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Vasubandhu's 'Treatise on the Three Natures' translated from the Tibetan edition with a commentary by Garfield, Jay L.

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 1. Introduction
            The present text Trisvabhavanirdesac (Rang bzhin gsum nges par bstan pa) is one
            of Vasubandhu's short treatises (the others being the Treatise in
            Twenty Stanzas
            Vimsatika and the Treatise in Thirty Stanzas Trimsatika)
            expounding his
            cittamatra,
            or mind-only philosophy. Vasubandhu and his older brother Asanga are
            regarded
            as the
            Fourth or Fifth century CE as the major philosophical rival within
            the Mahayana
            Buddhist tradition to the older Madhyamaka tradition. The latter
            school,
            founded by
            Nagarjuna, urges the emptiness -- the lack of essence or
            substantial,
            independent
            reality -- of all things, including both external phenomena and
            mind.(2)
            Vasubandhu,
            however, reinterprets the emptiness of the object as being its lack
            of external
            reality, and
            its purely mind-dependent, or ideal status.(3) At the same time,
            however, he
            argues that the foundational mind is non-empty since it truly exists
            as the
            substratum of the
            apparent reality represented in our experience. The position is
            hence akin to
            the idealisms defended by such Western philosophers as Berkeley,
            Kant and
            Schopenhauer.(4)
            While Trisvabhavanirdesa is arguably the most philosophically
            detailed and
            comprehensive of the three short works on this topic composed by
            Vasubandhu, as
            well as
            the clearest, it is almost never read or taught in contemporary
            traditional
            Buddhist
            cultures or centres of learning. The reason for this is simple: this
            is the
            only one of
            Vasubandhu's root texts for which no auto-commentary exists.(5) For
            this
            reason,
            none of Vasubandhu's students composed commentaries on the text and
            there is
            hence
            no recognized lineage of transmission for the text. So nobody within
            the
            Tibetan
            tradition (the only extant Mahayana monastic scholarly tradition)
            could
            consider
            him/herself authorized to teach the text. So it is simply not
            studied. This is
            a great pity.
            It is a beautiful and deep philosophical essay and an unparalleled
            introduction
            to the
            cittamatra system.
            The text introduces the fundamental doctrine of Buddhist idealism,
            and

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            clarifies in
            remarkably short compass its relations to the other principal
            doctrines of that
            school -- that all external appearances are merely ideal and
            originate from
            potentials for
            experience carried in the mind. The central topic of the text is the
            exposition
            of how this view
            entails the cittamatra theory of the three natures -- the view that
            every
            object of
            experience is characterized by three distinct but interdependent
            natures.
            Vasubandhu's
            idealism is distinctive in its insistence that a coherent idealism
            requires the
            positing of
            these three natures, and in its subtle analysis of the complex
            relations
            between the
            natures themselves, involving the thesis of their surface diversity
            but deep
            unity.(6)
            This text also presents a creative union of ontology and
            phenomenology.
            Vasubandhu's characterization of the status of the objects of
            experience is at
            the same
            time self-consciously a characterization of the character of
            subjectivity
            itself. Not only
            will Vasubandhu argue that we can only make sense of objects if we
            ascribe to
            them
            these three triune natures, but he will argue that a complete
            account of
            experience -- especially of the experience of a sophisticated and
            accomplished
            philosopher or
            meditator -- requires an account of three distinct kinds of
            subjectivity, which
            are related to
            one another as are the three natures themselves. This phenomenology
            is crucial
            to the
            soteriological purport of the system. For this is not speculative
            philosophy
            for its own
            sake, but a philosophical system designed to guide a practitioner to
            buddhahood
            in order that s/he can work to alleviate the suffering of all
            sentient beings.

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            Trisvabhavanirdesa is unique in its exposition of idealism as
            involving the
            doctrine of
            the three natures, in its detailed analysis of the natures
            themselves and in
            its exploration
            of their relations to one another. In Vimsatika-karika Vasubandhu
            clearly
            defends
            idealism against a series of objections, but does not explicitly
            articulate the
            roles of the
            three natures in his idealistic theory or expound its structure. In
            Trimsika-karika
            Vasubandhu explores the relation between the three natures and the
            three
            naturelessnesses (naturelessness with respect to characteristic
            laksana-nihsvabhavata, mtshan nyid ngo bo nyid med, naturelessness with respect to production
            utpatti-nihsvabhavata,
            skye ba ngo bo niyd med and ultimate naturelessness
            paramartha-nihsvabhavata,
            don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid med]) adumbrated in the
            Samdhinirmocana-sutra, but does
            not explore their relation to idealism, per se, or their relations
            to one
            another. It is only in
            the present text that he explicitly analyses idealism as implicating
            the three natures, and
            explains in detail how they are interconnected.
            Sthiramati, in his commentary on Trimsika-karika, argues that the
            three natures and three naturelessnesses are equivalent. His understanding
            of the
            three natures
            as equivalent to the three naturelessnessess of the
            Samdhinirmocana-sutra is
            adopted
            uncritically by such Tibetan doxographers as Tsong Khapa(7) and
            mKhas grub.(8)
            The adoption of this commentarial tradition, which emphasises the
            homogeneity
            of the Samdhinirmocana-sutra with Vasubandhu's and Asanga's thought,
            along with
            the exposition of the three natures as presented in Trimsatika and
            Vimsatika
            reinforces the
            elision of this more mature and explicit articulation of
            Vasubandhu's theory
            from subsequent developments of Yogacara. The emphasis of the
            dominant
            Madhyamaka school on naturelessness as a fundamental metaphysical
            tenet, and
            its need to see Yogacara as the penultimate step to its own
            standpoint lends
            further impetus to this tendency to assimilate these two doctrines.
            Of all of
            the Madhyamika, only Candrakirti
            really takes the trisvabhava doctrine itself seriously as a target
            for critique
            (dBu ma la jugs pa/Madhyamakavatara).(10)

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            The thirty-eight verses of the text divide neatly into six sections.
            In the
            first six verses
            Vasubandhu introduces the three natures and provides a preliminary
            characterization
            of each. In verses 7-9 he sketches two schemata for thinking about
            the
            character of
            mind from the standpoint of three nature theory. Verses 10-21
            develop a
            dialectically
            complex and elegant discussion of how to view the polar pairs of
            existence/non-existence, duality/unity and affliction/non-affliction
            in
            relation to each of the three natures, culminating in a discussion of the senses in which the
            natures are
            identical to
            one another and the senses in which they are different. Verses 22-25
            present
            the natures hierarchically from the standpoint of pedagogy and
            soteriology.
            Vasubandhu
            presents the famous simile of the hallucinatory elephant conjured by
            the stage
            magician
            in verses 26-34. This is probably the most famous and oft-cited
            moment in this
            text.
            In a vivid and simple image Vasubandhu presents a way of
            understanding the
            three natures, their relation to one another, to idealism, and of the
            phenomenology
            they
            suggest to Buddhist soteriology. The concluding four verses are
            devoted to the
            soteriological implications of the text.
            Trisvabhavanirdesa is not only a philosophically subtle text. It is
            also a
            considerable
            literary and poetic achievement. (Much of the elegance of
            Vasubandhu's
            Sanskrit is preserved in the Tibetan translation. I have found it
            difficult
            to produce a translation
            that does proper justice to the poetic value of the text while
            remaining
            faithful to the
            philosophical ideas and rhetorical structure.) The doctrine it
            expounds is
            packed with
            dynamic tension born of constantly impending paradox and of the need

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            continuously
            to balance several levels of discourse. The poetic text that
            develops this
            doctrine mirrors
            that tension in its constant shifting of level; in its frequent
            double entendre
            allowing
            claims to be made at two or more levels simultaneously; and in its
            multi-leveled
            discourse in which claims that appear contradictory are reconcile,
            albeit
            often in startling and revealing ways. The poem is full of
            unexpected
            rhetorical and philosophical turns, and is structured so as to
            reflect the
            ontological and phenomenological
            theory it articulates. The language is as spare and vibrant as the
            radiant
            mind-only
            ontology it presents.
            2. The Text of Trisvabhavanirdesa(11)

            1. The imagined, the other-dependent and
            The consummate.
            These are the three natures
            Which should be deeply understood.

