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Xuanzang's Inference of Yogãcãra and Its Interpretation by Shilla Buddhists

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Xuanzang's Inference of Yogãcãra and Its Interpretation by Shilla Buddhists

Shigeki Moro*

Xuanzang'sÿ (602-664) biographies l indicate that he wrote in India such as Huizong-lunûñâ (Treatise for Reconciling Various Doctrines),2 (Treatise for Controlling the Wrong View) 3 and Sanshen-lun (Treatise on the Bodies of the Buddha).

4 Since none of these texts have been we cannot read them; however, a part of their contents could be gathered from several sources. According to Yinmin-ruzhengli-lun-shu (Commentary on Nyãya-praveša), authored by (632— Xuanzang made an inference (anumäna)5 to prove the truth of

Xuanzang's biography in the manuscript of the from the Taisho version. See Masumi Fujiyoshi,

Strictly speaking, the term inference is not an accurate translation of anumäna. Although word inference may be suitable only when referring to parärtha-anumäna, the words proofor demonstration can be used when referring to svãrtha-anumäna. In this paper, however, we would prefer to use the word inference since according to some studies Xuanzang and his followers did not distinguish between parärtha-anumãna and svärthaanumäna.

After traveling around India and completing his study, our master, Xuanzang, wanted to return to China. At that time, Šïläditta, who was the king of India, held a large and uninterrupted Buddhist service that lasted for eighteen days and asked our master to spread his interpretation of Yogãcära all over India. The king chose those who have wisdom and goodness, called them to the service. He sent non-Buddhists and Hïnayäna Buddhists to dispute with Xuanzang. Our master had made the following inference and no one could make an argument against it:

• In the ultimate reality, generally accepted forms are not apart from visual consciousness [proposition]. • This is because based on the theory which we (Yogãcärin) accept they are categorized in the first three of eighteen elements of human existence (the eye, from the six organs; sight, from the six objects; and visual consciousness, from the six consciousnesses); however, they are not included in the general eyes (which include the eye of Buddha etc.) [[[reason]]]. • Like as the visual consciousness [simile].6

According to Xuanzang's biography in (the Further Biographies of Eminent Monks), the concepts contained in Zhiejian-lun were preached during the service held by šïläditta. Therefore, Xuanzang's inference may be regarded as a part of Zhiejianlun.7

Based on Xuanzang's biographies, no one present at the Buddhist service could make an argument against his inference. However, numerous problems regarding the inference arose immediately after the service, and there were prolonged discussions on how it would be interpreted in East Asia. In general, two issues are relevant for the criticism or the interpretation of the inference. The first issue is the similarity between the style of Xuanzang's inference and Bhävaviveka's (c. 490-570) logical method. One of the some inferences quoted in this paper are itemized.

7 Gang Xiao states that Xuanzang's Yogãcãra inference was the core of Zhiejian-lun ('V [On Xuanzang's inference to prove the fruth of vol. 2, 2002).

features of Bhãvaviveka's logic is the restriction "in the ultimate reality" in order to make an argument for éünyatã. In Xuanzang's inference quoted above, the same restriction is used to prove the truth of Yogäcãra. Yasunori Ejima claims that Xuanzang's inference was based on Bhävaviveka's method. 8 On the other hand, Bhävaviveka has been criticized by the Faxiang school (the East Asian branch of Yogäcãra) since he was regarded as a master of the Mãdhyamika school.

The second issue is whether or not fallacies exist in Xuanzang's inference. Hajime Nakamura claims that the Yogãcãra inference has

errors; he has a high opinion of the Shilla monks, such as Sunkyöngllfi'lh because they did not blindly follow authority but criticized it.9 Nakamura also regards the Shilla Buddhists' interpretations of Xuanzang's inference as characteristic of the Korean way of thinking. By citing the development of Han'gúl as an example, he states that the Shilla Buddhists' interpretations of Xuanzang's inference demonstrate the rationalism of the Korean people. In this study, I have collected and examined the Shilla Buddhists' interpretations of Xuanzang's Yogäcära inference in order to clarify the intellectual situation of Yogäcära Buddhism in Shilla, and criticize Nakamura's understanding, and thus, this paper contributes to the studies the characteristics of Korean Buddhism.

