Difference between revisions of "Manual of Pramana - Reading Seven: Contradiction and Relationship"
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− | The following reading consists of the Presentation of the Concepts of Contradiction and Relationship (‘Gal-’brel gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Intermediate Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam ‘bring-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama. | + | The following reading consists of the Presentation of the Concepts of Contradiction and Relationship (‘Gal-’brel gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the [[Intermediate]] [[Path]] of {{Wiki|Reasoning}} (Rigs-lam ‘bring-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the [[Master]] Tutor Purbuchok Jampa [[Tsultrim Gyatso]] (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the [[Dalai Lama.]] |
− | Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each. | + | Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the [[Tibetan]] text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
− | Here is the first section: an explanation of the concepts of contradiction and relationship. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal. | + | Here is the first section: an explanation of the [[Wikipedia:concept|concepts]] of contradiction and relationship. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then {{Wiki|present}} our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal. |
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | ||
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Anything which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing is always something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing. | Anything which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing is always something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing. | ||
− | Consider the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing. | + | Consider the exclusion of all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing. |
So is being it then [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]? | So is being it then [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]? | ||
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Because being it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]. | Because being it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]. | ||
− | [It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.] |
Suppose you say it’s not correct. | Suppose you say it’s not correct. | ||
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It is so correct, | It is so correct, | ||
− | Because (1) it [the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing] is something distinct from a working thing, and (2) there exists no one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing] and a working thing. | + | Because (1) it [the exclusion of all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing] is something {{Wiki|distinct}} from a working thing, and (2) there [[exists]] no one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing] and a working thing. |
− | [The first part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is something distinct froma working thing.] | + | [The first part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing is something {{Wiki|distinct}} froma working thing.] |
Suppose you say that the first part of our statement is not correct. | Suppose you say that the first part of our statement is not correct. | ||
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Consider this same thing. | Consider this same thing. | ||
− | It is so distinct frombeing a working thing, | + | It is so {{Wiki|distinct}} frombeing a working thing, |
− | Because it is an unchanging thing. | + | Because it is an [[unchanging]] thing. |
− | [The second part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that there exists no one thing which is both the exclusion all that is not an unchanging thing, and also a working thing.] | + | [The second part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that there [[exists]] no one thing which is both the exclusion all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing, and also a working thing.] |
Suppose you say that the second part of our statement is not correct. | Suppose you say that the second part of our statement is not correct. | ||
− | Consider an unchanging thing. | + | Consider an [[unchanging]] thing. |
− | It is so true that there exists no one thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not it, and also a working thing, | + | It is so true that there [[exists]] no one thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not it, and also a working thing, |
− | Because it is unchanging. | + | Because it is [[unchanging]]. |
− | [Then I agree to your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing] | + | [Then I agree to your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing] |
− | Consider the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing. It is not so true, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing, | + | Consider the exclusion of all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing. It is not so true, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing, |
Because being it is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing. | Because being it is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing. | ||
− | [It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an [[unchanging]] thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.] |
Suppose you say it’s not correct. | Suppose you say it’s not correct. | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing. | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing. |
− | And this is because an unchanging thing is just such a thing. | + | And this is because an [[unchanging]] thing is just such a thing. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | ||
− | If something is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging, then it is always something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing. | + | If something is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is [[unchanging]], then it is always something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing. |
Consider the exclusion of all that is not a pillar. | Consider the exclusion of all that is not a pillar. | ||
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So is it then [something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing]? | So is it then [something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing]? | ||
− | Because it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging]. | + | Because it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is [[unchanging]]]. |
− | [It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging.] | + | [It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is [[unchanging]].] |
Suppose you say it’s not correct. | Suppose you say it’s not correct. | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
− | Because it is (1) distinct from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not exist a single thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing. | + | Because it is (1) {{Wiki|distinct}} from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not [[exist]] a single thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing. |
− | [It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is (1) distinct from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not exist a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is (1) {{Wiki|distinct}} from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not [[exist]] a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing.] |
Suppose you say that it’s not correct. | Suppose you say that it’s not correct. | ||
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Consider a pillar. | Consider a pillar. | ||
− | It is so true that there does not exist a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, | + | It is so true that there does not [[exist]] a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, |
Because anything which is the exclusion of all that is not it [a pillar] is always such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing. | Because anything which is the exclusion of all that is not it [a pillar] is always such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing. | ||
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It is so this way, | It is so this way, | ||
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also a changing thing; | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also a changing thing; |
And this is true because a pillar itself is just such a thing. | And this is true because a pillar itself is just such a thing. | ||
− | This reason is easy to accept. | + | This [[reason]] is easy to accept. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing, then it is always such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing. | If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing, then it is always such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing. | ||
− | Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher. | + | Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher. |
So is it then [such that being it is not contradictory with being something that is not contradictory to being a working thing]? | So is it then [such that being it is not contradictory with being something that is not contradictory to being a working thing]? | ||
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Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing]. | Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing]. | ||
− | [It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.] |
Suppose you say it’s not correct. | Suppose you say it’s not correct. | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher] and also a changing thing; | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher] and also a changing thing; |
− | And this is because the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is just such a thing. | + | And this is because the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher is just such a thing. |
If you say it’s not correct, the answer is easy. | If you say it’s not correct, the answer is easy. | ||
− | Suppose though you agree to our original statement, [saying that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing]. | + | Suppose though you agree to our original statement, [saying that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing]. |
− | Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher. | + | Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher. |
It is so not something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing, | It is so not something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing, | ||
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Because it is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing. | Because it is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing. | ||
− | [It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.] |
Suppose you say that it’s not correct. | Suppose you say that it’s not correct. | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
− | Because (1) it is distinct from that which is such that being it is not contradictory with being a working thing, and (2) there exists no one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher] and also something such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing. | + | Because (1) it is {{Wiki|distinct}} from that which is such that being it is not contradictory with being a working thing, and (2) there [[exists]] no one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher] and also something such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing. |
− | [It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that there exists no one thing which is both it and also something such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher is such that there [[exists]] no one thing which is both it and also something such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.] |
Suppose you say that it’s not correct. | Suppose you say that it’s not correct. | ||
− | Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher. | + | Consider the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher. |
− | It is so true that there exists no one thing which is both it and also something | + | It is so true that there [[exists]] no one thing which is both it and also something |
such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing, | such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing, | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing; | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing; |
− | And this is true because | + | And this is true because “[[knowable thing]]” is just such a thing. |
[Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which does no work is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.] | [Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which does no work is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.] | ||
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Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | ||
− | If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a existing thing, then it is always such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing. | + | If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a [[existing]] thing, then it is always such that being it is contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing. |
Consider a thing which is not made. | Consider a thing which is not made. | ||
− | Is it then [such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing]? | + | Is it then [such that being it is contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing]? |
− | Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a existing thing]. | + | Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a [[existing]] thing]. |
− | [It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a existing thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a [[existing]] thing.] |
Suppose you say it’s not correct. | Suppose you say it’s not correct. | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [that is, a thing which is not made] and (2) such that being it is contradictory to being an existing thing; | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both (1) it [that is, a thing which is not made] and (2) such that being it is contradictory to being an [[existing]] thing; |
− | And this is true because the two of unchanging things and changing things is just such a thing. | + | And this is true because the two of [[unchanging]] things and changing things is just such a thing. |
− | [Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which is not made is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.] | + | [Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which is not made is such that being it is contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing.] |
Suppose you agree to our original statement. | Suppose you agree to our original statement. | ||
− | It is not so, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing, | + | It is not so, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing, |
Because it is such that being it is not contradictory to being just such a thing. | Because it is such that being it is not contradictory to being just such a thing. | ||
− | [It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being it is not contradictory to being an unchanging thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being it is not contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing.] |
Suppose you say it’s not correct. | Suppose you say it’s not correct. | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
− | Because anything which is an unchanging thing is such that it is one thing which is both itself and unchanging. | + | Because anything which is an [[unchanging]] thing is such that it is one thing which is both itself and [[unchanging]]. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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Sharing a relationship with it is so sharing a relationship with it such that to be it is to automatically be it, | Sharing a relationship with it is so sharing a relationship with it such that to be it is to automatically be it, | ||
− | Because sharing a relationship with it is (1) distinct from it, and (2) sharing a relationship with it exists. | + | Because sharing a relationship with it is (1) {{Wiki|distinct}} from it, and (2) sharing a relationship with it [[exists]]. |
[Then I agree with your original statement: sharing a relationship with a working thing is such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing.] | [Then I agree with your original statement: sharing a relationship with a working thing is such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing.] | ||
