation is something quite different from productive imagination -- can be proved just by introspection. Indeed, everyone knows that an image is something utterable (capable of coalescing with a name). Now, if we begin to state at a patch of colour and withdraw all our thoughts on whatsoever other (objects), if we thus reduce our consciousness to a condition of rigidity, (and become as though unconscious), this will be the condition of pure sensation. If we then, (awakening from that condition), begin to think, we notice a feeling (of

remembering) that we had an image (of a patch of colour before us), but we did not notice it whilst we were in the foregoing condition, (we could not name it) because it was pure sensationu24• This coruscative observation has given Dharmakirti immortality in the history of Indian philosophy.

sahopalapfhaniyamad abhedo llilataddhiyoi.z!bhedasca bhrdntivijniinair drsyatenddviviidvayi II, a verse of Pramlina-viniseaya is one of the most remarkable representation of the idealistic philosophy of Dharmakirti. Practically there is no opponent philosopher who did not criticize this verse. Even then Dharmakirti was not unaware of the danger to which Idealism may ultimately lead in the shape of its direct consequence, solipsism. He therefore

singled out this problem from his great work and devoted to it a special tract under the title SantanQntara-siddhi. i.e., EstabHshment of the existence of the other minds. This work contains a verification of the wh~le of DharmakIrti' s epi~temology in its application to a special complicated case Dharmakirti makes a gift to us of this brilliant piece of document narrating the realistic and Buddhist position in a problematic matter in the day.

He however did not want to discuss about a metaphysical entity. which is a compulsory matter of discussion for the Nyaya logicians. It is said that Dharmakmi, when studying under Isvarasena wrote the chapter on Buddhology in Pramdna-vartika. But this religious part was dropped in all the other treatises and he himself most emphatically and clearly expresses his opinion in the closing passage of Santani'lntara-siddhi, " ... Our knowledge being

limited to experience. we neither think nor speak out anything definite about Him, we can neither assert nor deny His existence26u• . For a century, from Dharmak1rti's time down to the 1st quarter of the 8th century, Buddhist philosophy was conspicuous by the absence of any remarkable original work due to absence of any talented philosopher in their school. At last a brilliant ~omposition from the Buddhist school came to light. It is the

Tattvasarrtgraha. Its author Santaraksjta (A.D. 705-65) was a professor at Nalanda. He visited Tibet at the invitation of king Khri-sron deu-tsan (8th cent.). The king with tht; assistance of Santarak~ita built in 749 A.D. the monastery of Sam-ye in Tibet, and San~ita was its first abbot. It is sure that TattvasaTflgraha was composed before its author had gone to Tibet He as elabomte1y explains the Buddhist doctrines of his own line as he vehemently criticizes the Nynya views.

Dharmakirti's Pramiina-vartika was then inaccessible. The Tattvasamgraha throws literally a flood of light on Buddhist metaphysics of the Sautmntika-Yogac'ara school and logic and epistemology. The most remarkable feature of this work is its reproduction of the views of scholars who otherwise would have

remaine~ in perfect oblivion. Kamala:Ua gives the names of the authors and quotes from them .... " 7 From the study of this work along with Uddyotakara's Nyaya- vartika and Kumarua's works one can fruitfully gather some ideas about the philosophical activities of the centuries. The attack on realism, on the Soul theory and on the infallibility of the Vedas, provoked simultaneously the Nyaya, and

Kumarila's Mimamsa schools. This countercriticisms of the orthodox stalwarts succeeded in undermining the prestige of the Buddhist monastery. But the Buddhists were not Supine and reacted with vigour and nerve. The Tattvasamgraha preeminently represents this phase of the Buddhist reaction. In fact, DharmaIdrti started to criticize directly the MIrofupsa school and as a result Kumarila tried

I to take revenge on the Buddhists. Naturally it was 1I0t possible for Santaraksita and his disciple Kamalaslla, to keep silence against Kumarila's criticism. .

We are hfre concerned with the conflict between the Nyaya and the Buddhist. Therefore from S1intaraksita's criticism of the Nyaya views, particularly of Uddyotakara, it appears that as Saniaraks.ita ~d Kamruasila (c. A.D. 750) accepted Sautrantika view in which the external object exists (though this existence can be proved only by inference), it has been easier for them to criticize the realist's objections.