Bhãvaviveka' s Reputation in Shilla

Before we examine the interpretations of Xuanzang's inference in it is important to understand the transition that Bhävaviveka's reputation underwent in Shilla 10 Bhaviveka's reputation was divided in East Asia; while some people believed him to be good others had a less charitable opinion of him. Based on Xuanzang's inference and his descriptions of Bhaviveka, it appears reasonable to suppose that Bhavaviveka (Development of Madhyamika Philosophy in India: Studies on Bhãviveka), Shunjüsha, 1980, p. 205.

Hajime Nakamura, (The Korean Way of Thinking)," 'Y •

Shunjüsha, 1989.

This chapter is based on my paper: Shigeki Moro,

Xuanzang thought highly of Bhävaviveka. According to a narrative on Bhävaviveka in Xuanzang praises Bhãvaviveka and refers to him as "broad-minded and virtuous. In addition, he describes Bhaviveka's faith in Maitreya in a positive manner. Hence, we may assume that some of Xuanzang's followers also thought highly of Bhãvaviveka.

On the other hand, Bhãvaviveka's inference in Dasheng-zhangzhen had been criticized in East Asia. The opening verse of Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun is as follows: In the ultimate reality, a conditioned existence is empty, like an illusion, since it is produced by causal conditions. An unconditioned existence also does not have any entities since like illusory flowers in the sky, it can never be generated. 12

Shun 'ei Hirai states that the scholar monks of the Faxiang school might have studied Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun because it was translated by Xuanzang.

13 Based on Shõshin Fukihara's list of the commentaries of Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun, we can find the names of Jingmai Wönhyo, and T'aehyönkN as the authors of these commentaries; however, the original commentaries of these authors have been lost. 14 It may be difficult to accept Hirai, since Wenbei was regarded as a "schoolmate of Wönhyo had never met Xuanzang, and T'aehyön was much younger than Xuanzang.

In this connection, we would like to focus on (724-797) which discusses the differences in the inferences in Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun and Dasheng-guangbailun-shilurzyc (Dharmapãla's commentary on Äryadeva's Guangbailun ffiË*) that quotes Korean scholar monks. Master Wönhyo of Shilla, in his P states that the inference in Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun is identical to that in Dasheng-guangbailun-shilun. (T30, 268b). Shunjüsha, 1976, p. 237.

Taigadö, 1944 (republished by Kokusho Kankö kai, 15 Miroku nyorai kan'no Vol. 5 (Jokai Hiraoka, Nihon mirokujodo shisou tenkai shi no kenkyu, 1977, p. 534).

Master claims that Wönhyo's interpretation is incorrect since the two inferences have different targets. (. . . ) Although both the inferences were drawn in order to confute the nature of existence that was a result of attachment, the targets are different. Dashengguangbailun-shilun criticizes only the Hïnayãna and non-Buddhist schools. Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun, however, criticizes the Mahãyãna, Hïnayäna, and non-Buddhist schools. Master SinbangÏNb states that the targets of Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun and Dasheng-guangbailun-shilun are not different (. . .) because both the texts serve the same purpose.

Master states that the inferences in these two texts are different. (. . . ) The concepts in Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun are based on emptiness, while those of Dasheng-guangbailun-shilun are based on the absence of reality. Hence, the purposes of both these texts are quite different. (. . ) For details of this, see the 10th volume of Sõng-yusingnon p

To cite another example on this topic, T'aehyön's Söng-yusingnon discusses whether the controversy between Dharmapãla and Bhãvaviveka was a historical fact or not. In the initial part of Sõngyusingnon hakki, T'aehyön reveals the existence of three groups in Shilla:

There were two groups in India: Bhãvaviveka and his followers, who referred to the Prajñãpãramitä sütras, claimed that conditioned and unconditioned existences are perceived by the ordinary view but appear empty in the true view, which is similar to the verses of Dasheng-zhangzhen-lun. (. . .) On the other hand, Dharmapãla and his followers, who referred to the Samdhinirmocana, claimed that all existences are perceived both as empty and not empty, which is similar to the verses of Madhyãntavibhäga. (. .

(a) Some people claim that the controversy between the two masters is a historical fact since the Buddhabhümisütra-šãstra states that "one thousand years after the death of šãkyamuni, a controversy will arise among the Mahãyãna between the school that professes emptiness and the one that professes existence." (. . . ) Wönch'ük and his followers also claimed that the controversy existed between the two schools.

