Contemporary Significance of Chinese Buddhist Philosophy

  I. INTRODUCTION

    In the early 1960s when I was engaged in doctoral thesis research, I came to know a work of Hu Shih, eminent historian and philosopher, on the subject of ancient Chinese logic.(l)

For the first time, I became aware that the Mohist school of logic, founded by Mo-tzu,(a) a contemporary of Confucius (K'ung-tzu(b) ), prospered in ancient China for a few centuries prior to the Ch'in and Han dynasties.

While perusing the text, I was struck by the fact that ancient China already developed a logical system comparable to that of ancient India as well as ancient Greece, and that the Chinese actively applied the logical method not only to advance scientific knowledge but also to resolve social and political problems.

    In the same work, Hu Shih pointed out that from the logical point of view, the Confucians and Mohists, though rivals, nevertheless complemented each other by their respective contributions to the development of logical thought.

Where Confucian thinkers set forth the principle of "names" and "predicables," the Mohist thinkers discovered the principle of "subject terms."

Thus, despite their adversarial positions, their theories precisely contributed to the advancement of Chinese logical thought in terms of the logical structure of propositions.

    Although Buddhism appeared in China several centuries after these pre-Han philosophical schools, its philosophical insights further contributed to the Chinese logical and linguistic understanding.

It is important for students of Chinese philosophy to focus more attention on the Buddhist philosophical insights in Medieval China in the area of pre-linguistic and pre-logical phases(2) which underly the ordinary mental, logical, and linguistic functions as a way to evaluate the moral and religious ideas of the Chinese.

    The purpose of this paper is threefold:

(1) to examine briefly the Confucian and Mohist ideas about logic and language,

(2) to present the Classical Chinese Buddhist thought on logic and language as an important complement to ancient Chinese logical thought, and

(3) to evaluate the contemporary relevance and significance of Chinese Buddhist thought and insight.



    II. CONFUCIAN AND MOHIST THOUGHT ON MORAL AND CULTURAL PROBLEMS

    As is known among historians, during the period of the 6th century B.C, the central power of the Chou(c) dynasty was steadily declining and the feudal state was rapidly disintegrating.

The Chou aristocracy and culture, the revival of which Confucius dreamed, were no longer cohesive.

There developed many independent states equipped with their own bureaucratic systems, so that each one fought against the others throughout this period of social and political upheavals.

This chaotic state of affairs eventually ended in the rise of Ch'in,(a) a centralized and bureaucratic empire just preceding the great Han dynasty.

Facing the ills of the times, Confucius and Mo-tsu were equally engaged in the task of restoring the order of society and reforming its system by advocating two widely different philosophical and practical orientations.

    Confucius (ca. 450 B.C.), a teacher of young nobles in the state of Lu,(f) devoted his life to defining and refining the values embodied in the proprieties and culture of the Chou aristocracy.

Behind these norms of conduct and culture he perceived an ideal "true gentleman" (chun-tzu(g) )guided by such inherent principles as benevolence ("Love others" and "Do not do to others what you would not wish them to do to you").


He reasoned that the ills of the society derived from a prevailing humane negligence on the part of the aristocratic members of society, their failure to adhere to the norms of proprieties and maintain cultural forms of harmony such as music (le(h))

Thus, his major effort was directed toward the restoration of the codes of honor (positive rules of propriety) to be practiced by the true "gentlemen."

Confucius was convinced that as soon as the ruling class of landed gentlemen mutually support each other through normative proprieties, the masses would spontaneously follow these same rules of life and culture.

    Chou society was divided into the classes of landed aristocrats and the masses.

The members of aristocracy regulated their own conduct based on a body of positive rules of propriety, i.e., a "code of honor" (li(i)), while the masses had imposed upon themselves,legal codes which provided for the "five kinds of penalties with their 'three thousand' classified degrees"

Under this dual system of morality,along with the division of the society into "superior men" and "little men," the former were governed only by a code of honor while the latter were controlled by the fear of punishment.

If the people are governed by laws and their conduct regulated by punishment, Confucius reasoned that the idea of "government by law" will become highly undesirable.

To him it seemed evident that the masses would try to evade any legal penalties without undergoing any paper sense of shame.

In any case, he did not think of the law as an effective instrument. Thus, he concluded that the best way to lead the masses is by example of virtue and the rules of propriety, enabling them to feel shame and so to try to be good.(3)


    Standing on the other side of the aisle, Mo-tzu and his followers neither shared the culture of Chou as understood by the Confucians nor desired to complicate their lives with elaborate etiquette, such as the duty to mourn one's father for three years.

Their guiding principle was always practical utility combined with pragmatic concern, so that the meaning of every institution lies in what is good for itself, and the meaning of every conception or belief or policy Lies in what kind of conduct or character it is best suited lies to produce.

Mo-tzu said. "Any principle which can elevate conduct should be perpetuated.

That which cannot elevate conduct should not be perpetuated.

To perpetuate anything that cannot elevate conduct is nothing but a waste of speech."(4)

The Mohists felt a deep objection not only to the class division between aristocrats and the masses, but also to the aristocratic moral code because it was divisive, requiring any gentleman to put his duties to his family and his lord before the interests of anyone else.

Accordingly, each family as well as each state was obliged to prefer itself over others and to be drawn into conflict with others, a conflict where the common people always suffered.


    In contrast to the Confucian principle of the gradations of love, decreasing according to the remoteness of the relationship, the Mohists introduced the idea of a universal concern or love, loving others just as one's self.

Chien-ai (j) means to "to love others just as one's self," having as much regard for others-say, father, elder brother, lord, vassar, and so forth-as for one's self, and having as much regard for other families as for one's own.(5)

The term signifies a principle that applies to all, so it is translatable as "universal love."

But it was also on this same principle of "universal concern" that aggression (kung(k)), namely one state attacking another state simply in order to benefit at its expense, was condemned by the Mohists as a crime no different from the private robberies and murders and punishable by the state.

Although Mo-tzu and his followers were not people with warm sympathies towards everyone, their personal affection was disciplined by a stern sense of justice and equality.

In theory, they did not tolerate the idea of a state or government which did not benefit all of its citizens.


    The Mohists believed that government originated from the need to unify the "different moralities" (i-i(1) ) of individuals competing in the primitive war of all against all.

Its function is to "unify and assimilate morality throughout the empire" (i-t'ung-hsia-chih-i(m) ) .(6)

He treated anarchy as a conflict not just of interests but also of "moralities." by which he meant not moral codes but the conflicting family or state loyalties existing within the "traditional love" which the Confucians advocated.(7)



III. CONFUCIAN AND MOHIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOGIC AND LANGUAGE



    Philosophically, both Confucius and Mo-tzu contributed to logical and linguistic reflections in their Chinese cultural traditions. Confucius sought to "rectify names," a task which he considered necessary in order to realize moral and political reform.