            2. Arising through dependence on conditions and
            Existing through being imagined,
            It is therefore called other-dependent
            And is said to be merely imaginary.
 
            3. The external non-existence
            Of what appears in the way it appears,
            Since it is never otherwise,
            Is known as the nature of the consummate.
 
            4. If anything appears, it is imagined.
            The way it appears is as duality.
            What is the consequence of its non-existence?
            The fact of non-duality!

            5. What is the imagination of the non-existent?
            Since what is imagined absolutely never
            Exists in the way it is imagined,
            It is mind that constructs that illusion.
 
            6. Because it is a cause and an effect,
            The mind has two aspects.
            As the foundation consciousness it creates thought;
            Known as the emerged consciousness it has seven aspects.
 
            7. The first, because it collects the seeds
            Of suffering is called `mind'.

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 The second, because of the constant emergence
            Of the various aspects of things is so called.

            8. One should think of the illusory non-existent
            As threefold:
            Completely ripened, grasped as other,
            And as appearance.

            9. The first, because it itself ripens,
            Is the root consciousness.
            The others are emergent consciousness,
            Having emerged from the conceptualization of seer and seen.

            10. Existence and non-existence, duality and unity;
            Freedom from affliction and afflicted;
            Through characteristics, and through distinctions,
            These natures are known to be profound.

            11. Since it appears as existent
            Though it is non-existent,
            The imagined nature
            Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
 
            12. Since it exists as an illusory entity
            And is non-existent in the way it appears
            The other-dependent nature
            Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-
.
            13. Since it is the non-existence of duality
            And exists as non-duality
            The consummate nature
            Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.

            14. Moreover, since as imagined there are two aspects,
            But existence and non-existence are unitary,
            The nature imagined by the ignorant
            Is said to be both dual and unitary.

            15. Since as an object of thought it is dual,
            But as a mere appearance it is unitary,

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            The other-dependent nature
            Is said to be both dual and unitary.

            16. Since it is the essence of dual entities
            And is a unitary non-duality,
            The consummate nature
            Is said to be both dual and unitary.

            17. The imagined and the other-dependent
            Are said to be characterized by misery (due to ignorant craving).
            The consummate is free of
            The characteristic of desire.

            18. Since the former has the nature of a false duality
            And the latter is the non-existence of that nature,
            The imagined and the consummate
            Are said not to be different in characteristic.

            19. Since the former has the nature of non-duality,
            And the latter has the nature of non-existent duality,
            The consummate and the imagined
            Are said not to be different in characteristic.
 
            20. Since the former is deceptive in the way it appears,
            And the latter has the nature of its not being that way,
            The other-dependent and the consummate
            Are said not to be different in characteristic.

            21. Since the former has the nature of a non-existent duality,
            And the latter is its non-existence in the way it appears,
            The other-dependent and the consummate
            Are said not to be different in characteristic.

            22. But conventionally,
            The natures are explained in order and
            Based on that one enters them
            In a particular order, it is said.
 
            23. The imagined is entirely conventional.
            The other-dependent is attached to convention.
            The consummate, cutting convention,
            Is said to be of a different nature.

            24. Having first entered into the non-existence of duality
            Which is the dependent, one understands
            The non-existent duality

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            Which is the imagined.

            25. Then one enters the consummate.
            Its nature is the non-existence of duality.
            Therefore it is explained
            To be both existent and non-existent.
 
            26. These three natures
            Have the characteristics of being non-cognizable and non-dual.
            One is completely non-existent; the second is therefore
            non-existent.
            The third has the nature of that non-existence.

            27. Like an elephant that appears
            Through the power of a magician's mantra --
            Only the percept appears,
            The elephant is completely non-existent.

            28. The imagined nature is the elephant;
            The other-dependent nature is the visual percept;
            The non-existence of the elephant therein
            Is explained to be the consummate.

            29. Through the root consciousness
            The nonexistent duality appears.
            But since the duality is completely non-existent,
            There is only a percept.

            30. The root consciousness is like the mantra.
            Reality can be compared to the wood.
            Imagination is like the perception of the elephant
            Duality can be seen as the elephant.

            31. When one understands how things are,
            Perfect knowledge, abandonment,
            And accomplishment --

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            These three characteristics are simultaneously achieved.

            32. Knowledge is non-perception;
            Abandonment is non-appearance;
            Attainment is accomplished through non-dual perception.
            That is direct manifestation.

            33. Through the non-perception of the elephant,
            The vanishing of its percept occurs;
            And so does the perception of the piece of wood.
            This is how it is in the magic show.

            34. In the same way through the non-perception of duality
            There is the vanishing of duality.
            When it vanishes completely,
            Non-dual awareness arises.

            35. Through perceiving correctly,
            Through seeing the non-referentiality of mental states,
            Through following the three wisdoms,
            One will effortlessly attain liberation.

            36. Through the perception of mind-only
            One achieves the non-perception of objects;
            Through the non-perception of objects
            There is also the non-perception of mind.

            37. Through the non-duality of perception,
            Arises the perception of the fundamental nature of reality.
            Through the perception of the fundamental nature of reality
            Arises the perception of the radiant.

            38. Through the perception of the radiant,
            And through achieving the three supreme Buddha-bodies,
            And through possessing bodhi:
            Having achieved this, the sage will benefit him/herself and others.

            3. The Text With Commentary
            1. The imagined, the other-dependent
 and
            The consummate.
            These are the three natures.
            Which should be deeply understood.
            Every phenomenon, according to cittamatra metaphysics has all three
            of these
            natures -- three ways of being. It is not the case that some have
            one nature
            and some have
            others; nor that phenomena appear to have one or another of the
            three, but in
            fact have
            another. The three are necessarily copresent in every phenomenon,
            and are,
            though
            distinct, mutually implicative.

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            Let us pause for a moment over the three terms themselves, whose
            translation into
            English is no straightforward matter. Each is a nature (Tib: rang bzhin, Skt:
            svabhava). So each is part of what it is to be a thing -- not an
            accidental
            attribute that a
            thing might have. But each of the three qualifiers added to this
            term to
            denote one
            of the three natures creates a subtly ambiguous compound, and plays
            on this
            ambiguity form part of the structure of Vasubandhu's ingenious verse
            treatise.
            On the
            one hand, each characterizes the nature itself -- part of what it is
            to be a
            phenomenon.
            On the other hand, each characterizes the relation of the subject to
            the
            phenomenon,
            or the character of the subjectivity that constitutes the
            representation of the
            phenomenon. This duality is not surprising, for this is an
            idealistic
            treatise. As far as
            Vasubandhu is concerned, what it is to be a phenomenon is to be an
            object of a
            mind,
            and this treatise is an exploration of what it is to be an object so
            

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            conceived. So
            questions about subjectivity and questions concerning the ontology
            of the
            object are
            closely intertwined.
            "Imagined" translates the Tibetan brtags or Sanskrit parikalpita.
            The terms
            connote
            construction by the mind, more than they do non-existence -- more
            akin to
            hallucination than fiction. But this simile can be misleading. To be
            imagined
            in this senses is not
            to be hallucinatory as opposed to being real -- it is to be
            constructed as the
            object that
            it is by the operation of the mind. "Other-dependent" translates
            gzhan gyi dbang or
            paratantra. Something that is other-dependent in this sense exists
            only in and
            through
            dependence on another thing. In this case, the emphasis will be that
            phenomena
            exist
            in dependence upon the mind and its process.(12)
            I use "consummate" to translate yongs su grub pa or parinispanna.
            This is
            the most
            difficult of these three terms to translate. Others have used
            "perfect",
            "perfected",
            "thoroughly established", "thoroughly existent", "completed" and
            "ultimate".(13)

