Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery: Revelation and Identity in rNying ma Communities of Present-day Kham The economic and political scenarios that have appeared in post-Mao China have allowed Tibetan areas a more overt expression of religious belief and practice. In the past three decades Tibetans seem to have gradually regained access to many popular practices forbidden in the past, such as pilgrimages, offerings to monasteries, erection of private shrines at home, and local ceremonies and festivals. However, the Chinese government’s political strategies as applied to Tibetan areas in the context of the large-scale economic development of the country have at the same time continued to weaken crucial religious authority from monastic institutions. Particularly targeted by political control, the historical role of monasteries as guarantors of religious authority, scholastic legitimacy, and institutional centers of traditional instruction has drastically decreased. Nevertheless, the Tibetans’ spirit of adaptation and their struggle for the preservation of their religious and cultural identity have resulted in a revitalization of alternative forms of religious control such as visionary activities and Treasure (gter ma) revelation; unconventional religious communities (chos sgar) have emerged as alternative centers of practice and cultural production. Le bouddhisme tibétain par delà le monastère Les scénarios économique et politique qui sont apparus dans la Chine post-maoïste ont permis aux regions tibétaines une plus grande expression des croyances et des pratiques religieuses. Durant les trois dernières décennies, les Tibétains semblent avoir retrouvé l’accès à de nombreuses pratiques populaires qui étaient interdites par le passé, telles que les pélerinages, les offrandes aux monastères, la construction d’autels domestiques privés, et des cérémonies et fêtes locales. Toutefois, la stratégie politique du gouvernement chinois envers les regions tibétaines dans le contexte d’un développement économique du pays à grande échelle a, conjointement, continué à affaiblir l’authorité religieuse déterminante des institutions monastiques. Particulièrement visé par le contrôle politique, le rôle historique des monastères en tant que garant de l’authorité religieuse, de la légimité scholastique et de centres institutionnels d’enseignement traditionel s’ est considérablement amoindri. Néanmoins, la faculté d’adaptation des Tibétains et leur combat pour preserver leur identité religieuse et culturelle a redynamisé des formes alternatives de contrôle religieux telles des activités visionnaires et la revelation de Trésor (gter ma) ; des communautés religieuses non conventionnelles (chos sgar) sont apparues comme de nouveaux centres de pratique et de production culturelle. TIBETAN BUDDHISM BEYOND THE MONASTERY REVELATION AND IDENTITY IN RNYING MA COMMUNITIES OF PRESENT-DAY KHAM Antonio TERRONE R eligious practice, like other forms of cultural systems, is never completely separated from its social, political, and historical contexts.1 Once Tibet 2 became part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949-1951, Tibetans faced a series of economic and political scenarios that dramatically affected their sociocultural life and jeopardized their unique sense of identity. The hard-line anti-Tibet policy promoted by Mao Zedong between 1959 and 1978 put Tibetans through two decades of severe hardships. In the post-Mao era,3 Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) launched an overall reform of the political and economic system of the country, but with the intention of leaving the state apparatus intact.4 These Chinese economic reforms, or “reform and opening” (Ch. gaige kaifang), became known as 1 I would like to express my gratitude to Matthew Pistono and Sarah Jacoby for their precious assistance in the preparation of this article and for their insights provided during long conversations on Tibetan culture and religion. I would also like to thank Gray Tuttle for his useful comments, insights, and critical incisiveness. To them goes also my sincere gratitude for proofreading and editing early versions of this essay. 2 The term “Tibet” in this article refers to the ethnic, cultural, and geographical areas today assimilated within the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and politically and administratively limited to the Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, Yunnan, and TAR provinces of the PRC. See Elliot Sperling, “The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics” East-West Center (Washington, 2004):32-33, on-line version at http://www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/ Publications/publications.htm. 3 With the term “post-Mao era” I intend here the years following the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. This period covers not only the end of the Cultural Revolution and of a harsh and hard-line religious and cultural policy towards ethnic groups in the PRC, but also the beginning of a period of economic reforms and of a leniency by Beijing leaders towards ethnic minorities under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping. A strategy of dialogue was established with the community in Tibet and in exile, and a certain degree of relaxation conceded to revive the people’s sense of cultural and religious identity. 4 Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) exposed his vision of economic reforms to the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in December 1978. Images of Tibet in the 19 th and 20 th Centuries Paris, EFEO, coll. « Études thématiques » (22), 2007, p. 733-765 734 Antonio Terrone “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” and although their scope was basically oriented towards the creation of a market economy and a stronger domestic economy, they also addressed issues of social control such as control of unemployment, inflation, and the improvement of Chinese citizens’ living conditions. Ironically, in the effort to facilitate the economic development and support the country’s transition to the market economy, a key side effect was that the central government had to soften its stance on the ideological control of its people and adopt a more tolerant attitude towards people’s social lives. In Tibetan areas this strategy translated into a more indulgent position towards cultural and religious activities. Thus while the government has insisted on an overall modernization of the education system in Tibet, penalizing the traditionally central role of monastic religious instruction, it has concurrently allowed popular forms of religious practice and activities to reemerge. On the one hand, Tibetans have gradually gained access to many of their centuries-old popular practices that were strictly forbidden in the past: ritual pilgrimages to sacred sites, the setting up of home shrines and altars, and raising of prayer flags on their houses, and so on. On the other hand, the many political gestures and socioeconomic policies instituted by Chinese Communist leaders over the past four decades have caused major crises within the Tibetan community in the PRC. First targeted by a hard-line and intolerant approach and then by a more moderate line, the socioreligious situation in Tibet has undergone dramatic dynamics, altering much of the character of the central role of religion in Tibetan social and political life before 1959. In the contemporary Hu Jintao era,5 “ethnic minorities” (shaoshu minzu) in China are among the top issues in the political agenda of the government.6 The alleviation of ethnic poverty, the improvement of the quality of life, and the progress of economic development are clear objectives of China’s political leaders. However, the government’s stance is still very cautious concerning religious freedom. The government considers religion one of the propelling energies behind social movements and therefore a root cause of social unrest. 5 Hu Jintao (born 1942) was elected president of the People’s Republic of China on March 15, 2003, at the First Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, the top legislature of the country. In 1985, 44-year-old Hu Jintao was appointed, successively, secretary of the CPC Guizhou Provincial Committee and of the CPC Tibet Autonomous Regional Committee in 1988. He was in Lhasa during the 1989 Tibetan “pro-independence” uprising to which he reacted with a strong political crackdown resulting in the death of several Tibetan activists. 6 Beside the Han Chinese, which constitute the ethnic “majority,” the largest and dominant ethnic group in the country, China recognizes fifty-four nationalities (minzu) or “ethnic minorities” (shaoshu minzu) accounting for roughly 8 per cent of the whole population. There are at least fifteen more ethnic groups in the PRC that are being scrutinized and considered for nationality recognition including the Sherpas and Chinese Jews. See Dru C. Gladney, Dislocating China: Muslims, Minorities, and Other Subaltern Subjects (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2004): 9. For minorities issues see also Morris Rossabi (ed.), Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 2004): 7. The Uyghurs in Xinjiang and the Tibetans are among the most active ethnic groups in the PRC, claiming independence for their countries. Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 735 The hard-line struggle against separatist activities (Ch. fenlie huodong) continues —a nightmare for the Communist authorities concerned about the ongoing presence of resistance forces among ethnic minority regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang.7 In the Tibetan regions, besides historical claims in support of Tibetan territorial independence, the situation has been exacerbated by various factors associated with the development of the western regions, such as market reforms, Chinese settlers, the tourism industry, and the influx of economic migrants. The history of Tibet in the twentieth century is a complex one. The so-called Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (1949), the Great Leap Forward (1958-1962), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) spread confusion and destruction not only in China proper, but also across Tibet, “the land of snows.” The convulsions of Mao Zedong’s radical utopias and his Great Leap Forward in the late fifties (which still need to be satisfactorily analyzed) caused many thousands of deaths from famine in Tibet.8 The liberalization period resulting from the economic reforms advanced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s eventually provided a basis, although still an unstable one, for a renaissance of Tibetan culture and what Chinese propaganda calls the “Great Development of the West” (xifang da kaifa).9 Currently the central government seeks the development of Tibet, the well-being of its population, and the winning of their loyalties by means of massive investments, political reforms, and economic development. One of the most effective strategies applied by Beijing in its campaign of economic reforms in Tibet was the remodeling of Tibetan life along more “modern” lines that emphasize a secular rather than religious idea of a nation. Education (and therefore language and culture) has been a primary target of Chinese reforms in all Tibetan ethnic and cultural areas.10 For example, in addition to a curtailing of the extent to which Buddhist monasteries traditionally dominated access to Tibetan education, Beijing has introduced a modern education system, shifting schooling to a secular modern setting. Buddhism remains, however, the fulcrum of the Tibetan sense of identity and therefore it is perceived as a potential threat to the authority of the state and to the 7 Since the last dynastic era (Qing dynasty 1644-1912), and the nationalist (guomin) period, Chinese leaders and policy makers have prioritized the attempt to provide a high degree of national unity (tongjie) for China. As Gray Tuttle suggests in his Tibetan Buddhists in the Making of Modern China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), control over religion in the early nationalistic period, and in the specific Tibetan case control over Buddhism, was seen by many Chinese policy makers as a means to acquire a significant opportunity to gain ethnic minorities’ loyalties and provide national unity for the country. 8 For an overview of Mao Zedong’s policies in the late fifties see Jasper Becker, Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine (New York: The Free Press, 1997). 9 The “Great Development of the West” was initiated in 1999 by Jiang Zemin (b. 1926), then President of the PRC. This period represented an acceleration of the policies concerning “ethnic minorities” formulated over the fifty years of Communist Party rule. See China’s Great Leap West (London: Tibet Information Network, 2000). 10 Catriona Bass, Education in Tibet: Policy and Practice since 1950 (London: Tibet Information Network, 1998): 10. 