So, as Hu Shih puts it, "Confucius sought to make the language an exact means and an integral part of a logical philosophy."(8)

He used written words and judgments (i.e.,propositions) so judiciously and so juridically to imply moral judgment, to approve and condemn as the laws of a State ought to approve and condemn.(9)

The events in the Ch'un-ch'iu(n) (Spring and Autumn Annals) are not merely recorded with linguistic exactitude, but also at the same time with ethical judgments.

The judgments are implied in the wording itself.

He registered his disapproval and condemnation of wars carried on by one state against another as "invasions and aggressions."

Only those wars led by princes who had received at least nominal sanction from the Emperor were recorded as "punitive expeditions.

In short, the Ch 'unch iu is said to have been intended by Confucius to embody his doctrine of "rectifying names and judgments" and "to reform a corrupt age and restore it to rightness."

 The underlying methods are (1) to apply exact use of language, (2) to give implicit ethical judgments, and (3) to lay out ideal relationship.


    Evidently, Confucius' goal was an intellectual reorganization of society by means of "names" and "judgments" which he truly believed to be the key to the solution, namely, "to reform a corrupt age and restore it to rightness."

He and his followers attempted to discover through the study of names what things ought to be in order to reform the social and political order of the day.

They furnished the society with an elaborate and rigid system of ideal relationships (li(o))(10)

These two tasks were carried out by Confucian scholars in the following centuries in terms of (1) teaching the judicious use of the written word as exemplified in the Ch'un-ch'iu, and (2) editing and codifying elaborate customs,moral

                         

precepts, rituals, and ceremonies into a system of propriety(li(i)).

Their motto was: "Set up what is righteous, and consider not its beneficial result."(11)




    Mo-tzu was quite dissatisfied with this Confucian method and approach.

He sought instead for a criterion by which truth and falsity as well as the right and wrong of beliefs, theories, institutions, and policies could be tested either to be so or not to be so.

Accordingly, Mo-tzu's motto, as quoted before, was: "Any principle which can elevate conduct should be perpetuated.

That which cannot elevate conduct should not be perpetuated.

To perpetuate anything that cannot elevate conduct is nothing but waste of speech."

Unlike the Confucians, they always considered this pragmatic principle and kept their eyes on the end results or beneficial results which might come by choosing the proper course of action.

Obviously, the practical consequence was the sole criterion of value and worth of principles and institutions.

Consequently,Mo-tzu and his followers were always aware of the importance of the motives of action as "foreseen ends which call for the endeavor."

This was Mo-tzu's distinct contribution, a philosophical insight into moral action which transcended that of Confucius.




     From the logical point of view, the Confucian contribution was the discovery of the significance of "names" or "predicables" which become the indices to classify things and actions.

But the Confucians failed to see that the predicables detached from their practical bearing upon the "predicated" are empty and meaningless.

It was left to Mo-tzu and his followers to introduce the term "subject" or the "predicated" (shih(p)) into their logic.

Quoting from Hu Shih's translation, Mo-tzu defined the subject term and the predicate term in the following ways.

"That by which something is said (about something) is the predicate (name), that by which something is said (about something) is the predicate (name) that about which something is said, is the subject or the predicated (real) "(12)

For students of philosophy, it is evident that the Confucian attempt to discover the original meaning of a word is a futile task. Even if it is found, the original meaning can have very little more than mere etymological interest.

If we abandon the strictly etymological approach, we are compelled to resort to arbitrary meanings by attributing them to conceptual references as ideals.


    According to Hu Shih, therefore, Mo-tzu's contribution was to check this irresponsibly one-sided emphasis on the empty predicables by discovering "subject terms to which names or predicates are to be predicated.

A predicate must be taken with reference to the predicated, and a judgment must be taken with reference to its practical consequences.

Knowledge ought to consist not in learning predicables and universals, but in the ability to use these things in real life, namely, "to elevate conduct."

A man is said to "know" things "not because of his ability to name them, but because of his ability to choose them."(13)


    The ancient Confucians will say to those who, stand by powerless, watching moral chaos, violent bloodshed, and meaningless destruction, "Educate yourselves about the meaning of human rights, freedom and justice."

Ultimately, people by this means will come to understand the underlying universal law through the study of these conceptual names and predicates.

By this means people today may, according to their view, seek to reform the global social and political order with an elaborate and rigid system of ideal relationship, and so try to bring new structure to multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-religious and multi-national encounters.

The Mohists, however, would respond:

This is not enough.

You ought to be able to distinguish the right from the wrong by enquiring into the causes of good or bad government.

By examining the relations between names (predicables) and substances (subjects), one ought to be able to determine the good and evil in reference to actual agents, things or events and deal more practically with difficult and doubtful situations.(l4)

    But how can we do these things? The Mohists then provided us with their logical method, through which we may be able to discover ways to deal with these multiple tasks.

Mo-tzu developed a system of logic, the only logic developed in the early history of Chinese thought.

Rephrasing Hu Shih's translation of the crispy textual statement, the Mohist definition of interential logic appears as follows:

                        

    The reasoner ought to note and observe the happenings (literally "becoming so") of all things, to seek the order or relation between various judgments, to define the subject with the predicate in order to express his meaning in a proposition by giving the reason (i.e., by the statement beginning with "because"("ku"(q)) in a premise, and support the reasonconclusion relation by selecting instances on the principles of agreement (t'ung(r) ') and difference (i(s) ) [Italics not in original.].(15)

This constitutes the essential element of Mohist logic.

The surprise is that this Mohist method of inference is indeed comparable to the Buddhist method of inference (anumana) developed in India.



      IV. A COMPARISON BETWEEN CHINESE AND INDIAN LOGIC



    The Indian logic of inference in general was theorized on the dual principles of anvaya and vyatireka.

The terms, anvaya and vyatireka, originally belonged to the vocabulary of the science of grammar in ancient India and signify respectively "connection" and "separation."(16)

 As philosophical reflection developed, these terms were used by Buddhist as well as Hindu logicians to mean the dual procedures of similar and dissimilar instantiations for logically valid reasoning.

As referred to before, these two operations correspond exactly to the Mohist principles of agreement (t'ung) and difference(i).

As will be made clear below, irrespective of Indian or Chinese language, these operations are fundamental to the mental process of classifying referential objects by means of naming and hence indispensable to the practical use of language (vyavahara).

    In the Indian logical context, the positive and negative instantiations represent not only inductive but deductive reasoning as well.

For instance, in an inference drawn from rising smoke perceived over the slope of a distant hill, one may infer an outbreak of fire there. First, the reasoner



seeks to determine whether it is valid to assert the two related predications (i.e., "something has smoke" (The reason) and "Something has fire" (The conclusion) in reference to an particular location outside of previse visual range in for side of a distant hill)).

So one tests the causal concomitance of "smoke-and-fire" (i.e., "Wherever there is smoke, there is fire") by referring it to similar instances, such as, a kitchen where the two always concur. In addition, one is also obliged to test the contraposition.

"If no fire, then no smoke" by referring to dissimilar instances, such as a water tank, where the two concomitants never occur separately or jointly.