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            Each of these choices has merit, and the variety of options
            illustrates the
            range of
            associations the term has in Tibetan or Sanskrit. When affixed to
            "nature" it
            connotes
            on the objective side the nature an object has when it is thoroughly
            

            understood. On the
            subjective side, it connotes the nature apparent to one who is fully
            

            accomplished
            intellectually and meditatively. It represents the highest and most
            complete
            understanding of a phenomenon. It is important, however, not to
            misinterpret
            this term to connote
            the real nature as opposed to the unreal natures denoted by the
            terms
            "imaginary" and
            "other-dependent", or the ultimate, as opposed to the conventional
            nature of
            things.
            Ultimately, all phenomena have all three natures. Each is real; each
            must be
            understood
            in order to understand the nature of things; each subjective
            relation to
            things is present
            in a full understanding of a phenomenon.(14)
            2. Arising through dependence on conditions and
            Existing through being imagined,
            It is therefore called other-dependent
            And is said to be merely imaginary.
            Vasubandhu begins by sketching in the second and third verses the
            outlines of
            the
            relation between the three natures. In the second verse he focuses
            on the
            relation
            between the first two. Any phenomenon comes into existence in
            dependence upon
            various causes and conditions. But Vasubandhu here calls attention
            to a special
            dimension of this dependence. For anything to exist as an object,
            its objective
            existence
            is dependent upon mental causes and conditions. This is a
            straightforwardly
            Kantian
            point -- that there are conditions on the side of the subject that
            make it
            possible for
            anything to exist as an object.
            But whatever is so dependent, and hence, when seen from this
            standpoint, the
            content of a mental act, is nonetheless represented as an
            independent existent.

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            Let us
            consider for example my perceptual representation of the screen on
            which these
            words appear as I type. I see it not as my representation, but
            rather as
            something that
            exists independent of, external to, and standing against my mind and
            perceptual
            faculties. No matter how thoroughgoing an idealist I may be in my
            philosophical
            moods, ordinary perception delivers me not imaginary objects seen as
            imaginary,
            but
            rather objects seen as external. But they do not, from this
            philosophical
            standpoint,
            exist in that way. In fact they are merely dependent on and,
            transcendentally,
            internal
            to, my mind. For this reason we can say that the content of my
            mental acts,
            seen as
            content, is other-dependent, in virtue of its dependence on my mind,
            but seen
            as it is
            experienced, it is imaginary, since considered in the way it appears
            to exist,
            it is in fact
            non-existent.
            3. The external non-existence
            Of what appears in the way it appears,
            Since it is never otherwise,
            Is know as the nature of the consummate.
            The third verse emphasizes this last point and uses it to connect
            these first
            two
            natures to the consummate nature: things appear to us as
            independently
            existent.

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            They do so in virtue of their dependence upon other such things and
            upon our
            minds
            (which -- in an important sense to be discussed later -- do share
            these three natures).
            But the fact is that given their actual mind-dependent status, of
            which we can
            be aware through careful philosophical reflection or through
            extensive
            meditative accomplishment, we can say that these apparent
            things -- independently existent computers, camels and coffee cups
            -- are always
            non-existent. What exists in their place
            are states of mind masquerading as independent phenomena. That
            non-existence -- the non existence of the apparent reality -- is the
            consummate nature that all
            phenomena have.
            The next two verses examine two consequences of this negative
            characterisation of
            the consummate nature: the co-existence of subject-object duality in
            the first
            two natures with non-duality in the consummate, and the
            mind-dependence of the
            imagined nature:
            4. If anything appears, it is imagined.
            The way it appears is as duality.
            What is the consequence of its non-existence?
            The fact of non-duality!
            Whatever appears to us as an object, we have seen, does so in its
            imagined
            nature. In
            any such appearance, the fact that the object is presented to us as
            independent
            entails
            the fact that it is presented as wholly other than the mind that
            apprehends it.
            This is
            the point that Kant makes against Berkeley when he urges in the
            Refutation of
            Idealism
            that even though in a transcendental sense all appearances are in
            us, in an
            empirical
            sense, for anything to appear to us in space, it appears to us as
            outside
            us.(15)

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            Schopenhauer hones this point and wields it against Kant himself
            when he points
            out
            that any account of the genesis of representation that harmonizes
            with a
            coherent
            transcendental idealist account of the ontology of representation
            must grant
            phenomena a genuine independent empirical reality in order to
            account for their
            causal
            impact upon us that is responsible for our cognitive apprehension of
            them.(16)
            But,
            he argues, such an idealism must also grant them a status as mere
            representations
            when we consider them as they appear to us. Interestingly, this
            point is made
            on the
            way to an account of a third nature of which Schopenhauer(17)
            charges Kant of
            being unaware -- their status as noumena, or will, in which all
            subject-object
            duality
            disappears.(18)
            5. What is the imagination of the non-existent?
            Since what is imagined absolutely never
            Exists in the way it is imagined,
            It is mind that constructs that illusion.
            Vasubandhu here simply repeats the tight connection between the
            account
            offered of
            the status of phenomena as imagined and their mind-dependence. Since
            the
            imagined
            nature is in fact totally imaginary, it does not arise from the side
            of the
            thing which
            appears. Rather it is an artifact of the operation of the mind.
            The next four verses sketch two alternative ways of presenting the
            nature of
            mind in
            Vasubandhu's idealistic system. In verses 6 and 7 he presents a
            division that
            distinguishes the mind in its role as subject from the mind in its
            role as
            object:

Imag4242es.jpg

            6. Because it is a cause and an effect,
            The mind has two aspects.
            As the foundation consciousness it creates thought;
            Known as the emerged consciousness it has seven aspects.
            Vasubandhu, in another move prescient of Kant,(19) distinguishes the
            mind in
            its role
            as transcendental subject from its role as object, as it appears to
            itself. In
            the first aspect,
            to which Vasubandhu refers as the "foundation consciousness", (Tib:
            kun gzhi,
            Skt:
            alaya-vijnana) the mind functions as the condition of the appearance
            of
            phenomena,
            and hence as the ground of the possibility of the imagined and
            other-dependent
            natures. But in its second aspect -- the "emerged consciousness"
            (Tib: `jug pa,
            Skt:
            pavrttivijnana) -- the mind exists as the object of introspection,
            and is
            conditioned both
            by external phenomena that appear in perception and by its own
            phenomena. Hence
            it
            constantly evolves, and emerges in new states as a consequence of
            experience.
            The
            "seven aspects" to which Vasubandhu alludes are the five sensory
            consciousnesses, the
            introspective consciousness apprehending the self as object, and the
            reflective
            consciousness of the transcendental subject of experience. These
            aspects are
            hence
            distinguished by their proper objects or spheres of operation.

Imag111es.jpg

            7. The first, because it collects the seeds
            Of suffering is called "mind".
            The second, because of the constant emergence
            Of the various aspects of things is so called.
            Vasubandhu is making a tendentious etymological claim about the
            Sanskrit term
            translated here as "mind", citta. On one etymology, he claims, the
            term is
            derived from
            cita, which means piled up or accumulated. Hence, he argues, "mind"
            can be
            thought of
            as indicating a storehouse of seeds of experience or mental
            potentials. In this
            sense the
            mind can be thought of as the location of the seeds of future
            experiences. The
            second
            etymology, Vasubandhu contends, connects citta to the Sanskrit term
            citra
            meaning
            various or manifold. This suggests the role of mind as a constantly
            emerging
            developing
            phenomenon. Hence, Vasubandhu suggests, the very etymology of the
            term connotes
            its two parallel roles.(20)
            The next two verses develop a three-fold account of the aspectual
            character
            of mind.

