The Struggle for Official
Recognition of ‘Displaced’ Group
1
Memories in post-Soviet Estonia
EIKE WULF
M
“All history is the history of past politics”
F. R. Ankersmit
NTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
I
The revision of the events of the Second World War played a crucial role
before and after the change of regime in post-socialist and post-Soviet
societies. I argue that this is largely because the interpretation of certain
historical events strongly affected the reconfiguration of collective identities in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989.2 Daniel Levy points to this
very connection, when he writes that “(h)istorical revisionism does not
directly cause new identities, but it does generate public attention to identity deficits and suggest alternative frames of identification… It is in this
capacity that historical revisionism has come to serve as a crucial link
between collective memory and the nation, as the crisis of collective identities continues.”3
Turning to the case study of Estonia, the overriding question, therefore,
is how the transformed sociopolitical and spatial frameworks affect postSoviet identities. In this article I examine three separate landmarks of
Estonia’s contemporary “historical culture” that are all examples of the
continuous reinterpretation of historical facts that has taken place since the
society underwent political reframing;4 namely 1) the work of the Estonian Occupation Museum; 2) the “Estonian International Commission for
the Investigation of Crimes against Humanity”; and 3) the conflict over
memorial monuments to different veteran groups in Estonia. All these
cases concern public ways of dealing with the enduring ambiguities of
Estonia’s recent past; particularly with the controversial issues of indigenous collaboration and complicity with the Soviet regime and the Nazi
occupiers, as well as with traumatic memories of the war and postwar
years. Within the realm of memory politics they represent attempts at
agreeing on a codification of how to officially remember Estonia’s past. In
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the background of my discussion stands the question of
makes them
instances of “historical revisionism.” To scrutinize this question, I consider historical revisionism in relation to five different “public uses” of
history, namely the moral, ideological, political, existential, and emblematic dimension of history.5
what
ISTORICAL REVISIONISM
H
I begin by proposing that revising conventional historical interpretations
in the light of subsequent knowledge is an essential part of what Alexander von Humboldt termed “the historian’s task”; that is, the (self-) reflexivity of a scholar and his or her discipline. In this the interpretation of
historical facts is not simply corrected and erased; it is rather a case of
adding layers to an existing body of knowledge. To put it differently, the
lens through which historical facts are viewed is “exchanged” for a more
fitting one. Temporal distance and a somewhat more “detached” perspective may also lead to the revision of past interpretations. Therefore, I understand the term “revisionism” as an effort to update the interpretation of
historical facts in the light of new findings (e.g. the opening of archive
collections, the release of formerly classified material, etc.). Hence, the
revision of history is dependent on the availability of sources, and on the
researcher’s position in time and space.
Albeit the term historical revisionism has acquired a pejorative meaning, implying manipulation and abuse, I do not view it as something negative
. And even though David Irving can be termed a historical revisionist (or more precisely a “Holocaust revisionist”), I nevertheless contend that not all historical revisionists are of Irving’s
.6 Irving’s
case, which certainly represents the extreme end of the scale, may however serve us in the attempt to define historical revisionism.7 Levy, who
also does not view historical revisionism as something intrinsically negative, notes how the “hunger for memory” observable since the 1980s has
been accompanied by a proliferation of historical revisionism, and that its
objective is to question the foundational myths of the nation.8 “More specifically, the object of historical revisionism is to debunk those mythical
substructures upon which collective identities rely. By attacking these
mythological foundations, revisionists thematize issues that were not previously discussed, and render them intelligible for rational debate.”9
While Levy studies France, Germany, Israel and the US, I turn to Central Eastern Europe to address the question of whether this region is witper se
contour
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219
nessing a specific kind of historical revisionism (that is, if the surge of
historical revisionism has been exceptionally strong there). I begin my
answer to this question with Shari J. Cohen’s pertinent analysis of the
“amorphous nature of these societies emerging form communist domination.” She continues that it is important to recognize “the lack of unifying
ideologies, a devastating legacy left by the fifty or seventy year experience of Leninist domination. These are societies trying to create new polities without common standards of moral or historical judgment.”10
In my description of the landmarks of post-Soviet Estonian historical
culture, I illustrate how the experience of alternating military occupations
and the legacy of two totalitarianisms, makes the assessment of the past a
highly complicated matter.
MEMORY POLITICS OR DIFFERENT USES OF PUBLIC HISTORY
Apart from historians rewriting history for and within the academic domain, there are many different societal groups using history for their ends
in the public sphere. The term “user” signifies intermediaries such as politicians and teachers, disseminating historical facts, as well as the wider
audience of consumers (e.g. newspaper readership, students, etc.). In addition, local historians produce history outside of mainstream academia. The
term “use” implies that, alongside ethically and morally decent ways of
utilizing history, misuses or abuses also exist. This is intimately connected
to the question of principles, rules, and standards of “history production,”
and to whose or what ends historical facts are employed.11 However, uses
of history cannot be equated with manipulation or deception per se.12 Gallerano holds that the “public use” of history is “all that developed outside
of the domain of scientific research in its strictest sense, outside the history of historians which is usually written by scholars and intended for a
very limited segment of the population.”13 However the academic domain
does not exist in isolation from other ideological and political currents in
the society that surrounds it.
I argue that historical revisionism is more connected to the public use
of history than confined only to the scientific community, or more precisely, it is situated at the interface of the two and targeted (more) towards
a wider public. It is in the public sphere that different societal groups attempt to gain recognition for their privately held memories (individual or
group); it is this struggle for public recognition which is intrinsically connected to questions of authorship, authenticity custodianship, and ulti,
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mately identity.14 The different “dimensions of history” emerge in this
rational debate over the past. I will identify four dimensions of public
history that I hold to be relevant to the topic of historical revisionism
(whereas I understand these differentiations to be only of an ideal nature,
as in practice all dimensions overlap in various ways).
ORAL DIMENSION
M
The moral dimension of history is a reaction to past insults, and can be
found in the endeavor of a political elite to put right historical wrongs. In
the public discourse surrounding Estonia’s accessions to NATO and the
European Union, the narrative of “being wronged by history” appeared in
moralizing arguments of betrayal and retribution. For instance, it was
occasionally stated that Western Europe bears a moral responsibility towards Estonia (since the Allies did not intervene and spare them their
fate).15
DEOLOGICAL DIMENSION
I
The use of history by intellectuals for the national cause can be defined as
an ideological dimension of history (for the purpose of national regeneration, for example). Such an ideological take on history was prevalent in
the program of the Estonian People’s Front (In Estonian, Eestimaa Rahvrinne, or RR), mobilizing mass-support for Estonia’s independence. Both
the ideological and the moral dimensions of history are linked to ideas of
absolute truth. Here, history is not a gradually evolving process, but a
story of mistakes that need rectifying. Quintessentially this presupposes
history as a metaphysical entity that is intrinsically moral. But can history
be wrong or right in the first place?16
OLITICAL DIMENSION
P
The political dimension denotes the rhetorically convincing use of historical arguments to tackle or attack existing sociopolitical shortcomings. In
this way, historical arguments are employed in a comparative, metaphorical fashion (often taken out of their original context). An overbearing
political dimension translates into an inflationary use of historical argu-
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221
ments in the public arena (e.g., in political propaganda). The concept of
politics of history (In German,
), which views history as
fundamentally political and focuses on the formation and imposition of
historical interpretations and models of identification in the official domain, is useful in highlighting the fact that history is essentially political.17
In the same vein, Gallerano insists that “history is used above all as an
instrument of the day-to-day political battle.”18 Both the ideological and
political dimensions of history are employed to claim and legitimize political power. I argue that historical revisionism is intimately linked to the
ideological and political dimensions of history.
