GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION: ARGUMENTS FOR NEGATING CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS

GORAMPA ON THE OBJECTS OF NEGATION: ARGUMENTS FOR NEGATING CONVENTIONAL TRUTHS

Sonam Thakchoe

In this paper I explore Gorampa's conception of the objects of negation. My primary aim is to show that, in Gorampa's conception of the objects of negation, negating the extreme existent (bhava/yod paj—the first of the tetralemma (catuskoti/mtha' bzhij— entails negating the conventional realities qua truths themselves. The paper first identifies Gorampa's notions ofthe objects ofnegation soteriogically and epistemically, and second it considers Gorampa's arguments defending his treatment of truths (bden pa) as the objects ofnegation. The chief arguments Gorampa employs for negating the truths (by way of eliminating the extreme of existence) can be summarised as follows: that all things are conceptually reified elaborations (spros paj, the Prasangika is committed to the transcendent ofall spros pa; that all entities are false as they all fail to reveal their reality when they are subjected to logical analysis; that an enlightened consciousness does not verify the existence oftruths; that there is no commonly agreed appearance that can be taken as a common basis for the debate between the Buddhist reificationist and the Prasangika Madhyamikas; that truths are the catalysts for driving ignorance through conceptual graspings to truths; that grasping to truths obstructs a seeker from attaining the enlightenment; and finally that seeing things as dependently arisen amounts to seeing nothing at all.

Introduction

Gorampa (Go rams pa Bsod nams Seng ge, 1429-1489 CE) is indeed one of Tibet's most recognisable figures. As a monk philosopher he tenaciously defended the Sakya tradition to which he belonged, and as a polemicist he was unrelenting in his criticisms against his opponents. Like his other polemical works, Gorampa, in his Lta ba'i shen ‘byed theg mchog gnad kyi zla zer (Freedom From Extremes: Distinguishing The Views) (Cabezon and Dargyay 2007) is critical of Tsongkhapa (Tsong kha pa Blo bzang grags pa, 1357 -1419), the founder of Dge lugs pa school, and Dolpopa (Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal tshan, 1292(1361), the founder of the Jonang school. In this text he regards Tsongkhapa as ‘nihilist' and Dolpopa as an ‘eternalist' (rtag mtha' smra ba), and regards only his view as being legitimately

representative of the 'Madhyamika' (dbu marsmra ba). Indeed Gorampa has other concerns in his critique of Tsongkhapa and Dolpopa. Nevertheless, the question of what is to be negated as dgag bya 'object of negation' plays a critical role in his critiques. The stakes are very high—failure or success in correctly identifying the objects of negation will, literally, determine whether one is considered a Madhyamika or not. In spite of the fact that objects of negation are a central issue, the Lta ba'i shen ‘byed does not offer us a detailed and systematic account of Gorampa's own treatment of the subject matter. So the aim of this paper is to critically engage with Gorampa's other works1 on the Madhyamika—the Nges don rab gsal (Illuminating the Definitive Meaning) (Gorams pa Bsod nams Senge, 1969a, 2002),2 the Lta ba'i ‘od zer (Illuminating the View) (1969c) and the Lta ba ngan sel (Eliminating the Erroneous View) (2001)3—which provide us plenty of textual resources on this subject, and allow us to reconstruct a systematic conceptual framework of Gorampa's treatment of the object of negation. This task can best be achieved in my view by way of appropriating Gorampa's own approach to deal with this subject. As we will see shortly, Gorampa deals with the objects of negation by way of dealing with the 'four extremes' (catuskoti/mtha' bzhi)— existent, non-existent, both and neither. And given the scope and the negative implications that each of these so-called extremes have on his overall philosophical and soteriological agenda, Gorampa's strategy is to negate them sequentially one after the other.

Taking this same approach I will devote two papers to Gorampa's treatment of the objects of negation. This paper will examine first of the 'four extremes/tetralema' (catuskoti/mtha' bzhi) exclusively; that is, the 'existent' (yod pa) with reference to Gorampa's arguments. It will be shown that by 'extreme existent' Gorampa means 'truth(s)' (bden pa), 'truly established' (bden par grub pa), 'inherently established' (ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa); and so by 'negation of the extreme of existent', the first lema Gorampa actually means the repudiation of truths or real phenomena. The discussion in the paper unfolds in two parts. In the first part I look at a broader spectrum of Gorampa's account of the objects of negation. Here I will consider one of Gorampa's most revealing passages on the subject, and this offers us an excellent conceptual framework of what is to be soteriologically and epistemically negated in Gorampa's system of the Prasangika. In the second part I will consider Gorampa's arguments defending his treatment of 'truths' (bden pa) as the objects of negation.

Identifying the objects of negation

Let us begin with perhaps the most important, concise and illuminating of all statements Gorampa makes regarding objects of negation. The Lta ba ngan sel reads:Identifying the objects of negation: (1) Soteric object of negation comprised of all false appearances. (2) Object to be negated by means of rational analysis and authoritative scripture (lung) is comprised of (2.1) objects (yul) and (2.2) subjects 

(yul can). The former (2.1) has two types: (2.1.1) objects reified by conceptual misconception (kun btags kyi ma rig pas btags pa) and (2.1.2) objects reified by innate misconception (lhan skyis kyi ma rig pas btags pa). The first (2.1.1) is the reificationists (dngos por smra ba) conceptions [of metaphysics and ethics] based on the justifications of invalid arguments and scriptures. This is of twofold:

(2.1.1.1) absolutism, the extreme of existence (yod pa sgro ‘dogs kyi matha') and

(2.1.1.2) nihilism, the extreme of nonexistence (med pa skur ‘debs kyi mtha'). The former (2.1.1.1) has twofold: (2.1.1.1.1) self of person and (2.1.1.1.2) self of phenomena. The former (2.1.1.1.1) is constituted by (2.1.1.1.1.1) the non- buddhists's conception of self as being distinct from the aggregates and