736 Antonio Terrone unity of the PRC. As a consequence monasteries, which in Tibet were the traditional centers of religious authority and literary production, have been particularly targeted by Communist propaganda because of the central role they played in pre-1959 economic and sociopolitical life in Tibet, as well as the large number of monastics that they housed. Accused by Marxist-Leninist theorists of being exploitative of the common people and a hindrance to local economic progress and cultural development, monasteries came under constant and increased inspection by governmental authorities and were eventually deprived of their central sociopolitical role. However, the Tibetans’ sense of adaptation and cultural identity, inextricably connected with religion, predominantly Buddhist, has resulted in the growth of renewed forms of control and maintenance of their religious legacy. As Beijing allowed more overt types of expressions of religious faith and practice in their attempt to win loyalties and pursue economic reforms and development, other forms of religious legitimacy emerged. In some areas of eastern Tibet, namely Kham and especially mGo log (today classified and Sichuan and Qinghai Provinces of the PRC) some forms of religious practice such as visionary activities, Treasure revelation (gter ma), charismatic leadership, and the formation of less conventional and quasi-monastic religious communities as centers of practice and cultural production have come to characterize current religious trends in contemporary Tibetan communities. Most present-day religious encampments and mountain retreat hermitages are associated with the rNying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism. Among the main schools of Buddhism in Tibet, the rNying ma order is well-known in Tibetan religious and Buddhist history for its extensive use of unconventional Tantric material (from the point of view of “orthodox” Tibetan scholasticism) and the adherence to innovative, although often controversial, strategies of establishing textual authority and legitimacy. While most of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, such as the dGe lugs pa, or the Virtuous Ones, were characterized by strict scholarly rigor, special emphasis on the monastic discipline (Tib. ’dul ba, Skt. vinaya), as well as adherence to Indian sources of textual authority, the rNying ma theorists and scholars have been more experience-based, contemplation-oriented, and concerned with creative and often alternative forms of establishing textual authorship and authenticity, such as the written material revealed as Treasures.11 In the economics of Tibetan Buddhism the “Treasure” (gter ma) revelation system of production and transmission of textual material as advanced by the rNying ma pa, or the “Ancients,” seems to have been particularly suitable for reestablishing a religious discourse of the continuity of the appropriation and dissemination of religious material.12 Due to its core feature as an intersection of several systems, such 11 The question of authenticity and validity of gter ma, Treasure, revealed texts is a complex one. Germano has written an insightful introduction to the rNying ma collection of Tantras. See Germano, “History and Nature of The Collected Tantras of the Ancients” (http:// www.thdl.org/ collections/literature/ngb/ngb-history.html ), March 25, 2002. 12 rNying ma, the “Ancients,” is the customary name of the most ancient school of Tibetan Buddhism. Its adherents claim their lineage stems from the first religious communities active in Tibet during the eight and ninth centuries. They associate their tradition with Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 737 as ritual authority, the codification of new identities, and the promotion of religious narratives, the revelation system appears as a flexible and innovative device to articulate a Buddhist discourse in a new socio-political environment as well as a source of spiritual power for its adherents. Treasure revealers (gter ston) and Tantric visionaries have become more and more visible in the religious and social landscape of twentiethcentury Tibet. This is particularly true in the eastern Tibetan area of Kham (today politically classified as part of the Qinghai and Sichuan provinces of the PRC) where this breed of religious figures has been intrinsically associated with the rise of large religious, namely Buddhist, encampments (chos sgar) and numerous small Tantric mountain hermitages (ri khrod). Run mainly by monastic and non-celibate Treasure revealers and characterized by a strong charismatic leadership, these religious communities have become increasingly popular in the negotiation of local control over religious identity and especially in the diffusion of traditional patterns of religious education and instruction. Within the context introduced above, this study attempts to investigate and define the modalities by which the activities of some prominent Tibetan religious personalities, monastics and lay alike, have contributed to the maintenance and diffusion of Buddhist practice in present-day Tibet.13 More specifically, this essay is concerned with the activities of a number of Buddhist masters who are leaders of Padmasambhava, an Indian Buddhist master who allegedly traveled to Tibet under the reign of King Khri srong lde’u btsan and helped him in the diffusion of the Buddhist doctrine in the country. The rNying ma school differentiates between the bka’ ma, or “long transmission of precepts,” and the gter ma, or “short transmission of Treasures.” The first refers to the lineage of a long, uninterrupted transmission of precepts and teachings from master to disciple through the centuries. The latter instead claims to be the shortest form of teaching transmission since the actual reception of the doctrine, in the form of revealed “Treasure,” stems directly from the words of Padmasambhava without passing through any succession of teacher-disciple continuity. Padmasambhava is also the initiator of the “Treasure” system of teachings transmission, which he elaborated in order to protect Buddhist texts from imminent persecution and to benefit the Tibetans of the future. For my discussion of the Treasure revelations see below in this article. For an overview of the gter ma tradition see among others A. I. Vostrikov, “Books from Buried Treasures,” in Tibetan Historical Literature (Culcutta, India: Indian Studies, 1970): 27-57; Eva K. Dargyay, The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977); Ramon N. Prats, Contributo allo studio biografico dei primi Gter-ston (Naples: Istituto Universitario Orientale, 1982); Tulku Thondup, Hidden Teachings of Tibet: An Explanation of the Terma Tradition of the Nyingma School of Buddhism (London: Wisdom, 1986); Janet Gyatso, Apparitions of the Self: The Secret Autobiographies of a Tibetan Visionary (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Andreas Doctor, Tibetan Treasure Literature: Revelation, Realization, and Accomplishment in Visionary Buddhism (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion Publications, 2005). For a general overview of the place of gter ma in the context of rNying ma literary canon see David Germano’s “History and Nature of The Collected Tantras of the Ancients.” 13 Much of the information contained and analyzed in this article has been personally collected during the past eight years (1997-2005) in various fieldwork trips to Kham (Sichuan and southern Qinghai provinces) and Amdo (Qinghai and Gansu). Some of the fieldwork sojourn has been kindly supported and sponsored by the Research School CNWS (Centre for African, Asian, and Amerindian Studies) of Leiden University in the Netherlands. 738 Antonio Terrone religious monastic centers that operate in the Kham area.14 Furthermore, it considers the revival of the Tibetan Treasure tradition as a successful means of asserting Buddhist authority and religious transmission in eastern Tibetan regions of the PRC as well as its role in the formation of some of the most active and vibrant rNying ma communities in twentieth-century Kham. The importance of understanding the many facets of Buddhist practice in Tibet lies in its contextualization within the state of religion and religious practice in contemporary China. In a country where traditional patterns of culture are continually under threat of suppression, and where the government keeps expressions of religious faith under continual surveillance, the fact that more and more Tibetans are unremittingly gathering around charismatic religious figures is a clear sign of their need to give voice to their own culture and value to their religious legacy. Religion in Present-day Tibet Recent scholarship has emphasized the pressure and the consequences of the Chinese government policies on religious practice in contemporary Tibetan regions of the PRC. On the one hand, some western Tibetologists tend to portray a sort of revivalist atmosphere in religious practice favored by a relaxation in the PRC’s religious policy.15 On the other hand, international human rights organizations and Tibet-monitoring agencies have provided information about the effects of Chinese economic development and modernization among Tibetans in their land that discourages a positive view of China’s attempts to modernize Tibet.16 Nevertheless, despite a few attempts to describe the contemporary role of Buddhist traditions in 14 I have dealt with this topic differently elsewhere. See for instance Antonio Terrone, “Visions, Arcane Claims, and Treasures: Charisma and Authority in a Present-day Treasure Finder,” in Tibet, Self, and the Tibetan Diaspora: Voices of Difference, ed. Christiaan Klieger (Proceedings of the Ninth Seminar of the IATS, Leiden: Brill, 2002): 213-28. Additionally, for a study of the role of mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs in contemporary Tibet, see also David Germano, “Re-membering the Dismembered Body of Tibet: Contemporary Tibetan Visionary Movements in the People’s Republic of China,” in Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet: Religious Revival and Cultural Identity, eds. Melvin Goldstein and Matthew Kapstein (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998): 53-94. 15 A number of studies have been published recently concerning the state of religion, and especially Buddhism, in contemporary Tibet. Goldstein and Kapstein bring up a range of issues concerning Buddhist and local practices in their Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet. See also Matthew Kapstein, “A Thorn in the Dragon’s Side: Tibetan Buddhist Culture in China,” in Governing China’s Multiethnic Frontiers, 230-69; Ronald D. Schwartz, “Renewal and Resistance: Tibetan Buddhism in the Twentieth Century,” in Buddhism and Politics in Twentieth-Century Asia, ed. Ian Harris (London and New York: Continuum, 1999): 229-53. 16 Some reports and publications have appeared on this topic in the recent years. See for instance Tibet Information Network, Relative Freedoms?: Tibetan Buddhism and Religious Policy in Kardze, Sichuan, 1987-1999 (London, 1999); Human Rights Watch, Trials of a Tibetan Monk: The Case of Tenzin Delek, 2004; International Campaign for Tibet, When the Sky Fell to the Earth: The New Crackdown on Buddhism in Tibet (Washington, 2004), and Incomparable Warriors: Non-violent Resistance in Contemporary Tibet (Washington, 2005). Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 739 Tibet, the actual phenomenon of the emergence of non-monastic systems of religious leadership and the active function of Treasure revealers in religious communities in the PRC have not received adequate scholarly attention.17 Within the general resurgence of religious activities, some Tibetan religious leaders are working actively for the diffusion of Buddhism and the maintenance of traditional practice. In particular, since the early 1980s, there has been an ongoing visibility of Buddhist teachers, especially rNying ma Treasure revealers such as Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan, ’Od gsal bde chen rdo rje, Nam sprul ’Jigs med phun tshogs, sKu gsum gling pa, and Rig ’dzin nyi ma, to name only a few. Such Treasure revealers are gaining popularity and respect, galvanizing large gatherings around themselves, as monastics and lay devotees are moved by a desire for religious instruction and spiritual guidance. Additionally, many among them have a more Fig. 1: The Buddhist teacher and Treasure revealer Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal and more visible social role within their own mtshan also known as mKhan po A land and in mainland China as well, sponsorchos at his residence in Ya chen sgar, ing the construction of local religious builddKar mdzes (Ch. Ganzi), Sichuan. November 2004. (Photo by Antonio ings, accepting of Chinese lay devotees and Terrone) students, and performing public rituals. My sense is that these revived forms of spiritual authority and charismatic leadership are employed, in varying degrees, to address specific claims of authority and legitimacy over the management of Buddhist practice in Tibet today. Many of these leaders are deliberately fostering a renewed faith in the Buddhist doctrine among their followers, restoring a structure for religious instruction, and creating centers of religious practice and education that adapt to the current forms of control as applied by the Chinese government. Furthermore, in a Tibetan society where the institutional role of many monasteries has been extensively damaged and their educational structure weakened, charismatic leaders such as Treasure revealers have found alternative ways to channel religious transmissions of practices and teachings. As a result of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, sociocultural changes have occurred throughout the PRC. The Chinese government’s acknowledgment of the excesses under the rule of Mao Zedong has allowed the political elite to consider a more tolerant attitude towards religious life and local culture among both Han Chinese 17 I use here the term “non-monastic” to refer to Tibetan religious settlements such as mountain hermitages (ri khrod) and the religious encampments (chos sgar) in most cases lead by non-celibate Buddhist teachers. In these religious encampments the resident population includes non only monks and nuns, but also lay people alike. 740 Antonio Terrone and ethnic minority groups.18 However, while the Chinese authorities have allowed some degree of freedom of religious practice in Tibet—especially popular forms of Buddhist practices, such as ritual circumambulation of religious buildings and holy sites, pilgrimage to sacred places, visits to monasteries and masters, and setting up of house altars—a certain intolerance has been declared on separatist activities linked to any religious activities that might potentially promote religion actively and so encourage a renewed sense of Tibetan identity.19 The monastery is traditionally the institutional heart of the Tibetan Buddhist world. The harsh policies applied over the years by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resulted in the monastery losing its traditional power base. Despite the iconoclastic destruction of monasteries, nunneries, and other religious centers that took place in all Tibetan areas especially during the years of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), in the past decades the revival has restored most of what was once destroyed.20 The population of monastic residents, both monks and nuns, however, has dramatically decreased due to restrictive government policies concerning the number of resident monastics and the age of enrolment. Additionally, over the decades since 1959, most of the major religious figures of the land have fled into exile, following the Fourteenth Dalai Lama bsTan ’dzin rgya mtsho. Each year more than two thousand refugee seekers, including monks and nuns, leave Tibet searching a new life in exile.21 Furthermore, the actual state of religious practices is con18 Hu Yaobang was a major architect of the reforms elaborated by Deng Xiaoping. As Party secretary, Hu Yaobang was the first to admit that the CCP had made serious mistakes in Tibet and proposed strategies to enhance the economic development to ensure a rise in the standard of living among individual Tibetans, and foster a revitalization of Tibetan culture and religion. For remarks on current Sino-Tibetan policies in the PRC, see Melvin Goldstein, “Tibet and China in the Twentieth Century,” in Governing China’s, 186-229. See also Tsering W. Shakya, The Dragon in the Land of Snows (London: Pimlico, 1999), and Tashi Rabgey and Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center Washington, 2004). 