Imag-41.jpg

            These are not intended as competitors to one another, but rather as
            alternate,
            compossible, ways to understand the multiple roles played by mind in
            

            experience.
            8. One should think of the illusory non-existent
            As threefold:
            Completely ripened, grasped as other,
            And as appearance.
            Here Vasubandhu notes three prima facie characteristics of the mind
            in our
            experience,
            all on the side of its role as object of inner sense. First, insofar
            as mind is
            an object, and
            hence an empirical phenomenon, it is a ripened potential -- the
            fruit of a seed
            of experience heretofore dormant in the foundation consciousness.
            Secondly, and
            perhaps
            most paradoxically, since it appears as an object, it appears as
            other than the
            self to
            which it appears. Here Vasubandhu is calling attention to the fact
            that even in
            apperception there is a duality between subject and object; a self
            that appears
            to us
            appears as distinct from the ego to which it appears. Finally, the
            self is an
            appearance -- not a continuing, stable or independent phenomenon,
            but rather as
            a series of moments
            of awareness, each an evanescent ripening of a potential for
            consciousness, and
            so like
            all external objects, its apparent unity is a matter of
            construction, not of
            discovery in
            some independently given noumenon.(21)

Godong.jpg

            9. The first, because it itself ripens,
            Is the root consciousness.
            The others are emergent consciousness,
            Having emerged from the conceptualization of seer and seen.
            Nonetheless, Vasubandhu argues, the first of these three aspects has
            a
            particular
            connection to the subject side of the self, as per the first
            division, while
            the second and
            third aspects of this threefold division are better aligned with the
            second
            side of the first
            division. The root (Tib: rtsa ba, Skt: mula), consciousness (the
            same as the
            foundation
            consciousness) is not only the subject of all experience, it is also
            the
            repository of all of
            the latencies, or potentials -- more often called the "seeds" --
            which, when
            actualized, or
            "ripened" become actual phenomena -- objects of experience. On the
            other hand,
            when
            the self is represented as an object of experience in introspection,
            it stands
            over and
            against the root consciousness of which it is an object. It is hence
            in this
            sense emergent
            from the root consciousness and is "grasped as other than the self".
            Finally in
            being so
            grasped, it is grasped as a series of evanescent moments of
            experience. These
            latter two
            aspects hence emerge as aspects of the self considered as object;
            the first as
            an aspect
            of self considered as subject, or as storehouse of latencies.
            The next eleven verses develop a delicate and logically acrobatic
            dialectic
            concerning
            the interplay of three pairs of contradictories and their relation
            to the three natures:
            existence and non-existence; duality and unity; freedom from
            afflictions and
            affliction.
            Vasubandhu will argue that each of the three natures is
            characterised by both
            members
            of each of these contraries. He then argues that these natures are
            each both
            identical to
            and distinct from one another. While it might be tempting and facile
            to think
            that here
            Vasubandhu is simply trading in paradox or irony this would be a
            mistake. This
            important section of the treatise is centrally concerned with the
            alternation
            in voices
            and perspectives represented by the three natures. They have a
            phenomenological
            side
            to them, representing not only the tripartite ontological dimension
            Vasubandhu sees in
            all phenomena, but also the three phenomenological perspectives that
            together
            constitute the complex subjectivity Vasubandhu envisions.
            10. Existence and non-existence, duality and unity;
            Freedom from affliction and afflicted;
            Through characteristics, and through distinctions,
            These natures are known to be profound.
            "Existence" and "non-existence" are understood here in a perfectly
            ordinary
            sense,
            though of course a sense ordinary within the framework of idealism
            generally.
            Given
            this context, of course, it will always be possible to ask about the
            standpoint
            from which
            an assertion regarding existence is made. Is it from the standpoint
            of
            subjectivity -- that
            is, an empirical, objective claim? Or is it from a transcendental
            standpoint?
            Moreover,
            we can always ask whether when a thing is asserted to exist we mean
            that it
            exists in the
            way in which it is apprehended, or whether it exists simpliciter.
            So, for
            instance, if I ask
            whether the "water" I see on a hot highway on a December day exists,
            one must
            be careful: the mirage exists, no water does. The percept to which I
            refer as
            "water" exists,
            but not in the manner in which it is apprehended. (And, of course,
            if I am an
            idealist,
            from a transcendental perspective neither the water nor the mirage
            can be said
            to exist at all. Both are merely appearances.)
            The duality/unity pair concerns subject/object duality. To assert
            that
            there is, from a
            specific standpoint, a duality in this sense is to assert that from
            that
            standpoint there is
            a real distinction between subject and object. To assert a unity or
            a
            non-duality is to
            deny such a duality. The important thing to bear in mind regarding
            this pair
            as one
            approaches Vasubandhu is that questions about duality and
            non-duality can
            always be
            posed in both a metaphysical and a phenomenological voice. So, we
            can ask of
            each of
            the natures in what sense it implicates such a duality as part of
            the structure
            of the
            object of experience. But we can also ask the question regarding the
            nature of
            the
            corresponding aspect of subjectivity itself. So in each case we can
            ask
            whether, or in
            what sense, in a subject considering things as other-dependent, etc.
            there is
            such a duality,
            as well as asking whether, or in what sense, each nature implicates
            such a
            duality in the
            structure of the object.
            The third pair -- affliction/freedom from affliction -- introduces
            specifically Buddhist
            soteriological concerns. Again, the concerns in play are both
            ontological and
            phenomenological. The afflictions are those associated with the
            suffering of
            samsara or
            cyclic existence. Those include not only physical and psychological
            suffering
            themselves
            but also the craving and grasping which are their proximal causes
            and, most
            importantly in this context, the primal ignorance regarding the
            nature of
            things that takes the
            phenomena of experience and the self to be inherently, or
            substantially
            existent, as
            opposed to being empty of substance. So we can say either that a
            mind
            apprehending
            an object is afflicted in virtue of regarding that object as
            inherently
            existent or that the
            object as perceived is an afflicted object. In the latter case we
            are saying
            that the object
            itself in virtue of one or more of its natures is constituted in a
            manner
            essentially
            implicating the afflictions. (22) Vasubandhu begins by arguing that
            the
            imagined nature
            involves both existence and non-existence.
            11. Since it appears as existent
            Though it is non-existent,
            The imagined nature
            Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
            Let us work through these verses with an ordinary example in mind.
            Let us
            consider
            a teacup on your desk. Consider its imagined nature. As imagined, it
            is an
            existent -- indeed independently, substantially existent -- teacup
            entirely
            distinct from and
            independent from your mind and mental processes. It endures through
            time, and
            has a
            nature all its own. Hence existence, in a very strong sense, is part
            of its
            imagined nature.
            On the other hand, when we move up one level in the dialectic, and
            see that
            this is
            merely an imagined nature -- merely the way the cup appears to a
            consciousness,
            we see
            that the cup that so appears -- the imagined cup itself -- does not
            exist at
            all, just as no
            water exists in the mirage. In this sense, the very fact that the
            cup-as-imagined is only
            imagined means that though it is imagined as existent, in fact it is
            