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It is not so, that it is what shares a relationship with it, | It is not so, that it is what shares a relationship with it, | ||
− | Because it is one example of the truth that the person has no nature of his own. | + | Because it is one example of the [[truth]] that the [[person]] has no [[nature]] of his own. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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Because it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from the working thing. | Because it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from the working thing. | ||
− | Our reason has already been proven. | + | Our [[reason]] has already been proven. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | ||
− | There exists no one thing which is both (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher; and also (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher. | + | There [[exists]] no one thing which is both (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher; and also (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher. |
− | But such a thing does so exist, | + | But such a thing does so [[exist]], |
− | Because the presence of all three of the material qualities for | + | Because the presence of all three of the material qualities for “[[existing]] thing” is just such a thing. |
− | [The "presence of all three of the material qualities" for any particular thing is, as we will see in Class Eight, the definition of its definition. The three material qualities are: (1) generally speaking, the thing is a definition; (2) it does apply to a typical example; and (3) it is the definition of no other thing than what it defines.] | + | [The "presence of all three of the material qualities" for any particular thing is, as we will see in Class Eight, the definition of its definition. The three material qualities are: (1) generally {{Wiki|speaking}}, the thing is a definition; (2) it does apply to a typical example; and (3) it is the definition of no other thing than what it defines.] |
− | [It's not correct to say that the first part of your reason applies to your example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the material qualities for "existing thing" is the kind of thing such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.] | + | [It's not correct to say that the first part of your [[reason]] applies to your example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the material qualities for "[[existing]] thing" is the kind of thing such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher.] |
− | But the first part of our reason is correct, | + | But the first part of our [[reason]] is correct, |
− | Because there exists no one thing which is both (1) it and (2) also something such that being it is contradictory with being that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher; | + | Because there [[exists]] no one thing which is both (1) it and (2) also something such that being it is contradictory with being that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher; |
− | And this is true because “that which can be made an object of the mind,” [which is the definition of "knowable thing",] is something which is such that being it [the presence of all three of the material qualities for "existing thing"] is not contradictory to being it [one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher]. | + | And this is true because “that which can be made an [[object]] of the [[mind]],” [which is the definition of "[[knowable thing]]",] is something which is such that being it [the presence of all three of the material qualities for "[[existing]] thing"] is not contradictory to being it [one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher]. |
− | [It's incorrect to say that the second part of your reason applies to your example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the material qualities for "knowable thing" is the kind of thing such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.] | + | [It's incorrect to say that the second part of your [[reason]] applies to your example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the material qualities for "[[knowable thing]]" is the kind of thing such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher.] |
− | Suppose you say that it’s not correct to say that the second part of our reason applies to our example. | + | Suppose you say that it’s not correct to say that the second part of our [[reason]] applies to our example. |
− | Consider the presence of all three of the material qualities for this same thing. It is so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher, | + | Consider the presence of all three of the material qualities for this same thing. It is so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher, |
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [the presence of all three qualities for "knowable thing"] and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher; | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both (1) it [the presence of all three qualities for "[[knowable thing]]"] and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a [[water]] pitcher; |
− | And this is true because “that which can be made an object of the | + | And this is true because “that which can be made an [[object]] of the [[mind]]” is just such a thing. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | ||
− | There does exist one thing which is a combination of all of the following: (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing; (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing; (3) something which shares a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a working thing; and (4) something which does not share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a working thing. | + | There does [[exist]] one thing which is a combination of all of the following: (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing; (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing; (3) something which shares a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a working thing; and (4) something which does not share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a working thing. |
So is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing then just such a combination? | So is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing then just such a combination? | ||
− | Because (1) there does exist one thing which is all of those and (2) that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination. | + | Because (1) there does [[exist]] one thing which is all of those and (2) that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination. |
− | [The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination.] | + | [The second part of your [[reason]] is not correct: it's not correct to say that that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination.] |
− | Suppose you say that the second part of our reason is not correct. | + | Suppose you say that the second part of our [[reason]] is not correct. |
Consider that which does not share a relationship with a working thing. | Consider that which does not share a relationship with a working thing. | ||
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[It's not correct to say it is just such a combination.] | [It's not correct to say it is just such a combination.] | ||
− | But the reason is what you’ve already said directly. | + | But the [[reason]] is what you’ve already said directly. |
[Then I agree with your original statement: that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.] | [Then I agree with your original statement: that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.] | ||
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But you can’t agree to our original statement, | But you can’t agree to our original statement, | ||
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both not related to it [to a working thing] and which is also not such that being it is contradictory to being the working thing; | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both not related to it [to a working thing] and which is also not such that being it is contradictory to being the working thing; |
[[File:Boo30tbb.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | [[File:Boo30tbb.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | ||
− | And this is true because the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are just such a combination. | + | And this is true because the two of a valid [[perception]] and a [[recollection]] which act as a [[cause]] for a working thing are just such a combination. |
− | [It's not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are just such a combination.] | + | [It's not correct to say that the two of a valid [[perception]] and a [[recollection]] which act as a [[cause]] for a working thing are just such a combination.] |
Suppose you say that it’s not correct. | Suppose you say that it’s not correct. | ||
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They are so, | They are so, | ||
− | Because they are something which is both (1) not related to a working thing, and (2) also such that being themis contradictory to being a working thing. | + | Because they are something which is both (1) not related to a working thing, and (2) also such that being {{Wiki|themis}} contradictory to being a working thing. |
− | [The first part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are not related to the working thing.] | + | [The first part of your [[reason]] is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid [[perception]] and a [[recollection]] which act as a [[cause]] for a working thing are not related to the working thing.] |
− | But the first part of our reason is correct, | + | But the first part of our [[reason]] is correct, |
− | Because they are its cause. | + | Because they are its [[cause]]. |
− | [The second part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are such that being themis contradictory to being a working thing.] | + | [The second part of your [[reason]] is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid [[perception]] and a [[recollection]] which act as a [[cause]] for a working thing are such that being {{Wiki|themis}} contradictory to being a working thing.] |
− | But the second part of our reason is correct, | + | But the second part of our [[reason]] is correct, |
− | Because they are a knowable thing which cannot be. | + | Because they are a [[knowable thing]] which cannot be. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | ||
− | There is no one thing which is all of the following: (1) such that being it is contradictory to being something such that being it is contradictory to being a thing which is unchanging; (2) such that being it is not contradictory with being something such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is unchanging; (3) related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging; and (4) not related to something which is not related to a thing which is unchanging. | + | There is no one thing which is all of the following: (1) such that being it is contradictory to being something such that being it is contradictory to being a thing which is [[unchanging]]; (2) such that being it is not contradictory with being something such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is [[unchanging]]; (3) related to something which is related to a thing which is [[unchanging]]; and (4) not related to something which is not related to a thing which is [[unchanging]]. |
− | But there does exist one thing which is all of the above, | + | But there does [[exist]] one thing which is all of the above, |
− | Because that which is not related to an unchanging thing is just such a thing. | + | Because that which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing is just such a thing. |
− | [It's not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is just such a thing.] | + | [It's not correct to say that that which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing is just such a thing.] |
Suppose you say it’s not correct. | Suppose you say it’s not correct. | ||
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It is so just such a thing, one that combines all four; | It is so just such a thing, one that combines all four; | ||
− | Because it is something which is (1) such that being it is contradictory to being something that is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing; and (2) it is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this [unchanging thing]; it is related to what is related to this [unchanging thing]; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to this [unchanging thing]. | + | Because it is something which is (1) such that being it is contradictory to being something that is such that being it is contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing; and (2) it is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this [[[unchanging]] thing]; it is related to what is related to this [[[unchanging]] thing]; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to this [[[unchanging]] thing]. |
− | [The first part of your reason is not correct: it is incorrect to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is such that being it is contradictory to being something that is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.] | + | [The first part of your [[reason]] is not correct: it is incorrect to say that that which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing is such that being it is contradictory to being something that is such that being it is contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing.] |
− | Suppose you say that the first part of our reason is not correct. | + | Suppose you say that the first part of our [[reason]] is not correct. |
Consider this same thing. | Consider this same thing. | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
− | Because it is (1) distinct from this [thing that is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing], and (2) if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an unchanging thing], then it must be such that being it is not contradictory with being an unchanging thing; | + | Because it is (1) {{Wiki|distinct}} from this [thing that is such that being it is contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing], and (2) if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing], then it must be such that being it is not contradictory with being an [[unchanging]] thing; |
− | And this is true because if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an unchanging thing], then it cannot be distinct from an unchanging thing. | + | And this is true because if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing], then it cannot be {{Wiki|distinct}} from an [[unchanging]] thing. |
− | [The second part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being an unchanging thing; it is related to what is related to an unchanging thing; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to an unchanging thing.] | + | [The second part of your original [[reason]] is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being an [[unchanging]] thing; it is related to what is related to an [[unchanging]] thing; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to an [[unchanging]] thing.] |
− | Suppose you say that the second part of our original reason is not correct. | + | Suppose you say that the second part of our original [[reason]] is not correct. |
− | Consider that which is not related to it [that is, to an unchanging thing]. | + | Consider that which is not related to it [that is, to an [[unchanging]] thing]. |
− | It is so such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being it [an unchanging thing], | + | It is so such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being it [an [[unchanging]] thing], |
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [that is, something which is not related to an unchanging thing], and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being it [an unchanging thing]; | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both (1) it [that is, something which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing], and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being it [an [[unchanging]] thing]; |
− | And this is true because an unchanging thing is just that. | + | And this is true because an [[unchanging]] thing is just that. |
− | [The third part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging.] | + | [The third part of your original [[reason]] is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing is related to something which is related to a thing which is [[unchanging]].] |
− | Suppose you say that the third part of our original reason is not correct. | + | Suppose you say that the third part of our original [[reason]] is not correct. |