(2.1.1.1.1.2) the Buddhist Sammitya's conception of self—one that is identified with the aggregates or considered inexpressible. Second (2.1.1.1.2) [[[self]] of phenomena] is constituted by forms etc., or things that are reified by the Tirthikas upto the Vijnanavadas as ‘truly established' (bden par grub pa). Second (2.1.1.2) nihilism, the extreme of nonexistence (med pa skur ‘debs kyi mtha') refers to Cai rvaka's/Lokayata's denial of the causal efficacy of the present life's wholesome or unwholesome karmic deeds and effects of the pleasant and unpleasant experiences in the future. Second, (2.1.2) objects reified by innate misconception (lhan skyis kyi ma rig pas btags pa) is one that is common to all beings—be they are philosophers or non-philosophers—for it is posited as person and phenomena, wherein both are seen as the bases for the objectification of person and phenomena. The objectified ‘truth' through this misconception is thus posited as self of person (gang zag kyi bdag) and self of phenomena (chos kyi bdag). Second, (2.2) subjective (yul can) [[[objects]] of negation] includes all cognitions objectifying ‘this object' and ‘that object' and all distorted views. (1969b, 595f; 2001, 101 -102)4

Gorampa identifies two forms of objects of negation: the ‘soteriological object of negation' (lam gyi dgag bya), and the ‘epistemic object of negation' (lung dang rigs pa'i dgag bya). The former, according to Gorampa, ‘is comprised of all false appearances' (1969b, 595f; 2001, 101 - 102).5 By ‘false appearance', as we shall see later, Gorampa means anything that appears to our mind, so in effect all conventional phenomena are false appearances. His contention is that appearance exists entirely due to our conceptual reification; where conceptual reification ceases, false appearance also ceases to exist. Thus, by definition, they are false. While false appearance proliferates as one's conceptual reification increases, false appearance ceases as one's insight into reality improves. An insight into reality puts an end to the conceptual reification. For this reason Gorampa insists that the Mai dhyamika's ‘should aim to develop a correct understanding of both “illusory-like conventional truth” (kun rdzob sgyu ma lta bu) and “ultimate freedom from conceptual elaboration”' (don dam spros dral) (1969b, 594; 2001, 101).6 Thus for the Mai dhyamika ‘the first priority should be the negation of the truth of appearances through establishing the truthlessness of their appearances' (1969b, 594- 595).7 The soteriological object of negation is thus a type of  negendum that is to be negated gradually and progressively as one develops along one's spiritual pathways (lam) and as one passes through the various levels (sa) of spiritual maturity. An essential condition for the elimination of the soteriological object of negation is one's progressive purging of naive and false view of things.

The second major category is the ‘epistemic object of negation' (lung dang rigs pa'i dgag bya). This form of the objects of negation, in Gorampa's view, is constituted by objects that are to be negated through rational analysis (rigs pa) and authoritative scriptures (lung). Again Gorampa classifies the epistemic object of negation further into(2.1) objective (yul) objects of negation and (2.2) subjective (yul can) objects of negation. The former (2.1) is comprised of (2.1.1) conceptual or philosophical misconception (kun rtags gyi ma rig pa) and (2.1.2) innate misconceptions (lhan skyes kyi ma rig pa). Of the objective objects of negation, we turn first to (2.1.1). By ‘philosophical misconception', Gorampa here means ‘reificationists (dngos por smra ba) conceptions [of metaphysics and ethics] based on the justifications of invalid arguments and scriptures', which he believes ‘ether commits oneself to “absolutism, the extreme of existence” (yod pa sgro ‘dogs kyi matha') or “nihilism, the extreme of nonexistence” (med pa skur ‘debs kyi mtha')' (1969b, 595f).8 Again by ‘absolutism' Gorampa is referring to the view of:

self of person and self of phenomena—the former is constituted by the non- buddhists's conception of self as being distinct from the aggregates and the Buddhist SammatTya's conception of self as being one that is identical with the aggregates or it is inexpressible. (1969b, 595f)9

The self of phenomena is, on the other hand, constituted by ‘forms etc., or things that are reified by the TTrthikas up to the Vijnanavadas as "truly established" (bden par grub pa)' (1969b, 595f).10 By ‘nihilism', Gorampa specifically means ethical nihilism of the ‘CaTrvakas/Lokayatas' denial of the causal efficacy of the present life's wholesome or unwholesome karmic deeds and the effects of the pleasant and unpleasant experiences in the future' (1969b, 595f).11 According to Gorampa, (2.1.2) ‘Innate misconception' (lhan skyes kyi ma rig pa) entails non-philosophical reifying tendencies of the innate ignorance of the reality. Philosophical misconception is, Gorampa maintains, a predicament limited to the circles of philosophers who are susceptible to conceptually reifying their problematic views while non-philosophical innate misconceptions of reality are a problem not limited to philosophers. This is because reification through one's innate misconception is one that is common to all beings—be they are philosophers or non-philosophers—for it is, in Gorampa's view, the positing of person and phenomena, or the objectifications of person and phenomena where the objectified ‘truths' are misconceived through this ignorance as either the self of person (gang zag kyi bdag) or the self of phenomena (chos kyi bdag) (1969b, 595f).12 Gorampa's point is essentially this. That non-philosophers do not entertain themselves with metaphysical speculations, so they are not susceptible to philosophical misconceptions. They are, however, susceptible to the inherent  misconception that objectifies the fundamental nature of person and phenomena as having as reified self of person13 and reified self of phenomenon.14

