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The Concept of Structure as a Basic Epistemological Paradigm of Traditional Chinese Thought

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by Jana S. Rosker



The theoretical work of European and American structuralism has produced a number of important elements which have resulted in (especially with respect to certain new, fundamental approaches in semantics, philosophy and methodology) essential shifts in the modes of thinking in the humanities, and in the cultural and social sciences. Despite these shifts, Western discourses have still not produced any integral, coherent structural model of epistemology. The present article intends to show that such a model can be found in the pan-structural epistemology of the modern Chinese philosopher Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973), and that the crucial, theoretical underpinnings of such models were developed much earlier in the history of Chinese thought, given that the bases of a structural approach to comprehension had already been established in ancient Chinese philosophy. This paradigmatic foundation (the concept li) was further developed and elaborated by various Chinese philosophers in later centuries as a crucial feature of the classical Chinese logic of binary analogies. The article also points out that the central binary concept of the Neo-Confucian tradition (i.e. the concept of structure and creativity; li and qi) has generally been interpreted as a dualism of idea and matter by Euro-American sinologists. However, such interpretations have overlooked an important feature of traditional, structurally determined Chinese onto-epistemology.


1. Introduction: Structuralism and Epistemology


At the dawn of the third millennium, we have decidedly entered into an era in which the concept of structure is perceived as something self-evident and omnipresent by most scholars and theorists. Structure has become a fundamental, though often vague notion, which enables us to speak in a unified, coherent way about comprehension, observation, the nature and stability of patterns, as well as relations among individual entities. The concept of structure is of crucial importance for virtually any research

Correspondence to: Jana S. Ros ˇker, Chair of Chinese Studies, Department of Asian and African Studies, Faculty of Arts and Humanities, University in Ljubljana, As ˇkerc ˇeva 2, 1000 Ljubljana, Slovenia. Email: jana.rosker@guest.arnes.si ISSN 0955-2367 print/ISSN 1469-2961 online/10/010079-18 � 2010 Taylor & Francis DOI: 10.1080/09552360903577626


in the areas of science, philosophy and art. Structures have often also been defined by inherited or habitual paradigms of our perception and comprehension of the world. As a result, we see the creation, formation and changing of objects as something that occurs within certain structural patterns. Of the main theoretical currents which dominate at the start of the 21st century, structuralism is the one which best epitomizes these various approaches. Structuralism represents a complex category, which spans a wide range of different programs and methods that enable us to perceive and interpret patterns of relations as a basic paradigm of reality. From the mid-20th century onwards, structuralism has become a leading theoretical current in ‘Western’ theories. This holds true for the natural sciences as well as for the humanities and social sciences. The majority of structuralist theories (including post-structuralism, de-constructivism, postmodernity, etc.1) focus upon the structural approach to the recognition, perception and interpretation of reality, in which no object can appear in isolation. In this sense, objects can only exist as parts of structures that connect them to other entities. Such discourses are always concentrated upon a structure that determines the status of every object and, ultimately, every being as such. Naturally, these discourses could not avoid investigating certain epistemological questions, such as that of the relation between subject and object (or the Self and the Other), or the relation between perception, comprehension and interpretation or transmission. The Euro-American theoretical production of the 20th century has generated a number of elements which, based especially on new, fundamental theoretical approaches to the philosophy of language, led to some important cognitive shifts in the humanities, and in the cultural and social sciences. However, such recognitions notwithstanding, Western discourses have yet to produce an integral and coherent structural model for epistemology.


2. Chinese Pan-structural Epistemology


The theoretical foundations of this model were developed within the specifically Chinese tradition of thought. In other words, in China, the structural approach to comprehension had already been elaborated in ancient times. This basic model, which arises out of the compatibility between the structures of the external world and those of the human mind (Ros ˇker, 2008, 305ff), was further developed by later philosophers, especially during the era of the Six Dynasties ( , 220–581) and the Neo-Confucian periodof the Song( , 960–1279) andMing ( , 1368–1644)Dynasties (ibid). Specific aspects of the structural model for the perception and comprehension of reality were also formulated by some Chinese philosophers of the 19th and 20th centuries.2 The paradigm of a structurally determined epistemology can also be found in the work ofseveralcontemporaryChinesetheoreticians.3 However,thephilosopherwhosework is probably most important for the current development of structuralist epistemology is Zhang Dongsun (1886–1973), who developed his own system of so-called ‘pan-structural epistemology’. Zhang is also significant in intercultural terms, since

