The Tiantai School of Chinese Buddhism

According to Zhiyi 智顗 (538–597), the founder of the Chinese Buddhist Tiantai school 天臺宗, “one object is all objects;” hence, all objects are profoundly interconnected. In this paper, I critically examine Zhiyi’s metaphysics of objects as presented in the historical Tiantai texts and subsequently develop a contemporary and accessible thesis of interconnectedness by integrating Zhiyi’s views with resources from contemporary analytic philosophy, particularly relative identity. By drawing on Zhiyi’s insights and incorporating contemporary philosophical ideas, I also illustrate how historical Chinese (...) Buddhism and contemporary analytic metaphysics can be mutually informing. (shrink)

In the early twentieth century, Uchiyama Gudō, Seno’o Girō, Lin Qiuwu, and others advocated a Buddhism that was radical in two respects. Firstly, they adopted a more or less naturalist stance with respect to Buddhist doctrine and related matters, rejecting karma or other supernatural beliefs. And secondly, they held political and economic views that were radically anti-hegemonic, anti-capitalist, and revolutionary. Taking the idea of such a “radical Buddhism” seriously, A Buddha Land in This World: Philosophy, Utopia, and Radical Buddhism asks (...) whether it is possible to develop a philosophy that is simultaneously naturalist, anti-capitalist, Buddhist, and consistent. Rather than a study of radical Buddhism, then, this book is an attempt to radicalize it. The foundations of this “radicalized radical Buddhism” are provided by a realist interpretation of Yogācāra, elucidated and elaborated with some help from thinkers in the broader Tiantai/Tendai tradition and American philosophers Donald Davidson and W.V.O. Quine. A key implication of this foundation is that only this world and only this life are real, from which it follows that if Buddhism aims to alleviate suffering, it has to do so in this world and in this life. Twentieth-century radical Buddhists (as well as some engaged Buddhists) came to a similar conclusion, often expressed in their aim to realize “a Buddha land in this world.” Building on this foundation, but also on Mahāyāna moral philosophy, this book argues for an ethics and social philosophy based on a definition of evil as that what is or should be expected to cause death or suffering. On that ground, capitalism should be rejected indeed, but utopianism must be treated with caution as well, which raises questions about what it means – from a radicalized radical Buddhist perspective – to aim for a Buddha land in this world. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the emerging field of comparative metaethics, which aims to analyse the metaethical views of philosophical traditions outside the Western mainstream. It argues that the metaethical views implicit in the mediaeval Chinese school of Tiantai Buddhism can be reconstructed in contemporary terms in order to develop two novel views. These views are moral dialetheism and moral trivialism. The taxonomy of contemporary metaethical views, in epistemic terms, is exhausted by either partial success, or complete error, theories. (...) They claim, respectively, either that some moral judgments are true (and some false) or that all moral judgments are false. There are also noncognitivist and nonfactualist views, claiming that all moral judgments are technically neither true nor false. In opposition to this moral truth gap, moral dialetheism and moral trivialism offer a moral truth glut. These views say, respectively, that some moral judgments and their negations are true and that all moral judgments and their negations are true. The upshot of this metaethical reconstruction of Tiantai Buddhism is that it allows us to complete the contemporary metaethical taxonomy, and to contribute to the therapeutic goal of finding ways to utilize metaethical reflection for the sake of release from the pathologies of morality. (shrink)

Zhiyi is the most important scholar of Tiantai Buddhism. He uses the term ‘ji即,’ which is normally translated as ‘equals to’ or ‘is identical to,’ to illustrate the relation between...

Tiantai Buddhism emerged from an idiosyncratic and innovative interpretation of the Lotus Sutra to become one of the most complete, systematic, and influential schools of philosophical thought developed in East Asia. Brook A. Ziporyn puts Tiantai into dialogue with modern philosophical concerns to draw out its implications for ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. Ziporyn explains Tiantai’s unlikely roots, its positions of extreme affirmation and rejection, its religious skepticism and embrace of religious myth, and its view of human consciousness. Ziporyn reveals the (...) profound insights of Tiantai Buddhism while stimulating philosophical reflection on its unexpected effects. (shrink)