Geschichtspolitik
XISTENTIAL DIMENSION
E
The entry hall of the Estonian Occupation Museum (2003)
In the main entry hall of the Estonian Occupation Museum two massive iron locomotive
can be found serving as a gateway to the exhibition. The models are identical
copies of each other, except that one displays a red star, whereas the other bears the swastika. An artistic expression, which places both regimes on parallel tracks, raising the pertinent question of the dangers inherent in historical comparison.
replicas
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Fourthly, history plays a pertinent role for the identity of a community
(for example “remembering in order not to forget”—In Hebrew,
). When a society is facing external or internal pressures of
cultural homogenization (caused for example by inter-ethnic conflict,
foreign occupation, etc.), the existential dimension of history becomes
more pronounced. As a counter-history it will be largely confined to the
private or semi-private sphere (for instance the opposition movement and
dissident circles in Soviet Estonia). The example of the heated conflict
over memorial monuments to different veteran groups, discussed in a later
section, demonstrates that the existential use of history can also be played
out in the public sphere.
In what follows, I will delineate different landmarks of the historical
culture in post-Soviet Estonia, while paying close attention to the different
dimensions of public history as previously outlined.
Zahor—
Lo Tishkah
HE ESTONIAN OCCUPATION MUSEUM: A CLAIM FOR VICTIMHOOD
T
The Estonian Occupation Museum provides a case in point of the political
dimension of history and the quagmires that historical comparisons often
entail. Battered suitcases, prison doors, aluminum cutlery, a refugee boat,
a range of trivial objects of daily use, as well as letters and newspapers,
constitute the core of the exhibition.19 In the words of one interviewee,
who was involved in planning the Museum from the very start, it “has to
be like a monument or a tombstone for the many people who have not
returned. And I believe that for the people who still live, but went through
this period, this [museum] would be something to make them feel a little
proud; that something like this is built for them.”20
The museum documents mainly the suffering that Estonians endured at
the hands of the Soviets between 1940 and 1991, while paying little attention to the victims of the Holocaust in Estonia or questions of indigenous
collaboration with the foreign regimes. This focus is consistent with the
fact that the repression by the Soviet authorities stands out as
main
public concern regarding Estonia’s recent past.21 This only changed under
international pressure, leading to a “prescribed public remembrance” of
the events surrounding the German occupation.22 Why public debate about
the occupations in post-1991 Estonia mainly concerned the Soviet terror,
while Estonian collaboration during the Nazi occupation was hardly
touched upon, can in part be understood as an overreaction against the
long-endured bias in Soviet historiography, which focused mainly on the
the
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atrocities committed during the Nazi occupation of Estonia.23 A further
cause may lie in Russia’s failure to acknowledge the events of 1939–41
(specifically, the recognition of the annexation of Estonia in 1940 as an
illegitimate act).
Equivalents to the Estonian Occupation Museum can be found in Riga
(the Documentation Centre of Totalitarianism, TSDC, established in
1998) and with the Museum of Genocide Victims located in the cellars of
the former KGB headquarters in Vilnius (founded in 1992).24 It appears
that in post-Soviet societies an idiosyncratic logic or perspective is operational: the fact that these societies experienced both the Nazi and the Soviet occupations leads to a specific interpretation of history different from
that which prevails in Western European countries, which were “only”
occupied by Nazi Germany. For if one were to pass by a “museum of
occupation” in Amsterdam, Paris, or Oslo, one could conclude from the
name alone that the museum concentrates on mass-deportations of Jews,
communists, and anti-German résistance fighters; but the curators of the
Estonian Occupation Museum clearly adhere to a different logic. Here, it
is the “national suffering” of ethnic Estonians during the various occupations that takes center stage (that is, mainly the Soviet occupations).25
At the opening of the museum the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a
statement that the museum’s creation was informed by a political bias, in
equating fascist Germany and the former Soviet Union.26 Although it is
crucial to avoid the pitfalls of historical comparison, such as attempting to
relativize individual or collective suffering and injustices by means of
such comparison, it is also necessary to bear in mind that comparison
deals with both resemblance and difference, and that to compare does not
mean to justify. Hence, the crimes committed in the name of Hitler’s
Germany cannot be explained by the atrocities committed in the name of
Stalin, or vice versa.27 In the mainstream academic debate in the former
FRG, comparative approaches to understanding the totalitarianisms of
Stalinism and Nazi Germany were frowned upon, and left on the fringes.28
After the break-up of the Soviet bloc and German reunification, direct
comparisons between the systems became more
; this was particularly the case in the debates emerging in newly independent Eastern
Europe. In the public debate in post-Soviet Estonia, there was little hesitation about comparing the two systems, which would indicate that it is not
the victims of the Nazi occupation (that is, Jewish survivors or communist
sympathizers) who dominated the debate, but victims of Stalinism and
those that believed that the Nazi occupation was the lesser of two evils.29
In response to a speech by the Latvian President Vike-Freiberga (at the
en vogue
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International Forum on Preventing Genocide in Stockholm in 2004) Ephraim Zuroff, head of the Jerusalem office of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre,
complains that some political leaders utilize the destruction of European
Jewry as a background to speak about other tragedies, such as communist
crimes. To be specific, Zuroff opines that the mass deportations of Latvians were not a case of genocide, and warns of a false symmetry that upgrades communist crimes by placing them on an equal footing with the
Holocaust.30
HE ESTONIAN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE
INVESTIGATION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
T
Whereas the museum’s primary objective is to collect and exhibit artefacts, memoirs, and eyewitness accounts to document the periods of occupation, the Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of
Crimes against Humanity (hereafter “Commission”), was established by
the Estonian government in 1998 to produce objective research reports on
the same periods, clearly tailored towards an international readership.31 It
was decided at the outset that a team of researchers selected by the Commission’s board would first investigate crimes against citizens of Estonia
(or on the territory of the Estonian Republic) committed during the German occupation, and subsequently explore crimes committed during the
Soviet occupations. The report attributes overall responsibility for the
crimes committed during the German occupation to the Germans, but it
identifies individual Estonians who served in the Estonian military units,
Estonian Police Battalions, and Estonian Security Police, stating that they
shared responsibility through their own actions in and outside of Estonia.32
Moreover, the Commission holds all members of the Estonian Political
Police responsible for war crimes, and asserts that members of the Estonian self-government were also responsible for war crimes committed in
Estonia. It is noteworthy that the Commission debunks the myth of a “just
war” of the Estonian auxiliary police (In Estonian, Omakaitse, or OK) in
1941 by emphasizing that the bulk of the killing of alleged communists
during the early stages of the German occupation happened at the hands of
the Estonian auxiliary police, and that, in assisting the Einsatzkommando
1 A, the OK played an active role in the extermination of the local Jewry
in 1941–42.33 The report also mentions that the majority of members of
the “destruction battalions” were ethnic Estonians, thus touching on another taboo—that of the fratricidal war in Estonia.34 The report ends on
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225
the broader note that historical events made Estonia a “victim nation,” but
states that this “does not preclude acts of perpetration.”