The subjective (yul can) objects of negation (2.2) is the second division of the epistemic object of negation: ‘Including in it', says Gorampa, ‘cognitions conceptualising objects as “this” or “that” and all erroneous views' (1969b, 596f).15 Gorampa's distinction between the subjective and the objective objects of negation is crucial in understanding his account of a coherent non-dual knowledge. A dual knowledge, for Gorampa is always incoherent and erroneous. A dual knowledge, according to Gorampa, inevitably reifies the dichotomy between the subject and the object. All empirical or conventional knowledge is dualistic. They are constituted by apprehending subjects and apprehended objects as they are two fundament components of all empirical claims, judgements or knowledge. By assigning the subjective/objective distinction to the objects of negation while treating both of them an epistemic objects of negation, Gorampa is able to undermine the authority of empirical/conventional knowledge in favour of a non-dual ultimate knowledge.41

Gorampa's ascent to a non-dual and transcendent Prasangika view is also made possible by his broader division of the objects of negation into soteriological and epistemic categories. Particularly, the soteriological object of negation allows him to argue for eschewing any thing that appears to the mind since all appearances are consigned to objects that must be negated in order to achieve the soteriological end.

It is quite obvious that the scope of objects of negation, on Gorampa's account, is quite extensive. But how extensive is it really? A full answer to this question will become clearer as we continue to examine Gorampa's arguments. However, we can anticipate Gorampa's response to this question through an understanding of his synthesis of spros pa (conceptual elaboration) with the objects of negation, and then with his identification of the extent of spros pa with the tetra lemma (catuskoti/mtha' bzhi)—existent, non-existent, both and neither (1969a, 371b).16 Any notion based on the conceptions of these four are regarded as inadmissible metaphysical propositions (catuskoti/mtha') in that they are the hallmarks of spros pa, triggers for discursive thoughts and conceptualisations THAT are utterly unacceptable to the Gorampa's Madhyamika since spros pa undermines the position of spros dral—transcendent of the conceptual elaboration—to which the Madhyamika is fully committed soteriologically. This follows because: ‘The Madhyamika view is', Gorampa explains, ‘one that free from the four extremes: existent, nonexistent, both and neither' (1994, 23).17 Gorampa's claim that the objects of negation are identical with spros pa, and spros pas with the catuskoti—that is, that which comprises the four problematic metaphysical propositions—is a critical move in his philosophical strategy. This allows him to argue for the negation of existent, non-existent, both and neither. But the question at issue is: why should these propositions be negated? So far, except Gorampa's broad categorical divisions of the objects of negation, we have not seen any specific argument defending his position. The arguments will be forthcoming.  Given that the catuskoti for Gorampa is comprised of four metaphysical positions—existent, non-existent, both and neither, each representing a slightly dissimilar level of the objects of negation, the latter ones subtler than the former—their negation, Gorampa claims, necessarily entails four inter-related steps or approaches18 where the earlier ones progressively pave the pathways for the latter negating the latter ones. In this paper, I will consider only the first approach—namely, the negation of existent, or the negation of the first extreme—and provide an analysis what this negation involves. Discussion on the three later moves—the negations of non-existent, both and neither—will be undertaken elsewhere in a separate project.

There are several reasons why it is necessary to only focus on the first approach. The first reason is a practical consideration: while it is important that Gorampa's treatment of the objects of negation is explored fully and comprehensively, the scope of this paper simply does not allow for the space to deal with all four approaches and their philosophical implications in any satisfactory manner. The second reason is that the first approach is, according to Gorampa, the most critical of all of the four steps of negation in the development of a correct Prasangika view. Such a view, Gorampa claims, is transcendent of the objects of negated. The first extreme is the coarser object to be negated (dgag by rags pa) as compared with the latter subtler ones (dgag bya phra ba) on the ground that ‘while the former is easier to negate if it is not negated it becomes causal drive for the samsaric suffering', on the other hand ‘the latter ones are more difficult to negate, and if they are not negated, they', according to Gorampa, ‘obstruct the attainment of the Mahayana's enlightenment, not just obstructing the nirvana—the freedom from the samsaric suffering' (2002, 39).19

But what is the ‘extreme of existence' (yod mtha'), the object to be negated in the first step? In Gorampa's view, there is no doubt that the first extreme comprises, as his Nges don rab gsal confirms, ‘all [positive] phenomena. This is on the ground that they are the key provokers of the “conceptual grasping to truths” (bden ‘dzin)' (1969a, 389a; 2002, 164).20 The text further affirms:

Basically all phenomena [comes under the first extreme, the extreme of existence]. For there is no phenomenon whatsoever that does not come under the rubric of the twenty objective bases of emptiness (stong gzhi chos chen), [moreover] One needs to negate truths of all these [twenty bases of emptiness] and subsequently establish them as transcendent of spros pa of all four extreme. (1969a, 389a; 2002, 164)21

Gorampa does admit however that the Madhyamika texts often only ask to negate truths of some specific objects. ‘The fact that that the Madhyamika texts primarily negate truths of produced phenomena (‘dus byas), things (dngos po), and appearance (snang ba)', according to Gorampa, ‘suggests that these are the principle objects which trigger grasping to truths (bden ‘dzin) and by negating truths of these [[[objects]]], truths of other [[[phenomena]]] are thereby negated' (1969a, 389a; 2002, 164).22 In the Lta ba'i shen ‘byed, Gorampa makes this point 

ever clearer: ‘Without negating the ‘truths' (bden pa)—the object of the grasping to truth—it is not possible to negate the latter “extreme graspings” (mtha' ‘dzin)' (1994, 23).23 Therefore, in the Lta ba'i shen ‘byed Gorampa asserts first of all: ‘All external and internal objects must be established as “truthless” (bden med) through the force of the arguments such as “freedom from the one and the many” (gcig dang du dral)' (1994, 23).24

So what is evident here is that the ‘extreme of existence' refers to bden pa, ‘truths'/‘real things'. This means that negating the extreme of existence entails the negation of conventional truths. Further analysis reveals that, for Gorampa, to negate bden pa is to actually negating ontologically existent entities, truths or real phenomena, not just mere conceptions. This point is made clearer in the light of Gorampa's treatment of bden pa ‘truths' as one and the same with ‘existent' (yod pa), ‘true existence' (bden grub) or ‘extreme existence' (yod mtha')—they all point to the same reified thing. To rephrase the point, Gorampa's claim is that the first phase of negation necessarily entails the negation of the existents/truths/or real phenomena, not just concepts or abstract phenomena.