In Tattvasamgraha, Uddyotakiira's views on the part and the whole (verse Nos. 560-62, 583,592-98), on momentariness (verse Nos. 370-84, 388,466-67,471-75), on Apoha (verse Nos. 981-99, 1184- 99), and on Soul (verse Nos. 180-84, 195-216, 220) are criticised. There were other famous logicians al~~ in the intervening period. They were Bhavivikta, A viddhaIcarna and Sluikarasvamin . Bhlivivikta may be prior to Uddyotakru-a. Bhnvivikta's BhiifYa!lkli and

Aviddhakaqta's Tattva/lka are known to u~ only by name. Anyway, those Naiyayika logicians were "pillars" of the system. Santarak~ita and KamalaSlla naturally attacked them. Many minor views of these scholars are found mentioned and criticised in Tattvasarrgraha and Pa'1ijikil. > Here one among many of the objections can be mentioned to assess San~ita and KamalaSlla as to how far the objection was justified. What we call existence, !hey are never tired of

repeating, is always related to an action. 'Existence is worlc' says Santaraksita. It is an anthropomorphic illusion to suppose that a thing can exist only, exist placidly, exist without acting, and then, as it were, suddenly rise and produce an action. Whatsoever exists is always acting. The conclusion

that whatsoever really exists is a cause is urged upon the Buddhist by his defmition of existence quoted above. Existence, real existence, is nothing but efficiency. Consequently what is non-efficient, or what is a non-cause, does not exist. 'A non-cause' , says Uddyotaldira, addressing himself to the

Buddhist, 'is double, it is for you either something non-existing or something change less'. KamalaslIa corrects this statement of Uddyotakara and accuses him of not sufficiently knowing the theory of his adversaries, 'because', says he, 'those Buddhists who are students of logic maintain that a non-cause is

necessarily a non-reality'. This means that to be a real is nothing but to be a cause, whatsoever exists is necessarily a cause. The growth and development of the ideas and the sentiments of these two different groups of philosophers have been reflected in a rich literature which can

make the subject extremely interesting. Now with San~ita and KamalaSiia, the Buddhist philosophy is in a safe situation, but on the contrary the Nylya philosophy was rather pushed to the wall without any brilliant logical production up to the middle of the 9th century from the time of Uddyotakiira. In this situation, Vacaspati Misra (c. A.D. 841)29, a Brahmin logician wrote an elaborate gloss on the Nyaya-viirtika under the title Nyaya-vartika-tiitparya-

In the writing of Vacaspati we fmd his exemplary observation of the logical nuances which can rarely be found in others. He possessed the rare qualities of erudition and faithfulness of representing the opponent's views. As a Nyllya exponent he followed Uddyotakara in refuting the Buddhist doctrines but not always without some differences of opinion. Hisrefutation is much more deep and subtle in comparison with Uddyotakiira's

refutation, being pungent and aggressive. Under NS i. 1. 4-5, TIka shows us Vacaspati's clear understanding about the nature of the Buddhist perception and inference.

Vacaspati quotes the relevant verses of Dignaga while explaining Yddyotakara's refutation of Dignaga. He found the fresh scope of refuting Dharmakirti's views §If perception and others. He quoted verses of Pramii'!a-viirtika and fj:am711l .. a-viniscaya . The verse of Tattvasamgraha is found to have been quoted in TiM but it seems that Vacaspati did not give much importance to that text.

' Up to the time before Vacaspati, God was not so much considered to be a matter of dispute in debate with the Buddhists. But starting with him, to prove or to refute the existence of God became a prestige issue.

Generally it is found that a philosopher having faith in a certain philosophical system cannot show his adherence to another philosophical system. When a philosopher in course of explaining seeks the permanent justification of the doctrine containing in the philosophy of his own like and tries to adopt those in thought and practice, it is very difficult for him to make his mind agree to give importance to another system of philosophy. Vicaspati is rather a conspicuous exception. He wrote three cOlllmentaries, Nyaya-vartika-tiitparya:. tiM on Nyaya philosophy, Sii'!'khya-tattva-kaumudi on Sarpkhya philosophy and Bliiimati on Vedanta philosophy. We do not know which one of them he preferred Rut in all the three commentaries, his coruscative explanation of the different doctrines makes us believe that none, in actuality, is negligible. Now even after a long journey we are struck with doubt if the objections against the Buddhist philosophy actually forbid us to believe in it

