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The Yogacara-madhyamaka Refutation of the Position of the Satyakara and Alikakara-vadins of the Yogacara School.

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The Yogäcära-mädhyamika Refutation of the Position of the Satyäkära and Alikäkära-vädins of the Yogäcära School.

Part 1 : A Translation of Portions of Haribhadra's Abhisamayälarhkãrãlokä Prajñäpäramitävyãkhyä.

Seitetsu Moriyama


2. INTRODUCTION


S 1. KAMALASILA'S AND HARIBHADRA'S PHILOSOPHICAL POINT OF VIEW. Buddhist epistemological theory, which was formalized by Dignägä (1)

(circa A. D. 480—540) and significantly advanced by Dharmakîrti (c. A. (2)

D. 600—660), is closely related to Buddhist logic. Some scholars have (3) therefore called this the school of Buddhist logicians. Säntaraksita (c.

(1) Concerning this date see Massaki Hattori. Dignäga, On Perception, being the of Dignãga's Pramänasamuccaya from the Sanskrit fragments and the Tibetan versions, HOS. 47. (1967), EDITOR'S FOREWORD. (2) Concerning this date see E. Frawallner. LANDMARKS IN THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC, WZKSO, Band V. (1961) p. 137. However, D. Malvania places the time of Dharmakïrti somewhere between 550—600 A. D. (Durveka Miéra's Dharmottarapradîpa, TSWS, Vol. Il. Patna 1955). Introduction p. XVI. While S. Chandra Vidyabhusana places his date about 635—650 A. D. (A HISTORY OF INDIAN LOGIC, 1978, p. 303.). (3) Matsumoto Shirõ Bukkyö Ronrigakuha no Nitai Setsu (Jõ) (±) (Controversies on the Theory of Twofold Truth (Satyadvaya) between Buddhist logicians (1)). Nanto Bukkyõ or Journal of the Nanto Society for Buddhist Studies

Dec. (1980) No. 45, p. 101. (4) (4)

A. D. 725—788), his disciple Kamalašïla (c. A. D. 740—795) and Harib- (5) hadra (c. A. D. 800) are now known as the major philosophers of the Yogäcãra-mädhyamika school. They were not only greatly influenced by Buddhist logic, but they also tried to apply it to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niþsvabhãva). During their period the Buddhist philosophical systems, such as those of the Vaibhãsika, Sauträntika, Yogãcä±a, and Mãdhyamika, had already arrived at their highest point, and at the same time, Buddhist logic was also flourishing. In these circumstances, even within Buddhists schools themselves, heated debates were common. Thus the formalism developed by Dignäga and then Dharmakïrti for judging the validity of a proposition the two valid means of cognition (Pramãea) by direct perception (6) (pratyak§a) and inference (anumãea) was employed in deciding such theoretical disputes by the major philosophers of the Yogäcãra—mädhyamika school. Musõyuishiki to Usõyuishiki (The theory of the Satãkãra and Alïkãkãra—vädin). Kõza Daijõ Bukkyõ No. 8 Yuishikishisõ • 8 ed. by A. Hirakawa, Y. Kajiyama, J. Takasaki, p. 179 (Shunjü sha 1983). (4) Concerning these dates see Katsumi Mimaki, BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA'. ZINBUN KAGAKU KENKYUSYO, UNVERSITÉ DE KYOTO (1982). INTRODUCTION, p. 5. (5) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yüichi Chügan Shisõ no Rekishi to Bunken (History and Bibliography of Philosophy of Mãdhyamika), Kõza Daijõ Bukkyõ No. 7 (Nov. 1982), Chügan Shisõ •

p. 21. cf. Note 3. (6) Yüichi Kajiyama. An Introduction to Buddhist Philosophy : An annotated translation of the Tarkabhãsä of Mokfikaragupta. Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University, No. 10, Introduction p. 2. kõki Indo Bukkyö no Ronrigaku, (cf. Note 33) p. 248.

Sntaraksita and his followers were therefore in the position to prove the proposition that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature (niþsvabhãva) through the use of these two valid means of cognition (Pramãea). In other words, had this logical procedure been disregarded, the proposition that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nitsvabhãva) could not be shown. In this sense, we can understand them as philosophers of the Yogãcära—mädhyamika school who were put in a position to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nilgsvabhäva) according to the formalism of logical examination. However, even though they adopted Buddhist logic to prove their philosophy, this does not mean that they endorsed completely the philosophy and logic of Dharmakïrti, since, in the end, they refute this view from the standpoint of highest truth of the Mädhyamika. Their obligation was to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nil?svabhãva) and, at the same time, to show that there are good grounds for refuting the various views of the other schools which were influential at the time. Accordingly, it was to these purposes that Kamalaéïla wrote his Madhyamakäloka—nã- (7) ma (Mal) and Sarvadharmani!¿svabhãva-siddhi (SD NS) which consist of debates between the Yogãcära—mãdhyamika and other schools of Buddhism, the the Sautrãntika, and the Yogäcãra, on the subject of whether or not all things have intrinsic nature (svabhãva). It is obvious that Kamalaéïla's philosophy was greatly influenced by (8) his teacher Sãntaraksita who wrote such works as the Madhyamakãla-

(7) SDNS (1). (2). Seitetsu Moriyama. A Synopsis of the Sarvadharmanihsvabhãvasiddhi of Kamalaéïla (1). JIBS vol. XXX No. 2, Mar. 1982. (8) Yüichi Kajima. Later Mãdhyamikas on Epistemology and Meditation Mahãyãna Buddhist Meditation : Theory and Practice. ed. by M. Kiyota, (Honolulu .

ñkãra—kãrikä (MA K), Madhyamakãlañkära—vrtti (MAV) and Tattvasañgraha (TS), since he wrote the Madhyamakãlñkãra—þañiikã (MAP) and Tattvasañgraha—pañjikã (TSP) as a commentary on these texts. It is this logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nitsvabhãva) and the logical refutation of the views of the other schools in portions of Haribhadra's Abhisamayãlañkãrãlokã Prajñãpãramitãvyãkhyã (AAPV) that were written on the bases of Sãntaraksita's MAK and MAV and Kamalašïla's MAP, Mal and SDNS, which are parallel to Haribhadra's work. It should thus be pointed out that the following translation of Haribhadra's AAPV shares much in common with the MA K, MAV, MAP, and Mal, which I have indicated in my notes to the translation. S 2. HARIBHADRA'S ABHISAMAYÄLAMKÄRÄLOKÄ PRAJÑÄPÄRAMITÄVYÄKHYÄ (AAPV) The AAPV was written, of course, as a commentary on the Astãsahasrikã—prajñãpãramita, according to the Abhisamayãlañkãra of Maitreya. In this respect the design of the AAPV differs from such works as the MAK and MAV of Säntarak$ta, which were written with the purpose of demonstrating his own philosophical position as a Yogäcära— mãdhyamika. This is true also for Kamalašïla's commentary (MAP) on Sntaraksi-

University Press of Hawaii, 1978) pp. 114—143 Ichigö Masamichi

"Chügan—Shõgonron—chü" no Wayakukenkyu (1) (1) (Japanese tranlation of MAV). Kyõtosangyõdaiqaku Ronshü vol. 2 ; Jimbunkagaku Keiretsu vol. 1, pp. 182—204. Idem (2), Mikkyõgaku (Gü¥) 9, pp. 42—55. A Synopsis of the Madhyamakãlañkãra of JIBS No. XX—2, pp. 995—989. ta's works, as well as his Mal and SD NS, which were also written as independent philosophical expostions. However, since Haribhadra is a successor to the Yogãcära—mädhyamika tradition of and Kamalašïla, he has inherited much from the previous masters of this (9) school. This is clearly seen in those portions of the AAPV where Haribhadra defines his stance as a Yogäcãra—mãdhyamika through his logical proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nilgsvabhãva) and the logical refutation of the views of the other schools, (portions of the commentary that actually have no direct relation to the Prajñãpãramitã sütra on which he is supposedly commenting), since these logical proofs and refutations correspond largely to those of the MAK and MAV of Sãntarak$ta and Kamalaéïla's MAP, Mal, and his SD NS. Even beyond the selections translated below, for example, Haribhadra's refutation of the various sorts of causation is the same as that appearing in


These portions appear as a commentary of following sentences from the Aît:asãhasrikã Prajñãpãramitã—sütra and verses 27 and 28 of the Abhisamayãlañkra (W62322—26 V15416—19) yaiva ca Bhagavato bodhisattva—bhütasya tathatã saiva Bhagavato' nuttarãrh samyaksambodhim abhisambuddhasya tathatä / iyam sä tathatã yayä tathatayä bodhisattvo mahãsattvo' nuttarãlñ samyaksambodhim abhisambuddhal.l sarhs tathägata iti nämadheyam labhate / 1. W. 0m. Tr. by E. Conze (Bibl. Ind. No. 284, Calcutta 1958) p11435—38 hitaril sukhalil ca ca éarar)arñ layanalil nrnäm / paräyanaril ca dvïyalil ca parit)äyakasañjñakam // 27 // anäbhogalil tribhir yäniah kriyayätmakalh / paécinaril gatikäritram idarh // 28 // c. f. Edward Conze Abhisamayälañkara introduction and translation from original text with Sanskrit—Tibetan Index, SOR VI p. 13 cf. P. S. Jaini. Säratamã A pañjikä on the Prajñäpãramitä sütra by Acãrya Ratnãkaraéãnti, TSWS No. XVIll p. 4, Kashi prasad jayaswal reserch institute, patna 1979. (10) AAPV W pp. 96926-97618 V pp. 54922-55325 Amano Kouei (11) the SD NS. It is then the appearance in Haribhadra's writings of passages found also in the works of Sntarak$ta and Kamalašïla that shows his indebtedness to the latter two masters. Thus, in the translation to follow, I have attempted to indicate those passages which are found also in the MA K, MAV, and MAP. Generally speaking, the proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niþsvabhãva) is accomplished through the refutation of the views of various school in the writings of Säntaraksita, Kamalaéîla, and Haribhadra, and in most cases the refutation begins with confuting the views of non—Buddhists and Buddhists that the external world is real. In this first case, it is pointed out that atomic theory is the necessary basis for asserting that the external world is real. There are then three

varieties of atomic theory, those of the Vaišesika, Vaibhä$ka and Sautrãntika, which are then refuted in that order. Basically, these Yogãcãra—mädhyamikas propose that a real external world cannot be proven so long as atomic theory cannot be established. Such atomic theories depend on the concept of intrinsic nature (svabhãva), and by logically confuting atomic theory the proposition of things possessing an intrinsic nature is destroyed. Such a refutation of atomic theory seems to have originated in the Viffiéatikä (Vé) of Vasubandhu, verse XI

Ingaron no Ichi Shiryõ —Haribhadra no Kaishaku—

(One source of causation—interprtation of Haribhadra). Kanakura Hakase Koki Kinen Indogaku Bukkyögaku Ronshü (1966) pp. 323-50 P. S. Jaini, (cf. Note 9) p. 5. (11) SDNS (2), pp 119-129. (12) Mimaki Katsumi Shokiyuishiki Shoronzyo ni okeru Sautrãntika setsu Z Sautrãntika M. Deux thèses philosophiques de 1' école Sauträntika, discutées dans les premiers traités des Vijñaptivãdin du Grand Véhicule. Töhõ Gaku (Eastern Studies) No. 43, pp. 88—89 Jan 1972


and its commentary. The Yogäcãra-mädhyamika then uses this manner of refuting the external world to deny the subjective reality (vijñãnamãtra) of the Yogäcära school represented by the Satyäkãra and Alïkäkära—vãdins. 3. KAMALASILA'S AND HARIBHADRA'S REFUTATION OF THE SATYÄKÄRA AND ALIKÄKÄRA-VÄDINS I. The characteristics of these two schools We may explain this subject from the following three points of view : Their respective view of Cl) image (ãkãra), [2) self—cognition (svasalicvedana) and [3) the three natures (trisvabhãva). To begin with, it is helpful to refer to the explanations given in the Jñãnãsãrasamuccaya-

nibandhana of Bodhibhadra (c. A. D. According to this work, the Satyäkãra—vãdin maintains that the images (ãkãra) of cogni-

(13) Vé pp. 625—72 na tad ekarh na cãnekaril / na ca te sarilhatã yasmät paramä4ur na sidhyati // 11 // Kim uktarn bhavati / yat tad rüpãdikam äyatanarh rüpädivijñaptïnam pratyekalñ vi§ayah syãt tad ekalñ vã syãd yathävayavirüparh kalpyate / anekam va / sartlhatã Vä ta eva paramälllavah / na tãvad ekalñ bhavaty avayavebhyo' nyasyãvayavirüpasya kvacid apy agrahapät / nãpy anekafrl pratyekam / nãpi te sarhhatã / yasmät ekarñ dravyam na sidhyati // cf. Daijõ Butten 15 Seshinronjü tr. by Nagao G. Kajiyama Y. Aramaki N. p. 361—2 Vé Note 16. published by Chuõ Köron sha 1976. SDNS (1) p. 63. (14) A commentary of Jñanasärasamuccaya which was written by Aryadeva ( ?) Katsumi Mimaki. La réfutation bouddhique de la permanence des choses (sthirasiddhid*ïlla) et la preuve de la momentanéité des choses Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Fascicule 41, Paris. (1976) pp. 190—207. (15) Concerning this date see Katsura Syoryu Dharmakïrti ni okeru Jikoninshiki no Riron Theory of Svasañvedana). Nanto Bukkyö or Journal of the Nanto Society for

Buddhist Studies No. 23. p. 8 Nov. (1969)

tion possess a dependent nature (Paratantra—svabhãva), while the Alïkäkära—vädin maintains the images of cognition are imaginary by nature (parikalpita—svabhãva). This explanation suggests to us one way in which we might understand the differences in the theories of the Satyãkãra and Alïkãkãra—vädins.