Arguments

Gorampa advances several arguments that clarify the scope of the negation of the first extreme. The first is the argument from the rational analysis. In the Nges do rab gsal, Gorampa writes:

In negating the first extreme, the very basis of the debate (rtsod gzhi) analysing whether it is real or unreal itself must be one that is subjected to negation (‘gog gzhi). (1969a, 388d;2002, 163-164)25

Gorampa confirms this in the Nges don rab gsal:

All phenomena which are apprehended as positive entities with characteristics of ‘truly established' (bden par grub pa), ‘ultimately established' (don dam par grub pa), ‘really established' (yang dag par grub pa), ‘intrinsically established' (ngo bo nyid kyi grub pa), ‘inherently established' (rang bzhin gyi grub pa), ‘established through self-defining characteristics' (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa), ‘truly produced' (bden pa'i skye ba), ‘mere existence of true entities' (bden pa'i dngos po yod pa tsam) etc. This is because none of these are affirmatively established as positive phenomena when these bases of negation are subjected to both Prasangika and Svatantrika forms of logical analyses. (1969a, 389a-b; 2002, 164-165)26

According to Gorampa's argument from rational analysis, the Prasangika Madhyamika's objects of negation (as part of negating the first lemma) entail all positive entities because they are undermined by the Prasangika's rational analysis.Thismustfollowbecause,first,suggesting thatthere are signs of‘positive entity' (sgrub pa's chos) is, in Gorampa's view, tantamount to reifying truthless/unreal entities as having objective truths/reals established by virtue of  their self-defining characteristic. Moreover, all positive entities do not reveal such reified ontological status when they are subjected to critical analysis implying that these entities themselves are negated through the power of logical examination. After all: ‘all conceived objects of thoughts must be established as truthless by way of subjecting them to the ultimate analysis of the reasoning consciousness' (1969a, 392b-c; 2002, 177-178).27 This follows, argues Gorampa, from the fact that the MaTdhyamika's investigation over whether certain things are ‘true' (bden pa), ‘existent' (yod pa), ‘truly established' (bden grub), and so forth, pertains to real phenomena rather than conceptually constructed/reified entities, and that a failure to find the truth/reality of things under such analysis must mean, in Gorampa's view, that the positing of conventional truth is erroneous. Gorampa provides us with, perhaps, the clearest defence of his first argument yet. When his imagined interlocutor asks Gorampa this question: If indeed that is the case, for you even the conventional truths would become the objects of negation from the purview of the ultimate analysis of the reasoning consciousness?'

Gorampa's reply is:

Yes, absolutely. Since [[[conventional truths]]] are not found at all when subjected to ultimate analysis of the reasoning consciousness. (1969a, 392c; 2002, 178)28 The fact that conventional truths fail to stand up to the test of logical analyses is, in Gorampa's view, indication that conventional truths are metaphysically eliminated by the rational cognition.

Gorampa's second argument is drawn from the chos chen mthun snang— concordantly appearing subject—debate between the Buddhist reificationist and the PraTsan_ gika. Gorampa claims that the PraTsan_ gika MaTdhyamika rejects the reality of all existent objects because it rejects the objects having any ontological status as it denies the existence of any common object that can be a basis of philosophical debate between the Abhidharmika and the PraTsan_ gika. This follows, Gorampa claims, since the former is committed to reality of things as it holds things as existent whereas the latter wholly rejects things' existence; hence there is no commonly agreed subject that can be considered a basis of the debate between the two. If the PraTsan_ gika's negation of the truths or reality of things does not entail negating things themselves, as Tsongkhapa would have argued, then, in Gorampa's view, there will be commonly perceived subject as the basis of the debate. The only reason that there is no such commonly agreed subject is the PraTsan_ gika does not admit the existence of anything, not even mere appearance.

If that is not the case, when appearance is considered as the subject of the debate whether it has or has not truth, for both the proponent and the opponent (rgol phyi rgol gnyis ka) there has to be established a commonly observed subject. If, in this context, one is committed to simply negate mere  truth of appearance but not the appearance itself, one risks falling off from the Prasangika position. (1969a, 392c; 2002, 178)29

This passage is partly a critique of Tsongkhapa's position, which does not treat appearance itself (snang ba tsam) as an object to be refuted, but only conceptually reified epistemic errors imposed upon the appearance. In contrast to Tsongkhapa's view of the Prasangika, Gorampa's claim is that the Prasangika does not posit any form of appearance as an ontological basis—even so-called ‘mere appearance' (snang ba tsam) as this would render the Prasangika's positionless stance implausible. Any ontological commitment to any form of appearance is, argues Gorampa, tantamount to accepting the truth of appearance, the truth of reified conceptualisation—the position that Gorampa attributes to the Buddhist reificationist.

