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THE RULES OF DEBATE ACCORDING TO ASANGA

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INTRODUCTION

THE ENCYCLOPEDIC WORK *Yogācāra-bhūmi* [1] composed in India by Asanga, also called Āryā-sanga, in possibly the second half, fourth century A. D., is an outstanding example of India's cultural contributions to her neighbors, Tibet and China, as well as of India's debt to these neighbors for restoring some of her former great achievements. Except for the portion called *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* (edited by Unrai Ogihara), the work has been directly accessible to interested specialists only in the Tibetan and Chinese translations. Since the period in which Asanga lived has many problems for the historian, those students of Indian history and the history of Indian thought who are unable to command other than Sanskrit and Western sources generally welcome information about this author from Chinese or Tibetan sources.

The invaluable aid provided the historian by textual evidence demands, for optimum benefit, the exhibition of the ACTUAL WORDS employed. Despite the usefulness of the evidence from Chinese and Tibetan texts, the original words as they existed in Sanskrit have often been exhibited merely in RECONSTRUCTION on the basis of Sanskrit-Chinese or Sanskrit-Tibetan word-lists. This is the case, for example, with the topic of the rules of debate as found in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*. The section has already been referred to in Western treatises by way of the Chinese and Tibetan versions. Thus, Sugiura [2] has a mere paragraph supposedly representing the Chinese. Vidyābhūṣaṇa,[3] presumably using the Tibetan, has a somewhat more expanded treatment, but it omits the most significant portions and besides is rather misleading. Tucci [4] has an extended and valuable treatment of the points, based on both the Tibetan version and Chinese sources.

It is now possible to treat this subject by consideration of the original Sanskrit words. In my current project of editing the Bihar Research Society's manuscript of the *Śrāvaka-bhūmi*,[5] a

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[1] *Yogācāra-bhūmi* was apparently at one time a generic term for a class of treatises. See Paul Demiéville, "La Yogācārabhūmi de Sangharakṣa," *BEFEO*, 44, 339-436, for analysis of a work of the same title as Asanga's but by an earlier author called Sangharakṣa. For the various *Yogācāra-bhūmi* known to Chinese tradition, see pp. 395-7. The reverence in China for Sangharakṣa's text can be known especially from Arthur E. Link, "Shyh Daw-an's Preface to Sangharakṣa's Yogācāra-bhūmisūtra and the Problem of Buddho-Taoist Terminology in Early Chinese Buddhism," *JAOS*, 77, 1-14. The considerable enthusiasm for this class of treatise undoubtedly predisposed the Chinese eagerly to attempt translation of the more monumental work of the same title by Asanga when, at a later date, this appeared in India. For the various partial, and the one complete, translations into Chinese of Asanga's work, see the data in Sylvain Lévi, *Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra* (Paris, 1932), pp. 30-31 (this is part of a chapter contributed by Paul Demiéville in adaptation from the Japanese of D. Shimaji). In the present article, the title *Yogācāra-bhūmi* will always refer to Asanga's composition.

[2] Sadajiro Sugiura, *Hindu Logic as Preserved in China and Japan* (Philadelphia, 1900), p. 30.

[3] Satis Chandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa, *A History of Indian Logic* (Calcutta, 1921), pp. 263-5.

[4] Guiseppe Tucci treats some of the rules of debate in his lecture series, *On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya [Nātha] and Asanga* (Calcutta, 1930), especially pp. 46 f. Of particular importance is his "Buddhist Logic before Dinnāga (Asanga, Vasubandhu, Tarka-śāstras)," *JRAS*, 1929, pp. 451-488. Here Professor Tucci has a detailed treatment of the same section outlined in the present article. My treatment is as comprehensive of the general outline, while his gives more information on many of the points. His article has been of great help, not only in suggesting apt translations of the technical terms, but in particular of providing the information that makes possible the translation of the list of ten Fallacies (see note 40).

[5] See Rāhula Sānkṛtyāyanna, "Search for Sanskrit Mss. in Tibet," *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, 24, Part IV, 138. The manuscript is accessible to me only in an enlargement of the negatives on file at Bihar, and these negatives result from the photographing of the text at the Shalu monastery during Sānkṛtyāyanna's 1938 journey to Tibet. Approximately nine folio sides were photographed on a single plate. The photographic processes have resulted in much lower definition of the script while even the enlargement leaves the size of letters considerably less than the original, which incidentally is in the Indic script called *kuṭilā* by reason of rounded character. The manuscript is read with these handicaps, and necessarily always together with the Tibetan translation.

major section of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, it turned
out that there is an intrusion of numerous folios
from earlier sections written by the same scribe.
Among the intrusive folios occurs the final portion
of the *Śrūtamayī-bhūmi* containing a section de-
voted to *hetu-vidyā*, the science of reasoning, an
expression denoting, at least in later times, the
discipline of Buddhist logic. But as here used,
hetu-vidyā is indeed the rules of debate, already
alluded to, and logic per se is a subdivision appar-
ently of no greater importance than the qualities
that make a good public speaker. As my main
task is editing the *Śrāvaka-bhūmi*, it is out of the
question to present at this time any more than an
outline of the original Sanskrit words of this *hetu-
vidyā* section. The addition of the terms in Ti-
betan and Chinese [6]—which have frequently played
a role in the translation of the Sanskrit words—
should expand the range of interested readers.
Their presentation is justified by the policy of
exhibiting the words in order that text compari-
son may have a sound foundation.

HISTORICAL REMARKS

Vidyābhūṣaṇa [7] describes the use of the word
Ānvīkṣikī from 650 B. C. onwards in the special
sense of logic, as well as for the art of debate in
assemblies called *pariṣad*. He further mentions [8]
that from circa 1 A. D. Indian logic entered into a
second stage with the formulization of the syl-
logism and became widely designated by the term
Nyāya-śāstra, or *Nyāya*. The *Nyāya* syllogism
has five members or premises (*avayava*): 1. Thesis
(*pratijñā*), 2. Reason (*hetu*), 3. Example (*uda-
hāraṇa*), 4. Application (*upanaya*), 5. Conclusion
(*nigamana*).

