Chandrakirti and the Madhyamakavatara

Although Chandrakirti lived approximately five centuries after Nagarjuna, that is, roughly halfway through the period in which their tradition was extant in India,-the Madhyamakavatara is often used as a convenient text with which to embark on the study of Madhyamika. Of the two elements that make up the

treatise's title, Madhyamaka means "middle" or "middle way" and is in fact a reference to the Mulamadhyamaka-karikas, or The Root Stanzas on the Middle Way, composed by Nagarjuna. Avatar a means literally "to descend55 or "to go down into.55 It is cognate with the Sanskrit word avatar and is to be found in such titles as the Lankavatara-sutra (The Sutra of the Journey into Lanka) and the Bodhichary avatar a (The Entry into the Ways of Enlightenment) by

Shantideva. The title of Chandrakirti5s text therefore means "an entrance or introduction to (Nagarjuna5s stanzas on) the Middle Way." It is what Tibetan scholarship defines as a general meaning commentary and provides a conspectus or summary of the overall meaning of Nagarjuna5s great masterpiece. The

Madhyamakavatara may therefore be contrasted with Chandrakirti5s later work, the Prasannapada, which also comments on Nagarjuna5s text but in much greater detail. In fact, although the Madhyamakavatara is actually of greater length than the karikas, its presentation of emptiness is actually simpler and less extensive in terms of subject matter and demonstration. Chandrakirti discusses fewer arguments but at greater length, in a manner more adapted to the beginner.

- The Madhyamakavatara is, therefore, a good place to start. Moreover, in addition to providing an accessible introduction to the teaching of Nagarjuna, it

also gives a wider overview of the Madhyamika teaching as this developed in the centuries that followed him. Chandrakirti takes into consideration, for example, the position of the Chittamatra school, the other great stream of the Mahayana tradition, which came into prominence after Nagarjuna5s time. And

following the later division between the Prasangika and Svatantrika approaches to the Madhyamika dialectic, it was the Prasangika teaching of Chandrakirti that came to be accepted by all four schools of Tibetan Buddhism as the summit of Buddhist tenet systems. Although the main theme of the Madhyamakavatara is the presentation of wisdom according to the view of Nagarjuna, it is important to advert to other

aspects of the text, which, though subsidiary, are also important. It should be noted, for instance, that the dialectic is presented as an integral part of the Mahayana, the Buddhism of the great vehicle. At the beginning of the text, Chandrakirti emphasizes that the seed and accompaniment of the realization of wisdom is compassion, the desire to release beings from suffering. The twin aspects of ultimate and relative bodhichitta are never separate. Moreover,

the exposition of the view is set within the framework of the ten paramitas and these are correlated with the ten Bodhisattva grounds of realization or bhumis. Finally, buddhahood itself is made the subject of a detailed presentation at the conclusion of the text. The Origins of Madhyamika and the Buddha}s Silence

When beginning the study of a complicated subject, it is often helpful to isolate a comparatively simple key idea that can provide a vantage point from which to view the whole terrain and that might serve later on as a landmark as one tries to thread one's way through the subsequent labyrinth. As suggested by the Indian scholar T. R. V. Murti and corroborated by Mipham Rinpoche in the introductory section of his commentary on the Madhyamakalankara, one such

idea is to be found in the characteristic attitude of the Buddha when confronted by a certain kind of question. He remained silent, refusing to answer or to express an opinion. These questions, usually fourteen in number, are mentioned on several occasions in the Pali canon. They are of a specifically metaphysical character and deal with subjects that of their nature lie beyond the possibility of common experience and empirical verification. On most occasions, they are posed by the wandering ascetic Vacchagotta and are as follows:

Whether the universe has a beginning, or not, or both, or neither.

Whether the universe has an end, or not, or both, or neither.-

Whether the Buddha exists after death, or not, or both, or neither. Whether the self is identical with the body or different from it.