According to the view of Prasangika view held by Tsongkhapa, the existence of ‘mere appearance' is an ontological fact, and is thus not refuted. What is refuted is only ‘truly established appearance' (bden grub kyi snang ba), which is purely conceptually reified error superimposed on the existence of mere appearance. However, for Gorampa, Tsongkhapa's distinction between ‘mere appearance' (snang ba tsam) and ‘truly established appearance' makes no sense whatsoever. As indicated earlier, on Gorampa's account, whether something is described as ‘truly established' or ‘mere established', essentially both imply one and the same ontological commitment. In Gorampa's view therefore, if the Prasangika is ontologically committed to even the existence of ‘mere appearance', the Prasangika's position will be reduced to the level of the reificationist. This follows, argues Gorampa, because any commitment to appearance is an ontological commitment—equivalent to accepting of the reality or truth of appearance. If this were the case then the Prasangika's and the reificationist's positions would not be different, at least ontologically, and thus appearance would exist as a commonly agreed ontological subject of debate. Nevertheless, the standard Prasangika line of argument is that there is no such commonly agreed subject that can be treated as the basis of the debate between the two schools. And the central reason for this is that the Prasangika is ontologically uncommitted while the reificationist is ontologically committed. Thus, in Gorampa's view, the Prasangika must negate phenomena themselves in order to refute their appearances.

Gorampa's three final arguments are soteriological in character. The first argument is this: the negation of the extreme of existence is equivalent to the negation of all positive phenomena (sgrub pa)/existents (yod pa) because they are, in Gorampa's view, the catalysts for the ‘grasping to the truth of phenomena' (chos kyi bden ‘dzin), which is the root of all sufferings. Since the ultimate aim of the Prasangika is to attain freedom from suffering, refutation of grasping to the truth of phenomena is critical soteriological agenda as it is the root that breeds suffering and stress. This follows, argues Gorampa, on the ground that: ‘If there is grasping to the truth of the five aggregates, it will surely directly result in “grasping to the truth of person” (gang zag kyi bden ‘dzin) which is itself the primal 

delusion/ignorance, the first among the twelve factors. And from this [[[delusion]]]', Gorampa maintains, 'arise all latter factors. Thus the root of [[[samsaric]]] suffering is “grasping to the truth of phenomena” (chos kyi bden ‘dzin)'. (1969a, 389b-c; 2002, 165)30

Moreover the Prasangika rejects all metaphysical commitments as it advocates the transcendentalist (spros dral) and positionless theses (dam bca' med pa). For this reason Gorampa views an ontological commitment to the five aggregates (phung po lnga/panca-skandha)—form, feeling, perception, compo¬sitional volitional factors, and consciousness—as being identical to 'grasping to the truth of phenomena' (chos kyi bden ‘dzin). This is tantamount, Gorampa claims, to making an ontological commitment to realities of unfounded and reified phenomena. From the ontological commitment arise deluded ignorance (ma rig pa/avidya)—'grasping to the truth of person' (gang zag kyi bden ‘dzin)—a commitment to reified person that is the catalyst for the operation of the 12 factors31 of the

subjective/internal interdependent arising (nang gi rten ‘brel). Thus the engine that runs the samsaric suffering, according to Gorampa, is the ignorant grasping to the truth of phenomena and person. Therefore the only feasible way out from suffering is to terminate the continuity of this vicious cycle by getting rid of conceptual grasping to the truth of phenomena and self. Nevertheless, grasping to the truths of things does not go away as long as there are things around. Therefore things themselves must be eliminated to stop the grasping to realities as this will put an end to the vicious cycle of suffering. The next argument is from Gorampa's conception of enlightenment (byang chub). It argues that realities must be negated on the soteriological ground in order achieve three types of enlightenment (byang chub). The Nges don rab gsal gives us three reasons to negate realities depending on the nature of enlightenment sought:

Those who seek to achieve enlightenment must negate realities: seekers of the enlightenment of the sravakas must negate truth of the five appropriated aggregates; seekers of the enlightenment of the pratyekabuddha must, in addition to the former, negate truth of the external objects and of afflictive defiled dharmas;and seekers of the enlightenment of the Mahayana must negate conceptual elaborations (spros pa) of all four extremes. (1969a, 389c-d; 2002, 166-167)32 Realities must be negated, according to Gorampa, for they are the obstructive to enlightenment, and the scope of reality to be negated is dependent upon the type of enlightenment that one seeks. This argument not only highlights the soteriological import of negating realities, it also provides a dimension to the hierarchy of realities to be negated progressively. For the sravaka's enlightenment a seeker must negate realities of the five aggregates and realise their unreality/truthlessness (bden med) since it is the grasping to the truth of the five aggregates that obstruct them from attaining their goal. In addition to negating realities of the five aggregates, a seeker of the pratyekabuddha's 

enlightenment has to negate realities of the external objects and of afflictive defiled dharmas and realise their truthlessness. This follows since it is the grasping to the truths of these phenomena that a seeker is obstructed from attaining the pratyekabuddha's enlightenment. Finally, all truths must be negated for attaining the Mahayana's (or bodhisattva's) enlightenment of complete buddhahood. For the reason that buddhahood is a transcendent of all conceptual graspings to truths, thus even the slightest conceptual operation is an impediment to achieving this goal.

The final soteriological argument gives us a glimpse of Gorampa's top-down perspective of enlightenment. The argument he advances runs as follows: realities are objects to be negated because their being/existence is not verified by the enlightened gnosis of buddhas. From this perspective, as it is stated in the Yang dag lta ba'i od zer ‘dependently arisen things are the objects of negation' (1969c, 292a).33 This must follow because dependently arisen realities are deceptive, false and illusion-like, whereas enlightened gnosis is transcendent, non-deceptive, unconditioned and non-illusory. In the Nges don rab gsal under the section called ‘Analysis of Whether or Not the Two Truths Exist at the Level of Buddhahood', Gorampa is more direct:

Conventional truths enunciated in the contexts [of Nagarjuna's Mulamadhyamakarika 24: 8-10 and Candraklrti's Madhyamakavatara 6: 23-24] are nonexistent [at the level of buddhahood] because where there is no erroneous apprehending subject, its corresponding object—[[[conventional truth]]]—cannot exist. (1969a, 446b; 2002, 399)34

This argument is also premised upon the identity of dependent arising and emptiness. Since seeing emptiness, in Gorampa's view, is not seeing anything, seeing things as dependently arisen amounts to not seeing them at all—just as no positive phenomenon whatsoever is seen when one sees emptiness directly, so no positive entity whatsoever is perceived when things are perceived as dependently arisen. It implies therefore that conventional realities are negated through the enlightened gnosis.

