

The Bodhisattvapiṭaka
Its Doctrines, Practices and their Position in Mahāyāna Literature

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Abstract

This thesis aims to provide a comprehensive study of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* with specific emphasis on the bodhisattva ideal. The content of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* indicates that its exposition belongs to the earliest treatises on the bodhisattva. The practices and doctrines that are expounded are invariably rudimentary and show little of the complexities that characterise their discussions in later bodhisattva literature. The *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*'s inclusion into the *Mahāratnakūṭa* rested probably on its pioneering account of the *bodhisattvacaryā*. Being by far the longest work on the bodhisattva in the whole collection, it expounds important practices and constitutes the hub for the remaining bodhisattva writings in the *Mahāratnakūṭa*.

The study falls into five parts. The first chapter considers the position of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in Mahāyāna literature. It investigates the various usages of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, it considers the relationship between the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa* and discusses the scholastic affiliation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. In addition, exploring the contents and evolution of the *Mahāratnakūṭa* collection, it establishes the scriptural context in which the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is placed. The second chapter provides an analysis of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. It examines the structural and literary traits of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, its chapter organisation and some aspects of the bodhisattva path in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Chapter three discusses the bodhisattva ideal in the *Mahāratnakūṭa* collection. It distinguishes between the various categories of bodhisattva *sūtras* in the *Mahāratnakūṭa*, it examines the bodhisattva practices and investigates whether there is evidence of a premeditated design that might have influenced the compilation of the *Mahāratnakūṭa sūtras* into one collection. Chapter four considers the bodhisattva doctrine as it is propounded in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* within the context of other scriptural traditions. It discusses the evolution of the concepts of the *cittotpāda*, *apramāṇa*, *pāramitā* and *saṃgrahvastu* and assesses the contribution of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* to that process. Chapter five consists of a translation of the eleventh chapter of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

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A Note on Orthography

With certain exceptions, all non-English terminology has been italicised. Words that have not been italicised include proper nouns (e.g., Dharma, nikāya), classifications of Buddhist practitioners (e.g., śrāvaka, arhant, buddha/pratyekabuddha and bodhisattva) including references to their respective vehicles that have also been capitalised and personal names (including references to the historical Buddha).

Generally, Sanskrit forms have not been pluralised except in the few cases that found their way into standard English vocabulary or where it seemed inevitable out of stylistic considerations. Exceptions are the following words: buddha/pratyekabuddha, bodhisattva/mahāsattva, bhikṣu/bhikkhu, sūtra/sutta and śāstra. I have decided to take this approach, because I do not wish to hybridise the Sanskrit word-forms. Although the hybridised forms have become widely accepted, from the linguistic point of view such adaptation is unfortunate since it denies Sanskrit the treatment that is given to Greek and Latin terms whose plural forms are generally not anglicised.

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Introduction

The present dissertation aims at providing a wide-ranging study of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. In the course of my research two main areas of investigation have emerged as being particularly important. First, there is the content of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Being one of the longest works on the bodhisattva in Mahāyāna literature, it provides a wealth of information on the training and dynamics in which the *bodhisattvacaryā* unfolds. Second, I have examined the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*'s doctrinal propositions in the wider context of Mahāyāna thought. While it is possible to speak of these two aspects of my research as distinct targets, in practice they are closely interwoven and often go hand in hand.

My interest in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* was aroused by the frequent references in Mahāyāna sources to a text (or collection of texts) called *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. As these references occur in practically all strands of post-nikāya sources, extending from the very earliest Mahāyāna *sūtras* to the latest phase of tantric Buddhism, it occurred to me that the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* must be an important text that was esteemed by generations of Buddhists. Although referred to in various contexts and for different purposes, practically all references to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* recommend it for its treatment of the bodhisattva ideal.

Of course, I was not the first person to have come across these references. They have been noted and duly recorded by a number of distinguished scholars, including Étienne Lamotte, Jean Przyluski, Alex Wayman and Anthony Warder. However, preoccupied with their own particular research, none of them went beyond making some useful but rather general observations. The first attempts to collate and explore these references in the wider frame of Mahāyāna literature were undertaken by Priscilla Pedersen and Nancy Schuster in 1975/76. Both scholars, working primarily from Chinese sources, have collected a fair amount of material and tentatively propose interpretations of its position and nature. However, as neither of them attempts to produce a systematic study of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* the results of their investigations are somewhat limited. Not having read through the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, they differ in their evaluation of the references and disagree on the historical context in that they belong.

The *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is part of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection. The majority of the forty-nine works included in the *Ratnakūṭa* are only extant in Chinese and Tibetan translations. In its

present format the *Ratnakūṭa* dates back to early eighth-century China. Its compiler, Bodhiruci, was a monk from South India. At the end of the seventh century, Bodhiruci travelled to China where he was commissioned by the T'ang Emperor Chung-tsung to translate the forty-nine *sūtras* into Chinese. It is said that he brought with him a complete Sanskrit copy of the *Ratnakūṭa*. After several years of editing and translating, he produced the first complete Chinese version.

Little is known of the history of the collection before Bodhiruci. While we have several fifth and sixth-century accounts mentioning the *Ratnakūṭa* in conjunction with other well-known *sūtra* collections, nothing concrete is known about its early contents and structure. *Ratnakūṭa* fragments found in Khotan, Tun-huang and Kucha indicate that its texts enjoyed particular popularity in Buddhist circles of Central Asia. We have practically no knowledge about its development in India. Tibetan historians say that it became greatly renowned by the second century AD, but there is no independent evidence supporting this claim. Indeed, I know of no reference to a collection bearing the name *Ratnakūṭa* anywhere in Indian literature.

The nucleus of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection is probably found in a relatively small body of *sūtras* that were put together sometime between the third and fifth centuries. The Buddhist traditions of India, China and Tibet preserved several *sūtra* lists where ten to fifteen *Ratnakūṭa* works constantly appear *en bloc*. The earliest of these enumerations goes back to third-century China. Although the origin of these lists is not known, their pan-Asian circulation indicates that they might have come into existence with the expansion of Buddhism across Asia. This would explain the complete silence of Indian sources and account for the difficulties in tracing the genesis of the *Ratnakūṭa* beyond Bodhiruci to a specific geographical area and a given historical context.

The hypothesis of a gradual formation would also accord with much of the content of the *Ratnakūṭa* texts. There is every indication that they were carefully compiled in a process that might have extended over several centuries. Its texts embrace a wide spectrum of Buddhist thought and address practically every aspect of Mahāyāna spirituality. Within this broad area of themes, the most frequently discussed topic is the bodhisattva ideal. Out of the forty-nine texts, roughly one half is concerned specifically with the bodhisattva. The longest and most important bodhisattva *sūtra* of the *Ratnakūṭa* is the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. In volume, it occupies roughly one seventh of the collection and is specifically dedicated to the *pāramitā* practice. Its length and the fact that there is practically no other text in the collection that discourses on

the *pāramitā* in detail, place the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in the centre of the *Ratnakūṭa*'s discussion of the bodhisattva. The *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*'s treatment of the *pāramitā* is supplemented by a variety of material on the bodhisattva in the remaining *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* that deal specifically with the bodhisattva practice. The thematic complementarity of these works is such that their propositions come close to representing a balanced cross-section of all major ideas in the development of the bodhisattva doctrine.

While it is difficult to establish the precise relationship between the various texts due to the uncertainties of their chronology, it is possible to distinguish several strands of bodhisattva thinking within the *Ratnakūṭa* works. The oldest thought on the bodhisattva is contained in *sūtras* such as the *Kāśyapaparivarta* and *Ugraparipṛcchā*. Second-century translations of these texts confirm their antiquity beyond any doubt. Next, we have works that seem to set out to systematise the material that was introduced in these early *sūtras*. The *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* belongs to this category. Then, the collection contains several *sūtras* displaying a high degree of organisation in their expositions on the bodhisattva. One characteristic of these texts is the meticulous implementation of the *daśabhūmika* scheme. Examples of this type are the *Svapnanirdeśa* and *Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā*. Finally, there are a number of rather advanced *sūtras*. These tend to show less interest in the practical aspects of the bodhisattva training, but focus on doctrinal matters. Quite frequently, they represent the latest strand of *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* and include such works as the *Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanāda* and *Pitāputrasamāgama*.

The above outline places the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* among the earlier bodhisattva *sūtras* of the *Ratnakūṭa*. Its antiquity is supported by an array of internal and external evidence. First, there is the close association between the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and the second-century *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa*. Since the *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa* is greatly indebted for its material to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, the origin of our *sūtra* must predate that of the *Akṣayamatīnirdeśa*. Second, we have a number of references to the *pāramitā* discussion of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in other *sūtras*. While some of these date back to the second century, others are third or fourth-century compositions.

The most persuasive evidence is, however, found in the content of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. The relatively undeveloped nature of the practices and their rudimentary organisation point to a period of composition when the thinking on the bodhisattva was still dominated by the spiritual ideal of early Buddhism. Although clearly a Mahāyāna text in orientation, several of the practices show traits that link them to the Śrāvakayāna. The fact that in later times many

of these early elements were modified and adjusted to doctrinal developments further confirms their antiquity.

If we compare the material that is included in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* with that of later writings on the bodhisattva, we note two things. First, most of what is being said about the bodhisattva in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* retained its validity and found its way into the scholastic treatises of the fourth and fifth centuries. It is often possible to trace to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* the individual building blocks of advanced works such as the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Second, some of the structures of its bodhisattva practices were adopted in later literature. The internal divisions of the *pāramitā*, the blueprint of the ten *cittotpāda* and the outline of the wisdom-practices all had profound bearing on the development of the bodhisattva doctrine.

After consideration of all the evidence, there seems to be a strong case for not only placing the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* among the earliest works on the bodhisattva, but also for looking at it as a text of fundamental importance to the evolution of the bodhisattva doctrine. Its pioneering exposition of the perfections, the lasting influence this exerted on generations of Buddhist thinkers and the frequent references to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in a wide spectrum of Mahāyāna works all seem to point in this direction.

In spite of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*'s influence, very little is known about its history and the circumstances in which it was composed. The fact that several of the early Indian schools possessed a collection of texts of this name alongside the traditional *Tripiṭaka* led some scholars to surmise that the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* might have sprung from a body of loosely connected, but distinct works on the bodhisattva. Wayman, for example, proposed an association with the Mahāsaṅghika school by arguing that Mahāsaṅghika followers "gradually built up the theory of the bodhisattva modelled after the life and theoretical former lives of Gautama Buddha" and thus produced the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as "the ultimate form of this effort".¹ While it is incorrect to link the origin of the bodhisattva ideal specifically with the Mahāsaṅghika, he is probably correct in seeing a connection between the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and the *jātaka*-genre. In the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* itself we find included altogether fourteen accounts of the Buddha's former lives. Moreover, the *jātaka*-genre probably provided the first impetus to the formulation of the bodhisattva ideal and almost certainly inspired some elements of its practice. Warder went so far as to suggest that the early schools actually included the *Jātaka* collection in their *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.² While there is no real evidence to support this hypothesis,

1. Wayman, 1991, p. 9.

2. Warder, 1980, p. 357.

the importance of the *jātaka* to the bodhisattva doctrine in general and their presence in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in particular might not be coincidental.

Even if we accept the existence of such a link, leading eventually to the composition of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* (either in the form of one unified text or a collection of independent works on the bodhisattva), it tells us little about the place, time and circumstances in which the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* was conceived. Like Wayman, Warder also ascribes the origin of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* to Mahāsaṅghika circles in southern India. As evidence, he cites a *piṭaka* list in the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* that includes the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as one of the five sections of the Buddhist canon. Since the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* is a Bahuśrutīya text, he infers that the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* formed part of the Bahuśrutīya canon. The Bahuśrutīya was of course a sub-sect of the Mahāsaṅghika that is known to have been widespread around Nāgārjunikoṇḍa in South India.

This line of argument, although perfectly sound by itself, does not take into consideration either of two factors. First, the Mahāsaṅghika themselves do not include a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in their division of the canon. According to Hsüan-tsang, their scriptures consisted of a *Sūtra*-, *Vinaya*-, *Abhidharma*-, *Samyukta*- and *Dhāraṇīpiṭaka*.³ This alone does not disprove the South Indian Mahāsaṅghika connection—Hsüan-tsang was given this list at Rājagṛha in the seventh century AD—but it raises the question whether it is possible to ascribe the Bahuśrutīya division to the Mahāsaṅghika in general. Second, the only other sect that is recorded to have been in possession of a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is a non-Mahāsaṅghika sect, namely the Dharmaguptaka.⁴ This is significant in two respects. On the one hand, it indicates that we cannot speak of an exclusive Mahāsaṅghika connection for the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Quite obviously, the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* was known in Sthaviravāda and Mahāsaṅghika circles alike. On the other hand, it throws doubt on South India as the place of origin of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. The little information we possess about the Dharmaguptaka indicate that their sphere of influence was limited to North-West India, Central Asia and China. Although the Dharmaguptaka might have adopted the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* from the Bahuśrutīya later, the geographical separation makes a regular exchange of ideas (and texts) unlikely. Therefore we have two conflicting scenarios for the origin of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. One points to the ancient Buddhist sites in southern India and the other to North-West India and possibly beyond. Apart from a likely *jātaka* content and a *terminus ad quem* in possibly the late

3. Beal, 1884, ii, pp. 164–5.

4. Bareau, 1955, p. 296.

second century AD, we know little else about the early history of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

Chapter One

The Bodhisattvapiṭaka in Mahāyāna Literature

The Term Bodhisattvapiṭaka

Throughout the centuries, in Mahāyāna literature the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* has been applied in a number of distinct ways. There are indications that it originated in the early, pre-Mahāyāna, schools. In later times, the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* was taken up by Mahāyāna writers who altered its scope of application and imbued it with new connotations. Yet, even in the later phases no single widely accepted interpretation evolved. In order to distinguish and indicate the various ways of its use and application, I propose to divide our sources into the following four working categories:

1. Treatises in which the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is applied to Mahāyāna scriptures as a whole.
2. Sources that identify the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as a distinct collection of works on the bodhisattva ideal.
3. Sources that associate the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* with the traditional six *pāramitā* and related practices.
4. Mahāyāna texts that refer to a specific work called *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra*.

Turning first to the question of its origin, there is no reference by which one could securely date the original formulation of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. It was first employed by members of the Dharmagupta and Bahuśrutiya schools who included a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in their *Pañcapiṭaka*. Here, the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is thought of as a body of literature and cited along with the *Sūtra*-, *Vinaya*-, *Abhidharma*- and *Dhāraṇīpiṭaka*. No details have so far emerged as to the contents of their *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. In all likelihood, these consisted of texts that formed part of the early development of the bodhisattva path as an alternative career to that of the arhant. Considering that both schools were part of the net-work of sects which belonged

to the proto-Mahāyāna movement, it is probable that the texts contained in their *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* have served as a foundation for the later developments of the bodhisattva doctrine. Unfortunately, as these texts are no longer extant we can only speculate on the role their thought may have played in the evolution of the bodhisattva ideal.

In Mahāyāna literature, the first occurrence of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is found in Lokakṣema's second-century translation of the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (*Kp*). Here, a text called *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is recommended as "a scripture that the bodhisattva should study".¹ It is not clear, however, whether the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* should be taken here to refer to a collection of texts or an individual work. The passage itself is highly ambiguous and does little to clarify this problem since, as Pedersen has observed, the Chinese expression *p'u-sa-ts'ang-ching* can be read as "*sūtras* of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*" and as "the" or "a *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra*".² Leaving aside these particular intricacies, this reference clearly shows that the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* was known already to the earliest Mahāyāna writers.

As I have stated above, the works that are included in the first category view the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as an overall designation of Mahāyāna scriptures in general. Six texts, in particular, belong to this category.³ They are the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (*Bbh*), *Mahāyānasamgraha*, *Sūtrālamkāra*, *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* and a work found in the Tun-huang collection but known only through its colophon. The authorship of the first four treatises is traditionally ascribed to one person, Asaṅga.⁴ Hence, it is not surprising to find in them a far-reaching concurrence of interpretations of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

In the *Bbh* we learn that the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* corresponds to the *vaipulya*-genre of the twelve traditional branches of Buddhist scriptures.⁵ It is cited in the Dharma Study Chapter

1. Stael-Holstein, 1926, pp. 13–14, § 6.

References to the *Bdp* are taken from the twentieth-century reprint of the sTog Palace *hKah-hgyur*, entitled: *The Tog Palace Manuscript of the Tibetan Kanjur*, 1979—Leh, Smanrtsis Shesrig Dpemzod. All page/folio references and text specifications (length, chapters, structure etc.) that are drawn to *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* other than the *Bdp* refer (unless a Sanskrit version is available) to the *Tibetan Tripiṭaka Peking Edition* (ed. by DT Suzuki, Otani University, Kyoto, 1956, vol. 22–24).

2. Pedersen, 1976, p. 25

Perhaps, this ambiguity reflects some uncertainty on part of the translator who himself might have been in doubt about the precise nature of the reference.

3. There are a number of other texts that, by implication, could be taken to fall within this category. In the *Sgm* (*Mahāsaṃnipāta*, 5), for instance, "not hearing and not accepting" the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is cited as one of the four *dharma* that obstruct the Mahāyāna (T 397 (5), vol. 13, p. 630; ref. Pedersen).

4. This traditional attribution is only a working hypothesis as it involves a whole range of uncertainties that have, as yet, to be resolved. For a discussion of the problematic in this assumption see: J. May, "La Philosophie Bouddhique Idéaliste", *Revue de la Société Suisse d'Etudes Asiatiques*, xxv, 1971, pp. 279–301, especially, p. 293.

5. *Bbh*, p. 96.1–5.

(*dharmaparyeṣaka*) alongside the *Śrāvakapiṭaka* and non-Buddhist treatises (*bāhyakāni śāstrāṇi*); these include logic, medicine, grammar etc., besides arts and crafts of the world as those areas of learning that the bodhisattva should become acquainted with. The association of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* with the *vaipulya*-genre is by no means rare and is found in a number of treatises.⁶ In most of these instances it is used quite clearly as a synonym to the expression *Mahāyānapīṭaka*.

In the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, for instance, the *Paramārthagāthā* opens with the following sentence:⁷

“Among the [deliberation of the meaning of the Buddha and of the meaning of the versifications of the discourses] in the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* and in the instruction of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* I shall set forth extensively the deliberation of the meaning of the discourses.”

Wayman remarks in a note to this passage that “it is a reasonable assumption that this method of instruction (*avavāda*) of this *piṭaka* refers to the various aspects of the *Yogācārabhūmi* where Asaṅga has set forth the Mahāyāna, especially the bodhisattva doctrine.”⁸

In the *Bbh*, Asaṅga adds: “This *Bbh* is also called *Bodhisattvapiṭaka-māṭrka* and *Mahāyānasamgraha*”. Then he gives an explanation of the term ‘*Mahāyānasamgraha*’, stating that it bears this name because it includes the contents of “all subtle *sūtras* that are included in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*”. Elsewhere in the *Bbh* he enumerates eight characteristics essential for a text to be called *Mahāyānasamgraha*.⁹ The first three factors are that (1) the text in question must contain the instructions included in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, (2) it has to reveal the real meaning of all *dharma* included in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and (3) it reveals all the inconceivable powers of the buddhas and bodhisattvas that are in this *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

Asaṅga’s hitherto most explicit statement concerning the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is found in the *Sūtrālamkāra*.¹⁰

6. *Akn-ṭikā*, TTP, 104, p. 184.2.7; *Bbh*, p. 297.21

According to the *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 139, the reason for this identification is the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*’s exhaustive treatment of the *pāramitā*, particularly with regard to their characteristics, order, number and cultivation. In the same text, the adherence to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* figures among the principal marks of persons who subscribe to the Mahāyāna (*op. cit.*, p. 147).

7. Wayman, 1961, p. 163.

8. *Bbh*, p. 298.3–5; cf. pp. 157.4, 180.16, 274.21, 332.23.

9. *Bbh*, pp. 298.3–8, 409.11–410.1.

10. *Msl*, p. 53.16–18

See also: Przyluski, *Le Concile de Rājagṛha*, 1926–8, pp. 357–9.

“Three baskets, this is *Sūtra*, *Vinaya* and *Abhidharma*. If classed in terms of Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna, the three baskets fall into two, the *Śrāvakaṭṭaka* and *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.”

On the basis of such passages it becomes clear, I think, that Asaṅga considers the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* synonymous with the notion of a *Mahāyānapīṭaka*, that is, the Mahāyāna literature in general.

Next, there are references to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa* and in a manuscript fragment found in Tun-huang. In both of them, the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is cited in connection with the *Avataṃsaka* collection.

In the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*, the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* appears in two instances. First, it is part of the overall title that runs, according to Chinese catalogues, as *bodhisattvapiṭakān-Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa-mahāvaiṣṭhasūtra*.¹¹ Second, it is mentioned in the formula that concludes the individual chapters. Curiously, it does not appear in all formulae but figures only in the later chapters.¹²

If we accept the results of Przyluski's text-critical study that chapters one to three predate the other chapters by several centuries, we are led to conclude that in the early phase of the Mahāyāna the application of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* was not particularly wide-spread. Quite evidently, in this context, it was introduced to supersede the ancient formula *paṭala-visara*—a term virtually identical in meaning. Its association with the *Avataṃsaka* collection indicates, according to Przyluski, that the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* was interpreted to stand for Mahāyāna scriptures in general. Naturally, the *Avataṃsaka* is part of these.

In the other source that cites the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in connection with the *Avataṃsaka*, the colophon of the Tun-huang manuscript, we read: “*Bodhisattvapiṭaka buddhāvataṃsaka Mahāyānasūtra kramena arvājñā jñānakara nāma daśabhūmi nirdeśa parivarta*”.¹³ Unfortunately, this colophon is the only fragment extant of the text it names. On the basis of this

11. J. Przyluski, 1923, p. 302.

12. The formula runs as follows: *bodhisattva piṭaka avataṃsakān Mahāyāna sūtram mañjuśrī mūla kalpāc caturthaḥ | prathama paṭa vidhāna viśaraḥ parisamāptaḥ*. In chapters one to three, the phrase runs differently: *iti bodhisattva paṭala visaraṇ mañjuśrī kumārabhūta mūla kalpāt trītyo maṇḍala vidhāna parivartaḥ*.

13. Louis de la Vallée Poussin: *Catalogue of Tibetan Manuscripts from Tun-huang in the India Office Library*, Item Number 132, India Office Library, Oxford, 1962.

single statement, out of context, one can have no certainty as to the precise application of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

Nancy Schuster has suggested that it might point to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* section in the *Avataṃsaka*.¹⁴ She argues that the title *Daśabhūminirdeśa* presumably corresponds to the *Daśabhūmika* (*Dbh*) chapter (twenty-two or twenty-six) of the *Avataṃsaka* and is here to be interpreted literally as the ‘basket of bodhisattva practices’ in that collection. Her hypothesis receives support from the *Bodhisattvagarbhasūtra*; this lists the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in connection with the *Dbh* in sixth position of an eightfold division of Mahāyāna scriptures.¹⁵ Apart from this reference, I have not been able to trace any further material in support of her thesis. It may be better to assign it a provisional value until further evidence has come to light in favour of her position, and meanwhile to take the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* to be a synonym for *Mahāyānapīṭaka* as in the case of the *Mañjuśrīmūlakalpa*.

There is one more reference that speaks of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in terms of the *Mahāyānapīṭaka*. It is found in a text called *Nandimitrāvadāna* and proposes a kind of catalogue of a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.¹⁶ This text contains a list of thirty-seven Mahāyāna *sūtras*, including, among others, such works as the *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, *Sukhāvativyūha* and *Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*. Having listed these *sūtras*, it says:¹⁷

“Pareils *sūtras* du Grand Véhicule existe par centaines de myriades, distingués par groupes et par catégories. En outre, il ya le recueil (*piṭaka*) du *Vinaya* du Grand Véhicule et la multitude des groupes et des espèces de recueil de l’*Abhidharma*. Tout celā forme l’ensemble du Recueil des Bodhisattvas (*Bodhisattvapiṭaka*).”

The second category of references to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* consists of a number of miscellaneous, apparently unrelated, literary documents. First, there are three works that classify Buddhist scriptures on the basis of the religious practitioners who take recourse to them. In all three, that is the *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka*, *Mahākaruṇāsūtra* and *Ajataśatrukaukṛtyavinodana*,

14. Schuster, 1976, n. 110.

15. Link, 1961, p. 283.

16. For a French translation of the *Nandimitrāvadāna*, see: Lévi; Chavannes: “Relation sur la Durée de la loi, Enoncée par le grand Arhat Nandimitra” (*JA*, 8, 1916, p. 5 ff.). It is only extant in a Chinese translation entitled *Ta a lo han nan t’i mi to lo so shuo fa chu chi* (T 2030, 49, pp. 12–15; ref. Pedersen).

17. *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.

the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is contrasted with the *Śrāvakaṭṭhaka* and *Pratyekabuddhapiṭaka*.¹⁸ Second, there are five treatises that cite the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in connection with the more traditional threefold classification of Buddhist scriptures. In the *Satyasiddhiśāstra*, it is listed as the fifth division, following the *Sūtrapiṭaka*, *Vinayapiṭaka*, *Abhidharmapiṭaka* and *Samyuktapiṭaka*.¹⁹ In the *Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra*, the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is cited in connection with the traditional *Tripiṭaka* and a *Matṛka*.²⁰ Paramārtha also places the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in fifth position, preceded by the *Sūtra*, *Vinaya*, *Abhidharma* and *Dhāraṇīpiṭaka*.²¹ In the *Bodhisattvagarbhasūtra*, the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is referred to in combination with the *Śrāvakaṭṭhaka* and *Vinayapiṭaka*.²² Curiously, Hsüan-tsang who carried out the earliest translation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* (*Rkṣ* 12) does not mention it in his discussion of the classification of Buddhist scriptures current in Mahāsaṅghika circles.²³

Finally, there are two references which set the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in the context of the twelvefold classification of Mahāyāna scriptures:

In the *Abhidh-sam*, the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is included in the *Sūtrapiṭaka* as a separate class of scriptures. On the one hand, it distinguishes those sections of the Buddhist canon which have traditionally been associated with early Buddhism, that is the *Sūtra*, *Geyā*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Gāthā* and *Udāna*. On the other hand, there are the *Vaipulya* and *Adbhutadharma* portions of the canon which the *Abhidh-sam* considers constituents of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.²⁴

In the *Ratnagotravibhāṣāśāstra*, a similar classification is employed.²⁵ Here, the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is contrasted with the *Sūtra*, *Geyā*, *Vyākaraṇa*, *Gāthā*, *Udāna* and *Nidāna*. While these are dismissed because of their association with conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*), the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is commended because it contains an exposition of the doctrine of absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*). To my knowledge, this is the only instance in which a classification

18. Yamada, 1968, p. 211; T 380, 12, p. 971b; T 626, 15, p. 386 respectively (*Taishō* ref. Pedersen). In the *Karuṇāp* (pp. 14, 15–6), this threefold classification is complemented by the introduction of the *Buddhapiṭaka* as the fourth and highest division of Buddhist scripture. A text called *Buddhapiṭaka* is extant in both the Chinese *Tripiṭaka* (T 653, vol. 15) and in the Tibetan canon (TTP 35, no. 886).

19. Bareau, 1955, p. 296.

20. Pedersen, *op. cit.*, p. 33.

21. Bareau, 1955, p. 296.

22. Link, 1961, p. 282.

23. He cites the traditional *Tripiṭaka*, plus a *Samyuktapiṭaka* and *Dhāraṇīpiṭaka* serving as divisions of the Mahāsaṅghika classification of the Buddhist canon (Bareau, 1955, p. 296).

24. *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 132

This division is found only in the *Sūtrapiṭaka* since the type of texts associated with the *Vinaya* and *Abhidharmapiṭaka*, that is the *Nidāna*, *Avadāna*, *Itivṛtaka*, *Jātaka* and *Upadeśa*, are shared by both śrāvaka and bodhisattvas.

25. Takasaki, 1966, p. 285.

involving the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is explicitly based on doctrino-philosophical issues.²⁶

The third category of sources is significant in two respects. First, these sources are the only ones that associate the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* with a well-defined set of spiritual practices. Second, they represent some of the earliest strands of Mahāyāna literature and are therefore particularly helpful in reconstructing the 'original' meaning of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

As I have mentioned earlier, all texts of this group associate the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* with the *bodhisattvacaryā* and, in particular, with an exposition on the six traditional *pāramitā*. Among them the most prominent *sūtras* are the *Vkn*, *Kp*, *Samdhis*, *Ug* and *Prṇ*. Although none of these texts gives explicit information on the actual physical format of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, the context implies that it is a title for a collection of works relating to the bodhisattva, rather than an independent treatise.

In the *Kp*, the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is mentioned in connection with the training of a bodhisattva who is admonished to:²⁷

“Seek out the proper *Sūtra* Dharma, the six *pāramitā* and the *Bodhisattva-piṭakasūtra* and all the vessels of the Buddha, [with a] heart free from anger [and] respectfully serving all the people under heaven in the ten directions, [whether] they are slave or great scholars.”

26. There is another reference to a division of Buddhist scriptures featuring the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* that deserves our attention. It is contained in the *Kuśalamūlasamparigraha* where the author places “this Mahāyāna *Dharmapiṭaka*” side by side with “the *sūtras* of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*” (T 657, 16, p. 138a; ref. Pedersen). To all appearances, this reference is pointing to some undefined, implied distinction between Mahāyāna *sūtras* and texts contained in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Unfortunately, we are left once more with limited information as to its contents and can do little more than guess about its composition and scope. Significantly, like the other references found in this source-category, it too refers to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as an autonomous, distinct body of Buddhist scriptures.

27. I adopted Schuster's translation (*op. cit.*, n. 491) which is based on Lokakṣema's second-century Han translation. There exist some differences between the various Chinese translations of this passage. Also the Sanskrit and Tibetan versions exhibit differences. The two remaining Chinese translations run as follows:

Chin: “[A bodhisattva] delights in hearing the good Dharma, [and] does not delight in hearing false Dharma, delights in the six *pāramitā* *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. He has humble thoughts without pride towards all beings” (*op. cit.*).

Ch'in: “[A bodhisattva] renounces evil Dharma [and] seeks the True *Sūtra* Canon, the six *pāramitā* *Bodhisattvadharmapiṭaka*, with a heart free from pride towards all beings, entirely humbled” (*Kp*, p. 15). Weller's German translation, based on the Tibetan and Sanskrit version is: “Seitdem er sich so daran machte, die Sammlung von Werken für den bodhisattva als diejenige zu suchen, welche die sechs Vollkommenheiten enthält, sucht er die gute Überlieferung, doch die schlechte Überlieferung sucht er nicht; und da er gegen alle Wesen ohne Überheblichkeit ist, gleicht sein Gemüt dem des Hundes” (Weller, 1962, p. 67).

In the *Vkn* we meet with the following definition of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*:²⁸

“The texts which are contained in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* are profound, of profound aspects, difficult to perceive by the world, ... are marked with the seal of the kings of formulae and texts, reveal the irreversible wheel of the Dharma and originate in the six perfections. They teach the *bodhipāṅśika dharma*, compassion and friendliness.”

The *Samdhis* adds that the bodhisattvas “should have courage, faith in and understanding of the subtle doctrines of the true Dharma connected with the *pāramitā* of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.”²⁹ In the *Vasudharasūtra* we are told that “this *sūtra* and other profound *sūtras* are included in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and connected with the *pāramitā*.”³⁰ In the *Prṇ*, a *Ratnakūṭa sūtra* that itself discusses the bodhisattva training in some detail we find the following definition of the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*:

“Further, O Pūrṇa, bodhisattvas who do not hear appropriate bodhisattva *sūtras*—which means the *sūtras* of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, *sūtras* that generate the *bodhicitta*, *sūtras* that attract to matters of bodhisattvas, *sūtras* that are linked to the six *pāramitā*—because they do not listen to these, they do not practice as instructed; since they are not instructed correctly, they will renounce the Doctrine.”³¹

A further reference is contained in the *Ug*. It distinguishes between those who “teach the *sūtras*, those who keep the precepts and those who adhere to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*” and admonishes those who adhere to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* to seek instruction in the *pāramitā* and skilful means (*upāyakaūśalya*).³²

28. Lamotte, 1976, p. 259.

It is probably no coincidence that apart from the *pāramitā*, the *bodhipāṅśika dharma*, *karuṇā* and *maitrī* are precisely those practices that figure most prominently in the *Bdp* (R, folio 649.2–679.5; 264.4–278.4).

29. *Samdhis* (*ÉLa*), p. 131.26–28, § 9.3; see also: p. 133.11–12, § 10.2, p. 140.9–12, § 18.5.

30. T 482, 14, p. 666a; ref. Pedersen.

31. TTP, 23, p. 239.3.1–3.

32. *op. cit.*, p. 267.2.5–6

There are numerous other references which shed some light on the way in which the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is interpreted in Mahāyāna literature. The *Lankāv* (p. 66.2–5), for instance, says:

“What is meant by abandoning the roots of virtue? It refers to those who have abandoned the

At this point let us briefly review the collected evidence. The majority of sources examined so far agree to assign the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* the role of a scriptural classification of Buddhist texts. In a number of treatises, it is taken to correspond to a body of *sūtras* comprising the totality of Mahāyāna writings. In others, it is more specifically associated with the bodhisattva ideal, apparently with the aim of demarcating its teachings from those of current orthodoxy. In this context it is probably best understood as a collection of teachings preached to bodhisattvas.

We have practically no information as to the exact structure and content of that classification. The majority of texts investigated correlate the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* to issues connected with the *bodhisattvacaryā*. Apart from its association with the six *pāramitā*, few details have emerged that clarify the nature of the practices included or their position in the evolution of the bodhisattva doctrine. On the basis of the rather vague nature of the evidence available, little can be said about the historical status of a collection of *sūtras* called *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. The numerous references found in almost all strands of Mahāyāna literature suggest that it must have been a widely known classification of scriptures over a fairly long period. However, since none of the references so far examined contains any information as to its structure and exact contents, we cannot exclude the possibility that the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* may have stood for the totality of scriptures that, in one way or another, deal with the bodhisattva ideal. In this event, the question of its historicity is most delicate since the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* may have existed solely as a vague concept in the minds of a few people.

As already indicated above, my forth working category refers to a number of texts that contain explicit references to a specific, individual text called *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra*. It is to these references that we shall turn next. In view of the heterogeneous nature of the sources included in this fourth category, I propose to divide the material into two subcategories:

First, there is a number of canonical and paracanonical sources that contain citations of a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. The most prominent texts of this category are the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (*Śikṣ*), *Lokadharaparipṛcchā* (*Lkdh*) and *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* (*Bdp*) as well as three, as yet uni-

Bodhisattvapiṭaka, who make wrongful accusations that are not in conformity with the *Sūtra*, *Vinaya* and liberation.”

The *Akṣ* mentions the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as part of an enumeration citing eighty-four ways of learning. In the middle of that list (no. 39) it differentiates between the way “... of studying the *prajñāpāramitā*, studying the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, studying the *saṃgrahavastu*, studying the *upāyakaṣāya*” (p. 50.5.5).

identified, fragments found in the Tun-huang material.³³

Second, there are the catalogues and compendia of the indigenous Chinese and Tibetan Buddhist traditions. Here, particular use will be made of Nanjio's catalogue, the *Mahāvvyutpatti* (*Mvy*) and, to a lesser extent, of Seng-yu's *Ch'u san tsang chi chi*.³⁴

The greatest number of references to a specific text entitled *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is found in the *Bdp*. Here, the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is mentioned sixty-four times. The majority of these references refer to the *Bdp* itself. There are, however, instances that contain ambiguity whether the reference in question points to a specific *sūtra* or a vaguely delineated body of texts considered above.³⁵ Since such instances are very few indeed and often appear in a context in which it is virtually impossible to decide conclusively on their format, it seems preferable to leave them untreated, at least for a moment.

Four brief quotations will suffice to convey some idea of the way in which the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* sees itself:

"Sitting in that seat, in order to benefit many sentient beings, the Tathāgata will explain a *sūtra* (*mdo sde*) called *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* which advances the *bodhisattvacaryā* and is commended as benefiting all sentient beings."³⁶

33. All three citations have been taken from, or are closely related to, the *Bdp*:
 1. 705.2 (28) corresponds to R, folio 604.2–604.7
 2. 705.2 (688) corresponds to R, folio 81.1, 86.1, 86.3
 3. 635.32 bears close affinity in contents to chapter eleven of our *sūtra*. Amongst others, it discusses skill in *viññāna* and *jñāna*, skill in the *bodhipāṭṭhika* and skill in *neyartha* and *nītartha sūtras* and would therefore seem to correspond to extracts from R, folio 631.4–673.6. As in many cases the manuscript is almost unreadable, I have not succeeded in pinpointing all of its contents. There is a fourth reference (380.109) that cites a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. The content of this fragment corresponds loosely in style and topics to our *sūtra*, but again, positive identification has not yet been possible.
34. For an analysis of Seng-yu's writings and his position in the Chinese Buddhist tradition, see: Link, 1957, 1960, 1961.
35. I base my conclusion, in addition to close contextual congruencies, on the following features of the Tibetan text. In the *Bdp*, the majority of references cite the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in conjunction with demonstrative pronouns (Tib. *hdi*, *de*) which, in some cases, are reinforced by the reflexive pronoun 'itself' (Tib. *ñid*). I take this emphatic use of the demonstrative pronoun, which in Tibetan is quite optional, as an indication that the author had a particular text in mind, most probably the *Bdp* itself, when he refers to 'this *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*'. Moreover, the context in which the references appear is always intimately linked to the subject matter discussed in that very passage. In addition, the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is often supplemented by the syllables *mdo sde* whose principal meaning is, according to the compilers of the *Mvy*, *sūtra* or *sūtrānta* (350, 805, 1412, 1435). There are, however, instances in which the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* appears to refer to a collection of texts. Furthermore, the Tibetan term *mdo sde* can optionally also carry the meaning 'sūtra-class'. As I do not feel confident to resolve this contradiction positively, I wish to draw attention to the possibility that, originally, the *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* might have been comprised of various texts which, in the course of time, grew into a homogeneous whole.
36. R, folio 76, 4–6.

“What are the riches of a bodhisattva’s teacher? It is the Dharma enunciation of this *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. When his teacher has recognised that the bodhisattva is speaking gently in every respect, he instructs him in the Dharma-enunciation of this *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* at great length. He teaches and proclaims it. He establishes him in it and analyses it. He clarifies and propounds it. A bodhisattva who abides securely in this *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* understands [how to] cut off poverty forever and quickly realises perfect enlightenment.”³⁷

“O Śāriputra, bodhisattvas who desire to attain swiftly their prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) should listen to the Dharma enunciation of this *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. They should take hold of it and retain it. They should also propound it to others and teach it at great length.”³⁸

“If bodhisattvas take hold of this *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and retain it, etc., they will persist in order to perpetuate the lineage of the three jewels and will never be separated from the four immeasurables. They will be training themselves vigorously in the six perfections and convert all sentient beings by means of the four means of conversion. O Śāriputra, this Dharma enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is the path of enlightenment. And why? Because supreme and perfect enlightenment is connected to the Dharma enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.”³⁹

The other *sūtra* that unmistakably refers to the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as an individual text is the *Lkdh*.⁴⁰ In his study on the *Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka*, Yamada suggests that it refers to the *Bdp*.⁴¹ Whilst Schuster argues that there is not sufficient evidence to support such a view,⁴² I do not know why she asserts this; in my opinion it is beyond any doubt that we are dealing here with citations from the *Bdp*. The most conclusive example is found in chapter eleven of the *Lkdh* that discusses the *bodhisattvacaryā* and its mental concomitants. Here, the title

37. R, folio 338, 2–5.

38. R, folio 717.3–6.

39. R, folio 735.4–736.3.

40. TTP, 34 p. 8.3.7–8; p. 7.46–7 and p. 32.1.3–4.

41. Yamada, 1968, p. 212 n. 3.

42. Schuster, *op. cit.*, n 109.

Bodhisattvapiṭaka is quoted in conjunction with an elevenfold enumeration of a bodhisattva's skill. This corresponds closely to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*'s exposition on skill.⁴³ The first six and the eleventh type concur verbatim, while the remaining five agree in contents. Moreover, the *Lkdh* reproduces several of the *Bdp*'s organisational irregularities. It cites, for instance, 'skill in mindfulness' when this type of skill is not mentioned in the *Bdp*'s introductory list on skill itself, but then is freely included in the exposition.⁴⁴ It appears, therefore, very likely indeed that we are dealing here with a reference to our *sūtra*.⁴⁵

The above finding has an important bearing on the historical status of the *Bdp*. So far, the earliest reference to our *sūtra* that can be dated with any security has been Hsüan-tsang's seventh-century translation. Apart from close textual affinities with the *Akn*, there has been no evidence at all to confirm its existence prior to the seventh century. All this has changed since we know from Chinese sources that the *Lkdh* already existed by the fourth century AD.⁴⁶ Therefore, we may now take the fourth century as the *terminus ad quem* for the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*'s origin.

Next, there is a quotation in the *Śikṣ* that Śāntideva (700–750 AD) attributes to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.⁴⁷ However, this quotation does not occur anywhere in the *Bdp*. This is not surprising, as the devotional flavour of the quotation that details ways of honouring a Tathāgata shrine is stylistically out of kilter with the pragmatic, factual tone of the *Bdp*.

This apparent incongruence raises another important issue. If we accept that this citation refers to one specific text (which is probable, considering its context and way of presentation),

43. In the *Lkdh*, a bodhisattva's skill is divided into eleven types:
1. Skill in aggregates; 2. Skill in sensefields; 3. Skill in elements; 4. Skill in dependent co-origination; 5. Skill in the bases of mindfulness; 6. Skill in the faculties; 7. Skill in the eightfold path; 8. Skill in mundane and supramundane *dharma*; 9. Skill in conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*; 10. Skill in investigating the marks of all *dharma*; 11. Skill in obtaining the power of recollection and a mind of investigating the sayings of all teachings (34, p. 9.5.4–6).

44. R, folio 615.4–616.1; folio 649.2–662.3.

45. Apart from the list in the *Lkdh* which runs almost parallel, I have not found a single list which matches exactly the *Bdp*'s scheme of skill. Lists of skill are by no means exclusive to the *Bdp*. However, in general, they do not match in every respect and include several additional members. For references to several of these enumerations of skill, see: chapter four, note 654.

46. The *Lkdh* is extant in two Chinese translations. The first was carried out by Dharmarakṣa between 265 and 313 AD (T 481); the second by Kumārajīva between 402 and 412 AD (T 482).

47. The quotation runs as follows (*Śikṣ*, p. 311.13–312.2; trsl. Bendall, p. 278):

"Again, in the holy *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is described a way to increase merit: 'He that cleans a shrine of the Tathāgata, he attains four purities of aspiration of perfection. And what are these four? Perfect purity of aspiration in form, in steadfast undertaking, in seeing the Tathāgata, in the multitude of lucky marks.'

Again, in the same place it is said:

"One who lays a flower on the shrines of the Tathāgatas or anoints them attains eight things without deficiency. And what are these eight? No deficiency in form, enjoyment, surroundings, virtue, tranquillity, knowledge, wisdom and aspiration."

then there must have been at least one further *sūtra* known under the title of *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Against this it would have to be assumed that the text known as *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* has undergone considerable internal change since the early eighth century. These questions will be investigated next.

Chinese catalogues of the Buddhist canon enumerate five texts with the title *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Nanjio, following the Ming catalogue, lists three texts in the Mahāyāna *Vinaya* section which beside the *Bdp* have been known in the past as *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

1. A text called *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* (T 1491, N 1103). Its Chinese translation consists of one fascicule only. This translation was carried out by Saṅghabhara during the Liang Dynasty between AD 506 and 524.
2. A *sūtra* that is listed currently under the title *Mahāyānatrīśikṣamasūtra* (T 1493, N 1090). Alternative titles cited in Nanjio are *Karmāvaraṇapratīsarāṇa*, *Karmāvaraṇapratīchedana*, and *Triskandhaka*. The *Taishō* index lists it also under the name *Karmāvaraṇapratīpraśrabdhisūtra*. It was first rendered into Chinese by Jñānagupta and Dharmagupta during the Sui Dynasty ca. AD 590.
3. A text which Nanjio lists as *Śāriputrakṣamasūtra* (T 1492, N 1106). He adds that this *sūtra* is also known as *Triskandhaka* and that it is an earlier and shorter version of the translations cited under N 1090 and N 1103. Its Chinese translation is attributed to An Shih-kao who is said to have made it during the Eastern Han Dynasty between AD 148 and 170.

A text entitled *Triskandhaka* is also mentioned in the *Mvy* (1384) and by Bu-ston.⁴⁸ In the *Mvy* it is found in the *sūtra* section of the Tibetan *Tripitaka*.⁴⁹ A work of the same name is further cited in the *Śikṣ* and *Ug*.⁵⁰ Here, the term *Triskandhaka* is mentioned primarily in a liturgical context. Schuster has suggested that, like the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, the expression *Triskandhaka* might also have had a twofold meaning, viz., that it might have referred to a particular text bearing that name and to a category of presumably brief treatises describing certain liturgical practices.⁵¹ Such a liturgical text would seem a likely candidate as the

48. Obermiller, 1931–32, i, p. 171.

49. *Mvy* 1384, TTP 950.

50. *Śikṣ*, p. 290.1–2.

51. Schuster, *op. cit.*, n. 99.

source for Śāntideva's brief citation from a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* on *stūpa* worship in the *Śikṣā*. If the three translations cited in Nanjio's catalogue (N 1090, 1103 and 1106) are approximately identical in content and have a shared interest in liturgical practices we are probably dealing here with texts that have little in common with our *sūtra*.

There is one more text that has been referred to in the past as *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. It is the seventeenth work in the *Ratnakūṭa* collection and presently called *Pūrṇapariṣcchā* or *Pūrṇaparivarta*.⁵² Its alternative title as *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* is attested in a number of sources. Bodhiruci's translation of the *Ratnakūṭa*, for instance, gives *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as its secondary title. Also Kumārajīva who rendered the *Prñ* into Chinese between AD 402 and 409 referred to it under the title of *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra*. His translation is the only Chinese version that survived. Mochizuki, however, has discovered that the T'ang catalogue lists Kumārajīva's translation as the second translation.⁵³ According to the same source, the first translation (which also bears the name *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*) was made by Dharmarakṣa at the end of the third century AD.⁵⁴ It is recorded as being a comparatively short text comprising only three fasciculi. This earlier version is no longer extant. In the *Taishō*, the term *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* is still employed as the secondary name of the *Prñ*.⁵⁵

In this *sūtra* the Buddha discourses on the bodhisattva path to a monk called Pūrṇamayāyana. In the course of the exposition that culminates in a description of Pūrṇa's attainment of the stage of irreversibility, the Buddha explains the generation of the thought of enlightenment, the manner in which an aspiring bodhisattva eliminates all enmity directed at him by a hostile world, and how he should cultivate the 'faculty of hearing'. Pūrṇa's personal quest is marred initially by his past exposure to evil influences that cause him to forget the goal of enlightenment. At a later stage, however, after he has overcome his unwholesome disposition he becomes successful in cultivating the four *śīla dharma* that generate in him roots of virtue, the resolve of 'no-turning-back' and finally the state of enlightenment.

Structurally, the exposition of *Prñ* has many features in common with other *Ratnakūṭa* texts. It also makes an extensive use of tetrads as a particular means of explaining the complexities of the bodhisattva training. In the *Prñ*, the tetrad section is extraordinarily long and covers roughly a quarter of the whole *sūtra*. Large parts of this section are dominated by

52. TTP, 760.18, T 310. 17.

53. Mochizuki, 1931–36, p. 3441a 5–25; ref. Schuster, *op. cit.*, p. 45, n. 100.

54. See also: Bagchi, 1927, i, pp. 83, 84 who confirms this information.

55. Seng-yu, in his *Ch'u san tsang chi chi*, gives as its usual title *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra* and cites *Pūrṇapariṣcchā* and *Mahākaruṇācitta* as two alternative names (Shih, 1968, p. 76, no. 65).

enumerative descriptions of the bodhisattva's duties. Conceivably, it is its apparent preoccupation with providing instructions relevant to the *bodhisattvacaryā* that accounts for its alternative title as *Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra*.

If we turn now to comparing the structure and content of the *Prñ* with the references to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* that are found in the various strands of Mahāyāna literature, a number of important differences become apparent. As we have gathered from the quotations cited above, the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is associated with the six *pāramitā*, *upāyakauśalya*, *maitrī*, and with preserving and acquiring the Dharma. In the *Prñ* these characteristics do not stand in the foreground. Most importantly, the *Prñ* does not include a systematic exposition of the *pāramitā*. Naturally, they do receive some attention but are clearly not the *raison d'être* of its composition. Hence, it seems improbable that when the sources refer to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* they actually imply the *Prñ*.

As already concluded above, in most cases the expression *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* served as an umbrella title for a group of texts which dealt in one way or another with the *bodhisattvacaryā*. Judging by the numerous references to the six perfections, the treatment of the *pāramitā* must have been the core of many of the *sūtras* that were included in that collection. We cannot exclude the possibility that the *Prñ* was included among the body of such early bodhisattva *sūtras*. It is not probable, however, that the *Prñ* can be indentified as the text such ancient *sūtras* as the *Kp* had in mind when they referred to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

Finally, there is a reference to a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in the *Mvy*.⁵⁶ Here, a *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is given as the fifth work in a list that enumerates one hundred and four Buddhist texts, between the *Avataṃsaka* and *Lalitavistara*. The *Avataṃsaka* is a composite work. Its two main recensions are divided into thirty-four and thirty-nine chapters, many of which are in fact separate *sūtras* that have been in circulation as independent texts. The *Lalitavistara*, in contrast, is a more homogeneous text that narrates the lives of Śākyamuni Buddha. Perhaps, by placing the *Bdp* between these two works, the authors of the *Mvy* intended to point to some affinity in structure or contents between the three works. They may have regarded the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as being composite in a similar way to the *Avataṃsaka*. Alternatively, they may have considered the presence of *jātaka*-type stories in the *Bdp* to be a factor that links it to the *Lalitavistara*. It is also possible of course that the arrangement of *sūtra* titles bears no relation to their respective content. Yet, the sequence of their enumerations seems to indicate

56. ref. Schuster.

the implementation of a premeditated design.⁵⁷

57. The lists commences with the *Śatasāhasrikaprajñāpāramitā*, *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikaprajñāpāramitā* and *Aṣṭasāhasrikaprajñāpāramitā*, followed by the *Buddhāvataṃsaka*, *Bodhisattvapīṭaka*, *Lalitavistara* and *Samādhirāja*. Considering the position assumed by these *sūtras* in Mahāyāna literature, the sequence might indicate an arrangement in which the texts are ranked in order of importance. The *Ratnakūṭa* is cited in the thirty-ninth position.

The Bodhisattvapiṭaka and the Akṣayamatīnirdeśa

As part of the discussion of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*'s position in Mahāyāna literature, I shall next explore the relationship between the *Bdp* and *Akn*.⁵⁸

The main body of the *Akn* consists of a detailed exposition of eighty inexhaustible (*akṣaya*) faculties and attributes of a bodhisattva. Here, many of the more important practices of the *bodhisattvacaryā* are discussed and set into an early Mahāyāna context.⁵⁹ Significantly, only the first ten of the eighty *akṣaya* bear unmistakable marks of Mahāyāna thought. Virtually all

58. The earliest reference to the *Akn* is found in a Chinese catalogue of the Buddhist Canon where it is listed as an early fourth-century translation and is included as the twelfth section of the *Mahāsaṃnipāta* (*Li tai san pao ki*; 41.2a; Bagchi, i, pp. 90–91). This translation was carried out by Dharmarakṣa in AD 307. The work is still extant and catalogued as *Taishō* no. 397. According to Nanjio (no. 74, 77) it is in fact a co-authored translation carried out by Chih-yen and Pao-yun soon after 427 AD. The *Akn* seems to have formed from the very outset a part of the *Mahāsaṃnipāta* collection which itself ranks among the earliest collections of Mahāyāna literature (Bagchi, i, p. 90). Bagchi lists the *Mahāsaṃnipāta* collection among the early Mahāyāna *sūtras* that were translated by Lokakṣema during the second half of the second century AD (Bagchi, i, p. 43).

In the Tibetan Canon which does not know any collection entitled *Mahāsaṃnipāta*, the *Akn* has been included in the 'sūtra section' (TTP 34, no. 842). Judging by the remarks found in the prologue and epilogue of the Tibetan translation, it is clear that by the ninth century, at least, the *Akn* had become a part of the Indian *Mahāsaṃnipāta* collection. Wayman cites some internal evidence which suggest that the *Akn* was composed by the same circle of monks who composed the *Satasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā*, *Saptaśatikāprajñāpāramitā*, *Kuśalamūlaparidhara*, *Buddhapitaka* and *Saddhp* (Wayman, 1980, pp. 212–214). The greatest number of citations from the *Akn* are contained in *Śikṣ*. Altogether, it refers twenty-two times to various sections of the *Akn*. Other citations are found in the *Sūtrasammuccaya* (TTP, 102, p. 85.1.2 ff); in Sthiramati's sub-commentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*, that is the *Sūtrālamkāravṛtti-bhāṣya* (TTP 109, p. 48.2.2); in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (La Vallée Poussin, 1913, p. 108.1–3) and in the *Mppś* (iii, pp. 1245–50, 1272, 1716). For a list of *Akn* quotations in Mahāyāna literature, see: Braavrig, 1989, pp. lvi–lxi.

Despite the *Akn*'s apparent popularity with the later Mahāyāna writers it seems unlikely that it belonged to the very earliest strand of Mahāyāna *sūtras*. That is to say, it almost certainly postdates works such as the *Aṣṭa* and *Saddhp*, but may have appeared in the second wave of Mahāyāna texts alongside the *Vkn* or *Śgs*. First, its highly systematised and concise way of dealing with the various aspects of the *bodhisattvacaryā*, its main topic, indicates that it is not an early work. Second, there are some issues which await, as yet, clarification. In the *Prajñā* Chapter (p. 56.2.6), for instance, there is a reference to a *Yogācārabhūmi*, saying: "Wisdom is attached to all places in the *Yogācārabhūmiśāstra*" (p. 56.2.6). The general nature of this citation does not allow us to infer that it is a reference to Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi* or to follow Wayman's suggestion that it is the *Yogācārabhūmi* composed by Saṅgharakṣa. If we take it to be a reference to Asaṅga's *Yogācārabhūmi*, then we have to discredit the various entries found in the Chinese catalogues which date the *Akn*'s first translation to 307 AD, since we know that the *Yogācārabhūmi*, in its present form, is at the earliest a late fourth-century work. On the other hand, Chinese sources do mention a partial, late second-century translation of Saṅgharakṣa's *Yogācārabhūmi*. If we assume that it is this text to which our citation refers, then the possibility of the *Akn* belonging to an early literary phase of the Mahāyāna cannot be excluded (Demiéville, 1954, pp. 395–396).

59. As Wayman has demonstrated, it is this list of eighty *akṣaya* that was taken as a basis in the *Sūtrālamkāra* where the *Akn* is cited as authority for the twenty-two forms of generating the thought of enlightenment. Cast into twenty-two similes in the *Sūtrālamkāra*, they correspond in number and sequence to the eighty *akṣaya* listed in the *Akn*. The similes themselves, however, did not originate in the *Akn*, but stem from a number of sources, most notably from passages of the early *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. The list of the similes is, for instance, contained in three *kārikā* of the *Abhisamayālamkāra* (Conze, 1954, pp. 9–10).

other practices cited fall within the scope of pre-Mahāyāna Buddhism and figured, in one way or another, already in the *suttas* of early Buddhism.

A number of otherwise well-known Mahāyāna concepts are not included in the *Akn*, most notably the theory of *gotra*, the fivefold path as propounded in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and the tenfold scheme of the bodhisattva's career.⁶⁰ Instead, more basic Mahāyāna concepts such as the generation of the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicittotpāda*), the cultivation of the six *pāramitā* and the attainment of the stage of irreversibility (*avaivartikabhūmi*) stand in the foreground. This preoccupation with ancient elements of Mahāyāna thought seems therefore to endorse the scriptural evidence found in Chinese catalogues that places the *Akn* in the early, formative period of Mahāyāna thought.

Next, we turn to comparing the issues that are central to the *Akn* with those found in the *Bdp*. In doing so, we note numerous themes which are common to both *sūtras*. In a number of instances, whole passages correspond word by word. Structural affinities are found also in the internal design and logical sequence in which the dialogues are construed. But the overall order of the practices differs in several respects. In the *Bdp* most of the concurrences are found in the *Prajñā* Chapter, while in the *Akn* they are more evenly spread out over the eighty *akṣaya*. The reason for this lies in the differing concentration of bodhisattva practices. In the *Bdp*, most of the practices are allocated to chapter eleven, while in the *Akn* no such accumulation prevails.

Particularly striking is the frequent recurrence of long, almost identical, abhidharmic-type lists enumerating the various qualities and practices associated with the bodhisattva. Clearly, concurrences of that kind point either to the existence of some commonly accepted patterns of exposition current at the time of their composition, or to a particularly close connection between the *Akn* and the *Bdp*. Further below, I shall show at some examples that the direction of this influence must have flowed from the *Bdp* to the *Akn* and not *vice versa*.⁶¹

When we turn to the practices, we note that in both texts, the *pāramitā* are treated individually

60. Obermiller, 1932, pp. 14–46.

In the opening passage of the fourth *akṣaya*, there is however one brief reference to 'stages' of the bodhisattva path. Since these are left undefined and do not seem to be part of the *Akn*'s overall scheme, we may be dealing here with a later interpolation, attempting to include a reference to the *Dbh* into the structure of the *Akn* (p. 41.5.3). The *Akn-tīkā* interprets the bodhisattva practices in the *Akn* in terms of the ancient scheme of the *saṃbhāramārga*, *prayogamārga*, *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga*. This scheme, however, is not explicitly put forward in the root text.

61. For a detailed analysis, see: Pagel. "The Akṣayamatīnirdeśa and Bodhisattvapiṭaka". *The Buddhist Forum*. iii. forthcoming.

and are not linked to any path structure. Also, the material that is employed under the respective headings of the six perfections corresponds in many points. In the *Kṣānti* Chapter, a practically identical exposition on the nature of 'highest patience' is found.⁶² In their *Dhyāna* Chapters both texts cite a largely concurring list of about one hundred *samādhi*. In their *Vīrya* Chapters, both *sūtras* underline the importance that mental exertion assumes in the bodhisattva's training and provide an identical way of explication.⁶³ However, similarities in contents go well beyond the *pāramitā* chapters. They are found in about eighty percent of practices which occur in both works. Outstanding examples are provided by the discussions of *punya* and *jñānasambhāra*, the treatment of *śamatha*, *vipaśyanā*, *bodhyaṅga* and *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*. In fact, the *Akn* and *Bdp* are often so close that I found it possible at several occasions to draw on the *Akn-ṭikā* to clarify obscure passages in the *Bdp*.⁶⁴

The first person to point to the textual parallels between the *Akn* and *Bdp* was Alex Wayman in an article published in 1980.⁶⁵ Noting their association only in passing, he acknowledged their common ground on many topics and correlated a few of their sentences. Taking his article as a point of departure, I investigated the other areas in which the parallels occurred. Leaving aside a handful of uncertain cases, we can distinguish three categories of textual parallelism. First, there is a group of concurring enumerations. Second, there is a large body of formulaic sections of text, so common in *suttas* of early Buddhism. Third, there are several independent, non-formulaic passages that are shared by both works.

Of the three areas of parallelism, it is easiest to account for are the concurrences that appear in lists. Altogether, I encountered far-reaching agreement in six enumerations. These include a list of types of skill⁶⁶, an enumeration of thirty-two pairs of mental vigour (*cittavīrya*), the *samādhi* list of the *Dhyāna* Chapter and a catalogue of forms of learning. In theory, owing to

62. *Bdp*, p. 46.4.2–47.1.2; *Akn*, p. 45.3.3–4.8

In order to lend accuracy to the comparison between the relevant sections of the *Akn* and *Bdp*, I adopt for this section of my work the readings in the *Peking Tripiṭaka Edition* (Suzuki, Tokyo–1956).

63. *Bdp*, p. 55.3.6–5.3; *Akn*, p. 48.1.5.

64. Wayman has drawn our attention to some, in his opinion, significant philosophical shifts in emphasis between the *Akn* and the *Bdp*. However, on close examination of the respective passages in both *sūtras* and the *Akn-ṭikā*, these discrepancies seem to be of a rather minor nature. For details, see: Pagel, 1991, pp. 8–12.

65. A. Wayman. "A Report on the Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra". *Studies in Indo Asian Art and Culture*. 6, New Delhi: 1980, p. 219.

66. In the *Bdp*, these include 'skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *satya*, *pratisamvid*, *pratisaraṇa*, *vijñāna* and *jñāna*, *bodhipāṅsika dharma*, *pratītyasamutpada* and *mārga*, (pp. 77.2.3–87.5.6). In the *Akn*, the list runs as follows: 'skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *satya*, *trikāla*, *yāna*, *pratītyasamutpada* and *sarvadharmā* (pp. 52.2.8–56.1.6). The five topics that do not appear in this context in the *Akn* are 'skill' in *pratisamvid*, *vijñāna* and *jñāna*, *bodhipāṅsika* and 'skill' in the path. They are given elsewhere an independent treatment (pp. 62.2.7–63.48; p. 64.2.4–3.5; pp. 66.4.3–70.4.3 and pp. 70.4.4–71.2.1 respectively).

the tendency in oral traditions to adopt wholesale listings of any type for mnemonic purposes, it is possible that this concurrence is ascribable to a third source and not to direct borrowing between the *Akn* and *Bdp*. In spite of intensive research in this area, I have not been able to trace any enumeration from which they might have stemmed.⁶⁷

The second category comprises a number of parallel passages that are largely composed of set expressions, turns of phrase and formulae. They prevail, above all, in the exposition of the *bodhipāṅśika dharma*, in skill in aggregates, elements and sensefields and in the section on the unique knowledge. While it was an easy task to identify them, it is virtually impossible to determine the texts from which their particular set phrases were originally taken. Being well acquainted with Buddhist *sūtras*, the authors of the *Akn* and *Bdp* probably recited them from memory without having in mind any specific work as point of reference. However, a number of interpolations of non-standardised text elements such as connecting phrases in the *Akn* shows beyond doubt that it was the *Akn* which drew on the *Bdp*.⁶⁸

Finally, the *Akn* and *Bdp* share a considerable number of non-formulaic text portions that are kindred in spirit and almost identical in phrasing and hence appear to be unique to the two *sūtras*. As will become clear further on, it is precisely this uniqueness that indicates the *Akn*'s indebtedness to the *Bdp*. The most interesting examples of this category are found in the sections dealing with 'skill' in *satya*, 'skill' in *dharma* and 'skill' in *pratisaraṇa*.

Amongst the six concurring enumerations, the most interesting example is the list detailing the bodhisattva's forms of learning. Wayman, noticing their agreement but not providing any reasons, saw in the list of the *Bdp* a kind of prototype for that of the *Akn*. While, in principle, I agree with his judgment, I wish to add precision to his observations and to corroborate them with additional findings. For one thing, Wayman thought that we are dealing with two, essentially identical lists. This is not the case. The first obvious variation is the difference in

67. See: Wayman. "The Samādhi Lists of the Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra and the Mahāvīyutpatti". *AOH*, 34, 1980, p. 305–318.

In his article on the *samādhi* lists (*op. cit.*, p. 312) Wayman writes that the *samādhi* in the *Akn* were adopted from the list of the *Bdp*. Wayman does not give any reasons to substantiate his assumption but he is probably correct in proposing this direction of borrowing. Of the total of one hundred and eighteen *samādhi* in the *Akn* seventy-two occur also in the *Bdp*. For the most part the meditations that are common to both texts appear in clusters of six to ten *samādhi* each. Perhaps to account for changes in doctrine, we have several cases in which the *samādhi* titles appear in slightly altered versions in the *Akn*. What puzzles me is the rationale behind the choice by which the *Akn* adopted *samādhi* from the *Bdp*. Why are of one hundred and one *samādhi* in the *Bdp* only seventy-two found in the *Akn*? What were the reasons for excluding the remaining forty-six *samādhi*—some of which bear well-known titles such as the *Samādhirāja*? Neither the order in which they are listed nor the actual wording of their titles appear to hold the key to these questions. I have given a list of both the *Akn*'s and *Bdp*'s *samādhi* lists in Appendix ii.

68. Pagel, *op. cit.*, pp. 5–8.

the length of the lists. The *Akn*'s enumeration gives eighty-four forms of learning, whereas the *Bdp* knows of only seventy-two.⁶⁹ Furthermore, the *Bdp* contains thirteen items that are not found in the list of the *Akn*, raising the number of variant items to twenty-five—roughly a third of the sum total. This substitution of individual items suggests that one of the lists was carefully edited. The greater length of the *Akn*'s list alone indicates posterity, because it is doubtful whether the *Bdp* would deliberately reduce its scope. On the contrary, if one's experience with other texts is anything to go by, material is usually added in the process of transmission rather than being taken away.

The majority of discrepancies that exist between the two lists are found in the second half of the enumeration. Up to *ākāra* thirty-three, most items concur closely in both sequence and contents. After that, apart from two codified sets of practice (no. 49–52, 53–55), the items are generally ill-matched and display few parallels. Thus far, I have not managed to identify a rationale behind this process of restructuring. Apart from some well-known standardised groupings⁷⁰, no scheme springs to mind when comparing the organisations of the two lists.⁷¹ Since both enumerations contain a remarkable comprehensive catalogue of practices, it is tempting to conjecture that their purpose was to gather all known bodhisattva practices in a single *Abhidharma*-type *mātrkā* list. Their placement before the main thrust of the bodhisattva practice adds weight to this theory.

In the other enumerations the situation is much clearer, since a close accord in number as well as contents is shown. This agreement makes it of course more difficult to determine the direction in which the borrowing took place. In these enumerations, the only clue is the presence of numbering schemes in the *Akn* that are not found in the *Bdp*. While the inclusion of these schemes, taken on its own, is not sufficient to substantiate the view that the lists of

69. It is worth noting here that also Śāntideva's quotation in the *Śikṣ* of the *Akn* enumeration is at variance with the original. I suspect that these divergencies are not the result of a consciously undertaken selection but occurred inadvertently, since the number of items is very close (80) and does not show any new *ākāra* (see: Appendix i).

70. E.g., *Bdp* item no. 49–52: four hallmarks of Buddhism (*bkaḥ rtags kyi phyag rgya bzī*); item no. 53–55: three gateways to liberation (*trīṇi vimokṣamukhāni*); item no. 76–77: reliances (*pratisaraṇa*); item no. 63–64: *bodhipāṣika dharma*; no. 65–71: buddha-powers (*buddhabala*) etc.

71. As far as the individual items are concerned, one meets with a few inconsistencies that stand out at once. First, there is the item called "study of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*" (no. 39, 35). Its position in the list, next to *prajñāpāramitā*, *saṃgrahavastu* and *upāyakaṣāya*, suggests that it was conceived of as a (set of) practice and not as single text (or body of scriptures) as it is interpreted elsewhere. Second, one notes the discrepancy that exists between the title *brahmavihāra* given to item 42/38 in the list and its designation in the text itself where these four practices are invariably referred to as the four *apramāṇa*. While it is true that one cannot speak of a standard title for this set of practices, the incongruence in their titles might indicate that the list of learning was implanted in the texts in a prefabricated form and does not stand in any 'organic' relation to the exposition itself.

the *Akn* were taken from the *Bdp*, a number of unambiguous editorial modifications suggests this.

The most telling examples of this kind are found in the section which details the bodhisattva's accumulation of merit (*puṇya*) and pristine cognition (*jñāna*). In the *Bdp* we meet here with the statement that bodhisattvas of pure resolve "appear in all worlds". In the *Akn* this sentence has been altered to say that purity of resolve endows bodhisattvas with "power over all worlds".⁷²

Now, it takes little acumen to see that this variation sprang from a shift in perception of the 'model bodhisattva'. In all likelihood, it dates back to the period in which the early characterisation of the bodhisattva as a human being was superseded by a more transcendental concept of bodhisattvahood. Unfortunately, we have little information to indicate when this shift took place. If one follows Harrison's findings—based on the earliest Chinese translations of Mahāyāna *sūtras*—it did not occur before the third century AD.⁷³ Other scholars, basing their propositions either on iconographic evidence⁷⁴ or by correlating the final stages of the *daśabhūmika* path with the emergence of mythical bodhisattvas⁷⁵, have suggested the second century AD.⁷⁶ Today, this view has been seriously challenged by Schopen in his masterly (re)interpretation of the various rock and pillar inscriptions. He shows that in epigraphical sources 'mythical' bodhisattvas are not attested before the 4th to 5th centuries AD.⁷⁷ Thus, without entering the intricacies of the controversy (which, in any event, is based on rather slim documentation), there is enough reason to place the emergence of mythical bodhisattvas in a rather later period than commonly assumed.⁷⁸ In principle, this dating fits in with the chronological order that I proposed for the *Akn* and *Bdp*.

Another variant reading that seemingly corroborates my theory is given in a tetrad enumerating the means that aid the bodhisattva to increase his accumulation of knowledge (*jñānasambhāra*). In the *Bdp*, we learn in this connection of the following four paths. 1. The path of the

72. *Bdp*, p. 81.4.2; *Akn*, p. 65.3.7.

73. Paul Harrison. *JABS*, 10, pp. 67–89.

74. V.S. Agrawala. "Dhyāni Buddhas and Bodhisattvas". *JUPHS*, 11(2), pp. 1–13.

75. See E. Conze. *A Short History of Buddhism*. 1982, p. 49.

76. Gregory Schopen's findings about the Kuṣāna image of Amitābha has made this early date—by implication—unlikely (Schopen, 1987, pp. 111–125).

77. Schopen, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

78. Epigraphic evidence and iconographic representations point to a considerable discrepancy between the literary forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism (dating back to the beginnings of our era) and their public manifestations. There was virtually no popular support for the Mahāyāna before the 4th/5th century AD that is documented in the various inscriptions, and even then it is chiefly of monastic origin and not by lay-supporters (Schopen, *op. cit.*, p. 124; Schopen, 1985 pp. 9–47; Schopen, 1979, pp. 1–19).

pāramitā; 2. The path of the *bodhipākṣika dharma*; 3. The noble eightfold path; 4. The path that leads to the pristine cognition of all knowing.⁷⁹

While this list is not particularly remarkable in itself, the *Akn* reading of this tetrad contains one interesting deviation. It replaces the third limb, the ‘noble eightfold path’, with the ‘path of the stages’.⁸⁰ Since the other three paths correspond to those of the *Bdp*, preference to the scheme of stages indicates tangible doctrinal progress. It is plausible that the author of the *Akn* felt compelled to account for this progress and consequently adjusted the *Bdp* reading accordingly.⁸¹

Another interesting, though somewhat more ambiguous, variant reading is found in the discussions of “reliance on the spirit and not on the letter” (*arthapratisaraṇena bhavitavyaḥ na vyañjanapratisaraṇena*). While, in the *Bdp*, we learn that the letter instructs the bodhisattva “not to abandon any sentient being”, the *Akn* says that the letter teaches bodhisattvas “to renounce all possessions”.⁸² The *Bdp*’s reading of this phrase is a reference to the bodhisattva’s moral obligation to pursue actively universal liberation. Historically, it probably stemmed from the thought contained in several early Mahāyāna scriptures that gives prominence to the ideal of the *grhṇpti* bodhisattva over that of the *pravrajita* bodhisattva. Texts such as the *Vkn* and (the early versions of the) *Ug* provide illustration of this literary strand. In contrast, the reading of the *Akn*, advocating total renunciation of worldly possessions, belongs to a later period. Its message is strongly reminiscent of the later trend that replaces the lay-ideal with that of the *pravrajita* bodhisattva as ‘model bodhisattva’. The dating of Chinese translations of Mahāyāna texts suggests that this reorientation to the mendicant model of early Buddhism was well advanced by the fourth century AD. Again, this would accord with the proposed chronology of the *Akn* and *Bdp*.

There exists, however, a second possibility of interpretation. Mahāyāna *sūtras* of all ages agree in propounding generosity (*dāna*) as the cardinal virtue of the lay-bodhisattva. Generosity epitomises his obligations and efforts, and is the principal means by which the *grhṇpti*

79. *Bdp*, p. 82.3.1.

80. *Akn*, p. 66.3.4.

81. Since their expositions of the bodhisattva’s training, both in emphasis of practice and structure, have many elements in common, the time gap between the two works cannot have been very great. Both *sūtras*, for instance, do not employ the tenfold path structure although they must have been aware of it, since it is briefly referred to in several places. Had they originated wide apart, one could expect to meet with traces testifying differences in doctrinal views of the period that separated their formulation. But for three sets of new practices and some minor shifts in emphasis this does not seem to be the case.

82. *Bdp*, p. 79.5.7; *Akn*, p. 63.5.6.

bodhisattva becomes cleansed from the three root defilements. Indeed, pure giving is often set forth on its own as a model for the *grhapti* bodhisattva's middle way which fares between affection and aversion—the two extremes against which he battles every day. Hence, the *Akn*'s admonition could also be understood as referring to the *grhapti* bodhisattva's obligation to practice generosity at all times with the aim of universal liberation. In this event, the *Akn* and *Bdp* would subscribe to the very same ideal. However, the *Akn*'s plea for a very severe form of generosity—which in its radicalism is fundamentally incongruous with the well-balanced middle way that is trodden by lay-bodhisattvas—renders this line of interpretation possibly less convincing.

The Scholastic Affiliation of the Bodhisattvapīṭaka

At this stage I wish to offer some thoughts about possible scholastic affiliations of the *Bdp*. The first translation into Chinese of the *Bdp* was carried out by Hsüan-tsang in AD 645. He is reported to have undertaken it immediately on his return to China. The initial phase of his translation activity is recorded as follows:⁸³

“On the first day of the seventh month [of the year of his return in China], the master started to translate the palm-leaf Sanskrit scriptures. At the beginning he translated the *Bodhisattvapīṭakasūtra*, *Buddhabhūmisūtra*, *Sanmukhadhāraṇīsūtra* and *Prakaraṇāryavacaśāstra*. He completed the translation of the *Sanmukhadhāraṇīsūtra* on that same day and finished the translation of the *Buddhabhūmisūtra* on the fifteenth day while the *Bodhisattvapīṭakasūtra* and the *Prakaraṇāryavacaśāstra* were done by the end of the year.”

The translation of the *Bdp* won Hsüan-tsang great praise from the emperor T'ang T'ai-tsung. In the same source we read:⁸⁴

“The emperor also read the *Bodhisattvapīṭakasūtra* which the master had submitted to him, and he highly praised it and ordered the crown prince to write an epilogue for this *sūtra*.”

The passage concludes by relating how Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Bdp* had even helped to bring about a change in the emperor's disposition towards Buddhism which, so far, had been marked by indifference.⁸⁵

It is well known that Hsüan-tsang's motivation for travelling to India was to acquire a copy of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. He managed to obtain this text and subsequently translated it between AD 646 and 648 together with the *Mahāyānābhīdharmasamyuktasaṅgīti*, *Mahāyānasamgraha*,

83. Li-Yung-hsi, 1959, p. 216 (ref. Schuster).

84. *op. cit.*, p. 225.

85. *op. cit.*, pp. 224, 225.

Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya and *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*. Other texts, translated at a slightly later date, included the *Sanmukhadhāraṇī*, *Prakaraṇāryavaca* and *Buddhabhūmisūtra*.

If we consider the authorship and doctrinal affiliation of the texts that Hsüan-tsang had chosen to translate first along with the *Yogācārabhūmi*, we find that most of these texts are closely associated with Yogācāra thought. The *Prakaraṇāryavaca* and the *Mahāyānasamgraha-bhāṣya* are attributed to Vasubandhu and so is a commentary on the *Sanmukhadhāraṇī*.⁸⁶ Furthermore, Bu-ston knows of a commentary on the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra* which he ascribes to Vasubandhu.⁸⁷ Obermiller pointed to a doctrinal affiliation between the *Buddhabhūmisūtra* and certain currents within the Yogācāra school.⁸⁸ The *Mahāyānābhīdharmaśāstram* is attributed to Asaṅga while Aśvabhāsa is generally accredited with the composition of the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra*.⁸⁹

In the light of his preoccupation with Yogācāra literature, it seems natural to raise the question about the reasons lying behind Hsüan-tsang's choice to translate first the *Bdp*. Does the *Bdp* form a part of the Yogācāra literary tradition? Did Hsüan-tsang know of some evidence that links our *sūtra* doctrinally or historically with the Yogācāra school? If so, he apparently regarded it as rather unimportant, since he does not mention it in any of his writings. Neither his *Sī-yu-ki* nor his various biographies seem to contain such a reference.⁹⁰

As I shall discuss further below, Sthiramati is reported to have shown much interest in some of the *Ratnakūṭa* works. Tibetan historians accredited him with the composition of the *Kāśyapaparivartaṭīkā*, the only surviving commentary of that text.⁹¹ The same sources attribute to Vasubandhu two other commentaries on *Ratnakūṭa* texts, namely, the *Amitābhavyūhaṭīkā*

86. Obermiller, 1931–32, i, p. 146.

87. *op. cit.*, i, p. 57.

88. *op. cit.*, i, p. 127 and n. 1192–1197 on p. 178.

89. Warder (1980, p. 553) gives the title of this commentary as *Mahāyānasamgrahopanibandhana* (TTP 1598).

90. Schuster (*op. cit.*, p. 55, n. 123) believes that his motive was of a more mundane nature. She proposes that he wanted to have the *Bdp* available as *propaganda fide*. Knowing in advance that he would be given an opportunity to report about his extensive travels in foreign countries, he may have chosen to prepare an easily intelligible text of imposing dimensions which was previously unknown in China in order to impress the emperor. She argues that Hsüan-tsang must have been well aware that any of the other, more philosophically oriented, texts would have achieved just the contrary.

One wonders, however, why he had chosen a text of such an extraordinary length. He must have suspected that the interest and patience of the indifferent and increasingly ailing emperor would hardly suffice to absorb a text of such length. Other equally imposing but much shorter texts must have been amongst the over six hundred works that he acquired on his travels. Furthermore, it seems improbable that Hsüan-tsang resolved to translate a lengthy text of little interest to himself for mere propaganda purposes at a time when a large number of works of high personal interest were awaiting examination. The prospect of an audience with the emperor may have influenced the sequence in which he decided to translate the Indian manuscripts, but it seems unlikely to have determined the nature of the texts themselves.

91. TTP 1523.

(T 1524) and the *Ratnacūḍabhāṣya* (T 1526). Paramārtha knows of yet another *Ratnakūṭa* commentary whose authorship he ascribes to Vasubandhu, this is, a commentary on the *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda*.⁹²

Hsüan-tsang himself is known to have been a strong advocate of Yogācāra thought. Shortly after his return to China, he founded the Fa-hsiang school whose basic tenets are derived from the *Yogācārabhūmi* and other related works. Considering his personal interest in Yogācāra Buddhism, it seems plausible that he should choose to translate first those works which bore closest affinity to Yogācāra doctrines. Such a view is further supported when we recall the two instances where the term *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* appears in conjunction with the title *Avatamsaka*, a collection of texts that is traditionally associated with the Yogācāra school. Moreover, if we accept the hypothesis that the list of *sūtras* found in the *Mvy* is based on some premeditated scheme, the listing of the *Bdp* next to the *Avatamsaka* could be interpreted to reflect some connection between our *sūtra* and Yogācāra thinking.

In the absence of any conclusive evidence, it is helpful to turn once more to the *Akn*, or rather, to its commentary, the *Akn-ṭīkā*. On reading the *Akn-ṭīkā*, one discovers soon that it interprets the *Akn* from a Yogācāra standpoint. One meets repeatedly with concepts such as *ālayavijñāna*, *cittamātratā*, *prajñaptimātratā*, *trisvabhāva* and *āśrayaparivṛtti* even though these concepts are not found in the *sūtra* itself.⁹³ The author of the *Akn-ṭīkā*, whether it was Sthiramati or Vasubandhu (an issue that is not as yet resolved), regarded the *Akn* clearly as a work belonging to Yogācāra thought. In view of the close affiliation of the *Bdp* and *Akn*, this assumption warrants some consideration when discussing the scholastic affiliation of the *Bdp*. Furthermore, in chapter one of the *Bdp* we find recurring references to the term *abhūtaparikalpa*.⁹⁴ The concept of *abhūtaparikalpa* is closely associated with Yogācāra thought and figures predominantly in works attributed to the advocates of its philosophy.

Finally, I propose to return to the history of the *Bdp* and its position in the formation of the Mahāyāna. It has been argued by several scholars that the *Akn* belongs to the earliest strands of Mahāyāna literature.⁹⁵ The arguments cited most frequently in support of this view, are

92. The authenticity of this reference is disputed. Wayman thinks that it is apocryphal, saying that it applies to comments in the *Buddhagotrāśāstra* which is attributed in Paramārtha's Chinese translation of the *Buddhagotrāśāstra* to Vasubandhu (Wayman, 1974, p. 7).

93. In conjunction with 'skill' in the aggregates, we read for instance (p. 194.2.6 ff):

"The unwholesome aggregates are overcome by the change of basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*) in the store-consciousness (*ālayavijñāna*) at the time of reaching enlightenment."

94. R, folio 36.1, 43.7, 44.1 ff.

95. Wayman, *op. cit.*, p. 232.

based first on the contents of the *Akn*, second on its association with the *Vkn*⁹⁶ (itself a very early text) and third, on its inclusion in the *Li tai san pao chi* catalogue⁹⁷, as having been translated by Lokakṣema in the second century AD.⁹⁸ As I do not wish to repeat the argument in detail it should suffice to point out that so far no author has been able to bring forth any compelling evidence in support of the antiquity of the *Akn* other than circumstantial testimony. However, since the inferential grounds put forward are persuasive, I think it justifiable to accept the *Akn*'s comparatively early date of composition—perhaps in the first or second century AD—as a working hypothesis.

Considering the nature of our findings about the relationship between the *Akn* and *Bdp*, such an early date for the *Akn* affects, of course, the dating of the *Bdp*; until now this has generally been held to be a rather late work.⁹⁹ To some extent this was due to the late date of the *Bdp*'s first Chinese translation, undertaken not before the middle of the seventh century AD.¹⁰⁰ Other factors that were cited in support of this theory range from its alleged systematisation and use of comprehensive enumerations, including the presence of supposedly “fully matured Mahāyāna thinking” in its exposition.¹⁰¹ Although my reading of the *Bdp* has left me with a different impression, it is quite unnecessary to subscribe to a discussion of such difficult and subjective terms as ‘maturity’, ‘comprehensiveness’ or ‘systematisation’, since our analysis has provided us now with much more powerful evidence. If we accept the antiquity of the *Akn*, the *terminus ad quem* for the *Bdp* is pushed back from 645 AD (the date of Hsüan-tsang's translation) and 265–313 AD (the dating of the *Lkdh*'s first translation) to the final quarter of the second century AD, the time when the *Akn* is reported to have been translated into Chinese.

Such early date of the *Bdp* would in many ways accord much better with the rather ill-organised, inconsistent internal structure of the *Bdp* and account for the rudimentary depiction that it gives of the bodhisattva career. In particular, it would validate my *mātrka*-theory for the list of seventy-two kinds of learning that I proposed in my paper on the *Akn* and *Bdp*.

96. Lamotte, *op. cit.*, pp. lxxxvii; pp. 105, 197, 284.

97. Bagchi, 1927, pp. 43, 91.

98. Alex Wayman (*op. cit.*, pp. 211–214) has further enlisted the rather uncommon use of the name Śāradvatīputra for the usual Śāriputra in support of the antiquity of the *Akn*.

99. E.g., Schuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 48, 51.

100. This argument is rather weak, since we know of several other early and important Buddhist works that came only relatively late to the attention of the Chinese translation teams. The *Āgama* and *Vinaya*, for instance, were all translated at a very late date (Demiéville, *L'Inde Classique*, ii, pp. 418–419).

101. Schuster *op. cit.*, pp. 48–51.

Undoubtedly, enumerations of this kind were particularly susceptible to change and expansion immediately after their compilation when the ideas they epitomised were still fluctuating. This last point applies to the *Bdp*'s exposition as a whole. That is to say, the author of the *Akn* would surely have shown greater restraint in modifying the wording of the *Bdp* had he seen it to embody an advanced account of the bodhisattva doctrine. It is tempting to deduce—if only by implication—that the *Bdp* stood more at the beginning of this evolution. Assuming that the length of the *Bdp* as it is preserved today reflects its original size, its exposition of the bodhisattva must have served as the foundation to many of the later bodhisattva treatises. I shall demonstrate in chapter four when exploring the practices and doctrines that this assumption is indeed borne out by the *Bdp*'s vision of the bodhisattva-ideal.

What is more, an early date of composition would also provide answers to a series of questions that, so far, have been resolved in an unsatisfactorily manner. It would account, for instance, for the references to a *Bdp* that are found in the *Kp*, *Ug* and *Vkn*—themselves amongst the earliest Mahāyāna texts. The physical format of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* they refer to is uncertain, but the fact that they associate it with the *pāramitā*, *maitrī* and *bodhipāṅśika dharma*—all themes that are discussed at great length in the *Bdp*—possibly indicates a references to some early, composite version of the *Bdp*. We do not know what exactly happened to the individual component parts, but it is conceivable that at a later stage these were incorporated into the structures of the present *Bdp*. As I shall show, its organisation of content and chapter divisions would certainly allow for this possibility. It would also explain Hsüan-tsang's selecting the *Bdp* out of over six hundred texts for immediate translation. He was no doubt aware of its importance to the formulation of the bodhisattva ideal and so decided not only to record the place when he obtained it, but also to give it priority over all other texts in his translation work.

The Mahāratnakūṭa Collection

The *Mahāratnakūṭa* (hereafter *Ratnakūṭa*) collection comprises forty-nine *sūtras* of varying doctrinal orientation and literary affiliation.¹⁰² As a collection of Buddhist texts it is considered to be one of the most popular and important Mahāyāna works, along with the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* and *Prajñāpāramitā sūtras*. As for the date of its compilation there is a certain disagreement among modern scholars of Buddhism. The antiquity of many of the texts it contains, however, has been established beyond any doubt. The collection as it stands today has been preserved in Chinese and Tibetan translations with only a few texts extant in the original Hybrid Sanskrit and Middle Indo-Āryan Prakrit idiom.

The *sūtras* included in the *Ratnakūṭa* cover a wide range of Buddhist thought. Most of its forty-nine texts share a common interest in the bodhisattva path. Indeed, it is argueable that this shared concern with the proper execution of the bodhisattva practices occasioned their inclusion into one collection. Although a certain thematic unity is provided by the incorporation of almost all basic Mahāyāna concepts, a tone of heterogeneity prevails. It is this very heterogeneous nature that may reveal the compiler's intention of presenting a cross-section of Mahāyāna thought. One is left with the impression of a deliberately arranged overview of Mahāyāna doctrines.

By the time of its initial compilation the principal Mahāyāna tenets were evidently well-established in most of the Buddhist communities of northern India. Yet, some of the (earlier) *Ratnakūṭa* texts seem to derive their religio-philosophical message from what might be called the phase of transition between the early strata of Buddhist thought (fundamentally based on the teachings of the historical Buddha) and those introduced in later centuries. In many instances these early teachings are skilfully incorporated into the Mahāyāna frame of reference, thereby producing *sūtras* of great literary beauty.

The path and ideal of the bodhisattva are central to many of the works included in this collection. Some *sūtras* are wholly dedicated to the new ideal and provide detailed instructions on the pattern by which an aspiring bodhisattva should pursue his spiritual training. Other

102. As a collection of texts it is also referred to as *Ratnakūṭa*, *Mahāratnakūṭa*, *Mahāratnakūṭasūtra*, *Mahāratnakūṭa-dharmaparyāya* or *Mahāratnakūṭa-dharmaparyāyaśatasahāsrikā-grantha* (Stael-Holstein, 1926, pp. vii-x).

texts integrate the teachings on the bodhisattva in an otherwise more philosophical exposition.

The lay and mendicant ideal are treated in a rather partisan fashion in a number of *sūtras*. In many instances, the respective positions are put forward with great conviction. But judging by my own reading, both ideals are advocated with equal strength. On the one hand, some texts as our *Bdp* unequivocally propose a monastic, celibate environment as the only appropriate framework for the *bodhisattvacaryā*. On the other hand, there are numerous *sūtras* that place the bodhisattva ideal firmly within the reach of non-celibate layfolk.¹⁰³

The topical references to the bodhisattva path prompted several scholars to conclude with Friedrich Weller that “the ethics of the bodhisattva career is just what all the forty-nine texts of the *Ratnakūṭa sūtra* have in common”¹⁰⁴ or with Schuster, “that it is this (common element), above all, which binds them together and gives them a recognisable identity”¹⁰⁵.

In India, the title ‘*Ratnakūṭa*’ was initially associated with the *Kp*, a text that at present is included as *Rkt* 43.¹⁰⁶ The question arises concerning the grounds and the circumstances by which this title came to be applied to the entire collection. Sthiramati, the author of one of the major commentaries on *Ratnakūṭa* works¹⁰⁷ who is cited by both Bu-ston and Tāranātha offers the following explanation: “The title *Ratnakūṭa* was bestowed on the *sūtra* because this *Dharmaparyāya* comprehends all the jewels of the Mahāyāna”. Then, Sthiramati lists sixteen Mahāyāna ‘jewels’ or virtues, for example, right conduct, and points to their presence in the *Kp*, calling it *Ratnakūṭa*.¹⁰⁸ The *Kp*, as the majority of other *Ratnakūṭa* texts, sets these virtues in the context of the *bodhisattvacaryā* and so intrinsically relates them to the bodhisattva training. Similar lists are found in the *Bdp*, *Ug*, *Rp* and *Bhadra-vy* to mention only a few of the more well-known *Ratnakūṭa* works. In many instances, these lists are structured in such a

103. Among the texts that belong to this second category figure most prominently the *Śms* (*Rkt* 49), *Ug* (*Rkt* 19), *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa* (*Rkt* 32) and *Gangottaraparipṛcchā* (*Rkt* 31).

104. Weller, 1965, p. 19.

105. Schuster, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

106. Chinese catalogues list another text that includes the title *Ratnakūṭa* in its name. It is called *Ratnakūṭasūtra* and was first translated into Chinese during the Eastern Han Dynasty in the second century AD. In the *Taishō Tripitaka* it is listed under the name of *Buddhaśīta-ratnakūṭasamādhi-maṇjuśrī-bodhisattva-paripṛcchā-dharmakāyasūtra* (T 356). It was retranslated at the beginning of the seventh century bearing the title *Ratnakūṭasūtra*. Although it is not included among the forty-nine *Ratnakūṭa* works proper, it is nevertheless contained in the group of texts that the authors of the *Taishō* apparently considered to be related to the *Ratnakūṭa* (Lancaster, 1979, pp. 93–94).

107. He is accredited with the composition of a work that, in the Chinese translations, bears the name *Mahāratnakūṭasūtra-śāstra* (Stael-Holstein, 1926, p. xv). The Tibetan tradition refers to it as *Ārya-mahāratnakūṭa-dharmaparyāya-parivarta-śatasāhasrika-kāśyapaparivarta-ṭīkā* (Schieffner, 1868, p. 131). Stael-Holstein has convincingly shown that this commentary refers only to *Rkt* 43 and not to the whole collection (*op. cit.*, pp. xiv–xv).

108. Stael-Holstein, *op. cit.*, pp. 2–7.

way as to form groups of tetrads. Just as in other, predominantly early, Buddhist writings these tetrads served as mnemonic devices to facilitate the memorisation and recitation of complex texts. In the *Ratnakūṭa* the frequency of their recurrence and their typical association with the *bodhisattvacaryā* suggests that they became also guidelines for a wide range of practical training aspects. It is therefore likely that, as Schuster says, “the name *Ratnakūṭa* originally referred to the teaching of the bodhisattva conduct, epitomised in series of tetrads ... for the edification of all those dedicated to the bodhisattva career”¹⁰⁹.

In order to convey some general idea of the principal doctrinal issues involved in the *Ratnakūṭa* texts, I have drawn up a tabulated list of the most salient points discussed in the collection.¹¹⁰ This survey is not intended to provide a comprehensive analysis of all the forty-nine texts included, but aims to show the major interests and themes that are common to many *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*.

Topics included in the content of the *Ratnakūṭa* literature:

1. Texts that discuss predominantly the nature, training and dangers associated with the lay-bodhisattva path: *Rkt* 16, 18, 19, 24, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 45, 47, 48.
2. *Sūtras* that propound the monastic environment as the preferable setting for a bodhisattva's training: *Rkt* 1, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 43, 44, 45, 49.
3. *Sūtras* that focus in their discussion of the bodhisattva's training on the distinction between ordinary or worldly and transcendental morality: *Rkt* 3, 18, 19, 38, 41, 45, 47, 49.
4. Discourses containing *jātaka*-type accounts and similar tales: *Rkt* 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 37, 44.
5. Texts that include into their elaborations miraculous and magical elements such as charms or wonders: *Rkt* 3, 18, 21, 38, 43.

109. Schuster, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

110. I am indebted to Nancy Schuster for suggestion of this type of tabulation.

6. Texts that elaborate on mythological buddha-fields and their buddhas: *Rkṭ* 1, 2, 5, 6, 13, 14, 15, 18, 47.
7. *Sūtras* that deal with *caitya* rituals, veneration of all buddhas or with vision of all buddhas: *Rkṭ* 1, 12, 15, 18, 19, 24, 25, 38, 43, 44.
8. *Sūtras* propounding the ideal of the female bodhisattva: *Rkṭ* 30, 31, 32, 33, 40, 48,

In addition, there are several *sūtras* that merit special attention because they contain important doctrinal discussions:

1. *Trisaṃvaranirdeśaparivarta*: on the affliction of clinging to the belief in the reality of the self.
3. *Tathāgatācintyaguhyānirdeśa*: on self-sacrifice and the impermanence of the body.
5. *Sukhāvātīvyūha*: on the resolves of the bodhisattva Dharmākara and the formation of his buddha-field.
6. *Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūha*: on Akṣobhya's buddha-field, (mental) dispositions required for rebirth there, on *stūpa* cult and on self-annihilation by one's own fire-element.
12. *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*: the chief bodhisattva text of the entire collection; famous for its treatment of *pāramitā*, *jātaka* accounts and *āveṇika dharma*.
13. *(Ā)nandagarbhāvākṛāntinirdeśa*:

on rebirth, pregnancy and the notion of *garbha*.

14. *Āyusmannandagarbhāvākṛāntinirdeśa*:

16. *Pitāputrasamāgama*:

on the virtues of meditation, the impermanence of the elements and the 'empty' nature of *dharma*.

17. *Puṇḍarīkapañcāśatikā*:

on the cultivation of the *bodhicitta*, *avaivartikacitta*, *kuśalamūla* and *abhijñā*.

18. *Rāṣṭrapālapañcāśatikā*:

on the virtues of the monastic (bodhisattva) path, self-sacrifice and aspirations to enlightenment.

19. *Ugrapañcāśatikā*:

on *dāna* as the foundation of the bodhisattva training, *śūnyatā*, the virtues of *grhasti* bodhisattvas and *caitya* worship.

21. *Bhadrāmāyākāvyākaraṇa*:

on magic as a vehicle for the *upāya* of the Buddha and as a valid means for facilitating the comprehension of doctrinal matters.

24. *Upāliapañcāśatikā*:

on serious misdeeds, the liturgy of the thirty-five buddhas, the code of conduct for (*grhasti*) bodhisattvas and its disagreements with the code of conduct of śrāvaka.

25. *Adhyāśayasamcodanasūtra*:

on proper conduct for mendicant monks and recluses.

28. *Viradattapañcāśatikā*:

a meditation manual for the bodhisattva, contem-

plation of the body and its vileness, (also known as *Yogācārabhūmisūtra*).

41. *Maitreyapariṣcchādharmāsta*:

on the eight 'profound' *dharma* which are to be realised if *bodhi* is to be attained; it also deals with the cult of Maitreya.

43. *Kāśyapaparivarta*:

discussions of bodhisattva ethics, concepts of *śūnyatā* and *āryagotra* and *bodhisattvacaryā*.

44. *Ratnarāśisūtra*:

elaborations on spirit and observance of monastic conduct, significance of the monastic robe and the spiritual benefits of forest life.

45. *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā*:

on the significance of proper and genuine motivation for giving, the ten stages of bodhisattva, meditation, *dhāraṇī* explanations.

46. *Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā*:

a concise discussion on what is essentially *prajñāpāramitā* thought.

47. *Ratnacūḍapariṣcchā*:

on the significance of mindfulness and the training thereof for both monks and lay-followers; it provides a detailed treatment of the *bodhipāṅśika* and *pāramitā*.

48. *Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanāda*:

on the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine, *ekayāna* doctrine, the (favourable) position of the lay spirituality in the Buddhist scheme of salvation. (Apparently one of the later *sūtras* in the collection).



49. *Rṣīvyāsaparipṛcchā*:on forest-life, alms and *dāna*.*The History of the Mahāratnakūṭa Collection*

On the whole, rather little is known about the history of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection.¹¹¹ Keeping with Buddhist tradition, each of the forty-nine texts is attributed to the Buddha. A brief prologue (*nidāna*) of the circumstances accompanying the formulation of the discourses is provided in their respective introductory sections. Thirty-five of the forty-nine *sūtras* are said to have been composed on either Mount Ṛḍhrakūṭa, near Rājagṛha, or in the garden of Anāthapiṇḍada, in the Jeta Grove in the vicinity of Śrāvastī. Both locations are well known in Buddhist accounts and are frequently given as sites for the various sermons of the Buddha.

As for its original compiler, no reference is found in either the *sūtras* themselves or in the Chinese and Tibetan commentarial literature that would point to any specific person. None of the forty-nine texts contains any cross-references to the other texts included except for the unresolved references to the *Bdp*. Both Chinese and Tibetan sources point to a later date of compilation.¹¹² It seems probable that the *Ratnakūṭa* collection as it is known to us, represents a rather later development of Buddhist literary activity. Yet, despite the fact that its compilation may have taken place as late as the early eighth century AD, many of the *sūtras* it comprises are of considerable antiquity and belong to the earliest strata of Mahāyāna Buddhism. This is evidenced by the doctrinal orientation of the texts in question and the early date of many of

111. Considering the comprehensive nature of this collection and the antiquity of many of its texts it is rather surprising to discover how little scholarly attention it has so far attracted. Out of the total of forty-nine works only twelve have been the object of academic investigation. These are the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, *Rāstrapālaparipṛcchā*, *Kāśyapaparivarta*, *Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā*, *Ratnarāśi*, *Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā*, *Ugraparipṛcchā*, *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda*, *Upāyakaśālyaparivarta*, *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraguṇavyūha* and *Bhadrakāraṇyākaraṇa*. For details on the authorship, as well as the date and place of publication of the respective studies, see: Appendix iii. To date, the best discussion of the history of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection is found in: Schuster, 1976, pp. 1–42. Other useful material has been collected by Stanton-Pedersen (1980).

112. *Otani bKaḥ-ḥgyur Catalogue*, p. 231, n. 1 (folio 123a), where we are told that the (Tibetan translation of the) *Ratnakūṭa* collection was compiled on the basis of Indian originals, complemented by Khotanese and Chinese *sūtras* during the second half of the eighth century. In *Taishō Daizōkyō* (vol. 11, pp. 1b 20–2b 6; see: BTI, no. 28, p. 6), the early eighth century AD is given as the date of compilation of its Chinese translation.

their first Chinese translations.

The majority of *sūtras* included in the *Ratnakūṭa* collection are designated, according to their Sanskrit titles, questions (*paripṛcchā*) or elucidations (*nirdeśa*). Thirty-four of the forty-nine texts fall into these two categories. Of the remaining texts, six are called predictions (*vyākaraṇa*) or arrays (*vyūha*).¹¹³ Many of these texts are comparatively brief and resemble in structure the *suttas* of the Pāli nikāya. Often they are composed in a stereotyped question-and-answer format and lack the elaborations and grandeur of the more voluminous Mahāyāna *vaipulya sūtras*. The group of texts that contain the terms *paripṛcchā* and *nirdeśa* in their titles includes most of the *sūtras* translated into Chinese during the second and third centuries AD.¹¹⁴

It is noteworthy that some of the works included in the *Ratnakūṭa* collection occur also as parts of other *vaipulya sūtras* (in the Chinese canon) or, by virtue of their content, are incorporated into other sections of the *Tripitaka*. The *Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā*, for instance, is a *prajñāpāramitā* text that is also found in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitā* Section of the Chinese canon (T 232).¹¹⁵ A translation of the *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā* (*Rcḍ*) is also included in the *Mahāsaṃnipāta* collection (T 397). Other texts, such as *Rkṭ* 1, 23, 24, and 44 bear strong resemblance to *Vinaya* texts. So, too, *Rkṭ* 13 and 14 exhibit close parallels to a section of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya*.¹¹⁶

In the *Taishō Tripitaka*, the bulk of the forty-nine *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* is followed by a large number of texts that were apparently considered to be closely related to the collection proper by *Taishō* compilers who base their opinions on older traditions (Ming, 1368–1644 AD). Among them are five translations of the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (T 360–364), nine texts related to the themes found in the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, such as the *Smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha* and the *Am-itāyurdhyāna* (T 365–373), two translations of the *Ratnakūṭa(samādhi)sūtra* (T 355, 356), three versions of the *Sarvabuddhaviṣayāvatārasūtra*, as well as a few miscellaneous earlier translations of *Ratnakūṭa* works, such as the *Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūha* (T 313), *Daśadharmaśāstra* (T 314) and *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetrāṅgaśāstra*.¹¹⁷ It therefore cannot be ruled out

113. Several of its titles contain references to well known personalities from the nikāya. The best known examples are Ugra and Raṭṭhapāla (*Rkṭ* 18, 19). Others are addressed to figures who were among the very first converts of the Buddha at Vārāṇasī (*Rkṭ* 17, 26, 33).

114. Bagchi, 1927, pp. 40–44, 86–114.

115. Lancaster, 1979, p. 7.

116. Lalou compares both versions with their corresponding passages found in the *Vinaya* section of the Tibetan Canon, noting divergencies between the three texts (Lalou, 1927, pp. 240–243).

117. Lancaster, 1979, pp. 24–27

that, at some stage, the collection may have comprised more, or at least different, *sūtras* than those which are currently included.

The oldest (Chinese) translations of some of the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*, according to the *Taishō* index, date back to the later years of the Eastern Han Dynasty (202 BC–AD 220).¹¹⁸ They are the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (*Rkṭ* 5), *Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūha* (*Rkṭ* 6), *Ug* (*Rkṭ* 19), *Maitreyapariṇīpaccādharmāṣṭa* (*Rkṭ* 41) and *Kp* (*Rkṭ* 43). Records show that their translations were done between AD 150 and AD 185. *Rkṭ* 6, 19 and 43 are attested as Han translations by the oldest surviving catalogue of the Chinese Buddhist canon, the *Ch'u san tsang chi chi* of Seng-yu (T 2145), written in AD 515.¹¹⁹ A further seventeen to nineteen *sūtras* were rendered into Chinese between the fall of the Han (AD 220) and the fall of the Western Chin Dynasty in AD 317.¹²⁰ Considering that three further *sūtras* among those which had already been translated during the Han Dynasty were retranslated within one hundred years, there must have been a sizeable interest among early Chinese translators in several of the *Ratnakūṭa* texts.¹²¹

One of the main protagonists in this early translation period was a monk called Dharmarakṣa (AD 230–308). Born in Tun-huang of a Yueh-chih family, he was primarily active in Chang-an between AD 266 and 304.¹²² There, he translated at least thirteen *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*.¹²³ Dharmarakṣa is not known to have travelled to India, but most of his translations are based on Sanskrit versions that he acquired in Central Asia. Although in the years following his death various translators continued to engage in the translation of *Ratnakūṭa* texts, there can be little doubt that in China the era of greatest interest in the collection was during Dharmarakṣa's lifetime. During the fourth and fifth centuries interest in *Ratnakūṭa* texts must have waned as

For a complete list of these texts see the respective entries in Appendix iii.

118. Lancaster, 1979, pp. 27–34.

119. Schuster, *op. cit.*, p. 4; Link, 1958, p. 18.

120. According to the *Ch'u san tsang chi chi*, the number is seventeen while the *Taishō Daizōkyō* lists nineteen texts whose earliest (Chinese) translations fall within this period (Lancaster, 1979, pp. 24–35).

121. The *Sukhāvatīvyūhasūtra* was rendered into Chinese at least four more times, the *Ug* at least twice and the *Kp* once.

122. Dharmarakṣa dominated the Buddhist communities of his time at Tun-huang and Chang-an. He is accredited with the translation of over one hundred and fifty Buddhist texts, with the foundation of monasteries and with the propagation of Mahāyāna thought. Although born and educated in Tun-huang, he spent most of his time at Chang-an, the Chinese capital of that period. He remained there at work with a great number of disciples until he was driven out shortly before his death by invasions and warfare at the beginning of the fourth century AD (Demiéville, *L'Inde Classique*, p. 414; Shih, 1968, pp. 33–37).

123. The *Taishō Daizōkyō* attributes the following sixteen *Ratnakūṭa* translations to Dharmarakṣa while others accredit him only with thirteen: *Rkṭ* 3, 4 (?), 5 (?), 10, 13, 15, 19, 21, 30, 32, 33, 36, 37 (?), 38, 42 (?) and 47. Those marked with a question mark have been contested. For further details see: Renou, 1953, § 2074; Schuster, *op. cit.*, p. 3, n. 14; Bagchi, 1927, pp. 83–114.

only a few texts are known to have been translated in that period. In all, twenty-two *Ratnakūṭa* had been rendered into Chinese by the end of the fifth century.¹²⁴ No doubt, the frequency of their translation allows for inferences to be drawn about the importance that was assigned to these *sūtras* during the centuries when Mahāyāna Buddhism made major inroads into Chinese society.

The earliest reference in the Chinese canon to a *Ratnakūṭa* collection consisting of forty-nine *sūtras* dates back to the T'ang dynasty (AD 618–907). It gives an account of a South Indian Brahmin called Bodhiruci (AD 571–727) under whose supervision a team of translators edited and partly rendered the *Ratnakūṭa* into Chinese.¹²⁵ On his arrival in China in AD 693, Bodhiruci is said to have been in possession of the Sanskrit originals.¹²⁶ These texts came to form the foundation of the collection as it is known to us. At first, however, Bodhiruci's assistance was sought by Śikṣānanda who was then engaged in the translation of the *Buddhāvataṃsaka* (AD 695–698). Thus it was only in AD 706 that Bodhiruci set to work on the *Ratnakūṭa*. Out of a total of forty-nine *sūtras* Bodhiruci is accredited with the translation of twenty-six texts, apparently considering the remaining twenty-three (then extant) translations as being satisfactorily executed.¹²⁷ The translations which he incorporated into his edition of the *Ratnakūṭa* had been translated by a total of fifteen scholars from different backgrounds over a period of more than four hundred years.¹²⁸ Bodhiruci retranslated fifteen texts that had

124. The number of texts cited in the *Taishō* index is higher. It lists twenty-six *Ratnakūṭa* translations that were undertaken in the second to the fifth centuries. However, this list does not seem to take into consideration duplicate translations. We are told of six translations of the *Ug* to have been completed by ca. AD 425, for instance, yet only three are extant and can be accounted for (Bagchi, 1927, p. 391).

125. The *Ta pao chi ching* (in the *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō* edition of the Chinese *Tripitaka*, ed. by J. Takakusu et al., no. 310 in vol. 11, p. 1a 1–659a 27) contains an Imperial preface (*hsu*) by Jui-tung dated AD 713 (p. 1a 1–b 19). It refers to a collection of forty-nine *sūtras* called *Pao chi pu* (*Ratnakūṭa* section) which have been translated between AD 706 and 713 by a team of translators led by a certain Bodhiruci (BTI, 28, pp. 5–6).

126. There is agreement among Buddhist scholars that by the time Bodhiruci arrived in China a *Ratnakūṭa* collection of some form must have been in existence in India. Wayman writes that “Bodhiruci, a native of South India, who arrived in China in AD 693 ... brought with him the Sanskrit text of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection of individual Mahāyāna *sūtras*” (Wayman, 1974, p. 9). Lü Ch'eng (1971) goes even further, stating that “Bodhiruci had brought to China a new (sic.) Sanskrit text of this [*Ratnakūṭa*] *sūtra*” and that “he took advantage of the special structure of the *Mahāratnakūṭa sūtra* ... making suitable adjustments in compiling and translating it”. Unfortunately, Lü Ch'eng does not document such an important statement by referring to his sources. In any event, he seems to be suggesting that on Bodhiruci's arrival in Loyang he was already in possession of a well-structured collection of forty-nine Sanskrit texts which he then improved and rendered into Chinese. He does not say whether at that time the collection already bore the name under which it came to be known or whether it differed significantly from Bodhiruci's edition. He also does not speak about the circumstances of its origin. See: Bagchi, 1938, pp. 541–543.

127. From among the already existing translations he selected the following works which included in his edition: *Rkt*, 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 26, 32, 33, 36, 38, 39, 46, 47, 44.

128. For their names and biographical data, see my notes in Appendix iii.

apparently been badly done or were incomplete, and rendered for the first time into Chinese eleven texts that had so far not been translated. Thus he cast the collection into the form in that it exists today.¹²⁹ He received the official request to engage in the translation of the *Ratnakūṭa* in AD 706 from the Emperor Chung-tsung. Supported by a team of assistant scholars of largely Indian origin, he was able to report on the completion of his task after seven years in AD 713.

The Tibetan Buddhist tradition appears to have modelled its version(s) of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection on that of Bodhiruci. The overall arrangement in all Tibetan editions corresponds closely to the structure of the Chinese version. Several of the *sūtras* included in the *dKon-brtsegs* (*Ratnakūṭa*) section appear to have been translated directly from the Chinese, thus giving further testimony to a close relationship between the Sino-Tibetan literary traditions.¹³⁰ The vast majority of the Tibetan translations, however, are based on Sanskrit originals. Many of them had already been translated during the so called ‘first diffusion’ of the Buddhist faith in Tibet (AD 641–838) and were revised and rearranged at a later date into a collection of forty-nine texts.

When we consider the number of *sūtras* included in the various Tibetan editions of the *Ratnakūṭa* and their respective listing in the catalogues we find certain minor differences. The *Ratnakūṭa* version of sDe-dge edition seems to correspond most closely to the collection as compiled by Bodhiruci. It too lists forty-nine *sūtras* and the sequence of the texts is identical with those of the Chinese *Ratnakūṭa*. The Peking and sNar-thaṅ editions, by contrast, contain irregularities. Although both of them comprise the forty-nine texts found in Bodhiruci’s edition, they do not agree in their sequence.¹³¹

129. Bodhiruci’s translation of the forty-ninth *parivarta*, the *Rṣivyaśāparipṛcchā*, breaks off abruptly shortly before the end. Roughly three hundred characters (*izu*) are missing (ref. Schuster). The missing passages are easily restored from an earlier, still surviving, translation of the text in question (T 354). The question, however, remains whether this omission is simply the result of (accidental) mishandling, or whether it reflects a sudden change of mood in the minds of the royal sponsors. Clearly, after AD 716 the atmosphere at the court became more adverse to the translation efforts of possibly too ambitious monk-scholars. In AD 717, for instance, Śubhākarasiṃha’s request for royal support in his translation of Sanskrit *Dhāraṇī* texts was silently rejected by the emperor.

130. At least seven of the forty-nine texts had been translated directly from the Chinese. The sNar-thaṅ edition of the Tibetan *Tripitaka* refers to the *Varmavyūhanirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 7), (*Ā*)*nandagarbhā-vakrāntinirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 13) and *Dārikāvimalaśraddhāparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 40) to have been translated by Chos-grub (Fa-cheng) directly from the Chinese. Recent research has established that the *Rāsmisamantamuktanirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 11), *Āyusmannandagarbhāvakrāntinirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 14), *Pūrṇāparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 17) and *Vidyut(prāp-ta)paripṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 20) are also based on Chinese sources (Sakurabe, “Tibetto-yaku Dai-Hoshaku-kyo no Kenkyū”, *Otani Gakuho*, 11, p. 550).

131. Six *sūtras* are in particular affected: the (*Ā*)*nandagarbhāvakrāntinirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 13), *Āyusmannanadagarbhā-vakrāntinirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 14), *Pūrṇāparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 17), *Rāṣṭrapālāparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 18), *Ratnarāśi* (*Rkṭ* 44) and *Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 45). In both editions their position in the overall scheme of the collection

Lalou pointed to three further documents that exhibit irregularities concerning the composition of the Tibetan *Ratnakūṭa*.¹³² First, there is the table of contents of the Peking *bKaḥ-ḥgyur* which records only forty-four texts as belonging to the *Ratnakūṭa*. Second, there is a *bKaḥ-ḥgyur* manuscript held in the Königlich-Bibliothek zu Berlin which cites only forty-seven *sūtras*.¹³³ Third, there is the catalogue of the 'Lhan-dkar collection' commissioned by Khri-gtsugs-lde-brtsan (815–838 AD). According to its table of contents, as preserved in the Peking edition, the *Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā* (*Rkṭ* 46) is not part of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection, but belongs to the *Prajñāpāramitā* Section.¹³⁴ Despite such anomalies, the actual number of texts included in all editions of the Tibetan canon is forty-nine.

The history of the collection prior to Bodhiruci has not been subject to any systematic research. Uncertainty prevails with regard to the date, place and historical circumstances in which the *Ratnakūṭa* collection may have been shaped. The source material can be grouped into four major working categories. First, there is a sizeable body of Chinese translations of Indian Buddhist writings, including some indigenous exegetical material. Second, there are Buddhist texts of Indian origin, usually in their original Hybrid Sanskrit idiom. Third, there are Tibetan translations of Sanskrit texts, commentarial and historical documents. Finally, there exists a small, but potentially significant, group of (fragmented) miscellaneous works of Khotanese, Singhalese and South Indian origin.

Chinese Sources

The earliest reference to a collection of *sūtras* bearing the name *Mahāratnakūṭa* is contained in the *Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra* (*Dbh-v*), a commentarial work traditionally ascribed to Nāgārjuna. No Sanskrit or Tibetan versions of the text are known to exist. The only Chinese translation extant was done by Kumārajīva between AD 402 and 415, entitled *Shih chu p'i*

differs. While in the sNar-thaṅ edition the *(Ā)nandagarbhāvākṛāntinirdeśa* follows upon the *Āyusman-nanadagarbhāvākṛāntinirdeśa*, the *Rāṣṭrapālāparipṛcchā* upon the *Pūrṇāparipṛcchā* and the *Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā* upon the *Ratnarāṣīsūtra*, the reverse order is found in the Peking edition.

132. Lalou, 1927, p. 237.

133. See: Hermann Beckh. "Verzeichnis der Tibetischen Handschriften". *Die Handschriften-verzeichnisse der Königlich-Bibliothek zu Berlin*, xxiv, 1914, pp. 16–25.

134. TTP, 127, fol. 352a–373a (item no. 25–72; ref. Lalou)

Lalou. "Les textes Bouddhiques au Temps du Roi Khri-sroṅ-lde-bcan". *JA*, 241, 1953, pp. 320–21.

p'o sha lun.¹³⁵ Here a reference is made to a chapter (*hui*) of the *Ratnakūṭa*, called *Kāśyapa-parivarta*.¹³⁶ It also cites a text called *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā* as belonging to the same collection. Another reference to an *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā* as forming a part of a *Ratnakūṭa* is found in the Chinese rendering of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsāstra* (*Mppś*).¹³⁷ Both works are contained in Bodhiruci's edition of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection, occupying the forty-third and forty-fifth position respectively. In addition, Japanese scholarship has shown that quotations in the *Dbh-v* from the *Ug* and the *Vimaladattapariṣcchā* correspond to texts contained in the *Ratnakūṭa* under the same names (*Rkṭ* 19 and *Rkṭ* 33 respectively).¹³⁸ Also, the twelfth *sūtra* of the *Ratnakūṭa*, the *Bdp*, is quoted in the *Dbh-v*. All this suggests that Kumārajīva was aware of some *Ratnakūṭa* collection. Since both works were produced in Kucha, such a collection was probably available in Central Asia. If we allow some time for the process of transmission, this evidence suggests the existence of a *Ratnakūṭa* collection during the fourth century AD. Yet very little can be said about its structure and content, except that it included the *Kp* and *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā* and possibly the *Bdp*, *Ug* and *Vimaladattapariṣcchā*.¹³⁹

135. T 1521.

136. This way of reference to the individual *sūtras* of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection was subsequently adopted by Bodhiruci. In the place of *sūtra* (*ching*), he employed the term *hui* meaning assembly (or section, chapter), probably because he perceived the individual *sūtras* as forming a part in an overall scheme. This usage contrasts the terminology employed by the authors in the translations of individual *sūtras* executed in the preceding centuries. Here, as a rule, the term *ching* meaning *sūtra* is applied. Indeed, Kumārajīva's rather unusual terminology could be taken to indicate that by the late fourth century AD some of the previously unassociated *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* had become a part of an overall structure.

137. *Mppś*, pp. 1245, 1272, 1762.

138. Kajiyama, Y. 1968, p. 197; Hirakawa, A. 1963, p. 98.

139. In the light of its importance for illuminating the earliest known literary form of our collection a closer examination of the history of the *Dbh-v* (T 1526) seems appropriate. It has already been mentioned that its authorship was ascribed to Nāgārjuna by Kumārajīva. Modern scholarship has cast some doubts on its authenticity since the ideas put forward do not seem to correspond to those normally associated with Nāgārjuna.

This fact was for the first time highlighted in an influential article published by A. Hirakawa in 1957 (*IBK* 5, 2, pp. 504 ff) where he challenges the claim of authenticity. Lamotte, on the other hand, holds the view that it has been composed by the founder of Madhyamaka thought (see: Lamotte, *op. cit.*, p. xcvi). Ruegg, a well-known authority on Madhyamaka literature, takes a more cautious position by pointing to the need of further detailed research on this matter (see: Ruegg, 1982, p. 29, n. 67).

A number of Chinese sources clearly accredit this work to the founder of the Madhyamaka. In the Chinese translation of the *Suṅkrāntavikrāmapariṣcchā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*, for instance, it is listed among the works attributed to Nāgārjuna (cf. Hikata, R., 1958, pp. lii, sq. lxxii sq where it is mentioned along with the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, *Ta-chi-tu-lun* and *Bodhisambhārasāstra*). Chinese catalogues include it under the title of *P'u sa hui kuo ching* amongst the texts of Nāgārjuna allegedly translated by Dharmarakṣa between AD 265 and 313 at Chang-an (Bagchi, 1927, i, p. 100).

Lamotte (*op. cit.*, p. xcvi) points to passages in the *Ch'u san tsang chi chi* (T 2145, ch. 2, p. 8b 17), a commentarial work composed in the first half of the sixth century, and the *Li tai san pao chi* (T 2034, ch. 6, p. 63a 23) both of which note the translation and remark: "The colophon says that it is an extract from the *Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra* of Nāgārjuna" (trsl. Lamotte). In any event, the fact that one of the translations of the *Dbh-v* is firmly accredited to Dharmarakṣa highlights the possibility that it was extant as early as the third, or possibly the second century AD. This suggests a new, as yet hypothetical, *terminus ad quem* for the existence of our collection.

The first reference to the *Ratnakūṭa* as being established amongst the major Buddhist scriptures is found in the *Li tai san pao chi*.¹⁴⁰ Here we read how the Gandharan translator Jñānagupta (arrival in Chang-an in AD 559) relates that the following twelvefold division of Buddhist scriptures was established in the south-east of the country of Che-chu-chia (modern day Karghalik): the *Mahāsaṃnipāta*, *Avataṃsaka*, *Vaipulya*, *Ratnakūṭa*, *Laṅkāvatāra*, *Lalitavistara*, *Śāriputradhāraṇī*, *Puṣpakūṭadhāraṇī*, *Tuṣāragarbha*, *Mahāprajñāpāramitā*, *Prājñāpāramitā* in eight sections and *Mahāmeghasūtra*.¹⁴¹ This division places the *Ratnakūṭa* (collection) alongside the titles of other well-known major works. Jñānagupta's account not only suggests a *Ratnakūṭa* collection in some form as early as the beginning of the sixth century, but also allows for inferences about its geographical area of circulation.

The first reference before the times of Bodhiruci that points to a *Ratnakūṭa* collection of considerable length and popularity is found in the biographies of Hsüan-tsang.¹⁴² On New Year's Day in AD 664, he is said to have been approached by a group of scholar-monks who requested him to translate the *Ratnakūṭa* collection. He declined on the grounds that the collection was as long as the voluminous *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (T 220), whose translation he had just completed. At his advanced age he saw little prospects of mustering the strength required to complete such a formidable task. He eventually opened his manuscript after repeated appeals and began to translate a few lines, only to resign a few minutes later.¹⁴³

Three conclusions can be drawn from this account. First, some forty years before Bodhiruci's

A major problem is the reliability of our sources when they comment on events which took place several centuries before their compilation. The *Ch'u san tsang chi chi*, composed between AD 502 and 557 by Seng-yu, writes about events which reportedly took place two hundred and fifty years earlier. This time-span is even greater in the case of the *Li tai san pao chi* which was compiled by Fei Ch'ang-fang in AD 597. See T 2154-537a:27 and T 2154-624:16 respectively (Lancaster, 1979, p. 366).

One cannot assert with certainty whether the version translated by Dharmarakṣa in the third century AD was identical with that rendered into Chinese by Kumārajīva one hundred and fifty years later. As Lancaster says, Sanskrit manuscripts had the tendency to undergo considerable changes in the course of their history, reflecting doctrinal shifts in emphasis which mark all living religious traditions (Lancaster, 1975, pp. 32 ff.). Furthermore, Kumārajīva is known to have interpolated his translations frequently with his own thoughts without indicating such course of action (Hikata, 1958, pp. lii-xxxiii; Link, 1961, p. 89; Lamotte, 1973, pp. 41-49). Therefore to conclude that the references contained in Kumārajīva's translation must have been included already in Dharmarakṣa's version lacks the desired foundation. Nevertheless, interesting possibilities are suggested.

140. T 2034 (ref. Stanton-Pedersen).

141. The titles of the texts have been conjectured from the Chinese sources by Stanton-Pedersen. Nanjio's catalogue contains a work called *Śāriputradhāraṇī* (N. 353). I have not been able to locate a *Puṣpakūṭadhāraṇī* or *Tuṣāragarbha* in any of the catalogues.

142. See: Waley, 1952, p. 126; Bagchi, 1927-38, ii, pp. 542-543. Stanton-Pedersen, 1980, p. 64, cites the following Chinese sources as containing the complete account: *Ta-t'ang-ku-san-tsang-Hsüan-tsang-fa-shih-hsing-chuang* (T 2052, vol. 50, p. 219a), and *Ta-tz'u-en-ssu-san-tsang-fa-shih-ch'uan* (T 2053 vol. 50, p. 276c).

143. See *Ta-tz'u-en-ssu-san-tsang-fa-shih-ch'uan* (T 2053, vol. 50, pp. 236a, 254a and 258a, ref. Schuster, *op. cit.*, p. 22; cf. Mochizuki, 1954, pp. 3418a, 25b, 26).

translation Chinese scholar-monks knew of the existence of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection of a length comparable to that of the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*. This raises the possibility that by then it already comprised many of the texts presently included in the *Ratnakūṭa*. Second, the *Ratnakūṭa* must have had great renown. Otherwise would such a venerated but aged *Tripitaka* master have been selected for the task of translating it at a time when other capable translators were at hand? Third, Hsüan-tsang seems to have been in possession of some Sanskrit version of the *Ratnakūṭa*, presumably brought from India.

Unfortunately, neither Hsüan-tsang's biographers nor his *Si-yu-ki* mention the place where Hsüan-tsang might have procured the *Ratnakūṭa* texts. Only the acquisition of the *Bdp* is recorded. He received this text in the monastery of Shih-fei-to-pu-lo (Śvetapura), located on the river Ganges some eighty to one hundred *li* south of Vaiśālī. About the monastery and its inhabitants he reports that it was inhabited by Mahāyāna monks who paid close allegiance to the spirit and letter of both the Dharma and *Vinaya*.¹⁴⁴

Of all six hundred and fifty works he brought home, the *Bdp* is one of the few texts that Hsüan-tsang gave details about the place and circumstances of its acquisition. It was also among the few texts that he chose to translate immediately on his return to China. Clearly, this suggests that he either held the *Bdp* personally in high esteem, or that it must have enjoyed great renown in India or, locally, in Śvetapura monastery.¹⁴⁵

The texts that Hsüan-tsang brought from India but remained untranslated at his death (AD 664) were deposited in the Tzu-en temple in Chang-an. Their translation was held in abeyance after the master's death. If our sources are correct, a copy of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection, or at

144. Li Yung-hsi, 1959, p. 98 and Beal, 1981, pp. 75,76.

145. His travel account, commissioned by the Emperor, does not contain any indications that Hsüan-tsang was aware of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as forming a part of an overall collection, although his knowledge of a collection of texts bearing the name *Ratnakūṭa* is recorded in his biography, in connection with his translation attempt in AD 664, twenty years after his return from India. The time elapsed between these two events prompted Schuster to speak about the possibility whether "the compilation of the *Ratnakūṭa* in forty-nine sections might not have been accomplished in China between AD 645 and 664, by putting together forty-nine texts from among the six hundred odd which Hsüan-tsang had brought with him from India".

She concedes that this leaves us with several other problems. First, the collection's Chinese origin seems irreconcilable with the (Chinese) account of Bodhiruci bringing a complete copy of the *Ratnakūṭa* from India in AD 693. Second, how likely is it that Hsüan-tsang knew of the precise extent of Dharmarakṣa's translation activity at Chang-an between AD 265 and 308? Without such knowledge he could have hardly matched up his selection with those thirteen *Ratnakūṭa* texts Dharmarakṣa had rendered into Chinese four hundred years earlier and leave out those texts he could not correlate with the Indian manuscripts in his possession. Is it really conceivable that the scrupulous Hsüan-tsang, who went to such lengths in order to acquaint himself with genuine Indian Buddhism, conspired to create a new collection of *sūtras*? Acceptance this theory means that one would have to discount the evidence provided by the Tibetan Buddhist tradition that points to an Indian origin of a (basic) *Ratnakūṭa* collection. I think that we can thus safely rule out the possibility of Hsüan-tsang's compilership of the *Ratnakūṭa*.

least large parts of it, would have been kept in the Tzu-en temple from 665 AD onwards.¹⁴⁶ As I already observed, Chinese traditions maintain that on his arrival in China Hsüan-tsang had the entire collection in Sanskrit in his possession. However, no reference is made at any point to its structure or contents, nor are there indications of what happened to his Sanskrit collection after it had been deposited in the Tzu-en temple in our sources. If the Chinese traditions are correct, then by AD 630–644 (Hsüan-tsang's period of travel) there must have been in some part of India a literary tradition associated with the *Ratnakūṭa* collection, perhaps even as it stands today. Schuster says that Bodhiruci's biographer makes it sound as if he might have been requested to bring a full copy with him to the Chinese capital.¹⁴⁷ If credence is to be given to this account, we may infer that by the late seventh-century Hsüan-tsang's *Ratnakūṭa* Sanskrit version was either not available to the court translators, or that it had never been a complete one.

Indian Sources

The other major category of sources relevant to our research are, of course, the texts belonging to the Indian Buddhist tradition. These consist in the following (fragmented) Sanskrit versions of *Ratnakūṭa* texts: *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (*Rkt* 5), *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraguṇavyūha* (*Rkt* 15), *Rp* (*Rkt* 18), *Vinayaviniścaya-Upālipariprcchā* (*Rkt* 24), *Kp* (*Rkt* 43), *Ratnarāśisūtra* (*Rkt* 44) and *Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā* (*Rkt* 46)¹⁴⁸. Since these works represent but a small fraction of the total body of the collection, by themselves they do not provide much ground to assess the manner of the collection's formation or its date of compilation.

Besides these seven works, a number of quotations of *Ratnakūṭa* works have been preserved in later Buddhist literature. Most of them are contained in the *Śikṣ* and *Msl*.¹⁴⁹ Other short

146. There are several other recorded cases where the scriptures of deceased Chinese scholar-travellers were deposited in local temples for safe-keeping. One such account tells of the texts that Wu-ching collected in India towards the end of the seventh century. After his death—he never reached his homeland as he died on the journey from Northern India—these were brought by his disciples to the Hua-yan temple. There, they were taken up in AD 716 by Śubhakarasiṃha for study. No such resumption of study of Hsüan-tsang's material is known to have taken place (Hodge. *The Buddhist Forum*. forthcoming, pp. 9–10).

147. Schuster, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

148. Almost all of these texts have already been the object of detailed studies. For the authorship, date and place of publication, see Appendix iii.

149. Seventeen out of the total of forty-nine works are referred to by name and quoted in these two texts. No mentioning, however, is made by either Asaṅga or Śāntideva of them as belonging to any kind of a collection (*Śikṣ*, p. 367–371; *Msl*, p. 165).

quotations of *Ratnakūṭa* texts are contained in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*,¹⁵⁰ in Prajñākaramati's commentary on the *Bodhicaryāvatāra*,¹⁵¹ in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*¹⁵² and in the *Bud-dhagotraśāstra* attributed to Vasubandhu.¹⁵³ While these quotations are valuable from the philological point of view, they do not reveal any information on the history or structure of the collection as a whole. The exception to this is possibly the *Śikṣ*. It contains a large number of quotations from the *Ratnakūṭa* taken from a total of fifteen texts. Although Śāntideva does not associate them with any overall collection, the mere fact that they are frequently referred to *en bloc* in doctrinally related contexts suggests that he was probably aware of their interconnection. However, we must conclude that the *Ratnakūṭa* was not widely known in India since he does not refer to them as being part of an established collection.

In the past there has been some confusion with regard to the origin of some of his quotations from the *Ratnakūṭa*. In seven instances the *Śikṣ* says that they were taken from a work called *Ratnakūṭa*.¹⁵⁴ Initially, this reference was taken to mean that Śāntideva was aware of a collection of that name on which he drew for canonical quotations. Baron von Stael-Holstein corrected this misunderstanding at the beginning of the twentieth century. He positively established that all quotations referred to by Śāntideva as belonging to the *Ratnakūṭa* were taken from a work which was known already to the Tibetan translators as the *Kp*.¹⁵⁵

Due to Śāntideva's way of referring to the *Kp*, it is up to the present day that it is frequently referred to as the 'old *Ratnakūṭa*'.¹⁵⁶ Despite having given rise to some confusion, Śāntideva's usage of the title *Ratnakūṭa* throws light on the role played by the *Kp* in the history of the collection. Frequently, the *Kp* is taken to have formed the nucleus of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection.

150. The quotations contained in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* are primarily taken from the *Śms*. They have been collected, arranged in the order of their appearance and published by Ui, H. in *Hoshoron kenkyū*, 1959, Tokyo.

151. La Vallée Poussin, 1901–1914, pp. 147, 153–4, 526, 527.

152. La Vallée Poussin, 1913, pp. 53.7–54.4, 121.4–122.2, 155.1–12, 191.2–9, 234.10, 256.12–258.5, 348.14–349.2, 408.10–409.6, 429.4–430.4, 474.7–10.

153. Stanton-Pedersen, 1980, p. 62.

The text most frequently cited is here the *Kp*. For an array of references to the *Kp* in Mahāyāna sources, see: *Mppś*, pp. 1845–6.

154. See, for instance, *Śikṣ*, pp. 54.11–14, 55.3–5. There we read: "...how this comes to pass is described in the *Ratnakūṭa*" or "the way to avoid the loss of the thought of enlightenment is still more clearly set forth in this same work, the *Ratnakūṭa*" (other references are found at pp. 52.12, 58.17, 146.4, 148.8, 196.11).

155. Stael-Holstein, 1926, p. xvi.

The Tibetan equivalent of the title *Kāśyapaparivarta* is *hphags pa ḥod sruṅs kyi leḥu ḥes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo*.

156. Japanese scholars, in particular, seem to favour this term. In Bodhiruci's edition, this work has been retitled *Samantaprabhāsabodhisattvapariṣcchā*. Apparently this alteration was made in order to avoid confusion with the *Mahākāśyapasaṅgītisimhanāda*, *Rk* 23 in the *Ratnakūṭa* collection.

Śāntideva's mode of reference (also adapted by the *Msl*) seems to support such a view. Starting from such an assumption, the *Kp* would have become already at an early stage a kind of doctrino-literary 'flagship' of the entire collection. In fact, large sections of it give a well-balanced doctrinal cross-section of *Ratnakūṭa* thought.¹⁵⁷ As a literary document it is undoubtedly worthy of the title *Ratnakūṭa* ('accumulation of jewels').¹⁵⁸ A similar development seems to have occurred in other collections. One only needs to reflect on the role of the *Aṣṭa* among the many texts that comprise the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature. Chronologically, an early version of the *Kp* might well have been among the first texts to be included in the *Ratnakūṭa* as it was among the very first texts to be translated into Chinese.¹⁵⁹

Tibetan Sources

Tibetan sources are of minor importance for research into the history of the *Ratnakūṭa*. Although the meticulously executed translations of the forty-nine *sūtras* are invaluable for determining the respective doctrinal positions, they yield little relevant data on the historical processes that shaped the collection as a whole.

Of far greater interest are the accounts composed by the Tibetan historians Bu-ston and Tāranātha. In his *Chos-ḥbyun*, Bu-ston observes that though the *Ratnakūṭa* consisted originally of one hundred thousand chapters, only forty-nine were still extant at his time.¹⁶⁰ Since he makes similar remarks on almost all other major Mahāyāna scriptures, claiming that in their present form they represent only a fraction of their 'original' size, caution should be exercised about the historical value of his statement. It seems likely that the motivation behind his statement was a pious wish to exalt Buddhist scriptural heritage rather than scholarly exactitude.

Bu-ston and Tāranātha's descriptions of the circumstances in which the 'one hundred thousand books' came to be known are of greater significance. The books are said to have first appeared at the time of the Third Buddhist Council organised by King Kaniṣka at around

157. See, in particular, *Kp*, pp. 50–68, 92–100.

158. In the *Āśokāvadāna*, we read of an island called Ratnakūṭa. The location of this place is of course not known. According to this legend it is reached via the Magadha port of Tāmralipti (Przyłuski, 1923, p. 104).

159. Stael-Holstein, 1926, p. iii; Tao-hsüan (*Ta t'ang nei tien lu*, T 2149–223c: 18) according to whom it was first translated in AD 179 by Lokakṣema.

160. Obermiller, 1931–32, p. 169 (ref. Schuster).

AD 100 in Kashmir.¹⁶¹ The same sources inform us that the diminution of the collection to its present forty-nine texts took place in the years between the life-times of Mātṛceta (second century AD) and Asaṅga (AD 290–350) “in a period when Buddhism endured a general decline in northern India”. So far I have not been able to locate any third-party accounts which would confirm these details. Bu-ston and Tāranātha do not cite their sources. Existing archeological evidence and historical accounts contain little to indicate that there was a general decline in the fortunes of the *Saṅgha* during the second and fourth centuries.¹⁶² And yet, if credence is given to their reports, one would have to place the origin of our collection in India, in the early centuries AD.

Elsewhere in the same source Bu-ston relates that “this teacher (Sthiramati) has studied the *Ratnakūṭa* up to the forty-ninth chapter and composed a commentary on it.”¹⁶³ A similar statement is contained in Tāranātha’s account.¹⁶⁴ The commentary in question has been preserved in both the Tibetan and Chinese Buddhist traditions.¹⁶⁵ Frauwallner, in his brilliant article “Landmarks in the History of Indian Logic”, places the dates of Sthiramati between AD 510 and 570.¹⁶⁶ Japanese scholars have suggested even earlier dates, setting his period of activity between AD 470 and 550.¹⁶⁷ Apparently, we have here a reference that places the dates of an Indian version of our collection as early as the fifth century AD.

Again, a more cautious approach seems to be in order if we consider the following factors. First, as mentioned above, when Sthiramati and other Indian Buddhists mention or quote from the *Ratnakūṭa* they usually refer to the *Kp*. Second, the compilers of the *Mvy* appear to have been unaware of a collection of texts called *Ratnakūṭa*. Although they enumerate as independent *sūtras* fourteen of the texts contained in Bodhiruci’s edition, they do not mention them as being part of a collection.¹⁶⁸ Third, the catalogue of the sDe-dge edition of the Tibetan *Tripiṭaka* explicitly states that the *Ratnakūṭa* collection, consisting of forty-nine

161. Obermiller, 1931–32, pp. 169, 170; Schiefner, 1868, pp. 63, 98.

162. La Vallée Poussin. *Dynasties et Histoire de l’Inde depuis Kanishka jusqu’aux invasions musulmanes*. Paris: 1935, pp. 7–71. Renou; Filliozat. *L’Inde Classique*. i, pp. 237–256.

163. Obermiller, 1931–32, ii, p. 148.

164. Schiefner, 1868, p. 130.

165. Chinese: (T 1523), translated by Bodhiruci (the younger) between AD 508 and 535; Tibetan: TTP 5510.

166. *WZKSO*, 5, 1961, pp. 136–137.

167. *WZKSO*, 1968–69, pp. 194–199.

168. *Mvy* 1355 (*Rkt* 3), 1330 (12), 1381 (15), 1333 (16), 1361 (18), 1396 (19), 1393 (26), 1407 (28), 1394 (37), 1364 (43), 1400 (45), 1391 (46), 1363 (47), 1392 (49).

In the *Mvy*, a work called *Ratnakūṭa* is listed in position thirty-nine (*Mvy* 1364). There is, however, no evidence indicating that the authors may have associated this *sūtra* with our collection.

works, was compiled by putting together *sūtras* from India, China and Khotan.¹⁶⁹ It seems that both Bu-ston and Tāranātha formulated their statements about the *Ratnakūṭa* on the grounds of a misinterpretation of Sthiramati's usage of the term *Ratnakūṭa*.

The majority of Tibetan texts included in the *Ratnakūṭa* were translated during the first half of the ninth century. They were translated by translation teams that often comprised Sanskrit scholars from India, Bactria and Tibet working together, using Indian manuscripts. Apparently they did not hesitate to consult Central Asian or even Chinese copies of the text in questions in the event of doubt.¹⁷⁰

Many of these scholars participated also in the compilation of the *Mvy*. Written prior to the translation-work proper, the *Mvy* does not contain a complete list of the *sūtras* that, in due course, came to form the *bKaḥ-ḥgyur*. Among the *sūtra* titles included there is a long list of works that form part of the present *Ratnakūṭa* collection. Interestingly, there appears to be far reaching agreement between the list contained in the *Mvy* and those found in the Indian Buddhist Sanskrit literature of the eighth century AD. In the *Śikṣ*, for instance, we find thirteen of the fifteen *Ratnakūṭa* works that occur in the *Mvy*.¹⁷¹ Of these thirteen, eleven are also mentioned by Bu-ston in his *Chos-ḥbyun*, ten of which appear also in the *Mvy*.

A great number of texts common to both the *Śikṣ* and *Mvy* are also found among the Tibetan documents of Tun-huang. Altogether, these manuscripts contain twenty fragments of *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*. In a few instances, entire texts have been preserved while in others little more than a brief citation or a reference in the colophon is extant.¹⁷² Ten of these texts concur with those quoted by Śāntideva while six accord with the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* enumerated in the *Mvy*. The selection of the texts itself does not seem to reflect a premeditated choice. And again, there is no evidence to indicate that this group of nineteen texts was conceived of as a

169. *Otani bKaḥ-ḥgyur Catalogue*, p. 231, n. 1, folio 123a; (ref. Kajiyama).

170. Ch'en, 1946, pp. 53 ff.

171. Śāntideva quotes from the following eighteen texts: *Rkṭ* 3, 9, 12 (?), 15, 16, 18, 19, 24, 25, 28, 29, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48. See also Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* which refers to seven *Ratnakūṭa* works: *Rkṭ* 3, 16, 24, 25, 43, 45, and 47 (Vallée-Poussin, 1903–1913). Note that all of these seven texts are also among those quoted by Śāntideva.

172. References to following *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* are contained in the various collections the Tibetan manuscripts from Tun-huang:

Amitāyurvyūhanirdeśa (*Rkṭ* 5), *Dharmadhātuprakṛtyasaṃbhedanirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 8), *Daśadharmakasūtra* (*Rkṭ* 9), *Rāśmisamantamuktanirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 11), *Bdp* (*Rkṭ* 12), Hymn addressed to Pūrṇa (*Rkṭ* 17?), *Rāṣṭrapālāparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 18), *Mahāpratihāryanirdeśa* (*Rkṭ* 22), *Maitreyasimhanāda* (*Rkṭ* 23), *Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 24), *Adhyāśyaśaṃcodana* (*Rkṭ* 25), *Viradattagrāhapatiparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 28), *Sumatidārikāparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 30), *Gāngottaraparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 31), *Simhaparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 37), *Maitreyaparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 42), *Kp* (*Rkṭ* 43), *Ratnarāśisūtra* (*Rkṭ* 44), *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā* (*Rkṭ* 47) and a certain text called *Mahāratnakūṭasūtra* which may be a reference to the *Kp* (*Rkṭ* 43). For their respective listing see: Lalou, M. *Fonts Pelliot Tibetain*, Paris, 1927, and La Vallée Poussin, Oxford, 1962.

part of a greater collection or even to represent some cross-section of the latter. Since it is not possible to establish the exact period in which these documents were deposited in the Tun-huang caves, few chronological inferences can be drawn.¹⁷³ Nonetheless, judging by the large number of references found to *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* in its materials, it is clear that the *Ratnakūṭa* must have been a popular collection in Central Asia.

Considering that Śāntideva's list itself comprises only eighteen *Ratnakūṭa* citations, the degree of concordance with those of the *Mvy* and the Tun-huang material is very high. In none of these three source categories is there any explicit reference to a greater collection of which these texts might have formed a part. Therefore we may infer the existence of fluctuating, but commonly accepted, *sūtra* lists in circulation in Northern India during the eighth and ninth centuries AD.¹⁷⁴ In due course, these were transmitted to the Buddhist circles of Central Asia and perhaps played a role in the formation of the Tibetan *Tripiṭaka*.¹⁷⁵

The earliest inventory of the Tibetan canon dates back to the beginning of the ninth century. Known as the catalogue of the 'Lhan-dkar collection' commissioned by Khri-gtsugs-lde-brtsan, it speaks of a *Ratnakūṭa* consisting of forty-eight texts. The exact circumstances in which this inventory was compiled are obscure, though it seems certain that it was drawn up as part of the conversion efforts by the royal family to establish Buddhism in Tibet. The authenticity of the Lhan-dkar listing is well established. Lalou has shown that the dating and bibliographical details (e.g., names of translators, locations, etc.) correspond to what we know from other sources about the initial translation activity in Tibet.¹⁷⁶

The authors of this catalogue carefully distinguish between translations that were done from the Sanskrit originals and those based on Chinese versions. Of the forty-eight *Ratnakūṭa*

173. There is no conclusive evidence when the caves themselves were sealed. Pelliot suggested that this may have taken place during the first half of the eleventh century while Uray proposed a date as early as 1002 AD. Tibetan literary activity itself appears to have diminished in the Tun-huang area in the first half of the ninth century (Rona-tas, *Acta Orientalia Hungarica*, 21, pp. 381–3).

174. Considering that Buddhist scholars from Central Asia and Bactria frequently participated in these translation teams, one cannot exclude the possibility that such lists might have even existed in Central Asian Buddhist circles other than those of Tun-huang. So far, however, I have not been able to trace any evidence which would support this thought.

175. Even if we accept this compilation mechanism, several questions remain unanswered. Why, for instance, did the Tibetan compilers of the *hKaḥ-hgyur* adopt the Chinese model of the *Ratnakūṭa* and, at the same time, fail to grant equal treatment to the *Mahāsamnipāta*? The first attested reference to the compilation of the *Mahāsamnipāta* in its present format goes back to AD 594. Given the popularity of this collection in China, the fact that more than two hundred years separated this date from the first wave of organised translation activity in Tibet and the adoption of the *Ratnakūṭa* format, one would expect to find this collection also in the *hKaḥ-hgyur*. This, however, is not the case although all of its texts are included on an individual basis in the 'Sūtra Section'. On the compilation of the *Mahāsamnipāta*, see: *L'Inde Classique*, ii, pp. 437–438.

176. Lalou, 1953, pp. 315–16.

translations listed in this catalogue not a single text is identified as going back to Chinese translations. This indicates that the seven Chinese-based *Ratnakūṭa* translations we possess today were composed at a later date. Either the early Sanskrit-based translations had vanished during the years of civil strife or they were too poorly executed to warrant inclusion in the manuscript collections of the thirteenth century. Apart from the omission of the *Saptaśatika-prajñāpāramitā*, the contents and structure of the Lhan-dkar *Ratnakūṭa* collection agrees closely with Bodhiruci's edition. Thus, the earliest period for which we can affirm the existence of an almost complete Tibetan version of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection is the first half of the ninth century AD.

It is worth noting that this period coincides with the epoch in which a cautious revival of Sino-Tibetan relations after the signing of the peace treaty in 821/23 AD took place. This chronological concurrence is perhaps yet another factor in favour of our hypothesis that the formation of the Tibetan *Ratnakūṭa* was based on, or at least influenced by, Chinese editions. For, there can be little doubt that the political rapprochement which took place in that period between China and Tibet was accompanied, if not preceded, by a renewal of contacts in the cultural sphere. For even during years of bitter enmity cultural contacts with Tibet's most powerful neighbour never appear to have been totally severed.

Miscellaneous Sources

The texts that comprise our fourth category of sources belong to a number of apparently unrelated literary traditions. Sthaviravāda sources, for instance, associate a certain *Ratnakūṭa* (whether the *sūtra* or the collection is uncertain) with Buddhist schools prevalent in South India.¹⁷⁷ The *Nikāyasamgraha*, a fourteenth-century text of the Singhalese tradition on the history of Buddhism in India and Sri Lanka, speaks of three classes of non-orthodox literature that, after their origin in India, were brought at a later stage to Sri Lanka.¹⁷⁸ These texts, it says, were doctrinally close to the Vaitulya and Vājiriya schools and included works embodying the 'sciences' such as the *Ratnakūṭa*. The same source relates that *Ratnakūṭaśāstras* were composed in the Andhaka schools (along with the *Raṭṭhapālagajjita* which may have been

177. Adikāram, E.W. 1946, p. 99 ff.

178. *Nikāyasamgraha*: composed by Devarakṣita (Dharmakīrti). Ed. by de Silva, A.; Gunasekera; Gunawardhana, Sri Lanka Government Press, 1907. Trsl. by Fernando, Sri Lanka, Govt. Press, 1908.

the doctrinal predecessor of the *Rp*, *Rkt* 18 in Bodhiruci's edition).¹⁷⁹

The oldest surviving manuscript fragments of the entire *Ratnakūṭa* collection have been preserved in a Khotanese document. It is a manuscript discovered in the Khotan area at the beginning of the twentieth century by group of Japanese scholars. Fragments of it were identified and published by Kuno Horyū in 1938.¹⁸⁰ They contain passages of the *Kp* which correspond to sections of the ninth-century Sanskrit manuscript edited by Stael-Holstein one decade earlier.¹⁸¹ It is assumed to have been composed sometime between the third and fifth century AD.¹⁸²

Finally, I should mention a number of early South Indian inscriptions that are indirectly relevant for the study of *Ratnakūṭa* literature. They are found chiefly at the celebrated Buddhist sites of Amarāvati and Nāgārjunikoṇḍa in the Āndhra country. As Wayman has shown in his study of the *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda*, many of these inscriptions are of importance since they allow us to infer the historical context in which the texts appeared.¹⁸³ For the *Śms*, they allowed him to pinpoint the period and location of its origin with some precision to South India of the third century. By implication, many of Wayman's findings on the *Śms* might be equally applicable to *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* of similar orientation, most notably *Aśoka-dattāvyākaraṇa* and *Vimaladattapariṣcchā* which show close affinity in contents and setting.

179. *Nikāyasamgraha*, 1907, pp. 8 ff.

180. *Bukkyo Kenkyū*, iii, 2, 1938, pp. 1–40.

181. Stael-Holstein's manuscript, damaged and some pages missing, was discovered in the 1890's in Khotan and purchased by the Russian consul at Kashgar. To the present day it is kept in the State Library of the Leningrad Academy of Sciences. See: Mirnov, N.D. : *Catalogue of Indian Manuscripts At Leningrad*, *Catalogi Musei Asiatici*, i, St. Petersburg, 1914 (chapter xi, p. 333).

182. Another *Ratnakūṭa* text of which early fragments have been discovered in Central Asia is the *Ratnarāṣi*. Published by Hoernle in 1916 it has been tentatively dated to the fifth to sixth century AD (*op. cit.*, p. xii–xxxi). Finally, there are a number of references to *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* in the *Book of Zambasta* (Emmerick, 1968). These are the *Bhadra-vy* (p. 10), *Vup* (p. 189) and again the *Kp* (p. 139). In one fragment, well over twenty pages long, Maitreya appears as main-protagonist alongside the Buddha (pp. 53–76). Although not positively identified, we have of course several texts in the *Ratnakūṭa* that seem to have been inspired by the cult of Maitreya (*Rkt* 23, 40, 41). While all of these postdate the *Kp* and *Ratnarāṣi* fragments by approximately four centuries, they are testimony to the *Ratnakūṭa*'s enduring popularity in Central Asia. It is difficult to determine just exactly for how long this popularity lasted. It is striking, however, that in the same source the *Ratnakūṭa* does not figure in a section that gives three of the four major *sūtra* collections of the day, that is, the *Prajñāpāramitā*, *Buddhāvataṃsaka* and *Mahāsaṃnipāta* (p. 187). This seems to suggest that it was more the individual *sūtras* of the *Ratnakūṭa* and not the collection itself which enjoyed popularity in Central Asia.

183. Wayman, A. 1974, pp. 1–16.

In his study on the *Śms* (*Rkt* 48), Wayman utilises archaeological evidence discovered at these sites to place the date of composition of the *Śms* tentatively within the Ikṣavāku rule of the third century AD. He then cites inscriptions of the second and third centuries AD that have been found at the same locations. They indicate the presence of the Pūrvaśaila and Uttaraśaila, two late sub-sects of the Mahāsaṃghika school, and that of the Mahāsaṃghika sub-sect called Caitya from which they issued. These data and doctrinal parallels found in the *Mvū*, a text of the Mahāsaṃghika-Lokottaravāda, prompted him to associate the *Śms* with the Mahāsaṃghika school of the third century AD (Wayman, 1974, p. 3).

Conclusion

In the light of the available information and the wealth of its documentation, a few concluding observations seem appropriate.

The *Ratnakūṭa* collection as it stands today was edited at the beginning of the eighth century in China by Bodhiruci, a South Indian *Tripiṭaka* master. In addition to compiling the collection, he participated significantly in the translation of the texts. Before Bodhiruci the history of the collection is rather obscure, though there is evidence to suggest that it must have existed in a similar form some fifty years earlier. At that time it was esteemed by scholars as an important collection which enjoyed considerable prestige.

Little can be said that is conclusive about the earliest phases in the formation of the 'original' collection. It seems certain that the *Ratnakūṭa* was shaped in India. There is evidence that suggests that already from very early on (perhaps because of similarity in contents) certain Mahāyāna texts came to be informally grouped together. This group, which may have comprised as many as twenty or more *sūtras*, was rendered into Chinese in the third century by Dharmarakṣa. Śāntideva and other Buddhist writers of later centuries called on them as scriptural authorities. It is probable that by the time Hsüan-tsang visited India in the seventh century AD they had already assumed the shape of a formal collection entitled *Mahāratnakūṭa*. However, owing to the fact that Śāntideva, Candrakīrti and Asaṅga seem unaware of it, one suspects that, in its earliest phase, the collection had been restricted to some local tradition.

A number of sources point to South India, during the early centuries of our era, as the cultural context in which the *Ratnakūṭa* may have been originally compiled. However, little sound evidence has been uncovered to support such a view. Several texts that are currently included in our collection appear to have been of South Indian origin, and Bodhiruci, the person who played a major role in shaping the collection as it stands today, was a native of this area. Yet, no source apart perhaps from the relatively late *Nikāyaśaṃgraha* actually confirms South India as the place of its compilation. The fact that Hsüan-tsang acquired the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* in northern India would seem to suggest that the *Ratnakūṭa* collection had gained some wider circulation by the first half of the seventh century. Similarly, no evidence has as yet been produced that would associate the formation of the *Ratnakūṭa* with any specific personality. By the time Bodhiruci received the request for translating the *Ratnakūṭa*

sūtras, its overall structure had probably already been determined.

The South Indian origin of several of the texts included in the *Ratnakūṭa* and their doctrinal affinity to what appears to have been early Mahāsaṅghika thought, point perhaps to some connection between the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* and the Āndhra schools.¹⁸⁴ The *Rp*, for instance, appears originally to have been part of the literary tradition of these early South Indian schools.¹⁸⁵

The earliest references to a collection of *sūtras* bearing the name *Mahāratnakūṭa* are found in Chinese translations of Indo-Buddhist commentarial literature. There is a certain disagreement among modern scholars with regard to the authenticity of their Indian originals. In any event, their Chinese translations of the early fifth century AD contain several references to a *Ratnakūṭa* collection, consisting of at least five works from among those currently included. The bulk of the first translations were executed between the second and third centuries in Chinese Central Asia, suggesting that the *Ratnakūṭa* was an apparently well-known body of scriptures possibly as early as the third century AD. In this event, it would have been among the first Buddhist texts to have reached Central Asia and China, thus forming a part of the earliest cross-cultural expansion of Buddhist thought. Manuscript remains of early *Ratnakūṭa* texts found in the Khotan area support such a view.

Undoubtedly, the corpus of *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* enjoyed particular popularity in Central Asian regions. Not only has its oldest surviving manuscript been rediscovered in Central Asia but Chinese sources emphatically point to its wide circulation among Central Asian Buddhist communities.

The forty-nine *sūtras* comprising the *Ratnakūṭa* literature cover practically the complete spectrum of (early) Mahāyāna thought. The impression gained is that the collection may have been compiled as part of an early conversion activity, with the aim to provide a well-balanced cross-section of Buddhist thought. Such a motive for its compilation would account for the almost complete absence of evidence on the formation and existence of an Indian *Ratnakūṭa* collection. If this is the case it would strengthen its ties with those Central Asian areas where

184. The following five sects are usually listed as the principal schools of 'Āndhra Buddhism': the Caitika (an offshoot of the Bahuśrutīya), the Pūrva Śāila, the Aparā Śāila, the Rājagīrika and the Siddhārthika. These are reported to have originated during the reign of Śātavāhana Emperor Meghasvāti (or -svādi) in the first century BC (*HIB*, p. 310).

185. Warder suggests, that "as to their (i.e., the Āndhra schools') literary expression, some of the early (short) Mahāyāna *sūtras* long afterwards collected in the 'Great' *Ratnakūṭa* group may have been taken over from the Āndhra schools". However, he goes on to concede that in many instances these may have been modified in ways that would be hard to trace (Warder, 1980, p. 329).

the earliest traces of the *Ratnakūṭa* literature have been discovered.

Doctrinally, large sections of the *Ratnakūṭa* are dominated by expositions on the path and ideal of the bodhisattva. Particular emphasis is laid on the cultivation and actual implementation of the practices that mark his spiritual progress. While the philosophy of *śūnyatā* has evoked immense attraction among generations of scholars and intellectuals, it was the teachings about the bodhisattva that made the Mahāyāna successful as a religion across Asia. Not only could it easily win admiration, but being adjustable to an infinite variety of human circumstances the bodhisattva doctrine could also be taken as the basis for immediate action. As a central component of Mahāyāna spirituality, the bodhisattva concept was therefore an integral part and corner stone of all missionary activity. Naturally, one would expect this doctrine to play a major role in a corpus of texts apparently compiled with the intention of serving as both the spiritual inspiration and doctrinal authority in such a conversion process.

Chapter Two

Analysis of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka

The *Bdp* is the twelfth of forty-nine texts included in the *Ratnakūṭa*. As already shown, the exact historical circumstances in which the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* were first collected are difficult to determine. From the viewpoint of historical analysis, we can only assume that it was compiled in the middle of the first millennium AD. Due to the lack of independent evidence the place of compilation and the motive for their being assembled remains uncertain.

Since external evidence is unsatisfactory and scarce, I propose to shift the focus of attention to the material that is included in the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* themselves. Thereafter, we should be able to identify the rationale behind the *Ratnakūṭa*'s structure and learn something about the interconnections holding its *sūtras* together. Our evaluation, though not exhaustive, will furnish us with sufficient data to gain a clear idea of the principal concerns expressed in the *Ratnakūṭa*, and particularly of its vision of the bodhisattva.

The most suitable starting-point for the analysis of the bodhisattva ideal is undoubtedly the *Bdp* itself. Not only it is the sole text in the collection entirely devoted to the bodhisattva by title and in content, but it is also the longest of the forty-nine texts, containing the most comprehensive treatment of bodhisattva training. While other *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* discuss the *bodhisattvacaryā*, none of them goes to such lengths in listing its principles and setting out how they should be implemented.

Because of the special position held by the *Bdp* in the *Ratnakūṭa* collection, I propose to begin with a structural analysis of its contents. The main-objective is to establish the framework in which the *bodhisattvacaryā* is mapped out and to uncover the literary expedients that are employed to that end.

Structural and Literary Traits

The structure of the *Bdp* is lucid in its overall presentation, but somewhat obscured by the disagreement in its translations on the number and scope of the chapters. In Hsüan-tsang's

seventh-century translation (T 310.12) the contents of the *Bdp* is divided into twelve chapters, each of which forms a logical, in substance well-delineated discussion of the assigned practices.¹ This contrasts with the ninth-century Tibetan (P 760.12) and eleventh-century Sung (T 316) translations, both of which contain only eleven chapters. For no good reason they merge chapters eleven and twelve, making the *prajñāpāramitā* chapter final and leaving Hsüan-tsang's last chapter without a title.²

Without a Sanskrit original, there is no immediate explanation for this, since Hsüan-tsang's more coherent lay-out is overshadowed by the Tibetan and Sung translations. On closer examination of the content and colophons of the individual chapters it becomes clear, however, that it is the twelvefold chapter division of Hsüan-tsang's translation that has the soundest claim to originality.

To begin with, in Hsüan-tsang's translation the contents of each chapter clearly mark in discrete sections identifiable aspects of the bodhisattva training. All major practices are given individual treatment and assigned to separate chapters. In all but the last chapter this pattern is also adhered to in the Tibetan and Sung translations. Here, the controversial final chapter inappropriately combines a lengthy, partially philosophical exposition of the Perfection of Wisdom, several sets of bodhisattva practices, a brief description of the means of conversion and a detailed account of Śākyamuni's prediction of enlightenment. Such disarrangement of topics runs in marked contrast with the otherwise strictly observed thematic division.³

Furthermore, the merging of topics is inconsistent with the path profile that is given at the beginning of chapter five.⁴ We learn here that a discourse on the bodhisattva training should comprise three successive areas of practice, that is, the pursuit of *maitrī* (presumably standing for the four immeasurables⁵), practice of the *pāramitā* and the cultivation of the *saṃgrahavastu*. In view of the importance of this thematic outline (it is the only of its kind in the whole text),

1. Hirakawa, A., "Bosatsu-zō-kyō to Hojokukuyo", *SK*, 45-2, 209, 1971, pp. 1-26; Ono Gemmyō, *Busshō Kaisetsu Daijiten*, Tokyo (Daito Shuppansha) 1933-36 (ref. Pedersen).

2. R, folio 695.1

For a comparison of Hsuan-tsang's translation and Dharmarakṣa's eleventh-century Sung version, see: Pedersen, 1976, pp. 15-23.

3. There is, however, one line of reasoning that might explain the merging of the *prajñāpāramitā* and *saṃgrahavastu* sections. According to the *Bbh* (p. 213.4-7), the *saṃgrahavastu* form a part of the training in *prajñāpāramitā*. Assuming that this proposition gained acceptance in Indian Buddhist circles (but I have found no other sources that hold this view) it could possibly account for the fusion of the two chapters in the later manuscripts on which the Tibetan and Sung are based.

4. R, folio 264.5-6.

5. In the *Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa the *apramāṇa* are actually equated with *maitrī-bhāvanā* (Demiéville, 1951, pp. 359-363).

it is surely uncharacteristic that the text should not have been structured into the separation of practices by chapters, especially since even practices of lesser significance have been conscientiously kept apart.⁶

Taking these organisational traits into account, it is improbable that the discrepancies that distinguish Hsüan-tsang's well-structured version from the convoluted Tibetan and Sung renderings are due to negligence on part of the translators. Rather, the relative proximity in date of the latter two translations and their shared structural details suggest that they may derive from a later, possibly corrupted, Sanskrit manuscript of a different reading.⁷ On the basis of these thoughts, I therefore propose to adopt Hsüan-tsang's division into twelve chapters as the original design of the *Bdp*.

The length of the twelve chapters varies considerably, ranging between fifteen and one hundred and sixty folios. Broadly speaking, we can differentiate three categories.

First, there is a group of short chapters each of which consists of no more than twenty folios. The subject matter that is included in these chapters is treated very succinctly. They are generally free from lengthy narratives or strings of examples and are reasonably easy to grasp. Chapters two, three, five, six and eight belong to this category.

Second, there are three chapters of moderate length, averaging fifty folios each. These are chapter one, ten and twelve. Their style is less concise than that of the first category and some recourse is taken to narratives and stereotyped literary expressions. Nevertheless, their contents are easy to follow and undue digressions are kept to a minimum.

Finally, there are four chapters of well over one hundred folios, namely, chapters four, seven, nine and eleven. The unmethodical arrangement of contents of some of these chapters obscures the otherwise unconvoluted exposition of the *Bdp*. Individual discussions are spread over many pages filled with examples, peripheral digressions and lengthy narrations so that

6. See, for instance, R, folio 671.4–679.6

Matters are further complicated by the disagreement that exists between the Tibetan and Sung translations. While Tibetan translations lack chapter headings for the sections on the Perfection of Wisdom, means of conversion and Śākyamuni's prediction (but nevertheless refer to a twelfth chapter at the very end of the discourse proper (R, folio 737.5)), the Sung translation treats the discussion of the Perfection of Wisdom as a separate, fully identified chapter. Yet, like the Tibetan it does not assign a chapter title to the section on the means of conversion and Śākyamuni's prediction.

7. We find similar parallels in contents between the Tibetan and Sung translations of the *Kp*. Here too, it is the Tibetan and the tenth-century Sung versions that correspond most closely among all extant versions (see: Weller, 1965, pp. 8–9).

thematico-logical connections tend to vanish in the wealth of material.⁸ Moreover, their expositions repeatedly fail to match the outlines of contents, leaving the reader confused over the direction of the discourse.⁹ Disorder and inconsistency increase in relation to the length of the chapters.

From the literary viewpoint, all twelve chapters are reasonably homogeneous and share many characteristics. All chapters, except for one, contain both prose and verse sections.¹⁰ The verse portions are regularly incorporated in the prose to summarise or restate in poetic form the issues previously raised. Also, verses are frequently (though not invariably) employed in direct speech, especially when it is addressed to the Buddha. The verse metre most frequently employed consists of seven syllables per line. This is followed closely by a metre consisting of nine syllables per line.¹¹ While these two types of metre are generally kept apart in distinct verse clusters, they do intermingle in some rare instances.¹²

The prose sections of the *Bdp* are dominated by a rather rambling narrative style. In the most common pattern of exposition the Buddha discourses on a selected theme in response to a brief question posed by the interlocutor. In the course of his discourse the Buddha switches freely between the first and third persons indicative singular, assuming the role of persons appearing in the narrative portions. Since the concise dialogue-format characterising the majority of *Ratnakūṭa* texts is found only in some isolated places, there are very few passages that contain well-defined and succinct statements. The narrative style with its wealth of examples tends to interfere with the flow of conceptual links between individual topics.

In some chapters, this situation is redressed by the incorporation of sets of mnemonic-type lists summarising the bodhisattva's practices. The most frequent numerical configuration is that of tetrads followed by lists of tens and fives. All lists appear regularly in clusters, making up larger groupings and often provide the back-bone for the exposition. In chapters six and seven, for instance, lists of bodhisattva ethics stand at the very heart of the discussion and these constitute practically the only section dealing with the proclaimed theme.¹³ In the

8. This applies, in particular, to chapter seven and nine. In chapter nine see, for instance, the portion of the text that describes the exploits of the two brothers, Saṃvara and Saṃvarasthiti (R, folio 486.2–513.6).

9. Compare, for instance, the heading that is given in chapter eleven (R, folio 615.6–616.1) with the actual contents of the subsequent exposition (R, folio 616.2–685.5).

10. The only chapter that has no verse section is chapter five (R, folio 262.1–284.5). Chapter eight contains only one short cluster of verses (R, folio 413.4–414.3).

11. For a discussion of the verse metre in Tibetan translations of Buddhist texts see: Michael Hahn, 1971, pp. 50–65 and 1985, pp. 201–206.

12. See, R, folio 381.5–382.7; folio 493.7–495.1; folio 497.2–498.2.

13. In chapter six: R, folio 286.6–292.5; in chapter seven: R, folio 368.6–371.6.

longer chapters, they have the additional function of providing the framework in which the exposition unfolds. In view of the *Bdp*'s length, such lists become valuable structural expedients for breaking up the contents.

A common feature is that the internal chapter organisation is poorly systematised. While there is every indication that the overall structure of the *Bdp* follows a well thought-out plan, no obvious outline is followed in the chapters themselves. In the shorter chapters this lack of systematisation has less importance. Elsewhere, however, it challenges the reader's ability to absorb and link the individual points of argument.

This situation arises from two factors. First, the issues that are raised in the discussions are poorly linked. This is especially evident in the longer chapters where sets of practices are only peripherally related and lack logical connection. Chapter nine, for example, though nominally on the perfection of vigour, deals with a broad spectrum of issues many of which have little direct bearing on *vīrya*.¹⁴ This is further aggravated by the extensive use of examples and parables. Again, most of these are found in the longer chapters, particularly in the ninth. While it is of course true that the extensive use of stock-phrases, picturesque language and many examples forms an integral part of the Indian literary heritage generally, there are only a few texts where they dominate the exposition to such an extent as in the *Bdp*.

The factor chiefly accountable for this internal intricacy is the frequency of references to *jātaka*-type stories.¹⁵ In all, we can distinguish fourteen samples of *jātaka* stories. Most of these are found in chapter nine. There are no *jātaka* references anywhere before chapter five—this is interesting because it is in this chapter that the instructions on the *bodhisattvacaryā* begin.¹⁶ All the following chapters with the exception of ten and eleven contain references to the previous lives of the Buddha.¹⁷ It is important to note that they are generally used to

14. In other chapters the situation is not very different. In chapter seven we meet with indiscriminately arranged descriptions of the bodhisattva's moral conduct in the form of listed norms of conduct. Since the style in which these attainments is presented is predominantly descriptive and non-technical, I conclude that, apart from their primary task of defining the scope and nature of the bodhisattva training, their function was to serve as inspiration and to encourage others to take up the bodhisattva training.

15. A summarised account of the various rebirths of Śākyamuni in the *Bdp* is contained in Bu-ston's *Chos-ḥbyun* (Obermiller, 1931–32, i, p. 125).

16. Compare this point of departure for the *jātaka* with the account that is given in the *Mvu* where we are told that *jātaka* related to the Buddha do not go back further than the eighth stage (Sénart, 1882, p. 105.6–14).

17. The following references are given in the *Bdp* to previous buddhas: 1. Mahāskandha (R, folio 262.5); 2. Kuhanachanda (ḥchos mos?) (R, folio 295.5); 3. Prasamgraha (R, folio 297.4); 4. Varasambhāra (R, folio 379.2); 5. Sālarāja (R, folio 385.4); 6. Vipāśyin (R, folio 448.1); 7. Abhyudgatarāja (R, folio 486.3); 8. Uttaptavīryata (R, folio 504.5); 9. Sucarita (R, folio 508.2); 10. Dipamkara (R, folio 519.5); 11. Padmottara (R, folio 539.3); 12. Ratnagarbha (R, folio 542.6); 13. Atyuccagāmin (R, folio 546.7); 14. Mahāvīrya (R, folio 549.3).

illustrate a particular aspect of the teaching, rather than to retell the events of his lives.¹⁸ Nor is the Buddha always the main-protagonist in these stories. Frequently, the impression one gains is that recourse to *jātaka*-type settings was solely taken to lay down some historical frame of reference.

From a structural viewpoint their incorporation enhances the overall coherence of the exposition. They furnish the discourse with a temporal framework since all *jātaka* references appear in strict chronological order.¹⁹ As a result, the treatment of the *bodhisattvacaryā* receives a sense a continuity and even dynamic purpose matching the Buddha's career as a graded progress across his previous existences.²⁰ The narrative framework and graphic style of presentation also simplifies the lines of argument. Many sections of the text are given an unmistakably descriptive flavour in which abstract thought-patterns are kept to a minimum.

The Bodhisattva Path

Having dwelt on the literary character of the *Bdp*, I now propose to look at the thematic structures by which the *bodhisattvacaryā* is explained. In the foregoing section I pointed to the loose internal organisation that prevails in most of the *Bdp*'s chapters. The impression prevails that the individual practices serve to exemplify a greater scheme. The contribution of the *jātaka*-type narratives to this 'sense' of coherence has already been mentioned. There are also more important factors in play and I shall turn to these next.

The most powerful device for achieving the effect of continuity is without doubt the adoption of the traditional sequence of the *pāramitā*. Practically all treatises on the bodhisattva from early on have incorporated this scheme into their visions of the path so that it became soon accepted as the fundamental structure of the training.²¹ The training scheme of the *Bdp*

18. The exception is the account of Śākyamuni's prediction to buddhahood at the end of chapter twelve (R, folio 698.7–735.3) that seemingly serves no other purpose than to retell the actual event in full.

19. Much of the course of Śākyamuni's career is traced in the *Bdp*, starting in his legendary encounter as Prince Caritavīrya with the Buddha Mahāskandha and ending with his prediction to buddhahood by Dipamkara. Also the references that are drawn to events between those two cornerstones purport to follow the chronological order of their occurrence. This can be deduced from the cosmic dates that are assigned to the periods in which the events are placed. For references, see the passages in which the various buddhas are introduced.

20. It is important to bear in mind that this impression rests largely on factors that are associated with the historico-temporal plane. Except in chapter eleven, no such continuation is evident, although later treatises on the bodhisattva propose certain models of internal, conceptual continuation for the individual practices raised in the *Bdp*. I have discussed these schemes in chapter four.

21. The sixfold training structure is already attested in the *Aṣṭa* (pp. 163 ff; 292–93; 310, 322; 412–13) and *Vkn*

is thus cast in the mould of a well-established pattern; the traditional order of the perfections is kept and they are dealt with in individual chapters.

Apart from following the *pāramitā* sequence, we have other hints that point to the implementation of a particular overall plan. First, there are several passages in the text itself that outline the order in which the bodhisattva training should proceed. The most important is found in a section belonging to chapter five that sets out the description of the path as follows:²²

“O lord, what is the path to enlightenment? O Prince, the path to enlightenment comprises benevolence towards all sentient beings, striving after the perfections and compliance with the means of conversion. This is the path to enlightenment.”

The order in which the practices are cited in this passage corresponds to the order in which they appear in chapters five to twelve of the *Bdp*. Other references suggesting a successive conceptual interconnection between the individual perfections are given in chapters seven and eight.²³

It is hence apparent that the text is not moulded in such a way as to depict the bodhisattva career on the scheme of the ten stages.²⁴ An explanation for this might be that the *Bdp* predated the formulation of the tenfold design.²⁵ Other scholars have suggested that because of some geopolitical isolation at the time of its composition, the author was not aware of the

(pp. 17–18, 29, 96–7, 108, 130, 157, 167, 216, 240, 259). But, in neither of these two works has it been implemented or does it become the guiding principle for the organisation of the bodhisattva training. Rather, it is only referred to in passing without having any significant impact on the structure of the exposition. Considering the very early date of both texts, this is perhaps not surprising. Other early works that give greater importance to the structural role of the six perfections in the organisation of the *bodhisattvacaryā* are the *Akn* (pp. 42.3.1–55.2.7) and *Rcd* (pp. 231.4.7–236.2.7).

22. R, folio 264.4–5

The description of the training proper ends on folio 698.7, just before the account of Śākyamuni's prediction to buddhahood begins. Thus, we note the following training structure: (1) cultivation of the *apramāṇa* (chapter five); (2) pursuit of the *śadpāramitā* (chapter six to eleven); 3. practice of the *saṃgrahavastu* (first part of chapter twelve). This path scheme occurs also on folio 582.6–584.4 where it includes the *bodhipākṣika dharma*, *śamatha* and *vipaśynā* that dominate much of chapter eleven.

23. R, folio 302.2–7; folio 408.3; folio 409.7–410.2.

24. In his *Chos-hbyun* (Obermiller, 1931, i, p. 125), Bu-ston suggests correlating chapters six to twelve of the *Bdp* to the first seven stages of the *Dbh* scheme. While it is not difficult to see why Bu-ston chose to draw these parallels (chapter six deals with *dānapāramitā*, hence stage one; chapter seven with *śīlapāramitā*, hence stage two, etc., up to chapter twelve devoted to *prajñāpāramitā*), it is important to note that this proposition is purely conjectural and not supported by the text itself. The *Bdp* contains no reference that would suggest that its exposition of the bodhisattva training follows the tenfold scheme of the *Dbh*, or indeed any other linear order.

25. Wayman, 1980, p. 218.

existence of such a scheme. Today we can discount both hypotheses since I have found several instances in the text itself where explicit reference is made to the tenfold scheme.²⁶ But this does not resolve our problem. We still do not know why our text favoured the basic scheme of the six perfections over the ten stages, especially since indications are that the ten gained rapid acceptance in Mahāyāna circles.²⁷

The best explanation for the present is that at the time of the *Bdp*'s composition the tenfold scheme had not yet won universal approval. This might indicate that the acceptance of the ten stages might not have been as swift as generally assumed. In fact, there are several other early Mahāyāna works that refer to the tenfold scheme in passing but do not implement it in their description of the *bodhisattvacaryā*. There must have been for quite some time a substantial faction within the *Saṅgha* unconvinced of its merits. If we interpret the growing circulation of the *Dbh* as a sign of the increasing acceptance of the scheme, it was probably not until the second/third century that this indecision was resolved.²⁸ The fact that the *Bdp* refers to the tenfold scheme on two occasions and even distinguishes the scope of the individual stages places its date of composition in the period that immediately preceded the formulation of the tenfold plan.²⁹ At any earlier time the *Bdp* would have been unfamiliar

26. The relevant passages on the bodhisattva stages run as follows:

"The bodhisattva who abides on the eighth, ninth or tenth stage, this bodhisattva is of great wisdom. He dwells on the great stage (*mahābhūmi*)" (R, folio 123.3–4).

"When he has acquired these three states (viz., the state of Cakravartin, Indra and Brahmā), he accomplishes the ten stages of the bodhisattva" (R, folio 294.1).

27. The earliest reference to the ten stages of the bodhisattva that can be dated with some degree of certainty goes back to 188 AD. It is found in the appendix to a *sūtra* called *P'u sa nei hsi liu po lo mi ching* 'Sūtra on the Bodhisattva's inner Practice of the six Perfections' (T 778) which was rendered into Chinese by Yen Fo-T'iau of the Eastern Han Dynasty (Rahder, 1929, p. 15). After that, the scheme gained prominence quickly and it became the major scheme to grade the bodhisattva's spiritual progress. Early references to the tenfold scheme are found in the *Mvu* (pp. 63–157) and *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, pp. i–xxvii, pp. 11–99). At a later stage, it was incorporated into the works of the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature, most notably in the *Pañca* (pp. 225, 379); while it is not found in the *Aṣṭa* itself, it is also mentioned in the *Śśp* (pp. 1454–73) and in the *Aṣṭadaśasāh* (T 220 ch. 490–91, pp. 490b–497b; ref. Rahder). A similar, though not identical scheme is put forward in the *Gv* (pp. 369–374). In the fourth century, it was adopted and refined in the *Bbh* (pp. 367–371). Finally, in the seventh century, it was taken up again by Candrakīrti in his *Madhyamakāvatāra*, where it serves as the structural framework for the exposition of the *bodhisattvacaryā*.

28. The first Chinese translation of the *Dbh* was carried out in 297 AD. Beyond that, we have no firm evidence about the period in which it might have been written. Modern scholarship has come up with a variety of dates for its composition. The earliest dating (by Conze) suggests a date as early as 100 AD. Rahder thinks to have identified certain sections of the *Dbh* in the *Tathāgataviśeṣaṇasūtra* (N 102); a text whose first translation goes back to 147–168 AD (Rahder, 1926, p. xxi). Other scholars have been less daring, allocating it to the late second or early third century. Whichever the precise date of composition, its doctrinal position indicates that it must have emerged some time after the *Vkn* and before the compilation of the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

29. If we accept the logic behind this argument, we would have to place the composition of the *Bdp* at the latest in the middle, or perhaps at the end, of the third century. However, since the earliest attested reference to the ten stages is already found in a work of the second century, it cannot be ruled out that the *Bdp*'s date of composition might also go back to the second century. The latter estimate would match the date that was proposed by Wayman for the *Bdp*. He allocated its origin to 'around 100 AD' (Wayman, 1991, p. 9).

with its structures, but at a later if it was not contemporary with it, it would have adopted them.

Chapter Organisation

In order to give an overview of the material included in the *Bdp*, I shall provide at this point a synopsis of the principal issues being raised. Since the content of the practices is discussed separately in chapter four, I limit myself here to the structures that underlie their presentation.

Chapter one essentially provides an introduction to Buddhist spirituality. Convinced of the vanity of conventional ways of perception, the Buddha identifies the principal failings of worldly existence and discourses on the illusory and conditioned frames of reference in which life takes place.³⁰ After the portrayal of reality the Buddha states the fundamentals of Buddhist doctrine by pronouncing a series of definitions of key terms, such as renunciation, knowledge and liberation.³¹ The chapter concludes with a brief sermon on the three root evils.

Chapter two opens with the prediction to buddhahood of the *yakṣa* Kumbhīra. He is the chief deity at the location where the Buddha is about to preach, and so entrusted with the setting.³² Next, there follows a picturesque account of the local scenery of the preaching site and the preparations that precede the Buddha's arrival. From the doctrinal point of view, this chapter is the least interesting. We learn practically nothing about the bodhisattva's training or the doctrinal context in which it is pursued. Like chapter one, its main concern is to introduce the reader to the Buddha's discourse.

Chapter three introduces the main topic of the *Bdp*. It begins with a string of questions on the conditions and circumstances in which bodhisattvas attain supreme enlightenment. What follows next is essentially a characterisation of the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) and an evaluation of its intent (*āśaya*).³³ As in chapter one, so also in this chapter the exposition

30. R, folio 13.7–51.2.

31. R, folio 51.5–56.2.

32. The only other reference I have found to the *yakṣa* Kumbhīra is located in the *Mahāsamājasūtra*. Here too, he is said to abide in the city of Rājāgrha on the Vipula mountain and to be in control of many thousands of *yakṣa*. No more information is given (Waldschmidt in: Bechert, 1980, pp. 154, 162). See also: D II, pp. 253–62 for the Pāli version of this text.

33. R, folio 82.2–87.3.

concludes in a brief independently conceived discourse on a set of Buddhist fundamentals. Here, however, it is more in harmony with Mahāyāna thinking, spelling out its interpretation of impermanence, suffering, non-self and *nirvāṇa*.