Dasgupta writes,[9] " Goldstücker says that both
Patañjali (140 B. C.) and Kātyāyana (fourth cen-
tury B. C.) knew the *Nyāya sūtras*. We know that
Kauṭilya knew the Nyāya in some form as Ān-
vīkṣikī in 300 B. C., and on the strength of this
we may venture to say that the Nyāya existed in
some form as early as the fourth century B. C. But

there are other reasons which lead me to think that
at least some of the present sūtras were written
some time in the second century A. D. . . ."

Indian literature from the early centuries A. D.
provides two basic descriptions of debate (*vāda*),
one in the medical texts, e. g. *Carakasaṃhitā*,
Vimānasthāna, Chap. 8,[10] the other in the *Nyāya-
sūtra*.[11] The first is for a worldly aim—justifying
a medical position; the second for a non-worldly
aim—justifying a philosophical position. The de-
scription of debate by Asaṅga is the Buddhist
counterpart of the Nyāya rules.

In the Buddhist tradition, we note the celebrated
dispute said to have occurred in the third century
B. C. under the auspices of King Aśoka. The Pali
school of Buddhism claims that the debates are
recorded in the book *Kathā-Vatthu*.[12] S. Z. Aung
attempts to formulate the logic of this treatise.[13]
Randle [14] does not consider its method comparable
to *Nyāya*, and takes this fact as an indication that
logic (*nyāya*) did not exist in the third century
B. C. in India.

Buddhist logic came to its high point of develop-
ment with Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, whose dates
are not definitely settled but must be within the
period fifth through seventh century, and the lat-
ter following the former by about a century. Re-
ferring to this Buddhist logic and to the Nyāya
five-membered syllogism, Randle says,[15] " And it
did not altogether reject the five-membered syl-
logism, but contented itself with drawing a distinc-
tion between inference as drawn by oneself and
inferential apprehension as conveyed to others.
The latter retained the five-membered form." Per-
haps Randle means by this that Diṅnāga's " in-
ference for others " (*parārthānumāna*) is equiva-
lent to the five-membered form. However, cer-

[6] It would not be possible to include the Chinese with-
out the aid of my wife, Hideko, who compared it with
the Japanese *Kokuyaku* translation. All the references
to the Chinese and Japanese texts are due to her.

[7] Op. cit., pp. 7-8.

[8] Ibid., p. 40.

[9] Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Phi-
losophy* (Cambridge, 1932), I, 279.

[10] For example, *The Caraka Saṃhitā* (Shree Gula-
bkunverba Ayurvedic Society, Jamnagar, 1949), II, 879,
f.; Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Phi-
losophy* (Cambridge, 1932), II, 373 f.

[11] For example, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Charles
A. Moore, editors, *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*
(Princeton, 1957), pp. 356-379; Vidyābhūṣaṇa, op. cit.,
pp. 54 f.

[12] *Points of Controversy* . . . translation of the *Kathā-
Vatthu*, by Shwe Zan Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids
(Pali Text Society, London, 1915).

[13] Ibid., xlviii-li.

[14] H. N. Randle, *Indian Logic in the Early Schools*
(London, etc., 1930), p. 14.

[15] Ibid., p. 25.

tainly the words changed. Stcherbatsky writes,[16] " From these five members Dignāga retained only two, the general rule including the examples, and the application including the conclusion."

Turning to Asaṅga, we note that his work *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, recently edited by Pradhan, contains [17] near the end a treatment of debate (*vāda*) that is surely an extreme condensation of the material in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* to be presented in outline below, omitting most of the subdivisions and making some emendations in wording of definitions. If a condensation had been done by a devoted follower, such differences would not be expected. Indeed, Asaṅga himself, a great thinker, can be expected to introduce modifications according to his own judgment. Especially striking is a change of terms in the section " Foundation of Debate " (*vādādhiṣṭhāna*) in the list of proofs (*sādhana*). In the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, Asaṅga gives these eight: Upholding of the Thesis (*pratijñā*), Reason (*hetu*), Example (*udāharaṇa*), Agreement (*sārūpya*), Difference (*vairūpya*), Direct Perception (*pratyakṣa*), Inference (*anumāna*), Trustworthy Authority (*āptāgama*). In the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, the first five of the eight become the five members of the Nyāya syllogism, except that *udāharaṇa* is replaced by *dṛṣṭānta*, which also means " example." Another feature of the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* presentation is that the elements of Debate are no longer under the general heading of *hetu-vidyā*.

To account for these alterations, we may presume that between the time the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* were written logic was undergoing far-reaching developments in India; and it may be that the term *hetu-vidyā* ' science of reasoning' could no longer be used to cover the subject of debates.

It is even possible that Diṅnāga's logical reform intervened. Take Asaṅga as living approximately A. D. 350-420 (part of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi*, was first translated into Chinese around 412-418). Then he is a contemporary of Kālidāsa, according to Upadhyaya, who concludes,[18] " If he lived to an old age, say eighty

years, then taking his death about A. D. 445, we can place his birth about A. D. 365." It is well known that Mallinātha, commenting on Kālidāsa's *Meghadūta*, stanza 14, explained the line " on the path of the elephants in that direction (*diṅnāgānām*), avoiding the proud movements of their thick trunks," as a *double entendre* referring to Diṅnāga (" elephant of the direction "). But it is only certain that Asaṅga could not have lived later than this time. He might have lived somewhat earlier.[19]

OUTLINE OF THE RULES

The section begins with the question, " What is the Science of Reasoning? " (*hetu-vidyā katamā*), and upon concluding is succeeded immediately with the question, " What is the Science of Words? " (*śabda-vidyā katamā*). The section in the Bihar Sanskrit Ms. begins 2B.6-3c, ends 3A.2-3a; in the Tibetan translation, Derge Tanjur, *Sems tsam*, Tshi, begins f. 187a-7, ends f. 199b-2; in the Chinese translation, Taishō, Vol. 30, begins 356a-14, ends 360c-20; in the Japanese translation, Kokuyaku Daizōkyō, *Yōga*, Vol. 6, begins p. 413, ends p. 436.[20]

The initial question is answered, *parīkṣārthena yad vijñānam vastu* ' the perception at hand by reason of careful consideration.' Also there are seven divisions: [21]

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[16] Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (Leningrad, 1932), I, 279.