This paper attempts to interpret the theory of personhood in the works of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) in a way that refutes a certain type of Nishida interpretation that Critical Buddhism offers. According to this type of interpretation, the logic of basho is a modern version of the Qixinlun system. Based on this interpretation, Critical Buddhism denounces Kyoto School philosophy as "topical Buddhism." This paper shows how Nishida himself consciously differentiates his philosophy from the idealistic and monistic system with which the (...) earlier version of the logic of basho can easily be confused. To show that his theory of personhood opposes the Qixinlun-like system, I argue that Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Tiantai theory of personhood is analogous to Nishida's and explore the common nature of their philosophies. (shrink)

This paper attempts to show the characteristics of Tiantai’s perfect teaching (yuanjiao) in Nishida’s philosophy of basho. This is an alternative to a certain type of Nishida interpretation that emphasizes influences from Huayan Buddhism and the Awakening of Faith in Nishida’s metaphysics, especially in his later notion of absolutely contradictory identity. These Buddhist doctrines as well as Yogācāra Buddhism are classified by Tiantai Buddhism as distinctive teaching (biejiao), not perfect teaching. This paper clarifies that the characteristics of the theory of (...) basho cannot be found in distinctive teaching although Nishida’s theory of cognitive act indeed shows similarities to Yogacara Buddhism. Following Mou Zongsan’s (1909―95) and Ando Toshio’s (1909―73) interpretation, I argue that Tiantai Buddhism, in its elucidation of the ontological stratum as the envelopment of cognitive act, has the same metaphysical structure as that found in Nishida’s logic of basho, which further crystallizes into the principle of contradictory identity. (shrink)

Doctrinal classification or the panjiao 判教 system of Chinese Buddhism has been rediscovered and renewed in modern East Asian philosophy since both the Kyoto School and New Confucianism clarified the philosophical meaning of this intellectual tradition. The theoretical relation between these two modern reconsiderations, however, has not yet been studied. I analyze the theory of panjiao in Kōyama Iwao 高山岩男 and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 so as to identify and extract, despite their apparent irrelevance, the same type of philosophical argument concerning (...) the ontological character of yuanjiao 圓教. My analysis shows that Mou’s distinction between the “two-door mind” paradigm and Buddhistic ontology in his interpretation of Tiantai 天台 Buddhism corresponds to Kōyama’s distinction between an idealistic system and the existential turn in his generalized panjiao system. (shrink)

Clower, Jason: The Unlikely Buddhologist, Tiantai Buddhism in M ou Zongsan’s New Confucianism Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s11712-011-9261-y Authors Sébastien Billioud, Univ Paris Diderot, Sorbonne Paris Cité. UFR LCAO/East Asian Studies Department, Case 7009, 16 rue Marguerite Duras, 75205 Paris Cedex 13 Paris, France Journal Dao Online ISSN 1569-7274 Print ISSN 1540-3009.

This article seeks to broaden contemporary scholarship on the Lotus Sūtra by arguing that it is a philosophically critical, self-reflective text struggling with problems of truth in Buddhist discourse. While all Lotus Sūtra scholars agree that the doctrine of skillful means is a central teaching in the text, there is a common tendency to frame skillful means as a passive vehicle (or ‘means’) for expressing truth rather than an active philosophical critique of truth. This article argues that the Lotus Sūtra (...) uses skillful means as a distinct form of criticism within a larger debate over the nature and efficacy of Buddhist practice, and that it raises important issues about truth that are shared by other important Buddhist thinkers and texts such as Nāgārjuna, Lin-chi and the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa. It analyzes key passages and parables without reducing the ethical teachings of the Lotus Sūtra to simplistic versions of utilitarianism, paternalism, or relativism, and without dissolving the critical elements that make the Lotus Sūtra a genuinely philosophically interesting text. (shrink)

This highly accessible book provides a comprehensive unpacking and interpretation, suitable for students and scholars in all fields, of towering philosopher Mou ...

In his _Treatise on the Golden Lion_, Fazang says that wholes are _in_ each of their parts and that each part of a whole _is_ every other part of the whole. In this paper, I offer an interpretation of these remarks according to which they are not obviously false, and I use this interpretation in order to rigorously reconstruct Fazang's arguments for his claims. On the interpretation I favor, Fazang means that the presence of a whole's part suffices for the (...) presence of the whole and that the presence of any such part is both necessary and sufficient for the presence of any other part. I also argue that this interpretation is more plausible than its extant competitors. (shrink)