− | Consider that which is not related to it [to an unchanging thing]. | + | Consider that which is not related to it [to an [[unchanging]] thing]. |
− | It is so something which is related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging, | + | It is so something which is related to something which is related to a thing which is [[unchanging]], |
− | Because it is (1) distinct from that which is related to it [to a thing which is unchanging], and (2) if there existed no things which were related to it [to a thing which is unchanging], then it could not exist either. | + | Because it is (1) {{Wiki|distinct}} from that which is related to it [to a thing which is [[unchanging]]], and (2) if there existed no things which were related to it [to a thing which is [[unchanging]]], then it could not [[exist]] either. |
− | [The fourth part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is not related to something which is not related to a thing which is unchanging.] | + | [The fourth part of your original [[reason]] is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing is not related to something which is not related to a thing which is [[unchanging]].] |
− | Suppose you say that the fourth part of our original reason is not correct. | + | Suppose you say that the fourth part of our original [[reason]] is not correct. |
− | Consider that which is not related to an unchanging thing. | + | Consider that which is not related to an [[unchanging]] thing. |
It is so true, that it is not related to itself, | It is so true, that it is not related to itself, | ||
− | Because it is an example of a thing which has no nature of its own. | + | Because it is an example of a thing which has no [[nature]] of its own. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | ||
− | There does exist one thing which combines all the following: (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a knowable thing; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing; and (4) something which shares a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a knowable thing. | + | There does [[exist]] one thing which combines all the following: (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a [[knowable thing]]; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a [[knowable thing]]; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a [[knowable thing]]; and (4) something which shares a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a [[knowable thing]]. |
− | So then is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing this kind of combination? | + | So then is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a [[knowable thing]] this kind of combination? |
− | Because (1) there does exist just such a combination, and (2) something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing is not such a combination. | + | Because (1) there does [[exist]] just such a combination, and (2) something which shares a relationship with a [[knowable thing]] is not such a combination. |
− | You have already agreed directly to the first part of our reason. | + | You have already agreed directly to the first part of our [[reason]]. |
Suppose then you say that the second part is not correct. | Suppose then you say that the second part is not correct. | ||
− | Consider something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing. | + | Consider something which shares a relationship with a [[knowable thing]]. |
− | So is it then something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing? | + | So is it then something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a [[knowable thing]]? |
Because it is just such a combination. | Because it is just such a combination. | ||
− | You have already agreed directly to the reason. | + | You have already agreed directly to the [[reason]]. |
But you cannot agree to our original statement here, | But you cannot agree to our original statement here, | ||
− | Because it [something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing] is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this thing; | + | Because it [something which shares a relationship with a [[knowable thing]]] is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this thing; |
− | And this is true because there does exist something which is both (1) it [that is, something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing] and | + | And this is true because there does [[exist]] something which is both (1) it [that is, something which shares a relationship with a [[knowable thing]]] and |
− | (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being that [knowable thing]; | + | (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being that [[[knowable thing]]]; |
− | And this is true because that which is one and the same as a water pitcher is just such a combination. | + | And this is true because that which is one and the same as a [[water]] pitcher is just such a combination. |
− | [Then I agree to your original statement: something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing.] | + | [Then I agree to your original statement: something which shares a relationship with a [[knowable thing]] is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a [[knowable thing]].] |
− | Consider something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing. | + | Consider something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a [[knowable thing]]. |
− | So is it then something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing? | + | So is it then something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a [[knowable thing]]? |
Because it is just such a combination. | Because it is just such a combination. | ||
− | You’ve already agreed directly to the reason. | + | You’ve already agreed directly to the [[reason]]. |
You can’t agree to our original position, | You can’t agree to our original position, | ||
− | Because it [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing] is something which does share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing; | + | Because it [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a [[knowable thing]]] is something which does share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a [[knowable thing]]; |
− | And this is because (1) it is distinct fromsom ething which does share a relationship with a knowable thing, and (2) if the thing with which it shares a relationship ceased to exist, then it would itself cease to exist. | + | And this is because (1) it is {{Wiki|distinct}} fromsom ething which does share a relationship with a [[knowable thing]], and (2) if the thing with which it shares a relationship ceased to [[exist]], then it would itself cease to [[exist]]. |
− | The reason we’ve given is easy to accept. | + | The [[reason]] we’ve given is easy to accept. |
− | Suppose, relative to this same point, someone comes and says: | + | Suppose, [[relative]] to this same point, someone comes and says: |
− | It is so, that there does exist a typical example which incorporates all the conditions stated. | + | It is so, that there does [[exist]] a typical example which incorporates all the [[conditions]] stated. |
− | Because there does exist one thing which is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this same thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this same thing; and (4) something which does share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with this same thing. | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this same thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this same thing; and (4) something which does share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with this same thing. |
Our answer to this is, “It doesn’t necessarily follow.” | Our answer to this is, “It doesn’t necessarily follow.” | ||
− | The reason, by the way, is itself true, for something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination. | + | The [[reason]], by the way, is itself true, for something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination. |
[It's not correct to say that something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination.] | [It's not correct to say that something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination.] | ||
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Because it is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; and (2) it is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being this thing [a pillar], (3) it is something which does not share a relationship with what does share a relationship with this thing [a pillar], and (4) it is something which shares a relationship with what does not share a relationship with this thing [the pillar]. | Because it is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; and (2) it is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being this thing [a pillar], (3) it is something which does not share a relationship with what does share a relationship with this thing [a pillar], and (4) it is something which shares a relationship with what does not share a relationship with this thing [the pillar]. | ||
− | The first and second elements in our reason are easy to accept. | + | The first and second [[elements]] in our [[reason]] are easy to accept. |
Suppose you say that the third is not correct. | Suppose you say that the third is not correct. | ||
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Consider this same thing [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar]. | Consider this same thing [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar]. | ||
− | It is so something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this thing [the pillar], Because it is not necessarily the case that, if something which did have such a relationship ceased to exist, it too would have to cease to exist; | + | It is so something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this thing [the pillar], Because it is not necessarily the case that, if something which did have such a relationship ceased to [[exist]], it too would have to cease to [[exist]]; |
And this is true because a place where there is no pillar is an example of that. | And this is true because a place where there is no pillar is an example of that. | ||
− | Suppose you say that the fourth element in our reason is not correct. | + | Suppose you say that the fourth [[element]] in our [[reason]] is not correct. |
Consider something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar. | Consider something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar. | ||
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It is so something which shares a relationship with something which shares no relationship with a pillar, | It is so something which shares a relationship with something which shares no relationship with a pillar, | ||
− | Because (1) it is distinct from something which shares no relationship with a pillar; and (2) if something which shares no relationship with a pillar ceased to exist, it too would have to cease to exist. | + | Because (1) it is {{Wiki|distinct}} from something which shares no relationship with a pillar; and (2) if something which shares no relationship with a pillar ceased to [[exist]], it too would have to cease to [[exist]]. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
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It is so, | It is so, | ||
[[File:Patanjali.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | [[File:Patanjali.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | ||
− | Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and also a thing which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory. | + | Because there does [[exist]] one thing which is both it, and also a thing which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory. |
And this is because being something which is contradictory is just such a thing. | And this is because being something which is contradictory is just such a thing. | ||
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It is not so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory, | It is not so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory, | ||
− | Because (1) it is distinct from something which is contradictory, and (2) there is no one thing which can be both it and something which is contradictory; | + | Because (1) it is {{Wiki|distinct}} from something which is contradictory, and (2) there is no one thing which can be both it and something which is contradictory; |
And this is because being contradictory is not something which is contradictory. | And this is because being contradictory is not something which is contradictory. | ||
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_______________ | _______________ | ||
− | Here is the second part, where we present our own position. We proceed in two steps, covering the definition of what it is to be in contradiction, and then the different types of contradiction. | + | Here is the second part, where we {{Wiki|present}} our own position. We proceed in two steps, covering the definition of what it is to be in contradiction, and then the different types of contradiction. |
Here is the definition of what it is for two things to be in contradiction: | Here is the definition of what it is for two things to be in contradiction: | ||
− | The two things must (1) be distinct from each other, and then they must be such that (2) it is impossible for any one thing to be both of them. | + | The two things must (1) be {{Wiki|distinct}} from each other, and then they must be such that (2) it is impossible for any one thing to be both of them. |
− | There are two different ways of being in contradiction: contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive; and contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed. | + | There are two different ways of being in contradiction: contradictory in the [[sense]] of being mutually exclusive; and contradictory in the [[sense]] of being diametrically opposed. |
− | The definition of the first of these, to be contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, is as follows: | + | The definition of the first of these, to be contradictory in the [[sense]] of being mutually exclusive, is as follows: |
Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that the presence of one automatically means the absence of the other. | Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that the presence of one automatically means the absence of the other. | ||
− | The two terms “contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive” and “contradictory” refer to the same thing. | + | The two terms “contradictory in the [[sense]] of being mutually exclusive” and “contradictory” refer to the same thing. |
− | Things which are contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive may be further divided into two types: those which contradict each other in this way directly; and those which contradict each other in this way indirectly. | + | Things which are contradictory in the [[sense]] of being mutually exclusive may be further divided into two types: those which contradict each other in this way directly; and those which contradict each other in this way indirectly. |
The definition of things which contradict each other in this way directly is “Two things which conflict with each other directly.” The definition of things which contradict each other in this way indirectly is “Two things which are such that no one thing can be both, but which are not such that one immediately obviates the other.” | The definition of things which contradict each other in this way directly is “Two things which conflict with each other directly.” The definition of things which contradict each other in this way indirectly is “Two things which are such that no one thing can be both, but which are not such that one immediately obviates the other.” | ||
− | A typical example of the first would be something like the two of “working thing” and “a thing which does no work.” A typical example of the second would be “heat” and “coldness,” or else “the state of mind which holds that things have some nature of their own” and “the wisdom which realizes that nothing has a nature of its own.” | + | A typical example of the first would be something like the two of “working thing” and “a thing which does no work.” A typical example of the second would be “heat” and “coldness,” or else “the [[state of mind]] which holds that things have some [[nature]] of their own” and “the [[wisdom]] which realizes that nothing has a [[nature]] of its own.” |
− | Here is the definition of the second kind of contradiction—of things which are contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed: | + | Here is the definition of the second kind of contradiction—of things which are contradictory in the [[sense]] of being diametrically opposed: |
− | Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that each one acts to stop the continued existence of the other. | + | Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that each one acts to stop the continued [[existence]] of the other. |
− | A typical example would be a spiritual antidote and the negative personal quality which it allows you to eliminate. | + | A typical example would be a [[spiritual]] antidote and the negative personal quality which it allows you to eliminate. |
The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that to be the first is to automatically be the other is as follows: | The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that to be the first is to automatically be the other is as follows: | ||
− | Whenever two existing things are such that, to be the first is by nature to be the second, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if the second were to cease to exist—then the first would have to cease to exist as well. | + | Whenever two [[existing]] things are such that, to be the first is by [[nature]] to be the second, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if the second were to cease to exist—then the first would have to cease to [[exist]] as well. |
− | An example would be the relation between a vase and the exclusion of all that is not the vase. | + | An example would be the [[relation]] between a vase and the exclusion of all that is not the vase. |
− | Here is an actual application of the concept. The definition of what it is to share a relationship with “working things” in such a way that to be a particular thing is to automatically be a working thing is “something which is such that to be it is by nature to be a working thing, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if ‘working things’ were to cease to exist, then the particular thing would have to cease to exist as well.” A typical example here would be a water pitcher. | + | Here is an actual application of the {{Wiki|concept}}. The definition of what it is to share a relationship with “working things” in such a way that to be a particular thing is to automatically be a working thing is “something which is such that to be it is by [[nature]] to be a working thing, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if ‘working things’ were to cease to [[exist]], then the particular thing would have to cease to [[exist]] as well.” A typical example here would be a [[water]] pitcher. |
The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that the first has come from the second is as follows: | The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that the first has come from the second is as follows: | ||
− | Whenever two things are such that to be the first is to be the kind of thing which is the result of the second, in such a way that to be the first is not to be, by its very essence, the second. | + | Whenever two things are such that to be the first is to be the kind of thing which is the result of the second, in such a way that to be the first is not to be, by its very [[essence]], the second. |
A typical example would be the relationship of one coming from the other between those things which are a working thing the moment after it, and the original working thing. | A typical example would be the relationship of one coming from the other between those things which are a working thing the moment after it, and the original working thing. | ||
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Here is the final part: eliminating our opponent’s rebuttal. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | Here is the final part: eliminating our opponent’s rebuttal. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim: | ||
− | Consider the two of existence and non-existence. | + | Consider the two of [[existence]] and [[non-existence]]. |
So are these then two things which are discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both? | So are these then two things which are discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both? | ||
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Because they are two things which are contradictory. | Because they are two things which are contradictory. | ||
− | To this we answer, “The statement you gave as your reason is not correct.” | + | To this we answer, “The statement you gave as your [[reason]] is not correct.” |
− | Suppose you do agree [that the two of existence and non-existence were two things which are both discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both]. | + | Suppose you do agree [that the two of [[existence]] and [[non-existence]] were two things which are both discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both]. |
− | Consider the two of existence and non-existence. | + | Consider the two of [[existence]] and [[non-existence]]. |
− | Are they then something which exists? | + | Are they then something which [[exists]]? |
Because they are discrete from one another. | Because they are discrete from one another. | ||
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It is so then a relationship where one thing has come from another, | It is so then a relationship where one thing has come from another, | ||
− | Because it shares a relationship with fire such that it has come from the other. | + | Because it shares a relationship with [[fire]] such that it has come from the other. |
To this we answer, “It doesn’t necessarily follow.” | To this we answer, “It doesn’t necessarily follow.” | ||
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− | Formal logic subject: | + | {{Wiki|Formal logic}} [[subject]]: |
− | Logical Statements Used to Prove an Absence of Something, and the First Category of this Type of Statement | + | [[Logical]] Statements Used to Prove an Absence of Something, and the First Category of this Type of Statement |
− | The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), also by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso. | + | The following selection is from the [[monastic]] textbook entitled An Explanation of the [[Art]] of {{Wiki|Reasoning}} ([[rTags-rigs]]), also by the Tutor of [[His Holiness the Dalai Lama]], Purbuchok Jampa [[Tsultrim Gyatso]]. |
_______________ | _______________ | ||
− | Here thirdly is our discussion of correct reasons of the type used to prove the absence of something. We will proceed in three parts: the definition, an explanation of the divisions, and a description of the valid perception where we confirm hat the definition applies to a typical example. | + | Here thirdly is our [[discussion]] of correct [[reasons]] of the type used to prove the absence of something. We will proceed in three parts: the definition, an explanation of the divisions, and a description of the valid [[perception]] where we confirm hat the definition applies to a typical example. |
− | Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in any particular proof is as follows: | + | Here is the first. The definition of a correct [[reason]] used to prove the absence of something in any particular proof is as follows: |
− | Any reason which is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and (2) such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit version of the thing which is considered the quality to be proven in the particular proof in which it acts as the reason, and also (b) a negative thing. | + | Any [[reason]] which is (1) a correct [[reason]] for the particular proof; and (2) such that there can [[exist]] one thing which is both (a) the explicit version of the thing which is considered the quality to be proven in the particular proof in which it acts as the [[reason]], and also (b) a negative thing. |
− | Correct reasons to prove the absence of something can be divided into two types: correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible [to the particular opponent], and correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is perceptible [to the particular opponent]. | + | Correct [[reasons]] to prove the absence of something can be divided into two types: correct [[reasons]] for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible [to the particular opponent], and correct [[reasons]] for the absence of something involving a thing which is perceptible [to the particular opponent]. |
− | Here is the first. Now there is a sutra where it says, | + | Here is the first. Now there is a [[sutra]] where it says, |
− | No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall. | + | No [[person]] should ever judge another; those who try will fall. |
The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the Commentary with lines such as the following: | The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the Commentary with lines such as the following: | ||
− | In a case where valid perception has yet | + | In a case where valid [[perception]] has yet |
− | To engage in the object, the result obtained | + | To engage in the [[object]], the result obtained |
Is that they don’t: they didn’t engage. | Is that they don’t: they didn’t engage. | ||
− | The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible in any particular proof is as follows: | + | The definition of a correct [[reason]] used to prove the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible in any particular proof is as follows: |
− | Any reason which is first of all a correct reason used to prove the absence of something for the particular proof, and which is secondly such that—even though the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof in which it serves as the reason does generally exist—this thing is imperceptible to the valid perceptions of a person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason. | + | Any [[reason]] which is first of all a correct [[reason]] used to prove the absence of something for the particular proof, and which is secondly such that—even though the thing which is considered the main [[element]] of all which is denied by the proof in which it serves as the [[reason]] does generally exist—this thing is imperceptible to the valid [[perceptions]] of a [[person]] for whom this same [[reason]] fulfills its role in the relationship between the [[subject]] and the [[reason]]. |
− | This kind of reason can be further divided into two types: a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied]. | + | This kind of [[reason]] can be further divided into two types: a correct [[reason]] used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by [[virtue]] of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct [[reason]] used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by [[virtue]] of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied]. |
Here are the respective definitions. The first is defined as: | Here are the respective definitions. The first is defined as: | ||
[[File:Buddha025.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | [[File:Buddha025.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | ||
− | Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly a negative in the sense of being the absence of something. | + | Anything which is first of all a correct [[reason]] in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly a negative in the [[sense]] of being the absence of something. |
The second is defined as: | The second is defined as: | ||
− | Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive. | + | Anything which is first of all a correct [[reason]] in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly either a negative in the [[sense]] of not being something, or a positive. |
− | The first of these can be divided into three types: those which are correct reasons used to prove the absence of something which represent (1) a cause for something involving a thing which is imperceptible; (2) a greater set than something involving a thing which is imperceptible; and (3) a nature of something involving a thing which is imperceptible. | + | The first of these can be divided into three types: those which are correct [[reasons]] used to prove the absence of something which represent (1) a [[cause]] for something involving a thing which is imperceptible; (2) a greater set than something involving a thing which is imperceptible; and (3) a [[nature]] of something involving a thing which is imperceptible. |
− | Here are respective typical examples for the three. Suppose someone sets forth the following logical statement: | + | Here are respective typical examples for the three. Suppose someone sets forth the following [[logical]] statement: |
Consider the place in front of us. | Consider the place in front of us. | ||
− | There cannot exist here, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits [another word for a preta, or tormented spirit] are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit; | + | There cannot [[exist]] here, in the [[mental]] {{Wiki|continuum}} of a [[person]] for whom flesheater [[spirits]] [another [[word]] for a [[preta]], or tormented [[spirit]]] are still abstruse [[objects]], a [[recollection]] whose [[object]] corresponds to [[reality]], and which is used to ascertain the [[existence]] of a flesheater [[spirit]]; |
− | Because there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater spirit. | + | Because there does not [[exist]], in the [[mental]] {{Wiki|continuum}} of this same [[person]], any valid [[perception]] wherein he or she [[perceives]] any flesheater [[spirit]]. |
− | Think of this fact: that there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater spirit. This represents the first type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there cannot exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. | + | Think of this fact: that there does not [[exist]], in the [[mental]] {{Wiki|continuum}} of this same [[person]], any valid [[perception]] wherein he or she [[perceives]] any flesheater [[spirit]]. This represents the first type of [[reason]] just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there cannot [[exist]], in the [[mental]] {{Wiki|continuum}} of a [[person]] for whom flesheater [[spirits]] are still abstruse [[objects]], a [[recollection]] whose [[object]] corresponds to [[reality]], and which is used to ascertain the [[existence]] of a flesheater [[spirit]]. |
− | Think now of the fact that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects has not yet perceived, with a valid perception, the fact that flesheater spirits exist. This represents the second type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, it would be improper for a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects to swear that flesheater spirits do exist. | + | Think now of the fact that a [[person]] for whom flesheater [[spirits]] are still abstruse [[objects]] has not yet [[perceived]], with a valid [[perception]], the fact that flesheater [[spirits]] [[exist]]. This represents the second type of [[reason]] just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, it would be improper for a [[person]] for whom flesheater [[spirits]] are still abstruse [[objects]] to [[swear]] that flesheater [[spirits]] do [[exist]]. |
− | Think finally of the fact that—in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects—there cannot be perceived, with any valid perception, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This represents the third type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there does not exist, in the mental continuum of just such a person, any recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. | + | Think finally of the fact that—in the [[mental]] {{Wiki|continuum}} of a [[person]] for whom flesheater [[spirits]] are still abstruse objects—there cannot be [[perceived]], with any valid [[perception]], a [[recollection]] whose [[object]] corresponds to [[reality]], and which is used to ascertain the [[existence]] of a flesheater [[spirit]]. This represents the third type of [[reason]] just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there does not [[exist]], in the [[mental]] {{Wiki|continuum}} of just such a [[person]], any [[recollection]] whose [[object]] corresponds to [[reality]], and which is used to ascertain the [[existence]] of a flesheater [[spirit]]. |
− | There is a specific purpose to these kinds of proofs. We are demonstrating here that, if a person still doubted whether flesheater spirits existed (and if they were thus still objects which were abstruse for them), then it would be inappropriate for them to come to some definite conclusion in their own minds about whether these spirits existed or not. We are meant by this example to realize how inappropriate it is for us to either overestimate or underestimate any particular person we may encounter, unable as we still are to confirm—through a valid perception—whether or not they do in reality possess a particular positive or negative personal quality. | + | There is a specific purpose to these kinds of proofs. We are demonstrating here that, if a [[person]] still doubted whether flesheater [[spirits]] existed (and if they were thus still [[objects]] which were abstruse for them), then it would be inappropriate for them to come to some definite conclusion in their own [[minds]] about whether these [[spirits]] existed or not. We are meant by this example to realize how inappropriate it is for us to either overestimate or underestimate any particular [[person]] we may encounter, unable as we still are to confirm—through a valid perception—whether or not they do in [[reality]] possess a particular positive or negative personal quality. |