[17] Pralhad Pradhan, editor, *Abhidharma Samuccaya of Asanga* (Santiniketan, 1950), Skt. text, pp. 104-6.

[18] B. S. Upadhyaya, *India in Kālidāsa* (Allahabad, 1947), p. 360.

[19] Although pertinent, the relations between Maitreya and Asaṅga on the one hand, and between Asaṅga and Vasubandhu on the other, are not discussed here since these topics require special treatment. A discussion of the continuation of Buddhist logic in Tibet and China is found in Stcherbatsky, op. cit., I, 42 f.

[20] While Hsuan tsang is conventionally said to be the translator of the only complete version in Chinese of the entire *Yogācāra-bhūmi*, and the one containing the " rules of debate," J. Saheki, the translator of the Japanese version in the Kokuyaku Daizōkyō, states (pp. 8-9) in the Introduction to Vol. 6 of *Yōga* that 25 Yoga scholars participated in the translation, beginning on the official date of May 15 in either 646 or 647 A.D., according to two different views, and ending on the official date of May 15, 648 A.D. The translator of the section that includes the " rules of debate " is shown (p. 11) to be Hsing Yu (see last entry in character list concluding this article). The Tibetan translation of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* took place early in the ninth century A.D. by cooperation of Indian and Tibetan pandits. The Tibetan in each case was Ye śes sde, the Indians different combinations of Jinamitra, Prajñāvarma, and Surendrabodhi. The Tōhoku catalog of the Derge Kanjur and Tanjur does not list the translators of the first part of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* that includes the " rules of debate."

[21] The page references for where the divisions indi-

Major Divisions	Bihar	Derge	Taishō	Kokuyaku
I. vāda	2B.6-4b	187b-1	356a-19	413.12
II. vādādhikaraṇa	2A.7-5b	188b-6	356c-5	416.10
III. vādādhiṣṭhāna	2A.7-6a	188b-7	356c-9	416.14
IV. vādālaṃkāra	2A.10-4a	195a-3	359a-22	428.12
V. vādanigraha	3A.1-6b [22]	196b-4	359c-16	431.10
VI. vādaniḥsaraṇa	3B.1-(?) [23]	198a-6	360b-7	434.5
VII. vade bahukarā dharmā	3A.2-1c	199a-6	360c-14	436.1

Before presenting the breakdown of the divisions, a few explanations must be made. For the translation [24] of terms into English, the definitions

vidually start are intended to serve the readers of Chinese, Japanese, or Tibetan who may wish to use the outline as a guide for reading the whole section, which indeed has numerous interesting ideas not communicated in the present article.

[22] Although this division starts on plate 3A, part of the material, by reason of the scribe's error, is on the reverse of the immediately preceding folio, 2B.10.

[23] The line, probably the first, on which the division begins, cannot be determined due to the unfortunate fact that this particular folio side is almost completely illegible.

[24] There are translation problems general to all languages and special to special languages. Specialists in Buddhist Sanskrit have recently gained an immense aid in Franklin Edgerton's *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary* (New Haven, 1953). The *Bodhi-sattva-bhūmi* (part of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*) was placed by Edgerton in the third class of BHS texts (see Grammar, xxv). This implies that the whole *Yogācāra-bhūmi* will show here and there vocabulary differences from classical Sanskrit. Since the present vocabulary is in three languages (Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese), it follows that the translations into English will not always satisfy all three languages. As far as possible the translation follows the original Sanskrit, but this brings up the problem of translation per se. Two recent essays on translation are worthy of note: Edward H. Schafer, " Non-translation and Functional Translation—Two—Sinological Maladies," *FEQ*, 13 (May 1954), 251-260; Paul Thieme, reviewing Louis Renou's *Études védiques et pāṇinéennes*, Tome I, in *JAOS*, vol. 77, 51-56. In the case of technical systems, such as Indian philosophies, it seems to me we must observe the " invariants " of the system—the " technical terms " which the author consciously employs in the same manner, and which should always be translated the same way. In a sense, they are the proper nouns of the system; and the fact that these must be translated in order that the system itself be translated further shows the justice of Schafer's decision to translate official titles. The remaining words might be called the " variables," the words which have varied usage, even by the same author —which we know is the case with our own native lan-

and examples—when furnished by the text—will be taken into account in at least one of the forms—Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Japanese, but the latter in general not cited.[25] In parenthesis, the first element will be Sanskrit; the second, Tibetan; and the third, reference to the Chinese characters. This reference will be in the form Ch[x], where the superscript letter designates the particular Chinese characters among those collected at end of article.

I. The Debate In Itself (*vāda, smra ba,* Ch[a])
There are six kinds:

1. Utterances of all kinds (*vāda, smra ba,* Ch[b]),

2. Worldly declarations (*pravāda, rmad khyer ba smra ba,* Ch[c]),

3. Quarrels (*vivāda, rtsod pa smra ba,* Ch[d]),

4. Rebukes (*apavāda, tshig ṅan smra ba,* Ch[e]),

5. [Doctrinally] consistent remarks (*anuvāda, mthun par smra ba,* Ch[f]),

6. Precepts [of guidance] (*avavāda, gdams par smra ba,* Ch[g]).

Of these, 5 and 6 are to be engaged in, 3 and 4 avoided, and 1 and 2 are indeterminate.

guages. And is it not true, especially of those great works which have been devotedly preserved through the centuries, that what an author writes is closer to what he means than what he doesn't write? Perhaps I am congenitally sympathetic with Thieme's position, as stated in his review. Translation should adhere to a standard, and inevitably temperament intervenes—sometimes declaring itself a universal rule.