Having done so, only then, in reference to a given subject term (i.e. here 'a hill'), the reasoner can safely assert the reason (hetu):

"Because of rising smoke on the other side of the hill," and the conclusion (sadhya): "an outbreak of fire on the other side of the hill."

In Indian syllogism, this combined procedure of inductive and deductive reasoning, i.e., citing similar and dissimilar examples, was required at all times.



    The Mohist principles of agreement and difference likewise constitute a form of inductive reasoning.

In distruction from Indian logic, however, the Mohists did not include the dual instantiations in the syllogistic formula, instead, they theorized that a valid inference is to be based on a hsiao,(bu)(17) i.e., an inductively well proven causal or logical relation based on the method of agreement and difference.

In this respect, Indian and Chinese forms of syllogistic inference are fundamentally the same reflecting the universal nature of logic and language.(18)

With this understanding, the meaning of the Mohist's criticism against the Confucian doctrine of names can be more clearly grasped by consulting a Hindu-Buddhist dispute that occurred in Medieval India.

There is an instructive parallel between the difference of Mohist and Confucian logical thought on the one hand, and that of Buddhist and Hindu logical thought on the other.



    One of the heated disputes between Buddhist and Hindu logicians in Medieval india was focused on the question: "is the Buddhist threemembered syllogism innovated from the traditional Indian five-membered

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logic valid." The traditional Indian syllogism consisted of five statements.

    (1) Thesis (pratijna): "There is fire on the hill,"

    (2) Reason (hetu): "smoke is on the hill,"

    (3) Examples (udhaharana). "Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, like in a kitchen," and "Wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke,like near a water tank.

    (4) Application (upanaya): "There is smoke on the hill,"

    (5) Conclusion (nigamana): 'Therefore, there is fire on the hill."(19)


    Critically examining this formula, the Buddhist logician, Dignaga (ca. 5th century) , introduced a three-membered formula as follows.


    (1) Examples similar instantiation(anvaya) and dissimilar instantiation (vyatireka),

    (2) Reason which implies its conclusion as applicable to a substratum,

    (3) Conclusion.


    The dispute in question arose between Hindu logicians who upheld that what is to be proven (thesis) must be initially proposed and the Buddhist logicians who countered that it is not necessary.

The reason that this difference became a heated dispute is that it was correlative to another difference concerning the object of inferential knowledge.


    In reply to Hindu logicians' criticism, Dignaga and Buddhist logicians in subsequent periods defended their theory by stating that real and necessary members of a syllogism or inference are only of two types, namely,

(1) the general rule expressed in the statement of similar and dissimilar instances (drstant) and (2) its application to an individual substratum by stating a reason (hetu).

When a universal relation of smoke and fire is known to a community of people,in order to let them know a conclusion that "a distant hill is on fire," it suffices to inform them that 'a distant hill has a billow of smoke (hetu)."

For, in this very reason (hetu), its conclusion (sadhya) that "the hill is on fire" is already implied.(20)



    In opposition to this Buddhist logicians' view in assigning class determination of a given substratum to the anvaya and vyatireka procedures as the primary task of inference, the Hindu logicians (Naiyayika) assigned to them the verification of the universal relation (vyapti) between smoke and fire.

Further, in opposition to Buddhist logicians' view in regards to the laying down of a reason (hetu: "a hill having smoke") as the main body of an inference, Hindu logicians interpreted it as a verification of a given reason (smoke on a hill) by means of its conclusion (sadhya: fire on a hill) determined by the previous (anvaya-vyatireka) procedure.

Dignaga refuted this Hindu logicians' view by stating:



The object of inferential reasoning is neither the property of a given substratum (e.g., "smoke-then-fire" of a hill) nor the connection (sambandha) between "smoke-fire" and a hill, but the substratum itself characterized by the conclusion (sadhya. "a hill having fire).


    The reason is threefold.

(1)When the concomitance of smoke and fire is known universally, the conclusion should be implied in the statement of a reason, i.e., "(a)P then (a)Q";

(2) When "Q" is known universally to be found in a similar instance, say, a kitchen as "b)Q" [here 'b' is a kitchen], the substratum'a', which is one of the class members similar to 'b' should be the object to be cognized by inference;and

(3) If the object of an inference is the hill-fire relation, there is no element capable of making an inference possible, nor is there anything to be inferred. It follows that the connection need not be expressed as a thesis (pratijna), and should not be accompanied by a reason (hetu).(21)


    The point intended here is that for Medieval Indian Buddhist logicians it is not the purpose of an inference to know a given universal relation (If smoke, then fire) as valid, because such a universal ought to be already known by a community of people through induction.

Hence, it is the purpose of the inference to let them known whether a given substratum, say, a yonder hill, is a member of the similar class of things like a kitchen and not a member of the dissimilar class like a water tank.

Hence, the main element of an inference is the laying down of a reason on the basis of the class determination of a given substratum, and not the verification of a reason (hetu) in relation to a conclusion (sadhya) as held by Hindu logicians.

This difference exactly parallels the difference found between the Confucian and Mohist views of logic.


    Recapitulating the foregoing points, the Confucians discovered the significance of "names" or "predicables" or "universals" which are the indices to classify things and actions. But they failed to see why cultural and ethical universals, which guide human conduct, become empty and meaningless statements when detached from their practical context of an agent or substratum.

The Mohists criticism precisely pointed to this by introducing the idea of subject term as object of inferential knowledge and defining the logic of inference as follows.

It is the task of inference to express one's meaning in a proposition by giving the reason in a premise [i.e. by the statement to begin with 'because,' i.e., "ku(9)..."],and support the reason-conclusion relation by selecting instances on the principles of agreement (t'ung) and difference (i).(22)

Here too, the essential business of the Mo-tzu s theory of inference is twofold:

(1) class-determination of a given subject term, and (2) laying down of an inferential reason.

It follows that the Mohist criticism was justified against the Confucian theory of the primacy of naming or universal relation, precisely because a name or a relation without its substratum has no reality or efficacy.



V. CHINESE BUDDHIST CONTRIBUTIONS TO LOGIC AND LINGUISTICS



    The religion of the Buddha was officially recorded to have been introduced to China in AD. 156 in the reign of the Han emperor Ming (ming-ti(t)).

Yet it would take a few centuries for Chinese Buddhism to acquire its generic features. During the period of the two centuries from the end of the 4th to the 6th, the period of the so-called "Six Dynasties," multifarious forms of Buddhism, Hinayana as well as Mahayana, along with their scriptures and cultures, were introduced piece-meal to the divided regions of North and South. They arrival offering no clear reference to scriptural origins, developmental history or their sectarian affiliations.

Thus, it became the major task of scholar monks and intellectual Buddhists to sort out the translated texts into textual groups and to correlate them into a certain order for the developmental history of the scriptures relative to the teachings purported in them The more comprehensive the system was, the more superior it was held by Buddhist scholars who classified them, in the attempt to portray the richness of religion and culture in Buddhism.

    By the time of the mid-sixth century, two clear features characteristic of Chinese Buddhism emerged.

The first was the so called Chioa-pan(u) (or in full Chiao-hsiang-pan-shih(r), namely, the systematic and critical classification of Buddhist doctrines.