According to its statutory report, the Commission is not intended to be
a fully-fledged “Truth Commission.” Former President Lennart Meri, who
headed the Commission until 2001, explained its two-pronged approach:
“It reflects our hope in Estonia, that shining the bright light of truth on
some of the tragedies of the past will not only contribute to reconciliation
within our society and its further reintegration into the international community of nations, but also prevent the repetition of such tragedies elsewhere.”35
From this it is evident that the Commission is not a juridical or prosecutorial body, which is why it did not initiate the tracking down of those
few Estonian perpetrators still alive, who were identified in the report on
the German occupation (published online in 2001), in order to extradite
and try them. However, one may argue that the Commission is not
a
scholarly body of politicians and journalists, since it is a state-funded institution. Hence, the question remains as to why the Commission did not
instruct the relevant governmental body to follow up these cases. In this
context Zuroff rebuked the contemporary Estonian Security Police for not
investigating the suspected criminals identified in the Commission’s report. Already in autumn 1991, he made a failed attempt to arrest the Estonian Evald Mikson (who was living in Iceland at the time) for war crimes
committed during the Nazi occupation of Estonia.36 More recently, Zuroff
presented the Estonian Security Police with a list of 16 members of the
36th Police Battalion, who according to the Commission’s report participated in the execution of Jews in Belarus in 1942; but, contrary to the
Commission’s findings, the Estonian Security Police concluded that they
had no evidence to confirm this indictment. In obvious frustration, Zuroff
then announced a reward of $10,000 to anyone providing information
leading to the arrest of these men.37 His effort to place an advertisement
reading “during the Holocaust, Estonians murdered Jews in Estonia as
well as in other countries” in local newspapers, however, came to nothing.38 Consequently, in his reports for the years 2001 and 2003, Zuroff
classified Estonia as making “insufficient and/or unsuccessful efforts to
prosecute perpetrators of the Holocaust.”39
Compared to the objectively written report of the Commission, the paper of a younger Estonian historian (who worked in the Commission’s
research team on the German occupation) presented at a conference in
Sweden on “Collaboration and Resistance in Estonia 1940–44,” seemed
slightly more biased, as he deliberately only included the genocide of
just
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Estonian Jews, while choosing not to deal with the fate of those thousands
of European Jews who were deported to Estonia to perish in the camps
there.40 This limitation allowed him to claim that less than 1000 Estonian
Jews were killed in Estonia during the German occupation. Moreover, he
suggested that the “evacuation” of approximately 500 Estonian Jews to
Russia by the Soviets can be termed the “first act of the Holocaust.” All
this led him to conclude that Estonia, although it was the first country to
declare itself “free of Jews” (in German,
), were also the country
in which the smallest number of Jews was exterminated under German
occupation. His presentation stands as an example of a highly selective
and ethnocentric approach to the study of the Holocaust in Estonia. At the
same conference, an American historian of Lithuanian origin acknowledged that Lithuanians needed to settle accounts with their past, but that
this could only happen in their own time and in their own way; above all
he said that they needed to discuss it among themselves in their own language, as many Lithuanian words (and concepts) cannot be translated into
English and are thus fundamentally unintelligible to outsiders. This is the
argument for a “closed discourse”; and possibly a consequence of longterm foreign rule.41
Shari J. Cohen notes that the difference between Eastern and Western
Europe and the USA shows when it comes to the interpretation of the
Holocaust.42 The uproar caused by the then newly appointed American
ambassador to Estonia, Joseph M. De Thomas, when he drew attention to
the fact that since 1991 no Estonian war criminal had been prosecuted for
crimes committed during the Holocaust, sustains this claim. De Thomas
recommended that the Holocaust needed wider recognition as part of Estonia’s national history.43 His remarks were however rated as “interference in the internal affairs of Estonia” by the Estonian Justice Minister,
who replied that De Thomas’ statement was like “breaking in through an
open door, since only a few states have done as much work as Estonia in
investigating the crimes of the Holocaust.”44 De Thomas’ comments were
not entirely unfounded, for as recently as October 2000 the Estonian Minister of Education declared that a Jewish Holocaust Day in schools was
not required. This opinion was only revised in 2002, when the Estonian
government declared January 27 Holocaust Day in schools.45 This incident illustrates how Estonian politicians can act as if they were under attack when it comes to the internationally-voiced demand for education in
and research on the Nazi occupation of Estonia.46 This defensive reaction
may be understood to stem from the fact that during the Soviet period
Estonians (along with the other Baltic nationalities) were collectively
judenfrei
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branded as “fascists” and “collaborators”; there is a tradition of defiance
against these kinds of allegations.47
MBLEMATIC DIMENSION
E
The Commission’s work may be seen as an attempt at restoring Estonia’s
moral standing in the international community (that is, as a strategy of
whitewashing), which would substantiate the idea that the Commission’s
carefully-worded and well-balanced report may not reflect the predominant opinion among Estonian historians, or indeed of Estonian society at
large.48 It may therefore be described rather as an “emblematic” use of
history, leading us to the fifth dimension of public history, that is, the
emblematic dimension. The moral use of history can be labeled emblematic when the discussion of certain historical facts remains mostly on the
surface. For instance, a fundamental settlement with the Soviet legacy
through “lustration” or a “Truth Commission” has not been achieved in
post-Soviet Estonia.49 Another example of the emblematic use of history
in Estonia is the recently introduced “Holocaust Day” which lacks meaning for most Estonian pupils since the Holocaust plays such a minor part
in most family narratives or in the official narrative.
HEN PRIVATE MEMORY GOES PUBLIC:
FISTICUFFS OVER MONUMENTS
W
During the Soviet period, narratives of fighting side-by-side with the
Germans against the Red Army were passed on as essentially unquestioned heroic stories of national resistance in the private realm of many
Estonian families. However, not all the privately held counter-memories
that resurfaced in the public domain of newly independent Estonia could
be integrated into the official history in the long run. The memory of the
veterans who fought in the German army is an example of an unofficial
account that became part of the public memory after 1991, but was pushed
back into the private sphere thereafter. It is this phenomenon that will be
elaborated in subsequent sections.
Earlier it was mentioned that a different regional logic prevails in societies which experienced both the Nazi occupation and the Soviet regime.
Enn Sarv’s recollections on the situation of Estonians in early 1944 reflect
this specific outlook on the past predominant among Estonians.