[25] A source that might have given help in Asaṅga's own commentary on the basic part of the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* outlining the seventeen bhūmis. That commentary, called *Viniścayasaṃgraha,* and included in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi,* is the type later called *pañjikā,* a commentary that only comments on the " difficult points." His commentary on the *Śrutamayī-bhūmi* in the Tibetan version is in Vol. Źi, f. 185a-2 to 198b-6. He mentions *hetu-vidyā* f. 189a-5, only citing the names of the seven divisions, en passant.

II. "Court-room"[26] of the Debate

(*vādādhikaraṇa, smra baḥi źal ce pa*, Ch^h)

There are six kinds:

1. Royal residence (*rājakula, rgyal po bźugs paḥi sa*, Ch^i),

2. Residence of officials (*yuktakula, bskos pa ḥdu baḥi sa*, Ch^j),

3. Assembly (*parṣat-sattvā, ḥkhor ba daṅ ḥdu ba*,[27] Ch^k),

4, 5. Ascetics and Brahmins skilled in the doctrine and meaning (*dharmārtha-kuśalā śramaṇa-brāhmaṇā, chos daṅ don la mkhas paḥi dge sbyoṅ daṅ bram ze rnams*, Ch^m),[28]

6. Persons desiring the doctrine and meaning (*dharmārtha-kāmā sattvā, chos daṅ don ḥdod paḥi sems can rnams*, Ch^n).

III. Foundation of the Debate

(*vādādhiṣṭhāna, smra baḥi gźi*, Ch^o)

There are ten kinds: 2 kinds of thesis (*sā-dhyārtha, bsgrub par bya baḥi don*, Ch^p); 8 kinds of proof (*sādhana, bsgrub pa*, Ch^q).

The two kinds of thesis are:

1. Intrinsic nature (*svabhāva, ṅo bo ñid*, Ch^r), namely, "from the standpoint of existence" (*sattvamatas*) and "from the standpoint of non-existence" (*asattvāmatas*),

2. Particular (*viśeṣa, bya brag*, Ch^s), e. g. "permanence from the standpoint of permanence, and impermanence from the standpoint of impermanence."

The eight kinds of proof are:

1. Upholding of the Thesis (*pratijñā, dam bcaḥ ba*, Ch^t),

2. Reason (*hetu, gtan tshigs*, Ch^u),

3. Example (*udāharaṇa, dper brjod*, Ch^v),

4. Agreement (*sārūpya, mthun pa*, Ch^w),

5. Difference (*vairūpya, mi mthun pa*, Ch^x),

6. Direct Perception (*pratyakṣa, mṅon sum*, Ch^y),

7. Inference (*anumāna, rjes su dpag pa*, Ch^z),

8. Trustworthy Authority (*āptāgama, yid ches paḥi luṅ*, Ch^aa).

"Upholding of the Thesis" (*pratijñā*)[29] is defined as the mutual embracing of an individual side, starting from the two kinds of thesis [with their affirmative and negative sides] (*dvividhaṃ sādhyam artham ārabhya yaḥ anyonyaṃ svapakṣa-parigraha . . .*).

Given the "Upholding of the Thesis," the "Reason" (*hetu*) is defined as the expression of reasoning (*yukti-vāda*) developed by any one of Nos. 4-8 (Agreement down to Trustworthy Authority) on the basis of an Example (*udāharaṇāśritaḥ*).

Given the basis of the "Reason," the "Example" (*udāharaṇa*) is defined as the expression involving comparison with "an entity that is stored and well-known in society" (*lokācitaprasiddha-vastu*).

Moreover, Agreement (*sārūpya*) is of five kinds:[30]

4(1). Resemblance of sign (*liṅga-sādṛśya, rtags ḥdra ba*, Ch^ab),

4(2). Resemblance of intrinsic nature (*svabhāva-sādṛśya, ṅo bo ñid ḥdra ba*, Ch^ac),

4(3). Resemblance of activity (*karma-sādṛśya, las ḥdra ba*, Ch^ad),

4(4). Resemblance of attribute (*dharma-sādṛśya, chos ḥdra ba*, Ch^ae),

4(5). Resemblance of cause and effect (*hetuphala-sādṛśya, rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu ḥdra ba*, Ch^af).

Difference (*vairūpya*) is also of five kinds, in contrast to Agreement.

Direct Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is:

6(1). Not indirect (*aviparokṣa, lkog tu ma gyur pa*, Ch^ag),

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[26] "Court-room" stands here not only for the place of the debate, but also for the persons who judge it.

[27] In the many centuries since the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* was first translated into Tibetan, the printing blocks have frequently worn out and been remade, offering opportunity for mistakes to creep in. Such may be the case here, where the word "daṅ" ("and") seems to be erroneously admitted. The original Tibetan might have read *ḥkhor ba ḥdu ba*.

[28] The Chinese has as No. 4, "wise men" (Ch^l) and Ch^m is counted as one item, No. 5. Ch^l might be compared to the *prāmāṇika-sahāyaka* ("authoritative associate") of Pradhan, editor, op. cit., p. 104, where it is one of the six in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* list.

[29] The word *pratijñā* has two basic meanings in classical Sanskrit: (1) pledge, (2) thesis. The usage here may be the historical link between those two meanings (the debater is pledged to uphold a thesis), and so may considerably antedate Asaṅga. The present usage is perhaps allied to the "claim, profession" of Edgerton, *Dictionary*, 363a.

[30] The five different expressions occur again in the

6(2). Not already inferred and not to be inferred (*anabhyūhita-anabhyūhya, mṅon par brtags zin pa ma yin daṅ mṅon par brtags par bya ba ma yin,* Ch[ah]),

6(3). Free from illusion (*avibhrānta, ma ḥkhrul pa,* Ch[ai]).

There are four aspects to being "not indirect" (*aviparokṣa*). Given the condition that the senses (*indriya*) are faultless (*aparibhinna*) and that attention (*manaskāra*) is present (*pratyupasthita*), it is:

6(1)-a. Because of occurrence in conformity (*anurūpotpatti, mthun par skye ba,* Ch[aj]),[31]

6(1)-b. Because of occurrence in transcendence (*samatikramotpatti, yaṅ dag par ḥdas nas skye ba,* Ch[ak]),[32]

6(1)-c. Because of lack of hindrance (*anāvaraṇa, sgrib pa med pa,* Ch[al]),

6(1)-d. Because of non-remoteness (*aviprakarṣa, thag riṅ pa ma yin,* Ch[am]).

