Difference between revisions of "Transcendence and Soteriology"
(2 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown) | |||
Line 1: | Line 1: | ||
− | + | [[File:Damien_Keown.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | |
<poem> | <poem> | ||
Part 1. [Reflections and notes on [[Damien Keown's]] The [[Nature]] of [[Buddhist Ethics]], 1992.] | Part 1. [Reflections and notes on [[Damien Keown's]] The [[Nature]] of [[Buddhist Ethics]], 1992.] | ||
− | [[Ethics]] in [[Buddhism]] is [[psychological]] analysis and [[mind]] control, not a search for a foundation of [[ethical]] {{Wiki|principles}}, a hierarchical arrangement of [[ethical]] values, or an enquiry into their objectivity (12). The chief [[reason]] why [[Buddhist ethics]] doesn’t have autonomy as in the [[West]] as an {{Wiki|independent}} [[philosophical]] [[disciplines]] is: because [[Buddha]] [[taught]] his teachings, [[dhamma]], a detailed and systematic [[exposition]] of normative [[ethical]] {{Wiki|principles}} in terms of which the [[noble]] [[life]] should be led. The urgency now is for implementation rather than further speculation (12). Therefore, [[Buddhists]] have shown little [[interest]] or initiative in developing and refining the tools of [[ethical]] analysis, because it assumes that [[ethical]] dilemmas or problems will be solved or dissolved in the pursuit of a [[religious]] [[life]], as one’s [[spiritual]] training toward [[enlightenment]] progress – [[ethical]] problems or choices will be become clear and unproblematic (12). | + | [[Ethics]] in [[Buddhism]] is [[psychological]] analysis and [[mind]] control, not a search for a foundation of [[ethical]] {{Wiki|principles}}, a hierarchical arrangement of [[ethical]] values, or an enquiry into their objectivity (12). The chief [[reason]] why [[Buddhist ethics]] doesn’t have autonomy as in the [[West]] as an {{Wiki|independent}} [[philosophical]] [[disciplines]] is: because [[Buddha]] [[taught]] his teachings, [[dhamma]], a detailed and systematic [[exposition]] of normative [[ethical]] {{Wiki|principles}} in terms of which the [[noble]] [[life]] should be led. The urgency now is for implementation rather than further speculation (12). Therefore, [[Buddhists]] have shown little [[interest]] or initiative in developing and refining the tools of [[ethical]] analysis, because it assumes that [[ethical]] [[dilemmas]] or problems will be solved or dissolved in the pursuit of a [[religious]] [[life]], as one’s [[spiritual]] {{Wiki|training}} toward [[enlightenment]] progress – [[ethical]] problems or choices will be become clear and unproblematic (12). |
− | It begs the question of what is the [[relation]] of [[ethics]] to the structure of [[Buddhist doctrine]] and practice? Or, what is the effect of nirvana-karma {{Wiki|polarity}} of {{Wiki|emphasis}} upon [[ethical]] values? More practically, how does [[Buddhism]] practically and specifically analyze [[ethical]] [[goodness]] or badness in the [[sphere]] of concrete [[action]]? These are the questions [[Keown]] attempts are to address in this [[book]]. Specifically, he asks what does [[sila]] or [[right conduct]] meanin context of the eightfold path?In other words, what is the role of [[ethics]] in the [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|soteriological}} program? This has become a [[subject]] to [[scholarly]] [[debates]]. Jayatilleke posits “[[Buddhist ethics]] as a [[form]] of [[enlightened]] [[egoism]] or [[enlightened]] [[altruism]], which can be best characterized as an [[ethical]] [[universalism]], while rejecting [[absolutism]] and [[recognizing]] {{Wiki|relativism}}, the objectivity of [[moral]] values is not denied, but he [[thinks]] [[Buddhist ethics]] is “teleological rather than deontological” in [[character]] (7). He argues that [[Buddhist ethics]] contain “a {{Wiki|factual}} component and an emotive-prescriptive component.” While others like Premasiri, following a detailed analysis and {{Wiki|evidence}} from [[Pali]] Cannon, concludes that [[Buddhist ethics]] is “objectivist and naturalist”. | + | It begs the question of what is the [[relation]] of [[ethics]] to the {{Wiki|structure}} of [[Buddhist doctrine]] and practice? Or, what is the