Chapter four, entitled 'On the Inconceivable Nature of the Tathāgata', is entirely taken up with a description of the buddha-qualities. Structurally, it is the best systematised chapter, since it utilises the highly stylised mode of enumeration in which the buddha-qualities are traditionally presented. The description itself is exhaustive by all standards, detailing the Tathāgata's pristine cognition, morality and meditation, his physical perfection, wonder-working powers, tenfold powers, four assurances, compassion, enlightenment and the eighteen exclusive buddha-qualities.³⁴

Structurally, this chapter is important in three ways. First, it lays down the foundation for the successful completion of the bodhisattva training, that is, faith in the nature and powers of the Tathāgata. Indeed, in the passage immediately following this chapter we learn that it is only after the bodhisattva has generated this faith that he qualifies to embark on the path.³⁵ Second, it is important since buddhahood constitutes the ultimate goal of every bodhisattva's aspiration. In this respect, a description of the Tathāgata's qualities and powers must surely have been expected to have an inspiring, reassuring and strengthen impact on the bodhisattva's resolve while advancing on the path. Third, bearing in mind that tathāgatahood constitutes the fulfilment of the bodhisattva training, the Buddha might have thought it advantageous to define its scope and attributes as a benchmark for all other spiritual achievements. In this role, chapter four serves to set out the goal-post for the *bodhisattvacaryā*.

With the end of chapter four we have come to an important break in the contents of the *Bdp*. So far, all we have learned about the *bodhisattvacaryā* has revolved around preparatory exploits. In chapter five, we are introduced to the training proper. This is placed in the context of a *jātaka* narrative and also spelled out independently. This correspondence lends a personal note to the exposition and contrasts with the rather formal, detached tone of later

34. The impression of systematisation is reinforced by the fact that the whole chapter (which is the longest of the entire work) is organised into ten sections or limbs, each spelling out one of the ten Tathāgata-qualities. The sequence runs as follows: (1) body (folio 100.7); (2) roar (folio 106.3); (3) pristine cognition (folio 110.1); (4) radiance (116.6); (5) moral conduct and meditation (folio 123.5); (6) wonder-working powers (folio 136.2); (7) ten powers (folio 143.7); (8) four assurances (folio 196.7); (9) great compassion (folio 215.4); (11) eighteen exclusive buddha-qualities (folio 235.1).

35. R, folio 262.1–5

In chapter three a similar idea is expressed, postulating faith as a paramount prerequisite for the spiritual advance of bodhisattvas in general (R, folio 86.3–88.4).

works on the bodhisattva. Since the *jātaka* reference is the first of its kind it establishes a connection between the teaching and the Buddha's personal spiritual advance. Both topics run parallel from now on and become progressively inseparable.

The common point of departure and thematic concurrence between the bodhisattva and *jātaka* underlines the significance of *jātaka* references, for there could be no better illustration of the *bodhisattvacaryā* than the Buddha's own past spiritual experience. Such linkage not only gives authority to the discourse, but also highlights the role played by the *jātaka*-genre in the formulation of the bodhisattva doctrine.³⁶ In view of this connection, it is not surprising that training phases are nowhere mentioned. Since schemes of the path do not figure in the *jātaka* themselves, it makes sense that the accounts of the *bodhisattvacaryā* that are modelled on the path of the historical Buddha should forgo these structural expedients. Following the opening passage, laying down the major areas of practice, the training proper begins with a discussion of the four immeasurables. Structurally, this section is of little interest since it presents the *apramāṇa* in a standard fashion and does not define their role in the general pattern of practice. Chapter five is thus a section that may demonstrate internally few intriguing structural features, but nonetheless is extremely important from the viewpoint of the overall composition.

Examination of chapter six reveals two points of structural significance. First, it formally initiates the discussion of the perfections and accordingly represents the first limb of the main body of the *Bdp*'s exposition.³⁷ Judging by the length of the various chapters, one would assume that the treatment of the perfections varies greatly in detail. This impression is misleading, since the space that is actually given to the *pāramitā* is not always in proportion to the total length of the chapters. This is particularly true of chapter nine, that includes a wide range of practices that are only indirectly related to the pursuit of *vīrya*. If one were to

36. Today, there is widespread agreement among scholars that the roots of the bodhisattva doctrine go back to the earliest strands of Buddhist thought. In particular, the *jātaka* have been the focal-point of several investigations. To quote Warder (1983, p. 9) on this matter: "It would seem that between these stray references in the *jātaka* and *Theragāthā* and the full-fledged enumeration in the *Buddhavaṃsa* the doctrine (of the perfections) had been systematised as the 'principles which make the Buddha' (*buddhakara dhamma*, *Bv*, ii.116)." Elsewhere, he argues that "this intrusive note (on pre-Mahāyāna practice) only strengthens the impression that the Theravāda tradition on the perfections of the bodhisattva developed independently of Mahāyāna very likely from a common and pre-Mahāyāna origin in the *jātaka* tradition of the third century BC" (*op. cit.*, p. 18). In the nikāya, these early doctrinal predecessors are particularly evident in the *jātaka* accounts of Śākyamuni's previous lives. But there are also other early works that contain isolated traces of the bodhisattva doctrine. Besides the well-known expositions of the *Buddhavaṃsa* and *Cariyāpiṭaka*, a good picture of these early notions on the bodhisattva is found in the *Nidānakathā*, the introduction to the *jātaka* commentary (i, pp.16–25, 45–7, 74).

37. R, folio 285.1.

purge it of all secondary issues, the relevant material would amount to little more than a third of its original length.

Another prominent feature of chapter six is that it introduces summaries of bodhisattva practices in the form of mnemonic-type lists. While lists of various types occurred already in earlier portions of the *Bdp* (most notably in chapters one and four³⁸), it is only in this chapter that they assume the mnemonic, stereotypical character.³⁹ The lists themselves occur rarely in isolation, but tend to appear in clusters forming larger groups.⁴⁰ Usually neither the order in which their items are enumerated nor the succession of the lists displays any particularly thought-out pattern of arrangement. Hence, the scope and items of the lists overlap at several points with factors cited elsewhere.⁴¹

The custom of tabulating individual practices figures prominently in chapter seven. At one stage tetrads make up a section of well over twenty folios.⁴² By reason of the frequency with which enumerations recur, the impression is given that the entire exposition of chapter seven is founded on these lists. Although this is clearly not the case (there are numerous sections which dispose of lists altogether), from a structural point of view their incorporation is undeniably its most outstanding feature.

The conceptual organisation of chapter seven contains three major, largely independent, segments. The first section introduces the chapter's principal theme, viz., the bodhisattva's moral conduct, and expounds its spheres of application in the context of the doctrine of non-self.⁴³ Other central elements are a list of ten mental factors and ten kinds of the thought of enlightenment.⁴⁴ Since the relations between these three elements are reciprocal with each one of them conditioning the other two, the first part of chapter seven is conceptually coherent and largely independent.

The second part of chapter seven consists of numerous lists itemising the benefit accruing

38. R, folio 28.5–34.1.

39. R, folio 285.7–288.4.

40. *op. cit.*; R, folio 368.1–371.6.

41. A good example of such overlapping is found in chapter seven amongst the moral precepts (R, folio 368.1–371.6).

42. R, folio 341.1–364.6

Despite the fact that all the practices enumerated in these lists are in some way related to the bodhisattva and his moral training, they do not seem to form a coherent whole. While some itemise little more than incentives (simultaneously, inspiring and reassuring in nature), others iterate the qualities, powers and insights that the novice can expect to gain by embarking on the bodhisattva path (R, folio 368.1–371.6).

43. R, folio 300.6–306.1.

44. The mental factors encompass three broad categories. (1) Faith in the Dharma; (2) Veneration of the teacher; (3) Inclination to follow resolutely the path (R, folio 306.1–4).

from reverence and moral integrity.⁴⁵ Culminating in an enumeration of sixty examples of pure moral conduct, it represents the core of the whole chapter.

In the third section, priority is given to those factors that impede moral conduct.⁴⁶ In keeping with Buddhist fundamentals, the text singles out desire (*rāga*) as the most devastating force.⁴⁷ Inspired by Mahāyāna reasoning, it is argued in the text that the best way to overcome this peril is to see its manifestation from the perspective of *śūnyatā*.

Chapter eight, much in contrast to chapter seven, displays a conceptually highly unified and coherent exposition. In part, this coherence is due to brevity. The points that are put forward are developed in logical sequence and build upon each other. The topic itself is introduced by means of a brief, definitive statement on the nature of the bodhisattva's patience. This gives way to a discussion of the various spheres and manifestations of patience. Essentially, the text distinguishes three kinds of patience, that is, conventional patience, bodhisattva patience and highest patience.⁴⁸ I have shown in chapter four that the actual contents of these types of *kṣānti* are far more intricate than their basic division would suggest.

In structure and organisation, chapter nine exhibits several features that distinguish its exposition from all preceding chapters. To begin with, it contains relatively few structural devices that punctuate so effectively the discussions in the other chapters. Therefore, it is rather difficult to break up its contents and to identify the individual teachings. But, it is second to none in the wealth of examples by which its postulates are illustrated. Since I have dwelt already on the effect these have on the comprehensibility of the text, it is sufficient only to draw attention to the particularly strong influence they have in chapter nine.

Next, we notice the astonishing diversity of material included in this chapter. So far, most chapters have been dominated by their main topics. With a few exceptions (most notably in chapter seven), they contained no significant digressions from the principal subject-matter. Chapter nine, in contrast, contains a great number of issues with ostensibly little bearing on the practice of vigour. Amongst the points raised we come across such seemingly unrelated

45. The nature of the qualities cited leaves little doubt that it is he rather than other people who chiefly benefits from these attainments. Most of them spring from the recognition of his previous faults and active training in teacher veneration.

46. R, folio 375.7–403.6.

47. It dedicates well over twenty folios to the various manifestations of desire during which the pitfalls of sexual desire figure most prominently (R, folio 375.7–403.6).

48. (1) conventional patience (R, folio 407.7–417.7); (2) bodhisattva patience (R, folio 418.1–420.5); (3) highest patience (R, folio 420.6–423.3).

subjects as the future-destiny of the Dharma⁴⁹, contempt of the Doctrine⁵⁰, failings of *grhapti* and *pravrajita* bodhisattvas⁵¹, avarice⁵², self-sacrifice⁵³ and Dharma-teaching.⁵⁴ The perfection of vigour figures expressly only in one section of the text.⁵⁵ Having said this, it is important to note that some effort has been made to relate the secondary issues to the perfection of vigour. Several of the examples that are cited to illustrate these secondary issues are configured to match both the issues they are supposed to elucidate and also the *vīryapāramitā*.

Chapter ten displays few structural peculiarities that have not been met elsewhere in the *Bdp*. Its rhetoric is filled with recurring statements, parallel phrasing, rich imagery and stereotyped lists of the kind I described in the foregoing sections. Structurally, it follows the internal organisation of the sets of practices it describes; enumerating and analysing in due order the four *dhyāna*, five super-knowledge, the interplay between means and knowledge, etc. As chapter ten makes only sporadic reference to examples and dispenses altogether with narratives, its exposition is rather methodical and orderly.

From the viewpoint of our structural analysis, the most interesting part is its concluding verse section.⁵⁶ Unlike its counterparts in the other chapters, it does not summarise previous issues, but introduces new material in the form of a list of one hundred and one *samādhi*. The style of presentation of these meditations is rather perfunctory. Apart from the title and a few general attributes virtually no data of any significance are revealed. Since the verses are only vaguely related to the prose in both content and style, the whole section might have been composed independently.

In spite of its title, chapter ten has actually very little to do with the practice of meditation. While we learn a lot about the benefits resulting from meditation, we are told little about the practical and theoretical aspects of meditation itself. To all appearances, the chapter was designed primarily to spell out the significance of meditation in the bodhisattva training, to inspire faith in the workings and, above all, in the powers of meditative processes.

Conceptually, this preoccupation is borne out by the priority given to the ways in which

49. R, folio 429.5–448.1.

50. R, folio 448.2–453.1.

51. R, folio 477.7–483.4.

52. R, folio 483.4–513.6.

53. R, folio 515.5–526.6.

54. R, folio 538.3–548.7.

55. R, folio 468.1–476.6.

56. R, folio 587.1–590.1.

meditative attainments benefit the bodhisattva's spiritual advance. Particular attention is paid to the role that is played in this process by the five *abhijñā*. Their explication spans over more than two thirds of the whole chapter and dominates the exposition more than any other practice.⁵⁷ Again, as in the case of meditation practice, little is said about the psychic processes lying at the heart of their operation. Instead, much stress is laid on their effects and on the role they assume in the training.

Chapter eleven, entitled 'On the Perfection of Wisdom', contains some of the most interesting thought in the *Bdp*. As I shall discuss its content and structure at length in chapter four, I shall limit myself here to a few general remarks. Like chapter ten, it dispenses with all narrative and incorporates only a limited number of examples. Its verse sections are very few and generally rather short. Particularly striking, from the organisational viewpoint, is the frequent use of lists and sets of practices that organise its contents into well-delineated sections. Owing to the lack of picturesque language, its exposition is rather technical and displays only thought that is of immediate relevance to the Perfection of Wisdom.

The contents of chapter eleven falls into three technically distinct, but doctrinally interrelated portions. The first section is given over to propound the basic phases in the process of cognition, that is to say, the factors leading to the acquisition of wisdom and the attainments that spring from them. The most notable feature in this section is a list of seventy-two types of learning. Next, a series of practices intimately connected with wisdom is expounded. These include right view (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*), correct seeing (*yoniso darśana*) and correct penetration (*yoniso praveśa*). There are several indications that the discussion of these attainments is structured to reflect the first four phases of the Buddhist path, that is, the *sambhāramārga*, *prayogamārga*, *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga*.

The second section defines in greater detail those practices particularly relevant to mastery over Perfect Wisdom. Formally embedded in a list of ten types of 'skill' are included, amongst others, the *pratisamvid*, *pratisaraṇa*, *punya* and *jñānasambhāra*, *bodhipāṅśika dharma* as well as *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. As in section one, most of these practices were conceived of in relation to each other and represent a continuation of the cognitive processes initiated through the seventy-two forms of learning. The attainment of wisdom itself is marked by 'skill' in all *dharma* that signals true cognition of reality.

Turning to the structure of this tenfold division of 'skill', we notice certain 'irregularities'

57. R, folio 551.5–572.4.

in its organisation. First, the sequence in which the individual 'skills' are listed in the introductory outline of contents corresponds only approximately to the succession in which they are actually raised in the text. While it is true that all items are included, they do not comply with the proposed order. 'Skill' in discursive insight (*viññāna*) and direct knowledge (*jñāna*), for example, figure as a subcategory to 'skill' in *pratisaraṇa* rather than (as announced) as an independent 'skill'.⁵⁸ In addition, the text discusses 'skill' in the accumulation of merit and knowledge and 'skill' in the bases of mindfulness as principal 'skills', even though they do not figure in the heading.⁵⁹ It is perhaps worth noting that all irregularities occur in the mid-section. Whatever the reason behind these modifications, it is clear that their impact on the overall scheme is negligible. It could even be argued that they reinforce the coherence of the exposition, since training in the *smṛtyupasthāna* and *jñānasamhāra* is certainly of advantage (if not altogether indispensable) to the generation of wisdom.

Approaching its conceptual climax, chapter eleven goes then on to define the exact cognitive contents of the perfection of wisdom.⁶⁰ For this purpose, it deconstructs the word *prajñāpāramitā* in its component parts and discusses the nature of *prajñā* and *pāramitā* separately. In spite of this formal division, the two strands of analysis run largely concurrent and correspond in much detail.

Chapter twelve comprises two major sections. It begins with a comparatively brief exposition of the four means of conversion. Proportionally, their elucidation accounts for little more than a tenth of the chapter's total content.⁶¹ It will be recalled that the means of conversion stand at the very end of the *Bdp*'s path scheme. However, it is left open as to whether this positioning was meant to grade them as the culmination of the path, or whether they were placed there out of structural convenience. While the exposition itself contains some interesting propositions, organisationally it is rather unremarkable.

The second part of chapter twelve consists of the well-known *jātaka* episode describing Śākyamuni's meeting with Dipamkara and the subsequent prediction to buddhahood.⁶² Unlike preceding *jātaka* used to illustrate the bodhisattva practice, this story serves no other purpose

58. R, folio 634.7–636.5.

59. R, folio 649.5–662.3; folio 639.7–649.2.

60. R, folio 685.7–690.1.

61. R, folio 695.1–698.7.

62. R, folio 699.1–737.4.

An identical version of the narrative of Śākyamuni's prediction is found in the Dharmaguptaka Vinaya (Bareau, 1966, 1–16).

than to relate the events of the narrative. Since its incorporation has no practical bearing on the *bodhisattvacaryā* (it contains virtually no information of any value on the training itself) apart from signalling the completion of the path, the whole point of it telling it here is perhaps simply to keep the tradition of the event alive.

Two considerations might have led to its placing at the end of the discourse. In an exposition that is largely dedicated to the training of the bodhisattva but frequently deployed in the context of the Buddha's former lives, there could hardly be a more appropriate way of ending it than by retelling the final phases of Śākyamuni's exploits. This stratagem not only brings the series of *jātaka* stories to its logical conclusion, but asserts the viability of the whole enterprise in an incontestable way. By singling out this ending, the *Bdp* not only re-enacts the context in which the bodhisattva training unfolds, but more importantly, sets it within a mythological frame of reference, thereby drawing ultimate authority from the experience of the Buddha himself.

Chapter Three

The Bodhisattva Ideal in the Mahāratnakūṭa Collection

In our survey of the content of the *Ratnakūṭa* in chapter one we have learned of the wide range of topics included in its forty-nine *sūtras*. It soon became apparent that many of them show a common interest in the bodhisattva. While examining the texts, I began to wonder whether this shared concern might have occasioned their being assembled into one collection.

In chapter two, I investigated the structural and literary features of the *Bdp*. Taking the findings of this analysis as point of departure, I shall now assess the structure and presentation of the *bodhisattvacaryā* in the *Ratnakūṭa*. Particular consideration will be given to the role played by the *Bdp*'s teachings amongst these *sūtras*. The reasons for this emphasis are twofold. First, while many *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* contain material on the bodhisattva ideal, the *Bdp* is virtually the only text practically exclusively dedicated to the bodhisattva. Second, no other text in this collection provides a similar wealth of detail on the bodhisattva as that found in the *Bdp*. In length alone, it eclipses all other bodhisattva texts many times over. This raises the distinct possibility that its teachings might also have been invested with special role in the description of the bodhisattva ideal.

Taking into account the size and diversity of the collection a detailed analysis of all forty-eight texts would constitute a task so vast as to take it well beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, I have selected twenty-three *sūtras* that are of particular relevance to the study of the bodhisattva ideal. Amongst these texts I include several *sūtras* that may contain little new in terms of practice, but exhibit intriguing and seemingly unprecedented perspectives of the path.

Let me stress, however, that this selection is not to imply that the remaining twenty-five works ignore the bodhisattva ideal. On the contrary, among them there are several *sūtras* containing some interesting insights. Generally, though, they treat other subjects more extensively and place the *bodhisattva* practice in a subordinate role or refer to it only in passing, and so are of minor importance to the present investigation.

Categories of Bodhisattva Texts

As already indicated I shall analyse only those *sūtras* containing most of the data on the bodhisattva. For this purpose, I distinguished two text groups. First, there are twenty-three *sūtras* that place the bodhisattva ideal in the centre of their exposition.¹ Since these works hold most of the relevant evidence, they become the bedrock for this study. Second, there is a group that comprises five texts containing isolated points of interest, but typically these refer to the bodhisattva ideal only in passing.²

For the sake of organisation, I propose to subdivide further the first text category by differentiating between:

1. *Sūtras* whose aim is the explication of the bodhisattva ideal.
2. *Sūtras* that discuss bodhisattva practices and attributes.
3. *Sūtras* that focus on the bodhisattva doctrine.

The following ten texts belong to the first sub-category:³ The *Rāṣṭrapālāparipṛcchā*, *Ugraparipṛcchā*, *Kāśyapaparivarta*, *Svapnanirdeśa*, *Upāyakaūśalyaparivarta*, *Sumatidarikaparipṛcchā*, *Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā*, *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā*, *Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā* and *Darikavimalaśuddha*.

The second sub-group consists of eight works:⁴ The *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā*, *Acintyabuddhaviṣayanirdeśa*, *Bhadramāyākāravvyākaraṇa*, *Mahāprātihāryopadeśa*, *Suṣṭhitamatidevaputraparipṛcchā*, *Upāyakaūśalyaparivarta*, *Darikavimalaśuddha* and *Kāśyapaparivarta*.

1. These are the *Svapnanirdeśa* (Rkt 4), *Pūrṇaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 17), *Rāṣṭrapālāparipṛcchā* (Rkt 18), *Ugraparipṛcchā* (Rkt 19), *Vidyutprāptaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 20), *Bhadramāyākāravvyākaraṇa*, (Rkt 21), *Mahāprātihāryopadeśa* (Rkt 22), *Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā* (Rkt 24), *Subāhuparipṛcchā* (Rkt 26), *Sūrataparipṛcchā* (Rkt 27), *Viradattagrhapatiparipṛcchā* (Rkt 28), *Sumatidarikaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 30), *Gaṅgot-araparipṛcchā* (Rkt 31), *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa* (Rkt 32), *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā* (Rkt 33), *Suṣṭhitamatidevaputraparipṛcchā* (Rkt 36), *Upāyakaūśalyaparivarta* (Rkt 38), *Darikavimalaśuddha* (Rkt 40), *Kāśyapaparivarta* (Rkt 43), *Ratnarāṣi* (Rkt 44), *Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā* (Rkt 45), *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā* (Rkt 47) and *Śrīmālādeviśiṃhanāda* (Rkt 48).
2. The most prominent examples of this group are the *Trisaṃvaranirdeśaparivarta* (Rkt 1) *Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa* (Rkt 3), *Daśadharmakasūtra* (Rkt 9), *Pitāputrasamāgama* (Rkt 16) and *Acintyabuddhaviṣayanirdeśa* (Rkt 35).
3. Besides the *Bdp*, it is only the *Ug* (colophon of T 323), *Prñ* (attested in the T'ang catalogue; Mochizuki, 1931–36, p. 3441a 5–25; ref. Schuster) and *Rp* (pp. 59.20–60.2) that contain references to the bodhisattvacarya in their title.
4. In most cases, the relevant section is introduced by shifting the focal point to the bodhisattva training. See: *Prñ* (23, pp. 231.3–32.5.4) *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā* (24, pp. 108.5.1–111.3.8), *Suṣṭhitamatidevaputraparipṛcchā* (24, pp. 130.4.6–134.1.4), *Bhadramāyākāravvyākaraṇa* (23, pp. 7.3.3–9.3.7). In other cases, however, the distinction becomes more blurred with sets of practices being freely interpolated in the description of the main topic, e.g., *Viradattagrhapatiparipṛcchā* (24, pp. 84.2.2–85.1.3) and *Mahāprātihāryopadeśa* (24, pp. 19.5.1–20.31; 20.3.5–21.3.7; 22.4.5–23.4.8).

trapaṇiparīcchā, *Subāhuparīcchā*, *Viradattagrāhaparīcchā* and *Pūrṇaparīcchā*.⁵

The third sub-category is comprised of three *sūtras*: The *Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda*, *Aśokadātvyākarāṇa*, *Gaṅgotaraparīcchā* and the *Sūrataparīcchā*.⁶

Besides these twenty-one texts, there is one more *sūtra* that seemingly places the bodhisattva in the centre of its exposition. This is the *Ratnarāśīsūtra*. The reason why I declined to allocate a place in either of these categories to this *sūtra* is simple. It does not mention the bodhisattva. The *Ratnarāśīsūtra* discusses the conduct and practice of the religious practitioner (*śramaṇa*) in what is formally a Mahāyāna frame of reference, but curiously does not refer to him as bodhisattva. Since the centre of interest is the *Vinaya* observing monk, it is clear that the text presupposes the monastic environment as framework for the spiritual training. On the basis of eye-witness reports, we know that in practice bodhisattvas were bound to the spirit of the monastic code and often pursued their careers in monasteries.⁷ Thus, it seems that the disciplinary reprimands that are voiced in the *Ratnarāśīsūtra* are directed at all practitioners partaking in the monastic training and so apply also to the bodhisattva.

Like practically all Mahāyāna *sūtras*, the *Ratnakūṭa*'s bodhisattva texts operate within the gnoseologic parameter of Mahāyāna ontology. This is most ostensibly borne out by the frequency with which they draw connections with its axioms of emptiness (*śūnyatā*), sameness (*samatā*) and inapprehensibility (*anupalambha*) that most accept as the philosophic substratum for their expositions. The extent to which these principles come to play a role in the bodhisattva training varies greatly from text to text. While some *sūtras* refer to them only in passing⁸, others assess the whole practice in strict accordance with these axioms. Frequently, it is achieved by defining every bodhisattva activity in terms of *śūnyatā* from the very outset.⁹

5. In chapter one, I pointed out that in an early T'ang catalogue the *Prṇ* carries the alternative title *Bodhisattvapīṭaka*. While it is true that virtually all portions of its exposition have some bearing on the bodhisattva ideal, it is only a relatively small part that contains explicit information on the bodhisattva training itself. Most of these data are found in its first chapter, entitled 'On the *bodhisattvacaryā*'. However, since this chapter is extremely short, spanning barely ten out of one hundred and fifty folios, even this part of the *Prṇ* does not provide much information on the training. Hence, I did not include the *Prṇ* amongst the ten *Ratnakūṭa* works whose centre of interest is the *bodhisattvacaryā*.
6. For the most part, these texts contain no explicit references to the bodhisattva training *per se*. Their importance lies chiefly in the doctrinal frame in which they set the pursuit of the bodhisattva ideal. This allows often for inferences about the theoretical dimensions of the bodhisattva doctrine as contrasted with the more practical aspects of its implementation in the training itself.
7. Our knowledge of monastic customs is chiefly based on the reports we have from Chinese pilgrims who travelled to India and Central Asia around the middle of the first millennium AD. For details on the prevailing state of affairs in Buddhist monasteries, consult: Beal, 1884; Legge, 1886.
8. The *sūtras* belonging to this category are most prominently the *Rp*, *Ug*, *Śvapnanirdeśa* and *Ratnarāśi*. In these, no attempt is made to link the tenets of Mahāyāna ontology with the practice itself. Thus, their teachings on the bodhisattva assume invariably a very realistic, urgent perspective.
9. This applies in particular to the *Vup*, *Sumatidarikaparīcchā* and *Upāyakaśālyaparivarta*. A similar

Owing to this somewhat defiant system of reasoning which challenges the validity of action in general, the bodhisattva thought inevitably becomes less persuasive.¹⁰

Let me stress, however, that the texts that use unmitigated philosophical reasoning throughout are in a clear minority.¹¹ The vast majority display an astonishing measure of spiritual pragmatism in their vision of the bodhisattva. This emphasis on practical concerns is best exemplified by the weight that many give to the ethical dimensions of the career. In addition, great heed is consistently shown to the more religious facets of the training, including concepts such as faith, veneration, discipline, vigour and purity.

Sūtras whose Aim is the Explication of the Bodhisattva Ideal

Broadly speaking, in this category we can distinguish four different approaches in the discussion of the bodhisattva ideal.

First, there are *sūtras* that display a high degree of informality and structural liberty in their description of the *bodhisattvacaryā*. Since they often belong to the oldest parts of the collection, their style of exposition is non-technical and lacks many of the elaborate subtleties that prevail in later strands of bodhisattva works.¹² There is every indication that they present the early ideas of the Mahāyāna movement. Since, at this stage, the finer points of the bodhisattva doctrine had yet to be worked out, priority is given to more fundamental, inspiring considerations about the general scope and nature of the bodhisattva training.

The most prominent works of this type are the *Rp* and *Kp*.¹³ Both texts contain numerous

though less systematised line of reasoning is adopted in the *Bhadra-vy*, *Kp*, *Śms* and *Suṣṭhitamatidevaputrapariṣcchā*.

10. This approach is found, above all, in those *sūtras* that I included for their indirect contributions to the bodhisattva doctrine. More will be said about the ways in which it affects the presentation of the bodhisattva.
11. The best-known of the more philosophical *Ratnakūṭa* works are the *Trisaṃvśranirdeśaparivarta*, *Saptaśatikānāmaprajñāpāramitā*, *Acintyabuddhaviśayanirdeśa*, *Pitāputrasamāgama*, *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetra-guṇavyūha*, *Samantamukhaparivarta*. Other less known works are the *Vidyutprāptaparipṛcchā* and, perhaps, the *Gaṅgotaraparipṛcchā*.
12. The uncomplicated form of presentation corroborates details that we extricated from Chinese sources about the early date of their composition. Chinese translations of these texts attest that several of them go back to the early centuries of the Christian era. Two of them were first rendered into Chinese during the second century AD and many others followed suit in the third and fourth centuries. Altogether we know of five *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* that reached China during the earliest phase of the translation activity in the late Han dynasty. Of these, two are linked to the devotional strands of Pure Land Buddhism (*Rkt* 5, 6), one is associated with the cult of Maitreya (*Rkt* 41) and two fall in the first category of bodhisattva *sūtras* (*Rkt* 19, 43). For an exemplary analysis of the characteristics that mark the relationship between the date, style and contents of these works, see: Weller, 1965, Einleitung, pp. 5–58.
13. Other examples from this category of works of inspiration are the *Rcd*, *Prṇ* and, of course, the *Bdp*.

bodhisattva practices and disclose ways in which these interrelate. Apparently in order to distinguish the bodhisattva's qualities from those of other religious practitioners, a marked effort has been made in both *sūtras* to describe the virtues and attributes particular to the bodhisattva. In the *Kp*, this process of delineation is cast in a somewhat negative mould, since the text invites conclusions by 'rhetorically' listing traits that fall well short of the bodhisattva's high standards. Standing alone, this indirect mode of reasoning might indicate an early date of composition for the *Kp* at a time when the bodhisattva doctrine was still in its formative period and evolved in reaction against previously existing ideas.¹⁴

If we survey the practices that are included in these early *sūtras*, we note that most texts accentuate the principles of early Buddhist practice and, in particular, the ethical side of their production. Mahāyāna practices such as the *pāramitā* or *upāyakauśalya* are relegated to the background and figure only sporadically. What is more, none of the texts proposes any formal scheme for the bodhisattva training. The practices are cited either on an individual basis or otherwise are loosely drawn together in tetrads.¹⁵

Second, we have *sūtras* that display a high degree of organisation in their discussion of the bodhisattva. It would seem plausible that these texts were included to balance the structural latitude of works like the *Kp* and *Rp*. Two *sūtras*, in particular, stand out for their well-structured outlines of the training, that is, the *Svapnanirdeśa* and *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā*.

In the *Svapnanirdeśa*, more than half of the exposition is dedicated to showing the interplay that links the diverse attainments of the ten stages.¹⁶ Priority is given to those factors that specifically correlate the notion of practice with that of progress along the path. The path-scheme itself emulates the tenfold design of the *Daśabhūmika*. The picture drawn of the career is rather sterile, since it is locked into the formal structure of the path and swerves nowhere from its linear order. This close adherence to the successive training-phases may point to the

14. This is also true of the *Rp*, since it too sets out to define the nature of the bodhisattva in opposition to the qualities of the śrāvaka (Ensink, pp. v-xvi).

15. There is ample room for speculation as to the reasons that led to this structural laxity. First, there is the fact that both works belong to the earliest strand of bodhisattva *sūtras* not only in the *Ratnakūṭa*, but probably in the Mahāyāna as a whole. Texts containing such early thought might be expected to be less organised in their presentation than those of later centuries when the bodhisattva doctrine had fully matured. Second, being conceived as works of inspiration, they might never have intended to provide a systematic description of the training. We know of several other Mahāyāna works where clarity and logical coherence are sometimes disregarded in favour of 'emotional' subject matter aimed at the more imaginative traits of the human mind. Thus, it might have well been thought that a terse, systematised style of exposition would inevitably diminish the appeal of texts whose chief function it was to attract following to newly formulated ideas.

16. 22, pp. 97.2.8-109.2.8.

rationale behind the *sūtra*'s incorporation in the *Ratnakūṭa*; namely, to furnish the collection with a text that systematically classifies, and sets in a well designed scheme practices that are elsewhere haphazardly cited.

In the *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā*, this sense for order is heightened to the point of practically encompassing the whole breadth of the bodhisattva training. It involves an abridged, highly systematised presentation of all major practices and phases of the bodhisattva's career, including the *bodhicittotpāda*, *prañidhāna*, the ten stages and affiliated perfections, meditations and magic spells.¹⁷ From the structural point of view, the *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā*'s presentation of the *bodhisattvacaryā* excels all other path schemes in the *Ratnakūṭa*. Beginning with the *cittotpāda* and concluding in the bodhisattva's acquisition of quasi-magical, buddha-like powers, it follows not only the chronological order of the career, but also points to the interrelationship between the successive attainments. The *pāramitā* are closely linked to the ten stages; the meditations are generated by sets of vows and, in turn, lead to the acquisition of magical powers.

Third, we have texts that are wholly dedicated to a specific set of bodhisattva practices. Good examples of such texts are the *Vup* and *Upāyakaṣālyaparivarta*.¹⁸ As their titles indicate, the bodhisattva's code of discipline in the *Vup* and skilful means in the *Upāyakaṣālyaparivarta* lie at the heart of the discussion. While the *Vup* explores the foundations of moral integrity and its manifestations in the bodhisattva's conduct, the *Upāyakaṣālyaparivarta* explicates the operations of skilful means in the bodhisattva's fulfilment of his pledge to universal liberation. Both practices are of cardinal importance to the completion of the career. The reluctance shown in both texts to discuss any topic not closely linked to their causes testifies to the enormous prestige of the practice of *śīla* and *upāyakaṣālyā*.

Fourth, there are *sūtras* that lay stress on the factors separating the lay path from that of the mendicant ideal. The most prominent *sūtras* of this class are the *Ug* and *Sumatidar-*

17. On reading the *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā*, it becomes immediately evident that every effort was made to cast its account of the bodhisattva path in the mould of the scheme of the ten stages as codified by the *Dbh*. In structure and terminology both works exhibit close parallels and it certainly looks as if most, perhaps even all, of its lay-out has been borrowed from the *Dbh*. Apart from this structural similarity, there is otherwise little substance that connects the two, since the *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā* is an infinitely shorter work and does not take up most of the detail that is set out in the *Dbh*.

18. Other texts dominated by individual practices are the *Ratnarāśi* and, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, the *Rcd*. In the *Ratnakūṭa*, this phenomenon of devoting whole *sūtras* to one concept only is not limited to expositions on the bodhisattva. There are several other texts that focus on a limited range of themes, most notably the *Bhadrāpālaśreṣṭhipariṣcchā*, *Rāśmisamantamuktanirdeśa*, *Āyusmannandagarbhāvākṛāntinirdeśa*, *Akṣobhyatathāgatasyavyūha* and, of course, the *Amitābhavyūha*.

ikapariṣcchā.¹⁹ First, both texts go to considerable lengths to present a complete picture of the nature and aptitude of *grhapti* bodhisattvas. Further, neither encourages the outright condemnation of its opposing ideal. Even in the passages where they directly contrast the qualities of *grhapti* bodhisattvas with those of its *pravrajita* counterpart, an amicable tone is maintained.

The *Ug* is most explicit in this matter and postulates that the highest form of bodhisattva practice consists in a combination of the virtues of both ideals.²⁰ That is to say, it proposes to join the compassion, dedication and altruism of the *grhapti* bodhisattva with the discipline and renunciation of the recluse. The practices and attainments advocated in the *Ug* coincide with those qualities traditionally associated with the two schemes; for the lay path it is faith, generosity and reverence, whereas for the recluse it is contentment, concentration and deep understanding.

Sūtras that Discuss Bodhisattva Practices and Attributes

I now propose to widen our investigation and to consider those *sūtras* containing specific, if sporadic, discussions of bodhisattva practices and attributes. Since they appear generally out of context or are crudely integrated into the plot they serve to illustrate, it seems to me that many of these passages could indeed be interpolations of later times. Amongst the eight texts to be considered here, we can distinguish two principal currents of exposition.

First, there are texts where the passages focus quite specifically on the bodhisattva practice. These are primarily ‘action-oriented’ and contain only few references to the bodhisattva’s qualities or attributes. This is particularly evident in the *Mahāprātihāryopadeśa* and *Prṇ*. In the *Mahāprātihāryopadeśa* a long section is taken up by a detailed, itemised description of the mechanisms behind the practices themselves.²¹ There is virtually no reference to the

19. Other texts of this category are the *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa*, *Viradattagrhapatipariṣcchā*, *Gaṅgot-arapariṣcchā* and philosophically, the *Śms*.

20. As the *Ug* is a composite work whose focal-point shifted over the centuries, its conclusions were also subject to change. In the words of Schuster: “The three Chinese translations, the Tibetan and the Sanskrit fragments preserved in *Śikṣ*, do not represent the same recension of the text. All translations of the text present similar pictures of the lay and recluse bodhisattvas. Yet there is a radical difference of opinion between the oldest version of the *Ug* (T322) and all the others about what is the superior bodhisattva vocation, and why” (Schuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 79, 315).

21. 23, pp. 11.4.4–23.4.5.

immediate fruits that would result from such practices.²² In the *Prñ*, too, an entire chapter is devoted to the bodhisattva training and the individual practices pursued in its course.²³ It is structured in tetrads that allow for only brief comments on the practices themselves, unlike the corresponding passage in the *Mahāprātihāryopadeśa* that contains much more detail.²⁴

Second, we have several *sūtras* where the focal-point shifts towards descriptions of the bodhisattva. Here, emphasis is placed on the qualities of the bodhisattva rather than on the practice itself. Even the most outstanding practices, such as the *pāramitā* or *saṃgrahavastu*, do not appear in their expositions. The main objective is no longer to explain the practical concerns of the training, but forge a new ideal from traditional collections of religious maxims. Generally, they do not investigate the way these were accomplished in the first place. Examples of this shift in emphasis are contained in the *Darikavimalaśuddha* and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in the *Subāhupariṣcchā*.²⁵ The *Darikavimalaśuddha* places specific bodhisattva attributes and powers in the foreground, whereas the *Subāhupariṣcchā* presents the bodhisattva ideal in subtly inspiring but more general terms. Apart from this difference in tone, both *sūtras* were clearly based on similar assumptions that place them side by side amongst the *Ratnakūṭa* works.

Sūtras that Focus on the Bodhisattva Doctrine

Much of our attention so far has been directed at the practical facets of the bodhisattva training. This is appropriate in view of the predominantly ‘action-oriented’ nature of most *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*. This feature however is not shared by all texts, as some concentrate on the theoretical perspectives of the bodhisattva ideal. These I have grouped together as *sūtras* that deal with doctrinal issues or contain only indirect references to the bodhisattva. They are

22. 24, pp. 15.5.7–16.3.5

The fruits and bodhisattva qualities that spring from the training are iterated separately towards the end of *bam-po* two (pp. 19.5.1–20.3.1) and again in the middle of *bam-po* three (pp. 22.4.5–23.4.8).

23. This is chapter one. Incidentally, this chapter, entitled: ‘On the *bodhisattvacaryā*’, is the only of all forty-nine texts (except the *Bdp*) that bears a title which is immediately related to the bodhisattva training (23, pp. 231.1.6–232.5.4).

24. The other texts containing passages that focus on the more active or dynamic aspects of the bodhisattva ideal are the *Bhadra-vy* (24, pp. 7.3.3–9.3.7), *Vimaladattāpariṣcchā* (24, pp. 108.5.1–111.3.8) and *Susthi-tamatidevaputrapariṣcchā* (24, pp. 130.4.6–134.1.4).

25. The third text which belongs to this category is the *Viradattagrhapatipariṣcchā* (in particular, pp. 84.2.2–85.1.3) and, of course, the *Bdp*.

separately examined further below, so it will suffice to note just two of their characteristics here.

First, all of them pass over the practical aspects of the bodhisattva training and include only a few statements immediately relating to the vision of universal liberation. At first glance, they do not seem to be of great import to the bodhisattva ideal. On closer examination, we find this is misleading. The *Śms* is the text where such philosophical priority is most conspicuous. The work abounds with allusions to the doctrinal background of the various career-phases. It not only adds new thought, but also draws parallels with several other Mahāyāna works and traces correlations with their propositions.

Second, practically all *sūtras* in this category endeavour to highlight the issues separating the attainments of the śrāvaka from those of the bodhisattva, often over many pages. These discourses assume an overwhelmingly theoretical flavour with little illustrative material and not much interest is shown in the practical application.

On the basis of this preliminary investigation, it is now possible to venture some opinion on the motives behind the inclusion of the *Bdp* in the *Ratnakūṭa*. In chapter one, I pointed to textual evidence that suggests that the *Bdp* was widely esteemed for its treatment of the perfections. This finding is corroborated by the results from our survey of its contents, showing that the *pāramitā* stand at the centre of the *Bdp*.²⁶

So far very little has been said about the *pāramitā* in the context of the *Ratnakūṭa*. The reason for this omission is that the *Bdp* is practically the only text in the entire collection that treats the six perfections with more than passing reference.²⁷ This is astonishing, considering the great attention that is given to the bodhisattva in every other detail in the *Ratnakūṭa*. Without the *Bdp* its depiction of the *bodhisattvacaryā* would lack the most prominent set of bodhisattva practices.

26. I know of no other Mahāyāna *sūtra* that propounds the *pāramitā* in quite the depth that the *Bdp* does. Even texts that are intimately linked to the bodhisattva's cause mention them only in passing. In the *Dbh*, for instance, the perfections appear only briefly at the end of each stage (*Daśa-bh*, p. 30; cf. *Śgs*, pp. 141–150). Likewise, in the *Vkn* they are cited only twice in full and also there little attention is given to their implementation (pp. 96–7, 157). Even in the voluminous *Pañca*, we find only sporadic discussions of the *pāramitā* altogether amounting to little more than a tenth of its exposition (e.g., pp. 263–67, 400–4, 453–64, 488, 509–526). One is led to conclude that the perfections were either considered to be very elementary and therefore required no specific explanation, or (and this seems much more likely) that behind the *Vkn* and texts like it there might have been well-known *sūtras* where the *pāramitā* were propounded in detail so that to discuss them once again would have been otiose.

27. The only exception is perhaps the *Rcd*, since in this work the perfections do receive considerable attention at the beginning of the discourse (24, pp. 231.4.7–236.2.7).

With the *Bdp*'s exposition of the *pāramitā*, the picture becomes complete. Indeed, there is then practically no aspect of the bodhisattva training that is not discussed or touched upon at least once in the forty-nine texts. We find works of inspiration that provide general information on the scope of the training and extol the qualities of the bodhisattva's accomplishments; texts that explore the major practices to be cultivated by bodhisattvas; *sūtras* that instruct in the order that the practices are to be undertaken and demonstrate how they interact with each other; works that propound especially selected practices warranting exclusive treatment; texts that address the controversy of the lay/mendicant distinction and lay down the frameworks for their respective training; and finally *sūtras* that give the bodhisattva ideal a more philosophically 'objective' treatment through examination of the theoretical principles lying at the heart of its doctrine. Clearly, in view of this thematic completeness, the notion that the *Ratnakūṭa* might have been compiled on the basis of a premeditated scheme now seems less absurd. On the contrary, it might well be argued that without a calculated plan such extraordinary degree of *balance in diversity* could not have been achieved.

The high standing of the bodhisattva in *Ratnakūṭa* works is confirmed by the multitude of practices that are introduced in the course of their expositions. Since I discuss many of these in the context of the *Bdp* in chapter four, I shall investigate here the extent to which they convey a complete picture of the *bodhisattvacaryā*. In particular, I shall probe whether their arrangement manifests any indications why they were included in the *Ratnakūṭa* collection.

Bodhisattva Vow

Adopting the order of the career progress, I suggest to look first at the ways in which the texts describe the bodhisattva's vow (*praṇidhāna*). The most advanced expositions of the bodhisattva vow are given in the *Śms* and *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā*. In both texts the vow is divided into ten component parts each of which addresses one specific training-perspective.²⁸ In the *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā*, the enumeration follows the succession of the ten *pāramitā* with each vow containing a pledge to practice the corresponding perfection. Its presentation is accordingly very formal. In the *Śms* the situation is different. Here, the *praṇidhāna* is embedded in the narrative and designates a specific point in Śrīmālā's spiritual advance. As a

28. 24, pp. 204.1.2–2.4; 24, pp. 252.1.5–5.2.

result, the description is very much alive and vibrates with her yearning for enlightenment. The contents of the individual limbs do not seem to follow any formal design, but reflect the underlying vision of the bodhisattva. Genuine desire for universal welfare is also displayed in the vow that is set out in the *Ug*. As in the *Śms* and *Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā*, it is cited at the beginning of the discourse and introduces the spiritual quest of the main protagonist, in this case the householder Ugra. Yet, in contrast to the former two, its formulation is rather archaic and may well belong to the earliest examples of its kind.

All other *sūtras* containing references to the bodhisattva vow relate its function to a specific purpose or mention it only in passing. Good examples are given in the *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa*, *Bhadra-vy* and *Rp*. While none of these works discusses the bodhisattva vow in detail, all uphold its cardinal importance for the bodhisattva career. In the *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa*, for instance, it is listed amongst eight *dharma* that remove blemish from household life—an issue of foremost concern to its defence of the lay path.²⁹ The *Bhadra-vy* and *Rp* give somewhat less attention to the bodhisattva vow. It appears inconspicuously halfway through a long sequence of tetrads spelling out all sorts of bodhisattva practices.³⁰ No attempt is made to set the vow apart from the principles cited next to it. Neither is the reference itself very explicit, since it broadly correlates the fulfilment of the vow to the accumulation of the roots of virtue and learning.³¹

Then, we have several *sūtras* that either build conceptually on the vow or allude to its scope and effects. First, there are those texts where it constitutes the rationale behind many of

29. 24, pp. 101.2.5–3.3.

30. *Bhadra-vy*, pp. 43, 96 (§ 103); *Rp*, p. 14.11–12.

The vows themselves are very similar in contents and represent variations on what must be considered the simplest and perhaps earliest form of the bodhisattva's *prañidhāna*.

In the *Bhadra-vy*, the bodhisattva pledges (1) to abide in *saṃsāra* until he has saved all sentient beings; (2) to strive to learn the disposition of all beings so that he can instruct them in a suitable manner; (3) to acquire wholesome *dharma*, to defeat Māra and to accomplish enlightenment; and (4) to teach the Doctrine to the world in just one word.

In the *Rp* the vow is vaguer (Ensink, *op. cit.*, p. 15):

“There is no salvation, no refuge nor relief whatever for the world that errs on the way of the conditioned. I must release all beings, therefore I make my vow to attain the highest enlightenment.”

Both are conspicuously similar to the vows that are included in the *Aṣṭa* and *Mvu*; these are probably the oldest of their kind. In the *Aṣṭa* (trsl. Conze, 1973, p. 254) it runs:

“We have crossed over, we shall help beings to cross over. Freed, we shall free them. Recovered, we shall help them to recover. Gone to *Nirvāṇa*, we shall help them to go to *Nirvāṇa*.”

In the *Mvu* (p. 138.16) the vow is given in precisely the same form as in the *Aṣṭa*. In this profile it is also found in the *Saddhp* (pp. 122–3).

31. In the *Rp* there is another reference to the bodhisattva vow. This time it is made by prince Puṇyaraśmi when he pronounces his willingness to follow the Buddhist path. Although very similar in contents to the former, it is less accentuated and easily overseen (p. 44.17 ff).

their propositions. The best-known examples of this kind are the *Vup* and *Upāyakauśalyapari-varta*, where the fulfillment of the vow is fundamental to their theses.³² Second, there are works that assimilate its significance, scope and implications without incessantly going back to the vow itself. A good example of this kind is the *Ug*. This text places the vow at the very heart of its teaching by linking its concomitants of altruism and selfless service with the moral and disciplinary zeal of the recluse.³³

Bodhisattva Practice

Broadly speaking, the training that leads to the implementation of the vow is composed of two categories of practice. First, it includes a number of principles that were adopted from the earlier strands of Buddhist practice. Although with the advent of the Mahāyāna these practices were 'officially' relegated to the background, many survived as the very bedrock of the bodhisattva training. Second, we have practices that were developed in the Mahāyāna itself. The most prominent amongst these are of course the *pāramitā*. It is their treatment in the *Ratnakūṭa* that I shall consider next.

The *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* approach the perfections in three different ways. First, there is one text that places the pursuit of the *pāramitā* in the centre of its exposition. This is the *Bdp*. However, one should also mention the *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā* and *Rcḍ* since both contain some material on all six (or ten) perfections. In the middle section of the *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā*, the *pāramitā* are briefly discussed and, thereafter, recur in connection with the various path-stages.³⁴ And yet, since the *sūtra* is an extremely short work and does not explain the training in the *pāramitā* beyond a number of attributes, we learn little about how to pursue them.³⁵ In the *Rcḍ*, the situation is not very different.³⁶ Here too, we have a work that

32. *Vup*, pp. 108–114, § 33–40.

33. In the *Ug*, by being placed at the very beginning of the discourse, the vow is employed in a very effective way. In a few lines it sets out the gist of the whole work and is easily memorised. Like those of the *Rp* and *Bhadra-vy*, it is early in both format and orientation and very close to that of the *Aṣṭa* and *Mvu*. It runs as follows (23, p. 259.3.1–2):

“I shall liberate those who have not yet been liberated, and release those who have not yet been released. Those who have not yet been comforted, I shall comfort. Those who have not yet been freed from affliction, I shall bring about their freedom from affliction.”

34. 24, pp. 204.2.6–205.4.7.

35. In the Peking edition of the Tibetan Canon the whole text extends barely over seventeen folios (24, pp. 203.3.7–206.5.4).

36. Besides Sthiramati's commentary on the *Kp* and Chinese commentaries on the *Śms*, the *Rcḍ* is the only text

considers all perfections, but does not place them in the centre of its exposition.³⁷ Instead, it is the *bodhipākṣika dharma* that become the focal-point of much of the discourse.

Next, there are works that contain partial discussions of the *pāramitā*. In some of these, treatment is only nominal and rarely exceeds a few lines. This is the case in the *Kp*, *Prn*, *Śms*, *Sūrataparipṛcchā* and, perhaps, the *Bhadra-vy*. Typically, they refer to the six *pāramitā* only in passing or allude vaguely to their implementation. The *Kp* goes furthest by simply referring to another text for a more detailed exposition of their contents.³⁸

A limited treatment of selected perfections is also found the *Sumatidarikaparipṛcchā* and *Rp*. Here, however, the perfections are not explicitly referred to by name, but are implied by the nature of the practices. It is worth noting that the practices that occur with greatest frequency in this connection are those constituting the bodhisattva's moral training (*adhiśīlaśikṣā*). That is to say, they are *dāna*, *śīla*, *kṣānti* and also, according to some, *vīrya*.³⁹

Finally, there are several texts that discuss only one of the six (or ten) perfections. The selected the *pāramitā* is invariably explored at great length and stands at the centre of the discourse. This is the case in the *Ug*, *Vup* and, of course, in the *Upāyakaṣālyaparivarta*. Each of them treats its selected perfection in exhaustive detail and looks at it from a number of perspectives, with very little overlapping between the discussions. The *Ug* explores *dāna*,

of our twenty-one bodhisattva *sūtras* that is furnished with a commentary. It is called *Ratnacūḍasūtracaturdharmopadeśa* (T1526) and exists in Tibetan and Chinese translations. Tibetan sources attribute it to Vasubandhu, but the validity of this authorship has been challenged. Demiéville (*BEFEO*, 44, p. 391, n. 5), however, says that this commentary is not extant in Tibetan.

37. The *Rcd* begins with a discussion of the six *pāramitā* (24, pp. 231.4.7–236.2.7) which is immediately followed by a lengthy exposition on the *bodhipākṣika dharma* (24, pp. 236.2.8–244.2.8). Its total volume spans well over one hundred folios (24, pp. 229.5.1–251.1.8).

The positioning of the *bodhipākṣika* in the middle of the discourse and the detail with which they are treated indicates that they were thought to stand at the very heart of the bodhisattva's training; probably right next to the *pāramitā*. The description of the individual factors is carefully phrased and a lot more exhaustive than all other references to the *bodhipākṣika* elsewhere in the *Ratnakūṭa*. Hence, it becomes a distinct possibility that just as the *Bdp* was seen as the authority on the perfections, so the *Rcd* might been held in high esteem for its contribution on the *bodhipākṣika dharma* and therefore warranted inclusion in the *Ratnakūṭa*.

38. 24, p. 189.2.6–7

For text-critical comments on the passage in which the *Kp* refers to the *Bdp* for the practice of the perfections, see: Weller, *op. cit.*, p. 67, § 6.1 (n. 5, 6). Other *Ratnakūṭa* internal references to the *Bdp* are found in the *Ug* (p. 267.2.5–6) and *Upāyakaṣālyaparivarta* (p. 162.1.7–2.8).

39. The *dhyānapāramitā* corresponds to the *adhicittaśikṣā* and the *prajñāpāramitā* represents the *adhiprajñāśikṣā*. The allocation of the *vīryapāramitā* is less clear-cut and varies from author to author, some associating it with the *adhicittaśikṣā* and others with the *adhiśīlaśikṣā*. This threefold division of the *pāramitā* was widely accepted in Mahāyāna circles and probably represents attempts to reconcile the practices of the bodhisattva to those of early Buddhism. Amongst others, it is spelled out in the *Msg*, *Bbh* and *Madhyamakavatāra*. sGam-po-pa propounds a similar scheme (Guenther, 1971, p. 149). For further references to this scheme see: Eimer, 1976, pp. 113 ff.

the *Vuṣ* expounds *śīla* and the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta* explains *upāyakauśalya*. Generally, the chosen perfection is treated on its own and not linked with other practices.⁴⁰

Treatment of the practices that complement the bodhisattva's training in the *pāramitā* is generally rather uniform. But for shifts in emphasis (largely due to varying contexts in which the ancillary practices are called upon), few texts exhibit any substantial differences in their choice and discussion of these practices. Repeatedly, our attention is drawn to the *pañcaśīla*, *apramāṇa*, *saṃgrahavastu*, *ṛddhipāda*, *abhiññā*, *dhutaṅga* and *bodhipākṣika dharma*, to mention just a few of the more frequent principles.⁴¹ Besides these well-established sets, one meets also with a fair number of individual, less codified practices, such as reverence, eloquence, self-sacrifice, selfless service, faith and learning.

Also the framework in which these practices are embedded is remarkable uniform. Generally, they are summed up in mnemonic-type lists of the kind I have already discussed in connection with the *Bdp*. In view of this consistency, it is tempting to conclude that many of these better known principles might have been based on some ancient, uniform stock of practices. What is surprising, however, is the extent to which the texts exhibit similarities in style and tone. It has been generally assumed until now that the concise *sūtra* style is particular to the early phase of Mahāyāna literature. In the *Ratnakūṭa*, however, these features are shared by early and late works alike.⁴²

40. The exception is the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta*. Here, a specific practice, viz., the perfection of skilful means is related to numerous other training aspects to which it becomes the frame of implementation. Hence, although priority is given to showing how skilful means influences the training as a whole, it is set repeatedly in contexts that disclose its application to specific practices. At the beginning of the exposition (24, pp. 151.4.8–152.1.8), for instance, it is shown how *upāyakauśalya* affects the practice of the *pāramitā*. In section two and three (24, pp. 156.2.3–167.5.8) it is taken to account for the Buddha's inexplicable past conduct. Thus, although *upāyakauśalya* is the focal-point that determines the perspective for all other practices, it is not the sole topic of the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta*.

41. As complete sets of practice, these are found above all in the *Ug*, *Sūratapariprcchā*, *Ratnarāśi*, *Rcd*, *Rp* and *Kp*. In other texts, commonly just one or two aspects of these categories are cited or else the respective principles are not discussed under the official headings but listed on their own merits. This is particularly the case in the *Bhadra-vy* (§ 79–121), *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa* and *Sumatidarikapariprcchā*.

42. Compare, for instance, the style of exposition of such early works as the *Kp*, *Ug*, *Maitreyapariprcchādharmāṣṭa* (trsl. second century) or *Rcd* (trsl. third century) with that of the *Akṣayamatipariprcchā* (trsl. eighth century), *Śms* or *Pps* (trsl. fifth century). It will be noted that, although doctrinally far apart, all seven works show affinity in literary style and share a conspicuous preference for concision in the presentation of their cases.

Bodhisattva Path

When discussing the types of bodhisattva expositions existing in the *Ratnakūṭa*, I have pointed to the *Svapnanirdeśa* and *Akṣayamatipariṣṭhā* as two *sūtras* whose descriptions of the *bodhisattvacaryā* emulate the *daśabhūmika* scheme. Identification of the tenfold design caused no difficulty, since the expositions of both texts are firmly locked into their structures. There are, however, *Ratnakūṭa* works where the path-design is less clear.

A good example is the *daśabhūmika* scheme that is found in the *Śms*. Being essentially a philosophical work, the *Śms* displays few clear-cut statements on the bodhisattva path. Much of what we know about its vision of the bodhisattva path is therefore based on exegetical works.⁴³ A key passage pointing to the adaptation of the tenfold design is contained in the second chapter where Śrīmālā speaks of the bodhisattva's successive renunciation of body, life-force and possessions.⁴⁴ Although, at first glance, no specific design emerges in this reference, it shows parallels with other works where the three types of renunciation are related to the ten stages. We learn in the *Mahāvastu* that from the eighth stage onwards bodhisattvas begin to renounce their property and take up the mendicant path.⁴⁵ This ties in with what the queen, says: by renunciation of the body, bodhisattvas attain the buddha-body (presumably the transcendental body first attained on the *acalābhūmi*); renunciation of the life-force settles bodhisattvas in Dharma-activity (by common consent on the *sādhumatībhūmi*), and by renouncing all possessions they are certain to receive honours from all beings (at the *dharmameghābhūmi* when the bodhisattva is encircled by the *Sanṅha*).

Further evidence of the adoption of the *daśabhūmika* scheme is found in a series of references to four kinds of merit (*guṇa*).⁴⁶ Of these, the *Rgv* links 'limitless merit' (*guṇāpramēyatā*) to the seventh stage, 'completeness of merit' (*guṇasarvatā*) to the eighth stage; 'inconceivable merit' (*guṇācintyātā*) to the ninth stage; and 'pure excellence of merit' (*guṇaviśuddhiparamatā*) to the buddha-stage.⁴⁷

There are yet more passages in the *Śms* that allude to a scheme for grading the progress of the bodhisattva. These propose to divide the bodhisattva path into two major phases. According to the *Msl*, quoting a passage from the *Śms*, the practitioner goes first through a 'progress-phase'

43. For a list of commentaries that were written on the *Śms* in China, see Wayman, 1974, pp. 9–11.

44. 24, pp. 255.5.3–256.1.5.

45. *Mvu*, p. 105.11–14 (ref. Wayman).

46. 24, p. 254.3.8–4.2.

47. *Rgv*, pp. 264–265 (ref. Wayman).

comprising the attainments of the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha and 'newly-set-out' bodhisattva.⁴⁸ Then he passes through the 'fulfilment-phase' that is set by the 'three stages of the body made of mind'.⁴⁹ These, Queen Śrīmālā associates with the advanced bodhisattva. Although the three path-stages are raised at several occasions in the *Śms*, at no point it is made fully clear to which phases they actually correspond.⁵⁰ Also the commentaries do not offer conclusive advice. Instead, they cite references to three stages in other Buddhist scriptures.⁵¹

The *Śms* belongs probably to the later strands of the *Ratnakūṭa*. This might have influenced the rather complex picture that it draws of the bodhisattva path. Our next example, the *Ug*, in contrast belongs to the earliest bodhisattva *sūtras*. Hence, it is not surprising that, like the *Bdp*, it does not follow any 'prefabricated' path scheme, but develops a plan of its own.⁵² In essence, many of its teachings revolve around the factors that distinguish the training of the *pravrajita* bodhisattva from that of its lay counterpart. While the controversy surrounding these two ideals is an old one, its conclusions are remarkable and warrant closer investigation. At several places in the *Ug* we are told quite clearly that the paths of the *grhasti* and *pravrajita* bodhisattva represent nothing but two consecutive career stages that eventually

48. *Msl*, p. 70.3–10

The quotation itself is however not found in the *Śms*.

49. Wayman associates the so-called 'body made of mind' to special cases of perception, to their reflected image in the three realms and to birth. Starting from these assumptions, he concludes that it must refer to a duplicate of the coarser body; and that indeed the 'body made of mind' is assigned to the 'nonfluxional realm' with its reflected image in the coarser body assigned to the 'fluxional three realms'. I must admit that I am not certain that I understand his terminology and the reasoning behind his argument. Since it is only of minor import to our present discussion, I shall not digress, but refer to the passages in which Wayman develops his case; that is: Wayman. 1974, pp. 29–31.

50. 24, p. 254.3.8–5.4, pp. 255.4.2–257.4.5.

51. Chinese commentaries (*Chi-tsang*, p. 173) point, for instance, to an account that is given in the *Laṅkāv* that arranges the 'three bodies made of mind' alongside the ten *bhūmi*, correlating the first body to stages one to five, the second body to stages six and seven and the third body to the eighth, ninth and tenth stages (pp. 211–214).

52. The clearest indications of such scheme are found in a section on *stūpa* rites:

"When shall I [the bodhisattva] renounce the filth of household-life? When shall I abide and fare just in this way? I shall generate, just so, the thought of wishing to go forth to mendicant life, of no longer remaining in household-life at all and to pursue the conduct of supreme enlightenment. All those who go forth to mendicant life and hasten to the empty forest of solitude realise perfect enlightenment" (23, p. 265.4.6–5.2).

For further details, see: 23, pp. 265.5.3–267.1.6 and p. 270.3.2–4. These statements on the path phases are corroborated by the sequence in which the individual aspects of the bodhisattva training are cited in the *Ug*. The first section sets out to define the nature and training of the lay bodhisattva. It describes the typical lay attributes of faith, generosity, morality and veneration (*HIB*, pp. 67–84), each of which is then individually taken up in section two to six (§ 2, morality; § 3, healing; § 4, home; § 5, generosity; § 6, *stūpa* worship). Next, departing from the ideal of the householder, section seven lays out in detail the practices of the *āryavaṃśa*. In part, these are taken up again in section eight that deals with secluded dwelling. As in all preceding sections great stress is laid on the reasons lying behind the individual practices and, above all, justifying the renunciation of household-life in favour of forest seclusion. Finally, towards the end of the discourse, the training schemes of the lay and mendicant ideals are merged and five *dharma* are put forward that characterise the training of the new, combined path (23, pp. 272.3.6–4.7).

come together in the ideal of the 'accomplished bodhisattva'.⁵³ While it is the *grhapti* bodhisattva who comes closest to the realisation of buddhahood⁵⁴, he cannot achieve this without having first gone through the phases of renunciation and discipline of the mendicant path.⁵⁵

The text distinguishes three path-phases. First, there is the phase of the superbly motivated, though technically ill-equipped, householder. He has raised the thought of enlightenment and proceeds on the path to buddhahood, but his progress is hampered by lack in purity and understanding. Then follows a phase in which the bodhisattva spends his days as a recluse in the forest, exerting himself to attain the degree of insight and purity required to implement his resolution with utmost success. Finally, in the third phase of his training, the bodhisattva returns to the world of the householder and resumes his task of liberating all sentient beings.⁵⁶

Householder and Recluse

Out of the twenty-three bodhisattva works in the *Ratnakūṭa*, seventeen take up this somewhat controversial issue. Of the seventeen, eight⁵⁷ uphold the training of the *grhapti* bodhisattva and nine⁵⁸ endorse the *pravrajita* bodhisattva as the higher ideal. Numerically, there is almost parity between the two groups. But before rushing to conclusions, let us look at the ways in which the texts argue their cases. As in previous instances, I have selected from each group one *sūtra* that is particularly well-suited to serve as an example.

The *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa* is in many ways representative for the advocates of the lay

53. *Ug*, 23, p. 272.3.7–4.7.

54. 23, pp. 272.5.7–73.1.6.

55. 23, p. 270.2.4–4.6.

56. 23, p. 271.2.7–3.1:

"And furthermore, O householder, in accordance with the Buddha's instructions the *pravrajita* bodhisattva must live in the forest abode, thinking to himself: "In this place I shall accomplish all virtuous practices. Having adhered to it by reason of roots of virtue, afterwards, I shall go to towns and villages to preach the Dharma."

A similar concept is found in chapter nine of the *Bḍp* where the bodhisattva is encouraged to withdraw into solitude prior to promulgating the Dharma (R, folio 540–41).

57. These are the 1. *Śms*, 2. *Sumatidarikapariṣcchā*, 3. *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa*, 4. *Vimaladattāpariṣcchā*, 5. *Gaṅgotarapariṣcchā*, 6. *Suṣthitamatidevaputrāpariṣcchā* (24, pp. 139.3.3–142.2.3 only), 7. *Viradattagrāhaparipariṣcchā*, 8. *Ug* (in the *Ug* the position is less clear as it changed over the centuries). Of these seven works, number 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 endorse also the potential of the female bodhisattva.

58. These are the *Bḍp*, *Rp*, *Suṣthitamatidevaputrāpariṣcchā*, *Bhadra-vy*, *Ratnarāśi*, *Sūratāpariṣcchā*, *Kāśyapapariṣcchā*, *Akṣayamatipariṣcchā* and *Pūrṇāpariṣcchā*.

ideal.⁵⁹ First, it belongs to those texts in which the *gr̥hapti/pravrajita* distinction is vehemently brought to the fore and thus is probably the main reason for its composition. Like most of the *sūtras* propounding the lay ideal, it is rather short and deals with few other issues. Second, there is its vivid description of the challenge launched at even the most senior monks by Princess Aśokadattā. This is commonplace in this type of text, where the dialogue is typically sharp and full of irony. At the end (and this too is characteristic for the householder/recluse debate in the *Ratnakūṭa*), it draws up a set of practices that bridge the differences between the two ideals to produce the ideal of the ‘accomplished bodhisattva’ very much along the lines of the *Ug*. Doctrinally, this is achieved by merging the maxims of purity, insight and meditation of the recluse with the compassion, selfless service and self-sacrifice of the householder.⁶⁰

Our second example, the *Ratnarāśi*, is less accommodating to the householder. It advocates strict observance of the monastic code of conduct and encourages the revival of the mendicant ideal. The reasons standing behind these concerns are well-known from the early *suttas*. First, it is concerned with the personal benefit that accrues to the religious by way of physical and mental purity.⁶¹ Second, it wishes to ensure the *Saṅgha*’s continuing ability to provide fields of merit for lay followers, as a loss might damage its financial standing.⁶² In order to kindle a desire for purity, the *Ratnarāśi* extols the benefits that spring from meticulous adherence to the *Vinaya* and praises those who genuinely withdraw into seclusion.⁶³

The assumption behind this commitment to a monastic-type discipline is that lay life is inevitably defiled and thus not suited to spiritual purification. Like the *Bdp*, the *Ratnarāśi* warns of the worldly evils of desire, greed and conceit and goes to great length to contrast them with the virtues of the disciplinarian framework of mendicant training.

59. 24, pp. 96.2.4–103.2.8.

60. The points include (1) to purify the body and gain faith in enlightenment; (2) to generate kindness and compassion; (3) to master all worldly affairs because of/with compassion; (4) to be able to give up one’s life and to achieve ingenuity; (5) to be able to make infinite vows; (6) to accomplish the perfection of wisdom and become detached from all views; (7) to develop unwavering, infinite courage and vigour; (8) to acquire unhindered pristine cognition as a result of attaining the realisation of the non-arising of *dharma* (24, p. 101.2.5–3.3).

61. 24, pp. 207.1.2–5.6.

62. 24, pp. 207.5.7–208.1.6; 208.3.5–209.1.5.

63. That is to say, it is to adopt wholeheartedly the practices that are included in the *āryavaṃśa* and to pursue the various meditative practices out of genuine desire for purification (24, pp. 208.1.6–4.2, 214.3.3–5.8). There is reason to believe that these ideals had not always been fully upheld, since the texts abounds with examples that illustrate how the monk should not conduct himself (24, pp. 210.1.1–211.5.5). In keeping with *Vinaya* tradition, these episodes are presumably cited on the basis of some true occurrence and might well reflect the state of the *Saṅgha* at the time of the composition of the *Ratnarāśi*. On evidence of moral laxity in the Buddhist communities of Central Asia during the fourth century where fragments of the *Ratnarāśi* have been found, see: *L’Inde Classique*, ii, p. 415. For further evidence of criticism of indiscipline in early Mahāyāna *sūtras*, see *Kp*, pp. 162–171, § 111–120.

Two issues warrant particular attention, since they disclose rather conclusively what the *Ratnarāśi* considered an ideal environment. First, (and this is accentuated throughout the text) no monk should expose himself unnecessarily to contact with the laity. Every interaction between lay followers and *bhikṣus* has to be sanctioned by the monastic community and must strictly serve its interests.⁶⁴

The training that such isolation was intended to advance consists of two main components. On the one hand, we have a strictly regulated monastic regime of intense supervision and willing submission.⁶⁵ The one issue that recurs constantly is the principle of personal accountability. Although it is applied to practitioners of all levels, it is argued that it is especially mandatory for those who hold a leading office in the monastic precinct.⁶⁶

The *Ratnarāśi* also spells out the less regulated path of the recluse. Since this career is beyond immediate control of monastic sanction and depends on the practitioner's willingness to honour the norms of the Dharma, the *sūtra's* tone changes from the prescriptive to a descriptive one. Rather than postulating strict rules of conduct, it gives practical advice and describes the kind of conduct that benefits a recluse's progress. In essence, these take the form of guidelines in combining the spirit of the *Vinaya* with the practicalities of forest-dwelling.

As forest life is described after the monastic training, it could be argued that the *Ratnarāśi* proposes, like the *Ug*, some stratification in the training. At first, the practitioner is expected to subscribe to the disciplinarian rigour of monastic training. During this period he is being schooled in the fundamental precepts of Buddhist spirituality. Then, having mastered the concept of non-self and achieved a high degree of mental and moral stability, he is allowed to withdraw into seclusion in order to internalise what he was taught in the monastery during prolonged periods of meditation. Let me stress, however, that while such a succession of training phases would accord with the principles of spiritual purification and seems corroborated on contextual grounds, it is not explicitly proposed in the *Ratnarāśi*.

The practices themselves build largely on the aspiration and training of the arhant-ideal.⁶⁷ Valid for the recluse and monk alike, they centre on the general categories of *śīla*, *samādhi*

64. This implies meticulous observance of the *prātimokṣa* rules in general and, in particular, the strict adherence to those *Vinaya* precepts that regulate the moments when monks and laity come into contact with each other, viz, on alms-round, while travelling, at public ceremonies and so forth. For details on these rules see the *Pavāraṇakkhandhaka* and *Kaṭhinakkhandhaka* sections of the *Culavagga* in the *Khandhaka* of the Pāli *Vinaya*.

65. 24, pp. 211.5.6–213.2.3.

66. 24, pp. 212.5.2–213.2.2.

67. See, in particular, 24, pp. 206.5.5–208.3.5.

and *prajñā* and the seven sets of *bodhipākṣika dharma*. But what is perhaps more surprising than the absence of specific bodhisattva practices, is the general indifference of treatment to the bodhisattva's chief aspiration of universal liberation. Except for one cluster of practices that encourage a generally positive disposition towards people, no explicit commitment to their liberation is made. Clearly, this disinterest in the fate of other beings and the implicit refusal to open the monk's aspirations to the laity points to an early origin of the *Ratnarāṣi*.⁶⁸

Bodhisattva Doctrine

These findings lead us to our next topic of examination, that is, the position of bodhisattva works in the *Ratnakūṭa* in the overall development of the bodhisattva doctrine. I have already pointed to four *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* (5, 18, 19, 43) that have features linking them with the earliest strands of the bodhisattva doctrine. Since they typically abound in lengthy descriptions of the bodhisattva qualities, I have called them works of inspiration. The earliest attested translations of these *sūtras* go back to the second century AD. While in at least two cases these have been subject to modifications, much of their original thought belongs without doubt to the earliest phase of the bodhisattva doctrine.⁶⁹

Next, we have several *sūtras* where the links with early Buddhist practice are less evident.

68. There are several factors that might have accounted for the *Ratnarāṣi*'s unusual doctrinal orientation and the weight that it gives to the observance of monastic precepts. First, one will have to consider the time of its composition. The *terminus ad quem* of the *Ratnarāṣi* is the end of the third century AD since one of its Chinese translations (T 310.44) goes back to this period. Beyond that, we know little about its literary history. Other clues that might be of relevance to the *Ratnarāṣi*'s historical evaluation are given in a few manuscript fragments that were discovered at the beginning of this century in Central Asia. The language of the fragments is Sanskrit written in the Upright Gupta script (Hoernle, 1916, pp. ix–xxxii, 116). The use of the Upright Gupta script raises the possibility that the manuscript might date back to the fourth or fifth century AD (Hoernle, 1916, p. xiii). While this alone can scarcely be regarded as sufficient evidence for a secure dating, it is in line with the date of the earliest Chinese translation of the *Ratnarāṣi*. For details on the language of surviving manuscript fragments of the *Ratnarāṣi*, see: Hoernle, 1916, pp. 116–121. There is yet another hint to be gleaned from the few surviving lines of the Central Asian manuscript. This is the *Ratnarāṣi*'s area of circulation. It will be recalled that we have evidence of the *Ratnakūṭa*'s popularity in Central Asia. Most of these had been discovered in the caves of Tun-huang. The fragments of the *Ratnarāṣi* were located near Kucha, in the extreme north-west of present-day China. The geographical distance that separates both places underlines the *Ratnakūṭa*'s wide dissemination in Central Asia. More importantly, however, Kucha tells us about the *Ratnarāṣi*'s sectarian affiliation. Hsüan-tsang, in his report on Buddhism in Kucha, refers to Kucha explicitly as a town that was under strong Sarvāstivādin influence (Beal, 1884, i, pp. 19–20). Clearly, an affiliation with one of the prevailing sects of early Buddhism would account for the hinayānist orientation of the *Ratnarāṣi*'s exposition. It would make good sense for Sarvāstivādins to take on travels in foreign lands those *sūtras* which teach the basics of Buddhist spirituality and lay down the framework in which it is to be pursued.

69. See: Weller, *op. cit.*, pp. 8, 9, 14–15, 17–23; Schuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 79–82, 325–334.

These embrace Mahāyāna thought more wholeheartedly and venture beyond the concepts of the early *suttas*. In these texts we meet with what were probably the first attempts to tackle the newly evolving thought in a systematic fashion. Much of their 'pioneering spirit' is directed at the bodhisattva practice itself which is typically reduced to its component parts. The most important works of this class are the *Bdp* and *Rcd*. Both contain detailed descriptions of individual bodhisattva precepts and set tentatively out to reinterpret śrāvaka practices. Yet, they do not draw up a scheme of the path or disparage the maxims of the mendicant ideal.

Then, we have a group of *sūtras* that seemingly take such basic matter for granted and shift the centre of their interest to subtler issues.⁷⁰ For the most part, they define the ways in which the bodhisattva path differs from that of the śrāvaka. Another trait they have in common is the dexterity with which they employ Mahāyāna philosophy to defend their views on the bodhisattva. This is most graphically carried out in the *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa* and *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā*; two texts in which all controversy about the need for purity and restraint is dissolved into Emptiness.

Other advanced bodhisattva *sūtras* place organisational concerns in the centre of their exposition. In them, the issue that receives most attention is the search for an ordered scheme to grade and allocate the practices to path-stages. This coordination is executed most effectively in the *Akṣayamatiparipṛcchā* where practically all major practices are given a place on the path. The nature of the practices themselves is of little concern in these texts.

Finally, there is a small group of *sūtras* that include doctrinally the most advanced thought on the bodhisattva. The complexity of their content indicates that, by then, all the fundamental components of the bodhisattva doctrine were in place. Here, we find few references to the actual bodhisattva training, since familiarity with it is apparently taken for granted. The best-known exponent of this category is the *Śms*.

Literary and Structural Characteristics

Having explored thematic considerations, I shall examine next the formal aspects of the collection and investigate whether previous findings can be corroborated by stylistic or

70. The most prominent *sūtras* of this category are the *Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā*, *Upāyakauśalyapari-varta*. Other less-known works are the *Svapnanirdeśa*, *Viradattagrhapatiparipṛcchā*, *Sumatidar-ikaparipṛcchā* and *Acintyabuddhaviṣayanirdeśa*.

literary evidence. Surely, if we are to accept the hypothesis that the *Ratnakūṭa*'s present format is the outcome of religio-literary arbitrariness, we would expect to find a variety of uncoordinated styles and literary genres. Moreover, its overall tone could be trusted to reflect the fortuity of its composition and exhibit a wide spectrum of religious and literary 'miscellanea'. If, on the other hand, its compilation proceeded on a premeditated plan with a specific objective, the chances are that its contents would display a certain stylistic and thematic coherence. Selected literary genres might be expected to recur in a number of works and favoured techniques of exposition would prevail throughout.

Since the evaluation of these issues is subject to interpretation and rests on personal judgment, it is perhaps wise to concentrate on matters that are verifiable through statistical investigation. It is these that I shall address first.

A feature common to practically all *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* is the brevity and succinctness of their expositions. With the notable exception of the *Bdp*, only a few of the texts exceed one hundred Tibetan blockprint folios. Indeed, the majority fall well short of this mark, with a considerable number averaging thirty folios or less.⁷¹ The range of topics discussed in these discourses is invariably narrow. Owing to the brevity of the expositions, formal chapter-divisions are found only in seven out of the total of forty-nine *sūtras*.

The briefness of the physical format is paralleled by a conceptual succinctness. In most *sūtras* little consideration is given to issues not immediately related to the main topic. Since the use of examples is generally kept to a minimum, the reasoning follows clearly perceptible lines of thought. It is very rare for these to be interrupted by lengthy, picturesque or explanatory digressions.⁷² Despite this conciseness the *Ratnakūṭa* is by no means a particularly technical, or even philosophical collection.⁷³ The themes that are raised in the discourses explain typically basic Mahāyāna tenets, elucidated with much common sense and persuasively in brilliant dialogues.

71. Out of the total of forty-nine texts, thirteen *sūtras* belong to this category of short works. They are *Rkt* 10, 13, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 42, 43 and 44. A further sixteen *sūtras* are of moderate length, that is, they measure seventy-five folios or less. These are *Rkt* 4, 8, 9, 14, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 35, 41, 43, 46 and 48. The average length of the remaining twenty works is one hundred folios plus, with the notable exceptions of the *Bdp* (well over five hundred folios), *Pps* (three hundred and fifty folios) and *Tathā-gatācintyaguhyanirdeśa* (two hundred and thirty folios).

72. These appear above all in the *Rp* (pp. 34–59), *Upāyakaśālyaparivarta* (pp. 156.2.3 ff.), *Mañjuśrībuddha-kṣetraguṇavyūha* and *Bdp* (chapter vii, ix, xii).

73. Exceptions to this rule are those *Ratnakūṭa* works which cast their expositions in predominantly abstract, philosophical terms. Good examples are found in the *Acintyabuddhaviśayanirdeśa*, *Pitāputrasamāgama*, *Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā*, *Āyūṣmannandagarbhāvakraṇtinirdeśa*, *Bhadrapālaśreṣṭhiparipṛcchā*, *Raśmi-samantamuktanirdeśa* and *Suśhītamātidevaputraparipṛcchā*.

This leads us to another characteristic that is shared by practically all *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*, that is, the extensive use of swift-paced, sharp interlocution. Unlike the tendency to prolixity of later strands of Buddhist scriptures, in the *Ratnakūṭa* dialogue is employed with great effect throughout. First, by maintaining the focus of the question its dialogues avoid discursive, drawn-out monologues. Second, a frequent variation of the interlocutors ensures that the subject is looked at from various angles. Finally, perhaps accounting for the collection's popularity, the dialogues enliven the discourse and imbue it with a degree of wit and surprise. Controversial issues are not concealed behind long-winded descriptions, but brought to the fore and become subjected to unrelenting probing.

Another stylistic feature that is widely shared by *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* is the use of lists as a means of summarising the various facets of the *bodhisattvacaryā*. The most frequent configuration is that of tetrads, closely followed by lists of tens and fives. Some scholars have suggested that these lists might have influenced, or even led to, the compilation of the *sūtras* into one single collection in the first place.⁷⁴ While one cannot but acknowledge the conspicuous frequency with which these mnemonic-type lists recur throughout, I fail to see the rationale for such a motive.⁷⁵ These lists have no intrinsic value on their own except for explication. I find it difficult to accept that a structural expedient, however widespread and well-suited, should have prompted the amalgamation of forty-nine *sūtras*.⁷⁶ I suspect that the regular recurrence of these lists is little more than a consequence of their prevalent use in the early bodhisattva *sūtras*.⁷⁷ It seems quite natural that they should figure in a collection full of texts that place the bodhisattva ideal in the centre of their exposition.

The reasons that lie behind their original incorporation are straightforward and well-attested

74. Schuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 37–38 (also n. 88).

75. To my knowledge, amongst the bodhisattva works there are only three texts that dispose of them altogether, that is, *Rkt* 31, 32 and 35. The most frequent configuration is that of tetrads: *Rkt* 12 contains thirty-six tetrads, *Rkt* 17 thirty tetrads, *Rkt* 18 twelve tetrads, *Rkt* 19 ten tetrads, *Rkt* 21 forty-three tetrads, *Rkt* 30 eight tetrads, *Rkt* 33 six tetrads, *Rkt* 35 four tetrads, *Rkt* 43 twenty tetrads and *Rkt* 44 sixteen tetrads. Other popular lists are those of ten (particularly frequent in *Rkt* 12, 17, 19, 27, 35, 43, 44, 45 and 48) and those of thirty-two (see: *Rkt* 12, 27, 38, 43 and 45).

76. This proposition becomes even more questionable if we recall the kind of *sūtras* included in the *Ratnakūṭa*. While such solution is conceivable when it is a matter of relatively unimportant, miscellaneous texts, it is very much less so in a collection of works of the class of the *Kp*, *Amitābhavyūha* or *Ug*. Moreover, this explanation does not account for the inclusion of those *sūtras* that are entirely devoid of lists. None of the following ten works contains any lists: 5, 6, 11, 15, 20, 31, 35, 38, 39, 46. At least five of these contain well-known, important expositions that surely prompted the inclusion in their own right.

77. It will have been noted that virtually all *sūtras* in which such lists appear are works that concentrate in one way or another on the bodhisattva. Indeed, their occurrences are conspicuously infrequent amongst *sūtras* which do not deal with the bodhisattva. This suggests that the employment of series was largely restricted to elucidating the individual aspects of the *bodhisattvacaryā* and not, as it has been suggested, a structural feature common to all *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*.

in many early *suttas*.⁷⁸ On the one hand, tetrads were undoubtedly intended to facilitate memorisation. For a tradition that relied over many centuries on oral transmission, such structural device was both ingenious and indispensable for its survival. On the other hand, the adoption of enumerations had the effect of organising its tenets and gave the impression of completeness to its structures.

Somewhat surprisingly, this care for order is not always reflected in the overall design of the *sūtras*. More often than not, the sections making up the expositions display little thematic coherence. While in some *sūtras* this does not present much of a problem (either because the subject is well-known from other sources, or because the chain of reasoning is perfectly lucid and self-explanatory), there are several others where the lack of conceptual continuity undermines the intelligibility of the contents. Owing to interruptions in their lines of thought, these texts may appear thematically fragmented.

Finally, I wish to draw attention to some minor, although not altogether insignificant, literary characteristics typical of *Ratnakūṭa* works. First, presumably by reason of the prevalent dialogue-format, it is only in isolated cases that we come across extended narrative portions. Generally, narrations are kept short and occur only at places where their inclusion clarifies some enigmatic pronouncement.⁷⁹ This dispensation with embellishing components intensifies the impression of succinctness that is otherwise conveyed by the brevity and thematic conciseness of the *sūtras*.

Buddhist scholarship has shown that several of the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* underwent change in the course of their history.⁸⁰ Conclusive signs of such modifications are found, above all, in the *Kp* and *Ug*.⁸¹ Comparisons between the various Chinese translations of the *Kp* have

78. The best example of this type of list is probably found in the *Sīlavagga* of the *Dīghanikāya* (D, I, pp. 3–26) where they make up roughly half of the *Brahmajālasutta*. They occur also in a number of other early *suttas* in an almost identical form, which suggest that they probably go back to a common, pre-Buddhist source (M I.79; M I.76, 77; M II.3; *Mahāvagga* v, 8.3). Like the *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*, its lists address ethical concerns predominantly and give a broad outline of Buddhist conduct. As a matter of fact, many of the issues raised in the tetrads of the *Ratnakūṭa* have parallels in those early enumerations. That, in turn, invites the conclusion that the precepts of the bodhisattva, too, might have grown out of these ancient rules of conduct. However, it is difficult to establish a direct link between them, since most of these precepts are little more than general norms of behaviour not exclusive to Buddhists.

79. See, typically, *Rcā* (24, p. 248.1.3–249.5.8) where the Buddha illustrates the practices of the bodhisattva with the help of examples of his own conduct during previous lives. This pattern is a relatively common one and can be observed in a number of *Ratnakūṭa sūtras*. Other examples are contained in the *Rp* (pp. 34–58) and in the *Upāyakauśalyaparivarta* (24, pp. 156.2.3 ff).

80. Stael-Holstein, 1926, pp. x–xii; Weller, 1965, pp. 8–11; Schuster, *op.cit.*, pp. 79–83; Régamey, pp. ix–x; Python, 1975, p. 5, § 5; Finot, 1901, p. vi.

81. Other texts that contain some indication that their contents might have been subject to revision are the *Bhadra-vy* and *Rp*. In contrast to the *Kp* and *Ug*, however, here the case is less clear-cut and rests largely on conjecture. For a brief evaluation, see: Régamey, 1938, p. 9; Ensink, 1952, p. x–xi.

revealed that a portion roughly equivalent to a tenth of its total length has been interpolated at the end of the work. This insertion grew over the centuries and found its way eventually into the ninth-century Tibetan translation.⁸² The same methodological principles have also disclosed the composite, evolving nature of the *Ug*.⁸³

82. For an analysis of the nature, extent and development of interpolations in the *Kp*, see: Weller, *op. cit.*, pp. 9–10; Stael-Holstein, *op. cit.*, pp. x–xiii.

83. An evaluation of the various kinds of bodhisattvas that are described in the *Ug* is given in: Schuster, *op. cit.*, pp. 325, 328 (cf. pp. 184–194, 214–223). On the basis of his seventh-century Sanskrit manuscripts, Bodhiruci seemingly felt the need to retranslate both the *Kp* and *Ug*. Thus, it is only the later versions of these texts that are currently included in the *Ratnakūṭa* collection. This is true of great many *Ratnakūṭa* *sūtras*. The details of their translations are given in Appendix iii.

Conclusion

If we take now a step back from the detail of the preceding analysis and evaluate the information we have so far extricated, two conclusions come to the fore. First, it emerges that amongst the forty-nine *Ratnakūṭa sūtras* there is not a single text that gives a complete account of the bodhisattva career. On the contrary, we have several texts that limit their expositions specifically to a few selected aspects.

The reasons that led to a specific choice of topic vary of course. In some cases, the subject no doubt reflects the doctrino-historical circumstances that prevailed at the time of composition. In others, the selection was probably the outcome of careful reflection in response to acutely felt omissions, new inspiration or reinterpretation. In others again, a particular preference might have been prompted by recurring misinterpretation or misdemeanour. Whatever the reasons for the various styles, topics and organisational features, their diversity makes it quite plain that the texts drew on a multiplicity of backgrounds and motives for inspiration.

This leads us to the second conclusion. Amongst the twenty-three *sūtras* under consideration, there are not even two works that concur exactly in their approach to the bodhisattva ideal. In practically every *sūtra*, the focal-point rests on a different assumption or exemplifies some specific point of view. Moreover, the texts differ not only in thought and structure, but frequently display methodological dissimilarities also.

We have noted further a large degree of coordination and complementarity between the individual *sūtras*. Indeed, there is not a single, major issue that is dealt with twice. Repetitions occur only in minor instances, or at occasions rendered inevitable by the context. Needless to say, this coordination is not the merit of the texts themselves, but attributable to the learning and skill of the person(s) who brought them together in the *Ratnakūṭa*. The outcome of their endeavours has been of great success, providing a well-balanced, comprehensive account of the bodhisattva that covers virtually every key idea of his career.

It has been argued in the past that this complementarity is coincidental and a mere by-product of an arbitrarily executed textual selection. While it is difficult (if not impossible) to establish that this was not the case, I doubt that a random assortment of this size could possibly yield such perfectly consistent patterns of thought. Even less, if we recall the proclivity to repetition

and assimilation (in both content and approach) that is a feature of Mahāyāna *sūtras* in general. A haphazardly compiled collection would undoubtedly have inherited this propensity for reduplication. Furthermore, echoing local or sectarian preferences, its contents would almost certainly tilt in favour of some prevalent textual tradition. There are no indications pointing to the predominance of any one specific tradition amongst *Ratnakūṭa* works.

But let us return to the objection that it is precisely because the *sūtras* do not exhibit an all-embracing conceptual framework that they cannot have been assembled to a premeditated plan. While it is true that there are several areas of thought that stand in isolation, rather than stressing the connections that do not exist (and I admit there are some), I propose to look at the issues linking the individual texts. Of these, the most conspicuous is the constantly recurring reference to the bodhisattva ideal. The other, most noticeable, connecting element is a close affinity in literary style. With a few exceptions, practically all forty-nine texts are written in a very factual, perspicuous and concise idiom that forgoes the stylistic niceties of long-winded embellishments.

One should also bear in mind that what is apparent to us today might not have been so in the middle of the first millennium AD (and *vice versa*). It is entirely conceivable that the compilers might have sought to implement a scheme whose logic is no longer perceptible by us. It would be a mistake to conclude that because we fail to discern any intent behind its present structures no such objective ever existed.

Finally, one is surely ill-advised to proceed from the assumption that its compilers had access to the whole range of Mahāyāna scriptures as we know it today. The wide dissemination of Mahāyāna thought renders it improbable that, even if the collection had been assembled at a time when all currently known Mahāyāna *sūtras* were already extant, its compilers could have been aware of all of them. From their point of view the collection might have been fully comprehensive though today we know that this may not be the case.

Whichever its omissions with regard to Mahāyāna doctrines in general, we have seen that the *Ratnakūṭa*'s treatment of the bodhisattva ideal is all-inclusive and considers every relevant career-aspect. What is more, the general picture emerging of the bodhisattva is extremely well-balanced. The scale of this systematisation suggests that calculated efforts were at work at least during those phases when the bodhisattva works were being put together. It is too early to say if such a plan existed for the other topics, although it is difficult to see why it

should have been specific to the bodhisattva.

In chapter one, I proposed that the *Ratnakūṭa* might have been compiled for missionary purposes. This view appears corroborated by the predominantly non-technical nature of its bodhisattva *sūtras*. Clearly, more than anything else it is the initial appeal of a text that determines its success in persuading listeners of the logic of its propositions. For new thought to gain acceptance it is necessary to use simplicity in reasoning and an inspiring tone. We have seen that in the *Ratnakūṭa* these two qualities are widely shared by its bodhisattva works.

The role assigned to the *Bdp* in this missionary process rested on two of its features. First, it was highly esteemed for the detail in which it describes the training of the bodhisattva. Above all, its exposition was commended for the treatment of the six perfections. Cross-references in the collection itself suggest that, at least as far as the *pāramitā* are concerned, the *Bdp* was thought to be at the very heart of the *Ratnakūṭa*'s vision of the bodhisattva.

The *Bdp* also contributed to the missionary efforts by furnishing the collection with the hugely popular *jātaka*-genre. To the present day, iconographic depictions and wall-paintings across Asia bear witness of the repute and affection in which the accounts of Śākyamuni's former lives were held. In the *Bdp*, these were taken up and coupled with the training of the bodhisattva. The outcome was twofold. On the one hand, the *jātaka* served to authenticate the practices themselves. On the other hand, their role was to inspire faith in the image of the bodhisattva. They not only made the scope of the new ideal clear, but more importantly for the conversion of other peoples, they provided the urgently required proof that its sublime accomplishments were attainable. Since the *Bdp* is the only major *Ratnakūṭa* text combining the bodhisattva ideal with the former exploits of Śākyamuni, it must have enjoyed great popularity amongst the newly converted peoples of Asia.

Chapter Four

The Bodhisattva Doctrines and Practices in the Bodhisattvapitaka within the Context of other Scriptural Traditions

Our discussion of the *Bdp*'s structure in chapter two has shown that large parts of its exposition are dedicated to the six perfections (*pāramitā*). This fact has given great acclaim to the *Bdp* and developed into something of a hallmark by which it came to be widely known. In addition to the *pāramitā*, two other sets of practice are singled out and granted special status in the *Bdp*, that is, the immeasurables (*apramāṇa*) and the means of conversion (*saṃgrahavastu*). Taken together, these three sets of practice constitute the skeleton of the *bodhisattvacaryā* in the *Bdp*.

The description of the path is not limited to these cardinal areas of instruction, but encompasses a number of other well-known practices. However, these are rather subordinate in rank and are incorporated in the discussion of the *pāramitā*. Prominent examples include the super-knowledge (*abhijñā*), learning (*śruta*), 'skill' (*kauśalya*), unique knowledge (*pratisaṃvid*), reliance (*pratisaraṇa*), accumulation of merit (*puṇyasambhāra*) and pristine cognition (*jñānasambhāra*), thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (*bodhipāṅśika dharma*), perfect mental quietude (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*).

In addition to these well established groups, we meet with a number of precepts that are discussed individually.¹ The majority of these is found in chapter eleven where they are introduced in a list of seventy-two types of learning and involve such practices as penetration (*praveśa*), good conduct (*pratipatti*), application (*prayoga*) vision (*darśana*), reflection (*manasakāra*), reverence (*pradakṣiṇa*) and attentiveness (*avikṣepa*).² Although they are classed together under the heading of learning at the beginning of chapter eleven, the exposition of these practices in the text itself does not follow the order or organisation of their introductory listing.

1. In my discussion of the bodhisattva practices, I shall consider only those practices that are known to promote and hence precede the attainment of buddhahood. By this criterion, the attributes, practices and powers of the Tathāgata fall outside my investigation. The contents of chapter four which deals exclusively with the buddha-qualities—most notably the powers (*bala*), assurances (*vaiśāradya*), wonder-working powers (*rddhi*), liberations (*vimokṣa*), great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) and exclusive buddha-dharma (*āveṇika-dharma*)—has therefore been excluded.
2. I have provided a list of these practices in Appendix i.

The Thought of Enlightenment

The first reference to the bodhisattva in the *Bdp* occurs in chapter three. Chapters one and chapter two are introductory to the whole exposition and do not consider the training of the bodhisattva. In chapter three, entitled 'On the Thought of Enlightenment', Śāriputra raises the topic of the bodhisattva ideal by asking the following question:³

"By what means do [bodhisattvas] enter into enlightenment?

What is the goal of these heroes?

How do they accomplish excellent enlightenment?

Please explain these distinguished teachings.

How do the heroes act

In order to [dispense] medicine to all living beings?

Through the production of what kind of *dharma*

Do they become buddhas, the most excellent of men?

How do [bodhisattvas] convert sinners

After they dwelled on the seat of enlightenment?

How do they attain supreme and perfect enlightenment

After they traversed ten million buddha-fields?"

In response to this question, the Buddha speaks of the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicitta*) and says:⁴

"O Śāriputra, when a bodhisattva is in possession of a certain single *dharma*, he takes hold of buddha-qualities and other immeasurable [qualities]. Which is this single *dharma*? It is the thought of enlightenment of excellent intent. O Śāriputra, when he is in possession of just that single bodhisattva *dharma*, he shall grasp the

3. R, folio 81.4-7.

4. R, folio 81.3-5.

buddha-qualities and other immeasurable [qualities].”

In the ensuing discussion, the Buddha considers the thought of enlightenment from several points of view. First, he examines its nature and attributes. Particular attention is given to the bodhisattva’s intent (*āśaya*). In the *Bdp*, intent is primarily described as a stabilising factor that assists the generation of the *bodhicitta*.⁵ As an ethical concomitant to the *bodhicitta*, *āśaya* is rooted in conventional experience and arises from compassion. Intellectually, it operates in the cognitive realm specifically with regard to the vision of true reality. Eventually, these interacting currents are drawn together to result in the unfolding of ‘pure intent’.

The other important concomitant to *cittotpāda* is determination (*adhyāśaya*). However, owing to their conceptual proximity, differences between *āśaya* and *adhyāśaya* tend to blur. Some clarification is provided by the description of *adhyāśaya* in the *Bbh*. Here, *adhyāśaya* is characterised as persistence, understanding and resolve—preceded by faith and insight in the Dharma—towards the buddha-qualities.⁶ It is therefore primarily concerned with the bodhisattva’s own spiritual progress.⁷ *Āśaya*, in contrast, designates a broader principle and is more intimately connected with the *cittotpāda*, since its main purpose is to achieve rapid progress in the implementation of the vow. According to the *Bbh*, it is divided into the subcategories of seven virtuous intentions for sentient beings (*kalyāṇāśaya*) and ten pure intentions (*āśayaśuddhi*).⁸ Above all, however, we find that *āśaya* promotes the practice of the six perfections to which it lends impulses of six different kinds.⁹

Intent and determination are often complemented by correct conduct (*prayoga*) as the third major factor influencing the progressive implementation of the bodhisattva’s resolve.¹⁰ In the *Msl*, we read to this effect:¹¹

The first production of the thought of enlightenment of the bodhisattva is likened to earth because it is the basis from which all buddha-qualities and related accumulations spring. Accompanied by intent (*āśaya*), the production of the thought of enlightenment resembles fine gold because his intent towards the welfare and

5. *Msl*, p. 14.5–9.

6. *Bbh*, pp. 313.4–314.8.

7. *Bbh* p. 18.17 (cf. *Mvś*, p. 85.1; Yamaguichi, 1934).

8. *Bbh* pp. 312.5–313.3, 333.4–16.

9. *Msl*, p. 102.13; *Mvg*, pp. 188 ff.

10. Cf. Kawamura, 1983, p. 141.

11. *Msl*, pp. 14.27–15.6.

benefit [of beings] is not susceptible to change. Accompanied by correct conduct (*prayoga*), it resembles the new moon on the fifteenth day of the month because his virtuous qualities (*kuśaladhama*) increase. Accompanied by determination (*adhyāśaya*), it resembles fire because he acquires more and more attainments like a fire that consumes all types of fuel.”

In the *Sūtrālamkāravṛttibhāṣya*¹², these categories of *cittotpāda* signals four junctions in the bodhisattva's career and are linked with the attainments of each level.¹³ Thus, the first type of *cittotpāda* is associated with adherence (*ādhimokṣika*) operating during the preliminary phase of training (*adhimukticaryābhūmi*).¹⁴ The second *cittotpāda* is dominated by pure determination (*śuddhādhyāśaya*) and leads to progress on the first seven stages. It is called pure because it is free from the subject/object dichotomy and because it is attained through equipoise (*upekṣā*). The third type of *cittotpāda* is characterised by its ability to accomplish the maturation (*vaipākika*) of sentient beings, because at this level (stage nine and ten) non-discriminating awareness (*avikalpajñāna*) arises in conjunction with the spontaneous practice of the *pāramitā*. Finally, the fourth kind of *cittotpāda*, operating at the tenth stage, is called obstruction-free (*anāvaraṇika*) since it is untainted by misconceived emotion and discursive thinking.¹⁵

The above exposition of the *cittotpāda* is clearly advanced and draws on a rich heritage of ideas. An early predecessor to this scheme is found in the *Bdp*. Like the *Sūtrālamkāravṛttibhāṣya*, it distinguishes several phases in the generation of the thought of enlightenment and proposes a certain dynamic. In all, the *Bdp* speaks of ten forms of *cittotpāda*. However, their allocation

12. TTP, 108, p. 233.2.6–3.7.

13. *Msl*, pp. 16.5–17.9.

14. The relevant passage in the *Msl* (p. 14.5–6) runs as follows:

“That mind directed towards enlightenment is zealous application (*ādhimokṣika*); it is pure in determination (*adhyāśaya*) on another [stage]. It is thought of as a matured state, and likewise, freed from obstruction.”

15. The division of the *cittotpāda* is most elaborate in the *Abhisamayālamkāra* (pp. 18–37) where it is divided into twenty-two kinds of *cittotpāda*. In agreement with the *Msl*, the first three are said to be accompanied by *chanda*, *āśaya* and *adhyāśaya* marking three successive stages during the *ādikarmikasambhārabhūmi*. In disagreement with the *Msl*, the fourth *cittotpāda* is attended by *prayoga*. It operates on the *adhimukticaryābhūmi* corresponding to the *prayogamārga*. Next follow ten kinds of *cittotpāda* each of which is associated with one of the ten perfections. The following five *cittotpāda* are accompanied by the *abhiññā*, *puṇya/jñānasambhāra*, *bodhipāṅśika dharma*, *śamatha/vipaśyanā* and *dhāraṇīpratibhāna* that, taken together, account for the *viśeṣamārga* of the last five stages (*Kośa*, vi, p. 278). *Cittotpāda* number twenty is attended by the four *dharmoddāna* and becomes functional on the preparatory path of the *buddhabhūmi*. Finally, the last two *cittotpāda* are generated in two distinct phases of the *buddhabhūmi* where they are accompanied by the *ekayānamārga* and the *dharmakāya*.

to specific path phases it rather vague and bears little resemblance to the ten stages of the *Dbh*.¹⁶ Curiously, the ten *cittotpāda* are not included in chapter three but occur in the *śīlapāramitā* chapter.

According to this scheme, the first two *cittotpāda* are most fundamental in that they bring about understanding of impermanence, impurity and insubstantiality of the body and carry as reward—if sustained by Tathāgata worship—the attainment of the perfect buddha-body.¹⁷ The third and fourth kinds of *cittotpāda* concern mistaken conduct of the past, in particular lack of reverence towards superiors and ill-contemplated pursuit of sense pleasures. Awareness and correction of these faults lead to rebirth among men and place the bodhisattva in contact with virtuous friends.¹⁸ As a collateral, the fifth *cittotpāda* bestows insight into one's past conceit and violence, makes the bodhisattva understand the workings of the law of karma and removes confusion that led previously to evil conduct. Through possessing these five kinds of *cittotpāda*, the bodhisattva becomes fearless, attains means (*upāya*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) and increases his meritorious deeds.¹⁹ Having understood the causal link between ignorance, irreverent comportment and ill-regard for the Dharma, the bodhisattva generates the sixth, seventh and eighth *cittotpāda* that render him inseparable from religious instruction. He is accomplished in learning, benevolence, buddha-worship and dwells in the company of the noble ones, abiding in high abodes.²⁰

Through the ninth *cittotpāda* the bodhisattva perceives that aimlessness used to mar his conduct. It calls to mind the need for constant mental concentration on enlightenment and unreserved devotion of all resources to its attainment. Furthermore, the ninth *cittotpāda* gives a clear picture of the bodhisattva's resolute wandering and cites numerous practices that pertain to it. These include faith, honesty, solitude, reverence, modesty, chastity as well as pursuit of the *pāramitā* and *bodhipākṣika dharma*. At this stage, being rewarded for insight into past mistakes, the bodhisattva becomes familiar with the perfections (which he now pursues with great vigour) and, supported by pristine cognition and merit, prepares to take up the seat of enlightenment.²¹

16. Note that also the *Madhyamakāvatāra* (*Mavbh*, pp. 12.13–13.1) and *Daśabhūmika* speak of ten *cittotpāda*. Apart from the number and a certain dynamic towards the more advanced path-stages, the *Bdp* does not seem to share much with these schemes. This is not surprising, if we recall that the *Bdp* ignores the plan of the ten stages while it is the rationale behind the ten *cittotpāda* in the *Daśabhūmika* and *Madhyamakāvatāra*.

17. R, folio 309.5.

18. R, folio 314.2.

19. R, folio 320.6; 324.5–325.3.

20. R, folio 238.4–329.1.

21. R, folio 336.6.

Finally, the bodhisattva fully grasps the eminence of his teacher and appreciates his erudition in faith, moral conduct, learning, modesty, chastity, renunciation and wisdom. This prompts him to express approval of the teacher's thinking and to pay lip-service to all instructions. He is now himself accomplished in moral conduct and becomes a receptacle of buddha-compassion.²²

In the discussion of the *cittotpāda* in chapter three, we find no allusions to the existence of this sketch in the *śīlapāramitā* chapter. Its characterisation of the thought of enlightenment is kept general and sheds light on only two areas. First, it describes the attributes that differentiate the *cittotpāda* from ordinary mentation. By and large, these attributes correspond to those of the bodhisattva's intent. That is to say, it is pure, steady, persistent, luminous and so forth. Then, also in analogy to intent, it is portrayed as the foundation of buddha-qualities, including the fivefold *dharma*-aggregate (*dharmaskandha*), powers, assurances and *āveṇika dharma*.²³

In the next passage we learn about the fruits that result from the *cittotpāda* and *āśaya*. The presentation is very straightforward and consists essentially of an enumeration of the benefits that accrue from the *cittotpāda* and *āśaya*. Already at this early stage the bodhisattva is destined for enlightenment and attains a physical appearance beyond blemish; he is invincible, not affected by worldly *dharma*, skilled in the path and becomes a benefactor, guide and refuge to all sentient beings.²⁴ In particular, he attains clear vision (*vidarśana*) that establishes faith in the law of karma and causes him to refrain from the ten non-virtuous paths of action (*akuśalakarmapatha*).²⁵ If he receives early support from spiritual friends, he comprehends dependent co-origination, culminating in true *dharma* vision.²⁶

Considerable emphasis is given to the notion of renunciation, in general, and the need to become a monk, in particular. Ordination into mendicant life is considered a natural imperative as it provides the framework to a successful completion of the practice.²⁷

Three factors that are to recur throughout the exposition of the training figure as concomitants to the *cittotpāda*. These are learning (*śruta*), conscientiousness (*apramāda*) and correct reflection (*yoniso manasakāra*).²⁸ Their areas of application are briefly dwelt on, viz., knowledge of teachings for learning, constraint of senses for conscientiousness and insight

22. R, folio 340.4–6.

23. R, folio 85.1–4.

24. R, folio 85.4–86.4.

25. R, folio 87.1–3.

26. R, folio 88.4–91.3.

27. R, folio 92.1–3.

28. R, folio 92.5–96.4.

into causation and the non-existence of *dharma* for correct reflection. These allow the bodhisattva to penetrate the four axioms of the teaching (*dharmoddāna*), proposing that karmic formations (*saṃskāra*) are impermanent and suffering; that *dharma* are non-self and calm *nirvāṇa*.²⁹ Appreciation of these postulates prompts the bodhisattva to comprehend impermanence; to eliminate all traces of desire; to produce the entrance to liberation and meditation on emptiness and to become acquainted with the notion of signlessness.

If we turn now to evaluate the *Bdp*'s vision of the *cittotpāda* and compare it with the schemes found in other sources, we note at first a general consent on its chief elements. The *Bdp* agrees that the two most important components of the *bodhicittotpāda* are an unshakable desire for enlightenment (*saṃbodhikāmanāsahagata*) and a paramount concern for the welfare of all other beings (*parārthālambana*).³⁰ By implication, it also recognises two separate phases of its production, that is the actual taking of the vow (*bodhipraṇidhicitta*) and the ensuing implementation (*bodhiprasthānacitta*).

Many Mahāyāna *sūtras* argue that the *bodhicittotpāda* is not a static entity generated only once at the beginning of the path proper but that it is continuously retaken and evolves through practice. In the *Akn*, for instance, it is generated in conjunction with the accumulation of merit and pristine cognition, six perfections and four immeasurables which determine the attainments that result from its generation.³¹ This is also the view of the *Bdp* since it proposes at several places a close association between the *cittotpāda* and *pāramitā* and other practices.³²

Differences occur only when we look in detail at the psychological processes that prompt and accompany the generation of the thought of enlightenment. I shall now turn to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in order to explore the nature of some of these differences.

In line with its overall organisation, the *Bbh* introduces the first raising of the *bodhicitta* as the second support (*ādhāra*) of the training. The treatment is divided into two sections. To begin with, the text lays down the attributes and modes of the *cittotpāda*. It suggests five different approaches of investigation. First, there is a perfect resolution (*samyakpraṇidhāna*) that is upheld throughout the training and generates the aspiration (*prārthanā*) for universal liberation.³³ This aspiration itself represents the *cittotpāda* proper.³⁴ Next, the *Bbh* defines

29. R, folio 96.5–97.5.

30. E.g., *Akn*, pp. 39.5.4–40.2.5; *Bbh*, p. 12.6–13.

31. *Akn*, pp. 39.5.7–40.1.4.

32. R, folio 84.7–85.3.

33. *Bbh*, p. 12.3.

the scope and object (*ālambana*) of the *bodhicitta*, namely, enlightenment for himself and deliverance of his fellow beings. As an auspicious force in its own right, the *cittotpāda* accumulates (*saṃcaya*) all those roots of virtue occasioning enlightenment and weakening the three root evils in beings. Besides, it is seen as the root of enlightenment, source of the bodhisattva's compassion and foundation (*saṃniśraya*) of moral conduct.

The conditions (*pratyaya*), causes (*hetu*) and powers (*bala*) that bring about the engendering of the thought of enlightenment are as follows.³⁵ As for the conditions, the *Bbh* gives learning about the Tathāgata's miraculous powers, hearing the Doctrine and observance of the imminent decline of the Dharma.³⁶ Each of these factors suffices to inspire the generation of the *bodhicitta*. The causes that prompt the *cittotpāda* are of a more personal and immediate nature.³⁷ They include the cause of lineage (*gotra*) that leads inevitably to *cittotpāda* due to previous achievements, the presence of virtuous friends (*kalyāṇamitra*), compassion, knowledge, meditation, investigation and great enthusiasm for enlightenment.³⁸ The powers that inspire the *cittotpāda* generally depend on the bodhisattva's own capabilities. In particular, they are brought about by the roots of virtue accumulated during previous rebirth or meritorious conduct in the present life.³⁹

Having generated the *bodhicitta*, the bodhisattva becomes immediately a field of merit that others can draw on through reverence and devotion.⁴⁰ Thus, the raising of the thought of enlightenment launches him automatically onto the path and creates a valuable source of merit. Moreover, it increases the bodhisattva's resources derived from his *gotra*, guarantees success with magic spells (*mantrapadāni*) and bestows experience in dealing with the lower

34. *Bbh*, p. 12.9.

35. In the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 15.1–6), we learn that the production of the thought of enlightenment is inspired by the fourth of ten vows taken by the bodhisattva while he dwells on the early phase of the *pramuditābhūmi*: "In order to attain the *bodhicittotpāda*, supported by the true instruction of the path of the stages that incorporates the entire *bodhisattvacaryā* ... he takes the fourth vow (*praṇidhāna*)."

The *Msg*, distinguishes three motives prompting the generation of the thought of enlightenment (iii.5). These are (1) recognition that innumerable beings reach enlightenment every moment, (2) the wish to attain the intent (*āśaya*) to practice generosity and related virtues in order to attain enlightenment; (3) desire for universal perfection arising from unlimited moral conduct.

36. *Bbh*, pp. 13.21–15.17.

37. Compare these with the causes that are given in the *Msl* (p. 14.10–15) which speaks of compassion as the root (*mūla*); the welfare of beings as intent (*āśaya*); zealous application (*ādhimokṣika*) as practice; questions relating to knowledge as object (*ālambana*); confident zeal (*chanda*) as vehicle; moral observance as basis (*pratiṣṭhā*); encouragement and approval of giving to adversaries as obstacle; faith in virtue as advantage (*anuśaṃsa*) since it accumulates merit and knowledge; constant application to the perfections as deliverance (*niryāṇa*).

38. *Bbh*, p. 15.11–17.

39. *Bbh*, p. 17.8–21.

40. *Bbh*, pp. 19.19–20.27.

destinies.⁴¹

If we now revert to the *Bdp*'s *cittotpāda* exposition and compare its vision with that of the *Bbh*, the first thing to notice is the limited scope of the *Bdp*'s explanations and its basic logical structures. In the *Bdp* we meet with repetitions and a fair amount of inessential material. Structurally, although not entirely without its own internal logic, the *Bdp*'s account therefore lacks the organisation of the *Bbh*'s description.

In content, however, the two works do not stand as much apart as it might seem at first sight. They share the two fundamental elements of the *cittotpāda*, that is, the personal aim of full enlightenment and the aspiration of universal liberation. Furthermore, the two texts agree that the *cittotpāda* functions as the root of compassion and provides the foundation of moral conduct. While this point is not illustrated in the *Bbh*, the *Bdp* refers to the ten virtuous deeds (*kuśalakarmapatha*).⁴² Both works also concur in their evaluation of the impact of the *cittotpāda* by making tathāgatahood the secured long-term achievement.⁴³

Differences arise only when we turn to the conditions that induce the *cittotpāda*. The *Bdp* does not cite any of the factors that are given in the *Bbh* as *cittotpāda* causes. Association to virtuous friends and learning, for instance, are given amongst its concomitants, but not explicitly as causes.⁴⁴ Other factors, such as fearlessness, lineage (*gotra*) or awareness of the decline of the Dharma do not figure at all in the *Bdp*, whereas learning of the buddha-qualities is mentioned as a motive.

With regard to the advantages that accrue from a successful *cittotpāda*, the *Bdp* and *Bbh* run very close in spirit. According to the *Bbh* the bodhisattva produces at first the gates (*dvāra*) that lead to virtuous practice that turns him into a supreme field of merit.⁴⁵ In the

41. According to the *Dbh*, the bodhisattva immediately upon generating the thought of enlightenment achieves ten rewards. (1) He surpasses the stage of ordinary men; (2) he embarks on the fixed career (*niyāma*) of the bodhisattva; (3) he is born in the Tathāgata family; (4) he becomes faultless in all kinds of speech; (5) he abandons all worldly conduct; (6) he enters into supramundane conduct; (7) he dwells in the ultimate essence of bodhisattva practices; (8) he is settled in the bodhisattva-abode; (9) he reaches the equality of the three times; (10) he becomes fixed in the Tathāgata lineage certain of perfect enlightenment (*Daśa-bh*, pp. 11–12, U).

In the *Madhyamakavṛtti* (xviii, 5), quoting the *Maitreyavimokṣa*, we are told that:

“Just as the son of a king almost immediately after his birth—being in possession of the royal characteristics—surpasses by the greatness of this lineage (*gotra*) all officers, even the most senior ones; in the same way, the bodhisattva almost immediately on generating the first thought of enlightenment—being born in the royal family of the Tathāgata—surpasses even the most senior śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas by virtue of the power of his *bodhicitta* and compassion.”

42. R, folio 87.1–5.

43. R, folio 85.2.

44. R, folio 88.2; 88.4; 89.4–90.1.

45. *Bbh*, p. 19.3–17.

Bdp a major point is the bodhisattva's permanent escape from the grasp of Māra and the ensuing immunity from worldly *dharma*.⁴⁶

The most interesting difference lies in the role they ascribe to intent (*āśaya*). We have seen that in the *Bbh* (and *Msl*) *āśaya* figures alongside *adhyāśaya* and *prayoga* as the most important concomitant of *cittotpāda*. Thus it comes as a surprise to learn that neither *adhyāśaya* nor *prayoga* are present in the *Bdp*'s treatment of the *cittotpāda*. What is more, *āśaya* is not portrayed as an 'independent' principle supportive of the *cittotpāda*, but as an attribute of the latter. No doubt, these differences are important and probably ascribable to the different dates of composition of the *Bdp* and *Bbh*. The treatment of the *cittotpāda* in the *Bbh* is clearly doctrinally more advanced and includes several issues that are not considered in the *Bdp*. In essence, however, their evaluations of the scope and function of the *cittotpāda* agree and are founded on similar assumptions about its role in the bodhisattva training.

46. R, folio 85.4–86.2.

The Four Immeasurables

Having introduced the spiritual foundation of the bodhisattva ideal, the *Bdp* spells out the buddha-qualities. This is done in chapter four. The reasons for dealing here with the buddha-qualities I have discussed in chapter three. I excluded them from my investigation, since they do belong to the bodhisattva practice proper.

The first bodhisattva practices that are expounded in the *Bdp* are the four 'immeasurables' (*apramāṇa*).⁴⁷ These include benevolence (*maitrī*), compassion (*karuṇā*), sympathetic joy (*muditā*) and equipoise (*upekṣā*). While the sequence in which these are discussed corresponds to the standard order of their presentation, their interpretation displays several divergences from other treatises on the *apramāṇa*.⁴⁸

For the historical Buddha the practice of the *appamañña* was always twofold. First, its four members—benevolence towards sentient beings, compassion with their suffering, sympathetic

47. Alternative titles for this group of practices are *brahmavihāra* (residences of Brahmā)—a term that is particularly widespread in early canonical literature—and *cetovimukti* (thought liberation). In Pāli sources, we can distinguish two principal conceptual contexts for the *brahmavihāra*. First, there is the famous *sutta* where the Buddha is shown instructing Doṇa on the various types of brahmins (A III, pp. 224–5). Here, among a long list of qualities, the Buddha cites the four instructions as practices that assist in making a brahmin equal to Brahmā. The Buddha goes on to say that a brahmin who pursues the four 'ways of living like Brahmā' (*brahmavihāra*) attains rebirth in the charming world of Brahmā. Elsewhere, Brahmā himself is described as possessing universal benevolence (M I, pp. 370–1)—a subject that was taken up by the commentators (*Manorathapūraṇī* ii, p. 204)—showing that if an individual developed Brahmā's virtues, he himself could attain the status of Brahmā after death. As the 'ways of living like Brahmā' refer to the cultivation of *maitrī*, etc., in a meditative context (D I, pp. 250–1; *Vism*, iii.30; Aronson, 1975, pp. 81–83)—usually at the level of the first *dhyāna*—the commentaries take them to represent absorptions or states of mind that spring from the cultivation of benevolence, etc., (*Ps*, ii, p. 353). We have therefore two principal ways of translating the term *brahmavihāra*. First, if interpreted as 'way of living like Brahmā' it refers to an individual who cultivates universal benevolence just as Brahmā does. Second, if looked at from a meditative context, *brahmavihāra* is best understood as 'sublime way of living' modelled on the fourfold instructions of the *Teviggasutta*. The latter interpretation is favoured by Buddhaghosa, although he acknowledges both possibilities (*Vism*, ix.106). For a full treatment of these variants in interpretation, particularly with regard to the Theravāda commentarial tradition, see Aronson, 1975, pp. 96–110.

48. To my knowledge, the only comprehensive study of the four immeasurables to date is that by H.B. Aronson, entitled: *Love, Compassion, Sympathetic Joy and Equanimity in Theravāda Buddhism*; PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1975. In addition, drawing on the findings of his doctoral research, Aronson published several articles and one monograph on this subject (see: bibliography). References to the *apramāṇa* (*brahmavihāra*) in Buddhist sources are numerous. In the nikāya, useful material is found in D II, p. 196; III, p. 220; *Th*, i.649; *Jātaka* i, p. 139; II, p. 61. For a Theravāda interpretation, see: *Vism*, i, pp. 111, 295; *As*, p. 192. For Sanskrit sources, see: *Kośa*, viii, pp. 196–203; *Saddhp*, p. 142; *Dhsgr*, § 16; *Kp*, p. 15, § 25.25; *Msl*, pp. 121.10–124.2, 163.13–172.20, 184.3–8; *Bbh*, pp. 241–49. Other references are found at *Amṛt* (B), pp. 188–9; *Abhidh-d*, p. 428; *Msg*, x.10, pp. 290–91; *Akn*, 34, pp. 56.3.7–58.5.6; *Pañca*, pp. 181–183, *Vkn*, pp. 96, 155. For further references in Chinese (translations of) Buddhist texts, see: Lamotte, 1973, p. 52*.

joy with their happiness and equipoise towards sensual attachment and hostility—played a role in placing the practitioner in the heavenly abodes. Second, finding their way into the gnoseologic scheme of the Buddhist path, the *appamañña* assumed importance in the meditative processes that culminate in liberating insight—the pinnacle of Buddhist cognition.⁴⁹

In a well-known passage from the *Aṭṭhakasutta*, the *appamañña* are cited as one of eleven practices that liberate the mind, eliminate all hindrances and prompt freedom from bondage.⁵⁰ In essence, they are seen as an integral part of those meditations that secure a high rebirth and further progress on the path to liberation up to the stage of the non-returner. According to the *Aṅguttaranikāya*⁵¹, if accompanied by insight in the particular and general features (*svasāmānyalakkaṇa*) of aggregates, they lead to the realisation of the first three paths and fruits, while for those who are established in insight and pursue equipoise at the level of the fourth absorption attain rebirth in the Śuddhāvāsa heaven.⁵²

The mental processes leading to the generation of insight in conjunction with the *appamañña* are laid down in the *Vatthūpamasutta*.⁵³ Here, the Buddha describes how a monk on realising the defiled nature of greed, conceit, hostility and so forth attains a steadfast conviction in the *triratna* and—by means of cultivating the *appamañña*—acquires true cognition. Buddhaghosa explains that the main advantages of their cultivation, as a basis supporting insight during meditation is that they free the mind from defilements through suppression.⁵⁴ As the resulting

49. Despite some excellent research in this field, the exact origin of the four immeasurables has not yet been resolved. Back in 1928, C. A. F. Rhys Davids pioneered the view that they might not be the brainchild of the Buddha but that he adopted them from some other teacher. One of the central arguments to this hypothesis has always been a passage in the *Samyuttanikāya* (S V, pp. 115–21) where a group of non-Buddhist *śramaṇa* let it be known that they too cultivate a practice involving benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy and equipoise and wish to learn in how far theirs differs from the Buddha's. Supporting evidence in non or pre-Buddhist sources is rather thin and limited to several passages in the *Upaniṣad* (*Chānd.* 815.1). Buddhist scriptures themselves (D II, pp. 220–252) preserve an account where the Buddha, during previous lives, receives instructions in the absorption of compassion from the *Brāhmaṇa* tradition. A similar point is made in the *Mahāśudassanasutta* (D II, pp. 186–7) where we learn that, as a bodhisattva, he practised benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy and equipoise. Today it is virtually impossible to determine whether the accounts of the Buddha's previous conduct are accurate depictions of his pre-enlightenment training or whether they simply superimposed post-enlightenment practices on his early struggle to buddhahood. What appears certain, however, is that in the discourses they were not considered unique to the Buddha's vision but practised also in early non-Buddhist circles (Arsonson, 1984, p. 21).

50. M I, pp. 349–51.

51. Cited in *Manorathapūraṇī*, iii, p. 126.

52. A similar, though not identical scheme is proposed in the *Haliddavasanasutta* (S V pp. 119–121) where the thought of benevolence leads to rebirth in the realm of the Śubhaktāna gods; the thought of compassion in the sphere of the infinity of space (*ākāśānantyaṭyatana*); the thought of sympathetic joy in the sphere of the infinity of consciousness (*viññānantyaṭyatana*) and the thought of equipoise in the sphere of nothingness (*ākīṃcanyāyatana*). The main difference between the schemes is that the *Haliddavasanasutta* allows for rebirth in the *arūpyadhātu* while the *Manorathapūraṇī* restricts becoming to the *rūpadhātu*.

53. M I, pp. 36–9.

54. *Vism.*, p. 693.

mental clarity persists for some time *after* the yogin has emerged from this meditation, he is able to apply this newly gained awareness to the development of insight in the characteristics of the component parts of that particular meditation. The four *appamañña* thus play a significant role in the process of mental purification and operate as a force that conduces to *dharma* discernment.

On another occasion, the Buddha connects the *appamañña* practice with the gnoseologic training by differentiating the usual instructions leading to rebirth in the heavenly abodes from those conducive to insight and total liberation.⁵⁵

“Monks, with regard [to that question], a monk cultivates the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness in connection with benevolence, ... he cultivates the factor of enlightenment of equanimity in connection with benevolence.” (The same formula is repeated for compassion, etc.)

This union, coupling the immeasurables with the factors of enlightenment, is perhaps the clearest indication of the contribution that was made by the Buddha to the doctrine of the immeasurables. By linking benevolence, etc., with the cultivation of the cognitive faculties pertaining to liberating insight, he shifted emphasis away from their prevalent ethical and psychological yield to integrate them in the gnoseological structure of the path.⁵⁶ ✓

In the Mahāyāna the *apramāṇa* became integrated into the scheme of the bodhisattva. As a result, modifications occurred with regard to the motive, scope and cognitive foundation of

55. S V, p. 119; *Kośabhāṣya*, p. 146.13–14 (cf. Warder, 1980, pp. 95–97).

56. In later *Abhidharma* works and some commentaries, the immeasurables receive detailed attention in particular with regard to their aspects, objects and benefits. See, for instance, *As* (pp. 192–7) which contains an exemplary exposition on the mental states that pertain to the four *brahmavihāra*. See also: *Satya* (S), ii, pp. 369–374.

In the *Kośa* we learn that they are only practised by and exclusively directed towards sentient beings who dwell in the *kāmaloka* (*op. cit.*, pp. 200–203), with benevolence directed towards those who are happy (*sukkhita*), compassion towards those who are suffering (*duḥkhita*), sympathetic joy towards those who are rejoicing and equipoise leading to an impartial attitude towards all beings (*op. cit.*, pp. 197–200). Compare also Warder who proposes that the *apramāṇa* were chiefly intended to be practised by monks and recommended to laymen only in a few instances (1980, p. 197). More importantly, the *Kośa* allots the four practices to the various stages of meditation, saying that sympathetic joy is restricted to the first two *dhyāna*, while the remaining three operate in all four *dhyāna* and at the stages of the *anāgāmya* and *dhyānāntara* (*op. cit.*, pp. 197–199). For a summary of their functioning, see *Kośa*, pp. 200–201.

An alternative Sarvāstivāda view on the impact of the *apramāṇa* is given in the *Amṛtarasa* (*Amṛt* (B), pp. 188–89). Here, each of the four members is said to eliminate one or several passions, to generate right speech and right action and to produce forces that are dissociated from thought. In detail, *maitrī* is held to eliminate spitefulness (*vyāpāda*); *karuṇā* overcome harm (*vihiṃsā*); *muditā* eliminates dissatisfaction (*arati*) and *upekṣā* suppresses both malice and desire (*rāga*). This enumeration follows closely a list that is given in the D III, pp. 248–9 and is also found in the *Abhidh-d*, p. 428 (cf. *Mppś*, iii, p. 1242).

V their implementation. We have seen that the śrāvaka practised the *apramāṇa* chiefly for the sake of their own mental purification and meditative advance. For the bodhisattva, echoing their origin in the *cittotpāda*⁵⁷, the chief purpose of the *apramāṇa* lies in their usefulness in bringing about universal welfare. In a sense, rather than meditative in nature, the area of application is closer to that of the notion of universal benevolence, etc., attributed to them in a famous passage in the Aṅguttaranikāya.⁵⁸ The bodhisattva achieves this through the dedication of all merit that accrued to him by practising the *apramāṇa*.⁵⁹

“O son of good family, if a bodhisattva considers all beings in this way, how does he produce great benevolence? O Mañjuśrī, a bodhisattva who considers them thus, says to himself: ‘I am going to expound the Law to beings in the way that I have understood it.’ Thus he produces towards all beings a benevolence which is truly protective (*bhūṭisaraṇamaitrī*) ... What is great compassion to the bodhisattva? It is the abandoning to sentient beings without retaining any of all good roots enacted or accumulated. What is the great sympathetic joy of the bodhisattva? It is rejoicing in and not regretting giving? What is the great equipoise of the bodhisattva? It is benefiting impartially without hope of reward.”

The qualities that are ascribed to the *apramāṇa* and in particular to benevolence are numerous. They are said to be free from passion and attachment, to be unperturbed, pure and of good intention, to ripen sentient beings, to penetrate true reality and indeed, to be spontaneously awakened.⁶⁰ They are associated with the six perfections that supersede the factors of enlightenment as regular concomitants of the *apramāṇa*. We read in the *Pañca* that a bodhisattva who courses in the *apramāṇa* practises the six perfections in a way that allows him to specifically utilise his expertise in the *pāramitā*.⁶¹ In the *Vkn* a similar idea is expressed where the *apramāṇa* are linked with the perfections since they inspire their appropriate pursuit. They are fixed to giving because they lead to generosity in teaching; to morality because they assist in maturing sentient beings; to patience because they protect the bodhisattva himself and other people; to vigour because they help to bear the burden of all beings; to

57. *Vkn*, p. 96.

58. A III, pp. 224–5.

59. *Vkn*, *op. cit.*, p. 96 (trsl. Lamotte).

60. *Vkn*, *op. cit.*, pp. 155–6; *Akn*, pp. 56.3.7–58.5.6; *Mppś*, iii, p. 1258.

61. *Pañca*, pp. 181–82.

meditation because they abstain from tasting its flavour and wisdom because they obtain it in due time.⁶²

Another difference between the śrāvaka and bodhisattva interpretation of the *apramāṇa* is the object and domain in which they operate. Unlike the śrāvaka who develop the *apramāṇa* in response to grievances in the *kāmadhātu*, the bodhisattva extends their application to all spheres of the universe.⁶³ Indeed, it is this spatial expansion that is usually given as the etymological explanation of the word *apramāṇa*:⁶⁴

“A bodhisattva dwells in a thought connected with benevolence, etc.—a thought that is vast, extensive, non-dual, unlimited, ... a thought that radiates friendliness in the ten directions of the world confined only by the *dharmadhātu* and the sphere of space.”

Or, in the words of the *Akn*:⁶⁵

“Just as the sphere of beings is immeasurable—there is no exhaustion—just so the bodhisattva’s cultivation of friendliness is immeasurable and in that there is no

62. *Vkn*, op. cit., p. 157.

63. Note, however, that their limitation to the *kāmadhātu* has been refuted by Buddhaghosa in connection with his analysis of *samādhi* (*Vism*, iii.20). Implying that ‘immeasurable meditations’ are free from the restrictions that prevail in the *kāmadhātu* and can serve as basis for the higher levels of *dhyāna*, Buddhaghosa proposes that the *appamañña* represent intentions associated with the liberation of mind that operate both in *kāmadhātu* and *rūpadhātu* (*Vism*, iv.74). Moreover, they are measureless not only because of the types of mind they accompany, but also because of the nature of their objects (*Vism*, ix.110):

“All of them, however, occur with a measureless scope, for their scope is measureless beings: and instead of assuming a measure such as ‘*maitrī*, etc., should be developed only towards a single being, or in an area of such an extent’, they occur with universal pervasion.”

In both their scope of object and development, for Buddhaghosa the *appamañña* are therefore immeasurable. The association of *maitrī*, etc., with the adjective immeasurable is however not totally new. It occurs already at one place in the *Dīghanikāya* (III, pp. 233-4) where Sāriputra in summing up the teachings of the Buddha describes the fourfold instructions as ‘the four immeasurables’ (*catasso appamaññāyo*). However, the specific designation of *maitrī*, etc., as referring to a state of mind that is measureless—either in terms of object or development—appears to be rather late as it is only found in the *Abhidhamma* (*Vism*, ix.105-10; Aronson, 1975, pp. 66-76). And yet, according to some, *maitrī*, etc., are not universally immeasurable in the Mahāyāna sense, since they do not operate in the *arūpyadhātu* (cf. *Kośa*, viii, pp. 199-200).

64. *Pañca*, pp. 181 (trsl. Conze); an almost identical passage is found in the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 34; L).

65. *Akn*, p. 56.4.2-3

In the *Mppś*, this definition is given further details by adding two distinct sets of measurement (iii, p. 1262). First, there is the ‘true’ immeasurable, that is to say, those things that cannot be measured by any person or saint. These include space, *nirvāṇa* and the nature of beings (*sattvasvabhāva*). Second, there are those things that although in principle mensurable are beyond reckoning of ordinary beings and become in this sense immeasurable. These consist of items such as the weight of Mt. Sumeru or the number of drops in the ocean. Since the measurement of such objects is known by the Buddha, they do not serve as a gauge for the *apramāṇa*.

exhaustion.”

Finally, there is a distinction in their implementation. On this matter, we read in the *Akn*:⁶⁶

“Benevolence is threefold. What are the three? Benevolence directed at living beings as object pertains to the bodhisattvas who have produced the first thought of enlightenment. Benevolence directed at *dharma* as object pertains to bodhisattvas who have embarked on religious practice. Benevolence without object pertains to those bodhisattvas who have attained the conviction of the non-arising of all *dharma*.”⁶⁷

This interpretation has grown, of course, out of the philosophical vision of Mahāyāna ontology, denying independent own-being (*svabhāva*) to worldly existence. Tuned to this conception of reality, the *apramāṇa* exhibit three degrees of purity. On the first level, when the bodhisattva pursues them with the conviction that he is dealing with ‘real’ people, he is still subject to impurity.⁶⁸ When he replaces sentient beings with *dharma* as the object of his benevolence, he is exposed to both purity and impurity, depending on his mental awareness. It is only after he has realised the true nature of sentient existence (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) and becomes convinced of the non-arising of *dharma* that his practice of the immeasurables becomes pure.⁶⁹

The *Bdp* shares many of these Mahāyāna features about the *apramāṇa*. Beginning with *maitrī*, the *Bdp* takes up the question of scope and explains that the bodhisattva’s benevolence

66. *Akn*, p. 57.2.3–5

The Sanskrit of this passage is preserved as a quotation in the *Śikṣ*, p. 212.12–14. An identical presentation of the three modes of benevolence is also found in the *Msl* (p. 121), *Dhsg* (§ 130) and *Bbh* (pp. 241–2). For further references to the three types of *maitrī*, see: *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1250–51.

67. Note that the three kinds of *maitrī* are traditionally compared to the giving of ordinary objects, to the giving of precious objects and to the giving of the *cintāmaṇi* (*Mppś*, iii, pp. 1253–4).

68. In the *Śikṣ* (pp. 212.15–213.2; trsl. Bendall), the first level of practice are presented in a slightly different light:

“Benevolence has the Buddha as its object of thought, the bodhisattvas, the disciples, all creatures as its object of thought. Here when it has all beings as its object of thought, it comes first by accumulating benefit and blessing upon a beloved being with meditation. Upon such a one he should accumulate benevolence; then upon acquaintances; then upon strangers; then upon neighbours; then upon fellow-villagers and so with other villages; and so on until he continues devoted to one region, spread all over it, covering it. So with the ten regions. But this procedure does not apply to the benevolence towards buddhas and the rest.”

69. *Mppś*, iii, p. 1245.

is called immeasurable as it demands application in a sphere of beings that is beyond measure.⁷⁰ Presumably, this explanation is also valid for the remaining three *apramāṇa*, although it is not applied to them explicitly in the appropriate sections.⁷¹ After that, the *Bdp* gives a brief overview of the application of benevolence. It is simultaneously seen as a personal protection for the bodhisattva and as practice for the benefit of others. The aspects that are cited, however, refer invariably to the bodhisattva himself. Through the *apramāṇa* he is freed from malice, anger, passion, fear and negligence and acts in accordance with the noble path. The liberation of sentient beings—being mentioned only once—does not stand in the foreground.

Among the advantages that accrue from benevolence, the *Bdp* discusses in particular wealth, honour and fame, vast accumulations of merit, physical perfection, rapid advance on the path and rebirth among gods and men.⁷² The fate of sentient beings receives little attention and is

70. The alternative explanation of their title 'immeasurable' is often that the amount of merit produced through the practice of benevolence, etc., exceeds all measure (*Kośa*, viii, p. 196; *Mppś*, iii, p. 1243). According to the early sources, however, the merit that is generated through them is not of any kind, but specifically brahmanic merit (*brahmāpunya*) which can only be consumed in the seventeen heavens of the Brahmaloṇa (A V, p. 76; *Kośa*, iv, pp. 250–1).
71. Reference only to *maitrī* in the explanation of the *apramāṇa* is by no means particular to the *Bdp*. As an issue, it is specifically raised in the *Mppś* (v, p. 2257) and occurs in several other *sūtras*. The reason behind this choice is the assumption that benevolence is the most important of the four *apramāṇa* and accrues the greatest amount of merit. Therefore, it is held to outshine the other *apramāṇa* not only in the quantity of merit, but also in quality and to be the only type of meditation that is pure (*anāśravabhāvanā*). This raises the question of the relationship between the four *apramāṇa*. While the *nikāya* are virtually silent in this respect, the commentaries propose an ideal topical progression through the four members. Particularly in the *Vism* this point is made. At first, the meditator wishes for the welfare of all sentient beings. Next, he recognises the great suffering that afflicts his fellow beings and generates great compassion. Then, he ponders the great prosperity of the very same beings for whom he cultivated benevolence and compassion and takes sympathetic joy in it. Even if they are not prosperous in the present life, he rejoices at their future wealth. Having done so, his conduct towards beings has come to an end and he observes sentient beings as a neutral observer (*Vism*, ix.109). This scheme is of course rather theoretical, since if progress depends on external circumstances, there would be no possibility of advance beyond compassion. Hence, in actuality, progress is dependent on 'skill' in each subject of meditation and ignores external circumstances. We have therefore in the *apramāṇa* something approaching an ideal hierarchy of meditation in which the meditator advances through the rarefied spheres of existence. This interpretation has, in the past, generated the misconception that *upekṣā*—being the last in the traditional sequence—would supplant or supersede the other three. Based on the causal link between *upekṣā* and equanimity as a factor of enlightenment (*Ps*, i.85; *Vism*, xiv.157; Aronson, 1975, p. 274) not shared by the other *apramāṇa*, it was suggested that *upekṣā* eclipses *maitrī*, *karuṇā* and *muditā*. That this is not the case has been shown by Aronson, 1979, p. 8. Although completing the practice of the *apramāṇa* and therefore at the pinnacle of their cultivation, the four remain at all times fundamentally complementary in nature. Cf. *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1255–58.
72. Note the parallels to the benefits that are cited in the *Bbh* as stemming directly from the practice of the *apramāṇa* which, while considering the fate of sentient beings, emphasise personal attainments. They include dwelling in supreme bliss, generation of an immeasurable accumulation of merit, strengthening the intent (*āśaya*) of enlightenment and holding back all suffering in *samsāra* (*Bbh*, pp. 248.23–49.6). For the *Mppś* too the benefits are chiefly of a personal nature. Thus, a bodhisattva who embarks on the practice of benevolent meditation (*maitrisamādhi*) escapes burning when he is immersed in fire, he survives poisoning, he escapes injury during military service, he does not die a violent death and is protected by benign divinities (*Mppś*, iii, p. 1273). The same list of advantages is also said to spring from practices of the remaining immeasurables despite their allegedly inferior nature. However, the fruits themselves are only attainable by persons belonging to the āryan-fold since the practice of the immeasurables

only indirectly referred to when the bodhisattva is described as “accomplished in protection of the simple-minded”.⁷³ Much greater emphasis is given to the personal purity of the bodhisattva and his progress along the path.⁷⁴

In this context, the *Bdp* links benevolence with the six perfections, indicating that it prepares the ground for their successful cultivation.⁷⁵ We saw that by doing so it concurs closely with *apramāṇa* expositions in other Mahāyāna works. Next, the Buddha distinguishes between the ‘ordinary benevolence’ of the śrāvaka that is solely directed at personal liberation and the ‘great benevolence’ of the bodhisattva that aims at universal welfare.⁷⁶

In conclusion, the *Bdp* draws attention to the different kinds of *maitrī*. That is, benevolence that has living beings as its objects and is based on the generation of the *bodhicitta*; benevolence that has *dharma* as its objects and is realised when the bodhisattva is established in the path; and benevolence that is objectless and reserved to bodhisattvas who are accomplished in patience (*kṣānti*).⁷⁷ While the exact scope of these three categories is not elaborated, it is well known from later sources.

According to the *Bbh*, the three modes of reference (*sattvāḷambana*, *dharmāḷambana*, *anāḷambana*) apply to all four immeasurables and are not restricted to benevolence.⁷⁸ Philosophically, it makes the point that the object of the ‘objectless application’ corresponds to the foundation of being (*dharmadhātu*) or thusness (*tathatā*).⁷⁹ Whilst the first level is also attainable by adherents of heterodox thought, the second by śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas, the third is restricted to bodhisattvas.⁸⁰ Benevolence, compassion and sympathetic joy are

is well beyond the scope of ordinary beings (*Mppś*, iii, p. 1272; other lists at *Mppś*, pp. 792, 2257, 2362. Compare this list with the advantages given in M II, pp. 207–8, A II, p. 129; IV, p. 150; V, p. 342, *Vinaya* (v, p. 140), *Paṭi* (ii, p. 130) and *Vism* (p. 253); *Kośa*, iv, p. 124; *Mvu*, pp. 421–22 and *Catuhṣatakaṭikā* (TTP, 98, p. 222.5.1–3; ref. Lang).

73. R, folio 267.4.

74. R, folio 267.3–6.

75. R, folio 268.3.

76. A similar division is proposed in the *Mppś* (iii, pp. 1253–4).

77. R, folio 269.2–4.

78. *Bbh*, pp. 241.16–18.

79. The same point is also made in the *Msl* (p. 221) and in the *Buddhabhūmisūtraśāstra* (*Mppś*, iii, p. 1250, n. 1). In the *Mppś*—reflecting pure Madhyamaka thinking—it is regarded as synonymous to the true character of things (*dharmāṇām bhūtalakṣaṇam*), pure and simple, without the idealistic connotations of *Bbh*’s model.

80. *Bbh*, p. 242.15–25

Also consult the *Mppś* on these issues that contains a particularly detailed account on the scope of application of the *apramāṇa* (iii, pp. 1242–1279). To sum up, at first, it compares benevolence, compassion and sympathetic joy with regard to their objects, scope and actual effect on the yogin’s psyche. Then, having established their exact function, it defines the three areas of application. Benevolence directed at sentient beings is only practised by ordinary beings (*pṛthagjana*) who engage in meditational exercise or by those adepts who undergo training (*saikṣa*) that is still subject to impurity. Those who generate benevolence with regard to *dharma* are either arhants who have destroyed all impurities, pratyekabuddhas

assembled with a resolution to bring about bliss while equipoise is brought about by the resolution of profit.⁸¹ Whichever the orientation of the *apramāṇa*, in the end all of them are founded on compassion engendered by the perception of worldly misery.⁸²

Of the four *apramāṇa*, compassion is granted the most detailed treatment in the *Bdp*.⁸³ Depicting it as the spiritual basis to the whole bodhisattva ideal, the Buddha explains:⁸⁴

“O Prince, what is the bodhisattva’s great compassion? O Prince, his great compassion is the basis of his desire for supreme and perfect enlightenment. For instance, just as the basis of the life-faculty of sentient beings is inhalation and exhalation of breath, in the same way, O Prince, is great compassion the basis of the bodhisattva’s accomplishment in the great vehicle.”

After this opening passage, the *Bdp* spells out the ten factors that prompt bodhisattvas to unfold universal compassion.⁸⁵ Most of these factors relate to the perception of the wretchedness of worldly existence and its inherent conceptual flaws such as belief in a self, wrong views, desire for perverted pleasure, exposure to the five obstructions (*āvaraṇa*)⁸⁶, delusion and conceit. In response to these conditions, the bodhisattva generates compassion that is sustained

or buddhas. This level of attainment is conditional on elimination of the perception of a self (*ātmanasamjñā*) and transcending the notion of identity and difference (*ekatvānyatvasamjñā*). The third level of attainment in benevolence is reserved to the buddhas, since operating beyond objects (*anālambana*), it does not rest in either the conditioned or unconditioned. Knowing that all objects are unborn, unreal and misconceived, their benevolence does not lean at, or function within, time but rests in non-distinction. Notwithstanding, they do not abandon sentient being to their fate but, relying on wisdom relative to the true character of things, unfold their benevolence to best effect. The same division is also applicable to the thought of compassion (*karuṇācitta*), but it is not put forward for sympathetic joy and equipoise.

81. Cf. *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1255, 1258.

82. The *Bbh* underlines this point by including a list of one hundred and ten kinds of suffering (*Bbh*, pp. 243.2–47.2) and discussing a group of nineteen specific forms of suffering that constitute its object (*Bbh*, p. 247.8–18).

Two of these are also hinted at in an important section in the *Msl* where in chapter seventeen (pp. 221.9–224.3), twelve verses are devoted to the immeasurables. At first, close agreement prevails between its exposition and that of the *Bbh*. Both works classify the *apramāṇa* practice in three levels, viz., practice targeted at sentient beings, practice aimed at *dharma* and practice directed at objectlessness, born out by thusness (*tathatā*) and reserved to those who are free from false imagination (*te hy avikalpatvād anālambanāḥ*).

83. Note, that unlike the discussions of *maitrī*, *muditā* and *upekṣā* that concur almost verbatim to their counterparts in the *Akn*, the *Bdp*’s exposition of compassion contains strikingly many discrepancies from the *karuṇā* section in the *Akn* (p. 57.2.6–5.6)

84. R, folio 269.5–270.1.

85. R, folio 270.5–276.4.

86. These are desire (*rāga*), hatred (*dveṣa*), delusion (*moha*), regret (*vipratīsarā*) and doubt (*saṃśaya*). On the various types of obstruction attested in Buddhist literature, see: *Kośa*, i, p. 51; iv, p. 18, 20; vi, p. 276; *Siddhi*, pp. 639–657; *Dhsgr*, § 115, 118.

by contemplation, imperturbability, reverence, purity, practice and vigour.⁸⁷ It becomes the motivating force (including pristine cognition) that establishes an intense communication between the bodhisattva and sentient beings, exposure to which nourishes, in turn, compassion.⁸⁸

The third immeasurable, sympathetic joy (*muditā*) is the least distinctive in the *Bdp*'s discussion of the *apramāṇa*.⁸⁹ Its characterisation amounts to little more than a list of enchanting examples taken from the bodhisattva's conduct. The bodhisattva delights in all aspects of the Dharma, he takes pleasure from solitude and the accomplishment of the six perfections, he approves of congeniality, lack of hatred, physical purity and rejoices in spiritual exertion.⁹⁰ In order to underline this commitment, the text gives a string of examples that illustrate the bodhisattva's devotion to his teachers, parents, sentient beings and good conduct in general. Judging by this passage alone, the main benefit of sympathetic joy is indefatigableness in the pursuit of enlightenment since it rekindles enthusiasm for the path in times of weariness.⁹¹

Acquisition of the fourth immeasurable—equipoise (*upekṣā*)—is divided into three phases, depending on the object at which it is directed. At first, the bodhisattva learns to assume equipoise towards defilement (*kleśa*).⁹² He maintains high spirits when rejected and defamed or, conversely, is not deluded when praised. He stays calm and unaffected in both misery and bliss and does not develop preferences for either friends or foes, but attains complete impartiality. Whatever the circumstances to which he is exposed, the bodhisattva abides in perfect mental equilibrium and does not allow any factors such as appreciation or aversion, pleasure or distress to influence his judgement and conduct.

Next, he trains in equipoise that applies to situations in which the bodhisattva is exposed to physical abuse and torture. Entitled, 'equipoise to protect oneself and others'

87. R, folio 276.5–277.4.

88. R, folio 277.3–278.4.

89. Aronson (1975, pp. 256–59) has made the same observation on the place of *muditā* in the *nikāya*. But for two instances, cited only in conjunction with the other immeasurables (D I, p. 73; A I, p. 243), it is the least explored member of the *apramāṇa*. In essence, it seems to epitomise an attitude that prevails among persons whose aptitude and interests are compatible. Cultivated in response to displeasure, it becomes an antidote to internal unwholesomeness and generates great merit. Its relationship to the meditative attainments of the practitioners is explained as follows (A I, p. 243):

“Monks, at the time (when monks live harmoniously), monks are living in the sublime way of living. That is to say, pleasurable interest arises in him who is joyous due to the liberation of the mind which is of sympathetic joy. He whose mind shows pleasurable interest experiences bodily calm. He who has a calm body experiences happiness. He who is happy becomes concentrated.”

90. R, folio 278.5–279.7.

91. R, folio 282.7–283.1.

92. R, folio 280.7–281.7.

(*ātmaparārakṣaṇopekṣā*)⁹³, it allows him to stay aloft over all types of anguish and to forego the thought of retaliation. This type of equipoise springs from the bodhisattva's resolution and is sustained through constant exertion in search for virtue.⁹⁴

The third manifestation of *upekṣā* is applied to right and wrong moments (*kālākālopekṣā*).⁹⁵ Now, the bodhisattva maintains composure when confronted with irreverence, blame, impurity and despicable demeanour. He abides in equanimity when challenged by persons who do not share his faith in the Dharma, who engage in practices at a wrong time (in particular with regard to the perfections⁹⁶) or who are otherwise ill-synchronised in their conduct. In sum, whatever challenge he is confronted with, the bodhisattva carefully weighs the situation, judges with a tranquil and impartial mind, and adjusts his response accordingly.⁹⁷

If we compare these features with the *apramāṇa* in other writings, we note several parallels. First, the *Bdp* speaks of a threefold mode of *apramāṇa* practice, distinguishing between *sattvāmbana*, *dharmāmbana* and *anāmbana*. We have seen that this is a theme that is common to virtually all Mahāyāna treatises. It is invariably ascribed to the *Akn* and not to the *Bdp* from which the *Akn* appears to have taken it.⁹⁸ In the *Bdp*, the standard formula is extended to include the stages where the various levels of practice are reached, viz., the *sattvāmbana* practice at the first generation of the thought of enlightenment (*prathamacittotpāda*), the *dharmāmbana* practice at the moment of constancy in the path, and the *anāmbana* practice at the acquisition of patience (*kṣānti*). In the *Akn* this formula is divided into two sections, the first gives the levels of practice and the second provides the moment at which they become operational.⁹⁹ Moreover, by making the 'conviction of the non-arising of dharma' (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*) the *terminus ad quem* for the *anāmbana* practice, the *Akn* modifies the occurrence of the third level. In the path scheme of the *Dbh*, this would mean that the *anāmbana* practice is not attained before the *acalābhūmi*, while the *Bdp*'s 'accomplishment in patience' might conceivably be already attained at the *prabhākarībhūmi*.¹⁰⁰ However, as the treatises on the bodhisattva are completely silent on this

93. R, folio 282.1–283.2.

94. R, folio 282.7.

95. R, folio 283.1–284.1.

96. R, folio 283.3–6.

97. In the *Bdp* it is explicitly said that none of three types of *upekṣā* are conferred by the buddhas, but are self-attained and form a distinct part of the his resolution (R, folio 282.7).

98. E.g., *Śikṣ*, p. 212; *Mppś*, iii, p. 1272 (other occurrences in *Bbh*, pp. 241.18–242.51 and *Msl*, p. 121.11–12).

99. *Akn*, p. 57.2.3–5.

100. *Daśa-bh*, p. 36.16–17

matter, their positioning must remain uncertain.

The *Bdp* agrees with those sources that confirm that *maitrī* reaches greatest effectiveness when it is coupled with other practices, in particular the *pāramitā* or *bodhipākṣika dharma*. It also speaks of these practices as forces on which the *apramāṇa* rely for inspiration.¹⁰¹ Other parallels exist in its assessment of compassion as the foremost of the *apramāṇa* and its explanations for their immeasurability.

Points where the *Bdp* differs concerns the profits of the *apramāṇa*, the nature of equipoise and the presentation of the material. We have seen that many texts—early and late—devote at least some attention to the states of rebirth gained as a result of *apramāṇa* practice. This is not the case in the *Bdp*. In the whole chapter there is not one explicit reference to ‘ways of living like Brahmā’ (*brahmavihāra*).¹⁰² Rebirth in the *rūpadhātu* or *arūpyadhātu*, so central to most other expositions of the *apramāṇa*, does not figure at all. Instead, every reward is immediately dedicated to universal liberation. Another peculiarity is the division of equipoise. Apart from the *Akn* no other text proposes to divide *upekṣā* into three distinct categories of application. What is more, neither of the types of *upekṣā* is taken up independently in any of the texts I consulted. Whether this omission constitutes an oversight or was deliberate we cannot tell. The inclusion of *apramāṇa* quotations in other sources from the *Akn* that are purged of the threefold division points to the latter.

Then there is also the lack of coordination between the different *apramāṇa* in the *Bdp*. Deviating from standard practice to grant a degree of cohesion to the four members—be it only through a collective set of benefits—the *Bdp* looks at each of the *apramāṇa* in isolation. For instance, no use is made of the integrating function of meditation as frame of reference for their implementation. As a result, the presentation appears fragmented and in want of structural coherence. This lack of integration is most noticeable with *upekṣā*. In other sources the exposition of *upekṣā* is completely interwoven with the practice of meditation as it quietens the emotions, stirred up by benevolence, compassion and sympathetic joy. In the *Bdp* no such link is proposed.¹⁰³ Without the technical language of *dhyāna*, its account is essentially descriptive and serves to demonstrate the scope of the bodhisattva’s attainment in

Note, that in the translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, the position of the *Akn* has been misquoted by replacing the ‘conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*’ as the beginning of the third level with ‘patience preparation for a future state’ (*Akn*, p. 57.2.5; *Śikṣ*, p. 212.14; trsl. p. 204).

101. R folio 268.5–69.1

102. In the *Bdp*, there is only one reference to Brahmā and that makes no mention of the notion that a bodhisattva might gain rebirth in the Brahmāloka (R folio, 267.4).

103. *Mppś*, iii, p. 1258.

equipoise.

The Perfection of Generosity

Chapter six introduces the main body of the bodhisattva practices. It marks the formal beginning of the exposition of the six perfections, starting with generosity (*dāna*). The subsequent chapters deal with one *pāramitā* each.

Methodologically, much of what has been said about the *Bdp*'s presentation of the four *apramāṇa* holds also true for the treatment of the *dānapāramitā*.¹⁰⁴ The whole account of *dāna* is primarily descriptive and offers little information on the psychological impact of its practice. The chapter begins by enumerating the objects that are typically to be given. These fall into two categories, that is, external gifts (*bāhyaṃ dānam*) and internal gifts (*ādhyātmikaṃ dānam*). Although not defined as such by name, this division clearly governs the *Bdp*'s classification of gifts.¹⁰⁵ First, the bodhisattva gives material gifts (*āmiśadāna*) such as food, clothes, jewels, pleasure-grounds including relatives and dear ones. Then, he trains in giving away his own body in self-sacrifice.¹⁰⁶ The order in which these gifts are listed suggests a ranking according to the degree of difficulty. That is to say, at the lowest level, the bodhisattva provides food, drink and clothing.¹⁰⁷ Then, embarking on higher levels of *dāna*, he renounces precious objects. Next, the bodhisattva trains to abandon his family and finally, at the highest level, sacrifices his body.¹⁰⁸ The gift of the Doctrine (*dharmadāna*), a major factor in the practice of generosity and acknowledged by most texts, is not cited in chapter six.¹⁰⁹

104. Candrakīrti, in his commentary to the *Catuhṣataka* (TTP, 98, p. 215.3.2–4.4; ref. Lang), gives the following etymological explanation of the word *dāna*. He begins by deriving *dāna* from the root *do* meaning 'to cut' saying that it alludes to death. Hence, the word *dāna* is said to give pleasure to a practitioner since it induces disgust (*udvega*) for the cycle of birth and death. Then, he acknowledges a relation between *dāna* and the root *dā* meaning 'to give', noting that the three types of giving include all perfections (*āmiśadāna* covering *dāna*; *abhayaḍāna* covering *śīla*, *kṣānti*; *dharmadāna* covering *dhyāna*, *prajñā*—with all three are linked with *vīrya*) and as a channel of the teachings pleases the bodhisattva. Finally, he says that *dāna* may also be derived from the root *de* meaning 'to guard' and *da* 'to purify'. The rationale behind these associations is that the bodhisattva's body, speech and mind are, as yet, in need of guarding and purification since future births are determined by the presence of desire. Thus, because *dāna* reminds the bodhisattva of other births, it inspires joy in bodhisattvas (cf. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 698–700).

105. This twofold division is well known from *dāna* treatment in the *śāstras*. See, for instance, *Bbh* (pp. 114–123) and *Mppś* (v, p. 2238).

106. R, folio 285.1–7.

107. On the bodhisattva's practice of alms-giving, see: *Msg*, pp. 224–25.

If, however, limited in his possessions by the constraints of mendicant life, the bodhisattva dispenses writing instruments (*lekhāni*), ink (*maṣī*), manuscripts (*pustaka*) and the gift of the doctrine (*Vup*, p. 30, § 20).

108. This scheme is also found in the *Mppś*, ii, pp. 750–51. At another place, however, the *Mppś* distinguishes between *āmiśadāna* as inferior giving; giving of the body as mediocre giving and generosity accompanied by mental detachment as the supreme type of giving (*Mppś*, i, p. 297).

109. It is, however, discussed in chapter nine (folio 539–546), ten (folio 563) and eleven (folio 628–631).

After listing the objects of *dāna*, the *Bdp* describes the mental states that accompany the practice of giving.¹¹⁰ It distinguishes forty different factors (divided into four lists of ten each) that turn ordinary generosity into pure generosity. Major concerns are the need for impartiality, dedication of generosity to enlightenment and the objective of universal liberation. A gift should not be bestowed out of wrath or pleasure, it must not have any detrimental effect on the recipient and need not be motivated by desire for retribution.¹¹¹ In other words, the whole

Looking at the development of the concept of giving, we note that, at first, references to a consciously perceived division in the objects of *dāna* are less articulated. In the four principal nikāya, a division between *dāna* objects is attested only once. In the *Āṅguttaranikāya* (A I, p. 89), we read:

“Monks, there are two gifts. What are these two? The material (*āmisa*) and the spiritual (*dhamma*). These are the two. Of these two, the spiritual gift is preeminent.”

Yet, already in early Mahāyāna *sūtras*, the concept of the gift of the doctrine was fully acknowledged and enhanced in value. In the *Kp*, the gift of the Doctrine is elevated to the supreme task of a bodhisattva, eclipsing even compassion, benevolence and communication of the thought of enlightenment (p. 79, § 20). It is undertaken with a pure heart and virtuous motives without expectancy for anything in return (p. 79, § 20.1) If correctly performed, involving uniform, impartial and open-handed preaching (p. 73, § 12.3; § 44), the gift of the Dharma secures immeasurable merit and prompts the state of unobscured insight (p. 80, § 22.1). He teaches the Doctrine to all beings just as he received it himself and does not hold anything back (p. 61, § 1.2). By doing so, he imparts the thought of enlightenment and inspires sentient beings to strive to buddhahood (p. 79 § 20.3; p. 73, § 12.2).

In later literature this distinction grew in importance. The gift of the doctrine is cited in the *Pañca* (p. 459) as the only *dāna* object alongside material gifts and figures in the *Ug* and *Vup* among the objects of generosity of householders (*Vup*, p. 30, § 20; *Ug*, p. 259.5.5). Its exact contents is defined in the *Kośa* (iv, p. 252) as “correct, undefiled teaching of the *sūtra* literature”. Those who teach the Doctrine with an impure mind or out of mistaken design such as gain, respect or reputation forfeit all merit that would otherwise fall to them.

In the *Mppś* the condition of the gift of the Dharma, whether that of the śrāvaka or bodhisattva, depends for status on the intention (*cetanā*) and mental state with which it is being given. If it is preached for personal gain, with mistaken views about the self or otherwise overshadowed by delusion, it is wholly impure and of *laukika* rank. If, however, it is taught out of pure intention and with wholesome thought the gift of the Doctrine attains *lokottara* status and introduces to the Buddhist path (*Mppś*, ii, pp. 693–5). Besides the gift of the Dharma and material gifts, the *Mppś* distinguishes a third category of *dāna*, that is the ‘gift of homage and respect’ (*pūjasatkāradāna*). It consists in showing veneration and is inspired by pure faith (*prasādacittaviśuddhi*). Pure faith figures also amongst the causes and conditions that give rise to giving in general. In the *Mppś*, these are compassion, faith and respect (or a combination of both); an object that is to be given (pure or impure) and a recipient who operates as a field of merit (either destitute or honoured).

Note the contribution of the *Msl* and *Msg* with regard to *dāna* by extending the traditional division into material and the spiritual objects to include the gift of security (*abhaya-dāna*). According to the commentary of the *Msg*, it serves to constrain violence (*ghātakanivāraṇa*), assists the shy or apprehensive (*bhīruparitrāṇa*) and anchors the bodhisattva’s altruistic intention in his practice (*Msg*, pp. 224–5). Defined as protection from the fear of lions, tigers, seizure, kings, thieves, water, etc., (*Bbh*, p. 133.17–19), it pertains, however, more to the realm of *śīla* and reflects the bodhisattva’s rejection of violence. (Meadows, p. 176.10; Lin Li-kouang, 1949, p. 250; *Mppś*, ii, p. 700). The *Dhsgr* (§ 105) cites in the place of ‘giving of fearlessness’ the ‘giving of benevolence’ (*maitrīdāna*) that is probably an elucidation of the more obscure concept of *abhaya-dāna*.

Somewhat surprisingly, the gift of security does not figure as an independent category in the *Bbh*. Instead, we find the traditional division into external objects and internal objects (p. 144.23). The gift of the Dharma—identified as the supreme gift (pp. 127.11–128.1)—falls as an individual object in the class of external gifts, but does not form a separate category (pp. 119.25–120.3). It is, however, cited at p. 133.12–13 where the *Bbh* gives material objects, the Dharma and security as the three objects that lead to bliss in this world and the next.

110. R, folio 287.7–288.5.

111. These precautions are not essential to the *Ug*, where it is argued that to fulfil other people’s desires is the highest aim of the *dānapāramitā* (pp. 261.2.6–3.2). The negative side-effects that total compliance with

section warns of aspects that might render an act of giving worthless and even counterproductive by way of mistaken attitudes or motivations.¹¹² By doing so, the *Bdp* establishes a connection between the practice of generosity and morality. That is to say, it qualifies the act of giving in moral terms and determines its value on the basis of the donor's intention and the choice of objects that are given. It is only if both are of high moral standard and fully compatible with the ideal of the bodhisattva that pure generosity is accomplished.

This association of generosity and morality is not particular to the *Bdp*. It occurs already in the *nikāya* and is given prominent treatment in the *Ug*.¹¹³ The rationale for the joined practice of *dāna* and *śīla* is twofold. First, moral impurity defiles the spirit of giving since it leads to corruption and expectations of reward, and hence obstructs the attainment of pure generosity. Second, there is the incompatibility of attachment and impartiality.¹¹⁴ Impartiality is a decisive

their wishes may produce are easily annulled by means of the bodhisattva's resolve (*praṇidhāna*):
 "Now it is time for the *dānapāramitā* and I shall give in accordance with that person's wishes. I shall cause the person who makes requests to be satisfied. If giving wine to him, I must soothe that person so that he shall attain right mindfulness (*samyaksmṛti*) and shall not be caused delusions. Why? To know how to satisfy another's desire, this is the *dānapāramitā*. Householder, for this reason, by making a gift of wine to someone, the bodhisattva does not draw away from the Buddha."

112. An exemplary account of the ideal circumstances of generosity is found in the *Bbh*. As some of the early *sūtras*, the *Bbh* devotes considerable attention to the objects and circumstances where the bodhisattva's *dāna* operates (pp. 132.23–133.2). The overriding purpose behind the practice of giving is to mature sentient beings. Gratification of sense desire is acknowledged to occur but regarded as an unavoidable by-product (pp. 117–118). The bodhisattva takes great care to differentiate between the needs of beings and gives only objects that promote their spiritual interest. The chief reward for the donor becomes exemption from rebirth in the lower destinies, provided that he gives with a pure, impartial state of mind that does not allow favouritism. The bodhisattva does not take advantage of others or seeks personal benefits from giving (p. 121.3–4). His practice of giving is marked by faith and devotion, proceeds in a timely fashion and does not lead to any harm (p. 132.26–7).

An important requirement for correct giving is knowledge of what constitutes the appropriate gift in a given situation and the awareness that ultimately no objects exist (pp. 123.18–124.22; 129.8–11). The gifts of the bodhisattva comprise specifically the four *apramāṇa*, as they have great impact on the recipient's spiritual welfare (p. 129.12–15). The chief impediments to a successful pursuit is lack of habit, lack in worthy gifts, attachment to pleasing objects and delight in the prospect of future reward (p. 129.16–21). Delay in the progress in giving occurs particularly when a bodhisattva only owns a few objects that are worth giving and is requested to hand these over to his enemy; when he is asked to renounce what is dearest to him or what he has become accustomed to and when he must give away those *dharma* that he has acquired with great trouble himself (p. 132.3–12). The most effective antidotes against these obstacles are intellectual penetration (*pravedha*), endurance of suffering (*duḥkhādhivāsanā*), cognition of misconception (*viparyāsaparijñāna*) and insight into the emptiness of karmic formations (*saṃkārasāratvadarśana*) (p. 131.6–13). As reward for practising *dāna*—if practised with determination (*adhyāśaya*) and in conjunction with the *pratisaṃvid*—the bodhisattva comes eventually face to face with true reality (p. 131.20–27).

Compare this position with the *Mpps* (ii, pp. 670–72) that informs that *dāna* reaps greatest reward if the gift is valuable, uncommon, well-timed, adjusted to local circumstances, in harmony with the requirements of mendicants, offered to members of the *Saṅgha*, continually and conditioned.

113. A connection of similar type is also established in the *Kp*, where offerings of material objects such lamps, if only to acquaintances, are said to contribute to the final elimination of traces of impurities (*keśavāsanā*) only if they are undertaken in conjunction with moral conduct.
114. *Ug*, 23, p. 264.4.3–5.7.

factor in the bodhisattva's practice of *dāna* since it is intrinsically connected to the pledge of universal liberation. Violation of the principle of impartiality by whatever means would affect the very foundation of the bodhisattva's quest and place him on the level of a śrāvaka.

Depending on the context, attachment comes into play on two levels. In the nikāya, the Buddha speaks of it in terms of sensual desire.¹¹⁵ The implication is that sensual desire corrupts the monk's psyche in general and renders him unfit to follow in the mendicant path. In the *Ug* which discourses on the lay path, the bodhisattva is warned of inappropriate attachment to his family and worldly possession, since this would obstruct his balanced pursuit of the middle path between worldly desire and renunciation. In a sense, giving is therefore dependent on disciplinarian vigour to fully unfold. However, morality is also reinforced by the practice of giving. For it is through unlimited generosity that the root evils of desire, hatred and delusion are most effectively weakened.

Having discussed the moral dimension of *dāna*, the *Bdp* gives three lists detailing the benefits derived from internal and external giving.¹¹⁶ Benefits accruing from material gifts are predominantly physical in nature or generate spiritual gain relevant to this world. The system of retribution that governs the granting of daily requisites follows well-established patterns, promising future affluence in precisely the items that were renounced. The gift of luxurious items and family members, however, pertains to a higher order and is rewarded with physical perfection or important spiritual faculties such as the *dharmaskandha*, pristine cognition (*jñāna*) or divine ear (*divyaśrotra*).¹¹⁷ The borderline between those two categories is rather fluid as reward patterns occasionally become blurred. Self-sacrifice and renunciation of all worldly pleasure are of the highest category, since they place the bodhisattva practically on the level of the Tathāgata through giving the buddha-qualities and all-knowing.¹¹⁸

115. In the progressive talk formula (*anupubbīkathā*) we read to this effect:

"Then the lord gave a progressive talk ... namely talk on giving, talk on moral conduct and talk on heaven. He revealed the danger, elimination and impurity of sensual desires, and the benefit of desirelessness. When the lord knew that the mind of ... was ready, soft, without hinderances, uplifted, settled, then he revealed the special *dhmma* teaching of buddhas: suffering, arising, cessation, the path" (D I, p. 110; trsl. Gethin).

116. For alternative lists of *dāna* benefits, see: *Samādh*, ii, pp. 326–332 and *Mpps*, v, pp. 2218–25.

117. R, folio 291.4–5.

118. R, folio 292.3–7

Compare these benefits with the rewards of generosity that are typically cited in the nikāya. In the *Sīlasutta* (A III, pp. 38–41), for instance, the Buddha distinguishes five advantages that accrue through giving—four in this life and one in the next. In this life, the benefactor is well-thought of and friend of many people. The wise will always be eager to accompany him and he attains great renown. Whatever company he enters, he moves with confidence and converses freely. At death, as a result of his generosity, he is assured a rebirth in the heavenly realms of the gods. A similar set of benefits is found at A III, pp. 32–33.

For the *Bdp* the most important determinant of the amount of merit that springs from *dāna* is therefore the object that is given and the purity of the donor's (*drāyaka*) thought. It disregards the role of the beneficiary (*pratigrāhaka*) as a field of merit (*puṇyakṣetra*).¹¹⁹ Already in the early *suttas*, we learn that the amount of *dāna* reward depends not only on the act of generosity and its object, but even more so on the spiritual state of the donor. In the *Vacchagottasutta*, the Buddha explains:¹²⁰

“O Vaccha, gifts given in the case of the virtuous are of great fruit, not those given in the case of the wicked. By ‘virtuous’ I mean one who has abandoned five qualities and possesses five qualities. What are the five qualities he has abandoned? Sensual desire is abandoned, malevolence, sloth and torpor, excitement and flurry, doubt and wavering are abandoned. These are the five. And of what five qualities is he possessed? He possesses the constituents of morality possessed by the adept, the constituents of concentration, the constituents of insight, the constituents of emancipation, the constituent of release by knowledge and vision of the adept. He has these five qualities. Thus, where five qualities are abandoned and five possessed, a gift is of great fruit, I declare.”

Thought to this effect is also expressed in the *Dakkhiṇavibhaṅgasutta* where the Buddha discourses on the four degrees of the purification of offerings. Distinguishing offerings purified by the donor, by the beneficiary, neither by the donor nor by the beneficiary and by both the donor and the beneficiary, he rejects all but the last variant as insufficient and concludes that the supreme gift is always that which is given by an accomplished monk person to an accomplished monk.¹²¹

Building on this proposition the nikāya came to differentiate various degrees of *dāna* purity. Besides the donor/beneficiary factor, it is above all the intention behind an act of giving that determines its value. In the *Sangītisutta*, the Buddha speaks of eight bases of giving that influence the result of *dāna*.¹²² These include the presence of a recipient, fear,

119. On the notions of *puṇya* and *puṇyakṣetra*, see Lamotte's notes in *La Concentration de la Marche Héroïque*, pp. 231–33.

120. A I, pp. 161–2 (trsl. Woodward).

121. M III, pp. 256–7 (cf. *Kośa*, iv pp. 236–8).

122. According to the *Abhidh-sam*, the value of the act of giving (*dānakarma*) depends on the purity of its base (*nidāna*) and endeavour (*utthāna*)—non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion—the choice of objects and his mental, vocal and physical bearing at the moment of giving. It is called accomplished, only when

reciprocity, hope for reciprocity, knowledge of the virtue of generosity, altruism, desire for fame or repute and peace of mind.¹²³ The point is made that in order to maximise the value of generosity, the donor should carefully assess his thinking and purify the intent that motivates his act of giving. For an act of generosity to be fully purified, it requires faith, respect, personal commitment, timeliness¹²⁴ and must be executed without causing distress to the recipient.¹²⁵

According to the *Kośa*, the mechanism of retribution evolves in four areas of operation. Vasubandhu postulates that gifts can either be beneficial to oneself, to others, to both or neither.¹²⁶ Merit itself is divided into two categories.¹²⁷ On the one hand, there is merit that arises by virtue of the sole fact of abandoning during the process of *dāna* (*tyāgānvayapunya*). It is generated through the production of a mental *dharma* of abandoning (*parityāgadharma*), constituting the intention to give and represents the act of giving proper. This form of merit accrues when gifts are presented to a *caitya*. On other hand, there is the merit produced by its enjoyment (*paribhoganānvayapunya*). It is merit that results from joy by the recipient in the objects that were bestowed.¹²⁸

The amount of merit depends, besides the benefactor's mental state, also on the status of the beneficiary. We saw that spiritual achievement in both the donor and beneficiary constitutes the purest form of giving and entails supreme merit. Thus, we read in the *Kośa*, citing a *sūtra* from the *Madhyamāgama*¹²⁹, that retribution proceeding from gifts made to the āryan community increases with the holiness of the beneficiary.

Corresponding to the standing of the beneficiary, the resultant merit falls into four categories. First, there is the field of merit characterised by destinies (*gati*). Here, the condition of birth of the recipient has great impact on the amount of merit that is acquired through giving.

performed frequently, impartially, with indifference (*anīśrita*) and, in particular, if associated to a commitment (*Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 94–5).

123. D III, p. 258 (see: also A IV, p. 236)

The *Amrtarasa* (*Amrt* (B), p. 89) records a tradition of seven mistaken ways of giving. These include giving with pride (*abhimānena*), giving for the sake of glory (*kīrttaye*), giving for the sake of power (*balāya*), giving accompanied by violence (*sabrśa*), giving with motivation (*hetupratyaya*), giving with the hope of reward and giving to the *Saṅgha* with discrimination (*vibhaṅga*). In contents, this enumeration contains little new and is based on the lists in D III, p. 258, A IV, p. 60, pp. 236–37; cf. *Kośabhāṣya*, p. 270.

124. On timely gifts see: A III, p. 41.

125. A III, p. 172; cf. D III, pp. 356–7.

126. *Kośa*, iv, p. 234.

127. *Kośa*, iv, pp. 244–5.

128. *Kośa*, iv, p. 244

Cf. *Amrt* (B), pp. 87–88 for a variant interpretation of this mechanism of retribution.

129. *Madhyamāgama*, TD 1, p. 722b 22.

Second, there is the factor of suffering. A gift to a needy person—sick, disabled or in any other physical distress—confers incalculable merit on the donor. In third place the *Kośa* cites “excellence through benefactor” as a condition that influences the field’s quality. For illustration, Vasubandhu quotes gifts to one’s father, mother or other benefactors as producing particularly abundant merit.¹³⁰ Third, we read that a field of merit excels through its qualities. Thus, “a retribution one hundred thousand times greater than a gift made to a persons who uphold moral conduct” will accrue to sponsors of bodhisattvas.¹³¹

Having examined some of the aspects of *dāna* in non-Mahāyāna texts, I return to the *Bdp* and appraise its exposition of *dāna*. The *Bdp* agrees with most other sources that a major benefit of generosity is the elimination of the fault of avarice (*mātsaryadoṣa*).¹³² This is a very fundamental proposition which is found in even the earliest expositions. In addition, it speaks of freedom from birth in the lower destinies (*durgatī*) as a reward for the practice of *dāna*.¹³³ This too is consistent with the early views, but it is at odds with later thinking that postulates the need for unabating selfless service and self-sacrifice in the bodhisattva training. Next, the *Bdp* takes up the ancient scheme of three causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) that give rise to generosity and determine the amount of merit produced. However, by focusing on the object (*deya*) and motivation (*cetanā*) of giving, but largely ignoring the issue of the beneficiary’s purity, it shows more concern for the active side of *dāna* practice.¹³⁴

Perhaps as a collateral, the *Bdp* pays little attention to the benefits that accrue to the beneficiary from *dāna* practice. That this is inconsistent with the reciprocity of the ideal of

130. This category refers primarily to the seven *aupadhika-punyakriyavastu* (on the *aupadhika-punyakriyavastu* and the *punyakriyavastu* in general, see: note 132 in my translation of chapter eleven).

131. *Kośa*, iv, pp. 234–38

This passage seems to fit ill with an explanation found in the *Dakkhiṇivibhaṅgasutta* (M III, pp. 254–5) that proposes that gifts given to the *Saṅgha* produce greater merit than offerings bestowed to the Buddha. For a brief discussion of the import of the Majjhimanikāya passage, see: La Vallée Poussin, 1980, p. 237 n. 3.

132. E.g., *Mpps*, v, pp. 663, 2388

In the *Mpps* (p. 2388), we find also a convenient overview of the various types of renunciation (*tyāga*). First, there is giving of gifts through the abandoning of material goods. Second, there is the attainment of *bodhi* through the abandonment of the fetters (*saṃyojana*). Both are fully attained at the seventh stage. Other types of *tyāga* are given as internal (*ādhyātmika*) and external (*bāhya*), light (*laghu*) and difficult (*guru*), the material gift and the gift of the doctrine, the mundane and supramundane gift, the latter being exempt from discrimination (*avikalpita*) and imagination (*asamkalpita*).

133. R folio 296.7.

134. The only passage in the *Bdp* that could be interpreted as taking into account the role of the beneficiary is a *jātaka* narrative that describes the offerings of the weaver Dhāvanī to the Tathāgata Kuhanachanda. This weaver attains innumerable auspicious rebirths culminating in enlightenment solely by virtue of his gifts to a Buddha—the highest of all recipients. But even here, the focus is quite clearly on the gifts that he offered and his persistence in doing so, and not on the spiritual status of the Tathāgata (R, folio 296.3–298.6).

giving, founded on the interchange of *āmiṣa* and *dharma* or *āmiṣa* and *punya*, need not be emphasised.¹³⁵ To all appearances, the *Bdp* views *dāna* above all as a pursuit that is advantageous to the bodhisattva's own advance. Characteristically, preaching of the Dharma—traditionally wellspring of the altruistic dimension of giving—is cited only once in passing.¹³⁶

It could of course be argued that giving of material items has a dual function. On the one hand, it brings to maturation the buddha-qualities and, on the other hand, attracts sentient beings to the Buddhist path. This interpretation would link the practice of *āmiṣadāna* with the *dānasamgrahavastu*. As the other three *samgrahavastu* could be categorised as *dharmadāna* (they are all concerned with preaching), also material giving raises the prospect of substantial spiritual benefits to other beings.¹³⁷

Towards the end of the chapter, the *Bdp* elucidates the overall context in which the *dānapāramitā* operates.¹³⁸ It qualifies the reward mechanism by stressing that happiness in this world is only a by-product and does represent the *raison d'être* of *dāna*. Since they are subject to the law of karma worldly benefits occur automatically in response to wholesome deeds, whether desired or not. In spite of such demotion, they are nevertheless valued and indeed become the 'launching pad' for the career of the bodhisattva. The *Bdp* explains this in the following words:¹³⁹

“O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* who persists in perfect enlightenment when giving worldly objects becomes not only a universal monarch but also acquires the states of Indra and Brahmā, even though he might not desire them. Once he has attained these three states, he accomplishes the ten stages of the bodhisattva and acquires the ten powers and four assurances of the Tathāgata. ... It is in this way, O Śāriputra, that the Tathāgata attain deliverance by means of the retribution of their [worldly] deeds.”

This thought is expanded in the next passages where the practice of giving is linked with

135. *Ug*, p. 260.5.4–5; *Kośabhāṣya*, pp. 268–69; *Amṛt* (B), p. 86.

136. R, folio 300.1.

137. The *samgrahavastu* appear in the *Bdp* on folio 695.1–698.7.

138. For a lucid account of the interrelation of *dāna* and the other *pāramitā*, see: *Mpps* (ii, p. 750–769). Another account of the relationship between the *pāramitā* and *dāna*, showing how *grhasti* bodhisattvas cultivate *śīla*, etc., in granting alms to beggars, is found at *Ug*, p. 263.1.6–2.6.

139. R, folio 294.1–4.

the *cittotpāda* and becomes the platform of the whole of the bodhisattva practice:¹⁴⁰

“O Śāriputra, once he has generated benevolence towards beggars, a bodhisattva who pursues generosity acquires by virtue of his *cittotpāda* the uninterrupted buddha-contemplations O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva assumes all forms of wonder-working powers. O Śāriputra, when former Tathāgata pursued the *bodhisattvacaryā* they procured such buddha-qualities by means of worldly gifts. O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who aspires to non-dying, enlightenment and *nirvāṇa* engages in giving worldly objects.”

Finally—setting a precedence for *pāramitā* illustration in all subsequent chapters—the *Bdp* gives an example of the *jātaka*-genre in order to demonstrate the worthwhile effects of practising *dāna*. The association of *jātaka*-type narratives and *dāna* practice has of course long been recognised. In particular, it was brought into connection with the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism.¹⁴¹ Many scholars have indicated the rising popularity of the *jātaka*-genre in the proto-Mahāyāna movement and suggested that its description of the Buddha’s former practice prepared the ground for the ascent of ‘new’, revised sets of practices in Buddhism.¹⁴² Above all, this holds true for the practice of generosity. The Buddha’s willingness in the *jātaka* to abandon all possessions including his own life must have left a lasting impression on the minds of many people.¹⁴³ Their popularity and wide circulation is well attested by their numerous recensions¹⁴⁴ and reproductions in iconography across Asia.¹⁴⁵

Ample testimony of this change is found in the literary documents of the Mahāyāna. The

140. R, folio 294.6–295.3.

141. Much has been written on the circumstance in which this transformation might have taken place and numerous, partly contradictory, scenarios were proposed. For a survey of these theories, including a good bibliography, see: Bauman, 1988.

142. E.g., Lamotte. “Sur la formation du Mahāyāna”. *Asiatica*, 1958, p. 377–80, “Mahāyāna”. in *The World of Buddhism*. ed. Bechert; Gombrich, 1984, p. 90.