The second was the primacy of Mahayana Buddhism over Hinayana, although in practice the latter tradition was also given due importance.

From the doctrinal point of view, Chinese Buddhists adopted Mahayana Buddhism as superior to that of Hinayana for two basic reasons:

(1) the Mahayana insight of dharmasunyata (k'ung-hsing(w) ) is superior to the Hinayana insight of dharmasvabhava (yu-tzu-hsing(x) ) and

(2) the Bodhisattva-yana path of practice (p'u-sa ch'eng(y)) is superior to the Sravaka-yana path of practice (shen- men-ch'eng).


    The term sunyata, compounded of sunyn ("empty," "void," "hollow") and an abstract suffix ta (equivalent to ness), was almost invariably translated into Chinese as kung-hsing ("emptiness," "voidness," or "vacuity").

The conceptal range of this term included logical and dialectical referents The difficulty in understanding this concept is due to its transcendental meaning (paramartha) in relation to the logico-linguistic meaning (vyavahara), especially because the etymological tracing of its meaning [i.e. sunya meaning "vacuous or hollow within a shape of things"] provides no theoretical or practical addition to one's understanding of the concept.


    The normative set of practices of the Bodhisattva-yana [("-vehicle" or --marga ("-path," p 'u-sa-tao(aa) or -carya ("-practice," p 'u-sa-hsing(ab)] consisted of six standard forms committed by "One who seeks to realize ultimate insight."

The six forms of practice (sat-paramitas, liu-tu(ac) or liu-po-lo-mi (ad) )which represent the broadest categories of virtues enumerated in the Prajnnaparamita-sutras and other Mahayana scriptures are charity (dana, pu-shih|(ae) )morality (sila, ch'ih-chieh(af) ) , perseverance (ksanti, jen(ag) ) , endeavor (virya, ching-chin(ah)), meditation (dhyana-samadhi, ch an-ting(ai)), and wisdom (prajna, chih-hui(aj)), to later on four more virtues were added later on resulting in the Ten Paramitas (shihpo-lo-mi(ak)): expediency (upaya, fang pien(al)), vow (pranidhana, yuan(am)), might (bala, li(an) ), and insight (jnana, chih(ao)).

The body of normative practices, however, prescribes no specific set of prefered conduct.

Whatever specific action a bodhisattva takes to apply within a given situation is left to his insight into sunyata.

The special faculty to be acquired through this insight is defined as "skillfulness in "expedient means, " or "skilfulness in the choice and adoption of the means," or "expedients for converting others or helping them" (upaya-kausarya, shan-ch'iao-fang-pien(ap) )(23)

The concept of "expedient means" does not simply mean ordinary conduct based on reason and rational calculation.

Because it is anchored in one's insight into sunyata, the "skillfulness in means" is a special faculty imbued with the nature of transcendence.

Moreover, this faculty is also pragmatic, because whatever specific action it is to be taken, a bodhisattva adopts it as the best means for a given situation as well as for a specific foreseen goal.

The concept is dual natured, empirical and trans-empirical.


    In the history of Chinese Buddhism,

The full comprehension of the Mahayana insight into `sunyata was attained only though two stages of development.

First, toward the end of the 4th century, Kumarajiva,(aq) foremost exponent and translator of the Madhyamika treatises, arrived in Western China and completed the translation of the dialectical treatises in A.D. 409, while raising a group of excellent scholar monks under his guidance.

Among these disciples, Seng Chao(ar) (383-413), whom the teacher praised as foremost in the understanding of the doctrine, left a treatise called Chao-lun(as) on the Madhyamika philosophy of sunyata.(24)

In this text, he innovated a unique method of paradoxical argument, which I believe operates best in utilizing the Chinese linguistic system t demonstrate the dialectical meaning of sunyata.


    Toward the end of the 6th century, then Chih-i(at) (531-597), the third patriarch of the T'ien-t'ai school(au) and a contemporary of the Sanlun(av) master Chi-tsang(aw) (549-623) wrote a series of texts on the T'ient'ai doctrines, establishing an elaborate system of teachings endowed with the classification of "five periods and eight teachings" (wu-shih-pachiao(ax)).

The system classifies the five periods of doctrinal development, the four methodical teachings of religious practice (hua-i-ssu-chiao(ay) , and the four doctrinal teachings of religious conversion (hun,fa-ssuchiao(az)) Philosophically, the T'ien-t'ai system is understood to be a type of Buddhist phenomenology, such that a moment of thought or human consciousness was analyzed into three thousand phenomenal dimensions (I-nien-san-ch ien(ba)), and that all these multiple phenomena are theorized to interact in perfect permeation (Yuan-jung-san-ti(bb)), embodying the threefold truth of "dependent origination" (pratityasamutpada, yuanch'i (bc)), namely, the three aspects of "emptiness"(`sunyata or k'ung(bd) , "linguistic practicality" (prajnapti, chia(be)) and the "middle path" (mad. hyama-pratipad, chung-tao(bf)). Chih-i adopted these definitions of "dehyama-pratipad, chung-tau(bf)).


    Although insights into sunyata, prajnapti, and madhyama (chung(bi)), were taken from Nagarjuna's Chung-lun, the system of I-nien-san-ch ien and Yuan-jung-san-ti ought to be regarded as a genuinely original Chinese theory, in the same Manner that the Hua-yen(bj) ten-fold theory of dependent origination (shih-hsuan-yuan-ch'i(bk)) with regard to both the transcendent (hsing(bl) or li(bm)) and the phenomenal (hsiang(bn) or shih(bo)) is originally Chinese.

During the lifetime of Chih-i the Hua-yen system was in the process of being established by Tu-shun(bp) (557-640).

It was then further developed by Chih-yen(bq) (602-668) and completed by Fa-tsang(br) (643-712) in the middle of the T'ang dynasty.

The system consists of a classification of Buddhism into five teachings and ten schools (wu-chiashih-tsung(bs)).

Though it was not as broad as that of T'ien-t'ai, it con- centrated philosophically on the analysis of the perfect interdependence of dharmas (dharma-dhatu-pratityasamutpada, fa-chieh-yuan-chi(bt').



Where the T'ien-t'ai system constitutes a grand combination of philosophical and religious elements, it represents a pioneering analysis of the causality of "dependent origination."

I believe it is a uniquely Chinese formulation, just as that of T'ien-t'ai.

In this paper, however, I shall confine myself to the question:

How and why did Seng Chao's method of dialectic and Chil-i's understanding of sunyata contribute to the contemporary world's philosophical enrichment?



       V. LOGICAL AND DIALECTICAL STRUCTURES



    The Nagarjunian method of dialectic shares the same structural foundation as that of logic and language.

At the time of Nagarjuna Indian logic (Nyaya) nearly reached its full maturation, equipped with a unique theory of syllogistic inference.

It was unique in comparison with the Aristotelian syllogism, but, as some contemporary logicians hold,(26) Indian logic of inference was essentially not different from that of the Chinese logic developed by Mo-tzu, precisely because of two identical procedures in their inferences.