19 For details concerning Chinese government’s attitude on separatist (Ch. fenlie) and antisplittist activities in Tibet see for instance Goldstein, Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet, 1-17. 20 Virtually all monasteries and temples in Tibet were in one way or another affected by the results of iconoclastic rage, especially powerful during the years of the Cultural Revolution. According to a recent count by Matthew Kapstein a hundred and twenty thousand monks are today residing in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and some three thousand monasteries are today active in Tibetan ethnic regions of the PRC. Kapstein, “A Thorn in the Dragon’s Side,” 263-64, note 3 21 See Refugee Report: Dangerous Crossing – 2004 Update (Washington DC: International Campaign for Tibet): 2. Nearly 80 percent of the Tibetan community in exile is made up of monks and nuns. The most spectacular and recent flights were the 1998 escape of A rgya Rinpoche, head abbot of the sKu ’bum monastery (Ch. Ta’ersi), which together with Bla brang bkra shis ’khil, is among the most significant dGe lugs pa monasteries in Amdo, today belonging to the Xining area of Qinghai province; and that of the then sixteen-year-old seventeenth Karmapa O rgyan ’phrin las rdo rje, from his seat in mTshur pu monastery in central Tibet in 1999. The former now lives in exile in the USA, while the latter has lived in exile in India since his arrival in January 2000. The formal seat of the Karmapa in India is the Dharma Chakra Center in Rumtek, Sikkim. Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 741 tinually undermined by political propaganda and patriotic education campaigns in Tibet, which aim specifically at weakening the authority and the prestige of religious monastic institutions and their leaders. Buddhism in Today’s Kham Although systematic control over religious practices by the Chinese authorities in Tibet is applied in all Tibetan ethnic areas, the strategies and the modalities they use differ from region to region and reflect varying local attitudes. While in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) religious practice is constantly marked by frequent tensions with the Chinese political leadership, outside the TAR, especially in the northern and eastern regions of Kham and Amdo, religious practice enjoys varying levels of openness. This disparity is mainly explainable by the fact that although Tibetans living in the lands now included within the PRC have shared a common identity of language, culture, and religion, the same cannot be said for their political loyalties. A centralized Tibetan government existed and was based in Lhasa. Although predominantly active in Central Tibet, Lhasa government, hierarchically dominated by local aristocracy and dGe lugs pa monastic estates, extended its powers to Chab mdo in Kham as well since the seventeenth century. The areas of Kham, as well as Amdo, were split off and organized in a series of small kingdoms, local feudal estates, and district communities governed by chieftains and local leaders (dpon po). Geopolitically speaking, the boundaries of Kham were largely based on a combination of tribal territorial control and human elements rather than political factors. Borders between communities were very clear at the local level at least in tribal areas where crossing into other tribes’ territories was very dangerous. Additionally, distinction and identity were largely based on local dialects and customs, as well as on clothing and ornamentation.22 However, from the Chinese perspective borders between Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu were decided in 1723-1725 during the Qing Dynasty when they were enforced in various ways, often with the work of the Ambans.23 Several reasons significantly hindered the formation of pre-1950 Tibet into a modern nation state. First of all, the aristocratic families, which had a significant influence on governmental policy, were largely, if not exclusively, from central Tibet (dBus gTsang). Secondly, the nebulosity of Tibetan boundaries resulted in the formation and existence of local independent communities rather than clear territorial entities.24 Finally, the religious diversity in Kham, in contrast to the dominance of dGe lugs pa religious and political monastic centers in central Tibet, increased the difficulty of negotiating concepts of centralized power 22 Carole McGranahan, Arrested Histories: Between Empire and Exile in 20th Century Tibet (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2001): 22. 23 I have particularly benefited from Gray Tuttle’s comments in discussing this point. 24 This can be also seen in the fact that the Tibetans themselves never really succeeded in defining their borders and territory. As far as I am aware of, the creation of maps or pictorial representations of state borders and/or administrative boundaries was hardly a concern of Tibetan policy makers in pre-1959 Tibet. 742 Antonio Terrone and unified government in Tibetan areas of Kham and Amdo. While the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan government (dga’ ldan pho brang) that was founded by the Fifth Dalai Lama, Ngag dbang Blo bzang rgya mtsho, in the seventeenth century were a central and indisputable religious as well as a political focus of legitimate central authority, eastern Tibetans were more inclined to address their political loyalties to local clan chieftains, warlords, and kings, promoting a loosely centralized system of inter-clan relations and loose hierarchical connections. These differences persisted until the assimilation of Tibet into the PRC and are still detectable today. For instance, eastern Tibetans from Kham talk about the people of central Tibet as bod pa, “people of Tibet,” distinguishing themselves as khams pa, “people of Kham”; and they refer to the Tibetan dialect spoken in Lhasa as bod skad, “language of Tibet,” while talking about their dialect as khams skad, “language of Kham.” This diversity of territorial and social control was reflected also in religious organization. Kham, as well as Amdo, was not only more religiously diverse than central Tibet, but tended also to inspire the creation of religious communities led by charismatic figures. The nineteenth century development of the ris med (“impartial” or “non-sectarian”) movement in Kham testifies to the open-mindedness and the breadth of a significant group of farsighted religious leaders.25 Non-celibate religious personalities, representing mainly the rNying ma and bKa’ brgyud schools, traditionally more contemplation-oriented, were valued as much as the officially ordained (rab tu ’byung ba), and therefore monastically-oriented, abbots and scholars. Despite the apparently fixed demarcation between ordained and non-celibate institutions, religious life in Kham was in fact never really marked in this way.26 Today, non-celibate Tantric specialists, lay followers, and ordained monastics often live together in religious communities, such as the religious encampments (chos sgar) discussed below, where nuns also have created their own quarters. Monks and 25 The ris med movement was a syncretic religious movement aimed at the dissemination of spiritual practice unbiased by sectarian prerogatives and especially promoting religious texts and ritual procedures, from different schools of Tibetan Buddhism, without rivalry. Launched in the nineteenth century it was particularly supported by a group of religious personalities from eastern Tibet such as Kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas (1813-1899), ’Jam dbyangs mkhyen brtse dbang po (1820-1892), gTer ston bSod rgyal (a.k.a. Las rab gling pa, 1856-1926), ’Ju mi pham rnam rgyal rgya mtsho (1846-1912), and mChog gyur bde chen zhig po gling pa (1829-1870). For a general overview of the ris med movement see Gene Smith “’Jam mgon Kong sprul and the Non-sectarian Movement,” in Kongtrul’s Encyclopedia of Indo-Tibetan Culture, ed. Lokesh Chandra (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1970): 1-87. Reprint in Gene Smith, Among Tibetan Texts: History and Literature in the Himalayan Plateau (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2001): 235-72. 26 In general it can be said that the Tibetan religious culture is populated by two kinds of religious specialists, ordained monastic-vow bound specialists (Tib. rab tu ’byung ba, Skt. pravartanatå; also Tib. dge slong, Skt. bhikΣu), and non-celibate householder Tantric specialists (Tib. sngags pa, Skt. mantrin/mantrika). Although a clear demarcation line between the two groups cannot be drawn, these two groups of religious personalities have characterized the religious landscape of Tibetan culture since the introduction of Buddhism in Tibet in the dynastic era and even more between the tenth and eleventh century with the gradual emergence of sectarian divisions within Buddhism. For an analysis of various religious professionals in traditional Tibet see Geoffrey Samuel, Civilized Shamans, 270-97 Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 743 Fig. 2: Monks outside the main assembly hall of Bla rung sgar in gSer rta, (Sichuan), November 2005. (Photo by Antonio Terrone) nuns attend religious classes and receive empowerments and instructions from noncelibate teachers and householder Tantric practitioners, as well as Treasure finders and ascetic hermits. The untamable and lively spirit of independence of the people of Kham reflects this open behavior, one of the major characteristics of nineteenthand twentieth-century eastern Tibetan society. The historical events and sociocultural developments that have contributed to shaping the situation of Buddhism and religious practice in Tibet also determined a series of specific relationships in the economy of religious power and spiritual authority, especially when it comes to standards of monastic discipline, ethical norms, and moral behavior within the religious community. Communities born around charismatic figures and spiritual leaders have also triggered a series of tensions in the sphere of authority. Ethical, as well as moral, claims such as the importance of the code of discipline and the maintenance of monastic vows in a monastic environment, the adherence to non-monastic vows in lay communities, and the often criticized controversial attitude of many non-celibate masters, have fuelled recent “underground” debates in Tibet.27 Lay Tantric personalities and practitioners are often criticized for their immoral behavior, fundamentally linked to the sexual prac27 Since the Chinese authorities monitor publishing houses strictly, some Tibetan religious leaders have opted to diffuse their ideas and propagate their advice to the faithful through the publication abroad of pamphlets and books containing their teachings, advice, and sermons. In recent years a few followers coming from Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan have opened branches of Tibetan monasteries and encampments in their own countries, often publishing their teachers’ teachings. On this see, for instance, the contributions by Henri Shiu and Yao Lixiang in this volume. 744 Antonio Terrone tices connected with yogic exercises and contemplation practices. For example, the late mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs (1933-2004), who was an ordained monk, an incarnation (sprul sku) of the famous Treasure revealer Las rab gling pa, the head of Bla rung sgar in gSer rta and himself a Treasure revealer (gter ston) was also known for his position concerning the maintenance of monastic and non-monastic vows and criticized immoral behavior among lay Tantric practitioners and teachers. In a collection of advice (zhal gdams) delivered in public that was edited and published by his disciples, and circulated in Tibet, mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs specifically elaborates on morality and ethical behavior, not only among monastics (dge slong), but also non-celibate religious figures such as lay householder Tantric practitioners (sngags pa khyim thabs pa), Treasure revealers, and yogin (rnal ’byor pa). In particular mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs directs his criticism at non-celibate Tantric specialists, including the Treasure revealers, for their often ambiguous attitude in terms of moral conduct, especially concerning the number of female partners, or consorts, they associate with for their ritual practices.28 As mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs’s comments reveal, the negotiations between celibate monastic life and non-celibate Tantric lifestyles are still the subject of ongoing internal debates in contemporary settings in eastern Tibet.29 The reemergence of non-monastic Buddhist centers of traditional education and practice has raised issues of ethical and moral behavior in some religious circles, especially in connection with monastic discipline and lay Tantric vows, issues that apparently animate the interaction among religious personalities in the current sociopolitical environment. Nevertheless, Tibetans are in a situation where voice is once again being given to their need for religious expression and the maintenance of traditional patterns of Buddhist life despite the constant threats of suppression and closure of religious institutions hanging over them. Above all, Tibetans seem to have been given permission to enjoy some degree of freedom in organizing their religious practice within the popular sphere. The cautious concessions granted by the central Chinese government on issues concerning social mores and religious practice, especially in the border regions of Kham and Amdo, is a useful tool in the hands of top Chinese government leaders, given the ambitious economic goals of the PRC in the world scene today. The Chinese government’s perceived leniency from the 1980s onward indeed did allow 28 Chos rje dam pa ’jigs med phun tshogs ’byung gnas dpal bzang po mchog gi mjug mtha’i zhal gdams rang tshugs ma shor/ gzhan sems ma dkrugs zhes pa’i ’grel ba lugs gnyis blang dor gsal ba’i sgron me (gSer rta: Bla rung lnga rig slob gling, 2005). I have read and translated the section of the publication specifically concerned with mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs’s ideas concerning morality and discipline among non-monastic personalities such as Tantric professionals, yogin, Treasure revealers, and I have recently presented it at the 11th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies (IATS) held in Königswinter near Bonn (Germany), within a study of modalities to examine Treasure revealers. See also David Germano’s report (“Re-membering,” 71-72) on mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs’s attitude towards lay Tantric practitioners active in today’s Tibet. 