Finally, the most pervasive of all arguments is without any doubt the spros dral (‘transcendent') argument. On this argument the Madhyamika must relegate spros pa of conventional realities as the objects of negation to ascend to the transcendent state of the conceptual elaboration (spros dral) since ‘spros dral means the ultimate truth, and spros dral is the [only] model of the ultimate' (1969a, 371a).35 This follows on Gorampa's account on four counts: First, Gorampa identifies spros pa and conventional realities in the Nges don rab gsal:

In short spros pa consists of the eight entities such as arising, cessation etc., addressed in the homage verse of the Mulamadhyamakarika, the twenty seven entities—beginning with conditions up to views—examined in the twenty seven chapters [of the Mulamadhyamakarika] as well as, contained in spros pa are all frameworks of linguistic and conventional practices. (1969a, 447c)36 

Given that spros pa are to be repudiated to achieve the transcendent truth, and given that spros pas and conventional realities are identified, the latter too must be negated to ascend to the transcendent truth. Second, according to his analysis of the term in the Nges don rab gsal, Gorampa treats spros pa as having a very broad span. He argues: ‘Spros pa is not merely “truly established” (bden grub) or “non-affirming negatives” (ma yin dgag) [such as emptiness], it rather incorporate all signs of dharmas—be they are affirmative or negative—that provokes discursive mental activities' (1969a, 371a).37 So what is contained in spros pa is literally everything there is—both negative and positive phenomena that have potential to provoke ideas, thoughts, concepts, images, representations in the mind and potential to stimulate conceptual tendencies to grasping the truths of things, especially to trigger innate beliefs in the reality of things. And since Gorampa insists on negating all spros pa, and given that in it is contained every reality there is, it must follow that conventional reality is negated. Third, transcendent truth is necessarily the non-dual ultimate truth, hence it must not be bound up by metaphysics (spros pas) of conventional realities—‘While spros pa is substantially grounded, tathagatas38 are not substantially grounded. Spros pas and tathagatas are not coextensive as [the latter] is transcendent of spros pa' (1969a, 371a -b).39 Fourth, ‘At the stage of buddhahood one directly realises dharmadhatu of all phenomena as having a unified taste within a span of single moment of wisdom', and thus ‘At this point spros pas are not seen. Yet it is not contradictory to describe [not-seeing of spros pas ] itself a correct knowing' (1969a, 447c).40 Therefore the highest goal, buddhahood, according to Gorampa, cannot be achieved as long one fails to transcend, and therefore negate, all spros pas of conventional reality.

Conclusion

Therefore, it is abundantly clear that the negation of the first extreme (the extreme of existence) on Gorampa's account entails actually negating the conventional truths, as it eschews real ontological structures in order to ascend to transcendent truth. Despite the fact that the scope of objects of negation outlined in Gorampa's Lta ba ngan sel passage strikes us to be exceedingly broad, his arguments adduced to justify his position convincingly affirms his conceptual commitment.

Briefly, Gorampa claims that all conventional realities must be negated on the ground that they are conceptually reified elaborations (spros pa), that the Prasangika is committed to the transcendent of all spros pa, that things do not reveal any reality when they are subjected to logical analysis, that an enlightened consciousness does not verify the existence of conventional truths, that there is no commonly agreed subject of debate between the Buddhist reificationist and the Prasangika, that truths are the catalysts for conceptual graspings to self and phenomena, that grasping to truths obstructs a seeker from attaining the  enlightenment, and finally that the seeing of things as dependently arisen amounts to seeing nothing at all.

NOTES

1. References to these Tibetan texts in the notes appear in three formats. First, if the source of the reference is in book form, the Tibetan text is documented with its title and page numbers, with other bibliographic details appearing in the bibliography. Second, if the source is in the traditional loose-leaf format, folio numbers are given. Third, if the text is a combination—folios compiled into a book form—then the format is a page number followed by a letter that refers to the folio; for example, 110a.

2. Unless other author names are cited, the text citations throughout the text refer to the relevant Gorams pa Bsod nams Seng reference in the reference list.

3. This text has been translated into English by Ven. Dr Tashi Tsering and JUrgen Stoter Tillmann (2005) as Removal of Wrong Views: A General Synopsis of the ‘Introduction to the Middle' and Analysis of the Difficult Points of Each of Its Subjects. Taipei, Taiwan: The Corporate of the Buddha Educational Foundation.

4. Dgag bya ngos bzung ba ...Lam gyi dgag bya ni ‘khrul pa'i snang ba mtha' dag yin la / ‘dir lung rigs kyi dgag bya ni yul dang yul can gnyis las / dang po la yang kun btags kyi ma rig pas btags pa dang / lhan skyes kyi ma rig pas btags pa gnyis las / dang po ni dngos por smra ba dag gis lung rigs ltar snang gi ‘thad pa la brten nas rtog pas sbyar ba dag ste / ‘de la yod pa sgro ‘dogs kyi mtha' dang/med pa skur ‘debs kyi mtha' gnyis / dang po la gang zag gi bdag dang chos kyi bdag gnyis/dang po ni / phyi rol pas btags pa'i phung po las don gzhan pa'i gang zag dang / rang sde mang pos bkur bas btags pa'i phung po dang ngo bo gcig pa'i gang zag dang brjod du med pa'i gang zag rnams so /gnyis pa ni/phyi rol mu stegs byed nas sems tsam pa'i bar gyis gzugs sogs kyi dngos po bden grub tu btags pa rnams so/gnyis pa ni/mu stegs rgyang ‘phen pas / rgyu las dge sdeg dang / ‘dras bu tshe phyi ma'i bde sdug sogs med par btags pas rnams so/gnyis pa ni/lhan skyis kyi ma rig pas btags pa ni grub mthar la zhugs ma zhugs thams cad la thun mong du yod pa'i gang zag tu ‘dzin pa dang / chos su ‘dzin pa gnyis kyi dmigs yul gang zag dang chos ‘job la / ‘dzin stangs kyi gzhung bya bden pa ni gang zag gi bdag dang / chos kyi bdag tu ‘job po'o/gnyis pa yul can ni yul de dang der rtog pa'i blo dang lta ba ngan pa thams cad yin te ... //