A concise alphabetic guide to the main concepts, figures, topics and important movements of thought that have shaped Chinese philosophy over the last three thousand years. The entries are concisely written, terms are cross-referenced and transcriptions are typically given in the pinyin system while the Chinese originals for important concepts are also provided. Chinese Philosophy A-Z stresses philosophical relevance in choosing entries while paying due attention to historical links between relevant ideas and movements of thought. The volume also shows how (...) some of the central ideas under discussion contribute to the philosophical enterprise as a whole. The book is aimed at students, teachers of philosophy, and educated non-specialists who are interested in Chinese philosophy, particularly those readers new to Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

: This is an attempt to clarify a vital ontological aspect of Tiantai teaching created by the sixth-century Chinese Buddhist monk Zhiyi. To do this Tiantai must first be distanced from Mou Zongsan's interpretation of its central pattern of nonduality, a reconstructive theory that refers to both Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism and sees a "two-level ontology" in Chinese philosophical traditions, grounded in both the Chinese Buddhist patterns of "nonduality between the sacred and the profane" and the Kantian distinction between "noumena (...) and phenomena." Part 1 of this article is a critical analysis and evaluation of Mou's theory, concluding that the Buddhist patterns of nonduality and the Kantian distinction are not mutually convertible. Part 2 focuses on Tiantai ontology in the specific context of its soteriological relevance, demonstrating that the ideal of "universally saving all sentient beings" in Tiantai soteriology must presuppose the conception of "nonduality of/between the sacred and the profane," and that the ambiguous ontological status of existing things corresponds to this soteriological doctrine in a manner that can only be expressed by a "paradoxical articulation." The ontological meaning of Tiantai teaching is then specified with regard to Zhiyi's discussion of reality and the diversity of existing things. The three constitutive elements of Tiantai Buddhism—the soteriological doctrine of nonduality, ontological indeterminacy, and paradoxical articulation—are all based on an ideal of universal salvation that excludes a level of "being" transcending the realm of sentient beings. This conclusion directly controverts Mou's metaphysical notion of a "two-level ontology.". (shrink)

: Many recent studies of Dōgen have rightly emphasized that for Dōgen language and thought are capable of expressing the buddha dharma. But they have not recognized that this positive assessment of language rests on an underlying critique of the prevalent commonsense view that language functions by representing an independent reality. Focusing on Dōgen's use of apparently paradoxical language, it is suggested that in order to understand this critique we need to trace it back to its roots in the interpretation (...) of Madhyamaka given by the Tiantai thinker Zhiyi. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Tiantai Doctrine of Evil as the Good:A Response to David R. LoyBrook ZiporynIn a recent issue of this journal (vol. 54 [1]:99-103), David Loy has done me the honor of publishing his sympathetic and thoughtful review of my book Evil and/or/ as the Good: Omnicentrism, Intersubjectivity, and Value Paradox in Tiantai Buddhist Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). Loy has done an excellent (...) job of bringing to the forefront some of the most troubling and distinctive aspects of the Tiantai Buddhist position on evil, as expressed in particular in the works of Siming Zhili, the focus of my book. Inevitably, with the nit-picky vanity that perhaps assails every reviewee, I feel some points have been imperfectly understood or represented, but in general I want before anything else to express my gratitude to Loy for the insight and acuity with which he has handled this material, the care he has taken in reading and responding to the book, and the candor, lucidity, and forcefulness with which he has expressed a very reasonable, non-Tiantai Mahāyāna response to some of the more radical and counterintuitive Tiantai ideas.But one particularly great service Loy has done is to present a very important and necessary challenge: what would these Tiantai writers, with their bizarre ideas about the interpenetration, nay, identity, of good and evil have to say about Hitler and the Holocaust? Putting this particular topic up as a casual example to be employed in an academic discussion, in effect "making use of" the mountains of corpses in the context of an ivory-tower discussion of subtle logical and ontological hairsplitting, perhaps will strike some as being in more than questionable taste. But there are points to be made here, and it is a valid question, one that needs to be addressed—indeed, that we cannot help addressing—even when it is played as a card all the meanings of which have already been determined. Loy is quite right: these mountains of corpses are always already in play in the background of our discussions of moral doctrines, perhaps even in the interstices of our casual entertainments, and we let ourselves off too easily if we leave them in the background, as unexamined, prepackaged moral tokens, or stock bugaboos whose "use-value" in the culture has already been nonnegotiably and comfortably mapped out. This is the extreme test case that anyone who wants to talk seriously about values and ethics must face head-on. For these reasons I want to take this opportunity to extend the thought experiment and respond to this challenge, speaking for the sake of argument in the name of the Tiantai doctrine, in the hopes that this will perhaps initiate a dialogue with specialists in other systems of moral theory, who might attempt a similar experiment.To do this, however, it will be necessary to take up a few of the more general theoretical questions raised in Loy's review. The first of these concerns the relation between ultimate truth and provisional truth. Loy acknowledges that, as argued in [End Page 329] the book, the Tiantai position gives a higher status to provisional or conventional truth than most Mahāyāna Two Truths doctrines, accurately paraphrasing the conclusion that "for Tiantai, however, the provisional ends up being equal to the ultimate truth." But, on the other hand, he wishes to point out as a potential shortcoming of the Tiantai position that it seems to overstress the "highest point of view." This assertion comes in the context of a grudging attempt to make sense of the Tiantai affirmation of evil from the point of view of the general Mahāyāna Two Truths theory, thereby, in my opinion, fatally distorting the point. Loy is willing to admit "the fact that from the highest point of view every possible apprehension—including evil ones—is neither a distortion of reality nor subject to invalidation by some other more privileged perspective." This strikes Loy as problematic, and he offers his own solution: it lies in "realizing that this 'ultimate' point of view is insufficient by itself—that it always needs... (shrink)