29 For instance see the discussion in Matthew Kapstein, “The Purificatory Gem and Its Cleansing: A Late Tibetan Polemical Discussion of Apocryphal Texts,” History of Religions 28.3 (1989): 217-44. Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 745 for a moderate religious recovery which was restricted to some primary expressions of religious life. However, other major issues that needed attention, especially in the field of the dissemination of traditional education and religious instruction in monasteries, received a hostile response. In addition, in terms of social control, such an attitude helps to camouflage the subtle maneuverings applied by government officials to control potential activities considered subversive and against central government policies. At the same time, together with the concessions on popular religious practices, the government turned a blind eye to the restoration of religious sites and buildings, monasteries, temples, and other major architectural structures that were often conducted by private donations and support, from both domestic and foreign sources. Such a strategy has enabled Beijing to gain a double score. The fact that popular practices can be reinstated has given local Tibetans the feeling that they have regained some access to their rights to maintain their cultural identity, and it has also increased the tourist industry and favored the local economy. Meanwhile, another issue has arisen within the religious scenario of modern Tibet. Tibetan religious leaders need to cope with the fact that a reconfiguration of the necessary spiritual authority is needed to support religious practice and to rebuild the religious infrastructure within the limits imposed by central governmental policies. The complete reconstruction and reorganization of Tibetan Buddhism in all its previous —i.e., pre-1959—aspects are highly problematic in present-day Tibet. The formation of any spiritually or religiously oriented organization and leadership in the PRC is immediately regarded with suspicion by the political authorities and usually put under tight control, especially if ties or contacts with the 14th Dalai Lama and his community in exile are suspected. Therefore, whereas Tibet has experienced a resurgence of non-monastic religious communities, it is also true that local authorities maintain strict control over these Buddhist centers and the activities performed by their religious leaders. Recently, especially since 2004, the Chinese government has put renewed emphasis in the organization and administration of religious affairs in the country. This is particularly evident in the new regulations on religious affairs that appeared in the PRC in 2005.30 One of the major points emphasized in the document is the obligation for monasteries and any other congregation officially present on Chinese soil —including temples, churches, and mosques—to register their presence and activity with the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB).31 Registration implies compliance with 30 In July 2004 the Standing Committee of the State Council passed a directive concerning the management of the religious affairs and in March 2005 published it as “Regulations on Religious Affairs” (Zongjiao shiwu tiaoli). Since then monasteries and nunneries have been put under pressure for registration with the government. This was later published in April 2005 in the form of a book with the same title and distributed to major monasteries and religious institutions around the country. In Tibet this publication has appeared in both Chinese and Tibetan. For an English translation see “Newly Promulgated Religious Affairs Provisions,” Chinese Law and Religious Monitor Journal 2 (2005): 53-66. 31 The Religious Affairs Bureau (Tib. chos don cus, Ch. zongjiao shiwu bumen) is an office under the direct administration of the State Council (Ch. guowuyuan) the central author- 746 Antonio Terrone the regulations that the government has established and involves accepting a series of requirements in order for a religious center to operate according to the laws of the PRC. Therefore monasteries and nunneries, often under heavy pressure from local authorities, are compelled to register their activities with the local RAB, which in turn draws to them more monitoring, controls, and influence from the authorities. This takes form not only as political indoctrination and patriotic campaigns but also as strict control on monastic resident population, age of monks or nuns, teaching material, and often the type of religious instruction offered at monasteries. It must be said, though, that despite the strictness of these regulations, most of these are enforced especially at large institutions, while smaller ones manage to accept younger monks and often enjoy a numerous monastic population. In this atmosphere in which religious institutions are attempting to adapt to the new political context and to maintain a certain degree of autonomy in the diffusion and practice of Buddhism, some of the most vibrant religious organizations are those that have been revived in eastern Tibet in the past two decades. Nonmonastic, loosely-formed religious mountain hermitages (ri khrod) and religious encampments (chos sgar) presently operating in the eastern regions of Tibet were either established or gained renewed popularity after the moderate cultural liberalization of the early 1980s. These reforms and changes of attitude must be viewed within the wider context of the CCP’s plans for massive economic and social development through an overall transformation of China into a modernized and globally competitive entity.32 Despite the fact that control is still strict and a hard-line attitude is still applied in Kham and Amdo—which are today classified as Qinghai, Sichuan, and Gansu provinces of the PRC—some relaxation in terms of religious policy has been allowed. This is due to two fundamental points. First, these regions had already been colonized by the Chinese before 1950. They were geographically closer to China, which made it easier for Chinese workers to enter Tibetan ethnic regions and establish themselves and open their enterprises and for Tibetans to go and work for the PRC.33 ity of the PRC. The major task of the RAB is to provide guidance and supervision in the administration of regulations concerning religious practice and venues of religious activities (Ch. zongjiao huodong changsuo) in China. In Tibet the office was established in 1965 and the first religious figure appointed as head of the RAB was sKyabs rje Khri byang rin po che (1900-1981). Goldstein, Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet, 7-8. 32 This general political movement in the PRC is usually referred to as gaige kaifang, or “reform and opening,” which covered many fields of the Chinese system under Deng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang. This liberalization, which was at the same time a modernization movement, was mainly to apply to the economic and social spheres. By the late 1980s, it not only brought China into the modern world, but loosened also the Party’s grip on personal, social, and cultural life. Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan (eds.), Protestantism in Contemporary China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1993): 21-65. See also Melvin Goldstein, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997): 61-66. 33 See Charlene E. Makley, The Violence of Liberation: Gender and Tibetan Buddhist Revival in Post-Mao China (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007): 29-30. Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 747 The economic reform, however, is largely seen to be encouraging migrants from central China. Second, central Chinese government leaders look forward to softening the hard-line stance on central Tibetans by showing them how generating loyalty to the central government can promote improvement in living conditions and the re-establishment of local cultural traditions. The powerful sociopolitical forces unleashed by economic reforms have had some positive consequences, especially on the standard of living for the general population. However, ongoing pressure has also been maintained, in particular within the religious and cultural spheres. This is due, above all, to the fact that the economic development so much promulgated and glorified by Chinese leaders did not prove to be as successful in promoting loyalty to China and removing attachment to cultural and religious traditions as they expected. As has already been stated, the increased popularity of religious encampments (chos sgar) and the ongoing attraction they have for many Tibetan Buddhist practitioners are in part a response to pressure applied by the political and cultural environment and the weakening role of the monasteries as the leading centers of religious instruction and education. However, they have also become popular destinations among practitioners, monastic and lay alike, because of the high quality of the education and instruction they offer, something difficult to acquire in monasteries in the past two decades. The revitalization of religious communities like the religious encampments and of activities such as Treasure revelation represent a growing need on the part of Buddhist practitioners to find sources of authority, legitimacy, and prestige in places other than the formal religious institutions recognized by the government. The suppression of traditional education and instruction in monastic institutions, following years of repressive religious policies by the CCP under MarxistLeninist ideology, often forces religious practitioners, above all monks and nuns, to look elsewhere for reliable and experienced teachers. These circumstances are shaped by three interdependent factors. First, the expulsion of monks and nuns in the years of the Cultural Revolution, 1960-1977, resulted in a 90 percent decrease in the number of monastic residents. Second, the political campaigns beginning in the early 1990s that were aimed at the reeducation of Tibetans in general and of monks and nuns specifically, targeted monastic institutions, and have inevitably diluted the quality of religious culture and damaged the basis of Buddhist knowledge in which scholasticism and contemplation experience are traditionally considered as fundamental aspects of monastic religious curricula. Third, since the assimilation of Tibet into the PRC, a significant portion of the religious population has left Tibet, leading to a lack of experienced and traditionally trained Tibetan religious teachers and scholars. They left behind a land now experiencing a dramatic shortage of primary human sources of traditional knowledge and education. Religious Identity and the Growing Visibility of Buddhist Encampments After the emigrations, many monasteries and nunneries were left without their abbots, leaders, and teachers. Traditional instruction and practice were forbidden 748 Antonio Terrone Fig. 3: A view of the Buddhist center Thub bstan chos ’khor gling also known as Lung sngon sgar in dGa’ bde (Ch. Gande) in mGo log (Qinghai), June 2005. (Photo by Antonio Terrone) and monasteries doomed to abandonment and decay. In the highlands of Kham and Amdo, however, religious encampments are developing as large communities exceeding formal monastic centers in both size and resident population. As seen above, the PRC now shows some tolerance towards the rehabilitation of religious practices, above all popular forms of religious activities that carry no threats to the stability and unity of the country, but in Tibet, the priority of the Chinese authorities has been to control places of religious activities by every means. The number of novices per year, their education and instruction, the age and the procedures of enrolment—everything has to comply with a rigid and strict set of rules established and dictated by the central Chinese government and rigorously controlled by local authorities.34 Coercive measures and religious suppression have been maintained over traditional monastic institutions and nunneries in central Tibet (TAR) and in Kham and Amdo alike. Secular disciplines of patriotic education and political instruction have been forcefully inserted into monastic curricula traditionally considered the only way to pursue spiritual achievement and religious (both Buddhist and Bon) acculturation. It is within the framework of this coercive cultural stagnation that the religious encampments have gained more popularity as a form of religious gathering. 34 Goldstein describes very well the revival of monastic life in central Tibet in his article with a case study on the revival of religious activities in ’Bras spungs monastery in Lhasa. See Goldstein, “The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung Monastery,” in Buddhism in Contemporary Tibet, 15-52. See Charlene E. Makley, The Violence of Liberation, for a study of Labrang monastery in post-Mao era’s Amdo. Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 749 The development of such monastic or quasi-monastic communities of monastics and lay people outside the authority of monasteries and nunneries for the traditional study and practice of the Buddhist doctrine in the last two decades is one of the most remarkable aspects of the revival of religious expression in eastern Tibet. Some Tibetan Buddhist masters of the rNying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism, such as Nam sprul ’Jigs med phun tshogs (b. 1944) and bDe chen ’od gsal rdo rje (b. 1921), have been particularly successful in present-day Kham in their attempt to maintain Buddhist practice and to reconstitute the network of traditional patterns of religious education, especially in accordance with the teaching triad of authorization of reading (lung), empowerment (dbang), and instruction (khrid) considered fundamental within the traditional religious training of the Tibetan Vajrayana system. As an example we have the interesting case of the teaching activity of the non-celibate Tantric master Pad ma gtum po, also known as sKyabs rje sKu gsum gling pa rin po che (b. 1934) who founded and developed Lung mngon sgar, a religious community in dGa’ bde (Dar par lag county) that nowadays houses more than three thousand resident monastics and lay devotees, including Han Chinese. At Lung mngon sgar, as in many of today’s religious encampments, there is a major focus on a curriculum of traditional monastic disciplines for monks, usually disseminated by a number of resident mkhan po, or seminary teachers. However, in addition, sKu gsum gling pa rin po che has also established a Tantric college (sngags pa grwa tshang) where non-celibate Tantric practitioners, including a group of young children, study more specifically Tantric material, such as the snying thig system of rdzogs chen (the Great Perfection) and especially the texts that sKu gsum gling pa has revealed as Treasures.35 This way of conferring teachings and instruction to Buddhist monastics and laypeople constitutes the backbone of the religious education system in Tibet, just as the teacherpupil relationship forms the only way to access Buddhist Tantric training.36 Religious assemblies of both monastics and lay practitioners around charismatic figures during periods of teachings, empowerments, or during the establishment of new semi-monastic communities is a practice that was quite common in pre-1959 Tibet. Religious encampments (chos sgar) appeared already in the fourteenth century in Tibet and were mostly associated with the activities of the Karma bKa’ brgyud school of Tibetan Buddhism. It was especially under the leadership of the fourth Karma pa Rol pa’i rdo rje (1340-1383) that large outdoor religious (chos) encampments (sgar) were organized on the occasion of his public teachings and empowerments and became known by the name of the great religious encampments of the 35 For a source on Pad ma gtum po’s life and activities see A bu dkar lo, O rgyan sku gsum gling pa’i rnam thar (Hong Kong: Tianma chubanshe, 2003). A shorter version of the biography written in Portuguese is available on line on the website of the Düdül Phurpa Ling Center at http://kilaya.dharmanet.com.br/brindex.htm. I am currently working on an English translation of sKu gsum gling pa’s biography (rnam thar), and I have included more on this gter ston in my Ph.D. dissertation. For the snying thig system see below note 53. 36 The Chinese government policies about religion and culture are noticeable also among other so-called “ethnic minorities” (shaoshu minzu); especially affected are the Uighur people of Xinjiang Autonomous Region. For a study of the situation of Muslim communities in the PRC see Gladney, Dislocating China. 750 Antonio Terrone Karma bKa’ brgyud (karma pa’i chos tshogs sgar chen).37 However the particular formation of the current ones, the size of some among them, as well as the growing number found in eastern Tibet are recent phenomena. In part today’s religious encampments can also be seen as an adaptation to the strict controls that have been placed on traditional monasteries and religious practitioners in general since the early 1980s and in particular since the 1996 “patriotic education” (Tib. rgyal gces slob gso, Ch. aiguo jiaoyu) campaigns. Government-driven patriotic education remains in effect today in most of the monasteries and nunneries of Tibet and is directed towards instructing and testing all monks, nuns and teachers in every monastery and nunnery across the Tibetan plateau on the “correct” view of religion, law, history, and the Dalai Lama within a socialist theoretical background. Work teams of Communist Party cadre/leaders, both Chinese and Tibetan, conduct study sessions lasting from a few weeks up to three months at the monastic institutions. Limits on the numbers of monks and nuns are also enforced by the work teams. It should be noted that in March 1998, the program was extended to schools and to the “citizens” of Tibet. However, the phenomenon of religious encampments also needs to be seen in part as a natural need for Tibetans to maintain their traditional freedom of movement necessary to continue the transmission of traditional patterns of Buddhist practice and gathering. The requirements of the Chinese government for all Chinese citizens to conform to the hukou (Tib. them tho), or household registration system has contributed to making the maintenance of Tibetan monastic system difficult.38 One of major characteristics of Tibetan Buddhist training and practice is the encouragement to receive different teachings during one’s spiritual development 37 For an informative overview of the great religious assemblies of the Karma bKa’ brgyud see Thub bstan phun tshogs’s “Karma pa’i chos tshogs sgar chen ’dzam gling zhes pa’i skor mdor bsdus stam brjod pa” [A brief discussion on the Karmapa’s great religious assemblies known as the ornaments of the world], Krung go’i bod kyi shes rig 1 (1993): 52-65. 38 The huji zhidu or “system of household registration” (also called hukou in Chinese) was established in the PRC in 1950 as one of the early policies in the aftermaths of the formation of the new Republic in order for the Chinese government to apply a stronger control over its population and keep an eye on internal population migrations. Within the new wave of government reforms and open market economy the system was weakened and internal migration encouraged, but the hukou system restrictions continue to affect the people of the PRC. This is especially true for ethnic groups for whom hukou identification is in many cases still applied. A number of scholarly studies of the hukou system have appeared both in the PRC and abroad, especially on the impact of the migration from countryside to urban areas of China on the economy of the country. See, for instance, Kam Wing Chan, “Zhongguo huji zhidu gaige he chengxian renkou qianyi” [Chinese hukou reforms and the rural-urban migration], Zhongguo laodong jingji (China Labor Economics) 1 (2004): 108-23. For an English translation of the article see Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, “The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration: Processes and Changes,” The China Quarterly 160.1 (1999): 818-55 (available at http://courses.washington.edu/chinageo/Chan-Zhang-CQ.PDF). The two articles above can be also downloaded in PDF format at the website of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China: http://www.cecc.gov/ pages/roundtables/090205/index.php. See also Fei-ling Wang, Organization through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 751 not only from the pupil’s root teacher (rtsa ba’i bla ma) in one’s home monastery, but also from other teachers, specializing in different doctrines or sets of practices, who often live far from the monastery or in other regions of the country. With the restrictions imposed by the hukou system of population registration, the Tibetans monastic population found itself constrained and limited in its movements across the land and therefore unable to continue the traditional forms of religious education. With the more tolerant attitude shown by the central government and local authorities concerning religious practice, Buddhist leaders regained visibility in Tibet and many began to reconstruct the sacred geographical landscape of their land and the religious structures that were heavily attacked in the past. In this atmosphere monks and nuns began to regain confidence and move around the country in search of authentic teachers and places for practice. They would thus gather around the teacher and establish themselves in the new setting, starting to build individual huts and cells in order to attend his teachings and to practice according to his instructions. Many monks and nuns living in the religious encampments today stay there for relatively short periods of time, three or four years, but sometimes much longer. Bla rung sgar,39 the religious encampment and mountain retreat (ri khrod) center established by mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs,40 offers the title of mkhan po (seminary teacher), which is an advanced study degree, to those monks—nuns can receive the title of mkhan mo—who, after a period of usually six to seven years, have proved their mastery in certain disciplines, such as basic traditional treatises on logic and epistemology, philosophy, and monastic discipline.41 One of the main reasons for the success of the religious encampments (chos sgar) in today’s Tibet is that great effort and emphasis is put on religious instruction, which is provided according to a traditional pattern. The triad of empowerment, teachings, and instructions is respected in order to establish a consistent and gradual way of learning and practicing that is otherwise hard to accomplish. Despite a degree of tolerance shown by the authorities, repression occurs, as is shown by the history of Bla rung sgar. mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs, one of the most active religious figures in modern Tibet in the maintenance of traditional patterns of religious instruction, was born in Kham and when he was still a child he was recognized as the reincarnation of Las rab gling pa (1856-1926) one of the 39 Bla rung lnga rig nang bstan slob gling (Larung Five Sciences Buddhist Academy) lies nearly ten kilometers from gSer rta township in Sichuan in dKar mdzes (Ch. Ganzi) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture. 40 For a study of mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs and his religious encampment (chos sgar) Bla rung sgar see Germano’s “Re-membering.” In the last few years various NGOs and human rights agencies have produced reports of the 2001 incidents at Bla rung sgar and the situation in similar religious encampments in Tibet. See for instance ICT, When the Sky Fell to Earth; and Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), Destruction of Serthar Institute: A Report, 2002. 41 It represents the peak of scholastic training, in rNying ma academies, for those monks who complete the study program, which often includes epistemology and philosophy, together with disciplines such as grammar, poetry, composition, but also painting, and often medicine. 752 Antonio Terrone most famous gter ston of Tibet. After having embraced religious life, he founded the Buddhist center gSang chen ’od skur grol ba’i dben khrod, also known as Bla rung lnga rig nang bstan slob gling or simply Bla rung sgar in gSer rta in 1980. In August 2001 a series of inspection visits by Chinese authorities to Bla rung sgar targeted nuns and monks who were found to lack valid residence permits according to the hukou registration system. Those staying at the encampment without permits were forced to leave and their cells were destroyed. mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs was reported ill and was accompanied to Chengdu where he was hospitalized until 2002. Repeated checks and demolitions occurred through the next few years until 2004, the year when mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs died, in an effort by the authorities to keep a tight control on the number of monastics living in the compound. This level of suppression demonstrates the powerful valence that religious encampments such as Bla rung sgar have taken on for Tibetan cultural and religious identity. The loose organization of the religious encampments, the absence of a strict set of rules regarding enrolment, monastic affiliation, number of resident monks and nuns, and the eclectic nature of the encampments, contributed to the success of the activities of this kind of religious center as one of the most significant religious movements of Tibet in the twentieth century. Teachings are usually delivered by mkhan po, who coordinate and provide basic and advanced instruction to small clusters of monks or nuns, most often segregated according to their place of origin. Monks and nuns assemble in the main assembly hall of the encampment only occasionally for formal general teachings by the leader of the encampment. Monks and nuns live in separate quarters, but usually attend the same meetings, sitting in separate sections of the main hall. These quasi-monastic religious encampments made up of Tibetan monks and nuns from all across Tibet as well as a significant number of Chinese students and devotees form around charismatic masters and are often located in remote areas often far from local government cadres. Usually none of the encampments has a significant tie to a pre-1959 monastic institution—hence the lack of any history of conflict with the central government; they are not “re-built” monasteries that had been destroyed during the Cultural Revolution. These religious encampments are not administered or run as traditional monasteries but rather function more as secluded meditation retreat centers. As a result of the continuous arrival of monks and nuns from their home monasteries and convents, as well as laypeople attracted by the chance to gain access to the religious education and instruction these places offer, most of the encampments have grown by the hundreds every year. The number of monks and nuns at these encampments varies greatly: from a few hundred or fewer in small encampments and mountain hermitages, as in the case of the sKyabs rje Rig ’dzin nyi ma’s Tsung shar ri khrod and Nam sprul ’Jigs med phun tshogs’s sNyan lung sgar, to five thousand or more as in the case of Ya chen bsam gtan gling (also known as Ya chen sgar) in Khrom thar in dKar mdzes county in Sichuan and an estimated ten thousand monks and nuns that lived in small meditation huts at Bla rung sgar in the year 2000.42 42 Among the best known Buddhist encampments are Thub bstan chos skor gling (also Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 753 What is