Where is the Human Realm
無礙法界．正教弘傳 人間在哪裡？對於太虛大師在淨土文章中人間概念的考察
美國天主 大學 / 周文廣 (Charles B. Jones) 摘要
大 （1890~1947）被譽為 運 「人 」 發 人 此 英文翻譯分別為「人 」（Humanistic Buddhism） 「
」（Engaged Buddhism） 「 球 」（Earthly Buddhism）和「人生 」（Buddhism for the Human Realm）。學 和這場運 追隨 普遍認為這是一場強調 下生活 運 。它旨 鼓勵 徒採取 提升 福利 增進人類繁榮 同時阻止過度 「出 」。換言 徒應該努力改善 下 生活 而不是把注意力集 來 或其他 界 。
大 著作 確 提出這樣 號召 但 仔細 他有關「人 」 創造 作品時 可以發 他對「人 」 解遠比這複雜得多。除了呼籲採取具體 來 育和振奮 人士 他還承認死亡是 進程 一環 並就旨 改善來 提供建議。此外 界定「人 」概 時 他更多 借鑒 統 宇宙學 而不是人們普遍 認 宇宙學。例如 提到居於六道輪迴 一 人類 不僅被發 存 於 球 北俱盧洲
（Uttarakuru）北 和阿
（Pure Land of Amitābha） 都發 其存 。 此 諸如「 球 」（Earthly Pure Land） 類 翻譯 未能充分體 他 內涵 而 對其人
解讀 則把他 像成一個比他 際 更 人。
文將以 大 對人 主 論述 《建設人 論》一文 以 其他有關 著作 來呈 大 複雜 。 文將論述他更是一位過渡 人 而不是 認 主 。
關鍵詞：太虛大師、人間佛教、淨土、人間
Where is the Human Realm? An Examination of Ven. Taixu’s 太虛大師 Concept of Renjian 人間 in his Pure Land Writings
Charles B. Jones
Abstract
Ven. Taixu ( 太虛大師 , 1890~ 1947) is justly credited with initiating the idea of the modern Buddhist movement called renjian fojiao人間佛教 , variously known in English as “Humanistic Buddhism,” “Engaged Buddhism,” “Earthly Buddhism,” and “Buddhism for the Human Realm.” Scholars and followers of this movement generally understand this as a movement which emphasizes the present life. It seeks to motivate Buddhists to take actions that will promote social welfare and human flourishing while discouraging an excessive “other-worldliness” (chushi出世 ). In other words, Buddhists should strive to improve life here and now and not focus their attention on the afterlife or on other worlds.
While Taixu’s writings do indeed contain such calls to action, a closer examination of his works dealing with the creation of the “Pure Land in the Human Realm” (renjian jingtu人間淨土 ) reveals his concept of the “human realm” to be far more complex than this. In addition to calling for concrete actions to educate and uplift people in society, he acknowledges the ongoing reality of death and advises practices aimed at a better afterlife. In addition, in defining the “human realm” he relies on traditional Buddhist cosmology more than is generally acknowledged. For example, the Buddhist scriptures say that human beings, as one of the six paths of rebirth, are found not only on planet Earth but also in the northern continent of Uttarakuru and in the Pure Land of Amitābha. Thus, translations such as “Earthly Pure Land” fail to capture his full meaning, and modern interpretations of his ideas on Humanistic Buddhism imagine him as more of a modernizer than he actually is.
This paper will look to Taixu’s major statement on the Pure Land in the Human Realm, the essay “On the Establishment of the Pure Land in the Human Realm” (“Jiànshè rénjiān jìngtǔ lùn” 建設人間淨土論 ) as well as other writings on Pure Land to present the full complexity of Taixu’s thought. It will argue that he is more of a transitional figure and less a fully-committed modernizer than has been recognized.