5. Lam gyi dgag bya ni ‘khrul pa'i snang ba mtha' dag yin na / 6. Bsgrub bya ni kun rdzob sgyu ma lta bu dang / don dam spros dral gnyis yin la / 7. de gnyis ka la yang thog mar snang ba la bden pa dgag dgos pas snang ba bden med bsgrub bya'i gtso bo yin no/ 8. Dngos por smra ba dag gis lung rigs ltar snang gi ‘thad pa la brten nas rtog pas sbyar ba dag ste / ‘de la yod pa sgro ‘dogs kyi mtha' dang / med pa skur ‘debs kyi mtha' gnyis / 

9. Phyi rol pas btags pa'i phung po las don gzhan pa'i gang zag dang / rang sde mang pos bkur bas btags pa'i phung po dang ngo bo gcig pa'i gang zag dang brjod du med pa'i gang zag rnams so/

10. Phi rol mu stegs byed nas sems tsam pa'i bar gyis gzugs sogs kyi dngos po bden grub tu btags pa rnams so/ 11. Mu stegs rgyang ‘phen pas / rgyu las dge sdeg dang / ‘dras bu tshe phyi ma'i bde sdug sogs med par btags pas rnams so / 12. Lhan skyis kyi ma rig pas btags pa ni grub mthar la zhugs ma zhugs thams cad la thun mong du yod pa'i gang zag tu ‘dzin pa dang / chos su ‘dzin pa gnyis kyi dmigs yul gang zag dang chos ‘job la / ‘dzin stangs kyi gzhung bya bden pa ni gang zag gi bdag dang / chos kyi bdag tu ‘job po'o / 13. According to Gorampa, if the self of person exists at all, it must exist essentially. The self of person cannot in any way exist without being an essentially existent self. So, from Gorampa's perspective, ‘an essential self of person' or a ‘mere self of person' mean the same thing. For example: ‘Sonam as a person' and ‘Sonam as an essential person' both mean the same thing. If Sonam exists at all, he must exist essentially; and if an essentially existent Sonam does not exist, even a mere Sonam does not exist.

14. ‘Essential self of phenomenon' should be understood in the same way as essential self of person. If ‘phenomena' exists at all, it must exist essentially. If an essential self of phenomena ceases to exist, phenomena ceases to exist. For example: a table and an essential table both mean the same thing. If table exists at all, it must exist as an essential table; and if an essentially existent table ceases to exist, a mere table also ceases to exist.

15. Yul can ni yul de dang der rtog pa'i blo dang lta ba ngan pa thams cad yin te / 16. Spros pa'i ngos ‘dzin bzhi tsam ‘byung ba rnams ni mtha' bzhi char spros pa las ma ‘das / 17. Dbu ma'i don ni yod med dang yin min la sogs pa'i mtha' thams cad dang dral ba yin ...

18. In traditional Buddhist terminology, these are called four extremes: existence, non-existence, both, and neither. Some traditionalist Gorampa admirers like Dr Wangchuk Dorjee Negi, Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Higher Studies, argue that for Gorampa the first two approaches serves the whole purpose. Two later approaches are rhetorical. They are not separate approaches as such, and they do not have any special application. However, Gorampa himself is very clear that all four approaches are four separate moves; each is seen to operate effectively to negate specific object to be negated.

19. ‘de la dgag by phra rags su ‘jog pa ni snga ma dgag sla zhing ma bkag na ‘khor ba'i sdug bsngal gyi rgyur ‘gyur ba yin la/phyi ma dgag dka' zhing ma bkag na theg pa chen po'i byang chub la gegs byed pa yin gyi ‘khor ba'i sdug bsngal spangs pa'i myang ‘das tsam la gegs mi byed pa'o / 20. Bden ‘dzin zhugs pa gtso che ba'i dbang du byas na dgnos po thams cad yin .../  21. Spyir chos thams cad yin te/stong gzhi'i chos can nyi shus ma bsdus pa'i chos ci yang med cing/de dag la'ang thog mar bden pa bkag nas mthar bzhichar gyi spros dral du bya dgos pa'i phyir ro /

22. ‘on kang gzhung las/‘dus byas dang /dngos po dang/snang ba rnams la bden pa ‘gog pa gtso bor gsungs pa ni bden ‘dzin ‘jug pa'i gzhi yin pas de dag la bden pa bkag pas gzhan rnams la bden pa khegs pa don gyis ‘grub pa la dgongs te /

23. Thog mar bden par ‘dzin pa'i yul gyi bden pa ma bkag na mthar ‘dzin phyi ma rnams dgag tu med pas / 24. Gcig dang du dral la sogs pa'i rigs pa rnams kyis phyi nang gi dngos po thams cad bden med du gtan la dbabs par bya dgos/ 25. De na mtha' dang po gang la ‘gog pa'i gzhi ni gang zhig bden par yod med rtsod pa'i rtsod gzhi de nyid yin te / 26. Gzhi de dag gi steng du bden par grub pa/don dam par grub pa/yang dag par grub ba/ngno bo nyid kyis grub pa/rang bzhin gyis grub pa/rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa/bden pa'i skye ba/bden pa'i dgnos po yod pa tsam la sogs pa sgrub pa'i sgo nas gzung ba'i chos thams cad ‘gog ste thal rang gnyis char gyis dgag gzhi de dag la rigs pas dpad pa'i tshe yongs gcod du grub pa'i chos ce yang med par ‘dod pa'i phyir ro/