found in these encampments is, above all, what we may call “spiritual gravitation,” a draw for thousands of monks and nuns who cannot find adequate Buddhist instruction elsewhere. Coercive measures such as regular patriotic education and political indoctrination aimed at religious practitioners have proved to be difficult to carry out in the encampments of eastern Tibet. They are unconventional in the sense that they remain outside established patterns of religious institution that Chinese officials are accustomed to controlling. The monastics do not gather for daily chanting sessions as at most other monasteries and nunneries. Rather, the monastic body gathers as a whole only when teachings and empowerments are being given. A loose organizational hierarchy prevails at these encampments, as opposed to the more rigid system of traditional monasteries in Tibet. The prominent incarnate lamas who give religious authority to the encampments try to avoid any administrative role. Nearly all the teachers at the encampments offer teachings in an ecumenical style, as opposed to the sectarianism that is found among some Tibetan Buddhist teachers. This teaching style allows for a much wider pool of disciples because students can come from any region and any school (including rNying ma, dGe lugs, Sa skya, bKa’ brgyud, Jo nang pa, Bon as well as Chinese Buddhists) to study, and then return to their home areas to practice and often teach younger monks. The extent to which the religious encampments are a popular destination for monastics interested in enriching their religious training in a traditional and nonsectarian environment in Tibet can be better understood if we reflect on the attention that they have attracted in the last four years from Chinese authorities concerned about the dimensions of such religious gatherings, the adherence to traditional and pre-1959 forms of religious transmission and authority, their support of H.H. the Dalai Lama, the potential for development of strong sense of cultural and religious identity, and how other similar encampments have developed in Tibet in the past two decades. Bla rung sgar and Ya chen sgar are examples of what happens when there is a perceived threat to the political—i.e., questioning the political authority of the central government. Both encampments experienced mass expulsion of monks and nuns, and both saw the demolition of thousands of monastic quarters carried out or ordered by government personnel.43 known as Lung mngon sgar in dGa’ bde [Ch. Gande]) led by Padma gtum po (also known as sKu gsum gling pa, b. 1933); sNyan lung sgar in gSer rta sNyan lung led by Nam sprul ’Jigs med phun tshogs (b. 1944) and the late Tåre lha mo (1938–2003); ’Brug khyung sgar, in Them chen (Qinghai), led by gTer ston Kun bzang grags pa (date of birth not available); and Nyag bla sgar (also known as Nyag bla dgon), established in Go ’jo by gTer ston Nyag bla byang chub rdo rje (1926–ca. 1978). Other religious centers associated with the Treasure revelation tradition, but smaller in terms of size and resident monastic population are rDza mer chen dgon in Shar mda’ in Nang chen county, residence of gTer chen bDe chen ’od gsal rdo rje (b. 1921), Tsung shar ri khrod, founded and run by sKyab rje Rig ’dzin nyi ma (b. 1931) in sNyan lung in gSer rta, A ’dzoms sgar in dPal yul led by A ’dzoms pad lo rin po che (b. 1971), also known as A ’dzoms rgyal sras pad ma dbang rgyal, and the Ral gzhung chu dkar dgon founded and run by the late rDo rung Karma (?-2002) ’Jo mda’, Chab mdo Prefecture. 43 Major instances of the attention paid by Chinese and Tibetan political leaders to uncontrolled religious groups and restriction of religious activities are the cases of mKhan po 754 Antonio Terrone While such encampments are among the most popular and growing centers of religious practice in Tibet today in terms of numbers of resident monastic population and lay followers, religious instruction, and their leaders’ activities, less known and smaller religious communities are also currently active in Tibetan areas of northern Kham. There is an indefinite number of religious practitioners and Buddhist teachers who lead a more secluded and therefore scarcely publicly active way of life, yet who have a following that plays a central social role in their local community. Living mainly in hermitages and mountain retreat centers, the major focus of their religious activities is an austere lifestyle characterized by meditation and the performance of a variety of Tantric rituals—often for the welfare of villages and individuals for whom they provide spiritual advice. In short, one can see that the phenomenon of the revival of the religious encampments is closely associated with three responses to the political restrictions applied by the government: first, a desire to avoid controls on enrolment in and the content of instruction; second, a search for teachers to replace those who fled Tibet after 1959; and finally, appreciation of the accessibility of the encampments and the diversity of instruction offered. Thus the encampments emerge as an alternative form of religious gathering, study academies, and adaptation to Buddhist practice. A phenomenon worth noting when discussing present-day religious encampments and the increased visibility of their leaders is the production and diffusion of a variety of worship material that in the recent years has contributed to the popularity of Buddhist teachers. Pins, pendants, watches, statues, posters, photos, and picture books, as well as introductory brochures, manuals of spiritual advice, prayer books, and media technology such as audio cassettes, VCDs, and DVDs can be found in many towns and villages of Kham, and nowadays also in Lhasa in some stalls in the Bar skor circular road around the Jokhang temple.44 The distribution of these goods and worship items has undeniably increased the popularity of figures such as mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs and Lung rtogs rgyal mtshan, as well as added charm to their activities. ’Jigs med phun tshogs and the destruction of his gSer rta institute as we have already mentioned, and that of Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan (also known as mKhan po A khyug) the current leader of Ya chen sgar in Khrom thar in dKar mdzes county. The events which saw the demolition of large portions of the two encampments have been reported and analyzed extensively in the Western media and in reports by Tibet-monitoring organizations such as ICT (International Campaign for Tibet), and TIN (Tibet Information Network). For an overview of the events it may be useful also to refer to Tibetan Centre for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD), Destruction of Serthar Institute: A Special Report, 2002. For an overview and remarks on the revived monastic activities in Tibet, see Melvin Goldstein, “The Revival of Monastic Life in Drepung Monastery,” 15-52. 44 In November 2004 bronze and clay statues representing mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs, were on sale in a shop selling Tibetan statues along Wuhousi road near the Dar rtse mdo’i mgron khang (Kangding binguan) in Chengdu, Sichuan. In the same area wristwatches with the portrait of mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs were on sale in a small Indo-Tibetan goods store. Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 755 The gter ma Tradition Besides the factors illustrated above it should not be forgotten that a major factor fostering the popularity of the religious encampments is the charismatic quality of their leaders. Virtually all of today’s leaders of the religious encampments claim to be Treasure revealers (gter ston) and are known for having discovered many different Treasure (gter ma) items and revealed various cycles of visionary teachings. According to the rNying ma tradition the origins of the transmission of Treasures in Tibet are primarily associated with the deeds and religious activities performed by the Indian master Padmasambhava, known more popularly in Tibet by the name of Guru Rinpoche (Precious Master), or Padma ’byung gnas (The Lotus-Born One). The phenomenon of Treasure concealement, therefore, seems to stem from the eighth century when the then king of Tibet, Khri srong lde’u btsan (756-797),45 invited Padmasambhava to Tibet under specific advice of the Buddhist master Íantarakßita (known in Tibetan as mKhan po Bodhisattva). The task of Padmasambhava was to remove the negative forces opposing the king’s plan to convert the land to Buddhism by subduing the many autochthonous deities and demons (lha ’dre) opposed to the introduction of the new religion on Tibetan soil. Padmasambhava is generally considered to be not only the introducer of Tantric Buddhism into Tibet, but also, especially by the rNying ma school, the “second Buddha” (sangs rgyas gnyis pa) who conferred empowerments and teachings and established the first community of monastics and lay practitioners in bSam yas.46 According to traditional sources, it was specifically during his years in Tibet that Padmasambhava realized the necessity of hiding numerous religious items and implements, and teachings, concealing material objects in various different receptacles in Tibet, such as pillars, trees, boulders, caves, and lakes, and transferring verbal teachings into the minds of his disciples.47 45 Chronology is one of the major problems in the study of Tibetan dynastic period and therefore the dates regarding the dates of birth and death and the reigns of early Tibetan kings are subject to debate. Refer to Christopher I. Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987): 229. 46 Padmasambhava, more popularly known in Tibet by the name of Guru Rinpoche, is traditionally believed by the rNying ma school to have turned the malignant deities of the Bon tradition into protectors (chos skyong, srung ma) of the Buddha Dharma and founded the bSam yas monastery in southern Tibet. For an account of how Padmasambhava was invited to Tibet and the request by King Khri srong lde’u bstan to subdue the lha ’dre beings see the Padma bka’ thang (Chengdu: Sichuan Natinalities Publishing House, 1987): 267-351. For an English version see Ye shes mtsho rgyal, The Life Liberation of Padmasambhava, edited by Thartang Tulku and translated by Kenneth Douglas and Gyendolyn Bays, 2 vols. (Berkeley, CA: Dharma Publishing, 1978). 47 See for instance Thu’u bkwan Blo bzang chos kyi nyi ma, Thu’u bkwan grub mtha’ (Langzhou: Gansu minzu chubanshe, 1984, 67-69): “Padmasambhava and some of his authorized disciples hid some supreme and extraordinary advices as Treasures (gter du sbas) for the welfare of the disciples of the future, blessed them without sparing a single one, and appointed the Treasures to guardians, expressing the hope that fortunate and karmically positive beings would find them. Looking at the way signs appear in the suitable discovery 756 Antonio Terrone A crucial expedient in the success of Padmasambhava’s enterprise was the formulation of the expectation that these teachings would be rediscovered on various occasions in the future by those who were to become reincarnations of his disciples and that they would retrieve and diffuse the teachings for the specific purpose of supporting the Buddhist doctrine and the spiritual interests of human beings at various times. Tibetans refer to this period of introduction of the Buddhist doctrine in the land as “early diffusion” (snga dar), as opposed to “later diffusion” (phyi dar) which started in the tenth century, and call “early translations” (snga ’gyur) the activities of translation of ancient Indic Tantric material which the rNying ma school later assimilated into its canon. The Treasure revelation tradition is associated with the activities of the first gter ston who appeared between the tenth and twelfth centuries—figures such as Sangs rgyas bla ma (ca 1000-1080), Nyang ral nyi ma ’od zer (1124-1192) and later on with Guru Chos dbang (1212-1273).48 Many gter ston have appeared since then and most of them have been recognized as great masters. Their revealed works have been incorporated into what is known as the rNying ma rgyud ’bum, the rNying ma Canon of Tantric Teachings, of which Ratna gling pa (1403-1478) was one of the most important editors. Therefore, one of the Treasure revelation tradition’s most important notions is the constant reaffirmation of its relation with the semilegendary and idealized “golden era” of Tibetan imperial or dynastic history. With the revelation of the Maˆi bka’ ’bum, for instance, a historical work whose composition is attributed directly to King Srong btsan sgam po (or Khri srong btsan, 618-641)49 himself and later revealed by several Treasure discoverers, among them Nyang ral nyi ma ’od zer, the Treasure revelation movement began to shape the ideology of continuity denoting and claiming direct descent from the imperial past and the dynastic ancestry.50 The gter ma revelation movement is particularly attached to the time at the time of their finding, all the Treasure discoverers (gter ston) have their name, family, and signs inserted in the Treasure list (gter gyi kha byang). One day when human beings gather and the Treasure is extracted and diffused to many fortunate ones, this will be known as Treasure teaching (gter chos).” 48 Eva Dargyay, The Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet, 97-119. See also Dudjom Rinpoche, The Nyingma School of Tibetan Buddhism: Its Fundamentals and History, vol. 1, trans. Gyurme Dorje and Matthew Kapstein (Boston: Wisdom, 1991). 49 Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire, 227. 