Now the objections against the Buddhists came from a new direction -- Kashmir. After Vacaspati there flourshied another talented Nyaya logician named Jayanta Bhatta (A.D. 840-9(0) who was the younger contemporary of Vifcaspati. He wrote an indePendent commentary on the Nyaya-slltra, called Nyaya-manjan. He was an orthodox Brahmin who zealously defended the authority of the Vedas and saw the refutation of Buddhism as a religious cause. Yet he was no fanatic. He was capable of retaining his sense of humour under adversity. He tells us that as he writes Nyaya-mafijan he is being held prisoner in a cave and "I have beguiled my days here by this diversion of writing a book 31 ". A rare virtue which is indicative of true greatness is his humility in declaring that he could lay no claim to originalitl2• Many of the Buddhist views are mentioned and refuted in Nyliya- malfjari~ such as, there are only two instruments of valid knowledge, perception is conceptual construction which is free from determination by the imagination and is non-illusory33, Apoha, momentariness, two theories of illusion --asatkhyliti (of the Madhyamikas) and lltmakhyiiti (of the Vijnanaviidins), etc, Among these the Buddhist theory of momentariness exhausted Jayanta's maximum energy.

It is needless to say that DharmakIrti amon"p the Buddhists is no doubt the main opponent of Jayanta. Numerous verses from Dharmakirti's Pram1ina-viirtika have been quoted and refuted in Nyaya- manjan. Dignaga also is occasionally mentioned. Dharmottara(c. A.D. 829) also is criticised by Jayanta in a few places 34 .

It is a perpetual matter of dispute wHether knowledge is like the eye or a candle. The philosophical discussion, however, about knowledge has been divided into two groups on

the basis of these two differences. And this stretched long. Naturally to refute the Vijffi'lnavadins we find this kind of discussion made in a great detail in Nyiiya-manjan.

After Dharmak:lry. the Mimamsa school turned up against the Buddhists. Kumarila (c. 8th cent.) a great Mimfupsaka scholar attained great success in refuting them and establishing his opinion. But it was a fact for the Naiyayikas that an old enemy is vanquished by a new enemy. Prabh8kara (c. late 8th cent.) another strong Mlmal1lsaka scholar played the same role. So the Naiyayika scholars thought it necessary to stop the group of

these new enemies. Properly going through Nyaya-manjar1, it however appears that Jayanta was also attentive to the refutation of the Mimamsa views of Kumarila as well as of Prabhakara. Actualiy with the decline of Buddhism in India the doctrinal and logical conflict was shifted to between the Nyilya and

the Mim~sa schools of philQsophy. It will not be improper to say that Jayanta accelerated the criticism against the MimaIpsa school though it is found to have been started long before by Uddyotaltiira and rather prominently by Vacaspati. In fact, Jayanta had to protect the Nyllya philosophy from the attack not only of the Buddhists but also of different groups of other philosophers. In spite of this Jayanta has retained his renown by faithfully representing the opponent's views.

Over and above, the activities of the Buddhists are not consistent with what they say. That is why Jayanta also was very much aggressive against them. He says: "You, Bauddhas. hold that there is no soul, yet you construct caityas (towers) to enjoy pleasure In paradise after death; you say that everything is

momentary; yet you build monasteries with the hope that they will last for centuries; and you say that the world is void, yet you teach that wealth should be given to spiritual guides. }¥hat a strange character, the Bauddhas possess, they are verily a monument of conceiC3 • In the 10th century the Nyaya system of philosophy is divided into two courses. One flowed in the old line and the, other course started with Bhasarvajna.

To put it clearly. Bhi\sarvajiYa was the first known proponent of a number of doctrines which diverge boldly from the accepted traditional views. A Kashmirian like Jayanta, Bhasarvajrl'a must have been flourished contemporaneously with him (c. A.D. 860-920). NyayabhUs.a,!a is a monumental work composed by him. It is an auto-commentary of Nyiiyasiira. It was supposed to be the lost for a long time, but it is a miracle that perhaps the only manusclipt of