Keywords: Taixu, Humanistic Buddhism, Pure Land, Human Realm
人間在哪裡？對於太虛大師在淨土文章中人間概念的考察 大
無礙法界．正教弘傳 Introduction:
One could translate the Chinese term commonly rendered “Humanistic Buddhism” more literally as “Buddhism in the Human Realm” (rénjiān fójiào人間佛教 ). The term “human realm” (rénjiān人間 ) has both an everyday meaning within modern Chinese and a more expansive technical Buddhist meaning. In everyday parlance, it means “the human world,” “humanity,” or “social relations,” and within a modern scientific world view, humanity exists in only one place—the planet Earth. Hence, English-language texts sometimes render the term “Humanistic Buddhism” as “Earthly Buddhism.” In traditional Chinese Buddhist texts, however, the term has a more specialized, technical meaning arising from pre-modern Buddhist cosmology. In this context it indicates one component in a list of possible paths of rebirth. To be reborn in the human realm means that one’s past karma has led to rebirth as a human being, and in Buddhist cosmology, the Earth is not the only place where humans reside. The fact that the term renjian has different definitions in these two contexts has led to some confusion when scholars confront the terms “Humanistic Buddhism” and “The Pure Land in the Human Realm” (rénjiān jìngtǔ人間淨土 ). Variations in the way Buddhists and scholars understand the meaning and purpose of Humanistic Buddhism only compounds the confusion.
This confusion is on full display in the work of the Ven. Taixu (Tàixū太 虛 ,1890~1947), widely recognized as the founding architect of Humanistic Buddhism. If one understands him primarily as a modernizer who responded to criticisms that Buddhism was antimodern, escapist, and parasitic on the economy, then one will most likely see his idea of the “Pure Land in the Human Realm” as a call for social welfare work and social justice reform. Such efforts would affect only human beings living on planet Earth. On the other hand, if one reads his writings with an eye attuned to his use of traditional Buddhist concepts and aims, then one might find that the human realm can exist in other parts of the cosmos as well. If that is indeed his view, then we should not translate his terms renjian/rensheng fojiao and renjian jingtu as “Earthly Buddhism” and “the Earthly Pure Land” respectively, nor should we understand his purpose as advocating only social reform here and now to the exclusion of other, more traditional practices and goals.
In the remarks that follow, I will examine Taixu’s writings on the Pure Land in the Human Realm to see to what extent he utilizes modern cosmological ideas to call for social reforms on Earth, and to what extent he retains traditional notions of humanity as a path of rebirth capable of manifesting in many different places throughout the cosmos. Within the latter, we will see to what extent he retains older Buddhist ideas about reality, the mind, practice, and mechanisms of rebirth.
Background:
Historical: As is well known, the new regime that took control of China after the fall of the Qing dynasty and several social-intellectual movements were very critical of Buddhism, and Pure Land belief in particular came in for very severe critique. Prasenjit Duara (1991) has described the very complex political situation that religion faced vis-à-vis the government and various social movements in the Republican Period, including the anti-religious fervor of the May Fourth Movement and the radical members of the Nationalist Party, struggles between the national government and local elites for control over ideology and property, and the rhetorical strategies that every faction deployed to help its own cause. For this paper, I will note only the “anti-superstition” campaigns of the Nationalist Party.
It is this element that may be of most significance for understanding Taixu’s ambiguities. The Party was willing to grant freedom of “religion” (zōngjiào宗教 ), which was seen as both beneficial and a part of China’s cultural deposit, but sought to crack down on “superstition” (míxìn迷信), which was harmful and retrograde (Duara 1991, p. 79~80). Popular religions and transregional secret societies suffered the most under this distinction, but Buddhism straddled the line in a curious way. It provided sublime philosophies and calls to benefit others as religion, but parts of it could also be interpreted as superstitious, including Pure Land ritualism. Taixu’s ambivalence may reflect his need to position Buddhism squarely in the “religion” category, especially after 1929 when these policies went into effect.
Running counter to anti-superstition sentiments among the political and educated elites, however, was a surge of interest in esoteric Buddhism. As Francesca Tarocco and others have noted, Tibetan and Japanese tantric Buddhism were sources of fascination among those not concerned with “science and reason” (Tarocco 2007, p. 39). Taixu supported such efforts, and his own disciples involved themselves in the transmission of esoteric rituals into China (Ibid, p. 40). It should come as no surprise, then, that a Buddhist leader seeking to unify Buddhists on a grand scale and trying to build the broadest base of support possible should try to formulate a framework that included both science and esotericism. Indeed, Taixu was not the only Buddhist figure of the Republican period who tried to meld science and tantra (See Bahir 2017 for the case of Wuguang 悟光 , 1918~2000). Once one realizes that Taixu needed to negotiate both of these trends, one will be better equipped to understand many seemingly contradictory currents in Taixu’s text below.