I. A. According to the theory of Satyäkära-vädin • [1) Images (äkãra) such as the color blue, are real (satya). However, when these images are wrongly interpreted as being either subjective or objective, or when they are misunderstood as being either eternal or (17) temporary, such discriminations are unreal. Nevertheless, images (ãkãra) themselves are always real and existent. [2) Independent self—cognition (svasañvedana) apart from images, such as the color blue, cannot exist. Self—cognition is none other than the very manifestation of images themselves. Therefore, selfcognition and images cannot be separated from each other, because (18) they are identical. [3) Images (ãkãra) are inseparable from cognition (vijñãna), which has a dependent nature (paratantra—svabhãva) because it depends upon the immediately preceding moment of consciousness (samanantaraPratyaya). Accordingly images (ãkãra) also possess a dependent nature (Paratantra—svabhãva). It is the misconceiving of these images, which

(16) Yüichi Kajiyama. Controversy between the sãkãra and niräkära—vãdins of the yogäcära school— some materials. JIBS vol. XIV No. 2 pp. 424-425. Hirakawa Akira *JilV. Indo Bukkyõ shi (Gekan) Y p. 233. (17) Oki Kazufumi. ibid Note 3. p. 181, 197, 198. (18) MAK. XLVII and MAV cf. Note (205). Mäl P200b5 D183b1 cf. Note 32. have a dependent nature, as something that may be seperated into an external world and internal world, or as things which are eternal or temporary, that imparts to these images an imaginary nature (parikalpita—svabhãva). When self—cognition (svasañvedana) accompanied by images, which has a dependent nature (Paratantra—svabhãva), is separated from an imaginary nature (parikalpita—svabhãva), it becomes absolute perfection Therefore, independent self—cogni- tion (svasañvedana) which has a dependent nature apart from images (äkãra) is impossible. Accordingly images (ãkãra) themselves exist as a reality even in the self-cogniton of sages. The distinction between the direct perception (Pratyak§a) of an ordinary person and the direct perception of sages actually lies in whether or not imaginary thought— (19) constructions (vikalpa) are projected on real images (satyãkãra). I. B. According to the theory of Alikäkãra—vãdin : (I) Both the images of the perceived and the perceiver (grãhya—grãhakãkära) are unreal (alika), or imaginary. Those images are produced (20) through dependence on error (bhrãnti), and therefore, they could not

(19) Katsura Syoryu. ibid Note 15, p. 13. (20) AAPV W 63125-6328 V 46220-28 [objection A thing whose nature is erroneous (bhrãnti) makes an unreal image (alikãkãra) manifest. Therefore, even though an image (ãkãra) is non— existent (asat), perception (sañvedana) would appear due to this error (bhrãnti). [Answer Your statement is incorrect. What does the word "error (bhrãnti)" mean? Does it imply : 1) a latent impression (vãsanã) which produces confusion (vibhrama) and which remains as a cognition (jñãna) of a cause (hetu—bhüta) ; or 2) nothing more than the erroneous cognition (bhrãntam eva jñãnam) which remains as a result (kãrya) of and produced from such a latent impression (väsanã)? Let's examine which one is correct. 1) If the first alternative is maintained, it is illogical (ayukta) that they (viz., images) are perceived through that (latent impression), since its cause (as a latent impression) does not have a necessary connection (aPratibaddhatva) with [those) images (ãkãra). Also, be real (satya). [2) Only independent self—cognition (svasañvedana) which is detached from the images of both the perceived and the perceiver is real and this means the nondual cognition (advayajñãna). Accordingly both images and self—cognition are independent of each other. In fact, the difference between the perception of ordinary people and the supermu- (21) ndane cognition (nirvikalpalokottarajñäna) of sages lies in whether or not the images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in their cognition. [3) Both images of the perceived and the perceiver which are based

otherwise unwarrantable consequences would follow (atiPrasañga). Nor is the necessary connection (Pratibandha) with a causal relation (tad—utPatti) possible [between images and latent impression), because otherwise a dependent nature (Paratantratva) would follow as before. 2) If, on the other hand, the second alternative is maintained, the necessary connection (Pratibandha) between image (äkãra) (and cognition (Vijñãna)) is not a causal relation (tadutPatti), but a relation of identity (tãdãtmya). This is because they (viz., images and cognition) are simultaneously perceived. It is impossible that a relation between two things (viz., images and cognition) existing simultaneously should be a causal relation (hetu—Phalatva). For this reason, it is hard to avoid the problem that these (images) would come to have a dependent nature (Paratantratva), since these [images) are not separate from it (viz., cognition), like error (bhrãntivat). Otherwise what would they be? Mal P202b3—6 D185a4—6 ées pa de ni ji Itar myofi ba de Itar gnas pa yañ ma yin te / gcig la gñis kyi ño bo ñid 'gal ba'i phyir ro // gal te de ni 'khrul pas de Ita bu ées so Že na / 'khrul pa 'di gañ yin / gal te ées pa de ñid yin na ni / 'o na de mñon sum sum ma yin te / mñon sum gyi mtshan ñid ni ma 'khrul pa yin pa'i phyir la / de rtag tu bdag ñid la bdag ñid kho nas 'khrul pa'i phyir ro // gñis kyi bdag ñid du yañ de'i bdag ñid snañ ba'i phyir gñis med pa'i ño bo ñid ñams par thal ba kho na yin te / gñis dail gñis ma yin pa dag ni phan tshun 'gal ba'i phyir ro // 'khrul pa don gian yin yañ de yañl rañ rig pa'i mthar thug pa ...2) ñid yin pas des gñis med pa de Itar ées pa ni ma yin no // 1. D dati 2. P orn. PV. 11. 212. paricchedo 'ntar anyo' yaril bhägo bahir iva sthitah / jñãnasyäbhedino bhedapratibhãso by upaplavah // (See Tosaki Hiromasa F IIIË*Œ. Bukkyõ Ninshiki- ron no Kenkyü (Jõkan) P. 313.) (21) Katsura Shõryü. ibid Note 15, p. 13.

on error (bhrãnti) have an imaginary nature (parikalpita-svabhãva). When cognition (vijñãna), which depends upon the immediately preceding moment of consciousness and thus has a dependent nature (Paratantra—svabhãva), is seperated from the two images of the perceived and the perceiver which have an imaginary nature (parikalpita—svabhãva), it becomes absolute perfection To put it in another way, self—cognition (svasañvedana), which is only the operation


of perception, is absolutely perfect (parini§Panna—svabhãva). The cognition of ordinary people is always accompanied by the images of the perceived and the perceiver, which have an imaginary nature. On the other hand, the self—cognition of sages is the nondual cognition (advayajñãna), which is only the operation of perception and is detached from an unreal image, and is absolutely perfect, because it is seperated from the images of the perceived and the perceiver (grähya—grãhakãkãra), which are imaginary by nature. Il. The method of refutation (23) The purpose of Sãntarak$ta's, Kamalaéïla's, and Haribhadra's refutating the various views of other schools, such as atomic theories of Vaišesika, Vaibhãsika, and Sautrãntika, or the epistemology of Satyãkära and Alîkäkära—vädins, is to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niþsvabhãva). To do this, they begin by refuting the views that admit some intrinsic nature (svabhãva), in other words, they proof that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nilgsvabhãva). This method of refutation itself as a proof that all things are devoid of

(22) Oki Kazufumi. ibid Note 3, p. 181, 187, 199. (23) Yüichi Kajiyama. ibid Note 8, pp. 114—143. intrinsic nature, is actually indirect, in the sense that they negate the views of other schools. This negation proceeds by dividing the various views that admit some intrinsic nature (svabhãva) into classes of (24) alternatives and refuting them in order. This leads to the Mãdhyamika

(24) Mäl P198a6-b5 D181a6-b4 yañ dag pa'i tshad ma ñid kyis sgrub po // 'di Itar dños po rnams la don dam pa'i ño bo ñid cigl yod par gyur na rnam pa gñis kho nar 'gyur te / thams cad rgyu dañ rkyen la rag las te / Skye ba'i phyir mi rtag pa'i 1210 bo ñid yin te / dper na mdo sde pa dañ / rnal 'byor spyod pa pa rnam 'dod pa Ita bu áig gam / rañ Yin gyis yañ dag par grub pa'i bdag ñid kyi phyir brtan2 pa'i khoñs su gtogs pa £ig yin te / dper na mu stegs can la sogs pa dog gis3 bdag la sogs pa kun pa rtags pa rtags pa Ita bu áig yin grañ / rtag pa dañ mi rtag pa dag ni phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshanid yin pa'i phyir phuñ po gsum pa ni med do // ño bo ñid 'dir rnam pa gñi ga yañ don dam pa par mi ruñ ste / de sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma med pa'i phyir dañ / gnod par byed pa yañ srid pa'i phyir ro // 'di Itar mñon sum mam4 / rjes su dpag pa Žig sgrub par byed pa'i tshad ma yin par 'gyur grañ na / de la dños po'i no bo ñid daft po ni gñi gas kyañ yañ dag par 'grub pa med do // 'di Itar rgyu dañ 'bras ba'i dfios po grub na / de 'grub par 'gyur ba Žig na / rgyu daft 'bras bu'i dños po de yañ re áig mñon sum gyi sgo nas ni don dam par mi 'grub po // de ni dbañ po las byuñ ba'i mñon sum mam / rañ rig pa'i mñon sum gyis 'grub grañ 5 tshu rol mthoñ ba rnams rnal 'byor pa'i mñon sum gyis the sñad mi 'dogs pa'i phyir dañ / yid kyi mñon sum gañ la yañ ma grags pa'i phyir de dag gis ni de 'grub par ni mi bsam mo // 1. D. gcig 2. D. brten 3. P has / bdag la sogs pa dag gis / 4. P 'am 5. P has / " (The Yogäcära—mädhyamika) prove [that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhäva)) by the method of the valid means of cognition (Pramãpa). This is because, if all things have intrinsic nature (svabhãva) in absolute truth, there would be two kinds of intrinsic nature. That is to say, 1) because all things are produced by depending upon cause (hetu) and condition (Pratyaya), they have a temporary (anitya) intrinsic nature such as that which Sauträntika or Yogäcära school assert, or 2) because all things can be established as a real by nature, they are belonged to the class of immovables (drdha) such as the self (atman) which is imagined by non—Buddhist. It is impossible that a third alternative can be established because the eternal (nitya) and the temporary (anitya) are mutually exclusived The two kinds of intrinsic nature are not reasonabk with respect to view of this intrinsic nature from the standpoint of absolute truth (Paramãrthatas). This is because there is no the valid means of cognition (Pramãpa) to prore these two and because there is also way of rejecting them. The reason is that either — — truth that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature. Although this method of negation itself characterizes the tradition of the Mädhyamika begin- (25) ning with Nãgãrjuna (circa A. D. 150—250) and continued by his (25) followers Ärya—Deva (c. A. D. 170—270), Buddhapälita (c. A. D. 470— (25) (25) 540), Bhaväviveka (c. A. D. 500—570) and Candrakïrti (c. A. D. 600—

650), it was Sãntarak$ta, Kamalašïla, and Haribhadra that embraced this method and integrated with it the formal logic of Dharmakïrti. Applying this new synthesis with systems of debate, they sought •to establish the principle of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature (nitsvabhãva) and refuted the two theories within the Yogäcãra school of Satyãkãra and Alïkãkära. They went on to refute even the view of (26) Dharmakîrti as a Satyãkära—vädin, though the latter vacillates between the position of the Sautrãntika and Satyäkãra—vädin depending on the (27) context. Kamalaéila, in his Mal, seeks to demonstrate that all things are

direct perception (Pratyaksa) or logical inference (anumãea) is (necessary) to prove them. In this case, the first intrinsic nature cannot be proven by means of two kinds (of the valid means of cognition) as a true existence. This is because if a causation can be established, it (viz., a temporary intrinsic nature) could be proven. Firstly cousation cannot be proven as a real existence from the standpoint of absolute truth by means of direct perception (Pratyaku). If it [viz., causation) can be established, it could be proven by means of the direct perception of either the sense organs (indriya—Pratyaksa) or self—cognition (svasañzvedana—Pratyaksa). The two kinds of the direct perception of a seer and mentarity (mano-PratyakgL), because ordinary people do not judge depending upon the direct perception of a seer and the direct perception of mentality, cannot be acknowledge in any case." (25) Concerning these dates see Kajiyama Yuichi, ibid Note 5, p. 2, 7, 9. (26) cf. 3. 111. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRÄDVAYA. Tosaki Hiromasa

Pramãpavãrttika Genryõshö no Wayakukenkyü (16) 70 7 • -f (Japanese Translation with Annotation of PVI[ K K O 320-340), Tetsugaku Nenpõ (1979). p 46. Note (50). PVlff, K 328. (27) D. Malvania. Durvekamiéra's Dharmsttarapradïpa [Being a subcommentary

devoid of intrinsic nature by the dual method of the valid means of cognition (Pramãpa) and testimony (ãgama). In particular, he gives much attention to proof by the valid means of cognition (pramãea). As he stated, "It is not only by testimony or a reduction to absurdity (Prasañga) that we [Yogãcära—mädhyamika) intend to prove that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (niþsvabhãva), but by the method (28) of the valid means of cognition (Pramãea)." Kamalašïla and Haribhadra demonstrate that assertions of the Satyãkãra and Alikäkära—vädins cannot be proven by the two valid means of congnition (Pramãva), that is to say, direct perception (pratyak§a) and (29) inference (anumãna) respectively.