Nyayabh~01Ja has been suddenly discovered from the personal custody of Satya Swamp Shastri, in 1959. Profuse quotations and verses from Dharmak1:rti's Praniif'!a-vtJrtika and Praji'iakara's Pramii'!a-vnrtika-alQ1VkOra are fO.!1nd in this work. He criticizes)he views of NagiiIjuna, Vasubandhu, Dignaga, Dharmakirti,PraJ'i13kara, Dharmottara, San~ita, Kamal~la, Karnagomin and many others. Prajiiakara (c. A.D. 940) started the philosophical school of

uiterpretation of the Prama'!a-vartika. He wrote a voluminous commentary on Pramana-vartika under the title Pramiina-vartika-allW]ktira. Now appeared in the field a great Buddhist scholar named Jilimairlmitra. He was associated with the VikramaSila ma.hlivihara which was established by the famous Buddhist emperor DharmapaJa (c. A.D. 770-810) and flourished under the liberal patronage of his successors. In the 11th century. we fmd it in the form of an international University attracting scholars from other parts of Asia. All the Shastras were taught in it Buddhism

received priority among them. There were six great Erudites there. Four of them were called keepers of the four .gates -- Dvarapal!ditas of the seat of leaming that was the mahivih8ra and the two others, still greater, were called the two "Great Pillars" of wisdom. We find JiiDnaSrimitra as the second Great Pillar of this University. He tried to revive the Buddhist philosophy against the attack of the Nyaya logic. He critic~~s the views of Trilocana and

his discip:e Va'caspati. Bhlisarvajna and a few other Naiyllyika logicians with the ubnost strength of his intellectuality. His writing on the one hand ascends the acme of intellectual analysis and on the other hand unveils the background ofUdayana's arguments. Among those who were refuted by him, Trilocana was a dom~Ft figure between Kamalafila and Vacaspati to receive the special attention of JiUmasii • Anyway, Jnanasri was more concerned with the

views of Bhiisarvajna, a strong opponent who flourished immediate!}' before him. It is known that Trilocana composed a worl!.: under the title Nyaya-prakirnaka. We do not know whether this worl!.: is the same as the Nyiiya-bhll~ya-tika. composed by him. One Nfoya-mdiijaii also was attributed to him. But unfortunately we do not find any of his works. Vittoka37 must have been a Nyaya author of considerable importan,9C. His views on TsVaravada alone have been

recorded by Jnanasri and his disciple Ratnakirti. It seems that he wrote a treatise on TSvara. Sati.nanda38 is the last Naiyayika whose view on Isvara alone has been quoted by Jnanasrimitra. It appears from his writing that being a teacher at Nalanda, J niiiaSrl directly realized the insult coming from the Nylya logicians. But though Jayanta and Bhiisarvajffa criticized the Buddhist doctrines very strongly, the wannness of opposition cannot be realized on

their body. But Joanasn and flfter him Udayana boiled over the dispute. They directly perceived the h~t of hostilitl . The biggest tract composed by him is on momentariness. To establish the theory of momentariness, the verse: yat sat tat ks,afljkam yathajaladhara!t santasca bhO.vo. imelsatta !aktirihllrthakarmaQimite" siddhe§u siddhii na salniipyekaiva vidhanyadiipi parak(nnaiva kriya vii bhavedldvedhlIpi k~a,!abhaiigasa"Jgatiratab sl1dhye ca

viframyatiJI was emanated from his pen and got the honour of fulcrum of the theory. Apoha. anupalabdhi and invariable concomitance (vyaptiJ were discussed in a great detail. On God, JoanaSri made such a heating discussion under the title ls'varavada, that practically this aroused in Udayana's writing an assaulting attitUde, later.

Ratnaldrti, a worthy disciple of Jlidnaslimitra. in his ten small treatises on different topics, tried to refute the Nylya philosophy.He gave more attention to refute Trilocana and Vacaspati rather than Bhasarvajil'a. A close scrutiny reveals that Ratnakirti has summarized the works of his guru in many cases and the debt has also been eloquently acknowledged. But the fatal thing that Ratnakirti did, is his writing a treatise Santifntmtara- d~a,!am

and it is a great risk of invitin~ solipsism which scared Dhannakirti and led him write SantUnantarasiddhi. But Ratankirti was daring enough to compose a worl!.: refuting the crucial view of their honoured-by-all preceptor. Jnanasrimitra made his last try to ameliorate the injuries inflicted by Vacaspati and B hasarvaj/ra on the Buddhist philosophy, but their philosophy again gota mortal hurt, when a Hindu logician Udayana (A.D. 984) composed two pungent works under the titles Nyaya-kusum7Jfija/i and Atmatattvaviveka.