143. Particularly enchanting examples of the bodhisattva’s selfless service and self-sacrifice are found in the *Vessantarajātaka* (Cone; Gombrich, Oxford, 1977), *Mahājanakajātaka* (Jātaka, vi, p. 34); *Candraprabhajātaka* (Mppś, ii, pp. 715–6) *Sarvadajātaka* (Jātaka, no. 514; *ṭikā*, v, pp. 36–57). For an example of such edifying stories preserved outside the *jātaka* collection, see the narrative of Velāma in *Aṅguttaranikāya* IV, pp. 392–396.

144. On the popularity of the *jātaka* genre in South Asia and the numerous recensions that attest this trend, see: Cone; Gombrich, 1977, pp. xv–xliv; Spiro, 1970, pp. 107–8, pp. 346–47; Gombrich. *Precept and Practice*. 1971, pp. 91, 93. For the persisting importance of *jātaka* in general, see: Spiro, 1970, pp. 18–21, 126, 153, 359 and Winternitz. *Indian Literature*. 1933, ii, p. 153.

145. See: Foucher. *La Vie du Buddha*. 1949 (introduction); Foucher, “Note sur l’itinéraire de Hiuan tsang en Afghanistan”. *Études Asiatiques*, i, pp. 261–2; Foucher. *La vieille route de l’Inde de Bactres à Taxila*. i, Paris, 1942, pp. 130–32; Lamotte. *HIB*. pp. 644–685.

first Mahāyāna *sūtra* to devote an entire chapter to the practice of giving was the *Ug*. Firmly anchored in the conduct of lay-bodhisattvas and acknowledged as fundamental to their training, *dāna* stands in the *Ug* at the centre of the whole discourse. The chief beneficiaries of the lay bodhisattva's *dāna* practice are mendicant monks. As his most elevated gifts are given to the *Saṅgha*, the bodhisattva trains to achieve the standards of morality of the monks.¹⁴⁶ Since he is in equal measure wealthy and devoted to universal liberation, generosity becomes the *grhṇpti* bodhisattva's best-known practice and lends viability to his training in society.¹⁴⁷ In the *Ug*, the practice of giving consists chiefly of material objects.¹⁴⁸ On an immediate level, the imparting of his wealth is intended to alleviate the suffering of beings. However, if perfected, it becomes the discipline by which he purifies himself of the three root defilements¹⁴⁹ and supports the conviction of the non-existence of a self.¹⁵⁰ Not before the bodhisattva has rid himself of all three defilements becomes this transformation into all-knowing feasible.¹⁵¹ What is more, his practice of *dāna* becomes also the very basis for all other attainments, most notably the remaining five perfections—that, in turn, sustain his accomplishments in generosity. Giving free from expectations for reward is here characterised as the perfection of wisdom.¹⁵² Indeed, by promoting insight through a series of mental exercises relating to generosity that guide on his path¹⁵³, *dāna* practice becomes something of a middle path between the extremes of worldly life.¹⁵⁴ In the end, the *grhṇpti* bodhisattva's entire activity is undertaken in and for the practice of giving, since it is at once the principal means of liberation and, when perfected, liberation itself.

The *grhṇpti* bodhisattva receives the inspiration to *dāna* from mendicants who dwell in temples and whom he visits frequently for instruction.¹⁵⁵ Ironically, in terms of *dāna* practice,

146. *Ug*, p. 267.1.2–2.8; p. 265.2.6–3.3.

147. Schuster, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

148. At several places we read that the lay bodhisattva gives the gift of the Dharma by preaching its doctrines to his fellow beings. By and large, these are exception in an exposition where material objects are the principal items of *dāna*. But as this charity is inspired by Dharma and teaches Dharma by example, Schuster argues that the gift of the Doctrine goes well beyond Dharma instructions proper (*op. cit.*, ii, p. 156–7). In principle, this of course holds also true for the *Bdp* and indeed all other works (e.g., *Vkn*, p. 112). And yet, since no such connection is indicated in the texts themselves, I feel that such an inference would only blur the lines between the various types of giving and contribute little to clarifying the intent of our sources.

149. *Ug*, pp. 262.5.8–263.1.2.

150. *op. cit.*, p. 263.2.7–3.2; p. 263.5.5–8; p. 264.4.3–5.7.

151. *op. cit.*, pp. 262.5.8–263.1.6.

152. *op. cit.*, p. 263.1.6–2.6.

153. *op. cit.*, pp. 262.3.7–267.1.2.

154. *op. cit.*, pp. 262.5.3–263.1.6.

155. *op. cit.*, p. 267.3.2–4.4.

the householder soon becomes superior to the mendicants, since they postpone *dāna* cultivation proper until after *dharma*-cognition.¹⁵⁶ In the *Ug* *dāna* constitutes therefore an important link connecting the householder with the mendicant ideal. Initially aroused by *bhikṣus*, it perfects the conduct of the *grhapti* bodhisattva. At a later stage the monks are set to join him in order to train themselves in *dāna*.

Another early text that discusses generosity in some detail is the *Akn*. Its treatment of *dāna* has many features in common with the *Bdp*.¹⁵⁷ It too discusses the practice of giving in the context of the six perfections. In both the *Kp* and *Ug* *dāna* is treated largely independently of the other perfections. The *Akn*'s exposition consists mainly of lists that enumerate the various objects of *dāna* and the mental states that accompany pure generosity. These enumerations address concerns similar to those of the *Bdp* and share a large stock of practices with the lists in the *Bdp*.¹⁵⁸ Other parallels exist in the reward mechanism. Like the *Bdp* the *Akn* explains that gifts of luxury lead to physical perfection, the giving of family members to high spiritual attainments and the giving of the body to the buddha-body. Differences are only found in the concluding passages, where the *Akn* sets out to define the cognitive processes that accompany the practice of *dāna*. Here, we learn that *dāna*, when perfected, is pervaded by the absence of distinguishing marks (*ānimittaparibhāvitva*), operates in the sphere of emptiness (*śūnyatākāraprasādhita*) and is not entangled in the affairs of the triple world (*traidhātukāsaṃsrṣṭa*).¹⁵⁹

The *dāna* exposition in the *Akn* represents an important watershed in the treatment of the practice of generosity. After it, departing from the numerative, highly laborious schemes of the early Mahāyāna texts, *sūtras* adopted a more succinct style in their discussion of generosity. Increasingly, descriptions of *dāna* became replaced by investigations in its conceptual foundations and scope of operation.

Early traces of this re-orientation are found in the *Rcḍ* which shows much greater interest in

156. *op. cit.*, p. 272.2.4–3.2

The mental preparation for the householder's practice of *dāna* is laid down in a list of fourteen deliberations that encourage liberal giving. These include recognition of the transiency of *dharma*, seeing the reality of non-self and perceiving that *dāna* frees the practitioner from fear, bonds of *saṃsāra* and the threat of Māra (*Ug*, p. 262.3.7–4.7).

157. 34, pp. 42.3.1–44.4.2.

158. Note that in *Akn* like the *Bdp* the gift of the Doctrine receives only scant attention and does not stand in the foreground. In a lengthy enumeration of items that are being given by bodhisattvas (pp. 42.2–43.1.1), the gift of the Doctrine figures only indirectly in five places (pp. 42.5.1–6), but is even then never clearly established as the object of *dāna*.

159. *op. cit.*, p. 43.2.8–3.1.

the mental operations underlying and manifest pure generosity.¹⁶⁰ At first, the *sūtra* lays down the conditions that are favourable to the pursuit of generosity.¹⁶¹ These consists in unreserved impartiality in the act of giving towards all beings whether evil and virtuous; generation of the mind of enlightenment with the knowledge of the sameness of all *dharma* (*sarvadharmasamatā*); resolve that the roots of virtue accrued through giving do not become transformed into personal gain; unshakable faith in the three aspects of giving.

Then, proceeding from this first, largely preparatory practice, the Buddha defines those attributes that transform giving into pure giving. Above all, these consist of cognitive processes that dominate the donor's mind at the time of giving. The bodhisattva discards the eight mistaken views concerning the self and becoming; he is free from propensities (*vāsanā*) linking the donor with desire and the lower vehicles; his body, speech, mind and intention are fully purified; he passes beyond desire for reward; transcends the fears of pride, conceit and evil works and realises emptiness all around.¹⁶² Throughout the practice, his mind is set on the welfare of beings, buddha-qualities, marks of a *mahāpuruṣa* and buddha-field.

The *Rcd*'s trend towards succinctness and conceptualisation is set forth in the *Vkn* that is entirely devoid of lists of *dāna* objects. Casting aside old established precepts on alms-begging and its footing in morality, Vimalakīrti advocates for unity of the benefactor, beneficiary and the object given (*trimaṇḍalapariśuddhi*) to become the basis of pure *dāna* practice.¹⁶³ By doing so, he dismisses practically all early principles of *dāna* practice and adjusts the notion of giving to the Mahāyāna tenet of 'universal sameness' (*sarvadharmatā*).¹⁶⁴ As a collateral of this overturn, he rejects the validity of distinctions in the objects of *dāna*. Thus, the gift of the doctrine is no longer restricted to preaching, but includes material goods as Dharma offering (*dharmayajña*).¹⁶⁵

After the *Vkn*, this thought was taken up in numerous Mahāyāna *sūtras* and became the basis for *dāna* practice. A good example is found in the *Pañca*. Acknowledging the validity of the threefold purity, it distinguishes a mundane and supramundane mode of generosity. On worldly *dāna* application, we read:¹⁶⁶

160. 24, pp. 231.4.6–232.4.3.

161. *op. cit.*, pp. 231.5.2–232.1.8.

162. *op. cit.*, p. 232.2.1–3.3.

163. *Vkn*, pp. 51–52.

164. M III, pp. 256–7; A I, pp. 161–2.

165. *Vkn*, p. 112.

166. *Pañca*, p. 264 (trsl. Conze).

“Held by three ties the bodhisattva gives a gift. What are the three? The notion of the self, the notion of others and the notion of a gift. To give a gift held by these three ties, that is called the worldly perfection of giving; it is called ‘worldly’ because one does not swerve from the world, does not depart from it, does not pass beyond it.”

Rooted in the conviction of the inapprehensibility (*anupalambha*) of *dharma*, supramundane giving takes as its object the threefold purity of giving.¹⁶⁷

“The supramundane perfection of giving, on the other hand, consists in threefold purity. What is threefold purity? Here a bodhisattva gives a gift, and he does not apprehend a self, a recipient, or a gift; also no reward for his giving. He surrenders that gift to all beings, but does not apprehend those beings, or himself either. And, although he dedicates that gift to the supreme enlightenment, he does not apprehend any enlightenment. ... It is called supramundane because one swerves from the world, departs from it, passes away from it.”

Crucially important to both modes of giving, is the bodhisattva’s willingness to transfer the gift itself and all the merit he gained through it to his fellow beings.¹⁶⁸

167. *Pañca*, p. 253a (trsl. Conze)

The notions of mundane and supramundane levels of giving are taken up in the *Mppś*. Mundane giving (*laukikadāna*) consists in ordinary generosity or gifts granted by members of the āryan-fold, but accompanied by impure thoughts. This last point is subject to controversy as some have argued that every gift from the ārya, even if of impure motivation, is by definition, supramundane since they have cut off all fetters (*saṃyojana*) of existence through the *apraṇihitasamādhi* (*op. cit.*, i, pp. 322–23).

Supramundane giving (*lokottaradāna*) has as its object items that are unreservedly pure and conforms to the true character (*bhūtalakṣaṇa*) of the Dharma. It includes also relinquishing one’s own life, if it is done out of concern for the welfare of beings (*Mppś*, ii, pp. 688–691). Every act of giving exclusively aimed at escape from *saṃsāra* is impure, since it ignores the suffering of sentient beings and lacks interest in the ‘true’ teaching of the Dharma (*Mppś*, ii, p. 677). This position is fundamentally based on a passage in the *Velāmasutta* (A IV, pp. 392–96) where the Buddha recounts an episode of his previous life as bodhisattva. Similar criteria apply to the donor. Persons who freely give away their riches but fail to abandon giving are mundane in character. Those, however, who resolve to renounce material objects *and* the concept of giving—knowing that they both are ultimately non-existent (*anupalabha*)—are supramundane operators (*Mppś*, ii, p. 724).

168. *Pañca*, p. 176 (trsl. Conze)

In the final analysis even this tenuous link with conventional reality must be abandoned, since any thought of having given something away might lead to pride and satisfaction. In the words of the *Vajracchedikā*:

“A gift should not be given by a bodhisattva who is supported by an object; a gift should not be given by a bodhisattva who is supported anywhere. A gift should not be given by a bodhisattva who is supported by matter, sound, scent, taste, touch or mind objects. For Subhūti, a gift is to be given by a bodhisattva *mahāsattva* in such a way that he does not support himself even on the notion of a sign” (*Vajracchedikā*; Vaidya, 1961, p. 76; ref. Meadows).

“Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the perfection of giving of a bodhisattva who courses in perfect wisdom and gives gifts consists in that, with attention associated with the knowledge of all modes, he turns over to full enlightenment that gift which he gives, after he has made that wholesome root [which results from the act of giving] common to all people.”

It is on this note that *Bdp* concludes its discussion of *dāna*. Linking generosity with the *cittotpāda*, it sums up the fundamental principles of *dāna* practice as follows:¹⁶⁹

“O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who is skilful gives [gifts] to many people, even if [what is given] is small. His practice excels by virtue of the power of his pristine cognition. It is strengthened by the power of his wisdom. It is without limit by virtue of his power of dedication.”

This survey of the development of the concept of *dāna* allows us to draw some conclusions about the treatment of generosity in the *Bdp*. The nature of presentation suggests that the *Bdp*'s exposition of generosity belongs to the earliest strands in Mahāyāna *sūtras*. The extensive use of enumerations, the predominantly descriptive tone and the application of the *jātaka*-genre as a vehicle of explication all point to an early date of composition. It is difficult to establish the period of time of its formulation, but the fact that the *Bdp* does not expose the practice of *dāna* to the principles of Mahāyāna ontology and shows no interest in conceptualising indicates that it probably predates the discussions of the *Vkn*, *Pañca* and *Rcd*. For the bodhisattva in the *Bdp*, the practice of *dāna* involves quite clearly true hardship and unfeigned renunciation. That the *Bdp* does not include the gift of the Dharma among the objects of giving is further evidence of its antiquity because it suggests that teaching had not yet

This non-support of the bodhisattva when giving is extended in the *Gaganagañjasūtra* to the gift itself (*Śiks*, pp. 270.14–271.1):

“Just as space is immaterial, so the gift is independent of matter; just as space is without feeling, so the gift is detached from all feeling; in the same way, it is without consciousness, unconditioned and bears the characteristic of non-manifestation; just as space pervades all buddha-fields, so that gift is pervaded with compassion for all creatures; just as space is always transparent, so his gift is clear of the nature of thought; just as space illuminates all creatures, so his gift gives life to all creatures ... by absence of duality, gift is clear of the marks of illusion.”

169. R, folio 298.5–6.

become a major concern of the bodhisattva. In later texts this position was fundamentally revised and *dharmadāna* became a major, if not the most important, aspect of the practice of generosity.

It is also of interest to note the connection between generosity and morality. When the *Bdp* discusses the forty manifestations of *dāna* and the mental states that accompany pure giving, it is clearly concerned to show that giving is an intrinsically moral practice that can only flourish if it is applied within the confines of pure morality. We have seen that this link between *dāna* and *śīla* is not particular to Mahāyāna thinking but had already been established by the Buddha in the Dīghanikāya. In the Mahāyāna, the *dāna/śīla* association is most evident in the early *sūtras*. Apart from the *Bdp*, it is found in the *Ug*, *Kp*, *Rp*, *Akn*, *PraS* and *Sukhāvatīvyūha*. In response to shifts in perception that were occasioned by the increasingly powerful presence of the ontological postulates of *śūnyatā* and *samatā* this connection waned in later literature. Already in the *Vkn* it became delegated to the background and it is altogether absent from the *Pañca*. In a sense, its disappearance was inevitable and represents the logical outcome of a vision of reality that rejects the validity of all worldly experience and operates beyond the parameter of purity and impurity. The fact that it is found in the *Bdp* and placed very much in the centre of the exposition of *dāna* is yet another indication that the *Bdp* is a work of great antiquity and belongs to the earlier strands of Mahāyāna *sūtras*.

The Perfection of Morality

“For ordinary people, for those who originate in the word [of the buddha],
For persons who are predestined to the awakening of pratyekabuddhas,
And for sons of the buddha there is no other cause but morality
[That leads to] supreme happiness and worldly delight.”¹⁷⁰

This verse, composed in the seventh century by Candrakīrti, is eloquent testimony of the high esteem in which Buddhists of all ages held moral integrity. Valued for the disciplinarian rigour and purificatory effect morality impressed on those who subscribed to its observance, the practice of morality formed from early on a pillar of Buddhist spirituality. Echoing this importance, it was juxtaposed to meditation and wisdom and became one of the three cardinal practices the Buddha grew never tired of expounding.

In particular, moral conduct was valued for its preparatory role in the spiritual development. In the *Dasuttarasutta*, the Buddha included the following counsel amongst eight conditions that occasion wisdom:¹⁷¹

“Self-restraint in accordance with the *pātimokkha* code, equipped with wholesome conduct, recognising danger in even the smallest transgression, [a monk] trains in the moral precepts (*sikkhāpada*).”

The *sāmaññaphala* stage by stage account of the path in the *śīlakhandhavagga* of the Dīghanikāya draws a clear picture of the dynamics governing the progress of spiritual purification. This process starts with *sīla* as the preliminary stage, proceeds through its intermediate stages with the practice of *samādhi* and culminates in the cultivation of *paññā*.¹⁷² The spirit of this scheme is encapsulated in a well-known passage of the

170. *Mavbh*, p. 41.17–20.

171. D III, p. 285.

172. This progressive characterisation of the path recurs numerous times in the nikāya. In the Majjhimanikāya (M I, pp. 178–89, pp. 267–71, pp. 344–8; III, pp. 33–6, pp. 134–7), we find several examples of slightly abbreviated versions. The same pattern, if adjusted to an altered frame of reference, is epitomised in the scheme of the seven perfections (*visuddhi*) of the *Rathavināsa* and, of course, in the overall structure of the *Visuddhimagga*.

Mahāparinibbānasutta:¹⁷³

“Such is *sīla*, such is *samādhi*, such is *paññā*. When imbued with *sīla*, *samādhi* is of great fruit and benefit. When imbued with *samādhi*, *paññā* is of great fruit and benefit. When imbued with *paññā*, the mind is rightly freed from the *āsava*, namely the *āsava* of sensual desire, the *āsava* of becoming, the *āsava* of views, the *āsava* of ignorance.”

In spite of this hierachical structure, it would be a mistake to infer that morality, meditation and wisdom are practised in isolation and succession.¹⁷⁴ For, in practice all three are inextricably linked together and can only flourish in conjoint efforts:¹⁷⁵

“Just as Gautama, one might wash hand with hand or foot with foot, even so *paññā* is fully washed by *sīla* and *sīla* is fully washed by *paññā*. Where there is *sīla* there is *paññā*, where there is *paññā* there is *sīla*. One who has *sīla* has *paññā*, one who has *paññā* has *sīla*. [*Sīla*] and *paññā* together are declared the summit of the world.”

The best canonical treatment of *sīla* is not to be found among the scattered references of the four principal *nikāya*, but in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*.¹⁷⁶ For the *Paṭis*, the quality of *sīla* is primarily determined by its scope and depth of application. Measured by as a series of factors that compromise moral integrity, these include transgressions motivated by considerations of gain, fame, family, physical well-being and life-and-death.¹⁷⁷ It is only when *sīla* is wholly unaffected and well beyond such worldly concerns that it fosters spiritual growth and becomes the basis for *nibbāna*.¹⁷⁸

In order to be fully beneficial to these attainments, moral conduct must have its foundation in cognition and operate in combination with restraint, non-transgression, volition and

173. D II, p. 81; repeated on pp. 84, 91, 98 (trsl. Gethin; my punctuation).

174. For a more detailed discussion of their interrelation see: Gombrich, 1984, pp. 91–102 and Gethin, 1987, pp. 399–400.

175. D I, pp. 124 (trsl. Gethin; my punctuation)

Samādhi is omitted in this scheme as the *Sonadādasutta*, from which this quotation stems, investigates the path phases only in terms of moral conduct and wisdom.

176. *Paṭis*, i, pp. 43–48.

177. A commentary on this section is found in *Vism*, i, p. 12.

178. *Paṭis*, i, p. 44.

consciousness-concomitants (*cetasika*). According to Buddhaghosa¹⁷⁹, quoting canonical sources, morality as restraint refers above all to the restraint through the *pātimokkha* code¹⁸⁰, mindfulness, knowledge, patience and energy.¹⁸¹ *Sīla* as non-transgression applies to compliance with whatever commitments of virtue one has undertaken. Since these vary with the respective vows, *śīla* ranges from non-violation of the *pañcasīla* to full adherence to all *Vinaya* rules. Conceptually, morality as volition and consciousness-concomitants go hand in hand as they represent two aspects of the same mental factor. The volitional dimension refers to the positive intention (*cetanā*) that is present in one who refrains from killing, etc., while, its consciousness-concomitants are those aspects of consciousness that arise together as the factor of abstinence.¹⁸² If applied to the ten wholesome acts of restraint, morality as volition accounts for the *cetanā* that generate the first seven non-actions, while its consciousness-concomitants generate the three remaining states of non-covetousness, non-ill-will and right view.¹⁸³

On the basis of these distinctions, the *Paṭi*s draws up five categories of *sīla*, namely, abandoning, abstention, volition, restraint and non-transgression, and relates them to each of the ten non-virtuous actions. The most important benefit that flows from these five modes of *sīla* is 'non-remorse cognition'.¹⁸⁴ It is so because it prepares the ground for higher understanding of the path which prompts the practitioner to carry out all practices as required.¹⁸⁵

Buddhaghosa, greatly expanding on the *sīla* section of the *Paṭi*s, proposes nineteen aspects of morality.¹⁸⁶ Of particular interest for the present study is his understanding of mundane and supramundane morality. Citing a passage from the *Vinaya*, he establishes that *sīla* that is still subject to the cankers is essentially mundane.¹⁸⁷ It brings about improvement in future states of existence and constitutes an indispensable prerequisite for deliverance. Supramundane morality, in contrast, operating beyond worldly constraints, is capable of leading directly to

179. *Vism*, i, p. 8.

180. According to the *Kośa* (iv, pp. 47–48), propounding a Sautrāntika point of view, the discipline of the *prātimokṣa* code falls into four categories. Morality (*śīla*) redressing that which is unjust; good conduct (*sucarita*) that is praised by the wise; action (of body and speech) because it is action by nature; and discipline (*saṃvara*) because it constrains body and speech.

181. D I, p. 70; M I, pp. 10–11; *Sn*. 1035.

182. Cf. *Atthāsalinī*, iii, chpt. v, pp. 103–106.

183. *Vism*, i, p. 7.

184. See also A V, p. 1 where we read: "Ānanda, profitable habits (virtues) have non-remorse as their aim and non-remorse as their benefit."

185. *Paṭi*s, i, p. 47.

186. *Vism*, i, pp. 10–51.

187. *Vin*, v, p. 164.

nibbāna and represents the plane of 'reviewing knowledge'.¹⁸⁸

Purification itself is brought about through four modes of practice and behaviour.¹⁸⁹ First, there is purification by teachings. This form of purity originates in hearing and observing the rules of the *Pātimokkhasutta*. Second, purification by restraint refers to consciously undertaken abstention from sensual indulgence. It evolves from a resolution to that effect and varies according to the commitments. Third, purification by search is achieved through conscientious probing resulting in rightful acquiring of requisites. Fourth, purification by reviewing emerges from mindful scrutiny of those objects that one plans to appropriate *prior* to the acquisition proper in order avoid unintended offence.¹⁹⁰

The Mahāyāna *sūtras* incorporated many of the above concerns into their interpretation of *śīla*. This is attested by the great number of *śīla* expositions that revolve around the issues that are expressed in the tenfold virtuous activity (*kuśalakarmapatha*). But they also went beyond this scheme which was expanded to comprise numerous other qualities and practices. Religiously, many of these new precepts grew out of the resolve to achieve universal deliverance and accommodate therefore a much greater spiritual ideal. This led to a conceptual expansion of the notion of *śīla* beyond the parameter of the *prātimokṣa* code.

Cognitively, this expanded interpretation of morality required a new frame of reference to

188. *Vism*, i, p. 13.

Next, Buddhaghōṣa distinguishes moral conduct that is natural, necessary, customary and due to previous causes (*Vism*, i, p. 15). A similar characterisation of the nature of moral conduct is found in the *Bbh* where we read that *śīla* should be understood as adopted, natural, habituated or conjoined with means. Adopted morality is that on which the threefold morality of the *Bbh* is modelled. Natural morality is undertaking physical and vocal activity that is entirely pure because of the nature goodness of the mental continuum that is established in the bodhisattva fold. Habituated morality characterises the moral conduct by which the bodhisattva has grown accustomed to the threefold morality in his previous lives. Morality that is conjoined with means refers to the bodhisattva's reliance on the four means of conversion in order to encourage to virtuous activity of body and speech (*Bbh*, p. 184.6–22).

According to the *Kośa*, combining material from two discourses of the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (II, p. 121; IV, p. 364), morality is of four types. First, there is morality of fear. One observes this out of concern for loss of the daily necessities, out of concern for a bad reputation, out of fear of chastisement and out of fear of birth in the evil destinies. Second, there is mercenary morality that one adheres to out of attachment to life in the good destinies, to pleasures and to honours. Third, there is morality that is suitable to the factors of enlightenment that pertain to persons of right view. Fourth, there is pure morality that, being free from stain, is free from vices (*Kośa*, iv, p. 248).

189. *Vism*, i, pp. 43–44.

190. In the *Kośa* (iv, pp. 247–8), moral purity is attributed to rejection of the causes of immorality (viz, the *kleśa* and *upakleśa*), to the workings of the four bases of mindfulness (vi, p. 158) and to reliance on the peace of *nirvāṇa*. Then, it considers five additional causes of moral integrity. These are purity of the deed itself (renouncing of evil deeds); purity of their attendants (renouncing the preparations or the means of killing, etc.); absence of the disturbance from *vitarka* (*kāma*, *vyāpāda* and *vihiṃsāvitarka*); its supervision through mindfulness (Buddha, Dharma and *Śaṅgha*—that includes the renunciation of undefined actions) and its application to *nirvāṇa* (*op. cit.*, iv, p. 248).

allow integration into the revised philosophical tenets of Mahāyāna thinking. The calls for purity of body, speech and mind indexed to a world that itself had no independent claim to existence beyond the level of convention must have startled the minds of many Buddhists of the day. In order to allay this bewilderment and to reconcile what appeared to be contradictory demands, Mahāyāna thinkers drew up a blueprint that distinguished two levels of truth. On the lower or conventional level, the need for moral integrity was upheld. On a higher level of understanding—reserved to those of rare spiritual gifts—‘reality as it is’ (*yathābhūta*) revealed itself as having the characteristics of same (*sama*), unborn (*anutpanna*) and calm (*śānta*), operating beyond the categories of purity and impurity. Seen from this absolute viewpoint, all endeavours in morality lose in their meaning and become harmful to liberation since they obstruct conceptual ‘unbecoming’ by superimposing non-existent predicates on reality.

It was from this kind of changes in perception that there eventually emerged a new type of ethics—the bodhisattva morality (*bodhisattvaśīla*). Based on the amalgamation of the vastly expanded mission and the new vision of reality, Mahāyāna *sūtras* came to propose a moral ideal that was tailored to the spiritual aspiration of the bodhisattva. Dismissing the early prohibitive schemes of the śrāvaka as inadequate, the bodhisattva morality superseded the ancient conventions and replaced them with a scheme that allowed for a free interplay between cognitive realisation and the religious obligation of universal liberation.

That this process was slow is attested in several early Mahāyāna *sūtras* where we find the treatment of *śīla* still bearing close resemblance to the ideal of early Buddhism.¹⁹¹ That is to say, it continues to revolve around the tenfold virtuous activity, to emphasise the threat of desire and to operate within (be at the margin of) the confines of śrāvakayāna ontology. A good example is the *Ug*. Here, the treatment of *śīla* is still dominated by an exposition of the *pañcaśīla*.¹⁹² Following well-established pattern, it discusses the five limbs and points to the

191. *Aṣṭa*, p. 427; for a list of eleven, see: *Aṣṭa*, p. 324 (cf. *Saddhp*, pp. 275–296).

Another example is the *Dbh*. The *Dbh*, however, stands out for the fruits it proposes arise from the *kuśalakarmapatha*. According to this text the *kuśalakarmapatha* lead to the state of pratyekabuddhahood when purified through the insight of its attainment. They encourage purification of the bodhisattva’s stages, perfections and conduct if practised in the spirit of the bodhisattva’s *prañidhāna* and lead, if fully purified, to the state of buddhahood itself (*Daśa-bh*, p. 26.1–13).

192. As if appended to the chapter, the *Ug* adds in a few lines the remaining five *śīla* of the *akuśalakarmapatha* so that in fact all ten factors are present (pp. 261.2.6–3.5).

The *pañcaśīla* correspond to the first five precepts in a list of rules known in Pāli as the *sikkhāpadāni* (Skt. *sikṣāpadāni*). Both refer essentially to those precepts a layman is expected to observe when he enters into the Buddhist community and, to some extent, define his spiritual status. In the Buddhist training, their role is chiefly preliminary as they prepare the commitment to higher disciplinary practices. In substance there is no difference between the *pañcaśīla* observance of śrāvaka and bodhisattvas since it spells out a basic moral ideal that is quite independent from the *cittopāda* and *prañidhāna*. In a controversial article

disadvantages arising from their violation, with desire (*rāga*) rated as the most serious obstacle.¹⁹³ Traces to the new ideal are few and do not affect the spirit of the treatise. They occur only once in a brief passage indicating compassion behind harmlessness and in a reference to 'caring generosity'.

In the *Rcd*, *śīla* is given a more advanced treatment. In particular, it displays several concepts that link it unambiguously with the Mahāyāna. First, it states that the bodhisattva's whole practice of morality is rooted in the *cittotpāda*.¹⁹⁴ Whatever its manifestations, the overriding purpose of the *śīla* practice is the universal liberation of beings. This objective is achieved by the traditional practice of the *daśakuśala* in conjunction with selfless service and resolve. The motivation behind the bodhisattva's moral training is therefore Mahāyāna, while the means to achieve progress therein are outlined along the conventional understanding of *śīla*. For the author of the *Rcd*, no doubt, moral purification takes place in a world of 'real' obstacles, genuine impurity and is achieved through a set of practices specifically designed to overcome them.

In the *Akn* this understanding of morality is taken up and further integrated into Mahāyāna ontology. At first, like the *Rcd*, the *Akn* looks at morality from a conventional point of view and enumerates a great number of attributes that pertain to moral perfection.¹⁹⁵ Although the list commences with the *daśakuśala*, many of the items go well beyond its scope and link *śīla* specifically with bodhisattva practices.¹⁹⁶ Next, the *Akn* investigates the nature of morality in the light of the doctrine of non-attribution (*asamāropa*), concluding that morality of the foundation of being (*dharmtāśīla*) prevails when there is absence of names and signs

(1963), Hirakawa has pointed out that in several versions of the *Aṣṭa* the *daśakuśala* are identical with the *daśasīla* of the nikāya to conclude that the *daśakuśala* were originally the morality of laymen after which they were adopted by the Mahāyānists as the basic discipline for lay and recluse bodhisattvas (p. 75). Alleging that the *daśakuśala* were neglected by nikāya Buddhism and taken up in reaction by the Mahāyāna, he argues that the *pañcaśīla* became the new basis of the bodhisattva morality. This raises several problems: First, the *pañcaśīla* do not correspond to the first five elements of the *daśakuśala* but have counterparts in the *sikṣāpadāni*. Second, for the *Ug* on which much of his claim rests (p. 94), the *pañcaśīla* are enjoined for laymen—not recluses. Third, not even the *daśasīla* and *daśakuśala* correspond in contents. All this indicates that the situation was much more complex than suggested by Hirakawa and that we cannot speak of a direct, verbatim borrowing between the morality of śrāvaka and bodhisattvas. Both, no doubt, shared a common conception of morality—that, according to Gombrich, (1984), had a pre-Buddhist origin—and were guided by similar principles. But to stipulate a direct line of borrowing seems certainly to oversimplify matters.

193. *Ug*, p. 261.1.2–2.6.

194. *Rcd*, p. 232.4.5.

195. *Akn*, pp. 43.4.2–44.1.7.

196. The *Akn* includes, for instance, unloquacious morality (*amukharaśīla*), peaceful morality (*śāntiśīla*), morality which grasps adequately gentle speech (*suvaḥpradakṣiṇagrahaśīla*), morality of bringing sentient beings to maturity (*sattvapariṇāmanāśīla*) and morality guarding the Dharma as manifestations of *śīla* (p. 44.4–6).

(*nāmasaṃketa*), since “morality is where there is no attribution of body, speech and mind”.¹⁹⁷ If seen from the *paramārtha* point of view and subjected to the same philosophical rigour as all other phenomena, it becomes a non-practice (*adharmā*) of no independent existence. With such propositions in hand, the *Akn* draws a clear line in the understanding of morality. By fully integrating moral conduct in cognition and by making its purity dependent on insight rather than practice, it blurs the distinctions between *śīla*, *samādhi* and *prajñā* as never before. It is true that also in the *Akn* the cognitive dimension is still dominated by practical concerns of morality; and yet, its cognitive propositions clearly herald a new type of understanding of *śīla*.¹⁹⁸

The first *sūtra* to undertake a clear commitment to this ontological interpretation was the *Kp*. Here, in a memorable passage, we learn:¹⁹⁹

“Die Moral, Kāśyapa, wird Moral genannt, bei der kein Selbsthaftes, kein Wesen, kein Nominalismus des Wesen, kein zu Tuendes, kein nicht zu Tuendes, kein Bewirken, kein nicht Bewirken, kein Wandel, kein Nichtwandel, keine Ausführung, keine Nichtausführung, kein Name, keine Gestalt, kein Attribut, kein Nichtattribut, keine Ruhe, keine Beruhigung, kein Erfassen, kein Aufgeben, kein zu Erfassendes [existiert]. ... O Kāśyapa, die Moral ist ohne Einflüsse, nichts zugehörig, abgesondert von der Dreiwelt, fern von all Basis im Leben.”

It is argued that monks who still considered moral conduct as a ‘real’ concern involving independently existing beings and of sensory experience that is based on mistaken assumptions (*upalambhadrṣṭika*)—however conscientiously they might have observed the precepts—failed to accomplish moral purity.²⁰⁰ In the words of Candrakīrti:²⁰¹

“If [a bodhisattva] sees in moral purity an own-being (*svabhāva*)
By that very reason, his morality is not pure.”

Besides this reinterpretation of *śīla*, the *Kp* makes another important contribution to the

197. *op. cit.*, p. 44.1.8–2.4.

198. *op. cit.*, p. 44.2.4–7.

199. *Kp*, pp. 202–206, § 140–142 (trsl. Weller).

200. *op. cit.*, pp. 191–2, § 134.

201. *Mavbh* p. 37.17–18.

understanding of morality. We have seen that so far conventional morality is chiefly concerned with the *dasakuśala*, either set in the context of prohibitive regulations or aligned to the thought of enlightenment. This concept is not absent from the *Kp*. It encourages repeatedly constraint of the senses²⁰², correct conduct²⁰³ and genuine observance of monastic precepts²⁰⁴ as the principal means to overcome evil propensities.²⁰⁵ Where it differs is the stipulation for extensive roots of virtue (*kuśaladharmā*) to complement compliance with the regulative strands of *śīla* so that they may result in maximum benefit. This recognition, it is true, is not totally absent in other texts. However, in the *Kp* it is for the first time that the accumulation of roots of virtue—if only tentatively—is proposed as a regular concomitant of morality.²⁰⁶ In later Buddhist literature, most notably the *Bbh*, this association contributed to making the accumulation of roots of virtue an integral part of bodhisattva morality.

In the *Vkn*, apparently building on the concerns of the *Kp*, but leading them to a logical conclusion, Vimalakīrti clarifies the impact of mind on moral conduct:²⁰⁷

“A fault exists neither on the inside, nor on the outside, nor between the two.”²⁰⁸

And Why? Because the Blessed One has said: ‘By the defilement of the mind are beings defiled, by the purification of the mind are they purified. Honourable Upāli, the mind exists neither on the inside, nor on the outside, nor between the two. So it is with a fault as it is with the mind, and with all *dharma* as with a fault: they are not separated from suchness.’ ... All *dharma* are without arising, disappearance and duration, like an illusion, a cloud or a flash of lightning.

Those who know this are called the true guardians of the discipline.”²⁰⁹

202. *Kp*, p. 46, § 22.1.

203. *op. cit.*, p. 13, § 6.2

204. *op. cit.*, pp. 18–19, § 8; pp. 191–2, § 134.

205. *op. cit.*, p. 45, § 21.1.

206. *Kp*, pp. 10–19; pp. 41–44, § 5, 6, 8, 19, 20

The advantages that accrue from the roots of virtue are manifold, but always personal to the bodhisattva. The means by which a bodhisattva accumulates roots of virtue are fourfold, viz., delight in solitude, practice of the means of conversion, selfless service and self-sacrifice and insatiability for roots of virtue (*op. cit.*, p. 41, § 19). In the *Kp*, the only factor capable of removing their accumulation is mind (*citta*) that, though utterly insubstantial, represents a real threat to the bodhisattva’s morality since it is associated with the sense pleasures but difficult to trace (*op. cit.*, p. 149, § 102).

207. *Vkn*, pp. 71–73 (trsl. Lamotte).

A very similar version of this passage is also found in the *Kp* (p. 144, § 98) and in the *Mppś* (ii, p. 861).

208. The reasoning behind this thought is explained in the *Kp* (pp. 206–10, § 142–44) where the point is made that the formulation of an idea on a concept incurs conceptual bondage (*saṃjñābandhana*) and that the only mode of escape from its trappings is given through entry into the attainment of the extinction of consciousness and sensation (*saṃjñāvedayitānirodhasamāpatti*).

209. On the notion of non-separation the *Vkn* (p. 192; trsl. Lamotte) adds:

The *Pañca*, introduces a third element that, while tacitly present in all Mahāyāna *sūtras*, has never before been specially mentioned as a factor affecting *śīla* practice. This is the bodhisattva's resolve to mature all sentient beings.²¹⁰

“Coursing in the perfection of morality ... endowed with this skill in means, the bodhisattva grows in wholesome roots, courses in the perfection of morality, matures beings, and purifies the buddha-field. But he does not aspire for any fruit from his morality, which he could enjoy in *samsāra*, and it is only for the purpose of protecting and maturing beings that he courses in the perfection of morality.”

While it is difficult to assess the influence such a passage might have had on subsequent developments, it is striking that many of its key elements found their way into later scholastic literature.²¹¹ In the *Bbh*, for instance, one meets with exactly the same *śīla* division proposing discipline, collecting wholesome roots and ripening of beings as chief components of moral conduct.²¹²

The first element, entitled morality of the vow (*saṃvaraśīla*) is said to vary according to the seven commitments that are open to Buddhist followers.²¹³ Recognising the variety of

“Good and bad are two. Not seeking after either the good or the bad, understanding that the sign and the signless are not two, this is penetrating into non-duality ... To say, ‘this is impure and that is pure’ implies duality. If one grasps *dharma* from the angle of their sameness, one no longer produces either a notion of impure or a notion of pure, but one is still not notion-free ...” (cf. *Madhyāntavibhāga*, p. 221. 24).

210. *Pañca*, p. 489 (trsl. Conze).

As the overriding concern of the bodhisattva training in general, this intention figures in one way or another in all *sūtras* we have looked at so far. Most notably, it is implied in the *Rcd*'s depiction of *śīla* where the thought of enlightenment is given as the foundation of moral conduct. Yet, prior to the *Pañca*, no text cites ‘morality as benefiting beings’ (*sattvānugrāhakaśīla*) as a quality that pertains specifically to moral conduct—let alone, as its *raison d'être* (cf. *Śgs*, p. 142).

211. For a concise, if slightly inaccurate, survey of sources in which these issues occur, see: *Hōbōgirin*, 1929–1930, “Bosatzukai”, pp. 142–146.

212. *Bbh*, p. 138.24–27

The same division appears also in the *Siddhi* (pp. 631–32) and is incorporated in the scheme of *śīla* propounded in the *Msg* (pp. 212–13). In the *Msg*, however, it does not serve as an overall classification, but—representing ‘superiority in kind’—forms part of a fourfold scheme that distinguishes ‘distinction in kind’ (*prabhedaviśeṣa*), ‘distinction founded in rules that are common and not common’ (*sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇaśikṣaviśeṣa*), ‘distinction in immensity’ (*vaipulyaviśeṣa*) and ‘distinction in depth’ (*gambhīryaviśeṣa*). Compared with the plan of the *Bbh*, the scope of this classification is rather limited and leaves many issues unexplained.

213. Altogether, action of discipline falls into three categories: (1) action included in the discipline of the *prātimokṣa* vow, (2) action included in the discipline of meditation (*dhyānaśamvara*), (3) action included in the discipline of (supramundane) purity (*anāsravaśamvara*).

As discipline of the *prātimokṣa* vow Buddhism distinguishes eight kinds of commitment—not seven (*Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 90). These are the discipline of monks (*bhikṣuśamvara*), nuns (*bhikṣuṇīśamvara*), of

human circumstances, the *Bbh* integrates both the lay and monastic side in its vision of the *bodhisattvaśīla*.²¹⁴ However, the description of the bodhisattva's *saṃvaraśīla* suggests that it is in fact firmly placed within the monastic environment.²¹⁵

The second component of *śīla* involves the accumulation of factors of virtue (*kuśaladharmasīla*).²¹⁶ The bodhisattva achieves this through a variety of practices, including reverence, mindfulness, compassion, seclusion and of course the practice of the *pāramitā*. Of particular interest are the five aspects of wisdom. These enable the bodhisattva to learn about the advantages that accrue from virtue, the causes of virtue, distortions (viz., the four mistaken views), non-distortions and about the obstacles to accumulating virtue.²¹⁷

The third aspect of morality is directed at the welfare of sentient beings (*sattvānugrāhakaśīla*) and specifically concerned with those practices that allay their suffering.²¹⁸ It includes training in skilful means, means of conversion, generosity²¹⁹, protection²²⁰, compliance when appropriate

those who undergo training (*śikṣamāṇasaṃvara*), novices (*śramaṇerasaṃvara*), female novices (*śrāmaṇerīsaṃvara*), lay-followers (*upāsakaṣaṃvara*), female lay-followers (*upāsikāsaṃvara*) and the discipline of fasting (*upavāsaṣaṃvara*). Possibly Asaṅga saw a correlation with the seven groups of moral observance that are comprised in the discipline of the *prātimokṣa* vow, viz., *pārājika*, *saṅghāvaśeṣa*, *aniyata*, *niḥsargika-pāyantika*, *pāyantika*, *prātideśaniya* and *saikṣa*. A good summary of some of the issues pertaining to the eight types of discipline is found in the *Kośa* (iv, pp. 41–47).

The discipline of meditation refers to abstention from indulgence in sense pleasures at a time when the seeds of defilement stemming from immorality, particularly those of sexual desire, are cut off during the first three stages of meditation. The *Kośa* (iv, p. 41) adds that while the *prātimokṣasaṃvara* belongs to the *kāmadhātu*, the *dhyānaṣaṃvara* operates only in the *rūpadhātu*.

Discipline of (supramundane) purity constitutes pure abstention that is attained through internal insight of truth by the force of one's attention to pure realms (*Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 90–91). They exist among the gods of the *kāmadhātu* and *rūpadhātu* (with the exception of the *asaṃjñāsattva* and the gods of the intermediate *dhyāna*), though never in the *arūpyadhātu* since discipline belongs to the sphere of matter which the *arūpyadhātu* gods cannot possess (*Kośa*, iv, p. 105).

The discipline that arises from meditation and the pure discipline are concomitants of the mind; not the *prātimokṣa* discipline since it continues to exist in persons whose mind is bad or neutral, or who is unconscious (*Kośa*, iv, p. 51).

For further detail on the *prātimokṣa* morality, see: *Kośa*, iv, pp. 87, 94–101; *Paṭi*, pp. 43–44. For an appraisal of the *upavāsaṣaṃvara* see: *Kośa*, iv, pp. 64–72 and *Mppś*, ii, pp. 825–39.

214. *Bbh*, p. 138.18–23

While, in general, this attitude is very common in Mahāyāna *sūtras* and *śāstras*, it is rare that it becomes as explicitly expressed as it is here in the *Bbh*. In most cases, the proposition that the *bodhisattvacaryā* can either be pursued in a monastic environment or as a layman is tacitly assumed. Notable exceptions to this rule are the *Vkn*, *Ug*, *Vup* and *Upāsakaśīlasūtra*. For a succinct discussion of the various aspect that pertain to the lay and monastic ideal, including a list of references in Pāli and Sanskrit sources, see: *Vkn*, pp. 75–77.

215. *Bbh*, p. 141.2–6

For an account of the kinds of action that infringe on discipline (*asaṃvara*), their impact on the bodhisattva's spiritual development and the psychological reactions they occasion, see *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 91–98.

216. *Bbh*, p. 139.1–3.

217. *op. cit.*, p. 144.9–16.

218. *op. cit.*, p. 140.4–28.

219. *op. cit.*, p. 147.7–25.

220. *op. cit.*, p. 146.14–19.

and resistance when necessary²²¹, sympathetic joy²²² and performance of wonder-working powers.²²³

For the cultivation of the threefold morality to become successful several preconditions have to be met.²²⁴ First, the bodhisattva requires a learned instructor in order to correctly receive his *śīla* instructions. Second, it is essential that the bodhisattva acquires a fully purified intention (*adhyāśaya*) since it determines judgement in the application of the precepts.²²⁵ If he is thus equipped, two more *dharma* emerge, viz., an undertaking to correction after failure and mindful avoidance of failure through respect. Accurate reception, pure intent and reverence are by themselves highly effective in preventing breaches of the *bodhisattvaśīla*.²²⁶

In the *Bbh*, the reception of the *bodhisattvaśīla* is inextricably linked with the taking on a commitment (*saṃvara*) in moral observance. Having solemnly declared his yearning for instructions in morality, the bodhisattva pledges:²²⁷

“I, of such and such a name, declare before all the Tathāgata and bodhisattvas of the great stage of the ten directions. Before them I undertake all the moral precepts of the bodhisattva and the entire bodhisattva morality; the morality of the vow, the morality of accumulating factors of virtue and the morality accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings that the bodhisattvas of the ten directions of the past, present and future have trained in.”

The scope and effectiveness of this *saṃvaraśīla* is thought to be superior even to the *prātimokṣa* vow—the most demanding of the eight traditional commitments. Theoretically, it enables the bodhisattva to train himself by following his own judgement. In practice, however,

221. *op. cit.*, pp. 147.25–150.13.

222. The bodhisattva applauds in particular those beings who have attained the qualities of faith, morality, learning, renunciation and wisdom (*op. cit.*, p. 150.13–19).

223. *op. cit.*, pp. 151.13–152.14

A summary of the impact of this practice is given in a section detailing the eleven modes by which the bodhisattva is established in the morality of accomplishing the welfare of sentient beings. However, since this covers much common ground I shall not go into the detail of these factors (*op. cit.*, pp. 144.23–152.17).

224. *op. cit.*, p. 137.14–25.

225. I have found no other text in which these requirements are stipulated. Most treatises simply refer for the foundations of morality either *en bloc* to the combined practice of the *daśakuśala* (*Mpps*, ii, pp. 782–819, *Daśa-bh*, pp. 26–27), or accentuate absence of (sexual) desire and hatred in conjunction with correct views as factors generating morality (*Mavbh*, p. 33.3–6).

226. *Bbh*, pp. 137.26–138.7

These three elements correspond to cardinal issues around which much of the exposition in the *Bdp* revolves (folio 306.1–4, 314.2–320.6).

227. *Bbh*, pp. 181.21–182.2.

he is advised to listen regularly and to consult the basket of the bodhisattva scriptures (*bodhisattvapiṭaka*) since it assists him in the observance of the moral precepts.²²⁸

Modelled in name and number on the 'defeats' (*pārājika*) of the śrāvaka *Vinaya*, the *Bbh* lays down four factors that signal failure in morality. Characteristically, these do not refer to moral violation in the traditional sense, but address backtracking in the bodhisattva's resolve. The four are (1) desire for praise and respect, (2) close-fistedness in wealth and Dharma, (3) anger and (4) repudiation of the *bodhisattvapiṭaka*.²²⁹

Repeated intentional violation of these leads to instantaneous and permanent forfeiture of his roots of virtue and loss of the *cittotpāda*.²³⁰ However, should the bodhisattva show only weak or medium involvement—even if his undertaking is relinquished—he retains the opportunity to receive once again the vow of morality in the same lifetime.²³¹ Moreover, once the vow is taken in accordance with the regulations and not abandoned, it maintains validity throughout the numerous life-cycles of his career.²³²

228. *Bbh*, p. 156.7–11

To the *Mpps* (ii, p. 586) moral conduct is self-promoting. It proposes that attainments in the *pañcāśīla* of the *upāsaka* inspire the tenfold morality of the *śramaṇa* that, in turn, when perfected, lead to the discipline of the monks (*prātimokṣa*). This, again, occasions the next higher form of morality, morality springing from meditation (*dhyānaśīla*), from which arises—once accomplished—pure morality (*anāsravaśīla*). Cf. *Bbh* (p. 186.16–19) that distinguishes, unfortunately without further elaborating, five modes of morality that are furnished with giving, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom.

229. *Bbh*, p. 158.2–5

This list of *pārājika* is not the only one that was drawn up for the bodhisattva. In the *Brahmajālasūtra*—a late text of doubtful authenticity—we meet with ten *dharma* that entail defeat and deprive the bodhisattva of his status. These include, besides the *pañcāśīla*, bringing others into disrepute, avarice, boastfulness at the expense of others, malevolence and calumny of the three jewels (DeGroot, 1967, pp. 32–39; Eidman, 1958, pp. 392–3).

230. The second factor leading to the relinquishment of all moral undertakings is the bodhisattva's abandonment of his resolution (pp. 159.23–160.2).

231. *Bbh*, p. 159.9–24

It appears that the concept of the opportunity of regeneration was introduced by the *Vup*. We saw that the bodhisattva's observance of morality—like all other aspects of the training—is decisively influenced by his determination (*adhyāśaya*). Expressed and strengthened in the commitment of the vow and resolution, it provides the bodhisattva with a stable and firm basis for his entire conduct. Since it is raised consciously and deliberately, this intention creates a mental shield that resists evil and, should it be breached, allows for swift restoration.

For the śrāvaka, the only means of spiritual renewal is given in the highly formalised confession-ritual (*Vin*, ii, p. 126, 192; iv, p. 18). While this is also available to the bodhisattva, it has lost much in formality and has gained a more personal note. In the *Vup*, the issue that matters most is no longer exact compliance with procedure, but the candidate's genuine regret and his undertaking to prevent a repetition of the transgression (*Vup*, pp. 36–38).

On the provisions for a confession of sins, see: *Bbh*, p. 181.6–21; *Vup*, pp. 31–37; *Ug* (cited in *Śikṣ*, p. 290.3–6, but attributed to the *Vup*); *Kp*, p. 170, § 119; *Saddhp*, p. 210; *Lal*, p. 379. Passages raising the possibility of private confessions are also found in the nikāya: D I, p. 85; M I, p. 438; III, pp. 244–7; S I, p. 24; II, p. 127, 205; A I, p. 238; II, p. 146; IV, p. 377.

232. This is not the case of śrāvaka discipline, where commitment to the discipline is only valid for the present life-time (*Kośa*, iv p. 63). The argument behind this proposition is that the person one would become would be different, that this new person would not be able to apply himself to the rules and that he would not remember undertaking them (*Kośa*, iv, pp. 63–64).

The gravity of moral transgressions other than the four defeats depends (as in the śrāvaka *Vinaya*) very much on the circumstances in which they were committed.²³³ In general, acts committed out of indolence, irreverence, greed, desire, pride, negligence or ill-will—the very antitheses to the bodhisattva’s resolution—are considered transgressions involving defilement. If developed out of forgetfulness, illness, mental distraught or ignorance, the fault is a transgressions without defilement.²³⁴

Finally, infringement on morality that originates in the bodhisattva’s *prañidhāna* is entirely free from fault or stigma.²³⁵ In order to elucidate this precarious issue, the *Bbh* draws up several scenarios where the violation of each of the *daśakuśala* is not only condoned, but becomes a vital expedient to the promotion of spiritual welfare among beings.²³⁶ Hence, according to the *Bbh*, “there is nothing that is categorically a fault” on the bodhisattva’s path. This thought is carried further in a preamble to examples that describe the scope and flexibility of the bodhisattva’s moral conduct.²³⁷

“Even in the case of what is reprehensible by nature, the bodhisattva acts with such skill in means that no fault ensues; rather there is a spread of much merit.”

In other words, by virtue of his expertise in skilful means²³⁸, the bodhisattva is allowed—at times even encouraged—to commit transgressions of disobedience (*pratikṣepaṇasāvadya*) if, by doing so, he benefits sentient beings.²³⁹ We saw that for the śrāvaka, moral contravention occurs only within the sphere of physical and vocal activity. Mental inaptitude is not directly addressed by the *prātimokṣa* rules. This does not hold true for the *bodhisattvaśīla* where mental improbity (*cittāpatti*) is fully recognised as a source and manifestation of moral infringement.²⁴⁰

233. *Bbh*, pp. 160.10–165.1.

234. *Bbh*, p. 180.10–12.

235. The text gives an example in which the bodhisattva is invited to a house but chooses not to accept the invitation. If he rejects it out of enmity or resentment he has committed a defiled fault, but if he does not attend because he learned of the opportunity to hear a Dharma discourse of great value he is free from fault (*Bbh*, pp. 162.25–164.7).

236. *Bbh*, pp. 164.19 ff.

237. *Bbh*, pp. 165.26–166.1.

238. Cf. *Msg*, p. 216.

239. He is, for instance, encouraged to accept vast quantities of robes, alms-bowls, beds, rugs and even gold and silver to redistribute them among sentient beings (*Bbh*, p. 165.8–22).

240. *Msg*, p. 214.

Generally, rather than actively transgressing certain rules, it is abstention from required actions that is regarded as a severe violation of the bodhisattva’s morality. For instance, should a bodhisattva who is in

But now to the *Bdp*. In emphasis and orientation, its treatment shares a common understanding with that of early Buddhism. Since moral improbity is held to lead inevitably to spiritual ruin, its main concern revolves around the need for conventional moral integrity. The presentation possesses therefore many of the hallmarks of the prohibitive *vinaya*-type approach, while, at the same time, it allows for adjustment to the increased scope of the new ideal.

The bedrock for the whole exposition is the insistence on the conscious and intentional abstention from the ten evil paths of action (*akuśalakarmapatha*).²⁴¹ It takes up over a third of the chapter and is divided into the spheres of body (killing, theft and sexual misconduct), speech (falsehood, slander, harsh and frivolous talk) and mind (covetousness, animosity and wrong views):²⁴²

“There are ten modes of auspicious action.

The bodhisattva who is skilled adheres to them.

The wise one who does not act through body, speech and mind

Is said to be in possession of moral conduct.”

And yet, in spite of this accentuation, the treatment of the *daśakuśala* itself provides little insight into the workings of purification. Instead of discoursing on the psychological processes that practice of them triggers, the *Bdp* devotes most attention to the benefits flowing from

possession of wonder-working powers fail to employ them in a situation where they would inspire faith, he would be guilty of a serious transgression. Similarly, should he fail to rebuke people who are in need of reproach or does not mete out a punishment for wrongdoing when he would be perfectly capable of doing so, he commits a defiled fault (*Bbh*, pp. 179.18–180.10). Passivity with regard to his duties articulated in his *prāṇidhāna* weighs more heavily than infringement on the letter of the *prātimokṣa* precepts. A concise list of attributes pertaining to pure morality appears at the end of the *Śīlapāṭala* (*op. cit.*, pp. 186.23–187.15).

241. The Sanskrit terms are as follows: (1) *prāṇātighāta*, (2) *adattādāna*, (3) *kāmamithyācāra*, (4) *mṛṣāvāda*, (5) *paśūnyavāda*, (6) *pāruṣyavāda*, (7) *saṃbhinnapralāpa*, (8) *abhidyā*, (9) *vyāpāda* and (10) *mithyādrṣṭi* (*Mvy* 1687–1698). For references in the nikāya, see: M I, pp. 42, 360; III, p. 23; S IV, p. 313; V, p. 469; A, I, p. 226. Sanskrit references are found at *Mvu*, i, p. 107.13; *Daśa-bh*, p. 23.6; *Śiks*, p. 69.13 and *Dhsgr* § 56 (cf. *Amrt* (B), pp. 89–91). For a full discussion of the *akuśalakarmapatha*, see: *Mpps*, ii, pp. 782–819. On their role in the bodhisattva-path, the *Dbh* comments (*Daśa-bh*, pp. 26.5–9):

“The ten good paths of action—as they are completely purified by the wide, immeasurable state, by the arrival at great compassion, by grasping skilful means, by the state of being bound to the next vow, by non-abandoning of all beings, by taking hold of the broad buddha-knowledge—conduce to the complete purity of the stages of the bodhisattva, to the complete purity of the perfections and to the full extent of the career.”

242. R, folio 304.2–3

This list recurs three times during the discussion of the *śīlapāramitā* (R, folio 368.2–6; 403.7–404.3). As it introduces at each occasion a new aspect of the practice of moral conduct, it was probably conceived of as laying down the individual areas of application that make up the overall scope of the bodhisattva’s morality. This tenfold division is of course very ancient and is well known from the nikāya (cf. D III, p. 214; A, I, pp. 49, 52, ff).

their cultivation and the impact they have on the bodhisattva's advance.

The acquisition of such benefits is dependent on the interplay of two factors. On the one hand, adjusting to Mahāyāna ontology, the *Bdp* invalidates moral conduct and denies it any role in the path.²⁴³ As we have seen, this is common practice in Mahāyāna *sūtras* and represents the *paramārtha* point of view. On the other hand, on a conventional level, *śīla* becomes a major force in the *bodhisattva* practices. It is held indispensable for the completion of the path, in general, and gives rise to a series of important mental factors. In the *Bdp*, such factors include faith, vigour, trust in retribution of deeds, trust in morally and wholesome deeds, aspiration to the noble lineage (*āryavaṃśa*)²⁴⁴, respect and veneration of teachers, withdrawal in search for the Dharma and unreserved commitment to enlightenment.²⁴⁵ Although it stops short of pronouncing a causal relationship between them and the *kuśalakarmapatha*, the *Bdp* indicates that they operate on a reciprocal basis and arise simultaneously to reinforce each other's presence.²⁴⁶

Through the roots of virtue that are generated by the *kuśalakarmapatha* in conjunction with faith, etc., the bodhisattva produces ten forms of *cittotpāda*. These are based on moral integrity, reverence and yearning for spiritual instruction, and lay down the phases in his cognitive growth.

In spite of the shared context in which the ten *kuśalakarmapatha*, ten mental *dharma* and ten *cittotpāda* occur—except for a broad association with the practice of morality—no connection between their members seems to exist. It is true that the ten mental factors and the forms of *cittotpāda* cover roughly the same ground (both emphasise the role of reverential conduct towards one's teacher and include search for the Dharma and insight into the workings of karma), yet at no point is there any indication of the relation in which they might develop.

243. R, folio 302.5–304.1

244. According to the *Ug* (pp. 271.5.1–272.1.7) acquisition of the *āryavaṃśa* is one of the chief manifestations of pure morality in *pravrajita* bodhisattvas. Other concomitants include practice in the thirteen *dhutaṅga*, seclusion, honesty, correct reflection, rejection of mistaken views, calm insight into the workings of the body, fearless acceptance of emptiness and signlessness and the generation of compassion. Apart from a broad contextual agreement with the mental factors in the *Bdp*, these show few parallels.

245. R, folio 306.1–4

There is a certain overlap between these ten factors and the five *indriya* cited as antidotes to moral impurity in the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (A V, p. 192). Moreover, several of them appear repeatedly in conjunction with moral conduct to define the attributes of true *bhikkhus* and figure among practices conducive to enhanced aspiration and high rebirth (M III, pp. 99–103). In this context, their chief function becomes to provide for the cognitive stability that is required for sound restraint from the three root evils.

On the benefits, see: D II, p. 86; M I, p. 33; A III, pp. 251–2 and *Vism*, i, p. 14.

246. The single most important factor underlying the bodhisattva's moral stance becomes the resolution undertaken in his vow to benefit all sentient beings. Although not explicitly mentioned in this capacity, the orientation of the *śīla* practice leaves not doubt that it is that intention which rules his conduct at all times (R, 307.2).

Furthermore, both schemes do not agree on the position in which they list the shared practices. Faith and vigour, for instance, the first two limbs of the ten mental *dharma*, figure in the *cittotpāda* at the very end. Moreover, some of the key issues of the *cittotpāda* do not occur at all among the ten mental *dharma*. Correct understanding of the body, the threat of desire, hatred and delusion, and headlong pursuits are only found among the ten *cittotpāda*.

In the absence of any positive evidence, we cannot stipulate any firm connection between the *akuśalakarmapatha*, mental factors and the types of *cittotpāda*. The only common denominator is a shared, if broad, association with moral conduct. This link, however basic, is rather pronounced and recurs on several occasions. For one thing, the generation of the ten mental *dharma* is conditioned by abstention from killing, etc. This would link them with the ten *cittotpāda*, as these too cover some common ground with the mental *dharma*.

Other parallels are found in the ethical connotations that are raised by the ten *cittotpāda*. We have seen that the first two, as if producing basic mental requirements, lead to a correct understanding of the body. To view the body as empty, essentially impure and impermanent weakens the propensity for attachment and removes the foundation of desire. Next, recognition of previous anger, violence and bitterness (realised with the fourth and sixth *cittotpāda*) instigates the mental processes that inspire the abandonment of hatred (*dveṣa*). Finally, appreciation of the faults of past misconduct—as manifested in lack of respect, mental confusion, ignorance of causation and purposeless straying—refers to delusion (*moha*), the third of the three root evils. All ten *cittotpāda* therefore have a bearing on the very factors that cause moral impurity. The destruction of desire, hatred and delusion is achieved with the tenth *cittotpāda* in which moral conduct is fully realised in conjunction with faith, modesty, chastity, learning, renunciation and wisdom.²⁴⁷

Cognitively, pure moral conduct triggers a series of insights into the workings of phenomenal existence. Evolving in conjunction with correct reflection (*yoniśo manasakāra*), the bodhisattva develops aversion towards karmic formations, loses interest in sense pleasures, rejects empirical knowledge and develops a defence mechanism against hatred and desire.²⁴⁸ First, on the emotional level, he trains in order to see in every sentient being his mother and father of

247. On the pillars of moral impurity, the *Akn* records:

“Morality is the absence of evil causal dispositions, the non-arising of mistaken views and elimination of hindrances like regret; morality does not abide by unwholesome roots of covetousness, anger and delusion” (p. 44.3.2–3).

248. R, folio 376.1.

previous lives.²⁴⁹ This allows him to recognise in situations that arouse sensual desire his mother as the object of passion. Likewise, in situations of great injustice, he restrains his anger by recognising his father as the aggressor.

Since it leads—if entwined with incorrect reflection—to unfavourable rebirth in the evil destinies²⁵⁰, desire is singled out as the most acute threat to the bodhisattva's moral integrity.²⁵¹ In order to eradicate desire, the *Bdp* proposes three methods that protect the bodhisattva from attachment.²⁵² First, it advises him to consider—as deterrent and cause for compassion—the

249. R, folio 384.7–387.2.

250. R, folio 388.6–7.

251. In this context, serving to exemplify the pitfall of sensual desire, we find a diatribe against the wife (folio 389.1–395.2) similar to that contained in the *Ug* (pp. 263.5.6–264.3.4).

Judging by later discussions of Mahāyāna morality, this view was not destined to last. In the *Vup*—marking an important stepping stone in the development of the *bodhisattvaśīla*—it is lack of altruistic compassion and hatred that replaces desire as the most severe and resilient impediment to moral perfection (*Vup*, pp. 50–51). In an earlier passage the Buddha adds the third member, delusion, that he qualifies as a grave defilement that is difficult to eliminate since (*Vup*, pp. 31–32):

“Attachment under the influence of the ramification of transmigration becomes the seed of rebirth; hatred, because it is quickly eliminated becomes a step towards the evil destinies; delusion, because it is difficult to eliminate becomes the cause occasioning one's fall into the eight hells.”

While this is not exactly the position of the *Bdp* in chapter seven, elsewhere we meet with statements that run very close in intent (R, folio 415.1–2):

“Māra obtains the opportunity to harm a bodhisattva whose mind is wrathful even after he has entered the great vehicle. If he obtains this opportunity, the bodhisattva will be cut off from supreme and perfect enlightenment, for a bodhisattva who is evil-minded becomes inattentive when pursuing enlightened conduct.”

252. In the *Bdp* desire is defined as attachment to the objects of the five senses, and above all, to the fetter of form (*rūpa*). It is seen to obstruct hearing of the Dharma, taking refuge in the *triratna*, seeing the Buddha, receiving the (eighteen) blessings as well as preventing faith, moral conduct, learning, chastity, modesty and wisdom to unfold (R, folio 390.2–7). As such, it is identified as the most potent threat to the training of the bodhisattva.

However, according to the *Vup*, an even greater threat to moral integrity is posed by conceit (*adhimāna*). Interpreted as a side-aspect of delusion in the threefold root defilements, it bars the bodhisattva from attaining his goal by deceptively magnifying his own attainments (*ātmokarśa*) and depreciating those of others (*parāvajñā*) (*Siddhi*, p. 346). The means by which conceit is overcome vary with the spiritual outlook of the practitioner. For the śrāvaka, it is above all avoidance of speculative and inconclusive thought that prevents its arising. The bodhisattva, however, is advised to eschew premature judgement on the quality of his progress in training and to learn to distinguish mistaken views from correct ones (*Vup*, pp. 53–54). For unlike other defilements, liability to conceit not only subsists in the more advanced stages of the path but, moreover, increases in attraction with the rate of progress in purification (*Aṣṭa*, pp. 385–95).

In the *Vup*, the Buddha distinguishes two areas of conceit. First, it draws attention to conceit operating on the moral plane. It occurs when the bodhisattva compares his degree of purification with that of ordinary beings and, judging it inferior, concludes that its holders of little worth (§ 47). This form of moral conceit may also arise on the basis of his spiritual powers and attributes (§ 48)—illusory or real—on the basis of attainments such as the buddha-qualities and even through perceived superiority in material wealth or worldly position (§ 17). Second, conceit arises at the cognitive level in response to inessential speculation (*Vup*, p. 54). This issue is also taken up in the *Samdhis* (*ÉLa*), pp. 47.19–48.15. Since deliverance is only achieved by totally abandoning thought representation (*sarvavikalpapavigata*) in favour of the acceptance of inconceivability (*Vup*, pp. 53, 64), all discursive thinking is detrimental to liberation and becomes, particularly if of academic hypothesis, a potential cause of vanity (*Vup*, p. 55):

“By means of what measure do monks evade conceit? The Tathāgata replied to the venerable Upāli: Monks are altogether liberated from conceit if they do not harbour wrong views (*abhiniveśa*) concerning the inconceivability springing from all-knowing.”

suffering of beings.²⁵³ The prospect of exposure to such a high degree of misery alone prevents immoral behaviour from arising.²⁵⁴ Second, the *Bdp* recommends as an incentive²⁵⁵ the contemplation of the excellent qualities of the members of the āryan-fold.²⁵⁶ Without complete purity, such excellence will always be beyond the reach of a bodhisattva. Third, the practitioner is reminded of the illusory character of sensory perception and the unreliability of the data it provides.²⁵⁷ In the spirit of purest Mahāyāna thinking, the *Bdp*—taking the example of sight—shows that all perception is utterly devoid of own-being and, hence, cannot give cause to meaningful attachment.²⁵⁸

The location on the path of such an attainment is only vaguely indicated. Judging by the benefits that accrue to a bodhisattva from the roots of virtue, it pertains to the more advanced stages.²⁵⁹ He is in the position to attain cessation at will²⁶⁰, he possesses great powers and physical perfection, and is separated from buddhahood by only five rebirths.²⁶¹ There can be

253. R, folio 390.5–392.4.

254. Cf. M III, pp. 99–103.

255. On generating these two antidotes, the bodhisattva ponders (R, folio 395.3–397.1):

“I shall tread the path of excellent beings and not the path of miserable beings. I shall tread neither the path that leads to hell nor the path that leads to the birth-destiny of animals. I shall not tread the path that leads to the realm of Yāma. I shall not tread the path of moral transgression. I shall not tread the path that is associated with moral transgression ...”

256. R, folio 395.3–396.4.

257. R, folio 400.5–403.6.

258. R, folio 403.4

The importance of correct reflection for moral integrity is attested in practically all Mahāyāna treatises that address the issue of purification. A good example is the *Vup* that follows the trend and submits the notion of morality to the philosophical rigour of its ontological propositions. Proceeding from the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*, it concludes that all moral conduct is perpetually accomplished and not subject to training, progress or retribution (*Vup*, p. 60):

“Once acknowledged that all *dharma* are by nature quiescent (*samāhita*)

Desire, hatred and delusion become non-existent.

And if *dharma* are themselves deliverance and free from desire,

Provided that they are unsupported, they exist already in *nirvāṇa*.”

Repudiation of such insight is above all based on mistaken views concerning the self and the possibility of moral acquisition. As long as these two misconceptions prevail, moral conduct, however elated, is prone to the defilement of conceit and misapprehension. It is not before the bodhisattva has achieved the revolution at the basis (*āśrayaparāvṛtti*) born from wisdom that he becomes capable of generating pure morality (*Msg*, p. 16):

“The mistaken view concerning the self is wrongful clinging to the [notion of the] self and mine. Through its influence, conceit of the self becomes. When one leans at the self or mine, one becomes conceited. Born from genuine affection, that is to say, born from attachment towards the self, the defilements of the mistaken belief in a self and conceit arise.”

Pure morality is therefore always dependent on the presence of correct vision. For the *Vup*, this is ‘seeing reality as it is’. In other words, moral perfection is always subject to understanding its operations from the *paramārthasatya* level and cannot be attained through conventional understanding (*samvṛtisatya*). Unless the *paramārthasatya* vision has been attained, conceit will remain a serious impediment to the bodhisattva’s advance (*Vup*, p. 53).

259. R, folio 341.1.

260. R, folio 341.6.

261. This information can be gleaned from the number of rebirths that are cited before the bodhisattva attains buddhahood (R, folio 341.2–364.6). From the moment of his attainment in moral conduct, he will be

no doubt that the foundation of these qualities lies in the bodhisattva's accomplishment in the perfection of morality.²⁶²

“O Śāriputra, one who pursues the bodhisattva's moral conduct for the sake of [understanding] the meaning of the *bodhisattvapiṭaka* and venerates and honours his teacher obtains such virtuous, most excellent, boundless, inconceivable and measureless blessings. It is in this way, O Śāriputra, that the bodhisattva who firmly pursues the *bodhisattvapiṭaka* attains great power and cultivates the *bodhisattvacaryā* through pure moral conduct.”

After the description of the benefits that accrue to bodhisattvas who are accomplished in moral conduct, the *Bdp* draws up fifty qualities that pertain to moral purity.²⁶³ Close to fifty percent of these attributes fall into easily recognisable groups. The first ten qualities coincide with the *kuśalakarmapatha*, five are characterised by the *pāramitā*, four are linked with the *apramāṇa* and three with the refuge in the *triratna*.²⁶⁴

The remaining twenty-seven concomitants spell out (without any discernible order) the general facets of the *bodhisattvaśīla*. Going beyond the narrow interpretation of morality, the *Bdp* announces that the bodhisattva dwells in hermitages as part of his moral training; that he examines his own mistakes rather than condemning others; that he develops sentient beings, grows content with little, and weakens his attachment to worldly phenomena. As a reward, he attains a whole array of qualities that lend support to his training.²⁶⁵ He acquires patience, confidence and composure; he becomes invincible, reclusive, faithful, truth-loving and realises the impermanence of karmic formations;²⁶⁶ he attains fearlessness, passes beyond low rebirth

reborn as (1) man, (2) god, (3) accomplished man, (4) *cakravartin* becoming recluse and (5) buddha (folio 343.4–7, 446.7).

262. R, folio 367.7–8; see also folio 341.1, 362.2.

263. R, folio 368.2–371.4.

This enumeration recurs almost verbatim at the end of the chapter, coinciding in 44 out of the 53 items that are listed there (R, folio 403.7–407).

264. The same association of morality is proposed in the *Akn* where *śīla* is linked with the practice of the *pāramitā* (p. 43.5.6–8) and *apramāṇa* (p. 43.5.4–5).

265. R, folio 371.5–372.3.

266. A more structured approach to the benefits is given the *Bbh*, proposing three blessings that keep the bodhisattva in touch with the needs of sentient beings. First, he is accomplished in practice (*śikṣā*); that is, he does not violate any moral precepts and learns of evil conduct as soon as it is committed. Second, he attains an excellent intent (*āśaya*). This involves monastic ordination, dedication to roots of virtue and constant focus on the Doctrine rather than on livelihood. Third, he is furnished with the blessing of the previous cause (*pūrvahetu*). By virtue of previously accumulated acts of merit, he never lacks daily requisites. On the contrary, the retribution of wholesome deeds committed in former lives provides him

and learns to devote selflessly his resources to the liberation of beings.

Thus, the practice of the *śīlapāramitā* revolves not only around his personal moral integrity but includes, in equal measure, the purity and fate of his fellow beings.²⁶⁷ The differing degrees to which both aims are discussed suggest that the *Bdp* gives greater weight to the bodhisattva's personal moral attainment. That this is only a temporary priority is eloquently expressed in the following verse:²⁶⁸

“Now I act benevolently towards sentient beings without exception.

Now I guide sentient beings who paid allegiance to evil.

Accomplished in the joy of the Dharma, with my mind free from desire,

I seek the basket of enlightened conduct.”

with great wealth that he readily shares with all beings (*Bbh*, pp. 182.14–183.16). Compare this list with the benefits that are cited in the *Msg* (p. 215) and *Msl* (p. 104.14–17). The *Bbh* adds that up to the moment of full enlightenment, the bodhisattva experiences five advantages arising from the training in *śīla* (*Bbh*, p. 187.19–27). He comes to the notice of the buddhas; he dies in a state of great elation; in whatever state he is reborn, he is always accompanied by fellow bodhisattvas that are of equal moral attainment; he is furnished with the infinite aggregate of merit that fulfils the perfection of morality in this life and he acquires a form a natural morality whose essence always is with him in perpetuity. Cf. *Kp*, p. 195, § 136; *Samādh*, Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 329–331, 332–4.

267. E.g., *Mpps*, ii, pp. 853 ff; *Daśa-bh*, p. 26, Q.

268. R, folio 328.3–4.

The Perfection of Patience

In the *suttas* of early Buddhism the practice of patience (Pāli: *khanti*; Skt: *kṣānti*) did not play a very prominent role.²⁶⁹ It rarely receives independent treatment, but is generally explained in conjunction with other practices such as benevolence (to which it becomes an important prerequisite) or is cited as a concomitant to morality and wisdom.²⁷⁰ A good example of its treatment is given in a stanza in the *Mahāpadānasutta* in which the Buddha recounts the *pātimokkha* rehearsal of Vipassi.²⁷¹

“How may you best discipline the flesh?

Be patient, monks, be forbearing.

What is the highest, what is the best?

O monks, the buddhas say it is *nibbāna*.

For he is no wanderer who harms

269. The exact linguistic origin of the term *kṣānti* does not appear to be as straightforward as it is generally taken to be. In Mahāyāna literature, one finds two kinds of meaning. First, when linked with general suffering and injury, *kṣānti*—taken from the root *kṣam*: ‘to endure, bear’—is generally translated as ‘patience’ or ‘tolerance’. This corresponds closely to the Pāli term *khanti*. There are, however, several other instances, the most prominent example of which is the term *anuttapattikadharmakṣānti*, where *kṣānti* carries the meaning of ‘intellectual receptivity’ (Edgerton, p. 199, col. 2). In those cases it would seem to go back to the root form *kam*, meaning ‘to like, to be inclined to’, of which the form *kṣānti* would then be a incorrect Sanskritisation of the Pāli form *khanti*.

In a study of this problem, Sasaki suggested that the word *kṣānti* is a Buddhist Sanskrit development of the Pāli *khanti* that, since stemming from the root *kam*, should be understood as ‘willing to’ and not as ‘endurance’ or ‘tolerance’. Citing numerous passages from both the Pāli and Sanskrit, Sasaki proposes that the correct Sanskritisation of *khanti* should have been *kānti* going back to the root *kam*. Passages from the *Kośa* referring to *kṣānti* as ‘*adhimātra satya-kṣamanād itit ūsmagatāvasthyāṃ mṛdu satyam kṣamate rocate*’ and its commentary by Haribhadra defining *kṣānti* as ‘*kṣamaṇa-rūpena ca kṣāntaya utpadyante*’ (*Akv*, p. 611) seem to suggest a more positive connotation than is expressed by ‘endurance’. This is also borne out by numerous texts in the Pāli *Abhidhamma* and by Buddhaghosa’s usage of the term *khanti* in the *Vism* itself. In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* (p. 230), we read for instance: ‘*yāḥ khanti khammanatā adhiyāsanaṭṭa accandikkam anasuro po attamanatā cittassa, ayaṃ vuccati khānti*’. That this willingness is implied in the idea of *anuttapattikadharmakṣānti* has been recognised by most modern scholars.

If we are to accept his argument, the question remains whether all occurrences of the word *kṣānti* in bodhisattva works imply this positive mental disposition. For the bodhisattva ideal, such adaptation would not present much of a problem, since—according to doctrine—the bodhisattva should *gladly* succumb to all forms of suffering, injury and torture as he thereby removes past karma and brings patience to a climax. Grudging endurance tallies only ill with the grandeur of the ideal and is probably not what was intended.

270. See, for instance, S I, p. 222 where patience is recommended when dealing with fools, weak beings or persons of otherwise inferior disposition who require a monk’s benevolence in order to progress spiritually (cf. *Vism*, ix, pp. 295–96).

271. D II, p. 49 (the same verse occurs also at *Dhammapada*, no. 184).

His fellow man; he is no recluse
Who inflicts injury on his neighbour.”

The context and wording of this verse suggests a close correlation between patience and the observance of the *pātimokkha* precepts. Quite clearly, the Buddha wishes to make the point that impatience deprives the monks of composure and thus leads to ill-contemplated actions that violate the disciplinary code. Although rarely explicitly stated, a correlation between morality and patience figures at several places in the *nikāya*.²⁷² The role of *khanti* in these contexts is generally of a supportive nature. It appears as a complementary virtue that facilitates moral observance, since it removes those *āsava* that might otherwise obstruct *śīla*. In other contexts, patience is not aimed at one particular area of defilement, but weakens—if accompanied by vision, control, use, avoidance, elimination and mental development—the whole range of the *āsava* and contributes to the attaining of *nibbāna*.²⁷³

The *Paṭi*s expands the interpretation of *khanti* so as to include in its meaning in addition to its moral dimension also a cognitive aspect. On the one hand, patience is held to weaken sense-desires, to inspire renunciation and generally to induce the practitioner to follow the path of the arhant.²⁷⁴ On the other hand, *khanti* is recognised as part of the mental processes that prepare the monk for the more taxing doctrines of the Dhamma. This applies above all to the teaching of the marks of existence (*salakkhana*) and mental instability.²⁷⁵ Indeed, willing acceptance of the notion of *anātman* prior to full penetration of its reasoning becomes indispensable for spiritual progress. At a later stage, having comprehended the validity of this proposition and seeing the general characteristics of *dhamma* the practitioner attains patience that conforms to reality.²⁷⁶ In due course, this allows him to enter upon the certainty of truth and makes the fruits of the path available to him.²⁷⁷

It would appear therefore that *khanti* constitutes some important element of the Buddhist training. First, it bestows psychological strength, resilience and confidence to resist the ‘attractions’ of moral transgression and increases the monk’s receptivity to the more daunting

272. M II, p. 43; S I, pp. 162–3, p. 226; *Vism*, i, p. 18.

273. M I, p. 10.

274. *Paṭi*s, xix, p. 171 (§ 14), xx, p. 183 (§ 23).

275. *op. cit.*, i, p. 106.

276. *op. cit.*, xxix, pp. 235–242.

277. *Paṭi*s, xxix, pp. 236 (cf. A III, p. 441).

The advantages that accrue from the practice of patience correspond, for the most part, to the blessings that arise from generosity and morality; A III, p. 253.

aspects of Buddhist thinking. Second, it figures among the five principal aspects that characterise the ideal of the recluse.²⁷⁸ And yet, there is no passage in the *nikāya* that gives a coherent account of its role and position in the training.²⁷⁹

History has shown that this obscurity was not to last. The timelessness, intense worldly exposure and philosophical abstractions accompanying the emergence of the bodhisattva ideal meant that the practice of patience was to rise 'phoenix-like from the ashes' and figure among its most important practices.

However, this process was a gradual one and took several centuries to complete. In the earliest strand of Mahāyāna literature, the role of *kṣānti* was at first limited to patient endurance of outright physical hostility and to the 'conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*' (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*).²⁸⁰ In the *Rgs* both elements are merged to form the introductory verse to the perfection of patience:²⁸¹

"When he hears someone else speaking to him harshly and offensively,

The wise bodhisattva remains quite at ease and contented.

[He thinks:] 'Who speaks? Who hears? How, to whom, by whom?'

The discerning is [then] devoted to the foremost perfection of patience."

Although not clearly differentiated as separate aspects of *kṣānti* in this incipient phase, most early texts already distinguish what later treatises describe as *sattvakṣānti* and *dharmakṣānti*.²⁸² The distinction is found in the *Pañca*²⁸³ and recurs as the most fundamental one in many other discussions of *kṣānti*.²⁸⁴ As alluded to in the *Rgs*, the role of *dharmakṣānti*

278. A III, p. 362:

"Patience and forbearance are the [recluse's] aim; wisdom is his quest; virtue is his resolve, nothing is his want, *nibbāna* is his ideal."

279. *Khanti* as a *pārami* does, of course, appear in several instances in the Pāli literature. It is mentioned in the *Jātaka* (i, pp. 45–7) and occurs at numerous instances in the commentarial literature to the *Buddhavaṃsa* (*Madhurattavāṇī*, i, p. 76) and *Cariyāpīṭaka* (Dhammapāla: *Cariyāpīṭakāṭikā*, pp. 321–22). Since these references are late and were produced almost certainly in response to Mahāyāna developments, they fall outside the present context.

280. *Rgs*, xxx. 8–14; *Saddhp* (pp. 136.10, 266.1, 327.4, 403.8, 419.6, 437.1); *Śgs* (p. 143, § 28, p. 160, § 48); *Sukhāvativyūha* (*SBE*, pp. 39–40, 51) and *Kp* (p. 18, § 8.4, p. 39, § 18.2, p. 49, § 24.17). The references in the *Saddhp* and *Sukhāvativyūha* have been largely misinterpreted. H Kern (p. 134) rendered the term *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* as 'acquiescence in the eternal law' while M. Müller took it to mean 'resignation of consequences that have not yet arisen'.

281. *Rgs*, xxx. 8 (trsl. Conze).

282. *Mpps*, ii, p. 865.

283. *Pañca*, p. 512 (trsl. Conze).

284. *Akn*, pp. 44.4.5–45.4.8; *Rcd*, pp. 233.3.6–234.1.1; *Bdp*, folio 407.3–423.4; *Sgm* (cit. in *Śikṣ*, pp. 102.30–103.27); *Pps* (cit. in *Śikṣ*, pp. 101.10 ff), *Gv* (cit. in *Śikṣ*, pp. 101.4 ff).

is generally one of support. It represents a mental precondition for the acquisition and retaining of spiritual fruits and prepares the practitioner for the moment when he comes face to face (*abhimukhī*) with reality itself.²⁸⁵

From early on it was recognised that this conviction could not be a static attainment but is subject to progression.²⁸⁶ In the *Aṣṭa* where it is discussed in the context of the first five stages and operates as a purely verbal profession (*ghoṣānugā*) *kṣānti* designates preliminary acceptance of reality based on faith and approbation.²⁸⁷ Once attained through the power of previous prayers, it is wholly dependent on will-power (*adhimukti*) and does not involve cognitive factors.²⁸⁸ Shortly before the bodhisattva becomes aware of the sameness of all *dharma* (*sarvadharmasamatā*), he attains the preparatory condition of patience proper (*anulomikīkṣānti*), but is still deprived of the conviction of their non-arising.²⁸⁹ According to the *Dbh*, this event is a precondition for reaching the *abhimukhībhūmi* and stands in direct relation to insight into the own-nature of *dharma* while, in the *Sukhāvativyūha*, it is attributed to service that the bodhisattva renders to former buddhas.²⁹⁰ This process culminates in the definite and final acquisition of the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*.²⁹¹ Granting the bodhisattva true insight into the workings of reality, it raises him beyond worldly concerns:²⁹²

“A bodhisattva who possess the conviction of the profound *dharmatā* does not become impassioned toward that which draws to desire, nor does he become

285. *Aṣṭa*, pp. 38–39.

286. Allusions to the various degrees of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* are found in the *Aṣṭa* (pp. 38–39), *Vkn* (pp. 25, 222) and *Sukhāvativyūha* (Müller, 1968, p. 51). Compare these standard versions with the more unusual scheme in the *Dhyānasamādhisūtra* (T 641, k. 2, p. 285a 10 ff) that distinguishes between *utpādakṣānti* enduring all injury, torment and insult that is inflicted on the bodhisattva; *anulomikīkṣānti* constituting the recognition of impermanence and the insight that *bhūtalakṣaṇa* is *alakṣaṇa*; and *anutpādakṣānti* that marks merely further progress in the *anulomikīkṣānti* practice (ref. Lamotte).

287. *Aṣṭa*, p. 232.18–20

In the *Samādhi* (Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 280.17–281.5), the preconditions of *ghoṣānugāṅkṣānti* are well-illustrated by a lyric (pp. 276.1–280.16) said to induce its realisation. Primarily, these factors relate to cognitive abandonment of the notion of self in persons and *dharma* (p. 279.2–10), to giving up all forms of attachment and aversion (pp. 278.15–279.2), to listening to the Doctrine (p. 280.1–4) and to seclusion (p. 280.9–12).

288. Müller, 1968, *SBE*, p. 51

289. Cf. *Rp*, p. 34.13–14: *nāhaṃ rāṣṭrapāla teṣaṃ ānulomikāṃ api kṣānti vadāmi, kutaḥ punar buddhajñānaṃ*. “O Rāṣṭrapāla, I do not attribute to them even the conviction preparing (lit. conforming) to (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*), still less to buddha-knowledge.” Ensink’s translation of the term *ānulomikāṃ* ... *kṣānti* as ‘conformable patience’ is an unfortunate choice as it fails to convey the preparatory connotation of *ānulomikīkṣānti* (Ensink, 1952, pp. 32–33).

290. *Daśa-bh*, p. 47.17–21

For translations of the passages leading to the attainment of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* see: Suzuki, 1975, pp. 226–7; Müller, 1968, p. 51.

291. *Saddhp*, pp. 136.9–10, 266.1, 419.6, 437.1; *Lal*, pp. 36.9, 440.21.

292. *Samādhi*, Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 95.6–7.

angry or deluded.”

In the scheme of the *Dbh*, it takes place on the *acalābhūmi* and represents the entrance to all-knowing due to the non-differentiation of suchness (*tathatāsamanirvikalpa*).²⁹³ In the plan of the *Sukhāvativyūha*²⁹⁴, however, this last step is once again attributed to devotional practices, in particular to performance of past prayers.²⁹⁵ Few texts agree on the individual fruits that ensue from the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*. In general, it is thought to coincide with the bodhisattva's final prediction to buddhahood²⁹⁶ and to furnish him with the status of irreversibility.²⁹⁷

In addition to these variants, some texts make also a distinction between different types of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*.²⁹⁸ In the *Pañca*, the Buddha cites two varieties that are differentiated

293. *Daśa-bh*, pp. 63.26–64.6; *Msl*, p. 134.16

Virtually all later commentaries agree on allocating this event to the eighth stage (*Msl*, pp. 122.2, 131.17; *Bbh*, p. 350.27; *Madhyāntavibhāga*, p. 105.10). The only exception is the *Mppś* that places *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* on the seventh stage (v, p. 2462). *Sattvakṣānti*, in contrast, the *Mppś* places on the second stage (v, pp. 2401–2), a proposition that is tenuously confirmed by the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 23.23).

Born of patience and kindness (*kṣāntisauratya*), the bodhisattva is at this point no longer found in the six destinies but assumes the *dharmakāya* in order to convert beings with greatest effect (*Mppś*, i, pp. 330–31). On the notion of *kṣāntisauratya* (*khantisoracca*), see: S I, pp. 100, 222; A II, p. 68; *Saddhp*, pp. 234.8, 236.9; *Dbh*, pp. 13.19, 37.11; *Bbh*, pp. 20.12, 143.27; *Śikṣ*, cit. *Akn*, p. 183.14.

294. Müller, 1968, p. 51.

295. In the *Avatamsaka* an entire chapter (*Śikṣānanda*: chpt. xxix) is devoted to the various kinds of *kṣānti* that a bodhisattva generates in the course of his career. The first *kṣānti* refers to accepting the teachings of the Buddha without fear or hesitation. The second designates the bodhisattva's acquiescence in reflecting on the nature of *dharma* and maintaining of mind of purity and serenity. The third corresponds to the *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*. The fourth to the tenth are acquired when the bodhisattva realises that *dharma* are like an illusion (*māyopamā*), etc., (T 279, k. 44, p. 232b 9–10; ref. Suzuki, 1975, pp. 126–27).

In the *Jen Wang hou kouo po lo mi king* (T 245, 246) 'Perfection of Wisdom of the Good Law that Protects the State', a Chinese work of apocryphal origin, five kinds of *kṣānti* are listed. These include *damakṣānti*, *śraddhākṣānti*, *anulomikīkṣānti*, *anutpādakṣānti* and *nirodhakṣānti*. Apparently adjusted to suit the tenfold stages of the *Daśabhūmika*, *damakṣānti* is practised in the preparatory stages leading up to the *adhimuktīcaryābhūmi*; *śraddhakṣānti* on the *pramuditā*-, *vimala*- and *prabhākarībhūmi*; *anulomikīkṣānti* on the *acīṣmatī*-, *sudurjayā*-, *abhimukhībhūmi*; *anutpādakṣānti* on the *dūramgama*-, *acalā*- and *sādhumatībhūmi* and *nirodhakṣānti* on the *dharmameghabhūmi* (T 245, k. 1, p. 826b 23–24; ref. Lamotte).

296. Several texts state that the acquisition of the 'conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*' coincides with the definite prediction (*vyākaraṇa*) of the bodhisattva to buddhahood: See, for instance, *Saddhp*, p. 266.1–2; (cf. *Lal*, p. 35.21; *Msl*, pp. 20.15, 141.27, p. 166.5–12); *Akn*, p. 45.4.8; *Sgm*, TTP, 33, p. 52.3.7; *Samādh*, Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 82.11–14.

297. *Saddhp*, p. 259.13: *avaivartikakṣāntipratilabdhas ca bhaviṣanti* ('and they will obtain the conviction of non-regression'). Cf. *Bbh*, p. 253.18; *Daśa-bh*, p. 71.12.

Note that in the *Vip* (pp. 30–31), none of these attainments is cited but *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* leads to three categories of renunciation (*tyāga*), viz., ordinary renunciation, great renunciation and absolute renunciation. Here, ordinary renunciation refers to giving up of royal power (*rājyaparityāga*), great renunciation to abandoning of family members and absolute renunciation to sacrificing body and life. The practice of *kṣānti* is thus set in close relation to the cultivation of the *dāna* for whose perfection it becomes a precondition. This association is not an isolated case. A similar statement is found in the *Rp* (p. 12.2) where *kṣānti* is cited in conjunction with the abandoning of all personal possessions (*sarvastraparityāga*).

298. At several places in Mahāyāna *sūtras* one meets with phrases that clarify the implication of the three modes of *kṣānti*. In the *Tathāgatācintyagūhyanirdeśa* (cit. *Madhyamakavṛtti*, p. 362.8), for instance, the

according to the conditions that lead to their existence.²⁹⁹ These comprise a kind that is founded in the non-origination of defilements and another that arises due to persistence of cognition. Unfortunately, the text is silent on the attributes that mark these types from each other and neither does its commentary, the *Mpps*, elaborate upon them.³⁰⁰

The basis for the generation of patience is constituted by the thought of enlightenment, as it carries sufficient force to render the bodhisattva's body, speech and mind naturally exempt from vengeful thought.³⁰¹ In turn, patience towards injury assists in safeguarding other qualities since it forestalls animosity which would otherwise exterminate his accumulation of roots of virtue.³⁰² Knowing that even if he were subjected to severe torture, the degree of suffering would be minuscule compared with his torment in hell had he retaliated, the bodhisattva exercises restraint at all cost.³⁰³ In the words of Candrakīrti:³⁰⁴

“Because hatred directed against the sons of the Jina
Destroys in a moment the merit of generosity and morality
Accumulated over a hundred thousand years,
There is no defilement other than non-patience.”

second type of patience is called *śūnyatānulomikīkṣānti* ‘conviction conforming to emptiness’. In the *Vajracchedikā* (Conze, 1958, p. 58.9), it is referred to as *nirātmyakeṣvanutpattikeṣu dharmeṣu kṣānti* while in the *Lal* (p. 36.9) it is characterised only as *anutpattikeṣu dharmeṣu kṣānti* (ref. Lamotte).

In the *Samādhi*, a whole chapter is devoted to the description of the three kinds of patience. In particular with regard to its the characterisation of the *ghoṣānuṅgākṣānti*, this shows many parallels to the *Gv*. Having discussed the three types of *kṣānti*, the *Samādhi* defines the three stages of the *dharmanidhyānakṣānti* in terms of *śrutamayī*, *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī*, saying (Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 82.7–10):

“That which arises from learning and reflection is called ‘in accord’ as it is conducive to realisation. That which arises from contemplation is the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*.”

299. *Pañca*, pp. 511–12.

300. *Mpps*, ii, pp. 912–26.

The *Mpps* distinguishes three types of *dharma-kṣānti*. First, when practised in its purest form, the bodhisattva does not see the attributes of patience, he does not see himself, he does not see those who do the insulting and he does not speculate on *dharma*. Second, if accompanied by perfect wisdom, the degree of patience does not regress (*avivartana*) and is free from agitation (*akṣobhaṇatā*). He is released from all anger and offensive words, he does not inflict physical harm and experiences no doubt with regard to *dharma*. Third, bodhisattvas who recognise the true character of the perfection of wisdom see no longer *dharma* since their thought operates beyond the categories of opinion (*abhiniveśa*) and their subject. This last aspect furnishes them with the inner strength to assist even those persons who inflict serious harm on them (ii, p. 926).

301. *Mavbh*, p. 47.14–19

According to the *Msl* (p. 29.11), however, the bodhisattva's patience is based on his lineage (*gotra*), membership in which may precede the *cittotpāda* (*Bbh*, p. 3.1–8).

302. *Mavbh*, pp. 48.17–20, 49.10.

303. *op. cit.*, p. 50.15–18.

304. *Mavbh*, pp. 50.19–51.2

This position is corroborated by a passage in the *Sgm* where it is implied—though not explicitly stated—that if he were to seek revenge the bodhisattva would automatically forfeit all the roots of virtue and regress to the very beginning of his career (*Śiks*, p. 184.12).

Emotionally sustained by the thought of enlightenment, the bodhisattva realises the omnipresence of suffering, discerns its origin in past desire and resolves to abandon its causes.³⁰⁵ Suffering is manifested to him in the eight categories of support (*adhiṣṭhāna*), viz, attendance to the bases of mendicant life (*niśraya*), worldly conditions (*lokadharmā*)³⁰⁶, modes of behaviour (*īryapatha*), properties (*parigraha*) of *dharma*, aspects of mendicant life (*bhikṣākavṛtta*), untiring application (*abhiyogaklama*), working for the benefit of sentient beings (*sattvārthakriyā*) and attendance to duty (*karaṇīya*).³⁰⁷ On the one hand, the eight categories indicate that suffering is a constant companion to the bodhisattva. Committed by his pledge to giving universal liberation, he complies with the aspects of mendicant life and works for the benefit of beings. On the other hand, by being exposed to them, the bodhisattva retains his vigour and endures suffering with patience. That is to say, they furnish him with meditative qualities that allow him to maintain composure at all times.³⁰⁸ Once he accomplished patience by accepting suffering (*duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti*), he constantly concentrates on enlightenment with a purified rejoicing mind that is free from distraction.

Having described some of the most fundamental features of *kṣānti*, we may now examine its characterisation in the *Bdp*. Broadly speaking, its treatment of the perfection of patience is divided into two sections. In the first part, the *Bdp* looks at the practice of patience with regard to *dharma* (*dharmakṣānti*) and sentient beings (*sattvakṣānti*).³⁰⁹ According to the

305. *Bbh*, p. 192.11–22.

306. These are gain (*lābha*) loss (*alābha*), fame (*nindā*), ill-fame (*praśamā*), praise (*yaśa*), blame (*ayaśa*), happiness (*sukha*) and unhappiness (*duḥkha*) (*Mvy* 873; *Lal*, pp. 352.10; 275.5). In the *Bbh* (p. 193.9–16), however, a slightly different list is given, including *alābha*, *ayaśa*, *nindā*, *duḥkha*, *nāśa*, *kṣaya*, *jāra*, *vyādhi* and *marāṇa*. Compare this list with its Pāli equivalents in D III, p. 260, A IV, pp. 156 ff., *Paṭi*, i, pp. 22, 122, *Vibh*, p. 387 and that given in the *Mvy* (2342–48) which cite invariably eight *dharma*.

307. *Bbh*, pp. 192.23–193.1.

308. *Bbh*, p. 193.26–27.

309. *R*, folio 407–417.

In the *sūtra* literature of the Mahāyāna, exemplifying the interplay between practice and cognition, this twofold division into *sattvakṣānti* and *dharmakṣānti* forms almost invariably the bedrock of *kṣānti* discussions. According to some, complementary virtues that prepare for the practice of patience include moral impeccability, pursuit of the means of conversion, benevolence and compassion (*Rcd*, p. 233.3.8–4.4). These, governing the bodhisattva's relationship to fellow beings, contribute to the prevention of ill-contemplated retaliation arising from anger but affect only patience on an ordinary level.

Also perceived as ordinary patience, *sattvakṣānti* and *dharmakṣānti* are characterised in the *Akn* by thirty-two manifestations (*Akn*, p. 44.4.6–5.6). These fall into four categories. First, absence of those factors that run contrary to patience, e.g., hate, anger or aversion, etc.; second, the generation of factors that promote patience, e.g., pursuit of compassion, insight, etc.; third, the *Akn* details the impact of these preparatory practices, e.g., purity of body, speech and mind, confidence, friendliness, etc.; and fourth, the reward that follows from the cultivation of patience, viz., high rebirth, aloofness, accumulation of roots of virtue, etc. The enumeration of these attributes in a closed list and its separation from pure patience

Mppś, the rationale behind both types of patience is the notion of universal sameness (*samatā*). Having realised that beings and *dharma* lack distinguishing marks (*lakṣaṇa*) that would allow for differentiation between the pure and impure, conditioned and unconditioned, the bodhisattva exercises total impartiality in his thought, recollection, affection and service. In other words, both kinds of patience rest on penetration of the doctrine of non-duality (*advayadharmaparyāya*) which enables him to enter into the 'suppression of controversy' (*nīrdvandva*).³¹⁰ In the *Bdp*, however, this reasoning is excluded from the initial *sattva/dharmakṣānti* discussion and pertains only to the highest patience (*prakṣānti*).³¹¹

Patience with regard to *dharma* is subdivided into external and internal aspects.³¹² External patience refers to all those factors of distress that are influenced by the environment, including cold, heat, wind, sun, etc. Internal patience is applied to the suffering resulting from the eight worldly conditions, sickness and death.³¹³

According to the *Mppś*, patience with external objects refers primarily to the bodhisattva's reluctance to apprehend the six categories of objects (*ṣaḍbāhyasthūla*) while forbearance with internal objects guards him from becoming engaged in any of the inner attractions (*ṣaḍādhyātmikaruci*).³¹⁴

(*viśuddhikṣānti*) and higher patience (*sātyantakṣānti*) suggests that it is conceived of as basic. Since a similar distinction is also upheld in the *Bdp* and *Rcđ* where the discussion of (basic) patience is followed by deliberations on pure and highest patience (*prakṣānti*), it represents perhaps an antecedent to the threefold *kṣānti* classification that is found in the *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, *Gv* or *Dbh*.

According to the *Rcđ*, the next higher form of patience, pure patience (*viśuddhikṣānti*), arises from the efficacy of careful investigation (*prativēkṣā*) with regard to body and mind and from contemplation (*bhāvanā*) with regard to all *dharma* (*Rcđ*, p. 233.5.1–3). Here, *kṣānti* arising from the examination of body and mind refers undoubtedly to physical and mental endurance of discomfort, insult and injury. *Kṣānti* founded in contemplation of *dharma* is called *sarvadharmavivekakṣānti* 'conviction of the solitude of all *dharma*' and affirms their non-arising (*Rcđ*, p. 233.5.4–5). Eventually, these two factors converge to form a type of *kṣānti* that acknowledges the selflessness of persons (*pudgalanairātmya*) and convinces one of the non-existence of all *dharma*. Although slightly differently phrased, this concept accords closely to the notion of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*. Hence, the *Rcđ* concludes by distinguishing two modes of pure *kṣānti* practice, viz, patience that affects the body and patience that corresponds to all *dharma* 'as they are' (*Rcđ*, pp. 233.5.8–234.1.1). In the *Akn*, however, this distinction between the forms of *viśuddhikṣānti* is not made (pp. 44.4.7–45.1.7).

310. *Mppś*, i, pp. 325–327

For a more detailed discussion of the notion of sameness of *dharma* and beings, see: *Bbh*, p. 286.11–24. On the conceptual proximity of *samatā* and *kṣānti* see also *Pañca* (p. 4) where bodhisattvas are described as 'in possession of patience and sameness' (*samatākṣāntipratilabdha*). As Conze has pointed out (1975, p. 37), the Tibetan and *Mppś* differ on the interpretation of this compound, suggesting that it should be translated as a *tatpuruṣa* meaning 'he acquires the patience acceptance of the sameness (of all *dharma*)'.

311. *R*, folio 420.5–423.5.

312. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 903–906 (cf. *Pañca*, p. 512).

313. In the *Bdp*, we read of "six kinds of suffering that emerge from the body, abuse, heat deprivations of life and death" (*R*, folio 407.5–6). In most other texts, including the *Mppś*, we find the eight conditions of existence (*Mppś*, ii, p. 905).

314. The *ṣaḍbāhyasthūla* include cold, heat, wind, rain, etc., whereas the *ṣaḍādhyātmikaruci* comprise hunger, thirst, old age, illness, death and so forth (*Mppś*, ii, p. 904).
The *Mppś*'s third type of patience—patience towards defilements (*kleśakṣānti*)—rests on the recognition

As both types of *kṣānti* are concerned with non-mental objects (*acittadharma*),³¹⁵ they are strongly influenced by the bodhisattva's advanced power of cognition and his resolution to postpone his entrance into *nirvāṇa* indefinitely.³¹⁶ The former allows him to perceive the manifestations of reality 'just as they are' and saves him from the traps of Māra.³¹⁷ Aware of the delusive character of phenomena, he gains sufficient inner strength to patiently endure all discomfort and hostility.³¹⁸ The latter precludes the untimely elimination of the *saṃyojana*, since this would prompt him to abandon *saṃsāra*.

Until he has severed the fetters and attained the 'path devoid of depravity' (*anāsravamārga*), the bodhisattva is compelled to trust and accept the Doctrine on the basis of faith. Above all, this implies accepting the three seals of the Doctrine (*trividhadharmamudrā*) and eschewing the fourteen unanswered questions (*caturdaśāvyākṛtavastu*)³¹⁹ without exposure to the obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) or loss of the Middle Path.³²⁰

The *Bḍp* does not dwell on external/internal *dharmakṣānti*, but proceeds directly to patience with regard to sentient beings.³²¹ This too comprises two areas of application. First, the bodhisattva bears verbal abuse with patience.³²² Fearing that he might lose his roots of virtue and remaining firmly rooted in compassion and equipoise, he does not return the abuse but renews his *praṇidhāna*.³²³ When in difficulty, the bodhisattva sustains his patience through recollecting (*anusmṛti*) the Buddha, Dharma and *Saṅgha* which brings all dithering to an end.³²⁴ Second, the bodhisattva exercises self-control and forbearance towards beings who

of exposure to worldly influence. Until he has fully overcome all defilements, fetters (*saṃyojana*) and effects of the work of Māra that bind him to *saṃsāra*, the bodhisattva must put on his armour of patience (ii, pp. 906–908). Paraphrasing a passage from the *Sn* (v. 426b–428), the *Mppś* enumerates desire (*kāma*), sadness (*arati*), hunger and thirst (*kṣutpipāsā*), craving (*tṛṣṇā*), languor and torpor (*styānamiddha*), fear (*bhaya*), doubt (*vicikitsā*) and anger (*krodha*) and hypocrisy (*mraṁṣa*) as the eight most damaging influences of Māra (cf. *Lal*, p. 261).

The *Bḍp* (R, folio 415.3–7) distinguishes ten kinds of influence of Māra: (1) desire for food, (2) desire for clothing, (3) desire for worldly enjoyment, (4) desire for praise, (5) lack of desire for ordination, (6) lack of desire for virtuous *dharma*, (7) lack of pleasure in seclusion, (8) lack of desire for enlightenment, (9) desire for things other than pristine cognition, (10) irreverence towards one's teacher and benefactor.

315. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 903–4.

316. The *Mppś* looks at the various aspects of patience from twenty different viewpoints. However, since most of these express little remarkable thought and show conceptual overlapping, I shall not discuss them in detail (*Mppś*, ii, pp. 903–12).

317. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 904–6.

318. As in the *Bḍp*, the argument is enlisted that if he were to succumb to his suffering—and presumably retaliate against aggressors—he would be no better from ordinary beings. (*op. cit.*, p. 906).

319. A list of these questions is contained in the *Cūḷamāluṅkyasutta* (M I, pp. 311–12).

320. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 912–13.

321. R, folio 408–417.

322. R, folio 408–415.

323. R, folio 412.1, 412.6.

324. R, folio 410.3–412.2

Since it is held crucial for the bodhisattva to regain his composure, several texts assign a particularly

inflict physical harm upon him.³²⁵ Aware that wrath or retaliation in response to any such attack would cloud his mind and lead to inattentiveness, he puts on the armour of dedicated patience. Absent-mindedness is particularly damaging to the bodhisattva's prospect of buddhahood, since it renders him susceptible to the influence of Māra which would cut off enlightenment.³²⁶ For this reason, he is not only encouraged to meet hostility with indifference or tolerance, but moreover, to generate delight and joy.³²⁷

“When I am pelted with rocks, beaten with weapons and suppressed for a hundred thousand million world-ages I shall not forsake life for a single moment but think: ‘Alas, this is marvellous. Sentient beings are noble, I shall not kill them.’ ”

Taking into account human psychology, the *Bdp* introduces then a new aspect of *sattvakṣānti*, that is, conceit through exposure to praise and flattery.³²⁸ So far, *kṣānti* found only application in antagonistic situations of hostility and menace. Now, we learn that praise too—appropriate or not—can have a damaging impact on the training and needs to be ignored.³²⁹

A concise overview of the factors that pertain to the *duḥkhādhivāsa* and *parāpakāramarṣaṇa* aspects of the *kṣānti* is found in the *Śikṣāsamuccaya*. For Śāntideva, endurance of suffering (*duḥkhādhivāsa*) signifies “bearing and patience with personal pains, lamentations, unhappiness, despondency and anguish of mind”.³³⁰ Its chief obstructing force is the fear of unhappiness³³¹ since fear alone is capable of leading to hatred (*dveṣa*) and despondency (*līnatā*).³³² Since both emotions are incompatible with the ideal of the bodhisattva³³³, the practitioner should resist delight in happiness and gloom in misery.³³⁴ For the *gr̥hapti*

important role to the timely generation of recollection (*anusmṛti*) during the practice of patience. In this function, it is cited in the *Akn* and *Bdp* and assumes a place of prominence in the *Rcd*. While the former encourage only the recollection of the Buddha, Dharma and *Śaṅgha*, the *Rcd* speaks of nine forms of *anusmṛti*, viz., recollection of the Buddha, enlightenment, pristine cognition (*jñāna*), benevolence (*maitrī*), overcoming (*vikrāma*), lion yawning (*simhaviṣṇubhāṇa*), summit of insight (*vilokitamūrdha*), primary and secondary marks (*lakṣaṇānuvyañjana*) and accomplishment of all buddha-qualities (*Rcd*, p. 233.4.5–5.1).

325. R, folio 414.3–7 (cf. *Pañca*, pp. 519a–520).

326. R, folio 415.2.

327. R, folio 414.4–5.

328. R, folio 419.4–420.3

329. In the *Mpps* (ii, pp. 867–888), the application of forbearance is similarly extended to include exposure to flattery, excessive attention of benefactors and the allures of women.

330. *Śikṣ*, p. 179.16–17 (cit. *Rtm*)

331. *op. cit.*, p. 179.12–13 (cit. *Dhsg*).

332. *op. cit.*, p. 179.13–14 (cit. *Dhsg*).

333. *op. cit.*, p. 20.12 (cit. *Bpm*).

334. *op. cit.*, p. 180.8–12 (cit. *Ug*).

bodhisattva, it is furthermore important to avoid bias and to abide unaffected by the eight worldly conditions as their threat to the spiritual equilibrium is particularly great.³³⁵

Despondency is overcome by the casting aside of imprudent (*laghu*) and irresolute (*sukumāra*) thoughts and by cultivating an invincible (*aparājita*) and steadfast (*akṣobhya*) intention to eradicate the *kleśa*.³³⁶ By doing so, the bodhisattva learns to withstand the onslaughts of Māra and maintains—even when exposed to torture or in intense pain—the sensation of happiness (*sukhasamjñā*).³³⁷ A decisive role in the struggle for patience is played by the *sarvadharmasukhākhṛāntasamādhi* since it turns all sensations of pain into pleasant, non-painful or indifferent experiences.³³⁸ For its unfolding, this *samādhi* is dependent on the bodhisattva's resolution (*praṇidhāna*) of universal liberation no matter how much hostility is shown towards him. Manifesting universal benevolence, he settles in the *sarvadharmasukhākhṛāntasamādhi*.³³⁹ The second concomitant to *duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti* is sympathetic joy (*muditā*).³⁴⁰ Distinct from physical bliss (*sukha*) in that it is primarily mind-based (*caitasika*)³⁴¹, *muditā* governs those training-areas that are free from despondency, sorrow (*daurmanasya*) and ill-temper (*arati*).³⁴² Finally, complementing sympathetic joy and absorption in the *sarvadharmasukhākhṛāntasamādhi*, the bodhisattva penetrates to the foundation of being (*dharmatā*). He realises that all sensations are based on illusion (*māyākṛta*) whose creation is traceable to mental constructions (*viṭhapanapratyupasthāna*) that, in turn, proceed from past deeds (*karmavipāka*) of no predicable agent.³⁴³

The exposition of 'patience in enduring the misdeeds of others' (*parāpakāramarṣaṇākṣānti*) is entirely based on the *Sgm*. In brief, it distinguishes three types of antagonistic demeanour³⁴⁴, viz., injury, contempt and injustice, all of which the bodhisattva endures in composure without intent for retaliation (*vyāpāda*).³⁴⁵ The same elements are also found in the *kṣānti*

335. *op. cit.*, p. 180.2 (cit. *Ug*).

336. *op. cit.*, p. 180.15–16 (cit. *Gv*).

337. *op. cit.*, p. 182.5–8 (cit. *Pps*).

338. *op. cit.*, p. 181.13–14 (cit. *Pps*).

Note that in the *Samādhi* (Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 79.9–12) it is patient endurance of injury caused by others—not suffering—that depends on the joint practice of meditation (leading to an unwavering mind) and wisdom (eradicating anger). Acceptance of suffering itself encourages the distinction of *neyārtha* from *nītārtha* texts, to acquire vision of sameness (*samatā*) and to show devotion to the *dharmatā* (*op. cit.*, pp. 78.1–4, 78.5–6, 77.15–16).

339. *op. cit.*, p. 182.8–15 (cit. *Pps*).

340. *op. cit.*, pp. 183.4–184.4.

341. *Mpps*, iii, p. 1256.

342. In the *Mpps* (ii, pp. 906–7) *Arati* is the name that is given to the second of Māra's inner hosts.

343. *Śikṣ*, p. 180.3–5 (cit. *Ug*).

344. *op. cit.*, p. 184.9–4.

345. *op. cit.*, p. 185.5.

discussion of the *Bdp*. However, being a much earlier text than the *Śikṣ* it does not provide as clear a distinction as Śāntideva but refers to them rather freely and in conjunction with other aspects of *kṣānti*.

So far, the *Bdp*'s exposition followed essentially 'patience in accepting suffering' (*duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti*) and 'patience in enduring the misdeeds of others' (*parāpakāramarṣanākṣānti*). Presented in terms of *sattvakṣānti* and *dharmakṣānti*—but never using this terminology—it did not address the cognitive dimension of patience. That is to say, the *Bdp* looked at *dharmakṣānti* solely from an empirical viewpoint and not from the standpoint which requires the bodhisattva to put up with suffering because of the intrinsic non-existence of *dharma*.³⁴⁶

Summed up as 'patience consisting in contemplating and adhering to the Dharma' (*dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti*), this type of *kṣānti* is brought about by resolute and astute investigation into the Doctrine.³⁴⁷ Like *duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti*, it is established by means of eight factors, viz., by determination (*adhimukti*) in the qualities of the *triratna*, by examining the meaning of reality (*tattvārtha*) and the laws of causation, by the force of buddhas and bodhisattvas, by personal attainments, means of attainment and by the sphere that is to be known (*jñeyagocara*).³⁴⁸

It is this cognitive maturity that leads the bodhisattva of the *Bdp* to the third level of *kṣānti* practice, namely, highest patience (*rab tu bzod pa, prakṣānti*). Passing through the process of

346. The discussion of this aspect—falling under the category of *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti*—occurs in the second section of the chapter. Partly repeating what has already been said concerning *duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti* (internal and external) and *parāpakāramarṣanākṣānti*, it reconsiders them under the heading of 'bodhisattva-patience' (R, folio 417.3, 419.4). Then, separately, it introduces 'highest patience' (*prakṣānti*). Although all three belong technically to the category of bodhisattva-patience, the conceptual proximity of the first two and the fact they are textually intermingled suggests a breach between them and 'highest patience'. Bodhisattva-patience itself is characterised by twenty-two attributes and attainments that accrue to the bodhisattva in the course of his career. But for the almost obligatory absence of anger, hatred, etc., few of these relate specifically to patience. That is to say, it accrues—if perfected—to bodhisattvas who are free from malice, wrath, harmful intention, quarrel and violence; to those who are watchful, caring, mindful of body, speech and mind, correctly reflecting, detached from *nirvāṇa*, aware of the law of karma, physically, vocally and mentally pure, in contact with the gods, in possession of the marks of a Tathāgata, in possession of his voice and of all roots of virtue; beyond inflicting injury and above all accusations. In short, in possession of all the buddha-qualities (R, folio 418.1–419.4).

347. The concept of *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* goes back to the earliest stratum of Buddhist thinking. Corresponding to the Pāli *dhammanijjhānakkhānti*, it occurs already in the *Caṅkhisutta* of the *Majjhimanikāya* (II, p. 175). Here, with faith in the foreground of the discourse, it follows on 'hearing *dhamma*' (*dhammasavana*), 'retaining *dhamma*' (*dhammadhāraṇā*) and 'considering meaning as secondary' (*atthupaparikkhā*) because 'one who considers meaning sees that in truth it is *dhamma* that support knowledge' (*yasmā ca kho atthaṃ upaparikkhati, tasmā dhammā nijjhanaṃ khamanti*). This patience, in turn, prepares and reinforces zest (*chanda*) from which emerges activity (*ussāha*).

348. *Bbh*, p. 195.10–20.

examination that characterises *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti*, the bodhisattva learns to eschew the forms of patience that participate in discursive thinking or are otherwise based on misconception.³⁴⁹

“Patience that inquires ‘Who is abusing and who is the abused?’ is a patience that construes duality. This is not the highest patience. Patience that inquires ‘Who abuses here?’ is patience that counts *dharma*. ... Patience that inquires ‘I course in [good] conduct, but he courses in bad conduct’ is patience [that engages in] duality. This is not the highest patience.”

Progressively refining his understanding of reality, the bodhisattva overcomes all forms of dichotomy and attains a vision of patience that operates beyond all predication.³⁵⁰

“What then is the highest patience? It is to understand emptiness without ever suppressing heretical doctrines or imputing emptiness. It is to understand emptiness without ever suppressing discrimination or imputing signlessness. It is to understand emptiness without ever suppressing one’s resolution or imputing wishlessness. ... It is to understand emptiness without ever suppressing *saṃsāra* or imputing *nirvāṇa*. Patience practised in this way is the highest patience.”

This process of realisation culminates in the bodhisattva’s ‘conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*’ (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*) when he sees that:³⁵¹

“Everything is unborn, unproduced and unarisen. The unarisen is without origination whatsoever. Since it is without origination, it is inexhaustible. The inexhaustible is the highest patience. It is neither conditioned nor unconditioned. It is never misconceiving. The non-established, non-increasing, genuinely non-multiplying, non-gathering and non-diminishing is without birth. That which is without birth is inexhaustible. If he is patient in this way [the bodhisattva] realises that *dharma* are unarisen.”

349. R, folio 420.6–421.3.

350. R, folio 422.1–6.

351. R, folio 422.7–423.4.

This final deliberation bears all the hallmarks of the *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti*. Having analysed conventional understanding of patience within the subject/object dichotomy, the bodhisattva now begins to fathom the meaning of emptiness. Thus, in a sense, he treads the middle way between categoric denial and mistaken imputation. This insight establishes him on the path leading to the highest patience that culminates in the recognition that *dharma* function beyond the parameter of origination or destruction in a space of no independent reality.

The spiritual ideal that is proposed in the *Bdp* as the highest patience was taken up by the *Akn* as absolute patience (*śin tu bzod pa, atyantakṣānti*).³⁵² Intrinsically invulnerable (*atyantāvraṇatā*), it operates beyond apprehension (*anupalambha*)³⁵³ and the duality of antidotes (*pratipakṣaprahāṇa*).³⁵⁴ Hence, absolute patience of the *Akn* epitomises the bodhisattva's true cognition of reality. That is to say, it prompts avoidance of the construct of suppression/imputation (*prativedhasaṃghata*) and allows him to see that *dharma* are established beyond the predicate of patience. Although the text stops short of using the term *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* to define its understanding of this highest or absolute form of patience, there can be little doubt that it propounds this very concept.³⁵⁵

The *Akn*, like the *Bdp*, shows no indication that it was aware of the possibility of progression in *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*.³⁵⁶ Adopting a purely cognitive approach to lay bare the reasoning leading up to the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*, it does not contain any reference

352. I have found only one *sūtra* where the threefold division into injury, suffering and *dharma* is not taken up. This is the *Saṅkarapariprcchā* (TTP, 33, pp. 248.5.5–50.3.8) where we meet with an division of *kṣānti* into the four *śramāṇakāradharmas* of abuse (*ākruṣṭa*), anger (*roṣita*), reproach (*bhaṇḍita*) and beating (*tādita*). In the *Saṅkarapariprcchā*, these are set in direct relation to the stage of irreversibility, to the thirty-two marks of a great being, to possession of a buddha-field and to proficiency in the *abhijñā*—in brief to buddhahood itself (*Mvy* 8708). The cognitive dimension, implied in *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti*, is treated separately but follows exactly along the lines of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* which is referred to as term (p. 250.1.4–7) and mentioned in conjunction with a prediction.

353. *Akn*, p. 45.1.7–8

The *Akn*'s understanding of the absolute patience runs therefore close to that of the *Rp* (p. 12.2) that employs the very term *anupalambhadharmakṣānti* to characterise *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*.

354. Contrast this interpretation of absolute *kṣānti* with that found in the *Pañca* (pp. 3–4) where, according to the Tibetan, it is likened to the 'conviction of the sameness of all *dharma*' (*śamatāsarvadharmakṣānti*).

355. *Akn*, p. 45.7–8:

"That kind of patience that is conviction concerning the non-originated and conviction that things are unoriginated (*anutpādakṣānti*) is absolute patience."

Cf. *Laṅka*, 203.11: *anutpāde kṣānti*; Suzuki, 1978, p. 175, § 109; *Akn*, p. 45.3.4–6.

356. This is also the case in the *Rcd*, *Bdp*, *Kp* and many other early Mahāyāna *sūtras* where patience is discussed as an individual perfection.

to the terms *ghoṣānugā-*, *anulomikī-* and *pratilabdhākṣānti* or to the thought that lies at their heart. With some reservation, this holds also true for the division into *duḥkhādhivāsana-*, *parāpakāramarṣaṇa-* and *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* since none of these terms actually appears in the *Akn*. And yet, the apportionment of contents into three identifiable sections dealing with ordinary patience, pure patience and absolute patience suggests, perhaps, that it was known to the *Akn*, if only in a rudimentary form.³⁵⁷

The benefits that accrue to the bodhisattva from the practice of *kṣānti* are manifold but do not always agree. Hūang-tsang, commenting on the three types of patience, explains that *parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti* becomes the cause of the bodhisattva's ripening of sentient beings (*sattvavipākapravṛtṭihetu*) while *duḥkhādhivāsanaṅkṣānti*, granting powers to cope with pain, induces buddha-qualities. The third form of patience, *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* functions as support (*āśraya*) for the two preceding types of *kṣānti* and describes the bodhisattva's attitude towards the Doctrine.³⁵⁸ The *Msl* gives a more pragmatic account, citing indifference to animosity and flattery, concern for benefit and welfare, death free from repentance and rebirth amongst gods and men as the fruits that spring from the pursuit of patience.³⁵⁹

Among the *sūtras*, the most advanced account is found in the *Samādhirājasūtra*. Here, we are told that a practitioner who has penetrated the *ghoṣānugāmī* level of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* abstains from disputes, penetrates the illusory nature of *dharma*, acquires knowledge of the scriptures, understands their meaning on the *neyārtha* and *nītārtha* level, attains faith and resolves to attain all-knowing. He reaches the stage of increased cognition (*jñānavivṛddha*)

357. A similar situation is found in the *Sgm* (33, pp. 50.1.5–54.4). Here too, one meets with the ingredients of later developments but does not find any technical terminology. That is to say, the *sūtra* introduces *kṣānti* by affirming its important role in the *bodhisattvacaryā* in that it renders the bodhisattva inseparable from the thought of enlightenment. Furthermore, it prompts him to generate the intent (*āśaya*) of the six perfections (p. 50.3.4–6) and, sustained by great compassion, establishes a lasting link between the bodhisattva and other humans, buddhas and gods (p. 50.4.3–5). Patient endurance with regard to injury of body and speech refer to all intents to *duḥkhādhivāsana* and *parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti* while patience with regard to the mind discusses the motive behind the bodhisattva's struggle. The cognitive element enshrined in the term *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* is dealt with in the last section where Sāgaramati is giving a long discourse on the nature of *dharma* (pp. 52.3.7–53.4.1). Perception of it arises from the perfection of mediation and wisdom. Through meditation, the bodhisattva gains the required composure for the vision of *dharma* with insight (*vipaśyanā*) in meditation to unfold (p. 53.2.6–8). This vision itself is wisdom and training in the perfection of wisdom leads to true realisation with regard to the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of *dharma* (p. 52.4.2–3).

358. *Msg*, p. 191

The same division, but without commentary, is also found in the *Siddhi*, p. 621 (cf. *Śgs*, p. 143, § 29).

359. *Msl*, p. 10816–21

This set of five was almost certainly taken from the *Āṅguttaranikāya* where we come across a very similar scheme (A III, p. 254).

and becomes fully settled in the teachings of the Buddha.³⁶⁰ Since most, if not all of these attainments are attributable to the bodhisattva's careful Dharma-pursuance, the text's comparison of the *ghosānugāmī* practice with the attainment of *śrutamayīprajñā* is quite appropriate.

At the *anulomikī* level³⁶¹, the bodhisattva ceases to waver in his undertakings. He attains the perfection of meditation, acquires the *abhijñā* and *ṛddhipāda* and transcends all mental limitations.³⁶² Thus, accomplished in insight (*vipaśyanā*) and perfect mental quietude (*śamatha*), he is wholly composed and traverses one hundred buddha-fields.³⁶³ Considering the intense meditative and reflective practice that marks this level of attainment, the juxtaposition to *cintāmayīprajñā* is all but far-fetched.

Finally, at the *pratilabdḥā* level of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* the bodhisattva sees innumerable buddhas teaching sentient beings and is conversant with their demeanour and armour. Jambudvīpa becomes his buddha-field where he rules with inconceivable wonder-working powers and teaches the Dharma to all beings.³⁶⁴ He abides wholly unaffected by mundane profit or renown. Established in the non-arising of *dharma*, he attains buddha-cognition and achieves the highest degree of benevolence and compassion.³⁶⁵ According to the *Samādhirāja*, this events takes place when the bodhisattva embarked on the sixth stage and received his final prediction buddhahood.³⁶⁶

In appreciation of these benefits, the bodhisattva also sets out to suppress anger in other beings.³⁶⁷ Thus, we learn in the *Bodhisattvapraṇītimokṣasūtra* that the bodhisattva cultivates patience not only in himself, but equally admonishes others to follow suit. Aware of the effects of anger and animosity, "he consoles and placates those who are angry, he appeases and heartens them"³⁶⁸ and explains:³⁶⁹

360. Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 77.2–79.8.

361. Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 79.9–80.12.

362. TTP, 31, p. 281.2.2–3.

363. Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 79.9–11.

364. TTP, 31, p. 281.2.4–7.

365. Dutt, 1941–53, ii, pp. 80.13–81.10

Other attainments that are thought to accompany the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma* are *śīla*, *prajñā*, *jñāna*, *punyasambhāra*, *smṛti*, *pratibhānapratīsamvid*, etc., (*op. cit.*, p. 95.15–16).

366. Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 82.11–14

We have seen that by most accounts this is not a standard positioning.

367. *Msl*, p. 105.18–19 (cf. S I, pp. 162–3).

368. *Śikṣ*, p. 188.17–18.

369. *Pañca*, p. 562–3.

“There is nothing real or substantial from that your wrath is produced. An unreal fancy is this wrath. No real entity corresponds to it, nor is there a real entity that offends you, makes you feel anger or ill-will, or that makes you belabour others with sticks or swords, or rob one another of life. For when you get angry as a result of an unfounded imagination, you will be hurled into the hells, the animal world, the world of Yāma or any other place of low rebirth where you will experience painful feelings—intense, harsh and bitter.”

In the *Bdp* the bodhisattva does not show such concern with the welfare of sentient beings. As in the previous chapters, the focus of the exposition rests rather narrowly on the training of the bodhisattva and ignores the wider issues that are involved in its application. We learn therefore very little about the benefits that accrue to him on the basis of the practice of *kṣānti* and the impact it has on the goal of universal liberation.

The description itself concurs to a large extent with the principles that underlie the discussions of patience in other Mahāyāna *sūtras*. That is to say, it speaks of *dharma-* and *sattva-kṣānti*, it distinguishes between *duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti*, *parāpakāramarṣanakṣānti* and *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* and recognises the principle of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* as the highest manifestation of patience. There is however no direct reference to these technical terms as their contents is incorporated in the flow of the exposition.

The position of these main-components on the path is only vaguely indicated. *Duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti* which corresponds in the scheme of the *Bdp* to ordinary patience is the lowest type of patience and is practised during the initial stages of the path. Although its exact position is not indicated, from the information on the next higher type of patience we may deduce that it probably prevails from the *pramuditābhūmi* to the *prabhākarībhūmi*. After that, the bodhisattva embarks on the so-called bodhisattva-patience. Corresponding to the *apakāramarṣanakṣānti*, this type of patience becomes manifest when the bodhisattva has acquired wisdom. That is to say, when he is accomplished in the bases of mindfulness, when he has attained correct reflection, possesses a fully purified disposition and has mastered the factors of enlightenment. It is not clear for how long the *parāpakāramarṣanakṣānti* dominates the *kṣānti* practice of the bodhisattva. According to the *Bdp* it extends over the whole width of the path and leads to the acquisition of the buddha-qualities. This generates difficulties since it is at odds with the position of the *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* which is generally

thought to fully manifest as *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* on the *acalābhūmi*. However, as the *Bdp* is completely silent on its positioning and does not distinguish it contextually from the bodhisattva-patience, we may assume that the *parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti*, *dharmanidhyānādhimuktikṣānti* and *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* (including perhaps the *duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti*) manifest concurrently from the eighth stage onwards. In other words, although they are initially accomplished in succession, from a certain level of attainment onwards (probably the eighth stage) all three types of patience merge into the ‘conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*’ where they coexist and find their true fulfilment.

The Perfection of Vigour

“Vigour is a steadfast mental effort (*cetaso 'bhyutsāha*) leading to wholesome *dharma*. It is of armour (*saṃnāha*), practice (*prayoga*), free of weakness (*alīnatva*), irreversible (*avyāvṛtti*) or insatiable (*asantuṣṭi*). Its purpose is to effect completion and attainment of favourable bearings.”

This definition of vigour, given in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, sums up many of the issues standing at the heart of the bodhisattva's *vīrya* practice.³⁷⁰ First, it establishes the psychology of vigour. Second, it maps out the various phases where vigour becomes manifest. Although, at first sight no more than random attributes, *saṃnāha*, *prayoga*, etc., represent in fact rather distinct stages in the cultivation of vigour. Finally, Asaṅga defines the rationale behind *vīrya*. The phrasing is by no means coincidental, but takes into account changes in its objectives, leading from concern for personal advance to selfless devotion to universal liberation. For Buddhism to produce such an elaborate concept of vigour, it had to mature over many centuries.

In early Buddhism, vigour (*virīya*) figures as a frequently cited but little elaborated aspect of the śrāvaka training. It is never expounded on its own but is invariably touched upon in connection with other virtues whose generation it assists. *Virīya* is discussed as part of the lists of the seven excellent qualities of monks³⁷¹, five faculties (*indriya*)³⁷² and powers (*bala*)³⁷³. It appears under the five limbs of striving (*padhāna*)³⁷⁴, seven factors of enlightenment (*bodhyaṅga*)³⁷⁵, five factors conducive to ripening³⁷⁶, eight conditions causing wisdom (*paññā*)³⁷⁷, ten conditions that make for warding³⁷⁸ and need to be remembered³⁷⁹, and is

370. *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 8.

371. M I p. 356

Identical formulations, but set in a different context are found in D III, pp. 237, 285; A IV, pp. 3, 110.

372. S V, p. 225; D III, pp. 239, 278.

373. S V, p. 197; A III, pp. 2, 11; A V, p. 15.

374. M II, pp. 95, 128; A III, pp. 152, 155; D III, p. 237.

375. A IV, pp. 352–3.

376. A IV, p. 357.

377. A IV, pp. 153–5.

378. A V, pp. 23–24, 27–28.

379. A V, pp. 90–91.

particularly associated with the moral precepts of the *pātimokkha* code.³⁸⁰

The contexts in which it is discussed suggests that *virīya* was recognised as an important practice. Its opposite, indolence, is listed among the eight principal stains³⁸¹ and mars renunciation of agitation, intemperance and immorality.³⁸² Moreover, *virīya* is expressively perceived as a contributing force to many cardinal attainments of the Buddhist path, including mindfulness, ripening, recollection and wisdom.³⁸³ Quite clearly, for the Buddha *virīya* constituted a high-ranking *dhamma* in its own right.³⁸⁴

“O monks, this *Dhamma* is for the energetic, this *Dhamma* is not for the indolent.”

In spite of such pre-eminence, references to *virīya* are predominantly succinct and summary-like. It is rarely analysed but surfaces in passages which follow stereotyped patterns of exposition that recur, without variation, in two or three variant readings throughout the *nikāya*.

The most frequent formula identifies *virīya* as the *raison d'être* of the *sammappadhāna* for which it serves along with faith, good health, honesty and wisdom as precondition.³⁸⁵ Accounting for approximately eighty percent of references to *virīya* in the *nikāya*, it typically runs as follows:³⁸⁶

“He dwells with stirred up energy for the sake of abandoning unskilled mental states. For the sake of acquiring skilful mental states, he is firm, of steady valour, perseverance in purpose amid skilful mental states.”

In several places this type of reference is expanded to include the monk's refusal to abandon the burden of teaching and good qualities in illustration of his vigorous resolve.³⁸⁷ It appears that for the early Buddhists *virīya* was above all a mental factor.³⁸⁸

380. A IV, pp. 153–5, 357.

381. A IV, p. 195.

382. A V, p. 146.

383. These links are established in A V, pp. 23–24; IV, p. 357; V, pp. 90–91; IV, p. 153.

384. A IV 233; see also: M I, p. 481.

385. M II, p. 95.

386. M I, p. 356 (trsl. Gethin).

387. A I, p. 117.

388. S V, p. 111.

“O monks, that which is physical energy is always energy as a factor of wisdom.
That which is mental energy is always energy as a factor of wisdom.”

The *As*³⁸⁹, citing this very passage, concludes that there is thus only mental energy and that whatever action results from the ‘initial generation of energy’ (*viriyārambha*), it springs from the psychological disposition towards *virīya*.³⁹⁰ In spite of its operational restriction to the mental realm, the impact of *virīya* goes of course beyond psychic processes as its purpose is to overcome idleness (*kosajja*) through energetic practice. While its foundation is also mental, the method and means that manifest energetic conduct vary according to circumstances.³⁹¹ The principal characteristics of *virīya* are grasping, strengthening and support of those wholesome mental states that are most liable to deterioration.³⁹² In this sense, it is specifically cited in the *As* in conjunction with *sīla*³⁹³ and recognised as the chief force that instigates and completes purification:³⁹⁴

“Livelihood purification is to be undertaken by means of *virīya*. For that is accomplished by energy because the abandoning of wrong livelihood is effected in one who has rightly applied energy. Abandoning, therefore, unbecoming wrong striving, this should be undertaken with energy by means of the right kind of striving consisting of alms round, etc.”

This quotation introduces striving (*padhāna*) as the other major aspect of *virīya* that (in particular as a concomitant to the four *sammappadhāna*) motivates to virtuous conduct.³⁹⁵ If

389. *As*, p. 145.

390. In the *Kośa*, the situation is very similar. Here (ii, p. 160), we learn that *vīrya* is primarily mental effort. It is said to refer at all times to wholesome action. The same thought is expressed in the *Pañcaskandha*: “*Vīrya* is energy of the mind concerned with the wholesome, the opposite to indolence.”

391. *As*, p. 120.

392. A vivid description of *virīya* in its supportive function is found in the *Milindapañha* (36):
“Just as, your majesty, a man might support a house that was falling down with an extra piece of wood, and being thus supported that house would no fall down—in the same way, your majesty, energy has the characteristic of supporting. Supported by *virīya*, no skilful *dhamma* are lost.”

393. *As*, p. 120.

394. *Vism*, p. 40 (trsl. Ñāṇamoli)

395. In the *Vism*, Buddhaghōṣa goes so far as to say that *virīya* is nothing but an alternative name for *padhāna* (*Vism*, p. 697), while in *Bodhirājakumārasutta* (M II, p. 95) *virīya* is listed besides faith, health, integrity and wisdom as one of the independent qualities of striving. According to the *Kośa* (vi, p. 283), giving the constituents of vigour, *vīrya* comprises the four *samyakpradhāna*, limb two of the *bodhyaṅga* and the *samyagvyāyāma* member of the Eightfold Path.

vigour has exertion as its characteristic, it functions to strengthen the coexistent states and manifests resistance to surrender to unwholesome *dhamma*.³⁹⁶ In this context, agitation (*uddhacca*)—the basic condition for generating *virīya*—becomes the proximate cause of energy³⁹⁷ and gives it an important role in the completion of the training:³⁹⁸

“Energy (*virīya*) is the state of one who is vigorous (*vīra*). Its characteristic is marshalling [driving]. Its function is to consolidate conascent states. It is manifested as non-relapse. Because of the words ‘bestirred, he strives wisely’ its proximate cause is a sense of urgency; or its proximate cause is the ground of the initiation of *virīya*. When rightly initiated, it should be regarded as the root of all attainments.”

The application of *virīya* and knowledge thereof is inextricably linked with understanding the meaning of exertion. According to the *Paṭi*s, it is acted out through training in the four *sammappadhāna* and produces the undertaking to abandon the seven obstacles in favour of renunciation.³⁹⁹ In this respect, its presence becomes a precondition “for the maintenance, non-corruption, strengthening, plentifulness, development and perfection of the arahant path” that is limited to those who fully subscribe to the practice of endeavour (*padhāna*) and bestirring (*ārabhata*).⁴⁰⁰

As one of the five *indriya*⁴⁰¹, it has its origin in adverting unwholesome *dharma*, in zeal and attention through the influence of exertion, in focusing through the influence of the faculty of energy leading to the abandonment of idleness.⁴⁰² Once in place, it is important that the faculty of *virīya* does not dominate any of the other four *indriya* as this would impede their development.⁴⁰³ Above all, however, it is imperative that the practitioner should balance

396. *As*, p. 121.

397. *Mil*, i, p. 57.

398. *Vism*, xiv, p. 137 (trsl. Nāṇamoli; cf. A II, p. 115).

399. *Paṭi*s, pp. 103–4.

400. *Paṭi*s, p. 104.

401. Several discourses in the Samyuttanikāya indicate that the *virīyendriya* and *sammappadhāna* conceptually cover exactly the same ground:

“What is the faculty of energy? Here the noble disciple dwells as one who has established energy. For the sake of abandoning unskilful *dharma* and arousing skilful *dharma* he is firm, of steady valour, unrelinquishing in purpose with regard to skilful *dharma*” (S V, p. 197).

Or, even more explicit (S V, pp. 196):

“In the four *sammappadhāna* there is the *virīyendriya* to be seen.”

402. *Paṭi*s, pp. 211, 209.

403. This, of course, is also true for the other four faculties as too strong a practice of any of them would obstruct the performance of their collective functions (*Vism*, iv. 46, p. 129; *Vin*, i, pp. 179–85, A III, pp. 374–6).

vigour with concentration. The reason is that idleness poses a threat to meditation in those who possess little vigour, since concentration favours inactivity. Agitation, on the other hand, occurs in those who possess great energy but are restless in meditation since energy favours agitation.⁴⁰⁴

“When the sign arises, one *bhikkhu* forces his energy, thinking: ‘I shall soon reach absorption.’ Then his mind lapses into agitation because of the mind’s over-exerted energy and he is prevented from reaching absorption. Another who sees the defect in over-exertion slacks off his energy, thinking: ‘What is absorption to me now?’ Then his mind lapses into idleness because of his mind’s too lax energy and he too is prevented from reaching absorption. Yet another who frees his mind from indolence even when it is only slightly idle and from agitation when only slightly agitated, confronting the sign with balanced effort, [that one] reaches absorption.”

In the Mahāyāna, the notion of *vīrya* has been modified in several respects. First, adjusted to the requirements of the new ideal, vigour is no longer targeted towards the bodhisattva’s personal advance, but is devoted to the welfare of all beings:⁴⁰⁵

“They [the bodhisattvas] have pure and courageous minds and are linked with other beings and persons. [When] they are practising the perfection of vigour, as a maid servant is submissive to her master who is not subject to anyone else, so do the firmly wise submit to subjection by all beings.”

Second, its practice is given a new meaning because of the unlimited duration of the bodhisattva path. In the nikāya, *virīya* was essentially interpreted as a supportive quality that promoted the generation of a wholesome mind-set. Its presence is especially required in meditation and has great impact on purification. Above all, it is related to practice and did not address the issue of time as a priority. With the expansion of the spatio-temporal dimension of Mahāyāna cosmology, the previous ideas on the length of the training became dramatically

404. *Vism*, iv.72, p. 137 (trsl. Gethin)

See also S V, pp. 112–114 where the Buddha construes the famous simile of the fire that cannot burn by lack of dry fuels (i.e., idleness) and cannot be put out by dry fuels (i.e., agitation), (cf. *Vism*, pp. 136, 138).

405. *Rgs*, xxix.11 (trsl. Conze; cf. *Pañca*, p. 455).

amended. As a consequence, even very early Mahāyāna *sūtras* draw connections between the need for perfect vigour and the formidable length of the path, arguing that it requires beings of truly extraordinary zeal. Such thinking is already attested in the *Rgs* and indeed figures in practically all Mahāyāna treatises on *vīrya*.⁴⁰⁶

Third, by applying their philosophical axioms on existence to the training itself, Mahāyāna *sūtras* merged their ontological absolutism with the realism of the practice itself. For the perfection of vigour, as indeed for all other practices, this led to a radical shift in interpretation culminating in the admission of the futility of all endeavour.⁴⁰⁷

“When one has no notion of either body, thought, or being,
Abiding without perception and coursing in the Doctrine of non-duality
That has been called by the Buddha ‘perfection of vigour’
Of those who long for blissful, imperishable unsurpassed enlightenment.”

In spite of (or perhaps, because of) the predicament posed by the dismissal of conventional experience, the bodhisattva proceeds to train in vigour with unabated zeal.⁴⁰⁸

“To some he gives sons and daughters, and to others a kingdom. For the sake of others he sacrifices himself. In this way he works the weal of beings by whatever device it can be worked. It is thus that the bodhisattva who courses in perfect wisdom and is endowed with mental vigour fulfils the perfection of vigour even though *dharma* are signless.”

This last quotation points to an important departure from early conceptions of *vīrya*. We have seen that for the śrāvaka vigour was primarily a mental *dhamma*. In the Mahāyāna, this definition is no longer upheld. Already in the incipient phase, its *sūtras* speak of physical and mental vigour. While it is probably true to say that mental vigour is still regarded superior as it creates the psychological foundation for the practical implementation, both are recognised and valued for their contributions.⁴⁰⁹

406. *Rgs*, xxx.4–5.

407. *Rgs*, xxx.7 (trsl. Conze).

408. *Pañca*, pp. 513–14 (trsl. Conze).

409. *Pañca*, p. 513:

“Here, the bodhisattva who courses in perfect of wisdom and is endowed with mental vigour

Also mental vigour itself underwent some modifications.⁴¹⁰ In the early Buddhism of Śākyamuni, it was always interpreted as an inherently dynamic force which promotes and sustains wholesome states, or prevents and destroys unwholesome states. For the Mahāyāna this is no longer the case, as mental vigour received a predominantly cognitive role:⁴¹¹

“The bodhisattva who courses in perfect wisdom and is endowed with mental vigour ... does not misconstrue anything whatsoever as permanent or impermanent, ease or ill, self or not-self, conditioned or unconditioned.”

Thus, rather than operating as the driving force behind the bodhisattva's exploits in *vīrya*, mental vigour became an agency bringing *vīrya* practice in line with Mahāyāna ontology. Its task was to free the bodhisattva from delusion and establish him in knowledge of sensefields, non-duality and *dharmatāsthiti*, culminating in the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*.⁴¹²

It is in consideration of these developments that the *vīrya* exposition in the *Bdp* needs to be examined. The *Bdp* introduces the discussion of vigour by pointing to the interaction between *kṣānti* and *vīrya*. For those who are dedicated to scriptural learning, it becomes a *sine qua non* for progress, as they meet with persistent envy and hostility.⁴¹³

Such explicit association of learning and vigour is rarely found in Mahāyāna literature. In the few cases where a connection is established, rather than physical protection, vigour is directed more to accomplishing the task of learning itself. Thus, we learn in the *Nārāyaṇaparipṛcchā* of the bodhisattva's great vigour in preaching the Dharma.⁴¹⁴

gives no opportunity to unwholesome deeds of body and speech.”

410. Cf. *Ratnameghasūtra* (cited in *Śikṣ*, pp. 51.21–52.3).

411. *Pañca*, p. 513 (trsl. Conze).

412. *Sgm*, 33, pp. 62.5.8–63.1.7.

413. R, folio 424.1–426.3.

414. *Śikṣ*, pp. 189.7–190.3

It is in this context that Śāntideva gives the well-known quotation of the *Akn*'s eighty types of learning to that I have referred on several occasions already. For the exact contents of this list, see: Appendix i. In the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 33.23–27, J), as a precondition for the practice proper and leading to the first *dhyāna*, the bodhisattva focuses his vigour on the search for learning and the Dharma at the *prabhākarībhūmi*.

The *Dbh* itself contains very little on the practice of the *vīryapāramitā* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 40.12–14, I). In the exposition on the *acriṣmatībhūmi*—the phase where training in *vīrya* should theoretically stand in the foreground—only one sentence addresses the bodhisattva's practice in *vīrya*, describing it as attentive (*aprasrabdhā*), pure (*aparikliṣṭa*), unfaltering (*apratyudhāvartya*), extensive (*vipulya*), infinite (*ananta*), earnest (*uttapta*), unequalled (*asama*), indestructible (*asaṃhārya*), aimed at the benefit of all sentient beings (*sarvasattvapariṇāṣa*) and saying that it discerns correct conduct from incorrect conduct (*nayānaya vibhaktā*).

The combination of *vīrya* and *kṣānti* is, in contrast, much more commonly attested in Mahāyāna *sūtras*. It is in particular the attainment of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* that *vīrya* is related to.⁴¹⁵

“O householder, how does the *pravrajita* bodhisattva, living in the *aranyavāsa*, cultivate and fulfil the perfection of vigour? To this end, the bodhisattva should train himself thus: ‘I shall not depart from this place, for it is essential that I should realise the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*.’ ”

The rationale behind this association is the bodhisattva’s change of body at the moment of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*.⁴¹⁶ Immediately after the first production of the thought of enlightenment, his attainments are weak and incomplete and he strives to attain perfection in his training by means of practice in generosity, moral conduct and good intentions. Throughout this period, stretching from the *prathamacittotpāda* to the attainment of the perfection of meditation, his endeavours are physical, since they operate on the material plane where he experiences truly physical hardship. With the production of the *abhijñā* at the point of mastery in meditation, physical effort is no longer required as he is now capable of transforming himself into whatever shape is best suited to assist sentient beings.

In the *Bdp*, however, the link with *kṣānti* is initially interpreted in the conventional sense. The bodhisattva is required to bear with the physical and vocal animosity directed at him under Māra’s influence.⁴¹⁷ In this respect, perfection in vigour provides a degree of psychological steadfastness in the pursuit of the path.⁴¹⁸

415. *Ug*, p. 271.1.3–5.

416. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 970, 711–12, n. 1.

417. *R*, folio 424.3–6.

418. *R*, folio 243–246

In the *Mppś*, the connection between *vīrya* and *kṣānti* includes the conventional and ontological frame of reference of patience. First, the bodhisattva shows great diligence in quietly enduring all pain and hostility—be it physical or verbal—and remains unaffected by the fame and homage shown to him (ii, p. 986). Second, the bodhisattva is not deterred by the difficulty of his undertaking. Working for the benefit of beings, he shows great patience with their shortcomings and accomplishes even the most difficult tasks through the combined presence of *vīrya* and *kṣānti* (ii, p. 949). This attainment of the *abhijñā* coincides with the ‘conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*’ (*Daśa-bh*, p. 71.22–26), at which stage he obtains a new body called the ‘body born from the Dharma-realm’ (*dharmadhātujakāya*). From now onwards he is no longer concerned with physical vigour that dominated his ‘body born from fetters and acts’ (*bandhanakarmajakāya*) since the production of the thought of enlightenment, but enters the realm of mental vigour. As this latter body is born from the teachings of the Doctrine, it is in perfect concordance with reality and is no longer subject to the restraint of his saṃsāric corporeal existence. Depending for realisation on the state of *anutpattikadharmakṣānti*, the link between *vīrya* and *kṣānti* fits well into scheme of the path.

Rooted in pure altruism, the motivation is not the prospect of future happiness, but the aspiration to achieve universal welfare.⁴¹⁹

“O Śāriputra, while delighting in purification, he accomplishes vigour not solely for the purpose of acquiring the *sambhogakāya* of mine. Rather, he enters into [vigour] in order to bring happiness and benefit to all sentient beings; to prompt sentient beings to understand [the *bodhisattvapīṭaka*] ... to prompt them to guard the noble path.”

Immediate application of vigour is found in the practice of the *pāramitā* and the unfolding of benevolence and compassion.⁴²⁰ While diligent training in the *pāramitā* leads to the roots of virtue for the bodhisattva himself, resolute altruism reinforces his commitment to universal liberation. Hence, vigour is of fundamental importance to the bodhisattva's quest for buddhahood.⁴²¹

“Vigour is the finest of virtuous *dharma* because on its basis there occur subsequent benefits. Through vigour pleasant dwellings and success arise, both mundane and supramundane. Through vigour one achieves the desired enjoyment in life. Through vigour, those [virtues] become purified. Through vigour [bodhisattvas] transcend reification and attain supreme enlightenment.”

Motivated by the *cittotpāda* and supported by the armour of vigour, the bodhisattva embarks on the course of training.⁴²² The term ‘armour’ (*saṃnāha*) points here to one of the three phases of *vīrya* practice.⁴²³ Definitions of *saṃnāhavīrya* fall broadly into two categories.

419. R, folio 428.4–7.

420. R, folio 426.1–3

For an account of the interaction between *vīrya* and the other perfections, see: *Mpps*, ii, pp. 927–35. In the *Msl* (pp. 105.25–106.5) vigour is classified into seven types corresponding to its function and contents. These are vigour in moral conduct, meditation and wisdom, physical and mental vigour, zealous (*satkrīya*) and constant (*sātaṭya*) vigour.

421. *Msl*, p. 114.4–14 (cf. *Msl*, p. 32.4–5)

See also *Bbh* (p. 201.21–25):

“Nothing else but vigour is the chief and best cause for maturing in this way all the virtuous *dharma* that generate [the bodhisattva's] enlightenment. For that reason, the Tathāgata points to vigour for the supreme and perfect enlightenment.”

422. R, folio 445.6.

423. It is also the only member that is common to all schemes of vigour. The scholastic treatises of the Mahāyāna propose two classification of *vīrya*. First there is a scheme which recognises three types of

First, we have a number of texts where armoured vigour is related to cognitive processes. In the *Sgm*, for instance, armour is fundamental to the purification of the body and mind.⁴²⁴ As a mental *dharma*, its chief task is to generate sufficient resilience and strength for the bodhisattva to pursue pristine cognition (*jñāna*). Specifically, if combined with *kṣānti*, it prepares for the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma* and thereby enables him to persist in the practice and search of the pure Dharma.⁴²⁵ Furthermore, it promotes insight into the psychological operations of name-and-form; it leads to understanding of the cessation of the subject/object dichotomy and prompts the bodhisattva to abandon grief, doubt, illness and conceit.⁴²⁶

Second, we have texts where the need for armoured striving is located in the demanding nature of the training itself, in its infinite length and vast objective. A good example of this type is the *Akn*.⁴²⁷ Here, the focus rests on the need for steadfastness in the actual practice—above all in the *pāramitā*—and the pledge to postpone *parinirvāṇa* until all beings have been placed in the thought of enlightenment.

In the *śāstras*, however, it is generally agreed that armoured striving is motivated by both factors.⁴²⁸ It is understood to stand at the very beginning of the *vīrya* practice⁴²⁹ as producing encouragement and a firm commitment to the training in general, and strengthening *vīrya* in particular.⁴³⁰ In the *Msl*, these aspects are brought together in a single verse, although the

vigour, that is, 'armoured vigour' (*saṃnāhavīrya*), 'vigour in accumulating wholesome *dharma*' (*kuśaladharmasamgrāhakavīrya*) and 'vigour in working for the benefit of sentient beings' (*sattvārthakriyāvīrya*). Among others, it is given in the *Siddhi* (p. 622) and *Bbh* (p. 200.10–11). Variants of this classification are found in the *Msl* (p. 114.17–18) or *Msg* (pp. 191–2) where vigour falls into 'armoured vigour' (*saṃnāhavīrya*), 'vigour in practice' (*prayogavīrya*) and 'spirited, imperturbable, insatiable vigour' (*alinam akṣobhyam asaṃtuṣṭi vīrya*). A further variation is given in the *Dhsg* (§ 108; cf. *Mahāyānasūtrasamgraha*, Vaidya; p. 338.1–2) which distinguishes between *saṃnāhavīrya*, *prayogavīrya* and 'vigour directed at the supreme end' (*paraniṣṭhā/pariniṣṭhāvīrya*). The only major treatise that does not adopt either of these threefold schemes is the *Mppś* (ii, p. 946). Following the categorisation of the *Pañca*, it differentiates between mental and physical exertion (*kāyikacaitasikāśramṣanatā*). For the perfection of vigour itself, it proposes five constituent characteristics, including dynamism in action, ease in enterprise, steadiness of will power, eagerness of mind and perseverance in action (ii, p. 946). As the composition of these attributes indicates, it is probable—though not explicitly stated—that these cover vigour in both its mental and physical dimension.

424. 33, pp. 62.5.3–63.2.1.

425. *op. cit.*, p. 63.1.6–2.3.

426. *op. cit.*, p. 62.5.5–6.

427. *Akn*, p. 46.3.2–4.5.

428. *Bbh*, p. 201.2–4.

429. *Msg*, p. 191.

430. *Bbh*, pp. 200.26–201.2

According to Tsong-kha-pa, armoured vigour is based on former exertion and operates as a preliminary resolve (*praṇidhāna*), leading to enthusiasm of mind, infinite accumulations of merit, freedom from obscurity and becomes the cause of irreversibility. A bodhisattva who generates faith and conviction in armoured vigour, attains steadfastness in his cause and accomplishes even the most difficult tasks with ease provided that he is motivated by yearning for enlightenment that it consolidates (*Lam-rim-chen-mo*; trsl. Wayman, 1990, pp. 172–3). Like in the *Akn*, the need for armoured striving is defended by the extraordinary length of the training and extent of suffering the bodhisattva has to undergo in the

distinction between *saṃnāhavīrya* and *prayogavīrya* becomes somewhat blurred.⁴³¹

“Bodhisattvas generate vigour in amour and application that is without equal in order to cleanse themselves and others of defilement and in order to attain supreme enlightenment. On account of this vigour they establish all sentient beings in the three types of enlightenment. And because they have attained pristine cognition, they equip the world with vigour forever.”

In the *Bdp*, as in the *Sgm*, the focus of armoured vigour lies in cognition and learning. Highly meritorious in its own right, it produces roots of virtue far beyond the merit that is generated through *dāna*. It promotes birth under auspicious circumstances, pure associations and mental lucidity.⁴³²

In addition, armoured vigour draws the bodhisattva's attention to the ten obstructive conditions that, in turn, inspires discipline, compassion, mindfulness and joy in solitude.⁴³³ Appreciation of these factors operates as a catalyst which prompts the bodhisattva to overcome the obstructive conditions in other beings.⁴³⁴ For this purpose he pledges to persist in the true teachings at all times and does not fall prey to heterodox thought.⁴³⁵ Fear of Dharma misinterpretation is thus a chief concern for the practice of vigour.⁴³⁶ Besides vigour in studying the Doctrine, the bodhisattva works for the survival of the Dharma through endless preaching and altruistic

world (*Bbh*, p. 200.20–26).

431. *Msl*, p. 108.22–25.

432. R, folio 435.2–4

The *Samādhi* knows of ten concrete blessings that accrue from the cultivation of vigour. That is, bodhisattvas become generally difficult to satiate, they are received by buddhas and protected by the gods, they do not distort the teachings they have heard but retain the Dharma just as they have learned it, they enter the fold (*gotra*) of meditation, they experience little illness, attain happiness, possess sufficient food-stuff and do not turn into a lizard (*musala*) but resemble a lotus (Dutt, ii, 1941–53, pp. 335.14–336.2). For variants in the Tibetan, see: TTP, 31, p. 310.2.7–3.8.

433. R, folio 439.3–6

These are (1) exposure to the sayings of Māra, (2) physical blindness, (3) physical illness, (4) a distracted mind, (5) hatred and anger, (6) disputes and malice, (7) exposure to Māra and its works, (8) adherence to mistaken doctrine in times of decline of the Dharma, (9) desire for alms-bowls, robes and food among the monks, (10) sensual pleasure (R, folio 436–42).

434. The *Tathāgatācintyaguhyānirdeśa* (cit. in *Śikṣ*, p. 274.3–11) proposes ten concrete ways of improving the force of the bodhisattva's vigour. These include (1) renouncing the body and life but not the Dharma, (2) showing reverence to all beings, (3) feeling compassion with weak creatures and not to dislike them, (4) granting food to those who are hungry, (5) granting protection to those who are fearful, (6) dispensing medicine and cure those who are ill, (7) delighting the poor with great riches, (8) repairing shrines dedicated to the Tathāgata, (9) adopting pleasant speech when speaking to people and sharing the fate of poverty with those who are poor and (10) carrying the burden of those who are exhausted. Cf. *Mpps*, ii, p. 943.

435. R, folio 447.1–3.

436. R, folio 436.2–438.6.

efforts.

Thus inspired, he sets out to train in 'vigour accumulating roots of virtue' (*kuśaladharmasaṃgrāhakavīrya*)⁴³⁷ and manifests unfaltering, bold courage (*anivartyaparākramavīrya*).⁴³⁸ This type of vigour is essentially bifocal. First, the bodhisattva is not discouraged from the path by the sheer distance of the goal, but devotes all resources to the practices concerned:⁴³⁹

437. The exact scope and nature of the *kuśaladharmasaṃgrāhakavīrya* is little explained in Mahāyāna literature. I have found only two treatises that provide some detail on its generation. First, there is the exposition in the *Sgm* which recognises the contributions of four specific *dharma* (*op. cit.*, p. 62.1.5–5.3). These are exertion (*ārambha*), courage (*vīra*), investigation (*pativekṣaṇa*) and good conduct (*pratipatti*). Each of these *dharma* is applied to specific sets of practices whose potential they aim to maximise. Exertion is primarily applied towards the *cittotpāda*, *dāna*, *śīla* and *śraddhā* (preparing the entry into the path) while courage focuses on the accumulation of roots of virtue and, in particular, on *kṣānti* (leading to the *śuklavidarśaṇa* stage, the first of seven *śrāvakabhūmi* stages). Investigation is employed to identify those things that bring greatest benefit to sentient beings, to *dhyāna* and to *prajñā* (leading to mental purity: *cittaprasrabdhi*). Finally, good conduct means bearing with committed *dharma* and engaging in skilful means (leading to irreversible pristine cognition: *avaivartikajñā*). On a personal level, exertion purifies and leads to recollection of the body; courage purifies speech and leads to recollection of feeling; investigation cleanses the mind of impure *dharma* and leads to recollection of thought; good conduct purifies *dharma* and leads to their recollection (*op. cit.*, p. 62.2.6–7, 4.7). Exertion cognises suffering, courage abandons the origin, investigation generates the path and good conduct realises cessation (*op. cit.*, p. 62.4.6).

In the *Bbh* (p. 201.6–25), the accumulation of roots of virtue is dependent on diligent application to the six perfections and consists of seven qualities. First, it is not moved by harm which resulted from mistaken considerations, defilements, false teachers and suffering. Second, it is certain because of his paying respect (*satkṛtya*). Third, it is infinite because it is founded in, and leads to, all areas of knowledge. Fourth, it is furnished with means that are designed to lead to the irreversible path and to penetrate sameness. Fifth, it is perfect vigour because the bodhisattva aspires to obtain things that ought to be obtained. Sixth, it is victorious because it is furnished with lasting application and seventh, it is free from pride because his undertakings in vigour are free from the thought-objects (*ārambha*). If his practice of vigour includes these seven qualities, the bodhisattva is predicted to accomplish all six perfections rapidly and to obtain enlightenment.

At the highest level, vigour in the accumulation of roots of virtue refers to the bodhisattva's diligence in acquiring the buddha-qualities. This means to accumulate the sum-total of roots of virtue including those that spring from the perfections and *bodhipākṣika* (*Akn*, *op. cit.*, pp. 47.5.7–48.1.2).

438. *R*, folio 468.1–476.5

In the *Akn* (*op. cit.*, p. 46.4.5–5.1) we have a similar subsection, entitled: 'imperishable courage' (*akṣaya parākrama*). Here, the purpose of courageous vigour is sixfold. It is found in the bodhisattva's effort to see the Tathāgata, to hear the Dharma, to ripen sentient beings, to accumulate the roots of virtue and to attain all-knowing. It is called courageous because the bodhisattva enters into the world for the sake of other beings in order to discipline their faculties and to bring about their liberation. Its action is the undertaking to enter in the world intent to benefit other beings, its cause is the bodhisattva's great compassion and its essence is the unfaltering firmness of its commitment to vigour (*op. cit.*, p. 46.5.1).

According to the *Bbh* (p. 203.13–22), there are six factors that contribute specifically to the consolidation of the bodhisattva's unfaltering courage (*dr̥ḥaparākrama*). These include persistent vigour because it ties to the cycle of existence; reverential vigour because it ties to exertion; naturally caused (*niṣyaṇḍa*) vigour because of the power of previous causes; vigour arising from practice (*prayoga*) because, investigating and contemplating, it is bound to good morals; non-enraged (*akopa*) vigour because he is not angered by pain or injury; and insatiable (*asaṃtuṣṭi*) vigour because for him mediocrity is not sufficient. Although not stated, one suspects that these should be understood as both conditions for and the ideal manifestations of unfaltering courage.

439. *Sikṣ*, p. 275.1–6 (33, p. 61.2.7–3.2).

“O Sāgaramati, a bodhisattva who has committed himself to vigour must incessantly be of a steady and bold courage. The bodhisattva who is earnestly striving [to buddhahood] must not lay down his burden. O Sāgaramati, for bodhisattvas who exert themselves vigorously the supreme and perfect enlightenment is not difficult to attain. Why? O Sāgaramati, where there is vigour, there is enlightenment. But for those who are indolent, it is far off. There is no generosity, morality, patience, vigour, meditation or wisdom on the part of the indolent. They do not work for the benefit of others.”

Second, it aims at universal liberation. For this purpose, the bodhisattva anchors his practice in *saṃsāra*, but dedicates his accumulation of roots of virtue to buddhahood. Indeed, according to the *Sgm*, it is this ‘double-tracked’ approach that transforms the bodhisattva’s *vīrya* into a practice of *pāramitā* status.⁴⁴⁰

“Vigour by means of which [the bodhisattva] does not let go his yearning for all-knowing, by means of which he holds on to the generation of the power of the thought of enlightenment and is bound to *saṃsāra* while beginning to accomplish roots of virtue constitutes the perfection of virtue.”

Thus, it is primarily the bodhisattva’s perfection in vigour that prevents him from untimely entering into *nirvāṇa*.⁴⁴¹

The implementation of vigorous courage manifests mental and non-mental striving.⁴⁴²

440. *Śikṣ*, p. 187.9–11 (33, p. 51.1–2).

441. *Mppś*, ii, p. 982; R, folio 468.4–6.

442. The distinction of *vīrya* into a mental and non-mental dimension is undoubtedly the oldest and most fundamental classification of vigour. Already proposed in the *nikāya*, it was adopted in numerous early Mahāyāna *sūtras* as the basic division of vigour. Good examples of such early adoptions are the *Akn* and *Pañca*. In the *Akn*, the entire discussion of the *vīryapāramitā* is structured according to its mental/non-mental dimension. Non-mental *vīrya* is perceived in terms of its various sub-aspects, showing the bodhisattva’s eight principal objects on which he focuses his energy. These include armoured striving (*saṃnāhavīrya*), courageous striving (*parākrāhavīrya*), vigour in attaining (*saṃudānavīrya*), vigour in ripening sentient beings (*sattvapariṣkāhavīrya*), vigour in accumulating merit (*puṇyasambhāravīrya*), vigour in accumulating knowledge (*jñānasambhāravīrya*), vigour in accumulating wisdom (*prajñāsambhāravīrya*) and vigour in attaining buddha-qualities (*sarvabuddhadharmasamudānavīrya*). The *Akn*, holding the mental dimension of *vīrya* to be superior distinguishes (like the *Bdp*) a mentally active part that inspires physical and vocal action and a mentally inactive part that is in tune with the Dharma teachings on the nature of reality (34, p. 48.3.5–4.2):

“One who is established in all activity in order to fulfil the imperishability of mental vigour and is separated from all distinguishing marks (*sarvanirmittāpagata*), that one not only enters

Although the non-mental plane refers primarily to exertion in body and speech, it is not limited to physical and vocal activity, but includes the commitment to universal liberation. First, it is aimed at the encounter with the Buddha when the bodhisattva receives his final prediction to buddhahood.⁴⁴³ Second, emerging as a collateral, the bodhisattva commits himself to the liberation of all sentient beings.⁴⁴⁴ These two prospects impel the bodhisattva to train with utmost vigour, whereby he accumulates incalculable roots of virtue as a matter of course.⁴⁴⁵ The magnitude of this task turns vigour quite naturally into a major practice. It causes the bodhisattva to honour his commitments even after he has attained enlightenment and allows him to venture fearlessly into the more daunting areas of Buddhist cognition.⁴⁴⁶

This confidence is rooted in the bodhisattva's unshakable trust in the path and in his increasingly accurate understanding of reality. On the first, the *Bdp* comments:⁴⁴⁷

"The bodhisattva boldly thinks: ... 'although the defilements of all sentient beings are incalculable and numerous, I shall seek to obtain a matching accumulation of wisdom and pristine cognition by means of this enunciation. I shall work hard and apply myself diligently. With vigour, I shall wholly appease the torment of desire, hatred, delusion of all sentient beings. I shall free them from this poison, suppress it and deliver them. I shall cause them to transcend it and establish them in the path leading to *nirvāṇa*.' "

This attitude of confidence and courage appertains to the category of physical/verbal vigour, because it belongs to the more active, engaging part of the bodhisattva practice. Progress in the cognitive realm, in contrast, is firmly rooted in mental vigour. Superior to vigour of body

into all activity of distinguishing marks but is also established in activity of pristine cognition and performs every deed with the pristine cognition of all action."

Since, according to the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, pp. 64.3–4, 64.23–27), separation from distinguishing marks is a chief characteristic of the *acalābhūmi*, mental vigour comes into operation at the eighth stage and coincides with the beginning of the bodhisattva's effortless activity (see below).

This understanding of the distinctions between the mental and non-mental dimensions of vigour tallies with the position of the *Mpps* (ii, p. 977). Here, the bodhisattva's physical vigour is summed up in the practice of the six perfections, in giving up all personal belongings and family members and, above all, in his readiness to pursue the training as long as required. Mental vigour, in contrast, is marked by the cultivation of wholesome *dharma*, by total faith and confidence, by freedom from indolence and, especially, by insatiability for Dharma investigation.

443. R, folio 468.2.

444. R, folio 468.4.

445. R, folio 469.2, 469.5.

446. R, folio 472.6.

447. R, folio 473.1–6.

or speech, it becomes the driving force behind all other types of vigour and is thus crucial to the completion of the *vīryapāramitā*.⁴⁴⁸ In the *Bdp*, mental vigour is distinguished by an active and inactive mode of operation. While the exact relationship between the two is not explained, their contents and areas of application point to their complementarity.⁴⁴⁹

“What is vigour of the mind? It is activity and stillness of the mind. What is activity of the mind? It is endeavouring to enlightenment. What is stillness of the mind? It is non-appeasing the thought of enlightenment. What is its activity? It is great compassion towards all beings. What is its stillness? It is acceptance that there is no self.”⁴⁵⁰

Being essential to the fruition of all others practices, the ultimate reward of vigour is, of course, nothing less than perfect enlightenment.⁴⁵¹ This view is also expressed in the *Bdp*.⁴⁵² More immediate benefits include a set of ‘factors of elevation’. These ensure that the bodhisattva prospers (*abhyudgacchati*) because he pleases the present buddha, adheres to virtuous friends, attains birth under favourable conditions, is accomplished in inexhaustible and virtuous practices and follows the example of bodhisattvas who persist in the vow.⁴⁵³

Misinterpretations of vigour differ depending on the status of the practitioner. In the case of the *grhṇṇī* bodhisattva, they include the abandonment of beings to their fate out of personal gain; to succumb to the pleasures of worldly life in violation of the moral code; to obstruct the Buddha’s teachings in others while adhering to them himself; to fraternise with people

448. R, folio 473.7–474.2.

449. R, folio 474.1–3.

450. For the most comprehensive treatment of mental and physical vigour, I propose to turn once again to the *Mppś* (ii, pp. 970–72). Beginning with a definition of physical/vocal vigour as mental vigour transformed into corporeal forces or speech, the *Mppś* proceeds to elucidate the characteristics of mental and non-mental vigour. (1) While physical/vocal vigour manifests itself in action related to the perfection of generosity and morality, mental vigour is operational in conjunction with the *ksānti*, *dhyāna* and *prajñāpāramitā*. (2) It is called bodily vigour when it is applied to external objects, but it is mental when it involves a special effort towards oneself (*ādhyātmikapravṛtta*). (3) Coarse vigour is physical and subtle vigour is mental. All vigour that produces merit is physical while mental vigour generates wisdom. (4) The accumulation of wealth for distribution is physical vigour while self-transformation for the sake of others in order to attain buddhahood is mental vigour. (5) The practice of the six perfections is physical vigour while in possessing the true *dharmakāya* and producing the six *pāramitā*, the bodhisattva pursues mental vigour. (6) To implement the bodhisattva training without ever showing concern for life is physical vigour, but never to relax in search of *dhyāna* and *prajñā* is mental vigour.

451. *Mppś*, ii, p. 935, n. 1.

452. R, folio 476.3.

453. R, folio 476.6–77.2.

who despise the Dharma and to reproach people whose care he was entrusted with in an unjust, harsh fashion.⁴⁵⁴ Any of these five mistaken modes of conduct bars the bodhisattva from spiritual advance:⁴⁵⁵

“O Śāriputra, a *grhṇāti* bodhisattva who acquires the five [mistaken modes of conduct] fails to please the present buddha. He fails to adhere to virtuous friends. He does not obtain birth under favourable conditions. He truly wastes the roots of virtue that he has accomplished. He does not follow the example set by bodhisattvas, *mahāsattvas* who adhere to their vow, and thus fails to acquire supreme and perfect enlightenment swiftly.”

For the *pravrajita* bodhisattva the situation is different. Here, misunderstood vigour manifests in moral transgression, abuse of the Doctrine, desire for profit, honour or praise, mistaken views about the self and avarice for the houses of others.⁴⁵⁶ Of these five *dharma*, however, only avarice is set in direct relation to the practice of vigour, presumably because its consequence (fear of rebirth in hell, blindness and, when reborn as man, of life in the distant border-regions) are particularly daunting. The overriding concern for the rejection of avarice lies therefore in its threat to the bodhisattva's personal advance.⁴⁵⁷ This preoccupation links unfaltering vigour with *vīrya* practice concerned with the accumulation of roots of virtue.⁴⁵⁸

The third area in which vigour finds application is the bodhisattva's commitment to bring about universal liberation (*sattvārthakriyāvīrya*).⁴⁵⁹ In the *Bdp* this is expressed through a

454. R, folio 477.3–480.6.

455. R, folio 480.7–81.2.

456. R, folio 483.1–3

Compare these downfalls with the position in the *Ug* (*op. cit.*, p. 273.1.7–2.1) that affirms that a *pravrajita* bodhisattva is by definition vigorous, since he has renounced the comforts of worldly life.

457. R, folio 513.5–7.

For a concise analysis of the various side qualities of vigour, e.g., zeal, perseverance, energy, vigilance, etc., see: *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 119–20.

458. The *Mpps* (ii, p. 1020), based on canonical sources, speaks of four qualities that manifest vigour in the *pravrajita* bodhisattva. These include observance of moral conduct (*śīlasampatti*), control of senses (*indriyeṣu guptadvāratā*), moderation in eating (*bhojane mātṛājñutā*) and application while staying awake (*jāgryām anuyoga*). Lamotte identified at A II, pp. 39–40 one of their occurrences in the *nikāya*. See also: S II, p. 219; A I, p. 113.

459. R, folio 514.2–539.1

According to the *Bbh*, vigour in benefiting sentient beings manifests eleven modes of practice (*op. cit.*, p. 201.26–27, but given on pp. 144.24–152.21). First, the bodhisattva renders assistance by assessing the needs of beings and decides what action is most appropriate to fulfil them. Second, he contributes actively to the appeasement of their suffering through practical and conceptual help (pp. 144.26–145.19). Third, he persists in showing gratitude and respect to those sentient beings who have helped him. Fourth, he protects frightened sentient beings from fear, be it the fear of wild beasts, robbers or

series of *jātaka*-type stories depicting the edifying effects of Śākyamuni's previous selfless service on the spirituality of innumerable beings. Three elements dominate the narratives. First, we have the recurring use of the physician/patient simile. This is designed to elucidate the bodhisattva's commitment to humankind and to underline his unique influence to their well-being. Second, physically his endeavours are sustained through the practice of vigour that endows him with great resilience.⁴⁶⁰ Third, a key role in the practice of 'vigour in working for the benefit of beings' falls to the *dharmakāya*. On the one hand, it braces the bodhisattva for the enormous hardship and gives him sufficient stamina to pursue the path without wavering:⁴⁶¹

"O lord, of what nature is the bodhisattva's *dharmakāya*? The lord replied: 'O Śāriputra, his *dharmakāya* is firm, steadfast, unfaltering, compassionate, non-perishing and unborn. He converts [sentient beings] by means of various bodies. Although it is multiplied by the power of converting beings, like a *vajra*, it does not perish in fire or is hurt through weapons. It is firm and does not waver. O Śāriputra, it is in this way that the bodhisattva who is of unfaltering vigour and persists in the *dharmakāya* pursues effortlessly the perfection of vigour.'

On the other hand, the *dharmakāya* introduces to the dichotomies of worldly convention and establishes the bodhisattva in true reality.⁴⁶²

defamation (pp. 145.20–146.4). Fifth, the bodhisattva relieves the suffering of sentient beings who have experienced calamity of loss of property. Sixth, he shows great vigour in cultivating generosity in accordance with the needs. Seventh, the bodhisattva attracts wealthy beings around him in order to obtain goods and implements with the aim of redistributing them to the needy at a later occasion (pp. 146.13–150.12). Eighth, the bodhisattva complies with the expectations of sentient beings. He lives as one of theirs among them and follows their habitual action. Ninth, the bodhisattva applauds whenever good deeds or qualities come to his attention, whether they be associated to learning, renunciation or wisdom (p. 150.13–19). Tenth, he punishes sentient beings in proportion to the nature of their offence. Eleventh, the bodhisattva resorts to his wonder-working powers in order to frighten sentient beings off immoral action (pp. 150.20–152.17).

460. This point is dramatically exemplified at the example of Śākyamuni's endurance when his body is carved up in order to appease the suffering of beings following the demise of Dīpaṅkara (R, folio 519.4–527.1).

461. R, folio 527.1–528.2.

462. R, folio 532.4–7

In the *Śgs* (pp. 144–45), the entire exposition of the perfection of vigour is dominated by this very theme, showing that the bodhisattva while nominally still functioning within a *samsāric* frame of reference has indeed passed well beyond its concerns, fetters and physical limitations. In the *Śgs*, the reason behind this elevated state of existence is the bodhisattva's entry into the *śūramgamasamādhi* that takes place on the tenth stage (*op. cit.*, pp. 131–2, § 21). We might infer from this information that the attainments cited in the *Bdp* under the heading of mental vigour culminating in the acquisition of the *dharmakāya* belong likewise to a later, if not the latest, phase of the bodhisattva career.

“O Śāriputra, again, a bodhisattva who is endowed with the *dharmakāya*—although freed from time, origination and destruction—teaches in terms of origination and destruction in order to ripen sentient beings. Although subject to death, he knows that all *dharma* are non-dying and that the accumulation of karmic formations is non-existent. Although born, he knows that all *dharma* are unchanging and undying. Although becoming, he knows that all *dharma* are unborn. One who relies on the Doctrine and its body, on nourishment and power in order to ripen sentient beings pursues the perfection of vigour with unfaltering spirit by means of the spontaneously arisen, previous resolution.”

While it is possible to distinguish these two roles of the *dharmakāya* as conceptually separate aspects, in practice no such distinction can be upheld. For, in essence, they epitomise of course nothing but the interplay between the cognitive faculties and practical means that, if well-balanced and truly interactive, become the only means of achieving any of the perfections.

The Perfection of Meditation

The perfection of meditation (*dhyānapāramitā*), examined in chapter ten, represents the penultimate *pāramitā* in the training-scheme of the *Bdp*.⁴⁶³ In type and conceptual emphasis, the exposition shows all hallmarks of what—for want of better terminology—has been termed as a Mahāyāna approach to *dhyāna*.⁴⁶⁴ That is to say, the thrust of the discussion does not revolve around the psychological processes at work during meditative experience, but investigates the ways in which meditation contributes to the implementation of the bodhisattva vow. As a result, *dhyāna* is described not so much for the technical detail of the mental processes at the heart of meditation as for its impact on the spiritual advance of the practitioner himself and, more importantly, on that of his fellow beings. For the *Bdp*, meditation is not solely an instrument of thought purification, but constitutes above all a means of moral edification.

In the *Bdp* the true scope of meditation therefore extends well beyond the psychological experience. It is at once contemplation and gnosis; it becomes the foundation to a broad range of cognition, culminating in supreme enlightenment; it frees the bodhisattva from doubt and lends itself to refined speech; it disentangles him from mistaken views and generates the conditions for acts in miracles. *Dhyāna* assumes therefore a unique position amongst the *pāramitā* and retains great importance until the very last phases of his career.

Ordered to retrace the bodhisattva's progress through meditation and the benefits thereof, these practices come as a series of individual building blocks. Altogether, we can distinguish ten, perhaps eleven, such units. Following the order of their occurrence in the text, these include (1) a passage on the traditional four *dhyāna*⁴⁶⁵, (2) the *abhijñā*⁴⁶⁶, (3) the distinction

463. Chapter ten of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* has already been object of an academic investigation. It is the topic of a PhD-dissertation, written by Dr. K.P. Pedersen at Columbia University, New York, 1976. Since Dr. Pedersen utilised only Chinese translations of the *Bdp* which—judging by her English translation—do not always agree with the Tibetan versions, her discussion was of limited help to my examination. Furthermore, her analysis of the contents contains some rather significant methodological shortcomings, particularly with regard to the choice of material she consulted and the depth to which she carried out her analysis. Notwithstanding its weakness, her contribution has its distinct merits, not least because it allowed me to draw comparisons between the Chinese and Tibetan versions. As a study of the *dhyānapāramitā*, however, it should be treated with caution because Dr. Pedersen has failed to bring out many of the important features that mark its treatment in the *Bdp*. Not wishing to diminish her labour, I shall draw attention to these shortcomings only when my findings appear irreconcilable with her analysis.

464. Pedersen, 1976, p. 79.

465. R, folio 550.2–51.3.

466. R, folio 551.7–72.4.

between *abhiññā* and *jñāna*⁴⁶⁷, (4) the realisation of *dharma*-sameness (*dharmasamatā*) brought about by *jñāna*⁴⁶⁸, (5) the interplay between *prajñā* and *upāya*⁴⁶⁹, (6) the role of the *abhiññā* in the training⁴⁷⁰, (7) the nature of non-regressing *abhiññā* (*acutyābhiññā*)⁴⁷¹, (8) the non-apprehension of *dharma*⁴⁷², (9) the marks and nature of the *bodhisattvadhyāna*⁴⁷³ and (10) an enumeration of fifteen foremost (*pūrvamgama*) contemplations of the *dhyānapāramitā*⁴⁷⁴, including a list of one hundred and one *samādhi*.⁴⁷⁵ Setting out with the assumption that these blocks were not positioned in an arbitrary fashion but represent individual thoughts that form a scheme of conceptual coherence, it is clearly essential to identify the rationale behind their concatenation.