Scholarly: Scholarship on Taixu, both Western and Asian, has emphasized his role as a political activist and advocate of Buddhist-based social reform. Because of this emphasis, scholars have understood the phrases he coined (rénshēng fójiào人生佛教 , rénjiān fójiào人間佛教 , and rénjiān jìngtǔ人間淨土 ) as all referring to goals to be accomplished in this present world and its political order and society. Indeed, when a scholar (especially a sociologist) present a thumbnail portrait of Taixu’s thought as it relates to modern social movements, they tend to revert to this
人間在哪裡？對於太虛大師在淨土文章中人間概念的考察 大
無礙法界．正教弘傳 over-simplified version of it. Richard Madsen, for example, puts it this way in his book Democracy’s Dharma: “Monks like Tai Xu (sic) strove to interpret Mahayana Buddhism in this-worldly terms. Instead of hoping to go to some heavenly pure land after death, Buddhists should place their hope on making this world a pure land by devoting themselves to eliminating social suffering.” (Madsen 2007, p. 23). David Schak’s synopsis of Taixu’s thought is similar. As he puts it:
Socially engaged Buddhism grew out of the teachings of a very influential monastic, Ven. Taixu ( 太虛大師 , 1890~1947). Ven. Taixu was very dissatisfied with the state of Buddhism. He wanted to move it away from its dependency on funerals, rituals to appease spirits and repeating Amithaba’s [sic] name to earn merit for others and ensure their rebirth in the pure land. He also hoped to make this world into the pure land by working in and improving society. Buddhism, he argued, needed to concentrate on accumulating merit in this life (in Xu et al, 2007, p.
202~203).
One of the reasons that non-specialist scholars consistently summarize Taixu’s thought in this manner is the way earlier and more specialized western studies approached him. This was the image of Taixu that Paul Callahan presented to colleagues in 1952. Confessing that in his view
Buddhism is inherently “other-worldly,” Callahan thought the main problem was to explain how Taixu could have adopted such a pro-social program for Buddhism and engaged with modern science to the extent that he did. Even though he quotes Taixu himself as insisting that Buddhism still maintain esoteric practices and nianfo, Callahan maintains that his program is “un-Buddhistic” (Callahan 1952, p. 158~162).
Holmes Welch, who devotes an entire chapter of The Buddhist Revival in China to him, portrays Taixu primarily as an organizer and modernizer, and not a very good one at that. While acknowledging (briefly) that Taixu’s ministry included Pure Land elements, Welch contends that Taixu was not sincere about it, but grudgingly included it as a sop for ignorant followers who knew nothing better. Welch’s characterization dominated western understanding of Taixu’s role in Buddhist modernism for a long time (Welch 1968, chapter 3).
Most surprising, however, is the portrait of Taixu found in the pages of Don A. Pittman’s seminal 2001 study. Throughout this book, one finds Pittman saying that Taixu was “more concerned with establishing a pure land on earth than in achieving rebirth in the Western Pure Land of Amitābha.” Pittman acknowledges that Taixu still used “traditional paradigms” but in the end
pursued a “this-worldly soteriology” (Pittman 2001, p.2~3). He was for “building a pure land here and now.” He was against any pessimistic view of the world as so mired in mofa末法 thought that it sought only rebirth in the Pure Land after death (Ibid, p.10). Pittman indicates that Taixu had no use at all for hopes of rebirth in a pure Buddha-land after death, but wanted only to mobilize thousands of “average bodhisattvas” to sacrifice and strive to create the Pure Land here and now (Ibid, p.222). Even when noting Taixu’s continued engagement in traditional Buddhist practices, both in his personal life and in his institutions, Pittman (like Welch) seems to think that it was merely a concession or an effort at Buddhist ecumenism (Ibid, p. 344n77). In the end, he describes Taixu as very much opposed to traditional Pure Land practice (Ibid, p. 239-240).