It is especially causation that they scrutinize by these two valid (30) means of cognition (Pramãea), because if causation can be established, some intrinsic nature (svabhãva) would be allowed as a reality, for (31) instance, either an eternal or a temporary intrinsic nature would be established. Ill. The essential focus of the refutation Ill. A. The focus of the refutation of the view of Satyäkãra—vädin

on Dharmottara's Nyãyabindutïka, a commentary on Dharmakïrti's Nyãyabindu). (TSWS, Vol. Il. Patna 1955) Introduction pp. xxii—xxiii. Tosaki Hiromasa, Idem (17). p. 46. Note (51), Idem (18), (1981). p. 104. Moreover Dharmakïrti takes the position of the Alïkãkära-vädin, too. Cf. Tosaki Hiromasa. Idem (17), p. 17. Note (70). PVI[, K 354, 355, 357, 358. Idem (16). PV KK O 330—331. Tosaki. Ibid. (Bukkyõ Ninshikiron no Kenkyü) pp. 312-315. PV 11, K 212, 213, 217. Mimaki Katsumi. Ibid. (BLO GSAL GRUB MTHA'). Xl : Yogäcãra. pp. 101-103. (28) Mal P198a5-6 D181a6 kho bo cag kyañ tshig tsam gyis chos thams cad ño bo ñid med par sgruh pa yañ ma yin la / thal bar sgrub pa tsam gyis kyañ ma yin no // 'o na že na yah dag pa'i tshad ma ñid kyis sgrub po // (29) (30) (31) cf. Note 24


lies in pointing out contradictions that occur when they assert that images (ãkãra) such as color blue are always real. The focus of refutation in the Mäl of Kamalašïla is as follows . (32... "If you [viz., Satyäkãra—vãdinj assert that images (ãkãra) are real, then [the cognition (vijñãna) that should be expected to be unitary (ekatva)) would become manifold just like the nature of images themselves because images (ãkãra) of cognition with respect to such (32a) things as pictures and so forth are manifold. If it is correct to understand that manifold cognition (vijñãna) arises in order to establish the principle of manifold images (ãkära), then it would be impossible to have a cognition (vijñãna) which grasps images (ãkãra) that exist as if they cover an object. This is because it is impossible for cognition (vijñãna), as something non—material (amirtatva), to occupy space. It is also not reasonable for something which does not occupy space to have any distinction such as north

(32) Mal P200b 2-6 D183a6-b2 gian yañ gal te rnam pa rnam pa rnams yañ dag pa ñid du 'dod na de'i tshe ri mo rkyañ pa la sogs pa dag la ges pa'i rnam pa sna tshogs yin pa'i phyir rnam pa báin du tha dad par thal bar 'gyur ro // gañ gis na rnam pa sna tshogs ñid gŽuñ gzugs pa'i phyir ges pa du ma Skye bar rtogs2 pa legs par 'gyur ba rnam par ées pa yul la bkram pa Ita bur 'dug par yoñs su 'dzin par Skye ba yañ med de / lus can ma yin pa la yul na gnas pa mi srid pa'i phyir dañ / yul na mi gnas pa rnams kyafi byañ dañ / éar la sogs pa'i phyogs kyi bye brag tu Skye bar mi ruñ ba'i phyir ro // de Itar mi Skye na yañ3 yul la bkram pa Ita bur snañ ba mi srid pa'i phyir ro // ées pa gcig dañ fio bo tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir ées pa'i ño bo bžin du rnam pa rnams fro bo ñid gcig par thal ba yañ yin no // tha dad pa yin na ni de dag kyañ don báin du ées pas 'dzin par mi' 'thad de / don Van yin pa'i phyir ro // de 'dzin par bya ba'i phyir rnam pa gžan dañ gian du rtog na yañ rnam pa rnams thug pa med par 'gyur ro // rnam pa "an dañ "an myofi ba yañ nam yañ med do // 1. D brkyañ ba 2. P togs 3. P 0m.

(32a) PV. 11. 205ab vijätïnäm anärambhãn nãläkhyädau vicitradhïh / and east. And this is because, since cognition (vijñãna) does not have any direction, it is impossible that [images (ãkãra)) can appear [within cognition (vijñãna)) as if they are spread over an object. Since images (ãkãra) [that should be expected to be manifold (aneka)) do not differ from unitary cognition (vijñãna) by nature, they must then have a unitary nature, like the nature of cognition (vijñãna—svarüPavat). On the other hand, if [images (ãkãra)) differ from [[[cognition]] (vijñãna)) by nature, they could not be grasped by cognition, like an object. In the latter case, (cognition and images) differ from each other. If, in order to grasp Can image), you [Satyäkära—vãdin) require the imagining of images one after another, this would mean an infinite regress (anavasthã). For images (ãkãra) can never be perceived in succession." This method of focusing on the incompatibility of unity (ekatva) and manifoldness (aneka) between cognition (vijñãna) and images (ãkãra) is found in the writing of Kamalašïla, and Haribhadra. It was also adopted by Ratnäkarašãnti (c. llc), who was a Alïkãkära—

vãdin, when he refuted the view of Jñãnašrimitra (c. 980—1030), who

was a Satyäkära—vädin. Kamalašîla and Haribhadra have inherited this (35) manner of debate from Sãntaraksita who had adopted it when refuting the four kinds of causation. Going back further this refutation of the (36) four kinds of causation can be traced to the Satyadvayavibhañga (33) Concerning this date see Kajiyama Yuichi ml.4Žf—, Köki Indo Bukkyo no Ronrigaku Y (Indian Buddhist Logic in the Later Period.) p. 245. Koza Bukkyõ Shisö No. 2 Ninshikiron Ronrigaku (1974). (34) Katsura Shoryu. cf. Note 15 p. 32 (35) SDP D 28b6 (36) SDNS (2) pp. 119-128 (37) (38) (SDV) of Jñãnagarbha (c. 700—760), verse XIV. How then is the incompatibility of unity (ekatva) and manifoldness (aneka) with respect to cognition (vijñãna) and images (ãkãra) established ? In the Mäl of Kamalašïla, this incompatibility is used to refute the view of Satyäkãra—vädin when he demonstrates that causation cannot be proven by means of direct perception (Pratyak§a) as sense perception


(indriya—Pratyak§a). Incompatibility is shown to occur when cognition (vijñãna) that should be expected to be a unity (ekatva) logically becomes manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images (äkära—svarüPatva). The model for this argument has been directly taken from the (40) refutation of atomic theory. He makes it clear that the errors (dosa) which were found in the case of examining an atom (Parãmapu) pertain also in this case, because cognition (vijñãna) that should be expected to be unity (ekatva) and immaterial (amürtatva) would have extension (deša—vitãna) or portions (sãvayavatã), like an atom, and would be

devoid of a single nature (ekatva). In conclusion, Kamalašïla points out that the Satyäkära—vädin's view involves a contradiction of direct perception (Pratyak§a) itself in that

AAPV W pp. 96926-97618 V pp. 54922-55325 cf. Note 8 (37) Concerning this date see Katsumi Mimaki cf. Note 3, INTRODUCTION (38) SDK XIV D2a5-b1, SDV D7a6, SDP D 28b6 du mas gcig gi dños mi byed // du mas du ma byed ma yin // gcig gis du ma'i dños mi byed // gcig gis gcig byed pa yañ min // cf. SDNS (2) p. 119. (39) Mãl P198b5 D181b5 de la re áig dbañ po'i mñon sum gyis ni de mi 'grub ste / ... ... Mal P200b2—6 D183a6-b2 cf. Note 32 (40) cf. Translation Concerning Šäntarak§ita see Yuichi Kagiyama. cf. Note 8 pp. 127—8 (41) cf. Note 32, Translation direct perception, in this case, includes imagingary thought—construction (vikalpa) because it grasps not only the unique particular (svalak§aea) that is the object of direct perception (Pratyak§a) but also the universal (sãmãnyalaksaea) that exists by definition within imaginary thought— (42) construction (vikalpa). In the same manner, Haribhadra also refutes their view by pointing out that it is contrary to the definition of direct (43) perception, which is devoid of imaginary thought—construction (vikalpa). This is because cognition itself involves imaginary thought—construction when multiple cognitions (anekajñãna) occurs at the same time (yuga-

111. A. A. Refutation of the view of CITRÄDVAYA Citrãdvaya means that cognition (vijñãna) which possesses manifold

(42) Mãl P202b6-7 D185a6 -7 gal te mñon sum ni rtog pa'i ño bo ñid tsam £ig yin no £e na / 'o na ni mñon sum rañ gi mtshan ñid kyi yul can ma yin te / rtogsl pa'i ño bo ñid ni spyi'i mtshan ñid kyi yul can yañ yin pa'i phyir ro // 1. D rtog Massaki Hattori. ibid. Note 1, pp. 79—80. (43) NB, I. 4. tatra kalpanäpodham abhrãntam. Th. Sthcherbatsky, Nyäyabindu of Dharmakïrti with Nyãyabindu?ïkã of Dharmottara, Bibl. Bud. VIl, 1977, p. 6. Masaaki Hattori. ibid. Note. 1. p. 25. Perception (Pratyaksa) is free from conceptual construction (kalpanä): pratyak kalpanãpodham. And pp. 82—83 cf. Note 20. Mal P. 202b3-6 D185a4-6. On the other hand, Dharmakïrti proves 'Patyaksañz kalpanäPodham' on the ground that a unitary cognition perceives manifoldness. (See Hiromasa Tosaki, ibid. Note 20, p. 307.) PV. 11. 207 nänãrthaikã bhavet tasmät siddhato'pi avikalpikã / vikalpayann apy ekärtharñ yato' nyad api paéyati // (44) cf. Translation PV. Il. 197ab. athaikäyatanatve' pi nãnekalñ grhyate sakrt /


(citra) images is unitary. The Satyäkãra—vãdin school asserts that cognition is always accompanied by a number of images (ãkãra) which are real (satya); however, any imaginary thought—constructions (vikalpa) with respect to these real images (äkära) such as concepts like the external world or the internal world, or "permanent" or "temporary", are in themselves always unreal additions to the images. They then had to answer the question of how a unitary cognition can possess

many images. That is why they advocate the theory of citrädvaya. This

position was taken by Prajñãkaragupta (c. A. D. 700—750) in his commentary, the Pramãeavãrtikabhã§yam, on verses 200 and 221 of chapter (48) Il (Pratyaksa) of Dharmakïrti's Pramãvavãrttika. " Although cognition has manifold images, it is none other than unitary. This is because cognition, having manifold images, differs by nature from the manifoldness of the external world itself. The manifoldness of the external world is distinguishable, but manifold images of cognition such as the color blue are indistinguishable. The reason is that the images such as the color blue that are the contents of perception itself cannot be perceived independently. Accordingly, although cognition is maniford, it is unitary because

images such as the color blue cannot be seperàtely discriminated." (50) How did Haribhadra then refute this theory? As mentioned above, (45) (46) (48) Oki Kazufumi. "Dharmakïrti no Citrädvaita riron ; Dharmakïrti D (citradvaita)} (Theory of Dharmakïrti's citrädvaita). JIBS Vol. XXI No. 2, Mar. 1973 p. 975 (47) Concerning this date see Kajiyama Yuichi, ibid. Note 33. p. 245. (49) Oki Kazufumi "Citrädvaita riron no tenkai—Prajñãkaragupta no Ronjutsu— (citradvaita) —Prajnakaragupta (Development of theory of citradvaita). Tokai Bukkyo No. 20, Dec. 1975, p. 9215—22 and Note 8. (50) cf. Translation Il-I-B—11-1-B-4 Kamalašïla and Haribhadra reached their refutation of the Satyäkãra— vädin view by pointing out that the Satyäkära—vãdin assertion involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception (Pratyak§a). In the case of citrädvaya as well, Haribhadra refutes this stance by utilizing the same method. Namely, their ground of asserting that a unitary cognition possesses manifold images (akara) is based upon the notion that manifold images such as the colors blue, yellow, and so forth which manifest at one moment, cannot be distinguished from one another by direct perception (pratyak§a). However, Haribhadra refutes this as follows : the presumption that manifold images cannot be distinguished (51) by direct perception also cannot be ascertained by direct perception. Ill. B. The focus of the refutation of the view of the Alikãkãra—vädin. The Alïkãkãra—vädin defines image (ãkãra) as the images of the perceived and the peceiver (grãhya—grãhakãkãra). According to their theory,an image (ãkãra) is none other than imaginary and unreal (alika), while only self-cognition (svasañvedana), which is detached from both the images of the perceived and the perceiver, is real. Accordingly, selfcognition means a nondual cognition (advaya—jñãna) and has only the operation of perception. Therefore, unreal images have nothing to do with real self-cognition, because unreal things cannot have any relation to some other thing. This is because, if self—cognition has some relation to unreal images, it would become unreal, like the image (ãkära). Then, how can the nondual cognition (advaya—jñãna) asserted by them, which is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver,