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In order to obtain weapons, [Estonian] men were forced to fight in German uniform…,
but they considered themselves an Estonian army. They had managed to gain the right
to wear a coat of arms with the colors of the Estonian national flag on their sleeves. In
February, Estonian SS fighters removed the SS symbols from their collars without authorization and replaced them with the emblem of the Estonian Cross of Freedom…
Our main enemy, the Soviet Union, was about to invade Estonia, once again aiming to
destroy our nation: so the War had become our own War.
50
Another Estonian interviewee (a professional historian and politician
born in 1960) related that his father and both his uncles fought in the
German army. In response to my question about whether his father joined
the German army voluntarily, he clarified:
To fight against the Russians of course! You know pretty well that the Germans had
been our historical enemy and we Estonians didn’t like them very much. But only one
year, 1940–41, made us love the Germans so much and greet them as “liberators.” Nazis as “liberators,” isn’t it awful? But it only gives you an idea what the communist occupation had been like. Not that we are Nazis or Nazi-minded, no, never!
51
My respondent insisted that they did not expressly fight for the Germans or on the German side, but that they had no other choice. This is the
line of argument the veterans themselves take. So for instance, llmar
Haalviste, a Waffen SS veteran, exemplified this particular Estonian
standpoint when he stated: “At the end of the day there was no right or
wrong side. The War was thrust upon us. We were on our side, defending
our homes.”52
HE MEMORIAL STONE IN PÄRNU: A SYMBOL OF RESISTANCE
T
In July 2002, a privately-funded memorial stone depicting an Estonian
soldier in Waffen SS uniform was put up at the Estonian sea resort town
of Pärnu. After attracting a negative response from the national government, the memorial was removed and town officials ordered its redesign
and the replacement of its inscription, which originally read “to all Estonian soldiers who fell in the Second World War to liberate their homeland
and to free Europe in 1940–45.”53 A local historian, Leo Tammiksaar
(born in 1962), who runs an organization called the “Estonian SS Legion
Museum” (in Estonian, Eesti SS Leegioni Muuseum) since the early
1990s, is behind the memorial.54 The inference from the original inscription and from Tammiksaar’s public statements is that he believes that the
Estonian legionaries prevented the Red Army from occupying the whole
of Europe.
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The Lihula monument to Estonian soldiers in the German army
The Lihula monument depicts a soldier wearing a German army helmet and carrying a
gun, with the order of the Estonian Cross of Freedom on his collar.
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HE ‘LIHULA CONTROVERSY’
T
The Pärnu monument was altered and reerected in the Estonian village
cemetery of Lihula in August 2004. The local authorities and about 2000
people who witnessed the unveiling ceremony wanted—in the words of
the former dissident and historian Tiit Madisson and mayor of the Lihula
parish, “to honor those who chose the lesser evil.”55 Whereas the monument still depicts an Estonian soldier in German uniform, the altered inscription is now “to the Estonian men who fought in 1940–45 against
Bolshevism and for the restoration of Estonian independence.”56
A fortnight after its inauguration, the police removed the monument in
the face of an enraged, stone-throwing crowd of several hundred. After
the removal only the base of the memorial remained, where a simple
plaque was installed, reading “at this place the monument to the Estonian
men used to stand 20.08.04–02.09.04.”57 The national government maintained that it was not appropriate “to build a monument that may be interpreted as an attempt to commemorate totalitarian regimes that had occupied Estonia.”58 The announcement of the Estonian Foreign Minister
Kristiina Ojuland expressed a similar view: “Estonia must not isolate itself
from the international community and damage its reputation. (…) Local
inappropriate action often results in very serious and far-reaching international consequences… Estonia … acknowledges the need to commemorate the fallen. This must be done in a manner that does not bring forth
past evils to poison the future.”59
At the same time the Estonian government offered its cooperation in
setting up a more apposite memorial.60 In a general response to the fisticuffs over the Lihula monument, it established yet another commission to
decide on the official representation of Estonian contemporary history,
whose long-term objective is to “persuade the international community to
condemn the crimes of the communist regime.”61
The position of the Estonian government on the occasion of the reburial of Alfons Rebane, an anti-Soviet partisan (and later a commander
of the Estonian Legion) in 1999 was equally ambiguous. For even though
the government contributed (financially) towards a reburial ceremony
with full military honors, only two MPs and the commander of the Estonian Defense Forces attended the occasion. Most representatives of the
Estonian government may have feared international criticism and thus
avoided a public appearance.62
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THE “ESTONIAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS’ ASSOCIATION”
On July 6, 2004 about 1,500 Estonian veterans commemorated the 60th
anniversary of the battles against the Red Army. This public annual celebration in Tallinn has been organized by the “Estonian Freedom Fighters’
Association” since the early ’90s. During the course of the celebration,
the Estonian government was pressed to attribute the status of “Freedom
Fighters” to those Estonians who fought against Soviet occupation, in
recognition of their claim to have fought for Estonia’s freedom and democracy. In their appeal the veterans explicitly sought state protection
against accusations from Russian and Jewish organizations which labeled
them fascists. The veterans demand public rehabilitation of their status;
hence their identification as “Freedom Fighters” in reference to the name
of the veterans of the Estonian War of Independence (1918–20). Also
during the summer of 2004 the Estonian Freedom Fighters’ Association
planned to put up a monument in the district of Maarjamäe (located on the
outskirts of Tallinn), which was to include the names of 16 Estonian units
who fought as part of the Wehrmacht and a map indicating the sites of
battles involving SS units against the Red Army. However, in April
2005 the government decided against the unveiling of the monument,
originally planned for May 8, 2005.
63
64
65
66
67
CHANGING INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORKS
In sum, the contested monument to the Estonian soldiers who fought in
the German army brought to light how counter-memories can enter into
the official representation of the past, but can then be pushed back into the
private sphere once the official interpretive framework changes. In the
course of a strengthening orientation towards the West, the specific Estonian interpretation of the Second World War clashed with the interpretive
framework underlying the Western discourse on the topic. It can be concluded that, compared to the early ’90s, a reorientation took place in the
Estonian public by the end of that decade which no longer allowed the
Estonian legionaries public space for their commemoration. Consequently, the odd situation occurred that the individual memories of Estonians who fought in the German army were once more confined to the
private sphere.
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The Bronze Soldier Statue
The Bronze Soldier at the foot of Tõnismägi in central Tallinn, which allegedly contains
the ashes of fallen Soviet soldiers, was erected in 1947 (formerly with an eternal flame
burning in front of the memorial). It became the concourse for the annual meetings of Red
Army veterans on May 9 and September 22 (that is, on ‘Victory Day’ and on the ‘Day of
the Liberation of Tallinn from Fascism’).