Zen and the roof were very unique Chinese Buddhist sect, which occur in the course of history with all kinds of relationships. Instrument such as the origins of Zen meditation all Guifeng Zongmi of "meditation device" is a Zhiyi "small Zhiguan" of transcription; Zen four Zudao Xin's "five heart to be" is also Zhiyi "card on the heart "The inherited; Zen lived north were Shenxiu Jingzhou Yuquan, Zhiyi Zhiguan seriously affected, and author of the same name with Zhiyi" view of (...) the heart on the "volume, this book later became the most respected Zen" Dharma Master disfigured on . " Accordingly, we can say the founder of Zen is to sell off in Tiantai. Song, Zen life extension urged phase-integration. Zen to teach the same, integrating the concept of mind were on the roof and the evil nature that; Ming, Zhi Xu mix Zhuzong idea that Zen's disease, non-roof can not be saved. In addition, Zen and the roof were also given ancestral place, Kokuseiji birthplace of ownership dispute. This article will discuss three aspects mentioned above for the points discussed. The Tiantai Section and the Zen Section are the most remarkable sects of Buddhism in China; various relations have emerged between them in the progress of history. For instance, Zuo Chan Yi of the Zen Section cites Xiao Zhi Guan from the doctrine of Tiantai, while the Zen Wu Men Xin Via is a successor of the Tiantai Zheng Xin Luen. Shen Xiou from the northern Zen once stayed in Yu Quan Temple, and, deeply influenced by Zhi Kai from the Tiantai Section, he wrote a book with the same title as one by Zhi Kai, Zheng Xin Luen, which has become the most honored writing among the later Zen Section. Accordingly, it is fair to say that the Zen Section emerged from the Tiantai Section. In the Sung Dynasty, Yian Shou combined the doctrine of Zen with the Tiantai doctrines of mind and evil nature. In the Ming Dynasty, Zhi Xu claimed the defects of Zen could only be remedied by the Tiantai Section. All the issues above are discussed in this paper. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 21.1 (2001) 119-122 [Access article in PDF] The Lotus Sutra and Process Philosophy Philip E.Devenish Rissho Kosei-kai In 1994, Rissho Kosei-kai began to sponsor an annual summer conference to which international scholars were invited to discuss and explore the Lotus Sutra. Some of the earlier conferences focused on themes such as "The Lotus Sutra and Ethics" and "The Lotus Sutra and Social Responsibility." These conferences have encouraged (...) a more widespread understanding of the Lotus Sutra among Western scholars and, as a result, a greater exposure to the Lotus Sutra on the part of students in the universities where these scholars teach. An additional feature of the conferences is the exposure of these scholars to Rissho Kosei-kai as a significant religious organization in modern Japan.This year's conference involved eleven scholars, six from the United States and five from Japan. It was held at Bandaiso, Rissho Kosei-kai's retreat center, about four hours north ofTokyo by bus. Its theme was"The Lotus Sutra andProcess Thought." Process thought is a kind of philosophical thinking developed primarily in America over the last century that shares certain features with the basic point of view expressed in the Lotus Sutra.The Lotus Sutra is not primarily a philosophical or theological text, but rather a religious one. It focuses less on analyzing reality than on coming to terms with it, responding to it, and also on changing it. However, a religious text always presupposes concepts and ideas that it employs in order to express its intuitions about what is important in life. Professor Gene Reeves, the organizer of this and the previous conferences in the series, has shown in his writings that Lotus Sutra Buddhism shares with process thought several basic commitments. One is to what he calls "a philosophy of integration" of teachings and practices, of people with nature, and of wisdom, compassion, and practice. Another is their shared "philosophy of becoming," according to which everything that exists depends on the basic process of causal relations, which makes it possible for anything at all to exist. Lotus Sutra Buddhism and process philosophy also agree that all individual realities exhibit a basic character of creativity and that creativity characterizes ultimate reality, whether this is understood in some sense as "the Buddha" or as "God." Moreover, both movements teach the possibility of religious salvation for all people as well as an ethics grounded in universal respect and compassion.Many of the participants in the conference expressed their conviction that process [End Page 119] thought, as it is developed particularly in the writings of the philosophers Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), Charles Hartshorne (b. 1897), and John Dewey (1859-1952), provides an especially clear and rich articulation of these themes and that Lotus Sutra Buddhists have much to gain from the study of this philosophy. At the same time, there was equally deep appreciation for the type of Lotus Sutra Buddhism given social and religious expression in Rissho Kosei-kai and, in particular, for its stress on the practice of "appropriate" or "skillful" means (upaya).Professor Joseph Grange, of the University of Southern Maine, drew attention to the overall consonance of the Lotus Sutra and Whitehead's later writings in overcoming dualism in thought and life. Professor Steve Odin, of the University of Hawai'i, discussed the ways both Lotus Sutra Buddhism and Whitehead formulate an interrelational vision of reality wherein each event is a microcosmic reflection of a macrocosmic whole, especially in the doctrine of the Lotus Sutra tradition of ichinen sanzen, or "three thousand realms in one thought." The present author, an independent scholar, focused on the convergence of the two movements of thought in the religious and ethical notions of peace and compassion.Professor Yoshitaka Goh, of the Japan Biblical Seminary, stressed the specifically historical character of human salvation, in which the past shapes the possibilities for our lives in the present. Professor Warren Frisina, from Hofstra University, New York, analyzed the relations between knowledge and action in the Lotus Sutra and the thought of John Dewey, showing that each... (shrink)