            non-existent. Insofar as
            we simply imagine the cup, we imagine an existent cup. Insofar as we
            become
            reflexively aware of that act of imagination, the cup we imagine
            disappears.
            12. Since it exists as an illusory entity
            And is non-existent in the way it appears
            The other-dependent nature
            Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
            Now, consider the same teacup from the standpoint of its
            other-dependent
            nature:
            from this standpoint, the cup exists as an entity dependent upon the
            mind. The
            cup
            so-considered certainly exists: it exists as a mental phenomenon --
            as a
            representation.
            On the other hand, we can ask what the objective character(23) of
            that
            representation
            is. Then the answer is simple, and takes us back to the imagined
            nature: the
            cup
            considered objectively is the old, real, independent cup, which,
            when we
            understand it
            from the standpoint of the dependent nature, does not exist at all,
            just in
            virtue of the
            fact that from this standpoint it is dependent. So, from the
            perspective of the
            dependent
            nature, the cup -- the dependent mental phenomenon we mistake for a
            real
            cup -- like
            the refraction pattern we mistake for water -- exists. But that
            putative real
            cup which is the content of that mental episode does not.
            13. Since it is the non-existence of duality
            And exists as non-duality
            The consummate nature
            Is said to have the characteristics of existence and non-existence.
            Now we come to the consummate nature of our cup. The cup we have
            been
            considering all along whether from the standpoint of the imagined or
            the
            dependent nature, is, in an important and common sense, dual in
            nature. In its
            imagined nature it is an independent object of mind, and so is
            distinct from the
            subject which apprehends it. But in its dependent nature, as an
            episode of mind,
            it is still, as a mere episode or mental act, distinct from the mind
            which is
            its agent or subject. In the consummate nature, this duality
            vanishes. For the
            consummate nature of the cup is the very fact of its illusory status
            -- that it
            is nothing other than aspect of mind. Hence the apparent, dual, cup
            is, in its
            consummate nature (or, equivalently -- from the point of view of one
            of
            consummate attainment) utterly non-existence. But that non-duality
            really exists
            That is the final nature of the cup.(24) And in this sense, the
            consummate nature embraces both existence and non-existence -- the
            non-existence of the cup
            as dual is its true existence as non-dually related to the mind
            apprehending it.
            This consideration of duality and non-duality as the mediators of
            existence and
            non-existence in the consummate forms the bridge to the
            consideration of duality
            and non-duality per se in the three natures.
            14. Moreover, since as imagined there are two aspects,
            But existence and non-existence are unitary,
            The nature imagined by the ignorant
            Is said to the both dual and unitary.
            For a thing to exist as imagined, and for it not to exist in the way
            it appears,
            are both diametrically opposed and identical, depending on how one
            conceives
            them. For on the one hand, they represent existence and
            non-existence, the most
            opposed of properties. In that sense, the imagined nature is
            thoroughly dual,
            encompassing both of these in virtue of the more fundamental
            subject-object
            duality it represents. That more fundamental duality gives rise both
            to the
            imagined existence of the object experience, and, when seen for what
            it is -- a
            mere illusion, the non-existence of that object in the way that it
            appears. On
            the other hand, to exist as imagined just is not to exist in the way
            a thing
            appears. In this sense the mode of existence and the mode of
            non-existence
            of the imagined nature -- of a thing as it is imagined -- are the
            same, and are
            non-dually related. And this non-duality is rooted in the more
            fundamental
            non-duality that emerges when we see from a higher standpoint that a
            thing as
            imagined is merely mental, and hence not distinct from mind. Hence
            the imagined
            nature is both dual and
            unitary, depending on how it is conceived. And the object as
            imagined is
            experienced dually in a non-reflective consciousness, but non-dually
            by more
            accomplished consciousness reflecting on that experience.
            15. Since as an object of thought it is dual,
            But as a mere appearance it is unitary,
            The other-dependent nature
            Is said to be both dual unitary.
            We can say pretty much the same thing about the other-dependent
            nature. A
            phenomenon understood as other-dependent is both dependent upon the
            mind that
            represents it and is also a mere appearance of, an content of, that
            consciousness In that sense the object is no different from that
            consciousness. Hence this nature, too, is both dual and unitary,
            depending on
            how it is conceived.
            16. Since it is the essence of dual entities
            And is unitary non-duality,
            The consummate nature
            Is said to be both dual and unitary.
            The unity of duality and non-duality is perhaps a bit less
            compelling in the
            consummate nature, For the consummate nature is virtually defined by
            its
            non-duality and by the fact that from its perspective all duality is
            erased.
            But Vasubandhu is concerned to argue that it, too, in a sense,
            participates in
            duality, and this for two reasons. The first, and least interesting,
            is his
            obvious drive for poetic symmetry in the exposition. The second
            reason is a bit
            more philosophically interesting: the pair duality/unity is itself a
            duality and
            so should, from the standpoint of the consummate, be overcome. So to
            say that
            the consummate nature is non-dual, or unitary as opposed to being
            dual would be
            self defeating. So Vasubandhu needs to achieve a kind of sublation
            of duality
            and non duality in the consummate. And he achieves this by noting
            that while the
            consummate nature itself may be non-dual, it is nonetheless the
            nature of dual
            entities -- entities that appear in their imagined nature, in virtue
            of their
            other-dependent nature. Inasmuch as it is nature of dual entities,
            then, the
            consummate nature can be said to be dual.
            17. The imagined and the other-dependent
            Are said to be characterized by misery (due to ignorant carving).
            The consummate is free of
            The characteristic of desire.
            This verse introduces the discussion in 17-21 of the sense in which
            the three natures are identical to one another despite their apparent
            differences in
            characteristic. Vasubandhu begins by emphasizing the prima facie
            ontological
            and ontological and soteriological gulf separating the imagined and
            the
            other-dependent from the consummate: the former are on the side of
            samsara;
            the latter is on the side of nirvana. The former two represent the
            aspects of
            phenomena apparent to a mind beset by primal ignorance, and hence by
            the
            suffering it engenders; therefore also the aspects responsible for
            the
            perpetuation of that ignorance and craving on the vicious circle of
            ignorance,
            grasping and suffering that constitutes cylic existence. The third,
            on the other
            hand, represents that aspect of phenomena apparent to a mind that
            has
            transcended all of that, and the aspect that conduces to the
            alleviation of
            suffering.(25) But, as we shall see, this prima facie ontological,
            epistemological gulf will be obliterated in the final union of the
            three natures.
            18. Since the former has the nature of a false duality
            And the latter is the non-existence of that nature,
            The imagined and the consummate
            Are said not to be different in characteristic.
            Vasubandhu now begins the task of unifying the three natures as
            three mutually
            implicative aspects of a single reality. He begins with the relation
            between the
            imagined and the consummate: the imagined nature is essentially
            dualistic, in
            that it involves an ontic distinction between subject and object;
            but seen as
            imagined that duality is in fact seen to be non-existent. But the
            non-existence
            of that duality is exactly what the consummate nature is. The
            imagined nature
            and the consummate nature are hence, from an ontological
            perspective, not
            different from one another. The difference is only apparent,
            representing a
            difference in perspective, rather than one of reality. The next
            verse makes the
            same point in the converse direction.
            19. Since the former has the nature of non-duality,
            And the latter has the nature of non-existent duality,
            The consummate and the imagined
            Are said not to be different in characteristic.
            20. Since the former is deceptive in the way it appears,
            And the latter has the nature of its not being that way,
            The other-dependent and the consummate
            Are said not to be different in characteristic.
            Verses 20 and 21 are devoted to establishing the identity of the
            consummate and
            the other-dependent natures. The point in verse 20 is parallel to
            that made with
            respect to the imagined nature. The dependent nature is deceptive,
            in that
            phenomena that are so dependent appear to be distinct from --
            although dependent upon -- the subject. But when that natures is seen, from a higher
            perspective,
            to be only dependent, but to be the fact of being merely mental, and
            hence
            non-different from the mind on which the phenomena depend. that
            understanding
            is the understanding of the consummate nature of things. Again, the
            difference
            between the natures is revealed to be not ontological in character,
            but merely
            perspectival.
            21. Since the former has the nature of a non-existent duality,
            And the latter is its non-existence in the way it appears,
            The other-dependent and the consummate
            Are said not to be different in characteristic.
            The parallel to the relation between the imagined and the consummate
            natures is
            emphasized in verse 21. The other-dependent, like the imagined, is
            dualistic in
            character. But when things experienced in their other-dependent
            nature are seen
            to be so experienced, the duality vanishes, and the non-existence of
            that
            duality is the consummate nature itself. The apparent difference
            between the
            natures is hence, for Vasubandhu, a difference not in the object --
            in the
            ontological character of phenomena, but rather in the subject -- and
            hence not
            a difference in nature, but a difference in experience of a single
            triune
            nature.
            22. But conventionally,
            The natures are explained in order and
            Based on that one enters them
            In a particular order, it is said.
            Nonetheless, though the three natures are at a deeper level a unity,
            