(51) cf. Note 42, 43. Translation Il—I—B—3 (Conclusion 1). Direct perception (Pratyaksa) does not grasp both distinction and nondistinction. be proven? (a) Kamalašïla shows that nondual cognition (advaya—iñãna) cannot be proven by inference (anumãva). Namely, he states that none of the logical reasons (hetu), a relation of identity (svabhãva), effect (kãrya), or non-perception (anupalabdhi), can be used to establish a proof. If images that manifest as two (viz., grähya—grãhaka) are also unreal, [as Alikäkãra—vãdin asserts), how can cognition exist as something with a nature apart from these in absolute truth? A real cognition that is devoid of both the images of the perceived and the perceiver cannot be perceived by ordinary people. Otherwise everyone could obtain the truth. It [viz., self—cognition that is devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) cannot be proven by inference (anumãea). This is because any logical reason to prove it cannot be established.

(52) Mäl P180b6-181a3 D166a1-5 gñis su snañ ba yañ brdzun pa ñid yin na ni ges pa'i ño bo gaff don dam par srid par 'gyun ba "an ci áig lus / ées pa de kho na ñid gzuñ ba dañ 'dzin pa'i rnam pa dañ bral ba gian ni tshu rol mthoñ ba rnams kyis yañ dag par myoñ ba med de / thams cad de kho na ñid mthoñ ba kno na ñid du thal bar 'gyur ro // de ni rjes su dpag pa'i sgo nas ñes pa yañ ma yin te / de Ita bu'i rtags ñid ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 'di Itar re fig rañ bžin gyi rtags las byuñ bas rjes su dpag pa ni mi srid de / d'i rañ báin ñid bsgrub par bya ba yin pa'i phyir ro / 'bras2 bu'i rtags kyañ ma yin te / gñis su med pa dañ 'ga' yañ Ihan cig rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños por ma grub pa'i phyir te / de ni dbañ pos mi sod pa'i phyir ro // de las ma gtogs pa'i 'bras bu gžan yod pa yañ ma yin te / 'di Itar khyed kyi Itar na gñis su med pa de kho na 'bras bur 'gyur ba fig na de ñid bsgrub par bya ba ñid kyi skabs yin pa'i phyir de yañ tshad mas grub pa ma yin no / gñis su snañ ba gañ yin pa de ni ri boñ gi rva dañ 'dra ba'i phyir 'bras bu ma yin no // gañ gis na mñon sum dañ mi dmigs pas sgrub pa rgyu dañ 'bras bu'i dños po 'grub par 'gyur ba don dam par gñis su med pa'i ées pas kyañ 'ga' yañ 'dzin pa med do // mi dmigs pa yañ dgag pa sgrub pa yin pa'i phyir yod pa sgrub pa'i skabs ma yin no // 1. P 0m. 2. P 'bas.

To begin with, inference based on a relation of identity (svabhãva) is impossible. This is because the identity of it [self—cognition as a nondual cognition) with some other thing is the very thing to be proven. Inference based on an effect (kãrya) is impossible. This is because it is untenable that a non—dual thing (viz., self—cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) has a causal relation with something else. It (viz., self—cognition as a nondualcognition) cannot be perceived by a sense organ (indriya). A different result apart from it (viz., self-cognition) does not exist.

The reason is that, according to your theory, the nondual thing (viz., self—cognition being devoid of both images of the perceived and the perceiver) itself would become the result, but that is the very thing to be proven. Neither can it be shown by the valid means of cognition (Pramãva). Because the two manifestations Cof the images of the perceived and the perceiver) are equivalent to the horns of a rabbit [viz., non—existence) [according to your theory), it is not a result. Otherwise, [if both images of the perceived and the perceiver exist in self—cognition), causality, which can be proven by direct perception (Pratyak§a) and non-perception (anupalabdhi), could be established. However, nothing can be perceived by non—dual cognition (advaya-jñãna) from the point of view of absolute truth (Paramãrthatas). Non—perception (anupalabdhi) is not an inference to prove the reality Cof non—dual cognition), because it is a proof of nonexistence. (b) Moreover, Kamalašïla refutes the view of the Alîkäkãra-vãdin that non-dual cognition (advaya—jñãna) is real by means of pointing

out that there is neither the relation of identity (tãdätmya) nor causation (tadutPatti) between the nondual cognition and unreal images (alikãkãra). Even though images (ãkãra) are unreal (alika), the identity of cognition and images should be acknowledged as long as these unreal images manifest in cognition. If so, both cognition and images would become unreal. Thus Kamalašïla points out that the view of Alïkãkära— vãdin involves contradiction. (53... If the nature of cognition (jñãna) is real (satya), there is neither the relation of identity (tãdãtmya) nor causation (tadutPatti) between a thing which truly manifests' and images (ãkãra) having an unreal nature. This is because it is incompatible for the real (satya) and the unreal (alika), which are mutually exclusive (ParasPara—Parihãra— sthiti—laksapa), to have the relation of identity (tãdãtmya) and this does not explain how the unreal is produced from something. Even though it (viz., the unreal) is produced by something, the two (viz., cause and effect) cannot be produced as a relation of identity

(53) Mal P182b3 - 8 D167b3- 7 ées pa'i bdag ñid bden pa'i ño bo de la ni gaff gis na de la de Itar gsal rab tu snañ bar 'gyur ba brdzun pa'i bdag ñid kyi rnam pa rnams de'i bdag ñid dañ / de las byuñ ba'i mtshan ñid kyi 'brel pa 'ga' yañ med be // bden pa dañ mi bden pa phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid dag ni de'i bdag ñid du 'gal ba'i phyir la / mi bden pa yañ gañ las kyañ Skye bar khas mi len pa'i phyir ro // de Skye na yañ 'di dag dus gcig tu de'i bdag ñid du snañ bar ni mi 'gyur te / rgyu dañ 'bras bu dag ni dus dañ fro bo ñid tha dad pa yin pa'i phyir ro // de Ita bas na gdon mi za bar rtogs pa'i ño bo dañ tha mi dad pa'i rañ gi ño bo'i rnam pa mi bden pa'i bdag ñid rnams snañ bar khas blañs ba'i phyir de'i bdag ñid kyi mtshan ñid kyis 'brel bar2 khas blañ dgos so // de'i phyir gñi ga' afi brdzun pa ñid du gyur to // de Ita ma yin na ni ji Itar brdzun pa'i rnam pa rnams dañ Ihan cig rtogs pa'i fro bo ñid de'i bdag ñid du ñams su myoñ bar 'gyur / de bas na bden pa la mñon par žen pa'i žags pa 'di 'or cig / 1. P 0m. 2. D par — — (tãdãtmya) at the same time. This is because cause and effect are different from each other with repect to time and their own nature. [Accordingly there is no causation (tadutPatti) between a true nondual cognition (advaya—jñãna) and an unreal image (ãkãra). ) It is unreasonable that the manifestation Cof images) is certified in spite of no relation between the two. Such would be over reductionistic (atiPrasañga). Accordingly you should surely acknowledge a relation of identity (tãdãtmya) between them, since the manifestation of unreal images [in the present case), which do not differ from the nature of cognition, are acknowleged. Thus both of them become unreal (alîka). Otherwise [if there is not a relation of identity between cognition and images), how can an unreal image (ãkãra) and the nature of cognition be perceived as an identity? Consequently cut this string of attachment to [only nondual cognition) as real.

IV. Conclusion

The method and contents of refuting the views of the Satyãkãra and Alïkãkära—vädin are common to the MAK and MAV of Säntaraksita, the MAP and Mal of Kamalašïla, and the AAPV of Haribhadra.

In the case of refuting the view of the Satyãkära—vädin, the incompatibility of unity (eka) and manifoldness (aneka) between cognition (vijñãna) and images (akãra) is pointed out. In conclusion, Kamalaéïla and Haribhadra show the error that this view involves, which is a contradiction with respect to direct perception (Pratyak§a) in that direct perception that should be expected to be devoid of imaginary thought— construction (vikalpa) becomes related to imaginary thought—construction. On the other hand, in case of refuting the view of Alïkäkära—vädin,

they show that the nondual cognition (advaya—jñãna) which is devoid of the images of the perceived and the perceiver (grãhya—grãhakãkãra) cannot be proven by inference (anumãpa) such as a relation of identity (svabhãva), effect (kãrya) or non-perception (anupalabdhi). Moreover it is pointed out that there is neither the relation of identity (tãdãtmya) nor a causal relation (tadutPatti) between the nondual cognition and unreal images (alikãkãra). In light of these refutations, Kamalašïla and Haribhadra cannot be considered as belonging to either the Satyãkära—vädin or the Alikäkãra— vãdin. This is also true for Sntaraksita. Nevertheless we should examine the sound basis on which they have been called the major philosophers of the Yogäcãra—mãdhyamika school and how they are distinguished from other philosophers of the Mädhyamika school, such as Bhävaviveka who is a Sauträntika-mãdhyamika and Candrakïrti who is a Präsañgika. At the same time, we should ask what the philosophy of Yogãcãra means in the context of Kamalašïla's philosophy. At the outset we should note that Kamalašïla describes the philosophy of Yogãcära in the sense of a school accepting only subjective reality (vijñãna-mãtra) or mind -only (citta—mãtra), as suitable for the attainment of the final

truth of all things being devoid of intrinsic nature (nil?svabhãva). Namely, he conceives of the philosophy of Yogãcära as a good approach

to the absolute truth of the Mãdhyamika. However this philosophy seems to be insignificant for Kamalaéïla, apart from its context as a theoretical

means to arrive at the highest Mädhyamika truth.

(54) cf. Note 56. (55) Mal P194a8-b1 D177b5 mar me la sogs pa phyi rol gyi don gyi fio bo'am ées pa'i ño bo yañ dag par This may be seen in the Mal of Kamalašïla. The Yogãcãra depending on scriptures such as the Sañdhinirmocana and the Gahanavyüha asserts that all things consist in subjective reality (vijñãna—mãtra) or mind—only (citta—mãtra), that only mind is an absolute existant, and that except for mind nothing exists. Therefore, they object to the position that all things are devoid of intrinsic nature (nihsvabhãva) can be proven. Kamalašïla has replied to this objection of Yogäcära. (56... These [[[scriptures]]) are not suitable for testimony. The existence of

ni ma grub ste / Whether a lamp has the nature of an object (artha) as the external world or of cognition (vijñãna) cannot be decided from the standpoint of absolute truth. BhKI . P53b6 D49a1 don dam par na sems kyañ bden par mi ruff ste / It is impossible from the point of view of the highest truth that mind (as well as objects of the external worlod) is real. BhKM. pp. 6-7.