The least problem in this regard is posed by the first two sections. Section one, dealing with the four *dhyāna* in what is the traditional way of exposition, is easily discernable as the basis to the whole discussion.⁴⁷⁶ Briefly citing the respective mental attainments that mark progress along the four *dhyāna*, its function is to sketch the psychological states that equip the bodhisattva with the refined awareness of worldly existence and prepare the more elevated phases of cognition. This role is amply documented in Mahāyāna literature and therefore needs not be discussed here.⁴⁷⁷ It occurs invariably at the beginning of discussions on *dhyāna* and—epitomising a practice adopted from early Buddhism—generally receives little attention. Typically, it does not extend beyond an enumeration (and brief characterisation) of the major

467. R, folio 572.4–73.7.

468. R, folio 574.2–75.7.

469. R, folio 576.1–78.3.

470. R, folio 578.4–80.2.

471. R, folio 580.2–81.1.

472. R, folio 581.2–84.4.

473. R, folio 584.5–86.2.

474. R, folio 586.3–87.1.

475. In her study of this chapter, Pedersen identified eight more units bringing the total number to eighteen. Apart from a number of obvious, but not very ground-breaking distinctions (between the individual *abhiññā*, for instance), these do not help in understanding the structure of the chapter and so have been omitted here.

476. Descriptions detailing the psychological processes and attainment experienced by practitioners during meditation are very stereotyped and occur in virtually all strands of Buddhist literature. For references in the nikāya, see: *Mppś*, ii, pp. 1023–4.

In Sanskrit literature, they are extant in the *Lal* (p. 129), *Pañca* (p. 167), *Daśasāhasrikā* (pp. 98–99), *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, pp. 33.28–34.17), *Kośa* (ii, p. 199; iii, pp. 2, 22–3, 167; vi, pp. 177, 198, 221–3) and are even included in the *Mvy* (1478–81, 1492–5). A particularly lucid, if exhaustive treatment of the various experiences pertaining to Buddhist meditation is found in the *Vism* (pp. 84–90 up to p. 373) and, above all, in the *Kośa* (viii, pp. 127–224).

In view of its rich documentation, I shall not reiterate the states that accompany the practitioner's progress through the various *dhyāna* and *samāpatti* but point to a highly recommendable summary of these experiences in Lamotte's introduction to the *Śgs* (pp. 16–26).

477. *Akn*, p. 49.1.2–2.3; *Bbh*, p. 207.2–7; *Ug*, p. 271.1.5–8; *Daśa-bh*, pp. 33.28–34.17.

categories of meditation levels.⁴⁷⁸ The reason for their apparent neglect in Mahāyāna *sūtras* is probably twofold. First, all of these are also attainable by śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas and so are not particular to Mahāyāna thinking. Second, their impact on the bodhisattva's vow is relatively small, since they primarily occasion personal advance that has no direct effect on the well-being of sentient beings.⁴⁷⁹

In exegetical writings on the *pāramitā*, this class of meditation bears an independent status and is called 'meditation leading to a blissful abode in this life' (*ḍṛṣṭidharmasukhavihārāya dhyāna*).⁴⁸⁰ Its chief task consists in suppressing vain imagination (*vikalpa*), pride (*manyānā*), attachment (*trṣṇā*) and marks (*nimitta*) and in promoting mental and physical tranquillity, repose and a blissful life in this world.⁴⁸¹ Invariably listed as the first type of meditation, *ḍṛṣṭidharmasukhavihārāyadhyāna* is unmistakably regarded as the lowest type of meditation and has little more than a preparatory function to *dhyāna* practice proper.

Dhyāna practice proper is epitomised by the second phase of meditative training that, in later literature, came to bear the title 'meditation of production' (*abhinirhāradhyāna*).⁴⁸² Building on the contemplations of the first phase, it is characterised by the *abhijñā* and their preparatory concentrations.⁴⁸³ As most of the preliminary absorptions are shared with the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas, it is *abhijñā* and pristine cognition (*jñāna*) that figure prominently

478. For a analysis of these classes of meditation, see: *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1209–1309.

According to the *Bbh*, however, the bodhisattva attains the *vimokṣa*, *abhibhvāyatana* and *kṛtsnāyatana* not before the second stage in the *dhyāna*-practice (p. 207.19–23).

479. In the *Akn* (pp. 48.4.5–49.1.2) the traditional list of meditations is replaced by an enumeration of sixteen types of *dhyāna* that are specific to the bodhisattva. While these are presented as independent forms of meditation, their nature makes it clear that they sum up the various aspects of the *bodhisattvadhyāna*. These are (1) meditation that is not attached to anything as it is aimed at the *tathāgatadhyāna* (not included in *dhyāna* list of *Pañca*, pp. 198–203), (2) meditation that is not to be tasted (*Bbh*, p. 208.13–16), (3) meditation that has as object compassion since it is aimed at the purification of defilement, (4) meditation that allows for return to the *kāmadhātu*, (5) meditation completing preparation for the *abhijñā*, (6) meditation leading to fitness of thought since it represents knowledge of the power of thought, (7) meditation of knowledge of all forms of *dhyāna* and the ways of departing, (8) totally peaceful meditation that surpasses the *samādhi* of all vehicles, (9) meditation wholly undisturbed due to its infinite certitude (*Msl*, xix.38, p. 166. 25), (10) meditation that serves as antidote to mistaken practice since it subdues all vice, (11) meditation that amounts to penetration into wisdom since it operates beyond all worlds, (12) meditation that is preceded by the intention to liberate all beings, (13) meditation that prevents the interruption of the *triratna* since it fulfils the *tathāgatadhyāna*, (14) meditation that is not slackening since it is always concentrated, (15) meditation that leads to control over all *dharma* since it fulfils the buddha-qualities and (16) meditation that pervades space on account of its vast knowledge.

480. *Bbh*, p. 207.10–11; *Siddhi*, p. 622; *Msg*, p. 192.

481. *Bbh*, p. 207.9–10; *Msg*, commentary, p. 192.

482. According to the *Siddhi* (p. 622), its full title is *bodhisattvasamādhiguṇanirhāryāya dhyāna*.

483. These include, besides unspecified meditations particular to the *tathāgatagotra*, eight *vimokṣa*, ten *kṛtsnāyatana*, four *abhibhvāyatana*, *prañidhijñāna*, *arañjñāna* and, according to the *Bbh*, also the four *pratisaṃvidjñāna* (p. 207.21–23).

in Mahāyāna texts.⁴⁸⁴ In the *Akn*, the different roles of the two are neatly summed up.⁴⁸⁵

“For what serves meditation as preparation? Fulfilment of the *abhijñā* and pristine cognition. What is *abhijñā* and what is pristine cognition? Vision of the appearance of all forms is *abhijñā*. Knowledge that the *dharma* of all forms are imperishable without realising the imperishable Dharma is pristine cognition. Hearing of all words is *abhijñā*. Knowledge that all sounds are ineffable and timeless is pristine cognition. Knowledge of the thoughts of all sentient beings is *abhijñā*. Refraining from realising the cessation of thought when perceiving the cessation of thought is pristine cognition.”

Broadly speaking, this characterisation holds also true for the *Bdp*. As indicated in the list of topics, the theme that follows immediately on the *dr̥ṣṭidharmasukhavihārāyadhyāna* phase is *abhijñā* with the discussion of pristine cognition being third.⁴⁸⁶ The vast majority of Buddhist sources, both Pāli and Sanskrit, expound the *abhijñā* in the following sequence: (1) *rddhividhijñāna*, (2) *divyaśrotrajñāna*, (3) *paracittajñāna* (also called *cetaḥparyāyajñāna*), (4) *pūrvanivāsānusr̥tījñāna*, (5) *divyacakṣujñāna* (also called *cyutyupapādayajñāna*) and (6) *āsravakṣayajñāna*.⁴⁸⁷ As the last item, knowledge of the destruction of the *āsrava*, is a characteristic of arhantship and occurs only in the life that ends in entry into *nirvāṇa*, it is not applicable to the long-term training of the bodhisattva and Mahāyāna *sūtras* tend to exclude

484. For examples among the *sūtras*, see: *Akn*, p. 49.1.2–2.2; *Pañca*, p. 514; *Daśa-bh*, pp. 34.19–24; For the *śāstras*, see, for instance: *Bbh*, p. 207.17–25; *Msg*, p. 192; *Siddhi*, p. 622.

The one exception is the *Ug* (p. 271.1.6–7) that indicates that the bodhisattva engages already during phase two in a teaching and conversion activity.

According to the *Msg* (pp. 221–224), this phase includes besides the practice of the *mahārddhi* and *duṣkaracaryā*, the cultivation of the six *pāramitā*, the deliberate generation of ten kinds of roots of virtue, the attainment of ten buddha-qualities, the ripening of sentient beings, the purification of the buddha-field and the production of buddha-attributes.

Attainment of the five/six *abhijñā* manifestations is dependent on the successful practice of meditative absorption. Passages attesting this dependency are already found in the earliest strands of Buddhist literature. Thus, we read in the *Samaññaphalasutta* (M I, p. 77) that their presence arises only in “a concentrated mind that is pure and composed, free from fault, unstained, supple, alert, stable and wholly unperturbed”. This association between meditation practice and the cultivation of the *abhijñā* has ever since formed the backbone to the Buddhist understanding of the *abhijñā*.

485. *Akn*, p. 49.1.2–7.

486. References to the six *abhijñā* are plentiful and spread throughout the Buddhist canon. For a selection of occurrences, see: *Mppś*, iv, pp. 1809. For references to the *abhijñā* in Sanskrit literature, see: *Kośa* (vii, pp. 97–126), *Catūṣpariṣasūtra* (Waldschmidt, 1957, pp. 432–34), *Daśa-bh* (pp. 34–36), *Pañca* (pp. 83–87), *Bbh* (p. 58.13–18), *Śikṣ* (p. 243), *Msl* (p. 25.2–10, p. 185.11–17) and *Dhsgr* (§ 20).

487. Of these *pūrvanivāsānusr̥tījñāna*, *cyutyupapādayajñāna* and *āsravakṣayajñāna* correspond to the three sciences (*vidyā*) of the same name that the Buddha attained during the three watches in the night preceding enlightenment (D III, pp. 220, 275; A V, p. 221; *Kośa*, vii, p. 107).

it from their discussions of *abhijñā*.⁴⁸⁸ The *Bdp* is no exception.

Where it does differ from most texts, however, is the order of presentation, discussing first *divyacakṣus*, second *divyaśrotra*, third *paracittajñāna*, fourth *pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñāna* and fifth *ṛddhividhijñāna*.⁴⁸⁹ No reason for this change of sequence is given in the *Bdp* itself.

The *Dhyānasūtra* (cited in the *Mppś*) provides the following explanation.⁴⁹⁰ At first, the bodhisattva obtains divine sight. Having seen all beings, but being unable to hear their sounds, he then seeks the *abhijñā* of divine hearing. Furnished with divine sight and hearing,

488. Representing this view, the *Vkn* explicitly excludes the sixth super-knowledge from the *abhijñā* practice of the bodhisattva (p. 130; trsl. Lamotte):

“A domain where the six super-knowledge are explored, but without arriving at the knowledge of the destruction of the impurities (*āsravakṣayañāna*), such is the domain of the bodhisattva.”

This position is slightly qualified in the *Mppś* (iv, pp. 1817–18) arguing that a bodhisattva who has destroyed his impurity (*kleśāsrava*) may elude *nirvāṇa* provided that the traces (*vāsanā*) of his impurity still prevail. Traditionally, destruction of impurity motivated by the yearning for personal liberation meant arhantship and subsequent *nirvāṇa*. In the Mahāyāna, this proposition was modified to make room for the ideal of the bodhisattva. Accordingly, for a bodhisattva who utterly destroyed his *kleśa* and the flow of *vāsanā*, the attainment of *āsravakṣaya* occurs only at the tenth stage, shortly before he achieves buddhahood. However, incomplete exhaustion of impurity, viz., with the *vāsanā* still intact, means that a bodhisattva—determined to utilise the remaining *kleśavāsanā* to prolong his liberating activity—sheds all constraints while traversing *samsāra*. Held to take place on the eighth stage (*Mppś*, ii, p. 1801), it enables him to assume the manifestations of the *dharmadhātujakāya* in this quest for universal liberation and to return to *samsāra* without fear of contamination.

The *Rgv* (pp. 245–6), citing the *Sgm*, distinguishes eight factors that prevent the bodhisattva from actually realising the destruction of the *āsrava*. These are (1) non-satiety in seeking merit, (2) intentional acceptance of existence through origination, (3) earnest desire to meet with the buddha, (4) indefatigability in ripening sentient beings, (5) strenuous effort to acquire the Dharma, (6) diligent application to benefiting sentient beings, (7) non-abandoning of the propensity of desire for *dharma* and (8) non-reluctance from fetters of the highest virtue. Referred to as ‘defilements endowed with virtuous roots’ (*kuśalamūlasamprayuktā kleśāḥ*), they fasten the bodhisattva by means of compassion to this world but protect him by means of cognition from personal exposure to worldly defilements. Springing from the cultivation of the five *abhijñā* fostered through meditation, all eight become collectively operational on the sixth stage (*abhimukhībhūmi*)—the moment when the bodhisattva comes for the first time ‘face to face’ with reality—and prompt him to abide in meditation in order to acquire the *bodhyaṅga* (*op. cit.*, pp. 250–2).

Also in the *Rgv* (*op. cit.*, pp. 227–28) we find an interesting passage elucidating the relationship between *āsravakṣaya*, *āsravakṣayañāna* and the five mundane *abhijñā*. Likening their contributions to the manifestations of a lantern, the text suggests that the worldly *abhijñā* have a “characteristic of engaging in (*pratyupasthāna*) the extinction of darkness that is opposite to knowledge which perceives an object (*arthānubhava*)”; that knowledge of the destruction of the *āsrava* resembles ‘heat’ because of its characteristic of engaging in consuming the fuel of the active force and defilements, leaving no residue; and that the actual destruction of the *āsrava* resembles colour because of its perfect purity resulting from moral and cognitive attainments. When becoming simultaneously manifest at the ‘immaculate sphere’, they are inseparable from each other, identical and in union with the absolute.

In spite of the tendency to discuss all six *abhijñā* *en bloc*, there are a few texts in which *āsravakṣayañāna* is excluded. Apart from a few instances in the nikāya (e.g., S II, pp. 121–22) this applies particularly to works belonging to the Sanskrit tradition, viz., *Mvu* (i, p. 284.3; ii, pp. 33.11, 96.1), *Divya*, p. 321.3; *Saddhp* (pp. 134.11, 141.9, 254.14) and *Śikṣ* (p. 243.13).

489. I have found just three texts in which the *abhijñā* are discussed in the same sequence, that is, the *Dhgr* (§ 20). *Pāramitāsamāsa* (Meadows, p. 228–232. vss. 40–66) and *Akn* (pp. 58.5.6–61.5.3). Apart from these, only the *Mvy* (202–208) appears to list the *abhijñā* in this order. Most other texts place the faculty of *ṛddhi* at the beginning of the list and the *divyacakṣus* at the end (e.g., *Pañca*, pp. 460–61, *Daśa-bh*, pp. 35–6, M).

490. *Mppś*, iv, p. 1823.

but still ignorant of their languages, sorrow and joys, he seeks the unique knowledge of language (*nirukti*pratisaṃvid).⁴⁹¹ Knowledgeable in other people's languages, but ignorant of their thought, the practitioner seeks knowledge of the thoughts of others. Still not knowing their place of origin, he sets out to acquire the *abhijñā* of their previous existence and to heal their mental ailments (*cittavyādhi*). For this purpose he seeks the *abhijñā* of the destruction of the impurities. However, even though he has mastered five *abhijñā*, the bodhisattva is not able to carry out transformations (*nirmāṇa*) and is therefore still unable to liberate beings in great numbers, so he resolves to pursue the *abhijñā* of magical powers.⁴⁹² The reason why the *ṛddhividhya* is generally cited at the beginning is not because it is attained before the other *abhijñā*, but because of its great impact on the liberation of beings.⁴⁹³ In this sense, for the bodhisattva, it is the most important of all six. *Divyacakṣus*, on the other hand, is cited first because, being the easiest to acquire, it is the natural starting point for the pursuit of the

491. Clearly, this reference to the *nirukti*pratisaṃvid comes as a surprise and raises some questions about the scope of the *divyaśrotrajñāna*. Does the text indicate that the attainment of the *nirukti*pratisaṃvid precedes the acquisition of the *abhijñā*? What is the relationship between the *divyaśrotrajñāna* and *nirukti*pratisaṃvid? The idea in the *Dhyānasūtra* is that the *divyaśrotrajñāna* enables the bodhisattva merely to hear the sounds of all beings—not to understand their meaning. This interpretation is borne out in several other passages where the cognitive factors are suspiciously omitted (e.g., *Mppś*, iv, p. 1822). Conceptually, however, both types of knowledge operate on the same level as the *divyaśrotrajñāna* and *nirukti*pratisaṃvid, operating in the *kāmadhātu* and the first *dhyāna*, fall into the category of *saṃvṛtījñāna* (*Mppś*, ii, p. 1042, iii, p. 1619). Thus, while it may carry personal benefit, for a compassionate practitioner to win maximum benefit from the *divyaśrotrajñāna*—for both himself and others—the text advises him to complement it with knowledge of vocal expressions (*nirukti*).

The key to a correct understanding of the appearance of the concept of *nirukti*pratisaṃvid is found when recalling that in the *Dhyānasūtra* we have a text belonging to early Buddhism. Its interpretation of the *nirukti*pratisaṃvid has therefore to be seen in a Śrāvakayāna frame of reference. The view that *divyaśrotrajñāna* does not lend itself to understanding languages and sounds is not found in Mahāyāna works (*Mppś*, i, pp. 330–31, 1822; *Bbh*, pp. 67.25–69.10). On the contrary, it is highly valued and figures among the chief benefits that accrue to the bodhisattva from meditative practice (*Mssg*, p. 224, § 8.8–9).

492. According to the *Mppś* (ii, p. 1043) the bodhisattva's power of transformation increases with his advance through the four *dhyāna* stages. It springs from the thought of creation (*nirmāṇacitta*) and, during the first *dhyāna*, is operational on the *kāmadhātu*. During the successive stages it functions also in the *rūpadhātu* (cf. *Kośa*, vii, p. 114). As all types of *ṛddhi* have matter as object (*rūpālambana*), arising successively, the bodhisattva is compelled—should he wish to see, hear or touch any object—to call again on the cognition of the Brahmaloка experienced during the first *dhyāna* (*Mppś*, i, p. 330). Altogether, one distinguishes fourteen different types of *nirmāṇacitta*, accomplishing eight kinds of creation. These include decrease, increase, taking away weight, exercising power (*vaśitvakaraṇa*) over physical shapes, possessing the superhuman power of Indra, drawing apart and together, causing earthquakes and personal transformation. Finally, there are four additional types of creation that address transformation of substances. These spring either from learning in magic, the *abhijñā*, the forces of retribution and meditation—all dealing invariably with matter—and are bound to the *kāmadhātu* (*Mppś*, i, pp. 381–3).

493. In fact, the *Mppś* (iv, p. 1820) states quite emphatically that the advanced nature of the cognitive requirements for the attainment of the *ṛddhi* are such that, being linked with space and observing the mark of emptiness, it cannot but stand at the end of a long process of schooling. A similar view is also held by the *Kośa* (vii, p. 104), adding that this preparation (*prayoga*) leads in each and every case to mastery (*vaśitā*) in *ṛddhi*, that is the eighth of the ten *vaśitā* that manifest on the *acalābhūmi* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 71.15–16).

abhiññā.⁴⁹⁴

In the *Bdp*, the rationale behind the cultivation of *abhiññā* is twofold. By means of those *abhiññā* that involve cognition, the bodhisattva gains a complete picture of saṃsāric existence and penetrates the processes that sustain and perpetuate its *continuum ad infinitum*.⁴⁹⁵ Exposing him to the vastness of sorrow that particularly prevails in the evil destinies, they strengthen his resolve to dedicate all resources to its complete eradication.⁴⁹⁶ This cognitive aspect of the first four *abhiññā* is complemented by a second, active element that shows the ways in which their cosmic knowledge has an immediate, practical effect on the training proper. The most effective of these means is provided by *ṛddhividhyabhiññā* itself.⁴⁹⁷ As it depends for profitable implementation on knowledge acquired through the four preceding *abhiññā*, it is cited in the *Bdp* in last position.

The actual division into cognitive and practical elements is somewhat blurred in the *Bdp*, since its functional demarcation is not always implemented. This is particularly true of the *divyacakṣus* that is credited with immediate and *de facto* influence on the conduct of beings.⁴⁹⁸ For example, it said to grant the bodhisattva power over the moral conduct of beings⁴⁹⁹ and to introduce beings to the practice of the *pāramitā*.⁵⁰⁰

494. The distinction between 'easy' and 'difficult' *abhiññā* applies to all beings except the most advanced bodhisattva. This, at least, is the reason that is given by the *Mppś* in reply to the question why the bodhisattva Śākyamuni, during the night preceding his enlightenment, began his *abhiññā* practice with the *ṛddhi* and not the *divyacakṣus* (*Mppś*, iv, p. 1825).

495. R, folio 553.3–5.

496. R, folio 555.5.

497. A survey of the types of *iddhi/ṛddhi* that arhants and bodhisattvas attain in the course of their career is given below, note 516.

498. According to the *Mppś* (i, pp. 330–31), divine sight falls into two major categories, depending on the causes that lead to its unfolding. First, there is the kind that arises from exercise (*bhāvanā*). This form of divine sight is wholly based on the practice of the *abhiññā* and is undoubtedly the kind exhibited in the *Bdp*. The second kind of *divyacakṣus* arises on the basis of retribution (*vipāka*). Strictly speaking, its presence is independent of training in the *abhiññā* as it arises on the basis of insight. To be precise, it is only attained by bodhisattvas who, having reached the 'conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*', are not found in the six destinies but appear by virtue of their *dharmakāya* in the world in order to convert beings. This form of *divyacakṣus* is not found among worldly, newly-set-out bodhisattvas who have not attained the *dharmakāya*.

499. R, folio 554.2.

500. R, folio 555.3–556.1

In the *Ratnolkadhāraṇī* (*Śikṣ*, p. 328.1–9; trsl. Bendall) we read in connection with the effects of miraculous feats:

"Some instruct all creatures in a thousand expedient by means of the Tathāgata's worship, by means of infinite gifts and generosity, by means of the practice of all [types of] asceticism, some by means of indestructible and imperturbable patience, by means of the heroism of austerity and vows, by means of meditation and calm in the hermitage, by means of the knowledge discriminating what is good, by means of thousands of expedients ... by means of the miracles of the conduct of the great vehicle" (cf. *Mppś*, pp. 1049, 1111; *Śikṣ*, pp. 334–7).

The *Bbh* (p. 210.3–17) adds that the bodhisattva who is established in the *dhyānapāramitā* disciplines sentient beings by the three types of miraculous display (*ṛddhiprātihārya*), that he grants elocution to the ill-spoken and bestows memory to the forgetful.

“His divine sight means that he does not show hostility towards those who seek [instruction]; that he is not angered by those who transgress the moral precepts, but that he watches over their harmful thoughts. It means that he encourages the indolent and instructs the agitated in the branches of meditation. It gives true sight of wisdom to those who are of aberrant wisdom.”

Spanning much of *samsāra*⁵⁰¹, the *divyacakṣus* is particularly important since it endorses the bodhisattva’s vision of suffering and liberation. On the one hand, it generates awareness of and compassion towards the afflicted sentient beings—the *raison d’être* of the vow itself.⁵⁰² On the other hand, allowing for glimpses at the state of buddhahood, it kindles a personal ambition and encourages in times of weariness.⁵⁰³ Both points are clearly expressed in the *Bdp* and, although conceptually not correlated, unmistakably form the backbone to its treatment of the *divyacakṣus*.⁵⁰⁴

The twofold approach, distinguishing cognitive and practical elements, is also adopted in the discussion of divine hearing (*divyaśrotra*). Here, the point is made that the bodhisattva’s

501. Strictly speaking, the *divyacakṣus* operates—like the *ṛddhi* and *divyaśrotra* and, according to some, also the *paracittajñāna* and *cyutyupapādajñāna*—only in the *kāmadhātu* and *rūpadhātu* as it depends for its objects on matter. Hence it arises only from the four *dhyāna* and not from the formless *samāpatti* (*Kośa*, vii, p. 102). In the *Kośabhāṣya* (pp. 429.17–430.3) we are told that the scope of the *divyacakṣus* varies according to the persons who generate it. If they do not make any specific effort, śrāvaka are able of survey one Sāhasra universe, pratyekabuddhas one Dvīsāhasra universe and buddhas one Trīsāhasra universe. However, should they apply themselves to the *divyacakṣus* vision, śrāvaka can extend their sight to one Dvīsāhasra universe, pratyekabuddhas to one Trīsāhasra universe and buddhas to infinite universes. Like the *divyaśrotra*, the *divyacakṣus* is only attainable by persons who have eliminated all desire. This state is achieved when the practitioners is freed from all passions pertaining to the *kāmadhātu* when he embarks on the *dhyāna* of the *rūpadhātu* (*Mppś*, v, p. 2273).

The *Msl* (p. 143.8–10) distinguishes five kinds of sight springing from the cultivation of *ṛddhipāda*. These are the (1) eye of flesh (*māṃsacakṣus*), (2) divine sight (*divyacakṣus*), (3) noble vision of wisdom (*āryaprajñācakṣus*), (4) Dharma-vision (*dharmacakṣus*) and (5) the buddha-vision (*buddhacakṣus*).

502. This thought is of course not exclusive to the *Bdp*, but occurs in most Mahāyāna *sūtras* where the *abhijñā* are discussed (cf. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 1055–6). That it found its place with this role into the scheme of the path at a very early stage is attested by a passage in the *Aṣṭa* (p. 403; trsl. Conze) where we read that:

“[The bodhisattva] surveys countless beings with his heavenly eye, and what he sees fills him with great agitation: so many carry the burden of a karma which leads to immediate retribution in the hell, other have acquired unfortunate rebirth, other are doomed to be killed, or they are enveloped in the net of false views, or fail to find the path, while other who have gained a fortunate rebirth have lost it again. And he attends to them with the thought that: ‘I shall become a saviour to all those beings, I shall release them from all their suffering.’”

503. R, folio 554.3–5:

“Having seen [the congregation of buddhas and bodhisattvas], the divine sight prompts the bodhisattva to accomplish the armour of the holy person, [to acquire] correct conduct and practice, recollection (*smṛti*), mindfulness (*samprajāna*), steadfastness in the path and in pristine cognition [showing that] all *dharma* are liberated, skill in pristine cognition in the attainment of *dhāraṇī* including skill in wisdom, knowledge and means.”

504. Both points are, for instance, raised next to each other in R, folio 553.2–554.3.

capability to understand the whole range of sound—human and non-human—has important implications not only because it allows him to grasp the teaching in their true compassion-inducing spirit and retain them in their entirety⁵⁰⁵, but moreover, to transmit these faithfully to his audience.⁵⁰⁶ In particular, it enables the bodhisattva to attune his discourses to the need and receptivity of his listeners.⁵⁰⁷ For the *Bdp* the ground that is covered by the *divyāśrotra* is therefore in many ways comparable to that of the Mahāyāna conception of *niruktiṭṭhāna*, a point which as was already made in connection with a reference in the *Dhyānasūtra*.

The third *abhijñā*, knowledge of the thought of others (*paracittajñāna*), grants insight into the mental disposition of all beings, irrespective of spatial or temporal constraints. In particular it allows the bodhisattva to assess the degree that their faculties have been exposed to, or moulded by, the bodhisattva practices⁵⁰⁸ and so permits him to ease beings into the appropriate vehicle.⁵⁰⁹ The main purpose of learning other people's thought is therefore to dispense instruction in the most suitable way.⁵¹⁰

“Even though [the bodhisattva] goes among his listeners, he discerns all of them immediately; and having discerned [their aptitude], he teaches the Dharma to sentient beings in exact accordance with their disposition.”

Since it influences the speed and success rate of the bodhisattva's conversion activity—the only gauge against which his progress is ultimately measured—knowledge of the thought of others clearly plays an important role.

The fourth *abhijñā*, knowledge of the recollection of previous births (*pūrvanivāsānūsmṛtijñāna*) is aimed chiefly at the bodhisattva's personal advance.⁵¹¹ According to the *Bdp*, the main benefit of this type of knowledge is not so much the recollection of the previous existences *per se*, but penetration into the circumstances that brought them about in the first place.⁵¹² The rationale behind this emphasis is the need for awareness of the mechanisms

505. R, folio 558.2.

506. R, folio 558.6.

507. R, folio 558.7–559.2.

508. R, folio 560.6–61.3.

509. R, folio 562.3–563.2.

510. R, folio 564.4–5.

511. For discussion of the psychological processes that underlie the *pūrvanivāsānūsmṛtijñāna* and their parallels in Indian systems contemporary to the Buddha, see Eliade: *Yoga: Immortality and Freedom*, 1969, pp. 180–85, 186–199. Consult also Demiéville, P.: “La mémoire des existences antérieures” (*BEFEO*, 1927, pp. 283–98) from which much of Eliade's detail is drawn.

512. R, folio 566.6–67.2.

that determine becoming and the assumption of a suitable attitude towards existence. In particular, it has the benefit of preventing conceit to arise.⁵¹³

“O Śāriputra, taking into account [the marks of] suffering, transience, non-self and emptiness, the bodhisattva is not infatuated with beauty, wealth, servants, sovereignty or with a yearning to become a *cakravartin*, Indra, Brahmā and world-guardian ... assuming these existences intentionally (*saṃcintya*) only in order to ripen all sentient beings.”

He acknowledges, disapproves and repents his previous impure action and undertakes to dedicate his roots of virtue to the cause of enlightenment.⁵¹⁴ Pledging to continue the lineages of the three jewels, the bodhisattva sustains his recollection through the supporting power of the *dharmadhātu* that leads to equipment in *punya*, *jñāna* and *pāramitā*, since:⁵¹⁵

“It is in this way that all the *dharma* of the past, present and future are kept in memory by the power that generated this recollection.”

That such an accumulation of qualities is foremost a personal achievement is amply documented in Buddhist literature. Also in the *Bdp* training in the recollection of previous births is primarily of personal benefit and has little immediate impact on others.

In contrast the *abhijñā* of magical power (*ṛddhi*) is entirely oriented towards the spiritual advance of sentient beings. While many texts diverge on the scope and kinds of magical power that are included in *ṛddhi*⁵¹⁶, virtually all agree that its prime objective is the conversion

513. R, folio 567.2–5.

514. R, folio 567.6–7.

515. R, folio 568.1–5, folio 568.5–7.

516. Compare, for instance, the types of *iddhi* in the S V, p. 264 with those cited in the *Daśa-bh* (pp. 34–36). Later Mahāyāna scholars produced further subdivisions that allocate the *ṛddhi* elements to thematic groups. A good example of such academic digression is found in the *Mpps* (ii, pp. 329–30). Here, distinguished by their character as either displacement (*gamana*), creation (*nirmāṇa*) or noble magic power (*āryarddhi*), the *ṛddhipāda* fall into three major categories. The *gamana*-class consists of four *ṛddhi* types, that is (1) unobstructed movement by flying like a bird, (2) instantaneous change of location, (3) plunging and emerging and (4) instantaneous disappearance. The *ṛddhi* of the *nirmāṇa*-class consist in the change of the (1) size, (2) power of multiplication and (3) the possibility to create at will whatever is desired. Finally, the *ṛddhi* of the *āryarddhi*-class concern the conversion of impure substances into pure ones. This last type of *ṛddhi* is held to be available only to a Buddha (cf. D III, p. 112; *Kośa*, vii, p. 111, viii, p. 210). According to the *Kośa* (vii, p. 113), the *gamana*-class of *ṛddhi* comprises only three *ṛddhi*, that is transportation, miracles (*adhimokṣa*) and rapid displacement with the speed of thought. Adopting a slightly different classification, the *Kośa* distinguishes *ṛddhi* by the method of production (vii, pp. 122–3). Accordingly, on one level, it differentiates between *ṛddhi* stemming from cultivation (*bhāvanā*)

of beings.⁵¹⁷ With this function, *ṛddhi* assumed great importance in the Mahāyāna where their application is strongly encouraged and praised as a factor of immense potency. This thoroughly positive attitude constituted a departure from the dogmatism and more cautious approach among the more conservative circles of early Buddhism. In many Pāli sources, the Buddha appears to endorse their performance only hesitantly and with a series of stringent reservations.⁵¹⁸

or meditation (*dhyāna*) and innate (*upapattilābhikā*) *ṛddhi*. Expanding on this division, it considers also *ṛddhi* springing from spells (*mantrakṛta*), *ṛddhi* springing from herbs (*oṣadhikṛta*) and *ṛddhi* springing from acts (*karmaja*) as distinct categories of *ṛddhi*. As it does not give examples of these five classes, concentrating instead on further ever more complex subdivisions, we are dealing here probably with a division of little but academic bearing.

517. E.g., *Mpps* (iv, pp. 1819–22), *Śgs* (p. 221), *Daśa-bh* (p. 36), *Saddhp* (pp. 72.1–78.5), *Bbh* (pp. 63.1–69.10, 152.10–14), *Msl* (p. 185.10–16) and *Msg* (p. 294, § 15).

The other important use to which the *ṛddhi* are put to is that of *buddhapūja*. Several treatises mention this as a specific purpose of the bodhisattva's attainments in *ṛddhi* (e.g., *Mpps*, ii, p. 1055, *Saddhp*, pp. 404–422).

Compare with the list that is given in the *Msl* (pp. 142.13–143.16) distinguishing six types of realising the *ṛddhipāda*, consisting of (1) sight (*darśana*), (2) instruction (*avavāda*), (3) stable miraculous power (*sthitivikṛdita*), (4) resolution (*praṇidha*), (5) mastery (*vaśitā*), (6) Dharma attainment (*dharmaprāpti*).

518. The question of the Buddha's attitude to the use *iddhi* as part of the conversion process has long occupied Buddhist scholarship. The single most important source for this controversy has always been the *Kevaddhasutta* (D III, pp. 211–15). In a series of comments in the introduction to his translation of the *Kevaddhasutta*, TW Rhys Davids suggests that the Buddha strongly disapproved of their use. Half a century later, this proposition was taken up by Louis Gomez, arguing that the Buddha rejected the use of *iddhi* chiefly because two of three types of wondrous display (*pāṭihāriya*) are not the exclusive property of the enlightened and are available to practitioners of the magical arts of Gandhāra (Gomez, in: Lancaster, 1977, p. 221). The validity of this argument has been challenged by Gethin on the basis of an alleged linguistic misinterpretation (Gethin, 1987, p. 196). The gist of Gethin's criticism of this position revolves around the assumption that the practice of the *iddhi* were 'unnatural' to the nikāya in the sense that stand apart from Buddhist practice. Springing from meditative absorption just as the *jhāna*, the *iddhi* appear indeed fully integrated into the śrāvaka training. The reason why the Buddha disapproved of Kevaddha's request for an *iddhi* demonstration, he argues, is not because he dismissed *iddhi* as such but because he feared that the public display of their kind would yield no tangible results in terms of conversion.

Arguing that for the faithful, the performance of miracles would only serve to reinforce the trust and amazement that they hold anyway, while the sceptic would dismiss it as a magical trick with no deeper significance, Gethin contends that the Buddha thought the same way. As a result, in contrast with those monks who were willing to comply and conjure miracles, the attainments of the arhant would clearly lose in standing for the laity—an effect the Buddha had clearly every interest to avoid. While somewhat failing to explain the Buddha's apparent readiness to endorse the other two types of wondrous display, that is the wondrous display of mind-reading (*ādesanā*) and the wondrous display of instruction (*anusāsani*), Gethin's argument has undeniable attractions. Above all, it tallies well with the *Vinaya* rule (ii, p. 112; trsl. Gethin) that the Buddha pronounced in response to Piṇḍola Bhāradvāja's performance of miracles before the inhabitants of Rājagaha:

"O monks, a display of miraculous *iddhi* beyond the capacity of ordinary men is not to be exhibited to the householders. If someone exhibits [such], there is a *dukkata* offence."

The reason that given in support of this rule is that:

"It is neither [conducive] to trust for those without trust, nor to growth for those with trust. Indeed, O monks, it is [conducive] to lack of trust for those without trust and to loss [of trust] for some of those with trust."

Today, it is of course impossible to know for certain what exactly led the Buddha to this attitude. Buddhist sources record several well-known instances in the early days of his ministry where he seemed quite prepared to engage in the public display of *iddhi*. Perhaps, he was guided in this judgement by his personal experience at Uruvelā, when hoping to convert Kassapa, the ascetic, he was confronted with the absurd situation of a 'thraumatogenic impasse'.

The *Kośa* (vii, pp. 111–12) cites as additional reason for the Buddha's apparent criticism of the display of *ṛddhi* the fact that *ṛddhiprātihārya* (as well as *ādesanāprātihārya*) captivates the minds of the audience for only a short time, while the *anusāsaniprātihārya* inspires the production of wholesome and benefiting

By the time the earliest Mahāyāna *sūtras* appeared, much of the disquiet about the suitability of miracles to further the cause of Buddhism had apparently evaporated. The rich imagery found in the *Saddhp*⁵¹⁹ and the tentative inclusion of miraculous feats in the otherwise rather technical discussions of the *Aṣṭa*⁵²⁰ bear testimony to their early presence in Mahāyāna literature.

Whatever the dissent concerning the use to which *ṛddhi* could be put, Pāli and Sanskrit works show broad agreement on the conditions that lead to their mastery. In virtually every source that discusses the performance of *ṛddhi*, we learn that they depend for generation on extensive and deep meditation.⁵²¹ In particular, acquisition of magical powers is associated with training in the four bases of success (*ṛddhipāda*).⁵²²

attitudes. Hence the firm affirmation that *anūsāsaniprātihārya* is the best form a miraculous display (*prātihārya*).

519. The *Saddhp* contains what is probably the best known early example of the use of *ṛddhi* for benefiting others in Mahāyāna *sūtras*. The passage I have in mind is, of course, that of the image of the burning house conjured up in order to encourage sentient beings to leave the world and follow the path of Buddhism (pp. 72.1–78.5). Other examples of *ṛddhi* are found in chapter fourteen (*op. cit.*, pp. 297–314) describing the emergence of bodhisattvas from suddenly appearing gaps in the earth.

520. *Aṣṭa*, pp. 381, 383–4, 464a–465, 466.

521. The fullest canonical account of the method of their generation is found in the *Paṭi*s (ii, pp. 205–6). Here, we read that the *iddhi* depend for unfolding on four ‘planes of success’ (*iddhiyābhūmiyo*), on the four *iddhipāda*, on ‘eight footings of success’ (*iddhiyāpadāni*) and on ‘sixteen roots of success’ (*iddhiyāmūlāni*). Referring to this passage in the *Vism* (xii.49–50, 54–5), Buddhaghōṣa explains that the four levels are nothing but the four *jhāna* (xii.49); that the eight footings denote the *iddhipāda*—each one considered from the aspect of concentration and from that of its basis (that is *chanda*, *virīya*, *citta* and *vīmaṃsā*)—and that the sixteen roots target the various obstacles that perturb consciousness (xii.54–55). He adds that before a monk can become proficient in the seven *iddhi*, he has to master all eight ‘basic absorptions’, meaning that he is capable of entering each of the eight attainments on the basis of all eight *kaṣiṇa* at will (*Vism* xii.2–7). Although held to be extremely difficult to achieve and therefore limited to very few, he allows for the option that, besides buddhas and pratyekabuddhas, very advanced disciples may acquire *iddhi* at the threshold of arhantship (xii.11).

522. In the Pāli Canon, the *iddhipāda* are regularly presented in the following stereotyped description (D II, pp. 213–4; trsl. Gethin):

“Here a monk develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration (*samādhi*) gained by means of desire to act (*chanda*), and with forces of endeavour (*padhānasamkhāra*). He develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of vigour (*virīya*) and with forces of endeavour. He develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of mind (*citta*) and with forces of endeavour. He develops the basis of success that is furnished both with concentration gained by means of investigation and with forces of endeavour.”

As indicated by this brief passage, the *iddhipāda* consist primarily in an interplay of three elements: meditation, forces of endeavour and the four factors that bring about absorption (*chanda*, *virīya*, *citta*, *vīmaṃsā*). It is therefore slightly incorrect to associate the bases of success with any of these three factors in particular. The commentaries on the Samyuttanikāya and *Vibhaṅga* leave no doubt that the significance of the interaction lies in the sustaining and promoting of the process of meditative attainments (*Vibh*, § 303).

The exact nature of *chanda*, *virīya*, *citta* and *vīmaṃsā* is left undiscussed in most *iddhipāda* contexts of the nikāya. Gethin points to an simile in the Sv (ii, pp. 642–3), indicating that their chief objective is to represent progressively easier means of achieving one’s purpose—the person who is endowed with *vīmaṃsā* being in the best position (Gethin, p. 174).

This view tallies approximately with the interpretations found in the Sanskrit sources of the northern tradition. Here, *chanda*-, *virīya*-, *citta*- and *mīmāṃsāsamādhi* are typically interpreted as mental one-

Generation of four bases of success is also the point of departure for the *Bdp*'s exposition on *ṛddhi*, where their presence becomes a chief requirement for any kind of magical prodigy (*ṛddhiprātihārya*).⁵²³ Of particular interest is the *Bdp*'s listing of desire, intimidation and sovereignty alongside the traditional *ṛddhipāda* of *chanda*, *vīrya*, *citta* and *mīmāṃsā*.⁵²⁴ The reason for their presence becomes clear when we look at the areas in which the bodhisattva's magical force is displayed. First, setting out to attract following by addressing people's yearning for physical beauty, he assumes exquisite shapes and colours.⁵²⁵ Second, by demonstrating immense strength, the bodhisattva disheartens conceited, wrathful or presumptuous beings, thereby creating favourable conditions for their instruction in the Dharma.⁵²⁶ Finally, equipped with *ṛddhipāda*, the bodhisattva generates vast miraculous powers (*adhiṣṭhāna*) that allow him to transform phenomena at will.⁵²⁷ By so doing, he creates

pointedness attained through proper application of zeal, constant application of *vīrya*, the power of concentration previously cultivated, hearing the Dharma and insight (*Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 121). In close concurrence with the Pāli formula, Sanskrit sources speak of the first *ṛddhipāda* as being furnished with *chandasamādhi* and *prahāṇasamkāra*, with *chandasamādhi* being acquired through the strengthening (*adhipati*) of *chanda* and so forth for *vīrya*, etc. Sanskrit sources do not identify the *prahāṇasamkāra* with *vīrya* (as they propose for the four *samyakprahāṇa*), but associate it with desire to act (*chanda*), striving (*vyāyāma*), faith (*śraddhā*), peace (*praśrabdhi*), mindfulness (*smṛti*), clear comprehension (*samprajanya*), volition (*cetāna*) and equipoise (*upekṣā*), (*Satya* (S), ii, p. 42; *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 121; *Mvs*, p. 51.11–52.3, iv.4).

For a considered assessment of the place of the *iddhipāda* in the Buddhist path, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 155–199.

523. According to the *Śgs* (p. 221), *ṛddhiprātihārya* are manifested in eighteen different kinds. However, the text does not elaborate on the nature of these eighteen types and I have found no passage that could be interpreted to illuminate this reference.

A concise Mahāyāna definition of the three types of miraculous display (*prātihārya*) is found in the *Rgv* (p. 363):

"It is indicated that the omnipresence [of the Buddha] through the display (*vikurvita*) of the body in all the worlds of the ten directions constitutes the miraculous display through feats (*ṛddhiprātihārya*). The illumination of the thicket of mental conduct of living beings, as involved in the mind, by knowing the variety of thoughts is the miraculous display through mind-reading (*ādeśanāprātihārya*). And with reference to the path leading to deliverance, [the Buddha] preaches and instructs in the path by the example of the utterances of his voice—this is the miraculous display through instructions (*anuśasatiprātihārya*)."

524. R, folio 569.3.

525. R, folio 569.6–70.2

Similar, but more elaborate descriptions of the lengths the bodhisattva is prepared to go in transforming his body are found in the *Vkn* (pp. 183–184; cit. in *Śikṣ*, pp. 324–27), *Ratnoladhāraṇī* (*Śikṣ*, pp. 330.13–332.8) and *Mppś* (ii, p. 984; cf. p. 1055).

On the contributions of *kṛtsnāyatana*, *vimokṣa* and *abhibhāvāyatana* to the transformation powers of the bodhisattva, see: *Mppś*, iv, pp. 1820–21, iii, pp. 1291–1307.

526. R, folio 570.3–71.2.

527. R, folio 571.3–2

The meaning of the term *adhiṣṭhāna* is somewhat ambiguous in this place. Although it may carry several meanings, on contextual grounds, I do not believe that any other translation than 'miraculous power' is appropriate here (Edgerton, pp. 15–16). Being itself a widely attested meaning, it occurs with this sense several times in similar contexts in the *Śgs* (pp. 187, 194, 196, 212, 222).

In this section, the *Bdp* proposes that a bodhisattva who possesses the *adhiṣṭhāna* of miraculous power becomes capable of performing feats of magnification and diminution on a vast scale, such as reducing the size of the ocean to a cow's footprint and *vice versa*. This example and others are reminiscent of passages in the *Vkn*, describing similar feats (*Vkn*, pp. 138–39, 140).

immense rapture in his audience, prompting his listeners to adopt the Buddhist faith and resolve to work for enlightenment themselves.⁵²⁸

A further peculiarity is the type of classification that the *Bdp* proposes for *ṛddhi*. In later Mahāyāna writings, *ṛddhi* is generally differentiated by its areas of operation. The best known division is that of the *Bbh* where *ṛddhi* is distinguished by action affecting transformation (*pāriṇāmika*)⁵²⁹ and by action affecting creation (*nairmāṇika*).⁵³⁰ Elsewhere, this twofold classification is extended by a third aspect, displacement (*gamana*), allowing the bodhisattva to appear in every location at will.⁵³¹ The *ṛddhi* classification of the *Bdp* into form (*rūpa*), power (*bala*), miraculous power (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and prodigy (*ṛddhiprātihārya*) has a much narrower focus, since its members are specifically designed to eradicate tendencies of desire (*kāma*) and intimidation (*vibhīṣaṇa*).⁵³² Consequently, the display of *ṛddhi* shows little diversity and concentrates on the impact of *rūpa*, *bala* and *adhiṣṭhāna*.⁵³³

The *Bdp* next distinguishes the scope of the *abhiññā* from that of pristine cognition (*jñāna*). This difference is primarily one of focus. That is to say, to a bodhisattva the *abhiññā* are less

The *Kośa* (vii, p. 119), citing as example the longevity of Mahākāśyapa's bones (*Divya*, p. 61), holds the view that the factor of *adhiṣṭhāna* furnishes the miraculous feats of bodhisattvas with a life-span well beyond that of their creator. Manifested in the thought 'it shall last' that is generated before the miracle, it furnishes the feat with unlimited life. This position, however, has been challenged in other texts, arguing that the long duration of miracles accompanied by *adhiṣṭhāna* is founded in protection granted by the gods (*Nyāyabindu*, p. 47, trsl., Bibl. Indica Series).

I do not know Pedersen's (p. 110) reasons for translating *adhiṣṭhāna* here as 'blessing'—a highly enigmatic rendering that does not seem to fit the context, leading to sentences such as: "The teachings of the bases of *ṛddhi* of all blessing-thought can all be developed by the bodhisattva-mahāsattva in accordance with the object of his blessing-thought" (*op. cit.*, p. 110).

528. R, folio 572.1–4.

529. According to the *Msg* (p. 221), *ṛddhi* of transformation allows the bodhisattva to set in motion (*kampana*) houses, etc.; to set his body ablaze (*jvalana*); to illuminate (*spharaṇa*); to render visible (*vidarśana*); to transform the four great elements (*anyathibhāvakarana*); to come and go in *samsāra* freely (*gamanā*); to decrease and increase phenomena (*saṃkṣepaprathana*); to insert all matter into his body (*sarvarūpakāyapraveśana*); to adapt to the customs of others (*sabhāgatopasaṃkrānti*); to appear and disappear with a great retinue (*āvirbhāvatirobhāva*); to submit other beings to his will (*vaśitvakaraṇa*); to overpower the magical powers of others (*pararddhyabhibhava*); to grant insight (*pratibhādāna*), memory (*smṛtidāna*) and bliss (*sukhadāna*) and to emit light-rays (*raśmipramokṣa*).

This list is also found in the *Bbh* (pp. 58.23–59.2). Cf. *Msl* (pp. 148.14–153.10) and *Daśa-bh* (pp. 34–35, M).

530. In the *Bbh* (p. 63.25), *ṛddhi* of creation involves either the body (*kāyanirmāṇa*) giving rise to appearance similar or different from the complexion of the agent, or creation of voice (*vāgnirmāṇa*) with the sole purpose of teaching the Dharma. In the *Buddhabhūmiśāstra* (6, p. 318, col. 2; 7, p. 325, col. 1–2; ref. Lamotte), however, a third dimension, that of the mind (*cittanirmāṇa*) is added to the creation of body and voice, giving rise to images in the bodhisattva's own mind (*svasambaddha*) or in that of other beings (*parasambaddha*), (cf. *Siddhi*, pp. 794–795).

531. *Mpps*, i, pp. 328–30.

532. R, folio 569.3.

533. I have found only one other text that cites these three aspects as distinct elements in its *ṛddhi* discussion. This is the *Ratnolkadhāraṇī* (*Śikṣ*, p. 330.11) where we come across the following sentence:

"With miracles of *ṛddhi* manifesting the psychic powers of the Tathāgata, through form, miraculous power and strength altogether (*samantāt*), through their ability of mind-reading, through revealing (*anūśāstrī*) their *ṛddhi* they convert sentient beings."

important for the knowledge they impart than for the contribution they make to the active aspects of his training. They allow him to traverse the fields of all buddhas, to appear in the five spheres of existence and to overwhelm with brightness even the most purified heavenly abodes.⁵³⁴ The *abhijñā* have therefore immediate bearing on the bodhisattva's conversion activity. Pristine cognition, in contrast, operates on the cognitive plane. Where the *abhijñā* generate unlimited sound perception, *jñāna* realises ineffability. When the *abhijñā* allow the bodhisattva to observe the minds of all beings, *jñāna* sees the cessation and non-cessation of thought.⁵³⁵ In other words, while he is dependent for his active training on the *abhijñā*, it is to *jñāna* that he owes insight into the frame of reference in which they manifest.

The bodhisattva learns of the mental defilements that pervade *samsāra* through the branches of *dhyāna* and his miraculous powers of mind (*cittādhiṣṭhāna*). This inspires him to win *dhyāna* in equal number.⁵³⁶ Thus committed (*samādāna*) and sustained by the conviction of the equality of practice, he achieves a high degree of concentration (*samāhita*) and attainment (*samāpatti*) in sameness.⁵³⁷

On the basis of this insight, the bodhisattva acquires tranquillity⁵³⁸ and discernment. These

534. R, folio 573.2–5.

535. Compare this picture of the relationship between the *abhijñā* and cognition with the account that is given in the *Kośa* (vii, pp. 98–112). Here the *abhijñā* (vii, pp. 100–1), given the same status as all other religious practices, represent the knowledge of the path of deliverance (*vimuktimārgaprajñā*). The *ṛddhi*, *divyacakṣus*, *divyaśrotra* and *pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñāna* belong to the sphere of conventional knowledge (*saṃvṛtijñāna*). The *abhijñā* manifesting *paracittajñāna* allows specifically for the attainment of *dharmajñāna*, *anvayajñāna*, *mārgajñāna*, *saṃvṛtijñāna* and, of course, *paracittajñāna*. As the *āsravakṣayajñāna* (resembling the tenth of the *tathāgatabala*), it leads to six or ten types of knowledge (*Mppś*, iii, pp. 1472, 1508) and belongs to all stages of *dhyāna* (*Kośa*, vii, p. 101). The first five *abhijñā*, in contrast, leaning on the four *dhyāna* but not on the *arūpyasamāpatti* for their object, consist of matter and are always bound to the *dhyāna* stage (or the next lower one) on which they became manifest (*Kośa*, vii, p. 104). All *abhijñā* are either acquired by means of detachment (*vairāgya*) if already practised in previous lives, or are otherwise mastered by present effort (*prayoga*). Founded on the practice of mindfulness, they correspond to specific bases of mindfulness (*Kośa*, vii, pp. 105–7). The *abhijñā* of *ṛddhi*, *divyacakṣus* and *divyaśrotra* correspond to the *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna* since they have matter as their object (cf. *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1121–2). The *abhijñā* of *paracittajñāna* includes the *smṛtyupasthāna* of *vedanā*, *citta* and *dharma* because it has thought and mentation as its object. Finally, the *abhijñā* of *pūrvanivāsānusmṛtijñāna* and *āsravakṣayajñāna*, having as their objects the five *skandha*, have as their nature all four *smṛtyupasthāna* (*Kośa*, vii, p. 106). In moral terms, all six *abhijñā*—but for the *divyacakṣus* and *divyaśrotra*—are wholesome (*śubha*) since they improve spiritual practice (*Kośa*, vii, p. 107).

536. R, folio 573.7–74.1.

537. R, folio 574.5–7 (cf. folio 574.7–75.1)

In the *Akn* (p. 49.2.4), the argument runs slightly different, suggesting that the bodhisattva becomes concentrated because he is established (*sthita*) in sameness and not because he is accomplished in meditation. On the other points, however, both texts concur closely. The doctrinal foundation at the heart of this thought is well-known from a number of other, perhaps earlier, Mahāyāna *sūtras*. It is found, for instance, in the *Śgs* (pp. 125, 131, 133, 139, 234) and *Vkn* (pp. 55–56, 122–23 and the whole of chapter vii, discussing non-duality (*advaya*)).

538. Here, in an effort to describe the composure of the bodhisattva's disposition it is likened to the stability of the four *mahābhūta*. This is a well-known simile that occurs in a number of Mahāyāna *sūtras* (e.g., *Akn*, p. 49.4.3–4) describing the bodhisattva's serenity of mind.

allow him to manifest all forms of worldly activity without ever ceasing to uphold his practice (*dharma*) and meditation (*samāhita*).⁵³⁹ It frees his practice from dithering and commotion, leads to moderation in speech (*amukharatā*), equips him with knowledge of suitable meditation conditions and sustains serenity.⁵⁴⁰ In the *Rcd*, it is explicitly stated that 'entry into certainty' (*nyāmāvakrānti*), realisation of attained fruits and non-accumulation (*anabhisamskāra*) are not the aims of meditation.⁵⁴¹ Its chief function consists less of realising attainments (here epitomised by the *trivimokṣa*) than to guide other people towards them.⁵⁴² Thus, even when meditating on 'emptiness furnished with the best of all excellent forms' (*sarvakāvaropetaśūnyatā*) that allows him to see the non-arising of *dharma*, the bodhisattva persists in his altruistic outlook. He generates conduct that is indiscriminating, faultless and unconcerned with its own flavour (*svarasavāhin*).⁵⁴³ By virtue of his meditation, he achieves

539. *R*, folio 575.7

The notion of the perpetually meditating bodhisattva is common to several early Mahāyāna *sūtras*. In the *Śgs* (p. 145), for instance, it forms the backbone of the entire discussion of the *dhyānapāramitā*. Realising that all *dharma* are eternally concentrated (*sadāsamāhita*), the bodhisattva holds on to meditation in order to subdue his thoughts (*cittadamanārtha*) and to convert sentient beings with greatest efficiency. While the bodhisattva of the *Śgs* is of the highest stage (p. 183), in full possession of all *ṛddhi*, there are other examples of less-advanced bodhisattvas who abide incessantly in meditation.

540. *R*, folio 575.4–7

This list of attributes is the closest the *Bdp* comes in spelling out the benefits that accrue through meditation. In contrast with the other perfections, Buddhist *sūtras* produced relatively few of such lists on *dhyāna*. One example of such rare enumeration is found in the *Samādhi*, distinguishing the following ten kinds of benefits: (1) persistence in training, (2) performing good conduct, (3) living a life free from affliction, (4) possessing well-guarded faculties, (5) experiencing joy, (6) liberation from desire, (7) serenity despite the impressive accumulation of meditation, (8) liberation from the sphere of influence of Māra, (9) dwelling in the sphere of the Buddha and (10) ripening (others) to liberation (Dutt, 1943–53, ii, p. 338.6–11; cf. TTP, 31, p. 310.3.8–4.8).

Compare the realism of this list with a characterisation of 'pure *samādhi*' in the *Ug* (p. 272.1.8–2.3) that focuses on the psychological attainments of one-pointedness, cognition of the non-abiding of thought (*apratiṣṭhitacitta*), non-differentiating thought (*aprapañcācitta*), mastery of thought (*cittavaśitā*) and unperturbed thinking (*akṣobhacitta*). Another example of a more advanced list of the benefit arising from the practice of meditation is found in the *Msg* (pp. 223–4). Here, we read of ten exploits (*duṣkaracaryā*) that accrue to the bodhisattva from superior thought (*adhicitta*).

But for a number of points that relate, in the Mahāyāna, to the path of the bodhisattva, the Śrāvakayāna understanding of benefits that arise from concentration agrees in broad agreement. For a good example of the Theravāda view, I propose to turn to the *Vism* where Buddhaghosa identifies (1) blissful abiding, (2) insight, (3) super-knowledge, (4) the prospect of higher rebirth and (5) cessation as the principal advantages that spring from meditation (*Vism*, pp. 371–372).

541. *Rcd*, *op. cit.*, p. 234.4.5–6

According to the *Bbh* (p. 358.2), the attainment of *nyāmāvakrānti* represents the third *viḥāra* of the *śrāvakabhūmi* scheme. Edgerton (pp. 314, 298) suggests to take *nyāma* for *niyāma*, thus rendering *nyāmāvakrānti* as 'entry into certainty' but this does not tally with the Tibetan 'absence of defect'. For a discussion of the term *nyāmāvakrāntivihāra*, see: *Gv*, p. 320.22; *Aṣṭa*, pp. 331.10, 322.5.

542. *Rcd*, *op. cit.* p. 234.4.6–5.2.

543. *Rgv*, *op. cit.*, p. 264

The notion that the meditator must not become attached to the flavour (*rasa*) of his absorption is a well-established maxim in Buddhist meditation. Indeed, any *dhyāna* that is associated with enjoyment (*āsvādanasaṃprayukta*) is regarded as impure and accordingly condemned in most *sūtras* (e.g., *Laṅkā*, p. 212.14; *Msl*, p. 160.14; *Kośa*, viii, p. 144). One reason why the texts do not tire of warning the recluse from this mishap is the danger of confusing attachment (*āsaṅga*) with the practice of *dhyāna* as both induce the mind to focus on a conceived object (*Mpps*, ii, pp. 1056–7). The bodhisattva succeeds in

impeccability (*avikala*) in the perfections, incessant exertion in ripening sentient beings and acquisition of buddha-qualities.⁵⁴⁴

An important element of these meditative attainments is the interplay of means (*upāya*) and wisdom (*prajñā*).⁵⁴⁵ While it is not necessary to go into the detail of this well-known pattern it is perhaps of interest that meditation is a constituent in both practices. That is to say, the *Bdp* quite explicitly maintains that *dhyāna* practice is essential to the generation of means and wisdom. The difference between the two is then not one of substance, but of focus. When aimed at the suffering in the world, *dhyāna* generates compassion, ripens sentient beings, produces buddha-qualities and manifests miraculous powers; but when concerned with outright cognition, *dhyāna* inspires a vision of reality where sentient beings do not exist, roots of virtue vanish and buddha-fields resemble space.⁵⁴⁶ It is therefore only by the combined presence of *prajñā* and *upāya* that the bodhisattva decides to return to the *kāmadhātu* and continues his quest of universal liberation.⁵⁴⁷ One ramification of this paired operation is that, depending on context and purpose, meditation is capable of performing either on the

disentangling himself from attachment to *samādhi* by realising that all *dharma* (including of course meditations) are non-dual and hence no cause for attachment (*op. cit.*, pp. 1049–50). The potentially devastating consequences such misapprehension might entail are exemplified by the downfall of Udraka Rāmaputra that occurred in response to his undue attachment to the *dhyāna* and *samāpatti* (*Mppś*, ii, pp. 1050–52). As in many other cases, the common wisdom of such advice had little validity for Vimalakīrti who reportedly sustained himself with nothing but the flavour of this trances (*Vkn*, p. 29).

544. *Rcd*, *op. cit.*, pp. 234.5.2–35.1.8 (cf. *Rgv*, *op. cit.*, p. 265)

According to the *Mppś* (ii, p. 984), the bodhisattva returns to the world from meditation in solitude only when he has obtained the power of the *abhijñā*. Assuming all types of form in order to convert sentient beings when he dwells in their midst, the bodhisattva guides them by whatever instructions and means he deems appropriate to their deliverance.

545. R, folio 576.1–78.4.

546. In a passage of the *Ug* (*op. cit.*, p. 272.4.2–4), *upāyakaṣālya* is given credit for holding the *grhasti* bodhisattva in this world in spite of his attainments in meditation:

“Furthermore, O householder, with regard to the empty house (presumably a quiet secluded place) the *grhasti* bodhisattva practises the four *dhyāna* but does not enter into the *samāpatti* by virtue of his skilful means.”

This sentence seems to suggest that without *upāyakaṣālya* the bodhisattva would cease his work in *samsāra* and withdraw into blissful realms of the *samāpatti*. Although this point is not made in the *Bdp*, the gist that the bodhisattva stays in the world in spite of the opportunity to retire temporarily from suffering is perhaps implied by the untiring reiteration that *upāya* means worldly engagement while dwelling in the *samāpatti* (R, folio 576.2–78.3).

Compare this proposition with a passage in the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 36, M) where we learn that:

“The bodhisattva enters into and emerges from *dhyāna*, *vimokṣa*, *samādhi* and *samāpatti* but is not born by their power (*vaśa*), except when he arises by the power of his resolution, witnessing the fulfilment of the factors of enlightenment. Why? Because the bodhisattva possesses the mental continuity (*cittasamtati*) achieved by skilful means.”

547. *Mppś*, ii, p. 1044

This touches on another important distinction between the *śrāvaka*- and *bodhisattvadhyāna*. Unlike any other being, the bodhisattva may enter into *dhyāna* while still in possession of a thought of the *kāmadhātu*. He is capable of doing so by reason of his cultivation of virtue (*guṇa*) and because his fetters (*saṃyojana*) are weak (*op. cit.*, p. 1446).

conventional (*saṃvṛti*) or absolute (*paramārtha*) level of reality.⁵⁴⁸

“Equanimity and realisation while attaining all conceivable factors of enlightenment stand for means. Completely purified, untroubled pristine cognition of the Tathāgata, bliss of objectless meditation, discernment of unobstructed perception, purification of all perception, meditation on the perfection of all bodhisattvas, practice of meditation devoid of meditation stand for wisdom.”

Meditation doctrinally assumes thus the role of a nexus, linking the mundane practices of *dāna*, *śīla*, *kṣānti* (and *vīrya*) with supramundane cognition of *prajñā*.⁵⁴⁹ On the one hand, it depends for cultivation on the four worldly *pāramitā*. Elimination of the five major obstacles to meditation (viz., covetousness, malice, indolence, regret, wastefulness and doubt) and generation of the five *dharma* that conduce to its unfolding (viz., zeal, vigour, recollection, thoughtfulness and mental one-pointedness) clearly require schooling in generosity, etc.⁵⁵⁰ On the other hand, meditation enhances training in first three perfections, since it provides the required mental focus.⁵⁵¹

Adopted to the *abhijñā*, these variant planes of *dhyāna* led the *Bdp* to recognise two types of *abhijñā*, viz., ordinary super-knowledge and non-regressing super-knowledge (*acutyābhijñā*).⁵⁵² As indicated by their titles, the difference between the two is one of progress or degree of perfection. That is to say, the practice of ordinary *abhijñā* is chiefly concerned with the five traditional areas of application and focuses on the conversion of sentient beings.⁵⁵³ Granting supernatural powers in vision, hearing, mind-reading, recollection and *ṛddhi*, it guides to the ‘great entry’ (*mahāpravṛtti*), engineers the attainment of pristine cognition, operates as a factor that conduces to deliverance (*nirvedhabhāgīya*) and addresses supramundane practices (*lokottaradharma*).⁵⁵⁴ The time-span of its operation is not fully

548. R, folio 577.6–578.1.

549. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 984–990, 928.

550. These ten *dharma* are cited in the *Mppś* (*op. cit.*, pp. 1013–23) as the chief causes/obstacles to a successful meditation. Although this list is by no means the only one that is proposed in Buddhist literature, it does seem to cover the contents of most other enumerations.

551. *Mppś*, ii, pp. 985, 1055

Besides the association with the other *pāramitā*, it is the connection to mastery over the *bodhipāṅśika* that most texts underline. It is mentioned in the *Pañca* (pp. 514–15), appears in the *Dbh* in the stage following his attainments in *dhyāna* (*Daśa-bh*, pp. 38–39, C) and is listed in the *Mppś* (ii, p. 1043) alongside the other *saṃādhi* the *dhyānapāramitā* brings about.

552. R, folio 578.4, 580.2.

553. R, folio 579.2–80.1.

554. R, folio 579.6.

indicated in the *Bdp*. Its link with the mastery (*vaśitā*) over all *dharma*⁵⁵⁵ and the *abhiṣeka* conferral suggests that it extends from the *acalābhūmi* to the *dharmameghabhūmi*.⁵⁵⁶

This advanced positioning on the path is corroborated by a list of one hundred and one *samādhi* that appear at the very end of the chapter.⁵⁵⁷ We know of several instances in Mahāyāna *sūtras* where the attainment of *samādhi*—enumerated in lengthy lists—signals the completion of the path.⁵⁵⁸ Generally, these *samādhi* do not represent individually attained meditations, but point to modalities in that the bodhisattva's final meditation manifests itself. Accommodating all practices simultaneously cultivated⁵⁵⁹, they represent the highpoint of training when the bodhisattva operates purely from within an infinite sphere of absorption.⁵⁶⁰ Needless to say—relying on the *dharmakāya* while moving through an empty, unmarked and purposeless space⁵⁶¹—the bodhisattva does so with greater efficiency than he has ever been able to achieve.

It is only at this point that the third and last phase of meditation sets in. Entitled 'meditation

555. According to the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 71.7), the attainment of mastery over *dharma* follows on the bodhisattva's production of knowledge about the body (*kāyajñānābhinirhāra*) at the eighth stage. Consisting of ten types of mastery (*āyurvaśitā*, *cetovaśitā*, *pariṣkāraśitā*, *karmavaśitā*, *upapattivaśitā*, *adhimuktivaśitā*, *prañidhānaśitā*, *ṛddhivaśitā*, *dharmavaśitā* and *jñānaśitā*), it heralds increasing control over his appearance—himself abiding in the 'immaculate sphere' (*anāśravadhātu*)—and leads to refined conversion methods. In the scheme of the *Bbh* (pp. 352.26–353.7), the acquisition of ten (somewhat differently conceived) *vaśitā* takes place at the tenth *viḥāra*. Here, as in most other sources, it springs from the attainment of the *abhiññā* and *jñāna* leading to a perpetual company with buddhas (*pratyutpannabuddhasaṃmukhāvasthita*).

Besides these bodhisattva treatises, the *vaśitā* are mentioned in a broad range of Mahāyāna *sūtras*, including the *Gv* (p. 83.10), *Dhsgr* (§ 74), *Laṅkā* (p. 1.10), *Lal* (pp. 45.14, 94.19, 274.21), *Ug* (p. 272.2.2) and *Mvu* (i, p. 282.15–20). As so often with lists of this type, the order of enumeration does not always correspond (*Mvy* 770–80). We find also some variation in contents (e.g., *Mvu*) that indicates that the concept of the *vaśitā* might have been new to Mahāyāna Buddhism. Indeed, the *suttas* of early Buddhism do not disclose any list corresponding to the *vaśitā* attributes of the bodhisattva.

556. *Daśa-bh*, pp. 71.7–18, 82.1–85.9

In broad terms, this allocation of *ṛddhi* matches even the otherwise 'non-conformist' career-plan in the *Gv*. Here, as elsewhere, we learn that the bodhisattva's capability of performing magical feats depends on his entrance on the *dharmadhātu*. Although this falls on the sixth stage (p. 372.15–18), it does not allow the bodhisattva to assume apparitional bodies immediately. For this to happen, he has to wait until he reaches the seventh stage at which he "having purified the *dharmakāya* completely pervades the fields with his own body". But even at this advanced stage he has not yet attained complete mastery over all *ṛddhi* and remains thus unable to proceed to purify of his buddha-field (*op. cit.*, p. 372.20). For, according to the *Gv*, the full attainment in miraculous powers—accompanying effective maturation of beings—takes place at the ninth stage after the bodhisattva has attained full proficiency in all types of meditation (*op. cit.*, p. 373.1–4).

557. R, folio 587.2–90.1.

558. *Daśa-bh*, p. 82.9–21; *Pañca*, pp. 142–43; *Śgs*, p. 132; *Akn*, p. 50.4.3–4.6. In the *Gv* (*op. cit.*, p. 369.23–24), the bodhisattva is said to attain mastery over all *samādhi* already at the ninth stage, while in the *Bbh* (p. 354.14–23) he has to await the twelfth *viḥāra*.

559. *Śgs*, pp. 141–150, § 26–38; pp. 152–154, § 42–46.

560. The *Mpps* (ii, p. 1048) indicates that this is a common feature of the bodhisattva's practice of the *dhyānapāramitā* and is not limited to his meditation on the advanced stages. However, the text hastens to add that this applies only to bodhisattvas furnished with the *dharmakāya*—a qualification that unmistakably points to the later career phases (*op. cit.*, pp. 1048–9).

561. *Mpps* (i, p. 324): *śūnyatāprāṇihitānimittagocara*.

at the service of others' (*sattvārthakriyādhyāna*), it is wholly targeted at the universal suppression of sorrow.⁵⁶² According to the *Bbh*, the *sattvārthakriyādhyāna* involves total compliance with the wishes, customs and, above all, spiritual needs of beings. It compels the bodhisattva to teach the Dharma, to appease physical misery, to protect from terror, to show gratitude and generosity as appropriate and to dispense impartial rebuke.⁵⁶³ Clearly, such diverse requirements allow only bodhisattvas of advanced stages in possession of the *dharmakāya* to attain the *sattvārthakriyādhyāna*.

The characterisation of non-regressing *abhijñā* is more problematic, since the *Bdp* offers few benchmarks against which it could be measured. It is implied—but not stated—that the *acutyaḥbhijñā* presupposes the attainment of the five ordinary *abhijñā*. The basis of its manifestation is complete mental purity cultivated during intentional (*saṃcintya*) absorption in the four *dhyāna*, eight *vimokṣa*, three *samādhi* and nine *samāpatti*. It represents liberation from the fetters of impurity (*kleśa*) and is beyond residence on the summit of contrariness (*viparyāyāgrāśraya*).⁵⁶⁴ Based on knowledge of the sameness of all *dharma*, it precludes attachment (*abhiniveśa*)⁵⁶⁵ to either *dharma* or *adharma*.

Abhiniveśa itself is the object (*artha*) of all practice (*dharma*).⁵⁶⁶ In a nutshell, the *Bdp* argues that non-attachment is the foundation to spiritual maturity that prevents delusion, indolence and impassioned disputes to cloud the bodhisattva's judgement. It prepares acceptance of universal sameness and immunity to imputation (*aparyāpanna*) and—repudiating form (*saṃsthāna*) and appearance (*nimitta*)—leads via pursuit (*anvaya*) to spiritual realisation (*adhigama*).⁵⁶⁷

In the present context, pursuit and realisation constitute two different, yet acutely overlapping and complementary aspects of the bodhisattva's training. Taken separately, each represents a major path-element; with pursuit standing for untiring cultivation of individual practices and realisation denoting understanding of their ontological invalidity. In practice, however, this

562. Hence, its alternative title that is given in the *Siddhi* (p. 622) as 'meditation of the accomplishment of duty' (*kṛtyānuṣṭhānadhyāna*).

563. *Bbh*, pp. 207.25–208.9

In essence, we are dealing here with the same list of behavioural norms towards the laity that was given already in the *Śīla-* and *Vīryapaṭala* (*Bbh*, pp. 144.24–152.17, 201.26–202.1).

564. R, folio 580.6 (*phyin ci log gi rtse moḥi gnas*); cf. Edgerton, p. 491.

565. According to Edgerton (p. 53), *abhiniveśa* carries two possible meanings, viz., when leaning on classical Sanskrit it is 'strong attachment' or, in affinity to Pāli *abhiniveśa*, any false belief, that in Buddhism is particularly the 'heretical belief of the existence of a self' (*Śīkṣ*, p. 198.21). In the context of *dharma*-sameness the word *abhiniveśa* could possibly be interpreted in either terms, with 'strong attachment' beings perhaps the more plausible translation.

566. R, folio 581.3–4.

567. R, folio 581.6–82.3.

distinction becomes meaningless as pursuit and realisation merge into one another to produce the pledge to universal liberation in spite of the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*:⁵⁶⁸

“He shows benevolence but knows that there is no self. He is compassionate but knows that there are no beings. He cultivates sympathetic joy but knows that there is no life-force. He abides in equipoise but knows that there is no person. ... He ripens sentient beings but his mind is of pristine purity. He retains the holy Doctrine but knows the indistinguishable *dharmadhātu*. ... He turns the wheel of the Dharma, but knows that there is no turning. He instructs on passing into great *nirvāṇa*, but knows of its sameness of own-being of *saṃsāra*.”

In an apparent allegory on the miraculous powers of the *abhiññā*, pursuit and realisation produce holy beings (*satpuruṣa*) that are capable of performing miracles (*āścarya*) and supernatural feats (*adbhūta*).⁵⁶⁹ The text is silent on the reasons behind this comparison. However, we are probably not much off the mark in interpreting it as an effort in the enhancement of the standing of more ordinary practices. Echoing the views of Śākyamuni Buddha, it was probably feared that a display of miraculous feats would make a far greater impression on an ill-informed laity clamouring for supernatural interventions than the rather less spectacular selfless striving of dedicated bodhisattvas. Hence, the departure from the dazzling descriptions of *ṛddhi* practices that dominated much of the first part of the *dhyāna* chapter to the more austere analysis of the principles underlying the training proper.

568. R, folio 582.6–84.3.

569. R, folio 582.4–5, 584.4.

The Perfection of Wisdom

The last of the six major *pāramitā*, *prajñāpāramitā*, is discussed in chapter eleven. Of all twelve chapters of the *Bdp*, this chapter is the most important with regard to the bodhisattva practice. For, it contains as part of the discussion of *prajñā* not only those elements traditionally associated with expositions of *prajñā*, but includes also a large number of ancillary wisdom practices. In its description of them, the *Bdp* draws substantially on Mahāyāna thinking. The style of composition indicates that it comes from a time when descriptions of these practices were still not fixed. What is perhaps most striking is not the content but the arrangement of the material. In apparent disregard of well-established structures found elsewhere, the *Bdp* develops a picture of wisdom that contains little evidence of a particular design despite the fact that it acknowledges some sense of organisation. In order to show what is meant, I have drawn up a list of contents:

1. *Śruta, praveśa, pratipatti*
2. *Samhāra*
3. *Prayoga*
4. *Darśana*
5. *Bhāvanā*
6. Skill in *skandha*, *dhātu* and *āyatana*
7. Skill in *satya*
8. Skill in *pratisamvid* and *pratisaraṇa*
9. Skill in *pūnyasamhāra* and *jñānasamhāra*
10. Skill in *smṛtyupasthāna*
11. Skill in *bodhyaṅga*
12. Skill in *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*
13. Skill in *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*
14. Skill in *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala*
15. Skill in *ekayānamārga*
16. Skill in *pratītyasamutpāda* and *dharma*

While the contents of the types of 'skill' presents no difficulty—virtually all practices discussed here are understood to contribute to the generation of wisdom⁵⁷⁰—the order of their arrangement proved complex and difficult to unravel. The concatenation of *śruta*, *praveśa* and *pratipatti*; the position of *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala* behind the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*; the role of 'skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *satya* in relation to the *pratisamvid* and *pratisaraṇa*, to indicate just a few issues, diverge from established patterns and are problematic.

Initial Phases in the Training of Wisdom

The exposition of Perfect Wisdom begins in the *Bdp* with a survey of the factors that generate wisdom. By identifying (1) seventy-two types of learning (*śruta*), (2) forty-one methods (*praveśa*) of acquiring learning and (3) good conduct (*pratipatti*) as causes, the *Bdp* emulates the ancient scheme of 'wisdom arising from learning' (*śrutamayīprajñā*), 'wisdom arising from reflection' (*cintāmayīprajñā*) and 'wisdom arising from contemplation' (*bhāvanāmayīprajñā*).⁵⁷¹

Virtually all abhidharmic treatises on the path agree that wisdom generated through learning, reflection and contemplation belongs to the earliest phase of the training. It is associated with the four bases of mindfulness and becomes manifest on the path of equipment (*sambhāramārga*).⁵⁷² In the *Bdp*, this allocation is confirmed by their position at the very beginning of the discussion of *prajñā*.

The first limb, *śruta*, does not present much of a problem since it accords closely with the established notion that learning is the first, and most fundamental, precondition for the arising of wisdom. Focusing on the wording of the instructions rather than on their meaning, it introduces the practitioner to the teachings of the Dharma and initiates the cognition

570. For the three conditions leading to *prajñā*, see: *MBT*, ii, pp. 198–99, § 9; *Śrotabhūmi*, TTP, 109, p. 296.3.1–5. For 'skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu* and *āyatana*, *satya* and *pratītyasamutpāda*, see: *Mvś (N)*, p. 37. For the *pratisamvid* and *pratisaraṇa*, see: *Bbh*, pp. 214.10–14, 257.16–22. For *punya* and *jñānasambhāra*, see: *MBT*, iii, p. 12.20–22. For the *bodhipāṅśika*, see: *Kośa*, vi, pp. 282–4; *Mvś (N)*, p. 50–55 and quotations in *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1119, 1132–36. For *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, see: *MBT*, iii, p. 1.7–13; Bugault, 1982, p. 92.

571. See, for instance: *D III*, p. 219; *Vibh*, pp. 324, 325; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 143–44; *Bbh*, p. 183.1.3–6.

572. *Kośa*, vi, pp. 159, 287; *Abhidh-d*, p. 362; *Abhidh-h (W)* p. 140; *Abhidh-sam (R)*, pp. 116–7; *Amṛtar (B)*, pp. 201–2; *DPP*, p. 20.

For full discussions of the fivefold path scheme, see: *Kośa*, v, pp. iv–xi; *HIB*, pp. 677–686; Frauwallner, *Abhidharma-Studien* iii, pp. 82–89; Günther, 1957, pp. 290–377 and, in particular: Ruegg, 1990, pp. 150–209.

process. At first sight, however, our list of seventy-two forms of learning appears to go well beyond this definition. Instead of learning, it is more concerned with the study of the bodhisattva practices proper.⁵⁷³ At this early stage, *śrutamayīprajñā* is founded on confidence in the words of the Buddha and is sustained by faith.⁵⁷⁴ In the *Akn-ṭikā*, Vasubandhu explains that the individual types of learning do not represent learning itself, but those factors that lead to learning. He says that each factor is the cause of learning, that it has learning as cause and that it shares its own-being with wisdom.⁵⁷⁵ Hence, our seventy-two forms of learning stand not so much for learning in the narrow sense of the word, but point to a series of complex interactions facilitating the attainment of wisdom.⁵⁷⁶

The second type of wisdom, *cintāmayīprajñā*, leads to a sound understanding of the four noble truths. Chiefly, though not exclusively, concerned with meaning⁵⁷⁷, it occasions a type of certainty that is founded in rational examining (*yuktinidhyāna*) wholly independent of faith or external authority.⁵⁷⁸ Like *śrutamayīprajñā*, it is dialectical in nature and of provisional value.⁵⁷⁹ It still pertains to the *laukika* domain and operates in a defiled consciousness (*sāsrava vijñāna*). The applicability of the *cintāmayīprajñā* concept to the *Bdp*'s list of forty-one methods of acquiring learning is ambiguous. For one thing, the terminology does not correspond; instead of founding it on *cintā*, the *Bdp* says that it springs from *yoniso manasakāra*.⁵⁸⁰ Vasubandhu does not give much weight to this difference, perhaps because he is aware that *yoniso manasakāra* often occurs in its verbal form *manasi karoti* as a synonym to *cintayati*.⁵⁸¹

573. This is particularly true of the items in the latter portion of the list, starting with item no. 29. The whole list is given in the Appendix i.

574. A IV, p. 82; *Kośa*, vi, p. 143.

575. *Akn-ṭikā*, TTP, 104, p. 181.3.6–4.1.

576. Cf. *Vibh*, p. 325.

577. The Vaibhāṣika hold that the relationship between names (*nāma*) and meaning (*artha*) is reciprocal, saying that *cintāmayīprajñā* secures the meaning by means of the wording (*vyañjanena*) as much as it secures the wording by means of the meaning (*Kośa*, vi, p. 143). This thesis is refuted by the Theravāda *Abhidhamma* saying that *cintāmayīprajñā* arises separated from hearing (*Vibh*, pp. 324–5).

578. M I, p. 265.

579. The nature and relationship between the three is illustrated by a simile in *Kośa* (vi, p. 143). The gist of this interpretation, suggesting a temporary value for the first two types of wisdom, but explained by means of the *artha/vyañjana pratisaraṇa*, is also found in the *Saṃdhis* (p. 105.1–26). To sum up, during the *śrutamayī* phase, the bodhisattva, having turned towards deliverance, focuses on the literal meaning of the texts, but fails to realise the meaning of designations. Then, he includes the meaning of the letters into his investigation. Progressing towards liberation he is now capable of realising worldly designations. Finally, through contemplation he learns of the intentions of the texts and—independent of the letter—acquires knowledge of those *dharma* that pertain to liberation.

For alternative explanations of their relationship see: *Msl*, pp. 54.9–14, 85.3–6. According to the *Msl* (p. 56.4–10), however, the three types of wisdom do not supersede each other, but are jointly required in order to penetrate the basis of reality (*dharmāṃbana*).

580. Edgerton, p. 387, col. 1; *pw*, pp. 1082–83.

581. *Rp*, p. 59.4; *Daśa-bh*, p. 12.21 (for further references see: Edgerton, p. 418, col. 1).

He postulates that *praveśa* corresponds with *yoniso manasakāra*⁵⁸² that he likens elsewhere to insight concerned with reflection (*cintā*)⁵⁸³, thereby practically identifying *praveśa* with *cintā*. Since, in the *Bdp*, *yoniso manasakāra* is the method by which *śruta* is acquired, a strong link between *praveśa* and *cintā* is established.⁵⁸⁴ The methods by which the bodhisattva acquires what he has studied are divided into forty-one practices.⁵⁸⁵ Of these, however, only twenty-three are included in the list of seventy-two types of learning.⁵⁸⁶

This together with the actual phrasing indicates that emphasis is not so much placed on content as on progress to the state of perfect wisdom.⁵⁸⁷ Typically, the forty-one methods begin by taking up one of the forms of learning and discuss its effect on the training. This becomes the basis of knowledge and leads to understanding arising from reflection (*manasakāra*). Finally, having attained this type of understanding, the bodhisattva performs good conduct which announces *bhāvanā* as the last and supreme condition of wisdom.

582. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 181.3.2–3

Statements underpinning the identity of *cintā*, *yoniso manasakāra* and *praveśa* in their relationship to *śruta* are found at several places. In the *Msl*, we read that *śruta* and *yoniso manasakāra* are jointly required for the bodhisattva to enter into the 'character of the knowable' (*jñeyalakṣaṇapraveśa*). Elsewhere we are told that at the moment when thought associated with correct reflection (*yoniso manasakārasaṃprayuktaka*)—corresponding to right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*)—is born, mental perception (*manovijñāna*) that has been impregnated with learning (*śrutavāsanā*) is being eradicated (*Mśg*, p. 65). Both factors are thus closely united in operations that are directed at the acquisition of transcendental cognition (*lokottaracitta*) and co-function in a way reminiscent of the *śruta/cintā* interaction. Corroborating this interpretation, the *Mppś* (ii, p. 1110) underlines the conceptual proximity between *manasakāra* and *cintāmayī* on the one hand, and its link with learning (*śravaṇa*) on the other hand, by pointing to their combined presence in the schooling of the bodhisattva who penetrates the *dharma*-character (*dharmalakṣaṇa*).

583. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 183.4.3–4.

584. *R*, folio 590.6

This very thought is also expressed in the *Msl* (p. 7.3–4) that says that "on the basis of learning (*śruta*) correct reflection (*yoniso manasakāra*) arises; from that reflection emerges a knowledge that has thusness (*tattva*) as its object".

585. In the *Akn* (p. 51.1.6–2.7) we meet with a parallel list as far as context and title are concerned. Although professing to itemise the ways of penetrating correct reflection, it contains only thirty-two elements and shows an altogether different content. Unlike the *Bdp* that addresses a broad selection of aspects, including all six perfections, the *bodhipākṣika*, veneration and dedication, the *Akn* superimposes a distinctly cognitive-meditative orientation on its list. Virtually all of its members deal with mental penetration into seeing 'reality as it is' and neglect the more practical aspects by which this is brought about. These contemplative overtones led Vasubandhu to comment that, in the *Akn*, the ways of penetrating correct reflection exemplify both the *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayī* factors of *prajñā* (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 185.4.1–4). While this assessment is doubtlessly correct and fairly unproblematic for the *Akn*, in the *Bdp*—as I shall show—the case is somewhat more ambiguous.

586. I have given a list of these items in note 13 of my translation.

587. Hedinger (1984, p. 53) describes *bhāvanā* as a generic term, subsuming all other meditative practices. He cites as evidence a passage from the *Vism* (pp. 101 ff) that draws up forty areas of application of *bhāvanā* and an alternative division of *bhāvanā* into stages that was proposed by Bhāvaviveka (Frauwallner, 1956, pp. 230 ff). Whatever the benefit of these, somewhat artificial, schemes, it is probably fair to say that to date the best and most coherent exposition of *bhāvanā* is still Kamalaśīla's account in the *Bhāvanākrama* (*MBT*). On the different definitions of contemplation (*bhāvanā*) in Sarvāstivāda thought, see: *Kośa*, iv, pp. 248–50; vi, pp. 283–88; vii, pp. 15–25, 49–54, 64–66.

According to the *Bdp*, *bhāvanāmayīprajñā* manifests 'good conduct' (*pratipatti*). In content, however, it is purely cognitive and consists of transcendental, non-defiled (*anāsrava*) knowledge (*jñāna*).⁵⁸⁸ As the chief characteristic it bears a sound understanding of *dharma*.⁵⁸⁹

I have found in several sources evidence that underpins this analogy between *śruta*, *praveśa* and *pratipatti* on the one hand and *śrutamayī*-, *cintāmayī*- and *bhāvanāmayīprajñā* on the other hand. To begin with, there is the commentary on the *Akn* that speaks of passages in the *Akn* that are similar to those in the *Bdp* as corresponding to *śrutamayī*-, *cintāmayī*- and *bhāvanāmayīprajñā*.⁵⁹⁰ The *Akn-ṭīkā* identifies quite explicitly the *śruta* and *praveśa* sections of the *Akn* with the concepts of *śrutamayī*- and *cintāmayīprajñā*. There are however difficulties with regard to *bhāvanāmayīprajñā*. According to the commentary, 'wisdom arising from contemplation' is included in the *Akn*'s discussion of *praveśa*. In fact, the notion of *pratipatti* is altogether missing in the *Akn*. This raises the question as to whether *pratipatti* plays any part in the threefold scheme of wisdom or whether it is an independent 'wisdom practice'. In order to resolve this problem, we have to consider the following factors.

First, it is important to note that *pratipatti* is appended to the *Bdp*'s exposition of *praveśa*. We have seen that *pratipatti* follows after the practice of *śrutamayī*- and *cintāmayīprajñā* and seemingly eclipses both in attainment. The wording of the *Bdp* leaves no doubt that it builds on the realisations of *śruta* and *cintā* and brings them to their logical conclusion. This matches the characterisation of *bhāvanāmayīprajñā* in the *Samdhis* and is not incompatible with the explanation in the *Kośa* which assigns a temporary value to *śrutamayī*- and *cintāmayīprajñā*. The variant interpretation in the *Akn-ṭīkā* could be explained by the absence of *pratipatti* in the *Akn* which compelled Vasubhandhu to account for all three types of

588. *Satya-s* (S), ii, pp. 485–88; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 143–44

For the *Bbh*, the definition of wisdom is broader. That is to say, it distinguishes three central areas of attainments that add up to *prajñā*. These are 'skill' in penetrating reality (i.e., realising that it is empty, without characteristic, etc.), 'skill' in the five classical sciences (*vidhyā*) and in three types of accumulation (i.e., benefiting, non-benefiting and neither ... nor ...) and 'skill' in benefiting sentient beings. Although listed as such only once, all three elements recur many times as the chief components throughout its discussion of *prajñā* and are clearly central to its understanding of *prajñāpāramitā* (*Bbh*, pp. 212.10–213.1).

589. R, folio 599.6–7

This interpretation is wholly in line with the fruits that accrue to the practitioner in the *Bhāvanākrama*. Citing a passage from the *Samādhi*, it proposes that *pratipatti* is central to the recognition of the unbornness of *dharma* (*MBT*, i, pp. 198–99). The reasoning that lies at the heart of the bodhisattva's insight of the non-origination of *dharma* springing from *śruta* and *cintā* is then spelled out by *Kamalaśīla* on pages 199–202 (§ 10).

According to the *Msl*, *śrutamayī* and *cintāmayīprajñā* are realised well before the bodhisattva has embarked on the path proper. That is to say, he attains them prior to the *adhimuktīcaryābhūmi*. *Bhāvanāmayīprajñā*, in contrast, becomes manifest for the first time on the *adhimuktīcaryābhūmi*, but is still subject to refinement during the remaining stages (p. 75.12–15).

590. *Akn-ṭīkā*, p. 185.4.1–7 (translations of the relevant sections are given in my notes in chapter five).

wisdom through *śruta* and *cintā* alone. That this caused difficulties is attested by the atypically convoluted style of explanation in his annotations on the *śruta* and *praveśa* sections.

Second, there is a passage in the *Satyasiddhisāstra* where *bhāvanāmayīprajñā* is defined as ‘practice in conformity with the Dharma which is applied in one’s actions and in one’s life’ (*dharmānudharmapratipatti*).⁵⁹¹ A similar connection is also made in the *Bhāvanākrama* where *pratipatti*, echoing the interplay between means and wisdom, becomes the locus of the bodhisattva’s cognition.⁵⁹²

Third, the Dīghanikāya contains a passage that defines the factors of path-attainment (*sotāpattyaṅga*) as learning the good Dharma (*saddhammasavaṇa*), correct reflection (*yoniso manasakāra*) and *dharmānudhammapaṭipatti*.⁵⁹³ These are the very components that are cited in the *Bdp*. What is more, the attainments of the *sotāpanna* consist in freedom from the view of individuality (*sakkāyadiṭṭhi*), freedom from doubt (*vicikicchā*) and observance of the precept and vow (*sīlabbataparāmāsa*) (with the last two being merely examples of wrong view (*micchādiṭṭhi*))⁵⁹⁴ which are all linked with right view (*sammadiṭṭhi*) or wisdom (*paññā*).

Fourth, there is a section in the *Bhāvanākrama* that says that the cultivation of the three types of wisdom follows immediately after the practice of the five preliminary perfections.⁵⁹⁵ This is exactly the case in the *Bdp*. Although *Kamalaśīla* does not cite his sources—and he may have been inspired by any text—the parallels to the scheme of the *Bdp* are obvious.⁵⁹⁶

Having completed its discussion of the three types of wisdom, the *Bdp* proceeds to describe the fruits that spring from the practice of learning, reflection and contemplation. Summed up

591. *Satya (S)*, ii, p. 486 (cf. Geiger, *Pāli Dhamma*, Munich, 1921, pp. 115–6)

Note also in this connection the integration of *śruta* and *pratipatti*. On this, the *Vkn* says, in one place, that “*bodhi* is the seat of learning (*śruta*) because it consolidates religious practice (*pratipatti*)” while it affirms elsewhere that “skill in learning results from practice” (pp. 97, 109 respectively). On the role and interaction of learning and religious practice, see: Rahula, *History of Buddhism in Ceylon*, Colombo, 1956, pp. 158–9 and *Manorathapūraṇi* (i, p. 93) which sums up the reasons for the preference that was given historically to learning in Theravāda communities.

592. *MBT*, ii, pp. 222.4–223.5.

593. D III, p. 227 (the fourth factor, “association with good persons” (*sappurisasamvesa*), is cited at a later place in the *Bdp*).

594. For references to the *saṃyojana*, see: M I, p. 9; S V, p. 12; for the explanation that doubt and lack of vow observance are nothing but manifestations of wrong view, see: *Dhs*, pp. 75–80, 182–3 (ref. Gethin).

595. *MBT*, ii, p. 198.4–8

According to *DPP*, p. 20, the generation of the three types of wisdom is an essential feature of the *saṃbhāramārga*. As I shall demonstrate, this is exactly the path-phase we are concerned with at present.

596. Of interest in this context is also the picture that is given to the conditions of wisdom in the *Bbh*. Apart from the customary factors of learning and reflection, it speaks of a power of careful consideration (*pratisaṃkhyābala*) and a power of contemplation (*bhāvanābala*). The former is said to determine the bodhisattva’s conduct in the world—promoting virtue and preventing mistakes—while the latter establishes him in infinite wisdom of the stage of uniformity (*samāhitabhūmika*), being the eighth stage (*Bbh*, p. 213.8–14).

as 'correct vision' (*yoniso dṛṣṭi*), these revolve around *dharma* cognition. Although not explicitly stated, the context indicates that this particular type of vision is founded on mindfulness concerning *dharma* (*dharmasmṛtyupasthāna*). For, *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna*—whose practice subsumes the other three *smṛtyupasthāna* and corresponds to insight (*vipaśyanā*)⁵⁹⁷—is decisive to the perception of *dharma*.⁵⁹⁸ Specifically counteracting the misconception of the self (*ātmaviparyāsa*) (but in Mahāyāna treatises generally extended to include the empty and uniform nature of *dharma*⁵⁹⁹) *dharmasmṛtyupasthāna* is intimately bound up with *prajñā*, itself defined as Dharma-discernment (*dharmapravicaya*).⁶⁰⁰

At this early stage of the path insight arising from mindfulness of *dharma* is still hampered by the presence of natural defilements (*rāga, moha, dveṣa*) and certain weak types of misconception (*viparyāsa*). Of inferior quality when practised on the *saṃbhāramārga*⁶⁰¹, the resulting Dharma-discernment is therefore imperfect and extends only to the particular and general characteristics (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*) of things.⁶⁰² However incomplete, it enables the bodhisattva of the *Bdp* to distinguish between virtuous and non-virtuous *dharma*.⁶⁰³ This faculty of differentiation is of crucial importance to the completion of the *saṃbhāramārga*. First, on the level of day to day conduct, it allows the bodhisattva to re-focus his efforts in accordance with his purified intention. For this re-evaluation to take place the bodhisattva engages in deep meditation in order to attain the light of wisdom (*prajñāloka*)—an indispensable factor for experiencing reality directly.⁶⁰⁴ Second, in the long-term, recognition of virtue is necessarily a precondition for the planting of the roots of virtue that lead to deliverance (*mokṣabhāgiya kuśalamūla*). As their accumulation lies at the very heart of the training on the *saṃbhāramārga*, adherence to *kuśaladharmā* and abandoning of *akuśaladharmā* assumes immense importance.⁶⁰⁵

597. *Satya-s* (S), p. 448; Gethin, 1987, p. 634.

598. *Kośa*, vi, p. 159; *Abhidh-d*, p. 360.5–11; *Nett*, pp. 83–84.

599. *Rcd*, p. 238.3.7–4.5; *Mpps*, ii, pp. 1193–4 (cf. pp. 1167–1169).

600. *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 8; *Mpps*, ii, p. 1046; *Kośa* iv, p. 283.

601. *HIB*, p. 612; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 158–159.

602. *Kośa*, vi, pp. 159–162.

603. R, folio 601.4.

604. *MBT*, ii, p. 204.13–15.

605. R, folio 601.4–5

The *Bdp* does not give any detail on how the *mokṣabhāgiya* are planted during the *saṃbhāramārga*. According to Lamotte, the bodhisattva overcomes desire within himself by practising the moral precepts that secure him a place in the lineage of the noble ones (*āryavaṃśa*). That is to say, he learns to be content with few clothes (*cīvara*), almsfood (*piṇḍapāta*) and humble seating (*śayanāsana*), he delights in *nirvāṇa* and the path that leads to it. Then, meditating on the repulsive aspects of life (*aśubhabhāvanā*), the bodhisattva engages in breathing exercises (*ānāpānasmṛti*) that allow him to focus on the eradication of desire and distraction and thereby prepare him to enter into the *smṛtyupasthāna* (*HIB*, p. 613). For

When the bodhisattva has thus identified *dharma* according to their general features and accumulated roots of virtue, he embarks on the *prayogamārga* and enters into meditation in order to penetrate true reality.⁶⁰⁶ In the scheme of the *Bdp*, he undertakes initially to free himself from those obstructions (*āvaraṇa*) that threaten to impede his practice.⁶⁰⁷ Following the ancient path model, he achieves this goal through the four perfect efforts (*samyakprahāṇa*). The practice of the perfect efforts takes place immediately after the *smṛtyupasthāna*⁶⁰⁸ and signals the bodhisattva's entrance into the path of application at the *mūrdhan* level of the *nirvedhabhāgiya*.⁶⁰⁹ The function of the *samyakprahāṇa* is twofold; to cultivate skilful *dharma* and to abandon gross obstacles that impede the unfolding of perfect wisdom. Since the *Bdp* does not specify which obstructions are overcome through the *samyakprahāṇa* at this stage, it is difficult to ascertain on textual grounds alone whether it refers exclusively to the *kleśāvaraṇa* or also includes the *jñeyāvaraṇa*. But according to general opinion it is only the obstructions of the defilements that are addressed here.⁶¹⁰ Their elimination prepares for the transition from the worldly (*laukika*) to the transcendental path (*lokottaramārga*), which is heralded by the attainment of right view (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*)⁶¹¹ and cleanses the entry into the light of the doctrine (*dharmālokaṃukha*).⁶¹²

The acquisition of right view is dependent on two causes. First, the bodhisattva must learn

canonical references, see: D III, p. 224; A II, p. 27; otherwise: *Kośa* vi, pp. 146–153.

606. At this stage, we find in most texts references to the four *nirvedhabhāgiya*, that is *uṣmagata*-, *mūrdhan*-, *kṣānti*- and *laukikāgradharma* (e.g., *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 105–6; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 169–72). As the *nirvedhabhāgiya* are said to spring from *bhāvanā*—a practice that is not explicitly mentioned in the *Bdp* alongside *śrutamayī*- and *cintāmayīprajñā*—it is perhaps not surprising that they are not given in this context.

607. R, folio 602.5–7.

608. Some of the most important schemes have been conveniently tabulated by Gethin (1987, pp. 637–639). Note that to the Theravāda tradition, the generation of the *sammappadhāna* forms part of the transcendental path (*Vism*, xxii, p. 35) while in path schemes of the Sarvāstivāda it belongs to the *laukika* realm (*Kośa*, vi, p. 287).

609. *Abhidh-d*, p. 362.14–15; *Kośa*, vi, p. 287.

610. Virtually all texts agree that both types of *āvaraṇa* are not eliminated before the practitioner embarks on the transcendental path. For *sūtras*, see: *Rcd*, p. 239.4.3–5.8; for *śāstras*, see: *Mvś* (N), pp. 53.13–55.5; *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 118–24; *Śrāv-bh* (Sh), pp. 236–7; *MBT*, ii, pp. 214.23–7, 217.9–15.

611. A comparison with the Sarvāstivāda path model reveals that these accomplishments, revolving around on the notion of right vision (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*), correspond to the insights that are associated with the *darśanamārga*. However, rejecting the axioms that lie at the heart of Sarvāstivāda psychology, the *Bdp* does not associate right seeing with the gradual comprehension (*anupūrvābhisamaya*) of the sixteen thought-moments that pertain to vision of the four noble truths (*Kośa*, vi, pp. 184–193).

The structure of the path model and the prefix *ārya* (presumably identifying it as the first fruit of the path that, according to the *Kośa* (vi, p. vi) takes place during the first moment of the *bhāvanāmārga* indicating stream-entry) leave little doubt that we are dealing here with the *lokottara* aspect of *samyagdr̥ṣṭi*. Reserved to either the *darśanamārga* or *bhāvanāmārga* (depending which sources one chooses to follow, the eightfold path can manifest itself on either of them) its presence here is a further indication that we have reached the *lokottara* level of the path.

612. R, folio 604.1–3.

to listen to other people's statements.⁶¹³ Recognising the danger of pride to those who are isolated from the Dharma the *Bdp* regards congenial listening to the words of others as a factor stimulating liberation by itself.⁶¹⁴ Second, the bodhisattva has to reflect correctly on the contents of what he has heard. Since failure to do so inevitably leads to misconduct on the path, the *Bdp* places correct reflection and listening to other people's statements on the *prayogamārga*.⁶¹⁵ As a methodological prerequisite, *śruta* and *cintā* are not restricted to the path of equipment, but also figure also on the path of application.

Having dealt with methodology, the *Bdp* defines the actual contents of *prayogamārga*. Perhaps in numerical analogy to the *nirvedhabhāgīya*, it gives as its principal components correct practice (*yoniso prayoga*), correct vision (*yoniso dṛṣṭi*), correct penetration (*yoniso praveśa*) and correct speech (*yoniso vāc*).⁶¹⁶ Of these four, correct practice and penetration serve as causes to the attainment of *samyagdṛṣṭi*, while correct vision and speech represent its conditions.

613. This concept is not new to the Mahāyāna but occurs already in the nikāya as the two conditions bringing about right view (M I, p. 294; A I, p. 87). Both factors are fundamental to a correct perception of the Dharma and in conjunction with wisdom arising from learning, reflection and contemplation stand at the very core of a monk's cognitive progress. This point is fully scrutinised in the *Nett* (p. 8, trsl. Gethin):

"The teacher or a fellow practitioner in the position of a teacher teaches someone *Dhamma*. Having heard this *Dhamma* he gains confidence. Therein, whatever is investigation, energy, consideration, examination, this is wisdom produced by hearing. Whatever is investigation, consideration, examination, contemplation in dependence on what is thus heard, this is wisdom produced by reflection. The knowledge that arises at the stage of seeing or the stage of development for one engaged in bringing to mind by means of these two kinds of wisdom is wisdom produced by development. From the utterance of another there is wisdom produced by hearing; from appropriate bringing to mind undertaken individually there is wisdom produced by reflection; the knowledge that arises both as a result of the utterance of another and as a result of appropriate bringing to mind undertaken individually is wisdom produced by development."

In the Mahāyāna, the role of these two factors became integrated into the respective visions of the path. For Yogācāra followers, statements of others (*parataś ca ghoṣaḥ*) and correct inner reflection (*adhyātman ca yoniśaḥ manasakāraḥ*)—being also the cause to right view—perfume (*bhāvayanti*) either knowledge springing from learning (*śrotavijñāna*), mental perception (*manovijñāna*) or both. In due course, at the arising of correct reflection, both types of knowledge vanish and are replaced by *lokottara* thinking pertaining to right view and leading to transcendental purification (*Msg*, p. 65).

A rather different interpretation of the term *parato ghoso* was introduced by Peter Masefield. According to Masefield (1986, p. 50), *parato ghoso* does not refer so much to the worldly realm of instructions from teachers, but is an expression indicating a channel of communication between the beyond and religious experience. Translating it as 'sound from the beyond', Masefield suggests that this type of transcendental sound is channelled to the śrāvaka only by the Buddha (and his closest followers), implying that right view or religious truth is wholly dependent on the disclosure of this sound for unfolding. This interpretation of the term *parato ghoso* has been disputed, not least because it fails to take account of several other contexts where it quite clearly does not carry this metaphysical connotation. For a discussion, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 424–25.

614. R, folio 604.7.

615. By placing the focus on *śravaṇa* and *yoniso manasakāra* as factors promoting right view, the *Bdp* underlines once again its conceptual proximity to a proposition in the *Mpps* (ii, p. 1110) according to which it is these two elements that have greatest bearing on the generation of wisdom.

616. R, folio 606.5, 606.6, 608.7, 610.1 respectively.

In the true spirit of Mahāyāna ontology, the *Bdp* states that correct practice is based on recognition of the sameness of all *dharma*. Thus, if fully accomplished, correct practice does not manifest any verbal or physical activity but unfolds in non-practice.⁶¹⁷ Conceived as practice free from obstruction, doubt or predication, it steadies the roots of virtue accumulated on the *sambhāramārga* and brings their development to a high-point—an event close to the *mūrdhan* phase of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*.⁶¹⁸ Next, as if to mirror the arrangement at the beginning of the chapter where *yoniso darśana* followed on *śruta*, *yoniso manasakāra* and *pratipatti*, the *Bdp* specifies the concept of ‘vision of all *dharma*’.⁶¹⁹ Above all, this constitutes insight into *dharma*-sameness.⁶²⁰ Then, taking up the notion *sarvadharmasamatā*, the *Bdp* develops a vision of reality that—sustained by the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*—precludes *dharma*-predication of any kind and effects withdrawal from path-activity.⁶²¹ Once again, it is possible to see parallels to the *nirvedhabhāgīya* scheme. For a bodhisattva who enters into its first phase, called *uṣmagata*, reality loses much of its ‘true objectivity’ as he begins to grasp (albeit only incompletely at his early stage) the empty and non-existent character (*svabhāva*) of external worldly phenomena.⁶²²

While the notions of correct practice and correct seeing are well expounded, their mutual relationship is unclear. Echoing conventional perception that practice (*prayoga*) precedes seeing (*darśana*), correct seeing is said to be based on correct practice.⁶²³ However, since correct practice becoming non-practice presupposes recognition of *dharma*-sameness—the very foundation of correct seeing—one cannot help but to conclude that practice and seeing are supportive of each other.

As if to accentuate this reciprocity, in correct penetration and speech the order of their relationship is reversed. That is to say, by proposing that penetration constitutes the basis of correct speech, the cognitive element is placed ahead of the practical aspect and becomes

617. R, folio 605.7.

618. *DPP*, p. 35.

619. R, folio 601.3.

620. R, folio 612.4–6.

621. R, folio 607.3–608.2

This section, being repeated almost verbatim at a later stage, is of considerable importance for the understanding of the argument, since it indicates that correct practice/correct vision and correct penetration/correct speech have equal influence on the bodhisattva’s cognition. That is to say, both enable him to see *dharma* in accordance with reality, to attain non-seeing, and finally to enter into the certainty of truth.

622. *Siddhi*, pp. 578–9.

623. See, for instance: R, folio 606.5, 612.5.

essential to its occurrence.⁶²⁴

Correct penetration consists of two important components.⁶²⁵ First, there is the cognitive element that allows the bodhisattva to penetrate phenomenal existence. This springs from perfect mental quietude (*śamatha*), insight (*vipaśyanā*) and discrimination (*vikalpa*)⁶²⁶, and unfolds before the bodhisattva's eyes a world that is impermanent, dependently originating, empty, signless and wishless. Yet, by virtue of his commitment to universal welfare—the second element of penetration—this newly won understanding, although alone sufficient to guarantee entry into *nirvāṇa*, does not tempt him to abandon *saṃsāra*.⁶²⁷ On the contrary, he assumes rebirth in the *kāmadhātu*, cherishes the Doctrine, develops compassion and cultivates skilful means.⁶²⁸ Accommodating in equal measure cognition and compassion, correct penetration is thus perfectly balanced.

If this binary disposition is juxtaposed to the *nirvedhabhāgiya*, parallels to the *kṣānti* phase immediately spring to mind. At this stage, having shed all misconception concerning the self (as subject) and *dharma* (as object) of perception, the bodhisattva is no longer subject to low rebirths; yet he continues his endeavour for deeper understanding and greater welfare in the world. This postponement, that involves trusting accepting the validity of the noble truths without further scrutiny, constitutes an important crossroad, since it determines the practitioner's allocation to the *gotra* of the *śrāvaka*, *pratyekabuddhas* or *buddhas*.⁶²⁹

The fourth constituent, correct speech, is acquired through the interplay of the factors that prepare right vision (*samyagdṛṣṭi*). Presumably it is selected for its dual function; reflecting personal maturity and representing the principal means of conversion, correct speech is described as congenial, well-founded and in perfect harmony with true reality. By characterising

624. R, folio 608.6–7.

625. Compare these with the four components of the *nirvedhabhāgiya* (*Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 105; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 169–178).

626. R, folio 608.7–609.1

Śamatha and *vipaśyanā* are of key importance to the psychological processes that mark *prayoga* cognition—and indeed beyond. While *śamatha* has already occurred on the *sambhāramārga*, its impact is still felt on the path of application as its fruit becomes manifest on the *prayogamārga*. *Vipaśyanā* in contrast, representing the bodhisattva's cognitive faculties, although directed at the very same vision of reality does not arise prior to the path of application (*DPP*, p. 34). Most sources agree, however, that beyond the early path phases, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* operate as a syzygy. Constituting the perfect path if practised jointly, they are best understood as one-pointedness of mind (*cittakāgratā*) observing the nine stations of mind (*cittasthiti*) and exact analytical investigation of reality (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*), (*MBT*, iii, p. 3; *Śrāv-bh*, pp. 363–5). For their manifestations on the *lokottara* consciousness, see; *Msg*, pp. 167, 171. Their role on the *laukikamārga* during the four basic *dhyāna* is explained in: *MBT*, iii, pp. 15–17.

627. R, folio 609.1–4.

628. R, folio 609.7–610.1.

629. *Kośa*, vi, p. 175.

correct speech as speech of reality and truth, the *Bdp* inspires once again a comparison with the *nirvedhabhāgiya* model where the last phase, called *laukikāgradharma*, is marked by the direct perception of the characteristics of the noble truths.⁶³⁰ As in the *Bdp*, this attainment is based on the four *pratisaraṇa*. It issues from unobstructed meditation (*ānantaryasamādhi*) but still within the *laukika* domain and prevails independently of sense perception.⁶³¹ Confirming the *laukika* status, the *Bdp* says that at this stage, even if the bodhisattva is accomplished in penetration and speech, his vision lacks clear insight (*vidarśana*) and he is still subject to discursive thinking (*vikalpa*) like ordinary beings.⁶³²

To rid himself of the residues of mistaken mental apperception, the bodhisattva embarks on the *darśanamārga*. Heralding entry in the *lokottara* phase of the path⁶³³, it consists of a series of thought moments no longer concerned with the general characteristics of *dharma*, but with the four noble truths.

In the *Bdp*, entry into this path-phase is announced by stating that persons who accomplish either correct practice and correct vision or correct penetration and correct speech are assured of the prospect of vision of *dharma*. As already implied, this type of vision is transcendental by nature and echoes the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*.⁶³⁴

“What is looking at all *dharma* in accordance with reality? It is non-seeing.

Non-seeing is an expression for unborn. Unborn is an expression for unarisen.

What is unarisen? It is an expression for invisibility.”

For the *Bdp*, correct vision is not specifically linked with the abandoning (*prahāṇa*) of defilements or with patience (*kṣānti*) and knowledge (*jñāna*) concerning the noble truths⁶³⁵, but it accrues from right vision (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*) for those who penetrate the sameness of practices and attainment. Yet, the fundamental psychological experience that marks the progress through the thought-moments of the *darśanamārga* follows the *Abhidharma* accounts rather

630. *Siddhi*, pp. 575, 581; *DPP*, p. 36.

631. *Siddhi*, pp. 578, 581–3.

632. R, folio 611.4, 608.7–609.1

The presence of *vikalpa* would suggest that the bodhisattva has not yet reached the *darśanamārga*, but dwells still on the *prayogamārga*.

633. *Kośa*, vi, p. 290; *Abhidh-d*, p. 362; *Amṛtar (B)*, p. 74; *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 107. For a discussion of the various types of *darśanamārga*, that is the *tattvadarśanamārga*—a path that is characterised by non-discursive knowledge (*nirvikalpakajñāna*)—and the two categories of the *lakṣaṇamārga*, that is *avyavasthitasatyadarśanamārga* or the *vyavasthitasatyadarśanamārga*, see: *Siddhi*, pp. 588–600.

634. R, folio 607.5–7.

635. *Kośa*, vi, p. 183.

closely. The *Bdp* describes a vision of reality where the practitioner sheds all misconceptions (*viparyāsa*), especially the view of individuality (*satkāyadrṣṭi*)⁶³⁶, and acquires a direct comprehension (*abhisamaya*) of conditioned reality.⁶³⁷ His wisdom becomes unobstructed (*anāsrava*) and he identifies the general characteristics of *dharma*. He realises that the nature of *dharma* is impure and yet congruent with *nirvāṇa*, that *dharma* are (like persons) without self and utterly indistinguishable.⁶³⁸ In spite of the removal of all tendencies to passion (*anuśaya*) and understanding conditioned existence, he is still subject to the laws of *saṃsāra* since the path of vision—merely eliminating those defilements abandoned by seeing—leaves countless innate defilements (*sahajakleśa*) untouched.

In order to eliminate these, the bodhisattva embarks on the next path-phase—the path of contemplation (*bhāvanāmārga*).⁶³⁹ The moment of entry into the *bhāvanāmārga* marks a critical threshold in the bodhisattva's career-stages. For, immediately on entry the bodhisattva penetrates the certainty of truth (*samyaktvaniyāmāvakrānti*)—the first fruit of religious life (*śrāmaṇyaphala*)—that guarantees irreversible progression to liberation.⁶⁴⁰ As this attainment, drawing on cognition acquired during the first fifteen thought-moments of *darśanamārga*, marks admission into the fold of noble persons (*āryapudgala*),⁶⁴¹ it is the clearest indication yet that the *Bdp*'s bodhisattva has advanced to the transcendental domain.⁶⁴² The exact entry-level, however, is left undetermined, since (at least among the *śrāvaka*) penetration into the certainty of truth may lead to a variety of spiritual conditions, depending on the degree of

636. R, folio 613.3, folio 613.7–614.1.

637. The various types of direct comprehension (*abhisamaya*) that occur on the *darśanamārga* are discussed in the *Siddhi* (pp. 601–605).

638. R, folio 612.2–6.

639. *Kośa*, vi, p. 257.

640. This is the view of the Sarvāstivāda and Theravāda school (Bareau, 1955, pp. 140, 212). Mahāsaṅghika and Mahīśāsaka sources refute the notion of the irreversibility of the *śrotaāpanna* (Bareau, 1955, pp. 66, 185).

641. *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 152; *Kośa*, vi, p. 182.

642. R, folio 607.3, folio 608.1–3

Besides the *lokottara bhāvanāmārga*, which is the standard level of cultivation (tracing the career of the *śrotaāpanna*, *sakṛdāgāmin* and *anāgāmin*), the texts speak also of a *laukika bhāvanāmārga*. This path is impure and inferior to its *lokottara* counterpart as it does not progress through 'reflection on the nature of things' (*tattvamanasakāra*) and the person on it fails to grasp the general characteristics of *dharma*. But it has still considerable preparatory value as the Buddha has demonstrated. Being an ordinary person when he approached the Bodhi-tree, the Buddha had previously eradicated all innate passions of the world by *laukika* meditation. All that was left to him therefore was to comprehend the four noble truths in their sixteen aspects and to destroy a set of nine innate passions linked with the *naivasamjñāyatana* and *bhavāgra* that he could not eradicate on the *laukika bhāvanāmārga* level (for explanation of this restriction, see: *Kośa*, vi, p. 233). Applying to each of them the *prahāṇamārga* and *vimuktimārga* thought, he then reached *bodhi* in thirty-four thought-moments (*Kośa*, ii, p. 206; vi, p. 177). The problem with the attainment of the fruits of the *laukika bhāvanāmārga* is that its disconnection from the *kleśa* is only temporary (*Kośa*, vi, p. 233) and leads, unless carried further, only to rebirth among the Brahmā gods. (For further detail, see: *HIB*, pp. 617–8; *Kośa*, vi, pp. ix–xi; *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 110–113).

residual attachment.⁶⁴³ For the *Bdp* the proposition of non-regression would seem to indicate that its location on the path is rather more advanced, since true irreversibility does not occur before the eighth stage.⁶⁴⁴

Having introduced the *bhāvanāmārga*, the *Bdp* spells out the attainments that accrue through repeated meditation (*punaḥ punarāmukhikaraṇa*). The *bhāvanāmārga* of the bodhisattva, agreeing in content with the śrāvaka model, is characterised primarily by the destruction of hitherto intact defilements. Based on wisdom and affecting innate defilements in the *kāma*-, *rūpa*- and *arūpyadhātu*, the bodhisattva is no longer linked with any conditioned *dharma*, but permanently emancipated from the fetters of worldly phenomena.⁶⁴⁵ He has dispelled practically all obstacles constituted by defilement (*kleśāvaraṇa*) including adventitious bonds⁶⁴⁶ and rises above conditioned activity to pursue his career beyond the parameter of good and evil.⁶⁴⁷

“He is emancipated from the eight worldly conditions. He is emancipated from the twenty secondary defilements including self-conceit, grave conceit and perverted conceit. ... He is emancipated from all lowly and wicked *dharma*. He is emancipated from the activity of all evil, including contentious and defiled activity, activity of the aggregates, activity of the lord of death and activity of the Evil One ... He is emancipated from avarice and generosity, morality and immorality, patience and malice, vigour and indolence, meditation and disquietude, wisdom and folly, furtherance and impediments of the perfections, knowledge and nescience.”

Prepared now by the destruction of the defilements through direct comprehension, he gradually eliminates the obstacles to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).⁶⁴⁸ Having cast aside all heterodox views based on the belief of the self, he relinquishes discursive thinking and rejects the dichotomies of classification.⁶⁴⁹

643. The actual entry level is determined by the degree to which he has eliminated the concomitants of desire. For details, see: *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 152.

644. *Daśa-bh*, p. 71.12; *Bbh*, p. 290.21 (cf. p. 235.18); *Msl*, p. 176.22; *Mvu*, i, pp. 1.3, 63.13–14.

645. *R*, folio 613.4.

646. *R*, folio 613.5, 614.2.

647. *R*, folio 614.3–6.

648. *Siddhi*, pp. 610–11.

649. *R*, folio 614.3–7.

“He is emancipated from all multiplicity, including multiplicity of buddha-fields, buddhas, sentient beings and *dharma*. He is emancipated from conditioned reflection of all sentient beings, including nescience, knowledge, discursive insight, conventional and absolute truth. He is emancipated from the bases of all reflection, thought and consciousness; including perseverance [in] formlessness, signlessness, causelessness and unconditioned wisdom.”

While not very different in meaning and content from the *bhāvanāmārga* of the śrāvaka, there is divergence on the factors that prompt its attainment. For the śrāvaka, the *bhāvanāmārga* represents the abandonment of defilements through the vision of the noble truths.⁶⁵⁰ As we have seen, in the *Bdp* the bodhisattva’s rejection of conditioned existence is not so much due to the systematic analysis of the noble truths, as by recognition of the sameness of *dharma* through Perfect Wisdom.⁶⁵¹

Perfect Wisdom and Skill

With the end of the *bhāvanāmārga* section we have come to an important break in the *Bdp*’s exposition of *prajñāpāramitā*. So far, much of chapter eleven followed the ancient model of the śrāvaka career. In the remainder of the chapter (which constitutes approximately seventy-five percent of its overall length) the scheme of progress is not immediately evident. That is to say, although not without a sense of order—all but three out of eighteen subsections show clear traits of systematic arrangement—no principle emerges that would establish an *overall* connection between the various practices. For this we shall have to turn to other treatises on the bodhisattva.

The content of this section is defined by eighteen types of ‘skill’. Through the practice of ‘skill’ the bodhisattva attains an increasingly refined understanding of reality that culminates eventually in the acquisition of wisdom. The various types of ‘skill’ indicate the practices that play a role in this process. They include, for example, the *pratisaraṇa*, *pratisamvid*, *bodhipāṅśika dharma*, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* and *punya-* and *jñānasambhāra*. The overriding

650. *DPP*, pp. 24–6; *Abhidh-sam (R)*, pp. 110–17.

651. Cf. *DPP*, pp. 41–2.

purpose of these practices, and therefore also the purpose of 'skill', is to investigate the nature of reality. This investigation manifests different points of emphasis and proceeds from various angles, depending on the nature of the individual practices. 'Skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana* and *satya*, for instance, aims to destroy the belief in a self (*ātmaḍṣṭi*), whereas 'skill' in *vipaśyanā* is designed to reveal to the bodhisattva the non-existence of *dharma* (*dharmanairātmya*).

In spite of this topical fragmentation, all eighteen 'skills' share the same objective, namely, the attainment of wisdom. In the *Bdp*, wisdom is defined as 'skill' in all *dharma*. The method by which such 'skill' is acquired is called 'discerning wisdom' (*prajñāpravicaya*) and comprises all the practices that are included in the various types of 'skill'.⁶⁵² In essence, 'skill' represents therefore the means of investigation through which the bodhisattva accomplishes Perfect Wisdom.⁶⁵³

The practice of 'skill' (*kauśalya*) is not particular to the *Bdp* but is found in numerous treatises on the path. It occurs in the *Akn*, *Dbh*, *Lkdh*, *Prñ*, *Rtm*, *Samdhis*, *Bbh*, *Śrotabhūmi*, *Śbh*, *Prbh*, *Mvś* and *Vism*.⁶⁵⁴ Although there is some overlapping in contents between the

652. R, folio 615.5–7

Already in the nikāya, we note a close connection between discernment (usually Dharma-discernment) and wisdom (M III, p. 85; S V, p. 111). Taken up by the *abhidhamma* literature (*Dhs*, p. 11), it developed into one of the chief characteristics of wisdom to appear besides the traditional factors of 'knowledge of the destruction of the impurities' (*āśravakṣayañāna*) and 'knowledge of their non-arising' (*anutpādayñāna*); e.g., *Kośa*, vi, p. 240; *Siddhi*, p. 313; *MBT*, iii, pp. 14–15. See also, *Mpps*, ii, pp. 1101–1104.

653. Note that this interpretation is at odds with the explanation of 'skill' in the *Akn-ṭikā* (pp. 194.5.5–195.1.2). Here, we read that 'skill' is not so much a tool of investigation as a designator of the objects (*ālambana*) or things (*vastu*) to be understood by wisdom.

654. The *Bbh* (pp. 308.9–309.6) distinguishes ten kinds of 'skill'. These are (1) 'skill' in means in order to remove hostility in angry beings, (2) 'skill' causing ordinary beings to enter (the path), (3) 'skill' causing beings who have entered (the path) to ripen, (4) 'skill' in delivering sentient beings who have been ripened, (5) 'skill' in worldly *śāstras*, (6) 'skill' in discerning the arising of mistaken observance in moral conduct of commitments, (7) 'skill' in the unsurpassed resolve, (8) 'skill' in the Śrāvakayāna, (9) 'skill' in the Pratyekabuddhayāna, (10) 'skill' in the Mahāyāna. Altogether, these produce the five cardinal actions of a bodhisattva. By the first four types of 'skill', the bodhisattva achieves his own benefit and that of his fellow beings. The fifth 'skill' renders him invincible. The sixth 'skill' establishes him in the vow-observance. By the seventh type of 'skill' he accomplishes all future objectives and by the eighth, ninth and tenth types of 'skill', the bodhisattva teaches the Dharma in accordance with the faculties, lineages and resolutions of the people whom he tries to convert. These objectives are clearly quite different from those postulated in the *Mvś* or *Bdp* and do not appear to be connected to their types of 'skill'.

Compare these lists with the rather different enumeration that is found in the *Ratnameghasūtra* (35, p. 182.5.1–3), distinguishing the following ten kinds of 'skill' of bodhisattvas: (1) 'skill' in the non-existence of a self (*anātman*), (2) 'skill' in the ripening of deeds (*karmavipāka*), (3) 'skill' in the conditioned (*samskṛta*), (4) 'skill' in the flow of existence (*samsārasantana*), (5) 'skill' in the transitoriness of existence (*samsāranivṛtta*), (6) 'skill' in the Śrāvakayāna, (7) 'skill' in the Pratyekabuddhayāna, (8) 'skill' in the Mahāyāna, (9) 'skill' in refraining from evil deeds (*māra-karmatyāga*), (10) 'skill' in non-regressing wisdom (*anirvṛttaprajñā*). An alternative sixfold list is given in the *Samdhis* (pp. 116.15–119.4), distinguishing (1) 'skill' in the production of the thought, (2) 'skill' in the duration of thought, (3) 'skill' in the destruction of thought, (4) 'skill' in the increase of thought, (5) 'skill' in the decrease of thought, (6) 'skill' in means.

The *Vism* (pp. 128–136) lists ten kinds of 'skill' in absorption (*appanākosalla*). These include (1) 'skill' in

various expositions of 'skill', I have not discovered two lists that match exactly. In most texts, the purpose of the enumerations of 'skill' is mainly organisational, that is, to break up the (bodhisattva) practice into smaller units in order to make the discussion more manageable. The topics that are included in the discussions of 'skill' vary greatly, ranging from very general themes (such as 'skill' in the three vehicles) over specific bodhisattva practices (such as 'skill' in liberating sentient beings) to practices of cognition (such as 'skill' in the non-existence of a self). In spite of this diversity there are some types of 'skill' that appear in most lists. Above all, these are 'skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *satya* and *pratītyasamutpāda*. These five 'skills' figure in the *Bdp*, *Akn*, *Prñ* and in all commentarial discussions of 'skill'. Generally, they occur in the order in which I have cited them and stand at the beginning of the exposition of 'skill'. The factor that ties these five types of 'skill' together is that all of them deal with cognition and introduce the practitioner to the futility of the belief in a self. They are included in sections that discuss the nature of reality or form a part of the expositions of wisdom (*prajñā*) and knowledge (*jñāna*).

This applies also to the *Bdp*. In addition to the 'skills' of *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *satya* and *pratītyasamutpāda* the *Bdp* includes in its exposition of *prajñā* 'skill' in *pratisaṃvid*, *pratisaraṇa*, *pūnyasaṃbhāra* and *jñānasaṃbhāra*, *smṛtyupasthāna*, *bodhyaṅga*, *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya*, *bala*, *ekayānamārga* and *dharma*. 'Skill' in each of these practices contributes to the attainment of wisdom. While the content of the practices follows mostly well-established traditions of thought, the exact use to which they are put in the *Bdp* is less obvious. As the text itself contains practically no clues that would explain their role in the training of wisdom I have turned for explication to exegetical writings.

The most instructive account of the practice of 'skill' is found in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*. In chapter three, entitled 'Tattvapariṣcchā', the *Madhyāntavibhāga* discusses 'skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, *sthānāsthāna*, *indriya*, *adhvan*, *satya*, *yāna* and *saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta dharma*.⁶⁵⁵ According to the commentary, all ten types of 'skill' contribute

cleansing the basis, (2) 'skill' in maintaining balanced faculties, (3) 'skill' in the sign, (4) 'skill' in timely exertion, (5) 'skill' in timely restraint, (6) 'skill' in timely encouragement, (7) 'skill' in timely equipoise, (8) 'skill' in avoiding poorly concentrated persons, (9) 'skill' in cultivating concentrated persons, (10) 'skill' in resoluteness upon concentration. These form part of the general description of the development of *samādhi*, as they serve to describe the general mental and physical attitudes conducive to concentration and do not appear not to be related to the ten 'skills' cited in the *Bdp*, *Rtm*, *Mvś* or *Bbh*.

655. *Mvś* (N), pp. 44–49.

Note that with the eight types of 'skill' of the *Akn* the *Mvś* shares all but two kinds, viz., 'skill' in the inevitable/impossible and 'skill' in faculties. These are exactly the two items by which the list in the *Mvś*

to the destruction of the belief in a self (*ātmadṛṣṭi*) and have important bearing on the understanding of reality.⁶⁵⁶ Each of the ‘skills’ addresses one particular aspect of the belief in a self. The *Mvś* reduces the belief in a self to ten component parts. In an order corresponding to the ten ‘skills’ these are: (1) the illusion of oneness (*ekatvagrāha*); (2) the illusion of causality (*hetutvagrāha*); (3) the illusion of the experiencer (*bhokṛtvagrāha*); (4) the illusion of the agent (*karṣṭvagrāha*); (5) the illusion of independent action (*svatantragrāha*); (6) the illusion of dominion (*adhipatitvagrāha*); (7) the illusion of permanence (*nityatvagrāha*); (8) the illusion of the support of defilement and purity (*saṃkliṣṭavyavadānatvagrāha*); (9) the illusion of the meditator (*yogitvagrāha*); (10) the illusion of an entity that is either released or bound (*amuktamuktatvagrāha*).⁶⁵⁷ Of these ten illusions, number 1, 2, 3, 4, 8 and 10 are relevant to our study of the *Bdp* since they are destroyed through forms of ‘skill’ that are also found in the *Bdp*. They are ‘skill’ in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *pratītyasamutpāda*, *satya* and *saṃskṛtāsaṃskṛta dharma*.⁶⁵⁸

According to the *Mvś*, ‘skill’ in aggregates prevents the bodhisattva from falling prey to the view that there exists a single reality—an *ātman*—in the five *skandha*.⁶⁵⁹ The *Akn-ṭikā*, commenting on a parallel passage in the *Akn*, corroborates this view through a list of examples that illustrate the empty, non-substantial nature of the aggregates.⁶⁶⁰ Like the *Bdp*, in order to broaden its explanation, the *Mvś* peruses the aggregates in relation to the world and draws the conclusion that it also shares the same characteristics of manifold conditions (*anekatva*), compression (*abhisamkṣepa*) and divisions (*pariccheda*).⁶⁶¹

exceeds that of the *Akn*. The *Bbh* (p. 4.6–8) contains yet another shorter version of this list, being reduced to ‘skill’ in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *sthānāsthāna*, *satya* and *pratītyasamutpāda*. These are said to figure specifically in the training of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas, but are also acquired by the bodhisattva. The same list is included in the *Śrotabhūmi* (109, p. 287.3.2–3), where it occurs alongside *gotra*, *lakṣaṇa*, etc., in a sequence of sixteen types of attraction (*saṃgraha*). It appears also in the *Prñ* (23, p. 237.4.4–5).

656. *Mvś* (N), p. 37, 10b.5, p. 40.1–2.

Without regard to philological evidence, the parallel occurrences in the *Akn*, *Bdp*, *Dbh*, *Bbh*, *Śbh*, *Prbh*, etc., nor context, Stephan Anacker takes the term *kausalāya* to stand for *upāyakausalāya* (1986, pp. 240–245). Realising the incongruities that are produced by such an interpretation—but apparently not prepared to rethink his position—he attempts to explain these away by the *saṃvṛtisatya/paramārthasatya* concept, remarking somewhat unconvincingly: “It is interesting that Vasubandhu regards the basic Buddhist analysis of the ‘personality’ as being only a provisional expedient against the view of individual self ... they are not to be taken literally; they are only temporary antidotes to suffering inducing conceptions, and must ultimately be abandoned themselves” (*op. cit.*, p. 281, n. 42).

657. *Mvś* (N), p. 44.14a.1–2.

658. I ignore here the fact that the *Bdp* cites also ‘skill’ in faculties (*indriya*) among its eighteen factual types of ‘skill’ (R, folio 673.3–75.2) as this has practically nothing in common with the *Mvś*’s ‘skill’ in *indriya*. I have discussed the implications of this nominal parallelism below. For a definition of *kausalāya/akausalāya*, see: *Śrotabhūmi*, p. 303.2.8–5.2.

659. *Mvś* (N), p. 45.14a.6–14b.1.

660. For the context in which these are set, see my notes to the translation of chapter eleven.

661. *Mvś* (N), p. 45.6–7.

Skill in elements is important for the destruction of the belief in a self, since it removes the notion of causality. The fault with causality lies in imagining that a self exercises true causal activity by bringing the various *dhātu* into existence. In order to repudiate this misconception, the *Mvś* likens *dhātu* (divided into internal *dhātu*, external *dhātu* and cognition-*dhātu*) to seeds (*bīja*) alternating simultaneously as cause and effect.⁶⁶² Although the problem of the origin of the *bīja*'s potency to generate is not addressed⁶⁶³, 'skill' in elements eliminates the misconception that the self is capable of causal activity by removing agency from its realm to that of karma.⁶⁶⁴ This interpretation corresponds with the treatment of 'skill' in *dhātu* in the *Bdp*. Postulating that the elements do not bear any characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) by which they would be established as independently existing, the *Bdp* points out that their sameness is rooted in insubstantiality and non-becoming. Clearly, things that lack substantiality and becoming, being neither conditioned nor unconditioned, are not subject to any causal agency.

Roughly comparable with the illusion of causality is the illusion of agency. Appearing in the *Mvś* in the fourth place⁶⁶⁵, it also addresses causal misconception, except that causality is limited to cognition, whereas the illusion of an agency embraces all types of effects. Both *Bdp* and *Mvś* indicate that the mistaken belief in a self as agent is best met by 'skill' in the law of dependent co-origination.⁶⁶⁶ More interested in eradicating the misconception that an agent persists in experience than in the twelve members, both works propound that there is no independent agency to trigger any operation outside ignorance, superficial reflection and the causal series itself.⁶⁶⁷

Having discussed causality, the *Mvś* proceeds to the question of experience. It argues that all experience—whether based in the present life or linked with future retribution—cannot be rooted in a self but is conducted through sensefields.⁶⁶⁸ For the *Bdp*, however, 'skill' in sensefields implies, above all, recognition of the sameness of all sensefields. This assumption

662. *Mvś* (N), p. 45.14b.2 (cf. *Siddhi*, p. 122, and, for a full treatment of the philosophical problems associated with the *bīja* theory, pp. 100–123).

663. For an ingenious attempt to solve this problem, see: *Siddhi*, pp. 102–9.

664. The *Akṣ-ṭīkā*, says that the meaning of *dhātu* corresponds with the meaning of holding characteristics and has the meaning of cause—with *kṣams*, *bīja* and *abyiṇs* being synonyms for 'cause' giving rise to the powers, etc., of the Tathāgata (p. 195.5.2–4).

665. In the *Bdp*, 'skill' in *pratītyasamutpāda* is placed last in the ten skills. The rationale for this positioning is obvious, since penetration of dependent co-origination figures among the factors signaling the attainment of wisdom. In a sense, it brings the discussion of *prajñā* to its logical conclusion, followed only by 'skill' in *dharma*. On contextual grounds I have decided to treat it alongside the first four types of 'skill', although it will figure again in my discussion of the *Bdp*'s path scheme.

666. *Mvś* (N), p. 45.14b.4–6; *Bdp*, R, folio 681.3–683.4.

667. R, folio 682.6–683.3; *Mvś* (N), p. 45.14b.4–6; cf. *Kośa*, iii, p. 56.

668. *Mvś* (N), p. 45.14b.3.

reduces discrimination between virtue and non-virtue *ad absurdum* and prompts the bodhisattva to discourage others from sensefield activity since it only increases mental instability. Even though he identifies the sensefields for what they are—and so abides unperturbed and unaffected by worldly experience—the bodhisattva persists in the path experience.⁶⁶⁹

So far, we have had little difficulty in interpreting the *Bdp*'s 'skills' in terms of the *Mvś*'s thought on the belief in a self. The very nature of the objects under discussion—*skandha*, *dhātu* and *āyatana*—reveals this purpose. Matters become less clear when we investigate 'skill' in *satya* for its influence on the illusion of the belief in a self. According to the *Mvś*, 'skill' in truth refers above all to the four noble truths.⁶⁷⁰ This view is also expressed in the *Bdp* where four out of six passages deal with the noble truths.⁶⁷¹ Besides an interest in the truths, these five passages have one shared concern. They assume the insubstantiality of the person and attempt to demonstrate that the self has no effect on the validity of the noble truths. At first we learn that knowledge of suffering is to see that the aggregates are unborn, that suffering is without origination and destruction, indeed that all *dharma* are uniform.⁶⁷² The aggregates themselves—though they are the basis of truth-perception—are in fact empty, unborn and in a complete state of cessation.⁶⁷³

Looking at these propositions in conjunction with the belief in a self based on the illusion of support of defilement and purity (*saṃkliṣṭavyavadānatvagrāha*), the connection between 'skill' in *satya* and the doctrine of non-self becomes obvious. Common (defiled) perception would require purity and defilement—the two cardinal facets of the noble truths—to possess a support or subject which could be defiled or pure.⁶⁷⁴ The significance of 'skill' in *satya* lies not only in the perception of defilement (*duḥkha/samudaya*)⁶⁷⁵ and purity (*nirodha/mārga*)⁶⁷⁶,

669. That is to say, he draws them away from the ten ignoble paths of *saṃsāra* (*Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 197.5.6–203.4.8; *Msl*, p. 124.3–15).

670. *Mvś* (*N*), p. 47.15b.3.

671. The passages that do not touch on the concerns of the four noble truths investigate the relationship of the various levels of experience, that is to say, conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*), absolute truth (*paramārthasatya*) and the truth of characteristic (*lakṣaṇasatya*). As these sections have already been subject to scrutiny, I shall refrain from discussing them again. For interpretations of the concept of the three truths in Buddhism, see: Wayman, 1980, pp. 220–21; Freeman, 1991, pp. 97–115; Sasaki, 1964–5, pp. 236–251; Pagel, 1990, pp. 8–10. Note, however, that in the introductory passage to 'skill' in *satya* it is the four noble truths that are explicitly cited as the object of this type of 'skill' (*R*, folio 620.4–6).

672. *R*, folio 620.6–621.2.

673. *R*, folio 622.1–6.

674. *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (T 31, p. 545c; trsl. O'Brien):

"Because the fruit of one's past deeds inclines one to practice evil deeds we imagine that there is someone who is defiled. Because it inclines one to practice right deeds, we imagine that there is someone who is purified. But this illusion comes from not understanding the four noble truths."

675. *Kośa*, vi, p. 122.

but—as shown by the *Bdp*—it rejects also the need for a self to sustain their presence. Knowledge of truth provides a self-contained explanation of their arising and destruction, revealing a fluctuating basis (the aggregates), the character of this basis (non-existence), the nature of the experience (ferry-like) and its origination (no-birth)—four notions that render the presence of a self superfluous to sustain purity and defilement.

To take stock and return briefly to the question of this chapter's overall organisation, we can make two observations concerning the purpose of the types of 'skill' investigated so far. First, the texts make it plain that their primary role is to remove the misconceptions about the self. In this sense, the *Bdp*'s first four kinds of 'skill' (including perhaps the more distant 'skill' in dependent co-origination) display a common objective and so were presumably conceived *en bloc*.

This hypothesis, however plausible, leaves several questions unanswered. If the eradication of the belief in a self is limited to 'skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *satya* (and *pratītyasamutpāda*) what is then the role of the remaining types of skill? Moreover, if perceived as a group of practices, what is their exact location on the path? It seems unlikely that such a major feature of the training should have been devised without thought being given to its position.

In general, descriptions of the path tend to place the elimination of the belief in a self at the beginning of the path.⁶⁷⁷ There is evidence in the *Bbh* that supports an early position for our five types of 'skill' also. Here, we learn that they (plus 'skill' in the inevitable/impossible) function as bases of knowledge mastered by śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas alike. The remaining types of 'skill' are only accessible to bodhisattvas.⁶⁷⁸ We may infer, therefore, that 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., represents a kind of a spiritual foundation on which the *bodhisattvacaryā* is built.⁶⁷⁹ Furthermore, as revealed by passages in the *Śbh* and *Prbh*, the

676. *Kośa*, vi, p. 120 (cf. *Kośa*, i, p. 8).

677. For the tenfold scheme, see: *Daśa-bh*, pp. 31.10, 43.17; for the fivefold scheme, see: *DPP*, pp. 21, 37.

678. *Bbh*, p. 4.6–8

Note that the descriptions of 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., follow closely the definitions that are given in the *Śbh* and contain many traits of Śrāvakayāna orientation (cf. *Śrāv-bh* (*Sh*), pp. 237–49). A useful indicator of the degree to which the first five types of 'skill' are associated with the Śrāvakayāna in the *Śbh* is obtained if we look at the sources on which the *Śbh* drew for inspiration (*Śrāv-bh* (*Sh*), pp. 240–49).

679. This, at least, is the opinion of the *Bbh*, which remarks (p. 3.14–18):

"Among them, the lineage of all the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas becomes pure through the purification of the obstructions of defilement, not through purification of the obstructions pertaining to the knowledgeable. However, the lineage of bodhisattvas becomes pure not only through purification of the obstruction of defilement, but also through purification of the obstruction pertaining to the knowledgeable."

scope of 'skill' even differs between the śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha.⁶⁸⁰ For a śrāvaka, only the 'skills' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, *pratītyasamutpāda* and *sthānāsthāna* are attainable whereas a pratyekabuddha also transforms *satya* into an object of 'skill'.⁶⁸¹ The scope and advancement in 'skill', it seems, become a type of gradation demarcating the three vehicles.

By themselves, these findings do not explain the position of 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., in the overall scheme of the *Bdp*. The key to this problem is found outside the *Bdp*. A glance at the list at the beginning of the current investigation shows that 'skill' in *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana* and *satya* is placed between the discussion of the *bhāvanāmārga* and 'skill' in *pratisamvid*. The chief characteristics of the *bhāvanāmārga* are the practice of meditation and the attainment of the *śrāmaṇyaphala*. In the *Śbh*, 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., occurs precisely in conjunction with these two training aspects. They are an important attribute particularly for the śrotaāpanna⁶⁸² and become objects of meditation (*ālambana*) in the śrāvaka training.⁶⁸³ This would seem to tally with the contemplative practice supposedly undertaken on the *bhāvanāmārga* in general, and in its *laukika* phase in particular.⁶⁸⁴ Hence, there appears to be a case for linking 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., with the discussion of *bhāvanāmārga*—the implication being that 'skill' forms a part of it.⁶⁸⁵

To find a connection between 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., and 'skill' in *pratisamvid* has proved more problematic. Essentially, we find two apparently contradictory views. One propounds that the *pratisamvid* lead to 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., and the other that 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., provides a basis for the acquisition of the *pratisamvid*. Having considered the evidence, I am inclined to adopt the first opinion.

In support of the first view we have a statement in the *Dbh*.⁶⁸⁶

680. *Śrāv-bh* (*Sh*), pp. 237–249; *Prbh*, pp. 376–7.

681. For the pratyekabuddha, 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., is present in all three major phases of this training. Judging by the brief passages in the *Prbh*, it prepares the ground for the 'penetration of the certainty of truth' via direct comprehension (*abhisamaya*) and the eventual attainment of the state of certainty itself (*op. cit.*). This interpretation would place 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., on the *darsanamārga*.

682. *Śrāv-bh* (*Sh*), pp. 177.8–183.11.

683. *op. cit.*, pp. 193.4–258.13

For a superior edition of this passage, see: Schmithausen, 1982, pp. 460–472. A parallel account of the psychological experiences underlying these meditations is found in the *Abhidh-sam* (*R*), pp. 134–36.

684. For details on these meditations during the *bhāvanāmārga*, see: *Kośa*, ii, pp. 134–6, 180, 205; iii, p. 196; vi, pp. 186–189 and chapter viii; *Abhidh-sam* (*R*), pp. 110–11; *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1213–1328; *MBT*, iii, pp. 1–8.

The association of the *pratisamvid* with meditation is further corroborated in a key passage in the *Bbh* that affirms that they constitute knowledge springing from meditative practice (*bhāvanāmayaṃ ... jñānam*). *Bbh*, pp. 258.6–7, 258.9–10, 258.12–13, 258.15–16.

685. According to the *Bbh*, the three types of wisdom (i.e., *śrutamayī*, *cintāmayī* and *bhāvanāmayaīprajñā*) themselves are conducive to the attainment of the lower six kinds of 'skill' (*Bbh*, p. 33.10–15).

686. *Daśa-bh*, p. 78.3–4.

“By the unique knowledge of own-being of things (*arthapratisamvid*), the bodhisattva enters into the attainment of ‘skill’ in aggregates, elements, sensefields, truth and dependent co-origination.”

A similar proposition is also found in the *Bbh*:⁶⁸⁷

“Reliance on the bodhisattva’s four [kinds of] unique knowledge should be known to lead to ‘skill’ in the five bases of the bodhisattva; being ‘skill’ in aggregates, elements, sensefields, dependent co-origination and the inevitable/impossible.”

This passage also underpins what we have already inferred from the *Śbh* and *Prbh* concerning ‘skill’ in *skandha*, etc., being cognitive foundations. Ironically, it is this function that gives weight to the alternative position. To this effect we read in the *Visuddhimagga*:⁶⁸⁸

“Now, the things classed as aggregates, sensefields, elements, faculties, truths, dependent co-origination, etc., are the soil (*bhūmi*) of this understanding [of the unique knowledge]. Two purifications, viz., purification of virtue and consciousness are its roots. Five purifications, viz., purification of view, purification by overcoming doubt, by knowledge and vision of the path ... are the trunk [of their understanding].”

To the *Vism* knowledge of the aggregates, etc., is quite clearly a cornerstone to the development of the *patisambhidā*.⁶⁸⁹ Likewise, it is probably no coincidence that knowledge of the aggregates and knowledge of the four noble truths are discussed immediately before the unique knowledge.⁶⁹⁰ Additional support for this proposition, however, is thinly spread and subject to interpretation.

Introducing this statement on the relation between ‘skill’ in *skandha*, etc., and the *pratisamvid* the *Dbh* comments that the bodhisattva “understands by the unique knowledge of designations the methodical (*asambheda*) ‘skill’ distinguishing the knowledge of *dharmā*” (*op. cit.*, p. 77.22–23).

687. *Bbh*, p. 258.17–20.

688. *Vism*, p. 443.

689. Having discussed the qualities of the *patisambhidā*, as if to underline the importance of a correct understanding of the aggregates, etc., to their generation, the *Vism* dedicates the next seventy pages to a description of their nature, functions and attributes (*Vism*, pp. 444–516).

690. *Vism*, p. 440.

In the *Śbh* the context places the practice of ‘skill’ into a meditative structure, specifically, on the *bhāvanāmārga*. Apart from the practice of the *dhyāna*, etc., advancement through the *bhāvanāmārga* involves a number of ancillary practices, particularly the noble eightfold path and joint practice of ‘perfect mental quietude’ (*śamatha*) and ‘insight’ (*vipaśyanā*).⁶⁹¹ If we accept that ‘skill’ pertains to the *bhāvanāmārga* or, at least, to meditation, by implication it is possible to draw a link between ‘skill’ and *śamatha/vipaśyanā*. This connection allows us to utilise a passage in the *Samdhis* where we learn that:⁶⁹²

“Bodhisattvas who cultivate perfect mental quietude and insight possess the unique knowledge of the own-being of things and the unique knowledge of designation.”

This statement suggests that the attainment of (at least two) *pratisamvid* springs from the practice of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*; that is to say, from meditation on the *bhāvanāmārga*. In other words, it arises from the very context in which ‘skill’ in *skandha*, etc., is being developed. This position is sustained by the content that is given to the *pratisamvid* in the *Samdhis*. In common with the *Bdp*, the *Samdhis* dwells on precisely those practices that were the focus of ‘skill’. More than just the fact of it referring to the problem of the self and defining the aggregates, elements, sensefields and noble truths⁶⁹³, it is the brevity in which these are treated that suggests that the bodhisattva was assumed to acquire ‘skill’ prior to the *pratisamvid*. In this sense, ‘skill’ in *skandha*, etc., would provide the cognitive foundation on which the *pratisamvid* would develop.

And yet, on balance, I do not think that these clues—however persuasive—allow us to disregard the unequivocal statements of the *Dbh* and *Bbh*. They say quite clearly that it is the *pratisamvid* that lead to ‘skill’ in *skandha*, etc., and not *vice versa*.⁶⁹⁴ It is perhaps appropriate

691. *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 126; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 279–80, 300–301; viii, pp. 130–31, 146, *Satya-s (S)*, pp. 448–49; *MBT*, iii, pp. 205.5–207.11.

692. *Samdhis (ÉLa)*, p. 98.1–4.

693. *Samdhis (ÉLa)*, pp. 99.12–13, 99.16–23, 100.12–14, 102.15–19, 103.1

It is perhaps significant that all of these references occur in the *arthaprasamvid* section that—while in second position in the *Samdhis*—is the first of the *pratisamvid* in the *Bdp*. By placing it at the beginning (a move that is non-standard by most treatises on the *pratisamvid*), the *Bdp* brings the *arthaprasamvid* references to *skandha*, etc., close to the section on skill—a device that might have served to accentuate an otherwise rather weak and indirect connection between the two sections.

694. It is conceivable that the relationship between ‘skill’ and *pratisamvid* has changed in the course of Buddhist history. However, the chronological closeness of the *Bdp* and *Dbh*, on the one hand, and the *Bbh* and *Vism* on the other hand apart from the fact that such re-interpretation would have involved a total reversal of whichever position was the original, renders this possibility remote.

to consider both positions as equally valid within their own textual traditions until further evidence comes to light to clarify the matter.

But now let us move on to look at the actual treatment of the *pratisaṃvid*. In contents the *Bdp* adopted what have become well-established patterns of exposition.⁶⁹⁵ Under the heading of *arthapratisaṃvid* it discusses the own-being of things and scrutinises reality from the viewpoint of the absolute truth, including some of the broader principles that pertain to the path attainments.⁶⁹⁶ Similarly, *dharmapratisaṃvid*, revealing knowledge of instructions and designations that introduces to the names and characteristics of phenomena, deals largely with standard issues.⁶⁹⁷ *Niruktipratisaṃvid* and *pratibhānapratisaṃvid* bestow intimate knowledge of languages and confer great eloquence.⁶⁹⁸ Traditionally appreciated for their role in conversion activity, they have less bearing on the cognitive dimension of the training than on that aspect of the vow committing the bodhisattva to spread the Buddha's teachings.⁶⁹⁹ As

695. More specifically, it agrees, for instance, with the *Mppś* (iii, p. 1619) that the *pratisaṃvid* manifest three levels of attainment, depending on whether they are practised by śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas or bodhisattvas. It also agrees with the *Vibhāṣā* (*op. cit.*, p. 1616) that the object of the *arthapratisaṃvid* is the absolute truth (*paramārtha*).

It is perhaps worth noting that the *Bdp* contains by far the most detailed analysis of the *pratisaṃvid*, covering almost nine folios in the Peking edition. In the *sūtras*, the next best presentations are found in the *Samdhis* (*ÉLa*), pp. 98.1–103.5, and *Daśa-bh*, pp. 77.1–79.3, while in the *śāstras* it is the *Mppś*, *Bbh* and *Msl* that give the best account (references see below).

696. R, folio 624.2–625.5.

697. R, folio 626.7–628.5.

698. R, folio 628.6–631.2.

699. See, for instance, *Bbh*, p. 353.19; *Daśa-bh*, pp. 77.1–5, 79.4–7 where teaching and the becoming of a *dharmabhāṇaka* are named as the chief purpose of the *pratisaṃvid* (cf. *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 172).

While the nature of the four *pratisaṃvid* is generally well-explained, their exact scope is only insufficiently indicated. Two passages in the nikāya would indicate that in early Buddhism they did not belong to the most elevated path practices. They were apparently within the reach of 'ordinary' monks' (A I, p. 24, A II, p. 161) and, for Śāriputra, attainable only a few months after ordination (A II, p. 160). Although by nature inseparable and simultaneously acquired, differences in ranking exist. For the *Kośa* (vii, pp. 89–94), the *pratisaṃvid* fall into two categories. First, the *dharmapratisaṃvid* and *niruktipratisaṃvid* pertain to the sphere of worldly knowledge (*saṃvṛtijñāna*) and operate only in the stages of the *kāmadhātu* and *dhyāna* (the *niruktipratisaṃvid* is restricted to the first *dhyāna*, while the *dharmapratisaṃvid* pertains to all four *dhyāna* stages; *Kośa*, vii, p. 93). The reason given is that they have as objects *nāmakāya* and languages. The other two, *artha-* and *pratibhānapratisaṃvid*, belong, by implication, to the *lokottara* consciousness. Found in all nine stages of meditation and corresponding respectively to the ten and nine kinds of knowledge (*jñāna*)—the *nirodhajñāna* being excluded from the *pratibhānapratisaṃvid* (*Kośabhāṣya*, pp. 418–19) and only attained by masters of meditation (*saṃādhipaśaṃprakhyaṇa*)—they were evidently regarded to be of a higher order. To some extent, this grading is echoed in the Mahāyāna interpretation of the unique knowledge, in particular with regard to the *pratibhānapratisaṃvid*. The contents of the first two, that is, *artha-* and *dharmapratisaṃvid* correspond largely to the śrāvaka interpretation, in the sense that the chief concern is the examination of reality (*Siddhi*, p. 70). Employing a comparable methodology but producing variant results, both śrāvaka and bodhisattvas investigate through them the own-nature (*svalakṣaṇa*) of phenomena and the terminology commonly used to designate them. Differences only arise with the *nirukti-* and *pratibhānapratisaṃvid*. For the śrāvaka, *niruktipratisaṃvid* has as object 'expressions of language relative to the thing designated and the designation' (*atthadhammaniruttābhilāpa*) or more generally speech (*vāc*). This led to its emphasis being placed on philological knowledge of grammatical

these general facets of the *pratisaṃvid* are widely documented, I shall confine my analysis here to those issues in which the *Bdp* deviates from the standard model.⁷⁰⁰

Differences relate primarily to organisation and allocation. The first, most noticeable, difference lies in the order in which the *artha*- and *dharmapratisaṃvid* occur. Most texts I consulted place the *dharmapratisaṃvid* at the beginning of the four, followed *artha*-, *nirukti*- and *pratibhānapratisaṃvid*. In the *Bdp*—perhaps for reasons of continuity—the sequence between *dharmapratisaṃvid* and *arthapratisaṃvid* has been reversed so that it is *artha* that introduces the unique knowledge.⁷⁰¹ Second, the allocation of some of the topics diverges from that of other texts. For instance, the *Bdp* incorporates in *arthapratisaṃvid* the theme of the non-characteristics of *dharmapratisaṃvid* and a reference to the *pratisaraṇa*—two issues belonging to the *dharmapratisaṃvid* according to the *Mppś*.⁷⁰² Similarly controversial, though possibly correct, is the inclusion of the eighty-four thousand types of *dharmaskandha* under *dharmapratisaṃvid*. These, according to the *Mppś*, pertain to the *pratibhānapratisaṃvid*.⁷⁰³ The *Bdp*'s incorporation of a number of specific path features in the *arthapratisaṃvid* is also striking, when in most other texts its treatment does not go beyond the own-characteristics (*svalakṣaṇa*) of *dharmapratisaṃvid*.⁷⁰⁴

forms, syntax, etc. (*Vibh*, pp. 295–9; *Prajñāptapādaśāstra* cited in *Kośa*, vii, pp. 93–4). Now, judging by the material included in Mahāyāna treatises on the subject, for the bodhisattva, knowledge of *nirukti* is more a question of fluency in languages—human and non-human. Philological detail is rarely mentioned and is certainly not the focus of attention (*Bbh*, pp. 258.11–13, 353.17–354.26). The reason for this adjustment is the central role of preaching in the bodhisattva training, particularly during the final stages. Recognising the need for effective communication, the *pratibhānapratisaṃvid* sets the previous *pratisaṃvid* to best effect. Being the last and highest form of unique knowledge, it merges the data of the previous three in order to pass them on to others for conversion and designates “l’habileté dans le discours qui procède de la connaissance des êtres à convertir” (*Siddhi*, p. 652). The bodhisattva is now in the position to adapt his exhortations to the spiritual faculties of beings (*Mppś*, iii, pp. 1622–23); he is accomplished in wisdom and magical powers which allow him to alter his appearance and birth-destiny at will; he is well-versed in all branches of knowledge and their texts. In short, he has assembled all necessary ingredients for an effective communication of the teachings of the Dharma. It is no coincidence that this attainment takes place close to the pinnacle of his career (*Daśa-bh*, pp. 77.1–81.3; *Bbh*, pp. 353.8–354.11), since it is only from the eighth stage onwards that he himself is fully accomplished in the Dharma, skilful means and magical powers. During the *sādhumatibhūmi* (corresponding to the *pratisaṃvidvihāra* of the *Bbh*), these three factors are then complemented with attainments in languages and eloquence to become the pillars of his conversion activity.

700. Good accounts of the general nature and scope of the *pratisaṃvid* can be found in the *Vibh*, pp. 293–305; *Vism*, pp. 372–76; *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1616–24; *Kośa*, vii, pp. 89–94; *Kośabhāṣya*, pp. 418–21; *Amṛtar* (B), pp. 214–15; *Bbh*, p. 258.4–17; *Msl*, pp. 138.19–139.16 (for further ref. see: *Msg*, pp. 53–54*).

701. The standard order, for instance, is found in the *Dbh*, *Samdhis*, *Kośa*, *Abhidh-sam* (R), *Amṛtar* (B), *Bbh*, *Msl*, *Dhgr* and *Msg* while that of the *Bdp* is only attested in the *Vism*, *Pañca*, *Akn*, *Samādh* and *Mppś*. Dayal suggests (p. 262) that these differences reflect a shift away from the formula that is found in the nikāya, giving precedence to the *pratisaṃvid* of *artha* over *dharmapratisaṃvid*. Taking into account the meagre evidence for such a claim (there being only one occasion in the primary nikāya where this sequence is attested; but see: *Paṭi*, i, pp. 88, 119; ii, pp. 150, 157, 185, 193; *Vibh*, pp. 293–305; *Vism*, pp. 440 ff), he later acknowledges that this is pure speculation (p. 264).

702. R, folio 625.5; *Mppś*, iii, p. 1621.

703. R, folio 627.3–628.5; *Mppś*, iii, p. 1623.

704. See, however, *Samdhis* (ELa), p. 104.7–27.

If nothing else, these discrepancies show that the contents of the individual *pratisaṃvid* were exposed to change longer than their consistency in later treatises might imply.⁷⁰⁵ This itself is not surprising, considering that most early sources provide a bare outline of their contents. In the four principal nikāya, the only references to the *pratisambhidā* are found in the Aṅguttaranikāya and even these give away little of their scope.⁷⁰⁶ Even many of the early Mahāyāna *sūtras* are silent on the contents of the *pratisaṃvid*. The *Aṣṭa*, *Vkn*, *Kp*, *Up*, *Śgs*, *Saddhp* and *Bhadra-vy*, to name just a few, contain only a handful of allusions.⁷⁰⁷ Apparently, interest in the details of the *pratisaṃvid* only arose with the second wave of Mahāyāna *sūtras*, producing the kind of exposition we find in the *Bdp*, *Akn*, *Dbh* and *Samdhis*.

Much of what has been said about the *pratisaṃvid* applies also the *pratisaraṇa* that follow on the *pratisaṃvid* in exposition of the *Bdp*.⁷⁰⁸ They are not found as a complete set in the early *suttas*, though they are already attested in their initial stages in the Dīgha- and Majjhimanikāya.⁷⁰⁹ From a few scattered references in Śākyamuni's discourses the *pratisaraṇa* progressed to a fully developed set of practices with a secure place in the bodhisattva training.⁷¹⁰ As is so often the case when concerned with bodhisattva practices, one is well advised to look for the most instructive account to the *Bbh*.⁷¹¹

But first to the *Bdp*. The discussion of the *pratisaraṇa* in the *Bdp* is rather unusual in several respects. First, there is the astonishing amount of detail about the individual reliances. Except for the *Akn*, I have found no other text that comes anywhere near its exposition in length. Second, the *Bdp* casts its treatment of the *pratisaraṇa* in a non-standard order, leading

705. Note that in the *Vkn*, the contents of *artha*- and *dharmapratisaṃvid* appear to have merged into a single concept. In chapter xii, § 11 (p. 260), we meet with the term *bhūtārthadharmapratisaṃvid* that Lamotte took to mean "infallible penetration concerning the Law in its true meaning". I do not know what prompted Lamotte to swerve from the *pratisaṃvid* context here, but to translate it as "unique knowledge concerning the own-being and designations of reality" seems more appropriate.

706. A II, p. 160; III, pp. 113, 120

The earliest canonical account of any length is found in the *Paṭis* (i, pp. 86–87, 121–22), while the most detailed analysis of the *Abhidhamma* is given in the *Vibh* (pp. 293–305).

707. *Vkn* (p. 260), *Śgs* (pp. 150, 188), *Saddhp* (pp. 202, 204), *Bhadra-vy* (R), p. 20.17–18; *Pañca* (p. 211); they are altogether absent from the *Aṣṭa*, *Kp* and *Ug*.

708. During the first half of this century, much useful material on the *pratisaraṇa* has been collected by Étienne Lamotte and Louis de La Vallée Poussin. Most of this has been published in footnotes to the *Abhidharmakośa* (*Kośa*, ix, pp. 246–48) and *Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse* (*Mppś*, i, pp. 536–41) and in "La critique d'interprétation dans le Bouddhisme" (*Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves*, 9, 1949, pp. 341–61).

709. D II, p. 124; cf. Waldschmidt, 1950–51, p. 238.24.1–3 (*dharmatā/pudgala*), D III, pp. 127–8, M I, p. 265 (*nītārtha/neyārtha*); M II, p. 240 (*artha/vyañjana*); *Vin*, i, p. 40 (*nītārtha/neyārtha*).

710. The first *sūtra* to give a detailed account of the four *pratisaraṇa* appears to have been the *Catuhpratisaraṇasūtra*. This text, however, extant in several Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese versions, is a relatively late composition. Nevertheless, it is still regarded as one of the principal sources on the *pratisaraṇa* and is regularly cited in conjunction with the four reliances (viz., *Mppś*, i, p. 536; Lamotte, 1949, p. 4).

711. *Bbh*, pp. 256.23–58.3.

to repetitions and some convolution. Third, taking full advantage of the *saṃvṛtisatya/paramārthasatya* dichotomy, its uniform technique of explication is surprising.

The first *pratisaraṇa* discussed is 'reliance on the spirit as opposed to the letter' (*artha/vyañjana*). The *Bdp* provides many examples to explain why it is the spirit that is given ultimately precedence. The thought that only the spirit contains the true meaning of the Dharma in the final analysis, whilst the letter is little more than an expedient for expressing and reaching it, is of course not new. It is already mirrored in the famous stanza of Śāriputra uttered in response to Aśvajit's admission that, as a novice, he could not propound the Dharma in full.⁷¹²

"Let it be so, my friend. Tell me a little or a great deal of it, but speak to me of its spirit. I need only the spirit, so why be preoccupied with the letter?"

Such preoccupation with the meaning stems from the conviction that purely literal exegesis is certain to produce incomplete or even mistaken interpretations and will fail to lead to liberation.⁷¹³ Equally, it was always appreciated that flawless preservation of the letter is essential to discovering the correct meaning, for:⁷¹⁴

"If the phrases and syllables are wrongly arranged, the meaning in turn is impossible to discover."

Recognition of a combined need for a clearly formulated textual basis and perception of the spirit as the ultimate bearer of Buddhist thought also inspired the *Bdp* in its discussion of the *artha/vyañjana pratisaṃvid*. Taking a more positive view by proposing complementarity (but pertaining to different levels of cognition), the text does not tire in reiterating the benefits that spring from their integration:⁷¹⁵

"The letter—disciplining body, speech and mind—instructs in achieving all attainments of learning and purity. The spirit—not apprehending body, speech and

712. *Vin*, i, p. 40.

713. *Lankāv*, p. 196.4–11.

714. *Nett*, p. 21 (ref. Lamotte).

715. *R*, folio 632.4–633.3.

mind—purifies the non-accumulation of karmic formations. ... The letter, being the receptacle of all that has been heard, is the root of wisdom. The spirit is the ineffable meaning. The letter instructs in the practice of the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣika dharma*. The spirit realises the fruit of their practice. The letter instructs in suffering, its origin and the path. The spirit realises its cessation.”

After the discussion of the *artha/vyañjana pratisamvid*, the *Bdp* expounds direct knowledge and discursive insight (*jñāna/vijñāna*). At first, however, for reasons that are not entirely clear, it interposes a brief section introducing reliance on *sūtras* of precise/provisional meaning (*nītārtha/neyārtha*) and reliance on the foundation of being/person (*dharmatā/pudgala*). This interpolation is practically devoid of information beyond the standard formula. Both *pratisaraṇa* are explained in detail *after* the *jñāna/vijñāna pratisaraṇa*, and yet they are styled to conclude the entire fourfold *pratisaraṇa* discussion even though *jñāna/vijñāna pratisamvid* has not been mentioned. This is probably another piece of evidence of the *Bdp*’s conceptual ‘immaturity’.⁷¹⁶ Things are further complicated by the introductory passage to the *jñāna/vijñāna* section which says that—in apparent reference to the *artha/vyañjana pratisamvid*—direct knowledge and discursive insight fall under ‘skill’ in the letter. Tellingly, the *Akn* that otherwise follows the *Bdp* so closely does not show these incongruities.⁷¹⁷

After a fruitless search for an explanation in the standard works, I came across the following passage in the *Tchou wei mo kie king*:⁷¹⁸

“There are two sorts of *dharma*. First, *vyañjana* or the letter. Second, *artha* or the spirit. One should not rely on *vyañjana*. There are two sorts of *artha*. First, *artha* known through discursive insight (*vijñāna*). Second, *artha* known through direct knowledge (*jñāna*). *Vijñāna* only seeks after the five false and illusory object of desire (*kāmaguṇa*). It does not seek after the real truth. Whereas *jñāna* seeks after the real truth and destroys the five objects of desire. Thus one should rely on *artha* known through *jñāna* and not rely on *artha* known through *vijñāna*. It is in order to seek after *artha* known through *jñāna* that one relies on *jñāna*.”

716. I have discussed this convolution in greater detail in note 114 of my translation.

717. *Akn*, p. 64.2.4.

718. T 1775, chpt. 10, p. 417a.10–25 (I follow here Lamotte’s translation; Lamotte 1976, p. 262). Note that in early Mahāyāna literature most lists of the *pratisaraṇa* begin with the pair *dharmatā/pudgala*, the only exception being the *Bhadra-vy (R)*, p. 100.

To us, the significance of this interpretation concerns the inclusion of *jñāna/vijñāna* under ‘skill’ in the letter. Uniquely among treatises on the *pratisaraṇa*, it establishes a logical connection between the four *pratisaraṇa* and explains the late reference to *vyañjana*. Kumārajīva’s choice to place the focus on *artha*—not *vyañjana*—and to make it the target of *jñāna* and *vijñāna*, introduces a further complication, though it throws some light on the underlying structure of the *Bdp*’s treatment of the *pratisaraṇa*. In order to link the exposition of *jñāna/vijñāna* with that of *artha/vyañjana*, the *Bdp* returned to *artha/vyañjana* so as to provide *vyañjana* as the object of *jñāna/vijñāna*. The fact that direct knowledge is not in the least concerned with literal understanding—perception of words being by definition part of conventional (*vyavahāra*) knowledge—is apparently ignored.⁷¹⁹

“The bodhisattva attaches great importance to direct knowledge of realisation and not to mere discursive insight of the letter or the spirit, arising from listening and reflecting. Understanding that what should be known through knowledge arising from contemplation cannot be recognised through discursive insight arising from listening and reflecting [alone], he abstains from rejecting or denying the teachings given by the Tathāgata, profound as they are.”

Next, the *Bdp* contrasts the attributes of *jñāna* with those of *vijñāna*. It establishes direct knowledge in the *lokottara* domain and defines discursive insight as the ordinary cognition subject to false mental constructions.⁷²⁰

“Discursive insight persists in the sphere of conditioned *dharma* but does not wander in the unconditioned [while] direct knowledge is perception of the unconditioned.”

In essence, the treatment of the third *pratisaraṇa*, contrasting *sūtras* of provisional meaning (*neyārtha*) with those of precise meaning (*nītārtha*), is rather similar with the *artha/vyañjana*

719. *Bbh*, p. 257.16–21 (cf. *Samdhis* (ÉLa), p. 105)

Perhaps because it noted this incongruity, the Pelliot manuscript omits the paragraph which contains the reference to ‘skill in letter’ (Pelliot, 977, 1b.7–2a.2).

720. R, folio 636.4–5.

pratisaraṇa. This is the case because of the conceptual closeness of *artha* and *nītārtha* on the one hand, and *vyañjana* and *neyārtha* on the other hand.⁷²¹

“The bodhisattva who resorts to the spirit (*artha*) and not to the letter (*vyañjana*) penetrates all enigmatic words (*saṃdhāyabhāṣita*) of the lord buddhas.”

In order to distinguish those texts to be taken literally from those requiring interpretation, the *Bdp* goes to some lengths to describe the attributes of *neyārtha* and *nītārtha sūtras*. As main criteria it suggests purpose, content, style and philosophical explicitness. Depending whether a text advocates the perpetuation of path activity or supports the immediate cessation of all action; whether it sets out to elucidate the conventional truth or absolute truth; whether it explains impurity or achieves complete purification; whether it partakes in duality or not, we are dealing with either a *neyārtha* or *nītārtha sūtra*. Texts that add non-essential material, written in a pleasing style, are *neyārtha* whereas *sūtras* that are terse and profound are *nītārtha*.⁷²² The fact that most, if not all, of these criteria are highly subjective and produce no overall and generally valid guidelines is not addressed in our text.⁷²³ Aware that literal interpretations (*yathārutārthagrāha*) fail to accomplish Dharma comprehension⁷²⁴, Buddhist scholars of all ages frequently drew attention to this problem.⁷²⁵

721. *Bbh*, p. 108.23–24.

722. *Kośa*, i, p. 75:

“Rien n’établit que ce *sūtra* soit de sens clair; le fait qu’il s’exprime en termes de définition ne prouve rien; car Bhagavat donne des définitions qui portent seulement sur l’élément essentiel ou capital de l’objet à définir.”

723. In fact, to my knowledge Buddhism has never succeeded in establishing such a general principle of identification, even though several attempts were made to this effect.

See, for instance, a section in the *Mpps* (i, pp. 539–40) where Kumārajīva proposes that *sūtras* containing allegations that are obvious and readily comprehended are *nītārtha*, while texts where the meaning is unclear and teach views through skilful means that seem at first incorrect and require explanation are *neyārtha*.

For the *Samādhi* (Dutt, 1941–53, ii, p. 78) it is above all a question whether a text seemingly acknowledges the reality of the self:

“Whoever knows the value of texts that have a precise meaning knows the way in which emptiness has been taught by the Sugata; but wherever reference is taken to the individual, human being or man, he knows that all those texts should be regarded as possessing provisional meaning.”

For Buddhaghōṣa, in contrast, texts that wish to lay claim to *nītārtha* status, must deal with impermanence, suffering and non-self, because “independent of the Tathāgata’s appearance in the world, causality—this fundamental essence of things remains”. *Sūtras* that deal with individuals and speak of the *pudgala* should be treated as *neyārtha* since from the absolute point of view no individuals exist (*Manorathapūraṇi*, ii, p. 188; ref. Lamotte). See also *Madh. vṛtti* (p. 43) that accepts principles of distinction that are rather similar to the first two and last five of the *Bdp*.

724. *Msl*, p. 138.10–11.

725. *Bbh*, pp. 257.8–16.

“A bodhisattva who places faith and confidence in the Tathāgata—only trusting his very word—relies on *sūtras* of precise meaning and not on *sūtras* of provisional meaning. By relying on *sūtras* of precise meaning, he cannot swerve from the Dharma and *Vinaya*. Indeed, in *sūtras* of provisional meaning the interpretation of the meaning—[typically] diffused in several directions—is ill-defined and causes hesitation. Hence, if a bodhisattva does not adhere to *sūtras* of precise meaning, he might swerve from the Dharma and *Vinaya*.”

The last *pratisaraṇa*, advocating reliance on *dharmatā* as opposed to the person, is in many respects the most fundamental of all four. Summing up the concerns that led to the formulation of the ‘four great authorities’ (*mahāpadesa*), it establishes the superiority of Dharma ‘compatibility’ over personal authority, however respected the person in question might be.⁷²⁶ In recognition of the many shortcomings that taint the human mind, the acceptance of the Dharma should not rest on blind faith⁷²⁷ but it should grow out of sound reasoning based on personal experience and understanding.⁷²⁸ To quote once again from the *Bbh*:⁷²⁹

“He who relies on sound reason and not on a person’s [authority] does not swerve from the meaning of thusness. He does not depend on others when confronted with the Dharma.”

The *Bdp*, however, is not so much concerned with the benefits that accrue through this *pratisaraṇa*, than to define the concepts of *pudgala* and *dharmatā* themselves.⁷³⁰ Thus, instead of arguing from the changeableness of the human mind, it explains that the Buddha’s use of the term *pudgala* is nothing but an expedient means and should not be taken literally.⁷³¹ Warning that undue attachment to the *pudgala* would harm one’s prospects of liberation, the *Bdp* invites one to strive for a complete understanding of reality and to turn this into one’s

726. D II, pp. 124–126.

727. M I, p. 133.

728. M I, p. 265.

729. *Bbh*, p. 257.6–8.

730. Note, that we have a number of inconclusive variant readings in the *Bdp*, alternating between *dharmā* (folio 638.1) and *dharmatā* (folio 631.5, but Pelliot, 977, 1a.2: *dharmā*; 638.7; 639.4). Judging by the context no difference in meaning is intended.

731. R, folio 638.2–7.

refuge. Since reality bears the characteristics of sameness and lies beyond discrimination, perception must not be conducted through sensory cognition (*dhātu*), but is to be gained only through *dharma*-observance and reliance on the foundation of being.⁷³²

Accumulation (*sambhāra*) of merit (*punya*) and pristine cognition (*jñāna*) is the first major practice 'skill' in which is not included in the introductory list.⁷³³ Building on attainments of the *pratisamvid* and *pratisaraṇa*, both types of accumulation form a highly esteemed aspect of the training and, according to some, are rivalled only by generosity (*dāna*) in benefit.⁷³⁴

732. R, folio 639.1–5.

733. Although by far the best known types, Buddhist sources record a number of alternative and frequently numerous kinds of accumulation. In the *Lalitavistara*, for instance, we meet with accumulation in *punya*, *jñāna*, *samatha* and *vidarśana*, while in the *Śikṣ* (p. 191.4–5) we learn of a *dharmasambhāra* and a *sarvadyānaprajñāṅgasambhāra* (p. 182.18). The *Akṣ* speaks besides the standard accumulations of *punya* and *jñāna* of a *prajñāsambhāra* and *buddhadharmasambhāra* (pp. 47.1.7–48.1.3). The longest list of *sambhāra* I have discovered is found in the *Karuṇāp* (Y) (i, pp. 338.5–341.7) containing forty different types of accumulation.

In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, we meet with the following explanation:

"There are four kinds of accumulation. First, the accumulation of merit. Second, the accumulation of pristine cognition. Third, the accumulation of the past. Fourth, the accumulation of the present. The accumulation of merit is that by which one obtains the regular equipment and the abundant jewels; by which one meets the truly rich fields as his good teachers and friends; by which one becomes free from many obstructions and applies oneself to discipline. The accumulation of pristine cognition is that by which one accomplishes the brilliant knowledge and has powers and faculties; by which one discriminates the doctrines of right and mistaken views; by which one attains the regular doctrine, meaning, teaching and exhortation. The accumulation of the past is that by which one attains now the accomplishment of the various faculties owing to the gathering of good faculties in previous lives. The accumulation of the present means that in this state of existence one—wishing to attain virtue—ripens his faculties and equips himself with restraint of morality and faculty" (T 30, p. 446b; trsl. Honda, 1968, p. 216).

734. *Bbh*, p. 216.4–11

According to the same text (*op. cit.*, p. 35.2–5), the two *sambhāra* become collectively the primary causes of enlightenment. While merit is the principal (*pradhāna*) cause, it is pristine cognition that is of supreme importance. The causes of ripening, ripening itself and the reward springing from ripening all stem from merit but merit depends on pristine cognition (*jñānaśrita*) which removes all defilements (*samkleśa*), (*op. cit.*, p. 34.26–27; cf. *Msl*, p. 139.18–19). This view is mirrored in a passage in the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 67.16) where, at the eighth stage, the accumulation of the roots of virtue (*kuśalamūlasambhāra*) is held essential to the acquisition of supernatural faculties. On the effects of *punya* and *jñānasambhāra*, the *Dbh* remarks (*Daśa-bh*, p. 45.1–4):

"Because [the bodhisattva] augments the accumulation of merit, he becomes insatiable. Because he seeks the accumulation of pristine cognition, he becomes a person of unfaltering vigour. Because he gathers an accumulation of benevolence and pity he becomes a man of unwearied intention."

A further indicator of the importance of *punya* and *jñāna* is perhaps their inclusion in a number of lists at the upper end of the path containing factors that mark the attainment of the next higher path-stages (*Daśa-bh*, pp. 55.6, 63.20, 82.4). For another overall correlation of the two *sambhāra* with the various path phases, see: *Msl*, p. 140.10–14.

An even greater role is played by *punya* and *jñāna* in the implementation of the commitments of the bodhisattva's vow (*Msl*, p. 44.7–11):

"For the sake of sentient beings, I shall acquire an accumulation of merit and pristine cognition. When an accumulation of merit and pristine cognition has been assembled, all living beings will obtain absolute purity up to the degree of strength of the ten powers (*daśabala*) as the highest point of unobstructed knowledge."

They liberate the bodhisattva from personal affliction while he is coursing in *samsāra*; they remove all types of misconception and settle him in the four sciences (*caturvidha*), including in the accumulation of 'skill' in *skandha*, etc.⁷³⁵

In the *Bdp*, these rewards are not specifically mentioned, because its exposition is less concerned with the fruits that spring from *punya* and *jñāna* than with the factors that promote their acquisition. This is particularly evident in the discussion of *jñānasamḥāra* where a careful distinction is made between the causes and conditions that lead to the accumulation of pristine cognition. In the section dealing with *punya*, the chain of reasoning is somewhat blurred by the wealth of examples brought together in order to illustrate the kind of conduct that is particularly conducive to the accumulation of merit. At first, taking up the ancient formula of the bases of meritorious works (*punyakriyāvastu*), the *Bdp* considers merit acquired through generosity, morality, contemplation, benevolence, vigour, gratitude and virtue transformation.⁷³⁶ Then, abandoning the structures provided by the *punyakriyāvastu*, it introduces a further dozen or so randomly arranged 'ancillary' practices. Central elements to this assortment are the virtues of teaching, generosity, morality, patience, vigour and reverence.⁷³⁷ Their presence here is expected, since in particular *dāna*, *śīla*, *kṣānti* (and *vīrya*) constitute the chief components of the accumulation of merit.⁷³⁸ Having defined the kind of practice that is particularly profitable to the acquisition of merit, the *Bdp* turns its attention to the underlying reward mechanism. In the *Bdp*, as in most other works⁷³⁹, the highest reward for the accumulation of merit is the acquisition of a perfect body—the buddha-body.⁷⁴⁰ Praised for its purity, physical beauty and intellectual impeccability, it is portrayed as an

And yet, in spite of their widely attested importance to the training, by nature, they belong to the *laukika* path of the bodhisattva (*Kośavyākhyā*, cit. in *Kośa*, iv, p. 77). This view is also attested in the *Akṣ-īkā* (p. 248.5.2) where they are said to represent the *samḥāramārga*, a path phase that is commonly held to represent the earliest phase of the path (*DPP*, pp. 18–20, 33–34).

735. *Bbh*, p. 34.17–25

See also *Tathāgataḡuhyasūtra* (cit. in *MBT*, ii, pp. 12.20–12.21) where this very position is concisely put forward:

"The accumulation of pristine cognition has as its aim the destruction of all defilements; the accumulation of merit serves to assist all beings. O lord, this is why the bodhisattva *mahāsattva* endeavours to acquire the accumulation of pristine cognition and merit."

736. R, folio 639.7–640.5

A discussion of the principles that underlie the *punyakriyāvastu* is found in note 132 of my translation of chapter eleven.

737. R, folio 640.5–41.3.

738. *Bbh*, p. 33.3–15; *Kośa*, vii, p. 78.

739. *Mavbh*, pp. 62.19–63.2.

