The role of intention in perception according to Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośabhāsya : the background to Buddhist soteriology

The Role of Intention in Perception According to Vasubandhu' s ábåjdåarr¿ako.íabñãgya: . A thesis submitted to the Facuì.ty of Graduate Studies of the University of Manitoba in partial fulfilLment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts ll n, August 1987 'ry./ David John Frederick Steenburg Department of Religion Permission has been granted to the National Library of C anada t.o mi cro f i lm th i s thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film. The author (copyright owner) has reserved. other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission. L'autorisation a êté accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de mícrofilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du f iIm. L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être impri-mês ou autremenÈ reproduits sans son autorisation écrite. r sBN 0-3i_5- 37 266- 4 THE ROLE OF INTENTION IN PERCEPTION ACCORDING TO VASUBANDHU I S ABHIDHARMAKOSABTIASYA : THE BACKGROUND TO BUDDHIST SOTERIOLOGY BY DAVID JOHN FREDERICK STEENBURG A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies of the university of Manitoba in partial fulfìllment of the requircments of the degree of }ÍASTER OF ARTS o tt_987 Permission has been granted ro the LIBRARY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MANITOBA to lend or sell copies of this thesis. to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA ro ;nicrofilnr rhis thesis and to lend or sell copies of the fìlm, and UNIVERSITy MICROFILMS to publish an absrracr of this thesis. The author reserves other publicatio¡r i-ights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's rv¡itte¡¡ permission. .\BSTRACT The basic purpose of this thesis is to understand one particuì.ar Buddhist view, Vasubandhu's, on the role of volition in the processes that underlie conscious perception, especially as this pertains to the distortion of perception. The approach taken involves first a study of the nature of consciousness and the causaf factors operative in consciousness. SecondÌy, it invol-ves a cLarification of the nature of mental- consciousness vis-à-vis sensory consciousness, for onÌy nentaL consciousness is capabÌe of distortion. Thirdly, this thesis examines the nature and function of volition and attention, the ]atter of which is a species of volition associated prinarily with the construction of consciousness.

Buddhist discipline is prinariJ.y an attempt to train attention, for improper attention is the primary source of ignorance and desire. Imaginative attention, which Ís utíIized in visualization meditations and gives one conplete control over the perceptual process, iilustrates the extent to which this consciousness-constructing volition can be trained.

Volition is characterized by desire and effort. Volition determines the conditioning of the personaJ-ity-substratum, the physiologicaJ. processes underlying conscious experience, and conversely the personality- substratum qualifies the voluntary processes.' Impurities', the negative emotional and cognitive conditioning of past voluntary acts, condition current volitions. Because volition is qualified by 'impurities', expressing itself through them, what volition constructs can be distorted by desire, aversion, and ignorance. A crucial. problem that is addressed is the fact that volition is associated with desire and effort, but consciousness in a state of eguanimity Lacks any sense of these. I suggest that the probì.em can best be resol,ved by recognizing that volition can aì,so operate mechanicaLly at a nonconscious level. One can justify ìabelling this subliminal effort 'voluntary' on the grounds that if it were not voluntary, it could not be negated by volition.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1

The Nature of Consciousness 14 1. Consciousness as a dåar¡na ...... 74 1.7 Dharpa as the true basis of experience. 74 '1,.2 Dharøa as a thing (draWa). 77 7.3 Dharna as momentary. 19 1.4 Summary. 20 7.5 Cltta, viJfiãna and manas as one dharna. ZI 2. Consciousness and the mental factors (cajttãl-r) Zz 2.1 The meaning of mental- factor. 2.2 Consciousness as implicit perception 2.3 The dependence of consciousness upon 2.4 "fhe dependence of consciousness upon 22 24 an object. 25 material existence. 26 3. Causality and simultaneitv 27 3.1 Associated causality . 27 3.2 Mutuaì. causality. Zg 3.3 SimulataneÍty in perceptÍon: feeling and 'contact'. 29 3.4 Implications and appraisaL. 33 Footnotes II. Mental consciousness, Sensory consciousness and Mind 1. The Objects ob Mental Consciousness 1.1 Mental consciousness attends the immaterial ¡.ealm. 1.2 Mental consciousness attends a]l dharnãh. 1 .3 Sumnary 2. The Role of the Mind 2.1 Mind as the past moment of consciousness. 2.2 Mind as a basis (ãSraya) of consciousness. 2.3 Mind as an 'equivalent and immedj ate cause' 2.4 Inplications.

3. The Qualities of Sensorv and Mental Consciousness 53 3.1 Mental conscÍousness as expLicit consciousness. 53 3.2 Conceptualization ( vikalpa). 55 3.3 Discernment (vltarka/vicãra). 58 3.3.1 Basic definition. Sg 3.3.2 Discernment as an orienting response. 61 3.3.3 DÍscernment and desire. 63 3.4 Perception (sa¿ñJña). 65 3.4.1 SañJñã as perception, cLassificatÍon and notion. 65 3.4.2 Perception as lacking reflective judgment. 68 3.5 Conceptuaì.ization (vikalpa) again. 69 3.6 Summary. 7I Footnotes 74 III. The Role of Sa¿iskalra in 1. {ttention (panaskãra) Consciousness 83 84 1.1 Attentlon vs. equanimity. 1.2 Attention as the factor sustaining 1.3 The three species of attention. 1.4 Attention as the source and effect consciousness. of pass i ons ( klepãir)

Appendix A: The InterreLation of the Mental, Factors IZ7 Biblíography 729 AbbreviatÍons 1-4.1 Attention and ignorance. 7.4.2 Attention and the conditloning of passions. 7 .5 Adhlnuktj-attention 1.6 Sumnary. 2. VolitÍon 2.7 Sañskara as the constructive aspect of the individuat. 2.2 Volition as the prirnary factor of sa¿nskãra. 2.3 Volition as characterized by effort and desi.re. 2.3.7 Ef f ort. 2.3.2 Desire. 2.4 tlolition transforms the personal.ity-substratum. 2.5 The personality-substratum qualifies volition. 2.6 Consciousness and effort. 3. Conclusion ...

Footnotes

Abhidharmako6a

AbhidharnakoSabhãsya

Edgerton, Franklin, Buddhist Hybrid sanskrit Grannar and Dictionary, vol. 2, Varanasi: Motilal. Banarsidass, 1920. (Originally published in 1952. ) Stcherbatsky, Th. The CentraL Conception of Buddhism and the Meaning of Dharma, Del.hi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970 .

Dwarikadas Shastri, swami. Abhidharmakosa and Bhãçya of Acharva Vasubandhu with Sphutãrthã Commentary, Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1970 - 7974.

de Silva, M.W. Padmasiri. An Introduction to Buddhist Psycholoey, London: Macmillan Press, 1929. Monier-williams, Sir M. A sanskrit-English Dictionary, Delhi: oriental Publishers, 1899. (Originally pubtished in 18?2.)

AK AKB BHSD IBP M. Wm CCB D¡l

PI de La Vall.ée Poussin, Louis. "L'AbhidharmakoSa de Vasubandhu", MéIanges Chinois et Bouddhisues, 16 (Six volumes originally pubJ.ished between 1923 and 1931 ) .

PAB HaLdar, Aruna. some Psvchol.ogical Aspects of Earlv Buddhist Philosophy based on Abhidharmako6a of Vasubandhu, Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1981. PPA Guenther, H.V. Philosophy and Psychologl_ln the Abhidharna Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1974.

These texts are referred to so often that, for the sake of brevity, I have adopted a nore concise citation format for them. The abbreviation appears in square brackets followed directly by the page number: €.g., [Dw 103] rather than Dw, p. 103. In citing poussin, both the volume and page will be given: e.g., lP 2.22) rather than p, vol- 2, p. ZZ. Though Dwarikadas' text is also a multivolume work, the page numbers run consecutiveLy from the first to the Last volume, so reference to the volume was deemed unnecessary.

Introductlon

Ernest Becker, on the topic of human self-awareness, descrlbed man's "flrst self-exposure" in this way: The nfneteenth century discovered that manrs whole verbal and psychologlcal approach to the world was fabricated on the basis of hu¡nan intent. Even mathematlcs was seen to be a creatlon of manrs nfnd, lndependent of any necessary connectlon to reallty. ... Flants s¡rmbollc world was almost reduced to the status of a fignent of the imagfnation.l

This lnslght was by no neans a "self-exposure" unknown prfor to nlneteenth century. Buddhlsn exenpllfies a tradltion that over two millennia ago clalned that the world ts fabricated out of human lntent. "The dlversity of the world comes about by action, which is volltlon and that which volitlon does."2 The Buddhars response to this truth, like Husserlts at the end of the nlneteenth century,S *." to analyze the process of perceptlon and the dynamics by which veridical perception might be attalned. In both Buddhism and Husserlrs phenomenology this necessarily entailed an analysis of the way in which perception 1s distorted. The purpose of this essay ls to examine one particular presentation of the Buddhist analysis of the process of perceptlon and the role of volitlon in that process.

The text I have chosen for thls is Vasubandhu's Abhidharmako6a and hÍs commentary, or Bhãsya, on that sane work. Reference will also be made to a secondary commentary on Vasubandhu's Bhãsya, Ya6omitrats Sphutãrthã Abhidhar¡rako6avvãkhyã, or the Vyãkhyã, for short. The reasons for chooslng the Abhidharmako5abhãsya are its broad popularity 1n Buddhist history as well as lts clarity and breadth of perspective. I intend to expllcate the Buddhist analysis of the processes underlying consciousness primarily through an exegesis of significant passages of the texts and through the extenslve study of particular

words rel.evant to the analysls. rt ls helpful also to enploy contemporary psychology secondarily as a framework wlthln whfch or agafnst whlch to understand the Buddhist anaìysfs. I emphasize that thls 1s a secondary endeavour, for lt ls not my purpose to deaL at rength with the flndings and theories of psychology. Irfy knowìedge of psychology extends llttle beyond an introductory level. yet psychology offers a franework which enables us to discern the extent to which Buddhist psychology can be understood by assimllatlng 1ts dlscusslon fnto a modern frane of reference and the extent to whlch one nust accomnodate oneself to the Buddhist frame of reference.

For the sake of rendering the scope of such a topic manageable, there is a need to abstract it as much as posslble fro¡n its ethical, soteriological and metaphysical context. My interest is primarlly in a descrfptive analysis of the process which constitutes perceptlon/ consciousness and cf the factors that govern consciousness. It would be as impossibì.e, however, to divorce total.ly such an analysÍs from the ethical-salvific-philosophical fra¡¡ework of which it is an integrar part as Ít would be to craim a pound of flesh without spitling a drop of brood. still, the analysis of the perceptual process has an integrity of its own that allows it to be a sufficient focus of attention. Restríctlng the scope as fully as possible to Just the analysls of perceptual processes ls the only means of making the toplc lean enough for a paper of this slze. The dynamlc factors that govern consclousness (carttáft) are forty-six in nunber; by excluding the ones

pertinent only to ethlcal states of consclousness I can restrlct the potentlally relevant factors to the ten that are com¡non to every monent of thought (øahãbhlløÍka calttliå). Atso I w1ì.1 not deal with the broader dlscusslon of the soterlological process by which verldical perceptlon and, ultlmately, the cessatlon of perceptlon are achleved, except to the extent that the process helps to clarlfy the structural or dynanic factors effecting perception. It 1s also not my intent to grapple with Buddhist metaphysics except to the extent that basic concepts can only be understood by reference to the Buddhist understanding of the nature of the world.

Havlng glven the narrow scope of ny concern, lt would be valuable to outllne the broad framework of Buddhist psychorogy. The Buddhfst understanding of perceptual processes is shaped by the universe of neaning of which it is a crucial part. Without sone understandlng of this universe we could not appreciate why the analysls takes the shape it does. unllke western psychologies, whfch seek to integrate lndivíduals into thelr environnent or to help then realize themsel- ves, Buddhlsn studles the mind for the sake of achieving tiberation fro¡n bondage to exlstence. For the Buddhlst, Nirvãga is the

beglnning and the end of the analysis of the nind, for out of the experlence of thfs liberation the analysis grows and to thls experience the analysis leads. Belng grounded in the experience of Nirvãga 1t 1s not governed by ephemerally faddish notlons of what norns constitute proper social adJustnent or full self-reaLlzation. UnIike modern sclence, the Buddhist did not attempt to arrive at a valuefree, obJective descrlptlon of phenomena whfch could be utilized equally by therapist, advertizer and tyrant. The goal of Buddhist psychology is speclfically salvlfic. Nirvã4a, at least in a Theravãdin context, was of two sorts -- the achievement of dispasslonate

equaninrity (or the cessation of emotionalfty) and the cessation of consciousness, ¡shlch was consldered a foretaste of the urtlnate cessation of exlstence that one wouìd achieve 1n death. Glven these experiences of Nlrvã4a, the Buddhlst anaJ.ysis of consclousness attenpted to discover the subtle components that comprlse consclousness, the different constellatfons of these components in the various states of mind that bridge ncrmallty and llberation, and the causa.L relatlonshlps between these conponents and states of ¡nind. This analysis was a gulde to cultlvatlng particular states of nind, certain constellatlons of mentaL components. Thfs is the background against which the Buddhist analysls of the role of volitton ín perception or consciousness was meant to be understood.

I have divided thls thesls into three major chapters. The first is a discussion of the Buddhist view of the nature of consciousness. The second deals more particularly wÍth the distinction between two kinds of conscÍousness: the consciousness assoclated with the five senses and the consclousness of mental phenonena. The third chapter deals with the conative eLements ln the process of perception. I.1. A dÍscusslon of the meaning and nature of "consciousness"

(cttta) will be the basls for the tnitiaì chapter. In thís context I wirL examine the neaning of dåarsa -- irreducible, real "elementary phenonenon" -- which is crucial to understanding the nature of consciousness as well as other concepts to be examined Ín thls paper. r.2. The study wirl then turn to examlne the nature and. role of the factors that qualify consciousness or the "mental factors', (calttãå). The mental factors are important as those elements in consciousness that determlne the awareness of the percept.

I.3. on this basls consideration wlll be glven to two kinds of causallty associated with consclousness: "nutuaL cause" (sahabhähetu) and assoclate cause (saøprayukta-hetu) . II.1. rn the second chapter the discussion wiìl deal wfth the dlfferences between the five sensory consclousnesses and the nental consciousness. I will begln by examining thefr different ranges of obJects.

r1.2, conslderatlon will then be given to their respective ',sensors" or "seats" (ã,6raya). This wilL entaiì a general dlscussion of the relationship between the organ and the consciousness. The focus wlll be on the particular organ that constitutes the cornerstone of the perceptual process, the "mind" (sanas). In this context sone attention will be glven to a klnd of causality carled the "equivalent and antecedent cause" (saø-anantara-pratyaya\ .

II.3. The major focus of the second chapter will be to explore the qualftles or characteristÍcs that distinguish the "mentaL consclousness" (aano-vlJñãna) fron the sense consciousnesses. This will require a study of certain species of thought processes that dfstinguish nental and sense consclousness: investigatlon (yjtarka), Judgment (vlcara\, perception ( satñJñã\, and conceptualization (vikar- .4 pa) .

IIr.1. In the thlrd chapter r wil.Ì study four mental factors that are or are associated with conative factors operatfng in consclousness: attention (aanaskãra), convictlon (adåJor¡ktj), volition (cetanã), and desire (chanda). These four factors will be divided lnto two discussions, one focusslng on the nature of volition and the other on the nature of attention. Under attention (øanaska=ra) I wilt discuss conviction ( adåløuktJ) .

rrl.2. under the rubric of volition I will explore the meanlng of desire - III.3 In the conclusion I wlll organlze and summarfze the findlngs by addressing the questlon, "slhat role do lntentlonal factors pl.ay in the construction of consclousness, according to Vasubandhu's Aþni¡leryqþ$aÞhãsya?"

The Author and the Text

The sources of informatlon about Vasubandhu are the hagiographical accounts of hts llfe by Paramãrtha, Bu-ston and Tãranãtha.5 th" nain outllne of their accounts agree. Vasubandhu was the second son born into a Brahmin family ln northern Indla. According to Tãranãtha he was born the year after the ordinatlon of hls older brother, Asañga, who won fame as an able expositor of Yogãcãra Buddhisrn. Early in life, vasubandhu studied valbhãsika sarvãstivãdln Buddhlsm, a scholastic tradition that had been formalized at the Fourth council (c.

100 C.E.). In the early part of his life he wrote the Abhidharnako5a, or the KoSa for short. Gradually, it woulrl seen, he moved fron Sarvãstivãda towards sautrãntlka Buddhism, which reJected the conpJ.ex doctrinal systenatlzation of scholastic Buddhism. The BhãSya ("comnentary") on his earlier work, reflects his novenent away from scholastic Buddhism. He accepted the Yogãcãra doctrines under the influence of his ol.der brother. After having read Asafigats works, Vasubandhu made some sarcastic comment about its opaque bulk. I{hen Asafiga heard of thfs he decided it was time to convert Vasubandhu and set out to prove the intellectual integrity and noral virtue of his position. So it was that Vasubandhu finally accepted Yogãcãra Buddhisn.

After his brotherrs death he was the head of the unlversity at Nãlandã and the primary teacher of the Yogãcãra doctrines. Eventually Vasubandhu went to Gãndhãra, where under royal patronage he establlshed many new learnlng centres before his death at the age of eighty.

The date of Vasubandhu is a noot lssue. Opinlons are quite dlverse and each has dlstlnguished contemporary exponents and adherents. B. Bhattacharya cites the posslble dates as 280-360 or 420-500 C.E., and hlmself prefers the forner.6.l. Tákãkusu prefers the latter date. Rãhula sãfrkgtyãyana suggests either 499-s69 or 401-481 c.8., following Paramãrtha and KunãraJ-rva, respectlvely. The controversy is not slmply one of placlng vasubandhu ln time, but also of dlscernlng

whether there ¡,tere two Vasubandhus and who these two ¡,lere. Frauwallner is the more popular exponent -- though not the flrst -- of the view that there were two vasubandhus who tived in 320-380 and 4oo(- 480?) C.8., the first being a Mahãyãna scholar and the latter the author of the KoSa. The traditional biographies of Vasubandhu, accordlng to FrauwaLlner, nerged the two Ínto one person. poussin also accepts that there were two \tasubandhus, but contends that both the earlfer and later Vasubandhus belonged to the scholastic tradltion, the latter belng the author of the KoSa and subsequently a convert to a, the Mahãyãna.'

Ascertaining the actuar date of vasubandhu is not of practical slgnificance for this paper. A nore signlficant issue is whether Vasubandhu, the author of the KoSa and Bhãçya, is the sane as the Vasubandhu who authored numerous Yogãcãra texts. Does paramãrtha's account of the Hrnayãnl who converts to the lrfahãyãna reflect the true path of Vasubandhu or is it a means to account for the conflation of the two distinct Vasubandhus into one, as Frauwallner argued? This ls slgnlflcant to the extent that it tells us somethlng about the character of the Bhãsya and the direction it 1s novlng in. Stefan

Anacker argues that the Karmasiddlprakãrana, another work attrlbuted to vasubandhu, is a link between vasubandhu's schoLastfc phase and his Yogãcãra phase.S Thu style and arguments of the latter are those of the Bhãsya. Yet, though 1t follows a scholastlc form of argument, It concludes firnly in the Yogãcãra canp. Anacker sees the Bhãçya as belonglng to a transitional phase, for unLike the Karmasiddiprakãra- Dâ, it does not ain at any particular concrusion; it just seeks to expose the flaws inherent in various positions -- prtmarily the vaibhãsika. Aruna Haldar finds a stylfstfc kinshlp as well between the

Ko6abhãsva and a bhãçya written by the Mahãyãni Vasubandhu on Asañga's Madhyãnta vibhañga.9 rh""" nay be seen as vlndications of the historicity of the traditlonal account of Vasubandhu's career, vindications which r am Íncllned to accept because r an biased in favour of the relative authenticity of tradÍtion against the tendency to fragmentatlon found 1n certain aspects of literary crítical scholarshlp. vasubandhu's Kosa ls a lucid synopsis of the fundanental teachings of Buddhisn as seen by "the School", by which he means the VaibhãSikas. The Vaibhãsikas took their nane from a series of conmentaries, or vföåã$ãlr, that were written in connection with the Fourth

Council as a way of consolidating the majority opinion of the particlpants. In this sense it represents what one might call "orthodox" Buddhism. This orthodoxy represented the northern scholastic traditlon, the Sarvästivãda, vis-á-vis the southern scholastics, 1.e.,the Theravãda, and the anti-schoìastics, the Sautrãntika. The latter rejected the unduly speculative and realistic tendencies of the scholastic, or Abhldharna, literature and relied stmply on the authority of the teachings of the Buddha, the Sutras, from which they take thelr nane.

belleves to

the Bhãsya we see Vasubandhu, in outllnlng what he the flaws of the Vaibhãçlkas, movlng away from scholasticlsm artogether and ln sympathy with the sautrãntlkas. His posltion 1s not a sautrãntika one, however, for he does not argue for any posltion conslstently.l0 Rather, he seeks to identify which positions are untenable, whlch are debatable and whlch conforn most clearly with loglc and the most obvlous sense of the teachings of the Buddha. The AbhldharmakoSa was popular from the tine of its composftion. A number of conmentaries were written on it, the chlef among whlch s vvãkhvã by Ya6onitra, a seventh century rndian naster. As early as 563 C.E. it was translated lnto Chinese and lts popularÍty 1s evldent in lts numerous translatlons into chinese, Tibetan and ulghur. The Ko5a6ãstra, the body of llterature conprislng the Ko6a and the conmentary literature that grew around it, gave its nane to the Kiu-chö school of Buddhlsn, whlch was doninant in China in the sixth century, and to the Kusha school, which was officlally recognized in ?93 c.E. in Japan. Even today all monasteries in china and so¡ne in Japan requlre it to be read for seven years as an introduction to Buddhisn. Its popularity, therefore, 1s not restricted to the H-rnayãna, but exlsts as werl wfthin the Mahãyãna. Furthermore, it is popular in the Theravãda; a Pãli translatlon of the text 1s ¡nenorlzed by sri Lankan chlldren at an early age.11

No doubt it is the wÍde popularlty of the Kosa that has made it a focus of academlc attentlon. In 1912 some of the leading scholars of Buddhfsm proposed a plan for the thorough study of the Kosa and its commentaries, lncluding the development of a critlcal edition of the varlous texts, translation lnto various languages and a systematic revlew of its philosophy. The more signiflcant works that have come In be

about since that tlme are unraf hloglharats crfticat edttion of the Vvãkhyã,12 l,ou1" de la Valtée poussln,s translatlon of the KoSa and its Bhãçya into Fren"h,13 and three maJor philosophlcal dlscusslons of the text by o. Rosenberg, Th. stcherbatsky and H.v. Guenther.14 rnterest in the KoSa and its author stitl persists, as ere see in the publlcation of A. Haldar's Some ppyqhological Aspects of Earlv Buddhfst Philosophv based on the ábåidåarmakoSa of Vasubandhul5 and in the occaslonal article addressing specific toplcs in vasubandhu,s thought. 16

The sanskrlt text of the Kosa and lts Bhãçya was thought to be lost until they were discovered fn Tibet by Rãhula sãfrkgtyãyana in 1935. Poussinrs translation, published in this sane perlod, had attempted to reconstruct the originaÌ Sanskrlt from Chinese and Tibetan translatlons of it, a task that was made easier by the existence of Ya6onitrars connentary in sanskrit. The KoSa was first published in 19461.7-' It was published with its Bhãsya in a critical edition first in 196?.18 E second crltical edition, which included ya6omrtra's vyãkhvã, was published in four voLumes between 1920 and 1924.19 lt 1" this Latter edltion and Poussin's translation of the KoSabhãsya which have served as the prinary texts for this paper.

one nust ask in studyfng a text like the Abhi.dharmakosabhãsya exactly whose perspective one is seeking. Though the KoSa is written from a valbhãslka standpoint, the Bhã.sva 1s often criticar of the Vaibhãçika arguments and conclusions. Though vasubandhu's position has the greatest affinity wlth a Sautrãntika perspective, he is not consistently ln agreenent with them either. Nor can we say that the Bhãçya presents us with Vasubandhu's own perspective. He does not always offer a conclusion of his own. He may take an argument between 10

the Valbhãç1ka and the Sautrãntika, ptayfng them back and forth, only to Leave the argument 1n the alr wlthout appointing a w.Lnner. He castigates lnconsistency and the dlstortion of the obvious sense of Scripture wherever he finds 1t but allows any lntegral argument to stand. I must admlt that in this I sense a fundanentat afflnity that draws me to Vasubandhu, that leads me to want to see through his eyes. Like hin, this paper does not lntend to set forth any partlcular posftfon, but to present that which Vasubandhu hlmself aìlows as havlng integrity.

Footnotes

1. Revolution in Psychiatry, Nerr¡ York: Free Press, 1964, p. 138. The obvlous irony of this passage is that it uses the word "dlscovered" rather than saying "created the notion". The irony lllustrates the very real dlfflculty of accepting a world where knowlng is not somehow anchored in a reality Índependent of individual or collective knowers.

2. KarnaJaù loka-vaicltryaù, cetanã. tat-kptañ ca tat. (AK 4.1)

3. The sinilarlties between Buddhism and Husserl's phenonenology are interestlng. Both held that sensory processes funnel a real world into the realm of experlence and that veridical perception is nitigated as the data is mixed with non-sensory conceptual and imaginative cornponents. One must aspire to discern reallty free of the distorting lnfìuence of imaginatlon. Buddhism and phenonenology both spawned reallstic and idealistic lnterpretations of the source of the 'real world'. Both have been ldentlfied as a kind of enpiricism that fs not restricted to sensory data. Buddhism accepts "mental sensations" and Phenomenology accepts categorical data, and one could argue that these concepts are equivaLent.

