

Problem of Hetu & Paccaya in Abhidharma Philosophy

Prof. Bimalendra Kumar
Dept. of Pali & Buddhist Studies,
Banaras Hindu University

Prof. G.C. Pande in his work ‘*Studies in the Origins of Buddhism*’¹ speaks of the theory of relation (*paccaya*) while discussing the principle of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). Theory of relation (*paccaya*) is a law explaining the existence of the *dhammas*, being related by some relations. It is further extension of the law of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*). Things come to existence in our day-to-day life. The law of dependent origination explains that they come into existence; depending upon some other factors.² The theory of relation explains that such dependence on the other *dhammas* is possible due to some relations. In other words, *Paṭiccasamuppāda* explains the process of existence of conditioned things. The relation (*paccaya*) explains the relation existing between different phases coming into existence. Such relations are also explained in conditioned things only.³

The *Paṭṭhāna-pakarāṇa*, the last and seventh book of *Abhidhamma Piṭaka* deals with the causation and mutual relationship of phenomena. It gives a detailed account of the *Paṭiccasamuppāda*. In the form of twenty-four *paccayas* mentions the twelve system of *Paṭiccasamuppāda*. A *paccaya* meant originally a ‘causal condition’ and was used along with *hetu*, so that the combination of *hetu* and *paccaya* signified “cause and condition” in a general way. The Buddhist emphasis on impermanence and determinate sequences of events tended to invest all psycho-physical factors with a dynamic and causal aspect. It is in this context that the Abhidhamma develops its theory of *paccayas*. It has been observed that the relation between the *Nidānas* is not uniform. Thus, the relation between *avijjā* and *saṅkhāra* is not identical with that between *Jāti* and *Jarāmarāṇa*. And neither is identical with that between *Viññāṇa* and *nāmarūpa*. But one can still say that in every case the antecedent in the sequence of *paṭiccasamuppāda* is a condition necessary and sufficient to the subsequent. This is the implication of the method of specifying the relation between the terms in the *anuloma* and *viloma* orders. The former order shows that the *paccaya* is sufficient to the *paccayuppanna*, the latter that it is necessary. The attempt to specify exactly the nature of *paccaya* in each case probably led to the development of the Abhidharma theory of the *paccaya*.⁴

A relation has four constituents: The one is that which is related; the other that to which one is related; the third one the relation and the fourth one refers to those who do not come under such relation? The first one technically, called a *paccayadhamma*, the second one as *paccayuppannadhamma*, the third one as *paccaya* and the fourth one as *paccanīkadhamma*. There are twenty-four types of relations, which have been enumerated, explained and illustrated in the *Paṭṭhāna-pakarāṇa*, the seventh and last book of the *Abhidhamma-Piṭaka*. A brief description of these relations are given below:

¹ G.C. Pande, *Origins of Buddhism, Motilal Banarasidas*, Delhi, Third Edition, 1983.

² ‘Imasmim sati idaṃ hoti, imassa uppādā idaṃ upajjati Imasmim asati idaṃ na hoti, imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhati-Majjhima-Nikāya, vol. Ii (Ed.) Bhikshu Jagdish Kashyap, Nalanda, 1958, p. 257.

³ *Paṭṭhānanayo pana āhaccapaccayaṭṭhitam ārabha pavuccati-Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho with Vibhāvanī Tikā* (Ed.) Revatadharmā Shāstri, Varanasi, 1965, p. 210.

⁴ cf. G.C. Pande, *Origins of Buddhism, Motilal Banarasidas*, Delhi, Third Edition, 1983, p. 436.