To each of his questions, Vacchagotta receives no answer or else, more pointedly, a negative reply to all four alternatives. He is thus faced with another, more fundamental question: Why is it that the Buddha refuses to be drawn into a discussion about such apparently fundamental topics, on which other

thinkers had been more than ready to express their views? The silence of the Buddha has traditionally been interpreted as profoundly significant. Correctly understood, it constitutes a seminal anticipation of the Madhyamika, in both meaning and method. It was expressive of a profound insight of the Buddha, and its subtle implications were to be fully elucidated in the writings of Nagarjuna. Conversely, the Madhyamika is to be understood as the exploration and systematic expression of the Buddha5s silence.

The fourteen unanswered questions are typical examples of the fundamental attempt, present in most philosophies, to go beyond the data of the phenomenal world in order to discover some kind of transcendent ground or reality that will explain the nature of things as they appear to us and the reason for their existence. Unlike commonsense reflection, which bases itself on concrete evidence and is interested not so much in what things are but in how they work,

metaphysics tries to find out the reality behind appearances. And it is evident that in an inquiry that extends beyond the field of phenomenal appearance, there can be no appeal to the objective data provided by the senses. The only possible course is deduction, reasoning from effect to cause. And since the conclusions arrived at cannot be verified empirically, their plausibility must rest exclusively on the quality of the arguments employed and on logical coherence alone. This kind of activity has

occupied the minds of philosophers for thousands of years and represents a deeply rooted tendency of the human mind, which yearns for knowledge and the satisfaction and sense of security that this brings. Faced with the mystery of the cosmos, the spirit naturally tries to interpret what it encounters; and where knowledge is lacking, it will fill the void with speculation or myth. When one surveys even the little that is known of philosophical and religious history, and the successive attempts put forward to account for the world and our experience of it, one cannot but marvel at the sheer inventiveness of the human imagination.

Of course, in view of the fact that reason and logic seem to work well enough in the context of day-to-day existence, one is naturally inclined to think that, given a sound basis in experience and adopting a careful method of argument, it ought to be possible to reason one's way to conclusions that, even in

the absence of material evidence, must be true. But here we encounter a paradox, which points to the precarious nature of such an assumption. At least on this point, the eighteenthcentury European philosopher Immanuel Kant is in full agreement with Nagarjuna and the Buddha himself: the use of pure reason extended beyond the empirical sphere results not in knowledge but in antinomies, that is, contradiction. It is a fact that equally plausible and coherent

arguments may be constructed upon the same premise only to arrive at diametrically opposite conclusions. One philosopher will propound an attractive thesis to show that the cosmos had a beginning in time; another, with equally persuasive reasons, will prove the contrary. No one has ever succeeded in inventing

a rational philosophy that is wholly incontrovertible. A procedure that appears to give us truth in fact produces only theory and opinion. And since, where metaphysics is concerned, verification is ruled out, there being no objective evidence available to compel the assent of all parties, it is clear that, in such a procedure, conflict between contrasting opinions

is not only inevitable but endless. The problem, it seems, lies not in the quality of this or that line of reasoning but in the very constitution of reason itself. We are thus led to the possibly unpalatable conclusion that any attempt to express the transcendent in the empirical terms of thought and word cannot but fail. It produces illusion and not knowledge. It is in the light of such reflections that the Buddha's silence is best interpreted.

In other passages in the sutras, where the Buddha refers to his meeting with Vacchagotta, he makes it clear that the problem lay not in the difficulty of the subject but in the very nature of the question and the expectation that it implied. Vacchagotta was looking for either an affirmative or a negative

reply. But what if the truth lies in neither of these alternatives? To reply according to the terms laid down by the questioner cannot but falsify the issue and make matters worse. The question "Is the self identical with the body?55 demands an answer of yes or no. Yet neither of these answers is true, for there is no such thing as a self. Reflecting on this, Vasubandhu observed, uSince such a self is totally nonexistent, how could the Buddha have declared whether it was the same or different from the body? It is as though Vacchagotta had asked: 'Are the hairs of the tortoise bristly or smooth?555

It is clear that the encounter between the Buddha and Vacchagotta was dominated by the latter5s incapacity. Vacchagotta had posed a question in terms such that no true answer could be returned. A question framed according to the categories of ordinary experience demands an answer similarly expressed. But when the inquiry itself concerns matters that transcend experience, it is clear that silence is the only possible response. If further communication is to take place, it is first necessary to bring the questioner to the understanding that the question itself is faulty and must not be pursued in its present form. This is the purpose of the Buddha's silence, and this, as we shall see, is precisely the function of the Madhyamika dialectic.