effect of nirvana-karma {{Wiki|polarity}} of {{Wiki|emphasis}} upon [[ethical]] values? More practically, how does [[Buddhism]] practically and specifically analyze [[ethical]] [[goodness]] or badness in the [[sphere]] of concrete [[action]]? These are the questions [[Keown]] attempts are to address in this [[book]]. Specifically, he asks what does [[sila]] or [[right conduct]] meanin context of the eightfold path?In other words, what is the role of [[ethics]] in the [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|soteriological}} program? This has become a [[subject]] to [[scholarly]] [[debates]]. [[Jayatilleke]] posits “[[Buddhist ethics]] as a [[form]] of [[enlightened]] [[egoism]] or [[enlightened]] [[altruism]], which can be best characterized as an [[ethical]] [[universalism]], while rejecting [[absolutism]] and [[recognizing]] {{Wiki|relativism}}, the objectivity of [[moral]] values is not denied, but he [[thinks]] [[Buddhist ethics]] is “teleological rather than deontological” in [[character]] (7). He argues that [[Buddhist ethics]] contain “a {{Wiki|factual}} component and an emotive-prescriptive component.” While others like Premasiri, following a detailed analysis and {{Wiki|evidence}} from [[Pali]] Cannon, concludes that [[Buddhist ethics]] is “objectivist and naturalist”. |
− | These [[debates]] seem to be stemming from the fundamental difference in the {{Wiki|soteriological}} goal of these different [[traditions]]. It is the questions of relationship of [[Buddhist ethics]] and its [[doctrines]] and practice, relationship between [[ethics]], [[knowledge]] and {{Wiki|summum bonum}}, or in [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|terminology}}; [[sila]], [[panna]] and [[nibbana]]. The question remains; how do [[Buddhist]] [[moral]] and [[intellectual]] goods relate to one another within the framework of [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|soteriology}}? The common [[view]] is that [[sila]] is instrumental to [[knowledge]] ([[panna]]) and then realize the latter, [[nibbana]]. In which case, [[Nibbana]] is [[essentially]] in procession of certain kind of [[knowledge]] and it becomes the [[intellectual]] goal and the role of [[sila]] remains simply instrumental. In terms of the [[eightfold path]], [[morality]] is viewed as preliminary stage and a stepping-stone to [[intellectual]] goal of [[knowledge]]. Thus, [[sila]] leads to [[samadhi]] or [[meditation]] that leads to [[panna]]. The role of [[sila]] is provisional. | + | These [[debates]] seem to be stemming from the fundamental difference in the {{Wiki|soteriological}} goal of these different [[traditions]]. It is the questions of relationship of [[Buddhist ethics]] and its [[doctrines]] and practice, relationship between [[ethics]], [[knowledge]] and {{Wiki|summum bonum}}, or in [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|terminology}}; [[sila]], [[panna]] and [[nibbana]]. The question remains; how do [[Buddhist]] [[moral]] and [[intellectual]] goods relate to one another within the framework of [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|soteriology}}? The common [[view]] is that [[sila]] is instrumental to [[knowledge]] ([[panna]]) and then realize the [[latter]], [[nibbana]]. In which case, [[Nibbana]] is [[essentially]] in procession of certain kind of [[knowledge]] and it becomes the [[intellectual]] goal and the role of [[sila]] remains simply instrumental. In terms of the [[eightfold path]], [[morality]] is viewed as preliminary stage and a stepping-stone to [[intellectual]] goal of [[knowledge]]. Thus, [[sila]] leads to [[samadhi]] or [[meditation]] that leads to [[panna]]. The role of [[sila]] is provisional. |