Cittam api Paramãrthato mãyãvad anutPannam / Mind is also non-arising just like illusion from the viewpoint of the highest truth. (56) Mãl P170b4 —171a7, D156b7 —157b1 de yañ khuñs su mi ruñ ba ñid de / ji Itar sems yod pa ñid du bstan pa de bžin du gzugs kyañ mdo de daft de las rnam pa du mar yod pa ñid du bstan pa kho na ste / de'i phyir de yañ ci ste don dam par yod pa ñid du mi bzuñ / 'on te don tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir dañ / mdo gžan dag las kyañ bkag pa'i phyir don dam par yod par rnam par mi g£agl ste / gañ zag la bdag med pa tsam la gžug pa la Idem por dgoñs pas gtul bar bya ba de Ita bu'i bsam pa la Itos te / de bstan pa 'ba'a Eig tu zad do £es bya bar brjod na gal te de Ita na ni sems kyañ 'og nas 'byuñ ba'i tshed mas gnod pa'i phyir dañ / de mdo gzan las kyañ / fio bo ñid med pa ñid du bstan pa'i phyir don dam pa ñid du ma 'dzin par sems tsam po ñid de ni rim gyis don dam pa'i tshul gyi rgya mtsho la gzuñ ba'i phyir bstan pa 'ba'a fig tu zad do sñam du zuñ éig3 /4 'di Itar gañ Éig cig car chos ma lus pa 1210 bo ñid med pa ñid du rtogs par mi nus pa de re Éig sems tsam la brten nas / rim gyis phyi'i don ño bo ñid med pa ñid la 'jug go // de ñid kyi phyir / rigs pas rnam par Ita na rnams kyi // gzuñ dañ 'dzin pa 'gag par 'gyur // áes gsuñs so // de'i 'og tu rim gyis sems kyi ño bo ñid la so sor rtog na / de yañ bdag med pa ñid du khoñ du chud nas zab mo'i tshul la 'jug par 'gyur te / de skad du / bcom Idan 'das kyis / color—form (rüPa) as well as mind is explained in various manners in several different scriptures. Accordingly why don't you understand that it [viz., color—form (rüpa)) also exists from the standpoint of absolute truth ? [Objection:) The object of the external world cannot be established from the standpoint of absolute truth (Paramärthatas), since it involves a contradiction with respect to the valid means of cognition (Pramãpa) and since it is denied in other scriptures also. The object of the external world is just stated according to the aim of disciples (vineya) who want to arrive at only the non—existence of the essential nature in a person (Pudgala—nairãtmya), because of the secret purpose of the scriptures of leading them there.

[Answer:) If so, since mind (citta) is also refuted through the valid means of cognition (Pramãea), which will be stated later on, and since it is explained as devoid of intrinsic nature (niþsvabhãva) even in other scriptures, you should understand that this theory of mind—only (citta—mãtra) was taught only to help one comprehend the ocean of the theory of absolute truth without regarding it as an

sems tsam la ni brten nas su // phyi rol don la mi rtog go // de báin na ñid la dmigs nas ni // sems tsam las kyañ bzla bar bya // sems tsam las ni bzlas nas su // snañ ba med la bzla bar bya // snañ med gnas pa'i rnal 'byor pa // des ni theg pa chen po mthoñ // 'jug pa Jhun gyis grun ciñ ái // smon lam dag gis mam par sbyañs // ye šes dam pa bdag me pa // snañ ba med la mi •••56a

mthon ño // žes gsuñs so // gáan dag na re sems tsms ni raff gis rab tu grub pa'i ño bo ñid yin pa'i phyir kun rdzob tu gnas pa kho na yin la / phyi'i don ni kun rdzob tu yañ mi gnas te / sems kyi rnam pa las ma gtogs par de grub pa med pa'i phyir ro // de'i phyir de rab tu bstan pa'i ched du bcom Idan 'das kyis dños po rnams sems tsam ñid du bstan gyi / de don dam par yod pa ñid ni ma yin te / mdo gian las de yañ ño bo ñid med pa ñid du bstan pa'i phyir te / (1) P hass báag (2) P has las bltos (3) P has Éig (4) P 0m. absolute existent. The reason is that those who cannot recognize all things as devoid of intrinsic nature (nitsvabhãva) in one moment, recognize gradually that an object as the external world is devoid of intrinsic nature by firstly depending upon the theory of mind—only (56-1... (citta—mãtra). Therefore, [the Blessed One) taught that the perceived and the perceiver (grähya—grãhaka) are destroyed by those who ex- ...56-1) amined [the external world) by means of reason (yukti). After that, when they gradually scrutinize the nature of mind, recognizing its being devoid of intrinsic nature too, they would comprehend the profound theory. The Blessed One taught as follows: (56a•••

Depending upon mind—only (citta—mãtra), the Yogin does not imagine an object in the external worid. Observing truth, he should transcend mind—only. After transcending mind—only, he should transcend non— manifestation [of the Perceived and the Perceiver). The Yogin who thus abide in non-manifestafion beholds the great vehicle (mahãyãna). The spontaneous stage (anãbhoga) which he reaches is tranquil and is purified by his devout vow. He observes that even perfect wisdom is devoid of intrinsic nature by means of the non—manifestation Cof ...56a) non—dual cognition). Some other scholars advocate as follows

(56-1) LAS, X-154ab yuktyä vipaéyamänãnälñ grähagrãhyaffi nirdhyate / (56a) Lañk X. 256-258 BhK 1. p. 2109-14 cittamätralñ samäruhya bähyam artharh na kalpayet / tathãtälambanel sthitvä cittamätram atikramet // cittamãtram atikramya niräbhãsam atikramet / nirãbhãsasthit02 yogi mahãyãnam nag paéyate // anãbhogagatih éãntä pranidhãnair viéodhitä / jñãnam anätmakam4 ére$ham nirãbhãse na paéyati // 1. BhK. tathatälambane 2. BhK. niräbhäse sthito 3. BhK. sa 4. BhK. nirãtmakaltl 5. BhK. niräbhäsena The theory of mind—only (citta—mätra) is reasonable from the standpoint of conventional truth (sañv?tyã) since it is inherently established. On the other hand, the object of the external world is not reasonable even from the standpoint of conventional truth since the external world independent of the mind Cor internal world) cannot be established. Therefore, although the Blessed One (Bhagavat) teaches that existences are product of the mind—only in order to indicate the above meaning, still he does not teach that it [viz., the existence of mind— only) is reasonable from the standpoint of absolute truth (Paramärthatas). This is because it is taught in other scriptures that the mind [as well as colorform (rüpa)) is devoid of intrinsic nature ...56) (nitsvabhãva). 

4. Summary of the contents of Haribhadra's Abhisamayãlañkärãlokä Prajñäpäramitävyäkhyä The logical formula (Prayoga).........W6245 V45732 A thing capable of effect implies : [I) a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jñeya—rüPa) which belongs to the external world ; or [Il) a thing which has the nature of cognition(jñãna—rüPa). ......W62411 V4584 I. A thing capable of effect is a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jñeya—rüPa) which belongs to the external world. ......W62412 V4585 Haribhadra refutes the view of the three kinds of atomic theory formulated by those who maintain that the external world is real, such as [1-1) Vai9ika, [1—2) Vaibhäsika and C1-3) Sauträntika. I—I. The hold that things which have a knowable nature (jñeya—rüpa) are atoms which have intrinsic natures that are connected to one another and form a unitary nature. W62416 874587 This view is refuted by the following arguments 1—1—1. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms at one spot (eka—deša) W62416 V4587 1—1—2. It is contradictory that an atom combines with the other atoms to form a whole (sarvâtmanä) W62418 V4589 1—2. The Vaibhäsika hold that the atom in the center is surrounded by atoms that have the nature of nonadhering (asamãšli§ta), and that there are intervals remaining between them(sântara). ......W62427 V45814 This view is refuted by the following arguments

1-2-1. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in the very same manner that it faces a single atom W6258 8745820

This same refutuation is also applied to the case of the Satyâkaravädin's view. (cf. Il—I—A—2—1) 1—2—2. It is contradictory that the atom in the center by a single nature faces the other atoms in a different manner than it faces a single atom. (cf. Il—I—A—2—2) W62518 V45827 1—3. The Sauträntika hold that atoms are an aggregation without intervals remaining between them (nir—antara) W62521 V45829 This view is refuted by the following arguments . 1—3--1. The directional characteristic of the atom in the center would be decided only by the side which is combined (sañyoga—paksa) because 'having no interval(nairantarya)' is equivalent to 'combination(sañyoga).'

1—3—2. It is illogical that an uncombined (asañyukta) atom is surrounded by the many atoms which are in contiguous locations (samîPatara— dešâvasthita) that are suitable to be called the side (dik—šabda—vãcya). w62524 V45831 1-4. [Conclusion : ) Distinction (bheda), which means the external world and which is produced by thought—construction, (kalPanoParacito) is not an essential component of efficiency(arthakriyâñga) W62527 V4593 Il. Haribhadra refutates the view of the Yogãcära school (viz., Satyâkara and Alïkâkãra—vädins): They assert that a thing capable of effect (arthakriyã—yogya) means a thing which has the nature of cognition

(jñãna—rüpa) W6267 V45910

Il—I. Haribhadra's refutuation of the view of Satyâkãravädin (ones who assert that images are real) : They explain the production of cognition (vijñãna) according to the casual relation with images (ãkãra) of both the perceived and the perceiver(grãhya—grãhaka) W62617

Il—I—A. According to this theory, cognition (vijñãna) would become manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images (ãkãra—svarüPavat). On the other hand, images (ãkãra) would become a unity (ekatva), like the nature of cognition (vijñãna—svarüpavat) W62617 V45917 Il—I—A—l. It is contradictory that cognition, which has a unitary nature, perceives manifold images (vaictryâkãra) W62620 8745919 Il—I—A—2. It is contradictory that diverse cognitions (vijñãna) of the same kind (samãnajãtiya) occur simultaneously like different kinds of cognition (vijãtiya—jñãnavat) .W6272 V45923 Il—I—A—2—1. It is contradictory that the cognition Cvijñãna), which is thought to be situated in the center (madhya), like an atom, faces by nature the other cognitions in the very same manner that it faces a single (eka) cognition. This is because the other cognitions would mutually occupy the same point. (cf. 1-2—1).........W6278 V45927

Il—I—A-2—2. It is contradictory that the cognition, which is thought to be situated in the center, like an atom, faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner. This is because it would have parts and it would thus be devoid of unity (ekatva). (cf. 1—2—2).........W62711 V45929 Il—I—A-2-3. Cognitions would be regarded as if they manifest having extension (deša—vitãna) in as far as they are multiple (bahu) but contrary to the fact that they do not have space (adeša) according to your theory that cognition has a manifold nature W62713 V45931 Il—I—A—2—4. The refutation of the view of the atomic theory can be applied to cognition (vijñãna) W62722 V4605 Il—I—A-2-5. [Conclusion:) Your statement that multiple cognitions (anekaiñäna) occur at the same time (yugaPad) involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception(Pratyak§a—virodha). ......W62728 V46010 Il—I—B. The refutation of CITRADVAYA (the view that a cognition possessing manifold images is itself a unity) W6287 V46014

It is contradictory that a single cognition (vijñäna) includes

a manifold nature (citra—rüPa) W6287 V46014 Il—I—B—2. Manifoldness (citra) is incompatible with unity(ekatva)

W62812 V46017 Il—I—B—3. [Conclusion 1 • It is contradictory that manifoldness appears as a unity in direct perception (Pratyak§a) since direct perception does not perceive a distinction W62822 V46024 Il—I—B—4. [Conclusion 2 : It is contradictory that manifoldness (citra) also is single (eka) since concentration (yoga) and tranquility (ksema) are not distinguished (abhinna). This is because the fact that concentration and tranquility are not distinguished from each other is not grasped by direct perception (pratyak§a) W6291 V46028 11—2. Refutation of the view of the Alïkâkära—vädin (ones who assert that images (äkãra) are unreal) 62910 V461 2 (To be continued) —


5. A Translation of Haribhadra's Abhisamayälañkärãlokä Prajñäpäramitãvyãkhyã (101.. [Major:) Whatever does not possess a single nature or a plural nature (ekâneka—svabhãva), does not have an intrinsic nature (svabhãva) from the standpoint of the highest truth (Paramârthatas): such as an illusion (mãyã). [Minor:) Things set forth by some Buddists and others (sva—Para) are devoid of a single nature or a plural nature (ekâneka— ...101) swabhãva). [Conclusion : Therefore, things set forth by some Buddists and others are not capable of having an intrinsic nature.) [This inference) is based on the principle of the perception of the incompatibility with the pervasive element (vyãpakaviruddhopalabdhi). This means that the Tathägata is like an illusion (mãyoPama). The logical reason (hetu) of this inference is not inadmissible (asiddha), since the action (Pravrtti) of a sage (Prek§ãvat) is pervaded by having purpose (Prayojana—vat). A thing (padârtha) capable of effect Cartha-