            pedagogically they
            from a hierarchy. There is an order in which they must be presented
            for the
            sake of clarity and soteriological efficacy. This is the topic of
            verse 22-25.
            23. The imagined is entirely conventional.
            The other-dependent is attached to convention.
            The consummate, cutting convention,
            Is said to be a different nature.
            The imagined nature is the easiest to present first. Is is the way
            that
            ordinary, unreflective persons represent things. The
            other-dependent, while
            constituting a more sophisticated view of things, remain at a
            conventional
            level. It, however, has real soteriological use, starting the
            process of
            freeing the mind the tyranny of convention and fundamental
            ignorance, and
            providing a bridge to a more transcendent view. Finally, awareness
            of the
            consummate nature allows the move to a fully awakened view of
            reality.
            24. Having first entered into the non-existence of duality
            Which is the dependent, one understands
            The non-existent duality
            Which is the imagined.
            On the other hand, Vasubandhu claims, the order of understanding the
            non-dual
            characters of the two conventional natures is reversed. It is easier
            to see
            that the dependent nature is non-dual. For once one has ascended to
            an awareness
            of this nature, and hence of the multiplicity of the natures of
            phenomena and
            of their mind-dependence, it is possible to see phenomena as
            non-dually related
            to mind. One can then reflect on the imagined nature -- initially
            experienced as
            a dualistic relation to appearances -- and see it, too, as non-dual
            in character
            in virtue of the identity in ontic status between subject and object
            in that
            nature. One must bear in mind that the point being made in this and
            the
            surrounding verses is a pedagogical point: as long as one only
            experiences the
            imagined nature, it is hard to see things non-dualistically. That
            ability is
            made possible by the understanding represented by awareness of the
            other-dependent nature, and then reflectively applies to the
            other-dependent.
            25. Then one enters the consummate.
            Its nature is the non-existence of duality.
            Therefore it is explained
            To be both existent and non-existent.
            Finally, once one has thoroughly understood both of the merely
            conventional
            natures, including their apparent dualities, but the unreality of
            each duality,
            one sees that all phenomena are both apparently dual, and ultimately
            non-dual.
            That is their consummate nature. Realizing this nature is the
            consequence of a
            complete understanding of the other two.
            26. These three natures.
            Have the characteristics of being non-cognizable and non-dual.
            One is completely non-existent; the second is therefore
            non-existent.
            The third has the nature of that non-existence.
            This verse sums up the result of the previous two discussions. Going
            "from top
            to bottom", the consummate nature is non-cognizable because all
            cognition, as
            discursive, is inescapably dualistic; the other two natures are
            non-dual when
            seen from that perspective, despite the duality engendered from
            within the
            perspective from any higher perspective. Therefore, the
            other-dependent nature,
            being the dependence of a non-existent entity on the mind, is also
            non-existent
            when seen from the standpoint of the consummate. And the consummate
            is just the
            fact of the non-existence of the first two. Thus, Vasubandhu
            concludes, despite
            the vast difference in the phenomenological character of the three
            perspectives
            from which phenomena have these three natures, the natures
            themselves are
            identical, joined in the object in virtue of its ideality.
            The next section of the text develops the famous simile of the
            illusory
            elephant conjured by the stage magician. This is in fact the only
            portion of
            this text regularly cited in later polemical and hermeneutic
            discussions of
            cittamatra philosophy by Tibetan commentators:(26)
            27. Like an elephant that appears
            Through the power of magician's
            mantra -- Only the percept appears,
            The elephant is completely non-existent.
            The magician, allegedly using a mantra, caused the astonished
            audience to see
            an apparition of an elephant. But, we are assured, there really is
            no elephant.
            The illusion is engendered purely by the skill of the magician and
            the
            gullibility of the audience.
            28. The imagined nature is the elephant;
            The other-dependent nature is the visual percept;
            The non-existence of the elephant therein
            Is explained to be the consummate.
            Now we can see the diverse aspects of subjectivity marked by the
            three natures
            as well as the ontological unity of the natures in the object (or
            putative
            object) they characterize. The non-existent elephant -- the apparent
            object of
            perception -- is the elephant. The deluded audience believes it to
            exist, in
            virtue of decidedly non-pachidermic causes and their own deluded
            ignorance. But
            nothing in fact exists in the way the elephant appears. But there is
            indeed a
            percept -- not a living, breathing elephant -- but a psychological
            episode
            brought into an sustained in existence in dependence on numerous
            conditions.
            This corresponds to the dependent nature. And the fact that there is
            no
            elephant in this percept -- that the elephant is completely
            non-existent and
            the percept is purely mental -- is the consummate nature.
            Note that this is a simile, and not a literal model of perception.
            What is
            crucial here is that to a naive observer, the hallucinated elephant
            appears as
            real and independent. To one "in the know" there is a real percept,
            but one
            which is decidedly not an independent elephant, and whose existence
            is entirely
            dependent on the state of mind of the member of the audience. And
            finally, the
            full story is that there simply is no elephant at all -- not even
            one in
            perception -- only hallucination which is purely mental and entirely
            in the mind
            of the audience member. Just as the imagined nature of my teacup is
            that it is
            an independent object; the dependent nature is that is is my mental
            representation and not an independent external object; and its
            consummate nature is its complete non-existence from a transcendent point of
            view.
            29. Through the root consciousness
            The nonexistent duality appears.
            But since the duality is completely non-existent,
            There is only a percept.
            Just a through the force of the magician's incantations and
            manipulations the
            illusory elephant appears, through the force of our own mental
            predispoditions
            the percept appears. But just as the elephant is purely
            hallucinatory, the
            percept is purely mental.
            30. The root consciousness is like the mantra.
            Reality can be compared to the wood.
            Imagination is like the perception of the elephant.
            Duality can be seen as the elephant.
            The psychological basis of appearances, for Vasubandhu and his
            cittamatra
            followers, is the root consciousness, and the potentials it contains
            for
            experiences. The mantra -- the magician, in this analogy, has a prop
            -- a
            piece of wood. (How this trick is actually performed is utterly
            mysterious at
            this point.) So, what appears to be an elephant is actually a piece
            of wood,
            transformed by the magician into an apparitional elephant. Likewise,
            in
            experience, what appears to be an independent object is in fact a
            merely
            mental episode, caused by the actualization of latencies in the root
            