The fundamental philosophy of momentariness and the denial of the existence of God are challenged in these two works, Atmatattvaviveka is mainly devoted to the refutation of the Buddhist doctrines of Soul. It criticizes several Buddhist views like those of Universal flux, Apoha. Universals, unity of knowledge and its object. Citradvaita, Vijfi'aIiavada, identity of the quality and the qualified, self as knowledge alone, fs'varavada, Sarv_ajnavada, etc. In most

of the topics Jnanasrimitra's works supply the purvapak~C!.. Jnliilas'rimitra has been quoted and referred to by name. Everything is obviously to prove the existence of God. It can humorously be said here that God will himself intend to exist no more, if He comes to know that his existenc~ depends on so much painstaking efforts done in Atmatattvaviveka. In fact, Jti'$asn gave a heavy jerk to the Nyaya view of the existence of God as for which Udayana had to

compose a separate work against that. In the practical life the bitterness travelled so penetratively between the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas that a controversy was decided (So goes the story) even by way of jumping from a palm tree. Udayana was very much proud of thinking himself as a protector of God. Here is his utterance: "Oh Lord, you have been puffed up with pride as you are now illustrious (when I have made you safe after defeating the Buddhists)

and dare ignore me. But (be sure) when the Buddhists come again, your existence will depend upon me,,40. . The continuous hurt inflicted by the Nyaya logicians made the Buddhist philosophy helpless to survive in the common mind. It is also a point that after Jruthasrimitra there was no Buddhist scholar who could efficiently hold up their philosophy. Many workS undoubtedly were composed but those lacked

sharpness of original thinking41. In fact, from the 10th century the struggle for existence of the Buddhists in India due to Muslim aggression over the Buddhist education centres was the main cause of unproductiveness of a brilliant philosophical literature for them. But the gradual fall of Buddhism in India was noticed much before. Dr. Stcheroatsky writes, "Notwithstanding the great scope and success of his propaganda he (Dharmakifti) could only retard,

but not stop the process of decay which befell Buddhism on its native soil. Buddhism in India was doomed. The most uyented propagandist could not change the run of history. The time of KumIDila and Sankarifcarya, the great champions of Brahmanical revival and opponents of Buddhism, was approaching. Tradition represents Dharmaklrti as having combated them in public disputations and having been victorious. But this is only an after- thought and a pious desire on the part of his followers. At the same time it is an indirect confession that these great Brahmin teachers had met with no Dharmakirti to oppose them,,42.

But in the Nyaya line two commentaries at least on Udayana's Atmatattvaviveka (alias Bauddha-dhikkara), one Bauddha-dhikkara- tika by Sarikara Misra (A.D. 1450) and the other Bauddha-dhikkara-siromafJi by Raghunatha Siromarti (A.D. 1477-1547) extinguished the last hope of the Buddhists to escape from the trap of the Nyaya logic. In SaIikara Misra's VTJdtvinoda Jnanasn's name is found in the list ofthe foremost Buddhist logicians. But during Saitkara's time the Buddhist works lost much of their importance as they were historical documents rather than part and parcel ofliving faith in India.NOTES NOTES Brahmajala·sutta: vide a History oflndian Logic, pp.227-29 Katha-vatthu : vide -do- pp. 23440 Upanisads : vide -<10- pp. 3 2 2.NS iv. 2.6-11

3 NS iii. 2.10-17 4 NS iv. 2.26-37 5 NS iv. 1.37-40 6 H. Nakamwa gives the date. of NaprjuDa .. c. lSO-2S0 A.D. vide Iodian Buddhism, p. 23S 7 .BL.I, p.22 8 Porinfonnali~ ~vide BL.l. pp. 29-30 9 BL.I.p.2? 10 Ddinitioo of perDI!pIioo ~tatorthat vijoanam pllllyabam, i.e., Pereeption is cognition CODling from that IIIIIDC object. Defioitioo of iDfenmce : UlDtariyatartha-dananam tadvido'numanam. i.e..lDfereace is the c:ognitioo of a thing which is invarably

concxmitant 00 the part of one who knows the said coruxxnitance. Definitioo of thesis : sadhyatmdhanam pnllijaa, i.e., Thesis is the mentioo of the probandum. Defmitioo of probans : hetnrvipabad viaesah, i.e., Probans is that which is disconnected frem where the probandum is known to be absent. 11 Plamma-samuocaya ('lib. Tilbad-ma Kun-ias btus-pa), Nyaya-praveaa ('lib. Tilbad-ma riga-par 'jug-pa'i sgo), Hetu-cakm-hamaru ('rib. gTIID-tshigs~ 'thor-logtaD-la dbab-pa), Alambanapariba (Tab. dMiga-pa brlaa-pa) and Trikala-pariba (Tib. Dus gaum brtag-pa).