When at the end of their interview the disconsolate Vacchagotta asked whether the Buddha had, after all, any theory of his own, the latter replied: "The Tathagata, 0 Vaccha, is free of all theories. But this, Vaccha, does the Tathagata know: the nature of form, of how form arises and passes away, the nature of feeling (and so on through the five aggregates). Therefore the Tathagata has attained liberation and is free from attachment, inasmuch as all imaginings, or agitations, or false notions, concerning a self and anything pertaining to a self have gone, faded, ceased, have been given up and abandoned.552 It would be easy to misread this passage as a simple rejection of metaphysics and a slightly condescending admonition to stick to the simple practice of self-scrutiny and attentive living. But the message is much more profound than this. It is precisely because the Buddha does not immerse himself in theories about phenomena that he is able to discern their true nature, and it is this very discernment that confers liberation. To know things as they truly are is to free oneself from their tyranny. On the other hand, to elaborate theories about phenomena is not only to become engrossed in endless cogitation and verbiage; it is to veil the nature of phenomena even more and to fall even further beneath their spell. One becomes ever more entangled in what can only be productive of further frustration and sorrow.

"To hold that the world is eternal,55 the Buddha declared, uor to hold that it is not, or to agree to any other of the propositions that you adduce, 0 Vaccha, is the jungle of theorizing, the wilderness of theorizing, the tangle of theorizing, the bondage and the shackles of theorizing, attended by ill, distress, perturbation, and fever. It does not lead to detachment, passionlessness, tranquillity, and peace, to knowledge, and to the wisdom of Nirvana. This is the danger I perceive in these views, which makes me discard them

It is important to assimilate this passage in its entirety. For although it expresses an unambiguous rejection of futile theorizing, it nevertheless indicates a truth that lies beyond the ordinary mind and becomes accessible precisely when theories are laid aside. It points, in other words, to a reality

that transcends ordinary thought processes but is nevertheless still knowable. To say that it is possible to know something that is beyond thought carries the important, indeed astonishing implication that there is in the mind a dimension that in the vast majority of living beings is wholly concealed, the existence of which is not even suspected. As the Buddha says, it is passionless, tranquil, peaceful; it is the knowledge and wisdom of nirvana. This, the

teachings say, is the true nature of the mind, which is discovered and actualized in enlightenment. Nagarjuna suggests- that it is a state so subtle and so profound that in the first moments after his awakening, the Buddha remained silent and declined to teach, perceiving that there was little chance of ordinary beings5 understanding him. Moved by the entreaty of Brahma S ah am patti, the Buddha, as we know, relented and began his compassionate mission for those who might be trained. And in words that resonate down the centuries, he declared: uOpen to them are the doors to deathlessness, 0 Brahma. Let those who have ears throw off their old beliefs.,}

These old beliefs undoubtedly refer not only to the belief in the self but to all theories and constructions of the ordinary mind, the inventions of philosophy and of religion, which operate according to the procedures of affirmation and negation and the two extreme viewpoints of existence and

nonexistence. No one, so the Buddha and the Madhyamika affirm, can hold to either of these views and hope to be free. It is necessary to analyze such false trails and, having discovered their inner contradiction, to abandon them. Only then can one progress beyond samsara. When, in a meeting that Nagarjuna mentions explicitly in the karikas,-Katyayana asked the Buddha for a teaching about the correct view, the latter replied that ordinary beings are used to

thinking dualistically, in terms of affirmation or negation. In dealing with themselves and the phenomena that surround them, they think and speak in terms of "it is" and "it is not." They take things and situations to be "really real55 or "really not real." They cling to them, act accordingly, and wander

through the transient joys and sorrows of samsara, high and low, in heaven, hell, or any of the other six realms. But for those who have wisdom and correctly perceive the truth of how phenomena arise, abide, and pass away, the Buddha said, there is no "is" and no "is not." "That things exist, 0 Katyayana, is one extreme. That they do not exist is another. But I, the Tathagata, accept neither 'is' nor 'is not,5 and I declare the truth from the Middle Position.55