"Lack of hindrance" (*anāvaraṇa*) means lacking these four hindrances:

6(1)-c-a Hindrance of veil (*avacchādanīya-āvaraṇa, sgrib gYogs kyi sgrib,* Ch[an]), e. g. darkness;

β Hindrance of disappearance (*antardhāyanīya-āvaraṇa, mi snaṅ bar byed paḥi sgrib, Ch[ao]*), e. g. through power of herbs;

γ Hindrance of overpowerment (*abhibhavanīya-āvaraṇa, zil gyis gnon paḥi sgrib,* Ch[ap]), e. g. a tiny thing overshadowed by a large thing;

δ Hindrance of bewilderment (*sammoha-āvaraṇa, rmoṅs paḥi sgrib,* Ch[aq]), e. g. through images.

"Non-remoteness" (*aviprakarṣa*) means not being subject to these three remotenesses:

6(1)-d-a Remoteness of place (*deśa-viprakarṣa, yul thag riṅ ba,* Ch[ar]),

β Remoteness of time (*kāla-viprakarṣa, dus thag riṅ ba,* Ch[as]),

γ Remoteness through diminution (*apacaya-viprakarṣa, cha phra bas thag pa,* Ch[at]).

Being "free from illusion" (*avibhrānta*) means being free from the five or seven kinds of illusion. These are the five:

6(3)-a. Illusion of idea (*samjñā-bhrānti, ḥdu śes ḥkhrul pa,* Ch[au]),

6(3)-b. Illusion of number (*saṃkhyā-bhrānti, graṅs ḥkhrul pa,* Ch[av]),

6(3)-c. Illusion of shape (*saṃsthāna-bhrānti, dbyibs ḥkhrul pa,* Ch[aw]),

6(3)-d. Illusion of color (*varṇa-bhrānti, kha dog ḥkhrul pa,* Ch[ax]),

6(3)-e. Illusion of activity (*karma-bhrānti, las ḥkhrul pa,* Ch[ay]),

The seven kinds add two more that are involved with all five:

6(3)-f. Illusion of thought (*citta-bhrānti, sems ḥkhrul pa,* Ch[az]), aroused by any of the first five;

6(3)-g. Illusion of view (*dṛṣṭi-bhrānti, lta ba ḥkhrul pa,* Ch[ba]), based on any of the first five.

Finally, Direct Perception (*pratyakṣa*) can be expressed in terms of what has the Direct Perception: Direct Perception belonging to the formal sense organs (*rūpin indriya-pratyakṣa, dbaṅ po gzugs can gyi mṅon sum,* Ch[bb]), which are five in number; Direct Perception belonging to mental experience (*manonubhava-pratyakṣa, yid kyis myoṅ baḥi mṅon sum,* Ch[bc]); Direct Perception belonging to the world (*loka-pratyakṣa, ḥjig rten gyi mṅon sum,* Ch[bd]), which is the foregoing two taken together; Direct Perception belonging to Purity (*śuddha-pratyakṣa, dag paḥi mṅon sum,* Ch[be]), which includes all the third kind, but exclusive of the latter also includes the Direct Perception belonging to the domain (*gocara*) of supramundane knowledge (*lokottara-jñāna*).

Inference (*anumāna*) is of five kinds:

7(1). From sign (*liṅgatas, rtags las,* Ch[bf]), e. g. an elderly man from white hair;

7(2). From intrinsic nature (*svabhāvatas, ṅo bo ñid las,* Ch[bg]), e. g. the past from the present;

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subsequent description of the five kinds of Inference (*anumāna*), where an illustration for each will be cited.

[31] "Occurrence in conformity" means the desire-realm objects (*viṣaya*) of desire-realm senses and the superior-realm objects of superior-realm senses (Taishō 357a-19).

[32] "Occurrence in transcendence" means the lower-realm objects (*adhobhūmikaviṣaya*) of superior-realm senses (*ūrdhvabhūmika-indriya*).

7(3). From activity (*karmatas, las las,* Ch[bh]), e. g. a horse from a neigh;

7(4). From attribute (*dharmatas, chos las,* Ch[bi]), e. g. suffering (*duḥkha*) from involvement in impermanence (*anitya*);

7(5). Cause from effect [and vice versa] (*hetu-phalatas, rgyu daṅ ḥbras bu las,* Ch[bj]), e. g. arrival at another place from travelling, and travelling from arrival at another place.

Trustworthy Authority (*āptāgama*)[33] is of three kinds:

8(1). Resulting from non-deviation from the Sacred Word (*pravacana-avirodhatas, gsuṅ rab sdud pa,* Ch[bk]),

8(2). Resulting from the antidotes to the corruptions (*saṃkleśa-pratipakṣatas, kun nas ñon moṅs paḥi gñen po,* Ch[bl]),

8(3). Resulting from non-deviation from the characteristics [of the Doctrine] (*lakṣaṇa-avirodhatas, mtshan ñid daṅ mi ḥgal ba,* Ch[bm]).[34]

IV. Adequacies[35] for the Debate

(*vādālaṃkāra, smra baḥi rgyan,* Ch[bn])

There are five kinds:

1. Knowledge of one's own and the other's context (*svaparasamaya-jñatā, bdag daṅ pha rol gyi lugs śes pa,* Ch[bo]),

2. Accomplishment of speech arts (*vākkaraṇa-sampannatā, tshig gi sbyor ba phun sum tshogs pa,* Ch[bp]),

3. Confidence (*vaiśāradya, mi ḥjigs pa,* Ch[bq]),

4. Restraint (*sthairya, brtan pa,* Ch[br]),

5. Resourcefulness (*dakṣiṇya, ṅo mi bzlog pa,* Ch[bs]).

Accomplishment of speech arts (*vākkaraṇa-sampannatā*) has five virtues (*guṇa*) and nine aspects (*ākāra*). The five virtues are that the speech is:

2.a(1) non-rustic (*agrāmyo-bhavati, groṅ mihi skad ma yin,* Ch[bt]),

2.a(2) of easy style (*laghur-bhavati, yaṅ ba,* Ch[bu]),

2.a(3) persuasive (*tejasvī-bhavati, brjid pa,* Ch[bv]),

2.a(4) coherent (*sambaddho-bhavati, ḥbrel ba,* Ch[bw]),

2.a(5) significant (*svartho-bhavati, don bzaṅ po,* Ch[bx]).