            consciousness to appear as independent nature, since that nature
            gives us the
            perceived object as a mere percept as opposed to as the object it
            appears to be.
            The imagined nature, on the other hand, is analogous to the
            hallucinated
            elephant, and the non-existent duality is like the intentional
            object of that
            hallucination -- the non-existent elephant.
            The concluding verses of the text are devoted to its soteriological
            implications. For cittamatra philosophy, like any Buddhist system,
            is
            soteriological in intent. The point of the system is to gain
            liberation from
            the delusions, attachments and suffering of samsara in order to be
            able to
            assist other sentient beings in accomplishing the same. From the
            cittamatra
            point of view, the root delusion is the taking the imagined nature
            of things to
            be their reality, and to fail to appreciate the other two natures,
            the identity
            of the three natures, and hence to fail to achieve the viewpoint
            represented
            by the consummate which reveals the world as it is.
            31. When one understand how things are,
            Perfect knowledge, abandonment,
            And accomplishment --
            These three characteristics are simultaneously achieved.
            To understand how things are is to understand all three natures
            simultaneously
            and in their correct relations to one another. This amounts to
            perfect knowledge
            of the ontology of the world and of the character of one's own
            subjectivity.
            That is to abandon attachment to the imagined phenomena craved by
            one who
            believes them to be real as they appear in imagination, and that is
            to
            accomplish the goal of perfect insight into the nature of things and
            consequent
            freedom from the craving which is the necessary condition of
            ignorance and
            afflicted action.
            32. Knowledge is non-perception;
            Abandonment is non-appearance;
            Attainment is accomplished through non-dual perception.
            That is direct manifestation.
            Perfect knowledge of this kind is non-perception in the sense that
            it is
            objectless, for
            the objects of ordinary perception are seen to be illusory, and the
            duality of
            perceiver
            and perceived that structures perception is transcended. Abandonment
            of
            commitment
            and attachment to imagined phenomena is achieved through the
            transcendence of
            instinctive assent to the imagined nature. The attainment of freedom
            is
            accomplished
            through the direct, immediate understanding of the unity of the
            three natures, and hence the non-dual awareness of all phenomena in their
            consummate nature. For one who has attained this kind of knowledge,
            Vasubandhu claims, this cognitive relation to things is direct,
            intuitive,
            and immediate -- not the consequence of constant philosophical
            analysis -- but the primary way of taking up with the world, albeit
            achieved
            through long analysis and practice.
            33. Through the non-perception of the elephant,
            The vanishing of its percept occurs;
            And so does the perception of the piece of wood.
            This is how it is in the magic show.
            Here Vasubandhu returns to the analogy in order to explain the
            structure of this
            accomplishment. When one sees through the trick -- when one stops
            being taken
            in by the show -- one stops seeing the elephant, and the percept
            vanishes.
            One no longer sees
            the piece of wood as an elephant at all. All of the illusion ceases.
            

            34. In the same way through the non-perception of duality
            There is the vanishing of duality.
            When it vanishes completely,
            Non-dual awareness arises.
            Similarly, through an accomplished perception of things in accord
            with the
            three-nature
            theory one stops seeing the dualistically represented phenomena.
            Those
            things, as they are seen by an ordinary, deluded consciousness,
            completely
            disappear. One sees through the
            show of ordinary experience, and the illusion ceases. One sees
            things simply as
            they are,
            without duality, without ascribing them independent reality, as
            having the
            triune three natures, each understood fully from the standpoint of the
            consummate.
            35. Through perceiving correctly,
            Through seeing the non-referentiality of mental states,
            Through following the three wisdoms,
            One will effortlessly attain liberation.
            This understanding has, Vasubandhu here announces, soteriological
            consequences. In virtue of coming to understand that one's mental
            states do
            not represent an independent reality, and through understanding
            fully the
            three natures and their relations to
            one another, attachment to objects as genuinely real, and as
            legitimate
            objects of craving, ceases. The are only dream-objects, nothing to
            take
            seriously, including both
            objects perceived as external, and one's self as it appears to
            oneself. The
            attendant
            cessation of grasping and of attachment is precisely the cessation
            denominated
            by the
            term "nirvana".
            36. Through the perception of mind-only
            One achieves the non-perception of objects;
            Through the non-perception of objects
            There is also the non-perception of mind.
            This verse emphasizes the connection between the release from
            attachment to
            external objects and the release from attachment of self. One begins
            the
            cittamatra
            analysis by seeing all phenomena as purely mental. This dissipates
            the view that
            external phenomena are real. But with this realization comes the
            realization
            that the
            mind we experience -- the self we cherish -- is every bit as much an
            object for
            us (albeit
            of inner and not outer sense) and so is every bit as unreal as the
            outer objects
            to which
            it is so easy to become attached. Our self-attachment is hence
            revealed by this
            analysis
            to be every bit as much the product of ontological delusion as is
            out
            attachment to
            external phenomena.
 
            37. Through the non-duality of perception,
            Arises the perception of the fundamental nature of reality.
            Through the perception of the fundamental nature of reality
            Arises the perception of the radiant.
            This realization is the full understanding of the three nature
            theory and its
            implications.
            The fundamental nature of reality is its threefold character, and
            the unity of
            this threefold character in the ultimate non-duality of all that
            appears as
            dual. The experience of the world in this way is, Vasubandhu claims,
            a
            radiant, or totally illuminating gnosis.

            38. Through the perception of the radiant,
            And through achieving the three supreme Buddha-bodies,
            And through possessing bodhi:
            Having achieved this, the sage will benefit him/herself and others.
            The deep insight embodied in this gnosis, coupled with the
            altruistic aspiration
            to attain
            liberation for the sake of other sentient beings enables the
            practitioner,
            through physical
            acts (the use of the form-body), through the blissful detachment
            from suffering
            that
            enables one to take the welfare of others fully into account (the
            fruits of the
            enjoyment-body) and through thorough understanding (the truth-body)
            to be
            maximally
            efficacious on behalf of others.
            This brief text hence articulates all of the principal features of
            cittamatra
            philosophy:
            its thoroughgoing idealism; the three nature theory of the ontology
            of
            representation
            and of the phenomenology entailed by that idealism; the
            understanding of
            non-duality
            and emptiness in which that theory issues; and the soteriological
            consequences
            both of
            the three nature ontology and of the full understanding of the
            theory
            itself.(27) There
            certainly are briefer expositions, more detailed expositions of this
            system in
            the classical
            literature, but perhaps none so elegant and perspicuous.