This position, this "Madhyamika," is the Buddha's Middle Way. On earlier occasions, it had been formulated ethically, as the path of moderation between the extremes of indulgence and excessive asceticism. Here is it expressed "philosophically" as the middle position between eternalism and nihilism, affirmation and negation. Confronted by Vacchagotta, the Buddha remained silent, refusing to involve himself in the inept attempts of philosophy and religion to reach beyond the world. This is exactly the attitude of Madhyamika. On the

issue of transcendent reality, it adopts the Buddha5s reserve and does not formulate a position. Rather, by a systematic analysis, whereby every possible position is exposed as false, the busy, restless mind (which, in failing to recognize its own nature, fails also to recognize the true status of phenomena) is reduced to silence. Conceptual construction must be stilled if the perfection of wisdom is to manifest; the mind must be brought to the Buddha's silence for liberation to be possible.

The Development of the Madhyamika School

In the final stanza of the karikas, Nagarjuna wrote: "I bow to Gautama, who out of compassion set forth the sacred Dharma for the rejection of all theories.55 The selfconfessed mission of Madhyamika is to undermine the misrepresentations of philosophy and religion, the fruit of the discursive mind's deep-rooted tendency to elaborate theories in an attempt to explain phenomena, both of the outer world of things and the inner world of thought and

emotion. In the hands of Nagarjuna, it is primarily a critique of other Buddhist tenet systems and secondarily, by implication, of the Hindu schools of ancient India. In the centuries that followed the Buddha's passing away, perfectly valid attempts were made to synthesize his teachings and facilitate their practice. But all of them, from the Madhyamika point of view, fall short to a greater or lesser degree, on the one all-important issue: the ultimate status of phenomena. All of them, in one way or another, affirm something to which they attribute real and ultimate existence.

In itself, therefore, Madhyamika is not a philosophy so much as a critique of philosophy. Its task is to examine the attempts of reason to give an account, in terms of thought and word, of "the way things really are55 and to demonstrate its failure, showing that it is not in words and concepts that the nature of reality can be expressed. In this respect (but in this respect only) Madhyamika has been accurately compared with the philosophy of Kant.

In being a system of pure criticism, Madhyamika has no positive content of its own. Its evolution therefore cannot be assessed in terms of doctrinal elaboration and change. The history of Madhyamika is consequently no more than the account of the system's relationship with other philosophies. This is

why the presentations of Madhyamika found in texts like the Wisdom chapter of Shantideva's Bodhichary avatar a and in the Madhyamakavatara itself, instead of being formal philosophical expositions, consist of a list of arguments with which other systems have been refuted. As Murti has observed, a study of the Madhyamika "shows the stresses and strains to which philosophy was subject in India down the ages.5-

The development of the Madhyamika system, from its appearance in the second century c.e. till the disappearance of Buddhism from India in the twelfth, falls into three or four periods. The first is that of systematic exposition, achieved by Nagarjuna and his immediate disciple Aryadeva. The second stage (in the course of the sixth century) is marked by the appearance of two subschools, or rather tendencies, the Prasangika and Svatantrika, occasioned by the

divergence of the masters Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka in their approach to debate procedure and other connected issues. This period was brought to an end, or rather another period was inaugurated, about a hundred years afterward by Chandrakirti, who, in defending Buddhapalita and refuting Bhavaviveka, endeavored to establish prasanga, or consequential arguments, as the normative procedure in Madhyamika debate when defining the view. As we shall see, this

entailed a quite specific attitude both to the position and the role of logic in such procedures as well as to a presentation of the conventional truth. Finally, the last important development in the Madhyamika, and of Indian Buddhist philosophy generally, was brought about by the great abbot Shantarakshita

and his disciple Kamalashila. This consisted of a synthesis of the two great tenet systems of the Mahayana, namely, the Madhyamika and Chittamatra (Yogachara), as ways of presenting the ultimate and relative truth respectively. It was Shantarakshita and Kamalashila who established the Buddhist sutra teachings in Tibet in the eighth century, and it was their brand of Madhyamika that was to prevail there until the translation of Chandrakirti5s work by Patsap Nyima Drak and others at the beginning of the twelfth century. Long extinct in its country of origin, Madhyamika has remained a living tradition in Tibetan Buddhism until the present day.