− | It is not necessarily the case, by the way, that if something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in a particular logical statement, then it is also all that we deny in the same statement. Think of the possibility that there did exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This is both what we consider the main element in all that we deny, and also all that we deny, in a proof that there does not exist any such recollection whose object corresponds to reality. The two of (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits, are—each of them separately—a kind of case where something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement, but not all that we deny in the particular logical statement. | + | It is not necessarily the case, by the way, that if something is what we consider the main [[element]] in all that we deny in a particular [[logical]] statement, then it is also all that we deny in the same statement. Think of the possibility that there did [[exist]], in the [[mental]] {{Wiki|continuum}} of a [[person]] for whom flesheater [[spirits]] are still abstruse [[objects]], a [[recollection]] whose [[object]] corresponds to [[reality]], and which is used to ascertain the [[existence]] of a flesheater [[spirit]]. This is both what we consider the main [[element]] in all that we deny, and also all that we deny, in a proof that there does not [[exist]] any such [[recollection]] whose [[object]] corresponds to [[reality]]. The two of (1) flesheater [[spirits]] themselves, and (2) states of [[recollection]] whose [[objects]] correspond to [[reality]], and which are used to ascertain the [[existence]] of such [[spirits]], are—each of them separately—a kind of case where something is what we consider the main [[element]] in all that we deny in the particular [[logical]] statement, but not all that we deny in the particular [[logical]] statement. |
The former example is easy. Suppose though that you say that the latter two are incorrect. | The former example is easy. Suppose though that you say that the latter two are incorrect. | ||
− | Consider then (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits. | + | Consider then (1) flesheater [[spirits]] themselves, and (2) states of [[recollection]] whose [[objects]] correspond to [[reality]], and which are used to ascertain the [[existence]] of such [[spirits]]. |
− | These are so—each one of them separately—things that we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement, | + | These are so—each one of them separately—things that we consider the main [[element]] in all that we deny in the particular [[logical]] statement, |
− | Because a correct opponent for this particular proof doubts whether or not flesheater spirits exist in the place in front of us, and also doubts whether or not there exists any such kind of recollection whose object corresponds to reality. | + | Because a correct opponent for this particular proof [[doubts]] whether or not flesheater [[spirits]] [[exist]] in the place in front of us, and also [[doubts]] whether or not there [[exists]] any such kind of [[recollection]] whose [[object]] corresponds to [[reality]]. |
− | Neither one of these is though, by itself, all that we deny in the particular logical statement, because generally speaking there do exist flesheater spirits; and because smoke is not all that we deny in a proof that there exists no smoke upon the nighttime ocean. | + | Neither one of these is though, by itself, all that we deny in the particular [[logical]] statement, because generally {{Wiki|speaking}} there do [[exist]] flesheater [[spirits]]; and because smoke is not all that we deny in a proof that there [[exists]] no smoke upon the nighttime ocean. |
− | Consider the fact that [the person described here] exists. This is an example of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied], for proving that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects still has no recollection which ascertains the existence of such spirits, and whose object corresponds to reality. | + | Consider the fact that [the [[person]] described here] [[exists]]. This is an example of a correct [[reason]] used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by [[virtue]] of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied], for proving that a [[person]] for whom flesheater [[spirits]] are still abstruse [[objects]] still has no [[recollection]] which ascertains the [[existence]] of such [[spirits]], and whose [[object]] corresponds to [[reality]]. |
− | Generally speaking, there are three different ways in which an object can be abstruse, relative to your state of mind. These are objects which are abstruse by virtue of the place, time, and nature. The first would be something like the details of particular beings or realms which are situated at a great distance from your particular location. The second would be something like the details of events which have occurred or are going to occur at times which are eons away in the past or future. These things are not abstruse in their own general right, but only relative to a given state of mind. The third would be something which is abstruse by virtue of being very subtle in nature, even though it may exist in the immediate proximity. Examples of this would be things like a flesheater spirit, or a being between death and rebirth who is headed towards birth as a human or pleasure being, and their various heaps. | + | Generally {{Wiki|speaking}}, there are three different ways in which an [[object]] can be abstruse, [[relative]] to your [[state of mind]]. These are [[objects]] which are abstruse by [[virtue]] of the place, [[time]], and [[nature]]. The first would be something like the details of particular [[beings]] or [[realms]] which are situated at a great distance from your particular location. The second would be something like the details of events which have occurred or are going to occur at times which are eons away in the {{Wiki|past}} or {{Wiki|future}}. These things are not abstruse in their own general right, but only [[relative]] to a given [[state of mind]]. The third would be something which is abstruse by [[virtue]] of being very {{Wiki|subtle}} in [[nature]], even though it may [[exist]] in the immediate proximity. Examples of this would be things like a flesheater [[spirit]], or a being between [[death]] and [[rebirth]] who is headed towards [[birth]] as a [[human]] or [[pleasure]] being, and their various heaps. |
*************** | *************** | ||
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− | The forms of debate: | + | The [[forms]] of [[debate]]: |
− | Some Debating Tactics | + | Some [[Debating]] Tactics |
− | The exquisite boxing style of Muhammed Ali showed the value of distracting and harassing your opponent before even throwing a punch, and we use some of the same tactics in a Buddhist debate. Again remember though, that the goal is not to defeat your opponent, but to help him and yourself and the audience listening; to sharpen his ability to concentrate under pressure, and to raise challenging questions that will clarify everyone’s understanding of the life-saving Dharma. | + | The exquisite boxing style of Muhammed Ali showed the value of distracting and harassing your opponent before even [[throwing]] a punch, and we use some of the same tactics in a [[Buddhist]] [[debate]]. Again remember though, that the goal is not to defeat your opponent, but to help him and yourself and the audience listening; to sharpen his ability to [[concentrate]] under pressure, and to raise challenging questions that will clarify everyone’s [[understanding]] of the life-saving [[Dharma]]. |
− | Almost every normal debate begins with the attacker taking a mistaken position, and this is perhaps the most important tactic of all. The greatest geshes and debaters in the monastery have overcome any kind of pride, and are fearless in taking a position which is mistaken—a position where they will eventually have to “lose”—if this means that the defender and the audience will learn some important point. The goal here is to take a position which is almost correct, and very subtly mistaken: this will make for a fun debate, and clear up this point for everyone. | + | Almost every normal [[debate]] begins with the attacker taking a mistaken position, and this is perhaps the most important {{Wiki|tactic}} of all. The greatest [[geshes]] and [[debaters]] in the [[monastery]] have overcome any kind of [[pride]], and are [[fearless]] in taking a position which is mistaken—a position where they will eventually have to “lose”—if this means that the defender and the audience will learn some important point. The goal here is to take a position which is almost correct, and very subtly mistaken: this will make for a fun [[debate]], and clear up this point for everyone. |
− | Feigning is another common tactic in boxing and debate. Hutzpah is essential: even if you’re not sure your answer is correct, act like it is. Let the other person prove you wrong logically, and you’ll both learn something valuable. Even if you can’t hear the opponent’s position clearly (which is a common occurrence in the incredibly noisy debate grounds!), or you don’t have much clue of what he’s talking about, take a shot! It starts a lively debate, which sooner or later clarifies every detail of the issue. The point is: always work from what you honestly think, answer to the best of your current understanding, and don’t be afraid to go on a journey with your opponent, even through some dark or fuzzy places in your understanding, to reach to the higher ground of knowledge. | + | Feigning is another common {{Wiki|tactic}} in boxing and [[debate]]. Hutzpah is [[essential]]: even if you’re not sure your answer is correct, act like it is. Let the other [[person]] prove you wrong [[logically]], and you’ll both learn something valuable. Even if you can’t hear the opponent’s position clearly (which is a common occurrence in the incredibly noisy [[debate]] grounds!), or you don’t have much clue of what he’s talking about, take a shot! It starts a lively [[debate]], which sooner or later clarifies every detail of the issue. The point is: always work from what you honestly think, answer to the best of your current [[understanding]], and don’t be afraid to go on a journey with your opponent, even through some dark or fuzzy places in your [[understanding]], to reach to the higher ground of [[knowledge]]. |
[[File:Buddha11.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | [[File:Buddha11.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | ||
− | Don’t be afraid to use the audience to help you distract or disrupt your opponent. Many an unbeatable position is overthrown in the monastery simply by the (mistaken) boos of the audience, egged on by the attacker. Here there are a whole repertoire of distracting taunts, which are fair game in the rules of debate. We will list a few of themfollowing—please note though that the exact meaning of the words used has often been obscured over the centuries; the meanings given here are sometimes “best guesses” offered to us in an informal interview by the most qualified master in the world, Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin. | + | Don’t be afraid to use the audience to help you distract or disrupt your opponent. Many an unbeatable position is overthrown in the [[monastery]] simply by the (mistaken) boos of the audience, egged on by the attacker. Here there are a whole repertoire of distracting taunts, which are fair game in the rules of [[debate]]. We will list a few of themfollowing—please note though that the exact meaning of the words used has often been obscured over the centuries; the meanings given here are sometimes “best guesses” [[offered]] to us in an informal interview by the most qualified [[master]] in the [[world]], [[Khen Rinpoche]] [[Geshe]] Lobsang [[Tharchin]]. |
− | One common taunt is Whoa! The attacker either feels or feigns great surprise at a position taken by the defender, and begins a loud whoa sound. This is picked up by the monks in the immediate vicinity who are following the argument, and quickly spreads to the “deadheads” in the back (who are often engaged in some conversation of their own and not listening) and even to monks in other debate groups in the compound—all of whom have no idea what the defender even said that he deserves a whoa! This whoa! generally means “Uh-oh! Now you’re in trouble!” | + | One common taunt is Whoa! The attacker either [[feels]] or feigns great surprise at a position taken by the defender, and begins a loud whoa [[sound]]. This is picked up by the [[monks]] in the immediate vicinity who are following the argument, and quickly spreads to the “deadheads” in the back (who are often engaged in some [[conversation]] of their own and not listening) and even to [[monks]] in other [[debate]] groups in the compound—all of whom have no [[idea]] what the defender even said that he deserves a whoa! This whoa! generally means “Uh-oh! Now you’re in trouble!” |
− | In the winter debates, the whoa can be followed by a loud chir! This is most often used when an argument has been presented to a defender and he finds himself unable to formulate an answer; it has the meaning of “Come on! We want an answer!” A common corrolary in smaller groups is for the attacker himself to say to a speechless defender, labda!—”Come on! Say something!” Some people say that the chir! is che!—meaning “Your argument has stalled now!” The spellings of these three in Tibetan are: | + | In the winter [[debates]], the whoa can be followed by a loud chir! This is most often used when an argument has been presented to a defender and he finds himself unable to formulate an answer; it has the meaning of “Come on! We want an answer!” A common corrolary in smaller groups is for the attacker himself to say to a speechless defender, labda!—”Come on! Say something!” Some [[people]] say that the chir! is che!—meaning “Your argument has stalled now!” The spellings of these three in [[Tibetan]] are: |
− | A screamed ha! has the same meaning as in English, “Wow! What a joke! Are you kidding?” It is often accompanied by throwing your hands up in the air. Tsa! is one of the most common taunts; it comes from the word ngo-tsa, meaning “You should be ashamed to have said such a stupid thing!” and is typically used when someone is forced to retract a position they have taken themselves earlier. This is most often accompanied with a slap of the back of one hand in the palmof another, with everything repeated a few times for emphasis: Tsa! Ooooh tsa! Tsa chik! (“You should be ashamed! Ashamed, man! What a disgrace!”). At this point a debater might scowl at his opponent and jam his finger in his own cheek, meaning: | + | A screamed ha! has the same meaning as in English, “Wow! What a joke! Are you kidding?” It is often accompanied by [[throwing]] your hands up in the [[air]]. Tsa! is one of the most common taunts; it comes from the [[word]] ngo-tsa, meaning “You should be ashamed to have said such a stupid thing!” and is typically used when someone is forced to retract a position they have taken themselves earlier. This is most often accompanied with a slap of the back of one hand in the palmof another, with everything repeated a few times for emphasis: Tsa! Ooooh tsa! Tsa chik! (“You should be ashamed! Ashamed, man! What a disgrace!”). At this point a debater might scowl at his opponent and jam his finger in his own cheek, meaning: “[[Time]] for you to blush, man!” Some [[people]] say the tsa is the {{Wiki|tsar}} in ngo-tsar, meaning, “Man! That was a weird thing to say!” These words in [[Tibetan]] are: |
− | Two more taunts are more based in formal logic than in tactics. The first is kyappa long, which literally means, “Give me your statement of necessity then!” | + | Two more taunts are more based in {{Wiki|formal logic}} than in tactics. The first is kyappa long, which literally means, “Give me your statement of necessity then!” |
This is used in a context like the following, with the indented portion from the opponent: | This is used in a context like the following, with the indented portion from the opponent: | ||
− | Consider sound. | + | Consider [[sound]]. |
It must so be a changing thing, | It must so be a changing thing, | ||
Line 816: | Line 816: | ||
Just because something is a thing which is made doesn’t prove that it’s a changing thing. | Just because something is a thing which is made doesn’t prove that it’s a changing thing. | ||