50 gTer ston Grub thob dngos grub is considered by many Tibetan scholars the principal discoverer of the Maˆi bka’ ’bum. However the source of the discovery is also attributed at the same time to Nyang ral nyi ma ’od zer and rJe btsun Shåkya bzang po. Cf. Matthew Kapstein, “Remarks on the Mani bKa’-’bum and the Cult of Avalokitesvara in Tibet,” in Tibetan Buddhism: Reason and Revelation, eds. Ronald Davidson and Steven Goodman (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992): 79-93, 81, and Per K. Sørensen, Tibetan Buddhist Historiography: The Mirror Illuminating the Royal Genealogies. An Annotated Translation of the XIVth Century Tibetan Chronicle: rGyal-rabs gsal-ba’i me-long (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz Verlag, 1994): 8. For references concerning biographical notes of gter ston see above all Guru bkra shis, bsTan pa’i snying po gsang chen snga ’gyur nges don zab mo’i chos kyi ’byung ba gsal bar byed pa’i legs bshad mkhas pa dga’ byed mngo mtshar gtam gyi rol mtsho (Gu bkra’i chos ’byung) (Beijing: Krung go’i bod kyi shes rig dpe skrun Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 757 when the numerous tribes and clans of the land were first unified under the rule of King Srong btsan sgam po. At that time, the first attempts were made to introduce Buddhism into the land, mainly as a court religion, which was further fostered by the royal marriage between the king and the Chinese princess from the Tang court and the Nepalese princess. Under their patronage the first Buddhist statues and constructions were set up in central Tibet.51 Another crucial aspect of the Treasure revelation tradition is the notion of a dark or “degenerate age” (snyigs dus) of Tibet, which is often emphasized in the articulation of a narrative discourse to provide legitimacy to the tradition itself. The concealment of Treasures apparently was motivated by the eclipse of the socio-political order in the ninth century, when the new rule threatened the very existence of Buddhism itself and the diffusion of its teachings came under strong persecution. The revelation of the Treasures represents in the final analysis attempts to reconnect, at least ideologically, with the cultural milieu of the early diffusion of the Buddhism in the land, and to revalorize the imperial grandeur of Tibetan civilization showing, to put it in Giuseppe Tucci’s words “the yearning for a restoration of ancient times, a proof of national revival.” 52 Why is Treasure revelation so crucial today? The form of religious continuity offered by the Treasure tradition and the charismatic power that Treasure revealers are able to generate mirror the need for many Tibetans to connect with their common historical past and to maintain a distinctive cultural and religious identity, especially in times of continual socio-political changes. A growing number of Tibetans consider these charismatic figures high practitioners, scrupulous teachers, and gter ma revealers. The term gter ston, Treasure revealer, defines a person who, by virtue of karmic connections with Padmasambhava and his direct disciples can retrieve religious items and scriptural teachings as material earth Treasures (sa gter) and reveal cycles of teachings as mental Treasures (dgongs gter) through visionary activity. Leaving aside the spiritual attainments and the fame of these religious figures’ knowledge and wisdom, much of these leaders’ charismatic influence stems from their ability to retrieve Treasures items and teachings (gter chos) and therefore to represent a direct connection with Tibet’s glorious past and to reestablish a religious narrative associated with Tibet’s dynastic era and imperial supremacy. However, in addition to claims of Treasure revelation and the discovery of series of Treasures (gter ma) of various types, their charismatic status is reinforced by the biographies, autobiographies, and also collected works (gsung ’bum) of some of these major teachers that are widely available to the public.53 This is notable because the khang, 1990, reprint 1998): 372-73. See also f. 41b of ’Jams mgon kong sprul blo gros mtha’ yas, Zab mo’i gter dang gter ston grub thob ji ltar byon pa’i lo rgyus mdor bsdus bkod pa rin chen bai du r.ya’i phreng ba, in Rin chen gter mdzod chen mo (Paro: Ngodrup & Sherap Drimay, 1976). 51 For an overview of Tibetan empire under Srong btsan sgam po see Chapter 1 in Beckwith, The Tibetan Empire, 11-36. 52 Giuseppe Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls (Rome: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato, 1949): 112. 53 For a biography of Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan, see the third volume of his three-volume collected works, gDod ma’i mgon po grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan dpal bzang 758 Antonio Terrone distribution of the biographies of active teachers contributes to the knowledge of their deeds and therefore increases their popularity among devotees. By claiming to be Treasure revealers these masters associate themselves with the period of the introduction of Buddhism in the land of Tibet, giving voice to Padmasambhava’s predicted decline of the doctrine and rise of the teachings through the revelations of past teachings. They are all known in varying degrees for their revelations of Treasures in material forms as well as in mental or spiritual forms. They also tend to adopt a more syncretistic or eclectic approach than do more conventional teachers associated with specific schools. Their contemplation activities adhere mainly to the rdzogs chen tradition of religious practice and principally the snying thig system.54 po’i gsum ’bum (Khrom thar, 2004) and Phur pa bKra shis and ’Brug rgyal’s rJe bka’ drin mtshungs med grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan mdzad bsdus lha rnga’i sgra dbyangs (Sichuan: Ya chen Monastery, no date of publication available). A number of biographies of mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs have been written in the past ten years. The most popular one is the one written by mKhan po bSod dar rgyas, bsTan ’dzin rgya mtsho, and Tshul khrims blo gros, sNyigs dus bstan pa’i gsal byed gcis pu chos rje dam pa yid bzhin nor bu ’jigs med phun tshogs ’byung gnas dpal bzang po’i rnam thar bsdus pa gsos sman (gSer rta: Bla rung internal publication, 1988). An English translation of the biography has become available recently, see Arnaud Versluys (trans.), Biography of H.H. Jigmey Phuntsok Dharmaraja (Hong Kong: Hua Xia Cultural Publishing House, 2001). A biography of Nam sprul ’jigs med phun tshogs and Tåre lha mo was written in 1997. See Padma ’od gsal mtha’ yas, Nam sprul ’jigs med phun tshogs dang mkha’ ’gro tå re lha mo’i rnam thar (Chengdu: Sichuan minzu chubanshe, 1997). For the biography of O rgyan sku gsum gling pa see the recently published A bu dkar lo, O rgyan sku gsum gling pa’i rnam thar. Regarding O rgyan sku gsum gling pa, it is also interesting to note that websites have been opened on the Internet and information about his activities both in the PRC and abroad are accessible both in Chinese and English. Information technology is more accessible in the PRC today and more Tibetan teachers, including Treasure revealers, are employing it in order to publicize their activities and their teachings. See http://hungkar.com for the Chinese website, and http://www.omura.com/k_lingpa/ klingpa.htm for the English language website. 54 The snying thig (The Seminal Heart or Heart-essence) is a system of teachings on Buddhist Tantric meditation and liturgy that was allegedly diffused and transmitted in Tibet in dynastic times (eighth to ninth century). Belonging to the larger class of the rdzogs chen, Great Perfection tradition, the snying thig teachings are believed to be associated with the semi-legendary figures of Padmasambhava, dGa’ rab rdo rje, and Vimalamitra and have been revealed in different versions in the form of dgongs gter by Treasure revealers starting from the tenth and eleventh centuries. In the fourteenth century the great scholar Klong chen rab ’byams pa dri med ’od zer (1308-1364) worked on the redaction and systematization of the various traditions of the snying thig teachings and brought it into a single corpus. Additionally in the eighteenth century the great gter ston ’Jigs med gling pa (1730-1798) revealed the Klong chen snying thig (The Seminal Heart of the Great Expanse), a series of teachings related to the snying thig tradition, which together with the scriptures by Klong chen rab ’byams pa has significantly influenced the practice of the rdzogs chen system until today. For a history of the rdzogs chen system see Samten Karmay, The Great Perfection (rDzogs chen): A Philosophical and Meditative Teaching of Tibetan Buddhism (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1988); and David Germano, Poetic Thought, the Intelligent Universe, and the Mystery of Self: The Tantric Synthesis of Rdzogs Chen in Fourteenth Century Tibet (Ph.D. diss., University of Wisconsin, 1992), and “Architecture and Absence in the Secret Tantric History of the Great Perfection (rdzogs chen),” Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 17.2 (1994): 203-335, among others. For a study Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 759 Many of today’s Treasure revelations take place publicly in the presence of congregations of devotees and followers, and printed material has been disseminated with photos of their discoveries (mostly religious objects) along with short accounts of their finders’ lives. I suggest that an important facet of the Treasure revealers’ high degree of success in attracting students, practitioners and devotees is their charismatic stature enhanced by the association of the Treasure revelation movement with Tibet’s golden age of Imperial glory and flourishing Buddhist life.55 As in the case of the “degenerate age” of Tibet’s past so much discussed in Tibetan traditional historical literature, this new resurgence of Treasure discovery has thus empowered contemporary teachers and represents a religious renaissance in the face of the hardships and eclipse caused by the new political and social order in post 1959 Tibet.56 The notion of the rise and fall of the Buddhist teachings is a central theme in the entire narrative of Treasure revelation. Earth Treasures (sa gter), and especially Treasure teachings (gter chos), are expected to have a crucial function at a certain time in the future. Due to the remedial and irruptive nature of Treasures in time of difficulties associated with the decline of Buddhism and human hardships, each revelation is meant to be specifically beneficial in the time of its revelation and dissemination. In terms of practice, the Treasure revealer is also its disseminator. Therefore, the charismatic authority expressed by Treasure revealers is associated with and significantly shaped by their knowledge of the appropriate religious means to apply to a specific moment in time. Additionally, it is important to remember that one of the major features of gter ma revelation is its profound link with the Tibetan soil, where it participates in the shaping and reshaping of Tibet’s sacred geography. Although some of the religious of ’Jigs med gling pa’s biography and the revelation of the Klong chen snying thig see Steven D. Goodman, “Rig ’dzin ’Jigs-med gling-pa and the kLong-chen sNying-Thig,” in Tibetan Buddhism: Reason and Revelation, 133-146; and Janet Gyatso, Apparitions of the Self. 55 See Germano, “Re-membering.” 56 Despite the lack of consistent textual evidence of the specific events transpiring between the eighth and ninth centuries, scholars agree in confirming the persecutions of Bon in the eighth century and Buddhism in the ninth century, which forced the adherents of both religions to hide texts and sacred objects to prevent their destruction. Much of the later developments of both Bon and rNying ma traditions are indeed connected to this reaction to the threat of the destruction of their texts and religious articles. Within such a context we should consider the presumed eighth century deeds of Padmasambhava and the necessity of early Buddhist practitioners to look for innovative means of hiding their textual material as strategies elaborated to prevent a complete downfall of Buddhism in the land. As dynastic rule became unstable in the aftermath of king Glang dar ma’s (836-842) assassination, the political arena was saturated with internal debates, social turmoil, and power struggles. With the subsequent collapse of the empire, the royal lineage lost its relevance, and the Buddhist elite was weakened. This social crisis was to last at least a hundred years and the late ninth and early tenth centuries were a nebulous period of political decay, economic crisis, and social unrest. The persecution of Buddhism was particularly focused in central Tibet where early monastic communities were dispersed, temples were left unattended and ritual practice forbidden. The gradual discovery of the texts hidden during those years allowed in later centuries for the constitution of a distinctive rNying ma canon, the rNying ma rgyud ’bum. 760 Antonio Terrone teachings actually go back to Indic material imported into Tibet, originally in the eighth century and later in the tenth and eleventh centuries, the gter ma tradition is significantly embedded in the cultural milieu of Tibet, to such an extent that, as in the case of another national icon, the Tibetan heroic figure of Gesar of Gling, the Treasure revelation and its cult is one of the factors contributing to a Tibetan sense of identity and nationalism.57 Chinese Buddhist Devotees in Tibet The influence of such activities of charismatic leadership and religious control and their appeal to the faithful has reached beyond the Tibetan people and territory. An increasing number of Han Chinese Buddhist practitioners and tourists now travel yearly to Tibet to visit, live, and practice in Tibetan Buddhist monasteries and religious centers. It is therefore rather common to find in religious encampments in Tibetan regions Chinese monks, nuns, and laypeople, not only from mainland China, but also from Taiwan and South-East Asian countries such as Singapore.58 The increasing visibility of Tibetan Buddhism on the Chinese spiritual scene is mainly shaped by two key factors. First, fascination with Tibetan Buddhism and especially the increased popularity of some Tibetan Buddhist teachers is a growing phenomenon among the Chinese. Second, a general need for spirituality, noticeable in the reemergence of religion in China proper and the birth of new faiths and religious congregations, seems to be pervasive among today’s Chinese.59 57 For an analysis of such issues, see George Dreyfus, “Le Nationalisme: Entre mémoires glorifiées et identité collective,” in Tibétains: 1949-1999: 40 ans de colonisation, eds. Katia Buffetrille and Charles Ramble (Paris: Éditions Autrement, 1998): 21-57. See also Germano, “Re-membering,” 60-61; G. Dreyfus, “Proto-Nationalism in Tibet,” in Tibetan Studies: Proceedings of the 6th International Association of Tibetan Studies Seminar, ed. Per Kværne, 2 vols. (Oslo: Institute for Comparative Research in Human Culture, 1994): vol. 1, 205-218. AnneMarie Blondeau’s comments on Tibetan nationalism and Treasures are equally insightful, especially in her critique of Dreyfus’s arguments. See her essay: “Les bKa’ thang et la question du nationalisme tibétain,” Annuaire de la section des Sciences Religieuses (EPHE), tome 109 (2000-2001): 116-119. 