First, both were theorized to bear the dual principles of similar and dissimilar instantiations (anvaya and vyatireka) in Indian logic or the dual methods of agreement (t'ung) and difference (i) in Chinese logic as essential criteria of valid reasoning.

Secondly,both understood that the function of inference is to cognize a given substratum or a subject term by determining its class as being in parallel with similar examples that belong to the same class in terms of a reason-to-conclusion relation.

The only minor difference between the two is that the Indian syllogism requires similar as well as dissimilar examples at all times for deduction, whereas the Mohist formula calls for an established model form (hsiao(bu)) for valid deduction, upon which a given reason ought to be in agreement.




    Hsiao means "to imitate, " to be "similar to, " "efficacious, " "to yield the expected result," or "to verify." Hu Shih translated this important Neo-Mohist logical term as "deduction" or "deductive reasoning;" i.e., "an inference to be deduced from a hsiao or a mold."

He translated the passage of the definition of hsiao as follows:(27)


    The ]]hsiao\\ or reasoning from a mold consists of setting up
    the form (fa(by)). That which is modeled after is that
    which is to be set up as the form. When the cause or reason
    conforms (t'ung) to the hsiao or mold, it is right [i.e.,
    the method of agreement]. When it does not conform (i) to
    the hsiao, it is false" [the method of difference] .

    Although the Mohist deductive reasoning requires no dual instantiation, since the reasoner ought to parallel a given object of deduction with a model form, it is evident that whatever model form to which the reasoner refers for his inference must be one that has already been well established in convention through the method of induction, i.e., on the basis of the methods of agreement and difference.

    The fact that the dual principles of similarity and dissimilarity or that of agreement and difference are commonly found in Indian and Chinese logic suggests that the inferential process of the mind is universal despite the difference of cultural and linguistic forms, and that they are essential to the symbolic process of the mind.

For instance, in order for a child to be able to call an animal a cow, he or she must know the convention according to which a certain group of animals with a set of similar properties, like a dewlap, is called a "cow."

The process that underlies the child's mind ought to be the process of affirming similar objects and denying dissimilar objects such as, horses, and while doing so, he classifies "cows" in contrast to what he has denied.

So, it is clear that the logical context in which a child correctly calls an object a "cow"is based on

(l) the dual rules of similar (anvaya) and dissimilar instantiations (vyatireka) or agreement (t'ung) and difference (i) and on

(2) the clear distinction of the class boundary between the two contrary groups of things (e.g., a cow" and a 'horse or non-cow" in the case of naming; and "a kitchen having smoke and fire and "a water tank neither having fire nor smoke" in the case of inference).

This is what I call the logical context of syllogistic inference



    Hu Shih pointed out that the Confucian contribution to logic was the discovery of "name" or "predicables" (ming(bw)) while the Mohist contribution to logic was the discovery of "subject" or the "predicated" (shih(p)) .

briefly mentioned before, Mo-tzu defined the subject term as "that by which something is said (about something) and the predicate term "that about which something is said."

When two universals are linked in proper sequence in reference to this subject term, there arises a meaningful statement or proposition.

The process, which links these two parts of a sentence, is structurally tile logical context in which the dual processes are clearly separated.

    Language is a system of symbols, semantically agreed upon for their denotation and for their syntactical stringing into a sentence, and stands in the middle between the spheres of nature and mind.

From times immemorial the human race has evolved the use of language as the primary tool to depict the world of experiences in abstraction and to communicate them with fellow humans.

Irrespective of whether a person is Japanese, Chinese, Indian, or English, every word of language, every common name, expresses the recognition of a class.

In fact, the process of classifying things and that of linking words, phrases, or sentences in the use of language is so common that it is performed in most cases unconsciously and spontaneously.

Then, what is the role of Buddhist dialectic? How is it related to this structural foundation of logic?

    Analyzing Nagarjuna`s dialectical treatises over and over again, I am increasingly convinced that one primary principle that underlies all of his reducrio ad absurdum arguments rasonga-vakyn)is the dialectical contrxr in which the dual instantiations (anvaynandvyarireka) are simultaneously applied to one and the same spatio-temporal sphere in reference.

The following is the gist of his argument that appears in the Vigrahavyavartani (karika36-39).'"

    Since an illumining light (a candle light) and the state
    of darkness are two opposite agents, wherever there is
    light, there



    cannot be the state of darkness, and vice versa. It
    follows that although conventional knowledge leads us to
    believe that these two may have contact somewhere, there
    is no possibility at all for their contact.

    The argument conveys to the reader two things: (I)It is impossible for two different things to be a referent at one and the same place and time, likewise for two contrary or contradictory concepts to be applied to one and the same referent.

This is correct from the point of view of the logical context. (2) Despite this convention, Nagarjuna reminds the reader of the fact that convention itself violates this rule, so that the process of naming (i.e., denoting an object by name) as well as the process of syntactical linkage of a subject with its predicate) is found to be ultimately based on the dialectical context.

     His dialectical argument gradually compels the reader to become aware that our conventions-"light illumines darkness," "wisdom dispels ignorance," and so forth-though apparently meaningful, are based on the juxtaposition of two conceptually contrary or exclusive statements, namely, "light illumines darkness," and "darkness obstructs illumination."

This means that convention is invariably anchored in the dialectical context where similar and dissimilar instantiations (anvaya and vyotireka) are simultaneously referred to at one and the same spatio-temporal sphere.

Here, two logically distinct classes of entities are no longer held separate in thought but coalesced into one, though empirically impossible and logically meaningless.

As a result, there comes into being a dual natured referent, e.g., something that is both "simultaneously existent and nonexistent"


    In other words, the dialectical procedure compels us to realize that every symbolic usage (i.e., naming an entity or classifying a similar instance) is concurred with its contrary (i.e., naming an opposite or classifying a dissimilar instance) in itself.

It is because of this reason that in order to explain the insight of sunyata, Nagarjuna and Mahayana Buddhists in general used a class of metaphors that exemplify dual natured entities such as magic, sky-newer, sand dreams.


    Just suppose that we are listening to an on-going speech, in which phonemes, words, and sentences are incessantly coming and going.

Catching a series of rapid sounds our mind instantaneously configurates them into a word, a series of words into a sentence, and a series of sentences into a unified understanding.

It is within this dynamic flow of speech or thought also that we cannot deny the on-going dual operations of positive and negative instantiations at every moment of consciousness, which vigorous logical reflection alone can abstract a-posteriori.

Now we can define the dialectical context in terms of two conditions.

The first condition is

(1) that the dual operations of anvaya and vyatireka are intuited to be present at every moment of consciousness in terms of linguistic symbols;

this is called the juxtaposition of the contraries secondly, (2) that these two operations in turn refer the two contrary meanings to a given moment within the spatio-temporal sphere, forcing the respective referents to coalesce,this is called the dual natured referent.

So, a stream of consciousness, a series of moments linked one to another, is understood to be accomplished within the dialectical context.