he managed to link the most advanced Euro-American theoretical developments of the first half of the 20th century with the valuable legacy of the specific structural approaches to comprehension developed by traditional Chinese thought. Instead of approaching reality through the Western idea of substance, he developed a new epistemology based upon certain concepts of classical Chinese philosophy and his own theory of structure.4 This theory provided an epistemological basis for structuralism nearly a half century before such discourses came to dominate progressive Western academic thought (Zhang Yaonan, 2000, p. 143). However, Zhang’s structure does not merely postulate a basis for existence; it represents the only form of existence which can be perceived by the human mind. It is conceived as a system of relations which connects specific entities that cannot exist independently, i.e. apart from this structure. His epistemology is thus determined by a structure which is not static, but dynamic; in fact, its very essence is organic. Being a physical and metaphysical seed-kernel of our world, this structure can only exist within a process of constant change. Time and space also form part of this structure and can be perceived by the human mind through certain structural relations which are compatible with it (or are translatable into its conceptual language). Zhang designated these relations as atomity ( ), continuity ( ) and creativity ( ). No existing entity within this dynamic structure has the nature of substance; hence, pan-structural epistemology rejects the possibility of ontological states for objects. Like many other modern and contemporary Chinese philosophers who elaborate extant theory in order to develop their own new theories, Zhang’s work also implies a fruitful synthesis of Chinese tradition and modern Euro-American thought. Even though he developed his theoretical system in the first decades of the 20th century, his works are still only available in the original Chinese.5 He is thus clearly incapable of filling the epistemological gap in the (post)structural discourses of ‘Western’ countries. It is precisely for this reason that his work is of paramount importance, especially those elements of his theory which are rooted in the classical Chinese philosophical tradition. Two currents were especially important in this context, and the composition and formation of Zhang’s pan-structuralism was clearly significantly influenced by both. The influence of the chan-Buddhist current can be seen in his de-ontologization of structure and in his radical critique of the concept of substance. The second current is instead linked to structure or structural patterns which constituted one of the crucial paradigms of ancient Chinese thought and formed a central category throughout the entire history of autochthonous6 Chinese philosophy, until its gradual dissolution beginning early in the 17th century. Because of limitations of space, the present article will focus on the introduction, analysis and interpretation of this latter current of the Chinese philosophical tradition.


3. The Structure of Traditional Chinese Holism As is well known, the traditional Chinese world view was a holistic one.7 Traditional Chinese thinkers did not strictly or categorically distinguish between the spheres

of matter and idea, nor between any other dualistic connotations resulting from this basic dichotomy.8 Far less known or recognized is the fact that this holism was by no means indiscriminate; the traditional Chinese holistic world was not a sort of homogenous unity in which everything was connected to everything else, without demarcations or distinctions. On the contrary, the traditional Chinese world view was logically ordered based on relatively strict binary oppositional patterns. On a mental–reflective level, these patterns formed a series of specific Chinese analogies9 which provided the bases for the prevailing method of logical thought (Cui, 2005, pp. 14–24). Binary concepts can thus be seen as one of the fundamental characteristics of traditional Chinese philosophy. They represent a kind of duality that seeks to attain the most real (possible) state of actuality through relativity, expressed in the relation between two oppositional notions.10

‘Distinctions are seen in binary terms, and primarily between pairs of opposites (with even figure and color reduced to square/round and white/black); having drawn them, and recognized some recurring or persisting pattern (for example large, round, hard, heavy, and white) we detach a stone from other things as we cut out a piece of cloth or chop off a piece of meat. Things are not seen as isolated each with its own essential and accidental properties; on the contrary, distinguishing characteristics are seen as mostly relative’ (Graham, 1989, p. 286). What we have here is a structural pattern of binary oppositions which, however, is fundamentally different from the model of Cartesian dualism. This latter involves a dialectic posited upon the relation between the mutually exclusive and polar opposites of thesis and antithesis, which have been determined by an opposition which is also a contradiction. This contradiction creates a tension, in which the reciprocal negation of thesis and antithesis creates a synthesis. The complementary model, which was prevalent in the Chinese tradition of thought, is instead based upon a non-contradictory opposition between two poles which do not exclude but complement each other, and which are interdependent (Ros ˇker, 1995, p. 196ff). Such binary patterns do not produce any separate syntheses that can preserve ‘positive’ elements of the previous state, while simultaneously eliminating the ‘negative’ ones. Zhuangzi described the relation between the two binary poles of a complementary model as follows:

Therefore I’m saying: why don’t we preserve truth and abolish falseness? Why don’t we preserve order and abolish chaos? If we think in this way, we do not understand the structure of nature, nor the state of being in which everything exists. This would mean preserving earth and abolishing heaven, preserving yin and abolishing yang. It’s quite clear that this wouldn’t work. (DC 2008, Zhuangzi XVII, Qiu shui, p. 2) The pattern of ‘logo-centric’ binary models, which prevailed in the Hellenistic and Judeo-Christian tradition, tends to preserve one of the poles and eliminate the other. As one of the founders of de-constructivism, the post-structuralist thinker