(b) However, others state that the two masters did not dispute. (. Sun 'gyöng and his followers state that no controversy existed.

(c) Other monks such as Wönhyo and his followers claim that although the two masters expressed their opinions differently, the fundamental meaning of their teachings is the same. (. . .)17

Hence, based on these two quotations, it is reasonable to suppose that Shilla had at least two groups with different opinions on the evaluations of Bhävaviveka's inference in Shilla. 18 In general, Wönhyo, Sinbang, and Sun'gyöng were of the belief that Bhãvaviveka and Dharmapäla had a dispute. On the other hand, Tojúng, Kyönghüng, and Wönch'úk believed that they were compatible. Dharmapäla was one of the founders of the Faxiang school and was the master of ŠïIabhadra who was a master of Xuanzang. Therefore, it may be presumed that the evaluations of Bhãvaviveka's inference were related with those of Xuanzang's inference.

3. Commentaries on Xuanzang's Inference in Shilla

Thus far I have outlined the interpretations of Bhãvaviveka's inference. Next, I would like to examine the Shilla Buddhists' interpretations of Xuanzang's Yogãcãra inference. In this chapter, I also classify the Shilla scholar monks into two groups according to their

claims on Xuanzang's inference and the arguments on Bhãvaviveka's intërence discussed above. The first group consists of Wönhyo and Sun'gyöng. Zenju's Inmyõ-

the infèrence of Dasheng zhangzhen lun in a positive- manner and compares it with Lengyanjing (HBC3, 691-692). However, this topic is beyond the scope of our discussion, since, according to Ch'oe Yön-shik, Kyöndüng's work was relevant in the Japanese context. -c ," Journal ofBuddhism (edited by Komazawa Junior College), Vol. 7, 2001.

quotes Wönhyo's P'anbiryangnon, which points out the flaws in Xuanzang's inference 19

When discussing with the schools that accept the mutual use of five organs, the inference should be as follows: In the ultimate reality, the generally accepted forms differ from the generally accepted visual consciousness. This is because based on the theory that we accept they are categorized in the first three; however, they are not included in the visual consciousness.

Hence, the inference is free of the anaikäntiko viruddhavyabhicara (being counterbalanced; flaws.20 For example, in the context of the Yogacara theory, a bodhisattva who is higher than the eighth bhümi can see with the ears, hear with the eyes, and so forth. In such a context, we can make the following inference, which is contrary to Xuanzang's Yogãcära inference:

• In the ultimate reality, the generally accepted forms differ from the visual consciousness.

Therefore, Wönhyo indicates the anaikäntiko viruddhavyabhicara flaw in Xuanzang's inference and makes a more accurate inference. On the other hand, according to Sun'gyöng pointed out that Xuanzang's inference also contained the anaikäntiko viruddhävyabhicära flaw and made the following inference to counter the flaw in Xuanzang's inference:

• In the ultimate reality, the generally accepted forms definitely diftèr from the visual consciousness. This is because based on the theory which we accept they are categorized in the first three; however, they are not included in the visual consciousness. • Like as the eye. 21 19 For more details on P'anbiryangnon, see Kim Söngch'ol's Wõnhyo Eli P'anbiryangnon kich 'o yõn 'gu, chisik sanõpsa, 2003.

However, according to Japanese sources, such as Zenju's Inmyõronsho-myõtõ-shõ, this counter inference appears to be originally based on Wönhyo's inference:

This counter inference that demonstrates Xuanzang's anaikãntiko viruddhãvyabhicära flaw was originally made by Master Wönhyo of Shilla. After some time, Master Sun'gyöng learned this counter inference, but could not interpret it. During the GanfengV¿i5j era, he sent this inference to the Great Tang and requested them to interpret it. Master states the following in his commentary on Nyäyamukha: "During the Ganfeng

era, master Sun' gyöng of Shilla sent the counter inference in order to demonstrate Xuanzang's anaikäntiko viruddhävyabhicära flaw that was pointed out by Master Wönhyo of his country (Korea) to this country (China), and claimed that 'In the ultimate reality, the generally accepted forms are definitely different from visual consciousness. The reason and simile follow this (proposition).' At that time, Xuanzang, faltered and could not provide an answer.