740. The perfect buddha-body accruing to a bodhisattva on the basis of merit is the *rūpakāya*. Encompassing the *sambhoga* and *nirmāṇakāya* (*Mavbh*, pp. 62.19–63.1), it is characterised by innumerable forms of merit, manifesting wonderful and incomprehensible attributes (cf. La Vallée Poussin, *JRAS*, 1906, p. 234; *Msl*, pp. 38.18–21, 41.11–14, 44.17–45, 47.19–21).

embellishment of great distinction that, no doubt as a reference to the bodhisattva's eventual attainment of buddhahood, adorns the Dharma, Bodhi-tree and Bodhi-seat (*bodhimaṇḍa*).⁷⁴¹ Moreover, the *puṇyasambhāra* frees from rebirth in the lower destinies, consolidates merit, leads to unshakable faith in the Doctrine and buddha-qualities.⁷⁴²

In view of the above detail, it is surprising that in the exposition of *jñānasambhāra* the prospect of reward does not figure at all. Instead, practically all attention is given to the causes that generate and augment pristine cognition. For the *Bdp*, there are three causes of *jñānasambhāra*. First, the bodhisattva develops an ardent longing (*chanda*) for pristine cognition. This manifests itself in desire to procure the Doctrine whose meaning he studies with great zeal.⁷⁴³ Second, there is the support of virtuous friends (*kalyāṇamitra*). Guiding the enquiring mind to the Dharma, the virtuous friend becomes a source of inspiration, support and information transforming the bodhisattva's initial and feeble Dharma interest into a potent force.⁷⁴⁴ Third, there is the application of the advice that the bodhisattva has received from virtuous friends.⁷⁴⁵ Intent on wholesome conduct, in particular with regard to meditation, reflection and moral purity the bodhisattva strives to apply the teachings of the Dharma just as told.⁷⁴⁶ In contrast to the practices aimed at the acquisition of merit, pristine cognition focuses chiefly on facets that are conducive to understanding, such as contemplation and investigation.⁷⁴⁷

Thus matured, the bodhisattva manifests the conditions that accompany the accumulation of wisdom.⁷⁴⁸ For the *Bdp* these are untarnished understanding of reality, modesty and virtuous

741. R, folio 641.4–642.3.

742. R, folio 643.2.

743. R, folio 643.4.

744. R, folio 643.5–7.

745. Another factor that is given in the *Bbh* (p. 34.2–7), viz., previous exercise in the accumulation of pristine cognition, does not appear in the *Bdp* as a separate cause of *jñānasambhāra*. However it could be argued that the last portion, entitled “exertion in the accumulation of pristine cognition” refers to the bodhisattva's previous practice in pristine cognition. For the *Bbh*, this exercise must have taken place in the past. Yet, as the exact point in time is undefined, we may assume that previous exercise was meant in the broadest terms, that is, exercise prior to the attainment of *jñānasambhāra* (*Bbh*, p. 34.4).

According to the *Bbh*, the three causes apply not only to *jñānasambhāra* but also to *puṇyasambhāra* (*Bbh*, p. 34.2). Moreover, there they are conceived in sequence. That is to say, longing for the Dharma leads to the acquisition of pristine cognition, the presence of a virtuous friend stabilises it and previous practice increases its accumulation (*op. cit.*, p. 34.3–4). In the *Bdp*, this distinction is not explicitly made, although the passage “after [his virtuous friends] have realised that he is a receptacle of the Dharma, they instruct him constantly with great concentration in the Doctrine; after he has heard the Doctrine, he exerts himself in the accumulation of virtuous practices” could well be interpreted in this light.

746. Note that the *Bbh* (p. 33.5–6) associates pristine cognition with *prajñāpāramitā* only.

747. This is roughly in line with the thinking of the *Bbh* (p. 33.21–24), proposing that it is *prajñā* springing from learning, reflection and contemplation—in conjunction with *vīrya* and *dhyāna*—that has the greatest effect on the accumulation of pristine cognition.

748. Cf. *Bbh*, p. 33.22.

conduct. Through merging the cognitive dimension with the more practical side of the path the bodhisattva maintains his commitment to the welfare of sentient beings whilst recognising the futility of discursive, binary thinking.⁷⁴⁹

Having discussed the causes and conditions that generate the accumulation of pristine cognition, the *Bdp* looks further afield to define the practices that increase its size and scope. Echoing the widely affirmed connection between the *pāramitā* and *sambhāra*, these primarily consists of generosity, morality, patience, vigour, meditation, wisdom and (skilful) means.⁷⁵⁰

749. R, folio 645.3.

750. Each of these practices is discussed in one of the twelve tetrads that make up much of the concluding section of the treatment of the *jñānasambhāra*. Excepting the perfection of generosity, their presentation is sequential and very straightforward. The *dānapāramitā* differs from the rest in that it extends over three tetrads—all others are dealt with in one—with a fourth on the powers (*bala*) being appended. Generosity has a special position in the *Bdp* where three types of giving are itemised, viz., the granting of material objects and respect (tetrad one), the granting of protection (tetrad two) and the bestowal of support (tetrad three). The rationale for the inclusion of the *bala* at this point is not fully clear. In all, I have identified three potential avenues of thought that might help us to understand this rather curious positioning of the *bala*.

First, there is the possibility that the inclusion of the *bala* here was intended to complement or qualify the three types of *dāna*. Generosity is less concerned here with the customary giving of wealth or Dharma, but refers chiefly to the granting of support and protection. These two spheres of *dāna* naturally require strength and resolve. Building on the assumption that the *bala* constitute a more active force than the *indriya*, that they are the *indriya* made strong and of greater intensity in application, the *Bdp* may have wished to substantiate the claims of protection and support through their interpolation. As Gethin has shown, the image of, or association with, physical strength is by no means foreign to the characterisation of the *bala* (M I, pp. 121, 244).

The second train of thought revolves around the interpretation of *śraddhā*—the first of the five *bala*. Investigating the perception of *śraddhā* in Vedic literature, Köhler (and after him Hara) has unearthed a significant amount of material suggesting that to early Vedic priests *śraddhā* meant, above all, generosity (*Spendefreudigkeit*). In later times (with the *Samhita* and *Brāhmaṇa*), with the increasing demystification of the universe, he argues (pp. 44, 57), the notion of generosity gained more and more independence from its concomitant ‘devotion’ (*Hingabe*) and eventually became the dominant meaning of the term *śraddhā*. He places this last phase in the period of the Upaniṣad (*Chānd. Up* and *Bṛhad Up*; pp. 68–70). Proposing that this trend towards rationalisation continued in the times of the Buddha, he presents a series of quotations from the nikāya to show that generosity is besides faith the second cardinal meaning of *śraddhā* in early Buddhism. As Gethin observed, he is rather selective in doing this and discusses chiefly contexts involving the granting of alms, thereby blurring the act of giving with a mental predisposition of faith (S I, pp. 22, 32, 42; A III, p. 34). While *śraddhā* in these quotations appears to support his views, the rather specific context weakens his argument.

Leaving aside the findings in the nikāya, his conclusions for the Veda alone seem to establish some connection between *dāna* and *śraddhā* in the sense of *Hingabe*. Of particular interest is a passage from the *Yoga Sūtra* that lists five requirements for yogic meditation (*Yoga-S* I.20). These correspond verbatim to the five *bala* (or *indriya* for that matter). Now, according to the commentary, *śraddhā* is here best interpreted as devotion (*yogaviśaye cetasaḥ prasādaḥ*) (p. 70). In our context, this could be taken to link *dāna* and protection. For giving to have greatest effect, the presence of an affective element is certainly of advantage and an addition to merit. In a very loose sense, it is thus perhaps not too far-fetched to see a trace of this association in the addendum of the *bala* to *dāna*.

Third, we note a certain parallelism between the five supports (*upastambhana*) that are cited in the *Mvu* (ii, p. 280.16–17) and our list of *bala*. To be precise, all five supports, except the first, are identical with the five powers. The first support, instead of being *śraddhā* as in the *bala*, is *chanda*. Now, the question is whether there is any evidence for us to construe a link between *śraddhā* and *chanda*. The answer to this is yes. According to the *Abhidh-sam* (R) (pp. 7–8), the purpose of *śraddhā* is to provide a foundation for *chanda*, in turn giving a base to *virya* (cf. *Siddhi*, pp. 309–10). Moreover, in the *Nett* (p. 15) we learn that *chandasaṁādhi* appears in the context of the *iddhipāda* as mental one-pointedness, possessing *saddhā* as dominant force. The link between *śraddhā* and *chanda* is further reinforced by the interpretation of the

Besides the six/seven perfections, it is only insatiability and the powers (*bala*) that are seen to augment the accumulation of pristine cognition.⁷⁵¹ However, if we read on to the end of the discussion, we find that neither of them is included among the practices that promote *jñānasambhāra*. Instead, it is the four merit-generating *apramāṇa* that occur alongside the perfections.⁷⁵²

This choice is problematic and raises several questions. First, virtually all the texts I have consulted agree that *dāna*, *śīla* and *kṣānti* play no role in the generation of *jñānasambhāra*.⁷⁵³ They are applicable to *puṇyasambhāra*, so their inclusion here among the factors that generate *jñānasambhāra* clearly comes as a surprise. The picture is less clear with regard to *vīrya* and *dhyāna* about which differences in opinion prevail, depending on the circumstances of their cultivation.⁷⁵⁴ Then, why has the cultivation of *upāya* been omitted in the final round-up if it figured as an apparently independent (*pāramitā*-like) practice in the tetrads? The answer is that probably *upāya* had not yet been fully recognised in status as a fully-fledged perfection, and was thus excluded from the final count. Also the inclusion of the *apramāṇa* is problematic, since all accounts agree that they do not appertain to *jñānasambhāra*. Conversely, the powers—forming part of the *bodhipākṣika dharma* that belong to the *jñānasambhāra* producing practice of *dhyāna*—do figure in its acquisition, but are not cited in the *resumé*.

faculty of faith in the Pāli commentaries (*Ud-a*, p. 305; *Vibh-a*, p. 125; *Vism*, p. 464; *As*, p. 120; ref. Gethin), where *saddhā* is regularly interpreted as a commitment (*adhimutti*). As a psychological force, *śraddhā* must therefore be understood as a type of basic confidence that—manifesting commitment and resolve—triggers the wish to embark on the path. Seen from this angle, *śraddhā* is then one step behind *chanda* in the concatenation of mental factors leading to path practice. Note, that in the *Śrotabhūmi* (p. 287.4.6), set in a meditative context, *chanda* occurs alongside *śraddhā*, *vīrya* and *upāya* as the four types of application (*prayoga*) operating as factors stabilising meditative concentration.

751. A third factor, the accumulation of paths, rather than increasing *jñānasambhāra* is held to prompt its penetration and stands so apart in function (R, folio 648.1–2).

752. For the *Kośa* (vii, p. 78), the practice of the *dhyānapāramitā*, if manifested in the cultivation of the four *apramāṇa*, contributes to the accumulation of merit. If dealing with the cultivation of the *bodhipākṣika*, it promotes the accumulation of pristine cognition (cf. *Kośa*, viii, pp. 196–205 and *Daśa-bh* p. 45.1–3, citing besides a *puṇya*- and *jñānasambhāra* also a *maitrī*- and *kṛpāsambhāra*).

753. According to the *Mavbh* (p. 62.18–19), this role pertains only to *dhyāna* and *prajñā*, while *vīrya* constitutes a kind of ancillary practice required for both *puṇya* and *jñāna* (cf. *Samdhis* (ÉLa), pp. 72.5–10, 131.19–22).

754. *Kośa*, vii, pp. 77–78; *Bbh*, p. 33.7–24; *Mavbh*, p. 62.15–19; *Msl*, p. 139.22–23.

Practices that Conduce to Enlightenment

The *bodhipākṣika dharma* themselves occupy a central position in much of the remainder of chapter eleven. Taking up over a fifth of its content, they constitute the most distinct category of practices included in the discussion of *prajñāpāramitā*. The reason for their preponderance is obvious. First, since they operate as ‘factors contributing to enlightenment’⁷⁵⁵, their cultivation becomes mandatory for every bodhisattva who courses in Perfect Wisdom.⁷⁵⁶ Then, *prajñā* itself is a chief member of the ten or eleven ‘ingredients’ (*dravya*) of the *bodhipākṣika*, represented by the four *smṛtyupasthāna*, *prajñendriya*, *prajñābala*, *dharmapracaya* and *samyagdrṣṭi*.⁷⁵⁷ Moreover, the thirty-seven practices originate themselves in wisdom arising from learning, reflection and cultivation—the very foundations of *prajñā*.⁷⁵⁸

While in spirit very close to those *bodhipākṣika* expositions found elsewhere in the Mahāyāna, their discussion in the *Bdp* manifests several peculiar features. Primarily, these affect organisational abnormalities, the actual phrasing of the formulae and their inclusion into an expanded list of practices. Since the scope, intent and nature of the *bodhipākṣika* have been already adequately researched by others, I shall limit my analysis to facets where the *Bdp* differs from the more ‘standard’ interpretations.⁷⁵⁹

One is struck first by the extent to which the wording of the *Bdp*’s description deviates from that of other *bodhipākṣika* accounts. A comparison with formulae from both Pāli and Sanskrit sources reveals that, except for the *samyakprahāṇa*, it stands very much on its own.⁷⁶⁰ Having examined most texts on the subject, I found only two works containing a

755. *Mppś*, iii, p. 1119. For other definitions following these very lines, see: *Kośa*, vi, p. 282; *Satya-s* (*S*), ii, p. 41; *Abhidh-d*, pp. 357–8.

756. *Śsp* (*Ghoṣa*), pp. 55–56.

757. *Kośa*, vi, pp. 283–84; *Amṛtar* (*B*), p. 208; *Abhidh-d*, p. 358.5–14; *Mppś*, iii, p. 1046 (cf. *Śrotabhūmi*, p. 291.2.1–3).

758. *Kośa*, vi, p. 284.

759. The *bodhipākṣika dharma* have already been subject to several investigations. The most exhaustive and resourceful study—albeit limited to their treatment in the nikāya and Pāli *Abhidhamma* works—is that by Rupert Gethin (PhD Dissertation, University of Manchester, 1987). Other, often rather brief or partial investigations have been carried out by Étienne Lamotte (*Mppś*, iii, pp. 1119–1207) and J. Bronkhorst (*BSOAS*, 1985, pp. 305–20). References to the *bodhipākṣika* are extremely numerous in both Pāli and Sanskrit literature. In the Mahāyāna, they are known to occur in the following *sūtras*: *Bdp*, TTP, 23, pp. 82.3.8–85.3.4; *Kp*, § 95; *Ug*, p. 269.3.8–4.3 (part.); *Rp*, p. 2.9 (part.); *Rcd*, 24, pp. 235.3.4–44.2.6; *Akn*, 34, pp. 66.4.3–71.2.1; *Arthav* (*S*), pp. 28–42. For references in the *Daśa-bh*, *Pañca*, *Śsp*, *Karuṇāp*, *Samādh* and *Lal* and many others, see: Dayal, p. 80, Edgerton, p. 402 and Lamotte, p. 1120. See also Gethin (1987, p. 661) for references in Sarvāstivāda literature and, of course, for a complete table of references in Pāli sources.

760. The most common specimen of such *bodhipākṣika* quotations have been conveniently collected by

similar phrasing. These are the *Akn* and *Arthavniścayasūtra* (*Arthav*). I have already pointed to the far-reaching borrowing between the *Akn* and *Bdp* and so resemblances in the wording of the *bodhipākṣika* are not surprising. Of greater interest are the parallels between the *Bdp* and *Arthav*, since they represent texts of rather different orientation and purpose.⁷⁶¹ Here, the borrowing is only partial (affecting merely the faculties (*indriya*) and noble eightfold path (*āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*)) and appears to be indirect.⁷⁶² Comparison with the wording in the *Bdp* and *Akn* reveals a very close verbal proximity with that of the *Akn* that suggests that the *Arthav* adopted the passages on the *indriya* and *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* from the *Akn*—not from the *Bdp*.⁷⁶³ While the dating of the *Arthav* is, as always, problematic, analysis of its contents has shown that most of its portions post-date both the *Akn* and *Bdp* by several centuries.⁷⁶⁴ Assuming the *Bdp*'s influence on the *Akn*, we have a textual lineage that covered may be as many as five centuries, starting with the *Bdp*'s lending to the *Akn* from which its contents reached the *Arthav*, to be finally included in the *Śiks*, where the *indriya* section is also quoted from the *Akn*.⁷⁶⁵

The *Bdp*'s apparent uniqueness in description does not extend to the spirit of its *bodhipākṣika* exposition. Virtually every aspect raised has counterparts in meaning in some other *bodhipākṣika* discussion elsewhere in Mahāyāna works.

Starting with the *smṛtyupasthāna* (the second type of 'skill' not cited in the heading), the proposition is that each type of mindfulness combats one of the principal four misconceptions (*viparyāsa*)⁷⁶⁶; this is frequent among post-canonical strands of Buddhist literature. Though not found in the nikāya, the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* adopted it as the chief task of the *smṛtyupasthāna* and it is also found in most Mahāyāna treatises on the subject.⁷⁶⁷ Probably

Lamotte in a preliminary note to the *Mppś*'s *bodhipākṣika* discussion (iii, pp. 1119–1132).

761. Unlike the *Bdp*, the *Arthav* is a highly technical work consisting of stereotyped explanations of twenty-seven groups of practices. Likened by Ferrari in contents and nature to the *Dhsg* and *Mvy*, it proceeds step by step through the aggregates, elements, sensefields, *bodhipākṣika*, *pratisamvid*, etc., on each of which it contains definition-like descriptions. For an assessment of its contents, see the introductions to Ferrari's and Samtani's editions of the *Arthav*.

762. *Arthav* (S), pp. 32.6–33.1 for in the *indriya*; pp.320–22 for the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*. Comparing the formulae collected by Lamotte with those of the *Arthav* (pp. 28.9–42.12), we gain the impression that their wording in the *Arthav* represents a combination of Pāli and Sanskrit sources, as if its authors had consulted a variety of texts before composing their own version. This is true for all but the *indriya* and *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* section which, as already observed, appear unique to the *Bdp/Akn* tradition.

763. I have given the Sanskrit text of the *Arthav*'s *indriya* and *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* sections in notes to the edition.

764. *Arthav* (S), pp. 61–67; Ferrari, 1944, pp. 546–49.

765. *Śiks*, pp. 316.13–317.13.

766. On the misconceptions, see: A II, p. 52; *Vibh*, p. 451; *Kośa*, v, p. 21; *Amṛt* (B), pp. 226–227; *Mppś*, ii, p. 925; iii, p. 1150.

767. In the nikāya, the connection between the *vipallāsā* and *satipaṭṭhāna* is not clearly stated. See, however, A

drawing on these traditions, the *Bdp* confirms that to consider the body mindfully—internally and externally—leads to a pure body of sound conduct.⁷⁶⁸ The same holds true for the discussions of feeling, thought and *dharma* that explain mindfulness as distinguishing pleasant from unpleasant feeling, permanence from impermanence and self from non-self.⁷⁶⁹ But the *Bdp* differs in the stress it places on *viparyāsa* itself. When discussing *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*, for instance, it is only in the very last passage that the issue of purity/impurity is raised. Much of the preceding material revolves around the theory of non-self with regard to the body and the use to which the body is put. With the exception of *vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna*, that is entirely dedicated to the correct interpretation of feeling, very little is also said about *viparyāsa* in the remaining bases of mindfulness. Both *cittasmṛtyupasthāna* and *dharmaśmṛtyupasthāna* touch on *viparyāsa* almost incidentally and give greater consideration to issues that develop from the affirmation of impermanence and non-self.⁷⁷⁰ In the discussion of mindfulness concerning thought it is the distinction between ‘creation’ and ‘foundation of thought’ that stands in the foreground, whereas in the exposition of mindfulness concerning *dharma* the concept of *dharma*-sameness prevails.⁷⁷¹

In addition to the references to the *viparyāsa* there is one more element in the *Bdp* that is common to all four types of mindfulness. This is the adaptation of the individual members to the bodhisattva’s concern for the welfare of sentient beings. When speaking of *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*, the *Bdp* commits the body to universal subsistence, to the conversion of gods and men and the postponement of entry into *nirvāṇa*.⁷⁷² Likewise, investigation into feeling is explicitly aimed at explaining feeling to others.⁷⁷³ Through mindfulness concerning thought the bodhisattva acquires the *paracittajñāna* that allows him to perceive saṃsāric delusion and, in turn, sustains the resolve for universal liberation.⁷⁷⁴ A similar mechanism is

II, p. 52 and *Vibh*, p. 376. For the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma*, see: *Amrt* (B), pp. 203–4; *Kośa*, vi, p. 162. For the Mahāyāna, see: *Kp*, pp. 137–9, § 94–95; *Rcd*, pp. 236.2.8–239.4.3; *Arthav-ṭ* (S), p. 208; *Śrāv-bh* (Sh), pp. 303–12; *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1144, 1150.

768. R, folio 651.6.

769. Reference to these position can be found on R, folio 652.1–653.2; folio 655.1–7; folio 596.1–660.1 respectively.

770. This is a common feature of the discussions of the *smṛtyupasthāna* in the Mahāyāna. In the *Kāśyapaparivarta* (*Kp*, p. 139, § 95), for instance, these notions become the *raison d’être* of the *smṛtyupasthāna* exposition. In most traditional accounts, eradication of the notion of a self is only a side-issue to the bases of mindfulness. See, for example: D II, pp. 290–314; M III, pp. 83–5, 135–6; S V, pp. 149–50; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 159–161; *Vism*, p. 464. There is, however, one passage in the Dīghanikāya that appears to be heralding future concerns (D II, p. 216).

771. See: R, folio 656.3–657.6; folio 660.1–661.3 respectively.

772. R, folio 651.7.

773. R, folio 652.6–653.2.

774. R, folio 657.7–658.2.

at work in the examination of *dharma*. Having recognised the sameness of non-arising *dharma*, the bodhisattva sees that all *dharma* are pure. And yet, retaining awareness of the suffering in *saṃsāra* he does not give way to the conclusions of no-birth, but reappears in order to look after sentient beings.⁷⁷⁵

It is hardly surprising that the commitment to universal liberation should figure in the *smṛtyupasthāna* of a work such as the *Bdp*. It is also found in the *Rcd* and referred to in number of other bodhisattva scriptures.⁷⁷⁶ Other widely shared points include references to the *mahābhūta* and Tathāgata-body in the *kāyasmṛtyupasthāna*⁷⁷⁷, the enumeration of the different types of sensations in the *vedanāsmṛtyupasthāna*⁷⁷⁸ and, of course, the philosophic background postulating a vision of reality that—exceeding the limits of suffering, impurity, non-self and impermanence—envisages universal purity, sameness and non-origination.⁷⁷⁹

The most remarkable among the *bodhipākṣika* in the *Bdp* are probably the perfect efforts (*samyakprahāṇa*).⁷⁸⁰ Where other accounts explain their operations rather mechanically in terms of types of vigour (*vidhavīrya*), the *Bdp* presents a logically coherent explanation of their functioning.⁷⁸¹ Once again the key term in its explication is correct reflection (*yoniso manasakāra*). As a conceptual synonym for zeal (*chanda*) concerned with avoiding unwholesome *dharma*, it stands at the very heart of the bodhisattva's spiritual training.⁷⁸² Causing persistent preventive refraint from non-virtue and the withdrawal from already produced unwholesome *dharma*, it becomes the cognitive foundation for the training in general and precludes the presence of unskillful *dharma*. The nature of the unskillful *dharma*, however, is kept rather vague; they are not characterised beyond their incompatibility with morality, meditation and wisdom. Conversely, we learn about the factors that lead to their presence and the antidotes that do away with them. Epitomised by the root evils of desire,

775. R, folio 660.2–5; folio 661.4–5.

776. TTP, 24, pp. 236.5.2–8, 237.4.12–2, 239.5.8.

777. *Mppś*, iii, p. 1188; *Rcd*, p. 236.3.4–5.

778. *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1190–91.

779. *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1187–1194.

780. For examples of Pāli and Sanskrit versions of the basic formula of the *sammappaddhāna/samyakprahāṇa*, see: Lamotte (*Mppś*, iii, pp. 1123–24) who cites passages from the *Dīghanikāya* (III, p. 221) and *Pañca* (p. 207).

In contrast with all other known accounts of the *bodhipākṣika*, the *samyakprahāṇa* are *not* the practice that follows on the *smṛtyupasthāna* in the *Bdp*. Defying the traditional order, the next practices cited are the *bodhyaṅga*. However, in order to do justice to the integration of the thirty-seven factors into a logically consistent description of the path, I discuss the seven sets in their standard order. Just what might have prompted this change in sequence—no doubt a major issue—is discussed further below.

781. See, for instance: *Mvś* (N), p. 50.19–24; *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 120; *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1176–77.

782. R, folio 672.2–673.4.

hatred and delusion, they arise from attachment, anger and ignorance and are removed by considering the antidotes of impurity, benevolence and causality.⁷⁸³ By virtue of *dharma*-sameness, pacification itself induces abandonment in the sense of non-apprehension (*anupalambha*) and hence becomes a stepping-stone in the bodhisattva's attitude towards reality.⁷⁸⁴

Having distinguished virtuous from non-virtuous *dharma* through correct reflection, the bodhisattva applies himself to generating wholesome *dharma*.⁷⁸⁵ This process consists of three phases, that is, initial intent (*chanda*), acquisition of diligence (*vīrya*) and perseverance (*āsthikriyā*). While each of these is fundamental to the planting of roots of virtue, it is only through their combined presence in the practitioner's mind that virtue hitherto unarisen is produced. The magnitude of the bodhisattva's aspiration means that this operation knows no limit.⁷⁸⁶ Motivated by the commitment to universal welfare, the bodhisattva does not allow his newly accumulated merit to disperse uncontrolled. On the contrary, he goes to great lengths in securing the roots of virtue in order to transform them into enlightenment. Such roots persist, says the *Bdp*, because the thought that led to their becoming was itself supramundane and because they are founded in *lokottara* practices independent of the *traiḍhātuka*. By this context, the *Bdp* indicates that the generation of wholesome *dharma* itself pertains to the *lokottara* realm.⁷⁸⁷ Since the perfect efforts are anchored in *laukika* practice, the *Bdp* appears to be drawing a line between a *laukika* effort and a *lokottara* realisation of that effort.⁷⁸⁸

In a way, the *Bdp* therefore has accommodated its discussion of the *samyakprahāṇa* to the ancient belief that the four correct efforts embrace the whole Buddhist path. Already characterised in the *nikāya* as general endeavours of restraint, abandonment, development and protection—and thus furnishing each part of the formula with a positive content—the

783. R, folio 673.5–7.

784. R, folio 673.7–674.1.

785. For the *Śbh* (*Śrāv-bh* (*Sh*), pp. 318.12–320.19), a person who cultivates the *samyakprahāṇa* possesses eight types of effort-predisposition (*prahāṇasaṃskāra*) that are designed to destroy his propensities (*anuśaya*) and to fulfil his meditations. These are (1) zeal (*chanda*), (2) endeavour (*vyāyāma*) corresponding to vigour (*vīrya*), (3) faith (*śraddhā*), (4) tranquillity (*praśrabdhā*), (5) mindfulness (*smṛtī*), (6) awareness (*samprajanya*), (7) volition (*cetanā*) and (8) equipoise (*upekṣā*).

786. R, folio 674.2–3.

787. R, folio 674.7–675.2.

788. Such a position would seem to echo the view of the *Vibhāṅga* commentary (*Vibh-a*, p. 219; ref. Gethin, p. 630) which distinguishes between *lokiya* and *lokuttara* interpretation of the *sammappaddhāna*. Here, depending whether the perfect efforts pertain to the 'prior stage to all' (*sabbapubbabhāga*)—which represents a kind of preparatory phase indicating advance to the practice proper—or go beyond this stage, the *sammappaddhāna* are either worldly or transcendental in nature.

samyakprahāṇa epitomise for the *Bdp* a blueprint of the course of practice complete in itself.⁷⁸⁹ The difference between the *nikāya* and *Bdp* are that while the former provide a specific focus for the four practices (restraint being characterised as the guarding of senses; abandonment as the renunciation of thoughts governed by desire and hatred; development as the cultivation of the *bodhyaṅga* and protection as the contemplation of ugliness)⁷⁹⁰, the latter puts principles rather than individual practices in the foreground.

In most discussions of the *bodhipāṅkṣika*, probably all according to Gethin, the practices to follow on the *samyakprahāṇa* are the bases of success (*rddhipāda*).⁷⁹¹ In the *Bdp*, however, the *rddhipāda* are not discussed following the *samyakprahāṇa*. In fact, there is no full treatment of the *rddhipāda* anywhere in the *Bdp*, though its author must have been aware of them because of several brief references to the *rddhipāda* in the *Dhyāna* Chapter.⁷⁹² Today, it is difficult to establish the reasons that prompted their omission without comment in the *Prajñā* Chapter. A contributing factor for this may have been the consideration that the *rddhipāda* are not an absolute requirement for the destruction of the *āsrava*.⁷⁹³ Being particularly associated with mastery over meditative attainments and powers, they are not part of those practices that aim at wisdom-acquisition, but pertain to the domain of meditation (*dhyāna*). We have seen that for the *Bdp* the single most important means to *prajñā* is investigation (*pravicaya*). Now, if we adopt Cousins's distinction between the *śamatha*- and *vipaśyanāyāna*⁷⁹⁴, investigation is doubtlessly closer to the 'vehicle of insight' so neglect of the *rddhipāda* might almost be expected. Moreover, the fact that they have already been referred to in the *Dhyāna* Chapter—albeit only sketchily—might have been reason enough for their omission in the *prajñā* context.

Bypassing the *rddhipāda*, the *Bdp* therefore moves directly from the *samyakprahāṇa* to the faculties (*indriya*). However, of all the faculties' traditional members only *śraddhā* is given full consideration.⁷⁹⁵ Characterised as confidence in the existence of other worlds, in the law of karma, in the *bodhisattvacaryā*, in causality and in the ontological doctrines of the Mahāyāna,

789. A II, p. 74.

790. D III, p. 225; A II, pp. 16–17.

791. Gethin, 1987, pp. 508–9.

792. R, folio 569.3–570.2

Note that the *rddhipāda* are also omitted from a list of *bodhipāṅkṣika dharma* on folio 277.7.

793. Compare, for instance, the lists of *khīṇāsavabala* that are found in A V, p. 175 and *Paṭis*, ii, pp. 173–4 with that of the D III, pp. 283–4 where the *iddhipāda* have been omitted (Gethin, 1987, pp. 496–7, 498).

794. Cousins, *BSHS*, pp. 56–68.

795. For a definition of the five spiritual *indriya*, see: *Kośa* (ii, pp. 154–7) and *Siddhi* (pp. 309–314).

faith becomes in the *Bdp* very much a spiritual foundation.⁷⁹⁶ Again, this role of faith is already attested in the *nikāya*⁷⁹⁷ where—essentially affective in nature and directed at the Buddha or his enlightenment—its function is to instigate and set in motion a process culminating in wisdom, for which it also provides continuing support.⁷⁹⁸ As if to underline this point, the remaining *indriya* are only mentioned by name and in relation to the forces that shape the succession of their occurrence. In order to obtain the result in which he believes, the bodhisattva makes an effort (*vīrya*).⁷⁹⁹ When he exerts effort, mindfulness (*smṛti*) is initiated. From mindfulness springs concentration of mind (*samādhi*) as to avoid distraction and from that arises consciousness that corresponds to the object (*prajñā*). The logic behind this concatenation is perfectly sound and it is perhaps not very surprising that there is an almost verbatim passage in the *Kośa*.⁸⁰⁰

Of still greater interest are the advantages that accrue from the *indriya*. For the *Bdp*, these are of the highest order since they include the buddha-qualities and access to the stage of prediction (*vyakaraṇabhūmi*) which is generally held to correspond to the *acalābhūmi*.⁸⁰¹ Most other schemes place mastery over the *indriya* well before the eighth stage.⁸⁰² Yet, the association of the faculties with the event of the prediction might provide the key to their

796. This, of course, is true for Buddhism in general. See, for example, the nature and names of the seven categories of *ārya* where the *śraddhānusārin* occupies the lowest rank (*Kośa*, vi, 273–282). Note, however, that in *Kośa* (vi, p. 289) all *indriya* are actually aimed at supramundane *dharma*. For the Theravāda, the five spiritual *indriya* are the exclusive domain of the *ārya-pudgala* and are therefore always *lokottara* (Gethin, p. 264).

797. M I, pp. 142, 294, 444, 479; S IV, pp. 226, 298–9; A III, p. 165.

798. Research documenting the reciprocal relationship between *śraddhā* and *prajñā* has been carried out by a number of scholars. For summaries of their findings, see: Carter, *Dhamma*, Tokyo, 1978, pp. 103–6; Ergardt, 1977, pp. 144–6; La Vallée Poussin, 1908, ii, pp. 32–43.

799. According to the *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 7–8, *śraddhā* first must provide a basis to *chanda* that, in turn, becomes a foundation for the generation of *vīrya*.

800. *Kośa*, vi, p. 287

A similar relation between the five *indriya* is also posited in the *Mpps* and *Rcd*. The *Mpps* includes, like the *Bdp*, faith in the bodhisattva training, faith in causality and moral integrity and confidence in emptiness, sameness, etc., as manifestations of the *śraddhendriya* (*Mpps*, iii, pp. 1195–96). For the *Rcd*, it is above all rejection of the heretical views positing a self (*ātmadrṣṭi*) and faith in buddha-qualities (pp. 240.5.6–41.2.7). Compare these with the expositions on *śraddhā* given in the *Śbh* and *Kp*. But for one or two minor points, their explanations have virtually nothing in common with that of the *Bdp*. In the *Kp* we learn that the five faculties function as antidotes to doubt, inertness, forgetfulness, distraction of mind, absent-mindedness and misconceptions (pp. 137–39, § 95–96). In the *Śrāvaka-bhūmi*, the faculty of faith should be taken as the four types of faith verified, vigour as the perfect efforts, mindfulness as the bases of mindfulness, meditation as the four *dhyāna* and wisdom as insight into the noble truths (*Śrāv-bh* (S), p. 232.7–18; cf. *Mvs* (N), p. 53.4–8).

801. The various types and occasions at which predictions to buddhahood take place, I have discussed in note 233 of my translation of chapter eleven.

802. According to the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* (*Kośa*, vi, pp. 287–89, *Abhidh-d*, p. 362.16–17), the attainments of the *indriya* correspond to the *kṣānti* stage of the *nirvedhabhāgiya* that, traditionally, is situated on the *prayogamārga*. For alternative locations on the path, but always situated on the *prayogamārga*, see: *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 116–7 and *Abhidh-h* (W), ii, p. 140.

For Mahāyāna schemes, see: *Daśa-bh* p. 39.3–4; *Bbh*, pp. 338.24–341.6.

unusual arrangement after the *bodhyaṅga* and *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*. But more of this later.⁸⁰³

The discussion of the five powers (*bala*) does not pose any of such difficulties.⁸⁰⁴ Conforming to the well-known proposition that the powers represent little more than an advanced, actively more effective phase of *indriya* practice, the *Bdp*'s main concern is to illustrate the bodhisattva's invincibility in *śraddhā*, *vīrya*, etc.⁸⁰⁵ To this effect, the *Bdp* sets each of the *bala* in contexts that render their practice particularly laborious and concludes that even in the most adverse situations faith, etc., is unassailable at the level of *bala*. That is to say, the bodhisattva's faith in the Dharma is not deflected by the treachery of Māra.⁸⁰⁶ He is unsurpassed in vigour by even the combined determination of all gods and men. His mindfulness cannot be shattered by intrusion of any type of defilement. When contemplating, he maintains deep absorption during the first *dhyāna* regardless of persisting in altruistic conduct that involves him in the bustle of worldly life; he sustains investigation during the second *dhyāna*, sympathetic joy during the third *dhyāna* and finally disquiet at universal suffering during the fourth *dhyāna*. Indefeatable in cognition, he acquires the most formidable crafts and skills that, springing from wisdom and knowledge, he puts to use in his quest of liberation.⁸⁰⁷ The presence of such impediments is, of course, far from accidental. For, his initial resolve (*praṇidhāna*) constrains not only escape from the pressures of *saṃsāra* but, more to the point, actually requires that

803. It is evident that the only viewpoint from which the *Bdp* examines the faculties is a spiritual one. That is to say, it excludes from consideration the remaining seventeen constituent *indriya* that shape human experience in general (La Vallée Poussin, *Nirvāṇa*, 1925, Paris, p. 237). For the *Mvś*, in contrast, it is chiefly these 'controlling principles' that stand in the centre of its discussion of 'skill' in *indriya*. Giving the illusion of dominion in the sense that certain powers are held to fall to specific faculties for specific purposes—e.g., the eye having the ability to see objects and hence be sovereign over the object—the *Mvś* (*Mvś* (N), p. 46.23) warns that there is no agent that rules over these faculties since they are independent. For our purposes, it is of interest that the five spiritual *indriya* are thought to pertain to worldly purification (*laukikaviśuddhi*) only, while the 'faculties of knowing what is not known' (*anājñātamājñāsyāmindriya*)—the second type of purification—are sovereign with regard to transcendental purification (*lokottaraviśuddhi*). This confirms what we learned about their status from Sarvāstivāda schemes and tallies with the positioning in the *Akṣ* and its commentary. The *anājñātamājñāsyāmindriya* are manifest on the *darśanamārga* and inspire desire to know the four truths, etc., (*Kośa*, ii, p. 117) while *lokottaraviśuddhi* is 'eradication of defilements through transcendental conduct' (*lokottaramārgaṇakleśanāṃ prahānam*; *Mvś*-t, p. 156.7).

804. For parallels in the fruits of *bala* see: *Rcd* (pp. 241.2.7-242.1.4) and *Amṛt* (B), p. 205.

805. For Pāli references to this effect, see: M I, pp. 121, 168, 244; S V, p. 220; *Paṭi*, i, pp. 6-7 and *Atthasālinī*, p. 295. A good Sanskrit reference is found in the commentary to the *Arthav* (S), pp. 226-7; cf. *Kośa*, vi, p. 286).

806. See, *Rcd* (p. 241.2.7-3.1) where we come across exactly the same theme in conjunction with the *śraddhābala*. The *Rcd* abounds with other, rather interesting, manifestations of *bala* (pp. 241.2.7-42.1.4). For, instance, it proposes that *śraddhā* causes the acquisition of the seven riches (5.4) and power over zealous application (*adhimukti*); power of *vīrya* leads to the accomplishment of the *bodhyaṅga* (5.4) and power over liberation (3.7); *smṛti* entails the six recollections of the bodhisattva (5.5) and power over the fifth *dharmaskandha* (3.7); *dhyāna* eliminates the seven bases of consciousness and prompts great mental power (3.8); *prajñā* removes the eightfold mistaken conduct (5.5-6) and purifies the conduct of all beings (3.8).

807. R, folio 677.4-679.6.

he expose himself to the very conditions from which he seeks release. Taking account of these constraints, the *Bdp* merges two concepts in its exposition of the five *bala*. On the one hand, it follows the traditional line that the *bala* are superior to the *indriya* in attainment, while on the other hand, it employs typical bodhisattva imagery to illustrate the origin, scope and nature of the obstacles that must be overcome by the cultivation of faith, etc.⁸⁰⁸

Few traces of such adaptation are found in the treatment of the factors of enlightenment (*bodhyaṅga*). Emulating the *bodhipākṣika* tradition of early Buddhism, the *Bdp* provides rather terse, definitive accounts of the focus and nature of each of the seven limbs. Judging by my reading of *sūtra* material, its explanations have no parallels in other texts. In spirit and practice, they correspond for the most part to ancient interpretations. Only in the ontological domain do differences prevail. For example, there is the conclusion in the *smṛtibodhyaṅga* that the recollection of *dharma* establishes knowledge of the lack of own-being of *dharma*—an opinion seemingly at odds with the ancient ideas of reality.

The *Bdp* explains *smṛti* in terms of recollection and presence of mind that, manifesting careful examination and analysis, command a vision of things just as they are. Next, the *bodhyaṅga* of Dharma-discernment (*dharmapravicaya*) is explained in terms of contextually adjusted approaches to the various types of instructions that make up the Dharma. As Gethin shows, this interpretation is one of several aspects that stand at the very heart of the concept of *dharmapravicaya* in the nikāya.⁸⁰⁹ Vigour (*vīrya*) is portrayed as a quality of strength and dedication, specifically directed at those factors that contribute to awakening, viz., Dharma-discernment, purification, meditation and equipoise.

This choice of 'vigour targets' contains a clue to the bond between the next two *bodhyaṅga*, namely, joy (*prīti*) and tranquillity (*praśrabdha*). Traditionally linked as factors that bring about a positive mental disposition, *prīti* and *praśrabdha* are intimately related to each other in practice and result.⁸¹⁰ The nature of this relationship is best summed up in the ancient

808. R, folio 679.6

Note also that preference is given to the *bala* over the *indriya* as practices leading to the accumulation of pristine cognition. Here, as in the *bala* section proper, each of the *bala* is specifically adapted to the bodhisattva training, when it says that faith promotes reverence; vigour is targeted at learning; mindfulness prevents oblivion of the thought of enlightenment; meditation helps faith in *dharma*-sameness and that wisdom assists acquiring the power of learning (R, folio 646.1–3). For examples of sources where reference to the *bala* (when subsequent to the *indriya*) are given only scant attention, see: *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 123–4; *Amṛt* (B), p. 205; *Mvś* (N), p. 52.20; *Mppś*, iii, p. 1200; *Satya-s* (S), p. 43.

809. Gethin, 1987, pp. 283–295; cf. *Abhidh-sam* (R), 1980, p. 123.

810. See, for instance, *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (Waldschmidt, 1956, p. 292, 30.27) where we read that joy (*prīti*) associated with the body leads to tranquillity (*praśrabdha*) of the mind (cf. *Mvy* 1587–95).

formula, saying that “the body of one whose mind is joyful becomes tranquil and one whose body is tranquil experiences happiness”.⁸¹¹ As this cohesion of emotional fulfilment and mental quietude is mediated through the body and involves purification of body and mind in meditation⁸¹², *prīti* and *praśrabdha* are closely coupled and, to some degree, dependent on each other.⁸¹³ It is not a coincidence that we also find close terminological parallels echoing this link in the *Bdp*’s description of the *bodhyaṅga* of joy and tranquillity.

The sixth *bodhyaṅga*, meditation (*samādhi*), has two aspects, on the one hand effecting realisation of the Dharma and, on the other hand, awakening to the workings of *dharma*. In a sense, this characterisation goes beyond the standard definitions of the *samādhibodhyaṅga* which content themselves with one-pointed, sustained meditative examination of the nature of *dharma*.⁸¹⁴ However, since both aspects contribute equally to the destruction of the depravities (*āsrava*) and go hand in hand, this deviation should perhaps not be given undue weight.⁸¹⁵

Equipose (*upekṣā*), to early Buddhism, is essentially a feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant (*aduḥkḥāsukhā vedanā*).⁸¹⁶ As a *bodhyaṅga*, however, it is less a feeling pertaining to the *vedanāskandha* than a skilful mental factor of the *saṃskāraskandha*.⁸¹⁷ Having the quality of balance, specifically regarding co-nascent *dharma*—that in the context of the *bodhyaṅga* must mean perfect balance between *smṛti*, etc.—it settles a restless mind into a state of equipose thereby rendering it conducive to enlightenment.⁸¹⁸ It is exactly these concerns that are addressed in the *upekṣābodhyaṅga* of the *Bdp*. Eschewing the latent tendencies to attraction and dislike, it is characterised as a quiescent mental state that is not diverted by the extremes of worldly experience. In other words, it is thought freed from all types of turbulence and anxiety, unaffected by hatred and desire and in harmony with the noble path

811. Gethin, 1987, p. 299

The idea that *praśrabdha* affects body and mind in equal measure is disputed by the Sarvāstivāda because it would expose a factor of awakening, belonging by definition to the *lokottara* path, to the impurities of the body pertaining to the *laukika* domain. For a full discussion, see: *Kośa*, ii, pp. 157–59.

812. Cousins, *Religion*, III (1973), pp. 120–2.

813. *Amrt* (B), p. 206:

“Ici, quand il médite, le corps et la pensée sont légers, dociles et en sécurité (*yogakṣema*) et ils s’adaptent à la concentration (*samādhyanuvartin*)—c’est le membre relaxation.” Cf. *Mpps*, iii, p. 1202.

814. *Vism*, xiv, p. 139; *Mpps*, iii, p. 1201; *Amrt* (B), p. 207; *Msl*, p. 144.18–19; cf. *Rcd*, p. 242.1.4–5.2

For a considered discussion of the operational scope of meditation in Theravāda Buddhism, see: Cousins, *Religion*, iii, 1973, pp. 115–131 (especially, p. 122).

815. Gethin, 1987, pp. 288–292.

816. S V, p. 210; *Vibh*, p. 123.

817. *Arthav-t* (S), p. 230.3–5; cf. *Kośa*, ii, pp. 159–60.

818. A good account of the different viewpoints on the intent, scope and operations of *upekṣā* in early Buddhist literature is found in Aronson, 1979, pp. 1–18. For a resourceful interpretation of Aronson’s findings, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 302–8.

itself.⁸¹⁹

The noble eightfold path (*āryaṣṭāṅgamārga*) is itself the object of investigation under the ninth type of ‘skill’. Here, in contrast to its ‘mainstream’ description of the *bodhyaṅga*, the *Bdp* casts aside the old-established explanations of the nikāya to replace them with a set of altogether new interpretations. The picture that emerges of the eight limbs—although in spirit compatible with the ideal of the path itself—is to my knowledge unique to the *Bdp*.⁸²⁰

I shall give here a brief outline of the standard presentation in the nikāya to show just how much it differs.⁸²¹ In this scheme, right view (*sammaddiṭṭhi*) is knowledge concerning the constituents of the four noble truths and becomes accordingly a form of wisdom. Right resolve (*sammāsankappa*) covers three areas of thought, that is, thoughts of non-desire (*nekkhamma*), non-hatred (*avyāpāda*) and non-violence (*avihiṃsā*). Right speech (*sammāvācā*) is manifested by refraint from falsehood (*musāvāda*), slander (*pisuṇāvācā*), harsh speech (*pharusāvācā*) and idle talk (*samphappalāpa*). It is right conduct (*sammākammanta*) to refrain from assaults on sentient beings (*pāṇatipāta*), not taking what is not given (*adinnādāna*) and avoidance of violations of celibacy (*abrahmacariya*). The contents of right livelihood (*sammājīva*) are rarely spelled out, but generally explained as “renouncing wrong modes of livelihood and making a living by means of right livelihood” (*micchājīvaṃ pahāya sammājīvena jīvitam kappeti*). Right effort (*sammāvāyāma*) is explained in terms of the basic *sammappadhāna* formula in the same way that it is found in the *Bdp*. Right mindfulness (*sammāsati*) is characterised by the basic *satipaṭṭhāna* formula⁸²² and right meditation (*sammāsamādhi*) is illustrated by way of the customary sketch of the four *jhāna*.

Before contrasting this presentation with the eightfold path in the *Bdp*, I wish to make three general remarks. First, as already observed by Gethin, the wording and type of characterisation of the eight members is not coincidental, but was designed to link into many of the regularly recurring themes of the nikāya.⁸²³ This might have put constraints on its phrasing and

819. The discussion of the individual factors of enlightenment extends in the *Bdp* over three folios, starting on folio 662.7 and ending on folio 665.4.

820. To be precise, it is only found in the textual lineage where the *Bdp* appears to be the foundation text. As indicated, it is also contained almost verbatim in the *Akn* (pp. 70.4.4–71.2.1) and *Arthav* (S), pp. 320–322.

821. M III, p. 251; see also: D II, p. 311; S V, pp. 8–10; *Paṭis*, i, pp. 40–2; *Vibh*, pp. 104–5. The bare list of the eight factors appears, of course, at many more places throughout the nikāya. According to Gethin (1987, p. 314), it is itemised no less than sixty-four times.

822. For examples of the basic formula, see: D II, p. 290; D III, pp. 58, 141, 221, 276; M I 339–340; S V, pp. 141–192, 294–306; A IV, pp. 457–8.

823. Gethin, 1987, p. 364.

terminology. Second, several of the definitions have close parallels where their members form part of other sets of practice. So, right view, right effort, right mindfulness and right meditation all display practically identical explanations in the faculties (and powers) of wisdom, vigour, mindfulness and meditation.⁸²⁴ Finally, the contents of right speech, right conduct and right livelihood epitomise the very concerns of the early Buddhist ideal of morality. Recurring as principal items in the *sīlakkhandhavagga* of the *Dīghanikāya*⁸²⁵, identical to four of the *pañcasīla* and corresponding to six of the ten *kuśalakarmapatha*, they rank among the most visible indicators of a monk's spiritual progress.

If we turn now to the description of the noble eightfold path in the *Bdp*, we immediately notice that such features are absent. In content, none of the descriptions of the eight factors shows any traces of linking either its definition with the wider frame of reference of the bodhisattva training—be it through the inclusion of key terminology or adaptation of otherwise well-known formulae—or to secure moral conduct as its spiritual epicentre. On the contrary, the whole presentation has a generality of tone that is practically devoid of references to concrete practices.

The first limb, right view (*samyagdr̥ṣṭi*), is explained in terms antithetical to its opposite, wrong view (*mithyādr̥ṣṭi*), and displays little positive argument. This also holds true for the explanation of right resolve (*samyaksamkalpa*), only declaring that right resolve does not result in *rāga*, *dveṣa* or *moha*, but that it establishes the five pure aggregates (*dharmaskandha*) co-resident with *bodhi*.⁸²⁶ The following three factors, that is, right speech (*samyakvāc*), right conduct (*samyakkarmānta*) and right livelihood (*samyagājīva*), traditionally epitomising ethical integrity, do not contain any of the 'morality markers' that are brought up in the early formula. In their place, the *Bdp* rather sweepingly defines right speech as intrinsically worthwhile and innocuous dialogue that abounds with beneficial application and is persuasive of the truth of the sameness all paths. Right conduct is measured by the kind of reward it is likely to

824. For concurring definitions with the *indriya* and *bala* see, for instance: S V, pp. 196–200.

825. D I, pp. 1–4.

826. R, folio 666.5–6

According to the *Kp* (p. 209, § 144), cited here in Weller's German translation, these five *skandha* define *nirvāṇa*:

“Die geistige Sammlung, die Weisheit, die Erlösung, die Schau des Erkenntniss der Erlösung, ihr Ehrwürdigen, wandern nicht durch die Wiedergeburten und erlöschen nicht völlig. Durch diese Gegebenheiten, ihr Ehrwürdigen, wird das *Nirvāṇa* angedeutet, doch sind diese Gegebenheiten leer, abgesondert, nicht zu fassen als reale Objekte.”

For Pāli references, see: D III, p. 279; S I, p. 99; A I, p. 162. Alternative titles of the *dharmaskandha* are found in *Dhsgr* § 23 (*lokottaraskandha*); *Mvy* 104–8 (*asamasamāskandha*); *Kośa*, i, p. 48; vi, p. 297; *Kośavyākhyā*, p. 607.10 (*anāsravaskandha*), (ref. Lamotte).

produce. *A fortiori*, it excludes unwholesome action, but—aspiring to a lasting cessation of all consequences of action—is aimed ultimately at the exhaustion of all types of activity.

The next limb, right livelihood, being characterised by a series of concrete attributes, is the single exception to these general descriptions. Its content is the ideal of mendicant life and, in particular, the four precepts of the *āryavaṃśa* conduct.⁸²⁷ Besides, it is free from foolishness, hypocrisy and violence but governed by modesty, vigilance, contentedness and moral purity. In spirit, many these characteristics are very close to the path ideal that was introduced in the *śīlapāramitā* which might, therefore, be legitimately taken to provide for the moral base in the eightfold path. The references to the mendicant ideal and, specifically, to the *āryavaṃśa* seem to suggest, however, that these facets go well beyond the moral domain, and trace, in fact, a paradigm of the bodhisattva's way of life interpreted in terms of right livelihood.

Right effort (*samyagvyāvāma*) marks a return to the rather condensed and yet imprecise explanations. Accordingly, we learn very little of its exact application other than generalities. Right effort is held to advocate virtuous conduct against mistaken conduct, to promote the eradication of the propensities of defilement and to introduce to the truths and the noble path itself.

In its explanation of right mindfulness (*samyaksmṛti*)—notably eschewing references to the stock formula of *smṛtyupasthāna*—the *Bdp* draws on elements that pertain to mindfulness in the nikāya.⁸²⁸ That is to say, it is seen as a self-possessed, composed and attentive state of mental awareness manifesting in the practitioner a high degree of presence of mind.⁸²⁹ Then, it examines the phenomena that surround the bodhisattva and tests them for their usefulness or inadequacy—as the case may be—in relation to the path. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, *samyaksmṛti* is a force of recollection calling to mind the commitment to the path and, by implication, to universal liberation.

It is this concern with the suffering of beings that also resonates in the definition of right meditation (*samyaksamādhi*). Its psychological content—in principle no doubt related to the experience of the śrāvaka—is declared as composure towards reality, particularly in view of

827. R, folio 667.4.

828. Gethin, 1987, p. 88.

829. This association with mental awareness is not particular to the nikāya, but became a generally characteristic of mindfulness. For the Sarvāstivāda, we read:

“The faculty of mindfulness is a name for accurate designation concerning the body, etc., as it is discerned by wisdom. A mind that has become acquainted with [mindfulness] does not experience loss of object. Such lack of loss is the faculty of mindfulness” (*Abhidh-d*, p. 360.14–16).

its constituents (*dharma*). To the *Bdp*, however, this alone does not suffice to turn 'meditation' into 'right meditation'. For this transformation to take place, it is vital that serenity is acquired with a higher, very specific goal in mind, namely, the liberation of all sentient beings. As if to underline this element of altruism, preaching is included as an important aspect of right meditation.⁸³⁰ This adjustment grew no doubt from the re-invigorated concern for the fate of the world the Buddhist communities in ancient India became preoccupied with and so is by no means coincidental.

The differences in approach between the path formulae of the nikāya and *Bdp* are so evident that they require, I think, no further illustration. As shown, apart from the reinterpretation of right meditation, most do not affect the spiritual core of the path, but centre on stylistic matters and detail of explanation. Most striking perhaps is the lack of reference to key bodhisattva terminology and the little use of established formulae. This is not a general feature of *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* descriptions in Mahāyāna literature. Usually, the eight factors are harmonised with the other bodhisattva practices in terms of a large degree of common vocabulary.⁸³¹ A good example of this is the account given in the *Rcd*.⁸³² Its explanations of the individual members are interspersed with a wealth of key concepts that occur elsewhere in connection with the bodhisattva training. Thus, right view is explained in terms of *śūnyatā* and *advaya*⁸³³; right resolve consists of 'skill' in *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, producing insight into *dharma*-sameness⁸³⁴; right livelihood is specifically developed in order to purify and ripen other beings⁸³⁵; mindfulness means, above all, recollection of the practice of the *pāramitā* and postponement of entry into *nirvāṇa*⁸³⁶ while meditation, although overtly concerned with the four noble truths conduces to a profound understanding of emptiness and all-knowing.⁸³⁷ A similar abundance of key terminology is manifest in the Mahāyāna interpretation of the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* given in the *Mppś*.⁸³⁸ Here, however, emphasis is not so much placed on specific bodhisattva practices as on philosophical concepts, such as *bhūtalakṣaṇa*, *anabhisamkāralakṣaṇa*, *śūnyatā*, *sarvajñajñāna* and *sarvakarmasamatā*. Although not as

830. R, folio 668.4–6.

831. E.g., *Śsp* (*Ghoṣa*), pp. 1427–39; *Ug*, p. 269.3.8–4.2; *Rcd*, pp. 242.5.2–44.3.6; *Arthav* (*S*), pp. 34–42; *Śrāv-bh* (*Sh*), pp. 327.8–330.18; *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1203–7; *Abhidh-sam* (*R*), pp. 123–4.

832. 24, pp. 242.5.2–244.2.6.

833. *op. cit.*, pp. 243.1.3–2.5.

834. *op. cit.*, pp. 243.3.3.

835. *op. cit.*, pp. 243.5.6.

836. *op. cit.*, pp. 244.4.1–8.

837. *op. cit.*, pp. 244.2.2–5.

838. *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1203–1207.

convincing an example as the account in the *Rcd*, the *Mppś* nevertheless documents the tendency in the Mahāyāna to adjust the descriptions of the eightfold path to contemporary thinking. For good reason, this trend is not manifested in the *Bdp*.

Interpolated into the discussion of the *bodhipākṣika dharma*, between the noble eightfold path and the perfect efforts, is an exposition of 'skill' in perfect mental quietude (*śamatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*).⁸³⁹ One key element in the description of *śamatha* is mental composure (*cittaśānta*). Effecting serenity, contentment, patience, ease of mind and imperturbability with regard to the senses, it stands at the very heart of the bodhisattva's meditative experience and is as such recognised in the *Bdp*. The attainment of composure itself signals the eradication of a series of factors certain to obstruct absorption. According to the *Bhāvanākrama*, these include indolence (*kausīdya*), forgetfulness with regard to the object of meditation (*ālambanavismaraṇa*), distraction (*vikṣepa*), agitation (*auddhatya*), absence of effort (*avyāyāma*) and effort (*vyāyāma*).⁸⁴⁰ In the *Bdp*, none of these is explicitly referred to, but we find their presence in a number of terms that betray their elimination.⁸⁴¹ Further details of the meditative contents are revealed by the inclusion of reflection (*manasakāra*) and thorough examination (*pratyavekṣaṇā*).⁸⁴² According to the *Bhāvanākrama*, reflection plays an important role particularly during to the first phase of *śamatha* practice where it is concerned with the body and *dharma*—objects that are also given in the *Bdp*. It is essentially a preparatory practice, technically known as 'images devoid of concepts' (*nirvikalpakapratibimba*), because the bodhisattva has not yet succeeded in evaluating their true value, that leads to full investigation ('images accompanied by concepts' *savikalpakapratibimba*) during *vipaśyanā*.⁸⁴³ As structure,

839. For references to *śamatha/vipaśyanā* in the nikāya, see: M I, p. 494; III, pp. 289, 297; S IV, pp. 194–95, 295, 350, 352; V, p. 52; A II, p. 157. For the Mahāyāna, see the contribution made by the *Samdhis* on *śamatha/vipaśyanā* (*Samdhis* (ÉLa), pp. 88.1–97.27). Good expositions in the scholastic literature are found in the *Bbh* (pp. 109.7–110.13), *Msl* (p. 146.6–28) and, above all, in the account drawn up by *Kamalaśīla* in his *Bhāvanākrama* (*MBT*, ii, pp. 205–214; iii, pp. 1–13).

840. *MBT*, ii, § 14, pp. 207–8; *MBT*, iii, pp. 9–11.

841. R, folio 669.2–3.

842. At first sight, to find references to *pratyavekṣaṇā* and *manasakāra* in the *śamatha* section comes somewhat as a surprise, since both terms are elsewhere specifically associated with *vipaśyanā*. See, for instance, *Śgs*, p. 256; *Samdhis* (ÉLa), pp. 89, 92, 96 and *MBT*, iii, pp. 4.16, 5.17. However, as made clear by the context, for the *Bdp* their focus is not the nature of the *pudgala* or *dharma*—as it is during *vipaśyanā* practice—but the functioning of the yogin's body. Therefore, in the *Bdp* they carry less the meaning of the sharp, analytic investigation that is the characteristic of them during *vipaśyanā* practice than an generally observing purpose. For a discussion of these terms in the context of meditative practice, see: Demiéville, 1987, pp. 79–80.

843. *MBT*, iii, pp. 1.13–2.5

The *Bhāvanākrama* stresses that part of this reflection is particularly concerned with the body of the Tathāgata—a topic not mentioned in the *Bdp*. For a list of alternative objects of meditation during the

the *Bdp* accepts the traditional eight branches of meditation supplemented by the *apramāṇa*—a division also found in the *Samdhis*.⁸⁴⁴ In contrast to the *Bhāvanākrama*⁸⁴⁵, the setting of *śamatha* practice and its preparations are little discussed in the *Bdp*, although it indicates that seclusion away from the bustle of worldly life is the ideal location.

The bodhisattva, having come into contact with true reality through reflection, produces insight (*vipaśyanā*) into the nature of reality. For the *Bdp*, this newly won realisation is threefold.⁸⁴⁶ First, focused on his own body, it allows him to penetrate its true nature and to conclude that the individual (*pudgala*) does not exist. Then, he widens his field of vision and applies the principles behind this insight to the world at large. Grasping the workings of causality and fruit attainment, he penetrates reality and sees that *dharma* are non-existent (*dharmanairātmya*).⁸⁴⁷ According to the *Bhāvanākrama*, it is exactly this vision of reality, manifesting insight into *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharmanairātmya*, that distinguishes *vipaśyanā* from other types of cognition and turns it into correct analysis (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*).⁸⁴⁸ Finally, having acquired accurate vision of *dharma* and the context where they occur, the bodhisattva shifts his attention to the objects of his meditation (*ālambana*) only to realise that they also lack own-being (*svabhāva*).⁸⁴⁹ At this stage, his understanding of reality has passed beyond all mental constructions to allow him to perceive the absence of concepts (*nirvikalpa*) and developments (*niṣprapañca*).⁸⁵⁰ Thus accomplished, insight is no longer to him a part of conventional cognition, but rests in equal measure on seeing and non-seeing. Also called perfect seeing (*samyagdarśana*), it establishes him in the highest form of bodhisattva activity that incurs no karmic traces whatsoever.

For this achievement to take place, it is essential that *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* are practised jointly throughout. As the two principal factors in meditation, they are inextricably linked like “two oxen harnessed to a plough”, to quote a canonical simile.⁸⁵¹ With well-developed

śamatha cultivation, see: *Samdhis* (ÉLa), pp. 88.8–89.19 and *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 126.

844. *Samdhis* (ÉLa), p. 93.1–10

For material on the psychological experiences that distinguish *upekṣā* from *śamatha*, see: *Samdhis* (ÉLa), p. 97.11–26; *Kośa*, ii, pp. 25, 159; viii, p. 147; *Siddhi*, pp. 334, 370, *MBT*, iii, p. 9.20–21.

845. *MBT*, iii, pp. 3.4–4.12.

846. The threefold division of *vipaśyanā* in the *Bdp* is mirrored in the account of the *Bhāvanākrama* (*MBT*, iii, pp. 5.18–8.17). For an alternative division, see: *Samdhis* (ÉLa), p. 92.14–30.

847. R, folio 670.1–2.

848. *MBT*, iii, p. 5.14–17.

849. R, folio 670.6.

850. *MBT*, iii, p. 7.14–15.

851. D III, pp. 213, 273; M I, pp. 494, 289; A II, pp. 156–7; *Paṭi*, ii, p. 92; See also: *Śikṣ*, p. 119; *Bbh*, p. 207. 2–6; *Msl*, p. 91.25–26; *MBT*, iii, p. 10.4–7. For further references, see: *Kośa*, viii, p. 131.

vipaśyanā but weak *śamatha*, thought is agitated like a lamp exposed to strong winds so that reality is not clearly seen. But, if *śamatha* prevails over *vipaśyanā*, sleep is close at hand and reality will never be perceived.⁸⁵² Hence, the view that *śamatha* precedes as practice the cultivation of *vipaśyanā*—although occasionally expressed in Buddhist literature and also implied in the *Bdp*—appears to be a more theoretical proposition.⁸⁵³

The Acquisition of Wisdom

The last type of ‘skill’ that is considered in the *Bdp* is ‘skill’ in *dharma*. Not included amongst the ten primary kinds of ‘skill’, but appended to the introductory statement, its function is to conclude the prior discussion. The key element in all six examples of ‘skill’ in *dharma* is the bodhisattva’s dexterity in transforming attainments of the conditioned into attainments of the unconditioned. He transforms the predisposition (*saṃskāra*) of body, speech and mind into all-knowing; he does not depreciate Perfect Wisdom through the five preliminary perfections; he leads sentient beings to enlightenment through the means of conversion; he does not cut the fetters of *saṃsāra*, but cleanses himself of worldly defilements; he remains unaffected by impurity in spite of his presence in the *traiḍhātuka*; he is acquainted with the teachings of emptiness, etc., and yet, he does not realise the unconditioned.⁸⁵⁴

The significance of these examples is twofold. First, it is shown that a bodhisattva who is skilled in *dharma*—conditioned and unconditioned alike—is in fact equipped with all-knowing. Second, since spiritual realisation devoid of ‘skill’ and wisdom cannot produce liberation, it testifies to their indispensability and discloses the benefits skilful interaction between the conditioned and unconditioned delivers.⁸⁵⁵ Emulating the ancient model of the integration of means (*upāya*) and wisdom (*prajñā*)—the former being part of the conditioned, the latter epitomising the unconditioned—‘skill’ in *dharma* accentuates the functional relationship

852. *MBT*, iii, p. 9.22–10.5; *Samdhis (ÉLa)*, p. 90.15–21.

853. In a *sutta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya*, for instance, we have Ānanda declaring that a *bhikkhu* who claims to have attained arhantship is in possession of one of four paths, that is, the path cultivating *vipassanā* preceded by *śamatha*; the path cultivating *śamatha* preceded by *vipassanā*; the path in which both are yoked together or a path where the *bhikkhu*’s mind is agitated by *dhamma* (A II, pp. 156–7). See also *Papañcasūdanī* (v, p. 504) where Buddhaghosa proposes that *śamatha* and *vipassanā* belong to different moments (*nānākkhanikā*), leading to a serial attainment of the three marks and *vipassanā* (ref. Ruegg; cf. *Kośa*, viii, p. 131). In Māhāyana texts, consult: *Samdhis (ÉLa)*, p. 90.3–14; *Siddhi*, p. 597; *MBT*, iii, pp. 1–3; *DPP*, p. 17.

854. R, folio 685.1.

855. R, folio 685.4–5.

coupling the actual practices to the cognitive realm. This accounts also for the positioning of 'skill' in *dharma* at the very end of the discourse *outside* the formal structure of the ten skills. For, 'skill' in *dharma* sets out to establish their interconnection by fusing the worldly *pāramitā* with the perfection of wisdom; by uniting learning, reflection and contemplation; by merging the *pratisaraṇa* with the *pratisaṃvid*; by joining *puṇyasamḃhāra* with *jñānasamḃhāra*; and by blending *samatha* and *vipaśyanā*.

This interpretation, obvious on textual grounds and well-known from other sources, does not present much of a problem. Difficulties arise, however, if we attempt to reconcile the *Bdp*'s intent behind 'skill' in *dharma* with that of the ten 'skills' in the *Mvś*. As already seen, for the *Mvś* 'skill' is essentially a means of illustrating the futility of the belief in a self (*ātma-drṣṭi*). In line with this thinking, 'skill' in conditioned and unconditioned *dharma* (likewise placed as the tenth 'skill' at the end of the discussion) is employed to show the 'illusion of an entity that is either bound or released' (*amuktamuktatvagrāha*).⁸⁵⁶ The idea is that such illusion consists in imagining that a self is at first tied to *saṃsāra* by defilements and later liberated from them. Since only conditioned *dharma* are subject to the *saṃyojana*, 'skill' in conditioned and unconditioned (i.e., all) *dharma* is explained to counteract this illusion.⁸⁵⁷

While this approach to 'skill' in *dharma* is consistent with the interpretation of the preceding nine types of 'skill', it does not show any obvious relation to our passage in the *Bdp*. The only link with the *Mvś*'s standpoint is perhaps the *Bdp*'s proposition that the transformation to enlightenment takes place on the basis of discerning all *dharma* as unconditioned enlightenment in the first place.⁸⁵⁸ This eliminates the need for purification and explains the abstention from realising the unconditioned. It would also account for the bodhisattva's twofold approach to reality. Moreover, in a sense, it removes by implication the process of deliverance from the individual that is of key concern to the *Mvś*.

Phases in Perfect Wisdom

I now propose to investigate the structural principles that underlie the arrangement of the

856. *Mvś* (N), p. 44.10.

857. *Mvś* (N), p. 48.6–7.

858. R, folio 683.7.

prajñāpāramitā practices. Following the bodhisattva practice proper,⁸⁵⁹ the *Bdp* discusses material that seems to include a blueprint of the bodhisattva's career phases. This blueprint—integrated into the discussion of 'skill' in solitary wandering—gives an approximate idea of the scope and nature of the various phases. However, since the text itself is anything but explicit I have had to turn once again to the *Akn-ṭikā* that contains a brief passage on a parallel section in the *Akn*.⁸⁶⁰ Guided by its analysis, it became possible to break up the contents of 'skill' in solitary wandering as follows.⁸⁶¹ At first, during the initial phase extending from the first *cittotpāda* to the *adhimukticaryābhūmi*, the bodhisattva practises only in his own interest, as he is unable to dispense instruction and benefit to others.⁸⁶² During this period, wholly independent and self-sufficient, he lives the life of a recluse and is isolated from the world. In spite of immense effort, his practice of the *pāramitā* is flawed. The process of *pāramitā* purification takes place during the second phase and follows on the attainment of patience. Although the *Akn-ṭikā* does not indicate the span of this period, our analysis of *kṣānti* has revealed that this is unlikely to occur prior to the seventh (*sudurjayābhūmi*) or possibly the sixth stage (*arcriṣmatībhūmi*). Still left to his own devices, he secures the perfections all by himself and resolves to achieve unsurpassed attainments. Advance to the third phase is marked by the acquisition of the vision of *dharma*-sameness. Having removed all obstacles related to defilements (*kleśāvaraṇa*) and having decisively weakened those pertaining to knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), the bodhisattva attains mastery of the means of conversion (*saṃgrahavastu*). This allows him to develop fellow beings and plant the roots of virtue with unprecedented impact.⁸⁶³ Finally, at the fourth stage, freed from all impurity, he overcomes the last remaining obstacles and, taking a seat on the *vajra*-throne, attains enlightenment. This, of course, signals the end of the bodhisattva's advance to buddhahood.

Clearly, this division, however plausible, is rather general. Moreover, it does not seem to stand in direct relationship to the content of the *Prājñā* Chapter, since it approaches the bodhisattva path in a much broader fashion. I suggest to leave its evaluation on the side for

859. For reasons that will become apparent, I take them to include the *pratisaṃvid*, *pratisaraṇa*, *puṇya/jñānasambhāra*, *bodhipākṣika* as well as *śamatha/vipaśyanā*.

860. *Akn*, pp. 72.1.8–73.2; *Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 271.4.4–272.2.1.

861. Text references to key sentences in the *Akn-ṭikā* and discussions of the terminology are given in my notes to the translation of chapter eleven.

862. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 272.1.1; *Bbh*, pp. 84.21–85.7, 86.4–11.

863. As reference to the means of conversion is omitted in the *Bdp* but found in the *Akn*, we must ignore the *saṃgrahavastu* phase. This, however, is immaterial to the characterisation of the path phases since vision of *dharma*-sameness is in any event fixed to the eighth stage (*Śgs*, p. 131) at which point the bodhisattva has already attained mastery over the *saṃgrahavastu* and sets out to ripen beings with immense effect (*Daśa-bh* p. 57.16).

the time being and to turn instead to the structures of the wisdom-practices themselves.

Reading through the chapter, the first thing one notices is the break between the section leading up to 'skill' and the discussion of 'skill' itself. The former section, starting with the seventy-two kinds of learning and ending with the bodhisattva's emancipation from defilements, is markedly less structured than the other parts of this chapter. Although much of its material is well-known from earlier sources, insufficient use of 'context markers' introduces some ambiguity regarding the conceptual interrelation between the practices and the training phases they represent. Notwithstanding, it is possible to outline a general structural pattern. As shown, large areas of the arrangement of the practices bear reminiscence to the first four of the five traditional path phases, comprising the *sambhāramārga*, *prayogamārga*, *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga*. In establishing this correlation, I considered the few 'context markers' available and compared the *Bdp*'s position with the contents of the various stages known from other sources. The picture that emerged from this analysis—although not beyond controversy in detail—supplies continuity between the individual practices.

Next, the *Bdp* introduces a series of 'skills' that are apparently related to the foregoing accomplishments. Most commentaries agree that the first four of these represent the cognitive attainment of the śrāvaka. Since their objective (that is, the eradication of the belief in a self) is not particular to the training of the śrāvaka, but equally pertains to the *bodhisattvacaryā*, they are cited also in the *Bdp*.⁸⁶⁴ When we turn to the *pratisaṃvid* difficulties arise because these exhibit no clear conceptual link with the destruction of the belief in a self. What is more, our sources disagree on their position in the path, some arguing that the *pratisaṃvid* spring from 'skill' in *skandha*, etc., while others assert the contrary. Judgement on this matter will have to await further research. Whatever their exact relation to the first four types of 'skill', the *pratisaṃvid* are an integral part of *prajñāpāramitā*⁸⁶⁵ and their overall task is well attested by their content. Above all, they introduce the bodhisattva to those areas of knowledge that will be of greatest demand in his career; that is, they give an accurate understanding of reality—in conventional and absolute terms—and the ability to communicate effectively with other beings.⁸⁶⁶ Their relation to the *bodhipākṣika* is of utmost importance to the bodhisattva. For, not only do they allow for the perception of the individual *dharma* 'in accordance with

864. *Bbh*, p. 4.6–8.

865. *Bbh*, p. 214.9–15.

866. In the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 242.1.4–7), this interpretation is brought out by the purpose to which the *pratisaṃvid* are set, that is the 'attainment of power in teaching'.

reality' (*yathābhūta*), but moreover, prompt him to postpone indefinitely their realisation.⁸⁶⁷

The rationale for joining the *pratisaraṇa* with the *pratisaṃvid* poses fewer difficulties, since both are closely related in contents and spirit. This is particularly true of the *arthapratisaṃvid* and *dharmapratisaṃvid*, as knowledge of the own-being of things and designations becomes almost a prerequisite for considered reliance on any of the four *pratisaraṇa*. The impact of the *niruktipratisaṃvid* on the *pratisaraṇa* is smaller, since the knowledge of languages has immediate bearing only on the *artha/vyañjana* and *neyārtha/nītārtha* distinction. In a sense, three out of four *pratisaṃvid* represent something of a basis of cognition to the *pratisaraṇa* therefore. Once established, their conceptual proximity could be taken to explain the irregular order in which the *pratisaraṇa* are presented. That is to say, by beginning the discussion of the *pratisaraṇa* with the *artha/vyañjana* combination in the place of the *dharmatā/pudgala* pair—which most other texts cite as the first *pratisaraṇa*—the *Bdp* might have intended to express a parallelism with the *pratisaṃvid* where *artha* is cited as the first item.⁸⁶⁸

Being thus trained in knowledge and well-focused in his practice, the bodhisattva embarks on the training proper. Dual aspected from the very beginning, it begins with the accumulation of merit and pristine cognition. By accumulating merit, the bodhisattva works for the benefit of sentient beings, since it furnishes him with the roots of virtue that he dedicates to their liberation. By the accumulation of pristine cognition, in contrast, he accomplishes the destruction of his own, personal defilements. This division—although rather theoretical since both practices go hand in hand—is remarkably well-delineated in the *Bdp*, with each accumulation mirroring its designated task. For the *Akn-ṭikā*, referring to the slightly edited path model of the *Bdp* in the *Akn*, this path phase represents the very beginning of the bodhisattva's 'organised career', that is, it coincides with the *saṃbhāramārga*.⁸⁶⁹ This, of course, is a standard classification

867. *Bbh*, p. 259.9–13.

868. Note that in the scheme of the *Bbh* (pp. 256.23–259.6) and *Msl* (pp. 138.3–139.17), the *pratisaraṇa* precede the *pratisaṃvid* on the basis that the former give rise to the latter. This view is also expressed in the *Bhadra-vy* (pp. 45.31–46.2). While Régamey (p. 100) is certainly mistaken in considering the *pratisaraṇa* to be a "free interpretation of the four normal *pratisaṃvid*", in terms of their conceptual proximity, his observation is perhaps not as out of place as might at first appear. Of some interest in this context is the *Bbh*'s comment that the *pratisaṃvid* are the agency giving rise to the cultivation of the *bodhipāṅsika dharma* (p. 259.9–11). This gives a logical connection to its order of beneficial *dharma* listed in the *Bodhipakṣyapaṭala*, viz., *pratisaraṇa*, *pratisaṃvid*, *puṇya/jñānasambhāra*, *bodhipāṅsika*, *śamatha/vipaśyanā*. But for the reversal of the *pratisaraṇa* and *pratisaṃvid* (and perhaps the positioning of the *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala*), this is exactly the order that is found in the *Bdp* (note that the same order of practices is also found in the *Msl*, pp. 138.3–149.4).

869. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 248.5.2.

that need not be discussed here.⁸⁷⁰ Of far greater import to the present context is the question whether this position is reconcilable with our earlier identification of *saṃbhāramārga*. If not, we would have to reconsider most of our observations on the first section of chapter eleven. However, as this problem is not isolated but recurs on three other occasions and requires detailed analysis, I shall postpone its discussion for the time being.

Subsequent to accumulation, that according to the *Akn-ṭikā* constitutes the only element of the *saṃbhāramārga*⁸⁷¹, the *Bdp* introduces the four *smṛtyupasthāna*. To the *Akn-ṭikā* their practice, emulating the Sarvāstivāda path model, signals entry on the *prayogamārga*.⁸⁷² While this classification is in itself not remarkable and is found with minor variation at several places, its adaptation for the *Bdp* raises a whole series of questions. The reason for this is quite simple. In the *Akn*, the bases of mindfulness introduce the traditional order of the *bodhipāṅśika* (with the *samyakprahāṇa*, *ṛddhipāda*, *indriya* and *bala* all part of the *prayogamārga*), whilst in the *Bdp* the *smṛtyupasthāna* are immediately followed by the *bodhyaṅga*. According to the Sarvāstivāda path, this would mean that for the *Bdp* the *prayogamārga* consists only of the bases of mindfulness, since the *bodhyaṅga* already herald entry into the next phase—the *darśanamārga*.⁸⁷³ Practically all sources agree that the *darśanamārga* consists only of one set of practices, be it the *bodhyaṅga* or *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*.⁸⁷⁴ Depending on which choice is made for the *darśanamārga*, the *bhāvanāmārga* as the penultimate stage of the path is occupied either by the factors of enlightenment or the eightfold path. According to the explanations of the *Akn-ṭikā* on the parallel scheme in the *Akn* this would be the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*.⁸⁷⁵ The eightfold path, being traditionally the last of the seven sets, concludes the treatment of the *bodhipāṅśika* in most texts.⁸⁷⁶ At first sight, this

870. *Siddhi*, pp. 564–74; *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 104–3; *DPP*, pp. 33–34.

871. *Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 248.5.3–49.4.2.

872. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 249.5.3–4

See, for instance, *Kośa*, vi, p. 287; *Abhidh-d*, p. 362.12–13.

873. *Abhidh-h* (W), ii, p. 140; *Mvś*, iv.8–10

There exists some disagreement on the distribution of the *bodhyaṅga* and *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* to the *darśana*- and *bhāvanāmārga*. For the *Kośa* (vi, p. 288) and the *Abhidh-d* (p. 362), the *bodhyaṅga* represent the *bhāvanāmārga* with the *darśanamārga* being taken up by the eightfold path, while the opposite is asserted by the *Vaibhāṣika* (*op. cit.*) and the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 266.1.3). The differences between the two schemes have, however, little bearing on substance, since both paths form part of the transcendental realm; it is chiefly a question of reconciling the traditional order of the *bodhipāṅśika* with the view that the meditative context of the *bodhyaṅga* should be associated with the contemplation of the *bhāvanāmārga*.

874. *Abhidh-d*, p. 365; *Kośa*, p. 288; *Mvś* (N), pp. 33.14–16; *Abhidh-sam* (R), pp. 116–7 (different terminology); *Abhidh-h* (W), p. 140.

875. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 267.3.5.

876. For references to examples in the nikāya, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 501, 510, 524–6; for Mahāyāna references, consult any of the following texts: *Kp*, § 95; *Vkn*, p. 20; *Daśa-bh*, pp. 38.16–39.11; *Rcd*, pp. 235.3.4–44.2.6; *Akn*, pp. 66.4.3–71.2.1; *Arthav* (S), pp. 28–42; *Pañca*, pp. 204–208.

model is also endorsed in the *Bdp*, since the practices that immediately follow on the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*, that is, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, do not belong to the *bodhipāṅkṣika*. On their analogous occurrence in the *Akn*, the commentary remarks that *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* constitute the means by which the practical aspects of the path are taught.⁸⁷⁷ I shall demonstrate below that this position, although unusual, is not irreconcilable with other path interpretations. The presence of the *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala* following *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* poses far greater difficulty.

In order appreciate the problems given by this presentation, it may be helpful to recall some of the more general features of the *bodhipāṅkṣika dharma*. Embodying Buddhist spiritual training at the higher stages of the path, the *bodhipāṅkṣika* are not a random assortment of practices, but constitute a coherent body of methods specifically designed to bring about enlightenment. On the one hand, whether in the form of individual sets, or from the point of view of their 'ingredients' (*dravya*), each of the seven categories is understood to reproduce the Path in its own right. On the other hand, epitomising the collective and individual means of reaching awakening, full development of any one of the sets brings to fulfilment all seven. Thus, as a spiritual unity whose individual members stand in close relation to each other, they constitute the very hub of the path.

This and the mnemonic constraints of oral literature, led to an early standardisation in their presentation, including stockphrases and formulae to aid elucidation. As a result, beyond abhidharmic detail, explanations of their contents generally display few differences in substance. Also the number of practices shows little variation, so that all thirty-seven are usually discussed *en bloc*. The order in which they are treated is nearly always the same, starting with the *smṛtyupasthāna* and ending with the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*. Even in expanded lists it is extremely rare that the seven sets are separated. When juxtaposed to other practices, the thirty-seven *dharma* regularly stand at the centre with the remaining practices clustered around them.

When differences occur, these are mainly due to variations in context affecting the status of individual practices. In several works expanded lists of *bodhipāṅkṣika* are met with. Generally, this occurs in the context of meditation practices. Depending whether they are addressed collectively on the *lokottara* path or individually in conjunction with higher applications of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* in the phase immediately preceding the emergence of *lokottara* consciousness, the *bodhipāṅkṣika* are ranked either as *lokottara* or as *laukika* practices.

877. *Akn-ṭīkā*, p. 267.3.6.

Finally, in their attempts to draw up a coherent scheme of the Buddhist experience, scholars have developed several models correlating the seven sets to the stages of the path. Of these, the best documented account is by the Sarvāstivāda school. However, even their distribution of the *bodhipākṣika* fluctuates, showing that these endeavours were never brought to a conclusion. Indeed, we also meet with propositions that indicate a continuous and simultaneous presence of all thirty-seven factors at the higher, transcendental levels of the path.

With these considerations in mind, let us return now to the *bodhipākṣika* in the *Bdp* and reassess those areas where anomalies occur. The first incongruity we have noted is the isolation of the *smṛtyupasthāna* on the *prayogamārga*, with three of its traditional co-residents being separated from the bulk of the *bodhipākṣika*. Editorial adjustments in the order of their presentation in the *Akn*—resulting in the interpolation of the *samyakprahāṇa*, *ṛddhipāda*, *indriya* and *bala* between the *smṛtyupasthāna* and *bodhyaṅga*—indicate that such positioning was already viewed with suspicion in ancient Indian Buddhist circles.⁸⁷⁸ Besides depriving the *prayogamārga* of much of its contents, their position at the very end overturns a whole tradition. For, as Gethin has shown, the order of the seven sets was already established during the four primary nikāya and rapidly assumed an air of inviolability.⁸⁷⁹ Indeed, judging by Gethin's survey of Pāli sources and my own reading in the Mahāyāna, the *Bdp*'s sequencing has no parallel anywhere in Buddhist literature.

The sole presence of the *smṛtyupasthāna* on the *prayogamārga* is less problematic. First, as already noted, Buddhism never produced any fixed and final scheme of distribution of the *bodhipākṣika* to the stages. Discrepancies are greatest with regard to the first two path phases, some placing the *smṛtyupasthāna* on the *saṃbhāramārga*, others on the *prayogamārga* or their equivalents.⁸⁸⁰ Second, the very nature of the *smṛtyupasthāna* could conceivably be taken to allow for this interpretation. Since they are well-known from the *Mahāsatipatṭhānasutta* as embodying on their own the whole Buddhist path and of great importance as basic instructions in meditation, the *smṛtyupasthāna*—it could be argued—stand at the centre of all types of practice.⁸⁸¹ This consideration, it seems, led the compiler of the *Kośa* to refer to the *smṛtyupasthāna* twice, distinguishing a lower and higher level of cultivation; first, as the practice dominating especially the *ādikarmikamārga* and, second, as the foundation to all

878. *Akn*, pp. 66.4.3, 68.5.1, 69.3.2, 69.4.1, 69.5.6, 70.2.3.

879. Gethin, 1987, pp. 500–26, and conclusions: pp. 527–533.

880. Compare, for instance, the schemes of the *Kośa*, vi, pp. 287–88; *Abhidh-d*, p. 362; *Abhidh-h (W)*, p. 140; *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 116–7; *Mvś (N)*, pp. 50–55 and *Mpps*, iii, pp. 1148–1149.

881. D II, p. 290; M I, p. 55.

four *nirvedhabhāgīya*.⁸⁸² Since the *nirvedhabhāgīya* are the very practices that make up the contents of the *prayogamārga*⁸⁸³, the *Bdp*'s identification of the *smṛtyupasthāna* with the *prayogamārga* perhaps is less inept than it appears at face value.

Having already considered the omission of the *ṛddhipāda* and the inverted correlation between the *bodhyaṅga/āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* and *darśana/bhāvanāmārga*, I shall proceed directly to the interpolation of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. To be sure, the occurrence of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* alongside the *bodhipākṣika* is by no means unusual. They are found in a great number of expanded *bodhipākṣika* lists from both the Pāli and Sanskrit traditions.⁸⁸⁴ Furthermore, the meditative experiences pertaining to perfect mental quietude and insight are integral to most aspects of *bodhipākṣika* cultivation. While for some texts this connection is only manifest in selected sets⁸⁸⁵, others define all thirty-seven factors in terms of their association with *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. A good example of the latter approach is found in the *Satyasiddhiśāstra* where all but three of the *bodhipākṣika* practices are identified as belonging either to *śamatha* or *vipaśyanā*.⁸⁸⁶ However, the exact role of perfect mental quietude and insight in relation to the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣika* is little discussed. Gethin, quoting a passage from the *Nettipakaraṇāṭṭha*, suggests that in certain lists the seven sets might have served to exemplify how *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* are fulfilled.⁸⁸⁷ In other contexts, most notably the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi* and *Visuddhimagga*, they further the arising of active skilful consciousness that operates in the phase prior to (*pubhabhāga*) the *lokottara* path.⁸⁸⁸ This would place *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* in the final phase of the *prayogamārga*.

882. *Kośa*, vi, pp. 159–178, 287.

883. This view is expressed in numerous texts. It is found in the *Abhidh-sam (R)*, pp. 105–6; *Kośa*, vi, pp. 169–78; *Mvś (N)*, pp. 33.14–16, 52; *Abhidh-d*, p. 362 and is discussed in *DPP*, pp. 20, 34–37. There are only a few texts that reject the *nirvedhabhāgīya* at the heart of the *prayogamārga*. One such example is the *Abhidh-h (W)*, ii, p. 194. However, rather than outright rejection, their omission from the *prayogamārga* is perhaps the outcome of a different terminology, since the association of the perfect efforts, bases of success, faculties and powers with striving (*vyāyāma*), one-pointedness (*cittaikāgratā*), weak (*mṛdu*) and sharp (*tikṣṇa*) is also present in the description of its equivalent to the *prayogamārga*.

884. For examples of such lists, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 510, 524–26. See also: *Śrotabhūmi* (p. 287.3.2–7) which interpolates the *pratisamvid* between the eightfold path and *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*.

885. See, for instance, the *Śbh (Śrāv-bh (Sh))*, pp. 325–7) relating *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* to the *bodhyaṅga*, with *prāsrabdha*, *samādhi* and *upekṣā* manifesting *śamatha*; *dharmapracicaya*, *vīrya* and *prīti* constituting *vipaśyanā* while *smṛti* is held to consist of both *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*.

886. According to this text, *śamatha* is manifest in the first three types of *smṛtyupasthāna*, in all *ṛddhipāda*, in the first four *indriya* and *bala*, in three of the *bodhyaṅga* and two of the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*. All others, with the exception of the three *śīla* factors of the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*, the *smṛtendriya* and *smṛtibala* are held to pertain to *vipaśyanā* (*op. cit.*, ii, pp. 448–9).

887. Gethin, 1987, p. 515.

888. *Dhs*, pp. 9–29; *Vism*, pp. 137–38, iv.74–5; p. 459, xiv.121; pp. 669–70, xxi.129–30; *Sp*, ii, p. 494; *Sv*, ii, p. 564; iii, pp. 883–4; *Ps*, iii, 243–4. For these and further references, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 625–27.

In Mahāyāna works, their relationship to the *bodhipākṣika* is explained differently. Typically cited after the description of the *bodhipākṣika*, they are given a firm place in the *lokottara* consciousness and interpreted as the culmination of the seven sets.⁸⁸⁹ Thus, we read in the *Bbh* that *śamatha* secures non-discrimination (*avikalpana*) of the *bodhipākṣika*, whilst *vipaśyanā* embodies their accurate perception in accordance with the highest truth and differentiation (*vyavasthāna*).⁸⁹⁰ It is probably in this context that one has to interpret the statement in the *Akn-ṭikā* that *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* jointly embody the practice of the *bhāvanāmārga*. That is to say, dwelling on the path of contemplation linked with wisdom⁸⁹¹, the bodhisattva is no longer concerned with the individual practices or their particular fruits of realisation⁸⁹², but looks at them from the absolute point of view. Citing *smṛti* as example, the *Bbh* explains:⁸⁹³

“In which fashion does the bodhisattva perceive the thirty-seven *bodhipākṣika* *dharma* from the viewpoint of the Mahāyāna? Here, the bodhisattva dwells considering the body as body, but he does not perceive the body as an existing body, nor as a body that does not exist in any way. He perceives the exact nature of the foundation of being of the body. This is for him to consider the body from the absolute point of view.”

For the bodhisattva, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* are therefore not so much part of the dhyānic processes that lead to the acquisition of the *bodhipākṣika*, as the group of factors that establish their position in the Mahāyāna scheme of things.⁸⁹⁴ In the *Bdp*, awareness of this frame of reference is dependent on composure and reflection and produces a vision of reality whose parameter consist in *pudgalanairātmya*, *dharmanairātmya* and *animitta*. Inevitably, the pursuit

889. E.g., *Śrotabhūmi*, p. 287.2.4–5

This is only true if cited in conjunction with the *bodhipākṣika dharma*. Their overall functions in the path as a whole are far more multifarious and vary, depending on the respective phase of the training. A description of their changing roles on the path—starting with their function as causal basis to the attainment of the *adhimuktīcaryābhūmi* and ending with their contribution to the purification of the buddha-field during the eighth, ninth and tenth stages—is given in the *Msl* (p. 146.10–26).

890. *Bbh*, pp. 260.11–261.2.

891. R, folio 670.1.

892. R, folio 671.3.

893. *Bbh*, p. 259.15–22; cf. *Msl*, p. 146.6–27.

894. Besides *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, these include the four *pratisamvid* and a general knowledge of means. They prompt the bodhisattva to look at the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment in accordance with reality, but without realising them (*Bbh*, p. 259.9–11).

of the *bodhipākṣika* within this framework cannot but be affected by such understanding, generating a novel type of consummation that is based on their very non-existence (*anupaladhitām upādāya*).⁸⁹⁵ This insight does not occur by chance, but is inspired by the meditative and cognitive exercises that lie at the heart of the seven sets themselves. Thus, as factors finalising the conceptual context for the bodhisattva's *bodhipākṣika* practice, the positioning of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* after the *bodhipākṣika* proper makes particularly good sense since it takes into account the role of the thirty-seven practices in securing their realisation.⁸⁹⁶

This cannot be said about the position of the *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala*. Apart from infringing on the traditional order of exposition, their location beyond the *bodhipākṣika* series raises the question of their status. That is to say, since they follow on practices that are to all intents part of the *lokottara* consciousness, is it safe to conclude that they also pertain to the *lokottara* phase of the path? If not, what are the effects on our scheme? Does it mean that our signposts have to be cast aside or re-interpreted?

In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to consider the status of the *bodhipākṣika* in general, and that of the *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala* in particular. In the *Kośa*, echoing the ancient view that all *bodhipākṣika* pertain to the higher stages of the path, we learn that the seven sets may be without *āsrava*.⁸⁹⁷ By implication, this must mean that all thirty-seven factors are potentially part of the *lokottara* consciousness. Summing up the Theravāda position on this matter, Gethin writes:⁸⁹⁸

“Strictly speaking, from the point of view of *abhidhamma*, we can only say that the *satipaṭṭhāna*, *sammappadhāna*, *iddhipāda*, *bala*, *bojjhaṅga* and *maggāṅga* function truly and fully when brought to the stage of the *lokuttaracitta*; this is their natural and proper level.”

Conceding that this is not the whole truth since the Pāli commentaries do in fact allow for

895. *Mpps*, iii, p. 1135.

896. A very revealing passage to this effect is found in the *Msl*, where it says that *śamatha*, here likened to stillness (*sthāna*) of thought, and *vipaśyanā*, held to correspond to *dharma* investigation, are in fact based on the *bodhipākṣika* factors of *samyaksamādhi* and *dharmapravacaya* (p. 146.6–10). Indeed, their positioning following the *bodhipākṣika* is found in a number of important works. It is given in the *Bbh* (p. 259.15–22), *Msl* (p. 146.6–27), *Abhidh-sam (R)*, (p. 126), *Pañca* (pp. 208–210; as parts of the string of meditative attainments) and in the *Vkn*, p. 40.

897. *Kośa*, vi, pp. 284, 290.

898. Gethin, 1987, p. 240.

laukika cultivation of the *bodhipāṅśika*, Gethin draws attention to the work of Bareau who established that worldly *indriya* practice is also catered to in the Vātsīputriya path.⁸⁹⁹ Here, the *indriya* are ranked as *laukika* in the context of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*, to be precise, as *laukikāgradharma* immediately preceding the emergence of *lokottara* consciousness.⁹⁰⁰ The proposition of the Vātsīputriya ties thus in with the distribution of the *bodhipāṅśika* to the various path phases. As already indicated, according to the Sarvāstivāda, the *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala* fall all into the *prayoga* phase. Allocated to three of the four *nirvedhabhāgīya*—with the *mūrdhan* level reserved for the missing *ṛddhipāda*—in terms of the path at least, they are thus clearly of *laukika* rank.

For the commentaries of the Pāli tradition the situation is more fluid than that. Proposing that the shift from the *laukika* to the *lokottara* experience rests more than anything on the context in which they are pursued (that is to say, depending on whether they are practised during the ‘prior stage’ separating ordinary practice from transcendental practice or during the *lokottara* path and fruit itself) the *bodhipāṅśika* are either *laukika* or *lokottara* in nature. In theory, it seems, this would allow for both levels of cultivation of the thirty-seven factors. Yet, in practice, as Gethin has shown, this principle does not apply evenly to all seven sets, but is only valid for the *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala*—with the other sets pertaining invariably to the *lokottara* mind.⁹⁰¹

Now, without going into the details of why this is so, we note that it is precisely these three practices which are ‘out of order’ in the *Bdp*. Bearing in mind what has been said on the *laukika/lokottara* potential of the *bodhipāṅśika*, two explanations spring to mind. First, we cannot discount the possibility that the *samyakprahāṇa*, etc., had been randomly positioned in their present location. This would explain the presence of *laukika* practices in a section of the path that, by common agreement, arises within the *lokottara* consciousness. Spotted as an error by a learned reader, it was not allowed to perpetuate itself, but got redressed and brought into line with the traditional *bodhipāṅśika* sequence when adopted for the *Akn*. The problem with this interpretation lies in the improbability that such a major structural defect

899. Bareau, 1955, p. 118.

900. Note that the interpretation of their status is far from resolved. To the Vibhajyavāda, for instance, the five *indriya* are exclusively *lokottara* because they are held to have immediate bearing on the acquisition of four fruitions of arhantship (Bareau, 1955, p. 172). The Sarvāstivāda protagonists, in contrast, appear to have adopted the Theravāda view and interpret the *indriya* as characterising the five components in their generality (*op. cit.*, pp. 143, 145–6). For a full treatment of the understanding of the *indriya* formula in Pāli literature, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 231–269.

901. Gethin, 1987, pp. 240, 630.

should have escaped notice, particularly in view of the renown and early codification of the seven *bodhipākṣika* sets.⁹⁰²

Alternatively, if not a mistake, their placement is deliberate and grew out of some undisclosed consideration. Whatever the reason, their installation towards the end of the path suggests that the three were not interpreted as *laukika* practices in their *prayogamārga* context, but in the *bodhipākṣika*'s original role as spiritual exercises of the highest order.⁹⁰³ Epitomising the 'practice' of the *bhāvanāmārga*, they could arguably represent a phase that develops the meditative pursuits of the *smṛtyupasthāna*, *bodhyaṅga*, *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga*, *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. Their contents would seem to correspond to the practices that the bodhisattva undertakes after emerging from meditation.⁹⁰⁴ Moreover, taken together, they cover most of the antidotes designed to prevent meditative defeat, viz., faith, zeal, effort, tranquillity, mindfulness, attentiveness, reflection and equipoise.⁹⁰⁵

Needless to say, if this interpretation is accepted we cannot maintain the allocation in the *Akn-tīkā*, since this would interfere with the presumed *lokottara* status of the *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala*. We would also be at a loss to explain the editorial modifications in the *Akn*. One would think that such carefully devised scheme would not be abandoned without due consideration. Equally intriguing is the fact that Buddhist literature does not record the rationale behind this scheme. I have not found a single text in which the *samyakprahāṇa*, *indriya* and *bala* are similarly placed.

Taking all factors into consideration, it would thus appear that their positioning—novel but probably deliberate and, in a sense, consistent with the *Bdp*'s path model—failed to attract support in Buddhist circles, became isolated and was soon forgotten. Even when encountered (as it must have been by the author of the *Akn*), its structure was not accepted but modified and brought into line with the established order of the *bodhipākṣika*. While the rationale may therefore be lost, the very fact of its survival in the *Bdp* reminds us, once more, of the fluctuations in thought that influenced the shaping of the bodhisattva doctrine and the multiple

902. The possibility that the *Bdp* was unaware of the traditional sequence can be safely ruled out, as it gives a complete and orderly listing of the seven sets at R, 630.3–6. In other places, however, without apparent reason or clear pattern, it gives only a selection of the *bodhipākṣika* (R, folio 592.1; 596.5–98.1).

903. Theoretically, there is still the possibility that their presence on what is to all purposes the *bhāvanāmārga* might point to the impure (*anāsrava*) or *laukika* phase of path of contemplation (*Kośa*, vi, p. 119, ii, p. 117, v, pp. 103–4). Their positioning after the noble eightfold path and after the *lokottara* practices of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, however, does not give much credibility to this hypothesis. Cf. *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 110, which distinguishes between a *laukika* and *lokottara* phase of the *bhāvanāmārga*.

904. *MBT*, iii, pp. 9.1–11.20.

905. *MBT*, iii, p. 10.8–12.

forces that were party to this process.

Leaving behind the intricacies of the *bhāvanāmārga*, we shall now turn to the last phase of the bodhisattva path. Interpreted by the *Akn-ṭikā* as ‘isolated awakening’ (*pratyekabodhi*), it covers the attainment of enlightenment and the cognitive realisations that stand in wisdom at its very heart. For the *Bdp*, as for most other treatises, the chief components of *prajñā* are penetration into the laws of dependent co-origination and insight into the general characteristics of *dharma*. Accordingly, the *Bdp* divided the climax of the path into ‘skill’ in solitary wandering (*ekayānamārga*), ‘skill’ in dependent co-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and ‘skill’ in all *dharma*.

The connotations of ‘skill’ in solitary wandering are many and vary to some degree within each context in which they appear.⁹⁰⁶ Broadly speaking, we can distinguish five concepts that are united in the term *ekayānamārga*. First, there is the idea that the *ekayānamārga* covers the totality of Buddhist practices, specifically with reference to the seven categories of *bodhipāṅśika dharma*.⁹⁰⁷ Second, it describes the mystical nature of a path that is well-delineated and easily followed since it does not deviate into side-roads. Third, being only wide enough for one person, it can only be travelled alone.⁹⁰⁸ Fourth, the path is one in the sense that it is traversed and accomplished only by the best, the Buddha. Finally, the *ekayānamārga* is one in as much as it leads to only one place, namely *nirvāṇa*.⁹⁰⁹

The reason why I have reiterated the findings of previous research here is straightforward. Practically all of these aspects of the *ekayāna* concept are mirrored, in one way or another, in the *Bdp*’s ‘skill’ in solitary wandering. That the ‘single path’ is all-encompassing and includes all practices corresponds to the bodhisattva’s commitment to the six perfections. Its description as a path that unified, well-defined and without forks is played on when the bodhisattva’s conduct is characterised as self-sufficient and independent of others. On a path whose course is straight and unambiguous, external guidance is obviously unnecessary. Next, as the path is

906. The term *ekayāna* is, of course, not a new entity to Buddhist research and has already attracted the attention of several scholars. For interpretations of the term *ekayāna* in the context of the *smṛtyupasthāna*, see: Gethin, 1987, pp. 117–129 and Ruegg, 1969, p. 178; for an assessment in *Prajñāpāramitā* works, in the *Vkn* and *Samdhis*, see: Lamotte, 1976, pp. 109–111.

907. *Nidd*, i, pp. 455–6.

908. Böhtlingk; Roth (*pw*).

909. These interpretations are largely taken from the Pāli commentaries where they occur at several places. See, for instance, *Sv*, iii, pp. 743–4, *Ps*, i, pp. 229–30 (ref. Gethin). The gist of these meanings is corroborated by the *Wörterbuch* (Bechert, vi, p. 442), attributing the following interpretations to *ekāyāna*: ‘zu nur einem Ziel gehend oder führend’; ‘sicher, zuverlässig’; ‘notwendiger Weise zu einem bestimmten Punkt hin oder vorbei führend’ and ‘der einzige Weg’.

narrow and grants place only to one traveller, the bodhisattva is unaccompanied and on his own. Knowing that it is only travelled by the best, the bodhisattva resolves to accomplish attainments that have not been achieved by any other member of the āryan-fold. The idea that the *ekayāna* is one in the sense that it has only one destination is expressed in terms of ending in enlightenment under the Bodhi-tree. Appropriately, this is attained through one thought-moment only after the bodhisattva has defeated the host of Māra single-handedly.

The import of this imagery for the path scheme is obvious. The presence of all *pāramitā*, the proposition that the *ekayāna* is only traversed by the most advanced practitioners, their total independence from other agencies, the vision that its final destination is nothing less than enlightenment—all these attest great achievement and place the bodhisattva very close close to the goal of buddhahood.⁹¹⁰ In other words, ‘skill’ in solitary wandering is a metaphorical way of signalling the conclusion of the training in Perfect Wisdom. Drawing on imagery belonging to the *ekayāna* concept, it illustrates the bodhisattva’s resolve, strength and independence as well as the uniqueness of the attainment itself.

The exact contents of these achievements are laid down in ‘skill’ in *pratītyasamutpāda* and ‘skill’ in *dharma*. First, the bodhisattva discerns the causal mechanisms underlying conditioned existence. Realising that causality is not limited to sentient life but lies at the basis of all phenomena, he perceives *dharma* as inactive, motionless and non-self and therefore fundamentally inapprehensible (*anupalambha*).⁹¹¹

“All *dharma* are subject to causes, conditions and their combinations. What is subject to causes, conditions and their combinations is not the basis of a self, life-force or person. It is without reckoning whatever.”

Notwithstanding this recognition, the bodhisattva does not abandon sentient beings to their fate, but subscribes to attainments in ‘non-cessation’ and ‘non-exhaustion’. Thus schooled in the conditioned and unconditioned, the bodhisattva now reaches the pinnacle of his training. No longer concerned with his personal advance or the prospect of merit, he dedicates his resources entirely to universal liberation. Since he is in perfect command of all practices and

910. See, for example, the scheme of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (I, 1e, 21) where the penultimate generation of the *bodhicitta* is linked with the *ekayānamārga*. Subordinate in importance only to the *cittotpāda* of the *dharmakāya*, the *ekayānamārga* manifests unmistakably only towards the very end of the path.

911. R, folio 682.6–683.1.

fully acquainted with true reality, he does not fall prey to the defilements of the world in spite of constant exposure to their influence. The reason for this immunity lies in the integrated presence of 'skill' and wisdom that, being the underlying principles of his progress through the final path phases, will lead him eventually to all-knowing.⁹¹²

912. The reference to the combined presence of 'skill' and wisdom in a truly accomplished bodhisattva adds another dimension to our perception of the role of 'skill'. We have seen that so far, 'skill' is primarily portrayed as a means bringing about understanding of reality—in short, wisdom. It contributes to the elimination of the belief in a self and involves training in a number of ancillary practices. Now, however, it is cited alongside wisdom as a separate factor of apparently equal importance. This shift in interpretation is not wholly unexpected but reflects the general drift in the description of 'skill' in *dharma*, announcing in clear terms the interaction between 'means' and 'wisdom'. The nature of their interaction and its manifestations are not discussed in the *Prajñā* Chapter, but are given separate treatment in the chapter twelve in the context of the *saṃgrahavastu*.

The Means of Conversion

No practice exemplifies the coordinated interaction between cognitive attainments and practical 'skills' better than the means of conversion (*saṃgrahavastu*).⁹¹³ Technically pertaining to Perfect Wisdom although essentially complementary, the *saṃgrahavastu* achieve great momentum particularly during the final stages of the path.⁹¹⁴ They enable the bodhisattva to attract the attention of his fellow beings and secure conditions where he can effectively communicate the Dharma. By virtue of this capacity, the *saṃgrahavastu* are frequently considered as a sub-species of skilful means particularly concerned with the maturation of sentient beings.⁹¹⁵ Like so many other bodhisattva practices, their presence in the path has its origin in the *suttas* of early Buddhism.⁹¹⁶ Starting as secondary practices in the nikāya, their status increased dramatically in the Mahāyāna where they came to rank amongst the most important bodhisattva practices.⁹¹⁷ The basic constituents of the *saṃgrahavastu* are giving (*dāna*), friendly speech (*priyavādītā*), service rendered (*arthacaryā*) and pursuit of a common aim (*saṃānārthatā*). Judging by a passage in the *Bdp* and the explanations of the *Bbh*, acquisition and function of each member is to some extent dependent on the presence of the former.

First let us consider the account of the *Bbh*. People are attracted to the bodhisattva through his generosity, thinking that to listen and behave as proposed by the bodhisattva is profitable. Then, having shown generosity, the bodhisattva prompts them to accept his reasoning through

913. Noting that in Sanskrit works often only one or two of *saṃgrahavastu* occur, Dayal infers that the set of four is a rather 'later development' in Sanskrit literature. Evidence in several early *Rk sūtras*, however, suggests otherwise. In the *Ug* (p. 262.5.6–7), *Kp* (pp. 41, 50; § 19, § 25), *Bhadra-vy (R)* (pp. 44, 97) and, of course, in the *Bdp* references to the *saṃgrahavastu* are invariably to the set of four. Already well-known in pre-Mahāyāna texts, it seems more likely that the four were taken over *en bloc* by the newly emerging movement as part of the established and widely recognised features of the path, as indeed were many other of the early practices (viz., *pratisaṃsāra*, *pratisaṃvid*, *bodhipāṅśika*, etc.). Moreover, the texts to which Dayal points are markedly later in origin. He cites, for instance, the composite *Mvu* (iii, pp. 383.11, 407.13), *Śsp (Ghoṣa)*, p. 280.12 and *Jātakamala* (pp. 2.1, 92.12), texts which hardly pertain to the first wave of Mahāyāna works.

914. *Bbh*, p. 213.4–7.

915. *Bbh*, pp. 261.20–62.8; *Msl*, p. 147.4.

916. For occurrences of the four means of conversion in the nikāya, see: D III, pp. 152, 191, 232; A II, pp. 32, 248; IV, pp. 219, 364; S V, p. 330. In Pāli called *saṅgahavasthu*, they occur as *dāna*, *peyyavajjam*, *atthacariyā* and *saṃānattatā*. See, also, *Mvu*, i, p. 3.11; ii, p. 395.8; *Dhsgr*, § 19; and *Lal*, pp. 38.16, 160.6, 182.6, 429.13.

917. For a measure of their prominence, see their position and the detail that is dedicated to them in the *Bbh* (pp. 217–230) and *Msl* (pp. 116.8–117.21). For a treatment of *upāyakaṣālya*, see: Pye, *Skilful Means*, 1978.

friendly speech. Thus enchanted by his logic and instructed in the Dharma, they are separated from evil tendencies and introduced to virtue through his service. Finally, providing an example to others, the bodhisattva adjusts his own conduct to the ideal of the Dharma so that beings will not accuse him of hypocrisy, but will emulate his behaviour.⁹¹⁸

In the *Bdp*, while accepting the gist of this account, the connection between the individual elements is explained differently:⁹¹⁹

“Giving is of bodhisattvas who have generated the thought of enlightenment for the first time. Friendly speech is of bodhisattvas who persist in their practice. Service rendered is of bodhisattvas who are irreversible. Pursuit of a common aim is of bodhisattvas who are held back by only one birth.”

This passage contains three important elements.⁹²⁰ First, it suggests that the practice of the *saṃgrahavastu* is not reserved to advanced bodhisattvas, but figures right from the beginning in the training. Second, it indicates that the acquisition of the members is separated by vast time-spans. Let us recall that even the most conservative estimate separates the four points that are mentioned here by one world-age (*asamkhyeya*) each.⁹²¹ Third, it hints at some form of interconnection between the *saṃgrahavastu* and suggests that the attainment of each member builds on the preceding one. The exact nature of this link is eloquently expressed in the imagery of the next paragraph.⁹²²

“Giving is the ground of the roots of enlightenment. Friendly speech is the developed shoot of enlightenment. Service rendered is the blossoming flower of enlightenment. Pursuit of a common aim is the resulting fruit of enlightenment.”

In its characterisation of the *saṃgrahavastu*, the *Bdp* draws a great deal on material from the foregoing chapters. It describes giving as generosity inspired by thoughts of benevolence; friendly speech as charming words rich in sympathetic joy; service rendered as exertion in

918. *Bbh*, pp. 112.18–113.6.

919. *R*, folio 698.2–4.

920. Compare this distribution of the *saṃgrahavastu* with the scheme that is drawn up in the *Msl* (p. 117.3–9).

921. *Daśa-bh*, p. xvii

For further detail on the length of the bodhisattva's career, see: *Siddhi*, pp. 731–33.

922. *R*, folio 698.4–6.

worldly conduct born from compassion and pursuit of a common aim that is marked by equipoise transformed to all-knowing.⁹²³ Alternatively, it speaks of generosity in terms of the *dānapāramitā*; of friendly speech in terms of the *śīla-* and *kṣāntipāramitā*; of pursuit of a common aim as the *dhyāna-* and *prajñāpāramitā*. To interpret the *saṃgrahavastu* in terms of the *apramāṇa* and *pāramitā* is rather unusual and not found in any of the standard reference works. This is perhaps of particular interest to the *Bbh*, since this work—like the *Bdp*—discusses the *saṃgrahavastu* immediately after the *pāramitā*.⁹²⁴

In substance, however, most sources give remarkably uniform descriptions of the means of conversion. Thus, the *dānasamgrahavastu* is invariably held to encompass material and spiritual gifts. Since a supreme value is placed on the giving of the Dharma, their focus rests invariably on *dāna*-factors that affect the bodhisattva's preaching activity. To a large degree this is also valid for the *Bdp*, although it includes 'protection' as the third object of giving. Also the *prīyavāditāsaṃgrahavastu* is chiefly referred to in conjunction with the gift of the Doctrine.⁹²⁵ Having established the Dharma as focus, it is here the positive attitude to preaching that stands in the foreground. When practising *arthacaryā*, the bodhisattva's perspective in teaching shifts once more. Now, it is no longer the mode or tone of his words that matters, but the concern to demonstrate the practical and spiritual benefits of the Dharma.⁹²⁶ For the spiritually more advanced, the bodhisattva acts as guide and supervises their progress along the path. That is to say, he dispenses instructions in the three vehicles, he establishes people in equipoise and the accumulation of merit and knowledge, he praises the advantages of solitude and meditation.

These characteristics, all taken from the *Bbh*, aim quite clearly at the benefit of others. For the *Bdp*, however, rendering service is also concerned with the bodhisattva's own progress.⁹²⁷ This proposition is surprising since, according to the *Bdp*'s own scheme, the *arthacaryāsaṃgrahavastu* is not practised before the stage of irreversibility. The most likely explanation is that the *arthacaryāsaṃgrahavastu* is seen to link up with the *samānārthatāsaṃgrahavastu* at which the bodhisattva is expected to display personal achievements for others to emulate. For these to be perfect, he would naturally make his personal advance an objective of the previous *saṃgrahavastu*.

923. R, folio 696.2–4.

924. *Bbh*, pp. 217–230.

925. *Bbh*, pp. 217.5–221.7; *Msl*, p. 116.2–9.

926. *Bbh*, pp. 222.20–223.7, 225.4–20.

927. R, folio 695.5.

According to the *Bbh*, progress in the *samānārthatāsamgrahavastu* falls into four phases.⁹²⁸ At first, the bodhisattva does not show his capabilities to the full as he does not wish to boast about them. Then, having become more confident, he modestly begins to explain them to beings, always looking for the most appropriate means. Next, in order to instruct in the accumulation of merit, he encourages to the maxims of his own conduct. Finally, now facing a well-disposed audience, he censures heterodox practices and warns his listeners not to swerve from the Buddhist path. His attitude during these phases does not change. He guides sentient beings to roots of virtue; he adheres to the *Vinaya* and acts in accordance with the Dharma, hoping that others will emulate his conduct.

These concerns also dominate the *Bdp*'s understanding of the *samānārthatāsamgrahavastu*. Committed to the liberation of beings, the bodhisattva promotes only those aspirations that he himself considers to be of highest quality. For this purpose he generates the thought of all-knowing with the firm intention to pass it on as soon as he himself acquired it.⁹²⁹ As in the *Bbh*, the rationale is twofold, that is, to establish beings in the Dharma and to fulfil for himself the buddha-qualities.⁹³⁰

The one issue in which the *Bdp* differs markedly from the views of the *Bbh*, and indeed most other works I have consulted, is the spiritual status of the persons to whom he addresses the *samgrahavastu*. For the bodhisattva of the *Bdp*, these are invariably mendicants (*yācanaka*) who have renounced worldly concerns and subscribe to a life of renunciation. Accordingly, giving means for him pleasing mendicants; friendly speech is paying respects to mendicants; rendering service means attaining the goal of the mendicants and to pursue a common goal is pursuing a goal similar to theirs.⁹³¹ For the *Bdp*, the practice of the *samgrahavastu* is therefore confined in scope.

Several reasons could have led to this attitude. First, there is the possibility that the *Bdp* was composed at a time when the path was not yet fully open to the laity. If this could be proved, it would lend further support to my hypothesis that we are dealing in the *Bdp* with Mahāyāna text of very early origin. Then, it might reflect historical circumstances where the bodhisattva—himself a recluse or wandering ascetic—would shun the distraction of worldly life and mix only with like-minded practitioners. Alternatively, it is not inconceivable that

928. *Bbh*, pp. 226.15–227.2.

929. R, folio 696.7.

930. R, folio 697.7.

931. R, folio 695.6–7.

the mendicant audience was simply a device to raise the status of the bodhisattva. For a bodhisattva to be in the company of *bhikṣus* and ascetics would surely have added to his prestige, at a time when lay participation was on the increase.

Whatever the reasons for this limitation, it is clear from later literature that it was not destined to last. The vast majority of Mahāyāna *sūtras*, including many of the *śāstras* leave no doubt that the path with all its practices—if not expressively pursued by monks and laymen alike—was unanimously understood to embrace all categories of sentient beings in its final objective of universal liberation.

Conclusion

The foregoing analysis of the *Bdp*'s practices and doctrines now provides sufficient data for us to establish the approximate position of the *Bdp* in Mahāyāna literature. Comparison with other texts has shown that its treatment of the bodhisattva ideal bears all the hallmarks of an early date of composition. Evidence of its antiquity is found in practically all areas of discussion, including the nature of the practices, the doctrinal frame in which they are developed, in the path structure and in the ideal itself.

First to the presentation of the practices. Repetitions in their discussion, the loose rambling style of presentation, the predominantly descriptive approach and a certain lack of organisation all suggest that the underlying structures of the practices were still fluid and had not yet been codified by the time the *Bdp* was composed. This is most evident in the treatment of the *dāna*-, *kṣānti*- and *vīryapāramitā* but applies also to the *bodhipākṣika dharma*. In each of these we find repetitions, variant classifications, interjections of unrelated thought and outlines of contents that are not adhered to. In later writings many of these structural 'anomalies' are corrected and brought into line with the current thinking on the bodhisattva. Immediate evidence of this process is contained in the *Akn* whose editorial adjustments of the material of the *Bdp* clearly reflect discontent with some detail of its overall design. In addition, the *Bdp* gives little information on the interrelation between the various practices. Explanatory comments are generally restricted to the practices themselves and do not clarify the context where they occur. For instance, the *Bdp* goes to great lengths to enumerate the objects of generosity and to describe the hardship encountered during the training in patience. And yet, it gives little attention to the psychological processes underlying both *dāna* and *kṣānti*. This is particularly evident in its discussions of the *apramāṇa* and *dhyāna* where there is virtually no information on the meditative experience itself. Here, as in most other chapters, the *Bdp* is mainly concerned with providing a description of the practices themselves and to illustrate their implications for the bodhisattva's spiritual progress. Hence, we learn a lot about the scope of their implementation and the benefits they bestow, but are left in ignorance about the psychological mechanisms of their functioning. We have seen that such emphasis on detailed descriptions and lengthy enumerations is particularly widespread among the earlier

bodhisattva works.

The *Bdp*'s antiquity is also borne out by the nature of its practices, many of which show traits of early Buddhism. The exposition of the *akuśalakarmapatha* in the *Śīla* Chapter, the detailed discussion of the *bodhipākṣika dharma* and its insistence on traditional moral discipline indicate that the *Bdp* originated at a time when early Buddhist maxims had still considerable influence on Mahāyāna thinking. In its exposition of *śīla*, for example, the *Bdp* closely follows the prescriptive approach of the śrāvaka *Vinaya* and does not allow for adjustments in moral observance even if the bodhisattva's vow should require it. Furthermore, it identifies desire as the chief source of moral impurity. We have seen that in both respects significant shifts in interpretation occur in later literature. Further evidence is found in the *Bdp*'s conception of *prajñā*. Unlike later sources which tend to conceive of *prajñā* predominantly as *dharmanairātmya*, the *Bdp* emphasises the destruction of the belief in a self and realisation of dependent co-origination. Also its threefold division of wisdom, distinguishing *śruta*, *yoniso manasakāra* and *pratipatti* as the fundamental causes of *prajñā* is, in a variant form, already found in the earliest strands of Buddhist literature. The fact that the scheme in the *Bdp* shows some terminological divergencies indicates that it was conceived before the exact terms had been codified.

The description of the practices themselves is marked by a high degree of realism. That is to say, it is conceived in terms of real sacrifice, hardship and struggle. In all chapters, except for the eleventh, the impact of Mahāyāna ontology is very small and does not affect the implementation of the bodhisattva practice. Again, this is a common feature especially among the works belonging to the first waves of Mahāyāna *sūtras*.

Also of interest is the *Bdp*'s position on skilful means. References to the term *upāyakaūśalya* occur at three places altogether. And yet, despite this lack of technical referral, there is an implicit employment of principle of skilful means throughout. In chapter eleven, for example, skilful means is closely associated with compassion and the welfare of others. Here, it becomes instrumental to both the bodhisattva's personal accomplishments and to the spiritual purification of sentient beings. In chapter ten, skilful means is placed at the very centre of the discussion and becomes the underlying force behind the bodhisattva's training in the *abhiññā*. Epitomised by the joint cultivation of 'means' (*upāya*) and 'knowledge' (*jñāna*), it allows the bodhisattva effective communication of his insights to this fellow beings. *Upāya*, in this context, stands above all for the practice of the *abhiññā* which create the conditions through

which he learns of people's spiritual requirements. Adaptation to other people's needs is, of course, the very foundation of the concept of *upāyakauśalya*. And yet, there is no provision of a separate chapter of skilful nor is it treated in anywhere near the detail of the other *pāramitā*. The conclusion must be that at the time of the *Bdp*'s composition *upāyakauśalya* had not yet received the status it was granted in later centuries when it became a *pāramitā* in its own right.

Training in the practices themselves proceeds within the narrow confines of the mendicant ideal and is only open to practitioners who have renounced all ties with society. Except for one brief section, the *Bdp* does not even contemplate the possibility of a lay path for bodhisattvas. On the contrary, the Buddha warns repeatedly of the blemish of worldly life and strongly urges that the mendicant life should be taken up. The dismissal of the lay ideal is not surprising if we recall that most of the discourse is set in a loose narrative of Śākyamuni's previous lives. Traditionally, his strivings have always been closely associated with the mendicant ideal and physical austerity.

Other indications for an early origin of the *Bdp* are found in the bodhisattva doctrine. The exposition of the *cittotpāda*, for instance, lacks several important elements that found their way into later discussions. It does not mention either *adhyāśaya* or *gotra* and is rather unclear about the relationship of the *cittotpāda* and *āśaya*. Also the distinctions between the various types of *cittotpāda* are rather vague. Although the *Bdp* speaks of ten different kinds of *cittotpāda* and indicates that these are generated successively, in content all ten are very similar and allocated only approximate places on the path. Since later treatises distinguish quite regularly between ten types of *cittotpāda*, it is fair to assume that the scheme in the *Bdp* must have been something of an 'embryo' for later developments.

This applies also to the *Bdp*'s treatment of the *apramāṇa* and *pāramitā* which contains many of the ingredients that, in later times, were brought together into a coherent doctrine. For instance, it proposes the *pāramitā* context for the practice of the *apramāṇa* and recognises three levels of training in *maitrī*. It does not endorse the reward of a high rebirth, but distinguishes between a śrāvaka and bodhisattva way of *apramāṇa* practice. In *dāna* the *Bdp* differentiates between external and internal gifts and associates the practice of giving with the generation of the thought of enlightenment. When discussing *kṣānti*, it discriminates between patience with regard to suffering, hostility and *dharma*. Also its thought on vigour is divided into three spheres, that is, armoured vigour, vigour in the accumulation of roots of

virtue and vigour in benefiting sentient beings. In the context of *dhyāna*, the *Bdp* speaks of nine preparatory types of meditation and distinguishes between meditation of production (marked by the *abhijñā*) and meditation that is aimed at the welfare of beings. We have seen that it was exactly these divisions that became the cornerstone of the *pāramitā* practice in later works. The loose fashion in which the *Bdp* speaks of these divisions is evidence of its position at the beginning of the development of the *pāramitā* doctrine. In the perfection of vigour and meditation, for example, no formal division is put forward, but the contents of their expositions allow us to identify three distinct categories of *vīrya* and *dhyāna*. For *kṣānti* the *Bdp* proposes its own division. Although the individual types differ by name, in contents, they run in fact very close to the *kṣānti* categories of later treatises. In addition, the dynamics of the practices invariably match the order of the more advanced schemes. First, the *Bdp* expounds the preparatory practices, followed by the practice proper aimed at the bodhisattva's personal advance and finally it introduces a shift in concern towards the welfare of beings.

There are, however, issues that later writers criticised. When these were of little significance, they were simply not adopted and fell into oblivion. This appears to have happened to the threefold division of *upekṣā*, to the order of the *abhijñā* and their division into ordinary and non-regressing *abhijñā*. More important matters were modified or supplemented with additional material. Examples of such changes are found in the *Akn*'s *samādhi* list and in its eighty-four types of learning, both of which originated in the *Bdp*.

Other adjustments affected the arrangement of the practices. We have seen that the *Bdp* does not possess any formalised, linear path structure. Progress to buddhahood is primarily conceived in terms of practices, beginning with training in the *apramāṇa* and ending in mastery of the *saṃgrahavastu*. History has shown that this design did not win acceptance. The first changes occurred already in the *Akn* that places the *apramāṇa* well behind the *pāramitā* and brings the means of conversion forward into the middle of the path before the *pratisamvid*, *pratisaraṇa* and *bodhipāṅśika dharma*. The *Akn* also altered the order of the seven sets of *bodhipāṅśika dharma* to comply with their traditional presentation. Quite clearly, these changes were deliberate editorial adjustments that did not occur by chance, but were meant to improve on the *Bdp*'s arrangement of practice.

These modifications are significant in two respects. First, they allow us to trace the development of the bodhisattva doctrine and highlight some of the concerns that led to changes in the perception of the training. Second, they are testimony of the communication

existing between the various Buddhist circles in ancient India. Although we do not know for how long this exchange of ideas persisted, it must have continued for several centuries since we find elements of the *Bdp*'s path design in the *Bbh* and *Msl*. While it is not possible to establish that the parallels between the *Bdp* and *Bbh/Msl* are the result of direct borrowing, the fact that they occur in no other texts allows for few alternatives. This would mean then that the arrangement of practices in the *Bdp*—although criticised in detail—was highly esteemed even two or three centuries after its composition. Rivalry with the *daśabhūmika* plan probably never occurred, since the *Bdp*'s account of the training is not based on a set of codified career stages, but revolves around a concatenation of practices.

In summary, we can distinguish the following training-phases in the *Bdp*. First, having generated the thought of enlightenment, the bodhisattva subscribes to the preliminary aspects of the path. This involves the practice of the *apramāṇa* and schooling in the perfections of *dāna*, *śīla*, *kṣānti*, *vīrya* and *dhyāna*. Coursing in the lower levels of their practice (that is, the preparatory level and the practice proper), the bodhisattva passes through the *saṃbhāramārga*, *prayogamārga*, *darśanamārga* and *bhāvanāmārga*. When he has reached the *bhāvanāmārga*, the bodhisattva begins to train in skill. In order to establish a sound psychological basis for the more advanced phases, he focuses at first on the destruction of the belief in a self. Next, the bodhisattva endeavours to acquire knowledge and merit to secure his personal progress. For this purpose he trains in the *pratisaṃvid*, *pratisaraṇa*, *punya* and *jñāna*. These practices liberate the bodhisattva from the obstructions of defilements and mistaken views, establish him in moral conduct and bestow the powers and faculties. Thus schooled, he is able to embark on the pursuit of the *bodhipākṣika dharma*. He now devotes most of his attention to the practice of meditation through which he acquires proficiency in faith, vigour, recollection, wisdom, etc. On the basis of these attainments, the bodhisattva comprehends eventually the insubstantiality of *dharma* (*dharmanairātmya*). This insight is reached for the first time during the joint practice of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* and signals the high-point in his cognitive training.

In order to acquire mental stability the bodhisattva withdraws into seclusion. Referred to as 'solitary wandering', it establishes the bodhisattva in emotional independence and cuts him off from all worldly constraints. Moreover, as the penultimate phase of the training proper, it leads him directly to the seat of enlightenment, thus placing buddhahood within reach. The acquisition of wisdom occurs when the bodhisattva penetrates 'skill' in dependent co-origination

and attains mastery over all *dharma*. It brings the bodhisattva 'face to face' with reality and creates the preconditions for universal liberation. The scope and nature of the liberation-process are summed up by the four practices that are included in the means of conversion. The bodhisattva bestows gifts, uses benign language, renders service and adopts unsurpassed conduct for others to emulate. When he has mastered all four *saṃgrahavastu*, he is only one birth away from buddhahood. Apart from the immense gnoseologic realisation, this achievement marks also the bodhisattva's return to the world. That is to say, he abandons his training in the *ekayānamārga* and resumes his duties towards humankind.

This leads us to the bodhisattva ideal. For the *Bdp*, entry in the bodhisattva path is entirely in the hands of the practitioner and takes place independent of external forces. For this all important step to take place, the bodhisattva must acquire a high degree of moral purity and be equipped with a determined resolve towards enlightenment. In addition, he must possess personal initiative and self-responsibility as there is no outside support apart from the sustaining power of the buddhas. Although devotional elements such as teacher veneration occur in several passages in the *Bdp*, buddha-worship itself plays no active role in the process of purification.

The *Bdp*'s position on the bodhisattva's relationship with sentient beings is ambiguous. On the one hand, it affirms repeatedly and with great eloquence that the overriding concern of all practices is universal liberation. However, this commitment is not borne out by the description of the practices. On balance, the *Bdp* gives notably more attention to their acquisition than to exploring how they could be used to liberate sentient beings. The discussion of the *saṃgrahavastu* covers less than five folios while the exposition of the perfections runs into hundreds of pages.

This kind of indifference is also found in its exposition of *dāna* where freedom from birth in the lower destinies is given among the benefits that accrue from perfect giving. The lower realms are clearly excluded as an outcome for more advanced bodhisattvas. Accordingly, hell figures only as a deterrent and is never promulgated as a particularly beneficial 'training ground'. Once bodhisattvas have attained the stage of the prediction their interaction with beings of the evil destinies abates and gods and men become the object of their attention.

Quite clearly, the *Bdp*'s vision of the bodhisattva contains a high degree of spiritual realism. It is primarily concerned with the practical aspects of the training and shows little interest in the more breathtaking prospect of universal liberation. The picture it draws of the bodhisattva

is of a person who is wholly absorbed by his yearning for enlightenment. Aiming to show how this goal is realised, the *Bdp* goes to great lengths to explain the underlying processes of purification. In a sense, the spirit of the exposition is therefore not so far removed from descriptions of the śrāvaka training. It speaks of the importance of moral integrity, it emphasises the need for a disciplined spiritual environment, it urges self-reliability and warns of complacency. Moreover, references to the śrāvaka are generally amicable and free of antagonism. These factors alone would point to a period of composition when the two ideals had still very much in common.

Further weight is lent to this hypothesis by the fact that many of the *Bdp*'s propositions belong to the incipient phase of the bodhisattva doctrine; the early nature of the practices and their loose divisions, the formal exclusion of skilful means, the basic path structure and the ill-organised form of presentation, they all imply an early origin of the *Bdp*. We have thus identified in the *Bdp* a text of fundamental importance in the evolution of the bodhisattva ideal. Looking back at the history of the *Bdp*, we notice that we are not the first to do so. The composers of the countless texts referring to the *Bdp* for its exposition of the *pāramitā*, the compilers of the *Ratnakūṭa* collection who placed the *Bdp* at the centre of their bodhisattva works and last, but not least, Hsüan-tsang, all of these have come to the same conclusion many centuries ago.

Chapter Five

Translation of Chapter Eleven of the Bodhisattvapīṭakasūtra

Introduction

The original version of the *Bdp* in the Indic language in that it was composed is no longer extant. As so many other Mahāyāna *sūtras*, it is preserved only in Chinese and Tibetan translations. For the present study, I utilised the following versions of the *Bdp*.

1. The ninth-century Tibetan translation made by Surendrabodhi, Śilendrabodhi and Dharmatāśīla, entitled: *hphags pa byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ces bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo* (*ārya-bodhisattvapīṭaka-nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra*).
In editing and translating chapter eleven, I used or consulted the following four editions of the Tibetan *hKah-hgyur*.
 - a. sTog Palace (R), Leh—1979, vol. 37, folio 590.1–695.1
 - b. sD-dge (D), vol. 42, folio 315.1–384.2
 - c. Peking (P), vol. 23, pp. 73.1.7–89.2.2
 - d. sNar-thaṅ (N), vol. 3 (ga), folio 327.3–386.4
2. Tun-huang Manuscript: Bibliothèque Nationale (Lalou, 1950), Pelliot, item no. 977
3. Tun-huang Manuscript: India Office Library (La Vallée Poussin, 1962), item no. 380.109, 635.32, 705.2

In addition, I utilised several works that either paraphrase passages of the *Bdp* or contain selected quotations. These are:

1. *Akṣayamatīnirdeśasūtra*: *hphags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo* (P 34, pp. 35.2.3–74.2.2).
2. *Akṣayamatīnirdeśaṭīkā*: *hphags pa blo gros mi zad pas bstan paḥi rgya cher hḡrel pa* (P 104, pp. 137.1.1–273.3.7).
3. *Arthaviniścayasūtra*: Samtani, NH, 1971.
4. *Arthaviniścayaṭīkā*: Samtani, NH, 1971.
5. *Śikṣāsamuccaya*: Bendall, C, 1902.

On several occasions, I was able to identify passages from the *Bdp* that are found in later Buddhist Sanskrit literature. For the most part these are not attributed to the *Bdp* but were taken from the *Akn*. While they show some minor divergencies from the Tibetan of the *Bdp*, they do give us a fairly good impression how the original Sanskrit text might have looked like.

Having said this, it is important to bear in mind that the conventional usage of the notion of a 'Sanskrit original' is rather misleading, since the Indic versions themselves were often subject to interpolation, rearrangement or shortening. Whether this was also the case with the *Bdp* is impossible to tell, although we have no reason to assume that it was exempt from such alterations. Assuming that certain changes were made, the Tibetan of the *Bdp* reflects only the Sanskrit text that existed in India in the eighth/ninth century that was used by the Indo-Tibetan translation team as basis for their work. Whether they founded their translation on only one version or had access to several manuscripts we cannot tell.

As we are dealing in the Tibetan with a translation from the Sanskrit (which turns my translation into a translation of translation), it was important not to lose the Sanskrit referent out of sight. For this purpose, I endeavoured to gain as close an understanding of the underlying Sanskrit as possible. In order to communicate my understanding to the reader, I provided in the notes Sanskrit equivalents to Tibetan technical terms. In establishing these, I drew generally on the vocabulary of the *Mahāvvyutpatti*. While the use of (reconstructed) Sanskrit terms is helpful to demarcate the context of the discussion and to provide translation markers, it has the potential to create a whole series of linguistic problems. Wishing to avoid a fully-fledged discussion of each reconstruction, I limited myself to those terms that occur with some frequency in Buddhist literature. Even then, they are to some degree tentative and should be used only with caution.

In the translation of the technical terms my overall objective was to be as consistent as possible. Whenever the context allowed I would use the same English word for a given Tibetan/Sanskrit term. While this worked fine in many instances, in others it did not. When in difficulties, I provided the Tibetan or Sanskrit term in order to draw attention to my 'non-standard' rendering. In these cases my interpretation is generally based on the available commentarial sources that indicate the particular meaning of a word.

The most important commentary for the study of the *Bdp* is the *Akn-ṭikā*. The textual parallels between the *Bdp* and *Akn* allowed me to draw quite regularly for explication on the annotations in the *Akn-ṭikā*. Whenever the explanations of the *Akn-ṭikā* affected my translation, I indicated this in the notes. Other texts of importance are the *Arthav* and *Śikṣ* since both contain quotations from the *Akn*.

With my English translation I hope to have produced an accurate and readable version of the meaning and contents of chapter eleven. In doing so, I found myself often confronted to chose between the literal meaning and that what I thought the text intended to say. The

principle of guidance in those situations was to be as literal as possible so long as it was reconcilable with the syntactical requirements of the English language. At times, this generated a rather Tibetanised English. Whenever in doubt, I followed the literal reading of the Tibetan, hoping that future research will throw light on those passages that I failed to penetrate fully. Not wishing to temper with the wording of the Tibetan, I kept additions or interpolations in my translation to a bare minimum. Again, this did not always further its readability, but constitutes, I believe, a methodological requirement for every translation activity, especially if presented to an academic audience for scrutiny.

The division of the text into sections is not found in the Tibetan but was introduced by me in order to make it more manageable. In essence, the choice by which I divided the text and the wording of the section-headings reflects my understanding of the content and are thus interpretative. Apart from exposing the structure of the exposition, their value is primarily methodologic in that they facilitate references to my edition.

Finally, the in-text folio numbering to the *Bdp* in my translation and edition refers to the sTog Palace Edition. For reasons of legibility, I based the translation and edition on the large type of the sTog Palace manuscript. All other reference to the Tibetan canon, whether in the notes to my translation or elsewhere in this dissertation, relate invariably to the Peking Edition.

English Translation of Chapter Eleven of the Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra

SECTION I

1.1 Accumulation

(590) O Śāriputra, what is the Perfection of Wisdom of a bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* who cultivates the *bodhisattvacaryā* whenever he applies himself to it? Concerning this, O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva listens diligently to the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. He takes hold of it and retains it. He reads it and fully absorbs it. He also explains it to others and propounds it at length.

O Śāriputra, when a bodhisattva has diligently listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, when he has taken hold of it, retained it, read it, fully absorbed it, and when he has also explained it to others and propounded it at great length, he attains the following forms of wisdom. But that wisdom, what is its form and what is the method by which it is acquired?¹ Its form is learning² and the method by which it is acquired is correct reflection³.

1. *hjug pa: praveśa* (Böhtlingk; Roth, *pw*, pp. 1082–1083).

2. In the *Akn-ṭikā*, founded on the variant reading in the *Akn* (34, p. 50.4.6) we read:

“What is the form (*ākāra*) of wisdom? What is its mode of acquisition (*praveśa*)? Learning is the form and correct reflection is its mode of acquisition.”

Vasubandhu explains that the form of wisdom is learning (*śruta*) and that learning constitutes the own-being (*svabhāva*) of wisdom, whereas discerning the marks of *dharma* indicates correct reflection. He qualifies this position by stating that the eighty-four types of learning originate in wisdom and says—with *ākāra* being likened to *hetu*—that the question ‘What is the cause of wisdom?’ corresponds to the question ‘What is the form of wisdom?’ (104, p. 181.3.2–6).

3. *tshul bzin yid la byed pa: yoniśo manasakāra*

As a general term indicating close mental examination, the meaning of *yonīśo manasakāra* is well-defined. According to the *Kośa* (ii, p. 154) it is “earnest application (*ābhoga*) of thought (*cetas*); submitting or applying the thought to its object”. In the *nikāya*, it is depicted as the first sign heralding the acquisition of the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* and to be preparing the attainment of the *samyakprahāṇa* (S V, p. 31). For the *Mahāyāna*, *manasakāra* became an essential ingredient to wisdom that was thought to arise on the basis of learning (*Msl*, p. 7.3). Its role on the path grew steadily until it was proposed that “a single instant of seeing founded in wisdom-based correct reflection (*yonīśomanasakāraprajñāpratyavekṣanā*) can eradicate innumerable defilements of action” (*Kp*, p. 106, § 71.8). Cf. *Śrotabhūmi*, 109, p. 287.5.3–4.

Buddhist sources came to differ, however, on the exact scope of *yonīśo manasakāra*. Depending on the context and viewpoint from which it is commented upon, we find a number of variant explanations. The *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 7, defines *manasakāra* as earnest application of thought (*cetasā ābhoga*), intended to fix thought (*cittadhāraṇa*) on the object (*ālambana*). Discussing the means by which the bodhisattva enters into the first *dhyāna* (p. 112), the *Abhidh-sam* lists seven kinds of reflection, viz., (1) reflection penetrating the characteristics (*lakṣaṇapratisamveda*), (2) reflection adhering to determination (*ādhi-mokṣika*), (3) reflection adhering to the state of solitude (*pravivikta*), (4) reflection attracting contentment (*ratisaṃgrahaka*), (5) reflection that investigates (*mīmāṃsaka*), (6) reflection of accomplishing practice (*prayogaṇiṣṭha*) and (7) reflection of the fruits of the accomplishment of practice (*prayogaṇiṣṭhāphala*).

1.1.1 Seventy-Two Forms of Learning

What are the forms of learning? They are zest⁴, intent⁵, determination, spiritual friend, lack of conceit, (591) reverence⁶, veneration⁷, congeniality, compliance in speech, reverend service, willingness to listen, paying respect, correct reflection, attentiveness, considering the sacred word as a jewel, considering it as a remedy, considering it as calming all ailment, a

Capable of manifesting three different degrees of intensity (intense-weak, intense-mediocre and intense-intense, p. 160), it is either innate (*upapattiprātilambhika*), arising from learning (*śrutamayī*), arising from reflection (*cintāmayī*) or arising from contemplation (*bhāvanāmayī*). According to the *Kośa* (ii, p. 328), the first three types of *manasakāra* take place within the *kāmadhātu*, whereas the fourth can either operate in the *rūpa* or *arūpyadhātu*. See also *Kośa* (ii, p. 325) where—in a discussion of prerequisites for path-entry—we meet with three other types of *manasakāra*, viz., reflection directed at specific characters (*svalakṣaṇamanasakāra*), reflection directed at common characters (*sāmānyalakṣaṇamanasakāra*) and reflection of earnest application (*adhimuktimanasakāra*).

Edgerton's observation (p. 418, col. 1) that in its verbal form (*manasi karoti*) correct reflection appears often in conjunction with *cintayati* led Meadows (1986, p. 109) to infer that *manasakāra* represents specifically the "method by which one acquires *prajñā* consisting in pondering (*cintāmayiprajñā*)". While a general association of *cintā* with *manasakāra* is no doubt correct, the view of the *Kośa* linking *manasakāra* on equal terms with learning, reflection and contemplation (and inbornness) casts some doubt on her narrow interpretation. Furthermore, according to the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (p. 81), the second type of *manasakāra*, *ādhimokṣikamanasakāra*, transcends both learning (*śruta*) and reflection (*cintā*) to realise *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*. The *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 185.4.1–4), commenting on the parallel passage in the *Akn*, explains:

"Reflecting and contemplating in accordance with [the noble path and cessation] is correct reflection. By means of correct reflection one penetrates things in accordance with reality, thus it is called penetration (*praveśa*) through correct reflection. Concerning penetration into meaning (*artha*); the meaning is understood after one has discerned through the wisdom arising from contemplation (*bhāvanā*) the *dharma* that were discerned with the wisdom arising from reflection (*cintā*). Hence, [correct reflection] is to be known as wisdom concerned with reflection and contemplation."

In the *Bdp* itself, *manasakāra* figures at thirteenth place amongst the seventy-two kinds of learning. It is identified with the bodhisattva's keen wish that bad, unwholesome *dharma* that have hitherto not arisen are not produced (R, folio 672.1–3). It is said to prompt him to abandon those unwholesome *dharma* that have already arisen (R, folio 673.3–4) and it is accredited with the elimination of desire (*rāga*) by way of contemplating impurity (R, folio 673.5–6).

Note that the *Paṭi*s (p. 195), when discussing breathing exercises, speaks of seventy-two kinds of knowledge through insight. However, as these are exclusively concerned with the three marks of existence and restricted in their operation to a meditative context, it shows no parallels to our list.

4. Taking zest (*chanda*) as example of all other forms of learning, Vasubandhu explains their role as follows. First, as the cause of both learning and wisdom, each of them leads to wisdom. Second, the forms of learning itself becomes the cause of *chanda*, etc., with which it forms jointly the basis to wisdom. Third, each of the types of learning represents also the own-being of wisdom (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 181.3.6–4.1):

"Zest is the keen wish to hear the Dharma. From the keen wish to hear, learning and insight occur but without the keen wish they do not. Hence, zest should be understood as the cause (*hetu*) through which wisdom arises. Again, zest arises from learning, but not from non-learning. Hence, learning becomes the cause from which zest arises. If the two are taken together, they are therefore the one cause [of wisdom]. Again, what is the own-being of wisdom? The form of zest means that the own-being of insight is zest. With regard to the following items, the form of resolve, etc., should be understood accordingly."

5. As part of its explanation of intent (*āśaya*), the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 181.4.3–4) draws attention to a passage in the *Bbh* (p. 18.17–21). However, this passage deals with *adhyāśaya* and not with *āśaya*—a confusion that exemplifies the conceptual proximity of both terms (cf. Edgerton, pp. 17–18). A good definition of *āśaya* is found further below in the *Bbh* (p. 313.4–6), stating that the intent of the bodhisattva is based on faith and Dharma-discernment and manifests a resolute belief accompanied by certain knowledge and determination towards the Buddha's teachings.

6. *Akn*: *bag yod pa* (*apramādyā*).

7. *Akn*: *gus par byed pa* (*satkrtyā*).

receptacle of recollection, knowledge arising from awakening⁸, search for understanding, penetration of reason, insatiability through hearing the Buddha's doctrine, propagation of renunciation, erudition through restraint⁹, adherence to great learning, experiencing joy in devotion, bodily cheerfulness, joyful mind, untiring listening, pursuit of the own-being of things, pursuit of designations, pursuit of good conduct¹⁰, lack of desire for other vehicles, pursuit of the perfections, pursuit of the *bodhisattvapiṭaka*¹¹, pursuit of the means of conversion, pursuit of skilful means, pursuit of the pure abodes, pursuit of the super-knowledge (592), pursuit of the bases of mindfulness, pursuit of the perfect efforts, pursuit of the bases of success, pursuit of dependent co-origination, pursuit of impermanence, suffering and non-self, pursuit of serenity, pursuit of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, pursuit of non-accumulation of karmic formations, pursuit of the accumulation of roots of virtue, self-assertion, reflection on the Doctrine, contemplation of unsuitable associations, severing of all defilement, delight in skilfulness, adherence to noble ones and rejection of ignoble ones, pursuit of noble [qualities], faculties, bases of mindfulness, factors of enlightenment and the noble eightfold path, the Tathāgata's powers, assurances, great benevolence, compassion, sympathetic joy, equipoise¹², unique knowledge (593) and eighteen exclusive buddha-qualities.

8. Vasubandhu's commentary on this term runs as follows (*Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 182.4.5–7):

"Awakening is wisdom arising from reflection. Also, wisdom arising from reflection has two different aspects, e.g., the assumption and non-assumption of composure. But he who is awakened since he is knowledgeable, that one is of knowledge arising from awakening. By means of the teaching of the knowledge arising from awakening, he acquires composed wisdom."

Now, the term *rtogs pa śes pa* (*gatibodhana*) is ambiguous as it may carry several meanings (Edgerton, pp. 208, 402). In his English rendering of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (1981, p. 185) Bendall translates *gatibodhana*—erroneously I think—as 'illuminating the destinies'. This interpretation was also adopted by Meadows (1986, p. 107), translating it as 'understanding the course', while Braarvig (1989, p. 254) follows Vasubandhu's understanding. Since *gati* may indeed mean 'awakening' (Edgerton, p. 208)—a meaning that brings it much closer to Vasubandhu's commentary of the term *gatibodhana*—Meadows and Bendall are probably misguided in their translation. In addition, to render *gatibodhana* as 'knowledge arising from awakening', being possibly an antecedent to the technical term *cintāmayīprajñā* fits the context in which it is cited in the *Bdp*, while the translation 'illuminating the destinies' does not.

9. This is one of the few instances in which, in spite of a common Sanskrit source term, the Tibetan translations of the *Akn* and *Bdp* do not correspond. While in the *Bdp* the Sanskrit term *dāttājaneya* is rendered as *sbyin nas mi smod pa*, we find in the *Akn* the phrase *dul zin can śes pa*. Notwithstanding these discrepancies in wording, both phrases concur closely in their respective meanings. Vasubandhu's explanation of that term runs as follows (*Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 183.2.1–183.3. 5):

"As regards restraint, he is restrained since he is endowed with improved meditative expedients and does not enter into the realm of the sense organs such as that of the eye, etc. He suppresses the defilements such as passion, etc. That is the cause. He who is restrained in that way is all-knowing. He is all-knowing, because he arrives at the place where he should be walking to all the time via the true path. That is the fruit. The true path is the union of knowledge and means, the noble eightfold path, that of the four noble truths and so forth. As regards the place to which he should be going, this is *nirvāṇa*. Thus it is that the learned one who originates in learning, although he is marked by the characteristic of the fruit and cause [of] the noble path becomes erudite through restraint."

10. According to the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 183.4.1), good conduct is here understood to apply to practices that are included in the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* since it is primarily these that liberate the practitioner from suffering.
11. Vasubandhu informs us in this context that the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is the *vaipulya* of the twelvefold division of scriptures. (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 184.2.7).
12. These four preceding items constitute, of course, the four immeasurables (*apramāṇa*), (*Mvy* 1504–7). Note

1.1.2 Forty-One Methods of Acquiring Learning

Thus, O Śāriputra, in whatever one is learned in that one becomes knowledgeable and being knowledgeable one performs good conduct. Why?

One who aspires to the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, he will listen to it. On hearing it, he becomes knowledgeable and being knowledgeable, he performs good conduct.

One who pursues with determination the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, he will listen to it. ...¹³

One who applies himself to the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, he will listen to it. ...

One who adheres to a virtuous friend, he will listen to it. ...

One who is free from conceit, he will listen to it. ...

One who is well-disposed towards the greatly learned, he will listen to it. ...

One who honours the greatly learned, he will listen to it. ...

One who persists in congeniality towards them, (594) he will listen to it. ...

One who is compliant towards them, he will listen to it. ...

One who pays respect to the greatly learned, he will listen to it. ...

One who is willing to listen, he will listen to it. ...

One who venerates the greatly learned, he will listen to it. ...

One who reflects on great learning¹⁴, he will listen to it. ...

One who considers the sacred word as a jewel, he will listen to it. ...

One who considers the sacred word as ambrosia, he will listen to it. ...

One who after hearing the sacred word thinks that it appeases desire, hatred and delusion, he will listen to it. ...

One who after hearing the sacred word considers holding on to it, he will listen to it. ...

One who penetrates the realisation of *dharma*, he will listen to it. ...

that unlike the ten powers (*bala*), four assurances (*vaiśāradya*) and four unique knowledge (*pratisamvid*), the *apramāṇa* are listed individually and not subsumed under their title.

13. Each of the following forty-one examples, specifying the acquisition of learning, concludes in the stock phrase | ... *de ni thos par hgyur ro* | *thos nas bar du śes so* | *śes nas nan tan byed do* || These I have translated as: "... will listen to it. On hearing it, he becomes knowledgeable (*prajānati*) and being knowledgeable, he performs good conduct (*pratipadyate*)."

In order to achieve a better English reading, I omitted these rather cumbersome, prolix and repetitive phrases. The omissions have been indicated by the insertion of three ellipsis points in the appropriate hiatus. Of the forty-one methods of acquisition of learning, only sixteen have been directly taken from the list of seventy-two forms of learning, that is *ākāra* no. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 20, 22, 27. A further seven methods of acquisition have counterparts in spirit, though not in letter, in the list of learning. These are no. 16, 17, 18, 21, 22, 26, 28. None of the remaining nineteen methods of acquisition exhibits any immediate parallels to the forms of learning. More importantly, none of the *Bdp*'s forty-one methods of acquisition corresponds to the thirty-two methods of acquisition of correct reflection that are given in the *Akn*. Both lists seem to have been construed along differing lines and have little in common except for the context in which they appear and the shared purpose to represent a further stage in the cognitive process leading to wisdom (*Akn*, p. 51.1.6–2.7).

14. My translation of this phrase is based on a passage in the *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 137, saying that application (*ādhāna*) is correct reflection (*yoniso manasakāra*) that has great learning (*bahuśruta*) as object.

- One who wishes for understanding of the sacred word, he will listen to it.
- One who after hearing the sacred word experiences mental inspiration, (595) he will listen to it.
- One who is insatiable in hearing the sacred word, he will listen to it.
- One who after hearing a discourse on giving considers the act of renunciation, he will listen to it.
- One who after hearing a discourse on moral conduct guards morality, he will listen to it.
- One who after hearing a discourse on forbearance acts with patience, he will listen to it.
- One who after hearing a discourse on vigour acts with flawless vigour, he will listen to it.
- One who after hearing a discourse on meditation acts with his mind free of inattention, he will listen to it.
- One who after hearing a discourse on wisdom exerts his mind to suppress the impurities, (596) he will listen to it.
- One who generates joy in great learning¹⁵, he will listen to it.
- One who attains bodily cheerfulness¹⁶ on listening to the Dharma, he will listen to it.
- One who rejoices on hearing the Dharma, he will listen to it.
- One who on hearing of the Mahāyāna aspires to it, he will listen to it.
- One who produces a friendly disposition on hearing about the means of conversion, he will listen to it.
- One who embarks on mindfulness with regard to body, feeling, thought and *dharma* on listening to a discourse on the bases of mindfulness, he will listen to it.
- One who becomes shameful and embarrassed by non-virtues that have already been sown and arisen on listening to a discourse on the perfect efforts, he will listen to it.
- One who constantly retains in mind virtuous *dharma* that have already been sown and arisen, (597) he will listen to it.

15. According to Edgerton the term *mañ du thos pa (bahuśruta)* carries several, albeit related, meanings. He gives 'sacred word' (p. 536, col. 1)—that is most often the Dharma—and 'great learning' (p. 399, col. 1) as the most frequently occurring ones. Monier-Williams (p. 726, col. 1) gives 'one who has studied much', 'very learned', 'being of deep erudition' as the principal meanings of the term *bahuśruta*. Already in the nikāya, great learning (*bahussuta*) assumed an important position and monks bearing this title were greatly revered. It occurs in the *Vinaya* (ii, p. 95), *Majjhimanikāya* (III, p. 11) and at two places in the *Aṅguttaranikāya* (II, p. 22; III, p. 114) where it is cited among the four things that bestow the rank of Elder on a monk:

"He has heard very much and memorised what he has heard. He retains in his mind what he has heard; the teachings are good at the beginning, in the middle and at the end in the sense that the meaning and letter are good. He follows the way of the *brahmacariyā* in every respect and with great purity. To these teachings he has listened very often, he has borne them in mind, repeated them aloud, investigated them for their meaning and well understood them through right view."

The *bahuśruta par excellence* was, of course, Ānanda who was singled out in recognition of this quality as the person responsible for the preservation of the Doctrine (D II, pp. 144–46). Listed among important qualities (A I, pp. 24–25; for its place in an alternative list of seven see; D III, p. 252; M III, p. 23), it became a title that bestowed great prestige and covered the *sutta*, *vinaya* and *mātikā* (A II, pp. 147, 170).

16. I follow here Bendall (1981, p. 185) in translating the term *lus sim pa (kāyaudbilya)* as 'bodily cheerfulness'.

On listening to a discourse on the bases of success, one whose body, mind and determination become agile, he will listen to it.

On listening to a discourse on meditation, one who establishes his mind in unfaltering reflection, he will listen to it.

On listening to a discourse on the immeasurables, one who becomes benevolent towards all sentient beings, greatly compassionate towards the poor, well disposed towards the Dharma and remains in the state of equipoise with regard to non-virtue, he will listen to it.

On listening to a discourse on the faculties, one who applies his mind to the faculty of faith, vigour, mindfulness, meditation and wisdom, he will listen to it.

On listening to a discourse on the factors of enlightenment, one who applies his mind in order to understand all the *dharma* perfectly, he will listen to it.

On listening to a discourse on the path, one who applies his mind to the pursuit of *nirvāṇa*, (598) he will listen to it.

One who directs his mind towards unsurpassed and perfect enlightenment on listening to the immeasurable teaching of the Buddha, studying the Tathāgata's powers, assurances, benevolence, compassion, joy, equipoise, unique knowledge and the eighteen exclusive buddha-qualities, such a person learns. On learning, he becomes knowledgeable and being knowledgeable, he performs good conduct.

O Śāriputra, these are the forty-one methods of acquiring the forms of learning.¹⁷ O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that a bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

1.1.3 Good Conduct

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, when a bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom has properly listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, when he has taken

17. In the *Akn* (p. 51.1.6), the contents of this section is called "thirty-two methods of acquisition by means of correct reflection". For the *Akn*, this ties well to the introductory passage of 'learning' where learning is identified as the form (or cause) of wisdom and correct reflection as the method of acquisition. Accordingly, Vasubandhu explains that "acquisition (*praveśa*) is either to persist in correct reflection or realise own-being and distinction by means of these [manifestations of] correct reflection" (*Akn-tīkā*, p. 185.4.5–7). In view of the purely cognitive orientation of the *Akn*'s thirty-two methods of acquisition this interpretation is appropriate (*Akn*, p. 51.1.5–2.7).

In spite of the fact that the list contained in the *Bdp* does not match the contents of that in the *Akn*, the same assumption can be made for the *Bdp*'s enumeration. While it is true that the cognitive element in the forty-one kinds of penetration is less evident, its presence, joined with *bhāvanāmayīprajñā*, is difficult to overlook in the phrase: "On hearing it, he becomes knowledgeable and being knowledgeable, he performs good conduct". The concept of knowledge implies no doubt the element of reflection and correct conduct could be interpreted to correspond to contemplation (*bhāvanā*) of those insights that were revealed to the bodhisattva in the course of the foregoing cognitive process. In the *Bdp* we have therefore a catalogue of forces that promote the generation of wisdom, given in the order in which they influence each other. First, there is learning, divided into seventy-two kinds. Second, if combined with a wholesome mental disposition the forms of learning lead to knowledge of what has been learned. Third, comprehension then modifies the bodhisattva's practice and causes him to apply himself correctly to its cultivation.

hold of it, retained it, read it, fully absorbed it, when he has also explained it to others and propounded it at great length, he performs good conduct¹⁸.

What is his good conduct with regard to *dharma*? Just as one complies with the instructions, he performs good conduct with regard to *dharma*.

Furthermore, performing good conduct with regard to *dharma* is non-apprehension any *dharma*. Why? If one apprehends *dharma*, one's conduct becomes misguided. As regards people who adhere to grasping *dharma*; (599) there is no place or occasion¹⁹ that arises from these *dharma*. They are unestablished. But even people who do not apprehend them because they are cleansed and are established in good conduct become insecure²⁰ towards these *dharma*, how much more those who grasp *dharma*? Hence, non-apprehension of any *dharma* is good conduct.

Furthermore, one who is unobstructed with regard to *dharma* is of good conduct. One who lacks assertion, grasping and attachment towards *dharma* and realises that they are unarisen and unceasing is of good conduct. In addition, seeing the absence of increase and decrease in *dharma* is good conduct.

Furthermore, I have not explained much here. Just as it did not become perceptible in accordance with the explanation, in the same way all *dharma* are imperceptible, inapprehensible and have one characteristic. What is this characteristic? It is the lack of characteristic. The characteristic is without characteristic. This is due to two factors. Why? Binary reflection and right understanding²¹ themselves, I declare to be without characteristic. This is their characteristic, but it is a non-characteristic. Consequently, one who understands that all *dharma* are imperceptible, inapprehensible and without characteristic is of good conduct. Embark diligently on good conduct. Attain the vision that all *dharma* are pure. (600)

18. *nan tan ñin por byed pa yin pa: pratipattisāra* (Mvy 1810)

According to the *Bhāvanākrama* (MBT, ii, p. 222 § 21), good conduct of bodhisattvas is at all times aimed at the welfare of sentient beings. Based on perfect knowledge and exempt from despondency, agitation or meditative faults, a bodhisattva ponders on the illusory nature of the *skandha*, *dhātu*, *āyatana*, etc., without, however, to bring the realisation of their insubstantiality to conclusion. Wishing to establish beings in true vision of all *dharma* (*sarvadharmayathābhūtaadarśana*), he observes the three areas of practice (*adhiśīla*, *adhicitta*, *adhiprajñā*) in order to set an example and manifests vigour and purity in conduct of body, speech and mind. Judging by the number of references Edgerton cites in his entry of *pratipatti*, these elements constitute for most texts the cardinal aspects of good conduct (p. 364). Precise definitions, however, are rare largely because the concept of *pratipatti* itself is rather broad and ill-delineated, changing with context and doctrinal orientation.

19. The Tibetan *gnas dañ skabs* could conceivably represent a misinterpretation of the Sanskrit term *avasthita* (*gnas skabs*; *Abhisaml*, p. 119) or *avastha* (Mvy 7588), in which case the translation 'condition' would be more appropriate. While this would make better sense, expressing that unestablished *dharma* do not produce any conditions that might perpetuate the causal chain, the Tibetan reading does not support this interpretation.

20. *the tshom du gyur pa: saṃśayita* (Edgerton, p. 542; Monier-Williams, p. 1117, col. 3).

21. *kun brtags pa: parikalpita*; *yañ dag par brtags pa: sampratipannā*.

Then, on that occasion, the lord composed these verses:

Whoever fares in truly good conduct
According to the *Bodhisattvapitaka*
Such a wise person does not cling to phenomena.
Thus, non-clinging emulates good conduct.

A man who obtains *dharma* does not profess emptiness.
The wise one does not take pride in empty *dharma*.
He has not attachment to empty *dharma* whatsoever.
Thus non-attachment resembles good conduct.

One does not grasp nor reject the *dharma*.
There is non-practice of grasping *dharma*.
Hence non-grasping is the characteristic of *dharma*.
It is this kind of emulation that is good conduct.

Why is the bodhisattva never attached to *dharma*?
His pristine cognition does not apprehend *dharma*.
He does not even attach himself to the non-grasping pristine cognition.
It is this kind of emulation that is good conduct.

The wise one should abide in the qualities of purification.²²
He should apply himself to these *dharma*.
When he has persisted in good behaviour and comportment.
At that time, his introduction to the Doctrine²³ becomes pure.

When he has purified his deportment,
He understands such teaching.
Then, he also perceives the resolve of the thought of enlightenment.
Truly, at that time, once he has perceived this resolve, the wise one explains such teaching.

After he has acquired knowledge of the absolute truth of this profound teaching,

22. *sbyaṅs paḥi yon tan: dhūtaguṇa* (Edgerton, p. 286, col. 1).

23. *sgo: mukha* ('entrance', 'ingress', 'introduction')

Cf. Edgerton, p. 433, col. 2; Monier Williams, p. 819, col. 3 ff. See also entries for *dharmamukha* (Edgerton, p. 280, col. 1) and *dharmālokamukha* (Edgerton, p. 281, col. 2) on which my translation is based.

He will always abide in truth.

He is noble due to his infinite conduct and excellent qualities.

The great learning of this wise man is like an ocean.

Truly, as regards the meaning and words of this teaching (601),

Their limit is beyond comprehension.

Both, words and meaning are infinite.

One who fares in good conduct remains unperturbed.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

1.1.4 Vision

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, after the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom has properly listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and has taught it in great detail to others, he attains light as regards all *dharma*, because he has dispelled the impenetrable, shadowy darkness of clouding ignorance. This is the light of wisdom.²⁴ Since he has attained this vision, he knows virtuous and non-virtuous *dharma*. For the sake of life, he never adheres to non-virtuous *dharma*. But, because he abandons non-virtuous *dharma* and comprehends the teachings that he has thus heard he is virtuous, mighty and calm²⁵.

Then, on that occasion, the lord composed these verses:

Just like one who has entered into a house

That is dim and filled with darkness,

24. *śes rab kyi śhan: prajñāloka*

If *prajñāloka* corresponds to *jñānāloka*, it would indicate the presence of the first *nirvedhabhāgīya*, viz., *usmagata* or 'heat'. Springing from the simultaneous pursuit of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā*, light of knowledge reveals to the śrāvaka for the first time the meaning of the four noble truths in their sixteen aspects (*DPP*, p. 20). The evidence suggesting such identity of *prajñā-* and *jñānāloka* is, however, rather thinly spread and not necessarily conclusive. Even if one accepts the identity of *prajñā* and *jñāna* as it is postulated by the *Kośa* (vi, p. 246), we have little material to go by. Most of the standard treatises do not contain any reference to *prajñāloka*. It is not found in the *Mppś*, *Kośa*, *Abhidh-sam*, *Msl* or *Msg* and appears unknown even to the *Bbh*. Indeed, besides two highly ambiguous references in the *Mvu* (iii, p. 332.15), the only text in that I located the term *prajñāloka* is the *Dbh*. Here, it appears on its own on the ninth stage, standing for the 'light of wisdom' that the bodhisattva continually discharges into *samsāra* to benefit beings (p. 71, R). Elsewhere in the *Dbh* (p. 62, N), the bodhisattva applies himself on the seventh stage to all practices by means of the light of the attainment, wisdom and knowledge (*samāpattiprajñājñānālokena*). The most instructive reference yet to *prajñāloka* is found on the *prabhākaribhūmi* (*Dbh*, p. 32, H) where the bodhisattva—contemplating the nature of conditioned existence—realises that to perceive all things truly is impossible unless by unproduced wisdom whose light (*āloka*) is dependent for unfolding on 'skill' in learning (*śrutakauśalya*). It appears, therefore, that for *prajñāloka* to become manifest, the bodhisattva is required to devote himself to learning (and teaching)—a proposition that tallies well with the context in which *prajñāloka* is mentioned in the *Bdp*.

25. *dge ba thub pa zi ba: śubhamuniśānta*.

Does not see with his eyes even those shapes
That exist in that house,

In the same way, by some of those in whom
impurity has arisen,
Virtuous and non-virtuous *dharma*
Are not perceived unless they listen to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

Once they have listened to it, they distinguish *dharma*.
On listening to it, they relinquish sin.
Once they have listened to it, they renounce all harm.
On listening to it, they attain *nirvāṇa*. (602)

Since they desire to learn, their erudition increases.
By learning, their wisdom increases.
By wisdom, their intentions become pure.
Once they have attained pure intentions, they attain happiness.

Those who reach the goal have sharp minds.
At the time when they reach *nirvāṇa*,
Being secure in the Doctrine and skilled in purity,
They attain great happiness.

As regards the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*;
Once they have listened to it, they abide in the essence of the Doctrine.
After they have realised it in the world,
They will cultivate enlightened conduct.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

1.2 Application

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom generates the notion of a virtuous friend towards a person who adheres to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. Having done so he purifies him in this very Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. He purifies him completely. He generates in him a keen wish for this *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. He causes him to strive and apply himself diligently. He causes him to retain it in his mind and

to endeavour zealously to that end²⁶. Since he has fully penetrated the four perfect efforts he attains freedom from obstruction concerning any *dharma* whatsoever.²⁷

Then, at that time, the lord pronounced these verses:

A person who pronounces the Dharma
Is thought of as a virtuous friend.
Once he permanently fares in good conduct,
He applies himself to the Doctrine and studies it. (603)

He never reduces his determination.
His vigour is always unsurpassed.
His wisdom is irrevocably completely purified.
He constantly abides in pristine cognition.

He understands my Dharma.
Due to his faith, he lives in this world.
He understands it as the imperturbable Dharma
That was fully explained by the Buddha.

The wise ones are skilled in analysing words.
Being learned, they comprehend their meaning.
They practice perpetually wholesome conduct.
They renounce perpetually unwholesome conduct.

Their minds are always free of blemish.
They are truly free from despondency concerning any teaching.
Just as easily as a body, they attain swiftly

26. *yaṇ dag par rab tu h̄jog par byed pa: samyakpradadhāti* (cf. Edgerton, p. 370, col. 2).

27. According to the *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 120, adopting the line of reasoning that prevails in the nikāya, the fruit of the cultivation (*bhāvanāphala*) of the four correct efforts (*samyakprahāṇa*) consists chiefly of the abandonment of *dharma* that are detriment (*vipakṣa*) to skilful *dharma* and the growth of *dharma* that counteract (*pratipakṣa*) unskilful *dharma*. Marking the stage of *uṣmagata*, the practitioner succeeds in eliminating the coarse impediments and prepares for entry on the transcendental path (*Kośa*, vi, p. 287). In the *Bdp*, by saying that the *samyakprahāṇa* contribute to the elimination of all hindrances (*āvaraṇa*), no immediate connection to such a fruit of perfect effort is attested. Moreover, it is also left open whether the bodhisattva is freed from the *klesāvaraṇa* and *jñeyāvaraṇa*—the standard division of the *Bbh* (pp. 3.13, 37.6) and *Msl* (pp. 2.25–3.4)—or whether he is still subjected to one of them. The fact that the *Bdp* makes a point in saying that he is liberated from hindrances of all *dharma*, suggests perhaps the former. In this event, the attainment of the *samyakprahāṇa* would establish the bodhisattva on the transcendental path—a remarkable progress from the cultivation of the *uṣmagata* phase of the *prayogamārga* that tallies ill with other path-schemes (cf. *Kośa*, vi, p. 184; *Mvs (N)*, pp. 53.13–54.19). The likelihood of imminent entry into the *lokottara* path is however strengthened by the content of the following section since this lays down the attainments of the *darśanamārga* that mark the first phase of the transcendental path.

The mind of enlightenment, vigour and determination.

By listening to the Doctrine, their wisdom increases.

Because of realisation arising from pristine cognition, their recollection stays flawless.

Once they constantly persist in pristine cognition and recollection,

They fully understand virtuous and non-virtuous *dharma*.

On learning the highest teachings,

They attain the supreme powers of understanding, recollection and wisdom.

Having studied like myself for a long time,

They know the disposition of sentient beings.

Once they have listened to the Doctrine they acquire excellence.

On acquiring excellence, their pristine cognition having become pure,

They perceive the disposition of sentient beings.

For this reason they teach the Dharma in accordance with the disposition of sentient beings²⁸.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.
(604)

1.3 Seeing

1.3.1 Right View

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom, having thus purified his mind and cleansed his entry into the light of the Doctrine, studies in the following way. So far as the emergence of the noble, right view is concerned, it has two causes and two conditions. What are the two? These are other people's statements and correct inner reflection.²⁹

He considers thus: "What are the statements of other people and what is correct inner reflection?" While he reflects correctly in this manner, he considers the following in his mind: "Those who cultivate yoga do not hear the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

28. The word *sems can* is not found in the Tibetan text. I assume that its presence is implied, since *sems can* is the object of the preceding verse to which this verse is contextually closely related.

29. The origin of this concept goes back to early Buddhism. It is found at several places in the nikāya and was adopted at a later stage by the Mahāyāna. "Statements of others (*parataś ca ghoṣaḥ*) and inner correct reflection (*adhyātman ca yoniśo manasakāra*) are the causes of right view" (A I, p. 87; *Kośa*, ii, p. 245; iv, p. 100; *Msg*, p. 65).

After they have obtained gratification through meditation alone without hearing the noble Dharma and *Vinaya*, they fall into great conceit through the power of pride. They are not liberated from birth, old-age, disease, death, misery, lamentations, suffering, grief and agitation. They are not liberated from the mass of suffering.”

Pondering these, the Tathāgata proclaimed: “One who listens congenially to the statements of others becomes liberated from old-age-and-death.”

The lord spoke again:

On hearing these teachings, bodhisattvas understand them.

On hearing them, they do not commit offences. (605)

On hearing them, they abandon harm.

On hearing them, they attain *nirvāṇa*.

A listener who wishes to learn becomes exuberant,

Because it is by learning that wisdom increases.

His intentions are purified through wisdom.

When he reaches the goal, he gains happiness.

Those who reach the goal have sharp minds.

At that time, they reach *nirvāṇa*.

Those who are skilled in pure *dharma* are purified

And attain supreme happiness.

1.3.2 Practice and Seeing

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva should study carefully the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* as the noble Dharma and *Vinaya*. He should take hold of it and retain it. He should read it and fully absorb it. He should also explain it to others and propound it in great detail. O Śāriputra, those who do not hear this Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and do not engage in correct practice violate the noble path.

Pondering this, the Tathāgata proclaimed: “Correct inner reflection is liberation from old-age-and-death.”

He studies in this way: “On contemplating the bodhisattva’s correct practice, viz., what this practice is actually like, he learns that a bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* does not pursue any *dharma*; he learns that he does not pursue any practice. Correct practice is an expression for non-practice.

Furthermore, the bodhisattva who practises correctly does not send out sound or murmurs. (606) He does not construe a place from which sound emerges. But, investigating its starting-

point and end-point, he thinks: "Sound emerges from and disappears into sound itself". He studies, thinking: "If one researches all sounds ever pronounced, by whom they were pronounced, for what purpose they were pronounced and in order to comprehend what they were pronounced, without apprehending sound as an aspect of the past, present or future, this is correct practice³⁰".

How does the bodhisattva who practises correctly in this manner see correctly? He studies in this way. At the time when the bodhisattva sees that all *dharma* are suppressed by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all *dharma* are appeased by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all *dharma* are tranquil by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all *dharma* are unattained³¹ by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all *dharma* are unborn by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. (607) At the time when he sees that all *dharma* are unarisen by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all *dharma* are absolutely unbecome by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. At the time when he sees that all *dharma* are in a state of *nirvāṇa* by their nature, at that time he sees correctly. Also investigating by whom they are seen, he realises that they are altogether unseen and unexamined. If he sees it in this way he is of correct vision.

Once again, he studies in this way. A bodhisattva who practises correctly has no doubt or uncertainty concerning any *dharma* whatsoever. He is free from obstruction concerning any *dharma* whatsoever. He who practises correctly will always be at the door to liberation concerning any *dharma* whatsoever. He who practises correctly does not exert himself to renounce any *dharma* whatsoever. He who practises correctly does not exert himself to contemplate any *dharma* whatsoever. He who sees rightly all *dharma* and looks at them in accordance with reality is of right view.

What is looking at all *dharma* in accordance with reality³²? It is non-seeing. Non-seeing is an expression for unborn. Unborn is an expression for unarisen. What is unarisen? It is an expression for invisibility.

Pondering this, the Tathāgata proclaimed: "If one realises that all karmic formations are unborn, one penetrates the certainty of truth³³". (608) Penetration of the certainty of truth is

30. The syntax of this paragraph is ambiguous and I am not certain that I have correctly interpreted the thought that stands behind it.

31. *sñom pa ma zugs pa: asamāpanna* (cf. Edgerton, p. 570, col. 1).

32. According to the *Bbh* (p. 294.14–20) to see *dharma* in accordance with reality involves four fields of cognition. These are (1) seeking out names (*nāma*), (2) seeking out things (*vastu*), (3) seeking out the manifestations of own-being (*svabhāvaprajñapti*) and (4) seeking out manifestations of distinction (*viśeṣaprajñapti*).

33. *yañ dag pa ñid du ñes pa: samyaktvāniyata*

The term *samyaktvāniyata* has two related, though conceptually somewhat different, meanings. On the one hand, it represents one of three categories (*rāśi*) classifying the various people according to the degree of spiritual attainments. First, there is the category of beings that are 'permanently fixed in falsehood'

right view.”

He studies in this way, thinking: “Why is it called penetration of the certainty of truth? Because all *dharma* are completely uniform with the buddha-qualities; therefore it is penetration of the certainty of truth.”

Hence, those who wish to penetrate the certainty of truth should listen carefully to this very Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. They should take hold of it and retain it. They should read it and fully absorb it. Indeed, they should apply themselves correctly to this very Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

1.3.3 Penetration and Speech

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, when the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom, having thus purified his mind and cleansed his entry into the light of the Doctrine, penetrates correctly he realises correct speech. What is correct penetration? What is correct speech?

A bodhisattva’s correct penetration is as follows. He penetrates the basis of perfect mental quietude and the binary thinking of insight³⁴. This is correct penetration. (609) Although he

(*mithyātvaniyata*). People belonging to this group are permanently unable to comprehend the teachings of the Buddha and excluded from the *tathāgatagotra*. Having committed grave offences, they are always born in the lower destinies, unless they move up to the next *rāśi*. The second type, ‘persons settled permanently in truth’ (*samyaktvaniyata*) will come in contact with the Doctrine and understand it whether it is preached by a buddha or not. Springing from a combination of cognition and past virtuous conduct, it is the domain of advanced practitioners (according to the *Dīgha* ‘non-returners’; D III, p. 217). Having entered into the path, their progress to *nirvāṇa* is assured and rapid. Third, the Buddha identified a group of people that are undetermined (*aniyata*) in the sense that they will only understand the Doctrine after lengthy expositions (*Mvu*, iii, pp. 318, 347). Numerically, this category is said to be largest of the three since it contains the majority of people. According to the *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (p. 44), the heaven of Amitābha is inhabited only beings of the first category. References to these three types of *rāśi* may be found in the S I, p. 196; II, p. 25; III, p. 225; *Kathāvatthu*, p. 186; *Nett*, p. 96; *Dhs*, p. 186; *Kośa*, iii, p. 137; iv, pp. 177, 202; *Lal*, pp. 351.9, 400.2; *Bbh*, p. 404.23).

On the other hand, as far as the path is concerned, entry into the certainty of truth marks an important turning-point in the spiritual advance of the adept. Being the point of embarkation on the *bhāvanāmārga*, *samyaktvaniyata* establishes the practitioner in the āryan-fold and guarantees liberation after no more than seven births (*Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 152). For the bodhisattva, the stages are as follows (*Bbh*, p. 290.11–23): First, he enters into the fold of bodhisattvas. Provided that he fulfils a number of spiritual conditions, he is certain to attain buddhahood in future. Second, there is the generation of the thought of enlightenment. At this point he cannot be turned away from buddhahood and is beyond conditions. The third stage is marked by the acquisition of the bodhisattva’s special powers (*vaśitā*). Being the outcome of his dedication to the welfare of beings and his correct vision of reality, he has now attained the certainty of the prediction and traverses the final phase of the path (cf. *Aṣṭa*, p. 33.18 ff, p. 322.5; *Śikṣ*, p. 270.4). For a sound discussion of a number of connotations associated with the term *niyata/niyāma* in the various strands of Buddhist literature, see: *Bbh*, Lexikalisches ..., pp. 28–31.

34. The association of binary thinking (*vikalpa*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*) indicates that we dealing here still with the preparatory phase of *vipaśyanā*. For, when brought to its highest point, *vipaśyanā* is no longer subject to recollection (*smṛti*) and reflection (*manasakāra*), but operates as non-discursive knowledge (*nirvikalpapajñāna*) manifesting analytical investigation (of the real) (*bhūtapratyavekṣā*) that is devoid of mental and verbal proliferation (*prapañcōpaśama*). According to the *Bhāvanākrama* (*MBT*, iii, pp. 15–16), recollective attention and reflection figure only during the initial stages of *vipaśyanā* development, while, at the pinnacle of its evolution, *asmṛti* and *amanasakāra*—springing from analytical investigation—become

penetrates the body of solitude³⁵, favourable dispositions, indestructibility, impermanence, the causes and conditions, dependent co-origination, the belief in a living being, a life-force and a person, the non-existence of the past, present and future, investigation into immutability, imperishability of causes and retribution, emptiness of causes as well as acquaintance³⁶ with signlessness and wishlessness, he does not realise emptiness and wishlessness.

Although he acquires meditations and attainments, he is not reborn through the power of contemplation. Although he acquires the knowledge of the super-knowledge, he does not enter into the suppression of impurity. Although he penetrates the notion of no-birth, he does not enter into the state of perfection. Although he penetrates the notion of non-self of all sentient beings, he does not renounce great compassion. Although he penetrates the notion of the destruction of all beings, he [does not] realise the inconceivable state of existence. Although he longs for *nirvāṇa*, he does not to embark on realising the Dharma. Although he penetrates the purity of objects of sense pleasure and abides in equipoise, he does not dismiss the joy of the Doctrine. Although he abandons all discursive proliferation³⁷, (610) he does not renounce skilful means³⁸. O Śāriputra, this is correct penetration.

the hub of the yogin's *vipaśyanā* experience (*MBT*, iii, pp. 15–17). This division is also borne out by the *vipaśyanā* account in the *Abhidh-sam* (*R*), p. 126, where, at first, insight is characterised by examination (*vicaya*), discernment (*pravicaya*), judgment (*prativitarka*) and investigation (*mīmāṃsā*). Cf. *Samdhis* (*ĒLa*), p. 90.3–22.

35. The *Śrotabhūmi* (109, p. 286.5.2–3) distinguishes five objects from which the bodhisattva achieves freedom when abiding in the 'body of solitude'. These are bad conduct (*duṣcarita*), desire (*kāma*), utensils (*pariṣkāra*), sexual intercourse (*samsarga*) and defilements (*kleśa*).

36. *hḍris pa: paricaya* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 593, col. 2).

37. *rtoḡ pa spros pa: prapañca*

Prapañca is a difficult term of which Edgerton's translation as 'spreading out', 'activity', 'error of false statement' or 'false imagining'—although linguistically sound—is not quite adequate (Edgerton, p. 380, col. 2). He comes somewhat closer when, on the basis of Chinese translations, he proposes 'frivolous talk' as its meaning. According to Stcherbatsky, *prapañca* is the "expression of conceptually differentiated reality in words" (*Nirvāṇa*, 1975, p. 38*, pp. 137, 168, 216). The same line of thinking is taken up by Honda, when (citing Stcherbatsky as authority) he defines *prapañca* as "diffusion or diversification as function of craving, the expression of conceptual conceit and wrongly differentiated reality in words and view, or the expression of conceptually differentiated reality in words" (1968, p. 233).