HE BRONZE SOLDIER STATUE
T
The removal of the Lihula monument unleashed a wave of vandalism
against Soviet-built memorials all over the country.69 In recent years the
Bronze Soldier—a prominent Second World War memorial, known as the
“monument to the liberators of Tallinn,” commemorating Soviet soldiers
who died fighting against the German army, has become a field of commemorative combat over the revision of Estonia’s recent past.70 It was
vandalized with paint on the morning of May 9, 2005—the 60th anniversary of “Victory Day,” and on numerous occasions thereafter.71 May 9
became the focal point of attention for Red Army veterans and Estonian
legionaries, all of whom claim to have fought for the “Estonian cause.”72
233
The Struggle for Official Recognition…
But whereas for the Red Army veterans the date marks the “liberation” of
Estonia from Nazi occupation and fascism, it represents the continuing
occupation and the “Long Second World War” for many Estonians.73
Hence many Estonians publicly request the removal of this monument,
arguing that it serves as a reminder of five decades of Soviet rule in Estonia; while for many Red Army veterans removal implies the revision of
the results of the Second World War.74
The furore about the Bronze Soldier is indicative of the fact that the
memory of those Estonians who fought in the Estonian Corps (Red Army)
was pushed to the margins of the national narrative of post-1991 Estonia.
Forgetting that (ethnic) Estonians fought as Soviet soldiers, many Estonians understand the Bronze Soldier to honor only the Russian soldiers
(while equating Soviet with Russian).
To this day the official canon on how to remember the fallen remains
unresolved in Estonia; nor is it decided whether the fallen on warring
sides shall be honored, or only selected groups. In an attempt to end this
divisive and somewhat ethnocentric interpretation of the past, the chairman of the Russian Faction of the Reform Party, Sergei Ivanov, suggested
replacing the Bronze Soldier with a monument to all soldiers who fell in
the Second World War.75 Ivanov’s proposal thus includes all soldiers who
fought in the armed forces and seems to be based on the assumption that
soldiers generally are victims of their sovereign.76 Furthermore, we would
have to examine whether Ivanov’s suggestion is born of humanitarian
intent or whether he is in fact attempting to relativize the war crimes committed by soldiers of either side.77 We need to be clear that the memorial
in mind would only concern soldiers who fought in the war; because it is
yet another matter to erect a monument for all the victims of war and tyranny in Estonia (see for instance in the case of the New Guard House in
Berlin, in German,
), which would unite perpetrators and
victims of the war and of totalitarian regimes in their suffering and thus
perilously blur the line between them.78 The current Estoninan Prime Minister Andrus Ansip has repeatedly spoken in favor of the removal of the
Bronze Soldier as “Monuments must unite people, but the monument in
question [the Bronze Soldier] is dividing people.”79 However, his main
coalition partner, the Centre Party under Edgar Savisaar, is against the
relocation of the Soviet-era memorial. Hence the Bronze soldier may turn
into a key issue in the forthcoming elections on March 4.80
The “battle over monuments” in Estonia (and other Central and Eastern Europe societies) has a
dimension, in that parts of
monuments erected during the inter-war period (and symbolizing indeall
Neue Wache
longue
durée
234
PAST IN THE MAKING
pendent statehood) were rescued and hidden in the countryside during the
foreign occupations.81 It was related to me that candles were regularly lit
at the remaining pediments of monuments in memory of Estonian soldiers
who fought in the War of Independence which had been dismantled after
the Soviet takeover. These were understood as silent acts of resistance.82
IN CONCLUSION
In this article I have argued that historical revisionism is intimately linked
to the ideological and political dimension of history and that it tends to be
more connected to the “public use” of history as it is targeted towards a
wider public and not just to the scholarly community.
I examined three landmarks of Estonian historical culture: whereas the
Estonian Occupation Museum aims at cementing the notion of Estonian
suffering, the Lihula monument and the Estonian Freedom Fighters’
claims are linked more to ideas of national resistance. Through the example of the Estonian legionaries, I demonstrated how the revision of history
is continuously contested and how monuments as “sites of memory” can
turn into “contested terrain,” because their destruction or removal causes a
“dislocation” or “displacement” of the respective group memories.83 Ultimately these monuments are so fiercely contested, because they are
sources of group identities (that is, the existential dimension of history);
we can thus speak of displaced group memories or identities. These battles
over monuments are battles between competing interpretive frameworks,
that is, between the specific official and local Estonian points of view, the
Western reading of the Second World War, and lastly pro-Russian, and
dated Soviet views of the past.
I end by pointing out that I consider further comparative research in
the iconography of cultural memories in post-Soviet and post-socialist
societies to be very fruitful.
The Struggle for Official Recognition…
235
Notes
1 This article is based largely on Chapter Seven of my doctoral thesis, entitled Historical
Culture, Conflicting Memories and Identities in Post Soviet Estonia, forthcoming in
Berghahn Books (in the series on Making Sense of History). It examines the debated
codification of an official memory in contemporary Estonia, while exploring how the
experience of long-term occupation impacted on the formation of post-Soviet identities.
The study used life story interviews as its primary source: between 1996 and 2003 I interviewed over 40 historians of Estonian, Russian and Estonian Russian background,
questioning them about their childhood, choice of profession, war memories, narratives
of resistance, suffering, and shame.
2 Something I will later refer to as the ‘existential dimension’ of history.
3 Daniel Levy, “The Future of the Past: Historiographical Disputes and Competing Memories in Germany and Israel.” History and Theory 38, No. 1, (1999): 51–66, 66.
4 I employ the concept of ‘historical culture’ (In German, Geschichtskultur), first introduced by Jörn Rüsen, as it offers an integrative approach to the study of collective
memory and history by understanding both phenomena as expressions of ‘historical culture’. In short, ‘historical culture’ includes every articulation and contestation of ‘historical consciousness’ (In German, Geschichtsbewußtsein) and all the ways in which
‘historical memory’ is processed in the daily life of a society. The concept of ‘historical
culture’ includes both processes of ‘history production’ and the moral standards operative in the relevant society. J. Rüsen, and F. Jäger “Erinnerungskultur” [Memory culture] in Deutschland TrendBuch. Fakten und Orientierungen [Germany book of trends:
facts and orientations], K.-R. Korte, and W. Weidenfeld, eds., (Opladen: Leske &
Budrich, 2001), pp. 397–428, 399; J. Rüsen, “Was ist Geschichtskultur? Überlegungen
zu einer neuen Art, über Geschichte nachzudenken” [What is historical culture?], in Historische Faszination. Geschichtskultur Heute [Historical Fascination], J. Rüsen, and K.
Füßmann, et al., eds., (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 1994), pp. 3–25.
5 On the different dimensions of history and its public use, see: J. Rüsen, and F. Jäger,
“Erinnerungskultur,’’ p. 406; Nicola Gallernano, “History and the Public Use of History,” Bedarida, Francois, ed., The social responsibility of the historian, [Is this a title?]
Diogenes 42–4, No. 168 (1994): 85–102; Karlsson, K.-G. Historia som vapen: Historiebruk och samhällsupplösning i Sovjetunionen och dess efterföljarstater 1985–1995 (History as Wappen) (Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, 1999), pp. 57, 218–232; Karlsson, K.-G.