27. Rnam rtog gis gang du zhen pa'i yul thams cad mthar thug dpyod pa'i rigs pas dpyad nas bden med du btan la dbabs dgos pa'i phyir ro / 28. o na kun rdzob bden pa'ang mthar thug dpyod pa'irigs ngor dgag byar ‘gyur ro zhe na shin tu ‘ang ‘dod de/mthar thug dpyod pa'i rigs pas brtsal ba'i tshe mi ryned pa'i phyir ro/

29. De ltama yin na snang ba'i steng du bden par yod med rtsod pa'itshe rgol phyi rgol gnyis ka la mthun sang du grub pa'i chos can snang ba yod par ‘gyur te/de'i tshe sang ba'i steng du bden pa tsam ‘gog gi snang ba me ‘gog par khas blangs pa'i phyir ‘dod na thal ‘gyur ba'i lugs las nyams so/ 30. Chos phung po la bden par ‘dzin pa'i bden ‘dzin yod na dngos ‘dras gang zag gi bden ‘dzin nges par ‘byung/de nyid yan lag bcu gnyis kyi thog ma'i ma rig pa yin zing/de las yan lag phyi ma rnams ‘byung bas sdug bsngal gyi rgyu' gtso bo ni chos la bden par ‘dzin pa'i bden ‘dzin yin te/ 31. From ignorance arises volitional actions, arises consciousness, arises name and form, arises the 12 sources, arises contact, arises sensation, arises craving, arises grasping, arises existence or becoming, arises birth and, finally, arises old age and death. 32. Byang chub thob par ‘dod pa dag gis bden pa dgag dgos te/nyan thos kyi byang chub thob pa la nyer len gyi phung po'i steng du bden pa dgag dgos/rang rgyal gyi byang chub thob pa la de'i steng du gzung ba phyi rol gyi don dang kun nas nyon mongs kyi chos sogs la bden pa dgag dgos/theg chen gyi byang chub thob pa la mtha' bzhi char gyi spros pa dgag dgos pa'i phyir ro/

33. Blo de'ingor rten ‘brel de nyid dgag bya de dag zhi ba'i rang bzhin du gnas pas rten ‘drel de nyid la yang zhi ba zhes bya ‘o/ 34. Zhes pa'i skabs nas bstan pa'i kun rdzob bden pa ni med de/yul can mthong ba brdzun pa med pas/de'i yul med pa'i phyir ro//.  35. Spros dral de mthar thug pa'i don do bsgrub pa dang / spros dral don dam pa'i mtshan gzhir bsnyad pa / 36. Mdor na rtsa ba shes rab kyi mchod brjod kyi skabs kyi skye ‘gag la sogs pa brgyad dang / rab byed nyi shu rtsa bdun gyis dpyad par bya ba'i rkyen nas lta ba'i bar nyi shu rtsa bdun dang / des mtshon nas kun rdzob tha snyad kyi rnam gzhag thams cad spros pa yin .../ 37. Spros pa zhes pa bden pa'i dngos po'am ma yin dgag kho na ma yin gyi gang la blo ‘jug cing ‘phro ba dgag sgrub kyi chos kyi mtshan ma thams cad yin te / 38. Tathagata is a Sanskrit word that literally means 'thus gone beyound'. It is an epithet of Buddha. Gorampa identities it with ultimate truth. 39. Spros pa ni dngos po'i rgu mtshan can yin na de bzhin gshegs pa dngos po med pa la/spros pa rnams ‘jug pa ga la yod de/de'i phyir de bzhin gshegs pa spros pa las ‘das pa yin no /

40. Sangs rgyas kyi sar chos kyi dbyings su ro gcig par yeshe skad cig ma gcig gis mngon du gyur pa'i tshe spros pa de dag mi snang yang de dag rtogs zhes pa'i tha snyad ni mi ‘gal .../

41. See Thakchoe (2007: 101-131) fora detailed discussion on Gorampa's nondual epistemology.

REFERENCES

CABEZON, JOSE IGNACIO, and GESHE LOBSANG DARGYAY. 2007. Freedom from extremes: Gorampa's ‘Distingushing The Views' and the polemics of emptiness. Boston: Wisdom Publications. GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 1969a. Dbu ma spyi don nges don rab gsal. In The complete works of the sakya scholars, vol. 12: 348-451. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko. GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 1969b. Lta ba ngen sel. In The complete works of the sakya scholars, vol. 13: 110-215. Tokyo: Toyo Bunk. GORAMS PABSOD NAMS SENGE. 1969c. Yang dag lta ba'i ‘od zer. In The complete works ofthe sakya scholors, vol. 12: 285-347. Tokyo: Toyo Bunko. GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 1994. Lta ba'i shen ‘byed theg mchog gnad gyi zla zer. Sarnath: Sakya Student's Union, CIHTS. GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 2001. Lta ba ngen sel. Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union, CIHTS. GORAMS PA BSOD NAMS SENGE. 2002. Dbu ma spyi don nges don rab gsal. Sarnath: Sakya Students' Union. THAKCHOE, SONAM. 2007. The two truths debate: Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the middle way. Boston: Wisdom Publications. Sonam Thakchoe , School of Philosophy, University of Tasmania, Private Bag 41, Tasmania 7001, Australia. Tel: + 61 3 6226 1776;Fax: + 61 3 6226 7846; E-mail: sonam.thakchoe@utas.edu.au