Jacques Derrida pointed out, we live in a philosophical tradition which seeks to preserve the referent to the detriment of reference, language to the detriment of writing, reality to the detriment of appearances, nature to the detriment of culture, life to the detriment of death, and good to the detriment of evil (see Graham, 1992, p. 65). If we examine this tendency more closely, we can discern a certain affinity between apparently distant or antagonistic positions within ‘Westernculture (ibid.), since the majority of its dominant discourses are based upon a universal causality, resulting from the desire to eliminate one pole of a given opposition in order to preserve the other. Such an affinity can be observed, for example, between the Christian belief in the immortality of the soul and certain tenets of traditional European science (before quantum mechanics). David Hall and Roger Ames (1998) have also identified and compared a number of chains of binary patterns which are typical of the spiritual underpinnings of the Judeo-Christian tradition. They discovered that one pole has usually been viewed as ‘transcendental’, i.e. as being able to exist independently, without its oppositional counter-pole, which can thus only exist in a relationship of dependency upon the former. Thinking in accordance with such a conceptual template makes possible the existence of creators without creation, reality without phenomena and good without evil (Graham, 1992, p. 65). It is not surprising, therefore, that in the context of such patterns the prevailing Chinese (i.e. complementary) bipolar model has also automatically been perceived as a dualism, based upon the domination of one of the two poles. This also explains why the majority of European and American sinologists still believe that the tradition of ‘undivided’ holism ended with the discourses of the Song Neo-Confucians, understood as a new approach that contained the seeds of the ‘real’ (i.e. Cartesian) dualism.11 This is a typical example of the misunderstandings which occur between traditional Chinese culture and its ‘explainers’. Such misunderstandings are rooted in an insufficient comprehension of the problems of cultural incommensurability.12


4. Binary Complementarity vs Cartesian Dualism


When the first sinologists (who were Christian missionaries) initially encountered Neo-Confucian philosophy in the 17th century, it was perfectly natural for them to interpret its bipolar conception of the world, consisting of something called qi and organized in accordance with something else called li , in terms of, respectively, matter and idea. However, in our view, the concept li cannot be understood as idea or principle in the ‘Westernsense, but rather as structure or a structural pattern, which can, of course, also pertain to the sphere of abstractions or ideas. Similarly, and based on a more profound understanding of Neo-Confucian philosophy, it is evident that the concept qi can hardly be understood as matter in the ‘Westernsense. In fact, the Neo-Confucian philosophers defined it as something which is not necessarily substantial, for air or even a vacuum (the Great void )

are composed of it. Thus, it represents a concept which could be more appropriately defined as creativity, or a potential that functions in a creative way: In the Great void, qi condenses and dissolves again. This can be compared to ice dissolving in water. (Zhang Zai, 1989, p. 389)13 . As noted, the majority of traditional European and American sinologists have translated this concept as matter. To illustrate this point, we can cite the translation of this passage by the renowned French sinologist Le Gall, in which the notion qi is clearly understood as atom(s): Le condensation et les dispersions des atomes dans la T’ai-hiu peuvent se comparer a la fonte de la glace dans l’eau. (Le Gall, quoted by Graham, 1992, p. 60)


This translation of the concept qi is problematic, for it derives from a profoundly intrinsic sense of the criteria, based upon the model of Cartesian dualism. Although Zhang Zai’s comparison with water explicitly states that qi is a continuous state, and not an aggregate of atoms, the analogy with matter was so deeply rooted in Le Gall’s perception, that he automatically saw the notion qi as an entity which contains or is composed of atoms. Hence, for centuries, Le Gall and other sinologists who followed his reading have misled scholars regarding the question whether traditional Chinese philosophy applied the concept of atomicity (Graham, 1992, p. 61). The second term, or the concept li, indicates the notion of structure, a structural pattern and the structural order of things. Taken as a whole, li represents a cosmic pattern, defining lines of movement or the dynamicity of men and nature. These structural lines are seen as relations which define both the sphere of ideas and that of phenomena. At the same time, they make possible the mutual adjustment of binary oppositions with complementary functions, as well as their orderly fusion within the cosmic unity. The concept li is not obeyed or violated like a law; instead, one either goes with or against the grain of it, as in chopping wood. Le Gall translated it as forme, thus remolding the whole neo-Confucian cosmology after the analogy of Aristotelian form and matter (atoms). J. Percy Bruce instead translated this term as ‘law’, thereby incorporating into neo-Confucian terminology itself the wrong answer to the question ‘Are there laws of nature in China?’ (ibid). Li and qi are thus complementary concepts, which can be explained as a structure (or structural pattern) and a creative formative potential (creativity). Both are of immanent nature and can therefore be realized in the spheres of both ideas and phenomena. Euro-American philosophy offers no precise equivalents for these two terms. If we want to comprehend the modes of their existence and their functions, we must first free ourselves from reasoning in terms of Cartesian dualisms and try thinking based on the model of analogy, which arose from and was prevalent in the immanent metaphysic of traditional Chinese thought. Graham (1992, pp. 61, 62) cautions that discourses of Chinese complementary binarity may seem to be merely the result of concrete thinking to someone who views