4. The etymologles of the words and the translatlons chosen for them will be dealt wfth later in the context of discussing the meanfng of the Sanskrlt terms. 5. Cf. Tãranãtha, Historv of Buddhism in India, (trans. Lama Chímpa & Alaka Chattopadhyaya), SinJ.a: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 19?0, pp.16? ff. Bu-ston, History of Buddhlsm, þt.2, (trans. E. Obermiller), Heidelberg, 1932, (Materlallen zur Kunde des Buddhismus), pp. 144 ff. Paramãrtha's account of Vasubandhu's Ltfe 1s sunmarized in A. Haldar, Sone Psvchologicaì Aspects of Early Buddhist philosophy based on the .ÃÞåJdåarnako5a of Vasubandhu, Caìcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1981, [The Aslatic Soclety Monograph Series, vol. 25], p.

11 10.

6. Much of this surnmary of current oplnlon I owe to Haldar, pAB p. 10f.

7. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, "L'Abhidharnako6a de Vasubandhu", Hélanges chjnofs et Bouddhiques, 16, p.xxvii. (six volumes originally pubÌlshed between 1923 and 1931) 8. "vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakâra4a and the problen of the hlghest meditations", Philosophy East & West, 22 (L572),247f. 9. PAB, p. 13.

10. I hold this posltion in contrast to Guenther (ppA, p.vii.) who says that Vasubandhu writes hls commentary from a sautrãntika perspective. Though Vasubandhu almost always sides with the Sautrãntlkas agafnst the Vaibhãçikas, he occasionally disagrees with the Sautrãntikas. For exanple, in AKB 4.65cd [3.136] [S 6?4] he affirms the Valbhãsika vfew that desire, antipathy and ignorance are not mental acts. In AKB 4.?8 [3.169] he notes the Sautrãntika faiLure to explain how their disagreernent with this view can be held in light of a particular Scripture.

11. This was discovered in conversation with a Buddhist acquaintance, Chandra Pad¡rlnl, who was raised in SrÍ Lanka. 72. U. I{ogihara (ed.) Sphutãrthã Abhidharmako5avvãkhyã, vols. 7 & Z, Tokyo, 1932 & 1936, respectively. 13. Cf. fn. 7.

14. O. Rosenberg, Problene der buddhÍstischen Philosophie, petrograd, 1918. (Translated into German by Mrs. O.Rosenberg, Heidelberg, 7924.1. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception of Buddhisn and the Meaning of Dharma, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970. (Originally publlshed in 1923. Hereafter caì]ed CCB.) H.V. Guenther Philosophy and Psychology in the Abhidharma, Delhi: Motilal Banasidass, 7974. (Originally published in 195?. Hereafter called PPA.) 15. CaLcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1981. (The AsÍatic Socíety Monograph Series, voJ.. 25)

16. Griffiths, Paul. "On Being Mindless: The debate on the re-emergence of consciousness from the attainment of cessation in the Abhidharnakoíabhãçyan and, its co¡nmentaries", PhíLosophy East& Ílest, 33 (1933). Stefan Anacker, "Vasubandhu's KarnasiddhÍprakãra4a and the probìem of the highest medftations", phltosophy East & West, 22 (1972).

1?. v.v. Gokhale, "The Text of the Abhidharnakosa-kârikã of vasubandhu", Journal of the Bombav Branch, Royal Asiatic Societv, N.S., Vol. 22, 1946.

18. P. Pradhan, Abhldharna-Koshabhãsya of vasubandhu, Tibetan Sanl2 skrlt works serles, vol. 8, K.P. Jayaswal Research rnstltute, patna, 1967.

19. Swami Dwarlkadas Shastrl, Abhidharmako6a and Bhãsya of Acharva vasubandhu u¡ith sphutãrthã conmentarv, varanasi: Bauddha Bharatl, 1970-19?4. 13

I. The Nature of Consclousness

In definlng what Vasubandhu means by "thought, consciousness" (cJtta), one of the most basic statenents one can make 1s that it is a dharøa. Because the concept of dharøa will be crucial for understanding the Buddhist discussion of consclousness and perception, it would be appropriate to address its meaning at the outset. An adequate definitlon for our purposes here ls that a dharøa is a phenomenal, irreduclble, and momentary real element.l

Another way of understanding consciousness is to contrast it to the mentar factors (calttãþ) that qualify it and are derivatives of it. Flnally, consideration will be given to the causal relationships between consciousness and the ¡nental factors that exist in any given moment of consciousness: mutual and associated causallty.

1. Consclousness as a dlraraa

{1.1} Dharnâþ are phenomenal in the sense that they are capable of being experienced. we are told in AK 2.62c [p 1.306] that "alr dharøã{ u are obJects (of consciousness). "2 This statenent is made in the context of defining the "objective causal condftion" (ã.raabana-pratyaya); the object plays a causal role 1n every nonent of consciousness as a factor that defines consclousness. In AK ?.13cd [p s.40] one reads, "fDharøa,þl that have an obJect 'nake known' (äkãrayatl) , but everythlng that exists is 'made known'."3 Edgerton defines ãtrca-rayaÉJ as "makes kno¡qn by a gesture or sigït".4 Th" inplication ís that every dharøa has a quality which renders it manifest. Dharøãþ are the fundamental bases of perception.

The significance of dharøãþ becomes readily apparent when one considers the basic orientation of Buddhlst epistemology: though 74

sensory processes funnel a real worldS into the realm of experlence, the perceptfons of those ¡sho are not htghly skilled 1n the abllity to see things as they truly are -- l.e, of those wlthout insight or wlsdom (praJñ'å) -- are mlxed wlth non-sensory conceptual and lmaginatlve components. one cultivates lnslght in part by the effort to discer.n reality free of the dlstorting infLuence of conceptuallzatlon and imaglnation. Llke the twentieth century phenomenologist, the Buddhist seeks to kno¡,¡ the phenomenon prlnarily by the way ft presents ltse]f lmnediately to consclousness. Perception of dåareåft, free of any qualitles superlmposed by imagination, ls verldlcal perception.

In phllosophy a dlstÍnctlon is nade between substance and quallty. substance ls that which possesses speciflc qualities; a quallty is that which manifests a partÍcular substance. In AKB 3:1o0ab lP 2.214] Vasubandhu represents Buddhism as a ¡ryhole in arguing against the Hindu VaiSeç1ka school that one can not distinguish between substance and quallty. There is no "thing" (dravyal dlstirrct from the quality that nakes it known. The quality that presents itserf to consciousness is the only "thing" to be known.

So, a dharøa is something phenomenal, capable of being experienced. What it means to be "experienced", however, has a broader neanlng than some Western philosophers would be willing to accept. The Buddhlsts acknowledged two neans of knowledge, "lmmediate perception" (pratyakga) and "reason, inference" (anunãna). Sone dharnãþ can only be known by lnference. The sense 'organs' (lndrÍyãþ) are the typical exanple of such dharøãþ.ô A b"tt"r word for organ would be sensor for the Jndriya is not the manifest form or physlcal aspect of the sense organ, but its subtle constitutlon, that which accounts for its sensitlvity. Slght depends on having an eye, yet sinply having an eye is 15

not sufflclent, for one may have eyes and yet be bllnd. One can infer that there must be a real. eLement lnherent in some eyes that render them varlousl.y effectlve. Even though such dåaraãþ are known only by inference, they are yet considered objects of consciousness, for "aIl dharøãh are objects of consciousness". Though they cannot be perceived by the ffve senses, they are known by the mental consclousn""" .7 unlfke the phenomenoJ.ogist, who seeks to understand the wholes and patterns in whfch the phenonenon presents itseLf,S th" Buddhist seeks the irreducible components of the phenomenon. For example, rüpa, the däarøãf that comprise the basic elements of all vlsible p.h9enonena,- conslsts of four prinary colours -- blue, red, yellow and white -- and elght degrees of brightness or crarity.lo of course, they admft that there are more colours than Just these four, but they are derivatives or admixtures of these basic four. This illustrates the lrreduclble character of dharnâþ and the atonistic understanding of phenomena in Buddhism.

The concept of dharøãþ as the irreducibly real elementary phenomena Ís one held by the various Sthaviravãdin school".11 The dlraraãf aLone are ultlmately real, and that which one constructs from them is but a "verbal conventlon, conventional designation,, (praJñaptÐ.12 such constructions are unreal products of the Ínagination. This, however, is the extent of their agreement, for one of the naJor themes of conflict in the Bhãçya 1s the Sautrãntika objection that varlous dharnãþ, thought by the Vaibhãsikas to exist, h¡ere slmply verbal conventlons. Thls conflict could be seen as one between different degrees of atomism or different degrees of reallsn. f present here a illustratlve sample of the moot dlrarpãf accepted 16

by the Valbhãslkas. rn AKB 1.10 [p 1.16] we flnd the vaibhãslka anaJ.ysis of the various dåarøåfr conprfsing vlslble data. Along with the four prlmary colours and etght degrees of brlghtness, they berieved there to be eight fundamental shapes (sadståána): long anc short, square and round, tall and short, equal and unequrl.l3 In AKB 2.45 [P 1.222] t}ne Vaibhãçikas argue that the characterlstics of a dharøa -- blrth, growth, duratlon, and impermananence (or death) -- must also be dlrarøäþ.14 th" justtflcation for this is that, tf these characteristics ¡cere not real entitles, then how could they be known? That

is, how can insight show us the inpernanence of all condítioned phenonena unless such a thing as lmpermanence really does exlst? The argunent is essentially that only sonethfng real. can be causally effective -- the effect here being knowledge. This exenprifies the reallsm of the VaibhãsÍka. This realisn fs seen again in their lnterpretation of the Attainment of cessation (nfrodha-sanapatti), which is a controlled comatose state, a trance state in which consciousness ceases altogether. For the vaibhãsika, cessation was a dharaa, a real causaf factor manifest as Cessation.

{1.2} The refutatlon of the existence of these dharaãþ is franed ln terms of them being verbal conventions (praíñaptr) rather than "things" (drawa). The reason for the use of the term dravya is that there is an element of anbÍguity tn the word dharea not found in dravya. The word dravya is occasionally used as a synonyn for dharøa, as is evident 1n AKB 2.34d [P 1.r77']: "Just as onry one erement of consclousness (c1tta-dravyal arises so does only one element of feellng (vedanâ-drawa) arlse."15 fn AKB 9 [p s.zg2] it ts asked whether the "person, soul" (pudgaJa) has elther a nomina] (praJñapti- L7

Éa) or concrete (dravyata) exlstence.lS The orthodox position is that it ls nominal, wlth no ultimate reallty. Dharøa and dravya are not fully synonymous, however. Not alt dharøãþ are concrete (dravyata). AKB 4.4 [P 3.25] acknowledges thls explicttly; the "mundane" dharøãþ -- possesslon, fane, praise, pleasure and thetr opposites -- are not things ín any concrete sense yet are stlll essentlally "real" from a worldly point of vierc.17 purthernore, in the vyãkhya on AKB 2.44 [P 1.274] we find the juxtaposition of praJñaptt-dharøa and dravyadharøa. According to the sautrãntlkas, the attainment of cessatlon

(saøãpattJ) 1s slnply the absence of consciousness rather than the causal factor behind cessatlon. Because nothing -- i.e., an absence of sornething -- cannot be something, vasubandhu afflrurs that it fs, therefore, just a verbaÌ construct. Ya5onitra makes this even more expliclt: "This means it 1s arnominal entity-dharøar, not a'concrete entlty-drrarÃa'."18 praTñapti-dharna, Ís a problenatic term. I would interpret it to mean that its true nature is verbal construction -- i.e., it has no reallty.We see fro¡n the usage of dåarpa 1n

the ratter texts that its range of meanlngs ls broad and can be used to apply to things with no ultfmate reallty. Therefore, dravya seems to be used as a synonyn that connotes more strictly and clearly the existence or non-existence of a phenomenon. The use of the word dravya for conditioned things fs applled only in a conventional sense, for ultimately, according to AKB 1.38a, only that whtch is unconditfoned (asaañskgta) is pernanent and, therefore, a dravya.lg Mentlon has been made of the fact that cessatlon as a rthing'was reJected by the sautrãntlka because it was sfmply an absence of something. Let us briefly consider one other Sautrãntika refutation of the vaibhãsika's disputable dåaraãÞ which is significant for under- 18

standlng Vasubandhurs vlew of the nature of reaìfty. vasubandhu addresses the issue of form or shape belng a dharøa ln AKB 4.3 [p g.g]. The dlscusslon follows on the tails of the Valbhãçfka refutatlon of the Vãts-rputr-rya ldea of overt behavlour (vlJñaptt) being essentially novement (Satl). Overt behavlour is the external and vfsible actlon which foLlows fron volition. The issue is thls: what is the irreduclble realfty that one's perceptlon of overt behavlour relles upon? The Vãtslputrryas say that one perceives behaviour because of movement. The valbhãçfka refutatlon of the vãts-rputrryas appeaLs to the ternporal atomism of Buddhlsm; novement ln time is only an appearance of

successive shapes, Just llke a notion plcture is a successlon of still fra¡nes that create the illusion of movement. Itlovement is not real; 1t can not be a dharøa. The vaibhãsikas naintain that the perception of behaviour reLies on successive shapes (satñstãna), which give the appearance of movement. This is llke saying with respect to a motion picture that it is the forn on the individual fra¡ne that is real. The Sautrãntika response is that, as movement is an illuslon in time, form is equally an illusion ln space. In thls way the sautrãntika are more consistently atomistic. this indicates a radically different attitude to the world as 1t ls consciously concelved. If the appearance of forns in the perception of the world is a false -- in the sense of lacking ultimate vaLÍdity -- superinposltion on the raw data of experÍence, then ultimate reality bears no resenblance to the world as it is conventionalJ.y known.

{1.3} Another characteristic of dåarøâf is that they are epheneraL or momentary (kganrka). According to AKB 4.2 [p 3.4], kganrka neans perfshlng lmmediately after having come into existence. A rmoment' is the s¡nallest lmaginable unit of time. vasubandhu in AKB g.Bs [p z.t7B] 19

nentlons a fe$, views of how short thls monent 1s, the most concrete of ¡shlch fs that sixty-flve moments occur in the tfme lt takes to snap one's fingers. Ètost such descriptlons are meant to defy inagination. lhe apparent continuity of the phenomenal world in spite of this constant birth and Ceath of the real elenents that underlie lts appearances is due to the causar effects of dharøâþ. The dåareã{z of one monent play a causal role in the origination of the dåaræãfr in the following monent. The signlffcance of this ephemerality is that 1t atitigates the bellef ln some substantial reality that remains unchanged in spite of apparent qualltatlve changes.

To conclude the dlscussion of the word dåarsa one can say that the Sthaviravãdin Buddhlsts agreed that dåarpa1þ are the fleeting and irreducible elementary phenonena that present themselves to consciousness, either to be seen in their atonistic sinpricity or to be bullt up into an imagÍnative construction. Though they cane to different concluslons about what was real versus what was contributed by lmagination, their basic definition of dåarsa was the same. {1.4} To call consciousness an irreducible phenonenal element

means that it is nefther a product of lmagination nor a linguistic devíce for referring to an aggregate of phenonena. consclousness ls somethlng whfch is fundamentally real. The monentary nature of dharøãþ indicates that cltta Ís the present most minute moment of consciousneas. consciousness exists only as the molecular moment; a sfngle thought wouìd ln the Buddhist analysis be a series (sa¡itãna) of conscious noments Ín succession, which give the false impression of a constant or stable state upon which evanescent feelings arise. There is no stabre state; Just a flow of processes in which consclousness ls but one more changing, evanescent e}ement. 20

consclousness is somethÍng capable of belng dlrectly percelved. It is not knorsn by deductlon. Regardless of one's trance state -- aslde from cessatlon, that ls -- and regardless of the obJect of which one is ar{are and the feeting tone that attends it, there is a quality implicit ln every noment of consciousness that is sul. generJs; as a phenomenon, the quatity called "consclousness" cannot be reduced to sornethlng else.

{1.5} As a dåarpa citta is the same "thlng" as vlJñãna and sanas. Yet, though these words denote the same baslc entity, they connote different aspects of the entity. The words are explicltly equated ln AKB 2.34a [P 1.176], where they are distinguished by their etymological and connotative differencu".20 The latter are more significant for our purposes. According to this analysis cttta is so-called because it is quaì.ified by factors that conditlon consclousness in favourable or unfavourable ways. That is, cltta connotes consciousness as it is normaJ.ly experienced, qualified by perception and feerings, energy or lethargy, etc. It is also the nore generic expression for consciousness vis-à-vis matter (rupa) . Manas is consciousness in its role as

the organ, sensor, or "seat" (a-S¡aya) upon which consciousness is dependent; it is the power or faculty (fndr!.ya) by which we are aware. Just as visual consciousness is dependent upon the eye as its seat -- i.e., that which supports and enabres it -- so consclous awareness requires a basis which sustains it. Åfanas I will translate as fnindr. No explanation is given of vlJñãna except to say that others dlstinguish it as that which is seated (ãSrfta), that whlch depends on a seat/sensor and on an object for its existence.2l Accordlng to thls definition, vlJñãna would connote consclousness 27

without qualifylng factors such as feellngs, perception, etc. unquatlfied consciousness, of which more ¡,¿1ll be said shortly, ls slmply the reflection of the obJect nlrrored within the observer. In llght of these connotative disttnctlons, one wonders how they can all apply to a common enttty. The difference between cJtta and vlJñãna is negligible, for they connote qualified and unqualifred consciousness, respectÍvely. But the difference between vlJñãna/citta and sanas is slgniflcant; when consciousness rests on or depends on Ranas, how canrthat which 1s seated'be the same as.the seat upon whlch it rests? This question wlrl be addressed when dealing speciflcally with panas.

2. Consciousness and the nental factors (cajttãå)

{2.1} citta, 1n the sense of consciousness quatified by feelings and thoughts, is frequentry denoted by the compound cJtta-caltta, "asrareness and the mental- factors". The nental factors (carttãf) are the cognitive, enotive and conative elernents that qualify and characterize consciousness. Mental factors are dharnãþ, which is to say that each factor embodies a dlstinctive quallty that may be present in consciousness; for example, respect (årt) is qualÍtatively dlfferent from pride (aãna) or equanimÍty (upekçã).

The presence or absence of a particular mental factor determines the basic character of any given moment of consclousness. According to AKB 2.23cd [P 1.152], there are six basic categories of mental factors. The basis of the categorization is an analysls of the categorres of consciousness in which they occur. Some are found in every monent. others occur in every morally pure, impure or defiled noment of consciousness. Others can occur at any time.22 Most gernane to 22

thls paper is the category calLed the "unlversal mental factors', (øahãbhi[øÍka-caltt¿it) that, according to the vatbhãglkas, are common to every moment of consclousness. vasubandhu, however, accepts the Sautrãntlka positlon, which holds that these factors do not necessarily occur in every moment but that there ls no category of consciousness in nhfch they cannot occur.23 th" number of these universal nental factors varies depending on whích school one follows. Some berieve there are only flve: feeling (vedanâ), perception (sañJñã), volitlon (cetanã), rcontactr (sparsa) and desfre to act (chandal. The Sarvãstavãdins lnclude another flve: menory or mlndfulness ( sortJ) , concentration ( saøâdht\, insight (praJñã\, attention (øanaskãra) and convictlon (adhløuktl). Vasubandhu finds no difficuLty with accepting the Sarvãstavãdin analysis.

The forn of the word caitta literally suggests "that which cones from cJtta", so thoughts and feeJ.ings are derivatives or transfornatlcns of consclousness. The relationship of the two is analogous to that of the Þå¿ita and bhautfka, that is, the relatlonshlp between the prÍmary elements (bhirta) -- earth, water, fire and wfnd -- and all the discrete, naterial elements or qualities (bhautlka = rûpa dharøIi[) that are derlved from the¡n. conscíousness as the'primary erementr that underlles the mental factors grants then its characteristic quality, the qualíty of being immateriaì (incapabte of resistance) and wlthout extension.

There are two categories of mental factors: those associated wíth conscfousness (sañprayukta) and those unassociated wtth ft (vtprayukta). Those associated wlth consciousness are the nental factors of which one may become conscious and which are inpllcitly present in the conscious percept. So, for exanple, feeling and perceptlon are 23

present in any glven mornent of consclousness and one nay become consclous of both factors, if one chooses to attend to them. The unassoclated factors, on the other hand, pertaln nore to the factors that govern the moments of an individual's existence rather than the moments of conscious experience. For exanpJ.e, vltality (a:yus) is the factor that governs the length of one's llfe. "Name" (nãea) governs Language, being the element of meaning that informs ringuistlc expresslon' 24 ou" interest 1s only 1n the factors associated with consclousness. {z.z¡ rn the expression cltta-caitta, crtta vis-à-vis ca-{tta may

be thought of as a pure, unqualified consciousness in contrast to the nental factors that qualify it.25 ln this sense of unquallfied con_ sciousness cJtta is synonymous with vfJñãna, so the definition of viJñãna can help us understand what one might nean by pure or unqualified consciousness. vtJñãna is defined in AKB 1.16a [p 1.30] as the lmpresslon (vtJñaptr) that corresponds to each sensory field.26 vlJñaptÍ is a difficult word that may mean ',proclanation, announcement, making known" .27 ln essence it conveys the idea of that which bears lnfornation. The Bhãgya clarlfles vtJñapti by juxtaposlng it

with the synonym uparabdhl, "perception, appearance", which the vvãkhvã deflnes as the "prehension of Just the object itself', ( vastuøãtra- graha4aa) in contrast to feeling, perception and volition that grasp the particular aspects of it ( vJ5ega-graha+al and render it knor.rn. More revealing is a text quoted else¡chere by the Vyãkhyã, ,'The visual consclousness (the vlJñâna related to the eye) produced by contact [with an obJect] knows blue, but not that ft is blue."28 In other words, the object is accurately represented within the organism but this implicit percept is not explicit, not consciously recogniz- 24

ed. It 1s perceptlon, feellng, and volition that account for the explictt a$rareness of the obJect.29

I have spoken of viJñãna as inpl.icft perception over agalnst the factors that make lt explicit. To clartfy what I mean by impricit perception consider the metaphor of a reflection in a mirror going unnotlced by oneself. In this metaphor consclousness (vÍJñâna) is the 'unnotlced reflection' of an externar obJect wlthin oneself.S0 rh" reflectlon ls present, but unattended and not rendered conscious. one could say that lt ts present wtthin the observer but not represented. Even so, lnpricit perception is the registratÍon or presentation of an object within the indivíduat -- just as an obJect "registers" or ls present in the mirror as a reflection -- wlthout any conscious awareness of the obJect, without the factors that cause it to be represented, consciously attended to, known.

{2.3} The mirror metaphor purposely refers to conscÍousness as the refl.ection in the mirror; consciousness is not the mirror upon which the reflection plays. There is no stabre unde:.lying reality independent of the refLection. stcherbatsky see¡ns to suggest otherwise when he says that the Buddhist understand consciousness to be, a substance without either qualities or nove¡nents. Being the pure light of knowledge it 'stands by' the phenomena, lLluminates llli:aleflects

then, without grasping them or befng affected by sthaviravãdin Buddhism would assert, however, that consciousness is not a llght that exists Índependentry of the objects of conscÍousness and lnto which tight the object moves.32 Con""lousness is an effect of an object and a perceiving sensor, just as a reflection is the product of an obJect and arseat' (the mirror) that holds the reflection.33 i,ik" the reflection, consciousness, can not exlst apart 25

from lts causes. Many texts support the necessity of an obJect for consciousness. In AKB 1.34 [P 1.62] the six kinds of consciousness (viJñãnãþ) are classed among the other dharøãþ that are classlfied as havlng an obJect (sa-ãlaøbana).As we read in AKB 2.34 [p 1.1?z] of the five rlikenesses' (saøatã) that consciousness shares with the mental factors, three of them are that they attend to the same basic object (ãlaøbanal, the sane aspect of the obJect (ãkãra) and the sane number of objects. Also, considerlng the various rstations of consciousnessr (vtJñãna-ståJtJ), 1t becones clear that one of the requlsites of consclousness ls perceptlon (saúJñÐ, which ín turn assumes what Brentano

referred to as intentionality -- the directedness of consciousness toward an object. The stations are the various spheres of existence/ stages of neditatfon, the highest of which is a stage called (and characterized by )' netther-perceptjon-nor-absence-of-perceptlon' (naiva-saùJñã-asaúúña).34 H""u consciousness is sustained by force of will (cetanâ) rather than by having a clear object or quality to focus or rest on. Yet it cannot be said that perceptlon is strictly absent. Beyond this stage is the attain¡nent of cessation in which perception is absent and consciousness does not exist. The other four aspects of existence (skandhãþ) -- matter, feeling, perception and volitfon -- are compared to a field in which consciousness, the seed., can grow or exist. l{ithout the field conscíousness cannot really exlst; it ls merely a potenti.l.35

{2.4) Consciousness for material beings such as ourselves depends on a physfcal basis. This is made explicit in AKB 3.gb [p 2.s] where it ls said that the serles of moments that comprise conscious existence depend for their existence upon matt.".36 The materlal aspect 26

of personal existence (räpa-skandha) not only supports consclousness but also governs fts state. In AKB 2.44d [p 1.213, Dw 247] the conatose state known as the Attalnment of cessation Ís attrlbuted by Vasubandhu to the equillbrium of the four primary materlal el.ements that compose the individuar (øahãbhüta-saøatã). The confusion and lack of self-control whlch are the resu]t of one's past acts are presented 1n AKB 4.58 [P 3.127] as the effect of disequilibriun of the four primary elements.ST so we see that consciousness requires a certaln degree of disequil,ibrfum, but too nuch mitigates the capacity for self-control.