“History in Swedish Politics—the ‘Living History’ Project,” in European History: Challenges for a Common Future, A. Pok, and J. Rüsen, et al., eds., (Hamburg: Körber
Stiftung, 2002), pp. 145–162; K.-G. Karlsson, and U. Zander, et al. Echoes of the Holocaust: Historical Cultures in Contemporary Europe (Lund: Nordic Academic Press,
2003).
6 E. Menasse, Der Holocaust vor Gericht: Der Prozess um David Irving [The Holocaust in
court. The case of David Irving] (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 2000).
7 That is, where is the border between legitimate re-examination of history and re-writing
history in a politically motivated manner, while changing widely established historical
facts?
8 Levy, “The Future of the Past,” pp. 62–63.
9 Levy, “The Future of the Past,” p. 65.
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10 S. J. Cohen, Politics without a Past. The Absence of History in Postcommunist Nationalism. (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1999), p. 2.
11 In the light of Cohen’s assessment of post-communist societies, these common standards of ‘history production’ may be weak or non-existent.
12 Tzvetan Todorov, “The Abuses of Memory,” Common Knowledge 5 (1996): 6–26, 15.
13 Gallerano, “History and the Public Use,” p. 85. According to Gallerano, the ‘public use’
is to a large extent based on the means of mass-communication and encompasses the
use of history in schools, museums, cultural associations, political parties, etc.
14 And to what might be translated as ‘definitional authority’ (in German, Definitionsmacht).
15 Cf. Toomas H. Ilves, “Estonia and the State of Change in European security,” a paper
delivered at Chatham House (London 04.05.1999).
16 An over-moralization of history can also be found in the public discourse on Germany’s
recent past during the 1990s.
17 E. Wolfrum, Geschichtspolitik in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland: Der Weg zur
bundesrepublikanischen Erinnerung 1948–1990 (The politics of history in the FRG:
The path to a memory of the Federal Republic of Germany 1948–1990) (Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1999), pp. 13–38.
18 Gallerano, “History and the Public Use,” p. 100.
19 Otherwise the Occupation Museum relies on new media, including video testimonies
and a series of seven CD-ROMs covering roughly the period from 1940 to 1987, as
well as the Estonian independence movement. See: www.okupatsioon.ee.
20 Simon, interview (Tallinn 07.06.02). The interview was conducted before the Occupation Museum was inaugurated in 2003.
21 Elsewhere, I sustain the argument that it is the narrative of sole victimhood, which
leaves little space for another people’s suffering, which forms an important part of Estonian national identity.
22 Namely the work of Efraim Zuroff (the head of the Jerusalem office of the Simon
Wiesenthal Centre), pressure from Russia and pressure applied to Estonia in the course
of the EU and NATO accession processes (in connection to this, the example of the
Holocaust Day is discussed in a later section).
23 R. J. Misiunas, “Soviet Historiography on World War II and the Baltic States, 1944–
1974” in The Baltic States in Peace and War 1917–1945, eds. Vardys, V. S. and R.
Misiunas (University Park—London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), pp.
173–196.
24 For historical revisionism in post-Soviet Latvia, see: Eva-Clarita Onken, “Revisionismus schon vor der Geschichte: Aktuelle lettische Kontroversen um die Judenvernichtung und Kollaboration 1941–1944” [Revisionism prior to history: current Latvian controversies on the Holocaust and collaboration 1941–1944], Galut-Nordost, Sonderheft 1
(special issue) (1998).
25 This is the overall tenor of a publication displayed at the Estonian Occupation Museum
in 2003, which contains a collection of speeches by the former Prime Minister Mart
Laar, Tunne Kelam, and Enn Sarv, see: M. Laar, and T. Kelam, et al., “International
Conference on Crimes of Communism” Tallinn 14.06.00 (www.isamaaliit.ee/isamaa2/
eng_4_2.html). The Museum Dungeon of the KGB in Tartu, which was termed the
‘Grey House,’ is another site to remember the Estonians’ struggle for freedom (and
their suffering). This museum was established in 2001, that is, two years prior to the in-
The Struggle for Official Recognition…
237
auguration of the Occupation Museum; similarly, its collection lacks any reference to
the site’s usage during the German occupation. See: www.tartu.ee/linnamuuseum.
26 Michael Tarm, “The Gift: An American of Estonian Descent Funds a new Museum that
Recounts a Nation’s Tragedy—and her own,” in Baltic City Paper (September 2003),
12.
27 Todorov, “The Abuses of Memory,” 16–19.
28 Cf. H. Arendt, Elemente und Ursprünge totaler Herrschaft [The origins of totalitarianism, 1951] (Munich: Pieper, 1986); Dietrich Beyrau, “Nationalsozialistisches Regime
und das Stalin-System. Ein riskanter Vergleich.” [National Socialism and Stalinism: A
precarious comparison.] Osteuropa 50, No. 6 (2000): 709–729; E. Nolte, The Three
Faces of Fascism (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1965); Stefan Creuzberger, and
Ingo Mannteufel, et al., “Kommunismus und Terror. Das ‘Schwarzbuch des Kommunismus’—Hauptthesen und Argumente” [Communism and Terror: The ‘Blackbook of
Communism’—main theses and arguments]. Osteuropa 50, No. 6 (2000): 583–584;
Dan Diner, ed., Ist der Nationalsozialismus Geschichte? Zu Historisierung und Historikerstreit [Is National Socialism history? About historization and the historians’ debate] (Frankfurt: S. Fischer, 1988).
29 This is when we follow Todorov’s list of four possible responses to the comparison of
the two totalitarianisms. It helps to identify the standpoint of the individual employing
the comparison: 1) ‘Hitler’s hangmen’ favor the pairing with Stalinists because it serves
to excuse their own actions; 2) Hitler’s victims oppose a pairing, because they are
aware that the ‘hangmen’ use it as an excuse; 3) ‘Stalin’s hangmen’ oppose a pairing,
because it is used against them as an accusation; 4) Stalin’s victims favor the pairing,
because they can use it as an accusation (Todorov, “The Abuses of Memory,” pp. 16–
19).
30 Efraim Zuroff, “Misleading Comparisons of the 20th-century Tragedies” in The Baltic
Times (19.02.04); Efraim Zuroff, “Lifting the Shadow of a Bloody Past” in The Baltic
Times (04.03.04).
31 The clear focus on an international public is also reflected by the international composition of the Commission’s board, with politicians and scholars from Germany, the UK,
Finland, Denmark and Russia (that is, Arsenij Rosinsky, the head of Memorial). It is
noteworthy that there are only a few trained historians among the board members. Former President Meri’s initiative was supported by leading Jewish organizations in the
US, which is mirrored in the person of Nicholas Lane, Chairman of the IR commission
of the American-Jewish Committee, also a member of the Commission’s board. It
needs to be stressed that comparable commissions were set up in the other Baltic States
(also in 1998), so that we may speak of a regional post-Soviet phenomenon.
32 By its statutory report the Commission refrains from assigning ‘collective guilt.’
33 The report stresses that 1200 of the 40,000 members of OK were involved in killings.
34 These destruction or shock battalions fought side-by-side with regular Soviet troops
carrying out Stalin’s scorched-earth policy in the face of the approaching German
troops in 1941.