12 A History of Indian Logic, p. 270 13 na sukbadi pnvoeyam va mano vastvindriylllPnlm/ anisedbad upattam ced anJeDdriyanum vrthaIl Quoted in NVIT. vide Catur. pp.23S-6 14 "Dignaga laughs at Vatayayma by saying that the Naiyayika (Aksapada) takea pride in bonowing his definition of pen:cpcion (pnItyaksa) from the Sutra of the VaiaeaikaJ, va., that pereeptioo is knowledge whichariaesfremtheinten:ouraeofthesouJwiththemind,themindwithaaenae-organ,andtheaenae-organ with its object. The Naiyayika il however careful not to connect hil perception with gmeralicY (Iamanya), particularity (visesa), subilllDce

(dravya), quality (guna) and action (Kanna) 00 which, .. poiJlted 0Ill by Dignaga, the Vaisesika's inten:ourae is dependent. Oh I what a ItrIUlge cooaistency". A History of Indian Logic, p. Z79 IS Definitioo of perc:eptloo : pratyaksam kalpanapodham, i.e., perc:eptloo is that which is free from mental cooatrudioo. Defmitioo of inference: anumeye'tba tattuJ.ye sadbhavo naatlta'sati, i.e., Inference is that which is present in the subject of iDference and abo in things similar to it and which

is abaenl from where the inferable property is non-emtent. Definition of probans : grahyadbannastadamsena vyapto hetuh. 16 Tbecootroversy regarding ca.nparison .. a separate instrument of valid knowledge is very ancient. We fmd certain referenc:es of this in Nyaya-manjari and Nyaya-Kummanja1i. e.g., NM, pp. 129-30; NKM. W. 193-204 O. Jha in his 'The Nyayuutma of Gautama' (fu. P. 198) says: In cbapter IV of his Pramana-aamuccaya Dignaaa objeas to upamana as a separate instrument of cognition; he includes it under perceplion. Uddyotakara sayl that comparilOD does not differfrom perception and word.

(But agama is not aGnitted .. a separate instrument ofvalid knowledge by the Buddhists.) (vide Catur., p. 3S6). Vasubandhu accepIed agama as a separate instrument of valid knowledge. (vide BL I, fu. p. 72) Stcherbataky : The Buddhists from the time of Dignaga fall in line with the Vaisesikas. They adnUt only two differeot sources of knowledge, which they call perception and inference. Verb&! testimony and reasoning by analogy is for them included in iDference. (BL. I, p. 72) Though the Vaisesikas and the Buddhists advocate for two instruments ofvalid knowledge, perception and iDference, still the

Naiyayikas are not 10 much objergatory towanla the Vaisesikas as they are against the Buddhists. Only it was Udayana who gave a stroo.g objedioo to the theory of two 'instrumeJ1ll of valid knowledge' of the Vaisesilw. 11. .Cbapter V of Pramana-aamuccaya contains the doctrine of Apoba. 18 Fragments from Dignagahave been found in aeveraUogica1 te:ltsoflndianphilosoply. Besides, also a large number of reconstructloo works of Dignaga'. tens has beM done by a number of scholars of different COUDtries. Translations in different languages from the e:llllDt OUneae and Tibetan translationl are abo available. vide The Encydopedia of Indian philosopilies, vol I, W. SI-SS

19 kutar\cikajl'.lmanivrttihetuh karisyate tasya maya nibandhahl/ NV, vide Catur., P. 6 20 kutarldkairdignagaprabhnibhih. NVn. vide Catur., p. 23 21 ActlJal verses of Dignaga's Pramana-samuccaYIl (chap. II) are [oood quoted in VTT on NS i.l.S.