Chinese cosmology in terms of dualistic binarity. According to this bias, the Chinese mode of thinking seems based on the analogies of ‘real’ physical coagulation and dissolutionorofrealpatternsinjade,insteadofviewingthese elementsasabstractions. If the cosmos is composed of matter which functions according to concrete natural laws, then traditional Chinese philosophers are clearly mistaken, locked as they were into immutable conceptual schemes that have since been superseded. Such misinterpretations result from a lack of insight into the nature of abstraction, which follows different paradigmatic methods. For someone raised within a specific cultural-linguistic context, the corresponding modes of thought are so ingrained and automatic that they need not constantly reflect on the underlying metaphorical roots of their thoughts. Such reflection becomes necessary, however, whenever we are confronted with theories arising from differently structured discourses. Chinese concepts appear concrete to us only because the inquiring outsider, unlike the insider who habitually thinks with them, needs to fix his attention on their metaphorical roots. He is much less conscious of the metaphors underlying his ownmatter’ and ‘law’, which, however, he must rediscover if he wants to explore the differences in a radical or fundamental way (ibid). In the Neo-Confucian tradition, li as a structural principle is thus a potential that cannot exist without its opposite pole, the potential of creative formation (qi), but this binary opposition includes concepts which are not comparable to the concepts of idea and matter, given that they can appear in both spheres and forms. Perhaps even more importantly, this binary concept differs from the dualistic model of idea and matter not only in terms of its inherent structure, but also in terms of its function. Given that li and qi form a binary concept for which the question of the priority of idea or matter is not an issue, the translation of the term li as (natural) law is clearly incorrect. As opposed toli’simmanent nature, the notion oflawinthe Euro-American tradition represents an external axiom which influences and determines things from outside. Similar problems arise with the translation of li as ‘principle’, a concept usually understood in terms of its effects, and not its causes and function.14 As we shall see, the concept li was (beginning no later than the period of the Song Dynasty (960–1279)) both, that is, the reason for the existence of all beings (the specific mode of their existence and the way they are) and also the method by which they become as they are. Furthermore, this concept must be understood as being both universal and particular. The most important characteristic of this ontological duality (or immanence) is its compatibility, i.e. a structural linkage or adjustment of universality and particularity. In ontological terms, this compatibility becomes the essential precondition of every being.


5. The Term li as the Traditional Chinese Concept of Structure


While interpreting the term li to mean ‘structure’ may seem highly unusual, there are several good reasons for doing so. This meaning is already apparent in the

original etymology of the character li , which is composed of the phonetic element and the radical , which designates jade. Originally, it denoted the lines or colored stripes in jade. As Wolfgang Bauer explains: in classical Chinese, this character in a figurative sense also denoted structure, for example in the meaning of a crystal net that represents the immaterial principle of ordered matter, and was already used with this sense in the Confucian commentary on the Book of Changes . (Bauer, Wolfgang, 2000, pp. 256–257)

A. C. Graham, a modern pioneer in the study of ancient Chinese logic, is one of the very few sinologists who consider the concept li as the expression of both a structural pattern and a structure: Li is the patterned arrangement of parts in a structured whole, of things in an ordered cosmos, of thought in rational discourse, and in Names and Objects,15 of words in a completed sentence. Its emergence in the Sung Dynasty (A.D. 960–1279) as one of the central concepts of neo-Confucianism was the culmination of a long development. In the pre-Han philosophy it attracts attention especially in the Interpreting Lao-tzu of Han Fe tzu,16 who uses it to mean the specific configuration of properties (‘square or round, long or short, coarse or fine, hard or soft’) in each kind of thing. (Graham, 1978, pp. 191–192) The philosopher cited by Graham, Han Feizi, was one of the founders of the legalist school and described the concept li as follows: We call li that which is long or short, square or round, hard or soft, heavy or light, white or black. (DC 2008, Han Feizi, Jie Lao, p. 29) , ,

The Norwegian sinologist and specialist in Chinese logic, Christoph Harbsmeier, uses this quotation to support his conjecture that the concept li designated the attributes of objects (Harbsmeier, 1998, p. 238). However, he adds that, in this context, the term li can only refer to those characteristics that could be perceived by our senses. His uncertainty about the justness of this translation is evident in the following comment:

I shall risk by way of an experiment the translation ‘attribute’ for li, which is an extension of the meaning ‘visible pattern’, well attested in early literature. (Harbsmeier, 1998, p. 238) In fact, in the earliest sources, li was understood as a visible structure, such as appears in the lines in jade. As Xunzi ,17 one of the two most famous successors to Confucius, wrote in a chapter of his principle work, Rectifying names :18 Form, color and structure can be distinguished with the eyes.19 (DC 2008, Xunzi, Zhengming, p. 9).20 The concept li was already mentioned in the oldest commentaries on the Book of Changes, as representing the basic structure of heaven and earth. Although neither Confucius nor Laozi mention the character li in their works, it appears quite often in the works of their immediate successors.