35 See the Commission’s homepage, www.historycommission.ee.
36 E. Zuroff, Beruf: Nazijäger. Die Suche mit dem langen Atem: Die Jagd nach den
Tätern des Völkermordes [Profession: Nazi hunter. A search that requires a long breath:
hunting for the perpetrators of the Holocaust] (Freiburg: Ahriman-Verlag, 1996), pp.
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PAST IN THE MAKING
318–321; cf. Raul Kruus, ed., People be Watchful! (Tallinn: Estonian State Publishing
House, 1962).
37 Sara Toth, “Cursory Nazi probe rejected,” in The Baltic Times (25.–31.07.02): 3.
38 “Wiesenthal Center ad left unprinted,” in The Baltic Times (30.01.03).
39 In April 2001 Estonia belonged to ‘category D’ (BNS “Juudikeskus peab Eestit kehvaks
natsiuurijaks”) in Postimees (20.04.01). In 2003 Estonia remained in this category,
joined by Austria, Finland, France and the UK (“Estonia gets Low Marks in Nazi Hunting”) in The Baltic Times, (01.05.03); BNS “Reinsalu disputes Nazi-hunt findings,” in
The Baltic Times, (31.08.03).
40 Meelis Maripuu’s paper reads “the present article is only concerned with the fate of the
local Jewish community during the Second World War; while the destiny of those
European Jews deported to Estonia in 1942–44 is not addressed” (Maripuu, Meelis
“Kollaboration und Widerstand in Estland 1940–1944” [Collaboration and resistance in
Estonia 1940–1944], a paper presented at the conference on ‘Reichskommissariat Ostland. Collaboration and Resistance during the Holocaust,’ Stockholm & Uppsala, Sweden, (18.–21.04.02).
41 My usage of the term ‘closed’ ought not to be confused with Karl Popper’s concept of
the ‘closed society.’
42 Cohen, Politics without a Past, 11f.
43 In his article De Thomas states “the fact that the Soviet occupation did more direct
harm in Estonia, however, does not negate the fact that the Holocaust happened here
too.” J. M. De Thomas, “Past, Present and Future,” in Eesti Päevaleht, (28.05.02.)
http://estonia.usembassy.gov/holocaust_eng.php.
44 “Estonian government puzzled at US ambassador’s Holocaust statement.” in Leta Daily
News Review (30.5.02).
45 “Lieber braun statt rot?” [Better Brown than Red?] in Newsletter of the Swiss Baltic
Chamber of Commerce (Tallinn 27.10.00). March 25 and June 14 are National Days of
mourning in remembrance of the mass-deportations during the Soviet periods.
46 Karsten Brüggemann, “Von der Renationalisierung zur Demontage nationaler Helden.
Oder: Wie schreibt man estnische Geschichte?” [From re-nationalization to the demolition of national heroes: Or how does one write Estonian history?], Osteuropa 7 (2001):
810–819.
47 Cf. Vardys and Misiunas, eds., Baltic States.
48 In her review of the final 1300-page report of the Commission (published in English in
2006), Eva-Clarita Onken concludes that it fails to take notice of the social context in
which the findings had been published (online) over the last six years, that is, its reception among the wider Estonian public. Moreover, Onken notes a rather positivistic understanding of history as ‘true facts’ in the individual contributions (and consequently a
lack of analysis); see: Eva-Clarita Onken, “The Politics of Finding Historical Truth:
Reviewing Baltic History Commissions and their Work,” Journal of Baltic Studies 38,
No. 1 (2007).
49 Apart from declarations, such the statement of the President of the Riigikogu, Toomas
Savi, on February 18, 2002 on the crimes of the occupation regime in Estonia. Toomas
Savi, “Statement of the President of the Riigikogu on the Occupation Regime in Estonia” in Euro University. The Monthly Survey of the Baltic and Post-Soviet Politics, No.
7 (109) (2001/2): 3–4.
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239
50 Enn Sarv, “Our Duty of Remembering,” a paper delivered at an International Conference on Crimes of Communism (Tallinn 14.06.2000): 36. www.isamaaliit.ee/
isamaa2/eng_4_2.html.
51 Oskar, interview (Tallinn, 01.10.03).
52 “Veterans: Views from the East.” in BBC News Week (09.05.05)
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4530273.stm). By comparison the veterans of the
Red Army in Russia vehemently deny such a claim.
53 BNS, “History Buff Building SS Legion Museum in Pärnu,” in The Baltic Times
(03.06.04); Agence France-Presse, “Plans halted for WWII memorial,” in The Baltic
Times (25.–31.07.02), 3; Melanie O’Connell, “Pärnu to Commemorate Freedom Fighters Again,” in The Baltic Times (31.08.03).
54 Aleksei Gunter, “Monumental Needs and Rethinking Estonia’s past,” in The Baltic
Times (10.06.04).
55 BBC, “Estonia Unveils Nazi War Monument,” in BBC News World Online Edition
(20.08.04).
56 Aleksei Gunter, “Riot Police Help Remove Controversial WWII Monument,” in The
Baltic Times (09.09.04).
57 Matthias Kolb, “Looking for the Truth Behind Lihula,” in The Baltic Times (27.04.05).
58 “State Removes Controversial Monument by Force,” in The Baltic Times (02.09.04).
59 Välisministeerium (Estonian Foreign Ministry), “Press Release: Statement by Foreign
Minister Ojuland Concerning the Lihula Monument,” (03.09.04).
60 “State Removes Controversial Monument by Force,” in The Baltic Times (02.09.04).
61 Aleksei Gunter, “Estonia Sets its History Straight,” in The Baltic Times (01.11.04);
Kolb “Looking for the truth;” From Wire Reports “Controversy Erupts Around Historical Commission,” in The Baltic Times (18.05.05).
62 Mel Huang, “Doing it Half Right,” in Central Europe Review 1, No. 2 (05.07.99).
63 Michael Shafir, “Analysis: Estonian War Veterans Provoke Russian Reaction,” in
Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) (22.07.04). The “Estonian Freedom
Fighters’ Association” represents Estonians who fought in divisions of the Waffen SS
(particularly soldiers of the 20th division of the Waffen SS, that is, the Estonian Legion) and as anti-Soviet partisans (that is, the “Forest Brethren”). Likewise in neighboring Latvia, the veterans of the Latvian SS Legion (the ‘National Soldiers’ Association’)
organize an annual public march to the Freedom Monument in the centre of Riga on
March 16.
64 BNS, “Freedom Fighters Demand Historical Clarification,” in The Baltic Times
(08.07.04).
65 Staff and wire reports “Freedom Fighters Appeal for Help, Evaluation of WWII
Events,” in The Baltic Times (05.08.04).
66 J. Postcom Staff, “Estonia Plans to Unveil Memorial to SS Veterans,” in Jerusalem
Post, Online Edition (22.05.04). The Estonian Legion per se cannot be termed a criminal organization, since in 1949–50 a UN commission investigated the Estonian and Latvian SS (the so-called Baltic Legions) and found these military units to be neither
criminal nor Nazi collaborators. However, the 16 Estonian units include the 36th Estonian Division of the Waffen SS, which the Commission had identified as having committed crimes against humanity.