3. Causality and sinultaneity

{3.1} There are two causal- relationships that describe the lnteraction of the consciousness and the nental. factors: "associated cause" (saùprayukta-hetul and "mutual. cause" (sahabhû-hetu). Associated cause conveys the idea that in order for consciousness to exist It must have five thlngs in common with the mental phenomena which qualify it. These five slmiLarities (salnatã) are given in AKB 2.34 tp 7.7771: they rely on the same sensor (ãÉraya), the sarne object (ãJarbanal, and the same aspect of the object (akara)38, they occur at the same time (kãla), and are directed towards the same single thing (drawa). For example, consciousness of a visual datum cannot exist unless the contenporaneous mental. factors -- perception, feeling, etc. -- also depend on the same source of stimulation and are focussed on the same datum.

It ls interestÍng to note that the object is a singìe thing (dravyal. Thls is emphasized by Ya6omitra: "Just as onìy one mo¡nent of consciousness arises, and not two or three, so does onJ.y one feeling 27

arise, and not two or three."39 consciousness at any given no¡nent has only one obJect, around whtch all awareness and feeling ls structured. The valldlty of thls statement is not imnedlately apparent; the neaning of a slngre dravya needs to be addressed . Dravya needs to be understood as a single perceptual feature upon whlch one can focus -- a partlcular colour, a partlcular shape, a particular kind of sound, etc. Most percepts are qulte complex. one nay be aware of nany particular things simultaneousì.y. rn spite of the complexÍty that one is capable of synthesfzlng lnto a single percept, there is a sense of

focus or, in terms of Gestalt psychology, a'figure,, which stands out agafnst lts context or'groundr. r would interpret ya6omltra to be saying that the 'figure'must have a slngle feature that allows it to be the focus of attention. For exanple, a simplerconplex'stÍmulus consÍsting of two blue dots surrounded by white night appear as two blue dots, which are equally the centre of attention, upon a white backgrourrd, with respect to which attention is more diffuse or less particular. Even though two dots are seen, Ya6omitrars statement implies it is a single and comnon feature -- theír blueness or'dotness'-- that ennables them to be Jointly focussed on. The one thing

(dtavya) that is the obJect of consciousness may be the colour or the shape; though two or several objects share this single feature, they are a slngle phenomenon. According to this analysis, ff the dots were to be different fron each other in both shape and corour, thls would prevent them from being a slngle percept; the two different shapes/ colours could not share attention equally. More shall be said about this rsingleness' of object after discussing mutual causality. {3.2} Mutual causality conveys the idea of a sinultaneous and reciprocal cause and effect relationship.40 K""ping in mind the uni¡na- 28

ginable brevlty of any given moment (ksana), the cause and effect occur 1n the same noment. To speak of "cause" in thls sense is semantlcally awkward, for we naturaLly think of cause arrd effect being a serial relatlonship, a cause giving rise to a subsequent effect. yet 1n mutuaL causatlon each element in the relatlonshlp ls like the leg of a trlpod; mutually and sfmultaneousry they support each other. The standing of one is both cause and effect of the standing of the others.41 Llk"roi=u, neither conscÍousness nor the mental phenomena, the caJttas, can stand alone. In any given moment one cannot exist wÍthout the other, for they sustain each other. UnLess consciousness exists ln a given moment, there can be no feeling, no perception, no intention -- in short, no awareness. sinilarly, consciousness alone, without any quaì.ifying factors is lnposslble; for it to exist, there nust be perceptlon, intention and feeling.

The necessary assoclatÍon of consciousness and the mental factors is an issue that cones up in a concrete rr¡alr in AKB 2.44d [p 1. Z7Zj. The discussion centers on vasunitra's belief that consciousness exists even in the Attainment of cessation ( nirodha-sapãpatti). one nust assume vasumitra meant that there is a kind of consciousness that one is not aware of, an awareness so subtle that it is devoid of awareness. In refuting this Bhadanta Ghoçaka voices an argument from scripture, which ls vasubandhurs own objection: if there is consciousness (vtJñãna) then there must also be tcontactr, feeling,

deflnition, and volltion. The conditions of consciousness cannot exlst without the conditions of the others also existing.42 {3.3} Mutual causallty requires sinuìtaneous interactivity. It is not just consciousness and the ¡nenta-L factors that effect one another in this way, but also the mental factors themselves are si¡rultaneous 29

causes of each other. Thls ls evldent in the dlscusslon of the relatlonshfp between 'contact' and feellng. Thls relatfonshlp is slgnificant for our understanding of the process by whlch the conscious percept comes about and so nerÍts our attention.

In AKB 2.24 "contact" (spar5a) is deflned as "the touching that cones fron the coincidence of sensor, obJect and consclousness."43 rn a sense ' consciousness exlsts as a potential and becomes actual only when defined. It 1s deftned when the eye "cones together,, wlth an obJect. tContactrshould be taken some¡chat literatly for there was a belief that the perceptual sensor -- i.e., the sensitive stuff that accounted for perception -- extends out fron the lndividual until it met resistance from an object.44 lt ts by the sensor meeting the resistance offered by the object that consciousness cones to be

informed by the object. In the Buddhtst index of causal relations, titled "Dependent orlgination" (pratrtya sanutpãdal, rcontact' is the nediating factor between the obJect-sensor-consciousness conjunction46 and feeling ( vedanã). Guenther makes reference to a Theravãdin netaphor which describes 'contact' as the pillar that supports the palace, the foundation on whlch the other mental factors rest.46 rContact' is the foundation of consciousness.

The Vaibhãsikas and Sautrãntikas not surprisingly disagreed over the nature ofrcontact'. The former believed it to be a concrete thlng (dharøa) that qualifies consciousness; the latter held it to be Just a nane for the convergence of obJect, sensor and consciousness. 47 In short, the vaibhãsika hords that consciousness l¡as ,contact' the sautrãntika hoLds that consclousness Js 'contact' .48 The argument between them is one that vasubandhu does not see fit to pursue to any concluslon. whether'contact' is an effect of the conver- 30

gence or a deslgnation of the convergence, in either casercontactr represents the meeting of the experlencer and the experienced, the place where the internal components of reaìity (i.e., those which comprise the knower) touch the ,external'.49

As has been mentioned, the synopsis of causal relations called Dependent Orlgination describes feellng as the effect of 'co¡ltact'. Feeling 1n this context should be understood as representatÍve of the varlous mental factors -- Í.e., perception and volition -- that explfcate the rcontact' that consciousness has/is. the Vafbhãçikas state in AKB 3.32ab [P z.10sf] that the other explicative mental factors are contemporaneous wlth feeLing.S0 fh" purpose of the Dependent originatlon index is sirnply to show the chaln of causal connections which keep the individuaì in the throes of existence,

displaced from Nirvãna. 0f the various factors that serve to expJ.icate conscious rcontact', feeling is the crucial factor in perpetuating the chain. Therefore, though feeling alone is nent.ioned, perceptlon and volÍtion are equalJ.y effects of rcontact'. Therefore, one can implicate these nental factors in the following discussion, which ís taken fron the Bhãçya's treat¡nent of Dependent orlgination. According to the vaibhãsikas, rcontact' and feeling were sinultaneous and mutual causes of one another.Sl fh" Sautrãntikas held

that the 'contactr of one monent gave rise to feering (i.e., expricit awareness) 1n the subsequent moment. Though this dtfference can be understood sirnply as the product of the acceptance or rejection of the notion of mutaul causallty, it has interesting impllcations. The Valbhãsika objectfon to the Sautrãntika view is two-fold. Either one must admlt that feelfng andtcontact' are not present in every moment of consciousness or one has to allow that consclousness can have more 31

than one obJect at the same moment. The Sautrãntikas have dlfficulty getting around these obJectlons and remalnlng conslstent; they do not manage to carry Vasubandhu along wlth them.52

The first probrem is that, if feetfng is subsequent to informatlon, ln one moment there is'contact,and in the next there is feeling. Thls contradicts the idea that all of the universal nental factors are found in every noment. Eventually the Sautrãntika appeals to his different understanding of the universaL mental factors -- they are not necessarlly present in every moment -- but the first lfne of defense against the Vatbhãçika argument is that both rcontactr and feelÍng exist Ín every moment, but they are not causalry connected to each other; in any glven ¡nonent the feeling is the effect of the previous momentrs'contact'and thercontact'is the cause of the

subsequent noment's feeling.S3 fh" Vaibhãçika response to this is that, if in a given ¡nonent feeling is not the effect of the current rcontactr, then conceivably feeiiug and rcontactr can have two dlfferent obJe"t".54 If the rcontact, of the previous moment was with one object and the 'contactr of the current nonent ls with another, then the feeling of the current moment, being a product of, the prevÍous monent, has a different object than that of the currentrcontactr. But sfnce there can only exist one consciousness in a given monent,

how can consciousness have two different objects. This is especially difficult to imagine when the different obJects could conceivably be of dlfferent 'specles' (anya-JãtÍya-ãJaøbana) such as colour and sound. The sautrãntika response to this is dlfficult to fathom but seens to suggest that the moment of consciousness wilr either be rcontactr or characterlzed by feeìing.55 unl"ss the sauträntÍka has come fulÌ circle and reJected the proposition that thls explanation 32

sought to uphold -- i.e., that every moment has feeling and is rcontact' one must assume that both rcontactr and feellng are present, but that only one is effective. Regardless of the nature of the answer, the notion that two objects can exist in consciousness slmultaneously is not supported by eíther vasubandhu or ya6onitra.56 {3.4} The imptications of the basic perceptual process that is presented are these: 1. consclousness can onry have one object,

2. all.rcontact'ls expllcitly consclous, and 3. 'contact' ís is sinultaneous with awareness. In light of the contemporary awareness of the subliminal processing that underl.ies awareness, this understanding of consciousness may seem naively simple.Ut Onu system of analysis ls controlled and restricted by the purposes which have spawned it. Behaviourisn, too, can seem naÍveìy sinple, yet it ¡nust ultinately be judged 1n terns of its effectiveness within the franework of its purpose -- the modification of behaviour. The Buddhist

attempt to anaì.yze consciousness is governed by the goar of Budcihist discipline: to faclLitate the control of consciousness. The vivisection of consciousness serves to enable one to recognize the myriad qualities that constitute conscious awareness, which in turn is a requisite for the cultlvation of a conscious awareness from which all undesirable qualÍties have been r.¡eeded. In thÍs context the singularity of the object of awareness, the expllcitness of perception and the imnediacy of the experienced to the experiencer are simply descrlptions of that which is naturally found in this phenomenotogical

vivisectfon.

Havlng said this, one should note that the Buddhist anaìysis does not whoLly overlook what nay be construed as subli¡ninaL factors in the emergence of ahrareness. In AKB 1.10d [p 1.20, Dn 3?] it is asked 4.,

what factor determines whlch of two sensory stlmult, touch or taste, will become conscl.ous when they present themselves slnultaneously to the sensors. The answer 1s franed in terns of slmple psychophysics -- the more energetic (pafiyãs: more sharp, clear ) will become conscious. But in a case where they are equally energetic the desire for eating (bhoktu-kãnatã) is dominant and so taste is favoured. In this the role of desÍre effects the emergence of'contact'. This is something to be consldered in the third chapter when we consider the intentlonal and constructlve aspects of consciousness.

Finally, it should be noted that the construction of consciousness by volitlon, referred to in the Vyãkhyã on AKB 2.3458, is not a process that requires time. The causal relationship is a simultaneous one. The constructÍon is concurrent with the awareness of that which is constructed. There wlll be further discussion of thls fact in the final chapter. 34

Footnotes

1. Because the word dharøa defies a precise and succinct transìation, I have chosen simply to transliterate it throughout. rts plural is dharøãþ.

2. AK 2.62c [Dw 34s] z ãl.aøbanatñ sarva-dharøãþ. That they are obJects of consciousness 1s made expllcit in the Bhãsya: yathã-yogatñ cakgurvlJñânasya

sasatrprayogasya rüpaø

"Accordingly, visible data (is the obJect) of visual consciousness and its associate (nental factors -- caittãItl; alt dåarøãf (are the obJect) of thre consciousness of the mind., ' 3. AK 7.13cd [Dw 1062]: ãkãrayantl sa-ãlaøbãþ, sarvaø-ãkãryate tu sat. That dharnãþ are referred to is made explicit in the Bhãsya: praJñã ca-anye ca sarve sa-âfaøbanã dharaã ãkãrayantl. "rnsfght and arl the other dharg,sþ wlth an object'make known' (the obJect). The dharE,alt that have an obJect are defined in AKB 1.34 [p 1.62] as nind (¡anas), the six kÍnds of conscfousness (vlJñãnãIt) and the nentar factors (calttãIt) assocÍated with the mind.

4. BHSD, s.v. ãkãrayatl.

5. To qualify the worrd as real is not intended to suggest that Buddhlsn is either universally or fundamentally realistic in the sense of classical Western philosophy. Buddhists of realistic and ldealistic conviction differ in whether this "real" Í¡orld has an external reality or whether it derives strictly from a source in consclousness.

6. AKB e [P 5.231f ].

7. Fuller discussion of this must walt until we explore the nature of mental consciousness. rt is this aspect of Buddhi.st epistenology which undermines Íts claim to be a form of empiricism. rf the affirmation of deduced propositions are accepted as empirlcar truths

rather than conceptual ones, then there is no end to what may be considered an enpirical truth. The experience of remenbering a previous birth, an experience cultivated through neditative discipline, nay allow the doctrines of rebirth and kar¡¡a to be considered empirical truths. cf. Frank J. Hoffman ("The Buddhist enplricism thesis",

Religlous studies, 18, pp. 151-158) offers this and other argunents ln response to those Buddhlst apologetes who attenpt to present Buddhisn as an empirical reìigion against Hlndu speculation and Judeo- Christian revelatlon.

8. This characteristic of phenomenology is apparent, for exarnple, in Gestalt psychoJ-ogy, which is a form of experimentar psychology that grew directly out of phenonenology.

9. Thls is one sense of the word rula. In a broader sense it is the class of ¡naterial dharøãþ, whlch includes all of the phenomena that stlnulate the five senses. Matter is deflned as that which offers resistance (pratlghâ), i.e., an atom of natter opposes another atom of matter so that the latter cannot occupy the same place at the same 35

time as the flrst. 10. This represents the sautrãntika understandlng of rüpa, s¡hlch vasubandhu argues for ln AKB 1.10a [p 1.16] and 4.3c [p 3.9ff]. The Vaibhãsika view will be discussed below.

11. The Mahäyãna schools ln contrast to the Sthaviravãdin schools heìd that all concepts, including the concept of a dharpa, were verbal constructs. Ultimate reallty ltself would adnit no dlstlnctions, no division lnto separate "thlngs". tlords and concepts could point one toward ultlmate reality, but to experlence ultimate reality one ¡.¡ould have to dlvest oneself of them.

12. BHSD, s.v. praJñaptl.

13. In thls way the vaibhãsikas attempted to account fully for the broad range of phenonena that attest to the givenness of forn, some- thing which the Western positivists following Hume fal]ed to do. Thls faiLure of positivisn is apparent, r berieve, in the evidence brought forward by Gestalt psychology. The structurallst orientatlon of positivlsm conceÍved of forns as arislng through the association of contiguous sensations, i.e. as a summative property of the data. Gestalt

psychology explored the complex principres that underlie the organizatlon of data, showing that percepts also have energent properties. There 1s an inplicit wholeness to lndividual phenomena ¡vhich structuralism cannot account for. rf thÍs wholeness of form is not the product of inagination superimposing structure on unstructured sensory data, as the vaíbhãsikas thought, one nust conclude that for¡n is in some sense an obJective property of the perceived object. The other alternative, held by the sautrãntika and the Mahãyãna, is to aLlow that the conventionar forms by which the wo¡rld is experfenced are lmaginative impositions.

74. Dharnãþ are ephemeral phenomena that have these four stages of existence. of course, since each of these stages was seen by the Vaibhãslka to be dharøãþ in their own right, each of the four dftarøa] associated with a given "root-dåarra" had four more dharnãþ of fts ohrn: the birth-dhatna possessed a secondary blrth-, growth-, dura- tion- and inper¡nanence-däa¡na, as did the growth-dharna, etc. 15. [Dw 209]: yathâ ca citta-dravyaa-ekam-eva-utpadyate, na dve trr4r vã; tathã vedanã-dravyaø-ekaø-eva-utpadyate, na dve trr¡r va-. tathã

saúJñã-drawne, cetanã-dravyaa-ltf-evaø-ãdi. "Just as only one consciousness- entity arises, not two or three, so does only one feeling- entity arise, not two or three. so Ít is with a perception-entity, a volition-entity, etc. The meaning of these "entlties,' will be dlscussed below.

16. [Dr{ 1191]: yat-tarhL vãtslputrryãþ pudgalath santaa-!.cchantl. klñ te dravyata lcchantT, ãhosvit praJñaptttaf? "with respect to the vãtsrputrlyas, they wish the 'person' to be something existent. Do they think it concrete or nominaL?" The questÍon of the existence of the "person" is bound up with the bellef in the exlstence of a ',soul" (ãt¡an), some klnd of substrate in the indivÍdual that grants conti- nuity in tlme. The openlng paragraph of AKB 9 [p 5.2go, Dw 11g9] says 36

of those who hold thls view: na-hi te skandha-santãna eva-ã.tøapraJñapttrù vyavasyantl. "They are not convinced that the 'self or soul'fs but a ì.fnguistlc construct for the serles of material and mentaL phenomenona." Dravyata is agaln used as an antonym for nominal (nãøatal in AKB ?.13a [p 5.90]. Though as thlngs there are seven "pure aspects" (ãøalaþ ãkãraå) of reaLity to be known, as names there are sixteen. In other words there are sixteen "aspects" nominally, but only seven 1n reallty.

77. [Dw 588]: na hl sarvatra dravyaø-anto dharøãlt parisaùkhyâyante. tad-yathã a$Êau loka-dharaã& -- Iâbhaþ, alãbhaþ, yasaþ, ayaíaþ, nindã, praíaùsã, sukhaø, duþkhaø-ltt. "Of course, dharøãþ are not counted as a concrete 'thÍngt 1n errery case. For example, there are the eight nundane dharøãþ -- possession, non-possession, fame, infa- DV, praise, blame, pleasure and suffering.

18. íDw 2a77: praJñaptL-dharøo-'yag, na dravya-dharøa tti-arthaþ.

19. [Dw 100]: dravyan-eka. asaañsk¡taai hl sãratvãd dravyaø. tacc dharøa'dhãtãv-astl, ato dharpa-dhãtur-eko dravya-yukta{r. ry: one Icatego- dhãtul is 'thing-cornprisingt. The unconditioned is a 'thing'

because of its stabillty. This [unconditfoned] is a part of the imma- terfal range, so it is the only category associated with arthing'.

20. [Dw 208]: clttañ øano-'tha vlJñãnaø-eka-artha. cl.tañ ßubhaaéubhalr- dhãtubhlr-ltt clttaø. tad-eva-âSraya-bhûtaù nanaþ. ãsrjtabhûtañ viJñãnan-lty-apare, "tThoughtr,'mind' and'consciousnessr are one object. As piled up wÍth favourable and unfavourable elements Iit is calledl citta. Being the rseat' lof consciousness] it is Ranas.

others say that vlJñãna ls that which is seated (dependent) upon Ãânas." Poussirl reads cftra ("nany-coloured, mottled") for cfta ( "heaped together" ) .

21. Though the text slnply descrÍbes vf.jñãna as dependent or ',seatêd", the vyãkhvã [Dw 20s] clarifies that it is caLled this "because of the saying that the emergence of vtJñãna is dependent on two things." ('dvayaù pratl.tya vi.Jñãnasya-utpatttþ, lti vacanãt.) The two things are undoubtedty the sensor and the object, as will seen in the

discussion of "contact" (sparfa). Cf. fn. 41 and fn. 45.

22. Appendix A summarizes these categorfes of nentaL factors, showing their interrelation.

23. AKB 3.32 IP 2.104] According to Vasubandhu and the Sautrãntikas, though there is no category of consciousness 1n which these universal factors could not occur, there are nevertheless other mental factors with whlch they cannot occur. For exanple, in AKB 2.2s [p 1.159f] we read the sautrãntíka vlew that when equaninity or 'lack of affect' (upekça-) is attained attentlon cannot exist sirnurtaneously. This example will be dlscussed more fully when dealing with attention in chapter three. That vasubandhu accepts the sautrãntika argument on the meaning of the unlversal factors is implied in the fact that he

favours the sautrãntika logic regarding the incompatability of 'lack of affect' and attentfon. Therefore, attention is not necessarily present 1n every moment of conscÍousness. 37

24. The unassociated factors, because they are not present in consciousness, are not capabre of being directly experienced. Thus they are often dlsputed by the sautrãntikas, who are unwillfng to recognlze many of these factors as actually being dharøãþ. The dffferences between the Vaibhãsikas and the sautrãntikas in regards to the unassociated factors reveals deep dlfferences in their approaches to

reality. The Vaibhãçtkas see language as rooted in reality whlle the Sautrãntlkas see 1t as nerely a conventlonal association of sound aud object. The Vaibhãsikas seek a carefully denoted analysis of the components of reallty; the sautrãntikas afflrm an element of nystery in realfty, such that lt escapes clear denotation and nust be addressed in terms of metaphors.

25. Guenther (PPA, p.12) translates cJtta as "attitude", whÍch he clarlfies thus : "Having a certain attltude means to be ready for sonething, and thls readÍness 1s due to a certaln subJectlve group-pattern [It] moulds our actions and even our ldeas do$rn to the minutest details." He justlfies translatlng cftta as "attitude" by saylng it is a generic term that admfts of various qualiflcations and distínctlons according to the constellating factors that

nake up the attitude. This translation avoÍds the pitfalls of seeing cltta as sorne underlylng mentaL phenonenon that persists lndependent of objects and the states evoked by objects. The problem with it is that it fails to maintain the distlnction between cJtta and the nental factors (calttãIt') that qualify it, for an attitude fs a "state of thought or feeling".

26. [Dw 50] : vlçayañ vÍçayaù pratÍ. viJñaptlr-upalabdhlr-vtJñãna-skandha ity-ucyate. "It is sald that the aspect of the psycho-physlcal existence called consciousness is the appearance or inpression of the various particular sensory fields." The Buddhfsts recognized sÍx vJgayall or sensory fiel ds: visual, aural, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, mental.

27. BHSD, s.v. vtJñaptl.. Stcherbatsky defines vtJñaptt as "intimation, awareness". (CCB, p.16)

28. Vvãkhvã on AKB 1.33 [Dw 89]: cakgur-vJ Jñãna-sañtsargr nÍlatit vtJãnãtl no tu nÌlaú¿ ...

29. cf. the vvãkhvã on AKB 2.34 [Dw 209] : vtJñãnañ hl nilañ prtaávã vastu vtJãnãtt. Upalabhata Ítl-arthalt. Tad-eva tathã-ãlanbanatù yastu vedanã-anubhavatl., satùJñã parlchlnattí, cetanã-abhJsa¡iskaro tl-ttlevap- ãdl. "ViJfiãna knons the obJect as blue or yellow. This is what "perceiving" means. LÍkewlse, that sane thing being the obJect, feeling arlses, perceptÍon discriminates, volitÍon constructs, and so on and so forth.

30. 0f course, we can imagine a reflection going unnotlced but we cannot imagine an unnoticed reflectiorr because to imagine the reflection requires that we notl.ce it imaginativery. It is the old problen of the tree falllng in the forest with no one to see it. 31. CCB p.63. Emphasis nlne. 38

32. cf. AKB 1.39d [P 1.?6, Dw t0?]: øanas-tv-anutpattr-dharøakaø-eva tatsabhãgaø. "only the mlnd that has not come into exlstence with respect to Ilft. 'charcterized by'] an obJect ls non-effective Ii.e., does not register an obJect] . " HaIdar has suggested that the Buddhist concept of rallyrfacet of bhavãñga, rite- existencer, may connote some forn of pure consclousness,

or ground of consciousness, of which expllcit consciousness is a qualification. she says, "rt may be compared with pure thought In a sense Bhavãt'rga indicates a prlnary and unmodiffed function of consclousness. rt may be compared with ... Freud's conception of rPrimary unconsclous' used in the sense of Btopsychological energy continuum." (PAB, p.64) she also co¡npares it to the,,storehouse consciousness" (ãIaya-viJñãna) of the yogãcãra. she says the term does not occur in the Ko5a, but that one can infer that the KoSa accepted such a notion. However, the ter¡n does appear at least twice in the Bhãsva and nelther tine does it appear to have this sense. rn AKB 3.35 [P 2.116], after mentloning the thirty-stx Teacher's statements,

an anaJ.ysis of feellngs (vedanã) that is cursorlly addressed, ifeellng' is described as "a multifaceted category of bhavãlga to be known. " (vedanãkhyaú bhavãñgaa-anekaprakãra-bhedatit vedl.tavyaø.) rn AKB I [P 5.250, Dw 1203] vasubandhu is quoting a scripture that refers to the twelve bhavãñgã&J as a synonyn for the skandha-ãyatanadhãtavãþ. Therefore, in both texts bhavâñga connotes a set of catego- ries of those things that make up experientiar rife, rather than the dynanic flow of organisnic llfe out of which consciousness arises.

Another suggestion of consciousness independent of any object mtght be found in stcherbatsky (ccB, p.ls) who says cltta, vtJñãna or Æanas "represent pure consciousness, or pure sensation without any con- tent." He aLso says of viJñãna, "If an apprehension contains some content, 1t will then represent the next degr.ee, a real sensation."

As we shall see, there is no conscfousness without an object or content. For this reason r prefer to speak of expJ.icit or implicit content.