− | A final rejoinder is korsum! or kordhi korsum! This means “You have just made a circular argument,” or “Now you have contradicted yourself completely!” A typical case would be where the opponent accepts that sound is a made thing, and accepts that if something is made it must be a changing thing, but stubbornly asserts still that sound is an unchanging thing. In the second version of this statement, the root syllable for the mantra of Gentle Voice (Manjushri, or Jampel Yang) is interjected. The Tibetan spellings for these are: | + | A final rejoinder is korsum! or kordhi korsum! This means “You have just made a circular argument,” or “Now you have contradicted yourself completely!” A typical case would be where the opponent accepts that [[sound]] is a made thing, and accepts that if something is made it must be a changing thing, but stubbornly asserts still that [[sound]] is an [[unchanging]] thing. In the second version of this statement, the [[root]] syllable for the [[mantra]] of Gentle {{Wiki|Voice}} ([[Manjushri]], or [[Jampel]] Yang) is interjected. The [[Tibetan]] spellings for these are: |
− | Defenders have a few tactics of their own, one of the most useful being ah? or la?—meaning “Whaddya say? I couldn’t catch what you said.” Then you put your cupped palm up to your ear as if you’re having a problem hearing the attacker in all the mayhem of the debate ground. This is a great way to buy a few extra moments while you formulate your answer! | + | Defenders have a few tactics of their own, one of the most useful being [[ah]]? or la?—meaning “Whaddya say? I couldn’t catch what you said.” Then you put your cupped palm up to your {{Wiki|ear}} as if you’re having a problem hearing the attacker in all the mayhem of the [[debate]] ground. This is a great way to buy a few extra moments while you formulate your answer! |
==See also== | ==See also== |
Revision as of 11:20, 28 December 2013
Selection from the collected topics:
Contradiction and Relationship
The following reading consists of the Presentation of the Concepts of Contradiction and Relationship (‘Gal-’brel gyi rnam-bzhag), from An Explanation of the Intermediate Path of Reasoning (Rigs-lam ‘bring-gi rnam-par bshad-pa), by the Master Tutor Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso (1825-1901), who in his day held the position of Tutor to the Dalai Lama.
Please note that indented statements are usually those given by the opponent. Responses within brackets are those that are usually left unwritten in the Tibetan text, and are understood to be there because of the context following each.
_______________
Here is the first section: an explanation of the concepts of contradiction and relationship. For this presentation we will first refute the position of our opponents, then present our own position, and then finally eliminate their rebuttal.
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
Anything which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing is always something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.
Consider the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing.
So is being it then [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]?
Because being it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing].
[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
It is so correct,
Because (1) it [the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing] is something distinct from a working thing, and (2) there exists no one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing] and a working thing.
[The first part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is something distinct froma working thing.]
Suppose you say that the first part of our statement is not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so distinct frombeing a working thing,
Because it is an unchanging thing.
[The second part of your statement is not correct: it's not correct to say that there exists no one thing which is both the exclusion all that is not an unchanging thing, and also a working thing.]
Suppose you say that the second part of our statement is not correct.
Consider an unchanging thing.
It is so true that there exists no one thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not it, and also a working thing,
Because it is unchanging.
[Then I agree to your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing]
Consider the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing. It is not so true, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing,
Because being it is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.
[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not an unchanging thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.
And this is because an unchanging thing is just such a thing.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
If something is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging, then it is always something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing.
Consider the exclusion of all that is not a pillar.
So is it then [something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing]?
Because it is [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging].
[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is unchanging.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because it is (1) distinct from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not exist a single thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing.
[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is (1) distinct from that which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing, and (2) such that there does not exist a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing.]
Suppose you say that it’s not correct.
Consider a pillar.
It is so true that there does not exist a single thing which is both the exclusion of all that is not a pillar and also something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing,
Because anything which is the exclusion of all that is not it [a pillar] is always such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.
[Then I agree to your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is changing.]
Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider the exclusion of all that is not a pillar.
It is not such, that being it is contradictory to being a changing thing,
Because it is such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.
[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not a pillar is such that being it is not contradictory to being a changing thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so this way,
Because there does exist one thing which is both it [the exclusion of all that is not a pillar] and also a changing thing;
And this is true because a pillar itself is just such a thing.
This reason is easy to accept.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing, then it is always such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.
Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
So is it then [such that being it is not contradictory with being something that is not contradictory to being a working thing]?
Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing].
[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because there does exist one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher] and also a changing thing;
And this is because the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is just such a thing.
If you say it’s not correct, the answer is easy.
Suppose though you agree to our original statement, [saying that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing].
Consider that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
It is so not something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing,
Because it is something such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.
[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.]
Suppose you say that it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because (1) it is distinct from that which is such that being it is not contradictory with being a working thing, and (2) there exists no one thing which is both it [that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher] and also something such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.
[It's not correct to say that that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher is such that there exists no one thing which is both it and also something such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.]
Suppose you say that it’s not correct.
Consider the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
It is so true that there exists no one thing which is both it and also something
such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing,
Because it is something which no one thing can be.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
If something is such that being it is not contradictory to something which is not contradictory to being a working thing, then it is always such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.
Consider a thing which does no work.
Is it then [such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing]?
Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to something which is not contradictory to being a working thing].
[It's not correct to say that a thing which does no work is such that being it is not contradictory to something which is not contradictory to being a working thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and which is also such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing;
And this is true because “knowable thing” is just such a thing.
[Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which does no work is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing.]
Consider a thing which does no work.
It is not so a thing which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing,
Because it is a thing such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a existing thing, then it is always such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.
Consider a thing which is not made.
Is it then [such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing]?
Because it is [such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a existing thing].
[It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is contradictory to being a existing thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [that is, a thing which is not made] and (2) such that being it is contradictory to being an existing thing;
And this is true because the two of unchanging things and changing things is just such a thing.
[Then I agree with your original statement: a thing which is not made is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.]
Suppose you agree to our original statement.
It is not so, that it is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing,
Because it is such that being it is not contradictory to being just such a thing.
[It's not correct to say that a thing which is not made is such that being it is not contradictory to being an unchanging thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because anything which is an unchanging thing is such that it is one thing which is both itself and unchanging.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
Anytime something is such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing, it must also always be such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing.
Consider sharing a relationship with a working thing.
So is it then [such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing]?
Because it is [such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing].
[It's not correct to say that sharing a relationship with a working thing is such that it is sharing a relationship with a working thing.]
Suppose you say that it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because it shares a relationship with “working thing” such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing.
[It's not correct to say that sharing a relationship with a working thing is sharing a relationship with "working thing" such that to be it is to automatically be a working thing.]
Suppose you say that it’s not correct.
Consider a working thing.
Sharing a relationship with it is so sharing a relationship with it such that to be it is to automatically be it,
Because sharing a relationship with it is (1) distinct from it, and (2) sharing a relationship with it exists.
[Then I agree with your original statement: sharing a relationship with a working thing is such that it shares a relationship with what is sharing a relationship with a working thing.]
Consider sharing a relationship with “working thing.”
It is not so, that it is what shares a relationship with it,
Because it is one example of the truth that the person has no nature of his own.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
Anything that shares a relationship with a working thing always shares a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is to automatically be the working thing.
Consider a working thing in the moment after it.
Does this then [share a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is to automatically be the working thing]?
Because it does [share a relationship with the working thing].
[It's not correct to say that a working thing in the moment after it shares a relationship with the working thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It does so,
Because it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from it.
[It's not correct to say that a working thing in the moment after it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from it.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It does so,
Because it is a result of the working thing.
[Then I agree to your original statement: a working thing in the moment after it does share a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is to automatically be the working thing.]
Suppose you agree to our original statement.
Consider this same thing.
It is not so, that it shares a relationship with the working thing such that to be it is to automatically be the working thing,
Because it shares a relationship with the working thing such that it came from the working thing.
Our reason has already been proven.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
There exists no one thing which is both (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher; and also (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.
But such a thing does so exist,
Because the presence of all three of the material qualities for “existing thing” is just such a thing.
[The "presence of all three of the material qualities" for any particular thing is, as we will see in Class Eight, the definition of its definition. The three material qualities are: (1) generally speaking, the thing is a definition; (2) it does apply to a typical example; and (3) it is the definition of no other thing than what it defines.]
[It's not correct to say that the first part of your reason applies to your example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the material qualities for "existing thing" is the kind of thing such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.]
But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because there exists no one thing which is both (1) it and (2) also something such that being it is contradictory with being that which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher;
And this is true because “that which can be made an object of the mind,” [which is the definition of "knowable thing",] is something which is such that being it [the presence of all three of the material qualities for "existing thing"] is not contradictory to being it [one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher].
[It's incorrect to say that the second part of your reason applies to your example: it's not correct to say that the presence of all three of the material qualities for "knowable thing" is the kind of thing such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher.]
Suppose you say that it’s not correct to say that the second part of our reason applies to our example.
Consider the presence of all three of the material qualities for this same thing. It is so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher,
Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [the presence of all three qualities for "knowable thing"] and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being one and the same as the two of a pillar and a water pitcher;
And this is true because “that which can be made an object of the mind” is just such a thing.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
There does exist one thing which is a combination of all of the following: (1) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing; (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing; (3) something which shares a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a working thing; and (4) something which does not share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a working thing.