Ideas adapted from the tradition of Chinese Tiantai Buddhism, in particular the notions of the "Three Truths" and "opening the provisional to reveal the real," are applied to the traditional mind-body problem as framed in Western philosophical discourse. An attempt is made to offer an account of the mind-body relation that explicates both the identity and the opposition between these two terms, thereby avoiding the traditional positions of dualism, monism, and parallelism while also accounting for the features of the relation (...) that have made these positions attractive in the past. (shrink)

This dissertation may be viewed as an exposition of the philosophical implications of a single eight-character sentence from the works of the Tiantai Buddhist monk Siming Zhili , the literal meaning of which may be rendered: "Other than the devil there is no Buddha, other than the Buddha there is no devil." A context in which to effectively interpret the significance of this claim is provided by examining the Chinese philosophical tradition with an eye for three closely related themes: notions (...) that do not share the arguably common-sense assumption that "good" and "bad" are mutually exclusive categories; concepts of holism ; and the conception of intersubjectivity as a primary, constitutive and ultimate component of experience. The work begins with introductory chapters laying out the nature of the problem, its parameters and implications, and the methodological limitations bearing on the investigation to follow. The next portion consists of an examination of ideas of value paradox, holism and intersubjectivity as they are developed by pre-Qin thinkers, including Confucius, Mencius, Xunzi Mozi, Laozi and Zhuangzi. The study culminates in an examination of the disputes over the Tiantai doctrine of "the evil inherent in the Buddha-nature" , beginning with its background in Indian and earlier Chinese Buddhism, and reaching its zenith in Zhili's notion of "the ultimacy of the dung beetle," as predicated on an assertion of an uncompromising identity between value and anti-value , a thoroughgoing omnicentric holism, and an insistence on the all-pervasiveness and ultimacy of constitutive intersubjectivity. By rendering these initially counterintuitive notions coherent, it is hoped that an alternative view of human experience, premised on omnicentric holism rather than atomism or unicentrism, on intersubjectivity rather than objectivity or subjectivity, and on value paradox rather than value dichotomy, will come into focus, thereby providing an additional resource to our arsenal of possible approaches to the world. (shrink)