As with the majority of classical Chinese words, the notion li can appear in either verbal or substantive form (in the latter case it means pattern or structure). In this case, the structure seems to indicate the sum of all the attributes which can be perceived by the senses (length, color, consistency, weight, form). If we wish to ‘cultivate’ any given object, we must follow its inherent structure. Instead, when the character li appears with a verbal function, it means the process of ordering certain things and phenomena. In fact, in one of the oldest Chinese encyclopedias, the Explanation of texts and interpretation of characters ( ),21 we find the following definition of li’s verbal function:


Li (means) to order (to cultivate) jade. DC 2008, Shuowen jiezi, p. 28) / /: , It is extremely important that this ordering (or cultivation) occur in accordance with the structure, expressed by the substantive function of the term li. Translating its verbal form with the term ‘to structure’ might thus seem appropriate. However, in the Indo-European languages, this verb has the connotation of establishing a structure in something that is unstructured, while li in its verbal function instead expresses the squaring of an object in accordance with an already existing system, which is inherent to the object:22 After the structure of a certain thing has been defined, it can be cultivated (squared). If we want to square it in a proper (square or round) form, we have to follow its model. These models are part of every existing thing. The sages can always follow them and this is why they succeed in everything they do. The structures can be divided into square, round, long, short, soft and hard ones. That is why after their structure has been defined, all things can follow the Way. (DC 2008, Han Feizi, Jie Lao, p. 08) . , , . . , , . .


This term underwent numerous semantic variations. Originally, it expressed cosmic, then social structure; subsequently, its semantic connotations also included the structure of language and meaning and, finally, the structure of the mind and consciousness. All these specific kinds of structural patterns were unified in the Chinese tradition,especiallyfromtheSong (960–1279)Dynastyonwards,inasingle,general and basic rational structure, which was distinguished by its fundamental compatibility with innumerable kinds of different structural patterns. A basic criterion or ultima ratio of this compatibility can be found in either the ethically determined ‘justice’ and ‘righteousness’ of Confucian discourses, or in the ‘naturalness’ of Daoist texts. This unification of particular, specific structural patterns into one single, general and basic structure, only became possible through a progressive semantic abstraction of the term li. This process lasted several centuries and must be viewed within the wider context of more general changes in Chinese culture and society. In practical terms, it was defined by the political and economic development of traditional China, while ideologically it was the result of the formalization of Confucianism as the state

doctrine, the new approaches formulated by Neo-Confucian philosophies, and certain elements of Buddhist philosophy.


6. The Process of Abstraction


We can reduce this process of abstraction somewhat schematically to three phases: the phase of ontologization (li as the cosmic structure or as the structure of nature and society), the phase of structural semantics (li as the structure of language and meaning) and the phase of epistemologization (li as the mutually compatible structure of external word and mind). Let us briefly examine the key turning-points in this process of abstraction. Already in the pre-Qin era,23 we can find numerous quotations which indicate that the term li was not understood merely as a visually perceptible, but also as an abstract structure. The earliest commentaries on the Book of Changes (Zhou Yi ) describe it as a work which helps people to understand and make use of the basic cosmic structure. (The Book of) Changes is simple, and yet it embraces the structure of everything that exists. (DC 2008, Han shi wai zhuan, III, p. 01) . The following quotation is attributed to the early legalist thinker Guan Zhong ,24 who lived in the 7th century BC: Sun and moon are connected by the same light, and heaven and earth by the same structure. (DC 2008, Guanzi, Xin shu xia, p. 27) . Many ancient Chinese philosophers used the term li to mean social order or the ordering of society. Gongsun Long expresses this sense quite clearly:

Let’s assume a ruler who wants to order his state (in accordance with the correct social structure). He punishes people who committed crimes, but also those who didn’t commit crimes. He rewards people who deserved a reward, but also those who didn’t deserve any reward. And then he complains that the society is not ordered (in accordance with the right structure). Is this right? (DC 2008, Gongsun Long, Yi fu, p. 13) The majority of ancient and middle-age Confucians also used the term li in this sense,25 while the classical exponents of philosophical Daoism generally understood it in a slightly different way. Zhuangzi, for instance, viewed li primarily as a structural pattern of nature: When things come into being, their structure is born. This is what we call form. (Zhuangzi, 1992, Tian di pian, p. 200) .