So is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a working thing then just such a combination?
Because (1) there does exist one thing which is all of those and (2) that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination.
[The second part of your reason is not correct: it's not correct to say that that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is not such a combination.]
Suppose you say that the second part of our reason is not correct.
Consider that which does not share a relationship with a working thing.
Is it then something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing?
Because it is just such a thing; [that is, one thing which is a combination of all the above].
[It's not correct to say it is just such a combination.]
But the reason is what you’ve already said directly.
[Then I agree with your original statement: that which does not share a relationship with a working thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a working thing.]
But you can’t agree to our original statement,
Because there does exist one thing which is both not related to it [to a working thing] and which is also not such that being it is contradictory to being the working thing;
And this is true because the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are just such a combination.
[It's not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are just such a combination.]
Suppose you say that it’s not correct.
Consider these two.
They are so,
Because they are something which is both (1) not related to a working thing, and (2) also such that being themis contradictory to being a working thing.
[The first part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are not related to the working thing.]
But the first part of our reason is correct,
Because they are its cause.
[The second part of your reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that the two of a valid perception and a recollection which act as a cause for a working thing are such that being themis contradictory to being a working thing.]
But the second part of our reason is correct,
Because they are a knowable thing which cannot be.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
There is no one thing which is all of the following: (1) such that being it is contradictory to being something such that being it is contradictory to being a thing which is unchanging; (2) such that being it is not contradictory with being something such that being it is not contradictory to being a thing which is unchanging; (3) related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging; and (4) not related to something which is not related to a thing which is unchanging.
But there does exist one thing which is all of the above,
Because that which is not related to an unchanging thing is just such a thing.
[It's not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is just such a thing.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so just such a thing, one that combines all four;
Because it is something which is (1) such that being it is contradictory to being something that is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing; and (2) it is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this [[[unchanging]] thing]; it is related to what is related to this [[[unchanging]] thing]; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to this [[[unchanging]] thing].
[The first part of your reason is not correct: it is incorrect to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is such that being it is contradictory to being something that is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing.]
Suppose you say that the first part of our reason is not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because it is (1) distinct from this [thing that is such that being it is contradictory to being an unchanging thing], and (2) if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an unchanging thing], then it must be such that being it is not contradictory with being an unchanging thing;
And this is true because if something is it [that is, if something is something which is not related to an unchanging thing], then it cannot be distinct from an unchanging thing.
[The second part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being an unchanging thing; it is related to what is related to an unchanging thing; and it is unrelated to what is unrelated to an unchanging thing.]
Suppose you say that the second part of our original reason is not correct.
Consider that which is not related to it [that is, to an unchanging thing].
It is so such that being it is not contradictory with being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being it [an unchanging thing],
Because there does exist one thing which is both (1) it [that is, something which is not related to an unchanging thing], and (2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being it [an unchanging thing];
And this is true because an unchanging thing is just that.
[The third part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging.]
Suppose you say that the third part of our original reason is not correct.
Consider that which is not related to it [to an unchanging thing].
It is so something which is related to something which is related to a thing which is unchanging,
Because it is (1) distinct from that which is related to it [to a thing which is unchanging], and (2) if there existed no things which were related to it [to a thing which is unchanging], then it could not exist either.
[The fourth part of your original reason is not correct: it is not correct to say that that which is not related to an unchanging thing is not related to something which is not related to a thing which is unchanging.]
Suppose you say that the fourth part of our original reason is not correct.
Consider that which is not related to an unchanging thing.
It is so true, that it is not related to itself,
Because it is an example of a thing which has no nature of its own.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
There does exist one thing which combines all the following: (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a knowable thing; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing; and (4) something which shares a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with a knowable thing.
So then is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing this kind of combination?
Because (1) there does exist just such a combination, and (2) something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing is not such a combination.
You have already agreed directly to the first part of our reason.
Suppose then you say that the second part is not correct.
Consider something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing.
So is it then something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing?
Because it is just such a combination.
You have already agreed directly to the reason.
But you cannot agree to our original statement here,
Because it [something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing] is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this thing;
And this is true because there does exist something which is both (1) it [that is, something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing] and
(2) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being that [[[knowable thing]]];
And this is true because that which is one and the same as a water pitcher is just such a combination.
[Then I agree to your original statement: something which shares a relationship with a knowable thing is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing.]
Consider something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing.
So is it then something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing?
Because it is just such a combination.
You’ve already agreed directly to the reason.
You can’t agree to our original position,
Because it [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being a knowable thing] is something which does share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with a knowable thing;
And this is because (1) it is distinct fromsom ething which does share a relationship with a knowable thing, and (2) if the thing with which it shares a relationship ceased to exist, then it would itself cease to exist.
The reason we’ve given is easy to accept.
Suppose, relative to this same point, someone comes and says:
It is so, that there does exist a typical example which incorporates all the conditions stated.
Because there does exist one thing which is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; (2) something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being this same thing; (3) something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this same thing; and (4) something which does share a relationship with something which does not share a relationship with this same thing.
Our answer to this is, “It doesn’t necessarily follow.”
The reason, by the way, is itself true, for something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination.
[It's not correct to say that something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar is just this kind of combination.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar.
It is so just such a combination,
Because it is (1) something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar; and (2) it is something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is such that being it is not contradictory with being this thing [a pillar], (3) it is something which does not share a relationship with what does share a relationship with this thing [a pillar], and (4) it is something which shares a relationship with what does not share a relationship with this thing [the pillar].
The first and second elements in our reason are easy to accept.
Suppose you say that the third is not correct.
Consider this same thing [something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar].
It is so something which does not share a relationship with something which does share a relationship with this thing [the pillar], Because it is not necessarily the case that, if something which did have such a relationship ceased to exist, it too would have to cease to exist;
And this is true because a place where there is no pillar is an example of that.
Suppose you say that the fourth element in our reason is not correct.
Consider something which is such that being it is contradictory to being a pillar.
It is so something which shares a relationship with something which shares no relationship with a pillar,
Because (1) it is distinct from something which shares no relationship with a pillar; and (2) if something which shares no relationship with a pillar ceased to exist, it too would have to cease to exist.
_______________
Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
If something is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory, then it must always be something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory.
Consider the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory.
So is it then [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory]?
Because it is [something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory].
[It's not correct to say that the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory is something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory.]
Suppose you say it’s not correct.
Consider this same thing.
It is so,
Because there does exist one thing which is both it, and also a thing which is such that being it is contradictory to being something which is not contradictory.
And this is because being something which is contradictory is just such a thing.
[Then I agree with your original statement: the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory.]
Suppose you agree with our original statement.
Consider this same thing [the exclusion of all that is not something which is contradictory].
It is not so something which is such that being it is not contradictory to being something which is contradictory,
Because (1) it is distinct from something which is contradictory, and (2) there is no one thing which can be both it and something which is contradictory;
And this is because being contradictory is not something which is contradictory.
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Here is the second part, where we present our own position. We proceed in two steps, covering the definition of what it is to be in contradiction, and then the different types of contradiction.
Here is the definition of what it is for two things to be in contradiction:
The two things must (1) be distinct from each other, and then they must be such that (2) it is impossible for any one thing to be both of them.
There are two different ways of being in contradiction: contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive; and contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed.
The definition of the first of these, to be contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive, is as follows:
Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that the presence of one automatically means the absence of the other.
The two terms “contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive” and “contradictory” refer to the same thing.
Things which are contradictory in the sense of being mutually exclusive may be further divided into two types: those which contradict each other in this way directly; and those which contradict each other in this way indirectly.
The definition of things which contradict each other in this way directly is “Two things which conflict with each other directly.” The definition of things which contradict each other in this way indirectly is “Two things which are such that no one thing can be both, but which are not such that one immediately obviates the other.”
A typical example of the first would be something like the two of “working thing” and “a thing which does no work.” A typical example of the second would be “heat” and “coldness,” or else “the state of mind which holds that things have some nature of their own” and “the wisdom which realizes that nothing has a nature of its own.”
Here is the definition of the second kind of contradiction—of things which are contradictory in the sense of being diametrically opposed:
Two things which conflict with each other in such a way that each one acts to stop the continued existence of the other.
A typical example would be a spiritual antidote and the negative personal quality which it allows you to eliminate.
The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that to be the first is to automatically be the other is as follows:
Whenever two existing things are such that, to be the first is by nature to be the second, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if the second were to cease to exist—then the first would have to cease to exist as well.
An example would be the relation between a vase and the exclusion of all that is not the vase.
Here is an actual application of the concept. The definition of what it is to share a relationship with “working things” in such a way that to be a particular thing is to automatically be a working thing is “something which is such that to be it is by nature to be a working thing, but in such a way that they are separate things; and where—if ‘working things’ were to cease to exist, then the particular thing would have to cease to exist as well.” A typical example here would be a water pitcher.
The definition of what it is to share a relationship with something else in such a way that the first has come from the second is as follows:
Whenever two things are such that to be the first is to be the kind of thing which is the result of the second, in such a way that to be the first is not to be, by its very essence, the second.
A typical example would be the relationship of one coming from the other between those things which are a working thing the moment after it, and the original working thing.
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Here is the final part: eliminating our opponent’s rebuttal. Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
Consider the two of existence and non-existence.
So are these then two things which are discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both?
Because they are two things which are contradictory.
To this we answer, “The statement you gave as your reason is not correct.”
Suppose you do agree [that the two of existence and non-existence were two things which are both discrete from one another, and which are such that no one thing can be both].
Consider the two of existence and non-existence.
Are they then something which exists?
Because they are discrete from one another.
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Suppose someone comes and makes the following claim:
Consider smoke.
It is so then a relationship where one thing has come from another,
Because it shares a relationship with fire such that it has come from the other.
To this we answer, “It doesn’t necessarily follow.”
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[Please note that this section continues, but was not translated due to the quantity of material.]
Logical Statements Used to Prove an Absence of Something, and the First Category of this Type of Statement
The following selection is from the monastic textbook entitled An Explanation of the Art of Reasoning (rTags-rigs), also by the Tutor of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Purbuchok Jampa Tsultrim Gyatso.
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Here thirdly is our discussion of correct reasons of the type used to prove the absence of something. We will proceed in three parts: the definition, an explanation of the divisions, and a description of the valid perception where we confirm hat the definition applies to a typical example.