67 “Tallinn decides against unveiling monument to Estonian Nazi troops,” in Estos in the
News, Itar-Tass (27.04.05). After the German troops withdrew from the city of Narva
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PAST IN THE MAKING
in April 26, 1944, soldiers of the Estonian Legion tried to bring the advancing Red
Army to a halt at Sinimäe. It is to the graves in Sinimäe that Estonian Waffen SS veterans, or legionaries, come to commemorate their battle on May 8, a day before Victory
Day (Sergei Stepanov, “Victory Day Opens Old Wounds,” in The Baltic Times
[16.05.02]).
68 Urmas Seaver, and Küllike Rooväli “Pärnu sai SS-vormis ‘Euroopa vaduse kaitsja’
bareljeefi,” [Translation Missing!] in Postimees (23.07.02); Urmas Seaver, and Mirko
Ojakivi “Pärnu võttis SS-vormis sõduriga ausamba maha,” [Translation Missing!] in
Postimees (24.07.02).
69 Gunter, “Riot Police.”
70 Even though the inscription (in Russian and Estonian) reads “To the fallen of the Second World War” the statue depicts a soldier in Soviet uniform, clearly defining the
meaning of the monument (Steven Lee Myers, “Debate Renewed: Did Moscow Free
Estonia or Occupy it?” in The New York Times [25.01.07] www.bafl.com/news).
71 Jari Tanner, “War monument in Estonia vandalized,” in Seattle Post-Intelligencer
(09.05.05); From wire reports “Candle Vigil Throws Kind Light on Bitter Monument,”
in The Baltic Times (15.09.04).
72 Joel Alas, “May 9 Protestors Call for Removing Bronze Soldier Statue,” in The Baltic
Times (10.05.06); Joel Alas, “Brawl Breaks Out in Shadow of the Bronze Memorial.”
in The Baltic Times (24.05.06). On May 9, 2006 the controversy reached a new height
when Estonian nationalists clashed with Soviet veterans and members of the Russianspeaking community waving Soviet flags (Joel Alas, “Coalition Split over Bronze Soldier,” in The Baltic Times [17.01.07])
73 Evidence for a different perception of European history came to light during the 60th
anniversary of the end of the Second World War, when the Estonian and Lithuanian
leaders did not travel to Moscow for the celebration on the 9th of May. The Latvian
president attended the ceremony, using the publicity to demonstrate the Baltic view on
the events of the Second World War. Johannes Vosswinkel, “Der 8. Mai 1945. Wo
Russen Täter waren” (May 8, 1945. Where Russians were the Perpetrators), in Die Zeit
(04.05.05), 19.
74 The dispute prompted members of the Russian Duma to push for sanctions against
Estonia. Agence France-Presse, “Russia slams removal of WWII memorial,” in The
Washington Times (22.01.07). The Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov called upon
the other European countries not to permit “this kind of blasphemous attitude towards
the memory of those who fought against Fascism.” TBT staff, “Russian Foreign Minister Opposes Sanctions Against Estonia,” in The Baltic Times (30.01.07).
75 From Wire Reports “Russian-speaking NGOs to Hold Roundtable on Bronze Soldier,”
in The Baltic Times (07.06.06).
76 Michael Walzer argues along these lines: M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral
Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York. Basic Books, 2000). Other scholars
in just war theory—such as David Rodin: D. Rodin, War and Self-Defense, (Oxford:
OUP, 2003), take a slightly more liberal stance, in that they allow for the fact that soldiers can be held responsible on an individual basis, because they have some freedom
of choice even in the exceptional situation of war.
77 In his case possibly more with the intention to relativize the war crimes committed by
Soviet soldiers. I believe the purpose of relativizing the extent of a group’s suffering or
the gravity of the crimes committed by that group is that of whitewashing.
The Struggle for Official Recognition…
241
78 O. Bartov, Mirrors of Destruction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (Oxford: OUP
2000), 39. In 1993 the Neue Wache was rededicated as the central memorial site for the
victim of war and tyranny. The plaque on the right side of the entrance reads “The Neue
Wache is the site of memory and remembrance of the victims of war and tyranny.” Subsequently, those nations and civilians who suffered and perished are listed in the same
breath with fallen soldiers and with innocent victims of war (that is, killed at home, in
captivity, and due to expulsion). The next section lists Jews, Sinti and Roma, homosexuals, and the mentally handicapped. Then those killed due to their religious or political beliefs are mentioned, followed by a paragraph on resistance fighters. The final
section is dedicated to women and men persecuted and killed due to their resistance to
the post-1945 totalitarian dictatorship. This is an extremely interesting example of an
attempt to do justice to many different (that is, competing) victim groups, but the juxtaposition of victims of different periods and regimes—and here I agree with Bartov’s assessment, is highly problematic: cf. P. Reichel, Politik mit der Erinnerung: Gedächtnisorte im Streit um die nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit [Politics of remembrance:
Sites of memory in the battle over the Nazi past] (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1999).
79 “Grave Mistakes,” in The Baltic Times (17.01.07).
80 Alas, “Coalition split.” In an attempt to resolve the dispute the Estonian parliament
accepted a bill banning the display of Soviet and Nazi symbols that might incite hatred
in late 2006: Joel Alas, “Free Speech Questioned as Estonia Prepares to Ban Soviet,
Nazi Symbols,” in The Baltic Times (06.12.06). Furthermore the parliament adopted the
“War Graves Protection Act” on January 10, 2007 to establish the legal basis for the
removal of the statue. A commission on war burial sites was soon established to decide
(along with the parliament) if a monument contradicts public interest or if it is located
in an inappropriate public place. Lastly, the parliament considers a draft law on renaming September 22 as ‘Day of Mourning’. Vladimir Socor, “Bronze Soldier Set to Leave
Tallinn as Last Soviet Soldier,” in Eurasia Monitor Daily, Jamestown Foundation
(12.01.07).
81 A similar emotional attachment can be witnessed with regard to forbidden books, indicative of the existential dimension of history.
82 Oskar, interview (Tallinn, 01.10.03).
83 Every collective memory is anchored (and unfolds) in a spatial framework (as well as in
a social framework). See: M. Halbwachs, La topographie legendaire des évangiles en
Terre Seinte. Étude de mémoire collective [The Legendary Topography of the Gospels
in the Holy Land], ([Missing Publisher and Place of Publication!]1941); M. Halbwachs,
La Mémoire collective, 1950 [Collective memory] (New York: Harper & Row, 1980);
M. Halbwachs, Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire [Social frames of memory] ([Missing
Publisher and Place of Publication!]1925); P. Nora, Zwischen Geschichte und Gedächtnis [Between history and memory] (Berlin: Wagenbach, 1990); Pierre Nora, ed.,
Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, Conflicts and Divisions, Vol. I, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Pierre Nora, ed., Realms of Memory: The
Construction of the French Past, Traditions, Vol. II, (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1997).