VI SENG CHAO'S PARADOXICAL ARGUMENT AND T'IEN-T'AI'S PHILOSOPHY OF SUNYATA



    Although the Mohist school abruptly disappeared from history after the Ch'in dynasty, evidence supports the view that the Mollist text circulated in the Neo-Taoist movement during the 3rd and 4th centuries.(29)Accordingly, some of the Taoist scholars may have been acquainted with the Mohist logical theory.

In another article I treated the Madhyamaka treatise by Seng Chao (384-413),a Taoist before being converted to Buddhism, and demonstrated his paradoxical method of dialectic that could have been aided by his knowledge of the Mohist logical treatise.

(30)First, his method of dialectic is not the form of reductio ad absurdum argument on which Indian masters mainly relied, but almost entirely a paradoxical form of argument. Secondly, he employed the most important technical term of the Mohist, hsiao, in the treatise, Chao-lun.

Though his use occurred only once toward the end of the last article, "Nirvana is No-naming" (Nieh-p'an-wu-ming-lun(bx)), (31) there is good reason to believe, from the view point of the textual context, that his usage of the term exhibits his knowledge of the Mohist method of deduction. Several examples are worth repeating here.

From childhood, we learn the use of language through listening to others, observing their behavior, and testing out the efficacy of its usage by ourselves.

Along with these experiences we acquire a mind ingrained with the conviction that things exist in the way in which language depicts them.

Seng-chao s paradoxical method of argument deals with such a fixation of our mind by forcing the reader to face a maze of paradoxes one after another.

Yet, at the end of each argument he shows that the dual members of each paradox invariably refer to one and the same reference.



    For example, if we want to express the real (chen(by)), we go against convention (su(bz) .

If we follow convention, we fail to express the real...

When poeple say that things are "abiding" (chu(ca) ) , I say that they are "gone" (chu(cb))Whentheysaythat things are "gone", 1 say that they are "abiding."

Although "gone" and "abiding" are different in expression, what they mean points to the same referent.

    The fact that Seng-chao was clearly aware of the dialectical context can perhaps be best demonstrated by referring to the final passages that appear in his essay, "Whatever is Unreal is Emptiness" (pu-chen-k'unglun(cc)).


    The expression "existent" (yu(cd) )refers only to a metaphorical existent (chia-yu(ce) ), so distinguishes it from "not-nothing"(fei-wu(cj)).

By the expression "nothing"(wu(cg) ) wedistinguishwhatis "not-existent" (fei-yu(ch)).

Though the referential fact is one, the expressions are two.

    We want to say that dharmas exist, but their existence is not a "real production" (fei-chen-sheng(ci)).

Wewanttosaythat dharmas do not exist, but phenomenal forms (shih-hsiang(aJ) ) arealreadyconfigurated.

Phenomenal forms cannot be said to be "identical with tnothing" (pu-chiwu(ck) ),butweonlysaythatanythingunreal (fei-chen(cl))isnotareal existent (fei-shih-yu(cm)).

It follows that the meaning of 'emptiness of whatever is unreal' is thus revealed.


    Accordingly, the large Prajnaparamita-sutra (ta-p'in-pan-joching(ch))says: "Dharmas are metaphorically called unreal' (chia-hao-pu-chen(cq))just as a magically created man is." For we cannot say that there is no magically created man, but only that such is not a real man (fei-chenjen(cp)).


     The Buddhist insight into sunyata does not offer any political alternatives for either the pobitical visions of the school of Confucian traditionalism or of Mohist utilitarian pragmatism.

Nor does it provide any additional definitions or forms to add to the Mohist logic or logic in general.

Their insight into sunyata, however, proposes to critically examine the use of symbols as well as, the logical and linguistic processes of the mind, as exemplified in Seng Chao's treatise.


    A century and a half after Seng Chao, there arose a number of Chinese Buddhist schools on both sides of the political division of North and South, among which the T'ien-t'ai school was foremost.

As briefly mentioned before, Chih-i constructed his system of thought ultimately on the three Nagarjunian concepts of sunyata, prajnapti, and modhyama (san-kuan(cq) ) .

Of the four successive levels of Buddhist doctrines which he classified in his system, Chih-i placed the threefold Nagarjunian insight into the highest and perfect teaching (yuan-chiao).(32)


According to the T'ien-t'ai master the perfect teaching is explained as follows:(33)



    The term yuan-chiao is identical with yuan-miaos ("perfect and wondrous") , yian-man(ct) (uperfectand fulfilled") , yuanchi(cu) ("perfectandcomplete") , '"yuan-tun(cv)" ("perfectandabrupt"),and is considered as the highe st theory in Mahayana Buddhism which exchaustively teaches the true form of the dharma-world (dharmadhatu) andleaves nothing hidden or untaught.

Yuan-chiao explains all phenomena with the truth of pu-tanchung(cw)or Not mere middle, " which means (1)Chi-k'ung(cx),



    "direct identity with emptiness'. (sunyata)

(2) Chi-chia
    (cy)", direct identity with linguistic convention
    (prajnapti) and

(3) Chi-chung(cz), "direct identity with
    Middle Path (madhyama)."


    This means that every and all phenomena are initially identified directly with dependent origination secondly, they are directly identified with emptiness; third, they are directly identified with linguistic convention; fourth, they are directly identified with the Middle.

So the four categories of theoretical teachings represent a system of gradual perfection of the causal insight of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) andare designed to enable practitioners to eventually attain the middle domain where phenomenal occurrences are viewed with an entirely different significance relative to their initial meanings.

In this regard, philosophical culmination becomes religious salvation.

    In the initial stage of teaching, innumerable phenomena are viewed through the insight of dependent origination as arising and perishing due to the state of human defilement and delusion.

In the last, perfected stage of teaching, however, imbued with the insight of 'sunyata, myriads of phenomena or human differentiations are identified with the ultimate true state of things as they are (chen-jo-shih-hsiang(da) , tattvasyalaksanam)perfectly free, unobstructed, and harmonious.

This is the ultimate realization of the middle path in the system of Mahayana Buddhism as intuited and constructed by the great T'ien-t'ai master, Chih-i.



                VII. CONCLUSION:

     CHINESE BUDDHISM AND ITS CONTRIBUTION



    'Sakyamuni Buddha did not express his religious doctrine in terms of 'sunyata, but rather by (1)dependentorigination (pratityasamutpada or yuan-ch'i(bc) or Yin-yuan-sheng-ch'i (db))and(2)the middle path (madhyamarga, madhyama-pratipador chung-tao (bf)).

Severalcenturies later, a group of Mahayana texts --the Prajnnaparamitasutras (Pan-jo-ching(dc) ) and Buddhavatamsaka-sutras (Hua-yen-ching(dd)-introduced the doctrine of sunyata.

By the middle of the second century A.D., this was further consolidated by Nagarjuna, the foremost Mahayana philosopher, through his dialectical treatises, among which is the definitive Mulamadhyamakakarika or the Middle Treatise (Chung-lun(de)).