Only with Justin Ritzinger’s recent doctoral dissertation and monograph does a western scholar acknowledge that Taixu’s very traditional beliefs and practices were sincere and not just a pose, a concession, or an expedient. Because all previous Taixu studies had characterized him as a modernizer and his practices as aimed at making Buddhism this-worldly in its social work, I was very surprised when I finally read his essay “On Establishing the Pure Land in the Human Realm” (Jiànshè rénjiān jìngtǔ lùn建設人間淨土論 ). It was far more traditional than I expected, and shows Taixu as a very ambiguous modernizer at best.
In order to illustrate how the view of Taixu that predominates in western scholarship distorts our understanding of his thought, I want to look into this essay and ask the question: Where is the “Pure Land in the Human Realm” actually located? The answer will surprise many readers, and it will help us to understand many other features of this essay.
Taixu's Text:
Taixu opens by saying that human beings seek security in their lives and possessions (p. 356). One place where they can secure these temporarily is in the mythical northern continent of Uttarakuru, but they may secure eternal life and bliss only in the Pure Land of Amitābha (Ibid).
He illustrates the point by citing the entire second chapter of the Sutra on the Fundamental Causes for the Arising of Worlds (Foshuo qishi yinben jing佛說起世因本經 , T.24) called “On the Continent of Uttarakuru” ( 鬱單越洲品第二 ). The citation runs from page 357 to page 371, occupying almost 18% of his entire essay. Taixu’s notes, scattered throughout this passage, show that he believed humans could eventually obtain the security and pleasure of Uttarakuru here on Earth through technological innovation, and later he states that it is a real place within the solar system,
人間在哪裡？對於太虛大師在淨土文章中人間概念的考察 大
無礙法界．正教弘傳 man realm,” since human beings inhabit it (p. 371-372). At no point does he try to demythologize and that people may attain rebirth there through the practice of the Ten Virtues. It is part of the “hutales of Uttarakuru or dissuade readers from seeking rebirth there. After that, Taixu notes that even life in Uttarakuru is limited to 1000 years and its pleasures are partial and temporary. Therefore, Amitāyus provides the pure land Shkhāvati so that living beings may find ultimate happiness and immortality there (p. 372). Following this declaration, Taixu provides another very long sutra citation, this time a detailed description of the Pure Land from the Larger Sukhāvatī-vyūha-sūtra. This citation runs from page 372 to page 382, and while it is not as long as the previous quotation, it still occupies 12.5% of the overall text. He prefaces it with the unqualified statement that rebirth in the Pure Land provides complete satisfaction of peoples’ needs for bliss and immortality. After the quotation he says that only rebirth in Sukhāvatī can remedy all the problems of natural disaster, personal turmoil, and social unrest. All this taken together leaves the strong impression that he regards future rebirth in the Pure Land as a viable aspiration for ordinary people.
Immediately after this, Taixu provides another very long citation from the Larger Sukhāvatīvyūha-sūtra, this time consisting of the Buddha Śākyamuni’s discourse to Maitreya concerning human suffering. Unlike the previous two citations, this one does not describe a paradisiacal land such as Uttarakuru or Sukhāvatī, but diagnoses the evils that human beings practice in the present world and the social and familial results to which they lead. To this extent, we begin to see Taixu’s concern with the problems of society. In the conclusion of this passage, the Buddha tells Maitreya how he comes into the world to teach and reform human beings in order to stop their evil and improve conditions. However, the final goal is not social improvement for its own sake, but to lead people to the practice of virtue so that they may “pass beyond the world, surmount the heavens, and gain the way of nirvana” (p. 384-391). At seven pages, this passage occupies another nine percent of the text.
The next section presents a quotation from the Liezi 列子 in which Taixu brings up the concept of humanity for examination. The passage describes ancient sages such as Paoxi 庖犧 , Nüwa
女媧 , Shennong 神農 , and Xiahou 夏后 who embodied humanity even though they had serpentine bodies. In contrast, some of the most infamous tyrants in Chinese history had fully human bodies, but exhibited the behavior and nature of savages and animals. Following this, Taixu asks the reader to consider what beings really constitute the “human realm” (rénjiān人間 ), and he provides a large chart correlating various kinds of nonhuman beings from Buddhist cosmology with various kinds of humans (p. 392-393).