1. *Hetu-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which one of the six *hetus* (roots) is a *paccayadhamma*. A consciousness associated with that or material qualities produced by that, is a *paccayuppannadhamma*. The relation between *paccayadhamma* and the *paccayuppannadhamma* is known as *Hetu-Paccaya*. In the *Hetu-Paccaya*, the *paccaya-dhamma* is one of the six roots. There arises a consciousness being associated with root and it also generates material qualities (*rūpa*). The consciousness, arising in this way, and the material qualities generated thereby are the *paccayuppanna-dhamma*. The relation between the two is the *Hetu-paccaya*. The rest are *Paccanīka-dhamma*. For instance, due to *Lobha* (greed), there arises a *Lobhamūlaka-citta*. It inspires one to lean towards the belongings of others and that brings changes in his material body. It is the generation of material qualities.
2. *Ālambana-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* is any one of the six types of objects and the *paccayuppannadhamma* is a consciousness, associated with a number of psychic factors, which arise following that object. For instance, a devotee sees an image of the Buddha. Immediately, there arises the saluting consciousness (*vandana-citta*). Here, the image of the Buddha is the *paccaya-dhamma* and the saluting consciousness is the *Paccayuppanna-dhamma*. The relation between the two is the *Ālambana-Paccaya*.
3. *Adhipati-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* is one of the objects having potentiality to exercise predominant influence and the *paccayuppanna-dhamma* is a consciousness, the associated psychic factors, which are influenced by it. Truth and sacrificing consciousness may be the example.
4. *Anantara-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* is the preceding factor and the *paccayuppannadhamma* is the succeeding factor. For example, in the course of cognition (*citta-vīthi*), the *pañcadvāravajjanacitta* is the *paccayadhamma*, being the preceding consciousness and the *cakkhuvīññāna* is the *paccayuppannadhamma* as the succeeding consciousness.
5. *Samanantara-Paccaya*: It is identical with *Anantara-Paccaya* in meaning, there being difference only in respect of nomenclature-“*yo anantarapaccayo, sveva samanantarapaccayo, Byañjanamattameva hettha nānam, upacayasantati a disu viya, ddhivacananirutti dukādisu viya ca, atthato pana nānam natthi.*” Ācārya Buddhghosa says that *Anantarapaccaya* is concerned with the succession of states of consciousness (*atthānantaratā*) only and the *Samanantara-paccaya* is simple with their temporal sequence (*kālanantaratā*)- “*Addhānantatātāya-anantarapaccayo, kālanantaratāya samanantarapaccayo.*” Again, *Anantarapaccaya* refers to the aspect of succession only while the *Samanantarapaccaya* refers to the absence of any gap (*saññhānābhava*) between the two states of consciousness occurring in succession- “*natthi etesaṃ ti hi anantarā, saññhābhāvato suññhu anantarā ti Samanantarā.*”
6. *Sahajata-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* and the *paccayuppanna dhamma* are born simultaneously. For example, *citta* and *cetasika*.
7. *Aññamañña-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* and the *paccayuppannadhamma* support each other in maintaining their existence. The example of three sticks existing supporting each other may be understood.
8. *Nissaya-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which *paccayadhamma* becomes the base for the *paccayuppannadhamma*. Again, the *paccayuppannadhamma* becomes the base of *paccayadhamma*, for the arising of another *paccayuppannadhamma*. In this way, the process of support and supplement is maintained.
9. *Upanissaya-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which *paccayadhamma* serves as a sufficing condition for the *paccayuppannadhamma*. The previously arising

consciousness and the consciousness arising later are related by these relations. It is defined as-“*purimā purimā kusalā-dhammā pacchimānaṃ kuslanānaṃ dhammānaṃ upanissaya-paccayena paccayo.*”