    As referred to before, Nagarjuna defined the original insight of dependent origination in the Middle Treatise by equating it with sunyata (k'ung-hsing) , prajnapti (chia-she(df)),and madhyama (chung-tao),thusaccomplishing the linkage of dependent origination and madhyama.

Very early on these four concepts became the primary objects of inquiry for Chinese Buddhists from the time of Seng Chao to that of Chih-i of the T'ien-t'ai school and Chi-tsang of the San-lun school.

According to Seng Chao and Chih-i, through the insights of sunyata and prajnapti every phenomenon (vyavahara) inthe world of convention can eventually be affirmed to pertain to the nature of transcendence (paramartha,chen-ti(dg)orsheng-i-ti(dl)') in the middle (chung).

This middle domain, one might say, is like a locus, without space or time, where the empirical (laukikavyavahara-satya, su-ti(di) and the transcendent (paramartha-satya, chen-ti) are said to interact as identical (t'ung), while at the same time being different (i).

The question now is: What does this religious commentary mean from the logical and linguistic point of view?



    Nagarjuna as well as Seng Chao invariably introduced the concepts of "secular" (su) and "true" (chen)respectively referring to the conventional nature (vyavaharasatya) andthe transcendent (paramarthasatya).

They invariably juxtaposed two contrary statements in the dialectical context, resulting in a referent to the dual natures, i.e., "something is existent while non-existent," "something is gone (ch'u)while being present (chu) " "light (ming(dj) ) is identified with darkness(an(dk))while being different from it," and so on.


    Language is the medium par excellence for the formation of culture because it depicts, prescribes, and sustains all forms of behavioral patterns that make up and involve all subjective and objective social institutions.

Simultaneously, cultural forms reinforce the ways language is used.

Though symbols may serve to liberate the human mind for universal communication, more often than not they create bondage and prejudice, interfering with proper communication and mutual understanding.

In this sense, even rational and logical thinking often reflects a particular form of culture and convention.

An ideology is defined as a systematic body of concepts about human life and culture or systematically integrated assertions, theories, and aims that constitute a socio-political program. As experienced by all of us, the twentieth century has manifested a variety of ideologies.

Today, when the era of ideological confrontation has just ended,there has begun an era of uncertainty accompanied by amorphous, even sanguine, confrontations among different ethnic societies and cultures, including those with different religious beliefs.

These conflicts are creating far more formidable human problems precisely because of their irrational nature.



    The crucial point is how one should deal with the force of a mind tied down to a particular form of ideology, culture, religion, ethnicity or race. How could that mind, compartmentalized within one form or another, be opened to what lies beyond its own culture?

Although Buddhist dialectic or the insight of 'sunyata shares the same foundattion as that of logic and language, it indeed appears to demolish the very foundation of logic and language by juxtaposing contrary predications and thereby inducing a dual-natured referent.

As evident in the T'ien-t'ai philosophy, however, the Buddhist insight does not repudiate the empirical world (shih-hsiang(dl))where the symbolic system operates, but simultaneously accepts the workings of symbols as they are (chia-she)from the transcendental point of view (i.e.based on sunyata).

Yet it repudiates the underlying mental force that engenders linguistic behavior and culture formation, again in terms of sunyata.

The insight of sunyata counters the referential force of the mind directed toward its object of reference by its ultimately dual nature, and thus counters the tendentious or purposive force of the mind that links one symbol to another in terms of its ultimate self-contradiction.



    What is the characteristic of Chinese Buddhism that is uniquely distinguishable from the Indian counterpart?

There should be no difference basically between Indian and Chinese Buddhism insofar as it is concerned with those fundamental insights of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada) emptiness ('sunyata) , linguistic practicality (prajnapti) , and the middle path(madhyama).

Nevertheless, there is a degree of difference between the practical forms of the method resorted to and the theoretical content of ultimate realization.

    First, the reason that Seng Chao resorted to his own paradoxical method of argument rather than the reducto ad absurdum argument of Indian masters can be traced in part to the non-inflectional mono-syllabic language and the use of ideographic characters of Chinese language.

In part it can also be traced to the influence of the Mohist system of logic, especially the application of hsiao and placing an importance on subject terms.


    Secondly, the T'ien-t'ai philosophical system accomplished a total bridging between the phenomenal (shih(bo) ) and transcendent (1i(o) )inpracticaldailylifein terms of the Nagarjunian threefold truth (i.e.,kungchia-chung(dm))whereas in Indian Buddhist systems, the state of the phenomenal, mundane existence, was not totally identified, except in theory, with ultimate transcendence in the way Chinese Buddhists accomplished.

   The practical mentality anchored in factuality (shih(p)) is an important asset of Chinese Buddhist religiosity and so is the harmonious orientation exhibited in theorization of facts, both of which are evidenced in the T'ien-t'ai theory of harmonious permeation of all phenomena in terms of the threefold transcendent truth" (yuan-jung-san-ti(dn) .

The Chinese Buddhist contribution to Chinese philosophy is that while accepting the Confucian and Mohist logical thought, they demonstrated why the ultimate foundation of these two theories ought to be perceived from the standpoint of the Buddhist insight of dependent origination and to review their respective theories from the transcendental view of middle path, namely, in terms of sunyata and prajnapti.

As this twofold Buddhist insight contributed to the history of Chinese philosophy, I believe it can also contribute to the understanding and amelioration of contemporary world problems.

The process is painfully slow, but it is time for contemporary thinkers to begin to examine insights and events that have moved and molded a culture to supreme heights - in this case, Chinese Buddhism which peaked during the T'ang Dynasty.


              NOTES

1. Hu-shih(do), The Development of fhe Logical Methood in Ancient China, Shang hai: The Oriental Book Co., 1928.


2. As to the meaning of "pre-linguirtic phases, , see Ichimura's "Sunyata and Pradigrn-Shift: Dialogue between Buddhism and Science' included in Sramana Vidya Studies in Buddhism. Prof. Jagannafh Upadhyaya Commemoration Volume I, Sarnath, Varanasi, India: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies 1987, pp.81-100.

3. Cf.Hu Shih, op.cit., p.47.
4. Ibid., p.65.

5. Cf. A.C Graham: The Later Mohist Logic ond Seience: Hong kong: Chinese University Press, 1978; p.12. 6. Cf.ibid., p.13, 7. Ibid, p.8.
8. Hu Shih,op. cit., p.50.

9. Ibid., pp.48-49.
10. Ibid., p. 67 Also see Herbert Fingarette: Confucius -- the Secular as Sacred, Harper Torhbook, 1972, esp., the concept of li in Confucius' thought. 11 Hu Shih,op.cit., p.64. 12 Ibid., p.67.

13. Ibid., p.93.
14. Ibid, and also Graham, op. cit., p.40. Graham especially calls attention to the Mohist introduction of the tz'u (dp) or "sentence or proposition 'for the first time distinguished from the name. He states: The distinction, grammatically less marked in Chinese than in Indo-European languages, seems to have attracted attention only after it was noticed that "knowing is different from having a pictorial idea," and with this discovery, "the Mohist's attention shifts to the similarities and differences, not between objects or names, but between the propositions by which we describe."