Taixu reminds readers that living beings slip in and out of the human realm through the process of rebirth, but then he correlates all the paths of rebirth in traditional Buddhist thought to human beings in various conditions:
Those who extend their strength to monopolize power to their own benefit and the detriment of others—these are the barbarians and asuras! Those who amass capital for their own enrichment, eating the substance of others to fatten themselves—these are the animals and beasts! Those who form the majority, whose capital is coerced, who labor without sufficient food or clothing—are they not the hungry ghosts? Those multitudes who live under repression and pressure and cannot speak or act freely—are they not the denizens of hell. (p. 394)
Taixu calls upon the reader to contemplate the inhumane treatment to which human beings subject one another and to consider how to bring them back into the human path. Here, at last, he brings up the topic of the Pure Land in the Human Realm. After reviewing ideas from the past and from many cultures for the creation of a utopian society (p. 396), he states that at present only Buddhists think about building a human pure land. The pure lands of the ten directions all have a buddha, the dharma, and a sangha present, so with that as his template, he says we need to construct the human pure land here with a “rationalized” (lǐxìng理性 ) buddha, dharma, and sangha.
This means taking the rational human mind as the buddha, taking the rational mind’s interactions with the environment and other people as the dharma, and taking all levels of human social organization as the sangha (p. 397). While this sounds very modern, Taixu immediately says that it is only within the human realm that one finds these qualities; they do not obtain in other traditional Buddhist realms of rebirth. Therefore, we must take hold of the opportunity that a human rebirth has handed us to build the pure land in the human realm (Ibid). Once again Taixu is not disputing longstanding Buddhist views on the cosmos and rebirth, and he is not attempting to demythologize Buddhism to facilitate a more modern and progressive social program. Like many
人間在哪裡？對於太虛大師在淨土文章中人間概念的考察 大
無礙法界．正教弘傳 Buddhist texts before him, he is simply saying that rebirth in the human domain is most conducive to the work of liberation and for ending suffering. Put another way, he is not saying that we need to build “the Pure Land in the Human Realm” simply because older forms of practice are outmoded and escapist. Rather, he is saying that the human realm is the best place to build a pure land because of the advantages of rebirth as a human being. When he turns to concrete methods of building the human pure land, he notes that it requires the safeguarding of life and property, and says there are two types of “radical” ways (zhìběn zhi fǎ 治本之法 ) of doing this. The first is to aim for rebirth in Uttarakuru by practicing the Ten Virtues, and the second is
through social reform work in the present world. There are also two “stopgap” or superficial ways (zhìbiāo zhi fǎ治標之法 ). The first is to found an international Buddhist Union that could spread the dharma and do rescue and reform work, and the second is to employ esoteric rituals and repentance ceremonies to enlist the powers of devas and non-duality (p. 398). He concludes, “If we could practice these methods for addressing both root and surface using both exoteric and esoteric means, then the causes and conditions would harmonize and there would be no one who would not be able to maintain security” (p. 399)
Modern scholars have made note of the next section in which Taixu lays out a specific plan for a utopian Buddhist community to be built on land donated by the government (see, for example, Pittman 2001, p. 226-230). Justin Ritzinger (2017) has already demonstrated Taixu’s lifelong propensity for devising unworkable utopian schemes, but the detail to note here is that the center of this community would be a Buddhist monastery housing monks of all eight traditional schools of Chinese Buddhism, the most important of which would be the Esoteric School. The monks of this hall would carry out the esoteric rituals needed to secure the nation and the world (p. 400). It would also house monks devoted to Pure Land practice, and one of the two nuns’ halls would be likewise engaged in the quest for rebirth in Sukhāvatī. When describing the villages surrounding the monastic cloisters, Taixu specifies that all of these should also have Pure Land halls (p. 402).