10. *Purejāta-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* is born first than the *paccayuppannadhamma*. For instance-*cakkhu* and *cakkhuvīññāṇa*.
11. *Pacchājata-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* is born later and the *paccayuppannadhamma* is born prior to it. It can be illustrated by an example of young vulture and *āhāra-sañcetanā*.
12. *Āsevana-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* when repeated adds the strength, and proficiency to *paccayuppannadhamma*. For example-the preceding lessons of books etc.
13. *Kamma-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* is an action and the *paccayuppannadhamma* is its resultant, as well as the material quality, produced by them.
14. *Vipāka-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which *paccayadhamma* and the *paccayuppannadhamma* both are the resultants and harmonious state among them is maintained.
15. *Āhāra-Paccaya*: It means that the *paccayadhamma* is a type of *āhāra* (food) and the *paccayuppannadhamma* is the energy generated by it.
16. *Indriya-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* is the *Rūpa-indriya* or *Nāma-indriya* and the *paccayuppannadhamma* is a consciousness that arises due to that. For example-*cakkhu* and *cakkhu-viññāṇa*.
17. *Jhāna-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which *paccayadhamma* may be one of the *Jhāna*-factors and *paccayuppannadhamma* may be a consciousness arising because of that. It may be understood in terms of *Jhānaṅgas* and the *Pathama-jhāna citta*. It is defined as-“*jhānaṅgāni jhāna-sampayuttakānaṃ taṃ samutthānaṃ ca rūpānaṃ jhānapaccayena paccayo.*”
18. *Magga-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which *paccayadhamma* is one of the eight constituents of path (*maggaṅga*), and all, the types of consciousness and mental concomitants arising due to that and all material qualities co-existing with the types of *Sahetuka* consciousness is the *Paccayuppannadhamma*.
19. *Sampayutta-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* and *paccayuppannadhamma* are very closely associated. The *citta* and *cetasika* may be its example.
20. *Vippayutta-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which the *paccayadhamma* and *paccayuppannadhammas* are completely opposite in their nature and still function together. The one material aggregate and the four immaterial aggregates functioning together may be the example.
21. *Atthi-Paccaya*: It refers to a type of relation which explains that the existence of the *paccayuppannadhamma* depends upon the existence of the *paccayadhamma*. It means where there is the *paccayadhamma*, there comes to be the *paccayuppannadhamma*. In the case of *citta* and *cittajarūpa*, *citta* is *paccayadhamma* and the *cittaja-rūpa* is *paccayuppannadhamma*.
22. *Avigata-Paccaya*: It is defined in the manner of *atthi-paccaya*, the former recognizing the ‘non-pastness’ of the first term, while the latter stresses upon the co-presence’ of the same. When the *paccayadhamma* is an ultimate reality that is present at that moment and exhibiting its characteristic, it is that of *Atthi-paccaya*. But, when a *paccayadhamma* is an ultimate reality that has not disappeared and ceased, it is that of *Avigata-paccaya*. The *Avigata-paccaya* explains continuity better than the *Atthi-paccaya*.

23. *Natthi-Paccaya*: It is a type of relation in which after the cessation of *paccayadhamma*, there is the arising of the *paccayuppannadhamma*. As for example, when the *cakkhuvīññāṇa* arises and disappears, there is the arising of *sampañicchanacitta*.
24. *Vigata-Paccaya*: It is essentially the same as *Natthi-paccaya*. When the *paccayadhamma* are absent because they have ceased after going through the nascent, static and nascent phases, they are those of *Natthi-paccaya*. But, when the *paccayadhammas* have disappeared after ceasing, they are those of *Vigata-paccaya*. In other words, *Natthi paccaya* may point to the momentary destruction, while *vigata-paccaya* points to gradual disappearance.

These are the twenty-four types of relations through which, the mutual communication and practical operation etc. of mind (*nāma*) and matter (*rūpa*) are explained by the Abhidhammikas. It is to be noted that some of the *paccayas* have already been described in the *Paṭisambhidāmagga*⁵ and the *Kathāvatthu*.⁶ But the book *Paṭṭhāna*⁷ can be mentioned at the first to group them into a body of twenty-four. It is a book of late period, that is why, it has close resemblance to the *Sāriputra-abhidharmas'āstra*⁸ in which ten-conditions are mentioned and to the *Vijñānakāya pāds'āstra*⁹ and the *Jñānaprasthāna-s'āstra*¹⁰ in which some conditions are recorded. It seems that two Abhidharma traditions i.e. Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda might have begun with a theory of four basic relations.¹¹ Later on, Theravāda Abhidhamma expanded this into twenty-four. Mahāsāṅghika and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma also expanded it into ten relations and four relations respectively. At the time of Ācārya Nāgārjuna, there were still four types of relations. The remaining twenty relations accounted for every type of causal correlation that the Abhidhammikas envisaged as a result of dealing with the wide variety of physical and psychological states, mentioned in the discourses of the Buddha. It appears as if the Theravādin Abhidhammikas went further to analyze every form of relation existing between the dhammas, while the Sarvāstivādins Abhidhammikas were quite satisfied with the analysis of the most important forms of relations which were only four in number. It may be presumed that there is no such theory of relations (*paccaya*) in the early discourses and that this is an innovation of the Abhidhamma. One certainly cannot find an elaborate theory of relations during the early period. Yet, even in their discursive treatment, the discourses refer to relations such as roots (*mūlaṃ*), dominances (*adhipateyya*), immediacy (*anantara*) and so on. The Abhidhammikas, in contrast, were compelled to focus on relations because of their extensive but non-discursive enumeration and classification of events. Without a process of synthesis, enumeration and classification would have left them a mass of disconnected events. The theory of relation thus serves the same function that of dependent origination (*paṭiccasamuppāda*) fulfilled in the early discourses.¹² Ācārya Buddhaghosa points out that the emphasis in the law of dependent origination is not on origination (*uppāda*) but on conditions and relations. He says that – *paṭiccasamuppādo ti paccayadhammā veditabbā*.¹³ Vasubandhu identifies