But for this philosopher, li was also an all-embracing structure of natural or cosmic order: What can be said about humanity? It brings confusion into (natural) virtues! And what can be said about justice? It disturbs the (natural) structural order! (ibid., p. 169)

As opposed to Confucian virtues, which he considered false products of the ideological suppression of human integrity and personal freedom, this concept of natural order or structure is something which should be followed. Things we learn or stories we hear are not important. It is far better to follow the natural structure (ibid., Keyi pian, p. 264). According to Zhuangzi, following or being in accordance with the concept li in no way contradicts the Daoist concept of non-action. On the contrary, he considers it a manifestation of the structural order of dao, the crucial notion and basic principle of Daoist philosophy. Therefore virtue is harmonic and dao is structured. (ibid., Shan xing pian, p. 268)

This quotation provoked many divergent interpretations, speculations and misunderstandings, as later thinkers sought to understand the conceptual links between the notions li and dao . In this phrase, the notions he (harmony) and li (structure) were assumed to function as adjectives. However, since in classical Chinese this semantic construct26 can also express the identity of two objects (nouns),27 many later interpreters have understood this phrase to mean the equalization of the concepts dao and li. The idea that these terms ultimately mean the same thing is confirmed by various philosophical sources from the following centuries. Harbsmeier, for example, notes that in the oldest commentaries of Huai Nanzi (2nd century BC), on six occasions the word dao is used to explain the concept li (Harbsmeier, 1998, p. 238). Several centuries after Hua Nanzi, Chen Chun , the author of the famous philosophical dictionary from the Song Dynasty was still able to conclude that: The words li and dao are roughly one and the same thing. But since they are written in different ways (with different characters), they must be different. (Chen Chun, 1983, p. 40) ,

He then goes on to explain this difference, specifying that the notion dao has a wider, more general and universal meaning, while the notion li refers to more particular, individual meanings and to actual reality28 (ibid.). The dual aspect of the concept li, understood as a specific structural pattern that was both particular and universal, was not formulated until the Song Dynasty. However, already after the second reform of Confucian doctrine, li referred to each

single, as well as to the one, universal structure. Cheng Hao , for instance, writes that: The basic structure of every single thing is at the same time the basic structure of everything. (Cheng Hao & Cheng Yi, 1981, p. 13) . Zhu Xi gives a more detailed description of the process of uniting particular structural patterns into one single structure, denoting both structural dimensions, i.e. the concrete, specific which manifests itself at the level of particular things, as well as the general, universal structure of everything that exists with the notion li.29 Such unification, however, already presupposed a perception of structure in the sense of a complete rationalized form, without any connection to concrete (natural, social, linguistic, etc.) formations. The first interpretations in which the term li was viewed as an abstract structure of language, occur in the works of the later Mohists.30 In the Daqu chapter of the Mohist canon, which is primarily concerned with investigating definitions of various central notions, the following affirmation appears:


Phrases originate from reasons, they grow in accordance with structure and move in accordance with categories. (Mo Di, 2000, Daqu 44, p. 172) . In their disputes on names (concepts) and realities,31 the classical philosophers from the pre-Qin era still based their arguments on a realist understanding of reality as an objective external world or external form of things. This form was viewed as being directly part of the structure of things, as in the ancient concept li. However, with the structure (li) of meaning, a notion that does not occur before the period of the Six Dynasties, we no longer have something directly connected with things, or that forms part of them. This notion instead results from a certain level of abstraction of the notion structure (li). The exponents of the School of Mystery ( ) modified the ancient disputes on the relation

between names (concepts) and realities into investigations into the relation between language (yan ) and meaning (yi ). In what was one of the most important theoretical shifts in the history of traditional Chinese thought (Tang Junyi, 1955, p. 65), their main interest was the structure of concepts or names (ming li ). In fact, their treatises on the structure of names or concepts ( ), i.e. on the relation between language and meaning, are not only the theoretical elaboration of ancient disputes on the relation between names (concepts) and realities, but can be considered to form the basis of a specific Chinese structural semantics.32 The main premise of their arguments was that the meaning of a particular word was determined by its relations to other words. Theirs was thus a theoretical elaboration of the tradition of ancient Chinese writings, which were based upon semantic parallelisms and the specific Chinese structure of analogous thought. In fact, traditional Chinese discourses were determined by a specific textual style, in which the structure of meaning was based upon contents and the mutual relations among word fields.

The discourses of conceptual structure, as investigated by members of the School of Mystery and especially by the group Pure Conversations ( ), were not limited to the semantic structure of language or human speech, but also examined the problems of transmission and communication between the external and the internal worlds. Here, we can mention Ji Kang’s 33 treatise on sounds,34 in which he argues that sounds as such do not imply any feelings, even though people can feel sadness or joy when listening to them. Several contemporaries of this philosopher instead took the opposing view, and argued that feelings might be latent in sounds or the structure of music. As Tang Junyi points out, the central issue in both cases was the connection (or relation) between two structures (li), that of the external world and human subjectivity. Despite their diametrically opposed views, both the advocates and opponents of Ji Kang’s theory based their arguments on the idea that certain sequences or patterns of sounds (the rhythmical and tonal structure of music) could evoke certain feelings in human consciousness. This is possible because both music and emotions (as a part of mind or consciousness) are structured.35 In effect, Ji Kang posited a sort of compatibility between human awareness and the structure of the external world.