33. This is not to say the Buddhists deny the possibility of experiencing unqualified consciousness. The second of the Formless Medita- tions is one which attends to the essential quality of consciousness so that consciousness is itself the object.

34. AKB 1.22bd [P 1.43]. rn this context nalva-saùJñã-asaraJñã ls referred to as bhavãgra, "the sumnit of existence,,. The stages of consciousness and meditation are considered to be spheres of existence also. To attain a certain kind of meditation is to be within a specific realm or heaven that has its own unique characteristics.

35. AKB 1.22bd [P 1.43] .

36. yathâ rûp14âñ sattvãntuñ rüpaú nlsrltya pravarttate cltta-sadtatilr, evaø-ãrtipyegu krø nlsrltya pravarttate? "If the contlnuity of consclousness of material belngs depends upon matter, then on what does it depend in the immaterial realn?" 37. [Dw 667] : yo øahãbhûtãnùñ prakopaþ sa v!.pâkaþ, tasøãJ-Jãtaø, ato 39

vipãkaJaà cittaø. "The repayment (of past acts) is the raglng (excitement, tumult) of the prfmary eÌe¡nents. Born of thls is therconsclousness resultlng from repaymentt .,,

38. This is somewhat obscure 1n meanfng due to the textual. variants. Dwarlkadas [Dw 208] gfves the given text as z tasya-eva-ãlaøbanasya prakãrena ãkara4ãt (sic., read jr-/<åra4ãt), but offers prakjiraSa,¡t for prakãrena, yielding, "For the aspect is accordlng to the obJect,s kind (or mode)." Poussin suggests the reading prakãra4a tp 7.177 fn.5]. "The manifestatfon of the object is because of its aspect.,' The sense of the idea 1s made clear by the Vyäkhyã, whlch refers to

the col.our of the obJect. one can only focus on one aspect of the object at a time, whether it be the shape, the colour, etc. 39. AKB 2.34 [p 7.177, Dw 209]: yathã ca cÍtta-dravyaa-ekan-evautpadyate, na dve trl4l vã, tathã vedanã-dravyaa-ekan-eva-utpadyate, na dve trlpl vã.

40. AK 2.50c [P 1.248, Dw 283]: sahabhûr-ye ¡,ithah-phalaþ. s,tthalt pãrazparye4a ye dharzãþ paraspara-phalas-te saåabhûhetur-yathãkathaø. "They are a nutua] [cause] when they are a reciprocal. fruit. rocalrmeans they 'Recip- [extst] by means of each other. rThey' refers to

the phenonenal elements. They are the effect of one another. such is tnutual causer . " 41. We are not aÌone in sensing the as¡kwardness of the idea of simultaneous causes. The sautrãntikas also objected to it (AKB 2.s1d [p 1.253ff ., Dr{ 2901) : kathaa saha-utpannãnùù dharøã4ãtù hetu-phala-bhãva JtJ? "How can there be a cause-effect relation of si¡nultaneouslyarising dharaãI¡7" The sarvãstivãdin argument, which Vasubandhu

accepte, is that a cause is a condition in which it hoLds that if A, then B and if not A, then not B. on this basis the sarvãstivãdlns present the tripod as an example of sinuLtaneous cause and effect. 42. stcherbatsky (ccB, p.g6) rightty notes that both the citta/caltta and the bhúta/bhautlka disttnctions are simll.ar to the distinction made in philosophy between substance and quality, in spite of the fact that the Buddhists deny the existence of any substance. He claims that the idea of mutuar causality is a way to avoid the concept of substance but doubts that it circumvents the problen, for

cÍtta is still prinary and supports caltta. The idea of cltta being substantial, seems to persist in his thought for in defining vtJñãna he says it is "pure sensation, mere awareness, a substance vlthout eÍther qualf.tles or øoveaents. Being the pure light of knowledge it 'stands by' the phenonena, illuminates them, reflects them, without grasping then or being affected by them." (ccB p.69. Emphasis mine.)

Yet if cÍtta has no existence apart fron the nental phenomena whtch characterlze it, it is difficult to understand how cltta can be primary. For this reason, as stcherbatsky notes, Buddhadeva argued against calling them primary and secondary. The argunent agafnst Buddhadeva by other Buddhlsts, as r understand it, ls that one can distfnguish prinary and secondary because the qualities of the prinary

are pervasive or proninent and the qualities of the secondary are not. stcherbatsky does not see in this a refutation of his belief that "the conceptions of substance and quality have found a back- 40

door." (p.35) r would not agree wlth hi¡r, tion ls however, for the distlnc- not one of substance versus quality, but of general and specific quallties -- 1.e., there are basic qualltles that are further quaìlfted and speclfic quaìities that effect thls further quaJ.ificatl.on. Incidentally,". Stcherbatsky implies that the bhüta/ bhautika relationship was also considered to be one of mutual causa- lity. This is explicitly reJected in AKB 2.sld [p 1.z]osf, D¡r 289,

2911. The prinary elenents are mutual causes of each other, not of the secondary elements.

43. [Dw 1S7] spar5a i.ndriya-viçaya-vlJñâna-sarinipãta-Jã spf$-tJå.

44. This follows from the concept of 'resistance' (prattghãta), discussed

in AKB 1.29bc [p 1.51ff,, D,-g ?9ff ]. rt ls partlcularly clear in the discussionl of the f ive

"unl..".$ wh,lch are characterized by 'obst- ruction-reslstance' (ãvara4a-pidtlghãta). This is that quality of inpenetrabtllty 1¡¿1 pre_vents'two particles of matter from existlng in the sane place.simultaneously. The resistance that characterlzes

the mind 1s a different kind of resistance, a resfstance that is ope- rative with respect to objects and sensory fÍelds (ãraebana- and

vlçaya-pratrehãta), but it ls stfll a ktnd of resistance in that the activlty of the sensor does not proceed beyond the object. rt should

be noted that not all sensors extend from the person, for taste and touch requlre immediate proximity in order for 'contactr to occur.

45. In Dependent origination obj.'qët, sensor and consciousness are sumnarized as the !bases òr'coii'ðdi¡usness, (ãyatanãþ), or factors that account for the emerþencè of consciousness. (cf. AKB 1.20 tp 1.37, Dw 591) There are two categorf es of a-yatanãþ: internal. and external. The six consciousnesses and their respective sensors are the internal and the objects of consciousness are the external. 46. PPA, p.32

4?. AKB 3.30ab [P 2.96f, Dw 46Sf].

48. AKB 3.32ab [P 2.103, nw ais,ltP sarve ca sparsâþ sa-vedanakâþ, sarvatú ca vlJñãnañ sparsa Jtf';:';'dTl ,contactl is attended by feeìing and every moment of consciousness is 'contact'.', The vyãkhyã clari- fies thatrcontact'-- the convergence of sensor, ob5ect and consciousness

-- is a "cause and effect conditlon" (kãra4a-kãrya-bhãva or Janaka-Jantta-bhãva). One can assume that consciousness is the effect aspect of 'contactr , and sensor and object comprise the cause aspect of rcontact' .

49. 'External' is qualified here and following because there is a sense in which even the. nental factors are external obJects of consciousness rather than inatie¡FbIe aspects of the subJect. so it is that ln AKB 39ab [P 1.?-g] thëìllmmaterial category of objects -- dharpa-dhiitu ( = dharaa-ãyatanal, i.e. those objects which are perceived onry by the nind and anong which are the ¡nental nental factors (cf. AKB 1.1s [p 1.30]) -- are ìisted as being external (bãhwl in contrast to the six sensors of perception and their respective consciousnesses, whlch are internal (adhyãtøtka). 47

50. [Dq¡ a?8] (quotlng scripture): caksr¿h pratltya nipjipl ca-utpadyate ca&gur-vf Jñãnaú trayã4ãrù sannipãtaf sparSaf sahaJãtâ vedanã sañJñã cetanã. "visual consciousness arises because of the eye and vlsible data; the conJunctlon of these three is ,contactr; feeling, definitlon, and volltlon arise together.',

sl. AKB 3.32 [P 2.1O1]

52. This conclusion is based on the fact that the final discusslon of the prcblen [P 2.1o7f, which does not point, favour the sautrãntlka view- 1s said by Ya5omitra [Dw 4?9] to be Vasubandhu,s oh¡n opinÍon:

ãcãtya ãha. "This is the Teacher speaking.,, 53. [Dw a75]: pÍirva-sparÉa-hetukã hi-uttaratra spar5e vedanâ., sa.rye ca spar5ãft sa-vedanakãþ, sarvañ ca viJñãnatñ sparsa iti. ',A feeling caused by previous rcontact', subsequently is attended by 'contact'. In every rnoment rcontactrs are attended by feeling, and every nonent of

consciousness 1s rcontact' . " The vyãkhyã comments i yo-ryan-idãnùñ dv t t r yalt ksa4aå spar Éa-bhãvena-ukt aþ, tat ra purva- s parfa-åetr¡Jcã pra tåara -kg a4a -v I J ñãna-he t ukã ve danã- ut p adyat e, t at - s par sa- purv I k ãapl- anyasø7nn-lt1-evap .sarvatra vlJñãne vedanã prãpnotl. "The feellng irnc othneta scet'c.o nd of these monents is atttributed to the occurence of This feeling arises caused by the previous rcontactr; that is, it is caused by conscfousness in the first moment. so feeling is

always attached to a conscious moment, even though Ít is the feeling of a previous nonent asscoiated with a different object.,, 54. [Dw a75]z idan-ayuktañ vartate. kln-atra-ayuktad? yat-uta bhi.nnaãlatbanayor- api. spar6a-vedanayoþ pürva-sparsa-hetuka-uttaratra veda- nã-ttl. "This 1s wrong. rn what regard? In that it says that the feeling in the subsequent norrent is caused by previous rcontact' -- informatÍon and feeling having separate objects.,' 55. [Dw a76]: .ástu tarhi tasnln kate sparía-bhûtati¡ vtJñãnaø-avedanakaa. Tasnât-ca yat pûrvatñ vlJñãnarù sa-vedanakañ tat-na sparsalt;

pratyaya-valdhuryãd-ltl-eva¡ñ satJ ko doça? "rn such a case there must be in that tine (vvãkhvã: i.e., when sound is the object) a consciousness consisting of rcontact' and without feeling. trlith respect to that (vyãkhyã: sound object) the precedlng feeling consciousness is notrcontact'. This is so because of the absence of cause. what is the fault with thÍs?"

56. Ya6omitra's response [Dw 4?6] is this: sa dogad pradarsyate -- yadl tãvad rúpa-ãlaøbanãt spar5ãd-utpannã vedanã 6abda-ãdy-ãla¡¡banaantaraa- ãl.apbate, sa nlpa-ãlanbanaþ sparsa{r sukha-vedanryo yãvad duhkha-asukha-vedanlya tti na prãpnoti. "The mistake is apparent. rf, whenever colour-information is to be experienced as pleasurable or unpleasurable, the feelÍng that has arisen from colour-Ínfornation rests on sound or some other object, then this (i.e., the experiencing of the pleasurabre or unpleasurable feeling) could not come about. "

57. It is interesting to note that in sone Buddhist systems there is a recognltion and descriptlon of subliminal processes underlying awareness. Lama Govinda (The Psvcholoeical Attitude of Earty Buddhist 42

Phl]osophv, London: Rlder & Co., 1969, p. 194f.) discusses thts description as found 1n the Atthasãrlnr. The process of perception reguires from elght to sevent."n moments. In the first three moments one is not aware of the stfmuìus that has already made its lmpact on the psycho-physical substratun. only in the fourth moment does one avert to the object. rn the flfth it is perceived. rn the sixth it fs received. It ls then Ínvestlgated and determlned 1n the seve¡lth and eighth. If the stlmuLus Is very great then from the ninth to the flfteenth it 1s fully or clearly perceived. If tt is extremeìy great then two moments of registration occur, naking a totar of seventeen noments.

58. Cf. fn. 28. 43

Ir. Mental consclousness, sensory consciousness and Mlnd In the last chapter we considered the Buddhist understanding of the nature and neanlng of consciousness. The overal.l process of trying to clarify the role of lntentlon ln the perceptual process requires that we pursue further an understanding of the various species of consciousness,/ perception. The Buddhist analysls of consciousness divided 1t into slx different species, one for each of the five senses -- sight, taste, etc. -- and one for consciousness of mental

data. This chapter wlll explore the distfnctions between these two basic categories of consciousness, sensory and mental. consciousness. Not aspiring to be exhaustive, we wilì consider just three ways in which nental consciousness can be distinguished fron the consciousness of the five senses: their objects, their sensors, and their characterlstic qualltÍes. This chapter will be structured around these three distinctions.

In the context of the discussion of the sensors upon which consciousness depends there wilt be an opportuntty to consider the causaL relatlonship between contiguous noments of consciousness, in which the mind (ranas) plays a crucial role. The mutual and associated causaLity discussed in the previous chapter one mlght rabel synchronic; as necessary conditions of a given moment of consciousness

they were valuabLe in clarifying the nature of consclousness. In this chapter we will address the diachronic cause -- the ,,equivalent and antecedent cause" (saø-anantara-pratyaya) -- which helps us to understand the process by which consciousness is sustained. 44

1. The Ob.'lects of Mental Conscf ousness

The five senses have as their obJects the five ranges (dhãtavaþ 'l or áyatanãå)' of materiar quarlties: vlsibre, audible, tangible, gustatory and olfactory data. The mentaL consciousness is descrlbed as perceiving a specific range of data riterally called the " dharna_ range" (dharøa-dhãtu or dharøa-ãyatana), which I shall designate the "immaterial.-range" because it specifically embraces those dharøãþ that are lmmaterial.2 th" mental consclousness ls also sald to be capable of percefvlng every dharøa.

{1.1} The immaterial-range comprises the fnnaterlal obJects which can only be experienced by the nind. Let us consider at length some of the objects included in thÍs category. To begin with, it is said in AKB 1.15 [P 1.go] to include feeling, perception and the other mental factors, as well as the three unconditioned dåara¡-{r: ',empty space" or "void" (ãkã5a), "cessation by wisdom" (prati-satikhyanirodhai, and "cessatÍon that does not come by wlsdom,, (apratisaùkhya- nlrodha). These latter three, which are described in AKB 1.s- 6 [P 1.?ff], require some explanation.

The two cessations comprise the two different klnds of Nirvãna to which the southern Buddhists aspire. "cessation by wisdon', is a lack of affect, the freedom from reaction, wlth regard to external objects. NornaLly there are qualities in the environment that govern one's attention, either because they seem to possess attractive or threatening quallties. when seen by wisdom as they really are, devoid of such imagined quaì.ities, one's mental. state becomes calm in an environment that has ceased being disquieting and urgent. The ,,cessation that does not co¡ne through wisdom', -- i.e., which is unrelated to veridical knowing,/perceiving -- is identical with the cessation of 45

consclousness and ls achleved by meditatlve disctpline. Such mental states are experienced only by the mind. Even the cessation of consciousness, which 1s the absence of experience, is known subsequently to have taken place and 1n this sense fs 'experlenced'. void (a-l<ãSa), being the absence of something, is a ¡nore difficult phenornenon to interpret, a fact to which the Buddhist interpretatíons of it attest. It is discussed in AKB 1.z8ab [p 1.49f], where

orifices such as mouth (open), nose and window (paneless) are offered as examples. A synonyn ls "hole, opening" (chldraø). since these are vislble thlngs, the question arises as to why these things are perceived only by the mind. For the valbhãçika holes are manifest by either light or darkness, depending on which of these two fills the hole. If this is the case, then a hole is somewhat material (rrrpa) in the sense that perception invoLves resistance. vasubandhu and the

Sautrãntikas, however, understand allcãSa as the absence of resistance, as is made cìear in AKB 2.55cd [P 1.Z7gffJ.3 n.gu"d]ess of the nature of âka-Sa, however, though it may be manifest by light, the light itself is not a-kã5a. Yet the reality of the hole is external and, therefore, is a reflection of reality rather than a superinposition L upon it.- Because it is known by the light and is not the light, there is a sense that only the mind can grasp the quality of the empty space.

opinlons or "views" (drsfj) are aìso part of the innaterial real.n, according to AKB 1.41ab [p 1.s0]. A view is defined as a kind of knowledge that follows from exanlnation or inqulry (saaitira¡a, upanldhyãna) 1n contrast to intuitive knowledge or im¡nediate sensory awareness. These are, in a word, "ldeas" in the conmon, conceptual sense of the word.S th" mental. consclousness is also unique wlth regard to 46

lts temporal range. In AKB 1.44 [p 1.94] it says that for the frve sen_ ses the obJect is contemporaneous, but for the mental consciousness the obJect can be ln the past, present or future. Menory, fn the sense of attending to past phenonena, and anticipations of future phenomena are, therefore, part of the lmmaterlal. realm. visual imagery is aLso a part of the immaterial-range rather than visuaL consclousness. This is clear from the mention of the sautrãntika interpretation of immaterial natter' in AKB 4.4ab tp

3'1s ffl.8 Th""" is a text of Scripture Ín which the Buddha refers to an invisible and lntangible (apratlgha: non-resistant) material eLenent (rüpa) that is a part of the lnmaterial-range.? th" Sautrãntika interpretation is that this is the rula on which one concentrates in neditatfve states. For exanple, when one perforrns an Ugliness Meditation, seeing oneself as a skeleton in the mindrs eye, the skeìeton

that one sees is not perceived by the eye, nor does it occupy space. Further evidence that the innaterÍal range includes visual imagery is the fact that AKB 1.2? [p 1.48] describes Ít as including the ten "Total.ities" (kgtsna-ãyatanãþ). The Totalities are a group of meditative objects, so calred because they are ¡neditated upon in such a way that one 1s totally and exclusively preoccupled with them. The ten Totalitles are the four prinary naterial ele¡nents (earth, water, air, fire), the prlmary colours, space and consciousness (vtÍñãna). of these, some are clearly visual in nature and others, such as consciousness and space, are more abstract.

In sunmary, the data that make possible mental consciousness are those internal phenomena of experience, ideas, and imagination. Arso, those externar phenomena that are not discernabl.e by the other five senses, such as a void ( a-ka-Sa) , are considered to be obJects of the 47

mlnd only. {1.2} The mental consclousness ls also dtstlnct as belng the only consclousness that can percelve more than lts specific range of obJects. It perceives all dharøãþ,8 though what this means is not i¡rmediatel'y apparent. Does 1t mean that atL moments of consciousness, even those which are visrral consciousness are also in some sense mental consciousness? such an lnterpretation may be suggested on the basis that nfnd (panas), the sensor upon which mental consclousness relles, fs involved in every moment of consciousness. This interpretation is ruled out, however, because one of the dlstlnctíons between

sense consciousness and nental consciousness is that each of the five sense consclousnesses has two sensors -- its own sensor and the nind -- whire mentar consciousness has only one sensor -- the mind. The other possible interpretation is that mental consciousness is capable of perceiving all dharaãþ in its capacity for reflecting on and articulating verbaì.ly or conceptuatly aIl phenolnerra.

support can be found for thÍs ínterpretatlon in AKB 3.32cd [p 2.108-1101, which deals with mental feellng (vedanã) in terms of various species of "mental consideration', (aana-upavlcãral. There are six basic kinds of mental consideration, one for each of the six senses. In response to the question of why feellng related to the five senses is not nental consideration, Vasubandhu says that mental consideration requÍres the capacity for reflective examination and conceptuaLization.9 A" we wltl see later, a chief characteristic of nental consciousness is its capacity to conceptualize, to mediate the data of sense perception in terms of categories and names. so mental consciousness performs unique operations on the data of all six senses. The affirmatlon that mental consciousness perceÍves alJ. dharøãh 48

conveys that everythfng avallable to the senses ls also avail.able to the conceptualizlng actfvlty of mental consclousness. {1.3} In sumrnary, mental consclousness is distlngulshed from sensory consciousness with respect to their obJects in two ¡{ays. Flrst, mental consciousness is the report of mental phenomena, the lmmediate awareness of those thtngs which are inaccessible to the five senses, which rely on reslstance or materiaì.1ty. secondly, nentaL consclousness 1s the reflective ar{areness in whlch the ÍnnedÍacy of sensory data is represented or mediated in terms of conceptual classification. Thls is to say that mental consciousness is the inmedlate awareness of the concepts or verbal fornulations whlch mediate sensory data.

2. The Role of the Mind

{2.1} As was mentioned Ín the last chapter, mind is the sane dharna as consciousness. rt is distinct, however, in that mind fs the moment of consciousness that has just passed away. As a noment of consciousness passes and another takes its place, whether the preceding moment were vlsual, mental, etc., in passing away it assumes the role called mind. The nind becomes a basis or seat (â5raya) for the moment of consciousness that follows it, exercising its activity (karrjt¡a) with respect to the (subsequent) present moment.

{2.2) The word ã6raya conveys a sense of that which plays a particularry significant causal roLe. This is evident in AKB 1.4sab [p 1.961 in the discussion of why the sensor 1s called the seat rather than the object on which consciousness rests; the quality of the monent of consciousness is dependent on the health and the ¡ireakness or cl.arity of the sensor rather than on the object. similarly, as we 49

noted in the last chapter, the physlcal basls of consclousness, whfch is also referred to as âsrayalo plays a determinatlve role in the character and stablllty of conscfousness. rt should be noted, however, that AKB 1.34d mentlons a reclprocal condftfonlng of the conscfousness and its sensor. Each is conditloned by the boons and banes of the other.11 The vyãkhyã clarifies thls using the eye and vlsuaL consciousness as an exampl..12 A boon is something that aids the eye or visual consciousness, ennabllng to function more clearly; for the eye it can be eye ointment, and for visual consciousness mental pleasure. A bane is that which hinders

functloning; it 1s exenpllfied by a punch in the eye or by mental displeasu"".13 lrlhether visual consciousness is characterized by satisfaction or dissatisfaction influences the effectiveness of the eye. Llkev¡ise, the conditlon of the eye effects whether consciousness has a posltive or negative feeling tone. The effect of this dependence is wel]. lllustrated in the fact that there is little or no consciousness in the various Buddhist evil fates (durgatl, i.e., being reincarnated fn a helr, as an animal, or as a hungry ghost); consciousness 1s there lnJured or destroyed ( paribheda) because of the feelings of pain.14 Fo" thls reason the evil fates are not considered a "statlon of consciousness" (vlJñana-ståitf), for consciousness cannot exist there.l5

Mind (aanas) is consciousness in its rol.e as the seat (ã5raya) upon whlch consciousness rests.16 thi" 1s unique to the Sarvãstlvãdin Abhidharmic tradftlon; according to stcherbatsky, the Theravãda considers the nebulous "heart-stuff", (pãli: hadaya-vatthu) as the sensor corresponding to mental consciousness.lT fh" Theravãdins nake no distinction between mind and mentaL consclousness. Guenther, speaking 50

from a Theravãdln perspective, interprets the term &ano-vrJfiâna as 'consciousness ¡chfch 1s øanas'.18 Contrary to thts, the Sarvãstlvãdin concept of øanas fnplles that mental. consciousness should be understood in the same way as visual consciousness -- i.e., as the consciousness that 1s dependent upon øanas.

In AKB 1.44 [P 1.94] we read that atl five sense consciousnesses have a double seat (ã5raya): their own respective sensor and the mind. Therefore, they have one present basis (the sensor) and one past basis (the mfnd). rn view of the fact that ã6raya inplies a determining causal factor, each noment of sensory consclousness is ínformed by the preceding conscious no¡nent and not simply by the contemporaneous sensor and object. The present conscious monent is a synthesis of the prevlous awareness and the current sensory infornation. ThÍs is not the case for ¡nenta] consciousness, though. rt has

only the mind for a basis; it is determined strlctry by the information fed forward fro¡n the past moment. The discussion of ,'mental consideration" (nana-upavlcãral tn AKB s.32cd [p 2.11o] shows that it is not slmultaneous with sensory consciousness; nental consideration can occur only subsequently. This is ¡nade explicit ln a text cíted by vasubandhu: "Having seen data with the eye, he considers that which is satisfying." The vyãkhyã emphasizes that the present participle, "seeing" (pasyanl 1s not used, but rather "having seer¡" (drsÊvã). Mental consideration, being a descriptlon of nental feeling (caftasikÍ vedanã1,1s necessarily a characterlstic of mental consciousness; therefore, the dlscussion of mentaÌ consideration ls applicable to mental consciousness by implication.

This presents an understandlng of mind that can be contrasted with the Theravãdin concept of the nind as a synthesizer of the vari- 51

ous senses. Relying on Theravãdin sources, Guenther descrlbes mind as a refuge where single sense perceptions give up their fsolation and independen"".19 It is there that the materlal presented by the senses to the perceivlng subJect is arranged, ordered, and interpreted in a certaln way. The role of the nind is subsequent to sensory fnput.2o The sarvãstivãdln, ln contrast to thls, thlnks the nind to be a preconditlon of sensory consclousness. The effect of the mind is simultaneous with the conscious moment as one of its inforning factors.

{2.3} Aside from the nlnd's role as a seat of consciousness, it also serves as an "equivalent and immediate cause,, (saø-anantarapratyaya). 21 equi.ralent and innediate causality is the prinary forn of causality that accounts for the flow of conscious processes. It is defined in AKB z.62ab [p 1.3o0f]. rt is immediate (anantara) in the sense that no noments intervene between the cause and effect. The cause exists in one no¡nent (kça¡a) and the effect occurs in the imnediately subsequent moment. This can be contrasted with a causal

factor like karpa, the effect of which occurs after the passing of time. The cause is equivalent (sa¡aa) to the effect in that one dåaraa only gives rise to one dharna. Only consciousness and the mentaL factors are equivalent and imnediate causes, for they alone generate a single effect.22 Thu"" can be but one citta fn a given moment of an individual's exfstence and it wirl give rise to only one subsequent citta, just as there is but one feeling in a moment of consciousness giving rise to a single subsequent feeling.