22 Udayana in his third chapler of his Almatattvaviveka discusse,. in a great detail, the Buddhist view of quality and qualified. 23 Recognition is considered by Uddyotakara as a strong ground to estabt lh the exislence of soo1. It is seen that recognition is a strong argument in Nyaya-manjari. (Ref. NM. pt. lI,p. 11). In NKM (I. 15) also we fmd: nanyadrstam smaratyanyo naikam bhutarnapakramatl vasanasarnkramo nasti na ca gatyantaram sthirell Remembrance also a ground which has been shown repe.'lledly in favour of a permanent soul. In this connection it should be mentioned that though

Uddyotakara elaborately refuleS this ancient view that rejects the reality of the soul, Uddyotakara himself does not admit that such a view was true to the real teachings of the Buddha. 24 BL, I, pp. ISO-I 25 The first half of the verse found in Pramana-viniscaya. The Tib. version runs as fonows : Ihan-cig dmigs-pa nes-pa'i phyir/snon dan de blo gzan ma yin} (mOo xcv II. fol'263b). But the second half is not found in verse form though the idea contained there has been clarified in prose. The verse form is found

in Pramana-vartika. 26 BL, I, p. 39 27 vide Preface ofTattvasamgraha. 28 Manorathanandin in his Pramanavartika-vrtti mentirns one Sankarasvamin as acaryiya whose view was criticised by Dharmakirti. vide Pramana-vartika, p. 143 In Nyayamanjari-granthi-bhanga, CakradharamentionsSankarasvamin as a commentator ofNyaya-bhasya. of. Sankarasvami nyayabhasyatikakrt, vide NM(S), n, p.

146 29 The latest researches seem to justify the Saka era theory and place Vacaspati in 976 A.D. (Date of Vacaspati Misrd and Udayanacarya -D.C. Bhattacharya, Jha Research Institute Journal, vol. II, pp. 349-56.) vide Ratnakirtinibandhavali, Introduction p.21 f. 30 N urnerous verses of Pramana-vartika are found quoted. artbopnyoge'pi punab smartam sabdanuyojanamJ aksadhiryadyapekseta so'rtho vyavahito bhavetl/ yah pragajanako buddherupayogavisesatah/ sa pascadapi lena syadabapayc'pi netradhih// are the verses of Pramana-viniscaya quoled under NS i.1.4. These can he identified with the Tibetan translation of the IeAt : don ni ne-bar sbyor-ba na'n/ gun yan sgra sbyor dran-pa 1aJ gal-te dban-po'i bio ltos naf don de

chod-par 'gyur-ba yinl! gan snon blo-yi skyed-hyed mini ner shyor kbyad-par mOO-pa' i pbyirl de ni phyis kyan 'gyur les naf don moo na yan mig blor 'gyurll (fshad-ma mam-parnes-pa, mDoJl.cv. n. fol. 253a) 31 grantharacanavinodadiba hi maya vasarah gamitah. NM(S), II, p.147 32 kuto va nutanarn vastu vayanl utpreksilum ksamahl vacovinyasavaicilramatram atra vicaryatamJ/ NM(S),I, p.5 na hiyarn kavibhih purvairadrastam suksmadarsibhihl sakta tmamapi draslum matirmama tapasvinil/ NM(S), II, p.147 33.kalpanapodham abhrantam pratyaksam. 34 A History of Indian Logic, p. ISO. vide also NM(S), I. pp. 91, 159. Those were identified also by Cakra'lh~!l\ in his Nyayamanjari-granthi-bhanga.

35 nastyatma phalabhogarnatramatha ca svargaya caityarccanaml salnskarah ksanika yugasthitibhrtascaitc viharah krtah! sarvam sunyamidam vasuni gurave dehiti camAyale/ bauddhanam caritam kimanyadiyati dambhasya bhurnih paml! NM.II,p.39

36 A.I... Thakur, "The Naiyayika Trilocana as a teacher of Vaca.spati", Indian Culture 14, 1947,36-40. A.I... Thakur, "Nyaya-manjari of Guru Trilocana -a forgotten workn , Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society (pama) 41,1955.507·11. Collections of different views of Trilocana ~rom the works of Joanasri and others can be a valuable contnbution to the Indian philosophical studies. 37 Viuoka is mentillfled several times in Isvamvada of Jnanasri.