Mind and structure are mutually congruent. (Ji Kang, 1962, p. 225)


In the Neo-Confucian discourses, the comprehension of objects through their structural relation with the human mind already represented an important epistemological method. In this regard, liang zhi (inborn, original knowledge) was seen as an element of the inborn mind, which was already ordered in accordance with the structure of nature. This concept was especially stressed by exponents of the idealistic current within Neo-Confucianism, i.e. the members of the School of Mind ( ).

The original knowledge of my mind is (congruent to) the so-called structure of nature. (Wang Shouren, 1933, p. 57) ’ The structural determination of the mind was also posited by most of the later Chinese philosophers. The compatibility of the inner and external worlds was even stressed by the epistemologist Dai Zhen ,36 one of the most important ‘realist’ philosophers of the 18th century, and one of the last representatives of a relatively autochthonous37 Chinese epistemology.

Physical appearances arise from nature and are therefore always congruent with it. We are surrounded by sounds, colors, scents and tastes. Sounds, colors, scents and tastes are perceived by everyone. What makes this mutual congruency between outside and inside possible are the receptors, known as ears, eyes, nose and mouth. (Dai Zhen, 1991, Mengzi ziyi, pp. 157–158).

This structural overlapping, however, is not only reflected in human sense organs, but also in the human mind. At issue here is not some concept of holistic identity, as has been much too often ascribed to the classical Chinese world view, but a structural connection between human subjectivity (inner-ness) and the external world, which, according to Dai Zhen, exists separately and independently of our consciousness.


7. Conclusion


In the context of the traditional Chinese theory of knowledge, this structural compatibility represents the very potential which enables us to perceive and comprehend the external world. The omnipresence of li signifies that the universe is structured and ordered. This same structural order, however, is at the same time also a quality of our mind and body (e.g. of our sense organs). Our thoughts can likewise follow the same structured order (especially when we try to achieve any real insight into the actual nature of reality). Given the multifarious translations of the term li in Indo-European languages, perhaps the ancient Greek term logos38 (Ladsta ¨tter & Linhard, 1983, p. 34) might be closest to the meaning of what li actually refers to, i.e. a structure ordered in accordance to cosmic rationality, which is also reflected in the human mind as reason. This notion, however, is still far from covering the full semantic spectrum of the term li, which, in addition to epistemological and ontological aspects, also includes a variety of other connotations (physical, naturalistic, metaphysical, artistic, cultural, medical, etc.). In any case, the concept li is still mostly translated into Indo-European languages as reason, principle or law, even though, as we have seen, such connotations extend far beyond the original meaning of this notion. The fact that the traditional understanding of the concept li continues to be preserved in sinology has not only decisively influenced the ‘Westerncomprehension of the basic nature of Chinese theoretical discourses but, via modernization processes,39 has also influenced the way in which the Chinese tradition of thought is understood by most modern Chinese theoreticians. In this context, etymological studies and researches into the semantic development of the Chinese concept of structure, together with comparative analyses of traditional Chinese and Euro-American theories could (and despite certain underlying questions as to the validity of such intercultural comparisons) prove itself to be an effective tool for clarifying some basic questions regarding the nature of human perception and apprehension of reality.


Notes


[1] Structuralism has been elaborated and further developed by all of the aforementioned theoretical currents (as well as others not cited here). The fundamental difference between those currents and earlier structuralist discourses consists in the fact that post-structuralist (de-constructivist, post-modernist, ...) critics view structures as less static and place them into frameworks of dynamic processes. This dynamic view implies a focus upon historical

discontinuities and the conditions by which structures are determined and come into existence. Another important characteristic of post-structuralist discourses is the critical treatment of normative representations and theoretical principles. These theoreticians also investigate and analyze the validity of principles which order/underpin classical metaphysical systems, primarily through psychoanalytical, discursive, semiotic and linguisticphilosophical methodologies. [2] See especially the works of Tan Sitong (1958), Xiong Shili (1992), Jin Yuelin (1978), Feng Youlan (1999), Feng Qi (1996) and Mou Zongsan (2003). [3] For example, Xia Zhentao (1996), Hu Jun (2004) and Zhang Yaonan (2000). [4] For a more detailed examination of this epistemological system, see Ros ˇker (2008), chapter on Zhang Dongsun. [5] The reason for this situation,