58 In the aftermath of the economic reforms some prominent Tibetan Buddhists set off on pilgrimage journeys across the country and Han regions, and in some cases also abroad. A case in point is the long journey of mKhan po ’Jigs med phun tshogs who traveled both to South-east Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Singapore, and to Europe and the United States. During such travels abroad Tibetan teachers would make new proselytes and new devotees who would later travel to Tibet to study directly under them. 59 The People’s Republic of China (PRC) recognizes five official religions—Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism. All other religions and especially cults or congregations which are not registered or accepted by the law of the PRC are usually declared illegitimate and therefore threatened with persecution and crackdown. Two major examples of the recent “new” cults rapidly spreading and growing in the PRC are the controversial Falun Gong (Practice of the Wheel of Dharma), or Falun Dafa (Great Law of the Wheel of Dharma), founded by Li Hongzhi in 1992, and the “Way of the Temple of the Heavenly Immortals.” For a study of Falun Gong see among other publications Danny Schechter, Falun Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 761 Fig. 4: A group of Chinese lay Buddhist devotees enjoy sacred dances at Ya chen sgar next to Grub dbang lung rtogs rgyal mtshan’s seat, July 2005. (Photo by Antonio Terrone) Containing the social and political influence of religion has recently become a leading policy concern for Chinese government leaders. The revival of religious fervor, the rapid growth of religious activities in the PRC, and the increasing number of devotees, practitioners, and religious believers has been an unexpected and unanticipated phenomenon. According to the Chinese government reports, there are more than two hundred million religious believers in the PRC today and at least eighty-five thousand authorized places of worship. Buddhists seem to be the most numerous and their numbers exceed a hundred million, with at least three hundred and twenty thousand monastics (both monks and nuns), in sixteen thousand temples and monasteries.60 Gong’s Challenge to China: Spiritual Practice or “Evil Cult”? (New York: Akashic Books, 2000); Barend ter Haar, “Falun Gong” (http://website.leidenuniv.nl/~haarbjter/falun.htm). For a bibliography of new religious movements in the PRC see Barend ter Haar, “Religious Culture in 20th Century China” (http://website.leidenuniv.nl/~haarbjter/chinPRCbib.html). 60 These data and figures are quoted in Jason Kindopp, “Policy Dilemma in China’s Church-State Relations: An Introduction,” in God and Caesar in China: Policy Implications of Church-State Tensions, eds. Jason Kindopp and Carol Lee Hamrin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004): 1-22, here 1. For Chinese reports see Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “Freedom of Religious Belief in China,” White Paper, released on October 1997, at http://www.china.org.cn/ e-white/Freedom/ index.htm [May 30, 2005]. See also the estimates as reported in the US Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report 2004: China (Includes Hong Kong, Macao, and Tibetan areas of China), released on September 15, 2004, available on line at http://www. state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35396.htm (May 30, 2005). 762 Antonio Terrone Although mostly unsanctioned by the Chinese state, the resurgence of religious beliefs in China and their rapid growth are a result of the strong appeal that religion still holds in Chinese society and the central government’s relaxation of restriction on religion. Besides the revived interest in classical Chinese religions, the people in China are now also turning to the Tibetan Buddhist world for their spiritual needs, a movement fostered in part by the Chinese romantic vision of Tibet as a mystery land of Shangri-La. The extension of today’s diffusion of Tibetan Buddhism into China proper has created a particularly important phenomenon in the Chinese religious world. Responding to many Chinese people’s increasing demand for Buddhist teachings, various Tibetan teachers travel regularly to different parts of China to give teachings, perform collective rituals such as the tshe thar (or animals’ life release ritual), and supervise the opening of new religious centers. The rediscovered need for spirituality and religious practice, especially true after China’s new economic rise and the fall of Communist cultic models, such as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, and the Chinese people’s general fascination with religions—especially Tibetan Buddhism—have encouraged many Chinese to travel to Tibetan areas and visit monasteries and practice Buddhism there. This has been made possible also by new socio-economic factors such as increased national mobility, and the rise of per-capita incomes. Not only are major monasteries and religious encampments, such as Bla rung sgar, Ya chen sgar, and Lung mngon sgar populated by thousands of Tibetan monks and nuns and laypeople alike, but in the past ten years more and more Chinese have attended various religious institutions, including religious encampments and monasteries, to study Tibetan philosophy, enroll in the mkhan po’s classes, and sometimes become monks and nuns according to the Tibetan tradition.61 61 Due to the unavailability of official figures and statistics concerning Chinese practitioners of Tibetan Buddhism, it is quite hard, if not impossible, to determine the exact scale of such a phenomenon in present-day Tibetan regions of China. However, I have personally witnessed a growing presence of both Chinese monks and nuns, and laypeople alike, in many religious encampments and monasteries in Sichuan and Qinghai provinces. It is rather common to encounter Chinese nuns and monks in towns such as dKar mdzes, gSer rta, Khrom thar, and dGa’ bde, often shopping for goods or just enjoying some leisure time in Chinese restaurants before returning to their monastic chores. When conversing with them I often noticed their personal devotion and profound fascination with Buddhism in general and the charismatic personality of their Tibetan teachers. I am currently preparing a paper about some new trends in Tibetan Buddhism in Tibet and the phenomenon of Chinese devotees in Tibetan Buddhist centers titled “The New Journey to the West: The Role of Chinese Devotees in the Development of Tibetan Buddhism in Eastern Tibet,” to present at the Annual Meeting of the American Academy of Religion (November 17-20, 2007 San Diego, California, USA). In the past few years the resurgence of religion faith in mainland China has been widely investigated both academically and journalistically. See for instance Kindopp and Hamrin (eds.), God and Caesar in China; Alan Hunter and D. Rimmington (eds.), All Under Heaven: Chinese Tradition and Christian Life in the People’s Republic of China (Kampen, NL: J.H. Kok, 1992); Alan Hunter and Kim-Kwong Chan (eds.), Protestantism in Contemporary China. For a bibliography of today’s religions in China, from a scholarly perspective, see also Barend ter Haar’s “Bibliography of Religious Culture in 20th century China.” Major editorials have appeared in various magazines and papers recently that report on the resurgence of religion in China along with economic expansion. See for instance, 763 Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery While the phenomenon of Chinese practitioners and devotees moving to Tibet is associated with both the religious encampments (chos sgar) and monasteries (dgon pa) alike,62 the religious encampments, with their special openness and loose administration, constitute an ideal setting for Chinese Buddhists to spend time practicing and receiving teachings and instruction. Most religious encampments have Chinese-speaking monastics who oversee the Chinese-language curriculum, which often includes simultaneous translations of the teachings given by the leaders of the encampments. The centers also provide various means to help Chinese students such as texts translated into Chinese—prayer books, textbooks, practices, and teachings delivered by the Buddhist leaders—and Tibetan-Chinese glossaries, along with frequent simultaneous translation of public teachings and empowerment rituals. ., At the turn of the century the Chinese government finds its people more and more involved in religious activities. Although the post-1978 policy framework provides some limited space for religious believers to practice their faith, comprehensive control measures to prevent religion from emerging as an independent social force are continually and carefully applied nationwide. In Tibetan areas of the PRC, where religious identity is strong and separatist movements feared, political authorities are particularly attentive to any religious groups, especially monasteries, potentially capable of mobilizing large numbers of adherents. In pre-1959 Tibet, monasteries represented the institutional heart of Tibet’s religious society. It is with such knowledge and awareness in mind that Chinese leaders tend to limit monastic power in the land and attentively control the monastic clergy. In this essay I have attempted to show how, within the contemporary Chinese religious policy trends, revived forms of religious leadership and quasi-monastic gatherings in the form of religious encampments are contributing to the maintenance of traditional patterns of religious instruction and preservation of religious identity in the Tibetan eastern regions of Kham. The gter ma tradition is directly connected with the emergence of these influential Buddhist communities associated mainly with the rNying ma school of Tibetan Buddhism in some areas of present-day Tibet. My own feeling is that this could be attributed to two major factors: the first is the ongoing weakening of monastery-centered power because of political pressure by the Chinese government over the last two decades, resulting in many religious practitioners’ looking elsewhere for religious authority. A second factor is the dilution since 1959 in quality of high scholastic education and instruction historically offered among many others, Hannah Beech’s “Renewed Faith.” See also the contribution by Sabina Ragaini in this volume. 62 In July 2004, at least three Han Chinese monks were resident at the Sutra and Tantra Teachings Institute (mDo sngags bshad sgrub gling) of mDo smad rnga yul sgo mang monastery in rNga ba prefecture (Ch. Aba xian) in Sichuan, and studying the Tibetan curriculum with the idea of obtaining the dge bshes doctoral degree. For other similar remarks see Kapstein, “A Thorn in the Dragon’s Side,” 249-60. 764 Antonio Terrone by monasteries in Tibet. This dilution is mostly due to the direct effect that policies have over monastic education and curricula, and to the inclusion of political study material and propaganda sessions within the monasteries that are increasingly altering the religious life and practice in monasteries. Additionally, this dilution is caused by the brain-drain of highly educated religious elites to Tibetan diaspora communites. Efforts have been recently made by a number of Buddhist leaders to reestablish traditional patterns of religious practice and to offer traditional religious instruction outside the context of formal institutions such as the monasteries. I have tried to illustrate how this is done with the help of the charismatic authority especially associated with the Treasure revelation movement. Such a hypothesis can be corroborated by the large number of practitioners who converge on these religious centers. Describing the ongoing developments of the Chinese policy towards freedom of religious belief on the one hand, and the struggle for the maintenance of the religious identity of the Tibetan people on the other, is no easy task. Chinese policy is mainly a mixture of accommodation and repression, and the situation in Tibet does not reflect a homogeneous pattern. Rather, the state of religious practice and the way it is controlled by political authorities varies considerably from place to place. However, it is also evident that phenomena such as the large religious encampment gatherings and the revived strategies of Buddhist revelation through Treasure revelation clearly reflect the Tibetans’ spirit of adaptation and the need to maintain a common sense of community and cultural identity. Therefore, the Treasure revelation movement in the eastern regions of contemporary Tibet can be seen not only as an attempt by some Buddhist religious professionals and personalities to re-appropriate Tibet’s religious heritage, but also as a valid means for regaining access to forms of traditional religious authority and legitimacy in a new and challenging political scenario. Primary Sources Padma bka’ thang (U rgyan gu ru pad ma ’byung gnas kyi skyes rabs rnam par thar pa rgyas par bkod pa) [(The chronicles of Padma) The expansive biography of the Lotus Born Teacher from Urgyan]. Chengdu: Sichuan Nationalities Publishing House, 1987. Karma pa’i chos tshogs sgar chen ’dzam gling rgyan zhes pa’i skor mdor bsdus tsam brjod pa [A brief discussion on the Karmapa’s great religious assemblies known as the ornaments of the world]. Krung go’i bod kyi shes rig, 1993 (1), 52-65. Chos rje dam pa ’jigs med phun tshogs ’byung gnas dpal bzang po mchog gi mjug mtha’i zhal gdams rang tshugs ma shor/ gzhan sems ma dkrugs zhes pa’i ’grel ba lugs gnyis blang dor gsal ba’i sgron me [The radiant lamp that discriminates between the two systems: A comment on the undisturbed minds of others, or the sublime and excellent lord of the Dharma ’Jigs med phun tshogs ’byung gnas dpal bzang po’s ultimate stable and unerring advice]. Shåkya’i dGe sbyong bstan ’dzin rgya mtsho. gSer rta, Sichuan: Bla rung lnga rig slob gling, 2005. Zab mo’i gter dang gter ston grub thob ji ltar byon pa’i lo rgyus mdor bsdus bkod pa rin chen bai ∂å rya’i phreng ba [The garland of lapis lazuli: A brief summary of the history Tibetan Buddhism beyond the Monastery 765 of origins the profound Treasures and the accomplished Treasure Discoverers]. Blo gros mtha’ yas, ’Jams mgon kong sprul. 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