Note also that, according to the *Siddhi* (p. 607), this type of abandonment does not take place before the *bhāvanāmārga*. Although not explicitly linked with a path scheme, indications to this effect are also found in the *Bhāvanākrama* (*MBT*, iii, p. 17.10–11) and *Ratnameghasūtra* (cited in *MBT*, iii, p. 7.16–18).

38. The role of *upāyakaūśalya* is twofold. On the one hand, it brings about personal welfare for the bodhisattva and, on the other hand, it furthers the liberation of beings. Taking this division as foundation, the *Bbh* (pp. 261.6–272.8) distinguishes several aspects within each category. First, as regards the bodhisattva's own welfare—epitomising the acquisition of buddha-qualities—it involves compassionate attention to sentient beings, accurate knowledge of all conditioned *dharma*, thirst for knowledge of unsurpassed enlightenment, non-defiled passing through the round of rebirth and ardent vigour (p. 261.6–19). Second, skilful means in the service of others—accomplishing the ripening of beings—is dominated by the cultivation of the four means of conversion (*saṃgrahavastu*). Through their presence, manifesting six kinds of effect, the bodhisattva multiplies the otherwise negligible fruits that accrue from the small roots of virtue of beings; he occasions the acquisition of great roots of virtue with little effort; he averts obstacles that would prevent beings from embracing the Buddha's teachings; he causes beings who are yet undecided to embark on the path; he ripens those who have already embarked on the path and he liberates those who have already ripened (p. 261.20–27).

The *Msl* (p. 147.3–9) speaks of five different types of means. First, there is non-constructive knowledge (*nirvikalpajñāna*) that occasions the acquisition of the buddha-qualities. Second, the means of conversion

O Śāriputra, what is correct speech? His speech is logical. Furthermore, O Śāriputra, it is attentive. It consists of sound and is articulate. It is investigative, non-contradictory and amiable. It is imperturbable, inapprehensive and compliant. It is judicious and well-balanced. It is unborn and lacks all foundation of quarrel. It is dependable and devoid of acrimony.³⁹

It is speech of suchness. It is speech of thusness, genuine thusness, unfailing thusness, truth and actuality.⁴⁰ It is speech of the sameness of the three times. It cuts off the fetters and is independent of form, feeling, perception, karmic formations and consciousness.

It is independent of the element of the eye, form and visual consciousness. It is independent of the element of the ear, sound and auditory consciousness. It is independent of the element of the nose, scent and olfactory consciousness. It is independent of the element of the tongue, flavour and gustatory consciousness. (611) It is independent of the element of the body, touch and tactile consciousness. It is independent of the element of the mind, its objects and mental consciousness.

His speech relies on the spirit, foundation of being, pristine cognition and on *sūtras* of precise meaning.⁴¹ O Śāriputra, this is correct speech.

It is in this way that a bodhisattva who applies himself to correct penetration and sees correct speech does not realise seeing. He sees just like one who lacks vision and clear insight⁴². When he sees in this way, he is of correct vision.

Again, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva who practises correctly will never become confused concerning any *dharma* whatsoever. A bodhisattva who practises correctly will always be at the door to liberation concerning any *dharma* whatsoever. He who practises correctly does not exert himself to renounce any *dharma* whatsoever. He who practises correctly does not

that assist sentient beings to mature. Third, the confession of faults, joy in the Buddha, invitation to the buddhas and transference (of merit) that speed up the attainment of enlightenment. Fourth, cultivation of meditations (*samādhi*) and formulae (*dhāraṇī*) that purify his conduct. Fifth, generation of unsupported (*apratisthita*) *nirvāṇa* that prevents the bodhisattva from interrupting his course in *samsāra* (ref. Lamotte).

39. Up to this point, the characterisation of correct speech shows many parallels to the discussion of the bodhisattva's 'unique knowledge of eloquence' (*pratibhānapratīsamvid*) that is discussed at 2.5.4 in my translation of chapter eleven (folio 629.6–631.4). However, the cognitive element, associating correct speech with insight and thus turning the bodhisattva's speech into a mirror of his profound understanding of the nature of reality, is specific to correct speech and not touched upon in the discussion of the *pratibhānapratīsamvid*.

40. The four preceding attributes are translations of the following technical terms (*Mvy* 1709, 1711, 1716) that, but for the last, serve as synonyms for the absolute (*paramārtha*): (1) *de bzin ñid: tathātā*, (2) *gzan ma yin pa de bzin ñid: ananyatathātā*, (3) *ma log pa de bzin ñid: tathātā*, (4) *ji lta ba bzin: yathāvat*.

41. This sentence, qualifying the foundation of speech, contains a reference to the bodhisattva's four types of reliance, viz., reliance on the spirit (*artha*) as opposed to the letter (*vyañjana*); reliance on the foundation of being (*dharmatā*) as opposed to the person (*pudgala*); reliance on pristine cognition (*jñāna*) as opposed to discursive insight (*vijñāna*); and reliance on *sūtras* of precise meaning (*nīthārtha*) as opposed to those of provisional meaning (*neyārtha*). The exact nature and scope of the bodhisattva's four reliances is considered in great detail at 2.6 as one of the skills leading to 'discerning-wisdom'.

42. *rnam par mthoṅ pa: vidarśana* (*Mvy* 1141)
On the conceptual closeness of *vipaśyanā* and *vidarśana*, see: *Abhidh-d*, pp. 355–7 (n. 440); *Kośa*, vi, pp. 279–281.

exert himself to contemplate any *dharma* whatsoever. He who sees rightly all *dharma* and looks at them in accordance with reality is of right view.

What is looking at all *dharma* in accordance with reality? It is non-seeing. What is non-seeing? It is an expression for unborn. What is unborn? It is an expression for invisibility.⁴³ (612) Just as it was previously discussed at great length, in the same way it should be formulated. It is in this way that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom studies in this way. “It is correct that all *dharma* are like the self.” He realises that just as the self is non-self, so all *dharma* are non-self. He realises that just as the sentient being is non-self, so all *dharma* are non-self. When he looks at them in this way, he sees correctly.

Seeing correctly that the sphere of *samsāra* is endowed with the sphere of *nirvāṇa*; this is correct practice.⁴⁴ Then, he realises that the own-being of all *dharma* is invariably that of impurity. Indeed, he does not take pride in either yoga or non-yoga. Through correct practice, he sees correctly. Correct practice is as manifold as all bases of sentient beings. Not seeing the bases of sentient beings and to be imperturbable concerning the basis of the Doctrine; this is correct practice of the bodhisattva. O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the forms of learning, correct penetration, correct vision and those which are the result of accurate vision are called wisdom.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom. (613)

1.4 Emancipation

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, the bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom is by virtue of his wisdom not linked to any conditioned *dharma*⁴⁵. That is to say, he is emancipated from⁴⁶ ignorance. Having become strengthened through emancipation from karmic formations, he is emancipated from old-age-and-death. Since he is emancipated from the belief in a self, he is emancipated from the sixty-two heretical views that are based on the belief in a self.⁴⁷

43. This passage starting with “Again, O Śāriputra” up to “invisibility” is almost identical with a previous section on folio 607 starting with “Once again, he studies ...” (folio 607.3–608.2).

44. The thought of the identity of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* is taken up in greater detail at 2.3, discussing the bodhisattva’s ‘skill’ in elements (*dhātu*).

45. *hdus byas la spyod paḥi chos thams cad mi gnas pa*
lit.: ‘to be independent of all *dharma* that participate in the conditioned’.

46. *lhan cig tu mi gnas: sahānvasthāna*.

47. The doctrinal foundations to most of the sixty-two heretical views (*dr̥ṣṭigata*) are either the views of existence or non-existence (*bhavābhavadr̥ṣṭi*) or the views of eternity or annihilation (*śāśvatocchedadr̥ṣṭi*). Representing the beliefs in extremes (*antagrāhadr̥ṣṭi*) that run counter to the ‘middle path’ of the Buddhists, they are rejected in equal measure by early Buddhists and later Mahāyāna writers alike. For references in the nikāya, see: D I, pp. 52–59; S II, p. 17; S III, p. 135; fine expositions of the Mahāyāna position are

He is emancipated from lofty and wretched thoughts. He is emancipated from the eight worldly conditions. He is emancipated from the twenty secondary defilements⁴⁸ including self-conceit, grave conceit and perverted conceit.⁴⁹ He is emancipated from all defilements, including minor, mediocre and major ones. Having become ensnared by the impenetrable, obscuring, dark mist of delusion, he is emancipated from all lowly and wicked *dharma*. He is emancipated from the activity of all evil, including contentious and defiled activity, activity of the aggregates, activity of the lord of death and activity of the Evil One.⁵⁰

He is emancipated from all heretical views concerning the self, including the belief in a

found at *Kp*, pp. 86–108; *Aṣṭa*, p. 66; *Madh. vṛtti*, pp. 272.14, 445.3. Additional material has been collected together by May (1959, p. 213, n. 720) and Lamotte (1976, p. 57, n. 36) from whom these references stem.

48. According to the *Siddhi* (p. 362), the twenty secondary defilements include (1) anger (*krodha*), (2) spitefulness (*upanāha*), (3) hypocrisy (*mṛakṣa*), (4) malice (*pradāśa*), (5) jealousy (*īrṣyātha*), (6) avarice (*mātsarya*), (7) deception (*māyā*), (8) concealment (*śāthya*), (9) complacency (*mada*), (10) violence (*vihiṃsa*), (11) lack of self-esteem (*āhrikyā*), (12) indecency (*anapatrāpya*), (13) inertness (*styāna*), (14) agitation (*auddhatya*), (15) lack of confidence (*āsraddhya*), (16) idleness (*kausīdya*), (17) indolence (*pramāda*), (18) confused recollection (*muṣitasmr̥tītā*), (19) inattentiveness (*asamprajanya*) and (20) distraction (*viksepa*).

Other lists that show comparable, but not identical, contents are found in the *Kośa* (v, pp. 88, 89–109), comprising twenty-one secondary defilements and in the *Dhsg* (§ 69), listing twenty-four items.

49. *na rgyal: māna; che baḥi na rgyal: mahāmāna; log baḥi na rgyal: mithyāmāna*
According to the *Kośa* (v, pp. 26–27), conceit falls into seven categories. Of these, only the first (viz., *māna*) and last (viz., *mithyāmāna*) are cited in the *Bdp*. *Māna* refers to a general arrogance of mind leading to feelings of superiority. *Mithyāmāna*, in contrast, is more specific and causes that one attributes to oneself spiritual qualities that one does not possess (*Kośa*, v, p. 27). I have not found a text where *mahāmāna* figures among the various types of conceit as an independent type of conceit. As *māna* and *mithyāmāna* constitute respectively the first and last limb in the list of seven, it likely that the *Bdp* made this selection in order to indicate the presence of all seven types without actually listing all of them (*Mvy* 1945–52).
50. This, of course, is a reference to the four types of *māra*. Personifying the forces of evil, Buddhist texts distinguish (1) the ‘evil of defilement’ (*kleśamāra*), (2) the ‘evil of aggregate’ (*skandhamāra*), (3) the ‘evil of death’ (*mṛtyumāra*) and (4) the ‘Evil One’ (*devaputramāra*). This is the most common division (*Mvu*, iii, pp. 218.7, 273.2; *Lal*, p. 224.18–19; *Madh. vṛtti*, p. 49.10; *Dhsg* § 80; *Mpps*, i, pp. 340–46), although we read elsewhere (*Udāna-a*, p. 216.11) also of other types of *māra*, viz., the ‘evil of formation’ (*abhiśaṃskāra-māra*) and the ‘evil of misdeed’ (*āpattimāra*). Already in the *nikāya*, the internal armies of *Māra* are identified with personal faults, such as desire, sadness, hunger, thirst, greed, etc., (*Sn*, vss. 436–449) and were named accordingly as *Taṇhā*, *Arati*, *Rāga*, etc. (*S I*, p. 124; *III*, p. 286). On the moment of their destruction during the last existence of bodhisattvas, the *Akn-ṭikā* says:

“The four kinds of *māra* are the *devaputramāra*, *kleśamāra*, *skandhamāra* and the *mṛtyumāra*. Among them, the *devaputramāra* is vanquished by the meditation of benevolence (*maitrīsamādhi*) underneath the tree of enlightenment. The *kleśamāra* is vanquished at the time of comprehension of enlightenment. The *skandhamāra* is vanquished by the reversal of the support of the storehouse consciousness (*ālayavijñānāśrayaparāvṛtti*) at the time of comprehension of enlightenment. Shortening the formation of long life (*āyuh-saṃskāra*) in Vaiśālī three month prior to the *parinirvāṇa*, the *mṛtyumāra* is vanquished by obtaining power over life.”

For further details on interpretations of *māra* and the contexts in which they appear, see: E. Windisch, *Māra and Buddha*, Leipzig, 1895; A. Wayman, ‘Studies in Yama and Māra’, *III*, 1959, pp. 112–32; *Mpps*, ii, pp. 880–884, 906–908; Malalasekera, *Proper Names*, ii, pp. 611–620. A list of disguises of *Māra* is given in the *Ratnaketuḍhārāṇī*, Dutt, vi, 1941–53, pp. 77.7–79.2. For further references to the notion of *māra* in Buddhist literature, see: Lamotte, 1976, pp. 99–101. In the same volume (pp. 169–70), Lamotte provides an excellent list of material that discusses the term *āśrayaparāvṛtti* (e.g., *Bbh*, pp. 367–70; see also: *Msg*, pp. 16*, 48*). On the circumstances accompanying the Buddha’s abandonment of the long-life *saṃskāra*, see: Waldschmidt, 1950, ii, p. 218.

self, a living being, a life-force, a feeder, a person, a human being and an individual. (614) He is emancipated from all continuity brought about by the traces, including the obstruction of action, impurity, *dharma*, heretical views, retribution and nescience. He is emancipated from reflection, binary thinking, marks, mental constructions [brought about through] seeing, hearing and recollection, discursive knowledge and all adventitious bonds⁵¹. He is emancipated from [the dichotomy of] avarice and generosity, morality and immorality, patience and malice, vigour and indolence, meditation and disquietude, wisdom and folly, furtherance and impediments of the perfections, knowledge and nescience.

He is emancipated from antitheses of all *dharma*, including truth, falsehood and perjury, virtue and depravity, reproach and approval, *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. He is emancipated from all multiplicity, including multiplicity of buddha-fields, buddhas, sentient beings and *dharma*. He is emancipated from conditioned reflection⁵² of all sentient beings, including nescience, knowledge, discursive insight, conventional truth and absolute truth. (615) He is emancipated from the bases of all reflection, thought and consciousness; including perseverance [to] formlessness, signlessness, causelessness and unconditioned wisdom. He is emancipated from these and other incalculable, conditioned *dharma*. It is in this way that the wisdom of a bodhisattva who courses in the Perfection of Wisdom is emancipated from all conditioned *dharma*.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

SECTION II

2. Skill

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who adheres to the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and courses in the Perfection of Wisdom is skilled in discerning the Perfection of Wisdom. He attains skill in all *dharma*.

What is discerning wisdom? It is tenfold, viz., skill in aggregates, skill in sensefields, skill in elements, skill in truth, skill in unique knowledge, skill in reliance, skill in discursive insight and direct knowledge, skill in the factors of enlightenment, skill in the path and skill in dependent co-origination.⁵³ (616) Investigation by means of these ten kinds of skill is discerning wisdom.

51. *sgros ḥdogs pa: āropita* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 151, col. 1).

52. *mtshan ma yid la byed pa: nimittamanasakāra* (cf. Edgerton, p. 207, col. 2).

53. Skt.: *skandha-*, *āyatana-*, *dhātu-*, *satya-*, *pratisaṃvid-*, *pratisaraṇa-*, *vijñāna-*, *jñāna-*, *bodhyaṅgāni-*, *mārga-* and *pratītyasamutpādakauśalya*. According to Vasubandhu, 'skill'—referring to the eight kinds of 'skill' in the *Akṣ-*—constitutes the sphere of wisdom (*Akṣ-ṭīkā*, p. 193.5.7).

2.1 Skill in Aggregates

What then is skill in aggregates?⁵⁴ He expounds the aggregates by way of allegories. That is to say, he shows that they are like froth, a mirage, a water bubble, a plantain tree, an illusion, a dream, an echo, an illusory appearance and a reflected image.

Matter is like froth and froth too is without a self, a living being, a life-force, a person, a man, a human being or an individual. The own-being⁵⁵ of froth is also the own-being of matter. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.⁵⁶

Feeling is like a water bubble and a water bubble too is without a self, a living being, a life-force, a person, man, a human being or an individual. The own-being of a water bubble is also the own-being of feeling. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.⁵⁷

Perception is like a mirage and a mirage too is without a self, a sentient being ... or an individual. The own-being of a mirage is also the own-being of perception. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.⁵⁸ (617)

54. Vasubandhu, in his commentary on the *Akn*, elucidates the meaning of 'skill' in aggregates on pages 193.5.8–195.5.1. The corresponding passage in the *Akn* is found on page 52.2.8–4.6. According to the *Akn*, 'skill' in aggregates means that the bodhisattva is capable of explaining the nature and role of the aggregates by way of comparisons. This is also the only instance where both *Bdp* and *Akn* cite an equally phrased, direct answer to the question that is posed at the beginning of each kind of 'skill'. After that, only the *Akn* provides brief direct answers to the initial questions, whereas the *Bdp* does not re-refer to the question (for details, see: *Akn-tīkā*, pp. 194.1.1–2.6, 194.2.6–195.3.6, 195.3.6–5.1).

55. According to the *Mvy*, the Tibetan term *ran bzin* has two principal meanings, viz., (1) *svabhāva* meaning 'own-being' (*Mvy* 3390, 4458, 7498) and *prakṛti* meaning chiefly 'nature' (Monier-Williams, p. 1276, col. 1; p. 654, col. 1 respectively). Both meanings do overlap of course and it is difficult to decide with certainty which of the two is intended in this passage. Although *prakṛti* is listed as the first, and thus principal term, I believe that it is in this context more appropriate to translate the term *ran bzin* as 'own-being' since reference is taken to the very nature, character or indeed 'own-being' of the *dharma* in question. The term 'nature' has a broader, slightly more encompassing and hence rather vague connotation that, I think, is here out of place.

56. The *Akn-tīkā* comments (p. 194.3.1–3; cf. *Akn*, p. 52.2.8–3.1):

"That is to say, in the great ocean some people see froth possessing matter and colour like crystals. Believing that it possesses substance and own-being, they grasp for it with their hands, but it flies away and disintegrates, whereupon they think: 'Alas, this is only froth, this is worthless, vain and lacks own-being'."

57. In the words of the *Akn-tīkā* (p. 194.3.8–4.4; cf. *Akn*, p. 52.3.1–2):

"When rains falls into water, some people perceive the water bubbles as if they constitute various types of crystals or gems. Thinking that they possess substance and are suitable [to be worn as] adornments, [people] grasp for them with both hands in order to arrange them but they disintegrate. Even those that they did not reach for burst as soon as they arise. Realising that they are devoid of substance, they learn and exclaim: 'Alas, these are water bubbles, without a self and own-being. They are worthless and vain.' It is in this way that also the aggregate of feeling [whether pleasant, unpleasant, etc.]—lacking a self or own-being—is worthless and vain just like the water bubbles. If grasped with the eyes and hands of wisdom, examining them whether they are existent or non-existent, one realises that all of them bear the mark of suffering and perish by nature as soon as they have arisen."

58. To quote again from the *Akn-tīkā* (p. 194.4.4–8; cf. *Akn*, p. 53.3.2–3):

"Perception is to grasp the distinguishing marks of objects. Objects are matter, sound, etc. Distinguishing marks are the [colours of] white, red, etc. To grasp is to decide 'this is white—not red'. The perception aggregate is like a mirage. Why? It lacks a self and is insignificant. That is to say, thirsty people who are tormented by the sun during the hot season see mirages such as fountains of water with their eyes. Believing them to be of water, they hurry to drink it. On discovering that it is not water, they exclaim: 'Alas, this is a mirage. It lacks a self and own-being. It is worthless and vain.' Likewise, with the eye of wisdom,

Karmic formations are like a plantain tree and a plantain tree too is without a self, a living being, a life-force ... or an individual. The own-being of a plantain tree is also the own-being of karmic formations. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.⁵⁹

Consciousness is like an illusion and an illusion too is without a self, a living being, a life-force, a person, a man, a human being, an individual or a being that arises and feels. The own-being of an illusion is also the own-being of consciousness. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.⁶⁰

Furthermore, the aggregates are of this world and the world, too, bears the characteristic of destructibility.⁶¹ The own-being of the worlds is also the own-being of aggregates. But what is the own-being of the world? Its own-being is that of impermanence and suffering.⁶² This, too, is the own-being of aggregates. Skill concerning this is skill in aggregates.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in aggregates courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

bodhisattvas realise that perception is full of thought construction concerned with misunderstandings."

59. The *Akn-tīkā* explains (p. 194.5.1–6; cf. *Akn*, p. 52.3.3–4):

"Karmic formation create various kinds of wholesome, unwholesome and neutral [actions]. The sum total of karmic formations is great. Why is the aggregate of karmic formation is like a plantain tree? It lacks a core. People who wish for a hard tree and cut down a plantain tree, stripping it off its bark from top to bottom, see that there is no core when they examine it in this regard and exclaim: 'Alas, this has the core of a plantain tree; it is empty, without substance or own-being.' In this way, when contemplating on the presence of a core or essence in the aggregate of diverse karmic formations [concerned with wholesome, unwholesome and neutral actions], one realises—when looking at it with the eye of wisdom—that it is thought-only (*cittamātrata*), unborn, beyond being and non-being. Having thus contemplated with effort on the duality of existence and non-existence, one sees that it is just like a plantain tree beyond one or many, self or others, without a core, essence or a self."

60. In the words of the *Akn-tīkā* (pp. 194.5.7–195.1.4; cf. *Akn*, p. 52.3.4–5):

"Consciousness is perception of objects such as form, etc. It consists of eight types, viz., consciousness pertaining to the eye, etc. The consciousness aggregate is like an illusion. Why? It is insubstantial. A magician conjures up with his art of magic trickery various illusory forms of gods, men, demons and animals. But, even though they are perceived with the eye, if one examines them with the expectation that they might possess an own-being and a lasting existence, on realising that they lack own-being and perish all the sudden, one exclaims: 'Alas, this is only an illusion; it is empty and devoid of own-being.' In the same way, if one examines with the eye of wisdom the own and general own-being in the consciousness aggregate generated by the different traces of action, expecting it to possess own-being and lasting existence, one realises that it perishes each moment like an illusion and is empty of own-being."

61. *hjiḡ rten yan hjiḡ pa: loko 'pi lugla* (cf. *Mvy* 3061 which gives *hjiḡ pas na hjiḡ rten* for *luyjata iti loka*).

62. This section is explained in the *Akn-tīkā* in terms of Yogācāra thinking (p. 195.4.1–4; cf. *Akn*, p. 52.4.4–6):

"The meaning of impermanence is the meaning of non-existence. The imagined that is empty of own-being as it is universally non-existent—bearing the character of being imagined like the horn of a hare—is impermanent. The *sūtra* says that it is undergoing suffering by nature. The meaning of imagining the non-existent is the meaning of undergoing suffering by nature. Again, it bears the characteristic of dependence (*paratantralakṣaṇa*). To the degree to which one imagines object and subject through *paratantra* [vision], to that degree the own-being of suffering comes into being and becomes the cause of various types of suffering."

2.2 Skill in Elements

Next, what is skill in elements?⁶³ That is to say, although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma⁶⁴ is the element of earth, it has not the characteristic of compactness. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of water, it has not the characteristic of moisture. (618) Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of fire, it has not the characteristic of heat. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element

63. Vasubandhu (pp. 193.5.1–196.4.5) explains that ‘skill’ in elements signifies ‘skill’ in pristine cognition that penetrates the elements of *dharmā*—that is, the qualities and practices of a bodhisattva (p. 195.5.4)—with the element (*dhātu*) representing the cause and condition leading to the attainment of the individual buddha-qualities—that is the *dharmā* themselves (p. 195.5.5). Note also the usage of the term *dhātu* in the *Akn* (pp. 52.4.6–53.2.3) that distinguishes carefully between *kham*s and *dbyi*ns, a distinction that is not upheld in the *Bdp*. Theoretically, it is possible that *chos kyi kham*s refers here to the twelfth *dhātu* or sixth kind of external object (*viṣaya*), viz., the class of non-sensuous objects. Contextual considerations render this explanation implausible, since they point to the ‘sphere of the Doctrine’ or *Dharmadhātu*—of which *chos kyi kham*s is a highly unusual translation—and not to the series of elements (*dhātu*) that are represented in the composition of an individual stream of life (*santāna*). What is more, in the *Akn*’s parallel reading the term *chos kyi kham*s (except for one unambiguous reference to non-sensuous objects) is invariably replaced by the ‘correct’ rendering of *chos kyi dbyi*ns. This modification establishes beyond any doubt that, in the *Akn*, it is the *Dharmadhātu* and not the *dharmadhātu* that is referred to. All other occurrences of the term *kham*s, whether in conjunction with *nam mkha*hi, *hdod pa*hi or otherwise are preserved as they occur in the *Bdp*. Thus, the *Akn* puts forward what is in effect a (re)interpretation of the *Bdp*’s reading. As we have seen, this is a general feature of their relationship and does not pose much of a problem.

What puzzles me is the mechanism by which this particular incongruity arose in the Tibetan, since their chronological order could not have been of any concern to the translators. They found presumably in both texts—assuming that they were translated from the Sanskrit which seems certain—the term *dharmadhātu*. And yet, they opted for a different term to translate the same word in the same sentence, passage and context, singling out *chos kyi kham*s for the *Bdp* and *chos kyi dbyi*ns in the *Akn*. In the *Akn*, their choice might have been influenced by the explanation given in the *Akn-ṭikā* (pp. 195.5.1–7), since it establishes quite clearly the *Dharmadhātu* and not non-sensuous objects as point of reference. But again, we cannot be certain that the commentary was at hand when the translators set about their task. In search for an explanation, I thought to find the key to this discrepancy in the terminologic revision (*sgra gsar bcad*) that took place in Tibet at the beginning of the ninth century. That is to say, I expected to learn that the *Bdp* had been translated before the Great Revision and was then left unrevised. This assumption proved ill-founded, since its translation was carried out by the very persons who played a major role in the Great Revision, namely Surendrabodhi, Śilendrabodhi and Dharmatāśīla (Simonsson, 1957, p. 241). Even if they translated the *Bdp* before receiving the royal command to undertake the general revision, they surely would have redrafted it afterwards. Moreover, already the first unrevised translation of the *Akn* contains the terms *chos kyi dbyi*ns. I then discovered that Dharmatāśīla had not only part in the translation of the *Bdp*, but also revised the early translation the of *Akn*. It is probably safe to assume that he would have employed consistent terminology had he held the word *dharmadhātu* to refer to the same concept in both texts. Alternatively, he might have contributed to the translation of the *Akn* after he had worked at the *Bdp* and neglected to go back to it for revision. In any event, it is quite unthinkable that he should have failed to notice the close parallelism that exists between the *Akn* and *Bdp* while working at them. Today, it is impossible to say whether Dharmatāśīla translated the *Bdp* before or after revising the old *Akn* version, but given that an unrevised translation of the *Akn* was already extant, one would expect him to turn first to the *Bdp*. On the other hand, being a thorough and accomplished scholar, he might as well have given priority to correcting the old faulty translations before looking at new texts. To whatever view one chooses to subscribe, there seems to be no hard and fast evidence to support either of them. As far as the translation of the passage is concerned, it is probably safe to follow the reading of the *Akn*. First, it fits the context very well and it is confirmed by *Akn-ṭikā*. And yet, it fails to address the question that lies at the heart of the problem, that is, why such incongruence arose in the first place. Furthermore, it raises the methodological problem of basing the translation of a passage on a reading that is not found in the text itself, however close its affiliation to this text may be. Finally, it does not account for the highly unusual practice to employ the term *chos kyi kham*s to render *Dharmadhātu* (‘sphere of the Doctrine’) into Tibetan.

64. For alternative meanings and translations of the term *dharmadhātu*, see: Ruegg (1962, p. 327) and *Kośa* (i, pp. 54–65, 100).

of wind, it has not the characteristic of agitation.

Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of visual consciousness, it has not the characteristic of seeing. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of auditory consciousness, it has not the characteristic of distinguishing sound. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of olfactory consciousness, it has not the characteristic of perceiving scent. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of gustatory consciousness, it has not the characteristic of savouring flavour. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of tactile consciousness, it has not the characteristic of contact. Although it is true that the sphere of the Dharma is the element of mental consciousness, it has not the characteristic of cognition.

The sphere of the self and the sphere of the Dharma are identical. The spheres of desire, form and non-form are identical. The spheres of *nirvāṇa* and *samsāra* are identical.⁶⁵ Thus, the sphere of all *dharma* and the sphere of space are identical. Since they are identical with emptiness, they are uniform. Since they are identical with non-becoming, they are uniform. Because of penetrating the spheres of the conditioned and unconditioned, his teaching about them is infinite.⁶⁶ (619) By means of that penetration, he investigates; this is skill in elements.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* who is skilled in elements courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.3 Skill in Sensefields

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields?⁶⁷ Concerning this, the bodhisattva perceives the eye in accordance with reality, thinking: "It is empty in itself and by itself, such is its own-being." This is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields. Corresponding to the former, the bodhisattva perceives also the ear, nose, tongue, body and mind in accordance with reality, thinking: "They are empty in themselves and by themselves, such is their own-being."⁶⁸ Not encouraging those who gather various objects and items in their sensefields for the sake of accumulating virtue, he does not discriminate virtuous and non-virtuous *dharma*⁶⁹. This is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields.

Although he thus looks unperturbed at the eye and form, thinking: "This is the visual sensefield and that is the tactile sensefield", he does not realise [absolute] imperturbability.

65. Cf. *Akn-ṭikā* p. 196.1.7–3.4.

66. *Akn-ṭikā* p. 196.3.4–4.3.

67. *Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 196.4.5–197.5.6

In the *Akn*, the corresponding passage is found on page 53.2.3–4.4. Here, the passage on sensefields is slightly longer than that of the *Bdp*, interpolating an introductory section modelled on that of the preceding topic which runs as follows: "Even though the sensefield of the Dharma ..., it has not the characteristic of ..."

68. In my translation, I disregarded the Tibetan clause *yid kyi* since reference is clearly taken to all five remaining sense organs—not only to the mind (R, folio 619.4).

69. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 197.1.3–2.1 (lit.: '... he does not embark on two notions (viz., dual thinking) concerning ...').

This is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields. Corresponding to the former, although he thus looks unperturbed at the ear and sound, nose and scent, tongue and taste, body and touch as well as at the mind and mental objects, he does not realise [absolute] imperturbability. (620) This is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields.

The sensefields consist also of noble and ignoble sensefields. Now, while a noble sensefield causes appreciation of the path, an ignoble sensefield causes withdrawal from the path.⁷⁰ This is to say, while the bodhisattva who persists in the path generates great compassion in support of sentient beings who have relinquished their zeal on the path, he himself never renounces the sensefields of the path. This is the bodhisattva's skill in sensefields.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in sensefields courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.4 Skill in Truth

What then is the bodhisattva's skill in truth?⁷¹ The bodhisattva's skill in penetrating truth is fourfold. That is to say, it is knowledge of suffering, knowledge of its origin, knowledge of its cessation and knowledge of the path.

What is knowledge of suffering? Knowledge that the aggregates are unborn is knowledge of suffering. What is knowledge of its origin? Knowledge that thirst has been vanquished is knowledge of its origin. What is knowledge of its cessation? Knowledge that suffering is free from origination and destruction is knowledge of its cessation. What is knowledge of the path? Not drawing mistaken inferences⁷² concerning uniform *dharma* is knowledge of the path. (621) Even when he thus understands these four truths by means of wisdom, the bodhisattva does not realise them in order to develop sentient beings. This is skill in truth.⁷³

70. Quoting a passage from the *Msl* (p. 124.3–15), Vasubandhu cites ten kinds of ignoble paths. These are the paths of (1) beings that are set alight with desire for bliss and sense-pleasure, (2) beings that have fallen under the power of Māra, (3) beings that are afflicted by suffering, (4) beings that are enveloped by obstruction, (5) beings that follow a path leading to the evil destinies, (6) beings that are tied by great fetters, (7) beings that long for indulgence in food, (8) beings that lose their way, (9) beings that follow a wrong path and (10) beings that are of little strength. On the basis of his infinite compassion, the bodhisattva's does not forsake these wretched sentient beings but extends his sympathy to them (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 197.4.1–5.5).

71. In the *Akn*, the corresponding passage is found on pages 53.4.4–54.2.8. Judging by the great attention Vasubandhu devotes to this section in the *Akn-ṭikā*, he must have considered 'skill' in truth as central to the training in *prajñā* (pp. 197.5.6–203.4.8).

72. *sgro mi ḥdogs pa: adhyāropa* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 23, col. 2).

73. *Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 198.5.6–199.1.3:

"To comprehend the own characteristic is wisdom, but to understand the general characteristic is pristine cognition. Here, however, the quoted wisdom is just wisdom and pristine cognition is to understand the notion of emptiness just as it is explained above; this is included (*parigṛhīta*) in wisdom. For the sake of sentient beings [the bodhisattva] does not realise [wisdom and pristine cognition] but, according to the *sūtra*, ripens sentient beings. Although the bodhisattva understands the four noble truths, he does not realise *nirvāṇa*, but being totally at ease like the śrāvaka he ripens sentient beings with great compassion and numerous means for their benefit. This then is included in means. Knowledge of the four truths as expounded above is included in wisdom and means; this is the bodhisattva's 'skill' in truth."

Furthermore, skill in truth is threefold. These are the conventional truth, absolute truth and the truth of characteristic. Now, conventional truth is just worldly convention and is expressed by letters, language and symbols. This is the conventional truth. What then is the absolute truth? The mind itself does not wander, how much less letters? This is the absolute truth. What then is the truth of characteristic? That is to say, all characteristics are of one characteristic and one characteristic is also a non-characteristic. The bodhisattva does not tire of explaining the conventional truth. He does not lapse into realising absolute truth. He discerns the truth of the characteristic by way of the non-characteristic. This is the bodhisattva's skill in truth.

Furthermore, truth is one, not two. This is the truth of cessation. He does not draw mistaken inferences concerning the one truth, but establishes in truth sentient beings who have lapsed into mistaken inferences. This is the bodhisattva's skill in truth.

Furthermore, the five aggregates are suffering. (622) That the five aggregates bear the characteristic of suffering, this is the noble truth of suffering. Knowledge that the characteristic of suffering bears the characteristic of emptiness, this is the noble truth of suffering. That heretical views arising from thirst are the cause for the proclivity to the five aggregates, this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering.⁷⁴ That heretical views are also the cause of thirst—without drawing mistaken inferences concerning them, holding on to them or asserting them—this is the noble truth of the origin of suffering. That due to complete exhaustion the five aggregates are in a state of cessation—that they have not arisen in the past, do not exist in the present and will not perish in the future—this is the noble truth of cessation. To attain, following persistence in the path, besides knowledge of suffering, its origin and cessation also consecutive knowledge⁷⁵ is the noble truth of the path that leads to the cessation of suffering. Reflection on knowledge of truth causes erroneously projecting sentient beings to discern it; this is skill in truth of bodhisattvas.

Furthermore, all feelings are suffering. Knowledge of feeling through discernment and understanding; this is the noble truth of suffering. The cause by which feeling is known as it is when it arises, the cause of its perception, this is the noble truth of suffering. Renouncing feeling and prompting [others] to experience non-feeling, investigating its cessation, but not realising the cessation of feeling, this is the noble truth of the bodhisattva's cessation of suffering. (623) The feeling by which one is attracted to the path is like a ferry; there is

74. The structure of this sentence is unclear. I follow in my translation the interpretation given in the *Akṣ-ṭikā* (p. 201.3.5–7).

75. *rjes las rtogs pa: anvayañāna*

According to the *Kośa*, 'consecutive knowledge' is a type of understanding that—being a non-propositional form of knowledge—arises in the practitioner after he has experienced and accepted the validity of the four noble truths in the three spheres of existence (*Kośa*, vi, p. 184). As a consequent knowledge bearing on the subject (*grāhaka*), it is one of the four factors that are brought in relation with each of the four truths (*āryasatyā*). Arising in response to the gradual comprehension of each of these four truths, it represents three of the fifteen events making up the *darśanamārga*, while the appearance of consecutive knowledge in response to the experience of the last truth—the path—belongs already to the *bhāvanāmārga*.

neither a requirement for feeling nor is feeling a requirement of the path, this is the noble truth of the path that leads to the bodhisattva's cessation of suffering. After he has understood them in this way, realising that the four truths are uniform, his vision is never fully purified; this is the bodhisattva's skill in truth.

Furthermore, birth is suffering. Knowledge that arises from careful investigation in no-birth, this is knowledge of suffering. Birth arises through the condition of becoming. Knowledge that things existing perish is knowledge of its origin of suffering. Knowledge that everything born is unborn and that—there being absolutely no cessation in the unborn—it is unceasing, this is knowledge of its cessation and exhaustion. This kind of considering, evaluating, pursuing, discriminating and penetrating knowledge is knowledge of the path.⁷⁶ Although he is placed in this knowledge of truth, [the bodhisattva] does not persist in this knowledge of truth; this is the bodhisattva's skill in truth.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in truth courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.5 Skill in Unique Knowledge

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in unique knowledge?⁷⁷ The unique knowledge of the bodhisattva is fourfold. (624) What are the four? These are the unique knowledge of the own-being of things, the unique knowledge of designations, the unique knowledge of languages and the unique knowledge of eloquence.

2.5.1 Skill in the Unique Knowledge of the Own-being of Things

What is the unique knowledge of the own-being of things?⁷⁸ It is knowledge that the

76. The *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 203.2.3–4.3), quoting the *Msl* (p. 58.8–13), distinguishes eleven types of penetration. These are (1) sudden, adventitious penetration (*āgantukatvaprativedhata*), (2) penetration into the aspects of reckoning (*saṃkhyānanimittaprativedhata*), (3) penetration into the inconceivability of objects (*arthānupalambhaprativedhata*), (4) penetration into the inconceivability of reality (*upalambhānupalambhaprativedhata*), (5) penetration into the sphere of the Dharma (*dharmadhātuprativedhata*), (6) penetration into the insubstantiality of a person (*pudgalanairātmyaprativedhata*), (7) penetration into the insubstantiality of dharma (*dharmnairātmyaprativedhata*), (8) penetration into inferior intent (*hīnāśayaprativedhata*), (9) penetration into the most exalted intent (*udāramahātmyāśayaprativedhata*), (10) penetration into differentiation according to the accomplished Dharma (*yathādhigamadharmavyavasthānaprativedhata*); and (11) penetration into dharma arrangement (*vyavasthāpitadharmaprativedhata*).

77. Vasubandhu's annotation of the corresponding passage in the *Akn* is found on pp. 240.2.7–244.5.4. In the *Akn* (and thus also in the *Akn-ṭikā*) the bodhisattva's unique knowledge (*pratisaṃvid*) is not being dealt with in the section on 'skill', but figures as an independent *aṅgaya*.

78. The term *artha* carries several meanings, with 'purport', 'aim' and 'meaning' being probably the most frequent ones. In the present context, however, none of these renderings seems appropriate. As Lamotte has shown, the most accurate translation of the term *artha* here is 'thing' or 'object', referring to the 'own-being' (*svalakṣaṇa*) or 'chose désignée' (*bhāṣitārtha*) of the item in question (*Mppś*, pp. 1614, 1616, n. 1). This interpretation is supported by the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 240.3.3–4), stating that "in order to instruct in knowledge of the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), it is asked what is the unique knowledge of the own-being of things?" For further evidence of this position, see: *Bbh*, p. 258.8–10, *Msl*, pp. 138.21–139.1, *Āloka*, p. 455. 25 ff; *Kośa*, vii, pp. 89–94; *Abhidh-d*, pp. 393.1–94.1; and for the nikāya: A I, p. 24; II, p. 160; III, pp. 113, 120. For references to the *pratisaṃvid* in the āgama and Chinese translations of Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma*

teachings of the Buddha are statements of absolute truth⁷⁹. It is knowledge of the causes, conditions and circumstances of non-duality. It is knowledge of the infinitude of inter-connections. It is knowledge of the basis of spiritual fruition. It is knowledge of the pure sphere of the Dharma. It is knowledge in conformity with thusness. It is knowledge of the unclassifiability⁸⁰ of *nirvāṇa*.

It is knowledge arising from⁸¹ the realisation of emptiness. It is knowledge arising from the understanding of signlessness. It is knowledge that wishlessness is wishlessness. It is knowledge that the non-accumulation of karmic formations is a non-accumulation of karmic formations. It is knowledge penetrating sameness.⁸²

It is knowledge penetrating the non-existence of the living being and self. It is secure knowledge that the life-force comes to an end and that the non-existence of the person is the absolute truth. It is knowledge that the past is determined, that the future is without limit and that the present is everywhere. It is knowledge that the aggregates are an illusion, that the elements resemble venomous serpents and that the sensefields are defined as emptiness.⁸³ (625)

It is knowledge that diseases abate, that there is no agitation in the beyond and that there is no substance⁸⁴ to objects. It is knowledge that mindfulness is the basis of spiritual fruition. It is knowledge that comprehension is absorption, that understanding is realisation and that truth is awakening. It is knowledge that suffering is non-existent, that its origin is a non-accumulation of karmic formations, that its cessation is signless and that the path is salvation.

It is knowledge that the Doctrine consists of versatile statements. It is knowledge that the faculties penetrate and that the powers are invincible. It is knowledge that perfect mental quietude is the basis of spiritual fruition and that insight is true vision. It is knowledge that illusions are fabricated, that mirages are deceptive and that dreams are untrue vision. It is knowledge that echoes occur only in certain circumstances and that miraculous appearances are subject to change.

It is knowledge that diversity of characteristic is one-characteristic, that unity is separation.

works, see: *Amṛt (B)*, p. 214.

In the Tibetan, the following specification of the nature and scope of the bodhisattva's unique knowledge of things assumes the form of a long enumeration. In order to achieve a better English reading, I have treated each of the fifty-one items of that specification as an individual clause.

79. Here, the *Bdp* agrees with the *Mppś* which gives also the absolute truth (*paramārtha*) as the object of the *arthapratīsamvid* (*Mppś*, iii, p. 1616). Other texts, however, most notably the *Kośa*, *Vibh* and *Nyāyānusāra*, give *artha* as its object while, for the *Āloka*, it is *dharmalakṣaṇa* (*Mppś*, iii, p. 1616, n. 3).

80. *mi gnas pa: anīṣṛita* (cf. Edgerton, p. 25, col. 2).

81. *rjes su rtogs pa śes pa: anvayajñāna* (*Mvy* 1224, 1228, 1232, 1236).

82. *tsul gcig: ekarūpa*
Akn-ṭikā, pp. 240.5.8–241.1.1:

“That is, [the bodhisattva] realises that the characteristics of all *dharma* are of one characteristics, that their nature is of one characteristic.”

83. *nes pa rtog pa: nirūpanā* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 554, col. 1).

84. *yul med pa: aviṣaya* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 110, col. 2).

It is knowledge that purification does not lead to future rebirth⁸⁵. When concerned with the Śrāvakayāna, it is knowledge understanding in conformity with statements. When concerned with the Pratyekabuddhayāna, it is knowledge understanding causal dependence and unsurpassed knowledge of solitude. When concerned with the Mahāyāna, it is knowledge of all kinds of accumulation of roots of virtue. This is the bodhisattva's unique knowledge of the own-being of things. (626)

Furthermore, as regards the unique knowledge of the own-being of things; it is to rely on the spirit conforming to reliance on the spirit of every *dharma*-foundation of all *dharma*. Why? All *dharma* being without exception empty, emptiness is the own-being concerned. All *dharma* being without exception signless, signlessness is the own-being concerned. All *dharma* being without exception wishless, wishlessness is the own-being concerned. All *dharma* being without exception non-manifest⁸⁶, non-manifestation is the own-being concerned. All *dharma* being without exception devoid of a living being, a life-force or a person, personlessness is the own-being concerned.⁸⁷

Such understanding of *dharma* is the unique knowledge of the own-being of things. The teaching of the own-being of things is an unestablished and inexhaustible teaching. This unique knowledge is a teaching of the awakened truth⁸⁸. It is conferred by the lord buddhas and gives lasting pleasure. It is genuine, authentic and factual; it is well-realised⁸⁹ through wisdom and altogether beyond reproach. This is the bodhisattva's unique knowledge of the own-being of things.

2.5.2 Skill in the Unique Knowledge of Designations

Next, what is the unique knowledge of designations?⁹⁰ It is knowledge penetrating *dharma*

85. *mtshams sbyor ba med pa: apratisaṃdhi* (cf. Edgerton, p. 372, col. 1).

86. *rnām par pye ba: vicita* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 959, col. 1).

87. According to the *Mpps*, reliance on *dharmatā* as opposed to *pudgala* and the resultant recognition of the own-being of *dharma* pertains to the sphere of the *dharmapratīsaṃvid* (*Mpps*, iii, p. 1621).

88. *rtogs pa'i don: adhigamārtha* (cf. Edgerton, p. 12, col. 2).

89. *śin tu rtogs pa: supratividdha* (cf. Edgerton, p. 600, col. 1).

90. In my translation of the term *dharmapratīsaṃvid* I follow once again Lamotte (*Mpps*, iii, pp. 1614, 1617, n. 1), who cites several passages that liken it to 'knowledge of instruction' (*deśanā*) (*Vibhaṅga*), 'knowledge of enunciation' (*paryāya*) (*Āloka*) or 'knowledge of names' (*nāman*) (*Nyāyānusāra*). The *dharmapratīsaṃvid* is hence primarily a knowledge that assists the bodhisattva to understand the designations (*bhāṣitārtha*), names (*nāman*), phrases (*pada*) or syllables (*vyañjana*) that are employed to designate any kind of object. In practice, however, the scope of the *dharmapratīsaṃvid* is much more limited. That is to say, it is only concerned with the word of the Buddha (*Vibh*, p. 294.22–24). In the words of the *Abhidh-d* (p. 393.5–6):

"The *pratisaṃvid* is the indestructible knowledge concerning the categories of names, etc., that are contained in the twelve branches [of the Dharma]. It relates to matters of expression and pertains to discussion."

In the *Bbh* (p. 258.4–8) no such detail is found as the *dharmapratīsaṃvid* is only taken to address, rather generally, the characteristics of *dharma* (*dharmalakṣaṇa*). The text is similarly unhelpful with regard to the objects of the other *pratisaṃvid* (p. 258.8–24).

According to the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 242.3.5–8; cf. *Akn*, pp. 62.5.4–63.2.4), the difference between *artha* and *dharma* is one of voice:

"While it is true that between *artha* and *dharma* there is no difference, *artha* should be

that pertain to virtue and non-virtue, reproach and approval, impurity and purity, (627) worldliness and supra-worldliness, conditioning and non-conditioning, contamination and the fortune of purification⁹¹, *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*. It is knowledge of the sameness of the sphere of the Dharma, knowledge of the sameness of enlightenment and knowledge of the sameness of the elements. This is [the bodhisattva's] unique knowledge of designations.

Furthermore, as regards the unique knowledge of designations;⁹² it is knowledge of the thoughts of those who act with desire, fictitious desire, severe desire, slight desire, unarisen desire, constant and infinite desire as well as with presently conditioned desire.

It is knowledge of sentient beings who act with desire. That is to say, it is knowledge of those who, while being externally free from desire crave internally; of those who, while being internally free from desire crave externally; of those who are internally as well as externally free from desire; of those who crave internally and externally; of those who, while being free from desire for sound crave for form; of those who, while being free from desire for form crave for sound; (628) of those who crave for both form and sound; of those who do not crave for either sound or form; of those who, while craving for form are free from desire for scent; of those who, while craving for scent are free from desire for touch; of those who, while craving for touch are free from desire for flavour and of those who, while craving for flavour are free from desire for form or scent.

By means of this acumen, there being twenty-one thousand modes of desire, twenty-one thousand modes of hatred, twenty-one thousand modes of delusion and twenty-one thousand modes of conduct that partake uniformly in desire, hatred and delusion⁹³, it is knowledge of the thoughts of eighty-four thousand modes of conduct.⁹⁴

It is knowledge of appropriate instructions and knowledge of instructions that are neither too long nor too short. It is knowledge of sentient beings who transcend desire and knowledge of those who are superior receptacles. It is knowledge of instructions that are efficacious. This is the unique knowledge of designations.

perceived as the object that should be instructed in and understood, but *dharma* should be perceived as the agent that instructs and prompts understanding. Again, *dharma* are conditioned and unconditioned things, etc., that are cited by name, while *artha* is the meaning of them that should be discerned and examined. Again, knowledge of *artha* is accurate cognition (*avi-paritādhigāma*) of the characteristics of all *dharma* while knowledge of *dharma* is knowledge of the names of these *dharma*."

91. *nam par byañ baḥi cha dañ ḥithun pa: vyavadānabhāgin* (cf. Edgerton, p. 515, col. 2).

92. See, M I, p. 59 and *Mpps*, iii, p. 1199 for parallel passages. Cf. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 213.1.5-2.3.

93. In the fourth item, 'partaking in the three uniformly', our text deviates from elsewhere well-established patterns. Most texts, like the *Kośa* (i, p. 47; ii, p. 297), cite 'pride' (*lobhā*) as the fourth member of the root-defilements of *rāga*, *moha* and *dveṣa*.

94. The notion that the *dharma*-aggregate of the Buddha consists of 84,000 units covering the mental conduct of all beings is, of course, an ancient one. It is found, for instance, in the *Saddhp* (p. 254.11), *Kośa* (i, pp. 46-47), *Rgv* (p. 232) and is cited in the *Msg* (p. 229). The division into the 21,000 varieties of desire, hatred, delusion and pride is less frequent as it is only found in the *Kośa* (i, p. 47). Note that according to the *Mpps* (iii, p. 1623) knowledge of the dispositions of sentient beings falls within the scope of the *pratibhānapratīsaṃvid* —not the *dharmapratīsaṃvid*.

2.5.3 Skill in the Unique Knowledge of Languages

Next, what is the unique knowledge of languages?⁹⁵ Penetrating all languages non-verbally, he explains the Doctrine to people by way of the language of gods, *nāga*, *yakṣa*, *gandharva*, *mahoraga*, southern *mahoraga*, *kinnara* and ancestors as well as by way of sounds and melodies. This is the unique knowledge of languages. (629)

It is in this way that he should discern, acquire and retain the practices. It is in this way that he should model his practice to the letter.

The bodhisattva knows the appellation of words that are in the singular, dual or plural. He knows words that are of feminine, masculine or neuter gender. He knows contracted and expanded words. He knows abusive and laudatory words. He knows words of the past, present and future. He knows how to infer by means of one letter. He knows how to infer by means of many letters. This is the unique knowledge of languages.

Again, as regards the unique knowledge of languages; it is free of error, neither repetitive nor hasty. He is well-acquainted⁹⁶ with texts that clarify the meaning of practices. By all means, this knowledge is of insightful cognition, profound, versatile and prompts delight in *saṃsāra*. It is embellished with conventional and absolute truth. It is subject to self-induced cognition. It is conferred by the Buddha and gives pleasure to all sentient beings. This is the bodhisattva's unique knowledge of languages.

2.5.4 Skill in the Unique Knowledge of Eloquence

Next, what is the bodhisattva's unique knowledge of eloquence?⁹⁷ It is articulate speech that teaches instructions free-speakingly. It is speech that is fluent, (630) eloquent, spirited and dynamic. It is impeccable and non-evasive. It is completely flawless, non-contradictory,

95. For the Mahāyāna, the object of the *niruktiṭṭhāna* is primarily knowledge of languages. This departure from the early conceptions according to which it covers chiefly grammar (*Kośabhāṣya*, p. 419.17–18) mirrors a revised understanding of the training requirements that sprang from the bodhisattva's pledge to universal liberation (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 243.3.3–4; cf. *Akn*, p. 63.2.4–3.5):

"In order to instruct in knowledge of language conventions (*vyavahārajñā*), it is asked what is the unique knowledge of languages?"

For further evidence of this interpretation see: *Bbh* (p. 258.11–13) and *Msl* (p. 139.1).

96. *yoṃs su byaṃ ba: paricita* (*Mvy* 2412).

97. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 243.5.4–5; cf. *Akn*, p. 63.3.5–4.8:

"In order to instruct in knowledge of expression (*abhiṭṭhāpajñā*), it is asked what is the unique knowledge of eloquence?"

Once again, this interpretation is also attested in the *Bbh* (p. 258.14–17) and *Msl* (p. 139.1–2). The reasons for the bodhisattva's eloquence are explained in the *Śgs* (p. 188):

"Pourquoi le bodhisattva est-il doué d'éloquence (*pratibhānasampanna*)? Le devaputra – Le bodhisattva parle sans utiliser la notion du soi (*ātmasaṃjñā*), sans utiliser la notion d'autrui (*paraṃjñā*) et sans utiliser la notion de *dharma*: il est donc 'doué d'éloquence'. Lorsqu'il prêche la Loi, les phonèmes (*akṣara*) sont inépuisables (*akṣaya*), et les *dharma* aussi sont inépuisables. Parlant ainsi, il ne parle pas de dualité (*dvaya*): il est donc 'doué d'éloquence'. Kulaputra, si le bodhisattva ne rejette pas le caractère de magie (*māyālakṣaṇa*) inhérent aux *dharma* et ne rejette pas le caractère d'écho (*pratiśrutkālakṣaṇa*) inhérent aux sons (*svara*), il est 'doué d'éloquence'."

non-contentious and preoccupied with the Doctrine. It is patient, profound and versatile. It is eloquent in conventional and absolute truth. It is eloquent attending to all forms of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom. It is eloquent in mindfulness, right efforts, bases of success, faculties, powers, factors of enlightenment, path, perfect mental quietude and insight.⁹⁸ It is eloquent in that it knows all entrances into contemplation, liberation, meditation, attainment and truth. It is eloquent in all vehicles as well as in the mental activity of all sentient beings.

It is eloquent in that it is of resourceful, congenial and orderly speech. It consists of subtle, smooth, taintless, emancipated, nonpartisan, honourable, articulate, fitting, impeccable, renown, sympathetic and laudatory speech. It is speech that is praised by all noble ones. Its sound reverberates with knowledge of infinite buddha-fields. (631) Its pure sound resembles melodies. It is the one sound that induces awakening. By means of this buddha-bestowed eloquent, [the bodhisattva] teaches the Doctrine to humans and other living beings. Also this liberating Dharma-discourse of his brings to a halt suffering in those who practice it. This is the bodhisattva's unique knowledge of eloquence. This is bodhisattva's skill in eloquence.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in eloquence courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.6 Skill in Reliance

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in reliance?⁹⁹ The reliances of bodhisattvas are four. What are the four? They rely on the spirit rather than on the letter. They rely on direct

98. This is the only instance in the *Bdp* where the *bodhipākṣika dharma* are listed in their entirety. All other references to their categories, including their detailed discussion as one of the bodhisattva's skills under 2.7.2 and 2.8–10, fail to mention the 'four bases of success' (*rddhipāda*).

99. For a commentary on the terms and concepts that are involved in this section, see: *Akn-ṭikā* (1) spirit/letter: pp. 244.5.8–246.3.8, (2) direct knowledge/discursive insight: pp. 246.3.8–247.2.5, (3) *sūtras* of precise/provisional meaning: p. 247.2.6–5.3 and (4) foundation of being/person: pp. 247.5.6–248.4.7.

The translations of the Sanskrit terms included in this category has not been agreed upon. Compare, for instance, those of Wayman (1974, p. 103), viz., 'meaning/letter', 'doctrines/personalities', 'knowledge/perception' and 'final meaning/provisional meaning' with those of La Vallée Poussin (*Kośa*, ii, p. 246). In my translation, I was guided by the terminology that is employed by Lamotte in his article: "La critique d'interprétation dans le bouddhisme" (*Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et Histoire Orientales et Slaves*, 9, 1949).

The concept of the four reliances is no doubt an ancient one. It is already found in several of the early *suttas*. For brief, often archaic statements on individual aspects of the four *pratisaraṇa*, see for instance: D III, pp. 127–129; M I, p. 265; II, p. 240; A I, p. 60; *Mahāvagga* I, p. 23. 4; *Nett*, p. 21. Other early commentarial references to the *pratisaraṇa* are found in the *Dīpavaṃsa* (ed. Oldenburg, p. 36), in the introduction to the commentary on the *Kathāvatthu* (*JPTS*, 1889, p. 3), *Vism* (pp. 473, 499) and *Atthasālinī* (p. 91; ref. La Vallée Poussin).

In many of these early works comparatively little importance is being attached to their attributes. Their rise to one of the major sets of practices in the spiritual training of the religious seems to have taken place in the later scholastic or analytic period of Buddhist thought. In particular, Asaṅga has made major contributions to the process of defining the exact scope and application of the *pratisaraṇa*. In both the *Msl* (p. 138.1–14) and *Bbh* (pp. 256.23–58.3), for instance, we have detailed passages where their significance is analysed with considerable scholastic exactitude. I have incorporated this material into my discussion of the *pratisaraṇa* in chapter four.

knowledge rather than on discursive insight. They rely on *sūtras* of precise meaning rather than on *sūtras* of provisional meaning. They rely on the foundation of being rather than on persons.

2.6.1 Skill in Reliance on the Spirit and not on the Letter

What is the spirit? What is the letter? The letter penetrates the activity of mundane *dharma*. The spirit realises supramundane *dharma*. The letter instructs in generosity, benignity, discipline and bravery. The spirit perceives benignity, tranquillity, non-arising and non-decaying. (632) The letter proclaims the teachings¹⁰⁰ of *saṃsāra*. The spirit relies on inconceivability. The letter proclaims the qualities of *nirvāṇa*. The spirit does not discriminate *dharma* that by their nature are in *nirvāṇa*¹⁰¹. The letter preaches according to the differentiation of the vehicles. The spirit is knowledge that arises from realising *dharma*-sameness. The letter instructs not to abandon any sentient being. The spirit purifies the three spheres of giving^{102 103}.

The letter—disciplining body, speech and mind—instructs in achieving all attainments of learning and purity. The spirit—not apprehending body, speech and mind—purifies the non-accumulation of karmic formations. The letter, suppressing malice, anger, pride and self-conceit instructs in patience and bravery. The spirit achieves the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*. The letter instructs in vigour concerning all roots of virtue¹⁰⁴. The spirit is vigour independent of apprehension or renunciation. The letter instructs in contemplation, liberation, meditation and attainment. The spirit is knowledge of entering the attainment of cessation.¹⁰⁵ (633)

The letter, being the receptacle of all that has been heard, is the root of wisdom. The spirit is the ineffable meaning. The letter instructs in the practice of the thirty-seven *bodhipāṣika dharma*.¹⁰⁶ The spirit realises the fruit of the practice¹⁰⁷ of the thirty-seven *bodhipāṣika*

100. Cf. Pelliot, 977, 1a.3 which has *rgyus* meaning 'knowledge', 'intelligence'; 'history', 'tale' instead of *yoṅs su bśad pa*.

101. *rañ bžin gyis yoṅs su mya ñan las ḥdas pa: prakṛtiparinirvṛta* (cf. Edgerton, p. 356, col. 2).

102. *ḥkhor gsum: trimāṇḍalapariśuddha* (Mvy 2537; cf. Edgerton, p. 258, col. 1).

103. Pelliot, 977, 1a.2–4:

"The spirit penetrates the meaning of the supramundane. The letter penetrates the activity of mundane *dharma*. The spirit perceives benignity, tranquillity, non-arising and non-decaying. The letter preaches generosity, benignity, diligence and great joy. Furthermore, the letter is proclaimed through causes of *saṃsāra*. The spirit looks at the inconceivable. The letter proclaims praise of the qualities of *nirvāṇa*. The spirit does not discriminate *dharma* that by nature are in *nirvāṇa*."

104. I follow here the Pelliot reading.

105. Pelliot, 977, folio 1a.5–1b.1:

"The letter—disciplining body, speech and mind—instructs in achieving all attainments of learning and purity. The spirit—when seeing body, speech and mind—purifies the accumulation of karmic formations. Furthermore, the letter heals the defilement of malice, anger, pride and self-conceit and instructs in patience and joy. The spirit achieves the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*. Furthermore, the letter instructs in vigour concerning all roots of virtue. The spirit is free from discrimination and discernment. It is vigour that is independent."

106. Pelliot, 977, 1b.2–3:

"The letter generates the practice of the thirty-seven *bodhipāṣika dharma*."

dharma. The letter instructs in suffering, its origin and the path. The spirit realises its cessation. The letter instructs in ignorance, etc., up to old-age-and-death. The spirit realises the cessation of ignorance, etc., up to the cessation of old-age-and-death. The letter instructs in the accumulation of perfect mental quietude and insight. The spirit realises knowledge and deliverance.

The letter explains the Doctrine to those who act with desire, hatred or delusion or who partake uniformly in all three. The spirit is the unperturbed liberation of the mind. The letter points to all *dharma* that cause obstruction. The spirit is the unobstructed pristine cognition and liberation. The letter displays the incalculable, excellent qualities of the three jewels. The spirit accomplishes the imperturbable state of being and the unconditioned qualities of the *Saṅgha*.¹⁰⁸ (634)

The letter instructs in learning and attainments that are accomplished by the bodhisattva, starting with the first production of the thought of enlightenment, the point of departure, up to the seat of enlightenment.¹⁰⁹ The spirit is perfect enlightenment arising from pristine cognition of all-knowing since is endowed with a single moment of thought. In brief, that which instructs in up to eighty-four thousand *dharma*-aggregates is the letter. The ineffable meaning of all sounds, letters and syllables is the spirit.¹¹⁰

107. *nan tan du byed pa: pratipatti* (cf. Edgerton, p. 364, col. 2).

108. Pelliot, 977, 1.b3-4:

"Furthermore, the letter explains the Doctrine to those who partake uniformly in desire, hatred or delusion. The spirit is the unperturbed liberation. Furthermore, the letter points to all obstructing *dharma*. The spirit is the unobstructed pristine cognition and liberation. Furthermore, the letter analyses the colour of the qualities of the three jewels."

109. *byaṅ chub kyi sñiṅ po: bodhimāṇḍa*

The Tibetan rendering of the term *bodhimāṇḍa* is explained in the *Āloka* (p. 206.7):

"The *bodhimāṇḍa*, used as a seat, is a spot so named because the *maṇḍa*, that is the quintessence of *bodhi*, is present there."

There exist two types of interpretation of the concept of *bodhimāṇḍa*. First, when understood as a seat, it refers to the seat underneath the Bodhi-tree under which all buddhas are held to attain enlightenment (*Saddhp*, p. 316.3-4). As a physical entity, the seat of enlightenment became soon subject to a cult. Already during Mauryan times, the tree of enlightenment received royal attention and became a sanctuary that was enclosed by brick walls and regularly worshipped (Bloch, *Inscriptions d'Asoka*, p. 112, *Dīvya*, p. 404.2). By the seventh century the cult of the *bodhimāṇḍa* had progressed to assume cosmic dimensions. Hsüan-tsang (Beal, 1981, ii, pp. 115-6) saw in the enclosure surrounding the Bodhi-tree a 'diamond seat' (*vajrāsana*) of which he was told that it would appear at the beginning of a Bhadrakalpa and stood, immovably, at the exact centre of the trichiliomegachiliocosm. Second, as a spiritual concept, the term *bodhimāṇḍa* stands for the presence of the Dharma as it is preserved in the *sūtras* or as it is embodied by the *dharmakāya* of all buddhas. As such it is non-spatial and may be found in any location where the presence of the Dharma is manifest. To this effect, we read in the *Saddhp* (p. 391.6-13, trsl. Kern):

"And wherever on earth, son of good family, this Dharma-enunciation shall be made known, read, written, meditated, expounded, studied or collected into a volume, be it in a monastery or at home ... in that place one should erect a *stūpa* in dedication to the Tathāgata; for such a spot must be regarded as a *bodhimāṇḍa*."

The same thought is also expressed in the *Vkn* (p. 99, trsl. Lamotte) when Vimalakīrti announces that all bodhisattvas "whether they go somewhere or return from it, whether they advance or stop ... come always from the seat of enlightenment." For these and further references to the development of the concept of *bodhimāṇḍa*, see: Lamotte, 1976, p. 94, n. 105.

110. Pelliot, 977, 1b.6-7:

"The spirit is perfect enlightenment arising from pristine cognition of all-knowing composed

Next, what are *sūtras* whose meaning is provisional? Texts that propound the letter should be absorbed meticulously just as they are preached. These are *sūtras* of provisional meaning.

What are *sūtras* whose meaning is precise? Texts that propound the spirit should be absorbed meticulously just as they are preached. These are *sūtras* of precise meaning.¹¹¹

Why does one rely on the foundation of being rather than on persons? Since the provisional meaning is that of persons, one does not rely on these. Rather, since the precise meaning corresponds to the foundation of being, one relies on it.

These are the bodhisattva's four reliances.¹¹² It is in this manner that the bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* who is skilled in reliance courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.¹¹³

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in the letter?¹¹⁴ (635) Concerning this, the bodhisattva who is skilled in two *dharma* courses in the Perfection of Wisdom. What are the two

of a single moment of thought. In brief, that which preaches all eighty-four thousand *dharma*-aggregates is the letter. That which is truly ineffable through any sound or letter is the spirit."

111. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.7–2a.1:

"Next, what are *sūtras* whose meaning is provisional? Sayings that should be absorbed meticulously just as they are preached, these are *sūtras* of provisional meaning. What are *sūtras* whose meaning is precise? Sayings should be understood in detail just as they are preached, these are *sūtras* of precise meaning."

112. This is evidently not the case, as the pair *jñāna/vijñāna* has not yet been treated. For a discussion of this incongruity, see note 114. In the *Akn*, this confusion has been redressed.

113. Pelliot, 977, 2a.1–2a.2:

"How does one rely on the foundation of being rather than on persons? That which is the provisional meaning is the meaning of the person. Through that there is no liberation. That which is the precise meaning corresponds to the foundation of being. Through that there is liberation."

114. The sequence in which the material is presented is quite evidently out of order. This irregularity appears in all blockprint editions consulted by me, that is, the sDe-dge, sNar-thaṅ, Peking and sTog-Palace *bKaḥ-hgyur* and, to a lesser extent, also in the Pelliot manuscript. Although it is true that one cannot speak of a universal agreement as to the sequence in which the four pairs of *pratisaraṇa* should be cited (compare, for instance, the sequence proposed in *Mvy* 1545–49 and *Kośa*, ii, pp. 246–8), the actual order in which the pairs are discussed corresponds invariably to that put forward in the respective subject listings. To my knowledge, the *Bdp* is the only text in which this is not the case. What is more, in the *Bdp* the pairs *nīthārtha/neyārtha* and *dharmatā/pudgala* are dealt with twice. The sequence runs as follows:

1. *Artha/vyāñjana* (R, folio 631.6–634.4; Pelliot: 1a.2–2a.7)
2. *Nīthārtha/neyārtha* (R, folio 634.4–5; Pelliot: 2a.7–2b.1)
3. *Dharmatā/pudgala* (R, folio 634.5–6; Pelliot: 2b.1–2b.2)

Interpolation

- Stockphrase: 'It is in this manner that ...' This phrase concludes elsewhere major sections in the *Bdp*.
- Re-introduction of the theme, linking the discussion of *jñāna/vijñāna* to 'skill' in the letter. This connects not only the discussion of the pair *jñāna/vijñāna* to the previously interrupted exposition, but leads also to the sequence found in the subject heading (R, folio 631.3–6, viz., *artha/vyāñjana*; *jñāna/vijñāna*; *nīthārtha/neyārtha*; *dharmatā/pudgala*)
- Coursing in the Perfection of Wisdom is acted out by 'skill' in two *dharma*, that is, *jñāna* and *vijñāna*.

End of Interpolation

4. *Jñāna/vijñāna* (R, folio 634.7–636.5; Pelliot: 2b.2–3a.1)
5. *Nīthārtha/neyārtha* (R, folio 636.6–638.1; Pelliot: 3a.2–3b.1)
6. *Dharmatā/pudgala* (R, folio 638.1–639.4; Pelliot: 3b.1–3b.7)

The whole interpolation is absent in the Pelliot manuscript. Here, the discussion of the pair *dharmatā/pudgala* is immediately followed by an exposition of *jñāna/vijñāna*.

dharma? He is skilled in discursive insight and direct knowledge.¹¹⁵

2.6.2 *Reliance on Direct Knowledge and not on Discursive Insight*

What is discursive insight? What is direct knowledge? As regards discursive insight; there are four abodes of discursive insight. What are the four? Matter in which discursive insight rests and is firmly rooted is its abode. Feeling, perception and karmic formations in which discursive insight rests and is firmly rooted are its abodes. This is discursive insight.

What is direct knowledge? Cognition that persists in the five appropriating aggregates and knows the aggregate of consciousness, this is direct knowledge.¹¹⁶ Perception of the element of earth, fire, water or wind is discursive insight. Cognition that does not attend to the four elements, but perceives the pure sphere of the Dharma, this is direct knowledge.

Furthermore, as regards discursive insight; perception of form, sound, scent, flavour, touch or mental objects through the respective consciousness is discursive insight. Tranquillity in internal sensefields, imperturbability in external sensefields and non-apprehension¹¹⁷ of any *dharma* whatsoever by relying on direct knowledge, this is direct knowledge.¹¹⁸

Furthermore, as regards discursive insight; knowledge that is born from false mental constructions and imagination is discursive insight. Imperturbability and refrain from grasping, asserting, construing and discerning, this is direct knowledge.

Furthermore, discursive insight persists in the sphere of conditioned *dharma* but does not wander in the unconditioned. Perception of the unconditioned, this is direct knowledge.

Furthermore, discursive insight attends to the notions of birth and decay. Independence of the unborn and unceasing, this is direct knowledge.¹¹⁹

2.6.3 *Reliance on Sūtras of Precise and not on Sūtras of Provisional Meaning*

Next, what are the *sūtras* whose meaning is precise? What are the *sūtras* whose meaning is

115. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.

In the *Akn-tikā*, this subcategory is explained on pages 246.3.7–247.2.5. For a discussion of the terms *viññāna/jñāna*, see: Wayman, 1980, p. 251–267.

116. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.3–4:

“What is direct knowledge? Cognition that does not persist in the five appropriating aggregates and knows the aggregate of pristine cognition, this is direct knowledge.”

117. *gzog par mi byed pa: samnidhāpayate* (cf. Edgerton, p. 58, col. 2).

118. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.5–6:

“Furthermore, as regards discursive insight; [absorption of external objects through consciousness], starting with absorption of form through the eye and ending with absorption of mental objects through mentation, this is discursive insight. Tranquillity concerning internal sensefields, inactivity concerning external sensefields and non-apprehension of any *dharma* whatsoever for the sake of proceeding to pristine cognition, this is direct knowledge.”

119. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.7–2b.1:

“Furthermore, discursive insight penetrates conditioned *dharma*. Discursive insight does not participate in the unconditioned. Knowledge through the unconditioned, this is direct knowledge. Furthermore, discursive insight attends to the notions of birth and origination. Non-attending to the unborn and unceasing, this is direct knowledge.”

provisional? *Sūtras* that introduce to the path are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that introduce to its fruit are of precise meaning.¹²⁰ *Sūtras* that cause to accomplish the conventional truth are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that preach the absolute truth are of precise meaning.¹²¹

Furthermore, *sūtras* that introduce to action and duties are of provisional meaning.¹²² (637) *Sūtras* that are taught in order to bring action and impurity to a final halt are of precise meaning.

Furthermore, *sūtras* that are taught in order to explain impurity are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that are taught for the sake of complete purification are of precise meaning. *Sūtras* that cause weariness with *samsāra* are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that do not partake in the duality of *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* are of precise meaning. *Sūtras* that are taught with manifold words and letters are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that are profound, hard to fathom and difficult to understand are of precise meaning. *Sūtras* that delight the hearts of sentient beings with many words are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that cause sentient beings to gain confidence with few syllables and words are of precise meaning.¹²³

Furthermore, *sūtras* that proclaim with various words a self, a living being, a life-force, a person, a man, a human being, an individual or a being that arises and feels saying that there is an owner when there is no such owner¹²⁴ are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that instruct in

120. This section contains a good example of the doctrinal advance of the *Akn* over the *Bdp*. Preserved in the Sanskrit of the *Madh. vṛtti* (p. 43.4–6), the *Akn* reads:

“*Sūtras* that have been expounded in order to teach the path of penetration (*mārgāvatāra*) are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that have been expounded in order to teach the fruit of penetration (*phalāvatāra*) are of precise meaning.”

It continues:

“All *sūtras* that instruct in emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness, non-accumulation (*anabhiṣaṃskāra*), non-birth (*ajāta*), non-origination (*anutpāda*), non-becoming (*abhava*), non-self, the absence of life-force, person and a master (*svāmin*), such texts are of precise meaning” (*Madh. vṛtti*, p. 43.6–9).

A corresponding section is found in the *Bdp* at 637.5–638.1.

121. Pelliot (977, folio 2b.1–3) has:

“*Sūtras* that preach the conventional truth are of provisional meaning. *Sūtras* that preach the absolute truth are of precise meaning.”

According to the *Mppś* (ii, p. 539), *sūtras* are of provisional meaning if they contain the following sayings:

“Among all omniscient, the Buddha is the foremost; among all texts, the *sūtras* are the foremost; among all beings, monks are the foremost.”

These Lamotte identifies as the three *agraprajñāpti* proclaiming the superiority of the *triratna* (A II, p. 34; III, p. 35; *Itv*, p. 87). In addition, *nītārtha sūtras* explain that “one acquires great merit through generosity, that morality allows for rebirth among the gods”. *Neyārtha sūtras*, in contrast, are held to teach that a master of the Doctrine (*dharmācārya*) gains the following five advantages (*anuśaṃsā*): (1) great merit, (2) affection from human beings, (3) beauty, (4) renown and (5) eventual arrival at *nirvāṇa*. These, of course, are exactly the benefits that are said elsewhere (A III, p. 41) to accrue to persons who engage in generosity.

122. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.3–3:

“Furthermore, *sūtras* that introduce to action are of provisional meaning.”

123. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.3–6:

“Furthermore, *sūtras* that are taught in order to cleanse impurity are of provisional meaning. ... Furthermore, *sūtras* that delight the minds of sentient beings with many classifications are of provisional meaning. Those which are straightforward for the mind in [showing] few classifications and words are of precise meaning.”

124. *bdag po med pa bdag po yod pa: asvāmikasvāmika* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 124, col. 1).

emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, in non-birth, non-arising and non-becoming, in the non-existence of a living being or person as well as in the gateways to liberation from the three times are of precise meaning.¹²⁵ (638)

2.6.4 Reliance on the Foundation of Being and not on the Person

Next, what is the foundation of being?¹²⁶ What is the person? One who attends to the belief of the existence of a person and pursues religious practice, this is the person.¹²⁷ The Dharma-continuance of one who acquires the belief of the existence of a person, this Dharma-sphere is the foundation of being.

Furthermore, as regards the person; in order to convert sentient beings the Tathāgata explains everything with the help of conventional methods in terms of persons, saying: “The unique person who is born in this world and appears for the sake of the benefit and well-being of many sentient beings, who feels compassion for the world and accomplishes the welfare, benefit and happiness of hosts of beings among gods and men, viz., the Tathāgata, Arhant, Samyak Sambuddha as well as lay persons, virtuous lay persons, faithful persons, Dharma-observing persons, persons of the eighth rank¹²⁸, stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, arhants, pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas, [all] these are persons.” Now, those who become attached to such [appellations] have nothing to rely on.¹²⁹ In order to establish beings in understanding, the lord said that rather than to rely on the notion of the person they should rely on the foundation of being. (639)

Next, what is the foundation of being? All *dharma* bear the characteristics of unbecome, unmade, unproduced and unaccomplished; of changeability, fluctuation, rootlessness and complete sameness, viz., sameness in equality, non-equality and in both equality and non-equality; of non-discrimination, non-undertaking, certainty and lack of own-being. This is the

125. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.6–7:

“Furthermore, those which explain the assembly of a self, a living being, a being that feels and a person are of provisional meaning.”

126. Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.1–1:

“Next, what is the foundation of being?”

127. The structure of this sentence is ambiguous. I follow here the interpretation of the parallel passage in the *Akn* (p. 64.4.7–8) as proposed by Vasubandhu in the *Akn-ṭīkā* (pp. 247.5.3–248.1.1).

128. *āryaṣṭamaka*

The term *aṣṭamaka* is problematic. Given in the Pāli as *aṭṭhamaka*, it is interpreted by the *PED* and *CPD* as a reference to that person among the *āriya-puggala* who has reached the eighth stage, that is to say, he is a person who has just entered on the lowest stage of the śrāvaka-path (*śotāpattiphala-sacchikiriyāya paṭipanno*; *Puggalapāṇṇāti*, p. 73). While such a definition is quite acceptable, difficulties arise since there appears to be no reference to a seventh, sixth, etc., person. In the *Nett* (pp. 49–50; ref. Gethin), the term *aṭṭhamaka* serves to define the anāgamin. On the basis of these findings, but somewhat evading the problem, Nāṇamoli suggests to consider the meaning of *aṭṭhamaka* as corresponding with that of *paṭipannaka* (‘one who has entered on the path’)—an assumption that is probably correct in essence as the practice of *aṭṭhamaka* refers in the *Netti* (pp. 95–6) to a person practising on the transcendental path. La Vallée Poussin comes to a similar conclusion (1907, p. 266, n. 2). The *Mvy* (1143) speaks of a *aṣṭamakabhūmi*, being the third of the seven *bhūmi* of the śrāvaka (cf. Edgerton, p. 81).

129. *ṛton pa ma yin pa: apratisaraṇa*

foundation of being.

Those who rely on the foundation of being never rely on elements. Hence, because they rely on all *dharma* by means of penetrating the door to Dharma-observance, [they know that] the totality of *dharma* is such foundation of being.¹³⁰

These are the four reliances of bodhisattvas. This is the bodhisattva's skill in reliance. It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in reliance courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.¹³¹

2.7 Skill in Accumulation

2.7.1 Skill in the Accumulation of Merit

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in accumulation? The accumulation of the bodhisattva is twofold. What are the two? These are the accumulation of merit and the accumulation of pristine cognition.

What is his accumulation of merit? It contains the bases of meritorious work that arise from generosity, moral conduct and contemplation.¹³² (640) It contains the bases of meritorious

130. Lit: 'the totality of *dharma* is such foundation of being.'

Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.4-7:

"What is the foundation of being? Existence has the foundation of the unmade, unproduced, unestablished and unsupported. All *dharma* bear the characteristics of complete sameness, viz., non-equality and equality, of non-discrimination, non-undertaking, non-originating and lack of own-being. This is the foundation of being. The *dharma* of those who rely on the foundation of being do not reappear. Hence, having relied on all *dharma* by means of entering into the door of Dharma-observance, they seize them. All *dharma* are such a foundation."

131 This paragraph, starting with 'These are' up to 'of Wisdom' is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.

132 *bsod nams bya baḥi dños po: punyakriyāvastu*

In the *suttas* of the Pāli tradition, we find three kinds of bases of merit, viz., the basis of meritorious work arising from generosity, arising from morality and meditation (*dāna-*, *śīla-*, and *bhāvanāmayakriyāvatthu*). Brief references to these three are found in D III, p. 218 and *Itiv.*, p. 51. In the *Anguttaranikāya* IV, p. 241, the Buddha expounds the various fruits that accrue to practitioners of the three bases of meritorious work, in particular, the sublime spheres of rebirth.

The most instructive explanation of their role and functioning is found in the *Kośa* (iv, pp. 231-33). Distinguishing, like the Pāli, meritorious action arising from generosity, morality and meditation (*dāna-*, *śīla-*, *bhāvanāpunyakriyāvastu*), it characterises each of the three as merit (*puṇya*), action (*kriyā*) and basis (*vastu*). *Dāna*, *śīla* and *bhāvanā* themselves are the bases of meritorious action (*punyakriyā*), because in process of their realisation the practitioner undertakes the preparation for merit.

Generosity, consisting of vocal and physical action is that which produces the action. But it is not so much the object that is given that matters and determines the resulting merit, than the reason why a certain thing has been granted. Hence, volition (*cetanā*) or the collection of thought and mentation (*cittacaittakalāpa*) is crucially important to the accumulation of merit of which *dāna*, *śīla* and *bhāvanā* are merely objects (*vastu*) or bases (*adhiṣṭhāna*). Depending on *cetanā*, generosity can either display a pure or impure disposition. Founding its views on the eight factors of the *Sanḅhitasutta* (D III, pp. 258-60), the *Mppś* (v, p. 2249) distinguishes sixteen types of impure giving, including generosity out of desire for retribution, out of hope for heavenly rebirth, fame, etc. Pure generosity, in contrast, is always motivated by the desire to purify one's thought and to adorn the spirit, and leads to *nirvāṇa*.

Morality as a basis of meritorious work is like generosity manifested in vocal and physical action. According to the *Mppś*, its scope of application is limited to the *pañcaśīla* consisting in abstention from killing, theft, lying, adultery and intoxication. Capable of showing three degrees of accomplishment (low, mediocre and high) and qualified by the motivation and circumstances surrounding moral violations, the amount of merit it produces varies with the integrity of the practitioner (A IV, pp. 241-43).

work that are furnished with a calm, benevolent disposition, compassionate conduct, exertion for all roots of virtue and the elimination of one's own and other peoples' sins.

It contains the bases of meritorious work that are furnished with gratitude¹³³ towards all sentient beings of all times for their roots of virtue, viz., towards all learned ones and unlearned ones, towards all pratyekabuddhas and those who have produced the thought of enlightenment for the first time, towards all who have embarked on virtuous conduct, towards all irreversible bodhisattvas, towards those who are separated from buddhahood by just one birth¹³⁴ and towards the buddhas of the past, present and future. It contains the bases of meritorious work furnished with the request of the Doctrine from all buddhas and noble ones. It contains the bases of meritorious work that are furnished with the transformation of all virtue into enlightenment.

He generates the thought of enlightenment in sentient beings who have not generated the thought of enlightenment. He teaches the Path of the Perfections to those who have generated the thought of enlightenment. He provides the poor with riches and dispenses medicine to the ill. He pays homage to the worthy ones. He is patient and congenial with the weak. He does not conceal his sins but eliminates evil. (641) He shows all forms of reverence and worship to those lord buddhas who dwell in the world and to those who have passed into *nirvāṇa*. He venerates his instructors and preceptors just as the teaching. He is diligent in seeking the Doctrine like a priceless jewel. He delights in the Dharma-pronouncement and even goes one hundred miles to hear them. He is not satisfied with hearing to the Doctrine, but explains it without aiming at worldly rewards. He honours his father and mother. He observes and stands by his deeds. He refrains from wickedness and is insatiable for accumulating merit.¹³⁵

Since he constrained his body, speech and mind with vows, he is free from physical, verbal

Meditation as the basis of meritorious work—according to the *Itiv* (pp. 19–22) the highest and most productive of all three types—is above all concerned with the generation of benevolent thought (*mañricitta*). Convinced of the prevalence of hatred (*dveṣa*) and distraction (*vikṣepa*) in the *kāmadhātu*, the *Mpps* (v, pp. 2255–7) argues that *mañrī* is the most urgent object of meditation that generates more merit than any of the other *apramāṇa*.

Finally, concluding the discussion of the *puṇyakriyāvastu*, the *Mpps* (v, pp. 2258–60) adds detail by highlighting the role that is played by material gifts and the gift of the Dharma as bases of merit. According to the *Kośavyākhyā* (pp. 352.31–354.31), citing a passage from the *Madhyamāgama* (T 26, k. 2, p. 427 c 25–428 c 25), merit consisting of material gifts (*aupadhikapunya*)—being sevenfold—is greatest if it is aimed at establishing and sustaining a monastic establishment. Immaterial bases of merit (*anaupadhikapunyavastu*), in contrast, concern primarily instructions and religious service but are as fruitful in terms of merit as material gifts.

In the *Mvy* (1699–1704) the number of bases of meritorious work is increased to five (*dāna*-, *śīla*-, *bhāvanā*-, *aupadhika*-, and *guṇyapūṇyakriyāvastu*), the last of which I have not been able to trace in any of the texts I consulted for this thesis.

133. *rjes su yi rañ ba: anumodhanā* (cf. Edgerton, p. 32, col. 2).

134. *skye ba gcig gis thogs pa: ekajātipratibaddha*.

135. Pelliot, 977, folio 3b.5–4a.1:

“Bodhisattvas generate the thought of enlightenment for those who have generated the thought of enlightenment. ... They conceal their sins and eliminate sin. ... They are not satisfied with hearing to the Doctrine, but explain the stainless Doctrine. ... They know, recollect and feel their deeds.”

or mental hypocrisy. He attains pure merit by building a Tathāgata-*stūpa*. He accomplishes the marks of a great person by gathering endless offerings. He accomplishes the eighty secondary marks by accumulating numerous stores of roots of virtue. His body is adorned with freedom from conceit. His speech is adorned with freedom from all offensive speech. His mind is adorned with freedom from intellectual impediments.¹³⁶

He is an embellishment of the buddha-field through the miracles of the super-knowledge. He is an embellishment of the Dharma-characteristic by virtue of his purified pristine cognition. He is an embellishment of the great retinue by renouncing slander, despondency and dissent-sowing words. (642) He is an embellishment of the imperturbable Doctrine by retaining the Doctrine. His Dharma-discourse does not intimidate since he applauds when he is pleased, saying: "Well done!". He explains in a fruitful manner by listening to the Doctrine with devotion and casting sin and ignorance aside. He is an embellishment of the Bodhi-tree by offering meditation-groves to the Buddha. He is an embellishment of the seat of enlightenment by virtue of retaining the thought of enlightenment—the factor that precedes all roots of virtue.

His life and death are pure since he does not generate actions and impurities. His hand is blessed since he gives away all his jewels and precious objects. His wealth is inexhaustible through the attainment of an inexhaustible resolution.¹³⁷ Since he does not contract his eye-brows angrily, sentient beings gain faith as soon as they see him and greet with a smiling face¹³⁸. He is an embellishment of sameness by directing light-rays at all sentient beings.¹³⁹ Since he does not despise the ill-instructed, he emits much light. By virtue of accumulating moral merit, his birth is pure. Because he does not abuse lowly people, the womb is completely pure at his birth.¹⁴⁰

By virtue of the complete purity of his tenfold virtuous activity¹⁴¹, he is born as god or man.

136. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.2–3:

"His body is adorned with emanations by accomplishing the marks [of a great person], by gathering endless offerings, by accomplishing the eighty secondary marks and by accumulating numerous stores of roots of virtue."

137. According to Vasubandhu's commentary on the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 219), the accumulation of merit is the first of four blessings (*guṇa*) that pertain to bodhisattvas who have progressed to the seventh stage with a set of ten superior practices and is held to generate great wealth:

"Superiority in wealth and personality is obtained according to requirement. Superiority of wealth and personality depends on the accumulation of merit."

138. *bzin ḥdzum pas gsoñ por smra ba: smitīmukhapūrvābhībhāṣantā* (cf. Edgerton, p. 614, col. 1).

139. I adopted here the argument found in Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.7.

140. Pelliot, 977, 4a.7–7:

"He attains sameness by uniformly [directing] light-rays at all sentient beings. Since he exerts himself for the ill-instructed, he emits adorned emanations. By virtue of accumulating moral merit, his birth is pure. On account of his prediction, the womb is completely pure at his birth."

141. Here, the tenfold virtuous conduct of the bodhisattva refers, in all probability, to abstention from of the traditional ten *akuśalakarmapatha*, viz., killing, theft, sexual misconduct, falsehood, slander, harsh and frivolous talk, covetousness, animosity and wrong views. This conclusion is, however, not completely safe as Buddhism developed several other enumerations of *dharma* consisting of ten kinds of virtue. There is, for instance, a group of ten *pārājika dharma* in the *Brahmajālasūtra*, containing besides the *pañcaśīla* (6)

He has conquered desire for worldly objects¹⁴² by contemplating all precepts.¹⁴³ Since he readily shares his knowledge¹⁴⁴ he masters the Doctrine. Due to his pure resolve, he appears in all worlds. He has faith in the magnificent Doctrine since he is not intent on the limited practice of the layman-observing-two-of-the-*pañcaśīla*¹⁴⁵. (643) Since he does not give up the mind of all-knowing, he retains all of his merit. He acquires the seven riches of the universal monarch¹⁴⁶ since he is motivated by faith. Acting in accordance with¹⁴⁷ his previous resolution, he does not deceive the worlds. He acquires all buddha-qualities by accomplishing virtuous *dharma*. This is the bodhisattva's skill in the accumulation of merit.

2.7.2 Skill in the Accumulation of Pristine Cognition

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in the accumulation of pristine cognition? Pristine cognition arises on the basis of causes. He contemplates all causes and conditions of pristine cognition in this way.

What are its causes and conditions? He endeavours zealously to procure the Doctrine. He adheres to friends who comply with pristine cognition. He relies on the pristine cognition of the Buddha rather than on that of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas. Rather than assuming a

bringing other in disrepute, (7) avarice, (8) boastfulness at the cost of others, (9) malevolence and (10) calumny of the *triratna* (DeGroot, 1967, pp. 32–39).

Even the ten *duṣkaracaryā* of the bodhisattva might be included among the candidates, viz., the exploit of (1) promise (*pratijñā*), (2) non-regression (*avivartana*), (3) not turning the back when facing misery (*aparāṇmukhībhāva*), (4) dedication (*abhimukhībhāva*), (5) purity in the face of constant exposure to *saṃsāra* (*anupalepa*), (6) commitment (*adhimukti*), (7) penetration (*pravedha*), (8) comprehension (*avabodha*), (9) non-abandoning and stainlessness (*aparityāganiḥsaṃkleśa*) and (10) effort (*prayoga*) in order to fulfil the tasks of a buddha (*Msg*, pp. 223–4). An alternative list of *duṣkaracaryā* is given in the *Lal* (pp. 243–60; trsl. Foucaux, 1988, pp. 210–224).

For a full study of the *duṣkaracaryā*, see: J. Dutoit, 1905.

142. *gdon mi za bar: avaśya*; lit.: 'hoarfrost' (cf. Edgerton, p. 76, col. 1).

143. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.7–4b.3:

"By virtue of the complete purity of his tenfold virtuous activity, he is born as god or man. He attains certainty by holding steadfastly on to all precepts."

144. *slob dpon kyi dpe mkhyud pa: ācāryamuṣṭi*; lit.: 'close-fistedness of a teacher to share things with his pupils' (cf. Edgerton, p. 89, col. 1).

145. *ñi tshē baḥi spyod pa: pradeśakārin* (*Mvy* 1610)

The meaning of the term *pradeśakārin* is ambiguous. If one were to follow the context in which it is presented in the *Mvy* where *pradeśakārin* appears among the twenty-eight types of religious austerity, it would appear to refer to some form of ascetic practice that is practised in a certain region or place (*pradeśa*). This interpretation is not supported by the *Kośa* (iv, p. 73) and *Mpps* (ii, p. 821) that clearly associate the term *pradeśakārin* with a type of *upāsaka* adhering to a selection of the *pañcaśīla*. In the *Kośa*, this *upāsaka* is said to observe two of the five rules, while in the *Mpps* he may observe two or three of the *pañcaśīla*. As neither of these texts mentions which of the five rules the *pradeśakārin* chooses to observe, we learn little of the moral maxims pertaining to this class of *upāsaka*.

146. According to the *Mvy* (3621–28), these are a parasol (*cakra-ratna*), elephant (*hasti-ratna*), horse (*aśva-ratna*), jewel (*maṇi-ratna*), royal consort (*strī-ratna*), householder (*gṛhapati-ratna*) and an officer or minister (*pariṇayaka-ratna*). Compare the contents of this enumeration with a list of seven treasures (*dhana*) of the bodhisattva (*Mvy* 1565–72), viz., faith (*śraddha*), morality (*śīla*), sense of shame (*hrī*), fear of blame (*apatrāpya*), learning (*śruta*), renunciation (*tyāga*) and wisdom (*prajñā*). The seven riches are well known from the nikāya where they occur, for instance, in D III, p. 163, p. 251 and in A IV, p. 4. The same list occurs in the *Bḍp* on folio 337.5–338.3.

147. *ñams su len pa byed pa: asthitikṛtya* (cf. Edgerton, p. 111, col. 2; p. 86, col. 2).

proud attitude towards his superiors and teachers, he rejoices in them. When his virtuous friends have realised that he possesses a good resolve, they do not hesitate to instruct him in all discourses of pristine cognition. When they have realised that he is a receptacle, they instruct him constantly¹⁴⁸ with great concentration in the Doctrine. After he has heard the Doctrine, he exerts himself in the accumulation of virtuous practice. Exertion in the accumulation of virtuous practice itself is exertion in the accumulation of pristine cognition.

What is exertion in the accumulation of virtuous practice? (644) He is content with little profit, little activity and few words. He sleeps neither at dawn nor at dusk and applies himself diligently to yoga. He contemplates the meaning of dependent co-origination and attempts subsequently to grasp it. His mind is unperturbed. He conquers sin. He knows when he is liberated from sin.¹⁴⁹ He is free from grudge and manifestations of evil tendencies¹⁵⁰. He performs good conduct and endeavours in virtuous practice. He is inclined to, and has a propensity for, virtuous practice. He applies himself to it as if his head and clothes were constantly alight.¹⁵¹

He persists in his search for pristine cognition. He is vigilant and sustains his efforts. He gains distinction and withdraws into seclusion¹⁵². He takes delight in solitude and contemplates the bliss of quietude. He cherishes the [four practice of] the noble lineage. He does not turn away from purification. He takes delight in the great joy of the Doctrine and aspires to it. He does not heed the esoteric formulae of the materialists. He is impeccably mindful in his search for supramundane *dharma*. When contemplating, his mind is well-focused on the meaning.¹⁵³ His understanding operates in accordance with the path. He exercises constraint

148. *bar chad med pa: nirantara* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 539, col. 2).

149. *ltuñ ba las hbyuñ bar šes pa*;

The meaning of this sentence is ambiguous since it does not indicate the scope of the attainment. That is to say, it is not clear whether it refers to the sixth *abhiññā* conferring 'knowledge of the destruction of defilements' (*āsravakṣayajñāna*), or whether it is simply an expression of the bodhisattva's control over the process of purification. The wording of the Tibetan suggests that it has a more general meaning since, according to *Mvy* (209), *āsravakṣayajñāna* has its equivalent in *zag pa zad pa šes pa*. On the other hand, the concept of 'knowledge of the purification of sin' runs arguably rather close to that of *āsravakṣayajñāna* and might overlap. Since 'knowledge of the destruction of defilements' is a highly technical concept—its application being practically restricted to the attainment of arhantship or buddhahood—the taking of a more cautious approach, pointing to vague parallels only, is perhaps appropriate.

150. *kun nas ldañ pa med pa: paryutthāna* (cf. Edgerton, p. 335, col. 2).

151. Pelliot, 977, folio 4b.7–5a.1:

"Contemplating the meaning of exertion, he removes afterwards the defilement of indolence—the ruin of the mind. ... He is not covered by it. He is not encircled by it. Being endowed with good conduct, he endeavours in virtuous practice. ... In this way, he persists in his search for pristine cognition."

152. *hdu hdzis dben pa: saṃsarga*

lit.: 'to be solitary as to commingling' (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 1119, col. 3).

Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.2:

"He is vigilant and does not long for honour. He does not gain distinction but withdraws into seclusion."

153. This last phrase is essentially a paraphrase of the Tibetan clause. The literal translation would run as follows: "When contemplating, he complies with understanding the meaning." See also: Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3.

with regard to sense-pleasure.¹⁵⁴

He penetrates pristine cognition by way of its conditions.¹⁵⁵ He is an embellishment of modesty and chastity. He treads the path of the Buddha. He removes nescience, ignorance and the mist of delusion.¹⁵⁶ (645) His eye of wisdom is stainless. He is fully purified. His understanding is excellent. He reveres his superiors. His mind is extremely versatile. He acquires direct knowledge¹⁵⁷. In his attainments, he does not depend on others and he does not boast with them. He discerns alien attainments.¹⁵⁸ He undertakes wholesome actions¹⁵⁹. He does not refute the ripening of deeds, though he knows that deeds are perfectly pure. This is the bodhisattva, *mahāsattva*'s accumulation of pristine cognition.

Furthermore, his accumulation of pristine cognition is acquired through four kinds of giving.

- (1) He gives bark of the birch tree, pencils, ink and books to reciters of the Doctrine.
- (2) He gives various cushions to them.
- (3) He gives all kinds of goods, shows respect and composes verses for them.
- (4) He shows sincere gratitude to reciters of the Doctrine for bringing together all teachings.

These four kinds of giving augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are four kinds of guard that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

- (1) He guards the body of the reciters of the Doctrine.
- (2) He guards their welfare.¹⁶⁰
- (3) He guards them when they enter into his region and district.
- (4) He guards propitious objects.

These four kinds of guard augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are four kinds of support¹⁶¹ that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

154. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.2–3:

“He adheres to the vow.”

155. I follow here Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3 which reads: *rkyen gyis ye šes chud pa*.

156. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3:

“Disapproving of nescience, he does not cleanse the mist of ignorance and delusion.”

157. *mñon sum tu šes pa: pratyakṣajñāna* (cf. Edgerton, p. 374, col. 1).

158. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3–4:

“He does not (sic) discern alien attainments.”

159. *legs par bya baḥi las byed pa: sukṛtakarmakārin* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 1220, col. 2).

160. Omitted in Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.7.

161. *ñe par rton pa: upasthambana* (cf. Edgerton, p. 143, col. 2)

The *Mahāvastu* (ii, p. 280.16–17) cites five kinds of support that enable the bodhisattva to display his noble, fearless smile (*āryasmīta*). These are zeal (*chanda*), vigour (*vīrya*), recollection (*smṛti*), meditation (*śamādhī*) and wisdom (*prajñā*). According to the *Dbh* (*Daśa-bh*, p. 15), the bodhisattva depends for

- (1) It is support of the teachings of the reciters of the Doctrine. (646)
- (2) It is support of pristine cognition.
- (3) It is support of worldly possessions.
- (4) It is support of enlightenment.¹⁶²

These four kinds of support augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are five powers that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the five?

- (1) It is the power of faith in order to pay homage.
- (2) It is the power of vigour in order to attain learning.
- (3) It is the power of mindfulness as not to forget the thought of enlightenment.
- (4) It is the power of meditation in order to gain faith in *dharma*-sameness.
- (5) It is the power of wisdom for the sake of the power of learning.

These five powers augment his accumulation of pristine cognition.¹⁶³ There are four kinds of moral conduct that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

- (1) It is moral conduct that is assured in the Doctrine.
- (2) It is moral conduct that pursues the Doctrine.
- (3) It is moral conduct that has faith in the Doctrine.
- (4) It is moral conduct that transforms into enlightenment.

These four kinds of moral conduct augment his accumulation of pristine cognition.¹⁶⁴ There

accomplishing the *cittotpāda* on (1) support of true instructions of the path of the stages, (2) support of instructions in the purifying impact of the six perfections and (3) support of generosity.

In the *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 162, in contrast, support (*upasthambā*) is cited as one of eleven aspects in which the training of the bodhisattva differs from that the śrāvaka, specifically with regard to the duration of the training and the ensuing need for an accumulation of virtue. See, also *Kośa* (ii, p. 314) where *upasthambahetu* is interpreted as the 'cause of maintenance' since the *mahābhūta* are the cause of the continuation of the *bhautika* (cf. Edgerton, *ārambaṇa*, p. 103, col. 1).

Judging by the ill co-ordination of these references and the lack of common ground, it is doubtful whether the Mahāyāna ever developed a theory of the bodhisattva's support. In the eyes of many, this might have seemed quite superfluous with Mahāyāna writers readily adopting the four types of reliance (*pratisaraṇa*) from early Buddhism.

162. Pelliot, 977, folio 5b.1:

"It is support of intelligence (*buddhi*)."

163. These five kinds of power (*bala*) correspond to the five *bala* of the thirty-seven *bodhipāṅsika dharma*, viz., *śraddhā*, *virya*, *smṛti*, *samādhi* and *prajñā*. They are treated in greater detail in section 2.10.5 (R, folio 677.2–679.5).

164. Compare these types of moral conduct with those proposed by later exegetical writers (*Bbh*, p. 138.21–23), distinguishing morality of the vow (*saṃvaraśīla*), morality involving the accumulation of virtue (*kuśaladharmaṣaṃgrāhakaśīla*) and morality involving efforts directed at the welfare of sentient beings (*sat-tvārthakriyāśīla*).

are four kinds of patience that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

- (1) Since he exerts himself diligently to attain the Doctrine, he bears patience with the words of those who speak evil and utter slander.
- (2) Since he exerts himself diligently to attain the Doctrine, he endures patiently wind, warmth, cold, heat, thirst and hunger.
- (3) Since he exerts himself diligently to attain the Doctrine, he complies patiently with his instructors and preceptors.
- (4) Since he exerts himself diligently to attain the Doctrine, he is patient towards the empty, signless and wishless nature of *dharma*.

These four kinds of patience augment his accumulation of pristine cognition.¹⁶⁵ (647) There are four kinds of vigour that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

- (1) It is vigour in learning.
- (2) It is vigour in retaining.
- (3) It is vigour in teaching.
- (4) It is vigour in application.

These four kinds of vigour augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are four factors of contemplation that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

- (1) He takes delight in seclusion
- (2) And in solitude.
- (3) He seeks pristine cognition and the super-knowledge.
- (4) He enters the pristine cognition of the Buddha.

These four factors of contemplation augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There

165. Of all classifications of bodhisattva practices presented in this section, it is the scheme of patience that bears closest resemblance to the divisions of later scholasticism (*Bbh*, p. 189.7–11). That is to say, the first type corresponds to the category of *parāpakāramarṣanākṣānti*, representing patience supporting injury and verbal abuse at the hand of other. The second type runs parallel to the bodhisattva's willingness to put up with painful sensations caused the four elements (*duḥkhādhivāsanākṣānti*), while the fourth type, 'patience towards the empty, signless and wishless nature of *dharma*' is close to the bodhisattva's 'conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*' (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*) that is the highest development of patience contemplating *dharma* (*dharmanidhyānakṣānti*). It is only the third type of patience, bearing with instructors and preceptors, that is not accounted for as an independent category in later writings.

are four wisdom-manifesting *dharma* that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

- (1) He refutes the notion of nihilism.
- (2) He impugns the notion of permanence.
- (3) He does not challenge dependent co-origination.¹⁶⁶
- (4) He rejoices in the belief of the non-existence of the self.

These four wisdom-manifesting *dharma* augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. There are four *dharma* that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition of means.¹⁶⁷ What are the four?

- (1) He complies with the world.
- (2) He complies with the *sūtras*.
- (3) He complies with the Doctrine.
- (4) He complies with pristine cognition.

These four *dharma* become his accumulation of pristine cognition of means. There are four *dharma* that cause him to penetrate the pristine cognition of the accumulation of paths. (648) What are the four?

- (1) It is the path of the *pāramitā*.
- (2) It is the path of the *bodhipākṣika dharma*.
- (3) It is the Noble Eightfold Path.
- (4) It is the path that leads to pristine cognition of all-knowing.

These four *dharma* cause him to penetrate the pristine cognition of the accumulation of paths. There are four kinds of insatiability that augment his accumulation of pristine cognition. What are the four?

- (1) He is insatiable for learning.
- (2) He is insatiable for instructions.
- (3) He is insatiable for investigation.
- (4) He is insatiable for pristine cognition.

166. Pelliot, 977, folio 5b.6:

“Assembling causes and conditions, he does not challenge origination.”

167. Cf. Pelliot, 977, 5b.7 which reads *thabs dan ye ses kyi tshogs*.

These four kinds of insatiability augment his accumulation of pristine cognition.

Furthermore, as regards his accumulation of pristine cognition; complying with all sentient beings and with all buddha-fields, the accumulation of pristine cognition should be seen as arising from giving. The accumulation of pristine cognition should be seen as arising from morality, patience, vigour, meditation, wisdom, benevolence, compassion, joy and equipoise. Why? Because all undertakings of the bodhisattva are dependent on, as well as motivated and supported by, pristine cognition. By persisting in pristine cognition, the holder of pristine cognition becomes a universal support. Moreover, none of the evil ones obtains an occasion to harm him. He acquires not only the sustaining power of the Buddha, but he is also established in the pristine cognition of all-knowing.¹⁶⁸ (649)

These two are the bodhisattva's accumulations of merit and pristine cognition. A bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* who is skilled in these two kinds of accumulation courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.¹⁶⁹

2.8 Skill in Bases of Mindfulness

Next, what is skill in the bases of mindfulness of bodhisattvas? They generate the four bases of mindfulness of bodhisattvas. What are the four? They generate the basis of mindfulness considering the body as body. They generate the basis of mindfulness considering feeling as feeling. They generate the basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought. They generate the basis of mindfulness considering *dharma* as *dharma*.¹⁷⁰

2.8.1 Skill in the Basis of Mindfulness concerning the Body

What is the generation of the basis of mindfulness considering the body as body? O

168. Pelliot, 977, folio 6a.2–4:

“Furthermore, as regards his accumulation of pristine cognition; complying with all sentient beings and with all buddha-fields, also giving should be seen as the accumulation of pristine cognition. Also morality, patience, vigour, meditation, wisdom, benevolence, compassion, joy and equipoise should be seen as the accumulation of pristine cognition. ... Having persisted in pristine cognition, he gathers all sentient beings [around him]. None of the evil ones obtains an occasion to harm him and he is established in the pristine cognition of all-knowing.”

169. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript. The section that follows in Pelliot 977 on ‘skill in accumulation’ appears in all block-print editions of the *Bdp* at the very end of chapter eleven. In my edition, it corresponds to section 3.1 and 3.2 (R folio 686.4–690.1).

170. On the relationship between the *smṛtyupasthāna* and *prajñā*, the commentary on the *Arthaviniścayasūtra* remarks (*Arthav-ṭ* (S), pp. 210.6–211.3):

“When considering the body, feeling, thought and *dharma*, the bodhisattva acquires a thought that is exempt from misconception (*viparyāsa*). He considers the body as body; that is to say, he considers it in accordance with reality; this is the sense of ‘considering’. This is valid in equal measure with regard to mindfulness concerning feeling, thought and *dharma*. Because they take as object a personal series, a series of others and both (*svaparobhayasantatyālabha-natvāt*), the bases of mindfulness have individually as own-being (*svabhāva*) the threefold science (*traividya*); that is to say, their own-being consists of wisdom springing from learning, reflection and contemplation.”

Śāriputra, a bodhisattva who dwells, considering the body as body contemplates the origin, present condition and future destiny of the body:

“Alas, this body is arisen from delusion¹⁷¹. It is born from causes and conditions. It is motionless, inactive, non-self and without proprietor. For instance, by reason of *dharma* that are neither a self nor of a self, neither permanent, steadfast or abiding this body that resembles grass, bricks, wood, ass or a mirage and consists of the aggregates, sensefields and elements is empty just like the grass, tree branches, plants or forests, that too emerge from causes and conditions and are without a self or proprietor. Rather than developing a sense of owner-ship for my body, I should patiently put up with the fact that the own-being of my body is insubstantial.

What is substantial? The body of the Tathāgata is substantial. The Tathāgata’s body is the body of the Doctrine. It is the *vajra*-body. It is imperishable and firm.¹⁷² I shall accomplish this most distinguished body of all three worlds. Though indeed this body of mine has produced sin through many offences, notwithstanding, it will become the Tathāgata’s impeccable body.”

Once he has duly realised thus through his powers of investigation, he guards his body—the abode of the *mahābhūta*—carefully and thinks: “May this body of mine perish [complying with] every requirement whatsoever of sentient beings. May this body of mine that has arisen from the *mahābhūta* become the subsistence of sentient beings through the assorted doors, bases, enunciations and enjoyments, just like the four external *mahābhūta*, viz., the element of earth, water, fire and wind support sentient beings through the various doors, bases, (651) enumerations, favours and enjoyments.”

Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be impermanent, he truly does not weary of death and birth. Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be suffering, physical suffering does not distress him. Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be non-self, he does not weary of developing sentient beings. Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be calm, he does not enter into indifference through a calm body. Although it is true that he has discerned the body to be empty and solitary, he does not enter into *nirvāṇa*.¹⁷³

When he dwells, considering the body as a body he does not consider it to be substantial or

171. *phyin ci log: viparyāsa* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 974, col. 2).

172. The *Rcā* (p. 236.3.3–5) employs the same argument in its description of the bodhisattva’s mindfulness concerning the body:

“By means of this defiled body I shall attain unassisted the body of the Tathāgata; the body of the Dharma, the body of merit and pristine cognition, the *vajra*-body, the blissful and non-afflicted body; a body that exalts in innumerable deeds in the triple world, a body that, when seen in its shape, appeases all sentient beings.”

Descriptions of the Tathāgata’s body in these terms are by no means uncommon and found in several other *sūtras*. See, for instance: Mahāyāna *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (T 374, k.3, p. 382c27; ref. Lamotte).

173. Very similar thought is expressed in *Bbh*, p. 259.15–22.

real. When he dwells, considering the body internally he does not permit the arising of internal, consequential defilements. When he dwells, considering the body externally he is emancipated from external, consequential defilements.

Since his body is without defilements, the bodhisattva is rich in pure physical activity. After he has purified his body, he attains a body that is adorned with the eighty secondary marks. After his body has been adorned, he converts gods and men. This is the bodhisattva's generation of the basis of mindfulness considering the body as body. (652)

2.8.2 Skill in the Basis of Mindfulness concerning Feeling

Again, how does the bodhisattva generate the basis of mindfulness considering feeling as feeling?¹⁷⁴ Concerning this, the bodhisattva thinks: "Whatever I feel, it is all suffering." Even though he experiences pleasant sensations, because he realises feeling that is awakened¹⁷⁵ by pristine cognition, wisdom and means he is not inclined towards the propensity of desire. Although affected by painful sensation, he produces great compassion for all those who are born in the evil destinies, but he is not inclined towards the propensity of hatred. Even though he is affected by feelings that are neither pleasant nor painful, he is not inclined towards the propensity of delusion. He experiences every sensation—whether it be pleasant, painful, unpleasant or painless—through a recollection subsequent to that feeling and sees their origin. In order to fully understand and appease the feelings of all sentient beings, he penetrates these himself, thinking:

"Since sentient beings do not know the origins of their feelings, they rejoice in pleasant sensations. They become angry at painful sensations. At sensations that are neither pleasant nor painful, they are confused. But me, my sensations being awakened by wisdom and pristine cognition, I have carefully purified all feelings. (653) By virtue of my accomplishments that I attained through skilful means and great compassion, I shall teach the Doctrine in order to bring all feelings of sentient beings to a final halt."

Why is it called feeling? An awakened feeling leads to happiness. A feeling that is not awakened leads to suffering. What then are awakened feelings? Concerning this, although there is no self, sentient being, life-force or person that produces feeling, feeling is attachment; feeling is appropriation; feeling is grasping; feeling is delusion; feeling is binary thinking; feeling is inclination to false doctrines. Feeling is the notion of the eye up to the notion of the mind, this is feeling. Feeling is the notion of form up to the notion of mental objects, this is

174. The *Akn-tīkā* explains (p. 256.2.2–5; cf. *Akn*, p. 67.2.1–4.4):

"What is [the bodhisattva's] feeling? Persisting in mindfulness concerning feeling, he achieves transcendence beyond the three kinds of suffering and experiences an unstained, pure and peaceful feeling. Thus, it is asked how do bodhisattvas generate the basis of mindfulness considering feeling as feeling? Feeling is understood by bodhisattvas and should be contemplated. That feelings are pleasant or unpleasant is stated elsewhere."

175. *rtogs paḥi tshor ba: adhigamavedanā*.

feeling. Any sensation that emerges from the condition of touch in conjunction with the eye—whether it be pleasant, painful, unpleasant or painless—this is feeling. Corresponding to the former, any sensation that is linked with external or internal *dharma* and emerges from the condition of touch in conjunction with mental processes—whether it be pleasant, painful, unpleasant or painless—this is feeling. (654)

Furthermore, by way of enumeration feeling is one, viz., knowledge by a single moment of thought¹⁷⁶; feeling is twofold, viz., internal and external; feeling is threefold, viz., knowledge of the past, present and future; feeling is fourfold, viz., knowledge of the four elements; feeling is fivefold, viz., reflection on the five aggregates; feeling is sixfold, viz., mistaken imagining of the six sensefields; feeling is sevenfold, viz., the seven states of consciousness¹⁷⁷; feeling is eightfold, viz., the eight mistaken modes of practice¹⁷⁸; feeling is ninefold, viz., the nine abodes of sentient beings¹⁷⁹; feeling is tenfold, viz., the path of tenfold virtuous activity.¹⁸⁰ Corresponding to the former, all this is feeling. To the degree that there exists mental construing and reflection, everything will be felt. Hence, the feeling of incalculable sentient beings is infinite.

Now, the bodhisattva who dwells, considering feeling as feeling generates pristine cognition of the feelings of all sentient beings as they arise, persist and disappear. He who knows feeling with regard to the virtuous and non-virtuous feelings of all sentient beings has generated

176. *sems gcig pus rnam par rig pa*

It appears that this statement is an indirect reference to the sixteen moments (*kṣaṇa*) of thought that mark the practitioner's gradual cognition of the four noble truths (*Kośa*, vi, pp. 178–193). Rejecting the notion of gradual advance as postulated by the Sarvāstivāda (*Kośa*, vi, pp. 185–9), the *Bdp* follows the view of the Mahāsaṅghika and early Mahīśāsaka (Masuda, 1929, pp. 21, 59) suggesting that comprehension of the four noble truths occurs simultaneously and is not subject to measured progress. Since the reasoning on which this theory rests is very complex, I shall mention only one explanation for this proposition. According to the *Āloka* (ii.12, p. 171) intuition of the *darśanamārga* as a single-moment intuition (*ekakṣaṇābhisamaya*) takes place because of the emergence of pure knowledge (*anāsravjñāna*). This knowledge makes known the nature of all modes and has within its scope the totality of all factors (*sarvadharmaviśaya*). Being fully comprehensive, it allows only for the presence of one thought-moment. An excellent account of the psychological intricacies that are involved in the controversy between those who propose that comprehension (*abhisamaya*) takes place on the basis of a gradual progress and those maintaining that it is subject to simultaneous/instantaneous attainment has been produced by Ruegg, 1989, pp. 150–182.

177. According to the *Kośa* (iii, pp. 16, 21–22), the seven bases of consciousness are (1) beings diverse in body and mentation (*nānātvakāyasamjñā*), (2) beings diverse in body but identical in mentation (*nānākāyayaiksamjñā*), (3) beings of identical body but diverse mentation (*ekatvakāyanānātvāsamjñā*), (4) beings of identical body and mentation (*ekatvakāyayaikātvāsamjñā*), (5) beings belonging to the infinitude of space (*ākāśānāntyāyatana*), (6) being belonging to the infinitude of consciousness (*vijñānānāntyāyatana*) and (7) beings belonging to the infinitude of nothingness (*ākāśānāntyāyatana*). References in the nikāya are found in D II, p. 68; III, p. 253 and in A IV, p. 39. The same list is also found in the *Mvy* (2289–95).

178. *log par hes pahi sbyor ba: samniyojana* (lit.: 'to put into effect or employment').

179. These nine abodes of beings (*sattvāvāsa*) consist of the seven basis of consciousness (*vijñānasthiti*), of the abode of beings beyond perception (*asamjñīsattva*) and of the sphere of neither perception or non-perception (*naivasamjñānāśamjñāyatana*). For canonical references, see: D III, pp. 263, 263; A IV, p. 401, (cf. *Amṛt* (B), p. 219).

180. Canonical sources speak of two, three, five, six, eighteen, thirty-six and one hundred and eight kinds of feeling (S IV, pp. 231–32). The most common variety is that which distinguishes between pleasant (*sukha*), unpleasant (*dukkha*) and neither pleasant nor unpleasant (*adukkhasukha*) feelings (cf. *Mpps*, iii, p. 1174).

the bodhisattva's basis of mindfulness considering feeling as feeling.

2.8.3 Skill in the Basis of Mindfulness concerning Thought

Next, what is the bodhisattva's basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought?¹⁸¹ (655) The bodhisattva is mindful of the thought of enlightenment; he guards it, secures it and does not turn his attention away from it.¹⁸² He looks at it in this way:

"Once a thought has arisen, it disintegrates. It is induced. Since it is fickle, it does not persist internally and it does not perish outwardly. The thought of enlightenment that I produced at first has disappeared. It does not exist. It changed. It is not found in any place. Since it is not found anywhere, I am not able to retain it. The thoughts that produced my roots of virtue have also disappeared. They do not exist. They changed. They are not found in any region or quarter.

Even the thoughts that transform [roots of virtue] into enlightenment do not bear any characteristic of own-being. Thought is not discerned by thought. Thought is not seen by thought. If thought is not known by thought, what then is the thought by which I shall attain supreme and perfect enlightenment? The thought of enlightenment is not tied to the thought of roots of virtue. The thought of roots of virtue, too, is not tied to the thought of the transformation into enlightenment. The thought of the transformation into enlightenment, too, is not tied to either the thought of enlightenment or to the thought of roots of virtue."¹⁸³

If he ruminates thus, he does not become terrified, frightened or fearful but thinks again:

"Truly, in the profound law of dependent co-origination the causes and retribution are imperishable. (656) Yet, even though the foundation of thought has such own-being all *dharma* are dependent on causes and conditions; they are motionless, inactive and non-self. Because I act just as I wish, I shall apply myself diligently to creation¹⁸⁴ and not weaken this foundation of thought."

What is the foundation of thought? What is creation?¹⁸⁵ Thought is like an illusion. There is

181. On the basis of mindfulness concerning thought, the *Akn-ṭikā* comments (p. 257.4.6–5.1; cf. *Akn*, pp. 67.4.4–68.2.5):

"What is an established (*pratiṣṭhita*) bodhisattva? He traverses the basis of mindfulness concerning thought as thought. He transcends all states of consciousness and accomplishes the infinite bodhisattva-meditation. Thus, it is asked what is the bodhisattva's basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought? That which is to be cultivated by the bodhisattva is the thought of enlightenment."

182. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 257.5.1–4:

"Unlike the practice of recollection concerned with the impermanence of one's own thought of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas do not forget through mindfulness and unfailing memory the first thought of enlightenment."

183. We find the same argument—investigating the nature of thought and reconciling its apparent transitoriness with role of the thought of enlightenment—in the *Rcd*'s discussion of the mindfulness concerning thought (pp. 237.4.7–38.2.1).

184. Cf. *Akn* (p. 67.5.5) which has *rnam par sgrub pa* (*viṣṭapanā*) for the *Bdp*'s *sgrub pa*. Both texts agree on the second member of the pair, that is, *sems kyi chos ṅid* (*cittadharmatā*).

185. Compare this section on *cittadharmatā* and *viṣṭapanā* with *Bdp*'s thirty-two pairs of mental vigour

nobody whosoever that causes its obstruction. This is the foundation of thought. To transform all possessions after one has renounced them into the pledge that effectuates the buddha-field is creation. Thought is like a dream and bears the characteristic of calm. This is the foundation of thought. Gathering the accumulation of the vow and transforming it swiftly into intuitive knowledge of all methods is creation. Since thought disintegrates like an illusion, decay is the foundation of thought. To transform the power of patience and bravery in order to accomplish the pledge of enlightenment is creation. Since thought is solitary like the reflected image of the moon in water, solitude is the foundation of thought.

To transform all undertakings of vigour in order to accomplish all buddha-qualities is creation. (657). Thought is inapprehensible and imperceptible. This is the foundation of thought. To transform all contemplations, liberations, meditations and composures of mind into buddha-meditation is creation. Thought is beyond form. It is inobservable, intraceable and not verifiable. This is the foundation of thought. To transform knowledge of all instructions in the various wordings as requested in order to accomplish buddha-knowledge is creation. Thought arises towards various objects. This is the foundation of thought. To produce¹⁸⁶ a disposition for the roots of virtue is creation. Thought does not arise in the absence of its cause. This is the foundation of thought. To produce the mental conditions of the *bodhipāṅkṣika dharma* is creation. Thought does not arise in the absence of an object. This is the foundation of thought. To produce the mental conditions of the buddha-sphere is creation.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva generates the basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought.

When he dwells, considering thought as thought he converges with thought for the sake of acquiring the super-knowledge. After he has acquired the super-knowledge, the bodhisattva perceives the thoughts of all sentient beings by means of a single thought. (658) Truly, once he has perceived them he explains the teaching of such own-being. Furthermore, when the bodhisattva dwells, considering thought as thought he converges with thought for the sake of attaining great compassion. By virtue of the attainment of great compassion, he does not weary of developing all sentient beings.

When he dwells, considering thought as thought, he does not sustain thought for the sake of achieving the cessation and final end of thought. Rather, he generates thought through the fetters of the stream of existence. Even though knowledge of the recollection of thought persists by means of *dharma* that settle him in certainty of the unarisen and unbecome, he does not descend on to the level of śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha. And until he has accomplished all buddha-qualities he perpetuates the succession of thought. It is by virtue of wisdom that is endowed with a single moment of thought that he acquires supreme and perfect enlightenment.

(*cittavīrya*) that distinguish between activity (*pravṛtti*) and stillness (*sthiti*) of the mind (R, folio 474.2–76.5).
186. *ñer bar sbyor ba: upasaṃhāra* (cf. Edgerton, p. 142, col. 2).

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva generates the basis of mindfulness considering thought as thought.

2.8.4 Skill in the Basis of Mindfulness concerning Dharma

O Śāriputra, how does the bodhisattva generate the basis of mindfulness considering *dharma* as *dharma*?¹⁸⁷ O Śāriputra, concerning this, bodhisattvas who look at *dharma* with the eye of noble wisdom are not confounded until they reach the seat of enlightenment. (659)

When they dwell, considering *dharma* as *dharma* they do not see *dharma* of even the size of an atom that are exempt from emptiness, signlessness or wishlessness, the unborn, unarisen, non-accumulated or beingless. They do not perceive *dharma* of even the size of an atom that are exempt from dependent co-origination. When the bodhisattva dwells, considering *dharma* as *dharma* he perceives their foundation of being, but he does not perceive them incorrectly.¹⁸⁸

What is the foundation of being? The truth of the non-existence of a self, a sentient being, a life-force or a person, this is the foundation of being.

What is incorrect? Belief in a self, a sentient being, a life-force or a person, the belief in nihilism or permanence and belief in origination or destruction, this is incorrect.

Again, O Śāriputra, all *dharma* are truth. All *dharma* are error. Why? Because of understanding emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, all *dharma* are truth. (660) Because of mistaken inclinations to consider *dharma* as a self or of a self, all *dharma* are error.¹⁸⁹

Now, when the bodhisattva dwells, considering *dharma* as reality he sees not even a *dharma* of the size of an atom amongst all *dharma* that is not a buddha-quality and becomes transformed into enlightenment, buddhahood, the path, liberation or deliverance.¹⁹⁰ After he has realised that all *dharma* exist he acquires a great compassion called 'Unobstructed'.¹⁹¹

187. On the basis of mindfulness concerning *dharma*, the *Akn-ṭikā* says (p. 259.2.8–3.2; cf. *Akn*, p. 68.2.5–5.1):
"What is a purified bodhisattva? He persists in the basis of mindfulness concerning *dharma*.
He transcends possession (*pariyavasthāna*) of hindrances, fetters, ties, latent defilements and impurities and attains mastery over all *dharma*. Thus, it is asked ..."

188. According to a brief discussion of the Vaiśeṣika understanding of *dharma* and *adharma* in the *Kośa* (iv, p. 7), *dharma* corresponds to merit and *adharma* to demerit. Elsewhere (*Kośa*, iv, p. 155; iii, p. 207), the meaning of *adharma* is given as stain or passion (*rāga*).

189. Philosophically, this interpretation of the nature of *dharma* and *adharma* evolves from the postulate of the sameness of all *dharma* (*sarvadharmasamātā*). Fundamentally, it rests on the proposition that "this indifferenciation (*anānārthatā*) is a mark of reality because of the sole flavour of emptiness (*śūnyatāyaikarasatvāt*)" (*Madh. vṛtti*, p. 375.7). On the moral level, suggesting that both *dharma* and *adharma* are causes of birth and destruction of all types of phenomena, the *Bḍp* seems to follow the view of the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma*, postulating moral neutrality for *dharma* (*Kośa*, iv, p. 7).

190. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 259.4.7–5.4 (cf. *Akn*, p. 68.3.5–6):
"Therefore, [because of universal emptiness, non-existence and non-apprehension] the bodhisattva who considers *dharma* does not see any *dharma* that is not a buddha-quality, deliverance, the path, liberation or the way leading out [of the triple world]."

191. *ñon moṅs pa med pa: anāvaraṇa* (cf. Edgerton, p. 23)
In the *Śikṣ* (p. 236.8), quoting the *Akn*, a *samādhi* bearing this name is found. This *samādhi* recurs in the *Āloka* (Obemiller (*DDP*), p. 36) where it signals—if accompanied by the *anvayañāna* concerned with subjects (*grāhaka*)—acquisition of the fourth *nirvedhabhāgiya*, that is, the *laukikāgradharma*. It therefore constitutes the last psychic experience of *laukika* status and—being traditionally associated with the

Recognising that even the defilements of all sentient beings show no trace of impurity, he considers them to be contrived.

Why? Thus penetrating true meaning, bodhisattvas are enlightened because they themselves are awakened by the insight that there is neither an accumulation of impurity nor a substance to the aggregates. The own-being of impurity is also the seat of enlightenment. The seat of enlightenment is also the own-being of impurity. Although bodhisattvas are mindful of this, they do not achieve even a little. They do not advance or secure [anyone].¹⁹² (661) They realise that intransitoriness¹⁹³ is the foundation of being. Hence, the sphere of the Doctrine is intransitory. The place where the sphere of the Doctrine is situated, there is also the sphere of sentient beings. The place where the sphere of sentient beings is situated, there is also the sphere of space. Hence, all *dharma* are identical with space.

When the bodhisattva dwells, considering *dharma* as *dharma* he relies on the teaching of the Buddha. Even though considering all *dharma*, he delights in the teaching of the Buddha. Although it is true that he is aware of destruction, he does not realise unconditioned destruction. Although it is true that he is aware of no-birth, he does not give way to the conclusions of no-birth but reappears in order to look after sentient beings.

This basis of mindfulness establishes him in mindfulness of all *dharma*. However numerous the *dharma* and *dharma*-designations of the śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas or buddhas are, he is established in their impeccable, unfailing recollection that is not darkened until the end of time.

This basis of mindfulness considering *dharma* as *dharma* is an infinite teaching because it does not belong to the sphere of ordinary conduct, but is included¹⁹⁴ in all teachings of the Buddha and because it (662) appeases the minds of all sentient beings, suppresses all evil and is spontaneous awakening. O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva generates the basis of mindfulness considering *dharma* as *dharma*. These are the four bases of mindfulness.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in the four bases of mindfulness courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.9 Skill in the Factors of Enlightenment

Next, what is the skill in the factors of enlightenment of bodhisattvas?¹⁹⁵ The factors of

attainment in *bala*—allows the bodhisattva to pass into the *darśanamārga*. As the *darśanamārga* itself is taken up by the cultivation of the seven *bodhyaṅga*—the next set of practices in the *Bdp*—it is probably safe to see in this reference (and, in particular, in the modification of the *Akn*, turning *anāvaraṇa* from a type of compassion to a form of meditation) a further indication of a consciously perceived path-structure in the *Bdp*.

192. I take the Tibetan terms *ñe bar hjog pa* to stand for *upasthāpayanti*; *rab tu hjog pa* for *prasthāpayanti* and *hjog pa* for *sthāpayanti*.

193. *gnas pa ñid: sthititā* (Mvy 1720).

194. *yañ dag par ḥdus pa: samavasaraṇa* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 1157, col. 3).

195. According to the *Akn-tikā* (p. 266.1.3), the factors of enlightenment make up the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*): “The title to summarise these seven factors is *darśanamārga*.”

enlightenment of bodhisattvas are seven. What are the seven? These are the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness, the factor of enlightenment of Dharma-discernment, the factor of enlightenment of vigour, the factor of enlightenment of joy, the factor of enlightenment of tranquillity, the factor of enlightenment of meditation and the factor of enlightenment of equipoise. O Śāriputra, these are the seven factors of enlightenment of bodhisattvas.

What is the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness?¹⁹⁶ It is recollection by which they consider the Doctrine mindfully, by which they examine and investigate it thoroughly, (663) by which they research, analyse and distinguish it. By that recollection they are led to the characteristic of the own-being of *dharma*. Again, what is knowledge of the characteristic of the own-being of *dharma*? It is recollection and realisation that all *dharma* are empty of own-characteristic. This is the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness.

What is the factor of enlightenment of Dharma-discernment?¹⁹⁷ It is knowledge discerning the eighty-four thousand *dharma*-aggregates. It is discerning the Dharma just as it should be discerned, viz., discerning its teachings that are of precise meaning in terms of precise meaning, teachings that are of provisional meaning in terms of provisional meaning, teachings that are of conventional truth in terms of conventional truth, teachings that are of absolute truth in terms of absolute truth, symbolic teachings in terms of symbols and investigative¹⁹⁸ teachings in terms of investigation. This is the factor of enlightenment of Dharma-discernment.

What is the factor of enlightenment of vigour? It is exertion to attain joy of Dharma-discernment, purification, meditation, equipoise and the receptacle of pristine cognition; it is exertion to attain perseverance, power, valour, irreversible aspiration, strength, resolute ardour and intuitive perception of the path. (664) This is the factor of enlightenment of vigour.

What is the factor of enlightenment of joy? It is delight, joy and supreme pleasure in the Doctrine leading to fearlessness and courage. It is fearless delight that purifies not only the body and mind, but removes also impurity. This is the factor of enlightenment of joy.

What is the factor of enlightenment of tranquillity? It is pacifying body, mind and defilements, freedom from obstruction and one-pointedness while in meditation. This is the factor of

On the factors themselves, Vasubandhu comments (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 266.1.3–5; cf. *Akn*, p. 70.2.3–4.4):

“As regards the factors of enlightenment; enlightenment is knowledge of destruction and non-origination. It has the own-being of lack of thought-construction. These seven factors, mindfulness, etc., are its causes or associates (*sahāya*); hence they are called factors.”

Note that according to the *Abhidh-sam (R)*, p. 118, the *sahāya* are associates to the factors of enlightenment and not the factors themselves (ref. Braavrig).

196. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 266.1.6–7:

“A bodhisattva who is linked with mindfulness acquires certainty that he will reach truth and attains the factor of enlightenment of mindfulness.”

197. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 266.2–3:

“A bodhisattva who is linked with discernment progresses in the factor of enlightenment of Dharma-discernment.”

An identical formula is used in the commentary to introduce the remaining five factors of enlightenment.

198. *rnam par gtan pa la bab pa: nirṇaya* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 555, col. 1).

enlightenment of tranquillity.¹⁹⁹

What is the factor of enlightenment of meditation?²⁰⁰ It is a composed mind by means of which knowledge and realisation of the Doctrine becomes—not a distracted mind. It is a composed mind by means of which awakening to *dharma* becomes—not a distracted mind. Apart from those who apply themselves to *dharma*-sameness and the Doctrine, no sentient beings understand this since they are ensnared by attachment. This is the factor of enlightenment of meditation. (665)

What is the factor of enlightenment of equipoise? It is thought that is quiescent because it is not seized by *dharma* taking part in pleasure or discomfort, that is not diverted by worldly *dharma*, but dwells in perfect rest. It is thought that is free from turbulence, discomposure and anxiety, that does not take up desire or hatred, but is in harmony with the noble path itself. This is the factor of enlightenment of equipoise.

O Śāriputra, it is in this manner that bodhisattvas who are skilled in the seven factors of enlightenment course in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10 Skill in the Path

2.10.1 Skill in the Noble Eightfold Path

Next, what is the bodhisattva's skill in the path? The path of bodhisattvas is eightfold. What are the eight? These are right view, right resolve, right speech, right conduct, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness and right meditation. These are the eight limbs of the path of bodhisattvas.²⁰¹

What is right view? (666) It is a view that is noble and transcends the mundane realm. It

199. In several places in the Samyuttanikāya (S V, pp. 66, 104, 111) a distinction is proposed between tranquillity of the body (*kāyapassadhi*) and tranquillity of the mind (*cittapassadhi*). Following this differentiation, the *Dhs* (pp. 14–5, 66) defines *kāyapassadhi* in terms of calmness of the aggregates of feeling (*vedanā*), perception (*saññā*) and formations (*saṃkhāra*), while explaining *cittapassadhi* as calmness of the consciousness-aggregate (*viññāṇa*). By implication, it is then *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṃkhāra* that link the practitioner's physical and mental experience and might be taken to bridge the attainment in joy and tranquillity—with the former pertaining to the body and the latter to the mind (Waldschmidt, 1956, p. 292, 30.27).

200. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 267.1.1–2:

“Meditation by means of which thusness is known through one's own [effort] and then realised; this is the factor of enlightenment of meditation.”

201. Vasubandhu indicates in the *Akn-ṭikā* that the eightfold path constitutes the *bhāvanāmārga* (p. 267.3.5–6): “Out of these, the summarising title (*piṇḍārtha*) ‘path of cultivation’ is taught by means of the noble eightfold path while its ‘practice’ is taught by means of perfect mental quietude and insight.”

The eightfold path itself is defined as follows (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 267.3.8–4.2; cf. *Akn*, pp. 70.4.4–71.2.1): “The path is pristine cognition by means of which the *ārya* attain unsurpassed enlightenment. The eight [factors], viz., right view, etc., are called limbs since they are associates of the pristine cognition of the path. They are right because they have turned away from mistaken views of the world.”

does not arise from the belief in a self, a sentient being, a life-force or a person; it does not arise from the belief in nihilism or permanence, origination or destruction. It does not arise from heretical views, starting with that which distinguishes virtue and non-virtue and ending with the view of [permanent] *nirvāṇa*; this is right view.²⁰²

What is right resolve? A resolve through which impurities such as desire, hatred and delusion, etc., prevail does not suffice. Rather, it is a resolve through which morality, contemplation, wisdom, deliverance and the knowledge and vision of deliverance come into being²⁰³; this is right resolve.²⁰⁴

What is right speech? It is right speech through which neither oneself nor others are distressed. It is rich in utterances of beneficial application²⁰⁵. It is through this speech that one penetrates path-uniformity; this is right speech.²⁰⁶

What is right conduct? Concerning unwholesome action; a bodhisattva does not perform action of the kind that produces evil retribution. (667) Concerning wholesome action; he performs action of the kind that produces wholesome retribution. Concerning wholesome/unwholesome action; he does not perform action of the kind that produces wholesome/unwholesome retribution. Concerning action that is neither wholesome nor unwholesome; he performs action of the kind that leads to the exhaustion of action since it produces no retribution. Hence, confidence in one's doings and diligent exertion to right action, this is right conduct.²⁰⁷

What is right livelihood? It is to live without abandoning the noble lineage²⁰⁸ or the virtues

202. *Akn-tīkā*, p. 267.4.2–3:

“A bodhisattva who transcends binary thinking acquires right view on the path of contemplation.”

203. *Akn-tīkā*, p. 267.5.1–2:

“Right resolve does not construct objects that generate *kleśa*, it does not generate the origination of *kleśa*.”

204. *Akn-tīkā*, p. 267.4.7–8:

“A bodhisattva who professes good resolve attains right resolve on the *bhāvanāmārga*.”

205. *rjes su sbyor ba: anyoga* (cf. Edgerton, p. 32, col. 2).

206. *Akn-tīkā*, p. 267.5.1–2:

“A disciplined bodhisattva who is attracted to the *bhāvanāmārga* by right speech acquires moral conduct that was approved by the *ārya*.”

207. *Akn-tīkā*, p. 267.5.6–7:

“A composed bodhisattva who is attracted to the *bhāvanāmārga* by right conduct acquires moral conduct that was approved by the *ārya*.”

208. *hphags paḥi rigs: āryavaṃśa*

To define right livelihood in terms of the *āryavaṃśa* is significant, since it throws some light on the *Bdp*'s position regarding the bodhisattva's sphere of conduct. The *āryavaṃśa*, literally ‘lineage of noble ones’ describes a set of ascetic disciplines that are held conducive to liberation. Their purpose is to lead to contentment and the eradication of desire. Although its practice is technically known as ‘lineage’, it is by virtue of one's way of life rather than birth that membership is attained. Unlike the notion of *gotra* to which one belongs by birth (for exceptions to this rule, see: *Bbh*, pp. 1–11), the *āryavaṃśa*—although notionally parallel to *gotra*—is a matter of personal decision.

Its frequent occurrences in the *nikāya* suggest that the *āryavaṃśa* gained high esteem from relatively early on. Detailed discussions of the practices that belong to the *āryavaṃśa* are found, for instance, at M I, p. 2 and A II, 27, 28 (ref. Schuster). The practices that are included in the *āryavaṃśa* are (1) contentment with robes made of rags (*cīvarā*), (2) contentment with alms-food consisting of scraps (*piṇḍiyālopa*), (3) contentment with roots of trees (*rukhamūla*) as lodging and (4) contentment with strong-smelling urine (*pūtimutta*) as medicine.

Besides the more explicit references, the four practices appear in number of other places in the early

of mendicant life²⁰⁹. It is to live without joking, hypocrisy or violent retaliation and to be easily satisfied with food and medicine²¹⁰. It is to live without assuming negligence in one's training or to envy other persons' property, but to be content with one's own belongings. It is to live beyond reproach as it was prescribed by the noble one; this is right livelihood.²¹¹

suttas. First, all but the last practice are included in the *dhutāṅga* (*Vism*, pp. 24, 30–36, 40). Second, among the practices that Devadatta wished to make obligatory for all monks, we note that it was mainly the concerns of the first three *āryavaṃśa* practices that stood at the centre of his aspirations (*Vin*, iii, x.1.1, *Cullavagga*, vii.3).

That the *āryavaṃśa* continued to enjoy high esteem is shown by Buddhaghosa's (*Vism*, pp. 93–94) recommendation of four texts that should be used by monks as guides to their practice. These include besides the *Āriyavaṃsasutta*, the *Rathavinītasutta* (M I, p. 24), *Malakasutta* (*Sn*, iii.11) and *Tuvaṭṭakasutta* (*Sn*, iv.14), all of which are concerned with issues of discipline and contentment. Similar concerns are also expressed in the seven *suttas* that are cited by Aśoka in his Bhābrā edict as works that monks, nuns and lay-persons should study in detail (Warder, 1980, pp. 255–57). Finally, mirroring the ideal of practitioners who elected the disciplinarian vigour of seclusion, the *āryavaṃśa* correspond to the four types of requisites that a pratyekabuddha is allowed to possess, viz., robes, almsfood, a place to rest and medicine (Kloppenbergh, 1974, p. 26). All of this suggests that the ascetic ideal that is epitomised by the four *āryavaṃśa* practices—always voluntary and free from the extremes of self-mortification—enjoyed broad support among the Buddhist community during the first centuries of Buddhism.

Not surprisingly, this concern for discipline, moderation and self-control did not wane in the course of time, but maintained much of its appeal for later generations of Buddhists. In scholastic writings, the four *āryavaṃśa* are treated in the *Kośa* (iv, pp. 146–8), *Mppś* and the Sarvāstivāda *Dharmaskandha* (chpt. vi). Among the early *sūtras* of the Mahāyāna, they are given prominent treatment in the *Ug* (pp. 268.1.6–69.3.1), *Rp* (p. 13.17–18, p. 14.7–8) and *Kp* (pp. 13–14, 174, 179–181; § 6, 123, 126). In particular, the *Ug* stands out for its detailed discussion. Here, they dominate practically the whole of section seven and stand at the heart of the bodhisattva's training in solitude and contentment. Two aspects of its discussion are especially noteworthy. First, there is the fact that the *Ug*'s presentation of the four practices corresponds almost verbatim to that of A II.28, pp. 26–7. This reinforces the assumption that the *āryavaṃśa* acquired great renown already in ancient times for it to enjoy the use of stockphrase in its description. Second, we note a tendency in the *Ug*, *Kp* and *Rp* to make the *āryavaṃśa* specifically the domain of the *pravrajita* bodhisattva. All three texts make it obvious that they consider it elemental to the proper conduct of recluse bodhisattvas. In them the *āryavaṃśa* epitomise the basic mental disposition that is conducive to a proper attitude in training, but are nowhere near the actual attainment of *bodhi*. In the *Kp* their mastery is also open to those of inferior understanding and is little more than preparatory to meditation practice.

Undoubtedly, this attitude reflects the Buddha's thinking when he decreed that their practice should not be made obligatory since he thought that they were of benefit only to those who already possessed a disposition of asceticism. It appears, therefore, that the interpretation of the *āryavaṃśa* had changed little since the early days. During the incipient Mahāyāna, the role of the *āryavaṃśa* is associated only with a minority of practitioners—the *pravrajita* bodhisattva—and is valued as a preliminary practice to meditation that instilled discipline, quietude and contentment in the adept. It is only with the rise of scholasticism, that this general appreciation became refined, leading to the detailed accounts in the *Kośa* and *Vism*.

The *Bdp*'s position on the *āryavaṃśa* does not match fully either of these strands. On the one hand, to include them in right livelihood would seem to assign the *āryavaṃśa* practices to the general model of Buddhist conduct and not specifically to the *pravrajita* environment. On the other hand, their positioning as the first practice of right livelihood suggests that they enjoyed a certain preeminence over the other factors (e.g., absence of hypocrisy, violence, jest). This prominence appears strengthened through the practices that follow after the reference to the *āryavaṃśa*. Most of them speak of moderation, contentment and moral integrity as the ideal life-style of wandering mendicants. By implication their inclusion in the general category of right livelihood would seem to point to the modest, reclusive life epitomised by the *āryavaṃśa* as the model training for the *Bdp*'s bodhisattva to follow.

209. *sbyaṃ paḥi yon tan: dhūtaguṇa* (cf. Edgerton, p. 286, col. 1).

210. *dgaṃ śla ba: supoṣa; gso śla ba: subhara* (cf. Edgerton, p. 600, col. 1; p. 601, col. 1).

211. *Akn-tikā*, p. 268.1.2–3:

“A peaceful bodhisattva who is attracted to the *bhāvanāmārga* by right effort acquires moral conduct that was approved by the *ārya*.”

Most other works on the *bodhipāṭṣika* include in the exposition of right livelihood as brief account of the five mistaken forms of livelihood (*mithyājīva*). These include (1) hypocrisy in order to obtain alms

What is right effort? Effort that preaches mistaken conduct, effort that leads to the propensities of defilements²¹² of desire, hatred and delusion—this is not intended. Rather, it is effort that—introducing to the noble path and truth—accords with the effort that establishes in the path leading to *nirvāṇa*; this is right effort.²¹³ (668)

What is right mindfulness? It is mindfulness that is well-composed, self-possessed, sincere and truthful; it is mindfulness that investigates the faults and defects of *saṃsāra* and guides the bodhisattva on the path to *nirvāṇa*; it is mindfulness that causes recollection and is not oblivious of the noble path; this is right mindfulness.²¹⁴

What is right meditation? It is composure towards reality and all *dharma*. When one dwells in this [type of] meditation, one penetrates reality. If one dwells in this [type of] bodhisattva-meditation in order to liberate all sentient beings and penetrates reality, that is right meditation.²¹⁵

(*kuhanā*), (2) boasting (*lapanā*), (3) divination (*naimittikatā*), (4) extraction of gifts from the laity (*naīṣpeṣikatā*) and (5) unceasing concern for profit (*lābhena lābham niścikīṣatā*). In the nikāya, they are found in D I, pp. 8, 67; M III, p. 75; A III, p. 111; for Sanskrit references, see: *Kośavyākhyā*, p. 420; *Bbh*, pp. 168.21–169.2; *Abhidh-d*, p. 309.9–11 and *Śikṣ*, p. 183.15. A fine summary of the significance of the five terms is given in the *Abhidh-d* (p. 310.1–5):

“The five mistaken forms of livelihood constitute particular thoughts. Hypocrisy is to resort to manifold posturing in order to demonstrate qualities that one does not possess. Boasting is to show off one’s qualities out of own interest. Divination is to interpret signs either favourably or unfavourably [for one’s own benefit] with the pretext to pay service [to others]. Extortion is to extract favour through threats. Unceasing concern for profit is to strive for new gains by virtue of previously obtained profit.”

The best analysis of the five types of mistaken livelihood in European languages is probably that by Wogihara (*Bbh*, pp. 21–26*). For other references of their occurrence in Buddhist literature, particularly in exegetical material, see: *Mppś*, iii, pp. 1182–3.

212. *ñon moṃs pa bag la ñal ba: kleśānuśaya* (cf. Edgerton, p. 198, col. 1)

The exact relationship between the *kleśa* and *anuśaya* is frequently glossed over in Buddhist literature. In many texts both terms are used as near-synonyms and are only inadequately distinguished. Even in scholastic works, their differences are not always made clear. According to the *Dhsgr* (§ 67) and *Siddhi* (p. 343), the *kleśa* are sixfold, viz., desire (*rāga*), aversion (*pratighā*), conceit (*māna*), ignorance (*avidyā*), mistaken views (*kudṛṣṭi*) and doubt (*vicikitsā*). In the *Kośa* (v, p. 2) these six factors (replacing the last two with *drṣṭi* and *vimati* respectively) are said to characterise the *anuśaya*.

In the Sarvāstivāda *Abhidharma* (*Jñānaprasthāna*, T 26, p. 943a27; ref. La Vallée Poussin), this list of *anuśaya* is extended to include ten kinds of *anuśaya* by subdividing the *kudṛṣṭi* into the (1) belief in a self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*), (2) false views (*mithyādrṣṭi*), (3) belief in the extremes (*antagrāhadrṣṭi*), (4) the esteeming of views (*drṣṭiparāmarśa*) and (5) the esteeming of moral and ascetic practices (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*). Creating further subdivisions and addressing specific viewpoints, the basic list of six has been variously expanded with the highest number of *anuśaya* amounting to ninety-eight (*Kośa*, v, p. 13).

A key passage in the *Kośa* (v, p. 6) explains that the *anuśaya* are not different from the *kleśa* but constitute *kleśa* in a state of sleep. They are said to be the opposite of *pariyavasthāna* (active defilement) that is, *kleśa* in an awakened state. Because the *anuśaya* are non-manifested they are in a latent state, bearing the characteristics of a seed belonging to a person who engendered the previous *kleśa*. While the *anuśaya* are the cause of the *kleśa*, they are not solely responsible since the *kleśa* depend for arising on the presence of *dharma* as objects and on incorrect preparation. In the words of the *Kośa* (v, p. 72):

“*Kleśa* arise from the non-abandoning of the *anuśaya*, from the presence of their object and from erroneous judgement.”

213. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 268.1.6–7:

“A bodhisattva who has gone forth to mendicant life acquires right livelihood on the *bhāvanāmārga*.”

214. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 268.2.1–2:

“A bodhisattva who is full of joy acquires the ability to retain words and meanings on the *bhāvanāmārga*.”

215. As this sentence differs from the preceding one only by qualifying meditation as bodhisattva-meditation, it

After the bodhisattva has intuitively grasped the inexhaustible path of the lord buddhas of all times he preaches, explains and fully elucidates it. This is right meditation.²¹⁶

These are the eight limbs of the path of bodhisattvas. This is the bodhisattva's skill in the path.

2.10.2 Skill in Perfect Mental Quietude and Insight

Furthermore, as regards their skill in the path; the path of bodhisattvas is twofold. What are the two? (669) These are perfect mental quietude and insight. This is the twofold path.

What is perfect mental quietude? It is composure, serenity and stillness. It is imperturbability, restraint with regard to senses and congeniality. It is freedom from conceit, arrogance and folly. It is resoluteness, watchfulness and self-possession. It is non-delusion of mind, joy in solitude, quietude and seclusion. It is reflection on physical seclusion, mental quietude and the door to solitude. It is ease of mind and modesty. It is purity of life, excellence of practice and guarded conduct. It senses timeliness. It is contentment with food and medicine. It is analytical investigation²¹⁷. It is mental poise and patient endurance of the words of those who speak evil. It is generating the thought of enlightenment at the door to yoga. It is taking pleasure in deep absorption and contemplating the branches of meditation. That is to say, it producing benevolence, acquiring compassion, persisting in sympathetic joy, assuming equipoise and attaining successively all eight [types of] meditation. This is perfect mental quietude.²¹⁸

Again, the accumulation of perfect mental quietude is infinite. Guidance to that accumulation is perfect mental quietude.

What is insight? (670) It is the path of contemplation²¹⁹ connected to wisdom. It is knowledge

appears that the *Bdp* intends to point to a difference between the śrāvaka-meditation and the bodhisattva-meditation. That is to say, the śrāvaka is concerned with his own liberation and may pass from the state of meditation into *nirvāṇa*, but the bodhisattva's motivation of his meditative practice is the goal of universal liberation.

216. *Akn-tīkā*, p. 268.2.6–7:

"A bodhisattva who is of great power attains the accomplishment of his intended aims on the *bhāvanāmārga*."

An Italian translation of the parallel passage in the *Akn* (as preserved in the *Arthav*) was composed by Alfonsa Ferrari, 1944, pp. 603–4. I have reproduced the Sanskrit of that passage in the notes to my edition. Note, however, that her translation is based on the Tibetan, since in 1944 the Sanskrit text of the *Arthav* was not yet available.

217. *so sor rtog pa: pratyavekṣā*

For a definition of *pratyavekṣā*, see: *MBT*, iii, pp. 3, 5, 14–15, *Bbh*, p. 109.18–22.

218. According to the *Bbh* (p. 260.15–23), *śamatha* falls into four categories. First, there is *śamatha* that is knowledge indicating the absolute truth (*paramārthikasāṃketikajñāna*). Second, there is *śamatha* that—being the fruit of the first type—is effortless perception of discursive proliferation (*prapañca*). Third, *śamatha* is characterised as penetration of the ineffability of things and their signlessness. Fourth, by cleansing the mind of all discrimination, *śamatha* leads to the essentially uniform single flavour of all *dharma* (*sarvadharmasamatā*). By means of these four aspects of *śamatha*, its practice accomplishes the pristine cognition of enlightenment. Other, less specific, classifications of *śamatha* are found in the *Samdhis* (*ÉLa*), p. 93.1–10.

219. *sgom paḥi lam: bhāvanāmārga*

At first sight, this reference to the path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*) is surprising. According to the *Siddhi* (p. 569) *vipaśyanā* constitutes the central vision of the *darśanamārga* and plays a decisive role in

seeing the imperturbability of *dharma*. It is knowledge seeing that there is no sentient being, life-force or person and that the aggregates are illusory. It is knowledge seeing that the elements are like the sphere of the Doctrine. It is knowledge seeing that the sensefields are like an empty city and that the eye scrutinises discursively. It is knowledge seeing that dependent co-origination is non-contradictory and that it is beyond the heretical view stipulating the existence of a sentient being. It is knowledge seeing that causes and effects ripen. It is knowledge seeing the manifestation of the fruit-attainment. It is knowledge seeing that penetrating reality is attainment.

Again, as regards insight; it is accurate seeing of *dharma*. It is seeing the suchness of *dharma*. It is seeing the unfailing thusness of *dharma*. It is seeing the emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness of *dharma*.

Again, as regards insight; it does not consist of seeing through causes or the absence of causes. It does not consist of seeing through causes that arise, abide and perish or that are mentally construed; and although it is insight, one sees not even a little.²²⁰ (671)

Furthermore, as regards insight; it is seeing by seeing and non-seeing by seeing. When one sees in this manner, then one sees rightly. When one sees rightly, one acquires skill in insight. Now, concerning the insight of bodhisattvas; they neither fall into karma-producing activity nor attend to accumulating roots of virtue; this is the insight of bodhisattvas.²²¹

the establishing of 'seeing'. Indeed, most texts agree that the practice of *vipaśyanā* belongs to the *darśana-mārga* and not to the *bhāvanāmārga* (examples, see: Ruegg, 1989, pp. 186–88). It could, however, be argued that *bhāvanāmārga* constitutes essentially a refined renewal of the 'non-constructive gnosis' (*nirvikalpañāna*) first intuited during the *darśanamārga* (*Siddhi*, p. 606). Judging by the characterisation of *vipaśyanā* in the *Bdp*, it is probable that it is this parallelism that is played at, since the content—affirming cognition of the emptiness, sameness and ultimate non-existence of *dharma*—corresponds to the definition of the *bhāvanāmārga* as "intuition dominated by supreme wisdom that is engaged in pondering, investigation and contemplation of the unreality of the separate elements of existence, their non-substantiality and relativity" (*DPP*, pp. 41–42). In the *Bbh* (pp. 109.7–110.4) both *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* play a part in the cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of *balagotra*, leading to the elimination of evil dispositions and purification of the vision of knowledge. This might explain why we find in several texts (e.g., *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 267.3.5–6, *Abhidh-sam* (*R*), p. 126) that the cultivation of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* is placed at the end of the *bhāvanāmārga*, indicating the final consummation of non-constructive gnosis.

220. The syntax of this passage is ambiguous and I am not certain whether my translation represents its chain of reasoning accurately. The commentary on the *Akn* is of little help here, since the crucial portion is not found in the root text (*Akn*, p. 71.3.5–8; *Akn-ṭikā*, pp. 268.4.1–269.5.6). However, some light is shed on the meaning of this passage by a paragraph in the *Samdhis* (*ÉLa*) (pp. 90.21–91.17) that discusses the ways in which thought perceived during meditation differs from ordinary thought.

221. Like *śamatha*, also *vipaśyanā* displays four levels of operation. First, at the lowest level, *vipaśyanā* encompasses all four aspects of *śamatha*. Second, *vipaśyanā* removes the remaining mistaken mental assumptions (*samāropa*) concerning *dharma*. Third, *vipaśyanā* eradicates all blame and contradiction (*apavāda*) and fourth, through infinite methods of differentiation *vipaśyanā* penetrates *dharma* analysis (*Bbh*, pp. 260.23–261.5).

Compare these four types of *vipaśyanā* with the three types that are proposed in the *Samdhis* (*ÉLa*) (p. 92.14–29). Here, we learn that *vipaśyanā* may either spring from notions (*nimittamayī*), striving (*prayesaṇāmayī*) or from analytical investigation (*pratyavekṣaṇāmayī*). The first is concerned with images that carry reflection (*vikalpabimba*) perceived during meditation. The second addresses *dharma* that the bodhisattva penetrated only partially through wisdom. The third type of *vipaśyanā* investigates accurately the Dharma in order to reach the bliss of enlightenment. Further material on the various divisions and aspects of *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* is found in the *Abhidh-sam* (*R*), p. 126.

It is in this way that the bodhisattva who is skilled in perfect mental quietude and insight courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10.3 Skill in Perfect Efforts

Furthermore, as regards skill in the path; the path of bodhisattvas is fourfold. What are the four?

They generate the keen wish that bad, unwholesome *dharma* that have hitherto not arisen are not produced. They strive and apply themselves diligently, they control their mind and endeavour zealously to that end.

They generate the keen wish that bad, unwholesome *dharma* that have already arisen are abandoned. They strive and apply themselves diligently, they control their mind and endeavour zealously to that end.

They generate the keen wish that virtuous *dharma* that have hitherto not arisen are produced. They strive and apply themselves diligently, they control their mind and endeavour zealously to that end.

They generate the keen wish that virtuous *dharma* that have already arisen persist, reappear, (672) prevail and endure. They strive and apply themselves diligently, they control their mind and endeavour zealously to that end.²²²

‘He generates the keen wish that bad, unwholesome *dharma* that have hitherto not arisen are not produced’ is an expression for correct reflection. ‘He strives and applies himself diligently to that end’ is an expression for not abandoning this correct reflection. ‘He controls the mind and endeavours zealously to that end’ is an expression for correct, careful investigation. Why? Because correct practices do not manifest unwholesome *dharma*.

What are unwholesome *dharma*? Unwholesome *dharma* are the detriment of moral conduct, meditation and wisdom. What is the detriment of moral conduct? *Dharma* that corrupt moral conduct and some others that impair it, (673) viz., *dharma* that are detrimental to the morality-aggregate, these are the detriment of moral conduct.

What is the detriment of meditation? *Dharma* that corrupt religious practice and some others that distract the mind, viz., *dharma* that are detrimental to the meditation-aggregate, these are the detriment of meditation.

222. Playing at the ambiguity of the word-formation of *prahāṇa/pradhāṇa*, Vasubandhu comments (*Akṣ-īkā*, p. 260.5.4–6):

“It is fitting to call ‘bad, unwholesome *dharma* that have hitherto not arisen are not produced’ and ‘those that have already arisen should be abandoned’ perfect abandoning (*samyakprahāṇa*). But how can ‘so that virtuous *dharma* that have hitherto not arisen are produced’ and ‘those that have arisen should endure’ be called perfect abandoning? To designate the two in this way appears illogical, but there is no inconsistency here since ‘perfect abandoning’ is taken to mean to abandon the detriment (*vipakṣaprahāṇa*), to produce and make the virtuous *dharma* endure and to abandon the detriment that takes place in order to produce and make endure [virtuous *dharma*].”

What is the detriment of wisdom? *Dharma* that corrupt vision and some others that obscure his vision overwhelmingly, viz., *dharma* that are detrimental to the wisdom-aggregate, these are the detriment of wisdom. These are bad, unwholesome *dharma*.

Due to correct reflection he generates the keen wish that such bad, unwholesome *dharma* are abandoned. He strives and applies himself diligently, he controls his mind and endeavours zealously to that end. Hence, these unwholesome *dharma* do not accumulate in his mind and do not prevail in any region or quarter.

He perceives that these unwholesome *dharma* that—wandering in the mind—have arisen from conditions and obstructions, viz., from desire by way of the disposition of affection, from hatred by way of the disposition of anger and from delusion by way of the disposition of ignorance. Then, the disposition of correct reflection acts to appease desire by way of contemplating²²³ impurity, to appease hatred by way of contemplating benevolence and to appease delusion by way of contemplating dependent co-origination.²²⁴ Pacification of these impurities is abandoning after having qualified them.²²⁵ One who abandons does not apprehend anything. (674) Since he is aware that all *dharma* are uniform, because of that, he abandons correctly. This is the second right effort.

Again, the expression ‘he generates the keen wish that virtuous *dharma* that have hitherto not arisen are produced. He strives and applies himself diligently, he controls his mind and endeavours zealously to that end’ has an infinite basis. Why? Because the virtuous *dharma* that should be accomplished by the *mahāsattva*, bodhisattva are incalculable. Here, ‘keen wish’ is the foundation of all roots of virtue. ‘Acquisition of diligence’ is the foundation of all roots of virtue. ‘Perseverance²²⁶ in controlling the mind’ is the foundation of all roots of virtue.²²⁷ This is the third right effort.

Again, ‘he generates the keen wish that all virtuous *dharma* that have already arisen persist, prevail and endure. He strives and applies himself diligently, he controls his mind and endeavours zealously to that end’ is an expression for the roots of virtue that have been transformed into enlightenment.

Why? Roots of virtue that have been transformed into enlightenment endure until he has

223. The word ‘contemplating’ (tib.: *sgom pa*) is not found in the Tibetan text, but is to be supplied on contextual grounds.

224. Compare this proposition with the view expressed in the *Siddhi* (pp. 359, 351) that defilements of speculation (*parikalpita*) can be abandoned through seeing (*darśana*) because they are coarse and hence easily abandoned while innate defilements (*sahajakleśa*) because they are difficult to abandon are eliminated through contemplation (*bhāvanā*).

225. *tha sñad du btags paḥi phyir* (lit.: ‘after having named them’) The idea behind this thought appears to be that the bodhisattva cannot proceed to eradicate unwholesome *dharma* until he has positively identified them.

226. *ñam su len par byed pa: āsthitikriyā* (cf. Edgerton, p. 111, col. 2).

227. Most other works do not elaborate the differences between the two poles of the *samyakprahāṇa*. For instance, in the *Kp* (p. 139; § 95) the four perfect efforts are collectively the remedy (*cikitsā*) that prompts the abandonment of non-virtuous *dharma* and leads to the fulfilment (*pāripūri*) of all virtuous *dharma*.

settled on the seat of enlightenment. Why? Because a thought thus produced is not dependent on the triple world. (675) Roots of virtue that depend on the triple world perish. Why? Because a thought thus produced is dependent on the triple world. All roots of virtue that are transformed into all-knowing are independent of the triple world and do not perish. This is the fourth right effort.²²⁸

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in the fourfold path courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10.4 Skill in Faculties

Furthermore, as regards skill in the path; the path of the bodhisattva is fivefold. What are the five? These are the faculty of faith, the faculty of vigour, the faculty of recollection, the faculty of meditation and the faculty of wisdom.²²⁹

What is the faculty of faith? It is faith through which he gains confidence in four *dharma*.²³⁰ What are the four?

(1) While in *saṃsāra*, he has faith in worldly right view²³¹. He relies on the ripening

228. For the *Akn-ṭikā*, the attainment of the four efforts mirrors the bodhisattva's progress in vigour. To begin with, during the first perfect effort, the bodhisattva exerts himself to produce the antidote to unwholesome *dharma*, viz., vigour (p. 260.5.7). Second, in order to abandon those bad *dharma* that have already arisen, he appeases them (p. 262.1.2–3). Third, now in possession of vigour, the bodhisattva promotes the becoming of wholesome *dharma* (p. 262.2.7–8). Fourth, being established in vigour, he consolidates those wholesome *dharma* that have already arisen (p. 262.3.6–7).

229. An Italian translation largely paralleling our 'skill' in faculties (as cited in the *Arthav* from the *Akn*, but made on the basis of the Tibetan) was composed by A. Ferrari (*op. cit.*, pp. 601–2). I have reproduced the Sanskrit of that passage in the notes to my edition of chapter eleven.

230. The section of 'skill' in faculties is one of the few passages of the *Bdp* that are extant in the Sanskrit. It is found in the *Sikṣ* citing from the *Akn* (pp. 316.13–317.13). An abbreviated Sanskrit version of the parallel passage in the *Akn* is also found in the *Arthav* (*S*), pp. 31.6–33.2 and in its commentary (*Arthav-ṭ* (*S*), pp. 223–25).

According to the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 263.5.4–5):

“A bodhisattva who possesses supreme faith progresses in the faculty of faith. Supramundane faith is superior to mundane faith, it is distinguished, greater and unsurpassed.”

231. *laukika samyagdr̥ṣṭi*: 'worldly right view'

According to the commentary on the *Arthav*, faith in worldly right view refers to the bodhisattva's belief in the existence of the other world (*paraloka*) and pertains to *laukika* consciousness (*Arthav-ṭ* (*S*), pp. 223–25). Merely concerned with the bodhisattva's receptivity to, and knowledge of, the structure of *saṃsāra*, it is to be distinguished from the *samyagdr̥ṣṭi* of the *āryāṣṭāṅgamārga* (*Kośa*, vi, p. 290). The Sarvāstivāda understood *laukika samyagdr̥ṣṭi* as '*prajñā* associated with (*saṃprayukta*) mental perception (*manovijñāna*)' that allows for vision of *dharma*. Wholesome by nature, but impure (*sāsrava*) it is not the right view of the arhant which is always pure (*Kośa*, ii, p. 81). This would establish the *indriya* in the *Bdp* as pertaining to the *laukika* consciousness—a possibility that is acknowledged by the Sarvāstivāda (Bareau, 1955, p. 143).

The issue of the feasibility of 'worldly right view' is hotly debated and the Sarvāstivāda view remained by no means unchallenged. Criticism came, for instance, from the Theravāda tradition, arguing that there exists neither a *laukika* right view nor a *laukika* faculty of faith (*op. cit.*, p. 66). For them, all mundane qualities—be it faith, vigour, mindfulness, meditation or wisdom—exist, by definition, outside the way to deliverance. As such, they are clearly distinct from the *indriya*, because they do not fulfil the purpose of the *indriya*, namely, the abandonment of delusion and extermination of desire that can only be achieved through pure wisdom and pure faith (*op. cit.*, p. 67). The *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 264.1.2–5), defines 'worldly right view' as perception of the conduct of ignorant laymen, as knowledge of the ripening of deeds in retribution

of deeds and refrains from sinful actions for the sake of life.

- (2) He has faith in the bodhisattva training and, once embarked on this training, does not long for another vehicle.
- (3) He has faith in the precise meaning of the absolute truth, in the profound law of dependent co-origination, in investigation concerning the sentient being and in the notion that all *dharma* bear the characteristics of emptiness and signlessness. (676) He does not harbour inclinations towards any heretical belief.²³²
- (4) He has faith in all buddha-qualities, in the powers and assurances. After he has heard of them, he becomes convinced and gathers these qualities trustingly. This is the faculty of faith.

What is the faculty of vigour? He produces *dharma* in that he has faith through the faculty of vigour; this is the faculty of vigour. He retains *dharma* that he gathered with vigour through the faculty of recollection; this is the faculty of recollection. He focuses his thought by means of the faculty of meditation on *dharma* that he retained through the faculty of recollection; this is the faculty of meditation. He examines by means of the faculty of wisdom *dharma* on which he focused his thought through the faculty of meditation; knowledge of these *dharma* is the faculty of wisdom.

It is in this way that his five faculties are connected with each other and cause him to accomplish all buddha-qualities. They cause him also to attain the stage of prediction. For instance, just like those who possess the five transcendental super-knowledge do not predict a foetus in the womb until he has attained male or female faculties, (677) in the same way also the lord buddhas do not predict bodhisattvas until they have attained these five faculties.²³³

and as knowledge of existence of the *triratna*. The issue of the *laukika/lokottara* distinction does not figure in the *Akṣ-īkā*'s explanation of the passage on the *śraddhendriya* beyond the statement that worldly observance of *śraddhā*, etc., contains the preconditions for the *indriya* to become a transcendental practice (pp. 263.5.4–6, 264.3.4).

232. *Ita bar byas pa: drṣṭikṛta* (cf. Edgerton, p. 269, col. 2).

233. This allusion to the prediction of buddhahood refers no doubt to the fourth and last prediction of the bodhisattva. Being public and made in the presence of the person concerned (*sammukhapudgalavyākaraṇa*), it is only conferred after the bodhisattva has developed the spiritual *indriya* (that, according to Kumārajīva, are of *lokottara* rank) and observes constantly the *brahmacaryā* ideal, when he has attained the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma* (*anupattikadharmakṣānti*) and resides on the *acalābhūmi* (*Śgs*, pp. 212–13; *Msl*, p. 166.9–17; *Bbh*, p. 290.6–7).

The preceding three *vyākaraṇa* are explained as follows: The first prediction (*anupāditabodhicittotpādayākaṇa*) is conferred on a person who abides in the lineage of the buddhas (*gotraśtha*) but has not yet generated the thought of enlightenment. He is endowed with weak faculties (*tikṣṇendriya*) but of honest aspiration (*udārādhimuktika*). Such a person is identified in the five destinies by the Buddha through his great sight (*apratihatabuddhacakṣus*) and prophesied to generate the *bodhicitta* in due course. The second prediction is conferred on a bodhisattva who has already generated the thought of enlightenment (*upāditacittavyākaraṇa*). It is conferred on those who have developed their roots of virtue, who have planted and cultivated the seed of enlightenment, who possess acute faculties, who accomplish superior conduct (*kṛtacaryā*) and show compassion towards beings. At this stage, their attainments are already irreversible (*avaivartika*) and free from the eight unfavourable conditions of birth (*aṣṭākṣaṇa*). The third prediction (*asamakṣavyākaraṇa* or *rohavyākaraṇa*) is secret in the sense that it is only known to the

This is his fivefold path. It is in this way that the bodhisattva who is skilled in the fivefold path courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10.5 Skill in Powers

Furthermore, O Śāriputra, what is the bodhisattva's skill in the fivefold path? The five limbs are the power of faith, the power of vigour, the power of recollection, the power of meditation and the power of wisdom.²³⁴

What is his power of faith? It is faith, confidence and devotion that is invincible. Even if Māra were to assume the appearance of the Buddha and approached [the bodhisattva], someone who has faith in the pristine cognition of the Doctrine would tell them apart, saying: "These teachings are not the Doctrine of the Buddha." Even if he deters him and dissuades him from his resolution, by persisting in thorough investigation the *mahābhūta* are completely transformed. However, this does not happen to a bodhisattva who trusts the power of faith. Thus, Māra cannot separate him from the bodhisattva's power of faith.

What is the bodhisattva's power of vigour? Whatever vigour they acquire and however many virtuous *dharma* they practice, although they attain a degree of firm power in these, the worldings including the gods are not able to repulse, describe or generate the degree of his power unless they are liberated in his place²³⁵. (678) This is the bodhisattva's power of vigour.

What is the bodhisattva's power of recollection? In whatever state or *dharma* his mind is established through the bases of mindfulness, no defilements whatsoever can perturb or distract him from them. Through the force of the power of recollection he overcomes all defilements. His recollection is truly invincible. This is the bodhisattva's power of recollection.

What is the bodhisattva's power of contemplation? He practises with composure in the midst of all bustle of worldly affairs. When he reflects on all sounds of worldly paths, the thicket of sound does not become an impediment to his first contemplation.²³⁶ Although he

assembly, but not to the bodhisattva concerned. The reason usually given in support of this secrecy is that, if conferred personally, the bodhisattva might forfeit his vigour in anticipation of what is by now certain buddhahood. On the other hand, the buddha's address to the assembly is meant to provide inspiration to the audience, to sustain their interest and to remove all remaining doubt of the feasibility of the goal (Śgs, pp. 202–213).

234. The difference between the practice of the *indriya* and *bala* is that (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 264.4.3–6):

"When treated as faculties [the bodhisattvas] attain only mastery in realising and fulfilling the practices in which one should have faith, etc., but they are not such that they overcome their antitheses. When treated as powers, however, faith, etc., provided that they are cultivated and purified, gather force and become a *bala* in order to overcome its antitheses, viz., distrust, etc."

This explanation runs very close to the reasoning that is given in the *Abhidh-sam* (R), p. 123, where we learn that the *pañcabala* are called power because they eliminate the danger posed by their antitheses and because of their distinction.

235. The last subclause represents only an approximate translation of the Tibetan phrase *gnas der ma bsgral gyi bar du* (R, folio 678.1). A more literal rendering would be: "unless they are removed from that place".

236. The allegory likening sound to a thicket is also found in the *Kathāvatthu* (pp. 202, 572–3; ref. Braavrig).

discriminates when pursuing virtuous investigation, it does not become an impediment to his second contemplation. Although delight and happiness arise in him and persist, it does not become an impediment to his third contemplation. Although he is not indifferent for the sake of developing sentient beings and to uphold the holy Doctrine, it does not become an impediment to his fourth contemplation. (679) When he dwells in these four contemplations, he is invincible by virtue of his contemplation and liberation. He does not renounce the state of contemplation and is not reborn by reason of the power of contemplation. This is the bodhisattva's power of contemplation.

What is the bodhisattva's power of wisdom. It is pristine cognition that is unconquerable by mundane and supramundane *dharma*. As soon as the bodhisattva is born in this world, he accomplishes without a teacher all excellent practices, formidable actions and arduous attainments in every manual skill. Indeed, it is by means of these supramundane *dharma* that he delivers the worlds. Gods or men cannot defeat these *dharma* since they originate in the bodhisattva's power of wisdom and pristine cognition. This is the bodhisattva's power of wisdom. This is the other fivefold path.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in these five limbs courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.10.6 Skill in Solitary Wandering

Furthermore, in brief, the path of bodhisattvas is solitary²³⁷. That is to say, it is a path that is traversed alone. The bodhisattva is unaccompanied and on his own. (680) Being without companion, he puts on his armour with the resolution that upholds the force of his diligent power for the sake of unsurpassed and perfect enlightenment. He is self-sufficient and does not dependent on others.²³⁸ He practises all by himself. He excels by virtue of his own power. Having put on a hardened armour, he reflects:

"I shall achieve that which no other sentient being has achieved. I shall achieve that which no other noble one or newly-set-out bodhisattva has achieved. Generosity is not my companion, but I am a companion of giving.²³⁹ Moral conduct, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom are not my companions, but I am their companion. I am not to be raised by the perfections, but the perfections are to be raised by me. Corresponding to the former, I shall meticulously

237. *mgo gcig pa: ekāṃśa* (cf. Edgerton, p. 153, col. 2).

According to the *Akn-ṭikā* (pp. 271.4.4–272.2.1), the bodhisattva who pursues solitary wandering approaches enlightenment. He practices his training effortlessly and is distinguished by four traits:

"A bodhisattva who practices without effort is of four kinds. First, he is unable to dispense (*avikṣīpa*). Second, he has attained patience (*kṣāntiprāpta*). Third, he persists in equality (*śamatāvihārin*) and, fourth, he is free from hindrances (*nirāvaraṇa*)."

238. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 272.1.1:

"A bodhisattva who is unable to dispense, strives to attain mundane and supramundane qualities only for himself."

239. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 272.1.3:

"A bodhisattva who has attained patience, purifies the perfections by himself."

understand all roots of virtue, that is, I shall not be raised by any roots of virtue, but all roots of virtue shall be raised by me.²⁴⁰ Once I took a seat on the *vajra*-throne without recourse to such *dharma*²⁴¹ and defeated Māra with his host single-handedly, I shall acquire supreme and perfect enlightenment by means of wisdom that is furnished with just one moment of thought.”²⁴² (681)

Earnest and determined practice²⁴³ to that end, this is the bodhisattva’s solitary wandering along the path. It is in this manner that one who is skilled in the bodhisattva’s solitary wandering along the path courses in the Perfection of Wisdom. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in the path.

It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in the path courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

2.11 Skill in Dependent Co-origination

Next, what is the bodhisattva’s skill in dependent co-origination? After the bodhisattva has thus retreated into solitude and become absorbed in meditation, he ponders:

“What is the origin of this whole mass of suffering?” Then, he reflects: “Because superficial reflection²⁴⁴ has arisen, ignorance arises. Because ignorance has arisen, karmic formations arise. Because karmic formations have arisen, consciousness arises. Because consciousness has arisen, name-and-form arise. Because name-and-form have arisen, the six internal sense-fields arise. Because the six internal sensefields have arisen, contact arises. Because contact has arisen, feeling arises. Because feeling has arisen, thirst arises. Because thirst has arisen, grasping arises. Because grasping has arisen, becoming arises. (682) Because becoming has arisen, birth arises. Because birth has arisen, old-age-and-death arises. Because old-age-and-death has arisen, suffering, lamentations, misery, grief and despair arise.”

And again, he reflects: “I know that just as all these *dharma* that emerge from causes of virtue, non-virtue, stillness and *nirvāṇa* are still, inactive and non-self and arise from conditions—sentient beings establishing by cause of action faculties that are the cause of correct

240. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 272.1.4–5:

“A bodhisattva who persists in sameness attains the four means of conversion, *dharma* that ripen sentient beings.”

In the *Śgs* (pp. 129–31), the Buddha addresses a brief discourse on the identity and non-reality of the Tathāgata to a Brahmā god called Samatāvihārin. Arguing from the empty and illusory nature of *dharma*, he shows that all *dharma* are in fact same—an attribute that he then applies to the Tathāgata. Having comprehended the gist of this teaching, Samatāvihārin, advancing to the eighth stage, gains at the end the ‘conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*’.

241. According to the *Akn-ṭikā* (p. 272.1.7–8), *dharma* should here be taken to include mundane and supramundane qualities (*guṇa*), the six perfections and four means of conversion.

242. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 272.1.6:

“A bodhisattva who is without hindrances overcomes the hindrances so that he attains supreme enlightenment by himself.”

243. *nes par rtog paḥi bsaṃ paḥi sbyor pa: avakalpanāśayaprayoga*.

244. *tshul bzin ma yin pa: ayoniśa* (cf. Edgerton, p. 64, col. 2)

Cf. *Śbh*, Wayman, 1961, p. 170.

knowledge and by cause of fruition of correct knowledge superior practice²⁴⁵—in the same way arise the assembled causes for the acquired and non-acquired *dharma*.” This is the bodhisattva’s skill in dependent co-origination.

Then, he reflects: “But, what is cessation? Because superficial reflection has ceased, ignorance ceases. Only when by reason of the cessation of ignorance karmic formations have come to a final halt, only then ceases this whole mass of suffering.”

It in this way that knowledge with regard to this [causal flow] becomes skill in dependent co-origination.

Then, he reflects: “But, all *dharma* are subject to causes, conditions and their combination. What is subject to causes, conditions and their combination is not the basis of a self, a life-force or a person. (683) It is without reckoning whatsoever.”

Such reflection is skill in dependent co-origination. It is in this manner that, as conditions for his enlightened disposition, the bodhisattva raises all buddha-qualities and discerns that these conditions are truly exhausted and ceasing; but, for the sake of looking after sentient beings he attains also non-cessation and non-exhaustion. This is the bodhisattva’s skill in dependent co-origination.

2.12 Skill in all Dharma

What then is the bodhisattva’s skill in all *dharma*? As regards the sum total of *dharma*; it comprises conditioned and unconditioned *dharma*. Thus, the bodhisattva should be skilled in the conditioned and unconditioned.

What is skill in the conditioned? His predispositions of body, speech and mind are pure. He transforms the virtuous [predispositions]²⁴⁶ of body, speech and mind into all-knowing by reason of discerning them as unconditioned enlightenment; this is skill in the unconditioned.

245. The meaning of this sentence is rather obscure. If one were to go by sense only, it would appear that the Tibetan have misinterpreted this passage, translating a *bahuvrīhi* compound as a *tatpuruṣa* compound (private communication with David Ruegg).

Vasubandhu’s comments on this section run as follows (*Akn-ṭikā*, p. 206.2.6–3.3; cf. *Akn*, p. 54.3.5–7):

“If [the bodhisattva] knows that *dharma* are not only exhausted but also arise from the cause of unceasing action, thinking: ‘Sentient beings who act in correct knowledge that penetrates the cause of faculties and think: ‘This is the origin of the cause of faculties, this is the origin of the cause of action’, are established in the cause of spiritual fruition. Because the faculties themselves are the cause that prompts and establishes virtue, non-virtue, *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, it is the cause of faculties. In this way, *dharma* emerge from the cause of faculties, but [the bodhisattva] perceives that the agent, etc., is not the object acts in correct knowledge that penetrates action—the cause of faculties. Although they are all virtue, non-virtue, *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa* and emerge from the cause of faculties and action, virtue, etc., are established as action and faculties—the cause of spiritual fruition.’ This is ‘skill’ in dependent co-origination. It is in this way that ‘skill’ [seeing] that birth is the origin of causes because it turns into a force that is able to produce fruits after having gathered causes and conditions perceives spiritual fruition as birth.”

Other examples that correlate the *indriya* with *pramāṇa* are found in the *Laṅkāv* (pp. 133.9, 151.6, 190.4–6, 242.9).

246. *Akn-ṭikā*, p. 218.2.5–3.1.

Furthermore, as regards skill in the conditioned; (684) it is gathering the five perfections that lead to the perfection of wisdom, viz., the perfection of giving, morality, patience, vigour and meditation. Again, due to knowledge of the unconditioned, he does not depreciate the perfection of wisdom with the five perfections; but, aspiring to skill in the entire accumulation of perfections and to unstained enlightenment, he transforms them into all-knowing; this is skill in the unconditioned.

Furthermore, as regards skill in the conditioned; it is attracting sentient beings by means of all-penetrating light-rays that are directed at all of them and through the four means of conversion. Because he is free from conceit, not believing in a self, he is skilled in the means of conversion; and since he aspires to unconditioned enlightenment, he transforms them into all-knowing; this is skill in the unconditioned.

Furthermore, as regards skill in the conditioned; he does not cut off the fetters of the stream of existence, but rids himself of the impurities of the stream of existence; he continues practices that are connected to enlightenment without taking up the practice of laymen who observe only one of the *pañcaśīla*²⁴⁷; this is the skill in the conditioned.

Knowing that he should be acquainted with the teachings of emptiness, signlessness and wishlessness, he is manifestly skilled in them; (685) and although he settles in enlightenment without depending on others, he does not realise the unconditioned; this is skill in the unconditioned.