(101) cf. MAK 1. P48b8 D53a1-2 MAV P52b5 - 6 D56b 7 bdag dañ gian smra'i' dños 'di dag / yañ dag tu na gcig pa dañ // du ma'i rañ bžin bral ba'i phyir // rañ bžin med de gzugs brñan bŽin // 1. MAV. PD smras BCP, p. 173 niþsvabhãvã amï bhãvãs tattvatah svaparoditãh / ekãnekasvabhãvena viyogät pratibimbavat // MAP P89a4-6 D87b2-3 gañ dagl gcig dañ du ma'i rañ b£in ma yin pa de dag ni don dam par2 raff bžin med de / dper na gzugs brñen b£in no // bdag dañ gžan gyis smras pa'i dños po rnams kyañ gcig dañ du ma'i raff báin ma yin pas áes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa yin te / gcig pa ñid dañ du ma ñid dag gis rañ báin la khyab pa'i phyir ro // 1. D zag 2. P 0m. _ (102) (103) kriyã—yogya) should be examined (vicärya) as an object (visaya). Otherwise, what sort of purpose (Prayojana) can those who pursue effectiveness (arthakriyârthin) attain by means of investigating useless things (asad-artha—Padârtha—vicãra) ? Therefore, the thing which has an effect (arthakriyã—kãrin) should be pursued. Does it (viz., a thing capable of effect) imply : [I) a thing which has a nature that is knowable (jñeya—rüpa) (which belongs to the external world); or [Il) the nature of knowledge (jñãna—rüpa), because they (viz., a thing cognizable and cognition) are also mutually incompatible (anyonya-vyavaccheda—rüPatva) ? [I) If the first alternative is maintained, does it (viz., a nature which (104... is knowable (jñeya—rüPa)) imply : [1-1) intrinsic natures which are ...104) connected with one another (Paras-Para-sañyukta—svabhava); or C1—2) (105... a thing which is surrounded by atoms (Paramãeu) that are homogeneous compositions (samãna—jãtïya), that are separated from one another by means of potency (sãmarthya), that have the nature of nonadhering (asamãšli§ta—svarüPa), and that have intervals remaining between them

(102) Read thus insted of paramärtha [W) according to doñ byed pa CP279b8) (103) Read thus instead of vicãraé cf. P 280a' rnanc par dpyad par bya (104) MAV P55a2 D59a2 phrad de 'tshogs nas dgos pa rtsom mo žes zer ba Ita bu'am / MAP P94b7-95a1 D92b1 de la kha cig na re rdul phra rab rnamsl phan tshun reg go žes zer ro // 1. D has la phra rab (105) MAV P55a2-3 D59a2 yañ na phan tshun mthus 'dzin gyis ma 'byar ba'i rañ báin barl yod ciñ bskor ba ste / 1. D par MAP P95a1 D92b1 "an dag na re rigs mthun pa mañ posl bskor ba rnams ni bar dañ bcas pa kho na yin la / 1. P has por — 38 — ...105) (106) (107... (sântara); or [1—3) a thing which is surrounded by atoms without ...107) intervals remaining between them (nir—antara) ? (108... Then, (1—1) in the first case, [1—1—1) if X (viz., an atom) is combined with Y (viz., the other atoms) at one spot (eka—deša), then X would have parts (sâvayavatva). Therefore, the single nature (ekatva) [of an atom) is destroyed, since it [the atom) is combined with other atoms „•108) (avu) having natures different from one another (aparâpara—svabhãva). (109... [1—1—2) If you assert that an atom combines with other atoms to form a whole (sarvâtmanã), when the atom in the front (Pürva) is combined (109a) with another in the back (aparâeu) to form a whole (sarvâtmanã), the atom in the back also is combined with yet another in front of it. Therefore, no sort of atom can ever be established as a single entity (eka—svabhãvatã) since their intrinsic natures (svabhãva) are mingled with each other on the ground that their combination (sañyoga) depends on the two.

(106) Read yad vã according to CW) insted of yadä CV). (107) MAV P55a4 D59a3 ji Itar rdul phra rab rnams mi reg kyañ bar med pas reg par 'du ées so // 1 1. D 0m. MAP P95a5 D92b4 gžan dag na re reg pa yañ ma yin la bar dañ bcas pa dag kyañ ma yin mod kyi / 'dabl chags pa kho nar gnas so £es zer te / 1. P mdab (104) (105) (107) MAK. Xl ab MAV P55a 8 D59a6 'byar ba dañ ni bskor ba'm // bar med rnam par gnas kyan ruñ // TS 1989 ab samyuktam düradeéastham nairantaryavyavasthitam / (108) MAV P55a5-6 D59a4-5 phyogs gcig gis 'byar na ni cha éas yod par 'gyur te / raff bžin gžan dañ gáan dag gis rdul gžan dati 'byar ba'i phyir ro / (109) MAV P55a5 D59a4 bdag ñid thams cad kyis 'byor na ni rdzas rnams 'dres par 'gyur te / rdul gyi raff báin gcig pu gañ gis 'byar ba de ñid gian dañ yañ 'byar ka'i phyir ro / (109a) W aParepâpunã —

This is because the atom in the front abandons its own nature (sva—svabhãva) and produces, in all respects, the nature of another at the back on the grounds that it is combined with another at the back to form a whole. And though it (viz., atom in the front) is combined with (another at the back), it is non—existent (asattva). In the same way, an atom at the back is also combined with another in the front. For this reason, the foundation of combination (sañyogâšraya) [viz., atom at the back) is non—existent (asattva) because an atom at the back abandons its own nature (sva—svabhãva) and it produces, in all respects, the nature of the atom in the front. Therefore, since it is unreasonable for unity (eka) to be affirmed (vidhi) and to be denied (pratiydha), which have the characteristics of excluding each other at the same time (ekadã), how can • • •109) Can atom) be of a single nature (eka—svabhãvatã) ? (110. [1—2) In the second case where [the knowable (viz., an atom)) is surrounded [by atoms with intervals remaining between them), even though contact (sañsparša) with the same sorts (samãna—jãtïya) [of

(110) MAP P95a8-95b 2 D92b7-93a1 phyogs gñis pa Itar na yañ rigs mthunl pa rnams dañ reg par mi 'dod du chug kyañ / phrag ni snañ ka dañ mun pa'i ño bo yin pa'i phyir rigs mi mthun pa snañ ba dañ 3 mun pa'i rdul phra rab rnams dañ ni reg par 'dod pa ñid do / snañ bas mnon pa'i mun pa dañ bral ba ñid dam4 / mun pas gnas su ma byas pa'i snañ ba dañ bral ba ñid ni rigs pa dañ Idan pa ma yin te / de gñis5 'byuñ ba ni yul la sogs pa phan tshun bral ba tsam la rag las pa'i phyir ro / 1. P 'thun pa 2. P ño'i 3. D has / 4. P daft 5. P de ñid MAV P55a6-7 D59a5 bar yod pa yañ bar dag tu snañ ba dañ mun pa'i rdul phra rab rnams kyi go skabs yod par 'gyur te / phrag ni mun pa dañ snañ ba'i bdag ñid yin pa'i phyir de dag dañ 'byar bar 'gyur ro / — — atoms) is not acknowledged, (contact) with the different sort (vijãtïya) of atoms (Paramãpu) of light (ãloka) and darkness (tamas) is necessarily acknowledged since the dividing space (chidra) has both the natures of light and darkness This is because it is not reasonable that a location which is not reached (asamãkrãnta) by light (ãloka) is devoid of darkness (tamas) or that a location which is not covered with darkness is devoid of light. This is why the two [viz., light and darkness) produce an inevitable connection (pratibaddha) only at the location, and so forth separated ...110) from each other. In the same way, the same error (do§a) as stated immediately above would follow that. If the connection (sañsparša) with different sorts (vijãtiya) (of atoms) (111... is not acknowledged, then the atom in the center (madhyavartin) either (1—2—1 ) faces, by a single nature, one atom and all other atoms in the ...111) very same way, or (1—2—2) faces all the other atoms in different ways. Thus there are two alternative (vikalpa) ways of dealing with the problem.

(111) MAP P95b4-5 D93a3 de la dbus na yod pa'i rdul phra rab gañ yin pa de rañ báin gañ gis rdul phra rab gcig la bltas te gnas pa de ñid kyis gŽan la bltas sam / 'on te ma yin £es bya ba brtag pa gñis so / MAK. Xl cd MAV P55a8 D59a6 - 7 dbus gnas rdul phran rdul gcig la // bltas pa'i rañ Yin gañ yin pa / TS 1989 cd rüpam yad mor madhavarttinah / MAK. Xll MAV P55bi D59a7 rdul phran g£an la Ita ba yañ // de ñid gal te yin brjod na // de Ita yin na de Ita bu // sa chu la sogs rgyas 'gyur ram // TS 1990 anvantaräbhimukhyena ted eva yadi kalpyate / pracayo bhüdharãdînãm evam sati na yujyate //

(112...

[1—2—1) In the case of the first

(Major:) Whatever has an intrinsic nature which faces the other atom of a single nature (eka—rüpa) would occupy a same spot (eka—deša) {that the surrounding atoms occupy) . e. g. the very atom Cin the center) would occupy the same   spot that the atom in the front occupies.

(Minor:) All the surrounding (Parivãraka) [[[atoms]]) have a nature which faces a single atom (eka—Paramãeu). (Conclusion : Therefore, all the surrounding atoms occupy the same spot.) [This is an inference) formulated on the logical characteristic of ...112) essential identity (svabhãva—hetu). The logical reason (hetu) of this inference has not the fallacy of inadmissibleness (asiddhatä), since it [the atom in the center) is acknowledged to face [another atom) by having the very same nature. Neither is this contradictory (viruddhatã), since the logical reason (hetu) is present in homogeneous examples (saPak§a). (113... On the other hand, if [the surrounding atoms) occupy points different

(112) MAP P95b7-8 D93a5-6 sbyor ba ni rdul phra rab kyi ño bo gcig la bltas pa'i rañ báin gañ yin pa de ni phyogs gcig pa can yin te / dper na dbus na gnas pa'i rdul phra rab de ñid kyi gar phyogs na gnas pa'i rdul phra rab Ita bu'am éar phyogs kyi khañ la khan pa gcig bltas pa Ita bu ste / bskor ba'i rdul phra rab thams cad kyañ rdul phra rab gcig la bltas pa'i rañ bžin yin pas Ées bya ba ni rañ báin gyi gtan tshigs so // 1. Porn. (113) MAP P95b8-96a2 D93a6-7 phyogs tha dad pa na gnas pa yin na ni mñon par 'dod pa'i rdul phra rab gcig pu la bltas pa'i rañ b£in dag tu mi 'gyur te / rdul phra rab te la raff báin gáan med pa'i phyir ro // rañ Min med na bltas pa yañ mi ruñ ba'i phyir gtan tshigs ma lies pa ñid ma yin no // de'i phyir yañ dag par nal bskor te gnas pa med pas rdul phra rab rnams rgyas par mi 'gyur ro // 1. P 0m.

from (bhinna—deša) one another, it would be impossible for them to face the single atom which is sought. This is because that atom does not have a diverse nature (aParâPara—svabhãva). Neither is the logical reason (hetu) inconclusive (anaikãntikatã), since it is not reasonable to face one another, if devoid of identity (svabhãva). Therefore, the surrounding (Parivãraka) atoms would be located at the same point (eka—dešatã) because [the atom in the center) is lacking the condition ...113) to be surrounded (parivãryâvasthana). When an assemblage (Pracaya) Cof atoms) does not exist from the standpoint of the highest truth (tattvatas), it is not reasonable for the atom (Parãmapu) to be acknowledged as having a single nature (eka-svabhãva) simply because of their being devoid of the effect (arthakriyã) that is to be proved (sãdhya). (114...

Then in the second case, since the atom [in the center) separately faces and combines with the other atoms having a different nature from one another, it would have portions (sâvayavatã). Therefore, ...114) it is just evident that atoms are devoid of a single nature (ekatva). This is because the discrimination of an entity (vastu—bheda) is defined by its having an intrinsic nature (svabhãva—bheda). (115.. (1—3) On the other hand, [1—3—1) if you maintain the third alternative

(114) MAK Xlll MAV P55b4 - 5 D59a3 rdul phran gŽan la Ita ba'i ños // gal te gžan du 'dod na ni // rab tu phral rdul ji Ita bur // gcig pu cha éas med par 'gyur // 1. MAK. P. phra ba'i TS 1991 anvantaräbhimukhyena rüpam ced anyad isyate / kathalñ nama bhaved ekah paramãqus tathã sati // MAP P96a2-3 D93a7-93b1 phyogs gñis pa Itar na yañ yan lag dañ bcas pa ñid du thal bar 'gyur bar gsal barl bdag gis rnam par ma phye'o // 1. D has rab tu (115) MAV P55a7 D59a5-6 bar med pa'i phyogs kyañ 'byar ba'i phyogs dañ tha dad pa med pa ñid de /

where Can atom in the center) is surrounded by atoms without intervals remaining between them (nairantarya), [the nature of the atom in the center) is decided by the side which is combined 'Having no interval (nairantarya)' is a synonym of 'combination ...115) (sañyoga)'. This is because there is no other alternative (gati) for a thing which is devoid of intermediate space (antarãla—deša) except mutual combina- (116) tion (Parasparsañšlesa). Even though the same sense is expressed by other words (šabda), it does not mean to exist in a different manner (anyathã). This is because otherwise unsuitable consequences would follow (atiPrasañgãt). [1-3-2) C Objection:) On the other hand, only that uncombined (asañyukta) (117) atom is surrounded by the many stoms which occupy an adjacent location (118) (samiPatara—dešâvasthita) which should be called the side (dik-šabda— vãcya). C Answer:) It is not reasonable. This is because this word ["side") is not established in practice (arthavattã) when this side and that side (arvãk—para—bhãga) do not exist (in atom).

bar med pa ni phrag med pa'o // phrad pa daft 'byar ba Ées bya ba ni don tha dad pa ma yin te / (116) W parasParasañšlesamuktvã, V Parasparasañšlesañz muktvä (117) This atomic theory is also a theory of the Sautrãntika. cf. Yuichi Kajiyama. ibid. Note 5. p. 40. Yuichi Kajima. Sonzai to Chishiki—Bukkyõ Tetsugaku Shoha no Ronsõ (Existence and Cognition—Debates of the Buddhist Philosophical Schools) Kyöryöbu no Konponteki Tachiba (the Fundamental position of the Sautrãntika school). Journal of Philosophical Studies (Tetsugaku Kenkyü No. 505. (1967), p. 1153. (118) V samipetara — — (1-4) (119.. [Objection:) Whatever is determined to have a different nature by another thing is false (asat) from the point of reality: e. g. distinctions

(119a) •••119) such as "this side" and "that side" According to this reasoning, Can atom) is not truly endowed with portions (savayavatva). [Answer : ) (Your statement) is incorrect. This is because it is impossible for those who admit the external world (bahir—arthavãdin) to

(120. ...120 confuse this with that due to distinctions of mutual relation (vyapeksã— bheda) : e. g. father and his son. Only the true (tãttvika) should be acknowledged as a nature (rüpa). This is because when it is the further shore (pãra) that depends on (121) something, it is never the nearer shore (aPãra) that depends on it [the further shore). Otherwise, how can the two which are called the nearer and further (122) shores (parâparâbhidhãna—tata) exist without the confusion (asãñkarya) (123) when both the nearer and further shores are not established from the point of view of absolute truth (apãramãrthikatva) ?