The nine aspects are that the speech is:[36]

2.b(1) not confused (*anākula, ma ḥtshal ba,* Ch[by]),

2.b(2) not violent (*asaṃrabdha, ñes par rtsom pa ma yin pa,* Ch[bz]),

2.b(3) understandable (*gamaka, brda phrad pa,* Ch[ca]),

2.b(4) of proper length (*mita, raṅ pa,* Ch[cb]),

2.b(5) cogent (*arthayukta, don daṅ ldan pa,* Ch[cc])),

2.b(6) right-timed (*kālana, dus,* Ch[cd]),

2.b(7) held to the point (*sthira, sbyor ba,*[37] Ch[ce]),

2.b(8) clear (*dīpta, gsal ba,* Ch[cf]),

2.b(9) continuous (*prabaddha, rgyun chags pa,* Ch[cg]).

There are twenty-seven benefits (*anuśaṃsa, phan yon,* Ch[ch]) from the five Adequacies for the Debate. This subsection begins Bihar 3A.1-2b, Derge 196a-2, Taishō 359b-23, Kokuyaku 430.8. The first of the twenty-seven is that one "becomes more esteemed" (*sammatataro bhavati, śin tu bkur bar ḥgyur źiṅ,* Ch[ci]).

V. Points of Defeat in the Debate

(*vādanigraha, smra ba chad pas bcad pa,* Ch[cj])

There are three kinds:

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[33] It is defined as follows: *yat sarvajña-bhāṣitam / tato vā śrūtvā tatrānudharmaṃ vā* / "Whatever has been expressed by the omniscient one, or heard from him, or is a doctrine consistent therewith." (Bihar 2B.9-2b, Derge 193b-4, Taishō 358c-3). A momentous definition! "Consistency" covers a multitude of virtues and sins.

[34] The characteristics are described extensively at the outset of the *Cintāmayī-bhūmi,* which follows the *Śruta-mayī-bhūmi.* This use of the word *lakṣaṇa* explains why in Tibet the whole curriculum of non-Tantric Buddhist studies is called *mtshan ñid,* the equivalent to *lakṣaṇa.* Presumably this "mtshan ñid" stems from the usage in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi;* and this fact may indicate an immense influence of this work in Tibet.

[35] The translation here is "enough," from *alam* 'enough' *kāra* 'making.' The usual meaning of *Alaṃkāra* is "ornament," accounting for the emphasis of the Chinese characters on "grandeur."

[36] The nine aspects are the opposites of the nine "faults of the discussion" (*kathādoṣa*) in Section V.

[37] The Tibetan by mistake added the term *bstan pa* between this and the foregoing item (*dus*).

1. Surrender of the discussion (*kathātyāga, brjod pa gtoṅ ba,* Ch[ck]),

2. Collapse of the discussion (*kathāsāda, brjod pa sma dbab pa,* Ch[cl]),

3. Faults of the discussion (*kathādoṣa, brjod paḥi ñes pa,* Ch[cm]).

What is Surrender of the discussion? Here the debater (*vādin*), by thirteen kinds of vocal information (*vāg-vijñapti*), informs the opponent (*prativādin*) that he surrenders the discussion:

1(1). "Mine is not good" (*asādhu mama, bdag gi ni ma legs so,* Ch[cn]),

1(2). "Yours is good" (*sādhu vā tava, khyod kyi ni legs so,* Ch[co]),

1(3). "Mine was not well considered" (*aparīkṣitam mama, bdag gi ni legs par brtags pa ma yin no,* Ch[cp]),

1(4). "Yours was well considered" (*parīkṣitam vā tava, khyod kyi ni legs par brtags paḥo,* Ch[cq]),

1(5). "Mine is not cogent" (*ayuktam mama, bdag gi ni rigs pa ma yin no,* Ch[cr]),

1(6). "Yours is cogent" (*yuktam vā tava, khyod kyi ni rigs pa yin no,* Ch[cs]),

1(7). "Mine is incoherent" (*asahitam mama, bdag gi ni ḥbrel ba ma yin no,* Ch[ct]),

1(8). "Yours is coherent" (*sahitam vā tava, khyod kyi ni ḥbrel ba,* Ch[cu]),

1(9). "My side has been defeated" (*nigṛhīto madvādaḥ, bdag gi smra ba ni tshar chod par gyur to,* Ch[cv]),

1(10). "Your side has been well established" (*pratiṣṭhito vā yuṣmadvāda[ḥ], khyod kyi smra ni brtan por gyur to,* Ch[cw]),

1(11). "This is all that occurs to me in this case" (*etāvad me atra pratibhāti, ḥdir bdag gi spobs pa ni ḥdi tsam du zad do,* Ch[cx]),

1(12). "After some more thinking, I shall resume the discussion later" (*uttare vā saṃcintya punaḥ vakṣyāmi, phyi ma ni bsam te smra bar byaḥo,* Ch[cy]),

1(13). "Let so much suffice! I shall not further discuss the matter" (*alam astv[?] etāvad na punaḥ kathāṃ kariṣyāmi, de tsam gyis chog gi yaṅ brjod par mi byaḥo,* Ch[cz]).