Almost every moment of consciousness becomes an equivalent and innediate cause as it becones the mind. The onìy exception is the last moment of consciousness before the saint enters Nirvãpa. rt is significant that not every g,anas contributes to the emergence of a 52

subsequent nonent of consclousness. Itlind is mind by vlrtue of the fact that lt serves as a basls for the subsequent consciousness, but it ls not necessarily the causal factor that brings about the subsequent moment of consclousness.23 In order to be a causaL factor lt must possess a certaln active ingredient or "actlvity,, (kdírjtra). Thls active ingredient, attentlon (øanaska-ra), wltl be discussed in the next chapter.

{2.4}, Having considered the role of the mind in general , r^,e can observe a dlstinctlon between sensory consciousness and mental consciousness in the fact that the latter relies solely upon the mlnd. Whereas the other kinds of consciousness are immediatety deter¡nined by sensory lnprrt, mental consciousness does not relate imnediately to the external environment. Even when it attends external phenomena, it can at best be a reflectlon or mediation of the inmedÍate awareness of the environnent.

3. The Qualities of Sensory and Mental Consciousness {3.1} A significant difference between nental consciousness and the five sensory consciousnesses corresponds to the distinction between what I have called inplicit and explicit consciousness. üle are told in AKB 3.3ocd [P 2.99], "By visual consciousness one knows blue but not that it is blue. By the mental consciousness one knows blue and knows that it is blue."24 Visual consciousness Ín this text exemplifies the five sense consciousnesses, in which the knowledge Ís

implicit, in contrast to mental consciousness, in which it is both implicit and explicit. Another contrast between the two types of consciousness is found in AKB 1.33ab [p 1.60]: nental consciousness ls "characterized by conceptualization" (sa-vlkalpa) and the flve sense 53

conscfousnesses are not. There 1s a close connection betu¡een the presence of conceptualizatlon and explicit awareness. This connectlon is evidenced in the Vyãkhya:25

Regarding the question of why Ithe five sense consclousnesses] are said to be'lacklng conceptualization', it is because of the saying "Endowed wlth visual consciousness, one knows blue but not that it is bfue." The understanditrg of explicit and implicit consciousness, therefore, necessitates understandlng the nature of vÍkalpa.

In the previorrs paragraph I suggest that the distinction between implicit and explicft consciousness 1s related to sensory consciousness vis-à-vis nental consciousness. rn the rast chapter r spoke of implicit and explicit consciousness in relation to the dlfference between consciousness (vÍJñãna or cftta) vis-à-vis the mental factors that expricate consciousness (saùJñã, vedanã, and saaiska=ra). The textuar basis for this distinction in the previous chapter was the following Vvãkhyã pu""ug" r 26

consciousness knor,¡s the obJect as blue or yeJ.Ìow. This is what perceiving means. Likewise, that sane thing being the object, feeling arises, perception discriminates, volition constructs, and so on- or also -- consciousness grasps that (tupa of the) object in a general way in so far as the object is perceptlble, and in a specific way feeling grasps in so far as the obJect engenders sensation, perception grasps in so far as the object 1s capable of being discrininated, and so on.

The three named nental factors, which exlst in every monent of consciousness, serve to make the "blue or yellow" explicit. perception (sa¡ñJñ'a-) in partlcular, which discrlminates and def ines, plays this role. Poussln [P 1.28] makes the point that saañJña- is the factor responsible for identifying a sensory inpression, citlng a text by Deva- Sarman:

vllñãnakãva, 26 a 16, dit que la connaissance visuelle con- nait le bleu ..., mais ne connait pas: rC'est bleu.' Crest par le sañJñã que J.'on donne un nom à J.'impression visuell.e, à 54

la cause externe de I'fmpression vlsuelle. The questlon arises, therefore, as to how perception could be present in any given sense consciousness and yet sense conscfousness not be expllclt, knowing "blue as blue"? This is essentiafly the same questfon raised in the Vyãkhyã:27

rf perception has a dLscriminating nature, mlght the five sense consclousnesses be conceptuallzing since, perception, being associated wlth they percelve a speclfic characteristic (of an object ) ?

Related to this question of how a moment of consciousness can have perception without conceptualization is another questlon: ,'rf the five sense consciousnesses are characterized by investÍgation (vltarka) and judgrnent (vlcãra), hor,r¡ is Ít they are said to be wÍthout conceptualization?"28 In short, the question before us is this: what is the difference between conceptualization on one hand and perception, investlgatlon, and judgment on the other such that mental consciousness afone is truly explicit?

Let us begin with the answers given by Ya5onitra and Vasubandhu themseLves. Ya5omitra answers the questlon of how there can be perception without conceptualÍzatlon in terns of the sharpness or cLarity of perceptionr29 The perceptlon assoclated with the five sense consciousnesses is not sharp. But the perception assoclated wlth the mental consciousness fs sharp and so it is called 'characterized by conceptual lzation' . Precisely what is neant by the sharpness of perceptlon is unclear. The answer is signiflcant, though, in that it shows the difference to be one of degree rather than a qualttative one. we will return to Ya6omÍtra's answer below, on page ?4. {S.Z¡ In AKB 1.33 [P 1.60] Vasubandhu offers the Vaibhãgika answer regarding ho¡c the five sense consciousnesses can have investigation 55

and Judgment without being characterized by conceptualizatlon.So The answer, like Ya5omitra's, implies an element of contfnuity. There are three forms of conceptuallzatlon: conceptuallzation proper (svabhâvavlkalpa), focussed conceptualization (abhtnlrúpa4ã-vlkarpa) and rememberfng conceptualization (anusøara4a-vLkalpal . The five sense consciousnesses are characterized by conceptualization proper but not by the ìatter two, which are unique to mental consciousness. Therefore, in the sane luay a horse with only one reg ls deened'regressr, the sense consciousnesses, having only one aspect of conceptualization are considered to be 'without conceptualizationr.

Let us pursue further the three species of conceptualization. The first, svabhâva, is the same as investigation/judg¡nent (vitarka_ vlcãra),31 thu meaning of which we wil.l address at length later. The second, focussed conceptualization, is a kind of insightt (praJñã) that is comnon to unconcentrated or non-meditative states of mind. That is, it. is the way of knowing that we typically rely on in our daiì.y affairs. The Vyãkhyã explains it more fully:32 Itlhy is it carled 'focussed conceptualization'? Because it is atmppalitetedr rt,o this or that object by taking account of its name: rfeeling', rimpermanent', rdisturbing', etc. But the concentrated lnsight which comes fron meditatlon applies itseLf to the object without respect to its name. The word abhlnirüpanã 1s defined as "fixation of thought,' or ',concentration". 33 Yu6o*itra here associates this fixity with classlfication,

irnplying that a cLassified object is by the very nature of the process of classification more fixed in one's thoughts than something whlch is merely perceived.S4 th. unique capacity of the mentar consclousness to know symbolicalty is also illustrated by the discussion of rcontact' (spar5a) Ín AKB 3.30 lp z.gsfl. The 'contact, associated with the five senses is quallfied as "'contact' by virtue of resis- 56

tance" (pratlgha-saaåspar5a), 1n whlch 'contactr occurs because of the resistance of the materlal obJect to the sensor. But thercontactl associated with the mind ls qualtfled as "appellation rcontact," (adhlvacana-sañspar5a), for it 1s'contact'wlth -- or medlated by -- a name, a synbolic representation. The third species 1s remenbering conceptualizatlon, which Vasubandhu describes as all memory that is associated wfth mental consciousness, regardless of whether one's state of nind is concentrated or unconcentrated. Again, it is the Vyãkhyã that clarifies the meaning of the text, this time by distinguishing mental menory from sensory nemory:*35

The mental memory is said to occur resting on Just the perceived obJect, lrrespective of namç^ We see this in the definition: "what is nemory? the desireóo of the mind." The memory associated with the five sense consciousnesses is thought not to emerge from the desfre for the perceived object and so is not acknowledged as I rememberfng conceptuallzation' .

Because mental consciousness is often associated with verbal categorization Ya5o¡nitra clarlfies that nental memory is not distinctive because it renembers objects by name. Rather it is distinct from sensory nemory in that it is characterized by desire. The 'deslre of the ¡nind' I would understand as the effort of the nind to recall. what one has seen or the effort to cling to an object while seeking to understand or verbalÌy express what it is. In contrast to this, sensory nenory lacks deslre. rnnediate sensory perception relies on nemory but there is no elenent of a desire to renember, no sense of clinging to an obJect until lt is recognized.

It fs only when the three aspects of conceptualization occur together that conceptualizatlon possesses its true nature, Just as only a four-legged horse is truly complete.ST Con"uptualizatlon is 57 only ever conplete in moments of mental consciousness, for it ts then that 1t takes on its characterlstlc categorfzatfon and desire. yet, because investigatfon and judgrnent, which are necessarily characteristic of the five sense consciousnesses, are 'conceptualization proper', there ls a contlnuity between the immediate perceptions of the sensory consciousnesses and the categorically mediated percepts of the mental conscfousness.SS

la ls to a study of lnvestigation and

judgrnent that we now turn.

{3.3i Discernment (vitarka/vtcãra) . {3.3.1} The neaning and nature of vltarka and yJca=ra is discussed 1n AKB 2.33 [P 1.I?bff]. The Vaibhãgika understand them as the causal factors behind gross (audãrl.ka: nanifest) or subtLe (sri/caøa) quarity of consclousness, respectively. According to the Vaibhãsika they occur simultaneously, after the analogy of a plece of ice being influenced by the warmth of the sun and the cold of the river in which it rests. Even so vJtarka and yica-ra both play on each moment of consciousness, one infruencing it to be nore manifest and the other to be more subtle. Vasubandhu raises two objections to the

Vaibhãsika understanding. First, thought cannot be both gross and subtle at the same time. A moment of consciousness is either one or the other.39 secondly, a moment of consciousness arways has a rel.ativeJ. y rnanÍfest or subtLe quality regardless of whether Ít is in the nundane sphere of Pleasure or in the the hÍghest stage of the sphere of FormLessness. rf vitarka or vlcãra are sfmply factors underlying the gross/ subtle quality of consciousness, then even the highest state must be characterized by vÍcãra. However, it was unlversally accepted by the Buddhlsts that these two factors were restrlcted to 58

the Lower states of consciousness.40 rh" vatbhã$ika definltion, therefore, 1s inadequate.

In contrast to the Valbhãsika view, Vasubandhu relates the Sautrãntika positlon, which ls that investlgatlon and Judgnent are to be understood as the "factors of voice,,, rzJr-k-sadska-råfr.41 fh" Vyákhyã [Dw 205] lnterprets this as "the originating causes of ilre voice,, (vaf<- saøutthãpakãþ). The sautrãntlka vlew goes on to say that of these voice-factors those which are obvious are called vitarka and those whlch are more subtle are called vlcãra. There ls irnpllclt in these deffnitions the sense that v/tarka and vlcãra are not speciflc things (draWâlt). Though Vasubandhu often sides with the Sautrãntikas, there is no indication that he agrees wfth their deflnitions here. The Sautrãntlkas restrict the role of vitatka and yJca-ra to only one facet

of overt behaviour (vlJñaptt), vocal activlties; vasubandhu seems to accept the Vaibhãçika vlew that vitarka and yJcãra are fundanental to both facets of overt behaviour: vocar antl bodil.y. hle read in AKB 4.gb [P 3.33] that overt behavlour has lts origln Ín a moment of consciousness that is associated with vltarka-vlcãra.42 thi" association is clarified in AKB 4.11 [P 3,39ff]; mental consciousness, when characterized by lgnorance or clinging, is an initiator of overt behaviour because it is the cause of vl.tarka-vlcãra.43

Vasubandhu does not discuss his own definitions of yÍtarka and vlcã.ra within the Bhãsya, but the Vyãkhyã gives an extensive quote of "the earlier naster" (púrva-âcãryã), which poussin identifies as quote fron Vasubandhu's pañcaskandaka:44

ttlhat is investigation? rt fs a seeking, a state of nental discourse characterized by either deduction (reasoning, inference) or the lack of it, depending on whether lt relies on efther inslght or volition, respectively. trlhat is judgrnent? It is intellectual. mastery, a state of ¡nental discourse characterized by 59

elther deduction or the lack of it, depending on whether it re- lies on either lnsight or volition, respectlvely.,, Here both words are defined as a "mental dlscourse,' (øano-Jalpa) a kind of talkfng to oneself. Both are charactertzed by deduction lf they utilize insight, otherwise they are sustained simply by the force of will. The only dlfference between them is that yJtarka is "seeking" (paryeçaka) and vlcãra is "thorough consideration, Ínter- LectuaL mastery" (pratyaveksaka).45 th" search is vltarka, the conclusion vlcãra. ya6omitra cites this analogy:46

some give this íllustration: "while strikes standing among many pots one (them) with his hand in such a way as to find out ¡chich is strong and whlch is old; such an examination is investlgatlon. Knowing which are strong and which are old, such understandlng Ín conclusion is judgment.', rnvestigation is the process in which one actively and manifestly applÍes thought -- here likened to the gross motor movement of the striking hand -- to resolving an issue. Judgment is the resorutÍon, the culmination and cessation of the apptication of thought as it comes to rest upon the ansrr¡er.4? Fo" the sake of brevity I shall use "discernnent" as a transLation of the cornbination of yJtarka and vf.cara.

Both Vasubandhu's deflnitions and Ya6omitra's exanple describe investigation and judgrnent at a very manifest revel. calling then nental dialogues (øano-Jalpa) ítself is suggestive that they utllfze a verbal/synbolic medium. However, ARB z.zB [p 1.16sf.] tells us that discernnent occurs in every moment of the normal state of consciousness' i.e., the sphere of pleasure. Though much of our mentaL lives is spent prattling on in an inner inquiry or description of the circumstances, hopes and fears of our Iives,48 thi" is not true of every slngle moment of consciousness. The sense conscfousnesses are charac- 60

terized by these two factors but do not utlllze symbolic representation. one must conclude that discernment can also refer to a nore subtle and non-symbolic process.

AKB 6.9c [P 4.148f] tells us that Foulness Meditation provokes investlgatfon because lts obJect is variegated and because it is turned toward the external world like eye-consciousness.49 I rr¡ould suggest that varfegation be understood in terms of stlmulus complexity as well as stinulus inconstancy. one can assume that these two causes, stimulus complexlty/inconstancy and external orientation, are simply two aspects of the same cause: that whÍch is external is compìex and changing and that whÍch is cornplex and changing is externaL. By nature discernment is turned towards the external world,50 und this implies that it is inclined towards and evoked by compìexity. The neditatfon exerclse called Breathing MindfuLness counteracts fnvestigation because its focus is on "wind" (vãyu), somethÍng internaL and without variegation (a-vlcftra\.

{3.3.2} on the basis of the relatlonship between stimuLus conplexity and lnvestigatlon (vltarka) one might suggest that investigation at its most basic level is equivalent to what current psychorogy calls the orienting reflex or response. Thls is the physiological and behavioural response to a novel stimulus, a response which serves to maximize sensitivity to the stinulus for the sake of being informed by it.51 tt 1s an lnvestlgative response. Likewise, judgment (vrcãra) can be understood by the orienting responsers counterpart, habituation. Habituatlon is the desensitization to a stimulus that occurs

when lt is perceived that no new information is forthconlng. Habituation narks the conpletion of the process of orienting oneself to the stimulus; the process of discernment is resolved when the stlmulus is 61

sufffclently discovered. Though habltuatlon 1s operatlonally defined 1n terms of an absence of arousal, there is a sense in whlch it ls a continulng factor of consciousness, rike judgrnent. ornsteirS2 "p"uk"

of habituatfon in terms of bullding a mental model of constant stimuli, a model against which in-coming stinuli are compared so that, as ìong as the stlmuLus matches the model, ft renafns unattended. The habítuated stimulus is filtered out so that it is no longer attended (fnvestigated); when changes occur in the habttuated stinulus, the habituated state gives way to the orienting response untll another model is constructed.

The challenge that arlses from thfs interpretation is whether orienting and habituation cease in certain states of neditation, as ís affirmed of investigation and judgment. In AKB 8.9 [p s.1s8] they are described as factors that disturb consciousness tike a wind blowíng on a rfver and so they are classed anong the eight defects (apa- ¡<gãJai) of 1n AKB 8.11 [P 5.161]. consciousness becomes calm when in the second level of meditatton (dhyãnal discernment has ceased. For evldence that orienting and habituation do cease in certain ¡neditative states one can turn to studies of Zen meditation Ín which the absence of habituatlon has been denonstrated.SS Electroencephalogran (EEG) patterns of experienced Zen neditators showed a conslstent response to a clÍcking stinuìus over tine, whlle control subjects quickly became habituated to the sound. The cessation of the orienting response is not as concretely evident. The phenomenological experience of the medltator nay not necessarily find a counterpart in physiological signs. The above EEG readings also indicated that the meditator's length of arousal was shorter than that of the the control subJects. It has been suggested that there are two klnds of 62

arousal of the cortex, a longer arousal which ls more susceptlble to habltuation and a shorter, less susceptible. These in turn have been associated wlth stressfuL and harnonious (tontc and phasic) actlvation, respectiv.ly.54 It nay be that the shorter, nore harmonious cortical activation would reflect the absence of vitarka. The character of investi.gation is further revealed in AKB 6.9c [P 4.148f] in the dlstlnctlon between two basic personality types: those 'prlnarlly oriented to investlgation, (vltarka-adåfka) and

those 'primarlly sensually-attached' (ra-ga-adhikal. There are two dlfferent approaches that one might take to enter the process of meditation 1n the beginníng, depending on whether investigation or sensual attachment is predominant. The one who is sensually-attached should use Foulness Meditatlon to counteract the desire for the pleasures of sight, sound, taste, etc. Because Foulness Meditation encourages lnvestigation, those who are predominantly lnclined toward investigation should use the Breathing Meditation to counteract this Ínclination. The inpllcation of this is that there are two basic styles of interacting wlth the environment: esthetic (sensual) and analyticat (investigative) .55

In conclusion one can say that vltarka is a way of interacting with the environment that is essentially analytlcal. Because vitarka can be seen at one level as the equlvalent of the orienting response, vltarka need not operate at a symbolic Level. Mental consciousness slmply exhiblts this analytical style or tendency at a more manifest level, taking the form of a nental dialogue. (3.3.3) Just as there was a need to consider how sensory consciousness could be investfgation ¡¡ithout the verbat/symbolic resources of mental consciousnesses, there is also a need to consider how 63

sensory consciousness can be goal-oriented, moving toward resolution, in spite of the fact that It 1s without the desfre. First we should note that the answer to this question is partiaì. ly given in identlfying investigation with the orienting reflex. The orientlng refìex does not function lntentionally or relying on deslre. It is simply an automatic response to an environmental conditlon. Beyond this, however, in speaking of a goar-oriented, analytical style, horv can sensory consclousness be without desire.

In AKB 4.4cd [P 3.26f] two functions of consciousness with respect to overt behaviour are introduced; consciousness can be an initiator (pravartaka) or a facÍlitator (anuvartaka). There Ís the nonent of consciousness that gives an act its tmpetus or nomentun and the subsequent noments that sustain the act until its conpletion. The analogy is given of an initiating hand that sets a wheel rolling and the facilitating ground that sustalns the wheelrs movement. In AKB 4.11 [P 3.39ff] we read that the flve sense consciousnesses are only faciLltators. Ya6omltra explains that they cannot initiate actÍon

"because it is affirmed that they are v¡ithout conceptualization.',56 Only nental consciousness can initlate. one may assume that thts is because it a-lone is characterized by conceptualization. The division of function is also reLated to whether the consciousness ls inwardlooking or outward-Iooking. The mental consciousness al.one can be an initiator because it is inward-looking, whfle the sense consciousnesses, being outward-looking, can only be facilitators. rnward-looking seems cJ.early to be associated with imagination and outward-looking with the registration of sense data.57

Another text that reflects this pattern of initiatfon and subsequent facilitatíon is found in AKB 9 [p 5.zg4f where menory activates 64

lnvestigation. rn argulng agalnst those heretical Buddhlsts who afflrn the exlstence of an acting self, vasubanclhu responds that the rvoluntary act' is merely a series of impersonal and automatlc processes 68 :

Hhat is the genesls of actlon? Menory gives rise to a deslre to act, which leads to investigation which gives rise to effort which causes a wind -- this is 'an actr. Presurnably memory ¡,¡ould realize desire because of ignorance, which associates pleasure or pain with the object of memory. This desire would in turn lead one to invol.vement with the environment for the sake of pleasure-seeking or pain-avoidance.

Thus ¡re see that the notive force that energÍzes discernnent is not assocfated with the sense consciousnesses. only the mental consciousness can set the the goal-oriented process into notion. Sensory consciousness merely sustains the momentum of that monent of consciousness in which deslre arises. one can conclude, therefore, that

investlgation as a style of interacting with the environment is the product of envisioning the goar. sensory consciousness is wlthout desire, unlike mental consciousness, and so is not motivating, yet it nevertheless occurs within a notivated state. OnIy nental consciousness can motÍvate, for 1t aLone is capable of evaluating sensory data in terns of its appealing or aversive qualities and it alone can envision future goals.

{3.4 } Perception ( sa¿ñJña-) .

{3.4.1} The basic defÍnition of saaiJ.ñã is given in AKB 1.14cd [p 1.281 (cf. 2.24 Íp 1.1541). rt is the "descrlbing of a slgn" (njaJtta- udgrahara). Nløltta is the means by which the characteristic feature or quality of an object is known, that nhich reveals the 65

obJect. The vvãkhyã [Dw 48] comments that "describfng,' ls a synonym for "definition, discrlmfnation" (pariccheda). such categories as "bLue, yellow, rong, short, mare, femare, friend, enemy, derightfuJ., sorrowful, etc." are offered as exampìes of sañJñã-drscrinination. These examples are misleading in that they suggest that saaiJñ.ã is always symbolic. De silva acknow]edges that ',a translation of the term to fit every context and all its manifestations ls not possib_ le-"59 saùJñã can denote the perception of qualities at both a synbolic and a non-symbollc level; that is, it enbraces c.Iassiflca_ tion as well as perception. satñJñã can also denote conplex ldeas or concepts. One could say that satñJñã ls the nanifestation or explicitness in perception of the structure that is implicit in all ar.rrareness .

Perception (saúJñã) is often synonymous with ,'name,, (na-pa).60 Thus the vãkhyã equates the "desÍre to nane" (nãaa-vasa) wÍth the "name-giving desire" (satùjñã-kara4a-va5a) . The',verbaJ. repetoire,, (nâaa-kãya), which the vaibhãslkas believe underl.ies the rneaning inherent in communication,ut i" deflned as ,,a collection of concepts,, (sañJñãyã saauktr) in AKB 2.47ab [p 1.238] This illustrates the association of saùJñã with conceptual or symbolíc recognition. The fact that saafñ'ã can be more than sinpre perception or

recognition is irrustrated in AKB 3.s-6a [p z.16ff]. rn the discus_ sion of the seven heavens (vlJñãna-sthltayâþ: stations of consciousness) the fÍrst four of the seven heavens are said to be dÍstinguished by body and saaiJñã. For exanple, Ín the second heaven alL of the gods there have different bodies and the same notions. The common notions of the second heaven are particularly significant as an ilLustration of saåtJñã used in reference to complex concepts. All 66

the gods of the second heaven -- i.e. Brahmãn and the gods of hls rank -- have "the concept of a slngle cause,' (abhinna-karara_sa¿iJñã), the single cause belng Brahmãn. Brahmãn thinks ,,r created these others" and they in turn think "we are created by Brahmãn.,,Here the notion is considered the same in splte of the dlfferences of perspec_ tlve from which they are articulated. ThÍs use of saútJñã ill.ustrates just how compì.ex the structure imptlcit in perceptfon can be. For exanple, one does not Just experience a table as a table; the structure of perceptfon is rarely so slmple. There ls usually an erement of "my tabl.e" or "tny table, which in its antiquity and warnth cap_ tures and expresses 'me"'. These are not necessarlry thoughts that

are mentally articulated, but rather are inalienable elements of the structure of one's perception of the table, a structure so complex and subtle that only poets can articulate it. The notion of Brahman being creator is a structural component of oners awareness of him. Though name and concept inpry synboiic representation, awareness is not necessarily symbolicarly nediated. According to AKB 1 .22cd lp 1.431, perception persists in the first three of the four levels of the Formless Sphere, in some of the hlghest states of concentration. As was noted in discusslng the neaning of abhlnirûpa4ã in AKB 1.30 tp 1.601 above, the concentrated states of mind do not attend to objects by means of verbal,/synbolic mediation. This can be ilrustrated by considering the nature of the first of the For¡nLess lrteditations, the Meditation on Endless Space (ãkãSa-anantyal.62 On" begins by focus_ sing on a hole, an absence of sonething, in order to discern the essentiar qualtty or characteristic (ntøttta) of vold. As one nanages to isolate this quatity and focus on it, one can becone a$rare of nothing but that quality. 67

Every moment of consciousness, because it has an obJect, is characterized by saàJñã. only in unconscious states is there an absence of perceptton. unconsciousness is literally ',without perceptlon" a-saòJñlka. The two trance states of unconsciousness are called the attainnents of being without perception (asaùtJñl-sa,aãpatti) and of the cessation of perception and feellng (saùtJñã-veditanirodha- saaapattf ) . 63

The fourth and highest trance state is called ,'neither-perceptfon- nor-absence-of-perception" (naiva-sañJñã-asaùúñÐ, which is the tralned sklll of being mininalry conscious, ¡vithout true perception. According to AKB 8.4 [p 5.149], this is because of the weakness (øãndyãt, ørdutvãt) of perception. rt is not crear or sharp (patu), but yet there is still perception. These words hark back to yaSonitrars distinction between the perception of the sense consciousnesses, which is weak, and the crear perception of mentaL consciousness, a distinction whfch can be understood in light of the discussion of

abhinirúpa¡a- above. Just as symbolic classification is more 'cLear' than perception because it is nore firmÌy grasped, in this high state perception (sa¿iJñã) is considered more firnly grasped than the nebulous experience that hovers just beLow perception. unlike the other medltations of the Formless Sphere, there is no sign (niartta) upon which one can focus as a r{ay of achleving this state; one attains it by wiìling to be free of the disturbance which is impìicit ín al.l percept ion/consciousness .