The next section may surprise modern scholars the most. After spending many pages describing in detail the way to establish the Pure Land in the Human Realm (i.e., the utopian mountaintop community), Taixu points out that human life still comes to an end and one must consider one’s next rebirth (p. 405). This leads to a discussion of ways to gain rebirth either with Maitreya in the Tuṣita Heaven or with Amitābha in his Pure Land. Taixu illustrates the first option with an extended quotation from the Sutra on the Bodhisattva Maitreya’s Ascent to the Tuṣita Heaven (Fo shuo
Mile pusa shang sheng Doushuai tian jing佛說觀彌勒菩薩上生兜率天經 , T.452). The passage stands alone; Taixu adds no comment of his own.
The next section provides another long quotation from the Shorter Sukhāvatī-vyūha-sūtra (Fo shuo Amituo jing佛說阿彌陀經 , T.366). This passage describes the features of Amitābha’s land of Sukhāvatī, and afterward the Buddha counsels all who hear of this land to make vows to be reborn there. Taixu does not comment on this passage, either (p. 141-415).
The next section, called “The Pure Land of the Ocean of Awakening” (juéhǎi jìngtǔ覺海淨
土 ), is very interesting because of Taixu’s use of Buddhist philosophy. All the lands that Taixu has described so far (the Impure Lands of the Five Destinies, the Pure Land in the Human Realm, the Pure Land of [[[Maitreya’s]]] Inner Court, and the Pure Land of Utmost Bliss) are contained within the land of the Buddha’s supreme wisdom, called the Tathatā-dharmatā Pure Land (zhēnrú fǎxìng
jìngtǔ真如法性淨土 ). Using language reminiscent of The Awakening of Faith (Qixin lun起信論 , T.1666), Taixu explains that living beings make false distinctions born of their past karma, but remain nevertheless within the “ocean of awakening.” If beings persist in ignorant and evil actions, then the Impure Lands of the Five Destinies will continue to elaborate, but if beings can quell and diminish ignorance and afflicted actions and states of mind, then the Pure Land in the Human Realm manifests. One might do this by “relying upon the pure vows of Maitreya and Amitābha as contributory conditions” and attaining rebirth in their pure realms. All the distinctions that mark out one’s progress or regress on the path reside within the purity of the Buddha’s mind (p. 415416).
In the next section, “One’s Own Vows of Compassion and Acts of Charity as the Starting Point”(You benren fa dabei yuan shishe wei shi由本人發大悲願施捨為始 ), Taixu again advises making compassionate action the root of subsequent practices for reducing the suffering of both human evil and natural disaster. To do so, he says, emulates the attitude out of which Amitābha made his original vows and established his Pure Land. To illustrate, Taixu quotes the entire section of the Larger Sukhāvatī-vyūha-sūtra containing all 48 vows (p. 417-423; See T.360, p. 12:267c17269b6). Taixu notes briefly that Amitābha’s march toward the fulfillment of his vows and attainment of buddhahood began with making offerings, so modern devotees should also make donations to the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Sangha. “by generating the mind to make such offerings for all humanity, to relieve them of all their suffering and attain bliss, to serve the Three Jewels and humanity, the myriad good practices will all be fulfilled.” (p. 423)
To demonstrate this, he cites the same sutra again, this time quoting the section that assures the reader that the Buddha fulfilled all his vows, created the Land of Bliss, and went to work teaching and caring for all sentient beings. After briefly exhorting the reader to emulate the Buddha Amitābha in making offerings and setting forth compassionate vows, Taixu concludes the main portion of his essay (p. 423-323; see T.360, p. 12:269c4-270a2).
The remainder of his essay consists of a transcript of a 1930 talk entitled, “Creating the Pure
人間在哪裡？對於太虛大師在淨土文章中人間概念的考察 大
無礙法界．正教弘傳 Land in the Human Realm” (Chuangzao renjian jingtu刱 [sic] 造人間淨土 , p. 425-430). This section is more clearly organized and succinct than the foregoing, and in it one does not find the long sutra citations and digressions found above. Instead, Taixu begins with a simple acknowledgement that Buddhist cosmology contains buddha-lands as ways to help people understand the unsatisfactory nature of the present defiled world. He also reaffirms the basic Buddhist doctrine that ass circumstances and events have their root in the mind. Therefore, cultivation of mind is the key to resolving humanity’s troubles. Once the mind is set aright and people cultivate morals, then they will take specific steps to address human suffering and meet human needs. Industrial development will alleviate shortages;. Next, education will extend human capabilities and ensure social progress. After that, the arts will elevate the products of technology into things that people can enjoy, and the practice of the arts will fortify both mind and body. Finally, morals will provide guidance and keep human progress on track.