What is Collapse of the discussion? Because the speaker is overcome by the opponent, he:—

2(1). By means of another [matter], retreats elsewhere (*anyenānyaṃ pratisarati, gźan nas gźan du gyur pa,* Ch[da]),

2(2). Brings up irrelevant matters (*bahir—[?] kathām upanayati, ma gtogs paḥi gtam gleṅ ba,* Ch[db]),

2(3-9). Manifests anger, hatred, pride, hypocrisy, threat, impatience, distrust (*kopañ ca dveṣañ ca mānañ ca mrakṣañ cāghātañ cākṣāntiñ cāpratyayañ ca prāviṣkaroti; khro ba ston pa, źe sdaṅ ston pa, ṅa rgyal ston pa, ḥchab pa ston pa, kun nas mnar sems ston pa, mi bzod pa ston pa, rkyen ṅan pa ston pa;* Ch[dc-di]),

2(10). Becomes speechless (*tūṣṇīm-bhūto vā bhavati, caṅ mi smra bar ḥdug pa,* Ch[dj]),

2(11). Is upset (*madgu-bhūtaḥ, yul yul por gyur pa,* Ch[dk]),[38]

2(12). Droops shoulders and lowers face (*srasta-skandhaḥ adhomukhaḥ, phrag pa bcum pa daṅ gdoṅ smad pa,* Ch[dl]),

2(13). Occupies himself with subtle reflection, his ingenuity gone (*pradhyāna-paramaḥ niṣpratibhānaḥ, sems khoṅ du chud pa daṅ spobs pa med par gyur pa,* Ch[dm]).

The foregoing are classified in three groups: Nos.

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[38] The translation "is upset" was chosen from among the various possibilities cited by Edgerton in his entry on *maṅku* in *Dictionary*, 414a. The considerable treatment of this word by Edgerton shows that it has an importance which justifies citing the explanation by Asaṅga. The scribe had omitted the passage which includes this, and the omission was corrected, possibly by his teacher, in a "footnote" at bottom of the folio (Bihar Ms. 2B.10). *kathaṃ madgubhūto bhavati manaskarmasaṃkocataḥ* / "How does he become upset? By way of retraction of mental action." The term *manaskarma* has a special meaning in Buddhism of *cetanā* 'volition' (see Louis de la Vallée Poussin, *L'Abhidharmakośa de Vasubandhu,* quatrième chapitre, p. 2; and Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharma-samuccaya of Asaṅga,* def. of *cetanā* on p. 5, last line, to p. 6). We might paraphrase, "He withdraws into his carapace." There is a suggestion of "frustration." The Tibetan *yul yul por gyur pa* has its own difficulty. The Tibetan word *yul* meaning "region" in translation of Sanskrit *viṣaya*, or the like, can hardly be the *yul* of this phrase. But it is natural to think of the Tibetan *gYul* "army" and to consider the fact that there is no verb form corresponding to the latter term in classical Tibetan. It may be that the *yul* of our difficult phrase and the *gYul* meaning "army" are the survivors of a word family containing a verb meaning "to do battle." It may be theorized that *yul yul por gyur pa* was once an idiom meaning "defeated in battle," or "routed."

(1-2) are "through distraction" (*vikṣepa-prati-pattitas, rnam par gYeṅ bar sgrub bo*, Ch^{dn}); Nos. (3-9) "through wayward action" (*mithyā-prati-pattitas, log par sgrub bo*, Ch^{do}); Nos. (10-13) "through inaction" (*apratipattitas, mi sgrub*, Ch^{dp}).

The Faults of the discussion—disqualifying a participant—are of nine kinds, insofar as the discussion:—

3(1) Has confused language (*ākula-vacana, tshig ḥchal pa*, Ch^{dq}),

3(2) Is violent (*saṃrabdha, ñes pa rtsom pa*, Ch^{dr}),

3(3) Is incomprehensible (*agamaka, brda ma phrad pa*, Ch^{ds}),

3(4) Is of wrong length (*amita, raṅ ma yin pa*, Ch^{dt}),

3(5) Is fallacious (*anarthayukta, don daṅ ldan pa*, Ch^{du}),

3(6) Is mistimed (*akālana, dus ma yin pa*, Ch^{dv}),

3(7) Is digressive (*asthira, mi brtan pa*, Ch^{dw}),

3(8) Is obscure (*adīpta, mi gsal ba*, Ch^{dx}),

3(9) Has halting language (*aprabaddha-vacana, tshig rgyun chags ma yin pa*, Ch^{dy}).

Being "fallacious" (*anarthayukta*) is of ten kinds: 3(5)-a. (*nirarthaka, dgos pa med pa*, Ch^{dz}), b. (*apārthaka, don med pa*, Ch^{ea}), c. (*yuktibhinna, rigs pa las ñams pa*, Ch^{eb}), d. (*sādhyasama, bsgrub par bya ba daṅ ḥdra ba*, Ch^{ec}), e. (*aticchalā-asaṃhita, ltag chod daṅ tshig dor daṅ ldan pa rnams*, Ch^{ed}), f. (*arthānupalabdhitas, don mi dmigs pa*, Ch^{ee}), g. (*asambaddhārthatas, don daṅ mi ḥbrel ba*, Ch^{ef}), h. (*anaikāntikatas, ma ñes pa*, Ch^{eg}),[39] i. (*sādhanasyāpi sādh[y]atas, sgrub pa yaṅ bsgrub par bya ba yin pa*, Ch^{eh}), j. (*ayoniśo sādhyasarvavādānugamatas, tshul bźin ma yin źiṅ tshogs paḥi naṅ du mi ḥos paḥi smra ba thams cad kyi rjes su ḥbraṅ ba*, Ch^{ei}).

Tucci's information that Sthiramati considers the last five as explanations of the first five,[40] is

supported by the ablative -*tas* endings on the last five original Sanskrit terms. A translation can therefore be attempted on that basis: a. Meaningless, because f. not observing meaning; b. Departed from meaning, because g. not connected in meaning; c. unsound of reason, because h. inconclusive; d. identical with the thesis, because i. awaiting a proof of the proof; e. equivocal [41] and irrelevant, because j. pursuing all debate of the thesis in an improper manner.

VI. Decision to undertake the Debate

(*vādaniḥsaraṇa, smra be las ṅes par ḥbyuṅ ba*, Ch^{ej}).[42]

One desides whether or not he will engage in the debate after three careful considerations:

1. Careful consideration of the merits and demerits (**guṇa-doṣa-parīkṣa, yon tan daṅ ñes pa brtag pa*, Ch^{ek}) in the sense of gain or loss for either side,

2. Careful consideration of the assembly (**parṣat-parīkṣa, ḥkhor brtag pa*, Ch^{el}),

3. Careful consideration of his skill and unskill (*kauśalya-akauśalya-parīkṣa, mkhas mi mkhas brtag pa*, Ch^{em}) in the previously listed elements of debate.