Furthermore, to be unaffected by the impurities of worldly conduct in spite of acting in the triple world, this is skill in the conditioned. Not to fall into the sphere of deliverance, in spite of knowing pristine cognition that liberates from the triple world; this is skill in unconditioned.

As regards skill in all *dharma*; it is an expression for 'all-knowing'. Since the attainment of realisation that arises from pristine cognition of all-knowing does not lead to liberation if it lacks wisdom or skill, on account of that, he is skilled in all *dharma*. It is in this manner that the bodhisattva who is skilled in all *dharma* courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.²⁴⁸

O Śāriputra, it is in this way that a bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* who persists in the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* and courses in the Perfection of Wisdom and—being skilled in discerning wisdom—is truly proficient in these ten kinds of skill courses in the Perfection of Wisdom.

247. *sbyor ba phyogs gcig pa: ekadeśaprayoga*

Cf. *Mvy* 1609 which gives *sna gcig spyod pa* for *ekadeśakārin* (*Kośa*, iv, p. 73; *Mppś*, ii, p. 821).

248. Cf. *Akn-tīkā*, p. 218.2.1–5.7.

SECTION III

3.1 Wisdom

What is wisdom? What is the meaning of perfection? Wisdom is comprehensive knowledge of virtuous and non-virtuous *dharma*. (686) Wisdom is realisation of *dharma* that are conducive to the four states of penetration²⁴⁹. Wisdom is correct knowledge because it leads to the realisation of the noble Doctrine. Accurate discernment of *dharma* leads to correct knowledge. Wisdom is discernment of all heretical views, manifestations of vices, impediments and obstructions. Wisdom is separation from prayers concerned with wishes, yearning or desires. Wisdom is the source of happiness²⁵⁰ by virtue of complete purification. Wisdom is the source of delight because it does not cut the connection to joy in the Doctrine. Wisdom is support because it realises complete pristine cognition. Wisdom is the basis of all *bodhipākṣika dharma*. Wisdom bears the characteristic of attainment, because it realises spiritual fruition in accordance with the vehicles. Wisdom bears the characteristic of perfectly knowing naturally illuminating pristine cognition. Wisdom is deliverance because it ferries across all rivers. Wisdom is guidance to true reality. Wisdom is the receptacle of all virtuous *dharma*.²⁵¹

249. *ñes par hbyed paḥi cha dan ḥthun pa: nirvedhabhāgiya*

The four states of penetration are 'heat' (*uṣmagata*), 'summit' (*mūrdhan*), 'patience' (*kṣānti*) and 'highest mundane *dharma*' (*laukikāgradharma*). In the Sarvāstivāda scheme of the śrāvaka-training, the *nirvedhabhāgiya* constitute the four major practices of the *prayogamārga*. Being states conducive to enlightenment, they mark the practitioner's meditative progress particularly in respect to the understanding of the four noble truths. During the 'heat phase', representing a state of complete perfect mental quietude (*samatha*) and insight (*vipaśyanā*), the light of knowledge (*jñānāloka*) concerning the truths in their sixteen aspects is revealed for the first time. In due course, the other three states add to this understanding, leading to full intuition (*abhisamaya*) of the truths at the first moment of the *darśanamārga*. For the bodhisattva, the experience of the *nirvedhabhāgiya* is similar in order but different in contents. Having entered the '*uṣmagata* phase', he sees with the clear light of intuition the unreality of external phenomena. Springing from the meditation on emptiness practised before the *saṃbhāramārga*, his attainment is still weak but is called 'heat' because it is "like the heat that precedes the fire of direct knowledge of the truth on the *darśanamārga*" (*Āloka*, Minaev, pp. 41a.16–41b.1; ref. Obermiller). The '*mūrdhan* phase' consolidates the attainments of the '*uṣmagata* phase', effectively preventing that the bodhisattva's accumulation of roots of virtue is brought to a standstill by *kleśa*. At the '*kṣānti* phase', the bodhisattva is fully awakened to the unreality of worldly phenomena. Now he begins to focus his mind on the unreality of the subject of experience, leading to a "meditative state that is characterised by the origination, for the first time, of the clear light of knowledge, revealing the unreality of subjective elements" (*Āloka*, op. cit., p. 48a.5, ref. Obermiller). It bears the name *kṣānti* because it establishes the bodhisattva in the 'conviction of the non-arising of *dharma*', leading to liberation from rebirth in the evil destinies. Subsequent to the '*kṣānti* phase', having shed all distinctions of the subject/object dichotomy, the bodhisattva passes into the unperturbable meditation (*ānantaryasamādhi*) from where he attains direct knowledge of reality. Entitled 'phase of highest mundane virtues' (*laukikāgradharma*), he is still an ordinary being and well below the rank of the arhant. Hence, the bodhisattva does not intuit as yet the *Dharmadhātu* and his knowledge of it is largely based on faith. Most path-schemes do not allocate the four *nirvedhabhāgiya* to any of the stages proper, but associate it to the preliminary efforts of the *adhimuktikāryābhūmi* (*Msl*, p. 27.7–11, p. 93.6–23; Kośa, vi, pp. 169–177; *Amṛt* (B), pp. 156–159).

For references to the *nirvedhabhāgiya* in Pāli sources, see: D III, pp. 251, 277; S V, p. 345; A III, p. 427; *Nett*, pp. 21, 48, 143 ff, 153 ff and *Vism*, pp. 15, 88. Note, however, that while the term *nirvedhabhāgiya* itself is canonical, the list of the four items is not. Most of these Pāli references are taken up by Rahula in his discussion of the *nirvedhabhāgiya* in śrāvaka sources (Rahula, 1980, pp. 105–6, n. 4).

250. *sim par byed pa: prahlādankārīn* (cf. Monier-Williams, p. 701, col. 3).

251. Pelliot, 977, folio 6a.4–6b.2:

Wisdom is the source of purification of all propensities of impurity. Wisdom is the supreme attainment, the crown of all *dharma*. (687) Wisdom is excellence in the much needed realisation arising spontaneously from pristine cognition. Wisdom is separation from causation since it is not stained by the triple world. Wisdom is obtained by all noble ones. Wisdom is elimination of prayers since it abandons all reflection on the marks. Wisdom is detrimental to indolence since it is wholly separated from the darkness of delusion.²⁵²

Wisdom is the practice of all those who are established on the stage of meditation. Wisdom is guidance to those who persist in the path to pristine cognition of all-knowing. Wisdom is a source of light since it suppresses the dark cloud of mist formed by the air of ignorance. Wisdom gives perfect sight to those who delight in its sight accordingly. Wisdom is free from impurity because it transcends the sphere of the eye and the sphere of form. Wisdom is absolute truth since it issues from truth. Wisdom is imperturbable because it is fully tamed. Wisdom is the light at the gates to pristine cognition. Wisdom, unfolding in all directions, is inexhaustible.

Wisdom is not contradicted because it is seen as the entrance to dependent co-origination. Wisdom is the path of liberation, since it prompts severing of all fetters of grasping. Wisdom is unstained since it is emancipated from all sinful *dharma*.²⁵³ (688)

O Śāriputra, thus the scope and application of the bodhisattva's wisdom and pristine cognition

"O Śāriputra, as regards wisdom; realisation of all virtuous practices is wisdom that realises because it realises all *dharma*. It is correct knowledge because it knows all *dharma* in accordance with reality. It is wisdom arising from awakening because it is not defiled by any sinful *dharma* that lead to heretical beliefs. It is separation from desire because it purifies constantly all wishes, yearnings or desires. It is the source of contentment since it appeases constantly all suffering. It is the source of happiness because it does not cut the connection to joy in the Doctrine. It is reliance because it realises understanding of the meaning. It is establishing because it establishes all *bodhipāṅśika dharma*. It bears the characteristic of attainment, because it attains spiritual fruition in accordance with the vehicles. It bears the characteristic of wisdom of perfect knowledge because it realises the bright nature of pristine cognition. It is deliverance with compassion because it ferries across the streams of all rivers. It is comprehension because it comprehends that all *dharma* are truly unborn. It is agitation because it kindles all virtuous *dharma*."

252. Pelliot, 977, folio 6b.2-5:

"[Wisdom] is the source of purification, because it is separated from reflection of the defilements of the propensities of disease. It is unsurpassed because it proceeds to the crown of all *dharma*. It is contentment because it realises teachings through spontaneously arisen pristine cognition. It is separation from causes since it is not stained by the triple world. It is attainment because it is attained by all noble ones. It is elimination of prayers because it removes all reflection on the marks. It is non-self because it is wholly separated from the darkness of delusion."

253. Pelliot, 977, folio 6b.5-7a.3:

"[Wisdom] is practice because it accomplishes the deeds of all those who are established on the stage of meditation. It is travelling because it abides in all noble paths of pristine cognition. ... It is the source of vision because it guides everyone in accordance with that vision. It is freedom from impurity because it transcends the path of intrigues through the eye of wisdom. It is absolute truth because it understands the great noble truth. ... It is splendour because it becomes the gate of pristine cognition. It is inexhaustible knowledge because it illuminates all that which is moving. It is non-cessation because it sees constantly and extensively. ... It is separation from abodes because it is emancipated from all impure, defiled *dharma*."

are truly as manifold as the mental activity of all sentient beings. The exploring of the bodhisattva's wisdom and pristine cognition is truly as manifold as the aspiration of all sentient beings.²⁵⁴ The doors that lead to the bodhisattva's wisdom are truly as manifold as the doors to the impurities of all sentient beings. The basis of his persistence²⁵⁵ in wisdom is truly as manifold as the knowledge of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas and fully accomplished buddhas.²⁵⁶ A bodhisattva should study this by all means. This is the wisdom of the bodhisattva.²⁵⁷

3.2 Perfection

Next, what is the meaning of 'perfection'? What is wisdom is also the meaning of 'perfection'. Comprehensive knowledge of virtuous [and non-virtuous] *dharma* is the meaning of 'perfection'. Corresponding to the former, one should examine also the wording of all perfections accordingly.²⁵⁸

Furthermore, the meaning of excellently accomplishing the bodhisattva-training is the meaning of 'perfection'. Furthermore, the meaning of accomplishing pristine cognition of all-knowing is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of withdrawing from conditioned and unconditioned *dharma* is the meaning of 'perfection'. (689) The meaning of realising the faults of *samsāra* is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of showing the inexhaustible Dharma-depository of knowledge is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of accomplishing unstained liberation is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of realising the uniformity of giving, morality, patience, vigour, meditation and wisdom is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of ascertaining is the meaning of 'perfection'.²⁵⁹

254. Cf. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.4 which has *sems can thams cad kyi mos pa* instead of *sems can thams cad kyi bsam pa*, thus clarifying the meaning of *bsam pa*.

255. Cf. Pelliot, 977, folio 7b.6, which has *śes rab gyi spyod pa* instead of *śes rab la gnas pa*.

256. Cf. *Akṣ-ñikā*, pp. 218.5.7–222.5.7.

257. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.3–7:

"O Śāriputra, in this way I have instructed you briefly the characteristics of wisdom. As regards the wisdom of bodhisattva, *mahāsattvas*, it should furthermore be known to be infinite and without limit. Why? The scope and application of the wisdom and pristine cognition of bodhisattvas, *mahāsattvas* are truly as manifold as the mental activity of all sentient beings. The activity of the wisdom and pristine cognition of bodhisattvas, *mahāsattvas* should be known to be truly as manifold as the aspiration of all sentient beings. The magnificent gates to the wisdom of the bodhisattvas, *mahāsattvas* should be known to be truly as manifold as the gates to the impurities of all sentient beings. The basis of the activity of wisdom should be known to be truly as manifold as the knowledge of śrāvaka, pratyekabuddhas and fully accomplished buddhas. O Śāriputra, concerning all bases of wisdom; the bodhisattva, *mahāsattva* should study these attainments with vigour. This is the seizure of wisdom of bodhisattvas, *mahāsattvas*."

258. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.

259. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.7–7b.6:

"Furthermore, O Śāriputra, that is the meaning of the perfection of bodhisattvas, *mahāsattvas*? O Śāriputra, all knowledge that the joy of all virtuous *dharma* turns into the perfection, this should be known as the meaning of 'perfection'. Again, O Śāriputra, corresponding to the former, the accumulation of wisdom should be known as the meaning of 'perfection's. Furthermore, all meanings of the excellent accomplishment of the conduct of bodhisattvas should be known as the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of non-attachment to any of the *dharma* of the past, present and future should be known as the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of constantly realising the incalculable great non-reality of *samsāra* should be

The meaning of penetrating the sphere of all sentient beings is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of attaining the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma* is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of accomplishing the stage of irreversibility is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of acquiring the buddha-field is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of developing sentient beings is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of [going to] the seat of enlightenment is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of defeating all evil ones is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of accomplishing all buddha-qualities is the meaning of 'perfection'. Furthermore, the meaning of being firmly planted in the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is the meaning of 'perfection'.²⁶⁰ (690)

SECTION IV

O Śāriputra, if one studies the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* one accomplishes all perfections. O Śāriputra, hence, a son or daughter of good family who persists in the Mahāyāna should retain the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*. He should take hold of it and read it. He should explain it also to others and propound it at great length.

Why? O Śāriputra, when he has listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, when he has taken hold of it, retained it, read it, fully absorbed it and when he has explained it also to others and propounded it at great length he obtains ten excellent blessings. What are the ten?

- (1) When he is reborn in another existence, he is skilled in all arts
- (2) And crafts.
- (3) He is of high lineage and well-respected.
- (4) He is renown for his great powers.
- (5) His words are valued.
- (6) He possesses great wealth.

known as the meaning of 'perfection'. Knowledge of the meaning of non-absorbing or non-realising any *dharma* whatsoever should be known as the meaning of 'perfection'. Understanding the meaning of the absolutely inexhaustible Dharma-depository should be known as the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of accomplishing the unstained liberation should be known as the meaning of 'perfection'. ... The meaning of 'skill' in supreme discernment should be known as the meaning of 'perfection'."

260. Pelliot, 977, folio 7b.6–8a.3:

"The meaning of going to all spheres of sentient beings is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of attaining the conviction of the non-arising of *dharma* is the meaning of 'perfection'. Accomplishing the end of irreversibility is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of purifying the buddha-field is the meaning of 'perfection'. ... The meaning of taking a seat on the throne of enlightenment after having come to the seat of enlightenment is the meaning of 'perfection'. The meaning of defeating the host of Māra is the meaning of 'perfection'. ... Furthermore, the meaning of firmly abiding in the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* is the meaning of 'perfection'."

- (7) He is exalted among gods and men.
- (8) He becomes an universal monarch.
- (9) He becomes Brahmā.
- (10) He is never separated from the thought of enlightenment.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings. Furthermore, he obtains ten other excellent blessings.
What are the ten?

- (1) He is not drawn into the disputes of the ascetics. (691)
- (2) He does not hold the belief of the existence of a self.
- (3) He does not hold the belief of the existence of a sentient being.
- (4) He does not hold the belief of the existence of a life-force.
- (5) He does not hold the belief of the existence of a person.
- (6) He does not hold the belief of nihilism.
- (7) He does not hold the belief of permanence.
- (8) He does not hold the view that all things exist.
- (9) When he goes forth to mendicant life, he accomplishes joyfully the production of the thought of enlightenment.
- (10) He understands swiftly the words that he has heard.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings. Furthermore, he obtains ten other excellent blessings.
What are the ten?

- (1) He acquires recollection.
- (2) He acquires intellect.
- (3) He acquires spiritual realisation.
- (4) He acquires aspiration.
- (5) He acquires wisdom.
- (6) He obtains the favourable condition of birth²⁶¹.
- (7) He recollects his former lives.
- (8) His desire is small by nature and restrained; hence, he is not afflicted by the torment of desire.
- (9) His hatred is small by nature and restrained; hence, he is not afflicted by the

261. These are the opposites of the conditions of birth that are unfavourable to the religious life (*asamayā brahmacaryāvāsāya*), viz., birth in the destiny of the hellbound (*narakā*), animals (*tiryāṇica*), hungry ghosts (*preta*), gods of long life (*drghāyuso devā*); possession of defect faculties (*indriyavaikalya*), false views (*mithyādarśana*) and life in periods when Tathāgata do not appear (*tathāgatānām anuṣṭpāda*). References in the nikāya are found in D III, pp. 263–64, 287; A IV, pp. 225, 227; for Sanskrit sources, see: *Mvu*, ii, p. 363.3; *Lal*, p. 412.14; *Śikṣ*, p. 2.4; *Gv*, p. 116.16; *Dhsgr*, § 34 (ref. Lamotte).

torment of hatred.

- (10) His delusion is small by nature and restrained; hence, he is not afflicted by the torment of delusion.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings. Furthermore, he obtains ten other excellent blessings.

(692) What are the ten?

- (1) He attains marvellous wisdom.
- (2) He attains astute wisdom.
- (3) He attains acute wisdom.
- (4) He attains sharp wisdom.
- (5) He attains awesome wisdom.
- (6) He attains profound wisdom.
- (7) He attains discerning wisdom.
- (8) He attains unproduced wisdom.
- (9) After he has met the Tathāgata, he praises him with melodies of verse.
- (10) On posing well-contemplated questions to the Tathāgata, he receives answers.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings. Furthermore, he obtains ten other excellent blessings.

What are the ten?

- (1) He gives pleasure to all virtuous friends.
- (2) He loosens all fetters of evil.
- (3) He defeats all evil ones.
- (4) He rebukes all impure ones.
- (5) He is aggravated about actions that appertain to any karmic formation.
- (6) He shuns all paths that lead to the evil destinies.
- (7) He sees the path that leads to *nirvāṇa*.
- (8) He bestows offerings that deliver from the whole round of rebirth.
- (9) He complies with the methods of all bodhisattvas. (693)
- (10) He complies with the pronouncements of all lord buddhas.

He obtains these ten excellent blessings.

O Śāriputra, when he has listened to the Dharma-enunciation of the *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*, when he has taken hold of it, retained it, read it, fully absorbed it and when he has explained it also to others and propounded it at great length he obtains all of these excellent qualities.

Then, in order to elucidate in great detail this very meaning, the lord composed these verses:

Those who retain this king of *sūtras*,
These wise ones attain infinite wisdom.
They become not only skilled in practices and their meanings,
But excel also in parts of speech and accomplish the letter.

Every monk who retains this king of *sūtras*,
Once joy and delight have arisen in him,
Explains the Doctrine in this way
And bestows unceasingly the gift of the Doctrine.

After sentient beings have heard much about the Doctrine,
They say: "Alas, when will he who explains the Great Attainment
Instruct us in such a Doctrine?
When will we take hold of such a *sūtra*?"

Chiefs who are endowed with such wisdom
Do not become dismayed about *dharma*.
By means of their recollection and wisdom
They teach sayings of noble and unsurpassed pristine cognition. (694)

Those who retain this king of *sūtras*,
Noble, eminent and praised, confer it unceasingly
And prompt others to seek the well-taught sayings of the Doctrine.
Since they have learned it, they are exalted in perpetuity.

After they have learned it, they cause others to grasp its meaning.
He who is endowed with wisdom does not pursue the letter.
By investigating the meaning his understanding increases.
His pristine cognition is infinite in perpetuity.

Also the meaning of infinite pristine cognition is untold.
He who is of infinite reflection is skilled in absolute truth.
Apply yourself to his attainments,
For his are the attainments of learning.

His desire and hatred are small.
His delusion is very small.
Also his mind attains purity.
For his are the attainments of learning.

After he has obtained wealth he does not become self-conceited,
But reflects on its purpose, thinking: "Is there substantiality in this wealth?"
After he has realised that wealth is insubstantial,
He disregards it and goes forth to mendicant life.

He withdraws from worldly life and abides in solitude.
Being always free from indolence,
He is not satisfied by listening to teachings.
When he confers the Doctrine he is free from avarice.

Since he went and posed questions
To the protector of the world,
Because of that, his pristine cognition increases.
Now, there is no abating in his virtue.

O Śāriputra, this is the Perfection of Wisdom of bodhisattvas. A bodhisattva who applies himself diligently to it pursues the bodhisattva conduct; this is diligent application to the Perfection of Wisdom.

no.	Akṣayamatīnirdeśa	Akn in Śikṣāsamuccaya	Bodhisattvapiṭaka
1	hdun pa	chanda (1) [†]	hdun pa
2	bsam pa	āśaya (2)	bsam pa
3	hlag pahi bsam pa	adhyāśaya*	sbyor ba
4	sbyor ba	prayoga (3)	dge bahi bśes gñen
5	dge bahi bśes gñen	nirmāṇa (5)	ña rgyal med pa
6	ña rgyal med pa	pramāṇa (6) ¹	rab tu hdud pa
7	bag yod pa	kalyāṇamitra (4)	ri mor byed pa
8	gus par byed pa	gaurava (7)	hthun pa
9	hthun pa hdzin pa	pradaksina (8)	bkah blo bde ba
10	bkah blo bde ba	suvacana (9)	bsñen bkur byed pa
11	bsñen bkur byed pa	paryupāsana (10)	rna ba blags te ñan pa
12	rna ba blags te ñan pa	avahitaśrotra (11)	bkur sti byed pa
13	yid la byed pa	manasakāra (13)	yid la byed pa
14	rnām par mi g.yeñ pa	aviksepa (14)	mi g.yeñ pa
15	gnas	vasthāna*	rin po cher hdu śes pa
16	rin po cher hdu śes pa	ratnasamjñā (15)	sman du hdu śes pa
17	sman du hdu śes pa	bhaiṣajyasamjñā (16)	nad thams cad rab tu zi bar byed pahi hdu śes pa
18	ñon moñs pahi nad thams cad zi bar byed pa	sarvavyādhiśamana (17) ²	dran pahi snod
19	dran pahi snod	smṛtibhojana (18)	rtogs pa śes pa
20	rtogs pa śes pa	gatibodhana (19)	blo gros hdod pa
21	blo gros hdod pa	matirocana (20)	blo la hjug pa
22	blo la hjug pa	buddhipraveśa (21)	sañs rgyas kyi chos thos pas mi sgoms pa ñan pa
23	sañs rgyas kyi chos thos pas mi sgoms pa ñan pa	atrptabuddhadharma śravaṇa (22)	gtoñ pa spel pa
24	gtoñ pa spel pa	tyāgavṛhana (23)	byin nas mi smod pa
25	dul žiñ cañ śes pa	dāntājāneya (24)	mañ du thos pa sten pa
26	mañ du thos pa brten pa	bahuśrutasevana (25)	gus par dgañ ba myoñ bar byed pa
27	sti stañ du byas te dgañ ba myoñ par byed	satkrtyapṛītyanubhavana (26)	lus sim pa
28	lus bde pa	kāyaudbiya (27)	sems rañs pa
29	sems rab tu dgañ	cittaprahādana (28)	mi skyor bar ñan pa
30	mi skyor bar ñan pa	aparikheda śravaṇa (29)	don ñan pa
31	don ñan pa	dharma śravaṇa (31)	chos ñan pa
32	chos ñan pa	(artha śravaṇa) ³	nan tan ñan pa
33	nan tan ñan pa	pratipatti śravaṇa (32)	theg pa gžan la hdod pa med pa ñan pa
34	gžan gis bstan pa ñan pa	paradeśanā śravaṇa*	pha rol tu phyin pa ñan pa
35	chos mthos pa ñan pa	śruta śravaṇa*	byañ chub sems dpañi sde snod ñan pa
36	mñon par śes pa ñan pa	abhijñā śravaṇa (39)	bsdu bahi dños ñan pa
37	theg pa gžan la hdod pa med pa ñan pa	anyayānāsprhana śravaṇa (33)	thabs mkhas pa ñan pa

38	pha rol tu phyin pa ñan pa	prajñāpāramitā śravaṇa (34)	tshaṅs paḥi gnas pa ñan pa
39	byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ñan pa	bodhisattvapīṭaka śravaṇa(35)	mñon par śes pa ñan pa
40	bsdu baḥi dños ñan pa	saṃgrahavastu śravaṇa (36)	dran pa ñe bar gźags pa ñan pa
41	thabs mkhas pa ñan pa	upāyakaśālyā śravaṇa (37)	yañ dag par spoñ ba ñan pa
42	tshaṅs paḥi gnas pa ñan pa	brahmavihāra śravaṇa (38)	rdzu ḥphrul gyi rkañ pa ñan pa
43	dran pa dan śes pa bzin ñan pa	smṛtisamprajanya śravaṇa (40) ⁴	rten ciñ ḥbrel par ḥbyuñ ba ñan pa
44	skye ba la mkhas paḥi ñan pa	utpādakauśalyā śravaṇa*	mi rtag pa ñan pa
45	mi skye ba la mkhas pa ñan pa	anutpādakauśalyā śravaṇa*	sdud bsñal ba ñan pa
46	mi sdug pa	aśubha*	bdag med pa ñan pa
47	byams pa	maitryāḥ śravaṇa*	zi ba ñan pa
48	rten ciñ ḥbrel bar ḥbyuñ pa	pratītyasamutpāda śravaṇa (43)	stoñ pa ñid ñan pa
49	mi rtag pa ñan pa	anītya śravaṇa (44)	mtshan ma med pa ñan pa
50	sdud bsñal ba ñan pa	duhkha śravaṇa (45)	smon pa med pa ñan pa
51	bdag med pa ñan pa	anātma śravaṇa (46)	mñon par ḥdu mi byed pa ñan pa
52	zi ba ñan pa	śānta śravaṇa (47)	dge baḥi rtsa ba mñon par ḥdu byed pa ñan pa
53	stoñ pa ñid ñan pa	śūnyatā śravaṇa (48)	rañ dbaṅ du gyur pa
54	mtshan ma med pa ñan pa	animitta śravaṇa (50)	chos ñam par ḥdu śes pa
55	smon pa med pa ñan pa	apraṇihita śravaṇa (49)	kun tu ḥdre ba mi ḥthun paḥi phyags su ḥdu śes pa
56	mñon par ḥdu mi byed pa ñan pa	anabhisamskāra śravaṇa (51)	ñon moṅs pa thams cad tshar gcod pa
57	dge baḥi mñon par ḥdu byed pa	kuśalābhisamskāra śravaṇa (52)	mkhas pa la mñon par bgah ba
58	bden pas byin gyis brlabs pa	satyādhiṣṭhāna (53)	ḥphags pa sten pa
59	chud mi gzon pa	avipranāśa*	ḥphags pa ma yin pa yoṅs su spoñ pa
60	rañ gi kha na las pa	svādhīna*	ḥphags pa ñan pa
61	rañ gi sems sruñ pa	svacittārakṣaṇa*	dbaṅ pa ñan pa
62	brtson ḥgrus mi gtod pa	vīryasyāśramasana	rjes su dran pa sgom pa ñan pa
63	sñon moṅs paḥi gñen po	dharmanidhyapti*	byañ chub kyi yan lag ñan pa
64	chos la ñes par sems pa	kleśavipakṣa (56)	ḥphags paḥi lam yan lag brgyud pa ñan pa
65	rañ gi phyogs sruñ pa	svapakṣaparīkarṣaṇa*	de bzin gśegs paḥi stobs ñan pa

66	pha rol gyi phyogs dañ ñon moñs pa tsar gcod pa	parapakṣakleśanigraha*	mi hjigs pa ñan pa
67	nor bdun yañ dag par hdu pa	saptadhanasamavasa śravaṇa*	byams pa ñan pa
68	dbul ba thams cad tsar gcod pa	sarvadāridryopaccheda*	sñiñ rje ñan pa
69	hdzañs pas bshags pa	sarvavidvatpraśasta*	dgah ba ñan pa
70	mkhas pa mñon par dgah pa	paṇḍitābhinandana (57)	gtañ sñoms chen po ñan pa
71	hphags pas kun śes pa	āryasaṃmata (58)	so so yañ dag par rig pa ñan pa
72	hphags pa ma yin pa dad par byed pa	anāryaprasādana (59)	sañs rgyas kyi chos ma hdres pa bco brgyad rnams ñan pa
73	bden mthoñ pa	satyadarśana (60)	
74	phuñ poñi skyon rnam par spoñs pa	skandhadoṣavivarjana*	
75	hdus byas yoñs su hdzal pa	saṃskṛtadoṣaparitulana*	
76	don la rton pa	arthapratisaraṇa*	
77	chos la rton pa	dharmapratisaraṇa*	
78	ye śes la rton pa	(jñānapratisaraṇa) ⁵	
79	ñes pañi don gyi mdo sde la rton pa	(nītārthapratisaraṇa) ⁶	
80	sdig pa thams cad mi bya ba	sarvapāpākaraṇa*	
81	bdag dañ gzan la phan pa legs par byas pañi las	ātmaparahita*	
82	mi hgyod pa	sukṛtakarmānanutapyana*	
83	khyad par du hgro ba	viśeṣagamana*	
84	sañs rgyas kyi chos thams cad hthob pa	sarvabuddhadharma- pratilābha	

† Numbers in brackets indicate Sanskrit equivalent to *Bdp* terms.

* Items not cited in *Bdp*

¹ *Śikṣ*: apramāṇa ² closer to *Bodhisattvapiṭaka* ³ omitted in *Śikṣ* ⁴ gaurava is here repeated in *Śikṣ*

⁵ omitted in *Śikṣ* ⁶ omitted in *Śikṣ*

Akn: TTP pp. 50.4.7–51.1.5; *Bdp*: TTP pp. 73.2.3–4.1; *Śikṣ*: pp. 190.4–191.3

no.	Akṣayamatīrdeśa	Akṣayamatīrdeśa (Skt) [†]	Bodhisattvapīṭaka
1	glog gi sgron mas bgryan	vidyutpradīpālamkāra (<i>Mvy</i> 546)	rnam par snañ (3) ^{††}
2	zla bahi hod	*candraprabha	mdzad ži ba
3	dge bkod rnam snañ de bžin sems	śubhavyūhapratibhāsa (<i>Mvy</i> 556)	zla hod (2)
4	mi khyab	*acintya	rnam pa bkod pa (3?)
5	hphags par snañ	udgataprabha (<i>Mvy</i> 511, 568)	de ŋid glog gis rab tu brgyan pa
6	dri ma med pa	vimala (<i>Dbh</i> , p. 82.10)	mñon par hphags (56)
7	chos rnams kun la dbaň byed	*sarvadharmavaśavartin	de bžin sems dpañ (3?)
8	yon tan hod	*guṇaprabha	dri ma med (6)
9	myan ñan med	*aśoka	snañ ldan
10	brtul žugs grub pa	*siddhavrata	yon tan hod (8)
11	grags pa brten	*drdhakīrti	grub hod
12	kun nas hphags pa	samudgata (<i>Mvy</i> 512)	mya ñan med (9)
13	chos kyi sgron ma	*dharmapradīpa	chos rnams thams cad la ni dbaň sgyur (7)
14	chos dpal lhun po che	*dharmaśrīmahāmeru	chos sgron (13)
15	chos kyi dbaň phyug	*dharmesvara	de bžin chos dpañ
16	chos šes dbaň byed	*dharmajñānavaśavartin	chos kyi dbaň phyug (15)
17	chos kyi phuñ po	*dharmaskandha	ri rab dpañ (14)
18	rnam par hthor ba	vikiraṇa (<i>Mvy</i> 569)	dam pañi chos kyi ye šes dbaň byed (16)
19	chos rnams hđzin pa rnam par dag pa	dharmadharaviśuddhi (<i>Kv</i> , pp. 51.14, 83.12)	dam chos kun hđzin šin tu rnam dag (19)
20	pha rol sems kyi spyod pa spyod pa	*paracittacaritacaryā	gžan gyi sems la rnam dpyod (21)
21	rgyal mtsan rtse moñi dpuñ rgyan	dhvajāgrakeyūra (<i>Mvy</i> 530)	dam chos kyi mchog
22	ñon moñs sel	*kleśāpaha	hod zer
23	bdud bžiñi stobs rnams rab tu hjoms pa	*caturmārabalāpramardin	rgyal mtsan rtse mo dpuñ rgyan (21)
24	stobs bcu hphags pa stobs dañ ldan pa	*daśabalodgatabalin	ñon moñs sel (22)
25	chags med chags pa šin du gcod pa	*asaṅgasaṅgātyantasamuccheda	bduñ kyi stobs rnams hjoms pa (23)
26	lag na sgron ma	*hastadīpa	stobs bcu dañ stobs las mñon hphags (24)
27	šin du sgra bsgrags	*atyantaśabdita	kun bcad chags med
28	sa hđzin	*nimimdhara	lag na sgron ma (26)
29	brtan pa hdi dañ rañ bžin	*drdhasvabhāva	bdud sbyin bsgrags pa
30	lhun po sgron ma	*merupradīpa	sa hđzin (28)
31	mi pham rgyal ba	*ajitamjaya	legs par gnas pa (71?)
32	šes rab bkyed	*prajñotpāda	ri rab sgron (30)
33	ye šes tal la	jñānolka (<i>Mvy</i> 744)	rgyal ba mi hpham (31)
34	bsam gtan hbyuñ gnas	*dhyānākara	ye šes sgron (80?)
35	mthah yas dbaň byed	*anantavaśavartin	de bžin mig gtsaň

36	sems rnams las su ruñ par byed pa	*cittakarmanāyatākāra	rgyal thams cad dran pa (45)
37	byed dañ byas dañ tshor byañ med	*akāarakakṛtakavedaka	chos dran yon tan ye śes hjug (46?)
38	chu yi zla ba	*udakacandra	ston par hjug (51)
39	ñi mahi dbyaṅs dag	*sūryaghoṣa	de bzin mtsan me (52)
40	tiñ hdzin mi gtoñ	samādhyanutsarga	smon med (53)
41	bdud rnams hjoms pa	*jārapramardaka	de bzin zi bahi sa
42	rnām pa sna tshogs ḥdu śes med pa	*avicitrasamjñin	ḥdu śes sna tsogs bral (42)
43	stag śin du dul ba	*suvinitahastivyāghra	rab dul klu dbaṅ stag (43)
44	glañ po śin du dul ba	*sudāntahastivyāghra	hkhyil ba
45	rgyal ba kun gyi rjes su dran pa	*sarvajinānusrṁti	rnām par ldog pa
46	chos dran dge ḥdun ye śes dbaṅ byed	*dharmānusrṁti- samghajñānavaśavartin	hjums pa med pa (49?)
47	mi ldog pa	avivarta (<i>Mvy</i> 553)	stobs
48	ldog pa med pa	avinivartaniya (<i>Mvy</i> 740)	mig dag (49?)
49	mig mi hdzums	*animiṣa	rdo rje ḥdra (55)
50	bdag med rab dge	*nairātmyaprasuddhi	rdo rje sa
51	rtag tu ston paḥi rnām par hjug pa	*nityaśūnyākārapraveśa	mñon hphags (56)
52	rtag tu mtsan med	*nityānimitta	mi hjum lhun po lha bu
53	rtag tu mi smon	*nityāpranīhita	kun nas gloñ hkhyil (58)
54	gnas par bsaṃ gtan byed pa mi chags	*saṃsthitāsaktadhyāyin	rnām pa dag sgra (59?)
55	rdo rje lta buḥi tiñ ñe hdzin	vajropamasamādhi (<i>Mvy</i> 560)	ñes rtogs (60)
56	mñon par hphags	*abhyudgata	ñon moṅs bral ba (61)
57	ñes par bcom pa	*nirghāta	nam mkhah ḥdra (62)
58	kun nas hkhyil	*samāvarta	nam mkhahi bar skabs
59	rnām par dag pa	*viśuddha	yon tan thams cad gus par len pa (64?)
60	ñes par sems	*nidhyapti	blo gros dran rtogs blo hphel (65?)
61	ñon moṅs bral ba	*apagatakleśa	stobs mi zad
62	yaṅs pa nam mkhah lta bu	akāśasamavipula (<i>Dbh</i> , p. 82.13)	ñes tsig bstan pa
63	gzun ba hjug pa	*avatārana	mthah yas mi zad
64	yon tan hjug pa	*guṇāvatāra	legs byas byas pa (71)
65	dran rtogs bla gros śes rab bsgrub pa	*smṛtigatimatiprajñāsādhaka	chud mi za ba (70)
66	spobs pa dag ni mi zad byed pa	*pratibhānākṣayakārin	lha ba
67	sgra ston pa	*śabdaśāsaṇa	hgro ba tsim byed (72)
68	bden pa mthoñ ba	*satyadarśana	byams pa mñon hphags (76)
69	hdzin pa	*dhātrāṇa	sñiñ rje yaṅs paḥi rtsa (77)
70	chud mi za	*avipranāśa	dgah la ḥdug pa

71	legs byas sbyin	*sukṛtadāna	mchog tu dgah la ḥdug pa (78)
72	ḥgro ba tsim par byed	*jagatsaṃtarpaṇa	btañ sñoms gñis la chags grol (79)
73	bltar mi mthoñ	*adrśya	chos don chos kyī ḥod zer (80)
74	rab tu rtogs	*prativedha	ḥgrug med (21)
75	dgah mgu skyed pa	*susthityutpāda	ye śes sgron (82?)
76	byams pa ḥphags pa	*maitryudgata	ye śes mtso
77	sñin rje chen poḥi rtsa ba bsam dag pa	*mahākaraṇāmūlasuddhāśaya	rnam grol sñiñ po ḥgro tsim byed (83)
78	dgah nam par dag la ḥjug pa	*muditākārapraveśa	rdo rje rgyal mtsan (85)
79	btan sñoms gñis la chags las grol ba	*dvayaśaṅgavimuktopekṣā	padma dam pa (87)
80	chos don chos byed ye śes tal la	*dharmārthadharma-kāryajñānolka	chos kyis rgyal
81	mi ḥgrugs pa	*avikopita	mi g.yo (69)
82	ye śes rgya mtso	*jñānasāgara	śes rab rtsibs
83	ḥgro ba tsim byed rnam par dul ba	*vinitajagatsaṃtarpaṇa	zi ba
84	rnam par grol baḥi ye śes dbaṇ byed	*vimuktijñānavaśavartin	sañs rgyas mtso
85	rdo rjeḥi rgyal mtsan	*vajradhvaja	ḥod zer mthah yas
86	sñin poḥi padma	*hṛdayakamala	rnam grol sbyin pa ye śes (96)
87	padma ḥdas	*atikrāntakamala	de bzin gśegs kyī rgyan (97)
88	ḥjig rten chos bral	*lokadharmavirahita	bkod pa chen po
89	mi g.yo ba	aniñjya (Mvy 554)	ziñ bkod snañ na
90	rdo rje lta bu	vajropama (Mvy 516)	sems can bsam ba yoñs rañ dgah (100)
91	dpah bar ḥgro	śūraṃgama (Mvy 506)	rdzogs paḥi byañ chub lam la rtag mthun (103)
92	sañs rgyas dgoñs	*buddhābhiprāya	pha rol phyin pa rgyan bkod mchog gtsug (104)
93	de bzin mi ḥgrugs	*aprakampya	byañ chub yan lag me tog sbyin (105)
94	gzi brjid can	tejovati (Mvy 549)	rnam grol sñiñ po bduñ rtsi sbyin (106?)
95	gzi brjid ḥod zer	*tejoraśmi	rluñ dañ rluñ bzin ḥgro ba mi dmigs (108)
96	nam par grol baḥi ye śes mchog sbyin	*vimuktijñānavarada	rgya mtso śugs ḥdzin (110)
97	sañs rgyas rgyan nmams śin tu bkod pa	*buddhālamkāṛāntavyūha	rin chen mdzod ldan (109)
98	kun tu snañ	samantāloka (Mvy 562)	brag dañ ri ḥthab rgyal po (111)
99	sañs rgyas ziñ dag	*viśuddhabuddhaksetra	rdzu ḥphrul yañs (112)

100	sems can bsam pa rab tu hjug pa	*sattvāśayapraveśa	śin tu don ḥdzin (112)
101	mgu byed	*ārādhana	saṅs rgyas yul ston (113)
102	śin tu mgu	*atyantārādhana	
103	byaṅ chub lam gyi rjes su hthun pa	*bodhipathānūlomika	
104	pha rol phyin bgryan gtsug na rin po che	*pāramitālamkāracūḍamaṇi	
105	byaṅ chub lam na lag me tog sbyin pa	*bodhyaṅgapuṣpadāna	
106	mam par grol baḥi ḥbras bu sbyin pa	*vimuktiphaladāna	
107	mi ḥchi dbyaṅs	*amṛtasvara	
108	dmigs med rluṅ bzin ḥgro	*yathāhvāyvanālanaganagana	
109	rin chen mthah	ratnakoti (<i>Mvy</i> 564)	
110	rgya mtsoḥ ṣugs ḥdzin	*arṇavavegadhārin	
111	ri daṅ brag mams rdoḥ par byed pa	*giriśailāśphalana	
112	rdzu ḥphrul don chen yaṅ dag bkyed pa	*maharddhyaṛthasamutpāda	
113	saṅs rgyas dpag med pa mthoṅ ba	*aprāmeyabuddhadarśana	
114	thos pa thams cad ḥdzin	*sarvaśrutadhāra	
115	mi g.yen	*avikṣipta	
116	g.yel ba med pa	*atandrita	
117	skad cig gcig la ye ṣes sbyin pa	*ekakṣaṇajñānadātṛ	
118	yon tan mthah yas rgya mtso mam par dag	*anantaḡaṇaviśuddhāṇava	

† Reconstructed by Braavrig (1989; pp. 146–48)

†† Numbers in brackets indicate location of *Bdp samādhi* in the *Akn samādhi* list.

* Conjectural reconstructions

Akn: TTP pp. 50.2.2–4.2; *Bdp*: TTP: pp. 72.4.5–73.1.3

Appendix III

The Mahāratnakūṭa Collection

A Bibliographical Guide¹

Sanskrit Title: ²	ārya-Mahāratnakūṭa-dharma-paryāya ³
Chinese Title:	Ta pao chi ching, forming the Pao chi pu (Ratnakūṭa Section) of the 'ching' (sūtra division of the Chinese Ta ts'ang ching). ⁴
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa chen poḥi chos kyi nmam graṅs stoṅ phrag brgya pa ⁵

1. *Trisaṃvaranirdeśaparivarta*

Chinese Title:	1. San Lü'i hui [T. 310.1] ⁶ 2. Ta fang kuang san chieh ching [T. 311] ⁷
Tibetan Title:	sdom pa gsum bstan paḥi leḥu zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.1; TTD 45]

2. *Anantamukhapariśodhananirdeśa*

Chinese Title:	Wu pien chuang yen hui [T 310.2] ⁸
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa sgo mthaḥ yas pa rman par spyoṅ ba bstan paḥi leḥu zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.2; TTD 46]

3. *Tathāgatācintyaguhyanirdeśa*

Chinese Title:	1. Mi chi chin kang li shih hui ching [T 310.3] ⁹
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1. The bibliographical data listed here have been taken from the following catalogues: Demiéville, P. et al. (1978); Lancaster, L. (1979); Nanjio, B. (1883); Skorupski, T (1985).
2. As reconstructed from the Tibetan versions.
3. Hereafter, the pre/suffixes (ārya-... -nāma-mahāyāna-sūtra) will be omitted.
4. *Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō*, no. 310.1–49, vol. 11, pp. 1a 1–659a 27 (120 chüan).
5. *Tibetan Tripitaka Peking Edition* (ed. by D.T. Suzuki, Tokyo; 1956), no. 760.1–49, vol. 22–24. *Tibetan Tripitaka sDe-dge Edition*. Berkeley: East Asiatic Library, University of California; no. 45–93, vol. 39–44.
6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (572–727AD) (3 chüan), [T 2154–570b:15].
Bodhiruci, born a Brahmin, was of South Indian origin. He became a Buddhist in 631 AD and arrived in China in 693 AD where he died in 727 AD. His original name was Dharmaruci II. He also translated the *Sukhāvativyūhasūtra* and a number of works on tantric ritual [Bagchi, ii, pp. 540 ff].
7. Trsl. by Dharmakṣema between 414 and 426 AD [T 2154–520c:17].
8. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 4–7).
9. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I. He was born of an Indo-Scythian family in Tun-huang in 233 AD and worked at

Tibetan Title:	2. Ju lai pu ssu i pi ta ch'eng ching [T 312] ¹ hphags pa de bzin gsegs paḥi gsaṅ ba bsam gyis mi khyab pa bstan zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.3; TTD 47]
English (part. trsl.):	Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 8, 125, 157, 225, 251, 283, 314 (quot.). Obermiller (1931), i, pp. 15, 29, 84, 91, 94; ii, p. 101 (quot.).
German (part. trsl.):	Winternitz (1930), pp. 37, 45.

4. *Svapnanirdeśa*

Chinese Title:	Ching chü t'ien tzu hui [T 310.4] ²
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa rmi lam bstan pa šes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.4; TTD. no. 48]

5. *Amitābhavyūha*

Chinese Title:	no coresponding translation. ³
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa ḥod dpag med kyi bkod pa zes bya ba theg pa cben poḥi mdo [TTP 760.4; TTD 49]
English (trsl.):	Beal (1882), pp. 378–383 (part.). Chang (1983), pp. 339–363. Müller (1883).
German (part. trsl.):	Winternitz (1930), pp. 21–30.
Edition:	Müller; Takakusu (1932).

6. *Akṣobhyatathāgatasavyūha*

Chinese Title:	1. Pu tung ju lai hui [T 310.6] ⁴ 2. A ch'u fo kuo ching [T 313] ⁵
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa de bzin gsegs pa mi ḥkhrugs paḥi bkod pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.6; TTD 50]

Ch'ang-an from 265 AD to 300/10/13 AD (chüan 8–14), [T 2154–493b:16].

1. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa II between 1018 and 1058 AD (20 chüan), [Ono. vol. 12, p. 184a].
2. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I between 265 and 313 AD (chüan 15–16) [T 2154–496c:20].
3. No Sanskrit original appears to be extant. If the original version of the *Amitābhavyūha* corresponds to the Large *Sukhāvatīvyūha* [extant in Sanskrit and various Chinese translations], then the translation of Bodhiruci [T.: No. 310.5] is the most relevant here. No corresponding Mongolian and Tibetan versions of the Large *Sukhāvatīvyūha* appear to have been preserved. Large *Sukhāvatīvyūha*:
a) Wu liang shou ju lai hui [T.: 310.5]
b) Wu liang ch'ing ching p'ing teng chiao ching [T 61].
Trsl. by Lokakṣema between 147 AD and 186 AD in Loyang [T 2153–389a; 18].
4. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 19–20).
5. Trsl. by Lokakṣema between 147 and 186 AD in Loyang (2 chüan), [T 2151–384c: 8; T 2146–115c: 2]. K'ai -yüan gives 147 AD for the date of translation [T 2154–478c: 5].

English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 315–338.
 French (trsl.): Dantinne (1983).

7. *Varmavyūhanirdeśa*

Chinese Title: Pei chia chuang yen hui [T 310.7]¹
 Tibetan Title: hphags pa go chaḥi bkod pa bstan pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.7; TTD 51]

8. *Dharmadhātuprakṛtyasambhedanirdeśa*

Chinese Title: Fa chiai t'i hsing wu fen pieh hui [T 310.8]²
 Tibetan Title: hphags pa chos kyī dbyiṅs kyī raṅ bzin dbyer med pa bstan pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.8; TTD 52]

9. *Daśadharmaka*

Chinese Title: 1. Ta ch'eng shih fa hui [T 310.9]³
 2. Ta ch'eng shih fa ching [T 314]⁴
 Tibetan Title: hphags pa chos bcu pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.9; TTD 53]
 English (part. trsl.) Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 5, 8, 114 (quot.).

10. *Samantamukhaparivarta*

Chinese Title: 1. Wen shu shih li p'u men hui [T 310.10]⁵
 2. P'u men p'in ching [T 315]⁶
 Tibetan Title: hphags pa kun nas sgoḥi leḥu zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.10; TTD 54]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 134–148.

1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 21–25).
 2. Trsl. by Mandrasena in 503 AD (chüan 26–27). He arrived in Nan-ching/Nanking in the same year from Fu-nan (Lower Cambodia) [T 2154–537b: 12].
 3. Trsl. by Buddhaśānta in 539 AD (chüan 28). Native of North India; in China from 508 to 539 AD (Loyang) [T 2154–542a: 26].
 4. Trsl. by Saṅghabhadra between 506 and 520 AD [T 2151–364b: 24].
 5. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 29).
 6. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 287 AD [T 2154–493b: 22].

11. *Raśmisamantamuktanirdeśa*

Chinese Title:	Ch'u hsien kuang ming hui [T 310.11] ¹
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa ḥod zer kun du bkye ba bstan pa zer bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.11; TTD 55]
English (trsl.):	Chang (1983), pp. 191–222.

12. *Bodhisattvapiṭaka*

Chinese Title:	1. Ta p'u sa ts'ang hui [T 310.12] ² 2. Ta ch'eng p'u sa ts'ang cheng fa ching [T 316] ³
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ces bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.12; TTD 56]
English (part. trsl.):	Pedersen (1976).

13. *(Ā)nandagarbhāvākṛāntinirdeśa*

Chinese Title:	1. Fo wei a nan shuo ch'u t'ai hui [T 310.13] ⁴ 2. Pao t'ai ching [T 317] ⁵
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa dgaḥ bo mñal na gnaṣ pa bstan pa theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.14; TTD 57]

14. *Āyusmannandagarbhāvākṛāntinirdeśa*

Chinese Title:	Fo shuo ju t'ai ts'ang hui [T 310.14] ⁶
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa tshe daṅ ldan pa dgaḥ bo mñal du hjug pa bstan pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.13; TTD 58]
German (trsl.):	Huebotter (1932)

1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 30–34).

2. Trsl. by Hsüan-tsang in 645 AD (556/600/602–664 AD), who travelled to Central Asia and India from 629 to 644/645 AD [T 2154–555c: 5].

3. Alternative title: P'u sa tsang cheng fa ching; trsl. by Dharmarakṣa II between 1018 and 1058 AD [Ono. vol. 12, p. 184a].

4. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 55).

5. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 281 AD [T 2157–790c: 15] or 303 AD [T 2149–234b: 10].

6. Alternative title: Fo wei nan t'u shuo chu chia ju t'ai ching; trsl. by I-ching (I-tsing) in 710 AD, who travelled abroad from 671 to 695/98 AD. He died in 713 AD (chüan 55).

15. *Mañjuśrībuddhakṣetraguṇavyūha*

- Chinese Title: 1. Wen shu shih li shou chi hui [T 310.15]¹
 2. Wen shu shih li fo t'u yen ching [T 318]²
 3. Ta sheng wen shu shih li p'u sa fo ch'a kung te chuang yen ching [T 319]³
- Tibetan Title: hphags pa hjam dpal gyi saṅs rgyas kyi zin gi yon tan bkod pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.15; TTD 59]
- English (trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 4, 14, 15, 170 (quot.). Chang (1983), pp. 164–190.
- French (part. trsl.): Lamotte (1960), pp. 20–23.

16. *Pitāputrasamāgama*

- Chinese Title: 1. P'u sa ch'ien shih hui [T 310.16]⁴
 2. Fu tzu ho chi ching [T 320]⁵
- Tibetan Title: hphags pa yab daṅ sras mjal ba zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.16; TTD 60]
- English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 177, 226 (quot.).
 Conze (1954), pp. 164–165.
 Obermiller (1931), i, p. 134 (quot.).

17. *Pūrṇapariṣcchā*

- Chinese Title: Fu lou na hui [T 310.17]⁶
- Tibetan Title: hphags pa gaṅ pos zus pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.18; TTD 61]

18. *Rāṣṭrapālāpariṣcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Hu kuo p'u sa hui [T 310.18]⁷

1. Trsl. by Śikṣānanda between 695 and 707 AD in Loyang. Native of Khotan (chüan 58–60), [T 2154–566a: 22f.].
2. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 290 AD in Loyang (2 chüan), [T 2148–289a: 4; T 2151–790c: 18].
3. Trsl. by Amoghavajra between 720 and 774 AD in Loyang (3 chüan), [T 2157–881a: 17; T 2157–980a: 8].
4. Trsl. by Narendrayaśas in 568 AD. Arrival in China from Uḍḍiyāna (North India) in 556 AD [T 2154–543c: 10].
5. Trsl. by Jih-ch'eng and Dharmarakṣa II between 1058 and 1072 AD [Ono. vol. 12, p. 184b].
6. Alternative titles: Fu lou na wen ching, P'u sa ts'ang ching; trsl. by Kumārajīva in 405 AD [T 2154–512: 15].
7. Trsl. by Jñānagupta towards the end of the sixth century AD. Native of Gandhāra (523–600 AD), [T

- Tibetan Title: 2. Hu kuo tsun che so wen ta ch'eng ching [T 321]¹
 1. ḥphags pa yul ḥkhor skyoṅ gis źus pa źes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.17; TTD 62]
 2. ḥphags pa yul ḥkhor skyoṅ gis źus pa źes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 833; TTD 166]
- English (trsl.): Ensink (1952).
 Edition: Finot (1910)

19. *Ugraparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Yü chieh chang che hui [T 310.19]²
 2. Fa ching ching [Dharmādarśasūtra, T 322]³
 3. Yü chieh lo yüeh wen p'u sa-hsing ching [T 323]⁴
- Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa khyim bdag drag śul can gyis źus pa źes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.19; TTD 63]
- English (trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 11, 21, 39, 83, 119, 130, 133, 141, 144, 149, 176, 187, 188, 190, 191, 194, 245, 248, 263, 282 (quot.).
 Schuster (1976).

20. *Vidyutprāptaparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: Wu chin fu ts'ang hui [T 310.20]⁵
- Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa glog thob kyis źus pa źes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.20; TTD 64]
- English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 149–163.

21. *Bhadramāyākāravvyākaraṇa*

- Chinese Title: 1. Shou huan shih po t'o lo chi hui [T 310.21]⁶
 2. Huan shih jen hsien ching [T 324]⁷
- Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa sgyu ma mkhan bźaṅ po luṅ bstan pa źes bya ba theg pa

 2154–550b: 19].

1. Trsl. by Dānapāla in 994 AD (4 chüan), [Ta-chung-lu, vol. 8 p.23 b: 26b].
2. Trsl. by Saṅghavarman from Sogdia in 252 AD (chüan 82), [T 2154–487a: 3]. According to Schuster (citing Hirawaka, A.) by Dharmamitra I a Kaśmirian who stayed in China from 424 to 442 AD.
3. Trsl. by An Hsüan (a Parthian layman) and Yen Fo-t'iao (the first known Chinese Buddhist monk from An Hui) in 181 AD (1 chüan), [T 2151–350a: 14].
4. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I between 266 and 300/10/13 AD (1 chüan), [T 2151–353a: 26].
5. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 83–84).
6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 85).
7. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I (1 chüan), [T 2151–353a: 26 f.].

English (trsl.): chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.21; TTD 65]
 Chang (1983), pp. 3–26.
 Edition: Régamey (1938).
 Régamey (1938).

22. *Mahāprātihāryopadeśa*

Chinese Title: Ta shen pien hui [T 310.22]¹
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa cho ḥphrul chen po bstan pa zes bya ba theg pa chen
 poḥi mdo [TTP 760.22; TTD 66]²

23. *Maitreyamahāsimḥanāda*

Chinese Title: Mo ho chia she hui [T 310.23]
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa byams paḥi seṅ geḥi sgra chen po zes bya ba theg pa
 chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.23; TTD 67]
 English (part. trsl.): Obermiller (1931), i, p. 12 (quot.).

24. *Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā*

Chinese Title: 1. Yu po li hui [T 310.24]³
 2. Chüeh ting p'i ni ching [T 325]⁴
 3. San shih wu fo ming li ch'an wen [T 326]⁵
 4. Yu po li wen fo ching [T 1466]⁶
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa ḥdul ba rnam par gtan la dbab ne bar ḥkhor gyis zus pa
 zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.24; TTD 68]
 English (trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 161, 165, 173, 264 (quot.).
 Chang (1983), pp. 262–279.
 French (trsl.): Python (1973).
 Edition: Python (1973).

1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 86–89).

2. TTP, TTD: *Mahāprātihāryanirdeśa*.

3. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 90).

4. Translator unknown (Chin Dynasty 266 AD to 420 AD in Tun-huang). The text mentions Tun-huang San-ts'ang as the translator, who is often identified with Dharmarakṣa I (1 chüan), [T 2145–12a: 21].

5. Trsl. by Guṇavarman during the Liu Sung Dynasty.

6. Trsl. by Amoghavajra between 720 and 774 AD in Loyang. Completely different version which in many respects is reminiscent to extracts of the Theravāda Vinaya. No corresponding Tibetan translation is known to exist (ed. by H. Bechert, Göttingen 1984) (1 chüan), [T 2157–881a: 17].

25. *Adhyāśayasamcodana*

- Chinese Title: 1. Fa sheng chih le hui [T 310.25]¹
 2. Fa chio ching hsin ching [T 327]²
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa lhag paḥi bsaṃ pa bskul ba zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.25; TTD 69]
 English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 17, 100, 105–114, 310 (quot.).

26. *Subāhuparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Shan pei p'u sa hui [T 310.26]³
 2. Su p'o hu t'ung tzu ch'ing wen ching [T 895]⁴
 3. Miao pei p'u sa so wen ching [T: no. 896]⁵
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa lag bzaṅs gis zus pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.26; TTD 70]

27. *Sūrataparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Shan shun p'u sa hui [T 310.27]⁶
 2. Hsü lai ching [T 329]⁷
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa nes pa zus pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.27; TTD 71]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 243–255.

28. *Vīradatta(gr̥hapati)paripṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Ch'üan shou chang che hui [T 310.28]⁸
 2. P'u sa hsiu hsing ching [T 330]⁹
 3. Wu wei shou so wen ta ch'eng ching [T 331]¹⁰
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa khyim bdag dpas byin gyis zus pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.28; TTD 72]
 English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 37, 217 (quot.).

1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 91–92).
2. Trsl. by Jñānagupta in 595 AD (2 chüan), [T 2151–366a: 3].
3. Trsl. by Kumārajīva between 402 AD and 412 AD (chüan 93–94), [T 2154–514c: 26].
4. Trsl. by Śubhakarasiṃha in 726 AD (3 chüan), [T 2157–874c: 3].
5. Trsl. by Fa-t'ien between 973 and 988 AD (4 chüan), [T 2035–398b: 23; Ta-chung-lu vol. 6, p. 16b–17b].
6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 95).
7. Trsl. by Chih-shih-lun in 373 AD [T 2157–815c: 26].
8. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 96).
9. Trsl. by Po Fa-tzu between 290 and 306 AD (1 chüan), [T 2153–399c: 25].
10. Trsl. by Dānapāla in 983 AD (3 chüan), [T 2035–398b: 25].

German (part. trsl.): Winternitz (1930), pp. 45–46.

29. *Udayanavatsarājaparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Yu t'o yen wang hui [T 310.29]¹
 2. Yu t'ien wang ching [T 332]²
 3. Ta ch'eng jih tzu wang so wen ching [T 333]³
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa bad saḥi rgyal po ḥchar byed kyis zus pa zes bya baḥi
 leḥu [TTP 760.29; TTD 73]
 English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), p. 85 (quot.).
 Obermiller (1931), ii, p. 169 (quot.).

30. *Sumatidarikāparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Miao hui t'ung nü hui [T 310.30]⁴
 2. Hsü mo t'i p'u sa ching [T 334]⁵
 3. Hsü mo t'i ching [T 336]⁶
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa bu mo blo gros bṣaṅ mos zus pa zes bya ba theg pa chen
 poḥi mdo [TTP 760.30; TTD 74]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 256–261.

31. *Gaṅgottaraparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: Heng ho shang yu p'o i hui [T 310.31]⁷
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa gaṅ gaḥi mchog gis zus pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi
 mdo [TTP 760.31; TTD 75]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 37–40.

32. *Aśokadattāvyākaraṇa*

- Chinese Title: 1. Wu wei te p'u sa hui [T 310.32]⁸
 2. A sheh shih wang nü a sha ta p'u sa ching [T 337]⁹

1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 97).
 2. Trsl. by Fa-chü between 290 AD and 306 AD (1 chüan), [T 2151–355a: 15].
 3. Trsl. by Fa-t'ien in 984 AD (1 chüan), [Ta-chung-lu, vol. 4, p. 1a: 3b].
 4. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 98a).
 5. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I between 265 and 313 AD (1 chüan), [T 2151–353a: 26].
 6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci in 693 AD (1 chüan).
 7. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 98b).
 8. Trsl. by Buddhaśānta in 539 AD (chüan 99), [T 2154–542a: 28].
 9. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 317 AD (1 chüan), [T 2154–493c: 9].

Tibetan Title: hphags pa mya ñan med kyis byin pa luñ bstan pa zes bya ba theg
 pa chen poñi mdo [TTP 760.32; TTD 76]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 115–133.

33. *Vimaladattāparipṛcchā*

Chinese Title: 1. Wu kou shih p'u sa (fen pieh) ying pien hui [T 310.33]¹
 2. Li kou shih nü ching [T 338]²
 3. Te wu kou nü ching [T 339]³
 Tibetan Title: hphags pa dri ma med kyis byin pas zus pa zes bya ba theg pa chen
 poñi mdo [TTP 760.33; TTD 77]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 73–99.

34. *Guṇaratnasamkusumitaparipṛcchā*

Chinese Title: Kung te pao hua fu p'u sa hui [T 310.34]⁴
 Tibetan Title: 1. hphags pa yon tan rin chen med tog kun tu rgyas pas zus pa zes
 bya ba theg pa chen poñi mdo [TTP 760..34; TTD 78]
 2. hphags pa sans rgyas bcu pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poñi mdo
 [TTP 938; TTD 272]

35. *Acintyabuddhaviṣayānirdeśa*

Chinese Title: 1. Shan te t'ien tzu hui [T 310.35]⁵
 2. Wen shu shih li so shuo pu ssu i fo ching chieh ching [T 340]⁶
 Tibetan Title: hphags pa sañs rgyas kyi yul bsam gyis mi khab pa bstan pa zes
 bya ba theg pa chen poñi mdo [TTP 760.35; TTD 79]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 27–37.

36. *Suṣthitamati(devaputra)paripṛcchā*

Chinese Title: 1. Shan chu i t'ien tzu hui [T 310.36]⁷

1. Trsl. by Nieh Tao Chen and Dharmarakṣa I between 280 and 312 AD at Ch'ang-an (chüan 100), [T 2154–501a: 2].
2. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 289 AD (1 chüan), [T 2154–493c: 11].
3. Trsl. by Gautama Prajñārucci in 541 AD (1 chüan), [T 2157–840c: 24; T 2157–841b: 5].
4. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 101a).
5. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 101b).
6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci in 693 AD (2 chüan), [T 2153–380a: 8].
7. Trsl. by Dharmagupta between 605 and 617 AD. Arrival from South India (Lata) in Ch'ang-an in 590 AD

2. Shen shan chu i t'ien tzu so wen ching [T 341]¹
 3. Ju huan san mei ching [T 342]²
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa lhañi bu blo gros rab gnas kyis źus pa źes bya ba theg pa
 chen poñi mdo [TTP 760.37; TTD 80]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 41–72.

37. *Simhaparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. A she shih wang tzu hui [T 310.37]³
 2. T'ai tzu shua hu ching [T 343]⁴
 3. T'ai tzu ho hsiu ching [T 344]⁵
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa señ ges źus pa źes bya ba theg pa chen poñi mdo [TTP
 760.37; TTD 81]
 English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 5, 53 (quot.).

38. *Upāyakaśālyaparivarta*

- Chinese Title: 1. Ta ch'eng fang pien hui [T 310.38]⁶
 2. Hui shang p'u sa wen ta shan ch'üan ching [T 345]⁷
 3. Ta fang kuang shan ch'iao fang pien ching [T 346]⁸
 Tibetan Title: 1. ḥphags pa sañs rgyas thams cad kyi gsañ chen thabs la mkhas pa
 byañ chub sems dpañ ye śes dam pas źus pañi leñu źes bya ba theg
 pa chen poñi mdo [TTP 760.38; TTD 82]⁹
 2. ḥphags pa thabs mkhas pa źes bya ba theg pa chen poñi mdo
 [TTP 927; TTD 261]
 English (trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 70, 161, 163, 164, 165 (quot.).
 Chang (1983), pp. 427–468.
 Obermiller (1931), i, p. 134 (quot.).
 Tatz, M. (1981).
 German (part. trsl.): Winternitz (1930), p. 40.

(chüan 102–105), [T 2154–552b: 22].

1. Trsl. by Prajñāruci in 541 AD (3 chüan), [T 2149–269c: 24].
 2. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I (3 chüan; var. 4), [T 2151–353a: 26].
 3. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 106a).
 4. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I (1 chüan), [T 2151–353a: 26f].
 5. Translator unknown. Listed in the *Hsi-chin-lu* as having been translated between 265 and 316 AD (1 chüan), [T 2154–587b: 23].
 6. Trsl. by Nandi (from Western China) in 420 AD at Lo-yang (chüan 106b–108), [T 2154–509a: 6].
 7. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 285 AD (2 chüan), [T 2145–8a: 12].
 8. Trsl. by Dānapāla in 1005 AD (4 chüan), [Ta-chung-lu. vol. 13, p. 1a–4a].
 9. Title as listed in Tibetan *bKaḥ-ḥgyur*: *Ārya-sarvabuddhamahārahasyopāyakaśālyajñānottarabodhisattva-paripṛcchāparivarta-nāma-māhāyāna-sūtra* (D, P, R).

39. *Bhādrapālasreṣṭhiparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Hsien hu chang che hui [T 310.39]¹
 2. Ta ch'eng hsien shih ching [T 347]²
 Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa tshoñ dpon bžan skyoñ gis žus pa žes bya ba theg pa
 chen poñi mdo [TTP 760.39; TTD.: 83]
 English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 223–242.

40. *Dārikāvimalaśraddhāparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: Ching hsin t'ung nü hui [T 310.40]³
 Tibetan Title: Bu mo nam dag dad pas žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poñi mdo
 [TTP 760.40; TTD 84]

41. *Maitreyaparipṛcchādharmāṣṭa*

- Chinese Title: 1. Mi le p'u sa wen pa fa hui [T 310.41]⁴
 2. Ta ch'eng fang teng yao hui [T 348]⁵
 Tibetan Title: 1. ḥphags pa byams pas žus pa brgyad pa žes bya ba theg pa chen
 poñi mdo [TTP 760.41/2; TTD 85/6]
 2. ḥphags pa byams pas žus pa žes bya ba theg pa chen poñi mdo
 [TTP 816; TTD 149]

42. *Maitreyaparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Mi le p'u sa wen hui [T 310.42]⁶
 2. Mi le p'u sa so wen pen yüan ching [T 349]⁷
 Tibetan Title: 1. ḥphags pa byams pas žus pañi leñu žes bya ba theg pa chen poñi
 mdo [TTP 760.42/41; TTD 86/85]
 2. ḥphags pa byams pas žus pañi leñu žes bya ba theg pa chen poñi
 mdo [TTP 816; TTD 149]

1. Alternative title: I shih ching; trsl. by Jñānagupta (from Gandhāra) in 591 AD (chüan 109–110), [T 2154–548b: 8].
 2. Trsl. by Divākara in 680 AD (2 chüan), [T 2153–397a: 7; Ono.: 630 AD].
 3. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 111a).
 4. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 111b).
 5. Trsl. by An Shih-Kao between 148 and 170 AD (1 chüan), [T 2151–349a: 12].
 6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 111c).
 7. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 303 AD (1 chüan), [T 2157–791a: 10].

43. *Kāśyapaparivarta*

Chinese Title:	1. P'u ming p'u sa hui [T 310.43] ¹ 2. I jih me ni pao ching [T 350] ² 3. Mo ho yen pao yen ching [T 351] ³ 4. Ta chia she wen ta pao chi cheng fa ching [T 352] ⁴
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa ḥod sruṅs kyi leḥu ḥes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.43; TTD 87]
English (trsl.):	Bendall; Rouse (1981), p. 52, n. 1; pp. 53, 54, 55, 144, 147, 190, 235 (quot.). Chang (1983) pp. 387–414.
German (trsl.):	Weller (1965). Winternitz (1930), pp. 36–37.
Edition:	Stael Holstein (1926). Vorob'jev- Desjatovski (RO; 21).

44. *Ratnarāśi*

Chinese Title:	Pao liang chū hui [T 310.44] ⁵
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa rin po cheḥi phuṅ po ḥes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.45; TTD. no. 88]
English (trsl.):	Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 56, 127, 129, 134, 135, 194, 278 (quot.). Chang (1983), pp. 280–314.
Edition:	Hoernle (1916), pp. 116–121.

45. *Akṣayamatipariprcchā*

Chinese Title:	Wu chin hui p'u sa hui [T 310.45] ⁶
Tibetan Title:	hphags pa blo gros mi sad pas ḥus pa ḥes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.44; TTD 89]
English (trsl.):	Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 12, 24, 36, 37, 115, 118, 156, 163, 185, 204, 219, 221, 248, 254, 260, 261, 264, 283 (quot.). Chang (1983), pp. 415–426.
German (part. trsl.):	Winternitz (1930), p. 48.

1. Alternative title: Ku ta pao shi ching; translator unknown (chüan 112).
2. Trsl. by Lokakṣema in 179 AD (1 chüan), [T 2149–223c: 18].
3. Translator unknown; Ch'in Dynasty (265–420 AD); (1 chüan), [T 2153–382b: 17].
4. Trsl. by Dānapāla in 985 AD (5 chüan), [Ta-chung-lu. vol.4, p.23a: 25b].
5. Alternative title: Pao liang ching; trsl. by Tao-Kung between 401 and 412 AD at Ch'ang-an (chüan 113–114).
6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 115a).

46. *Saptaśatikaprajñāpāramitā*

- Chinese Title: 1. Wen shu shuo pan jo hui [T 310.46]¹
 2. Ta pan jo po lo mi to ching (chapter 7) [T 220.7]²
 3. Wen shu shih li so shuo mo ho pan jo polo mi ching [T 232]³
 4. Wen shu shih li so shuo pan jo po lo mi ching [T 233]⁴
- Tibetan Title: hphags pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa bdun brgya pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.46; TTD 90]
- English (trsl.): Chang (1983), pp. 100–114.
 Conze (1973), pp. 79–107.
- Edition: Tucci (1923).

47. *Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā*

- Chinese Title: Pao chi p'u sa hui [T 310.47]⁵
- Tibetan Title: hphags pa gtsug na rin po ches zus pa zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.47; TTD 91]
- English (part. trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), pp. 115, 120, 217, 219, 222, 222, 249, 284 (quot.).
 Obermiller (1931), ii, p. 115 (quot.).

48. *Śrīmālādevīsīṃhanāda*

- Chinese Title: 1. Sheng man fu jen hui [T 310.48]⁶
 2. Sheng man shih tzu hou i cheng ta fang pien fang kuang ching [T 353]⁷
- Tibetan Title: hphags pa lha mo dpal hphren gi seṅ geḥi sgra zes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi mdo [TTP 760.48; TTD 92]
- English (trsl.): Bendall; Rouse (1981), p. 44 (quot.).
 Chang (1983), pp. 363–386.
 Wayman (1974).

1. Trsl. by Mandrasena in 503 AD (chüan 115b–116), [T 2154–537b: 12].
 2. Trsl. by Hsüan-tsang between 659 and 663 AD (2 chüan), [T 2154–555b: 28; T 2149–282b: 10].
 3. Trsl. by Mandrasena in 503 AD (1 chüan), [T 2154–537: 12].
 4. Trsl. by Saṅghabhara between 509 and 520 AD at Lo-yang (2 chüan), [T 2151–364b: 24].
 5. Trsl. by Dharmarakṣa I in 290 AD (chüan 117–118), [T 2154–493b: 21].
 6. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 119).
 7. Trsl. by Guṇabhadra in 436 AD (1 chüan), [T 2154–528a: 15]. A translation made by Dharmakṣema in 433 AD was no longer extant by the time of the Yüan Dynasty. (See: Wayman, 1974, pp. 9–13).

49. (*Rṣi*)vyāsaparipṛcchā

- Chinese Title: 1. Kuang po hsien jen hui [T 310.49]¹
2. P'i yeh p'o wen ching [T 354]²
- Tibetan Title: ḥphags pa draṅ sroṅ rgyas pas ḥus pa ḥes bya ba theg pa chen poḥi
mdo [TTP 760.49; TTD 93]

1. Trsl. by Bodhiruci (chüan 120).

2. Trsl. by Gautama Prajñāruci in 542 AD (2 chüan), [T 2157–841a: 1].

Appendix IV

Tibetan Text of Chapter Eleven of the Bodhisattvapiṭakasūtra

SECTION I

1.1

(590) śā rihi bu de la byañ chub sems dpaḥ chen po gañ la brtson na |¹ byañ chub sems dpaḥ spyad pa spyod par ḥgyur baḥi byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen poḥi śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa gan ze na | śā rihi bu ḥdi la byañ chub sems dpaḥ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi nram graṅs rab tu ṇan par byed |² ḥdzin par byed | ḥchañ bar byed | klog par byed | kun chub par byed | gžan dag³ la yañ ḥchad ciñ rgya cher yañ dag par rab tu ston par byed de ||

śā rihi bu de la byañ chub sems dpaḥ⁴ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi nram graṅs śin tu mñan | blaṅs | bzuñ | bklags | gžan dag⁵ la yañ bśad ciñ rgya cher yañ dag par rab tu bstan na | śes rab kyi nram pa ḥdi dag ḥthob par ḥgyur ro || śes rab de yañ nram pa gañ⁶ | ḥjug pa gañ ze na | de la śes rab⁷ thos pa ni nram paḥo || tshul bzin yid la byed pa ni ḥjug paḥo ||

1.1.1

thos pa yañ⁸ nram pa gañ ze na | ḥdi lta ste⁹ | ḥdun¹⁰ paḥi nram pa dañ | bśam paḥi nram

1. In my edition of chapter eleven, I have adopted the punctuation and Arabic page/folio numbering as it is found in the modern reprint of the sTog Palace Kanjur (Leh—1979). Whenever it seemed appropriate to point to the inclusion of additional *śad* in other editions of the canon, I have indicated thus in the footnote section. Round brackets serve to indicate conjectural insertions, while square brackets indicate deletions. Whenever available, I reproduced in the footnote section the reading of the Tun-huang manuscript (Pelliot 977) of the *Bdp*. Since it is independent of the various blockprint versions, I decided to treat the Tun-huang manuscript as a variant in its own right. Thus I have not edited the text, but faithfully recorded its readings. Like many Tun-huang works, it contains a fair amount of non-standard spellings, such as ‘śa ri bu’ for ‘śā ri bu’, ‘myed’ for ‘med’ or ‘yin ba’ for ‘yin pa’, etc. In order to keep the manuscript portions on the same page as the text of the sTog Palace reading, I have broken it up by paragraphs to match those to the main body of the text.
2. P add: len pa byed.
3. D N gžan dag.
4. N dpaḥ.
5. N gžan dag.
6. D dañ.
7. D N add: kyi; R add: kyis.
8. N gañ.
9. I provide here the Sanskrit equivalents of the 72 technical terms that are given in the Tibetan:
1. ḥdun pa: chanda; 2. bśam pa: āśaya; 3. sbyor pa: prayoga; 4. dge baḥi bśes gñen: kalyāṇamitra; 5. ṇa rgyal med pa: nirmāṇa; 6. rab ḥdud pa: praṇāma; 7. ri mor byed pa: mānānā; 8. ḥthun pa: anukula; 9. bkaḥ

pa dañ | sbyor bañi rnam pa dañ | dge bañi bśes gñen gyi rnam pa dañ | ña rgyal med pañi rnam pa dañ | rab tu (591) ḥdud pañi rnam pa dañ | ri mor byed pañi rnam pa dañ | ḥthun¹ pañi rnam pa dañ | bkaḥ blo bde bañi rnam pa dañ | bsñen bkur byed pañi rnam pa dañ | rna blags te² ñan pañi rnam pa dañ | bkur sti byed pañi rnam pa dañ | yid la byed pañi rnam pa dañ | mi g.yeñ bañi rnam pa dañ | rin po cher³ ḥdu śes pañi rnam pa dañ | sman du ḥdu śes pañi rnam pa dañ | nad thams cad rab tu źi bar byed pañi ḥdus śes kyi rnam pa dañ | dran pañi snod kyi rnam pa dañ | rtogs pa śes pañi rnam pa dañ | blo gros ḥdod pañi rnam pa dañ | blo la ḥjug pañi rnam pa dañ | sañs rgyas kyi chos thos pas mi ñoms pañi rnam pa dañ | gtoñ ba spel bañi rnam pa dañ | byin nas mi smod pañi rnam pa dañ | mañ du thos pa sten⁴ pañi rnam pa dañ | gus par dgaḥ ba myoñ bar byed pañi rnam pa dañ | lus sim pañi rnam pa dañ | sems rañs pañi rnam pa dañ | mi skyor ba ñan pañi rnam pa dañ | don ñan pañi rnam pa dañ | chos ñan pañi rnam pa dañ | nan tan ñan pañi rnam pa dañ | theg pa gžan (dag) la ḥdod pa med par

blo bde ba: suvacas; 10. bsñen bkur byed pa: paryupāsana; 11. ma ba blags te ñan pa: avahitaśruta; 12. bkur sti byed pa: satkāra; 13. yid la byed pa: manasakāra; 14. mi g.yeñ pa: atandrita; 15. rin po cher ḥdu śes: ratnasamjñā; 16. sman du ḥdu śes pa: bhaisajyasamjñā; 17. nad thams cad rab tu źir bar byed pañi ḥdu śes pa: sarvavyādhiśamana; 18. dran pañi snod: smṛtibhojana; 19. rtogs pa śes pa: gatibodhana; 20. blo gros ḥdod pa: matirocana; 21. blo la ḥjug pa: buddhipraveśa; 22. sañs rgyas kyi chos thos pas mi sgoms pa: atṛptabuddhadharmaśravaṇa; 23. gtoñ pa spel pa: tyagavṛhana; 24. sbyin nas mi smod pa: dāntājāneya; 25. mañ du thos pa sten pa: bahuśrutasevanā; 26. gus par dgaḥ ba myoñ bar byed pa: *gauravanandānubhavati; 27. lus sim pa: kāyauḍbilya; 28. sems rañs pa: cittaprahādana; 29. mi skyor bar ñan pa: aparikhedaśravaṇa; 30. don ñan pa: arthaśravaṇa; 31. chos ñan pa: dharmaśravaṇa; 32. nan tan ñan pa: pratipattiśravaṇa; 33. theg pa gžan la ḥdod pa med pa ñan pa: *parayānānarthika; 34. pha rol tu phyin pa ñan pa: prajñāpāramitāśravaṇa; 35. byañ chub sems dpañi sde snod ñan pa: bodhisattvapīṭakaśravaṇa; 36. bsdu bañi dños ñan pa: saṃgrahavastuśravaṇa; 37. thabs mkhas pa ñan pa: upāyakaśauśalyaśravaṇa; 38. tshañs pañi gñas pa ñan pa: brahmavihāraśravaṇa; 39. mñon par śes pa ñan pa: abhijñāśravaṇa; 40. dran pa ñe bar gžags pa ñan pa: smṛtisamprajanyaśravaṇa; 41. yañ dag par spoñ ba ñan pa: samyakprahāṇaśravaṇa; 42. rdzu ḥphrul gyi rkañ pa ñan pa: rddhipādaśravaṇa; 43. rten ciñ ḥbrel par ḥbyuñ ba ñan pa: pratītyasamutpādaśravaṇa; 44. mi rtag pa ñan pa: anityaśravaṇa; 45. sdud bsgnal ba ñan pa: duḥkhaśravaṇa; 46. bdag med pa ñan pa: anātmaśravaṇa; 47. źi ba ñan pa: śāntaśravaṇa; 48. stoñ pa ñid ñan pa: śūnyatāśravaṇa; 49. mtshan ma med pa ñan pa: apraṇihitaśravaṇa; 50. smon pa med pa ñan pa: animittaśravaṇa; 51. mñon par ḥdu mi byed pa ñan pa: anabhisamskāraśravaṇa; 52. dge bañi rtsa ba mñon par ḥdu byed pa ñan pa: kuśalābhisamskāraśravaṇa; 53. rañ dbañ du gyur pa: *svādiṣṭhāna; 54. chos ñam par ḥdu śes pa: *dharmanidhyapti; 55. kun tu ḥdre ba mi mthun pañi phyags su ḥdu śes pa: *samsargapratipakṣasamjñā; 56. ñon moñs pa thams cad tshar gcod pa: *sarvakleśanigrahasthāna; 57. mkhas pa la mñon par bgaḥ ba: pañḍitābhinandana; 58. ḥphags pa sten pa: āryasammatā; 59. ḥphags pa ma yin pa yoñs su spoñ pa: anāryaprasādana; 60. ḥphags pa ñan pa: satyadarśanaśravaṇa; 61. dbañ pa ñan pa: indriyaśravaṇa; 62. rjes su dran pa sgom pa ñan pa: *anusmṛtibhāvanāśravaṇa; 63. byañ chub kyi yan lag ñan pa: bodhyaṅgāniśravaṇa; 64. ḥphags pañi lam yan lag bgyad pa ñan pa: āryāṣṭāṅgamārgaśravaṇa; 65. de bžin gśegs pañi stobs ñan pa: tathāgatabalāniśravaṇa; 66. mi ḥjigs pa ñan pa: vaiśāradyaśravaṇa; 67. byams pa ñan pa: maitrīśravaṇa; 68. sñiñ pa ñan pa: karuṇāśravaṇa; 69. dgaḥ ba ñan pa: muditāśravaṇa; 70. gtañ sñoms chen po ñan pa: upekṣāśravaṇa; 71. so so yañ dag par rig pa ñan pa: pratisamvicchraṇa; 72. sañs rgyas kyi chos ma ḥdres pa bco bgyad mams ñan pa: āveṇikabuddhadharmaśravaṇa (Śikṣ: pp. 190–191; Akn: pp. 50.4.7–51.1.5; see also Appendix i).

10. P mos.

1. R mthun (throughout the text).

2. R rna ba blags te te.

3. P dkon mchog.

4. N bstan.

ñan¹ paḥi rnam pa dañ | pha rol tu phyin pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | bsdu baḥi dños po ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | thabs mkhas pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | tshañs paḥi gnas pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | mñon par śes pa ñan paḥi rnam pa (592) dañ |

dran pa ñe bar bźag pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | yañ dag par spoñ ba ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | rdzu ḥphrul gyi rkañ pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | rten ciñ ḥbrel par ḥbyuñ ba ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | mi rtag pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | sdug bsñal ba² ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | bdag med pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | źi ba ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | stoñ pa ñid ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | mtshan ma med pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | smon pa med pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | mñon par ḥdu mi byed pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | dge baḥi rtsa ba mñon par ḥdu byed pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | rañ dbañ du gyur paḥi rnam pa³ dañ | chos⁴ ñan par ḥdu śes paḥi rnam pa dañ | kun tu ḥdre ba mi ḥthun paḥi phyogs su ḥdu śes paḥi rnam pa dañ | ñon moñs pa thams cad tshar gcod paḥi rnam pa dañ | mkhas pa la mñon par dgaḥ baḥi rnam pa dañ | ḥphags pa sten⁵ paḥi rnam pa dañ | ḥphags pa ma yin pa yoñs su spoñ⁶ baḥi rnam pa dañ | ḥphags pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | dbañ po ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | rjes su dran pa sgom pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | byañ chub kyi yan lag ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | ḥphags paḥi lam yan lag brgyad pa ñan paḥi rnam pa dañ | de bźin gśegs paḥi stobs dañ | mi ḥjigs pa dañ | byams pa dañ | sñiñ rje dañ | dgaḥ ba dañ | btañ sñoms chen po dañ | (593) so so yañ dag par rig pa dañ | sañs rgyas kyi chos ma ḥdres pa bcu brgyad rnams ñan paḥi rnam pa ste |

1.1.2

śā riḥi bu de ltar gañ na thos pa de ni⁷ śes paḥo || gañ na śes pa de ni nan tan no || de ciḥi phyir ze na | gañ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam grañs la mos pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

gañ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam grañs la bsam pa yod pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam grañs la sbyor ba yod pa de ni thos par ḥgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ dge baḥi bśes gñen la rten⁸ par byed pa de ni thos par

1. P om: par ñan.
2. P sdug bsñal.
3. P bdag la rag las paḥi rnam pa, for D N R rañ dbañ du gyur paḥi rnam pa.
4. N kun tu chos.
5. D N R bsten; P bstan.
6. D R spañ.
7. D R na; N om: pa de ni.
8. D P sten; N brten.

hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ ña rgyal med pa de ni thos
 par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ mañ du thos pa (de) la
 rab tu ḥdud pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ
 mañ du thos pa de¹ la ri mor byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes
 nas nan tan byed do || gañ ḥthun par ḥdzin pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so ||
 śes nas nan (594) tan byed do || gañ bkañ blo bde ba de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu
 śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

gañ mañ du thos pa (de) la bsñen bkur byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes
 so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ rna ba blags te ñan pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab
 tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ mañ du thos pa (de) la bkur sti² byed pa de ni thos
 par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ ḥchad pa dañ | gañ mañ
 du thos pa (de la)³ yid la byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas
 nan tan byed do || gañ mañ du thos pa (de) la⁴ rin po cher⁵ ḥdu śes pa de ni thos par hgyur
 ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ mañ du thos pa (de) la rtsir⁶ ḥdu
 śes pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ mañ du
 thos pa thos nas ḥdod chags dañ | ze sdañ dañ | gti mug rab tu zi bar ḥdu śes pa de ni thos par
 hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ mañ du thos pa thos nas⁷
 ḥdzin par ḥdu śes pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do
 || gañ chos rnams rtogs par khoñ du chud pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so ||
 śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ mañ du thos par blo gros ḥdod pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos
 nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ mañ du thos pa thos nas | blo nam par mi⁸
 g.yo ba de ni thos par hgyur ro || (595) thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ
 thos pas mi ñoms pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do
 ||

gañ sbyin pañi gtam thos nas gtoñ bar rtog pa⁹ de ni thos par hgyur ro || gañ tshul khrims
 kyi gtam thos nas tshul khrims sruñ¹⁰ ba de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes

1. N om: de.
2. N bsti.
3. D P R thos par; N pa.
4. D N R om: la.
5. P dkon mchog du.
6. P sman du.
7. D R na.
8. D P R om: mi.
9. N sbyin pa gtoñ bar byed pa.
10. N bsruñ.

nas nan tan byed do || gañ bzod pañi gtam thos nas bzod par byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro ||
 thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ brtson hgrus kyi gtam thos nas brtson
 hgrus ma ñams par byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan
 byed do || gañ bsam gtan gyi gtam thos nas sems mi g.yeñ bar byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro
 || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ śes rab kyi gtam thos nas zag pa zad
 pa la¹ sems gźol bar byed pa de ni thos par (596) hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas
 nan tan byed do ||

gañ mañ du thos pa (de la)² dgañ ba skye ba de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes
 so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ chos thos nas lus sim par byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro ||
 thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ chos thos nas rañs par byed pa de ni
 thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

gañ theg pa chen po thos nas mos par hgyur ba de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes
 so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ bsdu bañi dños po thos nas gañ bsdu bar sems skyed³ pa
 de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ dran pa ñe bar
 bźag pañi gtam thos nas | dran pa lus la žugs pa⁴ dañ | dran pa tshor ba la žugs pa dañ | dran
 pa sems la žugs pa dañ | dran pa chos la žugs pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes
 so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ yañ dag par spoñ bañi gtam thos nas mi dge ba skyes śiñ
 byuñ ba dag la⁵ khrel žiñ ño tsha bar hgyur ba de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes
 so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

gañ dge bañi chos skyes śiñ byuñ ba la mi gtoñ bar blo hjug pa (597) de ni thos par hgyur
 ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

gañ rdzu hphrul gyi rkañ pañi gtam thos nas lus yañ ba dañ | sems yañ ba dañ | hdun pa⁶
 yañ ba skye ba de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ
 bsam gtan gyi gtam thos nas ñes par⁷ rtog pa la sems gtoñ⁸ ba de ni thos par hgyur ro ||
 thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ tshad med pañi gtam thos nas sems can
 thams cad la byams pa dañ | hphoñs⁹ par gyur pa mams la sñiñ rje che ba¹⁰ | chos la dgañ ba

1. N las.
2. D N P R thos par.
3. N bskyes.
4. P soñ ba (also in the following three instances).
5. P gis.
6. P sred pa.
7. P om: ñes par.
8. P gźol.
9. D N phoñs; P des.
10. D om: che; N chen po.

dañ | mi dge ba la btañ sñoms pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ dbaṅ poḥi gtam thos nas dad paḥi dbaṅ po dañ | brtson hgrus kyi dbaṅ po dañ | dran paḥi dbaṅ po dañ | tiñ ñe ḥdzin gyi dbaṅ po dañ | śes rab kyi dbaṅ po la sems hjug¹ par byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ byañ chub kyi yan lag gi gtam thos nas chos thams cad khoṅ du chud par bya baḥi phyir sems hjug par byed pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do || gañ lam gyi gtam thos nas mya ñan las (598) ḥdaḥ bar hgro ba la sems hjug pa de ni thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

gañ de bzin gśegs paḥi stobs dañ | mi hjigs pa dañ | byams pa dañ | sñiñ rje dañ | dgaḥ ba dañ | btañ sñoms chen po dañ | so so yañ dag par rig pa dañ | sañs rgyas kyi chos ma ḥdres pa bcu brgyad yañ dag par bslab pa² sañs rgyas kyi chos tshad med pa thos nas bla na med pa yañ dag par rdzogs paḥi byañ chub tu sems hjug ste | de thos par hgyur ro || thos nas rab tu śes so || śes nas nan tan byed do ||

śā riḥi bu ḥdi ni³ thos paḥi mnam pa la hjug pa mnam pa bzi bcu rtsa gcig ces bya ste | śā riḥi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpaḥ⁴ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la⁵ spyod do ||

1.1.3

śā riḥi bu gzan yañ byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa | byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi mnam grañs śin tu mñan | blañs | bzuñ | bklags | kun chub par byas | gzan la yañ⁶ bśad ciñ rgya cher yañ dag par rab tu bstan na⁷ nan tan sñiñ por byed pa yin no || chos rnams la nan tan byed pa gañ ze na | gañ ji ltar bstan pa bzin du gnas pa ste | de ni chos la nan tan byed paḥo⁸ ||

gzan yañ chos la nan tan byed pa de⁹ ni gañ chos thams cad mi len paḥo || de ciḥi phyir ze na | chos rnams len na¹⁰ yañ log paḥi nan tan du hgyur te | gañ zag (599) gañ chos len par gnas pa de¹¹ ni chos de dag las ḥbyuñ bar hgyur baḥi gnas dañ skabs med de | de ni gnas med

1. P gźol (also in the next three occurrences of the term ‘hjug’).
2. P dag dañ, for D N R yañ dag par bslab pa.
3. P gzan, for D N R ḥdi ni.
4. N dpaḥi.
5. P om: la (also in all further instances of this regularly reoccurring stock phrase).
6. N om: yañ.
7. N P nas.
8. N R do.
9. D N P om: de.
10. N om: na.
11. D P R om: de.

paḥo || gañ zag mi len par spyod pa rnam kyañ bsa¹ baḥi phyir | chos ḥdi dag la nan tan du
bžag² pa the tshom du ḥgyur na | chos len par spyod pa rnam lta smos kyañ ci dgos te | de
bas na chos thams cad mi len pa ni³ nan tan no ||

gžan yañ gañ chos rnam la mi sgrib pa de ni nan tan žes byaḥo || gañ chos rnam la rlom
sems⁴ med pa dañ | gañ chos rnam mi len pa dañ | mi rlom pa dañ | mi skye ba dañ | mi ḥgog
pa de ni nan tan žes byaḥo ||

gžan yañ⁵ chos rnam la bsnan⁶ pa med pa dañ | bsa ba med pa de ni nan tan žes byaḥo ||
gžan yañ gañ du cuñ zad kyañ ma bśad | ji ltar bśad pa bžin du mi snañ ba de lta bu ni chos
thams cad mi snañ ba⁷ | mi blañ ba | mtshan ñid gcig paḥo || mtshan ñid gañ že na | ḥdi lta
ste | mtshan ñid med paḥo || mtshan ñid ces bya ba⁸ ni mtshan ñid med pa ste | de ni gñi ga
las ḥgyur ro || de ciḥi phyir že na | kun brtags pa ḥam | yañ dag par brtags pa de ñid mtshan
ñid⁹ med par bśad pa yin no || ḥdi ni mtshan ñid do | ḥdi ni mtshan ñid ma yin paḥo žes | ḥdi
lta ste | chos thams cad la mtshan ñid med pa | mi snañ ba | blañ ba med par rtogs pa de ni nan
tan žes byaḥo || nan tan la brtson par gyis śig | chos thams cad mi sgrib par snañ ba thob par
gyis śig || (600)

de nas deḥi tshe bcom ldan ḥdas kyis tshigs su bcaḍ pa ḥdi dag gsuñs so ||

gañ žig byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod la ||

śin tu nes par nan tan gnas byed pa ||

mkhas pa de ni chos la ḥdzin¹⁰ mi byed ||

mi ḥdzin pas na nan tan de ḥdraḥo ||

mis ni chos rñed stoñ par mi byed do ||¹¹

chos laḥañ de ni stoñ par rlom sems med¹² ||

stoñ paḥi chos la rlom sems¹³ gañ yañ med ||

1. P bstsal (also in all subsequent occurrences of the word 'sel ba').

2. N gžag.

3. N len paḥi.

4. D N R rlom sems; P sñems pa.

5. P add: kyañ.

6. D P bstan.

7. N om: mi snañ ba.

8. N om: ba.

9. P om: mtshan ñid.

10. P len (also in the next line).

11. P chos rñed stoñ pa ñid du mi byed min.

12. P stoñ pa sñems mi byed.

13. P sñems pa (also in the following three occurrences of the word 'rlom sems').

rlom sems med phyir nan tan de ḥdraḥo ||

chos la len pa med ciñ ḥdor ba med ||
 chos ni chos la len par byed pa med ||
 len pa med phyir ḥdi ni chos kyi mtshan ||
 ḥdi¹ ḥdra ba ni nan tan źes byaḥo ||

gañ phyir chos la nams kyañ de mi chags ||
 de la de yi ye śes blañs mi ḥgyur ||
 ye śes ma blañs de laḥaṇ rlom sems med ||
 ḥdi ḥdra ba ni² nan tan źes byaḥo ||

mkhas pa³ sbyaṇs paḥi⁴ yon tan gnas par gyis ||
 chos ḥdi dag la śin tu brtson par gyis ||
 cho ga spyod pa dag la gnas gyur na ||
 deḥi tshe de yi sgo ni dag par ḥgyur ||

sgo dag na ni chos ḥdi ḥdra ba śes ||
 de na sems la bsam paḥaṇ śes par ḥgyur ||
 mkhas pas de tshe bsam pa śes nas ni ||
 ḥdi ḥdra ba yi chos kyañ ḥchad par ḥgyur ||

zab moḥi chos la don dam mkhas⁵ gyur nas ||
 rtag tu don la mam par gdon mi za⁶ ||
 spyod pa mthaḥ yas yon tan rnams kyis ḥphags ||
 mkhas pa mañ du thos pa rgya mtsho⁷ ḥdra ||

-
1. D N de.
 2. D P R la; N laḥaṇ.
 3. D N pas.
 4. P nan tan.
 5. P bstsal.
 6. N add: ba.
 7. P add: mi rnams.

de yi don dañ tshig ḥbru¹ dag la yañ || (601)
 mthaḥ ma rtogs par ruñ ba ma yin zin ||²
 don kyañ mthaḥ yas tshig ḥbru mthaḥ yas te ||
 nan tan sñiñ por byed pa mi ḥkhrugs ḥgyur ||

śā riḥi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do³ ||

1.1.4

śā riḥi bu gzan yañ byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la⁴ spyod pa⁵ |
 byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam grañs śin tu ñan pa nas | gzan la rgya cher
 bstan paḥi bar du byas nas ma rig paḥi mun pa mun nag mun pa rab rib stug po bsal⁶ baḥi
 phyir | chos thams cad la snañ ba thob ste | śes rab kyi snañ baḥo || de snañ ba⁷ thob pas dge
 ba dañ mi dge baḥi chos rnams rab tu śes te | de srog gi phyir yañ mi dge baḥi chos la mi gnas
 te | de mi dge baḥi chos rnams spañ baḥi phyir | ji ltar thos paḥi chos rnams rtogs pas na | dge
 ba thub pa zi ba zes byaḥo ||

de nas bcom ldan ḥdas kyis deḥi tshe tshigs su bcad pa ḥdi dag gsuñs so ||

ji ltar mun pas khyab bsgribs pa⁸ ||
 khyim du žugs par gyur na ni ||
 yod par gyur paḥi gzugs⁹ rnams kyañ ||
 mig gis mthon bar mi ḥgyur ro ||

de bzin du ni ḥdi la yañ ||
 la¹⁰ laḥi mi dag skyes gyur kyañ ||
 dge ba dañ ni sdig paḥi chos ||

1. P yi ge (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term ‘tshig ḥbru’).
2. P mthaḥ ma khon du chud par mi nus te.
3. P paḥo (also in all subsequent occurrences of this stock-phrase).
4. D P R om: la.
5. P add: na (also in all subsequent occurrences of this stock phrase).
6. R gsal.
7. D N add: de.
8. P paḥi; N pas.
9. N gzug.
10. D rtal.

ma thos par ni śes mi ḥgyur¹ ||

thos nas chos rnams mam par śes ||

thos nas sdig pa sten² mi byed ||

thos nas gnod pa spoñ bar (602) byed ||

thos nas mya ñan ḥdas pa ḥthob ||

thos par ḥdod pas thos pa ḥphel ||

thos pas śes rab ḥphel bar ḥgyur ||

śes rab kyis³ ni don rnams sbyoñ ||

don thob nas ni bde ḥthob ḥgyur ||⁴

don thob de ni yid rno⁵ ste ||

tshe ḥdi la ni mya ñan ḥdas ||

chos la sbyor źiñ gtsaṅ la mkhas ||

śin tu bde ba ḥthob par ḥgyur ||

byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ni ||

thos nas chos ñid gnas par ḥgyur⁶ ||

ḥjig rten la⁷ ni snañ gyur nas ||

byañ chub kyi ni⁸ spyad pa spyod ||

śā riḥi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

1.2

śā riḥi bu gzan yañ byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa | byañ
chub sems dpaḥi sde snod⁹ ḥdzin paḥi gañ zag la dge baḥi bśes gñen du ḥdu śes bskyed nas |

1. R nus.
2. N bstan; R bsten.
3. P byañ chub śes rab kyis; N śes rab kyi.
4. N om: entire last line of verse.
5. P gzuñs.
6. P thos nas chos ñid la gnas te.
7. P gyi.
8. P byañ chub sems dpaḥi.
9. P add: kyi mam grañs.

byañ chub sems dpañi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam grañs ḥdi ñid la śin tu byañ bar byed |
 rnam par dag par byed do || byañ chub sems dpañi sde snod ḥdiñi don gyi phyir ḥdun pa
 skyed | ḥbad par byed | brtson ḥgrus rtsom par byed | sems la rab tu ḥdzin par byed | yañ dag
 par rab tu ḥjog par¹ byed de | de yañ dag par spoñ ba bñi la rab tu žugs pas | chos thams cad
 la sgrib pa med pa ḥthob po ||

de nas deñi tshe bcom ldan ḥdas kyis tshigs su bcad pa ḥdi dag gsuñs so ||

chos smra ba ni gañ yin pa ||²

de la dge bañi (603) bñes su sems ||³

rtag par nan tan gnas gyur nas ||

chos la nan tan byas te ñan ||

rtag par ḥdun pa ḥbri mi byed ||

rtag par brtson ḥgrus śin tu ḥphags ||

rtag par⁴ śes rab rnam par sbyoñ ||

ye śes la ni rtag tu gnas ||

de ni bdag ñid⁵ chos śes te ||

dad pañi phyir ni ḥgro mi byed ||

sañs rgyas kyis ni gañ bñad pa⁶ ||

mi g.yo ba yi chos śes so ||

mkhas pa de dag tshig rnams ḥbyed la⁷ mkhas ||

bslabs pa don la khoñ du chud par byed ||

de dag dkar poñi phyogs ni rtag par sbyoñ ||

nag poñi phyogs ni rtag tu spyoñ bar byed ||

de yi sems la nams kyañ ñams pa med ||

1. P smon par, for D N R rab tu ḥjog par.
2. P gañ dag chos ni smra ba la.
3. P dge bañi bñes gñen du ḥdi sems.
4. N rñam rtag.
5. P ñañ.
6. P pañi.
7. P gi rnam pa, for D N R rnams ḥbyed la.

de ni chos rnams gañ lahañ zum pa med¹ ||
 lus yañ² de bzin sems dañ brtson hgrus dañ ||
 hdun pa yañ bañ³ myur du hthob par hgyur ||

chos thos nas ni ses rab hphe bar hgyur ||
 ye ses rnam par rtogs nas dran mi ñams ||
 dran dañ ye ses la ni rtag gnas nas ||
 dge dañ mi dgehi chos ni rab tu ses ||

bla na med pañi chos rnams bsalabs nas ni ||
 rtogs dañ dran pa ses rab stobs mchog thob ||
 ji ltar bdag ñid⁴ yun riñ bsalabs pa bzin ||
 des ni sems can rnams kyi bsam pa ses ||

chos bsalabs nas ni khyad par hthob hgyur te ||
 khyad par thob ciñ ye ses dag gyur nas ||
 de ni sems can rnams kyi bsam pa ses ||
 de phyir bsam pa bzin du chos ston to ||

śā rihi bu de ltar na byañ chub (604) sems dpañ ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do
 || bam po bcu bdun pa ||⁵

1.3

1.3.1

śā rihi bu gzan yañ byañ chub sems dpañ ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin la spyod pa de ltar
 blo sbyaṅs pa dañ | de ltar chos snañ bañi sgo śin tu yonś su dag pas hdi ltar slob ste | hpbags
 pañi yañ dag par lta ba hbyuñ ba (de) ni rgyu gñis dañ | rkyen gñis te | gñis gañ ze na | gzan

-
1. P mi hgyur.
 2. P yañ ba; R kyañ.
 3. P yod pa, for D N R yañ bañ.
 4. P gis.
 5. D P om: bam po bcu bdun pa.

gyi sgra dañ | bdag ñid¹ tshul bzin yid la byed paḥo ||

de ḥdi sñam du sams te | gzan gyi sgra de gañ | bdag ñid tshul bzin² yid la byed pa de gañ
 ze na | de de ltar tshul bzin yid la byed pa na | ḥdi sñam du sams par ḥgyur te | rnal ḥbyor
 spyod pa gañ dag byañ chub sams dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi nam grañs ḥdi ma thos |
 ḥphags paḥi chos ḥdul ba ma thos par | tiñ ñe ḥdzin tsam gyis dgaḥ ba rñed³ nas | ña rgyal
 gyi dbañ gyis che baḥi ña rgyal du lhuñ ba de dag ni skye ba dañ | rga ba dañ | na ba dañ |
 ḥchi ba dañ | mya ñan dañ | smre sñags ḥdon pa dañ | sdug bsñal ba dañ | yid mi bde ba⁴ dañ
 | ḥkhrug pa las yoñs su mi thar | sdug bsñal gyi phuñ po las yoñs su mi thar te | de dag la de
 bzin gśegs pas dgoñs nas ḥdi skad gsuñs so || pha rol la rjes su ḥthun pa thos pa ni rga ba dañ
 ḥchi ba las nam par grol baḥo ||

yañ bcom ldan ḥdas kyis gsuñs so⁵ ||

chos namts thos nas nam par śes ||

thos nas (605) sdig pa mi byed do ||

thos nas gnod pa spoñ bar ḥgyur ||

thos nas mya ñan ḥdas pa ḥthob ||

thos ḥdod⁶ thos pa ḥphel bar ḥgyur ||

thos pas śes rab ḥphel bar ḥgyur ||

śes rab kyis ni don namts sbyoñ ||

don rñed nas ni bde ḥthob ḥgyur ||

don rñed de ni yid rno ste ||

tshe ḥdi la ni mya ñan ḥdas ||

chos gtsañ mkhas pa gtsañ ba⁷ dañ ||

mchog⁸ tu bde ba ḥthob par ḥgyur ||

1. P la (also in the next phrase).

2. N add: du.

3. P tshor.

4. P yi mug pa, for D N R yid mi bde ba.

5. D N P R pa.

6. P pas.

7. D gtsañ ma.

8. P śin.

1.3.2

sā rihi bu de ltar byañ chub sems dpaḥ¹ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs ḥphags paḥi chos ḥdul ba śin tu mñan par bya | blaṅ bar bya | gzuṅ bar bya | bklag par bya | kun chub par bya | gzan la yaṅ rgya cher yaṅ dag par rab tu bstan par byaḥo ||

sā rihi bu gaṅ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam graṅs ḥdi mi ñan pa daṅ | tshul bzin du sbyor bar mi byed pa de dag ni ḥphags paḥi lam las yoṅs su ñams par² ḥgyur te | de la dgoṅs nas de bzin gsegs pa ḥdi skad du | bdag ñid tshul bzin yid la byed pa (de) ni rga ba daṅ³ ḥchi ba las grol baḥo || zes gsuṅ ño ||

de ḥdi ltar slob ste | byañ chub sems dpaḥi tshul bzin sbyor ba ni gaṅ ji ltar na⁴ byañ chub sems dpaḥ tshul bzin sbyor ba yin sñam nas | de ḥdi ltar slob ste | byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po ni chos gaṅ lahaṅ sbyor bar mi byed | rab tu sbyor bar mi byed do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba zes bya ba de ni mi sbyor baḥi tshig bla dags so ||

gzan yaṅ byañ chub (606) sems dpaḥ tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni sgra ḥbyin par mi byed | zlos pa ḥbyin par mi byed | gaṅ nas sgra ḥbyuṅ ba de yaṅ mi dmigs | sgra de ñid gaṅ nas byuṅ⁵ gaṅ du ḥgag ces sñon gyi mthaḥ daṅ phyi maḥi mthaḥ la rtog par byed do || gaṅ smras ba daṅ | gaṅ smra ba daṅ | gaṅ smra bar ḥgyur ba daṅ | gaṅ gi⁶ smras ba daṅ | gaṅ gi smra ba daṅ | gaṅ gi smra bar ḥgyur ba daṅ | gaṅ⁷ spoṅ baḥi phyir smras ba daṅ | gaṅ spoṅ baḥi phyir smra ba daṅ | gaṅ spoṅ baḥi phyir smra bar ḥgyur ba daṅ | gaṅ khoṅ du chud par bya baḥi phyir smras ba daṅ | gaṅ khoṅ du chud par bya baḥi phyir smra ba daṅ | gaṅ khoṅ du chud par bya baḥi phyir smra bar ḥgyur ba de thams cad yoṅs su btsal na ḥdas paḥi rnam pa daṅ | ma ḥoṅs paḥi rnam pa daṅ | da ltar byuṅ baḥi rnam par mi dmigs pa de ni | deḥi tshul bzin du⁸ sbyor baḥo || zes de de ltar slob bo ||

byañ chub sems dpaḥ de ltar tshul bzin du sbyor bas ji ltar na⁹ tshul bzin du mthoṅ ze na | de ḥdi ltar slob ste | gaṅ gi tshe na byañ chub sems dpaḥ chos thams cad raṅ bzin gyis ḥgags par mthoṅ ba deḥi tshe tshul bzin mthoṅ ño || gaṅ gi tshe chos thams cad raṅ bzin gyis ñe bar

-
1. D R dpas.
 2. P bri bar.
 3. D add: na ba daṅ.
 4. N om: na.
 5. N ḥbyuṅ.
 6. D N gaṅ gis (also in the following two clauses).
 7. P gaṅ gi (also in the following two clauses).
 8. N add: du.
 9. N om: na.

ʒi bar¹ mthoñ ba dehi tshe tshul bzin mthoñ ño || gañ gi tshe chos thams cad rnam par ʒi bar
 mthoñ ba dehi tshe tshul bzin mthoñ ño || gañ gi tshe chos thams cad rañ bzin gyis sñoms par
 ma ʒugs par mthoñ ba dehi tshe tshul bzin mthoñ ño || (607) gañ gi tshe chos thams cad ma
 skyes par mthoñ ba dehi tshe tshul bzin mthoñ ño || gañ gi tshe chos thams cad ma byuñ bar
 mthoñ ba dehi tshe tshul bzin mthoñ ño || gañ gi tshe chos thams cad śin tu yañ dag par ma
 byuñ bar mthoñ ba dehi tshe tshul bzin mthoñ ño || gañ gi tshe chos thams cad mya ñan las
 ḥdas par mthoñ ba dehi tshe tshul bzin mthoñ ño || de gañ gis mthoñ ba de la yañ rtog ste | ci
 nas kyañ mi mthoñ ba dañ mi rtog pa de ltar mthoñ ste | de ltar mthoñ na tshul bzin mthoñ ba
 ʒes byaḥo ||

yañ ḥdi ltar slob ste | byañ chub sems dpañ tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni | chos gañ la yañ the
 tshom dañ rmoñs pa med do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ la yañ sgrib pa med do ||
 tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ la yañ² thar pañi sgor mi ḥgyur ba med do || tshul bzin du
 sbyor ba ni chos gañ la³ yañ spañ bar bya bañi phyir ḥbad ba med do || tshul bzin du sbyor
 ba ni chos gañ la yañ rtogs par bya bañi phyir ḥbad ba med do || gañ chos⁴ thams cad yañ
 dag par mthoñ ba dañ | ji lta ba bzin du mthoñ ba de ni yañ dag par lta baḥo ||

chos thams cad ji lta ba bzin du mthoñ ba gañ ʒe na | ḥdi lta ste | ma mthoñ baḥo || ma
 mthoñ ba ʒes bya ba de ni ma skyes pañi tshig bla dgas so || ma skyes⁵ pa ʒes bya ba de ni
 yañ dag par ma byuñ bañi tshig bla dgas so || yañ dag par ma byuñ ba ʒes bya ba gañ ʒe na |
 de ni mi snañ bañi tshig bla dgas te | (608) de bzin gśegs pas de la dgoñs nas ḥdu byed thams
 cad mi skye bar mthoñ na yañ dag pa ñid du ñes pa⁶ la ḥjug ste | ḥdi lta ste | yañ dag pa ñid
 du ñes pa la ḥjug pa de ni yañ dag par lta baḥo || ʒes de skad gsuñ ño ||

de ḥdi sñam du sems te | de ciñi phyir ʒe⁷ na | yañ dag pa ñid du ñes pa la ḥjug ʒes bya ʒes
 do⁸ || ḥdi ltar slob ste | chos thams cad gañ dañ mñam pa sañs rgyas kyi chos de dañ mñam
 ste | de bas na yañ dag pa ñid du ñes pa la ḥjug paḥo⁹ ||

de lta bas na yañ dag pa ñid du ñes pa la ḥjug par ḥdod pa rnams kyis | byañ chub sems
 dpañi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam grañs ḥdi ñid śin tu mñan par bya | blañ bar bya | gzuñ bar
 bya | bklag par bya | kun chub par byaḥo || byañ chub sems dpañi sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam

1. N om: ʒi bar; P om: ñe bar.

2. D P R add: gañ.

3. D R om: la.

4. N chos gañ chos.

5. N skyed.

6. P skyon med pa, for D N R ñid du ñes pa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term 'ñid du ñes pa').

7. D N om: ʒe.

8. P add: de ltar rtog pa las; N add: la.

9. N om: de bas na yañ dag pa ñid du ñes pa la ḥjug paḥo.

graṅs ḥdi ṇid laḥaṅ tshul bzin du sbyor bar bya ste | sā rihi bu de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpah
śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

1.3.3

sā rihi bu gzan yaṅ byaṅ chub sems dpah śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa¹ de
ltar blo śin tu yoṅs su sbyaṅs pa daṅ | de ltar chos² snaṅ baḥi sgo śin tu yoṅs su dag pas tshul
bzin du ḥjug pa la brtson na | tshul bzin gyi tshig mthoṅ ṇo ||

de la tshul bzin du ḥjug pa gaṅ tshul bzin gyi tshig gaṅ ze na | de ltar byaṅ chub sems dpah
tshul bzin du ḥjug pa ni | ḥdi lta ste | ži gnas kyi gnas³ la ḥjug pa daṅ | lhag mthoṅ rnam par
rtog pa la ḥjug pa⁴ ni (609) tshul bzin du ḥjug paḥo || lus dben par ḥjug pa daṅ | sems yid du
ḥoṅ bar ḥjug pa daṅ | chad pa ma yin par ḥjug pa daṅ | rtag pa ma yin par ḥjug pa daṅ | rgyu
daṅ rkyen la ḥjug pa daṅ | rten ciṅ ḥbrel par ḥbyuṅ ba la ḥjug pa daṅ | sems can med pa daṅ |
srog med pa daṅ | gaṅ zag med pa la ḥjug pa daṅ | ma ḥoṅs ma phyin mi gnas pa la ḥjug pa
daṅ | mi ḥpho ba daṅ | rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu chud mi za ba daṅ | rgyu stoṅ pa ṇid du rnam par
ḥbyed pa⁵ la ḥjug pa daṅ | mtshan ma med par ḥdris par bya ba la ḥjug pa daṅ | smon pa med
par rab tu śes pa la ḥjug kyaṅ stoṅ pa ṇid daṅ | mtshan ma med pa daṅ⁶ smon pa med pa len
par ḥjug pa ma yin pa daṅ |

tiṅ ṇe ḥdzin daṅ sṇoms par ḥjug pa⁷ len pa la ḥjug kyaṅ | tiṅ ṇe ḥdzin gyi dbaṅ gis skye ba
la mi ḥjug pa daṅ | mṇon par śes paḥi ye śes len pa la ḥjug kyaṅ | zag pa zad pa la mi ḥjug pa
daṅ | mi skye bar rtog pa la ḥjug kyaṅ | ṇes par gyur bar ḥgro ba⁸ la mi ḥjug pa daṅ | sems
can thams cad⁹ bdag med par rtog par ḥjug kyaṅ | sṇiṅ rje chen po gtoṅ ba la mi ḥjug pa daṅ
| skye ba thams cad ḥjig par mthoṅ ba la ḥjug kyaṅ¹⁰ | srid pa bsam gyis mi khyab pa len pa
la (mi) ḥjug pa daṅ | mya ṇan ḥdas bar ḥdod pa la ḥjug kyaṅ | chos mṇon du bya ba la mi ḥjug
pa daṅ | ḥdod paḥi yon tan gyi dgaḥ ba btaṅ sṇoms pa¹¹ la ḥjug kyaṅ | chos kyi dgaḥ ba ḥdor

1. P add: na.

2. N om: chos.

3. P byin gyi rlabs (also in the next occurrence of the term 'gnas pa' (adhiṣṭhāna)).

4. N om: ḥjug pa.

5. P rab tu rtogs pa

In P, 'rab tu rtogs pa' regularly substitutes the D N R compound 'rnam par ḥbyed pa' (pravacaya).

6. N P R om: mtshan ma med pa daṅ.

7. P bžag pa; N ḥjug pa la.

8. P skyon med pa las ḥdaḥ pa, for D N R ṇes par gyur bar ḥgro ba.

9. P add: kyi.

10. N R daṅ.

11. N dgaḥ bar btaṅ sṇoms; P dgaḥ bar ṇes sṇoms pa.

ba la mi hjug pa dañ | (610) rtog pa spros pa thams cad gtoñ ba la hjug kyañ | thabs mkhas pa gtoñ ba la mi hjug pa ste | šā rihi bu de ni tshul bzin du hjug pa zes byaño ||

šā rihi bu de la¹ tshul bzin gyi tshig ces bya ba gañ ze na | rigs pañi tshig de ni tshul bzin gyi tshig go | šā rihi bu gzan yañ tshul bzin gyi tshig de ni tshul gyi² tshig go | de ni sgoñi tshig go | de ni khañi tshig go | de ni rgyuñi tshig go | de ni rab tu rnam par hbyed pañi tshig go | de ni mi hgal bañi tshig go | de ni mi rtsod pañi tshig go | de ni btañ sñoms kyi tshig go | mi len pañi tshig dañ | mi hñor bañi tshig dañ | mi spros pañi tshig dañ | mi bsnan pañi tshig dañ | ma bri bañi tshig dañ | mi skye bañi tshig dañ | rtsod bañi gzi med pañi tshig³ dañ | mi ldog pañi tshig dañ | gñen po med pañi tshig dañ |

de kho nañi tshig dañ | de bzin kho nañi tshig dañ | ma log pa de bzin ñid kyi tshig dañ | gzan ma yin pa de bzin ñid kyi tshig dañ | de bzin ñid kyi tshig dañ | ji lta ba bzin gyi tshig dañ | dus gsum mñam pañi tshig⁴ dañ | yoñs su chad pañi tshig dañ | gzugs rnam par šes pañi gnas med pañi tshig dañ | tshor ba dañ | hdu šes dañ | hdu byed dañ | rnam par šes pa gnas med pañi tshig go |

de ni mig dañ | gzugs dañ | mig gi rnam par šes pañi khams gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni rna ba dañ | sgra dañ | rna bañi rnam par šes pañi khams gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni sna dañ | dri dañ | snañi rnam par šes pañi khams gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni ltse dañ | (611) ro dañ | ltseñi rnam par šes pañi khams gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni lus dañ | reg dañ⁵ | lus kyi rnam par šes pañi khams gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni yid dañ | chos dañ | yid kyi rnam par šes pañi khams gnas med pañi tshig go | de ni don la rton pañi tshig go | de ni chos la rton pañi tshig go | de ni ye šes la rton pañi tshig go | de ni ñes pañi don gyi mdo sde la rton pañi tshig ste | šā rihi bu de ni tshul bzin gyi tshig go ||

de ltar byañ chub sems dpañ tshul bzin du hjug pa la brtson pa | tshul bzin gyi tshig mthoñ ba (de) ni gañ gis mthoñ ba de ñid mi mthoñ ste | ji ltar⁶ mi mthoñ | rnam par mi mthoñ ba⁷ de ltar mthoñ ño || de ltar mthoñ na tshul bzin mthoñ ba zes byaño ||

šā rihi bu gzan⁸ yañ byañ chub sems dpañ tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ la yañ rmoñs par mi hgyur ro || byañ chub sems dpañ tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ yañ⁹ thar pañi

1. D P om: de la.

2. P rigs pañi, for D N R tshul gyi.

3. D N R rtsod bañi gzi med pañi tshig; P mi hñab pañi tshig.

4. P R dus gsum mñam pañi tshig, for D dus gsum mñam pa ñid kyi tshig.

5. P om: reg dañ.

6. P add: mi rtog.

7. P om: rnam par mi mthoñ ba.

8. D N R om: gzan.

9. D P add: gañ.

sgor mi hgyur ba med do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ yañ spoñ bañi phyir hbad pa med do || tshul bzin du sbyor ba ni chos gañ yañ rtogs par bya bañi phyir hbad pa med do || gañ chos thams cad yañ dag par¹ mthoñ ba dañ | ji lta ba bzin du² mthoñ ba de ni yañ dag par lta baño ||

chos thams cad ji lta ba bzin du mthoñ ba gañ ze na | hdi lta ste | mi mthoñ baño || mi mthoñ ba gañ ze na | de ni ma skyes bañi tshig bla dags so || ma skyes pa zes bya ba gañ ze na | de ni (612) mi snañ bañi bar gyi tshig bla dags te | rgya cher ji ltar snar bzlas³ pa de ltar de bzin du bzlas par bya ste | de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

sā rihi bu gzan yañ byañ chub sems dpañ ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa hdi ltar slob ste | chos thams cad ni bdag bzin du tshul bzin te⁴ || ji ltar bdag la bdag med pa de bzin du chos thams cad bdag med par mthoñ ño || ji ltar sems can bdag med pa⁵ de bzin du | chos thams cad bdag med par mthoñ ste | de ltar mthoñ na tshul bzin du mthoñ ño ||

gañ tshul bzin hkhör bañi khams mthoñ ba [de tshul bzin]⁶ | mya ñan las hñas pañi khams dañ ldan par mthoñ ba ste | de ni tshul bzin du sbyor ba zes byaño || de ni chos thams cad kyi rañ bzin la ñon moñs pañi rañ bzin du bye brag med pa dañ ldan par mthoñ ño⁷ || rnal hbyor dañ rnal hbyor ma yin par yañ⁸ mi sñems so || tshul bzin du⁹ sbyor bas tshul bzin mthoñ ste | tshul bzin gyi sbyor ba ji sñed pa sems can gyi gnas thams cad kyañ de sñed do || sems can gyi gnas¹⁰ kyañ mi mthoñ¹¹ | chos kyi gnas kyañ hkhörug par mi byed pa de ni byañ chub sems dpañi tshul bzin sbyor ba ste |

sā rihi bu de ltar na rnam pa hdi dañ | thos pa hdi dañ | tshul bzin du hñug pa hdi dañ | tshul bzin mthoñ ba hdi dañ | ji lta ba bzin du mthoñ bañi rgyu hñhun pa hdi dañ hdi dag ni ses rab ces bya byaño¹² | sā rihi bu de ltar na byañ (613) chub sems dpañ ses rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

1. P pañi.

2. D N R om: du.

3. R hñas.

4. P bdag tshul bzin du byed paño

5. N P add: de.

6. P gañ tshul bzin byed pa las hkhör bañi khams mthoñ ba de tshul bzin byed pa ni.

7. P dañ ldan par khyad par med par mthoñ ño, for D N R du bye brag med pa dañ ldan pa(r) mthoñ ño.

8. N om: yañ.

9. N P R om: du.

10. P byin gi rñabs (also in the next phrase).

11. P gtoñ.

12. D N R ste.

1.4

śā rihi bu gzan yañ byañ chub sams dpah śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa | ḥdus byas la spyod paḥi chos thams cad la śes rab kyi mi gnas pa yin te¹ | ḥdi lta ste | ma rig pa dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | ḥdu byed rnams dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas pa nas rgyas par byas te² | rga šihi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | bdag tu lta ba dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas pa nas³ | bdag tu lta baḥi rtsa ba las byuñ baḥi lta ba rnam pa⁴ drug bcu rtsa gñis dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | mtho bar sams pa dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | dmaḥ bar sams pa dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | ḥjig rten gyi chos brgyad rnams dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | ṇa rgyal⁵ dañ | che baḥi ṇa rgyal dañ | log paḥi ṇa rgyal nas | ñe baḥi ñon moṇs pa ṇi śuḥi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | chen po dañ | ḥbriñ po dañ | phra mo nas | ñon moṇs pa thams cad kyi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | gti mug gi mun pa rab rib kyi liñ thog sgrib pa dañ chod par byed pa kun tu dkris te ḥdug pa nas⁶ | dmaḥ baḥi chos thams cad kyi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | rtsod paḥi rñog pa⁷ dañ | ñon moṇs pa dañ | phuñ po dañ | lhaḥi bu dañ | ḥchi bdag gi bdud nas | bdud thams cad kyi las kyi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas |

bdag dañ | sams can dañ | srog dañ | gso dañ | gañ zag dañ | śed bu dañ | śed las skyes pa (614) nas | bdag du lha ba thams cad kyi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | las kyi sgrib pa dañ | ñon moṇs paḥi sgrib pa dañ | chos kyi sgrib pa dañ⁸ | lta baḥi sgrib pa dañ | rnam par smin paḥi sgrib pa dañ | mi śes paḥi sgrib pa nas | bag chags kyi mtshams sbyor ba thams cad kyi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | kun tu rtog pa dañ | rnam par rtog pa dañ | mtshan ma dañ | dmigs pa dañ | mthoñ ba dañ | thos pa dañ | dran pa dañ | rnam par rig pa⁹ dañ | mdud paḥi sgro ḥdogs pa thams cad dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | ser sna dañ | gtoñ ba dañ | tshul khrims dañ | ḥchal paḥi tshul khrims¹⁰ dañ | bzod pa dañ | gnod sams dañ | brtson ḥgrus dañ | le lo dañ | bsam gtan dañ | g.yen ba dañ | śes rab dañ | ḥchal paḥi śes rab nas | pha rol tu phyin paḥi

1. P ḥdus byas kyi spyod pa thams cad la śes rab dañ gnas pa yin te, for D N R ḥdus byas la spyod paḥi chos thams cad la śes rab kyi mi gnas pa yin te.
2. P rgya cher, for D N R rgyas par byas te.
3. P om: nas.
4. D N R lta bar gyur pa.
5. D N R ṇa rgyal; P ṇa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term 'ṇa rgyal').
6. N tog gis bsgrib pa; P gti mug gi mun pa rab rib stug po sgrib pa sgrib par byed pa, for D R gti mug gi mun pa rab rib kyi liñ t(h)og (b)sgrib pa dañ chod par byed pa kun tu dkris te ḥdug pa nas.
7. P ṇus ṇan paḥi rñog pa; R rtson paḥi rñog pa.
8. P om: chos kyi sgrib pa dañ.
9. P rnam par śes pa.
10. P tshul khrims ṇan pa, for D N R ḥchal paḥi tshul khrims.

phyogs¹ dañ | mi h̄thun paḥi phyogs dañ | śes pa dañ | mi śes paḥi bar thams cad dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas |

ñes pa dañ | ma ñes pa dañ | log par ñes pa dañ | dge ba dañ | mi dge ba dañ | kha na ma tho ba dañ | kha na ma tho ba med pa dañ | h̄khor ba dañ mya ñan las ḥdas pa nas | chos thams cad kyi gñen poḥi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | ziñ sna tshogs dañ | sañs rgyas sna tshogs dañ | sems can sna tshogs dañ | chos sna tshogs nas | sna tshogs thams cad² kyi bar dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | mi śes pa dañ | śes pa dañ | rnam par śes pa dañ | kun rdzob dañ | (615) don dam pa nas | sems can thams cad kyi mtshan ma yid la byed dag dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas | śes rab mi rgyu ba dañ | lus med pa dañ | mtshan ñid med pa dañ | mtshan ma med pa dañ | ḥdus ma byas pa³ nas | yid la byed pa thams cad dañ | sems dañ rnam par śes paḥi gnas dag gi bar⁴ dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas te | de dag dañ gzan yañ ḥdus byas la spyod paḥi chos dpag du med pa dag dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas so ||

de ltar na byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod paḥi⁵ śes rab de ni ḥdus byas kyi spyod pa thams cad dañ lhan cig tu mi gnas te | śā riḥi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

SECTION II

2.

śā riḥi bu gzan yañ byañ chub sems dpaḥ byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod la gnas pa | śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa na⁶ | śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa rnam par ḥbyed mkhas pa yin te | chos thams cad la mkhas pa rjes su ḥthob po ||

de la śes rab rnam par ḥbyed pa gañ ze na | ḥdi lta ste | phuñ po la mkhas pa dañ | khamś la mkhas pa dañ | skye mched la mkhas pa dañ | bden pa la mkhas pa dañ | so so yañ dag par rig pa la mkhas pa dañ | rton pa⁷ la mkhas pa dañ | rnam par śes pa dañ ye śes la mkhas pa dañ | byañ chub kyi yan lag la mkhas pa dañ | lam la mkhas pa dañ | rten ciñ ḥbrel par (616) ḥbyuñ ba la mkhas pa dañ bcu ste | mkhas pa rnam pa bcu po ḥdi dag gi⁸ rnam par ḥbyed pa gañ

1. P gñen po.
2. P om: thams cad.
3. N om: pa.
4. P om: gi bar.
5. D P R add: gañ.
6. D N R om: na.
7. P rten pa (in P, 'rton pa' is frequently substituted by 'rten pa').
8. D R gyi; P gañ.

yin pa de ni śes rab rnam par ḥbyed pa źes byaḥo ||

2.1

de la phuṇ po la mkhas pa gaṇ źe na | gaṇ ḥdi phuṇ po rnam kyī dper bya ba bstan pa¹
ḥdi lta ste | dbu² ba rdos ba lta bur bstan pa daṇ | smig rgyu lta bur bstan pa daṇ | chu bur lta
bur bstan pa daṇ | chu śiṇ³ lta bur bstan pa daṇ | sgyu ma lta bur bstan pa daṇ | rmi lam lta
bur bstan pa daṇ | brag cha lta bur bstan pa daṇ | mig yor lta bur bstan pa daṇ | gzugs brñan
lta bur bstan paḥo ||

gzugs ni chuḥi dbu ba lta bu ste | dbu ba la yaṇ bdag med | sems can med | srog med | gaṇ
zag med | skyes bu med | śed bu⁴ med | śed las skyes⁵ med do || dbu baḥi raṇ bźin gaṇ yin
pa gzugs kyaṇ deḥi raṇ bźin⁶ te | gaṇ de la mkhas pa de ni phuṇ po la mkhas pa źes byaḥo ||

tshor ba ni chuḥi chu bur lta bu ste | chu bur la yaṇ bdag med | sems can med | srog med |
gaṇ zag med | śed bu med | śed las skyes med | skye ba po med⁷ | skyes bu med de⁸ || chu
bur gyi raṇ bźin gaṇ yin pa tshor ba yaṇ deḥi raṇ bźin yin te | gaṇ de la mkhas pa de⁹ ni
phuṇ po la mkhas pa źes byaḥo ||

ḥdu śes ni smig rgyu lta bu ste | smig rgyu la yaṇ bdag med | sems can med pa nas | skyes
buḥi bar du med do || smig rgyuḥi raṇ bźin gaṇ yin pa ḥdu śes kyaṇ deḥi raṇ bźin yin te | gaṇ
de la mkhas pa de ni (6/7) phuṇ po la mkhas pa źes byaḥo ||

ḥdu byed rnam ni chu śiṇ lta bu ste | chu śiṇ la yaṇ bdag med | sems can med | srog med
pa nas | skyes buḥi bar du med do¹⁰ || chu śiṇ gi raṇ bźin gaṇ yin pa ḥdu byed dag kyaṇ deḥi
raṇ bźin yin te | gaṇ de la mkhas pa de ni phuṇ po la mkhas pa źes byaḥo ||

rnam par śes pa ni sgyu ma lta bu ste | sgyu ma la yaṇ bdag med | sems can med | srog med
| gaṇ zag med | śed bu med | śed las skyes med | skyes bu med | byed pa po med | tshor ba po
med do¹¹ || sgyu maḥi raṇ bźin gaṇ yin pa rnam par śes paḥaṇ deḥi raṇ bźin yin te | gaṇ de la
mkhas pa de ni phuṇ po la mkhas pa źes byaḥo ||

1. P dpe ḥjog ciṇ ḥchad pa.

2. N lbu.

3. P add: skyes (also in all further occurrences of the term 'chu śiṇ').

4. P śed can (also in all further occurrences of the term 'śed bu').

5. N skyes pa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term 'śed las skyes').

6. D add: yin.

7. P om: skye ba po med.

8. N om: skyes bu med de.

9. N ḥdi.

10. D N P R med pa ste.

11. D N P R med pa ste.

gžan yañ phuñ po rnams žes¹ bya ba (de) ni hñig rten yin te | hñig rten yañ hñig pañi mtshan ñid do || hñig rten rnams kyi rañ bžin gañ yin pa phuñ po rnams kyañ deñi rañ bžin yin no || yañ hñig rten gyi rañ bžin gañ yin že na | ħdi lta ste | mi rtag pañi rañ bžin dañ | sdug bsñal gyi rañ bžin te | phuñ poñan deñi rañ bžin no || gañ de la mkhas pa de ni phuñ po la mkhas pa žes byaño ||

de lta na byañ chub sems dpañ phuñ po la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.2

de la khams la mkhas pa gañ že na | ħdi lta ste | chos kyi khams de² ni sañi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams sra bañi mtshan ñid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (618) (de) ni chuñi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams rlan pañi mtshan ñid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni meñi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams tsha bañi mtshan ñid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni rluñ gi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams g.yo bañi mtshan ñid ma yin no ||

chos kyi khams (de) ni mig gi rnam par šes pañi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams mthoñ bañi mtshan ñid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni rna bañi rnam par šes pañi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams sgra rtogs pañi mtshan ñid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni snañi rnam par šes pañi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams dri snom pañi mtshan ñid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni ltseñi rnam par šes pañi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams ro myoñ bañi mtshan ñid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni lus kyi rnam par šes pañi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams reg pañi mtshan ñid ma yin no || chos kyi khams (de) ni yid kyi rnam par šes pañi khams mod kyi | chos kyi khams rnam par sgom pañi mtshan ñid ma yin no ||

chos kyi khams dañ bdag gi khams de ni mtshuñs so || ħdod pañi khams dañ | gzugs kyi khams dañ | gzugs med pañi khams de (ni) mtshuñs so || ħkhor bañi khams dañ mya ñan las ħdas pañi khams de (ni) mtshuñs so || de lta chos thams cad kyi khams dañ nam mkhañi khams de (ni) mtshuñs te | stoñ pa ñid dañ mtshuñs pas mthuñs³ | mi ħgyur ba dañ mtshuñs pas mtshuñs te | ħdus byas kyi khams su ħjug pa dañ | ħdus ma byas kyi khams su ħjug pañi (619) phyir | de la bsad pa dpag du med do || gañ khams la ħjug pa des rab tu rnam par ħbyed pa⁴ de ni mkhas pa žes byaño ||

de lta na khams la mkhas pañi byañ chub sems dpañ sems dpañ chen po šes rab kyi pha rol

1. N šes (in N, all initial 'ž' turn into 'š' when preceded by a final 's').
2. D P R om: de.
3. D P R mthuñs par.
4. P stsogs par byed pa; R rab tu ħbyed pa.

tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.3

de la byañ chub sems dpañi skye mched la mkhas pa gañ ze na | ḥdi la mig bdag dañ bdag gis stoñ pa te | byañ chub sems dpañ mig gi rañ bzin ni¹ ḥdi lta buḥo || zes yañ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du rab tu śes te | de ni byañ chub sems dpañi skye mched la mkhas paḥo ||

goñ ma bzin du sbyar te | de bzin du rna ba dañ | sna dañ | ltse dañ | lus dañ | yid bdag dañ bdag gis stoñ pa de | byañ chub sems dpañ yid kyi rañ bzin ni ḥdi lta buḥo || zes yañ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du rab tu śes te | dge ba² sogs pañi phyir gañ skyed mched la kun sogs pa dañ | sna tshogs sogs pa de dag sogs par mi byed ciñ | dge ba dañ mi dge bañi chos mams la ḥdu śes gñis su mi ḥjug ste³ | de ni byañ chub sems dpañi skye mched la mkhas paḥo ||

ḥdi ni mig gi skye mched do || ḥdi ni gzugs kyi skye mched do || zes⁴ de ltar mig dañ gzugs mams la ḥdod chags med par mthoñ yañ | ḥdod chags med pa mñon du mi byed pa de ni byañ chub sems dpañi skye mched la mkhas paḥo || rna ba dañ sgra | sna dañ dri | ltse dañ ro | lus dañ reg | yid dañ chos | goñ ma bzin du sbyar te | de ltar byañ chub sems dpañ yid dañ chos (620) kyi bar du ḥdod chags med par mthoñ mod kyi | ḥdod chags med pa mñon du mi byed pa | de ni byañ chub sems dpañi⁵ skye mched la mkhas paḥo ||

skye mched ces bya ba de (ni) yañ ḥphags pañi skye mched dañ | ḥphags pa ma yin pañi skye mched do || de la ḥphags pañi skye mched ni gañ lam sdud par byed paḥo || ḥphags pa ma yin pañi skye mched ni gañ lam gtoñ bar byed pa⁶ | ḥdi lta ste | byañ chub sems dpañ lam la gnas pa ni sems can lam la brtson pa bor zin gnas pa⁷ la sñiñ rje chen po ḥthob ciñ | lam gyi⁸ skye mched kyañ mi gtoñ ba ste | de ni byañ chub sems dpañi skye mched la mkhas paḥo ||⁹

de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañi¹⁰ skye mched la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

1. D P R om: ni.

2. P add: las.

3. P om: ḥdu śes gñis su mi ḥjug ste.

4. P add: ḥdu śes gñis su mi ḥjug ste.

5. P dpañ.

6. P add: ste.

7. P om: la brtson pa bor zin gnas pa.

8. R mi.

9. D add: de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañi skye mched kyañ mi gtoñ ba ste | de ni byañ chub sems dpañi skye mched la mkhas paḥo.

10. P R dpañ.

2.4

de la byañ chub sems dpañi bden pa la mkhas pa gañ ze na | byañ chub sems dpañi bden pa la hjug pa mkhas pa ni rnam par bži ste | hdi lta ste | sdug bsñal śes pa dañ | kun hbyuñ ba śes pa dañ | hgog pa śes pa dañ | lam śes paḥo ||

de la sdug bsñal śes pa gañ ze na | gañ¹ phuñ po rnams la mi skye bar śes pa de ni sdug bsñal śes pa zes byaḥo || de la kun hbyuñ ba śes pa gañ ze na | gañ sred pa hjoms pa² (śes pa) de ni kun hbyuñ ba śes pa zes byaḥo || de la hgog pa śes pa gañ ze na | gañ mi hbyuñ (ba) mi hjig par śes pa de ni hgog pa śes pa zes byaḥo || de la lam śes pa gañ ze na | (621) gañ mñam pa ñid³ thob pañi chos rnams la sgro mi hdogs pa de ni lam śes pa zes byaḥo || gañ gi tshe byañ chub sems dpas bden pa hdi bži de lta śes rab kyis śes kyañ sems can yoñs su smin par bya bañi phyir mñon du mi byed pa de ni bden pa la mkhas pa zes byaḥo ||

gžan yañ bden pa la mkhas pa (ni) rnam pa gsum ste | hdi lta ste | kun rdzob kyī bden pa dañ | don dam pañi bden pa dañ | mtshan ñid kyī bden paḥo ||

de la kun rdzob kyī bden pa (gañ ze na)⁴ | hjig rten gyi tha sñad ji sñed pa dañ | yi ge dañ | sgra dañ | brdar bstan pa⁵ ste | de ni kun rdzob kyī bden pa zes byaḥo || de la don dam pañi bden pa gañ ze na | gañ la sems kyī rgyu ba yañ med na⁶ yi ge⁷ lta ci smos te | de ni don dam pañi bden pa zes byaḥo || de la mtshan ñid kyī bden pa gañ ze na | hdi lta ste | mtshan ñid thams cad mtshan ñid gcig la | mtshan ñid gcig pa ni⁸ mtshan ñid med paḥo || de la byañ chub sems dpañ kun rdzob kyī bden pa hchad pas mi skyo || don dam pañi bden pa mñon du byed par mi ltuñ | mtshan ñid kyī bden pa mtshan ñid med pas rtogs par byed pa⁹ de ni byañ chub sems dpañi bden pa la mkhas pa zes byaḥo ||

gžan yañ bden pa ni gcig bu | gñis ma yin pa¹⁰ ste | hdi lta ste | hgog pañi dben paḥo || de la dben pa gcig bu la gañ sgro mi hdogs pa dañ | sems can sgro hdogs par lhuñ ba rnams la bden pa sbyor bar byed pa de ni byañ chub sems dpañi bden pa la mkhas pa zes byaḥo ||

gžan yañ phuñ po lña (622) rnams ni sdug bsñal ba ste | gañ phuñ po lña rnams kyī sdug bsñal gyi mtshan ñid de ni sdug bsñal (gyi hphags pañi bden pa) zes byaḥo || gañ sdug bsñal

1. N om: gañ.

2. R add: zes bya ba.

3. P gñis.

4. D N P R ni.

5. P kun rtog pa hchad pa, for D N R brdar bstan pa.

6. P gañ sems de ñid kyañ rab tu mi rgyun, for D N R gañ la sems kyī rgyu ba yañ med na.

7. P add: dag.

8. P hañ.

9. P rtog pa, for D N R rtogs par byed pa.

10. P gñis po med pa, for D N R gñis ma yin pa.

gyi mtshan ñid kyi stoñ pa ñid kyi mtshan ñid rtogs pa de ni sdug bsñal hphags pañi bden pa
 zes byaño || gañ phuñ po lña rnams kyi bag la ñal rgyu sred pa las byuñ bañi lta ba de ni kun
 hbyuñ bañi bden pa zes byaño¹ || gañ sred pañi rgyu lta ba de la yañ sgro mi hdogs (pa) mi
 len (pa) mi sñems pa de ni kun hbyuñ ba hphags pañi bden pa zes byaño || gañ phuñ po lña²
 rnams śin tu zad pañi phyir hgog pa sñon gyi mthar ma byuñ ba | phyi mañi mthar mi hpho
 ba | da lta byuñ bar mi gnas pa de ni hgog pa hphags pañi bden pa zes byaño || gañ lam la
 brten nas³ sdug bsñal śes pa dañ | kun hbyuñ ba śes pa dañ | hgog pa śes pa la yañ reg par
 byed la | rjes las rtogs pañi śes pa yañ thob par byed pa de ni sdug bsñal hgog par hgyur bañi
 lam hphags pañi bden pa zes byaño || gañ bden pa śes pa de la rnam par rtog pa dañ | sems
 can yoñs su brtag pa la rtog par byed pa de ni byañ chub sems dpañi bden pa la mkhas pa zes
 byaño ||

gžan yañ tshor ba thams cad (ni) sdug bsñal ba ste | de la tshor bar⁴ rnam par hbyed⁵ pa
 dañ | blos rig pa ñid de ni | sdug bsñal hphags pañi bden pa zes byaño || rgyu gañ gis kun
 hbyuñ bar śes pañi rgyu de ji lta ba yañ dag par rab tu śes pa de ni kun hbyuñ ba hphags pañi
 bden pa zes byaño || gañ tshor ba gtoñ žiñ ma tshor ba tshor bar byed pa dañ | hgog pa la yañ
 so sor rtog (623) la | tshor ba hgog pa yañ mñon du mi byed pa de ni byañ chub sems dpañi
 sdug bsñal hgog pa hphags pañi bden pa zes byaño || tshor ba gañ gis gziñs dañ hdra bañi lam
 de sdud par byed la | tshor bar dgos pa yañ ma yin | lam gyi dgos pa yañ ma yin pa de ni byañ
 chub sems dpañi sdug bsñal hgog par hgro bañi lam hphags pañi bden pa zes byaño || de ltar
 rtogs nas bden pa de⁶ bži la mñam par mthoñ žiñ | mthoñ ba śin tu dag pa yañ ma yin pa de
 ni byañ chub sems dpañi bden pa la mkhas pa zes byaño ||

gžan yañ skye ba (ni) sdug bsñal ba ste | gañ mi skye ba la so sor rtog pa śes pa de ni sdug
 bsñal śes pa zes byaño || srid pañi rkyen gyis skye ba ste | gañ srid pa hjig par śes pa de ni
 kun hbyuñ ba śes pa zes byaño || skye ba thams cad gañ gis mi skye bar śes la⁷ | de la hgog
 pa gañ yañ med ciñ | gañ mi hgog par śes pa de ni zad pa hgog pañi⁸ śes pa zes byaño || gañ
 de ltar tshor ba⁹ dañ | hjal ba dañ | yoñs su tshol ba dañ | rnam par rtog pa dañ | hjug pañi śes
 pa de ni lam śes pa zes bya ste | gañ bden pañi śes pa de la gžog par byed kyañ | bden pañi śes

1. P R bden paño.

2. D P R om: lña.

3. P gañ lam rtogs nas.

4. D N R add: bya ba; Akn (p. 54.1.8) om: bya ba.

5. P rdzogs.

6. P add: dag.

7. N pa.

8. P par.

9. D R bar.

pa de la mi gnas pa¹ de ni byañ chub sems dpañi bden pa la mkhas pa ste |

de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ bden pa la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.5

de la byañ chub sems dpañi² so so yañ dag par rig pa la mkhas pa gañ ze na | (624) byañ chub sems dpañi so so yañ dag par rig pa ni bži po ḥdi dag (yin te) | bži gañ ze na | ḥdi lta ste | don so so yañ dag par rig pa dañ | chos so so yañ dag par rig pa dañ | nes pañi tshig so so yañ dag par rig pa dañ | spobs pa so so yañ dag par rig paḥo ||

2.5.1

de la don so so yañ dag par rig pa gañ ze na | gañ chos rnams la don dam pañi tshig tu śes pa dañ | gñis su med pañi rgyu śes pa dañ | rkyen śes pa dañ | ḥdus pa śes pa dañ | mthaḥ³ med pañi rjes su ḥgro ba śes pa dañ | rten pa⁴ la ḥjug pa śes pa dañ | chos kyi dbyiñs dbyer med pa śes pa dañ | de bžin ñid kyi⁵ rjes su ḥjug pa śes pa dañ | yañ dag pañi mthaḥ mi gnas pa śes pa dañ | stoñ pa ñid rjes su rtogs pa śes pa dañ | mtshan ma med pa rtogs pa śes pa dañ | smon pa med pa la smon pa med par śes pa dañ | mñon par ḥdu mi byed pa la mñon par ḥdu mi byed par śes pa dañ | tshul gcig tu ḥjug pa śes pa dañ | sems can med pa ḥjug pa śes pa dañ | bdag med par ḥjug pa śes pa dañ | srog med par byed pa gcig pa⁶ śes pa dañ | gañ zag med par⁷ don dam par śes pa dañ | ḥdas pañi dus la ma chags par śes pa dañ | ma ḥoñs bañi dus la mthaḥ med par śes pa dañ | da ltar byuñ bañi dus la thams cad du śes pa dañ | phuñ po rnams la sgyu mar śes pa dañ | khams rnams la sbrul gdug pa lta bur⁸ śes pa dañ | skye mched rnams la stoñ pa ñid du (625) nes par rtog par śes pa dañ | nañ (du) ži bar⁹ śes pa dañ | phyi rol tu mi rgyu bar¹⁰ śes pa dañ | yul la yul med par śes pa dañ | dran pa la gnas su śes pa dañ | rtogs pa la khoñ du chud par śes pa dañ | blo gros la¹¹ mñon sum du śes pa dañ | bden pa la rab tu rtogs par śes pa dañ | sdug bsñal la mi ḥbyuñ bar śes pa dañ | kun ḥbyuñ ba la mñon par

1. P gnas par byed pa, for D N R gnas pa.

2. N dpañ.

3. P ḥgog pa.

4. P rten ciñ ḥbrel pa; N brten (also in the next occurrence of the term 'rten pa').

5. D kyis.

6. R om: gcig pa.

7. N P pa.

8. D N dañ mtshuñs par.

9. D N P R ba.

10. D N P R ba.

11. P om: la.

hdu mi byed par śes pa dañ | hgog pa la mtshan ñid med par śes pa dañ | lam la sgrol bar śes pa dañ |

chos la tshig rab tu tha dad par śes pa dañ | dbaṅ po rnams la hjug par śes pa dañ | stobs rnams la mi rdzi¹ bar śes pa dañ | ųi gnas la gnas su śes pa dañ | lhag mthoñ la snañ bar śes pa dañ | sgyu ma la bsgrub par śes pa dañ | smig rgyu la hkhru² bar śes pa dañ | rmi lam la mi bden pa mthoñ bar śes pa dañ | brag cha la rkyen la hjug par śes pa³ dañ | mig yor la hpho bar śes pa dañ | mtshan ñid sna tshogs la mtshan ñid gcig tu śes pa dañ | hdu ba la hbral bar śes pa dañ | rab tu sbyaṅs pa la phyir⁴ mtshams sbyor ba med par śes pa dañ | ñan thos kyi theg pa la sgraḥi rjes su hgro bar hjug par⁵ śes pa dañ | rañ saṅs rgyas kyi theg pa la rten pa la hjug pa śes śiñ dben pa la⁶ mchog tu śes pa dañ | theg pa chen po la dge baḥi rtsa baḥi tshogs bsags pa thams cad śes pa ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi don so so (626) yañ dag par rig pa źes byaḥo ||

gźan yañ don⁷ so so yañ dag par rig pa ni gañ don la rton pa ste | chos thams cad kyi chos ñid kun gyi don la rton pa ñid kyi rjes su hbrañ baḥo⁸ || de ciḥi phyir źe na | chos thams cad ma lus par⁹ stoñ pa ste | stoñ paḥi don gañ yin pa de ni don no || chos thams cad ma lus par mtshan ma med pa ste | mtshan ma med paḥi don gañ yin pa de ni don no || chos thams cad ma lus par smon pa med pa ste | smon pa med paḥi don gañ yin pa de ni don no || chos thams cad ma lus par rnam par phyē ba ste | rnam par phyē baḥi don gañ yin pa de ni don no || chos thams cad ma lus par sems can med | srog med | gañ zag med pa ste | gañ zag med paḥi don gañ yin pa de ni don no || gañ de lta buḥi chos rnams rtogs pa de ni don¹⁰ so so yañ dag par rig pa źes bya ste | gañ don ston pa de ni gnas med pa ston paḥo || de ni mi¹¹ zad pa ston paḥo || so so yañ dag par rig pa ni rtogs paḥi don ston pa yin te | saṅs rgyas bcom ldan hdas rnams kyis gnañ ba | rjes su yi¹² rañ ba | yañ dag pa | de kho na | gźan ma yin pa | śes rab kyis śiñ tu rtogs pa | thams cad tu kha na ma tho ba med pa de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi don so so yañ dag par rig pa źes byaḥo ||

1. P mi thoms pa; R mi brdzi pa.

2. D hkhruḡ.

3. P rten ciñ hbre^l pa śes pa, for D N R rkyen la hjug par śes pa.

4. P sbyaṅs pa la slar, for D N R rab tu sbyaṅs pa la phyir.

5. P rjes us rtogs pa hjug pa, for D N R rjes su hgro bar hjug pa(r).

6. D P om: la.

7. D P R om: don.

8. N hbrañ ño; P chos thams cad kyi chos so | chog gi don la rten pa ñid la rten paḥo.

9. P kun (also in the following five instances of the phrase 'ma lus par').

10. P R om: don.

11. P om: mi.

12. N yid.

2.5.2

de la chos so so yañ dag par rig pa gañ ze na | gañ dge ba dañ | mi dge ba dañ | kha na ma tho ba dañ bcas pa dañ | kha na ma tho ba med pa dañ | zag pa dañ bcas pa dañ | (627) zag pa med pa dañ | hjig rten pa dañ | hjig rten las h̄das pa dañ | h̄dus byas dañ | h̄dus ma byas dañ | kun nas¹ ñon moñs pa dañ | rnam par byañ bañi cha dañ h̄thun pa dañ | h̄khor ba dañ mya ñan las h̄das par ñe bar h̄gro bañi chos rnams la h̄jug pa śes pa dañ | chos kyi dbyiñs mñam pa ñid śes pa dañ | byañ chub² mñam pa ñid śes pa dañ | khams mñam pa ñid śes pa ste | de ni chos so so yañ dag par rig pa zes byaño ||

gžan yañ chos so so yañ dag par rig pa ni | gañ h̄dod chags spyod pa rnams la sems³ h̄jug pa⁴ dañ | bcos pañi⁵ h̄dod chags spyod pa rnams dañ | h̄dod chags brtan par spyod pa rnams dañ | h̄dod chags chuñ du spyod pa rnams dañ | rnam par mi ldañ bañi h̄dod chags spyod pa rnams dañ | mthañ mar⁶ rtag tu med pañi h̄dod chags spyod pa rnams dañ | da ltar byuñ ba la rkyen gyis h̄dod chags spyod pa rnams la h̄jug pa ste |

sems can gañ dag nañ du h̄dod chags la⁷ | phyi rol tu h̄dod chags med pa dañ | phyi rol tu h̄dod chags la | nañ du h̄dod chags med pa dañ | nañ duhañ h̄dod chags med | phyi rol tuhañ h̄dod chags med pa dañ | nañ dañ phyi rol tu⁸ h̄dod chags pa dañ⁹ | gzugs la h̄dod chags la | sgra la h̄dod chags med pa dañ | sgra la h̄dod chags la | gzugs la h̄dod chags med pa dañ | gzugs dañ sgra la h̄dod chags pa dañ | (628) gzugs dañ sgra la h̄dod chags med pa dañ¹⁰ | gžugs la h̄dod chags la¹¹ | dri la h̄dod chags med pa dañ | dri la h̄dod chags la | reg la h̄dod chags med pa dañ | reg la h̄dod chags la | ro la h̄dod chags med pa dañ | ro la h̄dod chags la | gzugs la h̄dod chags med pa dañ | dri la h̄dod chags med pa de ni h̄dod chags spyod pa rnams kyi h̄jug pa ste |

h̄jug pa deñi sgos h̄dod chags spyod pa rnams la ñi khri chig stoñ | ze sdañ spyod pa rnams la ñi khri chig stoñ | gti mug spyod pa rnams la ñi khri chig stoñ | cha mñam par spyod pa rnams la ñi khri chig stoñ ste | gañ de dag gi spyod pa brgyad khri bži stoñ gi sems h̄jug pa

1. P om: kun nas.

2. N add: kyi.

3. P spyod pañi sems, for D N R spyod pa rnams la sems.

4. D P R add: śes pa.

5. P sgyu mañi.

6. D P R ma.

7. P kyi (also in the seven following occurrences of the term 'la' of the present context).

8. P add: yañ.

9. N om: nañ dañ phyi rol tu h̄dod chags pa dañ; R add: nañ dañ phyi rol tu h̄dod chags med pa dañ.

10. R om: gzugs dañ sgra la h̄dod chags med pa dañ.

11. D gžugs la h̄dod chags la; N dañ.

śes pa dañ | ji ltar rigs par bstan¹ pa śes pa dañ | mi mañ mi ñuñ bar bstan pa śes pa dañ |
 ḥdod pa las yañ dag par ḥdaḥ bar śes pa dañ | snod kyi khyad par śes pa dañ | ḥbras bu yod
 par bstan pa śes pa | de ni chos so so yañ dag par rig pa źes byaḥo ||

2.5.3

de la ñes paḥi tshig so so yañ dag par rig pa gañ ze na | gañ skad thams cad la skad med par
 ḥjug pa śes pa dañ | lhaḥi skad dañ | kluḥi skad dañ | gnod sbyin gyi skad dañ | dri zaḥi skad
 dañ | mi ḥam ciḥi skad dañ | lto ḥphye chen poḥi skad dañ | mi dañ mi ma yin paḥi skad dañ |
 ḥgro ba sñar skyes paḥi sems can rnams kyi skad dañ | sgra dañ dbyaṅs² rnams las skad des
 de dag la chos ḥchad pa ste | de ni ñes paḥi tshig so so yañ dag par rig pa źes byaḥo || (629)

de ltar chos de dag brtag par byaḥo || de ltar chos de dag bsdu bar byaḥo || de ltar chos de
 dag rjes su rgyun chags par byaḥo || de ltar chos de dag yi ge rnams kyis sbrel bar byaḥo || de
 tshig gcig gi bla dags śes | tshig gñis paḥi bla dags śes | tshig mañ poḥi bla dags śes | bud med
 kyi tshig śes | skyes paḥi tshig śes | ma niñ gi tshig śes | bsdu baḥi tshig śes | rgyas paḥi tshig
 śes | smad paḥi tshig śes | stod paḥi tshig śes³ | ḥdas paḥi tshig śes | ma ḥoṅs baḥi tshig śes |
 da ltar byuñ baḥi tshig śes | yi ge gcig gis sgro btags pa śes | yi ge mañ pos sgro btags pa śes |
 de ni ñes paḥi tshig so so yañ dag par rig pa źes byaḥo ||

yañ deḥi ñes paḥi tshig so so yañ dag par rig pa ni ḥkhrul ba ma yin | zlos pa ma yin |
 brtags pa ma yin | don gsal baḥi yi ge⁴ yoṅs su byaṅ ba ste | ci nas kyañ ḥkhor yañ dag par
 dgaḥ ba sna tshogs pa zab pa | zab par snañ ba | kun rdzob dañ don dam pas brgyan pa⁵ |
 bdag gis⁶ sems mthoñ baḥi śes pa la rag lus pa | saṅs rgyas kyis gnañ ba | sems can thams
 cad dgaḥ bar byed pa ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi ñes paḥi tshig so so yañ dag par rig pa
 źes byaḥo ||

2.5.4

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi spobs pa so so yañ dag par rig pa gañ ze na | gañ tshig bzañ
 ba⁷ | mi gnas par luñ bstan pa ston (630) pa | rgyun mi ḥchad pa | spobs pa myur ba | spobs
 pa mgyogs śiñ myur ba | spobs pa ma⁸ rmoṅs pa | spobs pa ji ltar dris pa bzin pa | spobs pa

1. P ḥchad (also in the next two occurrences of the term 'bstan').

2. N dbyiṅs.

3. D Rbstod paḥi tshig śes; P om: bstod paḥi tshig śes.

4. N R ye śes.

5. P dam paḥi rgyan.

6. N P R gi.

7. P gañ mdzes paḥi tshig.

8. N om: ma.

yoñs su ma ñams pa | spobs pa mi hgal ba | spobs pa rtsod pa med pa | spobs pa chos la rab tu
 dgañ ba¹ | spobs pa bzod pa la gnas pa | spobs pa zab pa | spobs pa sna tshogs | kun rdzob
 dañ don dam pa la spobs pa | sbyin pa dañ | tshul khrims dañ | bzod pa dañ | brtson hgrus dañ
 | bsam gtan dañ | śes rab thams cad la gnas pañi spobs pa | dran pa ñe bar bžag pa dañ | yañ
 dag par spoñ ba dañ | rdzu hphrul gyi rkañ pa dañ | dbañ po dañ | stobs dañ | byañ chub kyi
 yan lag dañ | lam dañ | ži gnas dañ | lhag mthoñ la spobs pa | bsam gtan dañ | rnam par thar pa
 dañ | tiñ ñe hdzin dañ | sñoms par hjug pa dañ | bden pa la hjug pa thams cad śes pañi spobs
 pa | theg pa thams cad la spobs pa | sems can thams cad kyi sems kyi² spyod pa la spobs pa |

tshig mi lkug pañi spobs pa³ | tshig mi rtsub pañi spobs pa | tshig mi hchal bañi spobs pa |
 tshig rtsub mo ma yin pañi spobs pa | tshig mñen⁴ pañi spobs pa | tshig dag pa | tshig grol ba
 | tshig ma chags pa | tshig btsun pa | tshig hbrel ba | tshig ldan pa | tshig ma ñams pa | tshig
 sñañ ba | tshig hjam pa | tshig ma smad pa | tshig hphags pa thams cad kyis bstod pa ste | žiñ
 mthañ yas pañi rnam par śes pañi rjes su (631) soñ bañi sgra | tshañs pañi sgra skad kyi
 dbyañs dañ hdra ba | rtogs par byed pañi sgra gcig pa | sañs rgyas kyis gnañ bañi spobs pas
 sems can gžan dañ gañ zag gžan dag la chos ston⁵ to || deñi chos bstan pa de yañ hbyuñ bar
 byed pa | de byed pañi sdug bsñal yañ dag par zad par⁶ hgyur ba ste | de ni byañ chub sems
 dpañi spobs pa so so yañ dag par rig pa žes byaño || de ni byañ chub sems dpañi spobs pa la
 mkhas pa ste |

de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ⁷ spobs pa la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la
 spyod do ||⁸

2.6

de la byañ chub sems dpañi rton pa la mkhas pa gañ⁹ že na | byañ chub sems dpañ nams
 kyi rton pa hdi bži dag¹⁰ ste | bži gañ že na | hdi lta ste | don la rton¹¹ gyi | tshig hbru la ma
 yin pa dañ | ye śes la rton gyi | rnam par śes pa la ma yin pa dañ | ñes pañi don gyi¹² mdo sde

1. P spobs pa chos dañ hgrog na bde ba.

2. D N R dañ.

3. P tshig lug bžin du mi lkug pañi spobs pa.

4. N gñen.

5. P hchad (also in the next phrase for 'bstan').

6. N om: zad par.

7. D N dpañi.

8. D add: bam po bcu brgyad pa; P add: hphags pa byañ chub sems dpañi snod sde ces bya ba theg pa chen
 poñi bam po bcu brgyad pa.

9. D P R om: gañ.

10. D N R om: dag.

11. N ston.

12. N gyis.

rnam la rton gyi | drañ bañi don rnam la ma yin pa dañ | chos ñid la rton gyi | gañ zag la ma yin paño ||¹

2.6.1

de la don gañ | tshig hbru gañ ze na | tshig hbru zes bya ba ni gañ hjig rten gyi chos kyi bya ba la hjug paño || don zes bya ba ni gañ hjig rten las h̄das pañi chos rtogs paño || tshig (632) hbru zes bya ba ni sbyin pa dañ | dul ba dañ | sdom pa dañ | des pa bstan² paño || don zes bya ba ni dul ba dañ | zi gnas dañ | gsar³ pa ma yin pa dañ | sñiñ ma yin par śes paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni h̄khor ba yoñs su b̄sād pa sgrogs paño⁴ || don zes bya ba ni mi dmigs pa la rton⁵ paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni mya ñan las h̄das pañi yon tan yoñs su sgrogs paño || don zes bya ba ni chos rañ b̄zin gyis yoñs su mya ñan las h̄das pa rnam la rnam par mi rtog paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni theg pa ji ltar rnam par b̄zag⁶ pa b̄zin du h̄chad paño || don zes bya ba ni chos tshul gcig pa rtogs par śes paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni sems can thams cad mi gtoñ bar bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni h̄khor gsum yoñs su dag paño ||⁷

tshig hbru zes bya ba ni lus dañ | ñag dañ | yid sdom žiñ bslab pa dañ | sbyañs bañi yon tan thams cad yañ dag par len par bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni lus dañ | ñag dañ | yid mi dmigs śiñ mñon par h̄du mi byed pa yoñs su dag paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni gnod sems kyi⁸ tha ba dañ | khro ba dañ | ña rgyal dañ | rgyags pa dañ | dregs pa hjom žiñ bzod pa dañ des pa bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni mi skye bañi chos la bzod pa thob paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni dge bañi rtsa ba la brtson hgrus rtsom pa thams cad bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni mi

1. Pelliot, 977, folio 1a.1–2

de la byañ chub sems dpañi so sor rton pa la mkhas pa gañ ze na | de ni rnam pa b̄zi ste | don la rton gyi tshig hbru la ma yin ba dañ | ye śes la rton gyi rnam par śes pa la ma yin ba dañ | ñes pañi don gyi mdo sde la rton gyi drañ bañi don gyi mdo sde la ma yin ba dañ | chos la rton gyi gañ zag la ma yin ba dañ b̄ziho ||.

2. N brtan (also in the next occurrence of the phrase ‘des pa bstan paño’); P h̄chad (also in the following thirteen occurrences of the word ‘bstan pa’).

3. D N sar.

4. P tshig hbru zes bya ba ni h̄khor bañi dam h̄chañ ba yoñs su sgrogs paño, for D N R tshig hbru zes bya ba ni h̄khor ba yoñs su b̄sād/bcad pa sgrogs paño.

5. P rtog.

6. D P R ḡzag.

7. Pelliot, 977, folio 1a.2–5

de la don ni gañ | tshig hbru ni gañ ze na | de la don ces bya ba ni hjig rten las h̄das pañi don so sor chud paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni gañ hjig rten gyi chos gyi bya ba la ḡzug paño | don ces bya ba ni dul ba dañ ži gnas dañ | gsar rñiñ myed par śes paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni sbyin ba dañ dñul ba dañ myi gye! ba dañ | śin tu dgañ ba b̄sād paño || ḡzan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni h̄khor bañi rgyus rab tu bgrags paño | don ces bya ba ni myi dmyigs pa la ltas paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni mya ñan las h̄das pañi yon tan bshags pa yoñs su bsgrags paño || don ces bya ba ni rañ b̄zin gyis mya ñan las h̄das pañi chos la rnam la rtog pa myed paño || ḡzan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni ci ltar theg pa rnam par ḡzag pa b̄sād paño || don ces bya ba ni tshul gcig gyi chos so sor chud bar śes paño || ḡzan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni sems can thams cad yoñs su myi gtañ bar b̄sād paño | don ces bya ba ni khor sum yoñs su dag paño ||.

8. P dañ.

len (pa) mi gtoñ ba la¹ gnas pañi brtson hgrus so || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni bsam gtan dañ | rnam par thar pa dañ | tiñ ñe hdzin dañ | sñoms par hjug pa² bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni hgog pañi sñoms par hjug pa³ (633) šes paño ||⁴

tshig hbru zes bya ba ni thos pa thams cad hdzin pa šes rab kyi rtša baño⁵ || don zes bya ba ni brjod du med pañi don to || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni gañ byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos⁶ sum cu rtša bdun gyi chos rnam rab tu bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni gañ byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos gsum bcu rtša bdun gyi chos rnam nan tan du byed pañi hbras bu mñon sum du byed paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni sdug bsñal⁷ dañ | kun hbyuñ ba dañ | lam rab tu bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni hgog pa mñon sum du byed paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni ma rig pa la sogs⁸ te | rga šihi bar du bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni ma rig pa hgog pa nas | rga šihi bar du hgog paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi tshogs bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni rig pa dañ rnam par grol ba šes paño ||⁹

tshig hbru zes bya ba ni gañ hdod chags dañ | že sdañ dañ | gti mug dañ | cha mñam par spyod pa rnam la chos bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni sems kyi rnam par grol ba mi hkrugs paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni sgrib par byed pañi chos thams cad rab tu bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni sgrib pa med pañi ye šes rnam par thar paño || tshig hbru zes bya ba ni dkon mchog gsum gyi yon tan bsñags pa mthañ med pa yañ dag par rab tu bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni gañ chos hdod chags (634) med pa dañ | hdus ma byas pañi dge hdun gyi yon tan bsgrub paño¹⁰ ||¹¹

1. N om: la.

2. P bžag pa.

3. P bžag pa.

4. Pelliot, 977, folio 1a.5–1b.1

tshig hbru ni lus dañ ñag yid kyi sdom ba ste | bsab pa dañ sbyaṅs pañi yon tan thams cad gzuñ ba bsad paño || don ces bya ba ni lus dañ ñag yid mthoñ bar hdu byed pa yin bar yoṅs su dag paño || gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni gnod sems kyi dri ma (...) khoñ khro ba dañ rgyags pa dañ | dregs pa kun bcos šiñ bzod pa la šiñ tu dgañ ba bsad paño || don ces bya ba ni myi skye bañi chos la bzod pa so sor rñed paño || gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni dge bañi rtša ba thams cad la brtson hgrus bsad paño || don ces bya ba ni rnam par myi rtog ciñ rtog pa myed de | myi gnas pañi brtson hgrus so ||.

5. P rtša ba šes rab tu hgyur baño, for D N R šes rab kyi rtša baño.

6. P om: kyi chos (also in the next occurrence of the phrase ‘phyogs kyi chos’).

7. N sdug bsñal pa.

8. P las stsogs.

9. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.1–1b.3

gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni thos pa thams cad hdzin pa šes rab kyi rtša baño || don ces bya ba ni brjod du myed pañi don to || gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni byañ cub kyi phyogs sum cu rtša btun gyi chos rab tu skye baño || don ces bya ba ni gañ byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos rnam kyi nan tan gyi hbras bu mñon du byed paño || gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni sdug bsñal dañ kun hbyuñ dañ lam rab tu dbye baño || don ces bya ba ni hgog pa mñon tu byed paño || gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni ma rig pa thog mar hgro bas na ši bañi bar duho kun bye paño || don ces bya ba ni ma rig pa hgags pas rga šihi bar du hgag paño || gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni ži gnas dañ lhag mthoñ gi tshogs bsad paño || don ces bya ba ni rig pa rnam par grol ba šes paño ||.

10. D yon tan sgrub paño; N R yon tan bsgrub paño; P yon tan no.

tshig hbru zes bya ba ni gañ byañ chub sems dpañi thog ma sems bskyed nas | byañ chub kyi sñiñ poñi bar du¹ bslab² pa dañ yon tan rtsom pa bstan paño || don zes bya ba ni sems kyi skad cig gcig dañ ldan pas³ | thams cad mkhyen pañi ye šes mñon par rdzogs par byañ chub paño || mdor na chos kyi phuñ po brgyad khri bži stoñ gi bar du bstan pa de ni tshig hbru zes byaño || sgra dañ | yi ge dañ | gañ sgra dañ yi ge thams cad kyis brjod du myed pa de ni don ces byaño⁴ ||⁵

de la drañ bañi don gyi mdo sde gañ dag yin⁶ ze na | gañ tshig hbru bśad pa ji ltar bstan pa bžin du rgya cher khoñ du chud par bya ste | hdi dag ni drañ bañi don gyi mdo sde dag go ||

ñes pañi don gyi mdo sde gañ dag yin⁷ ze na | don gañ bśad pa ji ltar bstan pa bžin du rgya cher khoñ du chud par bya ste | hdi dag ni ñes pañi don gyi mdo sde dag go ||⁸

de ji ltar na chos la rton gyi | gañ zag la ma yin ze na | gañ drañ bañi don de ni gañ zag gi don yin pas de la mi rton gyi | gañ ñes pañi don de ni chos ñid ji lta ba bžin pas de la rton pa ste | hdi dag ni byañ chub sems dpañi rton pa bži paño || de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ sems dpañ chen po rton⁹ pa la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||¹⁰ bam po bcu brgyad pa¹¹ ||

de la byañ chub sems dpañ rnam kyi tshig hbru (635) la mkhas pa gañ ze na | hdi la byañ

11. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.3–1b.5

gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni hdod chags ze sdañ gti mug cha mñam ba spyod pa la chos hčhad paño || don ces bya ba ni hkhrug pa myed pañi nam par grol baño || gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni bsgribs pa thams cad la chos hčhad paño || don ces bya ba ni bsgribs pa myed pañi ye šes rnam par thar paño || gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni dkon mchog gsum gyi yon tan kha dog rab tu phye baño || don ces bya ba ni hdod chags myed pañi chos ñid de || dge hdun gyi yon tan hdus ma byas sgrub paño ||.

1. P kyi.

2. N bslabs.

3. P sems skad cig tu sbyor bas.

4. I follow here Pelliot, 1b.7; P sgra dañ yi ge thams cad kyi hbru ... ||, for D N R sgra dañ | yi ge dañ | tshig hbru thams cad ... ||.

5. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.5–7

gžan yañ tshig hbru zes bya ba ni gañ byañ chub sems dpañi thog ma sems bskyed pa nas sñiñ po byañ cub kyi bar du bslab pañi yon tan brtsam ba bśad paño || don ces bya ba ni sems skad cig ma gcig gyis sbyor ba thams cad mkhyen pañi ye šes mñon bar byañ chub paño || mdor na ci tsam tu chos kyi phuñ po brgyad khri bži stoñ bśad pa ni tshig hbru zes byaño | gañ sgra dañ yi ge thams cad kyis brjod du myed pa de ni don ces byaño ||.

6. D N R om: dag yin.

7. D N R om: dag yin.

8. Pelliot, 977, folio 1b.7–2a.1

de la drañ bañi don gyi mdo gañ ze na gañ gsuñs pa hbyed pa ji ltar bśad pa bžin rgyas par chud par bya ba ste | de ni drañ bañi don gyi mdoño zes byaño || de la ñes pañi don gyi mdo gañ ze na | gañ gsuñs pa gañ ji ltar don bśad pa bžin du rgyas par šes par byaño || de ni ñes pañi don gyi mdo zes byaño ||.

9. D ston.

10. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.1–2a.2

de la ji ltar na chos la rton gyi gañ zag la ma yin (...) ze na | gañ drañ bañi don pa de gañ zag gyi don te | de las hbyuñ ba ma yin no | gañ ñes pañi don de chos ñid ji lta ba bžin te des hbyuñ no ||.

11. D P om: 'bam po bcu brgyad pa'.

chub sems dpah¹ chos gñis la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do || chos gñis gañ ze na | ḥdi lta ste | rnam par śes pa la mkhas pa dañ | ye śes la mkhas pa yin no ||²

2.6.2

de la rnam par śes pa gañ | ye śes gañ ze na | rnam par śes pa zes bya ba ni | ḥdi lta ste | rnam par śes paḥi gnas pa bžiḥ³ || bži gañ ze na | gzugs la zugs⁴ paḥi rnam par śes pa yoñs su gnas śiñ gnas pa dañ | tshor ba la zugs pa dañ | ḥdu śes la zugs pa dañ | ḥdu byed la zugs paḥi rnam par śes pa yoñs su gnas śiñ gnas pa ste | de ni rnam par śes pa zes byaḥo ||⁵

de la ye śes gañ ze na | gañ len paḥi phuñ po lña⁶ rnams la gnas pa | rnam par śes paḥi phuñ po yoñs su śes pa de ni ye śes zes byaḥo || gañ saḥi khams rnam par śes pa dañ | chuḥi khams dañ | meḥi khams dañ | rluñ gi khams rnam par śes pa de ni rnam par śes pa zes byaḥo || gañ yañ ye śes khams bži la mi gnas pa | chos kyi dbyiñs tha mi dad pa śes pa de ni ye śes zes byaḥo ||⁷

gžan yañ rnam par śes pa zes bya ba ni gañ mig gi rnam par śes pas śes par bya baḥi gzugs rnams⁸ śes pa dañ | rna baḥi rnam par śes pas śes par bya baḥi sgra rnams dañ | snaḥi rnam par śes pas śes par bya baḥi dri rnams dañ | ltseḥi rnam par (636) śes pas śes par bya baḥi ro rnams | lus kyi rnam par śes pas śes par bya baḥi reg rnams dañ | yid kyi rnam par śes pas śes par bya baḥi chos rnams śes pa de ni rnam par śes pa zes byaḥo || gañ yañ nañ gi skye mched rnams la ñe bar zi žiñ | phyi rol gyi skye mched rnams la rgyu ba med pa ye śes la rton pas⁹ | gañ yañ chos gžog par mi byed pa de ni ye śes zes byaḥo ||¹⁰

1. D dpahī.

2. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.

3. P bži dag ste.

4. P su son, for D N R la zugs (also in the following three occurrences of the phrase ‘la zugs’).

5. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.1–2a.3

de la ji ltar na ye śes la rton gyi rnam par śes pa la ma yin ze na | de la rnam par śes pa zes bya ba ni rnam par śes pa gnas pa bži ste | bži gañ ze na | gzugs la ñe bar soñ baḥi rnam par śes pa kun tu gnas pas gnas so || de bžin du tshor ba dañ | ḥdu śes dañ | ḥdu byed la soñ baḥi rnam par śes pa kun tu gnas pas gnas te | de ni rnam par śes pa zes byaḥo ||.

6. Akn bži.

7. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.3–2a.5

de la ye śes gañ ze na | gañ len paḥi lña phuñ la myi gnas śiñ ye śes kyi phuñ po yoñs su śes pa de ni ye śes zes byaḥo || gañ saḥi khams rnam par rig pa dañ | de bžin du chu dañ mye dañ rluñ gi khams rnam par rig pa de ni rnam par śes pa zes byaḥo || gañ khams bži la myi gnas paḥi ye śes chos kyi dbyiñs ma bye bar śes pa de ni ye śes zes byaḥo ||.

8. D P add: la.

9. P mi rgyul ye śes la ḥjug paḥi phyir, for D N R rgyu ba med pa ye śes la rton pas.

10. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.5–2a.6

gžan yañ rnam par śes pa zes bya ba ni myig gis (...) rnam par śes paḥi gzugs rnam par chud pa nas yid kyi rnam par rig paḥi chos rnams chud paḥi bar de ni rnam par śes pa zes byaḥo || gañ nañ gyi ḥdu mched ži žiñ phyiḥi ḥdu mched la rab tu myi spyod de | ye śes la so sor ḥbyuñ baḥi phyir chos gañ la yañ myi ḥjog pa de ni ye śes zes byaḥo ||.

gžan yañ rnam par śes pa źes bya ba ni dmigs pa las rnam par śes pa skye ba dañ | yoñs su rtog¹ pa las rnam par śes pa skye ba ste | de ni rnam par śes pa źes byaño || gañ yañ mi ħdzin pa | mi sñiems pa | mi dmigs pa | rnam par mi rig pa | mi ħkhrugs pa de ni ye śes źes byaño ||

gžan yañ ħdus byas la spyod pañi chos rnams la rnam par śes pa² gnas kyi | ħdus ma byas la rnam par śes pa rgyu ba med de | gañ yañ ħdus ma byas śes pa de ni ye śes so ||

gžan yañ skye ba dañ ħjig pa la gnas pa ni rnam par śes paño || gañ yañ³ mi skye (ba)⁴ mi ħgag (ba) mi gnas pa de ni ye śes źes byaño ||⁵

2.6.3

de la ñes pañi don gyi mdo sde gañ | drañ bañi don gyi mdo sde gañ ze na | mdo sde gañ dag lam la ħjug par byed pa de dag ni drañ bañi don źes byaño || mdo sde gañ dag ħbras bu la ħjug par byed pa de dag ni ñes pañi don źes byaño || mdo sde gañ dag kun rdzob sgrub par byed pa de dag ni drañ bañi don źes byaño || mdo sde gañ dag don dam par bstan⁶ pa de dag ni ñes pañi don źes byaño ||⁷

gžan yañ mdo sde gañ dag las kyi⁸ bya ba (637) la ħjug pa de dag ni drañ bañi don źes byaño || mdo sde gañ dag las dañ ñon moñs pa zad par bstan pa de dag ni ñes pañi don źes byaño ||⁹

gžan yañ mdo sde gañ dag kun nas ñon moñs pa yoñs su bśad pañi phyir bstan pa de dag ni drañ bañi don to || mdo sde gañ dag rnam par byañ ba rnam par dag pañi phyir bstan pa de dag ni ñes pañi don to || mdo sde gañ dag ħkhor bas skyo bar byed pa de dag ni drañ bañi don to || mdo sde gañ dag ħkhor ba dañ mya ñan las ħdas pa gñis su mi ħjug pa de dag ni ñes pañi

1. N rtogs.

2. N add: la.

3. R N om: yañ.

4. cf. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.1 and Akn (p. 64.3.5).

5. Pelliot, 977, folio 2a.6–2b.1

gžan yañ rnam par śes pa źes bya ba ni dmyigs pa las rnam par śes pa skyes pa dañ | yoñs su rtog pa las rnam par śes pa skyes pa de ni rnam par śes pa źes byaño || gañ myi ħdzin | myi bsñiems | myi dmyigs | rnam par chud pa myed ciñ myi skur de ni ye śes źes byaño || gžan yañ ħdus byas kyi spyod pañi chos la rnam par śes pa ħjug go || ħdus ma byas la rnam pa śes pa spyod pa myed do || gañ ħdus ma byas śes pa de ni ye śes so || gžan yañ skye ba dañ | ħgyur ba la so sor gnas pa rnam par śes paño || gañ ma skyes myi ħgog pa | so sor myi gnas pa de ye śes źes byaño ||

6. P ston (also in the following six occurrences of the term ‘bstan’).

7. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.1–3

de la ñes pañi don gyi mdo sde ni gañ | drañ bañi don gyi mdo sde gañ ze na | mdo sde gañ gis lam la gjud pa de ni bkri bañi don ces byaño || mdo gañ gis dag ħbras bu gjud pa de ni ñes pañi don ces byaño || gžan yañ mdo sde gañ gis kun rdzob bśad pa de ni drañ bañi don ces byaño || mdo sde gañ las (...) don dam pa bśad pa de ni ñes pañi don ces byaño ||

8. Akn (p. 64.3.7) dañ.

9. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.3–3

gžan yañ mdo sde gañ gis bya ba la gjud pa de ni drañ bañi don ces byaño || gañ gis las dañ ñon moñs pa zad pañi phyir bśad pa de ni ñes pañi don ces byaño ||

don to || mdo sde gañ dag yi ge dañ tshig sna tshogs su bstan pa de dag ni drañ bañi don to ||
 mdo sde gañ dag zab pa | blta dkañ ba | rtogs par dkañ ba de dag ni ñes pañi don to || mdo sde
 gañ dag tshig hbru mañ ba¹ sems can rñams kyi sems rañs² par byed pa de dag ni drañ bañi
 don to || mdo sde gañ dag tshig dañ tshig hbru ñuñ la ñes par rtogs par³ byed pa de dag ni
 ñes pañi don to ||⁴

gžan yañ mdo sde gañ dag bdag dañ | sems can dañ | srog dañ | skyes bu dañ | gañ zag dañ |
 śed bu dañ | śed las skyes dañ | byed pa po dañ | tshor ba poñi sgra sna tshogs bdag po med pa
 bdag po yod pa bžin du bstan pa de dag ni drañ bañi don to || mdo sde gañ dag stoñ pa ñid
 dañ | mtshan ma med pa dañ | smon pa med pa dañ | mi hbyuñ ba dañ | ma skyes ba dañ | yañ
 dag par mi hbyuñ ba dañ | sems can med pa dañ | gañ zag med pa dañ | dus gsum (638) las
 rñam par thar pañi sgo bstan pa de dag ni ñes pañi don to⁵ ||⁶

2.6.4

de la chos gañ | gañ zag gañ že na | gañ⁷ gañ zag tu lta ba la gnas te | chos⁸ la rtsom pa de
 ni gañ zag ces byaño || gañ gañ zag tu lta ba rtsom pa deñi chos gnas pa chos kyi dbyiñs de ni
 chos zes byaño⁹ ||¹⁰

gžan yañ gañ zag ni so soñi skye boñi gañ zag dañ | so soñi skye bo dge bañi gañ zag dañ |
 dad pañi rjes su hbrañ bañi¹¹ gañ zag dañ | chos kyi rjes su hbrañ bañi gañ zag dañ | brgyad

1. Añ (p. 64.4.3) add: žin.

2. P rñs.

3. P sems rtog par; R ñes par rtog par.

4. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.3–6

gžan yañ mdo sde gañ gis fion moñs pa yoñs su bsal bañi phyr bśad pa de ni drañ bañi don ces byaño ||
 gañ gis las byañ ba rñam par dag pa bśad pa de ni ñes pañi don ces byaño || mdo sde gañ gis hñhor ba la
 skyo bar byed pa de ni drañ bañi don ces byaño || gañ gis hñhor ba dañ mya ñan las hñas pa gñis su myed
 par gjud pa de ni ñes pañi don ces byaño || gžan yañ mdo sde gañ las rñam par bkra bañi tshigs dañ hbyed
 ba bśad pa de ni drañ bañi don ces byaño || gañ las zab mo blta dkañ ba chud dkañ ba bśad pa de ni ñes
 pañi don ces byaño || gžan yañ mdo sde gañ las hbyed pa mañ po sems can rñams kyi sems tshim bar byed
 pa de ni drañ bañi don ces byaño || gañ las tshig (...) dañ hbyed pa ñuñ ba la sems la rtog pa myed pa de ni
 ñes pañi don ces byaño ||.