vide Jnaoa.srimitranibandhavali, pp. 235, 237. 242-3.255,260. Also vide Ratn!lkirtinibandhavali, p. 47 38 "The name of this scholar does not actually occur in these works. Jnanasrimitm introduces his views as those of a 'a certain scholar' (aparah) (lsvaravada, pp. 237,255). The marginal notes supply the lacuna. Now what we could gather about this scholar is this: Satananda wrote some tract on Nyaya philosophy in which the refutatillfl of the Buddhist position wi th regard to Isvara occured. The five arguments put against the Buddhist positillfl by him have been proved ineffective in the Isvaravada. Jnanasrimitm-nibandhavali, Introduction, p.22. 3

9 n ... Jnaoa.srimitra had to face a number of scholars who weilded considrable importance at his time. Many important texts he consul1ed are now lost and perhaps irrepa~ly. In the Nyaya system the works of highest importance only have been preserved. Those intervening between two such WOlXs are lost. Sometimes their views were quoted anllflymously in later works. Thus some of the older views IlfIlsvara can now be tmced in N yaya-kusumanjali of Udayana. But the Buddhist and laina authors have preserved passages from ancient masters with proper reference to their authors. Jnanasrimitra is responsible for preserving actual passages from the works of many important scholars that came between Dharmakirti and Udayana and thus his Nibandhas became an important

document to a student of Indian Logic". Jnanasrimitra-nibandhavali, Introduction, pp. 22-23. 40 .aisvaryarnadamattah san atmanamavamanyasel punarbauddhe samayate madadhina tava sthitiihll 41 In the 11th century the Buddhists, Jnanasribhadra, Ratnakar&~anti, Yamari, Sankarananda contributed voluminous writing on Buddhist thought and logic. In the Nyaya line from the begilUling of the 13th

century the Naiyayika logicians were much engaged with the philosophy of the New school of Nyaya logic, i.e., with Tallvacintamani of Gangesa. 42 BL, I, p. 35 ABBREVIATIONS BL - Buddhist Logic. Catur. - Caturgranthika. NKM Nyayakusumanjali. NM - Nyayarnanjari, Ed. S. Sukla. NM(S) - Nyayamanjari, Sarnpumananda Sankrita Visvavidyalaya ed. NS - Nyaya-sutra. NV - Nyaya-vartika. NVTT - Nyayavartika-ta1parya-tika. BmLIOGRAPHY Buddhist Logie. (2 vols). FH Stcherbatsky.

New York. Caturgranthika. First ahnika of Nyaya-sutrs, with Nyaya-bhasya, Nyaya-vartika, Nyayavartika-tatparya-tika and Nyaya-parisuddhi. Ed. A. I... Thakur. Mithila Institute Series, text no. 20,1967. ('lbe) Encyclopedia of Indian Philosq>hies. (vols I,II) Ed. Karl H. Potter. Delhi, 1974, 1977. (A) History of Indian Logic. S.C. Vidyabhusana. Motilal Banarasidass. Delhi, 1978. (A) History of Indian Philosophy. (5 vols). S Dasgupta. Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi, 1975 (First Indian Edition). loanasrimitranibandhavali. Ed. A.L. Thakur. Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Research Institute, Patna, 1959.

Nyayabhusana (Bhasarvajna), auto-eommentary IlfI Nyayasara. Ed. S Yogindrananda. Saddarsan Prakasan Pratisthan, Varanasi, 1968. Nyayamanjari (Jayanta Bhatta). Ed. S N Sukla. Chowkhamba, Varanasi,1971 (PL I); Ed. A Madhvacarya Adya. 1969 (PL II).

Nyayamanjari (Jayanta Bhaua) with Granlbiltt ..... commeDIaI)' by Clbadbva. (3 vola). Ed. D Shutri. Sampumananda Samlbit vilvavidyaJaya. V8I'8II8Ii. 1912,1983. Pramanavartib (Dbannakirti) with c:ommentary of ManorathanandiD. Ed. D Shastri. Bauddha Bhanti, Vanmasi, 1968. Rasuakirtibibandbavali. Ed. A.L. 1baIcur. Kashi Prasad Jayaswal Re.searcb Institute, PaIna, 1957. Tattvasamgraha (SantanWita) with Panjika by Kamalaaila. (2 vols). Ed. D SbMtri. Varanasi, 1968. Tlhe-ma 1Dam-p'f ne.-pa(pramana-viniscaya). mOo xcv 11.2SOb. 6-329h,l.