This last section makes the clearest call for human effort to improve life in the present and to direct people away from escapist goals such as rebirth in a pure buddha-land. With an attitude that is neither optimistic nor pessimistic but merely realistic, with sustained effort over a long period of time, and with the right motivation and training, this world can become the Pure Land in the Human Realm.
Analysis:
The above summary is very long, but this was inevitable. If we are to get the full scope and range of Taixu’s thoughts on the establishment of the Pure Land in the Human Realm, we need to see a full summary that presents all the topics that Taixu addresses. We are now in a position to critique the oversimplified version of Taixu’s thought prevalent in western scholarship today.
Let us start with the question posed at the beginning of this paper: Where exactly is the “Pure Land in the Human Realm”? In Taixu’s essay, we have seen the following propositions affirmed: (1) The “human realm” encompasses places other than our present planet Earth. As he says more than once, the continent of Uttarakuru is part of it as well. (2) The “human realm” is not a permanent part of any living being’s identity. It is simply the part of the Buddhist world occupied by beings who for now enjoy a human rebirth. (3) Finally, as he shows with his citation from the Liezi, to be human is not just to be biologically a human organism. Ancient sages with serpentine bodies exhibited humanity, and ancient tyrants who were biologically human showed by their deeds that they were not. Both the location of the human realm and the beings who occupy it turn out to be fungible and transient categories.
As he says, the “Pure Land in the Human Realm” is as much a very traditional affirmation that a human rebirth is most conducive to Buddhist practice and attainment, and thus a likely place
for beings to bring it into being through meritorious practice. Compassionate work here and now is part of it, but so are offerings, meditations, and vows to seek rebirth in the Pure Land or the Tuṣita Heaven. Far from discouraging people from practices aimed at rebirth in these postmortem destinations, he affirms that they are indeed worthy goals. Compassionate social work is a means toward their attainment, not a modernist substitute for them. Scholars have lately come to realize that Taixu had an active liturgical and devotional life focused on the buddha-to-be Maitreya and cherished the personal goal of attaining rebirth in the Inner Court of the Tuṣita Heaven (see especially Ritzinger 2017). That is certainly an advance over the image of him as a quasi-secularist reformer that dominated prior scholarship, but we must note that in this essay he devotes far more space to setting forth and encouraging mainstream Pure Land practices focused on the buddha Amitābha and the goal of rebirth in Sukhāvatī. In other essays, he also attempts to present balanced recommendations to Buddhists about seeking rebirth in these two destinations.
It should be very clear now that Taixu is not trying to persuade people to pursue social and charitable work to the exclusion of other-worldly and escapist practices, nor is he a modernizer in the sense that he wants to replace Buddhist mythology and cosmology with a scientific world view. He seems to accept the existence of Uttarakuru, Sukhāvatī and the Tuṣita Heaven as real places. He resorts to very long sutra citations to convey their attractions and to tell his readers what practices will lead to rebirth in them. Nowhere does he discount them as fantasies or unworthy goals. In fact, even while recommending activities to purify the present world, he still acknowledges that people die and need to give some thought to their next rebirth. All this makes him an ambiguous and partial modernizer.
Perhaps our failure to see Taixu in his own terms stems from our own western biases. For example, we might see Taixu as a “modernizer” and then emphasize his advocacy of science and social welfare work because that is what modernization entails in the west. I would ask scholars with more expertise in Taixu’s thought than me whether and how often a term such as xiàndàihuà 現代化 appears in his works. We should also be careful not to equate “reform” with “modernization” and “modernization” with “westernization.” Taixu was responding as a committed Buddhist to his own cultural, historical, and religious moment, and the solutions he proposed were addressed specifically to his own time and place.
人間在哪裡？對於太虛大師在淨土文章中人間概念的考察 大
無礙法界．正教弘傳 BIBLIOGRAPHY
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