⁵ cf. *Paṭisambhidāmagga* (Ed.) Bhikṣu J. Kashyap, Pali Publication Board, Nalanda, 1960.

⁶ *Kathāvatthu* (Ed.) Bhikṣu J. Kashyap, Nalanda Edition, Nalanda, 1961, p. 440.

⁷ *Paṭṭhāna-pakarāṇa* vol. I (Ed.) Bhikṣu J. Kashyap, Nalanda, 1961, p.3.

⁸ cf. *Encyclopaedia of Buddhism* (Ed.) G.P. Malalasekera, Ceylon, 1961, Vol.I, pp. 68-71.

⁹ *Abhidharma-vijñānakāyapādas'āstra* by Devaśarma, TS No. 1539 (Vol.26), 547b.

¹⁰ Cf. *Jñānaprasthāna S'āstra* (Ed.) Shanti Bhikṣu Shastri, Visva Bharati, Santiniketan, 1961.

¹¹ *Catvārah pratyayā hetus'calambanamantaram/ Tathāvadhipeyañca pratyayo nāsti pancamaḥ/-Abhidharmakoś'a*, Chapter II, verse 61.

¹² David J. Kalupahana, *A History of Buddhist Philosophy, Continuities and Discontinuities*, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu, 1992, p. 149.

¹³ *Visuddhimagga* (Ed.) Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Bauddha Bharati, Varanasi, 1977, p. 437.

Pratītyasamutpāda with all the *samskr̥tadharmas*.¹⁴ Ācārya Aniruddha in his work ‘*Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho*’ has explained the causal states, acting as relations to the conditioned things. He declares that the law of dependent origination is marked by the simple happening of a state dependent on its antecedent state and the theory of relations is said with reference to the existence of conditions that relate to one another.¹⁵ This reference has been made by Ācārya Aniruddha¹⁶ to Ācārya Buddhaghosa who has mixed these theories in his magnum opus work *Visuddhimagga*. The idea of plurality of conditions (*hetu-samūha*)¹⁷ has sometimes given rise to an erroneous distinctions between the words *hetu* and *paccaya*, taking the former to stand for the term ‘cause’ and the latter for the term ‘condition’. Buddhaghosa lists *hetu* and *paccaya* in the list of six synonyms for the word cause, saying that although the words are different, they stand for the same meaning. They are *hetu*, *paccaya*, *kāraṇa*, *nidāna*, *sambhava* and *pabhava*.¹⁸ *Paccaya* is that depending on which the fruit of effect derived come – *paticca etasmā eṭṭi paccayo*. *Hetu* is that by which the effect is established-‘*hīnoti patitthā ti etenāti hetu*.¹⁹ In characteristics, a cause has the characteristics of rendering service. For whatever, state renders service to the arising of a state is said to be its cause. Thus, it is condition in the sense of root, ‘cause’ in the sense of rendering service-*iti mūlatthena hetu, upakāraṇatthena paccayo ti*.²⁰

In the *Paṭṭhāna-aṭṭhakathā*, *hetu* has been defined as root condition and cause- thus the root condition is cause-‘*hetu ca so paccayo ca ti hetu paccayo*’.²¹ Being condition it is the cause, by being condition it is cause-‘*hetu hutvā paccayo, hetubhāvana paccayo it*’.²² Condition is an equivalent word for part of speech, reason, root-‘*hetu ti vacanāvaya-kāraṇamūlānametaṃ adhivacaṇaṃ*.²³ It is said that whatever state stands or arises through not letting go another state, the latter is the cause of the former – ‘*yo hi dhammo yam dhammaṃ appaccakkhāya tiṭṭhati va upajjati va, so tassa paccayo ti vuttaṃ hoti*’.²⁴