− | This, however, assumes that [[enlightenment]] is a statement of [[moral]] {{Wiki|transcendence}}. i.e. [[nibbana]] is amoral or supramoral. So [[ethics]] is extrinsic to [[nibbana]], dispensable and subsidiary to [[knowledge]]. On the contrary, another position is that [[ethics]] and [[knowledge]] can co-exist in post-enlightenment. Keown’s own [[view]] is that they can co-exist and there is no {{Wiki|superiority}} of one over the other, their co-existence makes [[enlightenment]] possible. That is why there is a huge {{Wiki|emphasis}} on both [[karuna]] and [[panna]] ([[wisdom]] and [[compassion]]) in [[attaining]] [[nibbana]]. [[Ethics]] is intrinsic to [[nibbana]], [[essential]] and {{Wiki|equal}} in value to [[knowledge]]. | + | This, however, assumes that [[enlightenment]] is a statement of [[moral]] {{Wiki|transcendence}}. i.e. [[nibbana]] is amoral or supramoral. So [[ethics]] is extrinsic to [[nibbana]], dispensable and subsidiary to [[knowledge]]. On the contrary, another position is that [[ethics]] and [[knowledge]] can co-exist in post-enlightenment. [[Wikipedia:Damien Keown|Keown’s]] [[own]] [[view]] is that they can co-exist and there is no {{Wiki|superiority}} of one over the other, their co-existence makes [[enlightenment]] possible. That is why there is a huge {{Wiki|emphasis}} on both [[karuna]] and [[panna]] ([[wisdom]] and [[compassion]]) in [[attaining]] [[nibbana]]. [[Ethics]] is intrinsic to [[nibbana]], [[essential]] and {{Wiki|equal}} in value to [[knowledge]]. |
The former position seems to be coming from [[Theravadin]] traditions,utilitarians make reference to the [[Parable]] of Raft, which is interpreted to mean that [[ethical]] considerations are ultimately to be transcended, “[[morality]] is to be left behind, like a raft once the crossing over has been safely accomplished”, [[Arahatship]] is beyond [[good and evil]]. The implication is that it is not a [[morality]] at all, just a [[form]] of [[philosophical]] [[egoism]], subjectively amoral. Let me put it this way for clarity and I will expand on them in later posts of this series: | The former position seems to be coming from [[Theravadin]] traditions,utilitarians make reference to the [[Parable]] of Raft, which is interpreted to mean that [[ethical]] considerations are ultimately to be transcended, “[[morality]] is to be left behind, like a raft once the crossing over has been safely accomplished”, [[Arahatship]] is beyond [[good and evil]]. The implication is that it is not a [[morality]] at all, just a [[form]] of [[philosophical]] [[egoism]], subjectively amoral. Let me put it this way for clarity and I will expand on them in later posts of this series: | ||
Line 15: | Line 15: | ||
Refutation: contraindications to the utilitarian presumption include the tendency among [[Buddhists]] to regard [[precepts]] as [[moral]] absolutes, that [[ethics]] is an end in itself as noted by [[King]]. | Refutation: contraindications to the utilitarian presumption include the tendency among [[Buddhists]] to regard [[precepts]] as [[moral]] absolutes, that [[ethics]] is an end in itself as noted by [[King]]. | ||
Misra argues that [[Buddhist ethics]] is intuitionistic, [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]]. [[Keown]] [[thinks]] Misra is right about the proximity of [[Buddhism]] to {{Wiki|Kantianism}} as opposed to utilitarianism. | Misra argues that [[Buddhist ethics]] is intuitionistic, [[Wikipedia:Immanuel Kant|Kantian]]. [[Keown]] [[thinks]] Misra is right about the proximity of [[Buddhism]] to {{Wiki|Kantianism}} as opposed to utilitarianism. | ||
− | [[Dharmasiri]] claims that [[Buddhist ethics]] a [[form]] of {{Wiki|ideal}} utilitarianism, of rule-utilitarian sub-class. He qualifies this by adding that [[Buddhism]] embraces deontology and {{Wiki|teleology}} only eventually transcends them both. (17) | + | [[Dharmasiri]] claims that [[Buddhist ethics]] a [[form]] of {{Wiki|ideal}} utilitarianism, of rule-utilitarian sub-class. He qualifies this by adding that [[Buddhism]] embraces deontology and {{Wiki|teleology}} only eventually {{Wiki|transcends}} them both. (17) |
[[Rahula]] argues for the importance both [[karuna]] and [[panna]] on the [[path]] of [[perfection]]. | [[Rahula]] argues for the importance both [[karuna]] and [[panna]] on the [[path]] of [[perfection]]. | ||
Work Cited: | Work Cited: | ||
− | Keown, Damien. | + | [[Wikipedia:Damien Keown|Keown, Damien]]. |
1992 The [[Nature]] of [[Buddhist Ethics]], {{Wiki|New York}}, Palgrave. | 1992 The [[Nature]] of [[Buddhist Ethics]], {{Wiki|New York}}, Palgrave. |
Latest revision as of 21:43, 20 April 2015
Part 1. [Reflections and notes on Damien Keown's The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, 1992.]