In addition, Zõshun;üfâ (1104-1180) in his Inmyõ-daisho-shößflhye quoted a story from which also regards Wönhyo as the original author of the counter inference and a reincarnation of Dignãga, and Sun'gyöng as the messenger. 23 In contrast, Shötõin's work quoted in Inmyõdaisho-shõ regards Sun'gyöng as the author and Master Yu7ß as the messenger (T68, 525b); this interpretation is based on Ji's work Cheng (T43, 647a). In any case, it is reasonable to believe that there was a lineage of Buddhist logicians in Shilla who originated from Wönhyo.

In Inmyõ-daisho-shõ, there exists a quotation titled Gojõkkiffiîfiäd, which is supposed to be a fragment of T'aehyön's commentary:

24 Based on two reasons, Kosei Ishii supposes that Mun'gwe/WengúiU31YL, an unidentified scholar monk who wrote some commentaries on Buddhist logic, came from Shilla: (l) Similar to Wönch'ük, Mun'gwe was severely criticized by Ji. (2) Mun'gwe belonged to the Ximingsiffli LlJj?r temple, where many fòreign monks, especially Shilla monks like Wönch'ük, stayed (Kosei Ishii, ËIiíö%c¥," Sanron kyõgaku no kenkyû Shunjüsha, 1990. see also UJHJjtW/C' 25, 1999).

In this quotation, sentences enclosed by r. . . J are the quotations from Ji's and Wönhyo's P'anbiryangnon. The sentences beginning with a" can be attributed to T'aehyön or Tojüng since Zenju quotes several parts beginning with k or "kNffi$4>, instead. Moreover, part (g) should be attributed to Kyönghüng because it nearly coincides with the quotation of Zenju that is quoted below:

Thus, because of his honorific title "81] E', it may be reasonable to believe that T'aehyön respected Kyönghüng. In (a), (b), (c), and (e), T'aehyön quotes various critical interpretations of Xuanzang's inference and claims that "all critical interpretations miss the original purpose of Xuanzang's inference" (underlined part of (c)). We must focus on the fact that he criticizes Ji, who strongly supports Xuanzang's inference. In (a), he criticizes Ji for premising that the concepts of Xuanzang's inference were accepted both discussants and disputed only the predicate of

the propositions (4k Ltå). On the other hand, according to (d) and (f), he regards Xuanzang's inference as svärtha-anumãna in order to demonstrate the true purpose of Xuanzang's inference. Although T'aehyön also criticizes Ji's criticism of Sun' gyöng in (b), we should not assume that T'aehyön agrees with Sun'gyöng because he also criticizes Wönhyo in (c) in the same manner as he criticized Ji. In addition, in (f), T'aehyön quotes Kyönghüng, who claims that visual consciousness in the Yogäcãra inference should be interpreted as a combination of visual consciousness and älaya vljñãna.

4. Conclusion

In conclusion, we can find at least two groups of Shilla Buddhists, one that was headed by Wönhyo and Sun ' gyöng (and probably Sinbang), and the other that was headed by Kyönghüng, Tojüng, and T'aehyön. The former group intended to interpret and revise the Yogãcãra inference following the system of Buddhist logic, especially by using Bhãvaviveka's method, since they believed that Xuanzang's logic was based on Bhävaviveka's work. On the other hand, it appears that the latter group attempted to interpret the inference in the context of the general Yogãcãra doctrines.

Nakamura examines the rationalism of the Korean people by quoting Wönhyo and Sun'gyöng, but this approach alone is insufficient. In my opinion, the peculiarity that this indicated maybe one of the characteristics of Korean Buddhism, while the interpretations in China and Japan may be unified. Acknowledgment

I am grateful to Professor Kim Söngch'ul of Tongguk University for providing valuable advice.

Korean Buddhism in East Asian Perspectives Compiled by Geumgang Center for Buddhist Studies Geumgang University written by Kim Sang-hyön / Robert E. Buswell, Jr. / Sergei Vladimirovich Volkov Pankaj Mohan / Henrik H. Sørensen / John Jorgensen / Jinhua Chen Charles Muller / Jörg Plassen / Ch'oe Ki-p'yo / Ishii Kosei Ch 'oe Yön-shik / Shigeki Moro

Jimoondang 514-7 Munbal-ri, Gyoha-eup, Paju-si, Gyeonggi-do 413-756, Korea


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