(119) I cannot identify this source. cf. Ml'. XlV-5 anyad anyat pratïtyänyan nänyad anyad Ite' nyatah / yatpratïtya ca yat tasmãt tad anyan nopapadyate // MK. XV111-10 pratïtya yad yad bhavati na hi tävat tad eva tat / na cänyad api tat tasmän nocchinnaril näpi éäévatarh // (119a) Read pãrãPära according to CW) has pãrãvãra. (120) Read PãrãPãra according to CV). (W) has pãrãvãra. (121) Read apäram according to CW) has apãram. (122) Read pãräPãra according to CV). CW) has pãrävãra. (123) Read Päräpära according to CW) has pärävãra. — —

This is because it is said that the other thing from what is thought to be the further shore (pãrâbhimata) is none other than the nearer

(124) (125) shore (aPãratva) which (you) want to call (vivak§ita) the nearer shore. If it (viz., the further shore) is also thought to be a thing which is imagined, the two (viz., the nearer and the further shore) would be identical (aikya). And in the same way things which are dependent upon something [viz., the nearer shore) (tad—ãšrita) would not exist without confusion (asañkïrea). This is because distinction (bheda) which is produced by thought—construction (kalPanoParacito) is not an essential component of efficiency (arthakriyâñga). [11) (201... That thing which is established by itself (svataþ siddha—rüpa) is none other than nondual cognition (advayañ jñänam) which has a single nature (eka—svabhãva) and which is separate from the relationship pertaining between cognitum and cognizer (grãhya—grãhaka—bhãva— rahita) from the standpoint of highest truth (Paramârthatas), because : 1) an object (vi§aya) exists by means of perception (sañvedana), 2)

(124) Read apãratvam according to [W) has avãratvam. (125) Read apãrasya according to CW) has avärasya. (201) cf. MAV P61a7-61b1 D64b6-7 raff gi sde pa sems tsam gyi tshul la brten pa blo gros dkar bal gañ dag rnam par ées pa ni mthun pa'i bag chags yoñs su smin pa la rag las nas 'byuñ ste / byuñ ma thag tu 'jig pa dañ don du tshor bar bya ba dañ tshor ba po'i rnam pa med do Žes smra ba de dag gi lugs la dogs pa bsu ste / 1. D pa sums up his view of the Yogäcãra—school before beginning his refutation of the view of the Satyäkãra and Alïkãkãra—vädins. "I take up the views of Yogãcära—school that hold that cognition (vijñãna) is produced by the force of the maturation of latent impressions (vãsanã), and these arise in succession. Immediately after being produced, cognition perishes. In truth, [the Yogäcäras maintain) the images (ãkãra) of the perceived and the perceiver (produced by the force of latent impressions) are non—existent."


an object (artha) is entirely invisible (atyanta—Parok§atvãt) when it is not being perceived, 3) a particular adapted effect is produced (pratiniyatasya käryasyodayãt). by means of the immediately preceding moment of mind (samanantara-Pratyaya), 4) it is impossible to conceive of [the production of a particular adapted effect) when its (the immediately preceding moment of mind) is excluded. This is because if [[[nondual]] knowledge) were devoid of cause (ahetukatve), it would always exist, etc. Because it is impossible that an eternal thing (nityatva) has efficiency (arthakriyã), etc., a thing which perishes as soon as it has been produced (udayânantarâPavargin) has a connection with its own cause (sva-hetu). (202... Images (ãkãra) merely manifest there (viz., in that cognition) by means of the maturation of latent impressions which adhere to a thing which has been existing as an entity in the world of transmigration since the beginningless past (anãdi—bhava—bhãvi—bhãvâbhiniveša—väsanã— ...202) paripãka—prabhãvät). Therefore, Yogãcäras consider that an entity (bhãva) consists of ...201) cognition (jñãnâtmaka). In this case also, [Yogäcäras) discriminate between C Il—I] those images (ãkãra) Cof cognition) which are real (tãttvika); C11—2) those

(202) cf. MAK. XLIV. MAV P61b1 D64b7 ji ste thog ma med rgyud kyi // bag chags smin pas sprul pa yi // rnam pa dag ni snañ ba yañ // nor bas sgyu ma'i rañ báin 'dra // MAV P61b3 D65a2 dmigs pa bden par 'dod pa'i ges pa la snañ ba'i rnam pa 'di dag kyañ thogs ma med pa'i srid par 'byuñ ba can dños po la mñon par áen pa'i bag chags yoñs su smin pa'i mthus snañ ño // which are satisfactory as long as they are not examined by any means (203) (203a) (avicãraika—ramya) such as reflection (Pratibimba), etc. [Il—I) Let us suppose that those images (ãkãra) are real. (204...

In that case, since cognition (vijñãna) is inseparable from images (ãkãra) which are real (tattvika) and manifold (aneka), it (viz.,

(204a) cognition) would become manifold (anekatva), like the nature of images (ãkãra—svarüPavat), how could it [[[cognition]]) be a unity (ektã) ? On the other hand, if cognition (vijñãna) can be defined as having a unity (ekatva) since it is perceptible for only one moment (sakrt), (204b) then it is hard to avoid the problem that images (ãkãra) would become a unity (ekatva), like the nature of cognition (vijñãna—svarüPavat), ...204) because they are inseparable from a unitary cognition (eka—jñãna). [objection:) It is so. UI-I-A-I

(203) MAR, XLV. MAV P61b4 D65a2 -3 de dgel 'on kyañ de dag gi3 //2 dños de yañ dag ñid dam ci // 'on te ma brtags gcig pu na // dga'a bar khas len 'di bsam mo // 1. Reform age from dag according to MAP (P107a1, D102b6) 2. D. MAK, MAV have / 3. MAV P. has gis MAV P62a1-2 D65a7 'on kyañ 'di la dpyad par bya cuñ zad tsam 'di yod de / ci rnam pa de dag de kho na ñid yin nam 'on te ci gzugs brñan la sogs pa Itar ma brtags pa gcig pu na dga'a ba fig yin /1 1. P 0m. (203a) [W) pratibimbaka [V) pratibimba (204) MAK, XLVI. MAV P62a2 - 3 D65a7-b1 gal te yañ dag rnam par ges // du mar 'gyur ro yañ na ni // de dag gcig 'gyur 'gal Idan pas // gdon mi za bar so sor 'gyur // MAV P62a3-4 D65b1-2 yañ dag pa'i rnam pa dañ tha dad pa ma yin pas rnam pa'i rañ gi ño bo bžin du rnam par ées pa du mar 'gyur ba'am yañ na rnam par ées pa gcig pu dañ tha mi dad pas rnam pa rnams kyañ rnam par ées pa'i rañ gi ño bo báin du gcig pu ñid du 'gyur ba bzlog par dka'ol // 1. P has dka'a 'o (204a) CW) anekaitva CV) anekatva (204b) CW) durniväraril [V) durnirvãram


[Answer:) This is incorrect. (205... This is because if one image (äkãra) manifests as a thing which has a quality which is unstable, etc. (calanatvâdi—viši§ta), then the rest of the images also would have the very same nature (tathã—vidhã eva) as the former image (pürvâkãra), because both of them would have an undifferentiated nature (avyatiricyamãna—mürti—svabhãvatva). Therefore, it is contradictory that [[[cognition]] which has a unitary 205) nature) perceives a manifold of images (vaictryâkãra). Hence, because it follows that images (ãkãra), which are not only various (nãnãtva) but also particular (aikãntika), are incompatibly combined with each other (parasPara—viruddha—dharmâdhyãsa—yogãt) as both a unitary and a manifold nature (ekânekatvayol?), then the variety (nãnãtva) of both images (ãkãra) and cognition (vijñãna) could be proven as a highest truth (Pãramãrthika). Because of this, the acknowledged doctrine of non—duality (abhyupagatâdvayanaya) would be disproved. (206...

If [you) think that (we) never fall into such mistakes as

(205) MAK. XLVII MAV P62a 5 - 6 D65b2 -3 rnam pa tha dad ma yin na // g•yo dañ mi g•yo la sogs lai // gcig gis2 thams cad g •yo la sogs // thal bar 'gyur te lan3 gdab dka'a // 1. MAV D. pa 2. P. MAV gi 3. D. MAV len MAV P62a6-7 D65b3-4 tha dad pa ma yin £es bya ba ni de ñid yin no žes bstan par 'gyur ro // de bas na gal te rnam pa gcig g•yo ba la sogs pa'i byed pa zin tam / ser po la sogs pa'i bdag ñid du gyur na Ihag ma rnams kyañ rnam pa de Ita bur 'gyur ro // de Ita ma yin na gdon mi za bar sna tshogs ñid du 'gyur ro (206) MAV P62a8-62b1 D65b5-6 gañ dagl bde ba la sogs pa Itar sñon po la sogs pa'i rnam pa rnams kyañ myoñ ba'i bdag ñid kho na ste /2 ées pa de dag ni mañ la de dag kyañ rigs mthun3 pa éa stag ste / rigs mi mthun pa'i ées pa báin du 'byuñ ño žes smra ba de dag gi ni // 1. P 0m. 2. D 0m. 3. P has 'thun pa

stated above because oneness (eka) is not understood as manifoldness (citratva) on the ground that images (ãkãra) such as the color blue, etc., like happiness (sukha), etc. are none other than a thing which consists of immediate experience (anubhava), and if (you) explain that diverse cognitions (vijñãna) of the same kind (samãnajãtiya) occur ...206) simultaneously like different kinds of cognition (vijãtiya—jñãnavat), you would commit another mistake (dosa). This is because the cognition (vijñãna), which is thought to be situated in the center (madhya), is acknowledged to be like an atom (avu) which is surrounded [by other atoms). (207...

We can divide it (into two cases) : Whether, [like an atom in the center), it faces by nature the other [[[cognitions]]) in the very same manner that it faces a single (eka) [[[cognition]]), or ...207) 2—2) whether it faces other surrounding cognitions in a different manner? C Let us suppose that it faces {by a single nature the other cognitions) in the very same manner [that it faces a single cognition). Since [the cognition in the center) is not situated in the point where it could be surrounded by the others, it is incorrect that others would mutually occupy the different point. Therefore, it would be impossible that a thing which does not exist as possessing the directions (digbhãga) of front and back (PürvâPara), etc. manifests in the form of a circle (mapdala) of blue, etc. Let us suppose that Cit faces other surrounding cogni-

(207) MAV P63a1-2 D66a4-5 'di Itar dbus su 'dod pa'i rnam par ées pa rdul gyis bskor ba Ita bur 'dod pa gañ yin pa de'i rañ báin gañ gis gcig la mñon du phyogs pa de ñid kyis ci gian la yañ phyogs sam 'on te gáan gyisl phyogs žes rnam par rtog pa'i ñes pa de ñid do / 1. D has gyi — tions) in a different manner. How can it [viz., cognition) have a single nature (ekatã) since the distinction of a thing (vastubheda) is defined by means of it having its own nature (svabhãvabheda) ? (208... Therefore, the errors (dosa) which were found in the case of exami- ...208) ning an atom (paramãpu) would pertain to this case, also. (Il-I-A-2-3) (bjection:) Cognitions (jñãna) do not have a front part or a back part (Paurvâparya) which consists of points (desa) because of their immateriality (amürtatvãt). Therefore, how can cognitions (jñãna) be located in the center (madhya) in the very same way as atoms (avuvat) ? [Answer:) Although your opinion (that cognition is different from an atom by nature) is true (satya), it (viz., your statement) contains another kind of error (dosa). Cognitions (jñäna), since you have admitted that images (ãkãra) manifesting extension (deša—vitãna) are true (satyatva), would be (209) regarded as if they manifested with extension (deša—vitãna) in as far as they are multiple (bahu) but contrary to the fact that they do no occupy space (adeša). Otherwise, even though the appearance of manifold cognition (aneka—jñãna) is allowed, a thing which manifests by appearing as an extension (deša-vitãna) like Can atom) would be false (mithyä).