Nettipakaraṇa, one of the three non-canonical texts also holds the distinction between *hetu* and *paccaya*. Discussing requisites or conditions (*parikkhāra-hāra*), it says, “two things give rise to or produce (a phenomenon), cause and condition”.²⁵ Explaining the characteristics of a cause and condition, this treatise points out that the cause has the characteristics of being unique and the condition the characteristics of being common.²⁶ The example of the sprout is given to illustrate this conditions, the seed is the unique ‘cause’ for the arising of the sprout while the earth and water, being common, are only ‘conditions’.²⁷ The distinction concludes with “intrinsic nature is the cause, extrinsic nature the condition, cause is internal, condition external; the cause generates, the condition supports, that which is unique is the cause, that which is common is the

¹⁴ Abhidharmakos’a, chapter II, p. 73

¹⁵ “Tattha labbhāvabhāribhāvākāramattopalakkhito paṭiccasamuppādanayo. Paṭṭhānanayo pana āhcca-paccayaṭṭhitim ārabha pavuccate. Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho with Vibhāvanī Tīkā (Ed.) Revatadharmā Shāstri, Varanasi, 1965, p. 210.

¹⁶ ‘Ubhayam pana vomissetva papañcenti ācāriyā’-Abhidhammatthasaṅgaho with Navanītaṭīkā (Ed.) Revatadharmā Shāstri, Varanasi, 1964, p. 140.

¹⁷ Visuddhimagga, op. cit., p. 437.

¹⁸ ‘Paccayo, hetu, kāraṇaṃ, nidānaṃ, sambhavo, pabhavo ti ādi atthato ekaṃ, byañjanato nānaṃ’- Ibid, p. 450

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Paṭṭhāna-aṭṭhakathā (Ed.) Mahesh Tiwary, Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, Nalanda, 1972, p. 70

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 71.

²⁵ ‘Dve dhamma jānanti-hetu ca paccayo ca-Nettipakaraṇa, (Ed.) E. Hardy, P.T.S., 1961, p. 78.

²⁶ ‘Asādhāranalakkhano hetu, Sādhāranalakkhano paccayo’-Ibid.

²⁷ ‘yathā añkurassa nibbattiyā bījaṃ a sādharanaṃ pathana api ca sādharana Añkurassa hi paṭṭhāvī api ca paccayo’ –Ibid.

condition.”²⁸ We agree with Ñānamoli’s comment, on the analysis of the category of requisites (*parikkhāra-hāra*) in the *Nettipakaraṇa*, that the distinction between *hetu* and *paccaya* seems peculiar to his work and that in the *suttas*, no such difference is discernible.²⁹

In a discussion on conditioned origination in the text *Peṭakopadesa*, we find the following distinction noted between cause (*hetu*) and condition (*paccaya*)-‘the cause is the ‘own-nature’ (*svabhāva*); the condition is the ‘other nature’ (*parabhāva*). The cause is the internal (to the sequences, series, stream of a person’s thoughts); the condition is external.³⁰ Further the text states that skill in attainment and skill in steadiness are the cause, and skill in resort and skill in health are the conditions skill in emerging is the cause and the health the condition. Pleasure is the cause and non-affliction the condition.³¹

In the text *Abhidhammāvatāra*, one of the nine manuals of *Abhidhamma*, Ācārya Buddhādutta has also described the difference between *hetu* and *paccaya*. *Hetu* has been stated as one which gives birth and *paccaya* as which nourishes (*anupālaka*). For instance, the seed (*bīja*) is the *hetu* for sprout (*aṅkura*). The earth, moisture etc. are the *paccaya*. Again, *paccaya* is a serviceable factor and *hetu* is designated as *sambhava*, *pabhava* etc.³²