The meaning of the two truths--the worldly or mundane truth samvrtisatya , and the real or supreme truth -- was a hotly debated topic among Chinese Buddhists in the 5th and 6th century a.d. From the time of Kumarajiva this issue was discussed in terms of yu and wu . Usually yu was iden- tified with samvrtisatya and wu with paramarthasatya, leading to the mistaken conclusion that the two truths represent two separate realities. The ambiguous meaning of these terms also (...) contributed to the confusion. Yu and wu have both positive and negative conno- tations for Buddhist philosophy. Yu understood as substantial Being is denied by the Buddhist concept of emptiness sunyata , but yu as conventional, conditioned, co-arising dharmas is compatible with the Buddhist concept of pratityasamutpada. Wu understood as a nihilistic nothingness is a misunderstanding of emptiness, but wu as a lack of substantial Being is synonymous with emptiness. The use of these ambiguous terms to interpret the meaning of the two truths prevented a satisfactory resolution of the problem until the issue was dealt with by Chi-tsang, of the Sanlun tradition, and Chih-i, founder of T'ien-t'ai philosophy. ;In this dissertation I outline the debate on the two truths in China from the time of Kumarajiva and Seng-chao, the first appearance of three truth formulations in Chinese apocryphal Sutras, the debate on the two truths led by Prince Chao-ming, Hui-yuan's discussion in his Ta ch'eng i chang, the positive evaluation of conventional existence by the Ch'eng shih lun scholars, and the contributions of Chi-tsang. Finally I discuss Chih-i's T'ien-t'ai philosophy and his resolution of the problem by means of his threefold truth concept. Chih-i tran- scends the yu/wu duality by emphasizing the oneness of reality and discussing the issue in terms of emptiness sunyata , conventional existence prajnaptirupadaya , and the middle madhyama . An annotated translation of the pertinent section of the Fa hua hsuan i is included in an Appendix. (shrink)

All Mahayana schools adopt some version of the Two Truths theory, with one exception: the Tiantai school, which alone among all Buddhist schools moves from the Two Truths epistemology to a Three Truths model of truth. The Three Truths are actually three different ways of looking at any object or state. Each implies the other two, and each is one way to describe the whole of that object, including its other two aspects. This cup is a cup: that is provisional (...) truth, conventional truth, local coherence. This cup is not a cup: that is ultimate truth, its emptiness, its global incoherence. To be a cup is not to be a cup: that is its Centrality, its Non‐duality, its Absoluteness. This cup is all things, all possible ways of being, all universes, as this cup. (shrink)

Tian-tai Buddhism and Hua-yan Buddhism can be viewed as the two most philosophically important schools in Chinese Buddhism. The Tian-tai school was founded by Zhi-yi (Chih-i) (538-597 A.D.). The major Buddhist text endorsed by this school is the Lotus Sutra, short for “the Sutra of the Lotus Blossom of the Subtle Dharma.” Hua-yan Buddhism derived its name from the Hua-yan Sutra, translated as “The Flower Ornament Scripture” or as “The Flowery Splendor Scripture.”1 The founder of the Hua-yan school was a (...) Chinese monk named Du-shun (557-640 A.D.). The second patriarch of Hua-yan is Zhi-yan (602-668 A.D.), who studied with Du-shun. However, it is generally acknowledged that the real founder of Hua-yan Buddhism is its third patriarch, Fa-zang (643-712 A.D.). He introduced the division of “the Realm of Principle” and “the Realm of Things,”2 which was developed by Hua-yan’s fourth patriarch Cheng-guan (738-839? A.D.) into the defining thesis for Hua-yan Buddhism – the “four dharma realms”: the Realm of Principle, the Realm of Things,3 the Realm of the Noninterference between Principle and Things, and the Realm of the Noninterference of All Things. (shrink)

Professor Ziporyn introduces the sophisticated philosophy of the Chinese Tiantai school of Buddhism, a Chinese Mahayana Buddhist school based on an idiosyncratic and innovative interpretation of the "Lotus Sutra". This is a deep dive into the Mahayana philosophy of dependent origination and emptiness which brings along with it Chinese sensibilities and innovations such as the Center, zhong 中, adding a third truth to the two truths doctrine of Madhyamaka Buddhism. Full book title: "Emptiness and Omnipresence: An Essential Introduction to Tiantai (...) Buddhism". (shrink)