(208) MAK. XLIX MAV P62b7- 8 D66a3 -4 ci l ste rnam pa'i grañs báin du // rnam par ées pa khas len na // de tshe rdul phran 'drar2 'gyur ba3 // dpyad pa 'di la4 bzlog par dka'a // 1. MA K. D ji 2. P. MAV 'dra 3. P. MAV bar 4. MAK. P. D. las (209) CW) deéavitãnotpãdaþ CV) deéavitãnãsthänenotpädah — — In this case, allowing the appearance (utPãda) of manifold cognition (aneka—vijñãna) would be definitely meaningless (vyartha) [if the various manifestations of cognitions do not mean their having extension). And the perception of the color blue, etc. [without extension) being different from manifestation (pratibhãsa) of the color blue, etc. which has extension (deša—vitãna) would not be true (satya). And if they (viz., the color blue together with extension) are unreal (210)

(alikatva), what else would be true (satya) ? Therefore, whatsoever is this ? (Il-I-A-2-4) (211... (Objection:) Atoms (avu) have material bodies (mürta). while cognition (vijñãna) is immaterial (amürta). In this case (viz., of cognition) how is there the very same error ...211) (dosa) that (the atomic theory) has ? [Answer:) There is never an error (do§a) [if we treat a fault concerning atoms as one of cognition). (212.. This is because the color blue, etc. which manifests as a unity (eka) without intervals (nairantarya) is definitely understood as being compo- ...212) sed of atoms (Paramäev—ãtmaka). (213... Otherwise, a thing which is thought of as the nature of cognition

(210) [W) alïkatve CV) alîkakatve (211) MAP P109b3 D105a3 rdul phra rab rnams ni lus can yin la rnam par ées pa ni lus can mal yin pa ma yin nam / de ji Itar na 'dir ñes pa 'di ñid du 'gyur sñam pa la / 1. P 0m. (212) MAV P63a3-4 D66a6 sñon po la sogs pa bar med par snañ ba de ñid kha cig ni rdul phra rab kyi bdag ñid du khas len / (213) MAP P109b4-6 D105a4-5 miñ tsam tha dad pa 'ba'a fig tu zed kyi / yul 'dab chags par gnas pa'i mtshan


(sañvid—rüpa) is definitely distinguished as name—only (nãma—mãtra). However, there is no difference between a thing which is characterized by continuous extension (deša—nairantarya) [and an atom). A thing which exists by virtue of function (Pravrtti) as name—only (nãma—mätra) is not subject to the same error (tulya—do§atã) [that an atom is), but that which exists as continuous extension is subject to the same error. Its (continuous extension) is also an attribute of a thing which is distinguished as name—only. Therefore, why shouldn't the same error [as in atomic theory) be ...213) found [in cognition) ? [Il-I-A-2-5) (Conclusion) [Objection:) Because, even so, the cognition (jñãna) and the cognizable (jñeya) are not similar (vaisãdršya), and refutation (dü§Œga) pertaining to the cognizable (jñeya) is not admitted for the cognition (jñãna). C Answer:) In this case also, we reply that if multiple cognition (anekajñãna) occurs at the same time (yugaPad), discrimination (vikalpa) which is the recognition of an object (visaya) such as a pot or cloth, etc. would not be secondary (kramabhãvin). [Therefore, discrimination (vikalpa) would come to be produced with perception at the same time.) It is impossible to say that only cognitions, having no thought—construction (nirvikalpaka-jñãna), occur at the same time (yougaPad) since

ñid kyi don la ni tha dad pa med do // miñ tsam la 'jug pa'i sgos byas pa'i ñes pa mtshuñs par bsgrubl pa ni ma yin gyi / yul 'dab chags par gnas pas2 byas pa'i ñes pa mtshuñs par byed pa de la yañ miñ tha dad pa yod kyañ ji Itar ñes pa mtshuñs par mi 'gyur áes bya ba yin no // 1. P has sgrub 2. P has par discrimination (vikalpa) is produced by means of a determined immediate experience (anubhavanišcaya). Therefore, these imaginary thoughts (kalPanã) are indeed not produced as something with an unknowable nature (asañvidita—rüpa) of their own (svayam).

So (if multiple cognition is produced at the same time, as you say), it would mean that a direct experience (anubhava) is determind immediately (sakrt) [[[including]] imaginary thoughts). Accordingly, it could not be that discrimination (vikalpa) is perceived as a secondary thing (kramabhãvin) [but that this discrimination is simultaneously determined along with perception). As a result [your statement) involves a contradiction with respect to direct perception (Pratyak§a—ðirodha). [This is because direct perception (Pratyak§a) is defined as a (214) cognition having no discrimination.) [Il-I-Bj

(215... Objection:) A single cognition definitely (ekam eva vijñãnam) grasps manifold nature (citra—rüPa) just as in the case of the manifestation (pratibhãsa) of a jewel which is dark—blue in color (mecaka—maei). [Answer:) Your statement is incorrect. The reason is as follows : (216... [Major:) Whatever is manifold (citra) is not single (eka) : e. g.

(214) NB, 1. 4. ibid. Note. 43. (215) MAV P63a4-5 D66a7 gañ du nor bu gzi báin du rnam par ées pa gcig kho nas sna tshogs kyi ño bo blañs so žes bya de dag gi lugs la dogs pa brjod pa / (216) MAP PilOa3-4 D105b1-3 notion (Pratyaya) in the plural stream of consciousness (nãnã—sañtãna). [Minor:) This cognition (vijñãna) is manifold (citra). [Conclusion: This cognition is not single.) This inference is based on the principle of the perception of incompatibility (viruddhopalabdhi).

The logical reason (hetu) of this inference is not inadmissible (asiddha), since (cognition) is perceived as a manifold nature (citrava). Neither is this contradictory (viruddha), since it is present in ...216) homogeneous examples (sapak§a). [Il-I-B-2)

Objection:) Why should manifoldness (citra) and unity (ekatva) be incompatible (virodha), since manifoldness (citratva) manifests as a unity (ekatva) ? (217... [Answer:) [Your statement is not correct) because there is no other

sbyor ba ni gaff žig sna tahogs yin pa de ni gcig pu ma yin te / dper na rin po che rigs sna tshogs pa Ita bu'am / dper na sems kyil rgyud sna tshogs la yod pa'i ées pa dag Ita bu yin no // rnam par ées pa 'di yañ sna tshogs pa2 yin te / rañ bžin 'gal ba dmigs pa yin no // 'di la ji Itar 'gal ba 'grub sñam pa la / 1. 2. 3. P 0m. (217) MAP PilOa4-8 D105b3-6 raff bÉin sna tshogs pa ma gtogs pa gian sna tshogs pa'i sgrar brjod par bya ba ni med do // sna tshogs pa dañ gcig pa gñis kyañ ño bo phan tshun rnam par bcadl pa med na med pa yin pa'i phyir phan tshun spañs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid kyi 'gal ba yin pas 'gal ba 'grub2 po / 'gal ba gñis kyañ rañ b£in gcig3 pa ñid yin na ni 'gro ba mtha'a dag rdzas gcig tu 'gyur te / de'i phyir Ihan cig Skye ba dañ 'jig pa la sogs par thal bar 'gyur ba bzlog dka'o // de Ita ma yin na ni gcig ces bya ba miff tsam kho nar 'gyur te / miñ la ni brtsad pa med pas gtan tshigs ma ñes pa ñid ma yin te / dpe4 rin po che rigs sna tshogs ni nam mkha'i gos can gyi lugs kyis blta bar bya'i / rnal 'byor spyod pa'i lugs kyis ni ma yin te / rnal 'byor spyod pa la ni5 rin po che ma grub pa'i phyir ro // 1. P gcad 2. D grub 3. P cig 4. D dper na 5. P 0m. PV. 11. 208 citrävabhãseîv arthesu yady ekatvam na yujyate / saiva tãvat katham buddhir ekã citrävabhäsinï // meaning of the word "manifoldness" (citra) except for "a plural nature" (nãnã—svabhãva). Because variation (nãnã) and singless (ekatva) constitute an invariable relation (nãntarîyakatva), which are opposites by their own nature (anyonya—svarüPa—vyavaccheda); [thus, these two) are contradictory (terms) (virodha) which are mutually exclusive As a result, incompatibility (virodha) is established Cin your statement). If the two, which are contradictory (viruddha), exist as a single nature (eka—svabhãvatva), then all the universe (sakalmic višvam) would be a single substance (ekañ dravyam). Therefore, [given such reasoning) it would be hard to avoid (durnivãra) [a conclusion) that such would mean that Cone thing) has both the characteristics of production (utpãda) and destruction (vinãša), etc. at the same time (saha). Otherwise, the singleness (eka) is none other than name—only (nãma— mãtra). Neither is this logical reason (hetu) inconclusive (anaikãntikatã), since there is no dispute (vivãda) with respect to name (nãma). You must not say that, first of all, the manifestation (pratibhãsa) of a jewel which has a dark—blue color (mecaka—mapi) is established as ...217) an example (drstãnta). Even in this case, this is because Ca thing which consists of a single nature) is incapable of such things as manifesting (avabhãsitva) plural nature (nãnã—rüpa) on the ground that a single nature is not pervaded (avyãPtatva) by various natures (nãnã—rüpatã) (since these two are mutually exclusive. Therefore, [that reasoning) involves the same kind of criticism (tulya— Paryanuyogatva) [that was stated above.] [Il-I-B-3) (Conclusion 1) [Objection:) It is not recognized that by direct perception (Pratyak§a) such things as the color blue, which appear before us (Pratibhãsamãna), are distinguished (bheda) from a thing which exists in another place (deša) and time (kãla). This is because X is not perceived as different (bhinna) from Y because of the absence of the manifestation (apratibhãsana) of two (distinguishable) things Cin direct perception (Pratyaksa) at the same time). Even if X is not differentiated from Y, since they manifest at the same time and place (samãna—kãla—deša), there is such a cognition (Pratyaya). This is because direct perception (Pratyak§a) can not ascertain [[[Wikipedia:distinction|distinction]]) on account of the absence of thought—construction (nirvikalpa). Therefore, a cognition which is both manifold and non—dual at the same time (citrâdvaya) manifests as a single nature (eka—rüÞa) in direct perception (Pratyak§a), since distinction (bheda) between the things perceived (grãhya) and between both the perceived and the perceiver (grãhya—grãhaka) are not mutually perceived. [Answer:) (Your statement) is refuted as follows : This is because unity (eka) is incompatible with manifoldness (citratva). [Il-I-B-4) (Conclusion 2) [Objection : ) Manifoldness (citra) also is single (eka) since concentration (yoga) and tranquility (k§ema) are not distinguished (abhinna). [Answer:) Your statement is not reasonable (ayukta). This is because it is contradictory (virodha) that something (viz., manifoldness) has a single nature (ekatva) because of possessing a mutually distinctive nature (vyãvrtta—rüPatva). And that concentration (yoga) and tranquility

(k§ema) are not distinguished (abhinna) from each other is not ascertained by direct perception (Pratyak$a). When the natures of concentration (yoga) and tranquility (k§ema) are identical (abhinna), some other nature different from its own nature (svarüPânyatva) also appears as a simultaneous manifestation (yugaPad— Pratibhãsana) (as long as a manifold nature manifests in direct perception (Pratyak§a) at the same time according to your theory). Therefore, why shouldn't manifestation of distinction (bheda-pratibhãsa) exist ? And if you imagine that it is non—dual (advaita), since distinction (bheda) is not ascertained (agraha), then X is not distinguished from Y as long as there is no distinction (abheda). Therefore, any sort of duality (dwaita) is not conceived because this type of characteristic (evañ—rüpa) is not recognized. If the real entity in its general aspect (vastu—mätra), apart from distinction and non—distinction (bhedâbheda), is recognized, how on earth does the manifoldness (citra) of such things as the color blue manifest ? If the manifestation (pratibhãsa) of manifoldness (citra) is acknowledged, the very thing would be said to be a manifestation of distinction (bheda-pratibhãsa) in this world (loka). Therefore, how can distinction (218) be denied (bhedâpalãpa) ? (Continued)

(218) CW) bhedapaläpah (V) bhedâpaläpah

I would like to thank K. W. Eastman who assisted in correcting the English language draft of this essay, and Karen Kei Yokomizo, Mary Gregory, and Paul Thompson who kindly accepted the task of typing the final draft. 1 July 1983 Department of Oriental Languages, University of California, Berkeley Regrettably, under the circumstences, the publication of this article was delayed, 25 Jan. 1984 first proofread.


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