The Sarvastivādins have made a distinction between *hetu* and *pratyaya*. They formulated a theory of six *hetus* and four *pratyayas*. The six *hetus* are *kāraṇa hetu*, *sahabhu hetu*, *sabhāga hetu*, *samprayuktaka hetu*, *sarvatraga hetu* and *vipāka hetu*.³³ The four *pratyayas* are *hetu*, *samanantara*, *ālambana* and *adhipati*.³⁴ It shows that the Sarvastivādins were the first to make a distinction between *hetu* and *pratyaya*. But, as Stcherbatsky remarks, “There is no hard and fast line of demarcation, at that stage of doctrine, between what a cause and what a condition is. The list of six causes seems to be a later doctrine which came to be graft itself upon the original system of four conditions.”³⁵

Yas’omitra says that no distinction is drawn between *hetu* and *pratyaya* and that both are synonymous.³⁶ The exposition of *hetus* is based on an examination of causes by way of non-obstacle (*avighna-bhāva*), co-existence (*sahabhutva*), identity (*sadrśatva*) etc., whereas that of *pratyayas* is based on an examination of causes by way of immediate contiguity (*samanantara*), etc.³⁷

According to the view of Vaibhāṣika, there are also six causes as mentioned in the *Samyuktābhidharma-hṛdaya* or *Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra*.³⁸ There are six kinds of

²⁸ ‘Iti svabhāvo hetu, parabhāvo paccayo, ajjhattiko hetu, bāhiro paccayo, janako hetu, pariggahako paccayo, asādhārano hetu, sādharano paccayo’-Ibid.

²⁹ Ñānamoli, Bhikkhu-The Guide (Translation of Nettipakarana), P.T.S., 1962, p. 111, n. 456/2.

³⁰ ‘Sabhāvo hetu, parabhāvo paccayo. Parabhāvassa paccayo hetu pi sabhāvassa hetu ya parabhāvassa kassaci paccayo. Avutto hetu vutto paccayo. Ajjhattiko hetu, bāhiro paccaya’-Peṭakopadesa, A. Barua, P.T.S., London, 1949, p. 104.

³¹ ‘Parikkhāro ti samapattikosallaṃ ca dhitikosallaṃ ca hetu, yaṃ ca gocarakosallaṃ yaṃ ca Kallantakosallaṃ paccayo Vodānakosallaṃ hetu, Kallaṃ paccayo, Sukhaṃ hetu, abyapajjaṃ paccayo- Ibid., p. 202.

³² ‘Janako hetu akkhāto, paccayo anupālaka Hetuaṅkurassa bījaṃ tu, paccaya paṭhavādayo-Abhidhammavātāra (Ed.) Mahesh Tiwary, Pali Parivena, Delhi, 1988, p. 173.

³³ ‘Kāraṇaṃ sahabhuscaiva sabhāgaṃ samprayuktakāḥ, sarvatrago vipākakhyāḥ saḍvidho heturiṣyati//’-Abhidharmakośa, chapter II, verse 61.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ T. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, vol. I, Leningrad, 1930, p. 138.

³⁶ Abhidharmakośa’avyākhyā, I, p. 188.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra (TS No. 1552) a work of Dharmatrāta and available in Chinese version is an expository treatise of Sarvāstivāda philosophy. It was translated into Chinese by Sanghavarman and others and translated into English by Bart Dassein as Samyuktābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra: Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Addition and published in 3 volumes by Motilal Banarasi das Publishers Private Limited, New Delhi in 1999. Prof. Lalji has reconstructed the Sanskrit title of this work as Miśrakābhidharmahṛdayaśāstra in his book

causes (*hetu*) so called the efficient cause (*kāranahetu*). The simultaneous cause (*sabhathutetu*), the homogenous causes (*sabhāgahetu*), the pervasive cause (*sarvatragahetu*), the associated cause (*samprayuktaka hetu*), and the cause of retribution (*vipākahetu*).³⁹ It is further stated in this text that “All conditions are laid hold of by the four conditions, that one that opens the way by the expedience of successive condition (perhaps this condition is similar to the *samanantara-pratyaya*, but is not exact), that one which is responsible and dependent by the expedient of the objective condition (*ālambana-pratyaya*), that one that is not an obstacle and separated, (so it is called as) the dominant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*) and that one that is the seed of phenomena by the expedience of the root-condition (*hetu-pratyaya*).