{3.4.2} Another signiflcant aspect of perception is that it is considered to be without reflective judgment. In the discussion of the four defilements (kre5ã{r) called the',Mistakes', (vlparyasal64 vasubandhu says that each of these four is a ,,perception mistake,, 68

( sañJñã-vlparyãsal, a "consclousness mlstake', (citta-vtparya-sa) as welL as an "interpretatlon mistake" (drçtt-,vlparyâsa). The vyãkhyã adds that neither perceptlon nor consciousness are "characterized by dellberative Judgment,,.65 th" perception is wrong by vlrtue of its associatfon with an incorrect vle¡r¡ (dfs-tJ). The implication of this is that perception 1s not a process ln the rryay that dÍscernnent and conceptuaLlzation are. Perception 1s reflexive, not involving detiberation. At a classiflcation level, having been funded with certaln

categories and incorrect views, perception 1s evoked by the obJects one 1s confronted with. perception is the elenent of deflnltion present in every moment of consciousness; thus it is the data upon which the process of discernment/conceptualization depends as weLl as the deflnition that is the result of the process of discernment. {3.5} Conceptual.ization (vtkalpa) again.

Let us now return to consider conceptuarization ( vJkaJpa) . The fact that discernment ls called ,,conceptuarization proper,, (svabhãva_ vfkalpa) indÍcates that the conceptualization is characterised by the effort to discern and the achievement of discernnent. There is a continuity between the deliberative character of sense perception and symbolicarly-mediated deliberation. There is discontinuity, however, between the discernment performed by the senses and that of the mind, fot vlkalpa in the futlest sense of the word invoìves representation, an lmagfnative mediation of infornation, which the sense conscious_ nesses are incapable of.

conceptualizatlon is associated with an inward-rookfng consciousnes". 66 rhi" is evident in the two kinds of probrems wlth consciousness: conceptually-troubled, which are addressed by nurtur_ 69

ing vision, and affectlvety-troubl.ed, which are resolved through ¡neditation.ST A conceptual problem occurs when one imaglnes thtngs that do not exlst, such as the concept of a soul. An affective problem is evident in inappropriate responses to real obJects because of faulty attributions to those objects -- i.e., that they are attractive, disgusting, etc. The essential difference between these two probLems, according to AKB 6.s8b [p 4.257], is that the former moment of consciousness has no real external object on which it rests and

the latter does have a real object. The conceptuaJ.ly-troubled mind is inward-looking only, which ls to say that it depends strictly on vikarpa. The affectÍvely-troubled mind is both inward- and outwardlooking, for it depends on sonething external but associates qualities with that external object that have their basis only in vÍkalpa. Though Edgerton enphasizes the negative aspect of conceptualization, definÍng 1t as "(vain) inaglning" or "false discrimination',,68 the word does not necessarily imply falsj.ty. This is evident in the Vyãkhyã on AKB 8.28a [P 5.193J, which distinguishes between "knowìedge,' (jñãna) and "vision" (dar6ana). one of the effects of a certain meditation is the aquisition of the power of divine sight with respect to

knowledge and vision.69 Yusomitra clarifies the difference between know].edge and vislon by pointing out that this knowledge is conceptual and therefore assoclated with mental consclousness, while vision is non-conceptuar and related to visual consciousness.T0 th" knowledge at this level, though mundane, would not be considered false.?l conceptualization, therefore, is such sinply by virtue of its imaginatÍve, representatfve or symbolic character. Conceptualization marks a radicaL discontinulty between the discerning activity of the sense consciousnesses and that of the nental 70

consciousness. As was noted above, onry the ratter is capabre of error and llable to being troubled. AKB 4.s8a [p 3.12s] says that only mental consciousness can have a mental disturbance (cJtta-ksepa) because it is characterized by conceptual.Ízation. The vyãkhyã [Dw 66b] clarifies that mental dlsturbance arises because one 'fmagines, qua_ litfes that have no reaL existence (asad-vlkalpa-lakça4atvãt). conceptual. ization is a prlmary factor in enotionaL disturbance. Buddhism dlstlnguishes between bodiJ.y feering and mental feeJ.ing, the first being assocfated wlth the five senses and the latter belng an Ínner or mental experience. There are three baslc categories of feeline (vedanã), pleasant, unpleasant and neutral. Affect-problens are

associated strictly with mental feeling, particurarly pleasant and unpleasant feeling. According to AKB 2.scd [p 1.11sJ, bodily feelings arise on account of the nature of the object and not by being constructed (svarasena-anabhlsaaiskaìre4a). This is the case also for mental neutrar feeling ( upekça-) . tsut mental satisfaction and rlissa_ tisfaction arise "under the deternining infruence of conceptuarization" (vlkalpa-yatalù. That is, positive and negative e¡notlons originate in evaluative appraisals. This in turn is the cause for the clinging and averslon indicatÍve of the essential sfckness of the human condition.

{3.6} Sunmary

Discernnent denotes the exploratory and analytical involvenent of the mlnd wfth its envlronment at both a symbolic and a non-slrmbo_ ìic lever rt can be understood in terms of the process of the reflexive orienting response and habituation, and in terms of classifying processes. perception in contrast to this is definrtion, the 7t

manifest structure characteristlc of all awareness. It may occur at the level of perception -- seeing red as red without the inner dla_ logue that takes direct notice of it by cJ.assifylng it -- or at the level of classification. It Ís not the process of cLassification itself, which is conceptualizatlon, but rather the deflnltion upon ¡shich the process of discernment,/conceptualization depends and the definition achieved by the process of classification. In contrast to these, conceptualization denotes just a higher leveL process, cLassification, and so 1s 1n continuity with dlscernnent. It is also the process that, being charactertzed by investigation, results in "vision" (dfçfJ) and conceptual perception (sa¿iJñ'ã).

Ya6o¡nitra referred to the difference between symbolic and nonsymbolic perception as one of clarity/sharpness vis_à_vis weakness. sinilarly, he interpreted focussed conceptualization (abhintrûpa4avl'kalpa) as being so because it utilized symbolic representation. The overall sense of these distinctions is that nrental co¡rsciousness, being symbolic, has a quality of conscious explicitness and specificity that immedÍate sensory awareness lacks. The articuLated repre_ sentation ls fully expLicit in contrast to the perceived datum which is less so. Perception (saañJñã), though less explicit, is nevertheless explicit in contrast to pure consciousness (citta) or consciousness devoid of explicating factors.

As a flnaì aspect of the topic of the difference between sensory and mental consciousness, let us consider the interaction of the t¡qo as illustrated in the process of hearing. This is described in AKB 4.74cd [P 3.159]. The atomfstic understandlng of time leads the Buddhists to consider at what monent certain acts can be said to occur. ftlhen can it be said that a lie has been told? This takes place, âc- 72

cordlng to one interpretation, at the moment when the the auraÌ con_ sciousness gives way to the mentar consclousness, i. e. when the registering of sound gives way to the registration of its meanlng. Though we are not necessarily aware of the brief space of time in which the spoken ¡{ord,/sentence ls but a concatenatlon of phonemes,/ words, ìogically such an interval must exlst. only at the point when the sound is represented conceptually can we say that mentaL consciousness 1s involved.

In concluslon we can say of sensory consciousness that it ls the lmnediate and, therefore, non-conceptual awareness of external data. It is characterÍzed by a natural tendency to orlent the lndividual within his environnent; to thls end it investigates and becomes habituated to the environment. The kÍnd of knowledge that characterizes the senses is devoid of imagination and dlstortion. The mental consciousness in Íts nornal, non-meditative state is also characterized by the inclination to orient itself to the environment. It is the faculty by which mental or non-material phenomena are experienced and by which the data of the five senses and mental experience are conceptually known. Because of the mind's capacity for distortion in conceptualization, mental consciousness alone is Liable to be false. When conceptualfzation is utlLized in the construction of consciousness, distortion can occur. rn the next chapter we wilL see how this occurs. 73

Footnotes

1. The terms dhãtu and a-yatana ref lect t¡,to different Buddhlst analyses of all the aspects of existence into a small. set of categorles. All of existence can be desribed in terms of twelve ãyatanãþ or in terms of eighteen dhãtavaþ. In AKB 1.2oab [p 1.9?] the explanation of these ter¡ns 1s glven metaphorically. Etymologlcalty ãyatana is derived from the root ã-yat, "to enter, to rest upon,,and may J.iterally mean a "base" or a "seat". Vasubandhuts etyrnology focuses on,'to

enter" as the meaning of the root, suggestfng that an ã.yatana is a "door"' a means for somethlng to enter lnto the realm of experfence; it ís, in short, something that makes consciousness posstble. There are six different klnds of these doors, slx each representfng one of the species of consciousness. por each klnd of door theré is an',in- ternal" means, i.e. the capacity for that kfnd of consciousness, and an "externar" means, 1.e., the presence of that particul.ar kind of sensory data. The dl¡âtu analysls Ís si¡nilar, yet it distlngulshes

between the consciousness and the sensor upon whfch each conscÍousness depends, thereby making a set of eighteen eLements from twelve. The basic meaning of dhãtu is that of a prímary eJ.ement, whether it be a mineral eLement or a verbal root. Vasubandhu draws on its mean- ing as mineral elements: as a mountaÍn is conposed of species of ninerals, so is an individua|s life composed of a set of species, and in each noment of consclousness a different combination of these species is nined out and brought into experience: sometimes it is mental experience and sometlnes vÍsual, etc.

2. rn AKB 1.24 [P 1.46] the explanation is given of why dharna-ãyatana bears this general nane ln spite of the fact that all ranges are composed of dharøãþ. This category of perceptíble objects incLudes a number of speciaT dharøaþ, including Nirvã4a, anrl so has a special claim to the tit1e.

3. In AKB 1.28ab there is a dÍfference of interpretation of a-ghasãnantaka rûpa, which describes emptiness. Etymologicalry gha denotes "resistance" and sãøantaka means "akin to,'. The function of the pre- fix a 1s in question. For the vaibhãstka it intensifies gåa so that the phrase neans "a kind of natter akin to that which is extremely resÍstant". For vasubandhu the a negates gåa, yielding ,'a kind of natter akin to that which is non-resistant,'. (Non-resistant rüpa, an apparent oxymoron, is addressed below. )

4. vasubandhu and the sautrãntikas in AKB z.ssd [p 1.2?9] deny that void has any ultimate existence, being sfmply the absence of some- thing. This is congruent with the view, noted earrier, that they deny the ultimate exlstence of forn (saañståatna).

5. There are eight categorÍes of views mentioned. The first five (AKB 5.7 [P 4-77f1.] are the basic erroneous views that underlie existence and lts characteristic the suffering -- the bellef in oneself as a stable self/person who can possess things (i.e., "the me-ny belief", ãtøa-ãtø7ya-grãha); the beltef fn the extrenes Iof eternal life and annihilationl (anta-grãha); the deniar of the essential Buddhist truths of suffering, etc. (øtthya-drçttt ,'shallow or mistake view,'); the valuing of impure things (drçtt-parãøarsa); and falsely under- 74

standing to be causes and the path of salvatfon are not those things whlch causes (such as God) and not the path of sarvation ( 6rjayra- ta-parãøarsa). The other three vfews are truths appropriate to dtffe_ rent Ievel.s of splrltual development. 6. The context of this is the dlscusslon of,,covert behavlour,' (avl_ Jñaptl). The Sarvãstirrãdin lnterprets the lmmaterial matter as covert behaviour. For him covert behaviour is an intanglble causaì factor that 1s produced by noral or immoral acts. At the noment when one commits murder, a real "thing" arises within oneself that stays with oneself and works for evil, independent of conscious volition. If one does an ethical deed, the covert behaviour is a factor that works for one's welfare, preventing one from committfng evil, acts and promoting virtuous ones.

?. The question of how a material element can be intangible or non- resistant when resistance is one of the defining characteristics of rula is one that is mentioned (AKB 4.4ab [p 3.1s]) but not resoìved. 8. AKB 2.62c [P 1.306f, Dw 348]: yathã-yogadt cakçur-viJñãnasya saøp¡'a- yogasya rûpaø, ... nano-viJñânasya sarva-dharøaþ. "In due order, a visual datun is [the object] of visual consciousness and its atten- dants (i.e., the mentar factors), and every däaraa is [the ob- ject] of mental consciousness." 9. [Dw 481]: kasnãt kãylkÍ vedana na Nanopavicãraþ? na-eva hy-asau &ana eva-ãsrltã, na-apy-upavicârlkã, avl.kalpakatvãd-lty-ayoiaþ.,'why is bodily feellng not mental consideration? It is not so b"ðau"" .v.n though it depends on [rests on] the mind, it is not consideration. Because it is without conceptualization 1t is not incLuded [as a kind of mental consiceration." The vvÃtsIÉ offers ,,ìacking eaamination',

(asaait-rrrka) as a synonym for üac.l(íne conceptuaLization,, (avikarplka). 10. The identification of ã5raya wlth the naterial aspect of the person finds Justification in AKB 2.44d [p L.zt4] where, shortly after ascribing the Attainment of cessation to the equiìibrlum of the prirnary

materiaÌ elements (øahãbhüta-saaata-) , the Attainment is said to occur (in the sautrãntika opÍnion) because of the ãÉraya being con- trary to the energence of consciousness (tad-viruddha-âsraya-ápãdana-

t). Asraya is also used in this sense in AKB 2.36cd [p l.18gif], 3.43a [P 2.132] and 4.4ab [p 9.24].

11. [Dw 911 anugtaha-upaghãtâbhyãø-anyonya-anuvidhãnãt. "This is because of the mutual compJ.iance by neans of rboon and bane,.,, 72. [Dw 91] : cakçur-dhãtu-ãdrnãn-anugraha-upaghãtãbhyãn-añJana-ãdlpãn7-

ghãta-ãd1-1akçnpãbhyãtit cltta-calttãnaa-anugraha-upaghãt6 bhavat aþ. c 1 t t a- ca f t t ãnâñ c a-anugraha-upaghãt ãbhyãút s 6øanasya:dôrrun""yu_ lakçnvãbhyãù cakçur-dhãtu-ãdÍnãø-anugraha-upaghãt6 bhavataþ.,,8y the boon and bane of the eye sensor -- by virtue of its qualities." it is conditioned by ointment or physical abuse -- the boon and bane of the mental complex occurs. And by the boon and bane of the nental complex -- by lts characteristics of satisfaction or dissatisfaction -- the boon and bane of the sensors occurs. " ?5

13. Boon (anugrahal meana "conferring beneflts, furthering a good obJect". Bane (upaghãta) neans "an inJury, blow, sickness,,, Haldar translates upaghãta as "obstructlon" and anugraåa as ,'receptlon,',

which she then interprets as stimulus and response, interpreting upaghãtaka as "recelving" and anugrãhaka as "respondlng,,. (pAB, pp. 54, 66. Cf . also her Introduction to Abhidharn":{gqhuÞ¡êSg_gl vasubandhu, by p. pradhan. (patna, x.Þ.--luya"*l Research rnstitute,

1967), p. a4.) The neanlngs of the words anugraha and, upaghãta are, however, obvfous in the above passage (and in AKB 1.4sab [p 1.96, Dw 12 6]) since examples of 'boons and banes' are given. 14. AKB 3.6b [P z.zr, Dw 396f] | kaþ punalt parlbhedaþ, yena viJñânaùt paribhtdyate? tatra-apãyeçu dultkhã vedanã parlbheda, upaghãtakatvât.

"hlhat is the inJury by which consciousness fs evil destroyed? In such an state painful feeling is the wound, because of the inJurlng.,'

15. The concept of an "abode of consciousness', is explalned metapho- ricarly 1n AKB t.2zbd [p 1.43, Dw 6?], using the rnetaphor of a seed and the field in which it is planted. This metaphor suggests that the field is that which ennables consciousness to'bloomr or to exist in a real state rather than a potential state.

16. AKB 1.17

17. CCB, p.18.

18. PPA, p. 29, fn. 1. He acknowledges that the term is ambiguous and nay be a ( vyadhÍkara?a) tatpuruça conpound -- which is how the Sarvãstivãda interprets it. Yet he favours the Yogãcãra and Theravãda view that it is a karnadhãrya conpound. 19. PPA, p. 16.

20. PPA, p.18f. "Thus Buddhaghosa states that 'rnnediately after the activity of visual perception or other sense perception has ceased, the panas which discrininates the visual object from other objects begins to function; its functlon is receiving the visual percept or other percepts; lts manifestation is suchness; and the moment from whence it starts its action, is the monent or situation when the activity of visual perceptlon or of other sense perceptions has ceased.

"' (visuddhimagga, xrv.9z) I am relying here on Guentherrs analy- sis. This text Ís open to an lnterpretation that is more in accord with the Vaibhãçlka system: if the øanas is being considered strict1y in its conceptualizing role, then it is lndeed subsequent to sensory input, for (as we will see) conceptual consciousness is a function of mentaL consciousness, which relies strictly on past information. The value of the above comparison is that 1t accentuates the Vaibhãçika

understanding; whether Guenther's interpretation (and, therefore, the above comparison) is accurate is a questíon that goes beyond the scope of this paper. 21. Literally, saø-anantara-pratyaya is "equivalent and immediate condition" rather than cause (tretu). Though in contemporary usage cause and condition are quite distinct in their meanings, the 76

Buddhlsts generally treated them as synonyms. This ls explicitly stated in the Vvãkhyã on AKB ?.13a [p b.30, Dw 105?] i ya eva hetu_ a-karad sa eva saøudayaþ, prabhavaþ, pratyayaþ-ca pratyaya-øãtraø naartha'bhedaþ. "That aspect known as 'cause' is the together', same as 'comlng 'successive causer, and 'conditlon,; since there is just tcondition' there is no dlfference in meaning." Because the Buddhlsts did not distlngulsh the two terms, r have chosen to transl ate pratya.ya as "cause" to avoid the natural tendency to read our dtstinctions into the Buddhist synonyms.

22. It should be noted that the mlnd ( øanas) as the consciousness (vtJñânal that has Just passed away is distinct from the nental fac- tors that have just passed away. The latter are treated separately and not impllcated in the nind. In AKB 1.44cd [p 1.95, Dw 125] the nental factors that have passed a!{ay are said to be just an equiva- lent and immediate cause for the subsequent nentaL factors, but the nfnd is both an equivalent and innedlate cause as werL as a seat ( ãSraya) for the subsequent consciousness.

23. AKB 2.62 [P 1.305].

24. [Dw 4s1]: cakçur-vf.Jñãnena nllaù vtJãnãtt no tu nll.ait, øano-vlJñânena nIl.añ vtJãnãti nÍlaa-i.ti ca vi.Jãnâti.

25. vvãkhvã on 1.33ab [Dw 89] fiatåaø avlkarpakã ttÍ-ucyante itl. 'cakgur-rrrJñãna-sanañgr nlrañ vtJãnãtt no tu nlraø" ltÍ vacanãt. Dwarikadas' text has samsarg.l, "purification',, but poussin suggests the reading saaar{g.i, "endowed with". The latter reading makes sense more readlly.

26. Vväkhvã on 2.34, [Dw 209]: ViJñãnañ hi nîlatù pltaùt va vastu vÍJâ- nãtÍ. upalabhata ltl-arthaþ. Tad-eva tathã-ãJaøbanaù yastu vedanaanubhavat

7, s añJ ñâ par 7 chlnatt l, cetanã- abhi s adtskarot I - 7 t Í -evan-ãd Í. . Atha vã -- tasya-eva-ãLanbanasya vtjñãnaú sãaainya-rúpe4a-upalabhyatãrúpaà

gph4ãtÍ, vf5eça-nipe4a tu vedana-anubhava-nlyatâ-rupaùt gph4ãtÍ, s añJ ñã pa r 7 c c he dy a t ã - rûp aùt- gy h4ãt i. - t t I - evaø- ãd i . 27 . on AKB 1.1a [Dw 48] : yadl parlccheda-ãtsfkã saútJñã, tat-sanprayoge nÍøÍttaø-udgyh4antl-ltt pañca-apl vl Jñãna-kãyã vtkalpakãþ syutti

28. AXB 1.33ab [Dw 89]: yadl pañca viJñãna-kãyãþ sa-vJtarka:þ savicãrãþ, kathan-avi.kalpakã itl-ucyante?

29. Yyãkhvã on AKB 1.14cd [Dw a8]: Na hi pañca-vÍJñãna-s¿ìmprayoginl saàJñâ pafvi. Mano-vlJñãna-kãya-saaprayoglni tu pafvl-Íti tad-eva vlkalpakaø-uktaø.

30. vasubandhu uses the word kJJa ("so it has been said,') to distance himself from the position he is reporting. However, he offers no critlcism of the position. rt may be that his problen with the vaibhãsika answer is not a logical one, but stens from the lack of crear scriptural support for the answer. Conceptualization is not a common dictionary definition for vlkalpa. Being a derÍvative of the root vt- klrp' which can mean "to conjecture, Ínagine, presume", (M.wm., s.v.) it has a broad range of meanings in classlcal sanskrit, though it has 77

taken on a more technical neanlng in Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit. Edger- ton deflnes this technlcal meanlng as (faÌse) ',(fal.se) notion, imaglnation, dtscrinination". (Edgerton, s.v.) From the dlscussion, how- ever' I hope to show that Poussin has properly understood it 1n terms of conceptuallzatlon or cLasstffcatlon.

31. Vasubandhu ldentifies it with vltarka, though according to Vibhãsa 42.14 it is vitarka-vicãra. rt is likely that, because the two ar.e so frequently compounded, vltarka alone is used to convey the sense of both words.

32. [Dw 90]: kaspa-d-abhinlrûpa4ã-vlkalpa ity-ucyate: tatra tatraãLaøbane nãøa-apekçaya-abhlpravptteþ, rûpaù vedanã anityait duþkhaø- ltt'ãdt-abhlnlrûpa4ât-ca. saøãhltã tu bhãvanãøayr nâøãn-apekçyaãlaøbane pravartata tti. nat ça-abhinträpa4ã-vlkalpa.

33. BHSD, s.v. "abhlnirûpadtä".

34. In the conventional psychologfcal dtstinctlon between classifica- tion and perception the latter ls immedlate awareness and classiflca- tion goes beyond thls to identify and label perceived objects accord- ing to categorles. (Cf. Zi¡nbardo, psvchology and Life, p.112.)

35. IDw 90] sã klla nãaa-anapekça-anubhûta-artha-øãtra-ãlanbãnã pravartate ltÍ; "saptrf kataøâ ? cetaso-abhttãçaþ " ltl. lakça4ãt. pañcav

1 J ñãnakãya-sanprayukta tu na-anubhäta-artha-abhi I ãça-pravpt ta- I t i na-anusaara4a-vf kalpa L t t - I çyate .

36. Poussin reads abh[lãpa, "expression" or "articulation',, instead of abh[lãsa, "desÍre". such a readlng is justifiable on the grounds that aål¡JJala is assocÍated with the def inition of nemory ( sa¡ti) in AKB 2.24 lP 1.1b4, Dw 18?l: yad-yogãd-ãfaebanaù na øano vl.sparatl., tacca- abhllapatÍ-lva sã saptif. "Because netnory is attached to the ob- jec*" the nind does not forget it, and sinilarly memory is that which

expresses [the object]." (cf. AKB 6.15 [p 4.160, Dw 90a]). I have retained the original text on the basis that the definition in the latter text speaks of all memory as "expressive',, lrlhereas the text quoted above denies the association of abhilãga with sensory menory. 37- It is sJ.ightly misleading, therefore, when Hardar says, ,'The five Vijñãnadhãtus are associated with vÍkalpa or speculative think- ing." ("Introduction", p. g8).The text itself prefers to say that they are lackíng vfkalpa.

38. AKB 1.32ab. The five sense consciousnesses are always characterized by lnvestigation and judgment, but mental consciousness is not necessarÍly so. It is present in alI ¡nonents of non-meditative consciousness, but is absent in all but the lowest states of meditation.

39. since the Buddhist endeavour is Ín part the discernment of dharøãIr, and since dharøãþ are irreducibre and discrete qualities, it nakes little sense to say that two dharøãþ account for a single qua- lity or aspect of a conscÍous state. Therefore, Vasubandhu agrees with the Sautrãntika position that vi.tarka or yicaf¡a do not concur- rently cooperate in governing this single quality. 78

40. They are both found in the first stage of concentration (dhyâna). (AKB 8.9 [P 5.149]) There is a stage between the first and second dhyânalþ caìled dhyãnãntara, which has vlcãra but not vltarka. Below that there 1s both, above that neither. (AKB S.23bd [p 5.182f]) 47. [P 1.174] This interpretation is stllI 1n existence. I.B. Horner [(trans.) The Middle Leneth SaVlngs, London: Luzac and Co., 1954], translates yJtãlclra-vicãra as',vocal activlties', .