while mainly political, is also due to the work itself, which is written in a difficult language, with many neologisms and abstract notions not yet translated into the Indo-European languages. The general ignorance of contemporary Chinese philosophy in so called ‘Western’ countries is also a factor (see Ros ˇker, 2008, p. 21). [6] The term ‘autochthonous’ is used here to indicate Chinese philosophy before it was influenced by European and American thought. Because Buddhist thought was synthesized during the 4th century, its explicit and implicit influence can be regarded as part of the Chinese tradition. [7] The Chinese holistic world view has been traditionally expressed by the phrase ‘Unity of men and nature’ ( ). [8] For example, distinctions between subject and object, substance and phenomena, creator and creation, etc. [9] The analogical model used in the context of traditional Chinese logic differs from the classical European model in terms of both its methods and functions (see Cui & Zhang, 2005, pp. 25–41). [10] Some well known binary concepts are: yinyang (sunny and shady), tiyong (essence and function), mingshi (concept and actuality), liqi (structure and phenomena), benmo (roots and crown), etc. [11] In my previous studies of Chinese philosophy (2005, 2006, 2008) (Ros ˇker, 2005, 2006, 2008), completed before the present research, Neo-Confucianism was interpreted in a similar way. [12] This term refers to the inability to transfer certain theoretical concepts from one cultural tradition (or from one socio-cultural context) into another. [13] Zhang Zai ( ) (1989, p. 389). [14] The analogy between traditional Chinese and orhodox ‘Westernmedicine is of utmost interest here. [15] Grahamov prevod poglavja Mingshi lun (O imenu in stvarnosti) moistic ˇnega kanona Mozi . Graham’s translation of the chapter Ming shi lun from the Mohist cannon Mozi . [16] V uradni transkripciji pinyin: Laozi in Han Feizi in the official pinyin transcription: Laozi and Han Feizi. [17] ca 300–230. [18] Xunzi (Master Xun). [19] The later commentator Yang Jing explains that, in this context, the character li signifies a structural pattern: : , (cf. Xu Fu, 2000). [20] John Knoblock translates the term li as ‘design’ (Xunzi, 1994, p. 129). [21] Compiled ca AD 100, by Xu Shen . [22] Regarding the philosophical connotations of such understanding, we should recall the conservatism which often appears as a crucial element of traditional Chinese, especially Confucian, axiology, and the elements of a specifically Chinese aesthetic that attributes

greater value to Art that seeks to express itself in accordance with the visual structures of Nature, than to creativity in the sense of giving form to new modes of expression which did not exist before. [23] This is a direct translation of a Chinese term that refers to the period of Warring States ( , 475–221 BC) during the Eastern Zhou Dynasty ( , 770–256 BC), which was immediately followed by the first unification of China under the rule of the Qin ( , 221–206 BC) Dynasty. The pre-Qin era was the period that gave rise to the greatest flowering of ancient Chinese philosophic schools. [24] 725–645 BC. [25] For example Xunzi ( , see DC, 2008, Xunzi, xing e, p. 12), Liezi ( , see DC,2008,Liezi,Liming,p.3),Dong Zhongshu (

, see DC, 2008, Chun qiu fan lu, Yin yang yi, p. 01), etc. [26] A, B þ . [27] (DC 2008, Xunzi, Wang zhi, p. 5), or , (DC 2008, Mozi, Xiao qu, p. 5). [28] , (Chen Chun, 1983, p. 40). [29] , (Zhu Xi, 2000, p. 137). [30] The idea that the relation between reality and its naming or its conceptual perception was defined by a unified structure had already been proposed by a number of earlier philosophers, such as the exponent of the School of Names, Deng Xizi, in the 6th century BC, who wrote: (Deng Xi, 1976, Wu hou pian, p. 35). [31] – . [32] In fact, the central issues for the philosophers of this period, who mostly belonged to the School of Mystery or the group of Pure Conversations ( ), i.e. the structure of concepts ( ) and of meaning ( ) can be seen as kernels of a structural semantic, as was developed by Western linguistic discourses more than 1500 years later. [33] 221–262. [34] . We can note that the character li was also used in his works with a verbal function, in the sense of tuning an instrument: ‘ ’. [35] While the idea that music represents a systematically ordered structure of tones, rhythms and dynamics was common to the ancient and medieval traditions of both China and Europe, the concept that feelings were also structured was not advanced in Western countries before the start of the 20th century. [36] 1724–1777. [37] Here, the phrase ‘relatively autochthonous’ refers to Chinese philosophy before it was exposed to the influence of European and American thought. [38] It should be noted that logos has been used more often as an equivalent of the term dao in translations of Chinese philosophy. [39] Or: Westernization. References Bauer, Wolfgang (2000). Geschichte der Chinesichen philosophie. Mu ¨nchen: Verlag C.H. Beck. Chen Chun ( ). (1983). (Bei Xi’s Explanation of the character meanings). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju. Cheng Hao ( ) & Cheng Yi ( ). (1981). (The collected works of the two Chengs), (4 vols). Beijing: Zhonghua shuju.


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