The relation of a theory to the phenomena as explained by the early Vaibhāsika is an expedient relation, not one of the sequence. This theory is not regarded as an event in time, but a general proposition as it turned out in the classical interpretation by virtue of a differential equation of phenomenal series. Therefore, this is indeed a statement about causes, but it is a statement about occurrences of which we could say that whenever they happen something else happens. It seems rather to be referring to something which is underlying the phenomena, which have to power of producing to phenomena. In the *Mis'rakathidharma hr̥dayaśāstra*, it is also called as the condition as much as the meaning of supporting dominant and cause “(That all) phenomena follow the four conditions has already been said by the Buddha.”⁴⁰

It may be noted that Ācārya Buddhadutta and Ācārya Aniruddha have reduced all the relations into four in the texts namely *Abhidhammāvatāra*⁴¹ and *Abhidhammatthasangaho*⁴² respectively. There four relations are namely - (i) *Ārammana-paccaya* (object condition), (ii) *Upanissaya-paccaya* (sufficing condition), (iii) *Kamma-paccaya* (action-condition) and (iv) *Atthi-paccaya* (presence condition). So these four relations differ with the four basic relations discussed earlier. It arises an inquisitiveness to know that why the later Abhidhammikas differed with the four basic relations in reducing all the relations?

It seems to me that in process of functioning in day-to-day life, it has been marked that some of the relations are similar in nature, though for the sake of understanding they have been given different names. Their close study may reveal that relating surviving in different names during the time of the Buddha and after that have been collected together. There is also a possibility that there may be some niceties in understanding the underlying sequence and ideas of these relations. *Hetu-paccaya* of the four basic relations has been taken as *kamma-paccaya* of the reducible four relations, since *kamma-paccaya* is the relations of actions-moral (*kusala*) or immoral (*akusala*) and these actions are being guided by the roots (*hetu*) i.e. *kusala hetu* and *akusala hetu*.

Adhipati-paccaya has been put as *Atthi-paccaya* since it is dependent on the existence of dominant things. *Samanantara-paccaya* may be considered as *Upanissaya-paccaya*. *Arammana-paccaya* is common in both early and later Abhidhamma tradition.

Miśkrābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra of Dharmatrāta (Hindi Translation), published by Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi in 2006.

³⁹ Miśkrābhīdharmahṛdayaśāstra of Dharmatrāta (Hindi Translation) by Lalji ‘Shravak’, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies, Sarnath, Varanasi, 2006, p. 74.

⁴⁰ ‘sabbe panime catuvīsati paccayā yathārahaṃ ārammana-upanissaya-kamma-atthi-paccayanāmāvasena catusu paccayesu saṅgaham gacchanti ti veditabbam’-Abhidhammāvatāra, op.cit., p. 202.

⁴¹ cf. ‘Kāraṇaṃ sahabhuscaiva sabhāgaḥ samprayuktakāḥ, sarvatrago vipākakhyāḥ saḍvidho heturisyati// -Abhidharmakośa, chapter II, verse 61. Ibid., p. 88. cf. Catvāraḥ pratyayā uktāḥ..... hetupratyayatā samanantarapratyayatā ālambanapratyayatā adhipatipratyayatā ce’ti.-Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, II-61, p. 98.

⁴² ‘ārammanūpanissaya-kamma-atthi paccayesu ca sabbe pi paccayā samodhānaṃ gacchanti -Abhidhammatthasangaho, op. cit., p. 230.

This condition stands for the objective support for the manifestation of mental phenomena.⁴³

Some of the modern scholars have examined the problem related with theories of causality, considering both the theory of the twelve *nīdanas* of dependent arising and the Paṭṭhāna's theory of twenty-four causal conditions (*paccaya*). Noa Ronkin has discussed it in her book *Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of A Philosophical Tradition*. She draws attention to certain peculiarities of the Nikāya notion of the causation: it concerns 'not the production of entities but the arising and ceasing of psycho-physical processes', not physical causality but connections between mental conditions, not a binary connection between a single cause and a single effect but ' manifoldness of supporting conditions'; and while the latter is not to be construed in terms of a 'network of interrelated conditions, it none the less does involve some sense of mutual conditioning.' She concludes 'that the Paṭṭhāna theory of *paccaya* is not about causation at all' in the sense of causal production; rather it is 'intended to account... for the individuality of each and every dhamma as a capacity of a certain mental event that occurs within a network of inter-relations of causal conditioning, but this, she suggests involves a circularity since causal conditions individuate dhammas only if the latter are already individuated.'⁴⁴