5. N zes byaño.

6. Pelliot, 977, folio 2b.6–3a.1

gžan yañ gañ las bdag dañ sems can dañ | htsho ba dañ | gañ zag las btsogs (conjectural reading) pa bśad
 pa de ni drañ bañi don ces byaño || gañ las stoñ pa dañ mtshan ma myed pa dañ | smon pa myed pa dañ |
 ma skyes pa dañ | sgra myed pa dañ | ma byuñ ba dañ | sems can myed pa dañ | gañ zag myed pa dañ | dus
 gsum las rñam par thar pañi sgo de ni ñes pañi don ces byaño ||.

7. N om: gañ.

8. D N R add: kha cig.

9. N gnas pañi dbyiñs de ni chos śes paño, for D P R gnas pa chos kyi dbyiñs de ni chos zes byaño.

10. Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.1–1

de la chos ni gañ | gañ zag ni gañ že na | gañ gañ zag tu lta ba la gnas te | gañ chos la brtsom ba de ni gañ
 zag ces byaño || gañ zag tu lta ba rtsom ba deñi chos (la) gnas pa dañ | chos kyi dbyiñs de ni chos śes
 byaño ||.

11. P hñug pañi (also in the next clause).

paḥi gañ zag dañ | rgyun du žugs paḥi gañ zag dañ | lan cig phyir ḥoñ baḥi gañ zag dañ | phyir
mi ḥoñ baḥi gañ zag dañ | dgra bcom paḥi gañ zag dañ | rañ sañs rgyas kyi gañ zag dañ | byañ
chub sems dpaḥi gañ zag dañ | skye bo mañ po la phan pa dañ | skye bo mañ po la bde ba dañ
| ḥjig rten la thugs¹ brtse ba dañ | lha dañ miḥi skye bo phal po cheḥi don dañ | phan pa dañ |
bde baḥi phyir gañ zag gcig ḥjig rten du skye žin ḥbyuñ bar² ḥgyur ba | ḥdi lta ste | de bžin
gśegs pa dgra bcom pa yañ dag par rdzogs paḥi sañs rgyas te | gañ zag gi sgra de thams cad
de bžin gśegs pas kun rdzob kyi gnas kyis sems can mams gzud³ paḥi phyir bstan paḥo || de
la gañ mñon par chags pa de dag ni rton pa ma yin pa⁴ žes byaḥo || de dag rtog⁵ pa la dgod
paḥi phyir chos ḥid la rton par byaḥi gañ zag la ma yin no || žes | (639) bcom ldan ḥdas kyis
gsuñs te |⁶

de la chos ḥid gañ že na | ḥdi lta ste | mi ḥgyur ba | sgro ma btags pa | mi byed pa | mnam par
mi byed pa | mi gnas pa | gnas med pa⁷ | rtsa ba med pa | thams cad du mñam pa | mñam pa
la mñam pa | mi mñam pa la mñam pa | mñam pa dañ mi mñam pa la mñam pa | mnam par mi
rtog pa | mi rtsom pa | nes par ḥgyur ba⁸ | thob pa | chos thams cad la šin tu no bo ḥid med
paḥi mtshan ḥid de ni chos ḥid ces bya ste | gañ dag chos ḥid⁹ la rton par byed pa de dag¹⁰
ni khams gañ laḥaṇ rton par mi byed do || de bas na choṣ kyi tshul gyi sgo la ḥjug pa ḥdis
chos thams cad la rton paḥi phyir chos thams cad de lta buḥi chos ḥid yin no¹¹ ||¹²

1. P om: thugs.

2. D N skye ba(r) ḥbyuñ bar.

3. P gžag.

4. N om: pa.

5. N rton.

6. Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.1–3a.4

gžan yañ gañ zag ni ma rabs so || gañ zag ni ma rabs dge baḥo || dad pas rjes su ḥbrañ baḥo || chos kyi rjes
su ḥbrañ baḥo || gañ zag ni bgyad paḥo || rgyun tu žugs paḥo || lan cig phyir ḥoñ baḥo || phyir myi ḥoñ
baḥo || sgra bcom baḥo || rañ sañs rgyas so || byañ chub sems dpaḥo || ḥgro ba mañ po la phan baḥi phyir
bde baḥi phyir | ḥjig rten las brtse baḥi phyir | lha dañ myi dañ ḥgro baḥi ḥdus pa chen po la phan ba dañ
bde baḥi phyir gañ zag gcig ḥjig rten du skye bas skyeho | de ni de bžin gśegs pa dgra bcom ba yañ dag par
rdzogs paḥi sañs rgyas so | gañ zag gi sgra de thams cad ni de bžin gśegs pas kun rdzob kyi rims kyis sems
can gzuñ baḥi don tu bśad paḥo || de la mñon bar chags pa de ni so sor myi ḥbyuñ ba žes byaḥo || so sor
rton pa de dag la gžag paḥi phyir bcom ldan ḥdas kyis gsuñs pa | chos ḥid la so sor rton par kyahī (conjec-
tural reading) gañ zag la ma yin no ||.

7. P mi ḥdug pa.

8. D P R nes par gyur pa.

9. N add: de.

10. N om: dag.

11. P de lta ba dañ ḥdra bar ḥgyur te, for D N R de lta buḥi chos ḥid yin no.

12. Pelliot, 977, folio 3a.4–7

de la chos ḥid gañ že na | de ni ḥgyur ba myed pa bskyed pa dañ | mnam par myi bya ba dañ | myi gnas pa
dañ | so sor myi gnas paḥi rtsa baḥo || thams cad tu mñam ba dañ | myi mñam ba dañ mñam ba | mnam par
rtog pa myed pa | rtsom ba myed pa | myi ḥgyur ba thob pa | chos thams cad šin tu no bo ḥid myed paḥi
mtshan ḥid ste | de ni chos ḥid ces byaḥo || gañ chos de la so sor rton pa ni chos gañ gi phyir yañ myi
ḥbyuñ no || de bas na deḥi chos kyi sgor ḥjug pas chos thams cad la rton pa nas bzuñ ste | chos thams cad
de lta buḥi no bo ḥid yin no || žes gsuñs so ||.

de dag ni byañ chub sems dpañ nams kyi rton pa bži (dag) zes bya ste | de ni byañ chub sems dpañ rton pa la mkhas pa zes byaḥo || de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ rton pa la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||¹

2.7

de la byañ chub sems dpañ tshogs la mkhas pa gañ že na | byañ chub sems dpañ nams kyi tshogs ni ḥdi gñis te | gñis gañ že na | ḥdi lta ste | bsod nams kyi tshogs dañ | ye šes kyi tshogs so ||²

2.7.1

de la bsod nams kyi tshogs gañ že na | sbyin pa las byuñ baḥi bsod nams³ bya baḥi dños po dañ | tshul khrims las byuñ baḥi bsod nams bya baḥi dños po dañ | sgom pa las byuñ baḥi bsod (640) nams bya baḥi dños po dañ | byams paḥi sems la sñoms par ḥjug pa dañ | sñiñ rjeḥi sbyor ba dañ | dge baḥi rtsa ba thams cad la brtson⁴ pa dañ | bdag dañ pha rol gyi sdig pa ḥchags pa dañ | dus gsum du gtogs paḥi sems can thams cad dañ | slob pa thams cad⁵ dañ | mi slob pa thams cad dañ | rañ sañs rgyas thams cad dañ | sems dañ po⁶ bskyed pa nams dañ | spyod pa la žugs pa thams cad dañ | phyir mi ldog pa nams dañ | skye ba⁷ gcig gis thogs paḥi byañ chub sems dpañ nams kyi sems bskyed pa la rjes su yi rañ ba dañ | ḥdas pa dañ | ma byon pa dañ | da ltar byuñ baḥi sañs rgyas bcom ldan ḥdas nams kyi dge baḥi rtsa ba⁸ thams cad kyi rjes su yi rañ ba dañ ldan paḥi bsod nams bya baḥi dños po dañ | sañs rgyas thams cad dañ | ḥphags pa thams cad la chos⁹ gsol ba ḥdebs pa¹⁰ dañ ldan paḥi bsod nams bya baḥi dños po dañ | dge ba thams cad byañ chub tu bsño ba dañ ldan paḥi bsod nams bya baḥi dños po dañ ||¹¹

1. The last paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.

2. Pelliot, folio 3a.7–7

de la byañ chub sems dpañ tshogs la mkhas pa gañ že na | byañ chub sems dpañ tshogs ni nram pa gñis te | de ni bsod nams dañ | ye šes kyi tshogs so ||.

3. P sbyin paḥi bsod nams (also in all following instances of the same context).

4. N rtsom.

5. N thiñ.

6. P thog mar.

7. P tshe.

8. D N P 'dge ba' only.

9. N add: ston par.

10. P om: ḥdebs pa.

11. Pelliot, folio 3b.1–4

de la bsod nam gyi tshogs gañ že na | sbyin ba las bsod nams byaḥi dños po dañ | de bžin du tshul khrims dañ | bsgom na las bsod nams bya baḥi dños po dañ | byams paḥi sems sñoms par sgrub pa | sñiñ rjeḥi sbyor ba dañ | dge baḥi thams cad kyi rtsa ba rtsom ba | bdag dañ pha rol gyi sdig ḥchags pa | dus gsum gyis bsod pa | sems can thams cad dañ | bslob pa dañ | myi slob pa thams cad dañ | rañ sañs rgyas thams

sems can byañ chub tu sems ma bskyed pa rnam byañ chub tu sems skyed pa dañ | byañ chub tu sems bskyed pa¹ rnam la pha rol tu phyin pañi lam ston pa dañ | dbul po rnam la loñs spyod kyis sdud pa dañ | nad pa rnam la sman² sbyin pa dañ | gus par bsñen bkur byed pa dañ | mthu chuñ ba rnam la bzod ciñ dañ du len pa dañ | lhun ba rnam mi hchab³ pa dañ | sdig pa hchags pa dañ | sañs (641) rgyas bcom ldan h̄das rnam⁴ bzugs pa dañ yoñs su mya ñan las h̄das pa rnam la bsñen bkur dañ ri mo⁵ thams cad byed pa dañ | slob dpon dañ mkhan po rnam la ston pa bzin du ri mo byed pa dañ | chos la rin po che rin thañ med pa bzin du yoñs su tshol bañi brtson h̄grus dañ | chos smra ba la dgañ zin dpag tshad brgyar yañ soñ ste | chos ñan pas chog mi šes pa dañ | zañ zin med par chos h̄chad pa dañ | pha dañ ma la rim gro⁶ byed pa dañ | byas pa gzo ba dañ | byas pa šes pa dañ | h̄gyod pa med pa dañ | bsod nam (bya bañi dños po) bsags pas chog mi šes pa dañ |⁷

lus bsdam pañi lus la⁸ tshul h̄chos pa med pa dañ | ñag bsdam pañi ñag la tshul h̄chos pa med pa dañ | yid bsdam pañi yid la tshul h̄chos pa med pa dañ | de bzin gšegs pañi mchod rten btsugs pañi phyir tshañs pañi bsod nam yoñs su h̄dzin pa dañ | mchod sbyin gtan pa med pa bsags⁹ pas mtshan ñid¹⁰ yoñs su rdzogs pa dañ | dge bañi rtsa bañi tshogs sna tshogs bsags pas dpe byad bzañ po yoñs su rdzogs pa dañ | ña rgyal med pas lus brgyan pa dañ | ñag gi ñes pa thams cad spañs pas ñag brgyan pa dañ | blo thogs pa med pas sems brgyan pa dañ

|¹¹

cad dañ | thog ma sems bskyed pa rnam dañ | spyad pa rdzogs pa rnam dañ | phyir myi ldog pa rnam dañ | skye ba gcig gis thogs pañi byañ chub sems dpañ rnam kyis sems bskyed pañi rjes su yi rañ ño || h̄das pa dañ | ma hoñs pa dañ | da ltar gyi sañs rgyas bcom ldan h̄das nam kyis dge ba thams cad kyis rjes su yi rañ ba dañ | ltan gcig soñ bañi bsod nam byañi dños poñ || sañs rgyas thams cad dañ | h̄phags pañi thams cad la chos gsol ba dañ ltan gcig soñ bañi bsod nam byañi dños poñ || dge ba thams cad byañ chub tu brjod pa dañ ltan cig soñ bañi bsod nam bya bañi dños poñ ||.

1. N om: dañ | byañ chub tu sems bskyed pa.
2. N add: gyi.
3. P h̄chags.
4. P R om: rnam.
5. P gus pa (also in the following two instances of the term 'ri mo').
6. P bsñen bkur.
7. Pelliot, 977, folio 3b.5–4a.1

byañ chub tu sems bskyed pa rnam byañ cub sems dpañ rnam kyis sems bskyed pañ || byañ chub tu sems bskyed pañi rnam la pha rol tu phyin pañi lam ston pañ || dbul po rnam loñs spyod kyis bsus pañ || na ba rnam la sman rab tu byin te rim h̄gro dañ bkur sti byed pañ || mthu chuñ ba rnam la bzod ciñ zin bañ || ltan ba so sor g.yogs bañ || sdig bšegs pañ | sañs rgyas bcom ldan h̄das bzugs pa dañ | mya ñan las h̄das pa thams cad la ri mo bkur sti byed pañ || slob dpon dañ mkhan po la ston par ri mo byed pañ | chos la rin thañ myed pañi rin po che tshol bañi brtson h̄grus so || chos h̄chad pa la dgañ ste dpag tshad brgyar kyañ mñan pas myi ñoms pa | ma h̄dres pañi chos h̄chad pa | pha ma la rim h̄gro byed pa | byas pa šes pa | byas pa dran ba | byas pa tshor ba | h̄gyod pa myed pa | bsod nam bstags pas myi ñoms pa |.

8. D N R lus bsdam šin.
 9. N bstags (also in the next occurrence of the term 'bsags').
 10. D N R mtshan.
 11. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.1–3
- lus bsdam pas sgyu myed pa | ñag bsdam pas ñag la sgyu myed pa | yid bsdam pas yid la sgyu myed pa |

mñon par śes pa sprul pas sañs rgyas kyi źiñ gi rgyan¹ dañ | ye śes yoñs su dag pas chos kyi mtshan ñid kyi² rgyan dañ | phra ma dañ | že gcod pa dañ | dbye bañi tshig yoñs su spañs pas (642) ħkhor mañ poñi rgyan dañ | chos ħdzin pas ħdod chags med pañi chos kyi³ rgyan dañ | rab tu dgañ nas legs so źes⁴ bya ba byin pas chos kyi gtam mi ħjigs par byed pa dañ | sgrib pa dañ sgrib par byed pa⁵ rnam par spañs śiñ gus par chos ñan pas ħbras bu yod par chos ħchad pa dañ | sañs rgyas rnams la dkañ thub kyi nags tshal phul bas byañ chub kyi śiñ gi rgyan dañ | dge bañi rtsa ba thams cad sñon du ħgro źiñ byañ chub kyi sems mi gtoñ bas byañ chub kyi sñiñ poñi rgyan dañ |⁶

las dañ ñon moñs pa mi dmigs pas tshe dañ śi ħpho yoñs su dag pa dañ | rin po che phañs pañi dños po thams cad yoñs su gtoñ bas rin po cheñi lag pa⁷ dañ | mi zad pañi smon lam thob pas loñs spyod mi zad pa dañ | khro gñer med pas mthoñ ma thag tu sems can rnams dad ciñ bźin ħdzum pas gsoñ por smra ba dañ | sems can thams cad la ħod zer sñoms pas⁸ mñam pa ñid kyi rgyan thob pa dañ | ma lobs pa la mi brñas pas⁹ ħod mañ po gtoñ ba¹⁰ dañ | tshul khirms kyi bsod nams bsags pas skye ba yoñs su dag pa dañ | ltuñ ba la mi rtsod pas mñal yoñs su dag pa dañ |¹¹

dge ba bcuñi las yoñs su dag pas lha dañ mir skye ba dañ | rjes su bstan pa¹² thams cad la

de bźin gśegs pañi mchod rten so sor gźag pañi phyir tshañs pañi bsod nams yoñs (...) | mtshan yoñs su rdzogs pa | phañs pa myed pas sdud pa bskyed pa | dpe byad bzañ po yoñs su rdzogs pa | rnam par bkra bañi dge bañi rtsi ba tshogs ba bstags pas sprul pas lus brgyan pa | ñag gyi ñes pa thams cad rnam par spañs pas ñag brgyan pa | thogs pa myed pañi blos sems brgyan pa |.

1. Akn (p. 65.2.8–3.3) gives ‘rgyan du ħgyur ba dañ’ in this and in the following five instances of the phrase ‘rgyan dañ’.

2. N kyis.

3. N kyis.

4. P R om; źes.

5. D N R chod pa.

6. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.3–5

mñon bar śes pas rnam par sprul pañi phyir sañs rgyas kyi źiñ brgyan pa | ye śes yoñs su dag pas chos kyi mtshan brgyan pa | phra ma dañ gla ma źid (conjectural reading) dbye bañi tshig yoñs su spañs pas ħkhor gyi lus brgyan pa | chos ħdzin pas ħdod chags myed pañi chos kyis rab tu brgyan to | rab tu dge ba dge bar sbyin nas chos kyi gtam myi ħjigs pa | sgrib pa dañ bsgribs pa mam par spañs pañi phyir bkur sti byas te | chos ñan pas ħbras bu yod pañi chos ħchad pañi || sañs rgyas rnams la dkañ thub kyi nags tshal phul bas byañ chub kyi śiñ gis brgyan to || dge ba thams cad thogs par ħgro bas byañ chub kyi sems myi gtoñ bañi phyir byañ chub kyi sñiñ po brgyan to ||.

7. D N R lag na rin po che.

8. N pa.

9. P zil gyis mi gnon pas, for D N R mi brñas pas.

10. D mthoñ ba.

11. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.5–7

las dañ ñon moñs pa myi dmyigs pas tshe dañ śi ħphos yoñs su dag pañi | rin po che bzañ poñi dños po thams cad yoñs su btañ bas rin po cheñi lag pañi | myi zad pañi smon lam thob pañi phyir loñs spyod myi zad pañi || bźin ba ħdzum źiñ gsoñ por smra ste khro gñer myed pañi phyir mthoñ ma thag tu sems can rnams dad pañi | sems can thams cad la ħod sñoms pañi phyir sñoms pa ñid so sor thob pañi || ma lobs pa la physis brtsan bas ħod kyis rgyan gtoñ bañi || tshul khirms kyi bsod nams bsags pas skye ba yoñs su dag pañi || luñ bstan pañi phyir mñal yoñs su dag pañi |.

12. P bstan par bya ba, for D N R rjes su bstan pa.

rab tu rtog pas gdon mi za bar gnong pa dan | chos la slob dpon gyi dpe mkhyud med pas chos
kyi dbaṅ phyug dan¹ | lhag paḥi bsam pa yoṅs su dag pas ḥjig rten thams cad la mñon sum
pa dan | ñi tshe baḥi spyod pa mi (643) ḥdod pas rgya chen poḥi chos la dad pa dan | thams
cad mkhyen paḥi sems mi ḥdor bas bsod nams thams cad yoṅs su ḥdzin pa dan | dad pa sñon
du ḥgro bas nor bdun yoṅs su rdzogs pa dan | sñon dam bcas pa ñams su len par byed pas²
ḥjig rten thams cad mi slu ba dan | dge baḥi chos yoṅs su rdzogs pas saṅs rgyas kyi chos
thams cad yoṅs su rdzogs pa ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi bsod nams kyi tshogs la mkhas
pa ḥes byaḥo ||³

2.7.2

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi ye ṣes kyi tshogs la mkhas pa gaṅ ḥe na | rgyu gaṅ gis ye ṣes
skye ba ste | de ltar rgyu dan rkyen⁴ gaṅ gis ye ṣes rtogs paḥo ||

de la rgyu gaṅ | rkyen gaṅ ḥe na | chos tshol ba la rab tu ḥdun pa dan | ye ṣes kyi rjes su soṅ
baḥi bśes gñen bsten pa dan | saṅs rgyas kyi ye ṣes la rton gyi | ñan thos dan raṅ saṅs rgyas
kyi ye ṣes la mi rton pa dan | de dag la ña rgyal mi byed pa | bla ma la dgaḥ ba dan | ston pa la
dgaḥ ba dan | deḥi dge baḥi bśes gñen de dag gis ḥdi ni bsam pa dan ldan bar ṣes nas | ye ṣes
kyi gtam gaṅ yaṅ mi ston pa med pa dan | snod du ṣes nas bar chad med par sems rtse gcig tu
chos ston pa dan | des chos de thos nas chos kyi tshogs la brtson par⁵ byed de | gaṅ chos kyi
tshogs la brtson par byed pa de ñid deḥi ye ṣes kyi tshogs la brtson pa yin no ||⁶

de la chos kyi tshogs la brtson (644) pa gaṅ ḥe na | ḥdi lta ste | don ñuṅ ba dan | bya ba ñuṅ

1. P chos la slob dpon gyis mi ḥchab pas chos la dbaṅ phyug dan, for D N R chos la slob dpon gyi dpe
mkhyud med pas chos kyi dbaṅ phyug dan.

2. D N ñams su lon par byed pas; P sgrol bas.

3. Pelliot, 977, folio 4a.7–4b.3

dge ba bcuḥi las yoṅs su dag pas lha dan myir skyeḥo || bstan pa thams cad la yid ches pas bsgrims pa gdon
myi za baḥo || chos la mkhan po myi ḥchab pas chos la dbaṅ paḥo | lhag paḥi bsam pa yoṅs su dag pas ḥjig
rten thams cad kyi bla yin no | ñi tse paḥi spyod lam mos pas rgya chen poḥi chos la dad paḥo || thams cad
mkhyen paḥi sems myi ḥdor bas bsod nams thams cad yoṅs su ḥdzin paḥo || dad pa thog mar ḥgro bas nor
btun yoṅs su rdzogs paḥo | sñon dam bcas pa las bsgal paḥi phyir ḥjig rten thams cad myi bslu baḥo || dge
baḥi chos yoṅs su rdzogs pas saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yoṅs su rdzogs paḥo || de ni byaṅ chub sems
dpaḥi bsod nams kyi tshogs la mkhas pa ḥes byaḥo ||.

4. D P R add: gaṅ dan.

5. P rnal ḥbyor (also in the following three occurrences of ‘brtson par’: 1. D R P rnal ḥbyor, 2. P rnal ḥbyor,
3. P rnal ḥbyor pa).

6. Pelliot, 977, folio 4b.3–6

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi ye ṣes kyi tshogs la mkhas pa gaṅ ḥe na | rgyu gaṅ gis ye ṣes bskyed pa ste | de
ltar rgyu dan rkyen gaṅ gis ye ṣes chud paḥo || de la rgyu dan rkyen gaṅ ḥe na || chos tshol ba la rab tu mos
pa | ye ṣes kyi rjes su soṅ baḥi bśes ñen bsten pa | saṅs rgyas kyi ye ṣes la rton te | ñan thos dan raṅ saṅs
rgyas kyi ye ṣes la myi rton paḥo | de dag la ña myed pa | bla ma la raṅs pa | mkhan po la raṅs pa | de dag
dge baḥi bśes ñen gyis bsam ba phun sum tshogs par rig nas ye ṣes kyi gtam gaṅ yaṅ myi ston pa myed do
|| snod tu rig nas ḥtshams myed par ḥbad de | de la chos ḥchad do || des deḥi chos thos nas chos kyi tshogs
la brtson par byed do | gaṅ chos kyi tshogs la rton ba de ñid ye ṣes kyi tshogs la brtson baḥo ||.

ba dan | sgra ñuñ ba dan | srod dan tho rañs la mi ñal zñ rnal hbyor la brtson pa dan | hbrel pañi don la yoñs su rtog pa dan | phyir zñ yoñs su tshol ba dan | sems la rñog pa med pa dan | sgrib pa gnon pa dan | ltuñ ba las hbyuñ bar śes pa dan | hgyod pa med pa dan | kun nas ldan ba med pa dan | nan tan sñiñ por byed pa dan | chos la gźol ba dan | chos la h̄bab pa dan | chos la bab pa dan¹ | chos la brtul ba dan | rtag par mgo dan lus² la me h̄bar ba lta bu dan |³

ye śes tshol ba de ñid la gnas pa dan | mi lhod pa dan | brtson h̄grus mi gtoñ ba dan | khyad par du h̄gro ba dan | h̄du h̄dzi las dben pa dan | gcig pur⁴ dgañ ba dan | dgon pañi bde ba yid la byed pa dan | h̄phags pañi rigs la dgañ ba dan | sbyañs pa las mi h̄gyur ba dan | chos kyi kun dgañ (ba) la dgañ zñ mos pa⁵ dan | h̄jig rten rgyañ phan pañi gsañ tshig la ri mo⁶ mi byed pa dan | h̄jig rten las h̄das pañi chos tshol ba la dran pa mi ñams pa dan | rtogs pa la don rtogs pañi rjes su h̄gro ba dan | blo gros la lam gyi rjes su h̄thun par byed pa dan | mos pa la sdom pa dan |⁷

rkyen la ye śes kyi rjes su rig pa⁸ dan | khrel yod pa dan⁹ | ño tsha śes pañi rgyan¹⁰ dan | sañs rgyas kyi h̄gros kyi rjes su h̄gro ba dan | mi śes pa sel ba dan | ma rig pa dan gti mug gi liñ tog (645) sel ba dan | śes rab kyi mig rnam par dag pa dan | rab tu rnam par dag pa dan | blo rgya che ba dan | bla ma žum pa dan | blo rab tu tha dad pa dan | mñon sum du śes pa dan | gźan (dag) la rag ma lus pañi yon tan dan | rañ gi yon tan gyis mi sñems pa dan | pha rol gyi yon tan la rtog pa¹¹ dan | legs par bya bañi las¹² byed pa dan | las kyi rnam par smin pa la mi¹³ h̄gal bar byed pa¹⁴ dan | las yoñs su dag par śes pa¹⁵ ste | de ni byañ chub sems dpañ

1. R om: chos la bab pa dan.

2. D P R gos.

3. Pelliot, 977, folio 4b.6–5a.1

de la chos kyi tshogs la brtson ba gañ ze na | de ni don ñuñ ba | bya ba ñuñ ba | sgra ñuñ ba | nam gyi cha stod dan cha smad la myi ñal bar brtson ba dan ldan ba | brtson bañi don la yoñs su rtog pa phyi phyir yoñs su h̄jig pa sems ma sñoms pañi (conjectural reading) bsgrib pa mam par sel ba | lhuñ ba las h̄byuñ bar śes pa | h̄gyod ba myed pa | yoñs su bskor pa myed pa | nan tan gyi sñiñ po can chos la gźol ba | chos la h̄bab pa | chos la bab pa | chos la sgrim ba | rtag par mgo dan gos la mye h̄bar bā bzin du ye śes tshol bañi de ñid la gnas pa |.

4. P R bu; N pu.

5. P chos la kun dgañ zñ dgañ bas dgañ ba, for D N R chos (kyi) kun dgañ (ba) la dgañ zñ mos pa.

6. N ri mor.

7. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.1–3

myi lhod pa bkur ba myi h̄dod pa | khyad bar du myi h̄gro ba | h̄du h̄dzi dan tha dad pa | gcig pur dgañ ba | dgon pañi sgor yid la byed pa | h̄phags pañi rigs la dgañ ba | sbyañs pa las myi h̄gyur ba | chos la kun dgañ zñ dgañ bas dgañ ba | h̄jig rten pa (phyal bañi) sñags la bkur sti myi byed pa | h̄jig rten las h̄das pañi chos tshol bañi dran ba myi ñams ba | rig pañi don gyi h̄gros su h̄gro ba | blo h̄gros lam tu mthun ba | sdom ba brtan pa |.

8. P ye śes su rtogs pa.

9. P om: khrel yod pa dan.

10. P ño tsha ba dad mdzes pañi rgyan.

11. P mi rtog pa.

12. D R legs par bya bañi las bya bañi las; P bthad por byed pañi.

13. N om: mi.

sems dpañ chen poñi ye śes kyi tshogs źes byaño ||¹

gźan yañ ye śes kyi tshogs ni sbyin ba rnam par² bźi ste |

- (1) chos smra ba la gro ga dañ | smyu gu dañ | snag tsha dañ | glegs bam sbyin pa dañ |
- (2) choś smra ba la chos kyi stan sna tshogs sbyin pa dañ |
- (3) chos smra ba la rñed pa dañ | bkur sti dañ | tshigs su bcad pa thams cad sbyin pa dañ |
- (4) chos smra ba la chos kun bsdu bañi phyir g.yo med par legs so || źes bya ba sbyin pa ste |

sbyin pa bźi po de dag [ni] ye śes kyi tshogs sogs³ par hgyur ro || kun sruñ ba bźi⁴ mams
ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur te | bźi gañ ze na |

- (1) chos smra ba mams kyi lus [kun]⁵ sruñ ba⁶ dañ |
- (2) dge ba sruñ ba dañ |
- (3) yul dañ ljoñs su hjug pa la sruñ ba dañ |
- (4) phan pañi dños po [kun]⁷ sruñ ba ste |

[kun]⁸ sruñ ba bźi po de dag (ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur ro)⁹ || ñe bar rton pa¹⁰ bźi
ye śes kyi tshogs (sogs par)¹¹ hgyur te | bźi gañ ze na |

- (1) chos smra ba mams kyi chos ñe bar (646) rton pa dañ |
- (2) ye śes ñe bar rton pa dañ |
- (3) zañ ziñ ñe bar rton pa dañ |
- (4) byañ chub ñe bar rton paño ||¹²

14. P byed pa mi gtoñ ba, for D N R mi hgal bar byed pa.

15. R byed pa.

1. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.3–5

rkyen gyis ye śes chud pa | ño tsha dañ khrel yod pañi rgyan | sañs rgyas kyi hgro bañi rjes su hgro ba | myi śes pa hđor bab ma rig pa dañ gti mug kyi bris (conjectural reading) ma sel ba | śes rab kyi myig rnam par dag pa | rab tu rnam par dag pañi bloñi rgya che ba | blo ma hkhums pa | blo rab tu tha dad pa | mñon sum du śes pa | pha rol gyi kha na ma las pañi yon tan mñon bar myi bsñems | pha rol gyi yon tan la myi rtog pa | bzañ por byas pañi las byed pa | las kyi rnam par smin pa la myi htshab pa | las yoñs su dag par śes pa de ni | byañ chub sems dpañi ye śes kyi tshogs śes byaño ||.

2. D N P om: rnam par.

3. N stsogs (but for one, also in all further occurrences of the word ‘sogs’ in this tetrad section); this applies also to the parallel passage in the Akn (p. 66.1.3–3.6).

4. N add: po.

5. Akn (p. 66.1.3) om: kun.

6. R yoñs su sruñ ba (also in the next three clauses).

7. Akn (p. 66.1.4) om.

8. Akn (p. 66.1.4) om: kun.

9. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.4).

10. N ñe bar brtan pa; P rton pa (also throughout this stanza).

11. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.4) as ‘stsogs par’.

12. Pelliot, 977, folio 5a.6–5b.1

(ñe bar rton pa bži po de dag ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur ro ||)¹ stobs lña ye śes kyi tshogs (sogs par)² hgyur te | lña gañ žes na | hdi lta ste |

- (1) mos paḥi phyir dad paḥi stobs dañ |
- (2) thos pa tshol baḥi phyir brtson hgrus kyi stobs dañ |
- (3) byañ chub kyi sems³ mi brjed paḥi phyir dran paḥi stobs dañ |
- (4) mñam pa ñid kyi chos la ñes par rtogs paḥi phyir tiñ ñe hdzin gyi stobs dañ |
- (5) thos paḥi stobs kyi phyir śes rab kyi stobs ste |

stobs lña po de dag ye śes kyi tshogs su (sogs par)⁴ hgyur ro || tshul khrims bži ye śes kyi tshogs sogs⁵ par hgyur te | bži gañ že na | hdi lta ste |

- (1) chos la ñes paḥi⁶ tshul khrims dañ |
- (2) chos htshol baḥi tshul khrims dañ |
- (3) chos la ñes par rtogs paḥi tshul khrims dañ |
- (4) byañ chub tu bsño baḥi tshul khrims te |

tshul khrims bži po de dag ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur ro || bzod pa bži ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur te | bži gañ že na | hdi lta ste |

- (1) chos tshol ba la mñon par brtson pas ñan du smra ba dañ | ñan du brjed paḥi tshig (rnam)⁷ bzod pa dañ |
- (2) chos tshol ba la mñon par brtson pas rluñ dañ | tsha ba dañ | grañ ba dañ | dro ba dañ | skom pa dañ | bkres pa bzod pa dañ |
- (3) chos tshol ba la mñon par brtson pas | slob dpon dañ mkhan poḥi rjes su hjug pa dañ |

gžan yañ ye śes kyi tshogs rnam pa bži ste | chos hchad pa la hgro ba dañ | ga la ma dañ snag tsa dañ | glegs bam byin ba dañ | chos hchad pa la mam par bkra baḥi stan sbyin ba dañ | chos hchad pa la brten pa dañ | bku sti dañ | tshigs su bcad pa thams cad sbyin ba dañ | chos hchad pa la chos kun bsdu baḥi phyir dgeḥo žes bya ba sbyin ba dañ bži ni ye śes kyi tshogs bstogs par hgyur ro || gžan yañ kun tu bsruñ ba bži ye śes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | bži gañ že na | chos hchad paḥi lus kun bsruñ ba dañ | yul dañ ljoñs su žugs la kun tu bsruñ ba dañ | phan baḥi dños po kun tu bsruñ ba dañ bžiho || gžan yañ brtan ba bži ye śes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | bži gañ že na | chos hchad pa la chos brtan ba dañ | ye śes brtan ba dañ | zañ žin kun brtan ba dañ | blo brtan paḥo || (R folio 645.3–646.1).

1. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.6).
2. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.6) as ‘stsogs par’.
3. P add: kun.
4. Given in Akn (p. 66.1.8) as ‘stsogs par’.
5. N bsags.
6. P bde bar gñas paḥi, for D N R ñes paḥi.
7. P ñan par ḥoñs paḥi tshig rnam, for D N R ñan du brjed paḥi tshig.

- (4) chos tshol ba la mñon par brtson pas | stoñ pa ñid [pa] dañ | mtshan ma med pa dañ | smon pa med pañi chos bzod pa ste |

bzod pa bži po de dag (647) ye šes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur ro || brtson hgrus bži ye šes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur te | bži gañ ze na | hdi lta ste |

- (1) thos pañi brtson hgrus dañ |
- (2) hdzin pañi¹ brtson hgrus dañ |
- (3) bstan pañi² brtson hgrus dañ |
- (4) nan tan gyi brtson hgrus te |

brtson hgrus bži po de dag ye šes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur ro ||³ bsam gtan gyi yan lag bži⁴ ye šes kyi tshogs [kyi] sogs par hgyur te | bži gañ ze na | hdi lta ste |

- (1) dben pa dañ |
- (2) gcig bur dgañ ba dañ |
- (3) ye šes dañ | mñon par šes pa tshol ba dañ |
- (4) sañs rgyas kyi ye šes la hjug pa ste |

bsam gtan gyi yan lag bži po de dag ye šes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur ro || šes rab snañ bañi chos hdi bži ye šes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur te | bži gañ ze na | hdi lta ste |

- (1) chad pa la mi gnas pa dañ |
- (2) rtag pa la mi hjug pa dañ |
- (3) rten ciñ hbrel par hbyuñ ba dañ mi hgal ba dañ |

1. D N R gzuñs kyi (Akn hdzin pañi).

2. D R brtan pañi; P hchad pañi (Akn bstan pañi).

3. Pelliot, 977, folio 5b.1–5

gžan yañ stobs lña ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te lña gañ ze na | lhag par grol bas dad pañi stobs dañ | thos pa tshol bas brtson hgrus kyi stobs dañ | byañ cub kyi sems kun tu ma stor bas dran bañi bstobs dañ | mñam ba ñid kyi chos la rtog pas ti ñe hdzin gyi stobs dañ | thos pañi stobs kyi phyir šes rab kyi stobs so || gžan yañ tshul khirms bži ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | chos la dgañ bañi tshul khirms dañ | chos tshol bañi tshul khirms dañ | chos rtog pañi tshul khirms dañ | byañ chub tu bños pañi tshul khirms dañ || gžan yañ bzod pa bžihi ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | chos tshol ba la mñon bar brtson bas ñan tu smra ba dañ skya skyoñi tshig (conjectural reading) bzod pa dañ | chos tshol ba la mñon bar brtson bas grañ ba dañ dro ba dañ skom ba dañ | bkris ba bzod pa dañ | chos tshol ba la mñon bar brtson bas slob dpon dañ mkhan poñi rjes su hgyur ba dañ | chos tshol ba la mñon bar brtson bas ston pa ñid dañ mtshan ma myed pa dañ smon pa myed pañi chos bzod pañi || gžan yañ brtson hgrus bži ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | thos pañi brtson hgrus dañ | gzuñ bañi brtson hgrus dañ | bśad pañi brtson hgrus dañ | nan tan gyi brtson hgrus so || (R folio 646.1–647.2).

4. Akn add: byañ chub sems dpañi.

(4) bdag med pa la mos pa¹ ste |

śes rab snañ bañi chos bñi po de dag ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur ro || chos hñdi bñi
thabs kyi ye śes kyi² tshogs (sogs par)³ hgyur te | bñi gañ ze na | hñdi lta ste |

(1) hñig rten pañi rjes su hñug pa dañ |

(2) mdo sdeñi⁴ rjes su hñug pa dañ |

(3) chos kyi rjes su hñug pa dañ |

(4) ye śes kyi rjes su hñug pa ste |

chos bñi po de dag thabs kyi ye śes kyi tshogs (sogs par)⁵ hgyur ro⁶ || chos hñdi bñi lam
gyi ye śes kyi tshogs⁷ (648) la hñug par hgyur te | bñi gañ ze na | hñdi lta ste |

(1) pha rol tu phyin pañi lam dañ |

(2) byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi lam dañ |

(3) yan lag brgyad pañi lam dañ |⁸

(4) thams cad mkhyen pañi ye śes su hñgro bañi lam ste |

chos bñi po de dag lam gyi ye śes kyi tshogs⁹ la hñug par hgyur ro¹⁰ || mi ñoms pa hñdi bñi
ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur te | bñi gañ ze na | hñdi lta ste |

(1) thos pas mi ñoms pa dañ |

(2) bstan pas mi ñoms pa dañ |

(3) dpyod pas mi ñoms pa dañ |

(4) ye śes kyis mi ñoms pa ste |

mi ñoms pa bñi po de dag ye śes kyi tshogs sogs par hgyur ro ||¹¹

1. Given in Akn (p. 66.3.1) as 'bzod pa'.
2. N thabs kyi; Akn (p. 66.3.1–2) has: thabs bñi po de dag byañ chub sems dpañ mams kyi ye śes kyi tshogs stsogs par hgyur ro.
3. Given in Akn (p. 66.3.2) as 'stsogs par'.
4. Akn (p. 66.3.2) replaces 'mdo sde' with 'sems can'.
5. Given in Akn (p. 66.3.5) as 'stsogs par'.
6. Akn (p. 66.3.3) has 'thabs bñi po de dag byañ chub sems dpañ mams kyi ye śes kyi tshogs stsogs par hgyur ro'.
7. D N P R lam gyi tshogs kyi ye śes.
8. Akn (p. 66.3.4) has 'sañi lam dañ' for 'yan lag brgyad pañi lam dañ' (D N P R).
9. D N P R lam gyi tshogs kyi ye śes.
10. Akn (p. 66.3.4–5) has 'tshogs stsogs par hgyur ro', for 'tshogs la hñug par hgyur ro' (D N P R).
11. Pelliot, 977, folio 5b.5–6a.2
gñan yañ bsam gtan bñi ye śes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | dben ba dañ | dag pa (conjectural reading) | gcig pur

gžan yañ ye šes kyi tshogs ni gañ sems can thams cad kyi rjes su hgro ba dañ | žiñ thams
cad kyi rjes su hgro ba ste | sbyin pa las kyañ ye šes kyi tshogs su bltaḥo || tshul khirms dañ |
bzod pa dañ | brtson hgrus dañ | bsam gtan dañ | šes rab dañ | byams pa dañ | sñiñ rje dañ |
dgaḥ ba dañ | btañ¹ sñoms las kyañ ye šes kyi tshogs su bltaḥo ||

de ciḥi phyir že na | ji tsam du byañ chub sems dpaḥi rtsom pa de thams cad ye šes las rag
las pa² | ye šes sñon du hgro ba | ye šes la rton pa ste | de ye šes la gnas pas³ ye šes can
thams cad kyi rton par hgyur te⁴ | bdud thams cad kyis kyañ de la glags mi rñied do || sañs
rgyas kyi byin gyi rlabs kyañ ḥthob | thams cad (649) mkhyen paḥi ye šes la yañ ḥjog⁵ par
byed do ||⁶

de gñis ni byañ chub sems dpaḥi bsod nams kyi tshogs dañ ye šes kyi tshogs te | byañ chub
sams dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po tshogs nmam par gñis de⁷ la mkhas pa šes rab kyi pha rol tu
phyin pa la spyod do ||⁸

2.8

de la byañ chub sems dpaḥ nmams kyi dran pa ñe bar bžag pa la mkhas pa gañ že na | ḥdi
bži ni byañ chub sems dpaḥ nmams kyi dran pa ñe bar bžag pa sgom pa ste | bži gañ že na | ḥdi
lta ste | lus la lus kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag pa sgom pa dañ | tshor ba la tshor baḥi
rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag pa sgom pa dañ | sems la sems kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe

dgaḥ ba dañ | ye šes kyi mñon bar šes pa tshol ba dañ | sañs rgyas kyi ye šes la ḥjug paḥo || šes rab kyi snañ
baḥi chos bži ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | chad pa la so sor myi gnas pa dañ | rtag pa la myi ḥjugs pa dañ
| rkyañ dañ ḥdu ba tshogs te ḥbyuñ ba ma bgags pa dañ | bdag myed pa la dad paḥo || chos ḥdi bži thabs
dañ ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te | ḥjig rten gyi rjes su ḥjug pa dañ | mdo sdeḥi rjes su ḥjug pa dañ | chos
kyi rjes su ḥjug pa dañ | ye šes kyi rjes us ḥjug paḥo || chos ḥdi lam gyi tshogs kyi ye šes la ḥjug par hgyur
te | pha rol tu phyin paḥi lam dañ | byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi lam dañ | yan lag brgyad kyi lam dañ | thams
cad mkhyen paḥi ye šes kyi rjes su hgro baḥi lam mo || myi ño(m)s pa bžis ye šes kyi tshogs su hgyur te |
thos pas myi ñoms pa dañ | bśad pas myi ñoms pa dañ | dpyod pas myi ñoms pa dañ | ye šes kyis myi ñoms
paḥo || (R folio 647.2–648.4).

1. P R gtañ.
2. D N R ye šes kyi khar las pa.
3. N gnas pa.
4. P ye šes thams cad mkhyen paḥi ye šes la rten par hgyur žiñ.
5. D N R gžog.
6. Pelliot, 977, folio 6a.2–4

gžan yañ ye šes kyi tshogs ni sems can thams cad kyi rjes su hgro ba dañ | žiñ thams cad kyi rjes su hgro ba
ste | sbyin ba yañ ye šes kyi tshogs su bltaḥo || tshul khirms dañ | bzod pa dañ | brtson hgrus dañ | bsam
gtan dañ | šes rab dañ | byams pa dañ | sñiñ rje dañ | dgaḥ ba dañ | btañ sñoms kyañ ye šes kyi tshogs su
bltaḥo || de jiḥi phyir že na | ji tsam tu byañ chub sems dpaḥi brtson ba de thams cad ye šes kyi khar las so
|| ye šes thog mar hgroḥo || ye šes la so sor rton to | de ye šes la gnas nas sems can thams cad so sor ḥkhor
bar hgyur ro || bdud thams cad kyis de la glags myi rñied de | thams cad mkhyen paḥi ye šes su ḥjog go ||
žes gsuñs so ||

7. D N P R nmam pa de gñis.
8. As in the previous instances, this connecting phrase is here missing in the Pelliot manuscript. Moreover, the next sentences do not correspond to those in the following section of the blockprint editions but are found in a much later part defining wisdom (cf. R folio 685.7), thus effectively jumping almost a third of the entire chapter.

bar b'zag pa sgom pa dañ | chos la chos kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar b'zag pa sgom paño ||

2.8.1

de la lus la lus kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar b'zag pa sgom pa gañ ze na | sã rihi bu hdi la
byañ chub sems dpañ lus la lus kyi rjes su lta zin gnas pa de lus kyi shon gyi mthañ la yañ so
sor rtog | lus kyi phyi mañi mthañ la yañ so sor rtog | lus kyi da ltar byuñ ba la yañ so sor rtog
ste | kye maño lus hdi ni phyin ci log las byuñ ba ste | rgyu dañ rkyen las skyes ba | g.yo ba
med pa | byed pa med pa | bdag po med pa | yoñs su hdzin pa med pa | hdi lta ste | dper na
phyi rol gyi rtswa dañ | śin gel ba dañ | sman dañ | nags tshal dag rgyu dañ rkyen las byuñ zin
(650) bdag po med pa¹ | yoñs su hdzin pa med pa | de bzin du lus hdiñan rtswa | rtsig pa dañ |
śin dañ | boñ ba² dañ | mig yor lta bu dañ³ | phuñ po dañ | khams dañ | skye mched yoñs su
hdzin pa dañ | bdag dañ bdag gi ham | rtag pa ham | brtan pa ham | ther zug gam | mi hgyur
bañi chos kyis stoñ ste | lus de la ña yir mi byañi | lus sñin po med pa des sñin po blañ bar
byañ⁴ ||

de la sñin po gañ ze na | hdi lta ste | de bzin gsegs pañi skuño || de bzin gsegs pañi sku ni
chos kyi sku | rdo rjeñi sku | mi phyed pañi sku | sra bañi⁵ sku | hjig rten gsum po⁶ thams
cad dañ khyad zugs pañi sku bdag gis bsgrub par byaño || bdag gi lus hdi ñes pa du mañi
skyon chags mod kyi | hon kyañ ñes pa thams cad dañ bral bañi de bzin gsegs pañi sku thob
par byaño || zes de so sor rtog pañi mthus legs par mthon nas | hbyuñ ba chen poñi gnas kyi
lus yoñs su sruñ bar byed do || ñañi lus ni sems can thams cad kyi ci⁷ dgos par zad paño ||
hdi lta ste | dper na phyi rol gyi hbyuñ ba chen po bzi po sañi khams dañ | chuñi khams dañ |
meñi khams dañ | rluñ gyi khams sgo sna tshogs dañ | dmigs pa sna tshogs dañ | rnam grañs
sna tshogs dañ | yo byad sna tshogs dañ | loñs spyod⁸ sna tshogs kyis sems can rnams ñe bar
htsho ba de bzin du | bdag gi hbyuñ ba chen po bzi las gyur pañi (651) lus hdi sgo sna tshogs
dañ | dmigs pa sna tshogs dañ | rnam grañs sna tshogs dañ | loñs spyod sna tshogs rnams
kyis⁹ sems can rnams kyi ñe bar htsho bar gyur cig | sñam mo ||

1. N om: pa.

2. P gseg ma.

3. N om: dañ.

4. P de la sñin po med paño, for D N R des sñin po blañ bar byaño.

5. P brtan pañi.

6. P R om: po.

7. N cir.

8. D N R yoñs su spyod pa (also in the next occurrences for the term 'loñs spyod').

9. D P R mams kyis; N kyi.

de lus mi rtag pa ñid duḥaṅ so sor rtog mod kyi | skye ba¹ daṅ śi ḥphos kyaṅ mi skyoḥo²
 || lus sdug bsñal ñid duḥaṅ³ so sor rtog mod kyi | lus kyi sdug bsñal bas kyaṅ yoṅs su mi
 gduṅ ño || lus bdag med pa ñid du yaṅ so sor rtog mod kyi | sems can yoṅs su smin par bya
 baḥi phyir⁴ yaṅ mi skyoḥo || lus źi ba ñid duḥaṅ so sor rtog mod kyi | lus źi bas⁵ btaṅ
 sñoms su yaṅ mi ltuṅ ño || lus stoṅ pa ñid daṅ lus dben pa ñid duḥaṅ⁶ so sor rtog mod kyi |
 dben paḥi mur yaṅ mi ltuṅ ño ||

de lus la lus kyi rjes su lta źiṅ gnas pa na lus la rdzas daṅ sñiṅ por rjes su mi mthoṅ ño ||
 (de) naṅ gi lus la yaṅ lus kyi rjes su lta źiṅ gnas pa na naṅ gi rjes su soṅ baḥi ñon moṅs pa
 rnams kyi go skabs mi ḥbyed do || de phyi rol gyi lus la lus kyi rjes su lta źiṅ gnas pa na phyi
 rol gyi rjes su soṅ baḥi ñon moṅs pa rnams daṅ lhan cig mi gnas so ||

de lus ñon moṅs pa med pas lus kyi las yoṅs su dag pa ldan pa yin no || de lus yoṅs su dag
 nas mtshan (ñid) gyis yaṅ dag par brgyan paḥi sku ḥthob po || de lus mtshan ñid kyis⁷
 brgyan par gyur nas lha daṅ mi rnams mñon du ḥdul⁸ bar ḥgyur te | de ni byaṅ chub sems
 dpaḥi lus la lus kyi rjes su lta ba⁹ (652) dran pa ñe bar bźag pa sgom paḥo ||

2.8.2

yaṅ ji ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ tshor ba la tshor baḥi¹⁰ rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar
 bźag pa sgom pa yin ze na | ḥdi la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ gaṅ ci tshor¹¹ yaṅ ruṅ¹² de thams
 cad sdug bsñal lo || zes de sñam du sems te | de ye śes kyis rtogs pa daṅ | śes rab kyis rtogs pa
 daṅ | thabs kyis rtogs paḥi tshor ba śin tu rtogs pas bde bar tshor ba tshor bar¹³ byed mod kyi
 | ḥdod chags kyi bag la ñal ba yaṅ bag la ñal bar mi byed do¹⁴ || sdug bsñal baḥi tshor bas reg
 nas kyaṅ naṅ soṅ du skyes pa thams cad la sñiṅ rje chen po skyed ciṅ khoṅ khro baḥi¹⁵ bag la
 ñal yaṅ bag¹⁶ la ñal bar mi byed do || bde ba yaṅ ma yin | sdug bsñal ba yaṅ ma yin paḥi tshor

1. P tshe.

2. D N P R skyoḥo; Akn (p. 66.5.8) skyoḥo; see also next occurrence of term 'skyoḥo'.

3. N om: ḥaṅ (also in the next clause).

4. D N R bya ba la.

5. N ba.

6. N om: ḥaṅ.

7. N P R om: mtshan ñid kyis.

8. N R ḥdu.

9. D N P R baḥi (also in all subsequent occurrences of this stockphrase).

10. P źiṅ.

11. P cuṅ zad, for D N R ci tshor.

12. N add: ste.

13. N add: bag la ñal yaṅ.

14. P mi ñal lo, for D N R ñal bar mi byed do (also in the following two occurrences of the phrase 'ñal bar mi byed do').

15. N add: tshor bar.

16. N om: ñal yaṅ bag.

bas reg¹ kyañ |² ma rig pañi bag la ñal yañ bag la ñal bar mi byed do ||³ de tshor bañi rjes su soñ bañi dran pas bde ba ham | sdug bsñal ba ham | bde ba yañ ma yin | sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin pañi tshor ba gañ tshor ba yañ tshor ba de dag las hbyuñ bar lta ba yin no || sems can thams cad kyi tshor ba yoñs su śes śiñ zi bañi phyir yañ hjug ste |

sems can hdi dag ni tshor ba las hbyuñ bar mi śes pas de dag bde bañi tshor ba la dgañ bar byed | sdug bsñal bañi tshor ba la ze sdañ bar byed | bde ba yañ ma yin | sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin pañi tshor ba⁴ la rmoñs par byed kyir⁵ | bdag ni (653) śes rab dañ ye śes kyis rjes su rtogs pañi tshor ba | tshor ba thams cad so sor sbyañs pa dañ | thabs mkhas pa dañ sñiñ rje chen pos yoñs su bzuñ bañi rtsom pas | sems can de dag gi tshor ba thams cad rgyun gcod pañi phyir⁶ chos bstan paño ||

cihi phyir tshor ba zes bya (ba) ze na | rtogs pañi tshor ba⁷ ni bde bar hgyur ro || ma rtogs pañi tshor ba ni sdug bsñal bar hgyur ro ||

de la rtogs pañi tshor ba gañ ze na | hdi la bdag gam | sems can nam | srog gam | gañ zag gañ du⁸ yañ tshor bar byed pa med do⁹ || chags pa ni tshor baño || yoñs su hdzin pa ni tshor baño || len pa ni tshor baño || phyin ci log ni tshor baño || rnam par rtog pa ni tshor baño || lta bañi bag la ñal ba ni tshor baño || mig tu hdu śes pa tshor ba yin pa nas | yid kyi hdu śes pañi bar du ni tshor baño || gzugs su hdu śes pa tshor ba yin pa nas | chos su hdu śes pañi bar du ni tshor baño || gañ mig gi hdu te reg pañi rkyen las byuñ bañi tshor ba bde ba ham | sdug bsñal ba ham | bde ba yañ ma yin | sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin pañi bar du de ni tshor ba zes byaño ||

goñ ma bzin du nañ dañ phyiñi chos rnams la sbyar te | yid kyi bar du hdu te reg pañi rkyen las byuñ bañi tshor ba bde ba ham | sdug bsñal ba ham | bde ba yañ ma yin | sdug bsñal ba yañ ma yin pañi bar du ni tshor zes byaño || (654)

gzan yañ rnam grañs kyis tshor ba gcig ste¹⁰ | de ni sems gcig pus¹¹ rnam par rig paño ||

1. P add: nas.
2. P bde ba yañ med | sdug bsñal yañ med pañi tshor ba med kyi mdo | de.
3. duṣkhañā vedanayā spr̥ṣṭaḥ sarvapāpākṣaṇopapanneṣu sattveṣu mahākaruṇām utpādayati || pe || api tu khalu punar abhiniveśo vedanā parigraho vedanopādānaṃ vedanopalambho vedanā viparyāso vedanā vikalpo vedanetyādi || (Akn as cited in Śikṣ, p. 233.6–8).
4. N ma yin pa, for D P R ma yin pañi tshor ba.
5. N P kyis.
6. N om: phyir; P so sor sbyañ bañi phyir; R rgyun bcad pañi phyir.
7. P tshor bas ma rtogs pa ni, for D N R rtogs pañi tshor ba (also in the two following occurrences of the phrase 'rtogs pañi tshor ba').
8. D N R om: du.
9. P rtogs par byed pa med paño, for D N R tshor bar byed pa med do.
10. P ni hdi lta ste (also in the next six phrases of this paragraph in which the numerical structure of feeling (tshor ba) is introduced).
11. P puñi.

tshor ba gñis te | (de ni)¹ phyi dañ nañ giho || tshor ba gsum ste | (de ni)² ḥdas pa rnam par rig pa dañ | ma ḥoñs ba rnam par rig pa dañ | da ltar byuñ ba rnam par rig paḥo || tshor ba bži ste | de ni khams bži rnam par rig paḥo || tshor ba lña ste³ | de ni phuñ po lña yid la byed paḥo || tshor ba drug ste | de ni skye mched drug yoñs su rtog paḥo || tshor ba bdun te | de ni rnam par śes pa gnas pa bdun no || tshor ba brgyad de | de ni log par ñes paḥi sbyor ba brgyad do || tshor ba dgu ste | de ni sems can gyi gnas dguḥo || tshor ba bcu ste | de ni⁴ dge ba bcuḥi las kyi lam⁵ mo ||

goñ ma bžin du sbyar te | thams cad ni tshor ba ste | dmigs pa ji sñed pa dañ | yid la byed pa ji sñed pa de thams cad tshor bar byaḥo⁶ || de bas na sems can tshad med paḥi⁷ tshor ba tshad med pa žes byaḥo⁸ ||

de la byañ chub sems dpaḥ tshor ba la tshor baḥi rjes su lta žiñ gnas pas | sems can thams cad kyi tshor ba skye ba dañ | ḥjig pa dañ | gnas pa la ye śes bskyed par bya ste | gañ sems can thams cad kyi dge ba dañ mi dge baḥi tshor ba la tshor ba śes pa de ni byañ chub sems dpaḥi tshor ba la tshor baḥi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag paḥo ||

2.8.3

de la byañ chub sems dpaḥi sems la sems kyi (655) rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag pa gañ že na | ⁹byañ chub sems dpaḥ deḥi¹⁰ mi brjed pa dañ | sba ba dañ | kun bsruñ ba dañ | mi g.yeñ baḥo || de ḥdi ltar so sor rtog pa ste | sems ni skyes nas ḥjig ciñ žu ste mi gnas pas¹¹ | nañ na yañ mi gnas | phyi rol tu yañ mi ḥpho ste | gañ bdag gis thog mar sems bskyed pa de yañ zad | med¹² | rnam par gyur te | yul na mi gnas | phyogs na mi gnas pas de rñed par minus te | sems gañ gis dge baḥi rtsa ba bsgrubs pa de dag kyañ zad | med | rnam par gyur te¹³ | yul na mi gnas | phyogs na mi gnas so ||

gañ yañ byañ chub tu bsños paḥi sems de yañ ño bo ñid kyis mtshan ñid med pa ste | sems

1. Akn (p. 67.3.7–4.3) upholds parallel phrasing throughout this passage, using the term ‘gañ ḥdi’ instead of ‘de ni’.
2. See previous note.
3. R tshor ba lña gañ že na.
4. Akn (p. 67.4.1) add: mi.
5. P add: rnam.
6. P yin par rig par bya ste, for D tshor bar bya baḥo.
7. N pas.
8. P de bas na sems can dpag tu med pa rnam kyi tshor ba dpag tu med pa žes byaḥo.
9. D N R add: gañ.
10. Akn (p. 67.4.5) add: byañ chub kyi sems.
11. N nas.
12. N om: med.
13. P med par gyur te, for D N R med | rnam par ḥgyur.

kyis sems rab tu mi śes te¹ | sems kyis sems mi mthoñ | sems kyis sems mi tshor na | gañ gis
bdag bla na med pa yañ dag par rdzogs pañi byañ chub mñon par rdzogs par htshañ rgya²
pañi sems de gañ yin | gañ byañ chub kyis sems de ni dge bañi rtsa bañi sems dan mi hgrog³
| gañ dge bañi rtsa bañi sems de yañ bsño bañi sems dan mi hgrog³ | gañ bsño bañi sems de
yañ byañ chub kyis sems dan | dge bañi rtsa bañi sems dan mi hgrog³ so || zes de | de ltar so
sor rtog pa na⁴ | mi skrag mi dñañ dñañ bar mi hgyur gyi⁵ | de yañ hdi sñam du sems te |

rten ciñ h̄brel par (656) h̄byuñ ba zab mo rgyu dan h̄bras bu chud mi za baño || gal te sems
kyi chos ñid de lta bu sems kyi rañ b̄zin ñid yin yañ chos thams cad rgyu dan rkyen la rag las
pa | g.yo ba med pa | byed pa med pa | bdag po med pa | ji ltar h̄dod pa de b̄zin du h̄grub kyis |
bdag gis sgrub⁶ pa la brtson par⁷ byaño || sems kyi chos ñid de mi h̄bri bar byaño ||

de la sems kyi chos ñid gañ | sgrub pa gañ ze na | sems ni sgyu ma dan h̄dra ba ste | de la
sbyin⁸ par byed pa yañ su yañ⁹ med de | de ni sems kyi chos ñid de | gañ yañ bdog pa
thams cad yoñs su btañ nas sañs rgyas kyi žiñ rnam par sgrub pañi rgyan du¹⁰ sño bar byed
pa de ni sgrub par byed paño || sems rmi lam dan h̄dra ba rab tu ži bañi mtshan ñid de ni sems
kyi chos ñid de | gañ yañ tshul khirms sdom pañi tshogs sogs so || chog¹¹ de thams cad myur
bañi mñon par śes par sño ba de ni sgrub paño || sems smig rgyu lta bu śin tu zad pas zad par
gyur pa¹² de ni sems kyi chos ñid de | gañ yañ bzod pañi stobs dan | des pa¹³ byañ chub kyis
rgyan bsgrub pañi phyir sño ba de ni deñi sgrub paño || sems chu zla lta bu śin tu dben pas
dben pa de ni sems kyi chos ñid de | gañ yañ brtson h̄grus rtsom pa thams cad sañs rgyas kyi
chos thams cad yoñs su rdzogs par bya bañi phyir sño ba (657) de ni deñi sgrub paño || sems
gzuñ du med pa mi mthoñ ba de ni sems kyi chos ñid de | gañ yañ bsam gtan dan | rnam par
thar pa dan | tiñ ñe h̄dzin dan | mñam par ḡzag pa thams cad sañs rgyas kyi tiñ ñe h̄dzin du
sño ba de ni deñi sgrub paño ||

sems gzugs med pa | mi mthoñ ba | mi thogs pa¹⁴ |¹⁵ rnam par mi rig pa de ni sems kyi

1. D P R om: te.
2. P sañs rgyas.
3. P ldan (also in the following two occurrences of the word 'hgrog').
4. N dan.
5. P mi h̄jigs mi skrag | skrag par mi h̄gyur gyi, for D N R mi skrag mi dñañ dñañ bar mi h̄gyur gyi.
6. D N R bsgrub.
7. P sbyor bar.
8. N D sgrib.
9. N om: yañ.
10. P gyis.
11. R chos.
12. P śin tu zad ciñ med pa.
13. P hgrog na bde ba.
14. D mi thos pa.
15. R add: rnam par mi thogs pa.

chos ñid de | gañ yañ dris pañi tshig tha dad pa bstan pa thams cad śes pa | sañs rgyas kyi ye
 śes yoñs su rdzogs par sño ba de ni deñi sgrub paño || dmigs pa sna tshogs la sems skye ba de
 ni sems kyi chos ñid de | gañ yañ dge bañi rtsa ba la dmigs pañi sems ñe bar sbyor ba¹ de ni
 deñi sgrub paño || rgyu med pa las sems mi skye ba de ni sems kyi chos ñid de | gañ yañ byañ
 chub kyi phyogs kyi chos kyi rgyuñi sems skyed pa de ni deñi sgrub paño || gañ yul med par
 sems mi skye ba de ni sems kyi chos ñid de | gañ yañ sañs rgyas kyi yul gyi rgyuñi sems ñe
 bar sbyor ba de ni deñi sgrub paño ||

śā riñi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ sems la sems kyi rjes su lta ba² dran pa ñe bar
 bžag pa sgom paño || de sems la sems kyi rjes su lta žiñ gnas pa na | mñon par śes pa thob
 pañi phyir sems śin tu ħbrel par byed de | de (658) mñon par śes pa thob nas sems gcig gis
 sems can thams cad kyi sems rab tu śes te | śes nas kyañ deñi rañ bžin gyi³ chos ħchad do ||

gžan yañ byañ chub sems dpañ (sems la)⁴ sems kyi rjes su lta žiñ gnas pa na | sñiñ rje
 chen po thob pañi phyir sems ñe bar ħbrel par byed de | sñiñ rje chen po thob pas sems can
 thams cad yoñs su smin par bya bañi phyir⁵ yoñs su mi skyoño⁶ || sems la sems kyi rjes su
 lta žiñ gnas pa na | sems zad pa dañ sems ħgog par bya bañi phyir sems gnas par mi byed kyi
 | ħkhor bañi rgyun gyi kun tu⁷ sbyor ba rnams kyis sems mñon par sgrub ste | sems kyi dran
 pa śes pa de ma skyes pa dañ mi skye ba ñes par gyur pa la žugs pañi chos rnams kyis gnas te
 | ñan thos dañ rañ sañs rgyas kyi sar yañ mi ltuñ no || sañs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yoñs su
 rdzogs par ma gyur kyi bar du | sems kyi rgyud de rgyun chags par byed de | sems kyi skad
 cig gcig dañ ldan pañi śes rab kyis bla na med pa yañ dag par rdzogs pañi byañ chub mñon
 par rdzogs par ħtshañ rgya ste | śā riñi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ sems la sems kyi
 rjes su lta ba⁸ dran pa ñe bar bžag pa sgom mo ||

2.8.4

śā riñi bu ji ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ chos la chos kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag
 pa sgom pa yin že na | śā riñi bu ħdi la byañ chub sems dpas ħphags pañi śes rab kyi mig gis
 chos gañ (659) mthoñ ba de dag byañ chub kyi sñiñ poñi bar du bar ma dor⁹ rmoñs par mi

1. P bsñen par byed pa (also in the next occurrence of the phrase 'ñe bar sbyor ba').
2. D N P R žiñ.
3. P ño bo ñid du, for D N R rañ bžin gyi.
4. Given in Akn (p. 68.2.1).
5. D N R bya ba la.
6. N skyeño.
7. P ħkhor ba dañ ħbrel ciñ; R ħkhor bañi rgyun gyi kun nas.
8. D N P R žiñ.
9. P sñiñ po tshun chad kyi bar du, for D N R sñiñ poñi bar du bar ma dor.

hgyur te | de chos la chos kyi rjes su lta źiñ gnas pa na | gañ stoñ pa ñid du ma gtogs pa dañ |
mtshan ma med par ma gtogs pa dañ | smon pa med par ma gtogs pa dañ | mi skye bar ma
gtogs pa dañ | ma skyes par ma gtogs pa dañ | mñon par hdu mi byed par ma gtogs pa dañ |
dños po med par ma gtogs pañi chos rdul tsam¹ yañ mi mthoñ ño ||

gañ rten ciñ h̄brel par h̄byuñ bar ma gtogs pañi chos rdul tsam yañ yañ dag par rjes su mi
mthoñ ño || byañ chub sems dpañ de chos la chos kyi rjes su lta źiñ gnas pa na | chos ñid yañ
dag par rjes su mthoñ gi | chos ma yin pa mi mthoñ ño ||

de la chos gañ že na | h̄di lta ste | bdag med pañi don dañ | sems can med pañi don dañ |
srog med pañi don dañ | gañ zag med pañi don te | de ni chos zes byaño ||

de la chos ma yin pa gañ že na | h̄di lta ste | bdag du lta ba dañ | sems can du lta ba dañ |
srog tu lta ba dañ | gañ zag tu lta ba dañ | chad par lta ba dañ | rtag par lta ba dañ | h̄byuñ bar
lta ba dañ | h̄jig par lta ba dañ | de ni chos ma yin pa zes byaño ||

yañ s̄a riñi bu chos thams cad chos so || chos thams cad² chos ma yin paño || de ciñi phyir
(660) že na | stoñ pa ñid dañ | mtshan ma med pa dañ | smon pa med pa ses pañi phyir chos
thams cad chos so || bdag dañ bdag gir lta bañi bag la ñal bañi phyir chos thams cad chos ma
yin paño ||

de la byañ chub sems dpañ³ chos la chos rjes su lta źiñ gnas pa na | chos de dag la gañ yañ
sañs rgyas kyi chos ma yin pa gañ las byañ chub tu mi h̄gyur ba dañ⁴ | gañ las sañs rgyas su
mi h̄gyur ba dañ | gañ las lam du mi h̄gyur ba dañ | gañ las thar par mi h̄gyur ba dañ | gañ las
h̄byuñ bar mi h̄gyur bañi chos rdul tsam yañ mi mthoñ ste | de chos thams cad h̄byuñ bar ses
nas sgrib pa med pa zes bya bañi s̄iññ rje chen po h̄thob ste | sems can thams cad kyi kun nas
ñon moñs pa⁵ yañ de dag ñon moñs pa dañ bcas pa ma yin gyi | de dag ñon moñs pa med
paño zes bcas mar h̄du ses skyed do ||⁶

de ciñi phyir že na | de ltar de dag ni ñes pañi don la yañ dag par h̄jug pa ste | ñon moñs pa
rnams la bsags pa ham | phuñ poñi dños po⁷ med de | de dag ñid rjes su rtogs pañi phyir

1. P phra rab tsam (also in all subsequent occurrences of the phrase 'rdul tsam').

2. N add: ni.

3. N dpañi.

4. P om: ba dañ (also in the next three occurrences of the phrase 'mi h̄gyur ba dañ').

5. D P add: la.

6. yathā tāvad atrāha | dharme dharmānudarśi viharan bodhisattvo na kañcid dharmam samanupaśyati | yato
na buddhadharmā yato na bodhiḥ | yato na mārgo | yato na niḥsaraṇam | sa sarvadharmāniḥsaraṇam iti |
viditva 'nāvaraṇam nāma mahākaruṇāsamādhiṃ samāpadyate | sa sarvadharṃeṣu sarvakleṣeṣu ca kṛtrim
asañjñāṃ pratilabhate | niḥkleśā ete dharmā | na ete sakleśāḥ | tat kasya hetoḥ | tathā hy ete nītārthe
samavasaraṇti nāsti kleśānām saṃcayo | na rāśibhāvaḥ | na rāgabhāvo na dveṣabhāvo na mohabhāva | eṣāṃ
eva kleśānām avabodhād bodhiḥ | yat svabhāvaś ca kleśās tat svabhāvā bodhir ity evaṃ smṛtim
upasthāpayati iti || (Akn as cited in Śikṣ, p. 236.6–13).

7. N om: ḥi dños po.

byañ chub po || ñon moñs pañi rañ bzin gañ yin pa byañ chub kyi rañ bzin yañ de yin no ||
 byañ chub kyi rañ bzin gañ yin pa ñon moñs pañi rañ bzin yañ de yin te | de ltar dran pa ñe
 bar bžag¹ kyañ | cuñ zad kyañ ñe bar h̄jog pa med | rab tu h̄jog pa med | (661) mi h̄jog pa
 med de | chos ñid de gnas pa ñid du rab tu šes so || de bas na chos kyi dbyiñs de ni gnas pa
 ñid ces byaño || chos kyi dbyiñs gnas² gañ la gnas pa | sems can gyi kham s kyañ gnas de la
 gnas so || sems can gyi kham s gnas gañ la gnas pa | nam mkhañi kham s kyañ gnas de la gnas
 te | de bas na chos thams cad nam mkhañ dañ mtshuñs žes byaño ||

byañ chub sems dpañ de chos la chos kyi rjes su lta žiñ gnas pa na sañs rgyas kyi chos la
 rton pa yin | chos thams cad sañs rgyas kyi chos su mos par byed de | de zad pa šes pa yañ
 bskyed mod kyi | h̄dus ma byas pañi zad pa yañ mñon du mi byed | mi skye ba šes pa yañ
 mñon par bsgrub [pa] mod kyi | sems can la lta bañi phyr yañ skye la | mi skye bañi mthañ
 de yañ mi gtoñ ño || dran pa ñe bar bžag paño žes bya ba ni chos thams cad dran pa de la bžag
 par byed ciñ | ñan thos sam | rañ sañs rgyas sam | sañs rgyas kyi chos ji sñed chos su btags³
 pa de dag thams cad ma lus par dran pa de la bžag ste | dran pa de yañ brjed⁴ par mi byed |
 phyi mañi mthañi bar du rmoñs par mi byed do ||

chos la chos kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag paño žes bya ba de ni bstan pa dpag tu
 med pa ste | kun tu spyod yul ma yin pa | sañs rgyas kyi chos thams cad la (662) yañ dag par
 h̄du ba⁵ | sems can thams cad kyi sems tshim par byed pa | bdud thams cad h̄dul ba | rañ
 byuñ ba rtogs pañi phyr te |

šā rihi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ chos la chos kyi rjes su lta ba dran pa ñe bar bžag
 pa sgom mo || de dag ni dran pa ñe bar bžag pa bži žes byaño ||

šā rihi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ dran pa ñe bar bžag pa bži po de dag la mkhas pa
 šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.9

de la byañ chub sems dpañ rnam s kyi byañ chub kyi yan lag la mkhas pa gañ že na | byañ
 chub sems dpañ rnam s kyi byañ chub kyi yan lag h̄di bdun te | bdun gañ že na | h̄di lta ste |
 dran pa yañ dag byañ chub kyi yan lag dañ | chos rnam par h̄byed pa yañ dag byañ chub kyi
 yan lag dañ | brtson h̄grus yañ dag byañ chub kyi yan lag dañ | dgañ ba yañ dag byañ chub

1. D P R gžog; N gžag.

2. N add: pa.

3. D bdags; N P gdags.

4. P brjod.

5. D R yañ dag par h̄du ba; N yañ dag par h̄dul ba; P yañ dag par rjes su h̄jug pa.

kyi yan lag dañ | śin tu sbyaṅs pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag dañ | tiṅ ñe ḥdzin yaṅ dag
byaṅ chub kyi yan lag dañ | btaṅ sñoms yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag ste | sā riḥi bu de dag
ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ rnam kyi byaṅ chub kyi yan lag bdun no ||

de la dran pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag gaṅ ze na | dran pa gaṅ gis chos rtog par byed |
chos la so sor rtog par byed | chos la dpyod par byed | chos (663) yoṅs su tshol bar byed ciṅ |
chos nam par ḥbyed par byed pa dañ | chos la nam par rtog par byed de | de dran pa des gaṅ
chos nam kyi ño bo ñid kyi mtshan ñid de yaṅ rjes su rtogs so || yaṅ chos nam kyi ño bo
ñid kyi mtshan ñid śes pa gaṅ ze na | chos thams cad raṅ gi mtshan ñid kyi¹ stoṅ pa ste | gaṅ
de ltar dran zin khoṅ du chud pa de ni dran pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag ces byaḥo ||

de la chos nam par ḥbyed pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag gaṅ ze na | gaṅ chos kyi phuṅ
po brgyad khri bži stoṅ rab tu nam par ḥbyed pa śes pa ste | ñes paḥi don kyaṅ ñes paḥi don
du | draṅ baḥi don kyaṅ draṅ baḥi don du | kun rdzob kyi don kyaṅ kun rdzob kyi don du |
don dam paḥi don kyaṅ don dam paḥi don du² | brdaḥi kyaṅ brdaḥi | nam par gtan la bab
paḥi kyaṅ nam par gtan la bab paḥi³ chos de dag ji ltar rab tu dbye bar bya ba de bzin du |
de dag nam par ḥbyed par byed de | de ni chos nam par ḥbyed pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi
yan lag ces byaḥo ||

de la brtson ḥgrus yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag gaṅ ze na | gaṅ chos nam par ḥbyed pa
de ñid kyi dgaḥ ba dañ | śin tu sbyaṅs pa dañ | tiṅ ñe ḥdzin dañ | btaṅ sñoms dañ | ye śes kyi
bar du ḥdzin pa dañ | spro ba dañ | stobs dañ | rtul ba dañ | mi zlogs paḥi mos pa dañ | mthu
dañ | brtson pa mi ḥdor ba dañ⁴ | (664) lam mñon par rtogs paḥi phyir⁵ brtson ḥgrus rtsom⁶
pa ste | de ni brtson ḥgrus yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag ces byaḥo ||

de la dgaḥ ba yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag gaṅ ze na | dgaḥ ba gaṅ dañ | chos la dgaḥ ba
gaṅ dañ | chos la mchog tu⁷ dgaḥ ba gaṅ gis sems mi zum zin dañ ba ste | ma zum paḥi dgaḥ
ba des gaṅ lus sam | sems kyaṅ śin tu byaṅ bar⁸ byed la | kun nas ñon moṅs pa yaṅ sel ba de
ni dgaḥ ba yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag ces byaḥo ||

de la śin tu sbyaṅs pa yaṅ dag byaṅ chub kyi yan lag gaṅ ze na | gaṅ lus śin tu sbyaṅs pa

1. D N P kyis.

2. Akaṅ D don dam pa yaṅ don dam par; P R don dam paḥi don kyaṅ don dam paḥi don du.

3. P mtshan ma yaṅ mtshan mar nam par gdon mi za ba dañ | nam par gdon mi za bar, for D N R brdaḥaṅ
brdar | nam par gtan la bab pa yaṅ nam par gtan la bab par.

4. P brtson ḥgrus mi gtoṅ ba dañ.

5. D N R rtogs par bya ba la.

6. P om: rtsom.

7. P rab tu.

8. P spyod par, for D N R śin tu byaṅ bar.

dañ | sems śin tu sbyaṅs pa dañ | ñon moṅs pa śin tu sbyaṅs pa dañ | sgrib¹ pa med pa dañ |
tiñ ñe ḥdzin du dmigs pa la sems ñe bar gźag pa ste | de ni śin tu sbyaṅs pa yañ dag byañ
chub kyi yan lag ces byaḥo ||

de la tiñ ñe ḥdzin yañ dag byañ chub kyi yan lag gañ ze na | gañ sems mñam par gźag
pas² chos śes pa rtogs par ḥgyur gyi³ | sems mñam par ma gźag pas ni ma yin pa dañ | sems
mñam par gźag pas⁴ chos de dag mñon par rdzogs par ḥtshañ rgyaḥi | sems mñam par ma
bźag pas ma yin te | chos mñam pa ñid dañ | chos la gźol ba ma gtogs par rjes su chags paḥi
kun nas dkris pas rtogs par mi byed de⁵ | de ni tiñ ñe (665) ḥdzin yañ dag byañ chub kyi yan
lag ces byaḥo ||

de la btañ sñoms yañ dag byañ chub kyi yan lag gañ ze na | gañ yid bde ba dañ | gañ⁶ yid
mi bde baḥi cha dañ ḥthun paḥi chos rnams⁷ la sems mi ḥdzin pa dañ | ḥjig rten gyi chos
kyis mi ḥphrogs pa dañ | mtho⁸ dman du mi gnas paḥi phyir rab tu mi g.yo (ro) || mi ḥkhrug |
rab tu mi ḥkhrug | yañ dag par mi ḥkhrug | chags par mi byed | ze sdañ bar mi byed kyi |
ḥphags paḥi lam de ñid dañ ḥthun par byed pa ste | de ni btañ sñoms yañ dag byañ chub kyi
yan lag ces byaḥo ||

śā riḥi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpaḥ rnams kyi⁹ byañ chub kyi yan lag de bdun la
mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||¹⁰

2.10

2.10.1

de la byañ chub sems dpaḥ rnams kyi lam la mkhas pa gañ ze na | byañ chub sems dpaḥ
rnams kyi lam ni ḥdi brgyad do || brgyad gañ ze na | ḥdi lta ste | yañ dag paḥi lta ba dañ | yañ
dag paḥi rtog pa dañ | yañ dag paḥi ñag dañ | yañ dag paḥi las kyi mthaḥ dañ | yañ dag paḥi

1. N sgribs; P R bsgribs.

2. R ma bźag pas, for D N P bźag pas.

3. D R N te.

4. R ma bźag pa.

5. P lta ba bag la ñal dañ kun nas bskor ba de dag spaṅs kyan mñon par rdzogs par ḥtshañ mi rgya ba, for D
N R rjes su chags paḥi kun nas dkris pas rtogs par mi byed de.

6. D P R om: gañ.

7. P yid mi bde ba stan pa la phan paḥi chos.

8. N mthon.

9. D P R om: rnams kyi.

10. P add: ḥphag pa byañ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod ces bya theg pa chen poḥi mdo || bam po cu dgu pa; D has
'bam po bcu dgu pa' only.

htsho ba dañ | yañ dag pañi rtsol ba¹ dañ | yañ dag pañi dran pa dañ | yañ dag pañi tiñ ñe
 ʔdzin te | de dag ni byañ chub sems dpañ rnam kyī lam yan lag brgyad paño ||

de la yañ (666) dag pañi lta ba gañ ʔe na | lta ba gañ ʔphags pa ʔjig rten las ʔdas pa ste |
 bdag tu lta ba las lañs pa ma yin | sems can du lta ba las lañs pa ma yin | srog tu lta ba las lañs
 pa ma yin | gañ zag tu lta ba las lañs pa ma yin | chad pa dañ | rtag pa dañ | ʔbyuñ ba dañ |
 ʔjig par lta ba las lañs pa ma yin | dge ba dañ mi dge bar lta ba las lañs pa ma yin pa nas |
 mya ñan las ʔdas par lta bañi bar las² lañs pa ma yin pa ste | de ni yañ dag pañi lta ba ʔes
 byaño ||

de la yañ dag pañi rtog pa gañ ʔe na | rtog pa³ gañ gis ʔdod chags dañ | ʔe sdañ | gti mug
 la sogs pañi ñon moñs pa gnas par ʔgyur bañi rtog pa de ldan bar mi byed⁴ kyī | rtog pa gañ
 gis tshul khrims dañ | tiñ ñe ʔdzin dañ | ʔes rab dañ | rnam par grol ba dañ | rnam par grol bañi
 ye ʔes mthoñ ba ʔbyuñ bar ʔgyur ba de la rtog pa ste | de ni yañ dag pañi rtog pa ʔes byaño ||

de la yañ dag pañi ñag gañ ʔe na | yañ dag pañi ñag⁵ gañ gis bdag dañ gʔan la mi gduñ ʔiñ
 | de phan pañi rjes su sbyor bañi ñag dañ ldan pa yin te | ñag des lam mñam pa la ʔjug pa
 (ste) | de ni yañ dag pañi ñag ces byaño ||

de la yañ dag pañi las kyī mthañ gañ ʔe na | gañ las (667) gnag la⁶ rnam par smin pa gnag
 pa de lta bu mñon par ʔdu mi byed pa dañ | gañ las dkar la⁷ rnam par smin pa dkar ba de lta
 buñi las mñon par ʔdu byed pa dañ | gañ las dkar gnag la rnam par smin pa dkar gnag tu
 ʔgyur ba⁸ de lta buñi las mñon par ʔdu mi byed pa dañ | gañ las dkar gnag ma yin (pa) la
 rnam par smin par mi ʔgyur ba las zad par ʔgyur ba de lta buñi las mñon par ʔdu byed pa ste
 | de las bdag gir bya ba la⁹ rton pa yañ dag pañi las la brtson (pa ste | de ni)¹⁰ yañ dag pañi
 las kyī mthañ ʔes byaño ||

de la yañ dag pañi htsho ba gañ ʔe na | gañ ʔphags pañi rigs dañ | sbyañs pañi yon tan mi
 gtoñ ba dañ | kha gsag¹¹ med pa dañ | tshul ʔchos pa med pa | thob kyis ʔjal ba¹² med pa dañ
 | dgañ sla ba dañ | gso sla ba dañ | cho ga mi lhod pa dañ | gʔan gyi rñed pa la phrag dog med

1. P ʔbad pa.
2. Añ (p. 70.4.8) ʔdas par lta bañi bar las; D N R ʔdas par lta ba las; P ʔdas pañi bar lta ba las.
3. N om: pa.
4. P ʔgyur.
5. D R om: ñag.
6. P po.
7. P po.
8. P om: tu ʔgyur ba.
9. P de rañ gi las (...) byuñ ba las, for D N R de las bdag gir bya ba la.
10. D N P R pas.
11. N bsag.
12. P gʔog sloñs, for D N R thob kyis ʔjal ba.

pa dañ | bdag gi rñed pas chog śes pa dañ | kha na ma tho ba med pa dañ | hphags pas gnañ
bañi htsho ba ste | de ni yañ dag pañi htsho ba zes byaño ||

de la yañ dag pañi rtsol ba gañ ze na | rtsol ba gañ¹ log par spyod par bśad pa ḥdod chags
dañ | ze sdañ dañ | gti mug gi² ñon moñs pa bag la ñal bañi rtsol ba de mi ḥdod kyi | rtsol ba
gañ hphags pañi lam dañ bden pa la ḥjug pa mya ñan las ḥdas par ḥgro bañi lam du ḥjug
par³ byed pañi rtsol ba deñi rjes su ḥgro ba ste | de ni yañ (668) dag pañi rtsol ba zes byaño ||

de la yañ dag pañi dran pa gañ ze na | dran pa gañ śin tu ñe bar gżag⁴ pa dañ | tha mal pa
ma yin pa dañ | drañ ba dañ | gya gyu med pa dañ | ḥkhor bañi ñes pa dañ skyon la lta ba dañ |
mya ñan las ḥdas pañi lam du ḥdren pañi dran pa dañ | dran par byed pa dañ | hphags pañi
lam mi brjed pa ste | de ni yañ dag pañi dran pa zes byaño ||

de la yañ dag pañi tiñ ñe ḥdzin gañ ze na | yañ dag pa ñid du⁵ mñam pa | chos thams cad
la mñam pa ste | tiñ ñe ḥdzin de la rab tu gnas na yañ dag pa ñid du ḥjug ste⁶ | gañ yañ byañ
chub sems dpañi tiñ ñe ḥdzin de la gnas na⁷ sems can thams cad rab tu thar par bya bañi
phyir | yañ dag pa ñid du ḥjug pa de ni yañ dag pañi tiñ ñe ḥdzin zes byaño || ḥdas pa dañ | ma
byon pa dañ | da ltar byuñ bañi sañs rgyas bcom ldan ḥdas rnams kyi lam⁸ mi zad pa ḥdi
byañ chub sems dpas mñon par rtogs nas ḥchad pa dañ | ston pa dañ | yañ dag par rab tu ston
pa | de ni yañ dag pañi tiñ ñe ḥdzin zes byaño ||⁹

1. N om; gañ.

2. R gañ; D dañ.

3. D R lam du ḥjug par; N lam du ḥjog par; P nan tan gtoñ bar.

4. D N P R gżog.

5. P yañ dag par (also in the next occurrence of the term 'yañ dag da ñid du').

6. P yañ dag pañi mi ḥgyur ba la ḥjug par byed de, for D N R yañ dag pa ñid du ḥjug ste.

7. N nas.

8. Añ (p. 71.1.6) 'tiñ ñe ḥdzin' for Bdp 'lam'.

9. tad yathā samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ samyaksamkalpāḥ samyagvāk samyakkarmāntaḥ samyagājīvaḥ samyaksmr̥tiḥ
samyaksamādhiśca || tatra katamā samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ | yā lokottarā
nātmadr̥ṣṭisamutthitānāsattvanajīvanapoṣanapurūṣanapudgalanamanujanamānavadr̥ṣṭisamutthitā
nocchedaśśvataḍṣṭisamutthitā na bhavavibhavadṛṣṭisamutthitā na kuśalākuśalāvyākṛtadr̥ṣṭisamutthitā yā
ca na samsāranirvānadr̥ṣṭisamutthitā | iyamucyate samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ || tatra katamaḥ samyaksamkalpāḥ | yaiḥ
samkalpaiḥ rāgadveṣamohakleśāḥ samuttiṣṭhanti | tān samkalpān na samkalpayati | yaiḥ samkalpaiḥ
śīlasamādhiprajñāvimuktijñānadarśanaskandha samuttiṣṭhanti | tān samkalpān samkalpayati | ayamucyate
samyaksamkalpāḥ || tatra katamā samyagvāk | yayā vācā nātmānaṃ na parāmśca tāpayati nātmānaṃ na
parāmśca kleśayati nātmānaṃ na parāmśca upakaroti tayā āryayuktānukulyā vācā
samādhiprītivacanairyukto bhavati | iyamucyate samyagvāk || tatra katamaḥ samyakkarmāntaḥ | yatkarma
kṛṣṇaṃ kṛṣṇavipākam tatkarma nābhisaṃskaroti | yatkarma śuklaṃ śuklavipākam tatkarmābhisaṃskaroti |
yatkarma śūlakakṛṣṇaṃ vartate śūlakakṛṣṇavipākam vartate tatkarma nābhisaṃskaroti | yatkarma
kṛṣṇaśūlakavipākam kṛṣṇakṣayāya samvartate tatkarmābhisaṃskaroti | satkarmābhisaṃskaroti
satkarmapratisaraṇakarmāntaḥ | iyamucyate samyakkarmāntaḥ || tatra katamaḥ samyagājīvaḥ | yadā
āryavamśena guṇasamlekhanutsarjanatā na kuhanatā na lapanatā na naiṣpeṣikatā śuratācāraśīlatā
paralābheṣu na īrṣyā ātmalābhasantuṣṭiḥ anavadyatā āryānumatānavadyājīvikā | ayamucyate
samyagājīvaḥ || tatra katamaḥ samyagvyāyāmaḥ | yo vyāyāmo mithyā yasmādrāgadveṣamohā anuśerate
taṃ vyāyāmaṃ necchati | yo vyāyāmaḥ samyagāryamārgasatyāvatāro nirvāṇagāmi pratipadarpayati taṃ
vyāyāmaṃ samanugacchati | ayamucyate samyagvyāyāmaḥ || tatra katamā samyaksmr̥tiḥ | yā supasthitā
aprakampyā r̥jukā akuṭilā samsāradveṣādinavadarśikā nirvāṇapathapraṇetṛī smṛtiḥ

de dag ni byañ chub sems dpañ rnam ki lam yan lag brgyad pa zes bya ste | de ni byañ
chub sems dpañi lam la mkhas pañ || bam po bcu dgu pa ||¹

2.10.2

gžan yañ lam la mkhas pa ni byañ chub sems dpañ rnam ki lam yan lag gñis pa ste | yan
lag gñis gañ ze na | hdi lta ste | ži (669) gnas dañ | lhag mthoñ ste | de ni lam yan lag gñis pa
zes byaño ||

de la ži gnas gañ ze na | gañ sems ki ži ba dañ | rab tu ži ba dañ | ñe bar ži ba dañ | mi
g.yeñ ba dañ | dbañ po rnam bsdams pa dañ | mi rgod pa dañ | ma kheñs pa dañ | mi hphyar
ba dañ | mu cor mi smra ba dañ | des² pa dañ | sbas pa dañ | g.yo (ba) med pa dañ | yid du
hoñ ba dañ | geig pur dgañ ba dañ | hdu hdi sel ba dañ | dben par dgañ ba dañ | lus dben pa
dañ | sems ma hkhru ba³ dañ | dgon pañi sgo yid la byed pa dañ | chog šes pa dañ | hdod pa
ñuñ ba dañ | htsho ba yons su dag pa dañ | cho ga phun sum tshogs pa dañ | spyod lam sbas
pa dañ | dus šes pa dañ | tshod šes pa dañ | drod⁴ šes pa dañ | dgañ sla ba dañ | gso sla ba dañ
| so sor rtog pa dañ | mi mtho mi dmañ ba dañ | tshig ñan pa smras pa bzod pa dañ | rnal
hbyor gyi sgor sems skyed pa dañ | nañ du yañ dag hjog la mñon par dgañ ba dañ | bsam gtan
gyi yan lag yid la byed pa dañ | byams pa skyed pa dañ | sñiñ rje mñon par sgrub pa dañ |
dgañ ba la gnas pa dañ | btañ sñoms sgom pa dañ | bsam gtan dañ po nas | brgyad ki bar du
mthar gyis sñoms par hjug pa ste | de ni ži gnas zes byaño || yañ⁵ ži gnas ki tshogs tshad
med pa ste | tshogs de la⁶ gañ rjes su rtogs pa de ni ži gnas zes byaño || (670)

de la lhag mthoñ gañ ze na | gañ šes rab ki cha dañ hthun pañi⁷ sgom pañi lam ste | chos
rnam la g.yo ba med pa dañ | sems can med pa dañ | srog med pa dañ | gañ zag med pa dañ |
phuñ po rnam la sgyu mañi phuñ por mthoñ bañi šes pa dañ | khams rnam la chos ki
khams su mthoñ bañi šes pa dañ | skye mched rnam la groñ stoñ par mthoñ bañi šes pa dañ |
mig la rab tu rnam par phye bar mthoñ bañi šes pa dañ | rten ciñ hbrel par hbyuñ ba la mi
hgal bar mthoñ bañi šes pa dañ | sems can du lta ba dañ bral bar mthoñ bañi šes pa dañ | rgyu

spharaṇamāryamārgāsaṃmoṣaḥ | iyaṃucyate samayaḥsmṛtiḥ || tatra katamañ samyaksamādhīḥ | yañ
samyaktvena samādhīḥ | yasmin samādhau sthitaḥ sarvasattvapramokṣāya samyak sthiraṭvam
niyāmaṃavakrāmati | ayaṃucyate samayaḥsamādhīḥ || ayaṃucyate āryāṣṭāṅgo mārgaḥ || (*Arthav* (S),
appendix, pp. 320–322)

1. D P om: 'bam po bcu dgu pa' at this place.
2. P mñen.
3. P hkhru pa.
4. P ñid tshod.
5. N gañ.
6. P las.
7. P cha la phan pañi, for D N R cha dañ hthun pañi.

dañ hbras bu rnam par smin pa mthoñ bañi śes pa dañ | hbras bu thob pa mñon sum du bya ba mthoñ bañi śes pa dañ | yañ dag pa ñid du hjug pa la hjug par byed pa¹ mthoñ bañi śes paño ||

yañ lhag mthoñ zes bya ba ni | hdi lta ste | chos rnams ji lta ba bzin tu mthoñ ba dañ | chos rnams kyi² de kho na ñid mthoñ ba dañ | chos rnams kyi gzan ma yin pa ñid mthoñ ba dañ | chos rnams kyi stoñ pa ñid mthoñ ba dañ | mtshan ma med pa mthoñ ba dañ | smon pa med pa mthoñ baño || yañ lhag mthoñ zes bya ba ni rgyus mthoñ ba med pa dañ | rgyu med par mthoñ ba med pa dañ | skye ba dañ | hjig pa dañ | gnas pañi rgyus mthoñ ba med pa dañ | dmigs pañi rgyus mthoñ ba med ciñ lhag par mthoñ (671) yañ | cuñ zad kyañ³ lhag par mi mthoñ baño ||

gzan yañ lhag mthoñ ni mthoñ bas kyañ mthoñ la | mthoñ⁴ ba yañ mi mthoñ ba ste | gañ gi tshe de ltar mthoñ ba deñi tshe yañ dag par mthoñ baño || yañ dag par mthoñ na lhag mthoñ la mkhas pa yañ rjes su hthob ste | de la byañ chub sems dpañi lhag mthoñ⁵ la | mñon par hdu byed par yañ mi ltuñ zin | dge bañi rtsa ba mñon par hdu byed pa la yañ mi gnas te | de ni byañ chub sems dpañi lhag mthoñ ño ||

de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañi zi gnas dañ | lhag mthoñ la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.10.3

gzan yañ lam la mkhas pa ni byañ chub sems dpañi rnams kyi lam rnam pa bzi ste | rnam pa bzi gañ ze na | hdi lta ste | sdig pa mi dge bañi chos ma skyes pa rnams mi skyed pañi phyir hdun pa skyed⁶ | hbad bar byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu hdzin | yañ dag par rab tu hjog go ||⁷ sdig pa mi dge bañi chos⁸ skyes pa rnams spañ bañi phyir hdun pa skyed | hbad bar byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu hdzin | yañ dag par rab tu hjog go || dge bañi chos ma skyes pa rnams bskyed pañi phyir hdun pa skyed | hbad bar byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu hdzin | yañ dag par rab tu (672) hjog go || dge bañi chos skyes pa rnams gnas pa

1. P yañ dag pañi mi hgyur ba la hjug pa.

2. N om: kyi.

3. N om: kyañ.

4. D N R blta.

5. N add: de ltar mthoñ.

6. P skye bar dad pa skyed, for D N R skyed pañi phyir hdun pa skye (also in all subsequent occurrences of this phrase, with 'pañi/bañi phyir hdun pa skyed' being invariably replaced by the phrase 'par/bar dad pa skyed').

7. P smon lam yañ dag par rab tu hdebs pa dañ, for D N R yañ dag par rab tu hjog pa dañ (also in the three subsequent occurrences of this phrase in this section).

8. D R om: chos.

dañ | phyir zin hbyun ba dañ | ñams par mi hgyur ba dañ | chud mi za bar bya bañi phyir hdun pa skyed¹ | hbad bar byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu hdzin | yañ dag par rab tu hjog paño ||

gañ sdig pa mi dge bañi chos ma skyes pa rnams mi skyed pañi phyir hdun pa skyed ces bya ba ni tshul bzin yid la byed pañi tshig bla dags so || hbad par byed | brtson hgrus rtsom zes bya ba ni tshul bzin yid la byed pa de mi gtoñ ba(hi tshig bla dags so)² || sems rab tu hdzin | yañ dag par rab tu hjog ces bya ba ni tshul³ bzin la so sor rtog pañi tshig bla dags so || de ciñi phyir ze na | tshul bzin la rab tu sbyor ba ni mi dge bañi chos rnams mi hbyun bañi⁴ phyir ro ||

de la mi dge bañi chos rnams gañ ze na | hdi lta ste | tshul khrims kyi mi hthun pañi phyogs⁵ dañ | tiñ ñe hdzin gyi mi hthun pañi phyogs dañ | ses rab kyi mi hthun pañi phyogs so ||

de la tshul khrims kyi mi hthun pañi phyogs gañ ze na | hdi lta ste | tshul khrims ñams pa dañ | gañ gzan la la⁶ tshul khrims ñams par hgyur bañi chos rnams (tshul khrims kyi phuñ poñi mi hthun pañi phyogs)⁷ te | de ni tshul khrims kyi mi hthun pañi phyogs zes byaño ||

de la tiñ ñe hdzin gyi mi hthun pañi phyogs gañ ze na | gañ cho ga ñams pa dañ | gañ gzan la la sems g.yeñ bar byed pañi chos tiñ ñe hdzin gyi phuñ poñi mi hthun pañi phyogs te | de ni tiñ (673) ñe hdzin gyi mi hthun pañi phyogs zes byaño ||⁸

de la ses rab kyi mi hthun pañi phyogs gañ ze na | hdi lta ste | lta ba ñams pa dañ | gañ gzan la la lta ba kun nas ldañ bañi⁹ sgrib par byed pañi chos [gañ] | ses rab kyi phuñ poñi mi hthun pañi phyogs de ni ses rab kyi mi hthun pañi phyogs zes bya ste | de ni sdig pa mi dge bañi chos rnams zes byaño ||

tshul bzin yid la byed pa gañ gis sdig pa mi dge bañi chos de lta bu de dag spañ bañi phyir hdun pa skyed | hbad par byed | brtson hgrus rtsom | sems rab tu hdzin | yañ dag par rab tu

1. P sgom pa mi brjed pa dañ | ma stor bar dad pa skyed, for D N R phyir zin hbyun ba dañ | ñams par mi hgyur ba dañ | chud mi za bar bya bañi phyir hdun pa skyed (also in partially corresponding passages below).

2. Akn (p. 68.5.6) reads 'yid la byed pañi tshig bla dags so'. Bdp reads 'yid la byed pa de mi gtoñ baño'.

3. N add: yid.

4. P rgyu bar mi hgyur bañi, for D N R mi hbyun bañi.

5. P log pañi gñen po, for D N R mi hthun pañi phyogs (also in all subsequent occurrences of this phrase in this section).

6. P gañ gzan yañ la la (also in the following two occurrences of this phrase).

7. Given in Akn (p. 69.1.1); see also the following parallel phrases in the Bdp.

8. [pāpakānām akuśālānām dharmanām prahāṇāya chandam janayatotyatra prastāve yāni cānyāni punaḥ] kānicid anyāny api cittavikṣepakarāṇi yāni samādhiskandhasya vipakṣāya samvartante | ayam ucyante samādhivipakṣaḥ | yāvad ime ucyante pāpakā | akuśālā | dharmā iti || (Akn.as cited in Śikṣ, p. 117.13–16).

9. N R ba.

h̄jog pa ste | de bas na mi dge baḥi chos de dag sems la phuñ por gyur pa ma yin | yul na mi gnas | phyogs na mi gnas so ||

gañ yañ mi dge baḥi chos de rnams sems la rgyu ba sdug paḥi¹ nam pas ḥdod chags sam | khoñ khro baḥi rnam pas ze sdañ nam | ma rig paḥi rnam pas gti mug gam | rgyu dañ sgrib pa gañ dag las byuñ ba ses śiñ | de la tshul bzin yid la byed paḥi rnam pa mi gtsaṅ bas ḥdod chags zi bar byed | byams pas ze sdañ zi bar byed | rten ciñ ḥbrel par ḥbyuñ bas gti mug zi bar byed de | gañ kun nas ñon moñs pa de dag zi ba de ni tha sñad du btags paḥi phyir spoñ ba zes byaḥo || gañ spoñ ba (674) ni gañ yañ rñed par mi ḥgyur ro || mñam pa ñid kyis² chos thams cad mñon sum pas [na] deḥi phyir³ yañ dag par spoñ ba zes bya ste | de ni yañ dag par spoñ ba gñis paḥo ||

gañ yañ dge baḥi chos ma skyes pa rnams skyed paḥi phyir ḥdun pa skyed | ḥbad par byed | brtson ḥgrus rtsom | sems rab tu ḥdzin | yañ dag par rab tu h̄jog pa zes bya ba de ni gnas⁴ tshad med pa ste | de ciḥi phyir ze na | gañ byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen pos yañ dag par bsgrub par⁵ bya baḥi dge baḥi chos tshad med paḥi phyir ro ||

de la ḥdun pa ni dge baḥi rtsa ba thams cad kyi rtsa baḥo || brtson ḥgrus yañ dag par bsgrub pa ni dge baḥi rtsa ba thams cad kyi rtsa baḥo || sems rab tu ḥdzin pa ñams su len par byed pa⁶ de ni dge baḥi rtsa ba thams cad kyi rtsa ba ste | de ni yañ dag par spoñ ba gsum paḥo ||

gañ yañ dge baḥi chos skyes pa rnams gnas pa dañ | ñams par mi ḥgyur ba dañ | chud mi za bar bya baḥi phyir ḥdun pa skyed | ḥbad par byed | brtson ḥgrus rtsom | sems rab tu ḥdzin | yañ dag par rab tu h̄jog ces bya ba de ni dge baḥi rtsa ba byañ chub tu bsños paḥi tshig bla dags so || de ciḥi phyir ze na | dge baḥi rtsa ba byañ chub tu bsños pa ni mthaḥ byañ chub kyi sñiñ poḥi rab tu slar chud za bar mi ḥgyur ro || de ciḥi phyir ze na | de ltar khams gsum la mi gnas par sems skyed paḥi phyir ro || (675) gañ khams gsum la gnas paḥi dge baḥi rtsa ba de ni zad par ḥgyur ro || de ciḥi phyir ze na | de ltar sems bskyed pa de ni khams gsum la⁷ gnas paḥi phyir ro || gañ yañ dge baḥi rtsa ba khams gsum la mi gnas pa thams cad mkhyen par bsños pa de ni zad par mi ḥgyur te⁸ | de ni yañ dag par spoñ ba bzi paḥo ||

1. P rgyu ba gtsaṅ paḥi, for D rgyu baḥi sdug paḥi.

2. N kyi.

3. D P add: phyir.

4. P tshig.

5. P bsdu bar, for D N R yañ dag par bsgrub par (also in the next occurrence of the term 'yañ dag par sgrub pa').

6. P sgrol ba, for D N ñams su lon par byed pa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term 'ñams su len par byed pa').

7. N om: gnas par sems skyed paḥi phyir ro || gañ khams gsum la gnas paḥi dge baḥi rtsa ba de ni zad par ḥgyur ro || de ciḥi phyir ze na | de ltar sems bskyed pa de ni khams gsum la.

8. D N R de la zad pa gañ yañ med de.

de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ lam yan lag bži pa la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin
pa la spyod do ||

2.10.4

gžan yañ lam la mkhas pa ni byañ chub sems dpañ lam yan lag lña pa ste | lña gañ že na |
hdi lta ste | dad pañi dbaṅ po dañ | brtson ḥgrus kyi dbaṅ po dañ | dran pañi dbaṅ po dañ | tiñ
ñe ḥdzin gyi dbaṅ po dañ | śes rab kyi dbaṅ po ste |

de la dad pañi dbaṅ po gañ že na | dad pa gañ gis chos bži la dad par byed pa ste | bži gañ
že na |

- (1) ḥkhor ba na spyod pañi ḥjig rten pañi¹ yañ dag par lta ba la mñon par dad de | de las
kyi rnam par smin pa la rton pa yin te | srog gi phyir yañ sdig pañi las mi byed pa dañ |
- (2) byañ chub sems dpañi spyod pa la yañ dad de | spyod pa la žugs pa de theg pa gžan la
ḥdod par mi byed pa dañ |
- (3) don dam pa ñes pañi don dañ | rten ciñ ḥbrel par ḥbyuñ ba zab mo dañ | sems can la
rnam par dpyod pa² dañ | stoñ pa ñid dañ | mtshan (676) ma med pañi mtshan ñid kyi
chos thams cad la dad de | lta bar byas pa³ thams cad bag la ñal bar mi byed pa dañ |
- (4) sañs rgyas kyi chos thams cad dañ | stobs dañ | mi ḥjigs pa rnams la dad ciñ thos nas the
tsom med de⁴ | nem nur med par chos de rnams sdud par byed pa de ni dad pañi dbaṅ
po žes byaḥo ||

de la brtson ḥgrus kyi dbaṅ po gañ že na | chos gañ la dad pa de brtson ḥgrus kyi dbaṅ pos
skyed par byed pa ste | de ni brtson ḥgrus kyi dbaṅ po žes byaḥo || chos gañ dag brtson ḥgrus
kyis bsdus pa de dag dran pañi dbaṅ pos chud mi za bar byed pa de ni dran pañi dbaṅ po žes
byaḥo || chos gañ dag⁵ dran pañi dbaṅ pos chud mi za bar byed pañi chos de dag tiñ ñe ḥdzin
gyi dbaṅ pos rtse gcig tu byed pa de ni tiñ ñe ḥdzin gyi dbaṅ po žes byaḥo || chos gañ dag tiñ
ñe ḥdzin gyi dbaṅ pos rtse gcig tu⁶ byed pa de dag śes rab kyi dbaṅ pos so sor rtog par byed
de | gañ chos de dag śes pa de ni śes rab kyi dbaṅ po žes byaḥo ||

de ltar na dbaṅ po lña po de dag lhan gcig tu ḥbrel pa ste | sañs rgyas kyi chos thams cad
yoñs su rdzogs par byed do || luñ bstan pañi sa yañ thob par byed de | hdi lta ste | dper na phyi
rol kyi mñon par śes pa lña dañ ldan pa dag mñal na ḥdug pa | bud med dañ skyes pañi dbaṅ
por ma gyur kyi bar du mñal na ḥdug pa la luñ mi ston pa de (677) bžin du | sañs rgyas bcom

1. P kyi (Akn, p. 86.3.4, gyi)
2. N rnam par spyod pa; P rtog.
3. D bya ba.
4. D P R med pa; N med.
5. N om: dag.
6. D N P R pa.

ldan ḥdas rnams¹ kyañ byañ chub sems dpaḥ dbaṅ po lña po de dag dañ² mi ldan gyi bar du luñ mi ston te | de ni lam yan lag lña paḥo ||³

de ltar na byañ chub sems dpaḥ lam yan lag lña pa la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.10.5

gžan yañ śā riḥi bu byañ chub sems dpaḥ lam yan lag lña la mkhas pa gañ ze na | yan lag lña ni | ḥdi lta ste | dad paḥi stobs dañ | brtson ḥgrus kyi stobs dañ | dran paḥi stobs dañ | tiñ ñe ḥdzin gyi stobs dañ | śes rab kyi stobs so ||

de la dad paḥi stobs gañ ze na | gañ mos pa dad pa mgo gcig pa mi brdzi ba ste⁴ | gal te deḥi druñ du bdud sdig can sañs rgyas kyi gzugs su bsgyur te ḥoñs nas | chos kyi ye śes la dad pa gañ yañ ruñ ba la la žig gis chos ḥdi dag ni sañs rgyas kyi chos ma yin no || žes ḥbral bar byed | ḥdun⁵ pa zlog par byed kyañ | yoñs su brtag pa bzuñ na ḥbyuñ ba chen po bži rnams ni gžan du ḥgyur gyi | dad paḥi stobs la mos paḥi⁶ byañ chub sems dpaḥ ni de lta bu⁷ ma yin no || de ltar byañ chub sems dpaḥi stobs las ḥbral bar mi nus pa de ni dad paḥi stobs so ||

de la byañ chub sems dpaḥi brtson ḥgrus kyi stobs gañ ze na | gañ brtson ḥgrus rtsom žiñ dge baḥi chos (678) gañ dañ gañ la mñon par sbyor ba de dañ de dag la brtan⁸ paḥi stobs kyi mthu thob kyañ | gnas der ma bsgral gyi bar du stobs kyi mthu de la lha dañ bcas paḥi ḥjig

1. P om: rnams.

2. N om: dañ.

3. katamāni pañca | śraddhendriyaṃ vīryendriyaṃ smṛtindriyaṃ samādhendriyaṃ prajñendriyamiti | tatra katamā śraddhā | yathā śraddhayā caturō dhammān ābhīśraddadhātī | katamāś caturah | samsārāvacarīm laukikīm samyagdr̥ṣṭīm śraddadhātī | sa karmavipākapratiśaraṇo bhavati | yad yat karma kariṣyāmi tasya tasya karmaṇaḥ phalavipākam pratyānubhaviṣyāmīti | sa jivitaḥetor api pāpam karma na karoti | bodhisattvacārikām abhīśraddadhātī | tat caryāpratipannaś cānyatra yāne sprhām notpādayati | paramārthanitārtham gambhīrapratītyasamutpāda nairātmyaniḥsattvanirjīvanīhpudgalavyavahārasūnyatānīmīttāprañihitalakṣaṇān sarvadharmān śrutvā śraddadhātī | sarvadṛṣṭikṛtāni ca nonuśete sarvabuddhadharmān balavaiśāradyaprabhṛtīmś ca śraddadhātī | śraddhāya ca vigatakaṭhaṃkathastān buddhadharmān samudānayaṭi | idamucyate śraddhendriyam || tatra katamad vīryendriyaṃ | yān dharmān śraddhendriyeṇa śraddadhātī tān dharmān vīryendriyeṇa samudānayaṭidam ucyate vīryendriyam || tatra katamat smṛtindriyam | yān dharmān vīryendriyeṇa samudānayaṭi tān dharmān smṛtindriyeṇa na viprañāśayati | idam ucyate smṛtindriyam | tatra katamat samādhindriyam | yān dharmān smṛtindriyeṇa na viprañāśayati tān samādhindriyeṇaikaḥgrikarotiḥdam ucyate samādhindriyam | tatra katamat prajñendriyam | yān dharmān samādhindriyeṇaikaḥgrikaroti tān prajñendriyeṇa pratyavekṣate pratividhyati | yad eṭeṣu dharmesu pratyātmajñānam aparapratyayaḥjñānam idam ucyate prajñendriyam || evam imāni pañcendriyāni sahitāny anuprabadhāni sarvabuddhadharmān paripūrayanti vyākaraṇabhūmīm cāpyayanti || (Akn as cited in Śiḱṣ, pp. 316.13–317.13)

4. P phyogs gcig pa mi tshoms pa ste, for D N R mgo gcig pa mi brdzi ba ste (with ‘mgo gcig pa’ being below invariably rendered ‘phyogs gcig pa’).

5. P dad.

6. P mos paḥi stobs la gnas paḥi, for D N R dad paḥi stobs la mos paḥi.

7. D N P om: bu.

8. R bstan.

rten rnams kyis¹ nram par zlog pa ḥam | bstan pa ḥam² | nram par bsłaṅ bar mi nus te | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi brtson ḥgrus kyī stobs ṣes byaḥo ||

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi dran paḥi stobs gaṅ ṣe na | chos gaṅ daṅ gaṅ la dran pa ṇe bar bṣag pas sems ṇe bar bṣag³ pa ste | de ni ṇion moṅs pa gaṅ yaṅ ruṅ ba dag gis gtor ba ḥam⁴ | g.yeṅ bar mi nus te | dran paḥi stobs kyī mthu⁵ des ṇion moṅs pa thams cad ḥjom ṣiṅ dran pa de yaṅ mi choms pa ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi dran paḥi stobs ṣes byaḥo ||

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi tiṅ ṇe ḥdzin gyī stobs gaṅ ṣe na | gaṅ ḥdu ḥdzi thams cad du⁶ dben par spyod pa ste | gaṅ dag gi lam gyī sgra thams cad la yaṅ rtog la | deḥi bsam gtan daṅ poḥi sgraḥi tsher ma la sgrib par mi byed pa daṅ | dge bar rtog pa la yaṅ nram par rtog [pa] mod kyī | (deḥi) bsam gtan gñis pa la yaṅ sgrib par mi ḥgyur ba daṅ | de dgaḥ ba daṅ bde ba skyes te gnas mod kyī | deḥi bsam gtan gsum pa la sgrib par mi ḥgyur ba daṅ | de sems can yoṅs su smin par bya ba daṅ | dam paḥi chos yoṅs su gzuṅ bar bya baḥi phyir btaṅ sñoms pa yaṅ ma yin mod kyī⁷ | (deḥi) bsam gtan (679) bṣi pa la sgrib par⁸ mi ḥgyur ba ste | de bsam gtan de bṣi la gnas na bsam gtan daṅ nram par thar pas gṣom⁹ par mi nus te | de tiṅ ṇe ḥdzin gyī gnas kyaṅ mi gtoṅ la | tiṅ ṇe ḥdzin gyī dbaṅ gis kyaṅ mi skye ba ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi tiṅ ṇe ḥdzin gyī stobs so ||

de la byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi ṣes rab kyī stobs gaṅ ṣe na | gaṅ ḥjig rten¹⁰ daṅ ḥjig rten las ḥdas paḥi chos rnams kyīs mi choms paḥi ye ṣes te | byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ skyes ma thag tu bzohi gnas ḥjig rten na ji sñed spyod pa dam pa daṅ | dkaḥ¹¹ bar byed pa daṅ | rñed dkaḥ ba de dag thams cad slob dpon med par mñon du ḥgyur te | gaṅ ḥjig rten las ḥdas pa de¹² dag kyaṅ gaṅ gis ḥjig rten dag sgrol bar byed de | de dag byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi ṣes rab daṅ ye ṣes kyī stobs kyīs¹³ byuṅ ba | lha daṅ mi rnams kyīs¹⁴ mi choms pa ste | de ni byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi ṣes rab kyī stobs so || ḥdi ni yan lag lña paḥi lam gṣan no ||

de ltar na byaṅ chub sems dpaḥ (lam)¹⁵ yan lag lña la mkhas pa ṣes rab kyī pha rol tu

1. N om: kyis.
2. R om: bstan pa ḥam.
3. N P R gṣog.
4. D R gtor ba ḥam; N btoṅ ba ḥam; P bsre baḥi ma.
5. Aka, D N R bskyed pa.
6. D N om: du.
7. P yal bor gtoṅ pa yaṅ ma yin., for D N R btaṅ sñoms pa yaṅ ma yin mod kyī.
8. D N R add: yaṅ.
9. N gṣog.
10. N add: pa.
11. N dgaḥ.
12. D P R om: de.
13. N kyī.
14. N kyī.
15. Cf. concluding parallel phrases in the preceding passages on 'skill in the path'.

phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.10.6

gžan yañ mdor bsdu na byañ chub sems dpañ nmams kyi lam ni mgo gcig pa ste | ḥdi lta ste¹ | lam bgrod pa gcig paḥo || ḥdi lta ste | byañ chub sems dpañ gcig pu (680) gñis su med pa | bla na med pa yañ dag par rdzogs paḥi byañ chub tu grogs med par śin tu brtson paḥi stobs kyi mthu yoñs su gzuñ baḥi bsam pas go cha bgos pa ste | gžan gyis ma bstan² pa | gžan gyi³ driñ mi ḥjog pa | bdag ñid⁴ byed pa | bdag gi stobs kyi yañ dag par ḥphags pa ste | de ltar go cha sra bar⁵ bgos nas | gañ sems can thams cad kyi ma thob⁶ pa de bdag gis thob par byaḥo || gañ ḥphags pa thams cad dañ | gañ theg pa la gsar du žugs paḥi byañ chub sems dpañ thams cad kyi ma thob pa de bdag gis thob par byaḥo ||

sbyin pa ni ñaḥi grogs ma yin gyi | ña ni sbyin paḥi grogs poḥo⁷ || tshul khirms dañ | bzod pa dañ | brtson ḥgrus dañ | bsam gtan dañ | śes rab ni ñaḥi grogs ma yin gyi⁸ | ña ni de dag gi grogs poḥo⁹ || ña ni pha rol tu phyin pa nmams kyi bsalñ¹⁰ bar bya ba ma yin gyi | pha rol tu phyin pa nmams ñas bsalñ bar byaḥo || goñ ma bžin du sbyar te¹¹ | dge baḥi rtsa ba thams cad la rgyas par śes par byaḥo || ña ni dge baḥi rtsa ba thams cad kyi bsalñ bar bya ba ma yin gyi | dge baḥi rtsa ba thams cad ñas bsalñ bar byaḥo || žes de ltar buḥi chos nmams la grogs med ciñ ña gcig pu gñis su med par¹² rdo rjeḥi gdan la ḥdug nas | bdud stobs dañ bcas pa btul te | (681) skad cig¹³ gcig dañ ldan paḥi śes rab kyi bla na med pa yañ dag par rdzogs paḥi byañ chub mñon par rdzogs par ḥtshañ rgya bar byaḥo ||¹⁴ žes | de la ñes par rtog paḥi¹⁵ bsam paḥi

1. D de nas; R de ni.

2. P bśad.

3. D gyis.

4. P om: ñid.

5. D R sra bar; N sra ba; P dam du.

6. P rñed (also in the following three occurrences of the term 'thob').

7. D N P R so.

8. N gyis.

9. D N P R so.

10. N bsalñ.

11. P de bžin du bsdu te, for D N R goñ ma bžin du sbyar te (also in similarly phrased sentences of that sense below).

12. P R pas.

13. P cig ma.

14. eko bodhisattvo 'dvitīyo 'sahāyo 'nuttarāyāṃ samyaksambodhau samnāhaṃ samnāhyati | sa vīryabalaparigṛhītenādhyāśayena aparāvakāśāsavayamkāri | svabalabalodgataḥ | sa evaṃ dṛḍhasamnāhaḥ samnaddho | yat kiñcit sarvasattvānāṃ pariprāpayitavyaṃ bhaviṣyati tad ahaṃ pariprāpayiṣyāmi | yat sarvāryāḥ sarvanavayānasamprasthitā bodhisattvā na pariprāpayiṣyanti tad ahaṃ pariprāpayiṣyāmi | na mama dānaṃ sahāyakaṃ | ahaṃ punar dānasya sahāyaḥ | na mama śīlakṣāntivīryadhyānaprajñāḥ sahāyikāḥ | ahaṃ punaḥ śīlakṣāntivīryadhyānaprajñānaṃ sahāyo | nāhaṃ pāramitābhīr upasthātavyo mayā punaḥ pāramitā upasthātavyāḥ | evaṃ saṃgrahavastuṣu sarvakuśalamūleṣu caleyaṃ | yāvad ekākinā mayā dvitīyenāsahāyena vajramaye mahimaṇḍale sthītena sabalaṃ savāhnaṃ mārāṃ dharṣayitvā ekacittakṣaṇasamāyuktayā prajñayā 'nuttarā samyaksambodhir abhisambodhavya || (Akn as cited in Śīkṣ,

sbyor ba¹ de ni byañ chub sems dpañ lam² bgrod pa gcig pu³ zes bya ste | de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ lam bgrod pa gcig pu la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

de ni byañ chub sems dpañ rnam⁴ kyi lam⁴ la mkhas pa ste | de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ⁵ lam la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

2.11

de la byañ chub sems dpañ rnam⁴ kyi rten ciñ h̄brel par h̄byuñ ba la mkhas pa gañ ze na | h̄di ltar byañ chub sems dpañ gcig pu dben par soñ ste | nañ du yañ dag par⁶ b̄zag nas h̄di ltar sems la rtog pa ste⁷ |

sdug bsñal gyi phuñ po chen po h̄di gañ las h̄byuñ bar h̄gyur sñam pa dañ | de h̄di ltar sems te | tshul b̄zin ma yin pa byuñ bañi phyir ma rig pa h̄byuñ⁸ | ma rig pa byuñ bañi phyir⁹ h̄du byed h̄byuñ | h̄du byed byuñ bañi phyir rnam par śes pa h̄byuñ | rnam par śes pa byuñ bañi phyir miñ dañ gzugs h̄byuñ | miñ dañ gzugs byuñ bañi phyir skye mched drug h̄byuñ | skye mched drug byuñ bañi phyir reg pa h̄byuñ | reg pa byuñ bañi phyir tshor ba h̄byuñ | tshor ba byuñ bañi phyir sred pa h̄byuñ | sred pa byuñ bañi phyir len pa h̄byuñ | (682) len pa byuñ bañi phyir srid pa h̄byuñ | srid pa byuñ bañi phyir skye ba h̄byuñ | skye ba byuñ bañi phyir rga śi h̄byuñ | rga śi byuñ bañi phyir mya ñan dañ | smre sñags h̄don pa¹⁰ dañ | sdug bsñal ba dañ | yid mi bde ba dañ | h̄khrug pa rnam⁴ h̄byuñ bar h̄gyur ro || zes de sñam du sems so¹¹ ||

de yañ h̄di sñam du sems par h̄gyur te¹² | ji ltar mi g.yo ba dañ | mi byed pa dañ | b̄dag po med pa dañ | dge bañi rgyu las byuñ ba dañ | mi dge bañi rgyu las byuñ ba dañ | mi g.yo bañi rgyu las byuñ dañ | mya ñan las h̄das pañi rgyu las byuñ bañi chos de dag thams cad rkyen las byuñ ba ste | gañ yañ las kyi rgyu gañ dag gis sems can gañ dag gi dbañ poñi rgyu tshad ma

p. 278.4–14)

15. D P R pa.

1. P de ltar brtsam pañi sbyor ba rtog pa, for D N R de la ñes par rtog pañi bsam pañi sbyor ba.

2. D R om: lam.

3. P lam phyogs gcig pu.

4. N add: bgrod.

5. D add: rnam kyi.

6. D P R om: par.

7. N skyes te.

8. P nañ du yañ dag zugs pa sdug bsñal gyi phuñ po chen po h̄di gañ las h̄du bar h̄gyur te zes de ltar sems kyi rtog pa skye ba las tshul b̄zin ma yin pa h̄byuñ ba las h̄gyur te, for D N R from nañ du yañ dag (pa) to rig pa h̄byuñ.

9. P byuñ ba las (also in the following occurrences of the phrase ‘byuñ bañi phyir’ in this section).

10. P mya ñan slos pa, for D N R smre sñags h̄don pa.

11. D N R sñam mo.

12. D N R de yañ ltar sems te.

dañ | lhag pañi cho gañi rgyu tshad mañi hbras buñi rgyu hgrub pa dañ | de ltar zin pa dañ mi
zin pa la gañ rgyu hdu pa byuñ ba de thams cad rab tu śes pa ste | de ni byañ chub sems
dpañi rten ciñ hbrel par hbyuñ ba la mkhas pa zes byaño ||

de yañ hgag gañ ze na | tshul bzin ma yin pa¹ yid la byed pa hgags pañi phyir ma rig² pa
hgag go || ma rig pa hgag³ pañi phyir hdu byed hgag pa nas | sdug bsñal gyi phuñ po chen
po hbañ zig gi bar du hgag par hgyur ro || zes de sñam du sems te | de ltar gañ de la śes pa de
ni rten ciñ hbrel par hbyuñ ba la mkhas pa zes byaño ||

de yañ chos thams cad ni rgyu la rag las | rkyen la⁴ rag las | hdu pa la rag las pa ste | (683)
gañ rgyu dañ | rkyen dañ⁵ | hdu pa la rag las pa de ni bdag gi byin gyi rlabs ma yin | srog
dañ gañ zag gi byin gyi rlabs ma yin te | de la bgrañ ba gañ yañ med do || zes de ltar (sñam
du) sems te | gañ de ltar sems pa de ni rten ciñ hbrel par hbyuñ ba la mkhas paño ||

de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ sañs rgyas kyi chos thams cad byañ chub kyi rnam pañi
rkyen du sloñ bar byed la | rkyen de dag la yañ zad pa dañ hgag par so sor rtog la | sems can
la lta bañi phyir zad pa dañ hgag pa ma yin pa yañ⁶ thob par byed pa de ni | byañ chub sems
dpañi rten ciñ hbrel par hbyuñ ba la mkhas paño ||

2.12

de la byañ chub sems dpañi chos thams cad la mkhas pa gañ ze na | chos thams cad ces bya
ba ni | hdi lta ste | hdu byas dañ hdu ma byas so || de la byañ chub sems dpas hdu byas dañ
hdu ma byas la mkhas par bya ste |

de la hdu byas la mkhas pa gañ ze na | gañ lus kyi hdu byed dañ | ñag gi hdu byed dañ |
yid kyi hdu byed dag pa ste⁷ || gañ yañ⁸ lus dañ | ñag dañ | yid kyi dge ba de dag hdu ma
byas pañi byañ chub la so sor rtog pañi phyir⁹ | thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du sño ba de ni
hdu ma byas la mkhas paño ||

gzan yañ hdu byas la mkhas pa ni | hdi lta ste | (684) gañ sbyin pañi pha rol tu phyin pa
dañ | tshul khirms dañ | bzod pa dañ | brtson hgrus dañ | bsam gtan dañ | śes rab kyi pha rol tu

1. D pañi; P la.

2. N rigs.

3. N P hgags.

4. N las (also in the next clause).

5. N om: dañ.

6. P mi zad pa yañ hgag pa de yañ, for D N R zad pa dañ hgag pa ma yin pa yañ.

7. D N R hdu byed do; Akn (p. 55.5.3) add: mñon par hdu byas ba de dag thams cad byañ chub la rtog pas
thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du yoñs su bsño ba hdi ni deñi hdu ma byas la mkhas pa zes byaño ||

8. D N gañ la.

9. D N R yid kyi dge bañi hdu byed kyi hdu ma byas pañi byañ chub la hdu ma byas par rtog pas, for P
yid kyi dge ba de dag hdu ma byas pañi byañ chub la so sor rtog pañi phyir.

phyin paḥi¹ dañ | pha rol tu phyin pa lña rnams sdud paḥo || gañ yañ ḥdus ma byas paḥi śes pas | śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la pha rol tu phyin pa lña rnams kyis smod par mi byed ciñ | pha rol tu phyin paḥi tshogs thams cad la mkhas pa dañ | zag pa med paḥi byañ chub de la mos pas gañ thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du bsño ba de ni deḥi² ḥdus ma³ byas la mkhas paḥo ||

gžan yañ ḥdus byas la mkhas pa ni (gañ) sems can thams cad la ḥod zer thogs pa med pa dañ | bsdu ba bzis sems can⁴ sdud paḥo⁵ || gañ yañ sñems pa med paḥi phyir sems can la bdag med par ḥdzin pa dañ⁶ bsdu ba la mkhas śiñ | ḥdus ma byas paḥi byañ chub la mos nas | thams cad mkhyen pa ñid du bsño ba de ni deḥi ḥdus ma byas la mkhas paḥo ||

gžan yañ ḥdus byas la mkhas pa ni gañ ḥkhor baḥi rgyun gyi kun nas⁷ sbyor ba rnams yañ dag par mi gcod la | ḥkhor baḥi rgyun gyi ñon moñs pa rnams yañ dag par gcod pa dañ | byañ chub tu dmigs paḥi sbyor ba rnams rgyun chags par byed pa⁸ dañ | sbyor ba phyogs gcig pa rnams mi sdud par spyod pa⁹ de ni ḥdus byas la mkhas pa zes byaḥo || gañ yañ stoñ pa ñid dañ | mtshan ma med pa dañ | smon pa med paḥi chos rnams la ḥdris par (685) bya ba¹⁰ śes śiñ mñon sum du mkhas pa dañ | byañ chub tu gžan gyi driñ la mi ḥjog mod kyi¹¹ | ḥdus ma byas kyañ mñon sum du mi byed pa de ni ḥdus ma byas la mkhas paḥo ||

gžan yañ khams gsum na spyod kyañ khams gsum na spyod paḥi ñon moñs pa rnams kyis mi gos¹² pa de ni deḥi ḥdus byas la mkhas paḥo || gañ yañ khams gsum las byuñ baḥi ye śes rab tu śes kyañ | ḥbyuñ baḥi khams su mi ltuñ ba de ni ḥdus ma byas la mkhas paḥo¹³ ||

gañ chos thams cad la mkhas pa zes bya ba de ni thams cad mkhyen pa ñid kyi¹⁴ tshig bla dags so || gañ thams cad mkhyen pa ñid kyi ye śes rtogs pa yoñs su rdzogs pa de ni śes rab dañ mkhas pa med na ḥbyuñ bar mi ḥgyur bas | deḥi phyir chos thams cad la mkhas pa zes bya ste | de ltar na byañ chub sems dpaḥ chos thams cad la mkhas pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod do ||

1. D N R pa dañ, for P paḥi.
2. N om: deḥi.
3. Akn (p. 55.5.5) om: ma.
4. N add: rnams.
5. P bsdu pa ñid dañ.
6. D N R dag.
7. P ḥkhor bar ḥjug paḥi sbyor ba, for D N R ḥkhor baḥi rgyun gyi kun nas sbyor ba.
8. P kyi rjes su sbyor ba, for D N R rgyun chags par byed pa.
9. P sbyor ba.
10. P om: bya ba.
11. D N R ciñ.
12. P chags.
13. D P R mkhas pa zes byaḥo.
14. N mkhyen paḥi.

śā rihi bu de ltar na byañ chub sems dpañ sems dpañ chen po byañ chub sems dpañi sde
snod la gnas pa | śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod pa | śes rab nam par hbyed pa la
mkhas śin mkhas pa bcu po de dag la yañ mkhas pas śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la spyod
do ||

SECTION III

3.1

de la¹ śes rab ni gañ | pha rol tu phyin pa nam kyi don ni gañ ze na | śes rab ces bya ba
ni dge ba dañ mi dge bañi chos (686) nam rab tu śes paño || śes rab ni nes par hbyed pañi
cha dañ hthun pañi² chos nam kyi mñon sum mo || hphags pañi chos mñon sum du gyur
pañi phyir tshad mar gyur pa ni śes rab bo || chos yañ dag pa ji lta ba bzin du rtogs pa ni³
tshad mar gyur paño || śes rab ni lta bar gyur pa thams cad dañ | kun nas ltañ ba dañ | sgrib pa
dañ | sgrib par byed pañi chos nam rab tu rtogs paño || śes rab ni hdod pa dañ | tshol⁴ ba
dañ | smon lam thams cad kyi smon lam dañ bral baño || śes rab ni śin tu sbyaṅs pañi phyir

1. In P (pp. 87.5–88.2.2), large parts of the section on the nature of wisdom (R folio 685.5–688.1) are cast in a slightly different order from that of D N and R. In meaning, however, they correspond closely to that of the other editions. In P, they run as follows:

de la śes rab ni gañ | pha rol tu phyin pa nam gyi don ni gañ ze na | śes rab ces bya ba ni dge ba dañ mi
dge bañi chos nam par rab tu śes paño || śes rab ni nes par rtogs pañi phyogs kyi chos nam kyi mñon
sum mo || hphags pañi chos mñon sum du gyur pañi phyir tshad mar gyur pa ni śes rab po || chos yañ dag
pa ji lta ba bzin du rtogs pa ni śes rab po || lta bar gyur pa thams cad dañ kun nas ltañ ba dañ || sgrib pa dañ
sgrib par byed pañi chos nam la smon pa dañ bral ba ni śes rab po || hdod pa tshol ba thams cad la smon
par byed pa | sim par byed pa ni gduñ ba thams cad gtoñ pañi phyir śes rab po || chos kyi dgañ ba la dmigs
śin nam par gcod pañi phyir dgañ bar byed pa ni śes rab po || ye śes thams cad mñon sum du gyur pañi
phyir rten pa ni śes rab po || byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos thams cad kyi gnas ni śes rab po || rñed pañi
mtshan fiid ni śes rab po || theg pa ji lta ba bzin du hbras bu rtogs pañi phyir rab tu śes pañi mtshan fiid ni
śes rab po || klun thams cad las sgrol bañi phyir | rañ bzin śes pañi snañ ba hjug pa ni śes rab po || yañ dag
par skyon med pañi bar du hdren pa ni śes rab po || dge bañi chos thams cad hdzin pa ni śes rab po || ñon
mon pa bag la ñal ba thams cad dañ bar byed pa ni śes rab po || chos thams cad kyi sbyi bo thob pañi rab
mchog ni śes rab po || rañ byuñ bañi ye śes rtogs pañi phyir bzañ ba ni śes rab po || kham sum la ma chags
pas rgyu ba dañ bral ba ni śes rab po || hphags pa thams cad kyis śin tu bzun ba ni śes rab po || mtshan ma
med par yoñs su rtog pa thams cad spañs pas smon lam nam par chad pa ni śes rab po || mun pa mun gnag
thams cad dañ bral bas bag med pañi gñen po ni śes rab po || mal hbyor spyod kyis la gnas pa thams cad
kyi sbyor ba ni śes rab po || thams cad mkhyen pañi ye śes kyi lam la gnas pa nam kyi rab tu hdren pa ni
śes rab po || ma rig pañi klun gi mun pa rab rib kyi sprin hjom par byed pas snañ bar byed pa ni śes rab po
|| mig la ji ltar mos pas nam kyi mig thams cad sbyiñ par byed pa ni śes rab po || mig dañ gzugs kyi lam
las hdañ pañi phyir zag pa med pa ni śes rab po || bden pa las hbyuñ bas don dam pañi ni śes rab po || śin tu
dul bañi phyir mi hkhugs pa ni śes rab po || ye śes kyi sgoñi snañ ba ni śes rab po || thams cad du rgyu bas
mi zad pa ni śes rab po || rten ciñ hñrel ba la hjug par mthoñ bañi phyir | hgal ba med pa ni śes rab po || len
pañi hcin ba thams cad gcod par byed pas thar pañi lam ni śes rab po || sgrib par byed pañi chos thams cad
dañ lhañ du mi gnas pas ma hdres pa ni śes rab po || (continuation: śā rihi bu ...).

2. P nes par rtogs pañi phyogs kyi.
3. D pañi phyir; P R pañi.
4. N tshor.

sim par byed paḥo || śes rab ni chos kyi dgaḥ ba la dmigs pa mnam par mi gcod paḥi phyir rab tu dgaḥ bar byed paḥo || śes rab ni ye śes thams cad mñon sum du gyur paḥi phyir rten¹ paḥo || śes rab ni byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos thams cad kyi gnas so || śes rab ni theg pa ji lta ba bzin du² ḥbras bu rtogs paḥi phyir thob paḥi mtshan ñid do || śes rab ni rañ bzin gyis ye śes snañ ba rab tu śes paḥi mtshan ñid do || śes rab ni chu bo thams cad las grol baḥi phyir rab tu sgrol baḥo || śes rab ni yañ dag par gyur pa la ḥdren paḥo | śes rab ni dge baḥi chos thams cad rab tu ḥdzin paḥo ||³

śes rab ni ñon moñs paḥi bag la ñal thams cad dañ bar byed paḥo || śes rab ni (687) chos thams cad kyi spyi bo thob paḥi mchog go || śes rab ni rañ ḥbyuñ baḥi ye śes rtogs par bya ba la⁴ dam paḥo || śes rab ni khams gsum dañ ma ḥdres pas rgyu⁵ dañ bral baḥo || śes rab ni ḥphags pa thams cad kyis⁶ śin tu bzuñ baḥo || śes rab ni mtshan mar yoñs su rtog pa thams cad spañs pas smon lam mnam par chad paḥo || śes rab ni mun pa mun gnag dañ bral bas bag med paḥi gñen poḥo ||⁷

śes rab ni rnal ḥbyor spyod paḥi sa la gnas pa thams cad kyi sbyor baḥo || śes rab ni thams cad mkhyen paḥi ye śes kyi lam la⁸ gnas pa nmams kyi rab tu ḥdren paḥo || śes rab ni ma rig paḥi rluñ gi mun par rab rib kyi sprin ḥjom par byed⁹ pas snañ bar byed paḥo || śes rab ni

1. N brten.

2. P tu, for D N R gyi.

3. Pelliot, 977, folio 6a.4–6b.2

śa ri bu de la śes rab žes bya ba ni | ḥdi lta ste | dge baḥi chos thams cad rab tu rtogs pa gañ yin ba de ni mñon sum mthoñ baḥi śes rab yin te | chos thams cad rjes su rtog paḥi phyir ro || yañ dag paḥi tshad mi śes rab yin te | yañ dag pa ci lta ba bzin du chos thams cad rab tu rtogs paḥi phyir ro || rab tu rtogs paḥi śes rab yin te | lta bar soñ baḥi kun nas dkris paḥi chos thams cad gyis bsgrub par myi ḥgyur baḥi phyir ro || smon pa dañ bral baḥi śes rab yin te | ḥdod pa dañ tshol ba dañ | smon pa thams cad gtan du bspañs paḥi phyir ro || tshim bar byed paḥi śes rab yin te | yoñs su gduñ ba thams cad gtan du ži bar byed paḥi phyir ro || rab tu dgaḥ bar byed paḥi śes rab yin te | chos kyi dgaḥ ba la dmyigs ba rgyun chad pa myed paḥi phyir ro || rton paḥi śes rab yin te | don śes pa nmams mñon sum du gyur paḥi phyir ro || mnam par ḥjog pa śes rab yin te || byañ chub kyi phyogs kyi chos thams cad mnam par ḥjog paḥi phyir ro || thob paḥi mtshan ñid gyi śes rab yin te || theg pa ci lta ba bzin du ḥbras bu thob par byed paḥi phyir ro || rab tu śes paḥi śes rab kyi mtshan ñid kyi śes rab yin te | ye śes kyi rañ bzin śin tu gsal bar rtogs paḥi phyir ro || sñiñ rjes sgrol bar byed paḥi śes rab yin te | chu bo thams cad lam sgrol bar byed paḥi phyir ro || gžol bar byed paḥi śes rab yin te | yañ dag paḥi chos skye ba myed pa la gžol bar byed paḥi phyir ro || sgul bar byed paḥi śes rab yin te | dge baḥi chos thams cad rab tu bskyod par byed paḥi phyir ro ||.

4. D P R om: la.

5. D rgyu ba.

6. N kyi.

7. Pelliot, 977, folio 6b.2–5

dañ bar byed paḥi śes rab yin te | snun gyi bag la ñal gyi ñon moñs paḥi rtog pa dañ bral baḥi phyir ro || mchog tu gyur paḥi śes rab yin te | chos thams cad kyi spyi bor phyin paḥi phyir ro || śin tu gya nom baḥi śes rab yin te | rañ byuñ baḥi ye śes kyis chos rjes su rtogs paḥi phyir ro || rgyu dañ bral baḥi śes rab yin te | khams gsum gyi chos dañ ḥdres pa myed paḥi phyir ro || yoñs su bzuñ baḥi śes rab yin te | ḥphags pa thams cad kyis yoñs su bzuñ baḥi phyir ro || smon pa mnam par gcod paḥi śes rab yin te | mtshan maḥi mnam par rtog pa thams cad yoñs su bsal baḥi phyir ro || bdag myed paḥi śes rab yin te | gti mug gyi mun nag thams cad spañs paḥi phyir ro |.

8. N om: la.

9. D byas.

mig la ji ltar mos pa rnams kyi mig thams cad sbyin par byed paḥo || śes rab ni mig dañ gzugs kyi lam las ḥdas paḥi phyir zag pa med paḥo || śes rab ni bden pa las byuñ bas¹ don dam paḥo || śes rab ni śin tu dul baḥi phyir mi ḥkhrugs paḥo || śes rab ni ye śes kyi sgoḥi snañ baḥo || śes rab ni thams cad du rgyu ba² mi zad paḥo ||

śes rab ni rten ciñ ḥbrel par (ḥbyuñ ba) la ḥjug par mthoñ baḥi phyir ḥgal ba med paḥo || śes rab ni len paḥi ḥchiñ ba thams cad gcod par byed pas thar paḥi lam mo || śes rab ni sgrib par byed paḥi³ chos thams cad dañ lhan cig tu (688) mi gnas pas ma ḥdres paḥo ||⁴

śā riḥi bu de lta bas na sems can thams cad kyi sems kyi⁵ spyod pa ji sñed pa byañ chub sems dpaḥ rnams kyi śes rab kyi⁶ las dañ | ye śes kyi spyod pa yañ de sñed do || sems can thams cad kyi bsam pa ji sñed pa byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab kyi dpyod⁷ pa dañ | ye śes kyañ de sñed do || sems can thams cad kyi ñon moñs paḥi sgo ji sñed pa byañ chub sems dpaḥ śes rab la ḥjug paḥi sgo yañ de sñed do || ñan thos dañ | rañ sañs rgyas dañ | yañ dag par rdzogs paḥi sañs rgyas rnams kyi yoñs su śes pa ji sñed pa śes rab la gnas paḥi gnas kyañ de sñed do || byañ chub sems dpaḥ thams cad la⁸ bslab par bya ste | de ni byañ chub sems dpaḥi śes rab ces byaḥo ||⁹

1. D ba.

2. N baḥi.

3. D add: phyir.

4. Pelliot, 977, folio 6b.5–7a.3

sbyor baḥi śes rab yin te | rnal ḥbyor spyod paḥi sa la gnas pa thams cad las mñon bar grub baḥi phyir ro || bsgrod par byed paḥi śes rab yin te | ḥphags paḥi ye śes kyi lam thams cad la rab tu gnas paḥi phyir ro || snañ bar byed paḥi śes rab yin te | ma rig paḥi rluñ kyis rab rib gyi mun pa thams cad yoñs su bsal baḥi phyir ro || myig sbyin bar byed paḥi śes rab yin te | myig bzin du thams cad rab tu ḥdren par byed paḥi phyir ro || zag pa myed paḥi śes rab yin te | śes rab kyi myig gis gya gyuḥi lam las yañ dag par ḥdas paḥi phyir ro || don dam paḥi śes rab yin te | ḥphags pa chen poḥi bden ba rab tu rtogs paḥi phyir ro | tha dad pa myed paḥi śes rab yin te | śin tu dul bar gyur paḥi phyir ro || snañ baḥi śes rab yin te | ye śes rnams kyi sgor gyur paḥi phyir ro | zad myi śes paḥi śes rab yin te | rjes su rgyu ba thams cad kun tu snañ bar byed paḥi phyir ro | ḥgag pa myed paḥi śes rab yin te | rtag par rgya cher mthoñ baḥi phyir ro || mnam par grol baḥi lam gyi śes rab yin te | ḥdzin paḥi ḥchiñ ba thams cad gtan du spoñ baḥi phyir ro || gnas dañ bral baḥi śes rab yin te | ñon moñs paḥi sgrib paḥi chos thams cad dañ ltan cig myi gnas paḥi phyir ro ||

5. D N R dañ.

6. P dañ (also in the next occurrence of the term 'śes rab kyi').

7. D R spyod.

8. N om: la.

9. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.3–7

śa ri bu de ltar ye śes kyi mtshan ñid nas mdor bsduś nas bstan pa yin te | byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po rnams kyi śes rab ni gzan yañ tshad myed dpag tu myed pa sñed yod par rig par byaḥo || de ciḥi phyir ze na sa ri bu ḥdi ltar sems can thams cad kyi sems kyi spyod pa ci sñed pa | byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po rnams kyi śes rab kyi lam dañ | ye śes kyi spyod pa de sñed yod pas so | de bzin du sems can thams cad kyi mos pa ci sñed pa byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po rnams kyi śes rab kyi spyod pa dañ | ye śes kyañ de sñed yod par rig par byaḥo || de bzin du sems cad kyi ñon moñs paḥi sgra ci sñed pa byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po | rnams kyi śes rab rgya chen poḥi sgra yañ de sñed yod par rig par byaḥo || de bzin du ñan thos dañ | rañ sañs rgyas dañ | yañ dag par rdzogs paḥi sañs rgyas thams cad gyi yoñs su mkhyen pa ci sñed pa | byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po rnams kyi śes rab kyi spyod paḥi gnas kyañ de sñed yod par rig par byaḥo || śa ri bu de ltar śes rab kyi gnas thams cad la byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po rnams kyis nan tan brtson ḥgrus kyis bslab par bya ste | ḥdi ni byañ chub sems dpaḥ sems dpaḥ chen po rnams kyi śes rab kyi nom ba zes byaḥo ||

3.2

de la pha rol tu phyin paḥi don gañ ze na | śes rab gañ yin pa pha rol tu phyin paḥi don
kyañ de yin te | dge baḥi chos rnams rab tu śes pa de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don zes byaḥo ||
goñ ma bzin du sbyar te | pha rol tu phyin pa thams cad kyi tshig¹ kyañ de bzin du dpyad par
byaḥo² ||³

gzan yañ byañ chub sems dpaḥi spyod paḥi khyad par yoñs su rdzogs paḥi don ni pha rol tu
phyin paḥi don to || gzan yañ thams cad mkhyen paḥi ye śes yoñs su rdzogs paḥi don ni pha
rol tu phyin paḥi don to || ḥdus byas dañ ḥdus ma byas (689) paḥi chos la mñon par ma chags
paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to || ḥkhor baḥi ñes pa khoñ du chud paḥi don ni pha rol
tu phyin paḥi don to⁴ || zad mi śes paḥi chos kyi mdzod ston paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin
paḥi don to || sgrib pa med paḥi rnam par thar pa yoñs su rdzogs paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin
paḥi don to || sbyin pa mñam pa ñid dañ | tshul khirms dañ | bzod pa dañ | brtson ḥgrus dañ |
bsam gtan dañ | śes rab mñam pa ñid rtogs paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to || rnam
par ñes paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to ||⁵

sams can thams cad kyi khams la⁶ ḥjug paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to || mi skye
baḥi chos la bzod pa yoñs su rdzogs paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to || phyir mi ldog
paḥi sa yoñs su rdzogs paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to || sañs rgyas kyi zin yoñs su
rdzogs paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to || sems can yoñs su smin paḥi⁷ don ni pha rol
tu phyin paḥi don to || byañ chub kyi sñiñ po yañ dag par thob paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin

1. N om: kyi tshig.

2. P sbyar ro, for D N R dpyad par byaḥo.

3. This paragraph is missing in the Pelliot manuscript.

4. N om: ḥkhor baḥi ñes pa khoñ du chud paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to.

5. Pelliot, 977, folio 7a.7–7b.6

gzan yañ śa ri bu byañ chub sems dpaḥi sems dpaḥi chen po rnams kyi pha rol tu phyin paḥi don gañ ze na |
śa ri bu ḥdi ltar ci tsam du dge baḥi chos gya nom ba pha rol tu phyin par ḥgyur ba rab tu śes pa thams cad
ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don ces bya bar rig par byaḥo || yañ śa ri bu goñ ma bzin du rgyas par sbyar te | śes
rab kyi tshogs thams cad ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don yin bar rig par byaḥo | gzan yañ byañ chub sems
dpaḥi rnams kyi spyod paḥi khyad bar yoñs su rdzogs paḥi don gañ yin ba thams cad ni pha rol tu phyin
paḥi don yin bar rig par byaḥo | ḥdus byas dañ | ḥdus ma byas kyi chos thams cad la mñon bar zen pa myed
paḥi don gañ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don yin bar rig par byaḥo | ḥkhor baḥi ñes dmyigs chen po
tshad myed pa rtog tu rtog paḥi don gañ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don yin bar rig par byaḥo | chos
thams cad khoñ tu ma chud ciñ ma rtogs paḥi don rab tu śes pa gañ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don
yin bar rig par byaḥo | gañ gyis mthar thug ciñ zad pa myed paḥi chos kyi mdzod kyi don rab tu rtogs pa
gañ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don yin bar rig par byaḥo || bsgrib pa myed paḥi rnam par thar pa
yoñs su rdzogs paḥi don gañ yin ba de ni | pha rol tu phyin paḥi don yin bar rig par byaḥo | sbyin ba dañ
tshul khirms dañ | bzod pa dañ | brtson ḥgrus dañ | bsam gtan dañ | śes rab mñam ba ñid du rtogs paḥi don
gañ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don yin bar rig par byaḥo | mchog tu rab tu rnam par ḥbyed pa la
mkhas paḥi don gañ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don yin bar rig par byaḥo |.

6. P om: la.

7. D R smin par bya baḥi.

paḥi don to || bdud thams cad rab tu ḥdul baḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to || saṅs rgyas
kyi chos thams cad yoṅs su rdzogs paḥi don ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don to || gzan yaṅ byaṅ
chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi nam graṅs b'zag¹ par byed paḥi don ni pha rol tu
phyin (690) paḥi don to ||

sā riḥi bu byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi nam graṅs bslabs na | pha rol tu
phyin pa thams cad kyi pha rol tu soṅ bar ḥgyur ro ||²

SECTION IV

sā riḥi bu de bas na theg pa chen po la gnas paḥi rigs kyi buḥam | rigs kyi bu mos byaṅ
chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi nam graṅs ḥdi blaṅ bar bya | gzuṅ bar bya | bklag par
bya | gzan la yaṅ b'sad par bya | rgya cher rab tu bstan par byaḥo ||

de ciḥi phyir ze na | sā riḥi bu byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod kyi chos kyi nam graṅs śin
tu mñan | blaṅs | bzuṅ | bklags | kun chub par byas | gzan la yaṅ b'sad | rgya cher yaṅ dag par
rab tu bstan na | yon tan bcu po ḥdi dag ḥthob par ḥgyur ro³ || bcu gaṅ ze na | ḥdi lta ste |

- (1) tshe rabs gzan du ḥphos nas⁴ bzohi gnas daṅ |
- (2) las kyi gnas thams cad⁵ rtogs par khoṅ du chud par ḥgyur |
- (3) rigs mtho zin btsun⁶ par ḥgyur |
- (4) dbaṅ che bar grags par ḥgyur⁷ |
- (5) tshig btsun par ḥgyur |
- (6) loṅs spyod che bar ḥgyur |
- (7) lha daṅ mi mams la ḥphaṅs par ḥgyur |

1. D N P R g'zog.

2. Pelliot, 977, folio 7b.6–8a.3

sems can gyi kham thams cad kun tu ḥgro baḥi don gaṅ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don ces byaḥo |
myi skye baḥi chos kyi bzod pa yoṅs su rdzogs paḥi don gaṅ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don ces
byaḥo | phyir myi ldog paḥi ma mthar yoṅs su rdzogs pa gaṅ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don ces
byaḥo | saṅs rgyas kyi zin yoṅs su sbyon baḥi don gaṅ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don ces byaḥo |
sems can thams cad yoṅs su smyin bar byed paḥi don gaṅ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don ces byaḥo
| byaṅ chub kyi sñiṅ por soṅ nas byaṅ chub kyi gdan la ḥdug paḥi don gaṅ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin
paḥi don ces byaḥo | bdud kyi dpuṅ mams rab tu btul baḥi don gaṅ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don
ces byaḥo | saṅs rgyas kyi chos thams cad yoṅs su rdzogs paḥi don gaṅ yin ba de ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi
don ces byaḥo | byaṅ chub sems dpaḥi sde snod chos kyi nam graṅs la yaṅ dag par gnas paḥi don gaṅ yin
ba ni pha rol tu phyin paḥi don ces byaḥo ||

3. N thob par ḥgyur ro (also in all subsequent occurrences of the phrase 'ḥthob par ḥgyur ro').

4. D add: kyaṅ.

5. D N add: la.

6. N brtson.

7. P mthu che bar ḥgyu, for D N R dbaṅ che bar grags par ḥgyur.

- (8) hkhos los sgyur baḥi rgyal po ḥthob par ḥgyur |
 (9) tshaḥs par ḥthob par ḥgyur |
 (10) thams cad du byaḥ chub kyi sems daḥ mi ḥbral bar ḥgyur te |

yon tan gyi phan yon¹ ḥdi ḥthob par ḥgyur ro || de gzan yaḥ yon tan gyi phan yon bcu
 ḥthob par ḥgyur te | bcu gaḥ ze na | ḥdi lta ste |

- (1) gcer bu paḥi² rtsod pa daḥ | (691) ḥdres³ pa ma yin par ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (2) bdag du mi lta ba daḥ⁴ |
 (3) sems can du mi lta ba daḥ |
 (4) srog du mi lta ba daḥ |
 (5) gaḥ zag tu mi lta ba daḥ |
 (6) chad par mi lta ba daḥ |
 (7) rtag par mi lta bar ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (8) dḥos po thams cad la mi lta ba daḥ |
 (9) rab tu ḥbyuḥ ba la dgaḥ bar sems skyed pa ḥthob pa daḥ |
 (10) thos paḥi tshig ḥbru myur du khoḥ du chud par ḥgyur ba ste |

yon tan gyi phan yon bcu po de dag ḥthob par ḥgyur ro || de gzan yaḥ yon tan gyi phan yon
 bcu ḥthob par ḥgyur te | bcu gaḥ ze na | (ḥdi lta ste |)

- (1) dran pa daḥ ldan par ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (2) blo gros daḥ ldan par ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (3) rtogs pa daḥ ldan par ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (4) mos pa⁵ daḥ ldan par ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (5) śes rab daḥ ldan par ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (6) dal ba phun sum tshogs pa⁶ rñed par ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (7) tshe rabs dran par ḥgyur ba daḥ |
 (8) raḥ bzin gyis ḥdod chags chuḥ ste | ḥdod chags bdo ba ma yin⁷ la | de śin tu ḥdod chags
 kyi gduḥ bas yoḥs su mi gduḥ ba daḥ |
 (9) raḥ bzin gyis ze sdaḥ chuḥ ste | ze sdaḥ bdo ba ma yin la | de śin tu ze sdaḥ gi gduḥ bas

1. P legs pa (also in all subsequent occurrences of the term 'phan yon').
 2. P gcer bu can gyi.
 3. N ḥdren.
 4. P om: ba daḥ (also in the following four occurrences of the phrase 'lta ba daḥ').
 5. P dgaḥ ba.
 6. P om: phun sum tshogs pa.
 7. P mi drag, for D N R bdo ba ma yin (also in the next two occurrences of this term).

yoñs su mi gduñ ba dañ |

- (10) rañ bzin gyis gti mug chuñ ste | gti mug gi bdo ba ma yin la | de śin tu gti mug gduñ bas
yoñs su mi gduñ bar mi hgyur ba ste |

yon tan gyi phan yon bcu po de dag hthob par hgyur ro || de gzan yañ yon tan gyi phan yon
bcu hthob (692) par hgyur te | bcu gañ ze na | hdi lta ste |

- (1) śes rab ño mtshar du hgyur |
- (2) śes rab myur bar hgyur |
- (3) śes rab rno bar hgyur |
- (4) śes rab mgyogs par hgyur |
- (5) śes rab rgya che bar¹ hgyur |
- (6) śes rab zab par hgyur |
- (7) śes rab ñes par hbyed par hgyur |
- (8) śes rab ma chags par hgyur |
- (9) de bzin gśegs pa mñon du mthoñ zñ mthoñ nas tshigs su bcad pañi dbyañs kyis bstod pa
dañ |
- (10) de bzin gśegs pa la tshul bzin du² zu ba yoñs su zu zñ tshul bzin du³ zu ba⁴ zus nas
lan ldon par hgyur ba ste |

yon tan gyi phan yon bcu po de dag hthob par hgyur ro || de gzan yañ yon tan gyi phan yon
bcu hthob par hgyur te | bcu gañ ze na | hdi lta ste |

- (1) dge bañi bśes gñen thams cad ma ñes bar byas par hgyur ba dañ |
- (2) bdud kyī bcñ⁵ ba thams cad lhod par byas par⁶ hgyur ba dañ |
- (3) des bdud thams cad tshar gcod par hgyur ba dañ |
- (4) ñon moñs pa thams cad smad par hgyur ba dañ |
- (5) hdu byed thams cad du gtogs pa las yid bskyod⁷ par hgyur ba dañ |
- (6) hgro ba ñan par hgro bañi lam thams cad la rgyab kyis phyogs par⁸ hgyur ba dañ |
- (7) mya ñan las hdaś⁹ par hgro bañi¹⁰ lam mñon du hgyur ba dañ |

1. P om: rgya che bar.

2. D N P R gyi.

3. D P R gyi.

4. N add: la.

5. N bcñs.

6. N om: byas par.

7. D P R bskyed.

8. P las skyo ba, for D N R la rgyab kyis phyogs par.

9. D N P hdañ.

10. D hgyur bañi.

- (8) h̄khor ba thams cad las sgrol baḥi sbyin pa byin par h̄gyur ba dañ |
 (9) byañ chub sems dpaḥ thams cad kyi cho gaḥi rjes su žugs par h̄gyur ba dañ | (693)
 (10) sañs rgyas bcom ldan ḥdas thams cad kyi bkaḥi rjes su žugs par h̄gyur ba ste |

yon tan gyi phan yon bcu po de dag ḥthob par h̄gyur ro || śā riḥi bu byañ chub sems dpaḥi
 sde snod kyi chos kyi rnam grañs śin tu mñan¹ | blañs | bzuñ | bklags | kun chub par byas |
 gžan la yañ bsad ciñ rgya cher yañ dag par rab tu bstan na | yon tan gyi phan yon ḥdi sñed
 ḥthob par h̄gyur ro ||

de nas bcom ldan ḥdas kyis don de ñid rgyas par² bstan paḥi phyir | deḥi tshe tshigs su
 bcad pa ḥdi dag gsuñs so ||

gañ dag mdo sdeḥi rgyal po ḥdi ḥdzin pa ||
 mkhas pa de dag śes rab mthaḥ yas h̄gyur ||³
 chos dañ don rnams la yañ mkhas par h̄gyur ||⁴
 tshig kyañ khyad par ḥphags śin yi ge rdzogs ||⁵

gañ žig mdo sdeḥi rgyal po ḥdi ḥdzin pa ||
 de ni rab dgaḥ śin tu mgu skyes nas ||
 dge sloñ de ni ḥdir yañ chos ḥchad de ||⁶
 rtag tu chos kyi sbyin pa byed par h̄gyur ||

sams can rnams ni mañ du chos thos nas ||
 kye maḥo yon tan chen po ḥchad byed pa ||
 nam žig bdag cag ḥdi ḥdraḥi chos ston ciñ ||
 mdo sde ḥdi ḥdra ḥdzin par h̄gyur žes zer ||⁷

gañ dag de ḥdra śes rab ldan mchog rnams ||
 chos rnams gañ la yañ žum par mi h̄gyur te ||⁸

-
1. N gñan.
 2. P śin tu.
 3. P mkhas pa śes rab mthaḥ yas bar yañ h̄gyur.
 4. P chos rnams dañ ni don rnams la ḥdi gsal.
 5. P tshig la mkhas śin yi ge yoñs su rdzogs par h̄gyur.
 6. P dge sloñ chos ḥdi ḥchad pa byed pa dañ.
 7. P mdo sde ḥdi ni ḥdzin par h̄gyur žes ḥdod.
 8. P chos gañ laḥaṇ śes rab žum par mi h̄gyur te.

dran dañ ye śes kyis ni ḥphags pa dañ ||
 bla na med paḥi ye śes tshig ston¹ ḥgyur || (694)

gañ dag mdo sdeḥi rgyal po ḥdi ḥdzin pa ||
 de ni ḥphags pas rtag bsñags rgyal bas gnañ ||
 chos tshig legs par bsad pa tshol bar byed ||
 de ni thos pas rtag tu ḥphags par ḥgyur ||²

thos nas don ni ñe bar³ ḥdzin par byed ||
 śes rab ldan pa ḥbru la mi sñegs te⁴ ||
 don la lta bas rtogs pa ḥphel bar ḥgyur ||
 de yi ye śes rtag tu tshad med do ||

ye śes mthaḥ yas don kyañ mthaḥ yas te ||
 sems dpah⁵ mthaḥ yas dam paḥi don la mkhas⁶ ||
 de yi yon tan phyogs dañ phyogs su ḥgro⁷ ||
 de yi thos paḥi yon tan ḥdi dag go ||

de yi ḥdod chags chuñ la ze sdañ chuñ ||
 de yi gti mug śin tu rab tu chuñ ||
 sems kyañ⁸ śin tu dag pa⁹ rñed par ḥgyur ||
 de yi thos paḥi yon tan ḥdi dag go ||

loñs spyod rñed nas rgyags par mi ḥgyur te ||
 ḥdi la sñiñ po ci zes don la rtog ||
 loñs spyod sñiñ po med par rab śes nas ||
 de ni loñs spyod mi lta rab tu ḥbyuñ ||

-
1. P ḥchad.
 2. P thos nas rtag tu mñon par dgaḥ bar ḥgyur.
 3. P mñon par.
 4. D sñiems te; P rgyug ste.
 5. N P R sems pa.
 6. P gtsal.
 7. N dgro.
 8. P kyī.
 9. D dgaḥ ba.

khyim nas¹ byuñ ste dgon par gnas ||
rtag tu g.yel ba² med pa dañ ||
chos rnams thos pas mi ñoms te ||³
chos sbyin pa la ser sna med ||

ḥjig rten mgon poñi druñ ñid du ||
soñ ste zu ba zu byed pas ||⁴
de phyir de yi ye šes⁵ ḥphel ||
de la dkar po ḥbri ba med ||

šā riñi bu de ni byañ chub sems dpañ rnams kyi šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ste | byañ
chub sems dpañ de la brtson pa byañ chub sems dpañi spyad pa spyod do⁶ || de ni šes rab
kyi pha rol tu phyin pa la brtson pa žes byaño ||

-
1. D N R mñon par.
 2. P sñom pa.
 3. P chos rnams thos nas chog mi šes.
 4. P soñ ste zu ba zus byas pas.
 5. N šes rab.
 6. P šā riñi bu de ni byañ chub sems dpañ rnams kyi gañ la brtson na | byañ chub sems dpañ byañ chub sems dpañi spyad pa spyod par ḥgyur bañi šes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ste, for D N R šā riñi bu de ni ... žes byaño.

List of Abbreviations

A:	Aṅguttaranikāya (Hardy, E)
AAWG:	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften, Göttingen
Abhidh-d:	Abhidharmadīpa (Jaini, P)
Abhidh-h (A):	Le Coeur de la Loi Supreme: Abhidharmahrdaya (Armelin, I)
Abhidh-h (W):	The Essence of Metaphysics: Abhidharmahrdaya (Willemen, C)
Abhidh-sam (R):	Le Compendium de la Super-Doctrine d'Asaṅga: Abhidharmasamuccaya (Rahula, W)
Abhidh-sam:	Abhidharmasamuccaya (Pradhan, P)
Abhisaml:	Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Conze, E)
Adsp (C):	Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Conze, E)
Akn:	Akṣayamatīnirdeśa (TTP 842)
Akn-ṭikā:	Akṣayamatīnirdeśa-ṭikā (TTP 5495)
Akv:	Abhidharmakośa-vibhāṣā (Haribhadra)
ALB:	Adyar Library Bulletin, Madras
AM:	Asia Major
Amṛtar (B):	La Saveur de l'Immortel: La version chinoise de l'Amṛtarasa de Ghoṣaka (T 1553) (Broek, J)
AOH:	Acta Orientalia, Hungarian Academy of Science
Arthav (S):	Arthavinīścaya Sūtra (Samtani, NH)
As:	Atthasālinī (Buddhaghosa: Müller, M)
Aṣṭa:	Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Vaidya, PL)
Āloka:	Abhisamayālaṃkāraḷoka (Wogihara, U)
Bbh:	Bodhisattvabhūmi (Wogihara, U)
BEFEO:	Bulletin de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient
Bdp:	Bodhisattvapīṭaka (R 11.11)
Bhadra-vy:	Bhadramāyākāravvyākaraṇa (TTP 760.21)
Bhadra-vy (R):	Bhadramāyākāravvyākaraṇa (Régamey, C)
Bpm:	Bodhisattvapratimokṣasūtra (TTP 915)
Brhad:	Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
BRS:	Bihar Research Society
BSHS:	Buddhist Studies in Honour of Hammalaya Saddhatissa
BSHWR:	Buddhist Studies in Honour of Walpola Rahula
BSR:	Buddhist Studies Review
BTI:	Buddhist Text Information
Bv:	Buddhavaṃsa (Jayawickrama, NA)
Chānd:	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
CPD:	A Critical Pali Dictionary (Copenhagen, 1924)
CSTCC:	Ch'u San tsang Chi Chi of Seng-yu (T 2145)
D:	Dīghanikāya (Rhys Davids, TW; Carpenter, J E)
Daśa-bh:	Daśabhūmika-Sūtram (Rahder, J: <i>Daśabhūmika Sūtra et Bodhisattvabhūmi</i>)

Dbh-v:	Daśabhūmikavibhāṣāśāstra (
Dbh:	Daśabhūmikasūtra (TTP 572)
Dhs:	Dhammasaṅgaṇī (Müller, M)
Dhsg:	Dharmasaṅgītisūtra (TTP 904)
Dhsg:	Dharmasaṃgraha (Müller, M; Wenzel, H)
Divya:	Divyāvadāna (Cowell, EB; Neil, RA)
DPP:	The Doctrine of Prajñāpāramitā as exposed in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra of Maitreya (Obermiller, E)
Gv:	Gaṇḍavyūha Sūtra (Suzuki, TD; Idzumi, H)
HIB:	History of Indian Buddhism (Lamotte, E)
HJAS:	Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies
IBK:	Indogaku Bukkyūgaku Kenkyū (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies)
IBS:	Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor J.W. de Jong on his Sixtieth Birthday. ed. Hercus et al. Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies, Canberra, 1982
IHQ:	Indian Historical Quarterly
IJ:	Indo-Iranian Journal
IT:	Indologica Taurinensia, Turin
Iv:	Itivuttaka (Windisch, E)
JA:	Journal Asiatique
JAOS:	Journal of the American Oriental Society
Jātaka:	Jātaka with Commentary (Fausböll, V)
JIABS:	Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
JIH:	Journal of Indian History
JIP:	Journal of Indian Philosophy
JRAS:	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
Karuṇāp (Y):	Karuṇāpuṇḍarīka (Yamada, I)
Kv:	Kāraṇḍavyūha (Samasrami, SV)
Kośa:	Abhidharmakośa (La Vallée Poussin, L)
Kośabhāṣya:	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Pradhan, P)
Kośavyākhyā:	Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā (Wogihara, U)
Kp:	Kāśyapaparivarta (Stael-Holstein, A)
Lal:	Lalitavistara (Lefmann, S)
Laṅkāṇ:	Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Nanjio, B)
Lkdh:	Lokadharapariṣcchā (TTP 841)
M:	Majjhimanikāya (Trenckner, V; Chalmers, R)
Madh. vṛtti:	Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti (La Vallée Poussin, L)
MBT:	Minor Buddhist Texts (Tucci, G)
Mavbh:	Madhyamakāvatāra (La Vallée Poussin, L)
MCB:	Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques
Mil:	Milindapañha (Treckner, V)
Mmg:	Mahāmeghasūtra (TTP 898)
MN:	Monumenta Nipponica
Mppś:	Le Traité de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse: Mahāprajñāpāramitā Śāstra (Lamotte, É)
Msg:	La Somme du Grand Véhicule d'Asaṅga: Mahāyanasaṃgraha (Lamotte,

	É)
Msl:	Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra (Lévi, S)
Mvś:	Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya
Mvś (N):	Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Nagao, G)
Mvu:	Mahāvastu (Sénart, E)
N:	A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka (Nanjio, B)
NAWG:	Nachrichten der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen
Nett:	Nettipakaraṇa (Hardy, E)
Nidd:	Mahāniddesa (La Vallée Poussin, L; Thomes, EJ)
Ono:	Ono Gemmyo, ed. Bussho kaisetsu daijiten
Otani:	A Comparative Analytical Catalogue of the Kanjur Division of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka at Otani University
Pañca:	Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Dutt, N)
Paṭis:	Paṭisambhidāmagga (Taylor, AC)
PED:	Pali English Dictionary (Rhys Davids, TW; Stede, W)
PEFEO:	Publication de l'École Française d'Extrême Orient
PIT:	Publicazioni di Indologica Taurinensia
Pps	Pitāputrasamāgamasūtra (TTP 760.16)
PraS:	Pratyutpanna-Buddha-Saṃmukhāvasthita-Samādhi-Sūtra
Prbh:	Pratyekabuddhabhūmi (Wayman, A)
Prṇ:	Pūrṇaparipṛcchā (TTP 760.18)
Ps:	Papañcasūdanī (Buddhaghoṣa: Woods, JH; Kosambhi, D; Horner, IB)
PTS:	The Pali Text Society
pw:	Kleines Petersburg Wörterbuch (Böhtlingk; Roth)
R:	sTog Palace Kanjur (Leh—1979)
Rcd:	Ratnacūḍaparipṛcchā (TTP 760.47)
Rgv:	Ratnagotravibhāga (Takasaki, J)
RO:	Rocznik Orientalistyczny
Rp:	Rāṣṭrapālāparipṛcchā (Finot, L)
Rtm:	Ratnameghasūtra
S:	Samyuttanikāya (Feer, L)
Saddhp:	Saddharmapuṇḍarika (Kern, H.; Nanjio, B)
Samādh:	Samādhirājasūtra (Dutt, N)
Satya (S):	Satyasiddhiśāstra (Sastri, A)
Samdhis (ÉLa):	L'Explication des Mystères: Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Lamotte, É)
SBE:	Sacred Books of the East (Müller, M)
Sgm:	Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā (TTP 819)
Siddhi:	Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (La Vallée Poussin, L)
SII:	Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
Sn:	Suttanipāta (Andersen, D; Smith, H)
Sp:	Samantapāsādikā (Buddhaghoṣa: Takakusu, J.; Nagai, G)
Sv:	Sumaṅgalavilāsinī (Buddhaghoṣa: Rhys Davids, TW)
Śbh:	Śrāvakabhūmi
Śbh (S):	Śrāvakabhūmi (Shukla, K)
Śgs:	La Concentration de la Marche Héroïque: Śūraṃgamasamādhisūtra

	(Lamotte, É)
Śikṣ:	Śikṣāsamuccaya (Bendall, C)
Śms:	Śrīmālādevīsīmhanāda (TTP 760.48)
Śsp:	Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā (Ghosa, P)
T:	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō Edition of the Chinese Buddhist Canon (Takakusu, J; Watanable, K)
Th:	Theragāthā (Oldenberg, H)
To:	A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canon (Ui, H)
TP:	T'oung Pao
TSWS:	Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series
TTD:	Tibetan Tripiṭaka sDe-dge Edition
TTP:	Tibetan Tripiṭaka Peking Edition (Suzuki, DT)
Ug:	Ugraparipṛcchā (TTP 760.19)
Vibh-a:	Vibhaṅga Commentary (Buddhadatta, AP)
Vibh:	Vihbaṅga (Rhys Davids, CAF)
Vism:	Visuddhimagga (Buddhaghosa: Warren, HC; Kosambhi, D)
Vin:	Vinayapiṭaka (Oldenberg, H)
Vkn:	The Teaching of Vimalakīrti: Vimalakīrtinirdeśa Sūtra (Lamotte, É)
Vup:	Vinayaviniścaya-Upāliparipṛcchā (Python, P)
WZKSO:	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens
ZDMG:	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft

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Errata Corrige

- p. 19.17 for: Sukhāvativyūha, read: Sukhāvativyūha (ibid., p. 50, n. 111)
- p. 21.15 for: Bodhisattvapīṭakasūtra, read: Bodhisattvapīṭaka
- p. 23.21 for: forth, read: fourth
- p. 26, n. 45 for: additional, read: variant
- p. 33.7 for: chapters, read: discussions
- p. 40.10 for: Asaṅga while Aśvabhāsa, read: Asvabhāva while Asaṅga
- p. 49.13 for: bodhisattva, read: bodhisattvas
- p. 54, n. 129 for: Rṣivyaśāparipṛcchā, read: Rṣivyaśāparipṛcchā
- p. 54, n. 129 for: Śubhākarasiṃha's, read: Śubhakarasiṃha's
- p. 56, n. 139 for: T 1526, read: T 1521
- p. 56, n. 139 for: In the Chinese translation of the Suvikrāntavikrāmaparipṛcchā Prajñāpāramitāsūtra, read: In Seng-yu's catalogue
- p. 56, n. 139 for: include it under, read: include its abstract under
- p. 63.23 for: nineteen, read: twenty
- p. 66.17 for: Vimaladattaparipṛcchā, read: Vimaladattāparipṛcchā
- p. 71, n. 2 for: Hsuan-tsang, read: Hsüan-tsang
- p. 90, n. 10 for: Trisaṃvśranirdeśaparivarta, read: Trisaṃvśranirdeśaparivarta
- p. 90, n. 13 for: Bdp, read: Ug
- p. 94, n. 25 delete: and, of course, the Bdp
- p. 99.15 for: selected the pāramitā, read: selected pāramitā
- p. 99, n. 36 for: twenty-one, read: twenty-three
- p. 103, n. 57 for: Viradattagr̥hapatiparipṛcchā, read: Viradattagr̥hapatiparipṛcchā (ibid., p. 107, n. 70)
- p. 108.17 for: out the, read: out of the
- p. 110, n. 80 for: pp. ix-x, read: pp. 5-15
- p. 117, n. 5 for: Msl, read: cf. Msl
- p. 118.6 for: signals, read: signal
- p. 118.13 for: stage nine and ten, read: stage eight and nine
- p. 121.11 for: parārthālaṃbana, read: parārthālaṃbana
- p. 121.4 for: calm nirvāṇa, read: that nirvāṇa is calm
- p. 125, n. 47 for: Teviggasutta, read: Tevijjasutta
- p. 126, n. 52 for: arūpyadhātu, read: ārūpyadhātu (ibid., p. 129, n. 63; p. 136.11; p. 162, n. 213; p. 243.8; p. 315, n. 3)
- p. 128.15 for: giving?, read: giving.
- p. 129.14 for: friendliness, read: benevolence
- p. 130, n. 68 for: are presented, read: is presented
- p. 138, n. 104 for: are linked with, read: being linked with
- p. 141.6 for: to follow in, read: to follow
- p. 148, n. 158 for: pp. 42.2 read: pp. 42.3.2
- p. 149.1 for: manifest, read: manifesting
- p. 149.20 delete: (sarvadharmatā)
- p. 151, n. 168 for: by absence of duality, gift, read: by absence of duality, his gift
- p. 157.22 for: śrāvakayāna, read: Śrāvakayāna
- p. 161, n. 212 for: sādharmaśādhāraṇaśikṣaviśeṣa, read: sādharmaśādhāraṇaśikṣaviśeṣa
- p. 166.15 for: daśakuśala, read: akuśalakarmapatha
- p. 169, n. 252 for: holders of little worth, read: holders are of little worth
- p. 175, n. 283 delete: (trsl. Conze)
- p. 176, n. 287 for: cognitive abandonment, read: trusting abandonment
- p. 177, n. 295 for: maintaining of mind, read: maintaining a mind
- p. 177, n. 297 for: bhaviṣanti, read: bhaviṣyanti



- p. 180, n. 309 for: higher patience (sātyantakṣānti), read: absolute patience (atyantakṣānti)
- p. 189.25 for: apakāramarṣaṇakṣānti, read: parāpakāramarṣaṇakṣānti
- p. 195.14 delete: the bodhisattva's
- p. 197.13 for: between kṣānti and vīrya, read: between kṣānti and śruta, and kṣānti and vīrya
- p. 197.14 for: it, read: the joint presence of kṣānti and śruta
- p. 214.9 for: ṛddhividhya, read: ṛddhividhyabhijñā
- p. 219, n. 518 for: willing to comply and, read: willing to
- p. 221, n. 522 for: cetāna, read: cetanā
- p. 224, n. 540 for: concentration agrees is, read: concentration is
- p. 226.13 for: in first, read: in the first
- p. 231, n. 570 for: Śrotabhūmi, read: Śrutamayībhūmi (ibid., p. 245.14; p. 247, n. 655, 688, p. 266, n. 750; p. 267, n. 757; p. 291, n. 884; p. 292, n. 889; p. 314, n. 3; p. 329, n. 35)
- p. 233, n. 584 for: This very thought is also, read: The opposite thought is
- p. 234, n. 588 for: vidhyā, read: vidyā
- p. 237.7 for: mūrdhan, read: uṣmagata
- p. 243.5 for: repeated meditation, read: repeated confrontation in meditation
- p. 253.17 for: 'skill' prior, read: 'skill' in them prior
- p. 256.6 for: Up, read: Ug
- p. 262, n. 734 for: pity, read: compassion
- p. 263.2 for: caturvidha, read: caturvidyā
- p. 273.14 for: vyakaraṇabhūmi, read: vyākaraṇabhūmi
- p. 279.7 for: many these, read: many of these
- p. 281.19 for: images, read: reflection (ibid., p. 281.20)
- p. 288, n. 872 for: p. 287, read: pp. 159–78
- p. 294.17 for: other, read: bodhyaṅga and āryāṣṭāṅgamārga
- p. 296.23 for: that unified, read: that is unified
- p. 296, n. 909 for: ekāyāna, read: ekayāna
- p. 302.26 for: with Mahāyāna text, read: with a Mahāyāna text
- p. 311.11 for: ḥKaḥ-ḥgyur, read: bKaḥ-ḥgyur
- p. 315, n. 4 for: itself becomes, read: themselves become
for: insight, read: wisdom; for: resolve, read: intent
- p. 315, n. 5 for: adhyaśāya, read: adhyāśaya
- p. 316, n. 8 for: Braarvig, read: Braavrig
- p. 317, n. 13 for: acquisition of correct reflection, read: acquisition by correct reflection
- p. 318, n. 15 for: brahmacariyā, read: brahmacariya
- p. 324.21 for: any teaching, read: any teachings
- p. 328, n. 33 for: the heaven of Amitābha ... of the first category, read: the Pure Land of Amitābha ... of the second category
- p. 330, n. 40 for: ma log pa de bzin ñid: tathāta, read: ma log pa de bzin ñid: aviparyāsatathatā; for tathātā, read: tathatā
- p. 351, n. 128 for: aṭṭhamaka, read: aṭṭhamaka
- p. 353.17 for: passed into nirvāṇa, read: passed into parinirvāṇa
- p. 355, n. 146 for: śraddha, read: śraddhā
- p. 365, n. 181 for: thought as thought, read: thought
- p. 383, n. 245 for: is not the object, read: not the object
- p. 387, n. 257 for: briefly the characteristics, read: briefly in the characteristics
- p. 387, n. 259 for: that is the meaning ... , read: what is the meaning ... ?
- p. 387, n. 259 for: great non-reality of saṃsāra, read: great punishment of saṃsāra
- p. 389.14 for: that all things exist, read: that all things are inherently existent
- p. 501.29 for: May, Jacques M, read: Lounsbury, G.C.