VII. Attributes of much utility in the Debate

(*vade bahukarā dharmā, smra ba la gces spras byed paḥi chos rnams*, Ch^{en})

There are three kinds:

1. Knowledge of one's own and the other's context (Ch^{bo}),

2. Confidence (Ch^{bq}),

3. Ingenuity (*pratibhāna, spobs pa*, Ch^{eo}).

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[39] Randle, op. cit., p. 192, says of the *Nyāya Sūtra's* Anaikāntika, "This is the *saṃdigdha* or *aniścita* of *Vaiśeṣika-Bauddha* logic,—the inconclusive or doubtful reason. It retained the same name and nature throughout the history of the schools." But does Buddhist logic use the term *aniścita?* Indeed, the Tibetan *ma ñes pa* could very well translate the latter Sanskrit term; but, as a matter of fact, in our present context it translates *anaikāntika*. At least Asaṅga's "Bauddha logic" uses the same word as does the *Nyāya-sūtra*.

[40] Tucci's *JRAS* article, p. 459.

[41] The word "equivocal" is adopted from the translation of *chala* by "equivocation" in Randle, pp. 339-40, under the assumption that the *atichalā* of Asaṅga's text is equivalent to the Nyāya term *chala*.

[42] As already reported (note 23) this folio side is scarcely legible. The *guṇa-doṣa-parīkṣa* and *parṣat-parīkṣa* were not actually seen. These are what could be expected from the Tibetan; better yet, Pradhan's text actually has the words *guṇa, doṣa*, and *parṣad* in the summary of this section. The word *parīkṣa* is certain from No. 3. But the *Caraka Saṃhitā* (op. cit.) II, 879, while making similar statements, does not use the words *guṇa* and *doṣa*, although it uses the word *parīkṣā*.

a 論體性	t 立宗	am 非極遠
b 言論	u 辯因	an 覆障所礙
c 尚論	v 引喻	ao 隱障所礙
d 諍論	w 同類	ap 映障所礙
e 毀謗論	x 異類	aq 惑障所礙
f 順正論	y 現量	ar 處極遠
g 教導論	z 比量	as 時極遠
h 論處所	aa 正教量	at 損減極遠
i 王家	ab 相狀相似	au 想錯亂
j 執理家	ac 自體相似	av 數錯亂
k 大眾中	ad 業用相似	aw 形錯亂
l 質哲者前	ae 法門相似	ax 顯錯亂
m 善解法義沙門 婆羅門前	af 因果相似	ay 業錯亂
n 樂法義者前	ag 非不現見	az 心錯亂
o 論所依	ah 非已思應思	ba 見錯亂
p 所成立義	ai 非錯亂境界	bb 色根現量
q 能成立法	aj 相似生	bc 意受現量
r 自性	ak 超越生	bd 世間現量
s 差別	al 無障礙	be 清淨現量

bf	相比量	**by**	不雜亂	**cr**	我論無理
bg	體比量	**bz**	不麁獷	**cs**	汝論有理
bh	業比量	**ca**	辯了	**ct**	我論無能
bi	法比量	**cb**	限量	**cu**	汝論有能
bj	因果比量	**cc**	與義相應	**cv**	我論屈伏
bk	不違聖言	**cd**	以時	**cw**	汝論成立
bl	能治雜染	**ce**	決定	**cx**	我之辯才唯極於此
bm	不違法相	**cf**	顯了	**cy**	過此已上更善思量當爲汝說
bn	論莊嚴	**cg**	相續	**cz**	且置是事我不復言
bo	善自他宗	**ch**	功德	**da**	或託餘事方便而退
bp	言具圓滿	**ci**	衆所敬重	**db**	或引外言
bq	無畏	**cj**	論隨貟	**dc**	或現憤發
br	敦肅	**ck**	捨言	**dd**	或現瞋恚
bs	應供	**cl**	言屈	**de**	或現憍慢
bt	不鄙陋	**cm**	言過	**df**	或現所覆
bu	輕易	**cn**	我論不善	**dg**	或現惱害
bv	雄朗	**co**	汝論爲善	**dh**	或現不忍
bw	相應	**cp**	我不善觀	**di**	或現不信
bx	義善	**cq**	汝爲善觀	**dj**	或復默然

dk	或復憂感	**dv**	不以時	**ef**	義無次序
dl	或竦肩伏面	**dw**	不決定	**eg**	義不決定
dm	或沈思詞窮	**dx**	不顯了	**eh**	成立能成
dn	妄行矯亂	**dy**	不相續	**ei**	順不稱理諸邪隱論
do	發起邪行	**dz**	無義	**ej**	論出離
dp	計行窮盡	**ea**	違義	**ek**	觀察得失
dq	雜亂	**eb**	損理	**el**	觀察時衆
dr	麤獷	**ec**	與所成等	**em**	觀察善巧及不善巧
ds	不辯了	**ed**	招集過難	**en**	論多所作法
dt	無限量	**ee**	不得義利	**eo**	辯才無竭
du	非義相應	**Proper Noun:**			行友

CONCLUSION

The foregoing suggests the great range of material presented by Asaṅga. Enough has been given to show a dignified sportsmanship which modern debators might emulate with profit.

The student of Indian thought might wonder how much of this is new to Asaṅga and how much he owes to his predecessors. Granted that it demonstrates a long evolution of civilized practices, still some contribution by Asaṅga is theoretically feasible.

It may have been noted that some matters are more extensively treated than would seem deserving in a general topic of debate, e. g. the treatment of Direct Perception (*pratyakṣa*). But these matters are precisely those which have an importance common to the whole work, which is devoted principally to the practice of Yoga. It may be that in such seemingly disproportionate discussions Asaṅga has introduced modifications of traditional views to accord with his other ideas about Yoga training.