42. IDw 596]: savltarka-vicãre4a hl clttena vlJñaptiþ. 43. [Dw 601]: darsana-prahãtavyatit cittañ vlJñapteþ pravartakaø; tatsaøutthãpakayor- vÍtarka-vlcârayor nlrdãna-bhûtatvãt.,,The mind to be abandoned by means of vision [i.e., the mind encumbered by ignoran- cel is the initÍator of action because it ts the gating cause of the insti- Iprocesses of] investigation and judgment.,'

44. vvãkhvã on AKB 2.JBa [Dw 206f.]: vttarkaþ kataøaþ? cetanãút vã nf srltya praJñãñ vã paryeçako aano-Jarpo-anabhyúha-abhyûha-avasthayoþ- yathãkraø, sã ca clttasya-audãrlkatã. VÍ.cãraþ kataøaþ? Cetanùit vã n I Ér L tya pral ñtuñ vã pratyavek çako øano- J a I po -anabhyûha- abhfiha-avasthayoþ- yathãkran, sã ca cltta-sukspatã.

45 . BHSD, s . v. " paryegaka" and ., pratyavekgaka,' . 46. [Dw 207]: tatra-udãhara4aù kecld-ãcakgate -- ,'tad-yathã öaåugu ghateçu-avasthltegu ,ko-'tra d¡úhaþ, ko JarJaraþ, ftÍ augffnaabhlghnato ya ûhaþ sa vttarkaþ, 'l.yanto JarJarã drdhã vã, itl yadante grahe?añ sa vlcãraþ.

47. Etymologically vitarka has as its root vi-tark, meaning "to ref- lect, ponder, think, believe, ascertain, etc.". (M.Wm., s.v.) Accord_ ingly, its range of neanings is broad: "conJecture, supposition, Ína- gination, deliberation, consideration". In transrating vikalpa as investigation, I intend it in the sense of the process of ascertain- ¡nent. The root of vfcãra, vL-car, also has a broad range of neanings: "to move about, investigate, perform, accomplish, etc." (M.Wn., s.v.)

vicãra echoes this broad range of meanings: ',exanination, invetiga- tion, change of place, procedure, etc." The meaning of vl.cãra, though the posslbllities are nanifold, is clear within the context of ya6onitra's discussion; it is the product of vltarka, the state of discernment that has been achieved by the process of investigation. 48. vitarka can al.so be transl.ated as "thoughts,'. rn the vyãkhyã on AKB 5.46d [P 4.89, Dw 844] there is a list of "thoughts,,which irnpede noral. purity: "thought of malice, vioLence ; thought associated with disrespect or with the prosperity of oners family ... ,,. (wãpãda-

vihitñsã-. . . -vitarka, avawanyanã-pratlsaùyukto vitarka, kula-udavatã- pratl.satñyukto vltarka). (cf . AKB s.46d [p 4.s8f ] a AKB s.59bc tp 4.991.) The absence of such thoughts is a factor in true ¡norality, a factor calìed "lack of inhibition by thought" (vltarkalr-anupahataø) (AKB 4.123ab [P g.z4B]) or "the lack of inJury (to morality) due to thought" (vitarka-anupaghãta) (AKB 4.110a [p g.226)1. The nature of vÍtarka in this sense is clear in AKB 4.123ab. of the five causes of 79

purity the first 1s the renunclation of the evil. act itself, the second 1s the renunclatlon of the preparatlon for and means of commiting the act. The third goes further by going an extra step and not even entertainlng the notion of comnlting the act, not derivfng enjoyment from imagining the act.

49. IDw 895]: aíubhâ tu yatra sañsthãna-vf6epa--laøbanatvãd vltarkaøâvahatl- ltl; a6ubhâåf cakgur-vlJñânavad bahlr-øukhl; tad-vÛçayaupanldhyãnãt. "But Foulness Meditation brings wíth it investÍgatlon because of the distinct forn of the object. For the FouLness Meditation is turned towards the external world ìike eye-consciousness because it is contenpJ.ation on visual data."

50. AKB 1.32 [P 1.58]. It ís noteworthy that Foulness Medltation is considered external-oriented, even though that whlch it attends 1s a nental image. Imagining a visual representation of that which fs external ls dynamically no different than attending to the external world.

51. A good discussion of this can be found in H.Beck, "Neuropsycho- Iogical Servosystems, Consciousness, and the Problem of Embodiment", Behavioral Science, 21 (1976), p.150. Also cf. Robert E. Ornstein, Psychology of Consciousness, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., pp. 52-56.

52. Ornstein, Psychology, p.56.

53. Kasamatsu, Akira, and Hirai, Tomio, "An encephalographic study of the Zen meditation", The Journal for the .A¡nerican Institute of HyDnosls, 74 (1973), pp. 109-112. Also, Robert E. Ornstein has a brief discussion of "dishabituation" in SsVcnotog-V of Consci (pp. 179f. ), whlch nentions similar studies.

54. Kasamatsu and Hirai, ibid., p. lt?.

55. This distinction between the sensualJ,y-oriented and Ínvestigatively- oriented may parallel that made by sone psychologists between hypnotically susceptible and non-susceptible people. E.R. Hitgard explored correLatlons between hypnotic susceptibility wlth other personaìity traits. (The ExperÍence of Hypnosis, New york: Harcourt, Brace & World, fnc., 1965.) He found a distinctlve difference betureen the ways in which people involve themseLves in tasks, a difference whÍch indicates either high or low susceptibility. Competltive athletics, scientific curiosity and achlevenent or goal-oriented play

reflect kinds of invoìvement that indicate Iow susceptibility. (p. 288) common characteristics of such people is that they are alert to exact environmental information, they focus on stimuli that lead to decision and control, and they stress activity. This person is typified by the baseball player whose interactions with his environment during the game are narrow, intense and governed by the determination to win the gane. Those who are more susceptible involve themselves much more lmaginatively and with much more feeling. The aesthete who ìoses hÍmself in a book or a piece of music, who can become thoroughly engaged in enjoying the present moment for its own sake is llkely to be hypnotizable. (p. 280f.) 80

56. [Dw 601]: avadhãra¡taø-avlkalpatvãt.

57. Note that this would not be immediate sense data. Mental consciousness, even when looklng outward, has a basis only Ín the past. In looking outward it attends the record of sensory data withtn the mind .

58. [Dw 1229]: søptlJo hi chandaþ, chandãd vitarkaþ, vltarkãt prayatnaþ, prayatnãd-vãyuþ, tataþ karna-ttf .... The ,,wlnd" (vãyi)

spoken of here fs that tntangibìe force that mediates the effort or exertlon lnvolved in a monent of volition and the effect action. manifest in AKB 3.i00ab IP z.z]-oj revea].s a similar example of the wind representing an intangible mediation between the destruction of the world at the end of one cosmic cycle (kajpa) and the emergence of a new ¡¿orld at the beginnfng of a new cycle. simirarly, AKB l.43cd [p 1.901 expresses the notion that wind Ís the factor responsible for

the cohesion of atoms in conglomerations. 59. IBP, p.18 60. Name in turn is defined in AKB 3.30 [p 2.94f, Dw 46?f] as 'the con- ventionally known explication of diverse objects: cow, horse, etc.'

(yadtdaù loke pratrtaù teçùit teçãnarthãnãrit pratyãyakan -- gault, a€vaþ,...).

61 Cf. chap. I, fn. 27 62. AKB 8.4 [P 5.143]

63. AKB 2.42 [P 200ff] The differ'ence between these states is not a qualltative one, for unconsciousness hardly admits of qualitative

differences. The differences are between the precondltions that produce them and, accordingry, the effects t.hat foLlow from then. Buddhlsts avoid the attalnnent of unconscÍousness, for it follows a desÍre for well-beÍng in whfch unconsciousness is equated with weIIbeing.

Because of this desire, unconsciousness is a dlsturbed state. 64. AKB 5.9d [P 4.23ff1. The four Mistakes are: seeing the impernanent as pernanent, the sorrowful as delightful, the impure as pure and the impersonallty of the individuat as having a stabre, underlying self. vlparyãsa has as its root vr-pary-as, meaning',to reverse, overturn"; thus it connotes somethtng whlch is opposite or backwards. Though "mistake" and "error" are legitÍmate translations of the word (M.wm., s.v. "viparyã.sa"), it should be noted that the nature of the mistake is that Ít holds the opposite of the truth to be true. 65. [Dw 779] z na hi saúJñã santÍrJkã, na-apl clttaø.

66. The earlier discusslon of consciousness initiating and facÍtitating overt behaviour mentloned the associatÍon between vrkarpa and initlating consclousness. sensory conscÍousness cannot Ínitiate action because it 1s without vLkalpa. The initiating and facititating modes of consciousness are in turn assocÍated with inward- and outward- looking consciousness by ya6omitra. B1

67. The text designates these klnds of consciousness "abandoned by vlsion" (darsana-heyal and "abandoned by meditation" (bhâvanã-heya),

respectively. I find lt helpful to translate them by reference to the problem rather than by reference to the cure. The unreaì things imaglned by the concept-troub-Ied mind are the five "views,, (drçtayaþ) presented in AKB 5.? [p 4.15ff].

68. BHSD, s.v. " vikalpa" .

69. dlvya-cakçur-abhtjñã Jñâna-darsanãya saøadhi-bhavanã. The power of divine sight is concentrated attention (meditation) wlth respect to knowledge and vision.

70. [Dw 1169] tatra Jñãnañ øano-viJfiãna-sanprayuktã praJñã. ,,anr bhavantaþ sattváft kãya-du6cartena sananvãgatãþ" i.ty-evaa-ãdÍ vlkarpãd. daríanañ cakgur-rrf Jfiãna-sapprayuktã praJñâ avtkatpakã'. Knowledge is insight associated with mental consciousness. This is because of

conceptualization, whlch is exempìified by such sayings as, ,,creatures, being sick, encumbered by evil bodlly acts ', vision is nonconceptualized insight associated with visual consciousness.

rt shourd be noted, however, that this is not the tinction standard dis- between Jñãna and dar5ana, as expressed in AKB ?.1c [p 5.3]. Darsana is a synonym for drçtl, according to both Edgerton (s.v., "darsana" ) and PoussÍn (who reads darsana throughout AKB 7.7-z [p 5-2ffl, which uses d¡gfi). DrçtÍ denotes the kind of knowledge that

depends upon investigation or refl,ection ( sarñtrra4a) . (AKB 1. er"a ¡n 1.811) Jñãna is the kind of knowledge which is free of doubt (but not

necessarily true). The two kinds of knowledge are not mutuatly exclu- sive, for there are sÍx "knowledges" (pra/ñaþ) which are both: the five basic wrong rrotions (beìief ir¡ a sour/person, etc.) and the correct mundane knowledge. The reason that darSana has a distinctive usage in AKB 8.28 is explicabJ.e in terms of AKB 1.41 [p 1.s1]: ,'vision" (d¡'çtJ) can be applÍed uniquely to the eye,/visual consciousness, for in this context it is intended literally.

77. Divine sight in AKB 7.43a [p 5.101] is defined as being "mundane knowledge" (lauklka-Jñãna), which is the conventional way of knowing that discrininates objects as nale, female, clothing, etc. (AKB z.2b

[P 5.4]). Though nundane, it would be cl.assed as "correct nundane vision" (lauktkÍ satùyag-di$.J), which is morally beneficial (kusaJa)

but nevertheless "characterized by disturbing factors,, (sa-ãsrava). 82

III. The Role of Sa¡iska-ra ln Consclousness In thls chapter ¡,re turn f inally to consider the intentionaL factors (sa¿iskára), the constructive aspects that underlle consciousness. The synchronic causa-Lity discussed in the first chapter makes it apparent that every ¡noment of consciousness exists because of the mutual support of the object of consciousness, feeling, recognition, consciousness, and volition. The diachronic causality of the second chapter also depends on intentional factors to sustain the emergence of every new moment of consciousness. According to the Buddhist ana- Lysis it is also these lntentional factors that cause cognitive and affective dlsturbances within mental consciousness. The purpose of this chapter is to explore two basic and interrelated intentional factors -- attentÍon and volition -- in order to understand better the role they play in conscious experience.

since "impurities" (kjefatl) and "dispositions, habits" (anusayãå) play an lmportant part in the discussÍon ahead, these terms need to be defined at the outset. An a¿usaya is the disposition and/or the conditioning that underlies habituat negative responses to the environment. l Th""" are sald to be six anusayäå in AKB s.lcd [p A.zf:

clinging, aversion, arrogance, ignorance, fal,se views and doubt.2 These negative dispositions are rerated to impuritles (kieÉaþ), though the relationship is understood differently in various Buddhist schools, as fs made clear in AKB s.2a [p 4.5ff]. According to the sarvãstlvãdins, kreía is a synonym for anusaya. For the sautrãntikas an anusaya is a dormant or ratent 'impurity t (prasupta klesal. The metaphor of a seed is used: the seed is the capacity or power (6aktJ) for the ¡nature plant to come into existence.3 th" anuÉaya is the 83

seed. The kle5a 1s the nature pìant, or kle6a évellIé, crest Ie kle5a manifesté as Poussin says [p 4.6], "Le , en acte. "

1. Attention (manaskãra)

(1.1) The basic definition of "attention" (øanaskatra) in AKB 2.24 [P 1.154] is the "inclinlng of consciousness" (cetasa ãbhogaþl. The Vyãkhvã explains this as the "bendine (turning, inclining) of the nind toward the object."4

The nature of attention (øanaskãra) is made clearer in AKB 2.25 [P 1.159f] by a conflÍct between the sautrãntika and the vaibhãsika over the relationship between attention and equanimity (upekga-). They concur in their definitions of both words, but their understanding of the definitions differs. Attention is the inclination of the mind toward an object; equanimity is the non-incLination of the mind (cÍtta-anãbhoga), or 'lack of affect', the skill of beÍng uninvolved with one's environment such that one responds to a bikini-clad woman or a poisonous snake with the same unemotional caln.5 1hu crltical issue is whether they can cccur sirruLtaneous]y in a moment of consciousness. How can the "inclination of the mind,' occur simultaneously with the "non-incfination of the nind,'?

The vaibhãsika hold that the two must be sinultaneous, for both are universal- mental factors and their understanding of these denands that all of them occur in every moment of consciousness. The way they weave these two together is to suggest that one can be,,inclined to something at the same time that one is uninclined toward something erse"-6 thi" line of argument is rejected by Vasubandhu because this implies consciousness can have two objects, one attended and one unattended, whereas it is a commonly accepted principle that conscious- 84

ness can only have one object. The bel.ieves that these mental factors cannot co-exist in the same moment opposite of equanÍmity.

Sautrãntika, on the other hand, are mutually lncompattble and so of consciousness. Attention is the

The confìict can be summarized as: is attention the awareness impliclt in all consciousness (the vafbhãslka view) or is it the conscious process of directing or restricting consciousness (the sautrãntika view)? The fact that consciousness necessarily has an object means that there is an element of attentlon or awareness ln every monent of consciousness. This understanding of attention would partially coincide more wlth contemporary views of attention. Zimbardo's discussion of attention, for example, assumes attention to be an

inalienable aspect of consciousness.T To be conscious is to attend one thing, filterlng out all extraneous information. Therefore, even when one 1s not motivated towards or enotionally involved wÍth any particular object, one still attends a specific object. perhaps the vaibhãsika answer cÍted above was meant to convey that one attends the object (i.e., ls a¡gare of the object) rchile not attending any motive-evoking qualities in the object. The sautrãntika view, on the other hand, suggests that attention denotes the process of selecting a particular obJect to be aware of, a process that requires an element of conscious volition or effort in order to focus or restrict

awareness. Like any act, therefore, attention always implies notivation and so is fundamentarly at odds with the unnotivated state of awareness called equanimity. The usage of attention and inclination (ãbhoga) throughout the Bhãsva and Vyâkhyã conforms to the Sautrãntika understanding. Attention 1s often spoken of with regard to neditative dlscipline as the 85

means (prayoga) of attaining a specific state. one begins by applytng attention to a specific obJect, exerting oneself wlth regards to it. rn AKB 7.43d [P 5.104], for example, attention to specific objects is considered the means of attalning supernatural powers with regards to those objects. The Vyãkhyã on AKB 2.64d [p 1.310] offers "the inclination of the mind" (cttta-ãbhoga) -- the phrase used to define

attention in AKB 2.24 -- as a synonyn for "the constructive effort of the mind" (cltta-abhjsaaiska-ra). The phrase is used to describe the consciousness that leads to the two kinds of unconsciousness. "The two states are assocíated with equivalent and immediate causality because they arise from a constructive effort of the nind. "8 Abhisañskãra here connotes a sense of effort, as it does in AKB s.40 [P 4.80] where it speaks of the great effort required in going

against the current of a river. The opposite of abhlsa¿iskã'ra is that which comes spontaneously, without effort.9 fh" implication of these associations is that attention irnplies the apprication of effort. The phrase used to describe the mental constructive effort ln AKB 2.64d [P 1.310] , citta-abhtsatñskãra, is al.so reminiscent of the definition of volition (cetanã) tn AKB 2.24 [p 1.1s4]: ',volition is a mentaJ. act, a constructive effort of consciousness."l0 Thi" aLone suggests that there is an association between attention and volition. As we wiìl see in this chapter, attention is in fact a species of

volition. rts particular distinction as a species of volition is a natter of contention, for it depends on whÍch of the two deflnitions of attention one prefers. [qle will have occasion to deal wlth this lssue at greater length in the discussion of volition. rn brief, one can say that attention is volition in its role of constructing consciousness. It Ís this form of volltlon that ptays a crucial role in 86

sustalnlng the flow of conscious experience. {1.2) Attention plays a causal role in the emergence of every moment of consciousness, according to the Vyãkhyã on AKB 2.72 [p 1.325]: "consciousness emerges imnediately after the previous consciousness. Attention is discussed Iin this cont-ext] for the reason

that those moments of consciousness emerge because of attention.,,ll rn AKB 2.64d [P 1.310], cited above, the kind of causalfty assocfated with sustalning the flow of consciousness, equivalent and immediate causallty, is assocfated wtth mental effort or the lncllnation of the mind. These two texts confirm that the activity (kårJtra-), whÍch renders the mind the equlvalent and immediate cause of consciousness, ls attention.12 Th""" is a probrem wfth this, though, for according to the sautrãntika perspective, which vasubandhu and yasomitra share,

attention is not present in every noment; it does not exist fn a monent characterized by equanimity, even though such consciousness continues unabated. The problern here is semantic. ya6omitra in AKB 2.72 [P 1.325] is using attention in the sense that the vaibhãqlka attribute to it. The meaning Ís clear, however, that it is volition in its consciousness-constructing role that yields equivalent and immediate causallty, which causes noments of consciousness to arise in succession.

{1.3} The text analyzes attention in AKB 2.22 [p 1.32bf, Dw 3?0] as being of three kinds. There is "attention to particular characteristics" (svaJakça4a-Eanaska-ra), which focuses on the qualities of a given obJect. rn contrast to this there is "attention to common characteristics" (sâøãnya-rakga4a-øanaskâra), which are the sixteen Facets (ãJ<a-rãi) of truth comrnon to all things conditioned things -- i.e. , impermanence, suffering, emptÍness, soul-lessness, ut".13 87

Thirdly, there is "attention utillzing imagination,/conviction', (adhiøuktl- øanaska-ra) .14 th" meaning of adhlwuktj is complex and merits its own discussion, to which we wirl turn shortty. For the moment it 1s sufficient to say that this species of attention, unlike the first two, is not focussed upon the external world, but is associated wlth kinds of meditation invoJ.ving imagination or visualization. The difference between the first two kinds of attention -- particular and common -- is one of level of anaìysis. Attention always

operates at a specific level; one can attend the abstract concept "thesis", or a sentence, a single word or letter. The Buddhist analysis, however, is governed by the basic soteriological orientation of the Buddhist enterprise, for which only two levels of attention to reality/ truth are significant: attention to bare qualities of sense data and attention to the abstract truths that are universally applicabLe to all sense data.

{1.4} Attent-ion is a crucial theme in the BuddhisL analysis, for the salvific process is essentialry the training of attention,lS 5y which one cones to escape the 'impurities' . seeing the truth requires the purification of attention. In AKB 6.27b Ip 4.1g?] this scripture is quoted: "The 5rãvaka's attending to the sorrowful as sorrowful is the discernment of truths associated with attention which is free

from the influence of impurityr." How we attend the environnent both depends on and determines cognitive and affective welì.-being. Truth and equanÍmity arise from and fuel proper attention; ignorance and affective disturbance are implicated in faulty attention. {1.4.1} Attention in its crippled state is ca_Lled ,,superficial, shal.row attention" (ayoniso-nanaslkãra). The vvãkhyã on AKB 4.94cd [p 3.1981 defines this as "attention brought about by a beginnlngless oo

'impurlty'-bound knowing."16'Impurity,-bound knowing is fgnorance. In the story of the fall of the gods into material exlstence fn AKB 3.98ab LP 2.20s1, it was superficlal. attention that caused them to conceive a sharp desire for sexual pleasure. If they had been proper_ ly attentlve, they vlould not have been seduced by the imaginative superimposltion that dlstorted reality. The fi¡.st rung of Dependent origination (pratrtya-saøutpãda), discussed in AKB 3.2? [p z.?Off], is ignorance. The question fs raised about how ignorance comes about. one answer to this questÍon, one that is identified by yasomitra with a vasubandhu,lT is that texts sometÍ¡nes give superffcfal attention as the cause of ignorance and sometines give ignorance as the cause of superflclal attention, the impltcation of whÍch is that there is a mutually causal and reinforcing interplay between the two.

{1.4.2} shatlow attention is also related as both a cause and effect to the occurence of an unsettling 'impurity' (kle5a). Attention is presented in AKB s.34 [p 4.72f] as one of the three causar factors responsible for unsettling 'impurity' arising.lS fhu fÍrst causal- factor is the disposition or habit energ-y (anuÉaya). The second is the occaslon, the presence of a particurar object (viçayal whlch evokes a disturbing response of attraction or aversion. Finally there is improper or superficial attentÍon, which serves as the preparation, the facilttator or means (prayoga) that enables the 'impurityr to arise. Inproper attention achieves and maintains awareness of the object in such a $¡ay that the obJect ts alLowe d to evoke a particuJ,ar habitual response. superficial attentlon is mentioned in AKB s.1a [p 4.2] as one of the effects of a disturbing,impurity'. when a'impurity' is rearized or expressed there are ten effects, of whlch but a few are relevant 89

to our purposes. For one, it makes a fundamental change in the personallty- substratum (á5raya) of the individual such that he becomes predisposed to produce such 'impurities' .19 One becomes more prone to experience certaln 'impurlties'. Not only does the tendency to respond with a certaln 'impurÍty' becone easier, but the tendency also becones nore difficult to extinguish, for at the same time the realization of a rinpurity' "makes the root firm" (øúiaù drdhÍ-karotÍ).

This root is identified by yasomitra as the disposition ( anusaya) that gives rise to that rlmpurity'. Another effect of ,impurity' arising is that the 'impurityt "gathers lts own requísite materiaL,' (sva-sanbhãrañ parf.grh4ãtt). That is, the 'impurity' creates the conditÍon that wÍll afl.ow it to recur. The vvãkhyã clarifies that this necessary condition is improper attention. How it does this can be understood in two ways. The person becomes more attentive or nore aware of those aspects of the environment which will evoke that

rimpurityr. or when one attends an object, one wirl be inclined to attribute quaLities to it that eLiclt a particular 'impurity' to which one is predisposed. Shallow attention is thus associated with another effect: "it leads one astray with respect to the object (of perception)" (ãlanbane saùøohayatl). The Vyãkhyã explains that this is "because of injury to the intellect,, (buddhy-upaghãtãd). One becones unable to recognize the object for what it is.

It is interesting to note the mutuaL conditioning of ignorance and affective disturbance. The controversy in the West between those who feel thought to be incidental to emotion and those who think thought to be central to emotlon, has no counterpart in this system of thought which accepts as comnon sense the synergy of thought and emotion. For the Buddhist there can be no correction of cognÍtive 90

dlsturbance without the dfsctplining of affect, nor the curlng of affective disturbance wlthout the discernment of reality.2O In summary, attention is the process of restrlcting a$¡areness, but it ls always qualified or governed by elther healthy or unhealthy factors. In turn it promotes healthy and unheaJ.thy factors, for it can fortify either ignorance or insight by virtue of the kind of world it delivers to the consctous individual for him to respond to. In this way it is evident that attention constructs consciousness, and its constructing activlty is governed to a large extent by dtsposltional factors, unless one cultivates the discipline by which he regains controL of attention.

{1.5} Adhtnokça is Listed among the ten universal mental factors in AKB 2.24 [P 1.153f]. The Bhãsya's definition does tittle to clarify the meaning of adhlaokça, for it sinply gives the equally nebulous adhløuktl as a synonyn. The vyãkhyã [Dw 18?] gives three dlfferent neanings of the word, each of which can be found in the Bhãsya. rn some contexts it is the ascertainment of the properties of an object. rn other contexts it has the meaning of "desire, pleasure" (rucJ). FinalLy, it can also denote the yogi's ability to rpossess' an object as he chooses.2l Ou" concern is particularly with the latter deflnition, for it is this which corresponds to adhiøuktl-øanaskãra.