Here is the first. The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in any particular proof is as follows:
Any reason which is (1) a correct reason for the particular proof; and (2) such that there can exist one thing which is both (a) the explicit version of the thing which is considered the quality to be proven in the particular proof in which it acts as the reason, and also (b) a negative thing.
Correct reasons to prove the absence of something can be divided into two types: correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible [to the particular opponent], and correct reasons for the absence of something involving a thing which is perceptible [to the particular opponent].
Here is the first. Now there is a sutra where it says,
No person should ever judge another; those who try will fall.
The point of these words is to show us how wrong it is for us to say that someone else lacks any particular good quality, only because it does not appear to us that they do. This same point is made in the Commentary with lines such as the following:
In a case where valid perception has yet
To engage in the object, the result obtained
Is that they don’t: they didn’t engage.
The definition of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible in any particular proof is as follows:
Any reason which is first of all a correct reason used to prove the absence of something for the particular proof, and which is secondly such that—even though the thing which is considered the main element of all which is denied by the proof in which it serves as the reason does generally exist—this thing is imperceptible to the valid perceptions of a person for whom this same reason fulfills its role in the relationship between the subject and the reason.
This kind of reason can be further divided into two types: a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the absence of a corollary which possesses a relationship [with whatever is denied]; and a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied].
Here are the respective definitions. The first is defined as:
Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly a negative in the sense of being the absence of something.
The second is defined as:
Anything which is first of all a correct reason in a particular proof for the absence of something involving a thing which is imperceptible, and which is secondly either a negative in the sense of not being something, or a positive.
The first of these can be divided into three types: those which are correct reasons used to prove the absence of something which represent (1) a cause for something involving a thing which is imperceptible; (2) a greater set than something involving a thing which is imperceptible; and (3) a nature of something involving a thing which is imperceptible.
Here are respective typical examples for the three. Suppose someone sets forth the following logical statement:
Consider the place in front of us.
There cannot exist here, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits [another word for a preta, or tormented spirit] are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit;
Because there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater spirit.
Think of this fact: that there does not exist, in the mental continuum of this same person, any valid perception wherein he or she perceives any flesheater spirit. This represents the first type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there cannot exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit.
Think now of the fact that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects has not yet perceived, with a valid perception, the fact that flesheater spirits exist. This represents the second type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, it would be improper for a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects to swear that flesheater spirits do exist.
Think finally of the fact that—in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects—there cannot be perceived, with any valid perception, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This represents the third type of reason just listed—for proving the fact that, in the place in front of us, there does not exist, in the mental continuum of just such a person, any recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit.
There is a specific purpose to these kinds of proofs. We are demonstrating here that, if a person still doubted whether flesheater spirits existed (and if they were thus still objects which were abstruse for them), then it would be inappropriate for them to come to some definite conclusion in their own minds about whether these spirits existed or not. We are meant by this example to realize how inappropriate it is for us to either overestimate or underestimate any particular person we may encounter, unable as we still are to confirm—through a valid perception—whether or not they do in reality possess a particular positive or negative personal quality.
It is not necessarily the case, by the way, that if something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in a particular logical statement, then it is also all that we deny in the same statement. Think of the possibility that there did exist, in the mental continuum of a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects, a recollection whose object corresponds to reality, and which is used to ascertain the existence of a flesheater spirit. This is both what we consider the main element in all that we deny, and also all that we deny, in a proof that there does not exist any such recollection whose object corresponds to reality. The two of (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits, are—each of them separately—a kind of case where something is what we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement, but not all that we deny in the particular logical statement.
The former example is easy. Suppose though that you say that the latter two are incorrect.
Consider then (1) flesheater spirits themselves, and (2) states of recollection whose objects correspond to reality, and which are used to ascertain the existence of such spirits.
These are so—each one of them separately—things that we consider the main element in all that we deny in the particular logical statement,
Because a correct opponent for this particular proof doubts whether or not flesheater spirits exist in the place in front of us, and also doubts whether or not there exists any such kind of recollection whose object corresponds to reality.
Neither one of these is though, by itself, all that we deny in the particular logical statement, because generally speaking there do exist flesheater spirits; and because smoke is not all that we deny in a proof that there exists no smoke upon the nighttime ocean.
Consider the fact that [the person described here] exists. This is an example of a correct reason used to prove the absence of something in a particular proof, by virtue of the presence of a corollary which is contradictory [to whatever is denied], for proving that a person for whom flesheater spirits are still abstruse objects still has no recollection which ascertains the existence of such spirits, and whose object corresponds to reality.
Generally speaking, there are three different ways in which an object can be abstruse, relative to your state of mind. These are objects which are abstruse by virtue of the place, time, and nature. The first would be something like the details of particular beings or realms which are situated at a great distance from your particular location. The second would be something like the details of events which have occurred or are going to occur at times which are eons away in the past or future. These things are not abstruse in their own general right, but only relative to a given state of mind. The third would be something which is abstruse by virtue of being very subtle in nature, even though it may exist in the immediate proximity. Examples of this would be things like a flesheater spirit, or a being between death and rebirth who is headed towards birth as a human or pleasure being, and their various heaps.
Some Debating Tactics
The exquisite boxing style of Muhammed Ali showed the value of distracting and harassing your opponent before even throwing a punch, and we use some of the same tactics in a Buddhist debate. Again remember though, that the goal is not to defeat your opponent, but to help him and yourself and the audience listening; to sharpen his ability to concentrate under pressure, and to raise challenging questions that will clarify everyone’s understanding of the life-saving Dharma.
Almost every normal debate begins with the attacker taking a mistaken position, and this is perhaps the most important tactic of all. The greatest geshes and debaters in the monastery have overcome any kind of pride, and are fearless in taking a position which is mistaken—a position where they will eventually have to “lose”—if this means that the defender and the audience will learn some important point. The goal here is to take a position which is almost correct, and very subtly mistaken: this will make for a fun debate, and clear up this point for everyone.
Feigning is another common tactic in boxing and debate. Hutzpah is essential: even if you’re not sure your answer is correct, act like it is. Let the other person prove you wrong logically, and you’ll both learn something valuable. Even if you can’t hear the opponent’s position clearly (which is a common occurrence in the incredibly noisy debate grounds!), or you don’t have much clue of what he’s talking about, take a shot! It starts a lively debate, which sooner or later clarifies every detail of the issue. The point is: always work from what you honestly think, answer to the best of your current understanding, and don’t be afraid to go on a journey with your opponent, even through some dark or fuzzy places in your understanding, to reach to the higher ground of knowledge.
Don’t be afraid to use the audience to help you distract or disrupt your opponent. Many an unbeatable position is overthrown in the monastery simply by the (mistaken) boos of the audience, egged on by the attacker. Here there are a whole repertoire of distracting taunts, which are fair game in the rules of debate. We will list a few of themfollowing—please note though that the exact meaning of the words used has often been obscured over the centuries; the meanings given here are sometimes “best guesses” offered to us in an informal interview by the most qualified master in the world, Khen Rinpoche Geshe Lobsang Tharchin.
One common taunt is Whoa! The attacker either feels or feigns great surprise at a position taken by the defender, and begins a loud whoa sound. This is picked up by the monks in the immediate vicinity who are following the argument, and quickly spreads to the “deadheads” in the back (who are often engaged in some conversation of their own and not listening) and even to monks in other debate groups in the compound—all of whom have no idea what the defender even said that he deserves a whoa! This whoa! generally means “Uh-oh! Now you’re in trouble!”
In the winter debates, the whoa can be followed by a loud chir! This is most often used when an argument has been presented to a defender and he finds himself unable to formulate an answer; it has the meaning of “Come on! We want an answer!” A common corrolary in smaller groups is for the attacker himself to say to a speechless defender, labda!—”Come on! Say something!” Some people say that the chir! is che!—meaning “Your argument has stalled now!” The spellings of these three in Tibetan are:
A screamed ha! has the same meaning as in English, “Wow! What a joke! Are you kidding?” It is often accompanied by throwing your hands up in the air. Tsa! is one of the most common taunts; it comes from the word ngo-tsa, meaning “You should be ashamed to have said such a stupid thing!” and is typically used when someone is forced to retract a position they have taken themselves earlier. This is most often accompanied with a slap of the back of one hand in the palmof another, with everything repeated a few times for emphasis: Tsa! Ooooh tsa! Tsa chik! (“You should be ashamed! Ashamed, man! What a disgrace!”). At this point a debater might scowl at his opponent and jam his finger in his own cheek, meaning: “Time for you to blush, man!” Some people say the tsa is the tsar in ngo-tsar, meaning, “Man! That was a weird thing to say!” These words in Tibetan are:
Two more taunts are more based in formal logic than in tactics. The first is kyappa long, which literally means, “Give me your statement of necessity then!”
This is used in a context like the following, with the indented portion from the opponent:
Consider sound.
It must so be a changing thing,
Because it’s a thing which is made.
And that’s true because anything which is made is always a changing thing.
It’s incorrect to say that.
Give me your statement of necessity then!
At this point, the opponent would be forced to give the following absurd statement of necessity:
Just because something is a thing which is made doesn’t prove that it’s a changing thing.
A final rejoinder is korsum! or kordhi korsum! This means “You have just made a circular argument,” or “Now you have contradicted yourself completely!” A typical case would be where the opponent accepts that sound is a made thing, and accepts that if something is made it must be a changing thing, but stubbornly asserts still that sound is an unchanging thing. In the second version of this statement, the root syllable for the mantra of Gentle Voice (Manjushri, or Jampel Yang) is interjected. The Tibetan spellings for these are:
Defenders have a few tactics of their own, one of the most useful being ah? or la?—meaning “Whaddya say? I couldn’t catch what you said.” Then you put your cupped palm up to your ear as if you’re having a problem hearing the attacker in all the mayhem of the debate ground. This is a great way to buy a few extra moments while you formulate your answer!
See also
- Manual of Pramana - Reading One: Why Study the Art of Reasoning?
- Manual of Pramana - Reading Two: An Outline of All Existing Things
- Manual of Pramana - Reading Three: Quality and Characteristic
- Manual of Pramana - Reading Four: Causes and Results
- Manual of Pramana - Reading Six: Negative and Positive
- Manual of Pramana - Reading Seven: Contradiction and Relationship
- Manual of Pramana - Reading Eight: Definitions and the Things They Define
- Manual of Pramana - Reading Nine: The Concept of Exclusion in Perception
- Manual of Pramana - Reading Ten: The Concept of Time
- Manual of Pramana - CLASS NOTES part 1
- Manual of Pramana - CLASS NOTES part 2