Ethics in Buddhism is psychological analysis and mind control, not a search for a foundation of ethical principles, a hierarchical arrangement of ethical values, or an enquiry into their objectivity (12). The chief reason why Buddhist ethics doesn’t have autonomy as in the West as an independent philosophical disciplines is: because Buddha taught his teachings, dhamma, a detailed and systematic exposition of normative ethical principles in terms of which the noble life should be led. The urgency now is for implementation rather than further speculation (12). Therefore, Buddhists have shown little interest or initiative in developing and refining the tools of ethical analysis, because it assumes that ethical dilemmas or problems will be solved or dissolved in the pursuit of a religious life, as one’s spiritual training toward enlightenment progress – ethical problems or choices will be become clear and unproblematic (12).
It begs the question of what is the relation of ethics to the structure of Buddhist doctrine and practice? Or, what is the effect of nirvana-karma polarity of emphasis upon ethical values? More practically, how does Buddhism practically and specifically analyze ethical goodness or badness in the sphere of concrete action? These are the questions Keown attempts are to address in this book. Specifically, he asks what does sila or right conduct meanin context of the eightfold path?In other words, what is the role of ethics in the Buddhist soteriological program? This has become a subject to scholarly debates. Jayatilleke posits “Buddhist ethics as a form of enlightened egoism or enlightened altruism, which can be best characterized as an ethical universalism, while rejecting absolutism and recognizing relativism, the objectivity of moral values is not denied, but he thinks Buddhist ethics is “teleological rather than deontological” in character (7). He argues that Buddhist ethics contain “a factual component and an emotive-prescriptive component.” While others like Premasiri, following a detailed analysis and evidence from Pali Cannon, concludes that Buddhist ethics is “objectivist and naturalist”.
These debates seem to be stemming from the fundamental difference in the soteriological goal of these different traditions. It is the questions of relationship of Buddhist ethics and its doctrines and practice, relationship between ethics, knowledge and summum bonum, or in Buddhist terminology; sila, panna and nibbana. The question remains; how do Buddhist moral and intellectual goods relate to one another within the framework of Buddhist soteriology? The common view is that sila is instrumental to knowledge (panna) and then realize the latter, nibbana. In which case, Nibbana is essentially in procession of certain kind of knowledge and it becomes the intellectual goal and the role of sila remains simply instrumental. In terms of the eightfold path, morality is viewed as preliminary stage and a stepping-stone to intellectual goal of knowledge. Thus, sila leads to samadhi or meditation that leads to panna. The role of sila is provisional.
This, however, assumes that enlightenment is a statement of moral transcendence. i.e. nibbana is amoral or supramoral. So ethics is extrinsic to nibbana, dispensable and subsidiary to knowledge. On the contrary, another position is that ethics and knowledge can co-exist in post-enlightenment. Keown’s own view is that they can co-exist and there is no superiority of one over the other, their co-existence makes enlightenment possible. That is why there is a huge emphasis on both karuna and panna (wisdom and compassion) in attaining nibbana. Ethics is intrinsic to nibbana, essential and equal in value to knowledge.
The former position seems to be coming from Theravadin traditions,utilitarians make reference to the Parable of Raft, which is interpreted to mean that ethical considerations are ultimately to be transcended, “morality is to be left behind, like a raft once the crossing over has been safely accomplished”, Arahatship is beyond good and evil. The implication is that it is not a morality at all, just a form of philosophical egoism, subjectively amoral. Let me put it this way for clarity and I will expand on them in later posts of this series:
Refutation: contraindications to the utilitarian presumption include the tendency among Buddhists to regard precepts as moral absolutes, that ethics is an end in itself as noted by King.
Misra argues that Buddhist ethics is intuitionistic, Kantian. Keown thinks Misra is right about the proximity of Buddhism to Kantianism as opposed to utilitarianism.
Dharmasiri claims that Buddhist ethics a form of ideal utilitarianism, of rule-utilitarian sub-class. He qualifies this by adding that Buddhism embraces deontology and teleology only eventually transcends them both. (17)
Rahula argues for the importance both karuna and panna on the path of perfection.
Work Cited:
Keown, Damien.
1992 The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, New York, Palgrave.