15 Hu Shih, ibid., p.93 ; Also Cf to the above note and its follow-up, in Graham, ibid., p.40. 16. Cf. G. Cardona, "Anvaya and Vyatireka in Indian Grammar," The Adyar Library Bulletin, 31-32 (1967-68), pp. 313-352. 17. Cf. Hu Shih, op. cit., p.99; also Graham, op. cit., pp. 470-473.

18. Cf. S Ichimura: "On the Paradoxical Method of the Chinese Madhyamikas: Seng-chao and the Chao-lun Treatise" Journal of Chinese Philosophy

19 (1992): pp. 51-71. 19. Of there five-membered statements, Dignaga eliminated initially the Nigamana (conclusion) and Upanaya (application of concomitance or vyapti) on the grounds that the former is a mere repetition of the pratijna (thesis) and that the latter is only a pedagogical indication of the qualities of the valid hetu.

20. Dignaga's refutation of Hindu Nyaya logic on this matter is quoted byVacaspati Misra inhis Nyayavarttikatatparyatika., p. 169

(24) - p. 180 (10). Cf. Vidyabhusana History of lndian Logic, pp. 281-82. 21. Ibid. 22. The italics are this writer's.

23. Cf. Har Dayal: The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature (originally published in London, 1932; Motilal Banarsidass, 1970) pp. 248 ff.

24. The Chao-lun or The Treatise of Seng-Chao consists of four short essays and two epistles written on Buddhist doctrines regarded as the earliest extant Chinese Madhyamika text composed by the native Chinese mind. 1 fasc., Taisho Daizokyo 45,(No. 1858), p. 150 ff. Sec Ichimura, op. cit.

25. Verse 18 in Ch.24 reads as follows: yah pratityasamutpadah sunyatam tam pracaksmahe/sa prajaptir upadaya pratipat saiva madhyama // and can be translated: "That which has arisen through dependent origination, we call it as Emptiness; it is a linguistic convention based on [causal] configuration, it is indeed the middle path." Cf. alternative translations, such as, by K.Inada in his Nagarjuna: A Translation of His Mulamadhyamikakarika [[[Tokyo]]:

  

Hokuseido Press, 1970], or by J. Takakusu in The EssenTinls of Buddhist Philosophy. (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1947). p 129.

26. Cf. Janusz Chmielewski, "Notes on Early Chinese Logic" (I-IV) ,Rocznik Orientalistyczny especially, No.III(1963).

27. Hu Shih, op. cit., p. 96. Graham, translating hsiao as "exemplifying." quotes the Mohist definition of hsiao from its text along with his translation in his work, op. ci., p.470 and gives his translation as follows: 'Some' is not all ['stone' when broken up].

The loan-named [Ch'in horse'] is not now so. An example ['pillar'] is a standard for being deemed such-and-such ['wood']: the thing exemplified is the standard by which the example is deemed suchand-such. Therefore if something coincides with an example, it is this thing, and if it does not it is not; this is exemplifying." (p. 471)

28. Cf.Ichimura, loc. cit., p.57.

29. Cf.A.C.Graham, op.cit., p.66. 30. See footnote 18 above.

31. Although Nieh p'an-wu-ming-lun(bx) was translated in that article as the "Treatise that Nirvana is nameless."I am more convinced now that the title should be translated as "Treatise that Nirvana is No-naming" in accordance with the foregoing analysis.

32. The perfect reading can be explained in contrast to those ranked below it. The readings are dedescribed from lower to higher here. (1) Tsang-chiao(dq) or the practical teaching concerned with the three realms of existence, comprising the teaching of the Sutra-pitaka, all doctrines of Hinayana schools; (2) T'ung-chiao(dr) or the theoretical teaching concerned with the three relams of existence, comprising the teachings common to the three vehicles and the basic Mahayana teaching; (3) Pieh-chiao(ds) or the practical teaching concerned with that which is beyond the three realms of existence, comprising purely Mahayana teachings specially opened to bodhisattvas as to the doctrine of sunyata and middle path; (4) Yuan-chiao or the theoretical teaching concerned with that which is beyond the three realms of existence, comprising the Middle path as noumenon, perfectly harmonious, theoretically and practically.

33. Cf. Bruno Petzold, The Classification of Buddhism, Bukkyo Kyohan, comprising The Classification of Buddhist Docfrines in India,China, and Japan; Vol. I, Pt. 4: Tendai Doctrine, Ch.12∫3,4 [Edited by S.Ichimura, (Wiesbaden, Germany; Otto Harrassowoitz, 1994]and J Takakusu: op. cit., pp..




133-34. Takakusu translates "perfect permeation" as "one-in
 -all all-in-one"(i.e., one element contains all
 elements) .Chih-i, Ssu-chiao-i(dt)[[[Taisho]] 46
 (no.1929),esp.pp.760-769].


CHINESE GLOSSARY

a 墨子 p 實 ae 布施 b 孔子 q 故 af 持戒 c 周 r 同 ag 忍 d 秦 s 異 ah 精進 e 漢 t 明帝 ai 襌定 f 魯 u 教判 aj 智慧 g 君子 v 教相判釋 ak 十波羅蜜 h 樂 w 空性 al 方便 i 禮 x 有自性 am 願 j 兼愛 y 菩薩乘 an 力 k 攻 z 聲門乘 ao 智 l 異義 aa 菩薩道 ap 善巧方便 m 一同天下之義 ab 菩薩行 aq 鳩摩羅什 n << 春秋 >> ac 六度 ar 僧肇 o 理 ad 六波羅蜜 as << 肇論 >>





at 智顗 bo 事 cj 事象 au 天台宗 bp 杜順 ck 不即無 av 三論宗 bq 智嚴 cl 非真 aw 吉藏 br 法藏 cm 非實有 ax 五時八教 bs 五教一宗 cn << 大品般若經 >> ay 化儀四教 bt 法界緣起 co 假號不真 az 化法四教 bu 效 cp 非真人 ba 一念三千 bv 法 cq 三觀 bb 圓融三諦 bw 名 cr 圓教 bc 緣起 bx 涅槃無名論 cs 圓妙 bd 空 by 真 ct 圓滿 be 假 bz 俗 cu 圓極 bf 中道 ca 住 cv 圓頓 bg 龍樹 cb 去 cw 不單中 bh << 中論 >> cc "不真空論" cx 即空 bi 中 cd 有 cy 即假 bj 華嚴 ce 假有 cz 即中 bk 十玄緣起 cf 非 da 真如實相 bl 性 cg 無 db 因緣生起 bm 理 ch 非有 dc << 般若經 >> bn 相 ci 非真生 dd << 華嚴經 >>






de << 中論 >>
df 假設
dg 真諦
dh 勝義諦
di 俗諦
dj 明
dk 暗
dl 事象
dm 空假中
dn 圓融三諦
do 胡適
dp 辭
dq 藏教
dr 通教
ds 別教
dt << 四教義 >>

Source

ccbs.ntu.edu.tw