She emphasizes that there appear to be no grounds for distinguishing between *hetu* and *paccaya* as 'cause' and 'condition' respectively in the *Nikāyas*, such a distinction is characteristic of especially the Sarvastivādin theory of the six *hetus* and *pratyayas* although she suggests that something of distinction is found within Theravādin sources as well, arguing that the Paṭṭhāna's and subsequent commentarial understanding of *hetupaccaya* has a certain affinity with the Sarvastivādin discussions.

Rupert Gethin does not agree with her as understanding of *hetupaccaya* as referring to an 'essential causal condition' that individuates its related dhamma and can be equated with *svabhāva*. In his review article, he presents the Theravādin views and says that *hetupaccaya* refers to the way in which six specific *dhammas* (*alobha, adosa, amoha, lobha, dosa and moha*) act as 'cause' (*hetu*) by being a 'root' (*mūla*) in relation to certain other dhammas that are associated it and have arisen together with it in the same moment. He says that Ronkin's misunderstanding appears to be based in part on conflating the identification of *svabhāva* as the 'cause' (*hetu*) of a *dhamma* discussed in the texts *Nettipakaraṇa*⁴⁵ and *Peṭakopadesa*⁴⁶ with the Paṭṭhāna's understanding of *hetupaccaya*.⁴⁷ Yet the position of *Nettipakaraṇa* and *Peṭakopadesa* in the development of the specifically Theravādin Abhidhamma remains problematic. These texts seem not to be based on exclusively Theravādin traditions.

As Theravada Abhidhamma states that *Hetupaccaya* is the name of a relation in which one of the six *hetus* is a *paccayadhamma*. Ledi Sayadaw also interprets *hetupaccaya* as greed (*lobha*), antipathy (*dosa*), ignorance (*moha*) non-greediness (*alobha*), friendliness (*dosa*) and right understanding (*amoha*).⁴⁸ A consciousness associated with any one of the six *hetus* or the material qualities produced by that, is *paccayuppannadhamma*.⁴⁹

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Quoted in The 'On the Nature of Dhammas: A Review Article' by Rupert Gethin in *Buddhist Studies Review*, The Journal of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies, U.K., Vol. 22, Part 2, 2005, p. 191.

⁴⁵ cf. *Nettipakaraṇa*, op. cit., p. 78-81.

⁴⁶ *Peṭakopadesa*, op.citt.p. 158.

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 191-192.

⁴⁸ "Katamo hetu paccayo? Lobho hetupaccayo. Doso, moho, alobho, adoso, amoho hetupaccayo"-Paṭṭhanuddesadīpanī (Ed.) Bimalendra Kumar, Sampurnand Sanskrit University, Varanasi, 2005, p. 1.

⁴⁹ 'Lobha saḥajātā cittacetāsikā dhammā ca rūpakalāpa dhammā ca dosasahajātā mohasahajātā lobhasahajātā adosasahajātā amohosahajātā cittacetāsikā dhammā ca rūpakalāpa dhammā ca hetupaccayato uppanna hetupaccayuppanna dhammā-Ibid.

Thus, it can be concluded that there was no difference between *hetu* and *paccaya* as ‘cause’ and ‘condition’ respectively in the *Nikāyas*. However, there is some distinction of *hetu* and *paccaya* in the Abhidhamma texts and their commentaries. There is some resemblance of the understanding of *hetupaccaya* based upon *Paṭṭhana* and its commentaries with the concepts of six kinds of *Hetupratyaya* of Sarvāstivāda tradition. Noa Ronkin says that the Theravadin *Paṭṭhana* theory of *paccaya* and the very distinction between *hetu* and *paccaya*, were the result of the contemporary intellectual milieu determined by the Abhidhamma and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma philosophical and doctrinal discussions before and after the two traditions were finalized.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Noa Ronkin, *Early Buddhist Metaphysics: The Making of a philosophical tradition*, Routledge Curzon, London & New York, First Published, 2005, p. 226.