            NOTES

            (1) My reading of this text has developed as a result of many
            conversation with
            and instruction from
            teachers, students and colleagues. I thank in particular Janet Gyatso for
            extended discussion of
            cittamatra philosophy in general and this text in particular, the
            Ven. Geshe
            Yeshes Thap-khas for
            several teaching sessions, the Ven. Gen Lobsang Gyatso for several
            useful
            conversations and Ms
            Karen Meyers for a number of spirited discussions of this text and
            of cittamatra
            philosophy in
            general. Dr Moira Nicholls read an earlier version and made a number
            of useful
            suggestions. Mr
            Jens Schleiter has made many very helpful suggestions regarding both
            the
            translation and
            commentary. Both are much improved as a consequence. I also an
            anonymous
            reviewer for
            Asian Philosophy for pointing out lacunae in an earlier version.
            Thanks also to
            Sri Yeshi Tashi Shastri and Mr Jamyang Norbu Gurung for research assistance.
            (2) See, e.g. Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamikakarika [Garfield, J. (1995)
            Fundamental
            Wisdom of the
            Middle way: Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakakarika (New York, Oxford University Press)
            or Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara [Huntington, C. & Wangchen, Geshe
            N. (1989)
            The Emptiness of Emptiness: Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara].
            (3) See also Vasubandhu's Madhyanta-vibhaga-bhasya and
            Trimsikakarika in
            Kochumuttom, T.
            (1982) A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience: A New Translation and
            Interpretation
            of the Works of
            Vasubandhu the Yogacarin (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidaas), and Anacker,
            S. (1984)
            Seven Works of
            Vasubandhu: The Buddhist Psychological Doctor (Delhi, [[Motilal
            Banarsidass]] for
            further expositions
            of this view.
            (4) While such comparisons will prove useful, and while the
            affinities are real,
            one must be
            very careful not to push the comparisons too far. There is a
            specifically
            Buddhist context to
            Vasubandhu's idealism, and the different philosophical milieus of
            medieval India
            and modern
            Europe generate distinct philosophical positions and moves. It is
            well beyond
            the scope of this
            commentary to address all of the relevant similarities and
            differences, or even
            to spell out all of
            Vasubandhu's arguments or system. See Garfield, J. (forthcoming)
            Western
            idealism through
            Indian eyes: Reading Berkeley, Kant and Schopenhauer through
            Vasubandhu, Sophia,
            for more
            on comparison between Vasubandhu's idealism and Western versions of
            that
            doctrine.
            (5) This may be due to the fact that this text was written when
            Vasubandhu was
            quite advanced in
            years. It was probably composed at Ayodhya during the last year or
            two of his
            life.
            (6) Compare, for instance, the presentation of the three natures in
            the
            Samdhinirmocana-sutra in
            which these ontological claims are completely absent.
            (7) See Legs bshad snyings po, translated in Thurman, R. (1984)
            Tsong Khapa'
            Speech of Gold in the
            Essence of True Eloquence (Princeton, Princeton University Press),
            esp. pp.
            223-230.
            (8) See sTong thun chen mo, translated in Cabezon, J. (1992) A Dose
            of Emptiness
            (Albany, State
            University of New York Press), esp. pp. 39-43.
            (9) See Garfield, J. (1997) Three natures and three
            naturelessnesses: comments
            on cittamatra
            conceptual categories, Journal of Indian Philosophy and Religion,
            for more on
            Cittamatra
            doxography and on the relations between the three natures and three
            naturelessnesses.
            (10) Translated in Huntingdon (1989), see esp. pp. 162-168.
            (11) The present translation is from the Tibetan text. The principal
            version
            used is that in the Peking
            edition of the Tibetan canon (Si 12a-14a). The Sde dge edition was
            used for
            comparison, and is
            in complete concordance. Anacker, op. cit., and Wood (1991) Mind
            Only: A
            Philosophical and
            Doctrinal Analysis of the Vijnanavada (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press),
            each reprint the
            original Sanskrit text.
            (12) Again, it is interesting to contrast this presentation with
            that of the
            Samdhinirmocana-sutra where
            this dependence is explicitly characterized as dependence on other
            non-mental
            causes and
            conditions. Vasubandhu is clearly developing an idealistic position
            that
            contrasts with the
            strikingly non-idealistic ontology of the Samdhinirmocana-sutra. It
            is in large
            part due to
            doxographic imperatives to unify the Yogacara corpus theoretically
            that so many
            Tibetans read the
            Samdhinirmocana-sutra as idealistic and that so many contemporary
            Western
            scholars have lately
            argued that Vasubandhu is not an idealist. (See Garfield
            [forthcoming], op.
            cit., for more on
            this.) Both imperatives should be resisted, as the tradition is
            internally
            quite diverse.
            (13) Kochumuttom, op. cit., Thurman, op. cit., Wood, op. cit.,
            Powers, J. (1995)
            Wisdom of the
            Buddha: The Samdhinirmocana Mahayana Sotra (Berkeley, Dharma Press),
            Anacker,
            op. cit.,
            Nagao, G. (1991) Madhyamaka and Yogacara (Albany, State University
            of New York
            Press) and
            Cabezon, op. cit., respectively.
            (14) Contrast this with the standard presentation of cittamatra
            metaphysics in
            Geluk-pa doxography,
            following Sthiramati, according to which the second and third are
            real, but the
            first -- the imagined
            nature -- is completely unreal. See Tsong Khapa in Thurman, op.
            cit., pp.
            223-230 and mKhas grub in Cabezon, op. cit., pp. 47-61. See also Meyers, K. (1995)
            Empty talk:
            Tsong Khapa's
            elucidation of the Buddha's intention as a matter of semantics,
            Amherst,
            Hampshire College
            Division III thesis, ch. 2.
            (15) See Kant, I. (1965) Critique of Pure Reason, N. Kemp-Smith
            (transl.) (New York, St Martin's
            Press), b275-276 and Berkeley, G. (1954) Three Dialogues Between
            Hylas and Philonous,
            C. Turbayne (Ed.) (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill).
            (16) Schopenhauer, A. (1974) The Fourfold Root of the Principle of
            Sufficient
            Reason, E. F. J. Payne
            (Transl.) (LaSalle, Open Court), pp. 273, ff, Schopenhauer, A.
            (1969) The World
            as Will and
            Representation, E. F. J. Payne (Transl.) (New York, Dover), Section
            4. See also
            "Criticism of the
            Kantian Philosophy".
            (17) Schopenhauer, (1969) Sections 19, 23-24.
            (18) This is not to say that Schopenhauer charges Kant with the
            failure to
            postulate a
            nouemenon -- only that he charges Kant with the failure to see that
            this
            noumenal character is a third nature of
            the object, one which is knowable immediately, without
            subject-object duality.
            Again, in this
            respect Vasubandhu's idealism is far closer to Schopenhauer's than
            it is to
            Kant's. I thank Dr
            Moira Nicholls for pointing out the need for clarity on this point.
            (19) See the analysis of time as the form of inner sense and hence
            of the
            empirical character of
            self-knowledge in the transcendental Aesthetic, Critique of Pure
            Reason,
            b155-159.
            (20) It is not, however -- to put it mildly -- at all obvious that
            these
            etymological claims are at all
            accurate.
            (21) Again, the anticipation of Kant's account o empirical
            self-knowledge is
            striking.
            (22) This gets complex and leads to an analysis of samsara itself,
            and the sense
            in which everything in
            samsara can be said to be afflicted -- to be caused by and to be a
            cause of
            suffering, and in a deeper
            sense to have suffering and primal ignorance as part of its very
            ontological
            structure; and then to
            an analysis of a specifically Yogacara understanding of samsara. But
            that is
            beyond the scope of
            this commentary.
            (23) In the scholastic or Cartesian sense -- the character of the
            mental object
            itself.
            (24) Note how this account of the ultimate nature of a phenomenon
            contrasts with
            that given by
            Madhyamika philosophers such as Nagarjuna or Candrakirti, according
            to whom not
            even the
            emptiness of the cup can be said to exist in this sense. It is at
            this crucial
            point in ontology that
            Cittamatra and Madhyamaka are utterly discontinuous. See SIDERITS,
            M. (1996) On
            the
            continuity thesis, Australia-New Zealand Joint Religious Studies
            Conference,
            Christchurch, Garfield,
            op. cit., note 2, but see Nagao, op. cit., note 13, for a contrary
            view.
            (25) This contrasts once again with the standard Geluk-pa view
            according to
            which the important
            ontological divide is between the imagined nature and the other two.
            On this
            view, the imagined
            nature is wholly false, while the other-dependent and consummate
            natures are
            both truly existent.
            (26) See, for instance, mKhas grub in Cabezon, op. cit., note 13, p.
            50.
            (27) The one significant ontological doctrine associated with
            cittamatra
            philosophy that does not make
            an appearance here is the theory of the three naturelessnesses
            (trinihsvabhava/ngo bo nyid med gsum)
            that takes centre stage in the Samdhinirmocana-sutra. In
            Trimsika-karika
            Vasubandhu connects
            this doctrine to trisvabhava theory, arguing that each nature is
            natureless in
            one of these senses.
            Sthiramati, in his commentary on this text, argues that in fact the
            three natures and the three
            naturelessnesses are the same -- a view adopted by such Tibetan
            exegetes as
            Tsong Khapa and
            mKhas grub. This is not a view that Vasubandhu ever articulates,
            however, and
            while he makes
            use of the trinihsvabhava in explicating emptiness in
            Madhyanta-vibhaga-bhasya
            it is not, on his
            view, a doctrine specifically connected to idealism, and so has no
            role in the
            present text. See
            Garfield, op. cit., note 9, for more on the relation between the
            three natures
            and the three
            naturelessnesses.

Source

ccbs.ntu.edu.tw