As was ¡nentioned earlier, yogic exercises that involve visualizatÍon are Listed as forms of adhiøuktJ-sanaska-ra. These are the Foulness Meditatlons, the Unlinited Meditations, the Formless Meditations, the Liberation Exercises, the Mastery Exercises, the Totality Meditations, etc.22 ThÍs serves to clarify what it rneans in saying that adåJmokça is the 'possessionr (dhãrana) of an object as the yogi ¡qills to possess it. He possess it in the sense that he holds it 91

wlthln consciousness; he perceives it as he will. This is the power of imagination cultlvated to a high degree. This is partlcularly clear ln AKB 8.35bd [P 5.213] wlth respect to the Mastery Exerclses (abhibhú-ãyatanãþ: llteralìy, mastery of the sources of consciousness). They yield "mastery of the object, for one can imagine (the object) as desired

mastery "for one Ímagines these obJects as bLue, yellow, etc. according to one's desire; what is blue in a moment is yeìlow in that noment."24 This apparently descrlbes a self-controLled positive hallucination, seeing somethíng which is not present as if it were. The nature of adhfnuktT-øanaskã.ra as a kind of perception is distinct fro¡n ordinary perception because it is imagined. This distinguishes it fron attention to and perception of reality. In AKB

8.30abc it is said that one cannot abandon'impurities' (kjeçalll) by the unlimited Meditations (ãpranãnãþ). The Vãkhyã explains that "^Abando¡ling 'inpurities' cones alrout only by attention to realitu.',25 The Vyãkhvã here makes the contrast explicit between adhinukti-Æa¿askãra and tattva-nanaskãra; adhinukti is imaginative as opposed to being orlented to reality. sinilarly, it says in ABK 6.9d [p 4.149f] "The Foulness Meditatlons do not lead to the abandoning of impurities', just to the stopping of then.,'26 Thi" in part is again because

it is only "imaginative attention". It is the inaginative character of this kind of perception that keeps it from being classed as knowledge. The Vyãkhyã on ABK 6.s4cd lp 4-2471 says, ',Knowledge is knowledge that is not characterized by imagination, which negates (impedes) the object (meaning)."27 Hu"" adhløokça is something which works against knowledge. The meaning of attention to real.ity in contrast to adhinuktl- 92

ø,anaskãre is well illustrated ln AKB 6.12 [p 4.1s4f]. Breathing Meditation is considered attention to reaì.ity. Breathing Medltation focuses on lnhalatlon and exhalatlon, so that one attends to oners breath moving into and out of the body. It is said that some hold the ldea that, in exhalatlon, one should attend ft all the way up into the atmosphere (vãyu-øart(ala). vasubandhu contests this on the grounds that this would not be rattention to reality'. certainly he does not doubt the existence of such a place; it is simpJy beyond the

lmmediately given and so couLd only be attended imaginatlvery. The Formlesð Meditatlons are also considered imaginative attention, Ín spite of the fact that the objects of meditation are generally believed to exist. We read Ín AKB 8.4 [P 5.143], for example, with regard to the first meditation (on ãkââa-anantya; infinite space) that one begfns by focusing on a hole, an absence of sonething, to grasp its sign (ntaltta) by adhinukti. one then contemplates on that sign when it is imaginatively grasped, extending it until it pervades the universe.

Though adhlnuktl-nanaskãra achieves imaginative perception, it 1s nevertheless considered perception. This is made most clear in AKB 8.30abc [P 5.198f] where an objection is raised over the unrlmited Meditation that has as its object the happiness of al.L creatures. rs it not an inappropriate object of meditation because it is not true that they are happy? The response is threefold: it is not wrong,'1. because it Ís really a wish that they might be; z. because it is not a mistake of intention; 3. because it is a perception deriving fron adhløuktl."28

one may thlnk of imaginative percepts having various degrees of seeming reality, ranging from the reÌative unreality of daydreams all 93

the way up to the positive halluclnations of hypnotic and psychotlc states . Adhløuktl-øanaskãra lnvolves the conviction characteristic of the ìatter end of the scale. AdhløuktJ is strongÌy associated with certainty or convictÍon as well as with perceptfon. For exampì.e, it says in ABK 2.43bd [P 1.204] that only Buddhists can attain the transic state of cessation and one of the reasons for thls is because "(The Buddhist) has been convinced of Nirvã4a as a thing that has been seen,'because it emerges by virtue of the Nobre path."29 orrly on"

who follows the Noble Path can see Nirvã4a, and having been convinced he has a basis for cultivating cessation. Perception and conviction go hand in hand also in AKB g.16 [p 2.bS].30 The topic is how different beings aquire their destÍnies. The one who has litt1e nerit does not have hÍs wits about him to enable him to find his way into a good incarnation. Regardless of the womb he finds his way into, he is inclined to think of it as a sheLter from the storm and to abide there. He conceÍves of the wonb as a shelter because "a false notion and false certainty arise" (viparltau sañJnã-adhtnokçau pravarttete.) Not only is he mistaken in his perception of where he is, but he is arso mistakenly certain about where he thínks he is.

The notÍon that convictlon is a baslc characteristic of adhlmukti is also nade expliclt in Nyãnamoli's translation of the VÍsuddhimagga XIV.151.31 Though he translates adhføukti as resoLution, he cl.arifies in an explanatory footnote that "the act of resolving should be understood as the act of being convinced (sanntlfhãna\ about an object". rndeed, the text itself says "the characteristic (of adåiøuktJ) is convictÍon."32 The definition given Ín the Visuddhinagga could be seen as corresponding to ya6omitra's first definition of adhløuktf -- i.e., 1t is the ascertainment or affirmation of 94

the object, the assertion of the kno$rledge of the obJect with convincing certainty.S3 r wourd suggest that this is the characterfstlc nature of adhTøukt1 that makes the word equally appticabLe to the yogic effort to assert a convincingly certain perception of the .34 oDJ ect .

Let us consider Foulness Medltation, described in AKB 6.10 tp 4.150f]' as an exanple of adhløuktj*øanaskãra. The meditator focuses in his imagination on a smarl part of his body and sees the flesh fall off it. Progressively he extends thls to hls whole body untfJ. he envisions hinself a skeleton. He asserts himself to perceive convincingly increasingly broad realns of beings reduced to skeletons.

This is referred to as the "increase of adhiøokça,' (adåJøokga-abhl_ vardhana). one woul.d assume that the broader one's scope, the more difficult it is to envision it convincingly. The ability to inaginatively reduce the world's population to skeletons Ís beginnerrs

IeveL. Having acconplished this, one moves to a higher rever of meditation by reducing the scope of one's attention to the point where one is attentive to just one half of his own skull. I take this to mean that one nust learn to focus one's attention without losing a sense of the world beÍng full of skeÌetons; just as one naturally tends to see oneserf within a certain context, mapped as a person against a society of persons, this meditation is ai¡ned at becoming aware of oneself in the context of a world of skeìetons. Highest level Foulness Mediatation, calred "absorute mastery of attention,,, reduces the point of attention further to just the point between the eyes.

{1.6} Attentlon Ís the form of volitlon associated with the construction of consciousness. The ¡neditative disciplines comprising 95

adhløuktl-attention lllustrate the scope of volition's lnfLuence in the construction of consciousness. The threefold divlsion of attention -- particular, common and imaginative -- is not intended to be exhaustive, but is directly re-Iated to Buddhist discipline, the means of transcending ignorance, desire and aversion. The first two, being reaJ.ity-oriented, apply themselves to see reality truly so that one can become free from'lmpurity'and its conditÍoning. In contrast to this, adhløuktl-attention is the discipline by which perception becomes governed by oners own intent rather than by external phenomena. 2. Volition (cetanã)

{2.1} volition is the prinary factor within the aspect of individual existence called the "conditioning component" (saøskãra-skandha). The conditioning component is called this, according to the Buddha, who is quoted in AKB 1.1bab [p 1.29], ,,because it constructs that which is constructed. "SS Thua which is constructed embraces almost every facet of experience,/reaLity, the exceptions being the two states of cessation (Nirvãla) and voicl. I.lhether it is siinply one's consciousness of the external., reaL world that is constructed or whether the worl.d itself is also constructed is a noot issue anong varÍous Buddhist schools; for our purposes it is sufficient to know that at least the former is implied.

It¡hat is meant by "constructing" is that the individual performs certain operations on the data of experience. For example, the Vyãkhvã on AKB 1.22bd [p 1.42] discusses ho¡{ perception nistakes cone about: "sorrowfut feeling becomes pleasant feeling through the transformation of uneasiness by the intentional factors.,'36 Th" elenent of suffering or sorror{, believed by the Buddhist to be a quality common 96

to all phenomenaJ. objects and,/or states of ly altered by the constructing activlty of in such a kray that the obJect which should mes a source of pleasure. consciousness, 1s radicalthe condÍtioning component properly evoke sorrow beco-

12.2) In the Buddhist scriptures the conditionÍng component is defined as volitÍon (cetanù.37 Though Scripture gives volftion as the onì.y definition of the conditioning component, wlthln the Abhidharmic systenatization of tradltion this component became a catcharl for all of the nental factors that flt nowhere else into the five-fold division of the lndividual. still, volition retains a primacy within the conditionlng component for it is the source of intention and thus of actÍon (karøa). As the vyãkhyã says on AKB 1.15ab

[P 1.29]: "rt is chief anong the constructive factors, saying'let me be such and such'. (It is chief) because it ís said, 'that which arises is caused by action.,"38 This harks back to the text cited in the lntroductlon: "The dÍversity of the world comes about by action, which is volition and that which volition does.,,39 Th" whole of the phenomenal world thus arises out of volition, and because of this volition is considered the chief factor within the conditioning conponent. AlL of the other nental factors lncl.uded in the conditioning component are said to belong there because they conform to volítton 40 -

All that ls is a product of volition, but it can be either a direct or an indirect result. Volition is the direct source of action (karøa), but all action has a farther reaching effect, for it bears fruit in the distant future. This fruition of karøa is called',repaynent" (vrpa-Ica) and, according to the action which it is 'repayÍngr, it is either good or bad. vasubandhu descrlbes volition as 'prepara- 97

tory', which the Vyãkhyã explafns tn thls uray:41 (Qualifytng volltion as) preparatory makes it clear that this the is nature of alI volitions. Volition is preparatory because 1t prepares the repayment; for by volltion (repayment) is willed and intended. (For example, one thinks,)',I wtll be a god or a man, etc.

Volition that is not inmediately constructive is ner¡ertheless indirectly constructive for it is the source of future effects. {2.3} t'Jhen the repayment, the f ruit of action, matures, it comes about automatically, without desire or conscious effort. Volition by contrast Is characterized by deslre (chanda)42 und effort. It ts lfkely because of the association of volition with desire that Vasubandhu defines chanda in AKB 2.24 [p 1.154] as "the desire to do,'

(kartu-kãnatãl in spÍte of the fact that this definition is hardly adequate to the breadth of the word's usage. From AKB z.z4 [p 1.1s4], which defines volition as "a mental act, an effort of consciousness", 43 *" know that effort is volitionrs fundamental. characteristic. The association of desire and effort with volitÍon is made most explicítly in AKB I [P 5.294] where Vasubandhu tries to account for

intentional action without reference to the "doer" that the heretical "Personal.ist" Buddhists posit. "hlhat is the genesis of action? Memory gives rise to a desire to act, which leads to investigation which gives rise to effort which causes a wind -- this is 'intentional action' .u44 Here vol.itÍon is reduced simpry to the series of factors associated with volltlon.

{2.3.1} The llst of what constitutes an intentional act is conposed in such a ü¡ay to depersonal.ize the action event as much as possible. If any factor in the list would correspond distinctly with volition, it would be "effort, activity" (prayatna). I suspect that this ¡sord was chosen instead of voLition or the nore common word for 98

voluntary effort, abhlsaútskalra, because it is not so comnonly associated with conscious intentlon; therefore, though Vasubandhu's definition of action cannot escape the question of.who,, makes the effort or where the effort comes from, it does not raise the question so obviously.

The contrast between repayment and effort is made explicit in AKB 2-?1 [P 1.3241. It is said that various kinds of conscious moments -- one of whlch is a monent of, consciousness that is the resuìt of repayment -- can be produced by a conscious moment that involves effort (prayogÍka-cttta), but that they cannot in turn produce a conscious moment involving effort. Repaynent-caused conscious moments are "noments of consciousness that are not conducive to effort because, arising without effort, they are weak.,'45

{2.3.2} The dÍscussion in AKB 1.3zbc [p 1.69f] supports the contrast between desire and repayment as the respective causes of voluntary and involuntary processes. The passage deals with which aspects of reality arise fron repayment. speech, for exampJ.e, because it arises only fron desire, can not be a product of repayment.46 4 dharøa that is a product of repayment is unintentional (anlcchata). Desire is sonetimes used in a specific sense to convey the in_

tention to achieve or acquire sonething, to address a perceived scarcity. So it is that the Vyãkhyã on AKB 2.SS [p 1.Zgtf, explaining the compound "desire-attachnent" (chanda-rãga), contrasts the two words in this way: " chanda is the desire for a future object ; rãga is the determined effort with regards to an aquired object.',47 Th" obJects of "desire-clinging" in this passage comprises the six kinds of sti_ muLi, from vlsible to consclous data. t{ith respect to the five senses, desire could be understood as the motive to experience certain 99

tastes, sounds, etc. Desire associated with the mental consciousness would be a desire for things that exist conceptually -- fame, wealth, heaLth, liberatlon, safety, etc. Desire is also used more generally in the broad sense of motive. It is in this sense that it is presented as the crucial causal factor in the establishment and maintenance of the cognitive and affective disturbance characteristic of the human condition. The five aspects of personal existence, when they exist in the disturbed state are considered to have desire as their cause or "root" (ll[Ja).48 Forr. different kinds of desire that pìay a rofe in the development of the individual are outlined in AKB ?.13a [p 5.3Sf].49 (1) The thought that says, rr am', is the desire to remain the same.

(2) The thought that says, 'Oh, that I might be', is the desire to live again in the same way. lvvãkhvã: an ardent desire just to líve again and in no particular form.] (3) The thought that says, 'Oh, that I might be like this', is the desire to live again in a different way. (a) The desire that is bondage to rebirth, or the desire that creates action." lVyãkhyã: "It is the creatÍon of action, the kind of desire that says ,in such and such a manner will I give gifts."l There is another interpretation of the four desires, which is worth mentioning before offering an analysis. According to this other interpretation, the four basic kinds of desire comprise two ways of

thinking and two kinds of anticipation. The two ways of thinking are 'r am' (asni) and'I wilL be' (bhaviçyânÍ). Each of these two ways of thinking can take on fÍve particular forms:

I am (wiLL be) such and such (ittaø-asni);

I am (wiJ.J. be) what I am (evan-asni);

I am (will be) something other than what I arn ( anyatha-asmJ);

I am (will be) fundamentally real (sad asnj);

I am (will be) fundamentally non-existent (asad asø:.).

The two kinds of anticipation are hope and determination: "oh, that r might be!" (syaø¡) and "I must be!" (api syãn). Each of these takes on 100

various forms: "might f be", "might I be like that,,, might I be the same", "might I be different." These are the various forms that chanda takes.

There are two interesting thíngs to note about the two expositions of desi-re, First, all desires are presented in terms of a present or future condition of the self, the "I". whether the desire is to simply continue existing regardless of the state in which one must live or whether one desires to retain or achieve a particuLar kind of life -- a wealthy, healthy, famous or heavenry life -- this reflects a funda¡nentaL desire to achieve for one's self a certain state. ^All motivation is intrinsicaJ.Iy 'seLfish' .5O

Secondly, one should note that not al,l of the desires are overtìy conative. Especially in the latter interpretation of the four desires, the two ways of thinking are not conative but rather reflect a certain cognitive framework which accounts for the way that data will be evaluated and responded to. rn a sense one can think of this cognitive franework as a potential form of desire. The individual who

thinks "r am wealthy" is not expressing desire or actively moving toward some end, but because thls bel.ief exists it potentiates desire. The first hint of loss of wealth or the suggestion that the truth can be more fully realized (1.e., which implies that the belief is partialì.y false) causes a motivated state to become actuated.. Desire is not simply an actuaL state of motivation but also the potential for motivated states arising, a potential that has its roots in the cognitive fundíng of the indivldual. rt Ís for this reason that the Buddhists see the belief in a serf as the primary root of all disturbing factors. In AKB 9 [P s.zgo] it says that alL the kle6ãþ can ultimately be traced to beLief in a self (ãtøan).51 Only when one assumes 101

the existence of the self is it possible for the seLf or to believe that it can be being in a particular state. All desire, preservation to the desire to be (become) fundanental error.

to seek a certain conditlon cognltively qualified as from the instinct of selfa god, is rooted ln this

{2.4'r According to the sautrãntika understanding of volition, it plays a crucial role in transforming the personality-substratum (ãfraya). we have discussed ãSraya earlier with respect to its denotation of the physical-substratun, upon which the character and stability of consciousness rests. In AKB 2.44d lp 1.2r4) in explaining vasubandhu's use of ãSraya, Ya6omitra lDw 247] uses "series" saùrtãna as a synonyn. The sautrãntikas (and vasubandhu) prefer to speak of

fundanentaì and enduring changes in the individual in vague terms of the transformation of the physical substratu*.52 Fo" example, in AKB 2.36cd [P 1.183, Dw 215] the ãSraya is transformed (parãvyttiþ) by the I.Jay of Meditation and of vision in such a way that it becomes free of impurities' . This is compared to a seed that, having been burned by fire, has its nature changed so that it loses its potential to germinate. Even so the discipline of the Ways alters the fundamentaL character of the person.

vasubandhu sides with the sautrãntikas in approaching personal change as an effect of volition upon the personaJ.ity-substratum. In the discussion over the essential nature of manifest behaviour (vijñapti) in AKB 4.3c [P 3.12] the Sautrãntikas argue that it is nothing more than voLition. Two kinds of behavíour are recognized, vocal and physical. The vaibhãsika thinks that their underlying realities (dharnãþ) are name and shape, respectively. The sautrãntika believe 702

them to be simply volitlons that have the body or voice for an object -- i.e., intentions to express oneself through the one or the other. The Vaibhãsika objectÍon to this is that actlon (karøa) is accepted as threefold -- there are acts of thought, word and deed -- and so, volitlon belng the mental act, how can word and deed also be cefined as volition? The answer is that there is a two step process of volitlon: first there is the mental act of resoì.ving to do somethlng, i.e., a resoLution-volition (saúkaJpa-cetanã), and then comes the vorition that expresses itself vocally or physicaJ.ly, the actingvolition (krlyã-cetanã) .

Likewise, Vasubandhu and the sautrãntikas contest in AKB 4.4ab [P 3.24f] that there is no such "thing" (dravya) as unmanifest action (avt/ñapti). For the Vaibhãsikas unnanifest action is a causal factor within oneself that exists independent of conscious ar^rareness and causes one to do good or eviL acts. Vasubandhu argues that unmanÍfest action fs sirnply the effect of intention (ã6aya) and personalitysubstratum (ãSraya). The Vyákhyã defines these further: "Intention

means the intentÍon not to conmit murder, etc., or the intention to have faith, etc. Personality-substratum refers to the transfornation of the personaJ.ity."53 In AKB 4.119 [p 3.241] intention (ãSaya) seems to be a synonym for resoLution-volition (saikalpa-cetanã) as opposed to acting-volition. It determines that such and such will be donu.54 It is by intention/voLition that the personarity is transforned. various exanples can be offered of vorition having a positive infLuence on the personality-substratum. rn AKB 4.4ab [p 3.20] it is said that the volition to give a gift for the sake of doing good to others resuLts in the personaì.ity-substratum of the donor being "saturated, pervaded" or (in poussin's terms) "perfuned" (parÍbhãvl- 103

ta) by the act. This in turn causes a subtLe transformatlon ln the personallty-substr.tum.55 The effect of such acts is that they become second nature, continual, refìecting and reinforcing a fundamentaì change ln the substratum from whlch thought and action emerg". 5ô This is sÍmilar to a concept found in AKB 4.9sa [p 3.199]. It is asked what is the effect of one act with regards to reincarnations? Reference is made to Aniruddha who, knowing his previous incarnations, said that the effect of giving al.ms once caused him to be

born seven times in a particular heaven, after which he was born into the wealthy saknya fanÍly. one response to this Ís that the act of alnsgiving gave rise to an "unbroken succession of voluntary acts of giving" (dâna-cetanãnãtit pravâhaþ), so that, though the numerous fortunate reincarnations were the accunulative effect of many volitions, these nany voltions were in turn the product of one, so that it was but the indirect cause of the rebirths. PresumabJ.y the many volitions were the effec+- of a transformation of the personality-substratun. A final exanple can be found in the discussion of spirÍtuat growth towards liberation in AKB 6.2Ad-ZSa [p 4.1?Sf]. It is said that

spiritual growth occurs graduaJ.ly, requiring at least three lifetimes for the personaìity substratum to be freed.57 In one life one plants a seed, in the next lt grows, and finally it bears fruit. The seeds of liberation ( nokça-bhâgrya) that one plants are identified in AKB 6.25a as the three kinds of action (karsa). Vasubandhu explains that it is primarily volition (nanas-karøa: thought action) but, because of this encompassing desire, bodÍly or vocal action is aLso a seed of liberatÍon when qualified by a desire for liberation.SS This resolution is itself a kind of volition that estabLishes a particular environnent that qualifies subsequent intentional acts. 704

Because vasubandhu dismisses the idea of unmanifest actlon, he also uses the concept of intentlon (ãSaya) in AKB 4.4ab lp g.z|f, Dw 5881 to understand "discipJ.ine" (sanvara). For the Vaibhãsika discipline is a kind of unmanifest actfon that prevents sinful thoughts or acts from being realized. For the Sautrãntikas and Vasubandhu it is simply a volltion (cetanâ) or resolution not to sin. Here the Vaibhãsika obJects that intention/volition (ãSaya/cetana-) is a poor substitute for the concept of unnanifest action (avÍJñaptt), because the main slgnlficance of unmanifest action is that it works without

regard to consclous effort or intention. If discipline is nothing nore than intention, then discipline ceases as soon as the ¡nonk ceases being intent on practising discipline. "rf discipline is volition, then a mo¡nent of consciousness which is not a conscious volition would not be 'disciplined,."59 Vasubandhu,s response is this:60 By virtue of a change that takes place in the persona]-ity-substrate, there is a state of restraint that, because of one's adhering to discipline, is remembered when thoughts of sins such as murder arise while one is actively engaged in other things. One remembers that he is resistant to such sins. The change in the personality-substratum is such that one unconsciously adheres to (in the sense of belng committed to) the principles

of discipline to which one has consciously comnitted himself through a resolution-volition. Because of this comnÍtment persisting at an unconscious LeveL, one is sensitized to sinful thoughts so that one becomes aware of then when they arise. hlhen this occurs one remembers the restraint that is the effect of having comnitted oneself to discipLine.6l lrtin,lful of this restraint, he can control his words and deeds.

Just as discipìíne is reduced to intention by the sautrãntika, so is the lack of disciprine. rn AKB 4.27d [p 3.64] the vaibhãgikas 105

reveal their lncLination to turn every concept into a dåarøa ¡ohen they present'lack of dlscipline' (asaøvãra) as a real thing (dravya). For the Sautrãntika it is simpìy an intention to commit sin (pãpa-krlyã-abhlsamldhl). The Vyãkhva [Dw 622] clarifies this as a species of volition which is characterized by habitual inclination to sin (sa-vãsana6-cetanã-vj5ega). The word for habÍtual inclination, vãsana, is a synonym for anuâaya and denotes the effect of past acts upon the organism such that it becomes ¡nore inclined to repeat those acts. The latent tinpurities' are ample evidence that intentions

"saturate the series" in a negative way as wel]. Even when such habitual inclinations are not being expressed -- that is, even when consciousness is norally pure -- the undisciplined person is considered to be characterized by the negative effects of past acts. According to the Vvãkhyã, only by a contrary voJ-ition, a volltion to be disciplined and not to sin, are those past effects mitigated.62 vol i ti on, part i cu J. ar ly reso I ut i on-voL it ion ( sari1r.alpa- cetanã.|, pÌays a cruciaL role in effecting changes within the personality-substratum, whether for better or for worse. These changes are responsibLe

for facilitating and promoting certain acts. Conditioning cannot occur without intentional invoLvement. When the organism becomes conditioned, this in turn influences the direction future volitions wil-l take. This is the case whether the conditloning is of a negative sort (an anu6aya) or a positive one that leads ultinately to liberatÍon (a øokça-bhãglya).

{2.5} Volition determines the condftioning of the personatitysubstratum, but in return the personaLity-substratum qualifies the voluntary processes. The qualifying of volition is expticitly addressed in AKB 4.65cd [P 3.136] where Vasubandhu affirms the Vaibhãsika 106

position that 'impurities' (kJe5ã,ir) such as desire, antipathy and ignorance are not mental acts.63 Cont"ury to the Sautrãntikas and Dãrstãntlkas, who hold then to be mental acts, onìy volition is a mental act. Yet vol.itlon can "arlse by the desire-door, the ignorance- door, etc."64 The netaphor of the door has been seen earlier; the door is that which enabLes sonething to occur, to enter lnto one's experlence. So it is that the ,inpurities,provide an opportunity

for the emergence of volition, and in so doing they qualify it. As is said in AKB 4.78cd [p 3.16s] "the vol.ltÍon associated with desire, antipathy and ignorance exerts itself with then as its vehÍcLe, 1t moves through their novenent, and according to them it constructs."6S The 'impurity, gives volition forn. Because of thls rimpurity' appears to be a mentaì act, but it is only an appearnace. without volition 'impurity' remains in a potential state, exists only as a dormant tendency (anuíaya). 'Impurity' becones realized only by volition. 'Impurity' gives volition llorm, but vorition gives 'impurity' íts substance.

Because volition is qualified by rinpurities', expressing itself through them, what volition constructs can be distorted by desire, aversion, and ignorance. Thus the rimpurities' are said in AKB 7.22bcd [P 1.42] to be responsible for "perception mistakes" (satitJñãviparyãsâþ), which the vyãkhyã explains as "the perception of nonexistent quaJ.ities such as permanence, etc."66 In explaining why

the five personality components (skandhãþ) are Listed in the order they are, one explanation presents them as increasingly deeper expìanations of the cause of transnigration. Bodily existence (rula) is the effect of attachment to pleasureable feeling (vedanã), attach¡nent is the effect of perception mistakes (which are associated with samto7 skãra), whfch are the product of 'lmpurftles', etc.67 Because the 'impurltles' are latent 1n the personaltty-substratum it is elsewhere given responsibilíty for distorting perception. Buddhfst literature

often speaks in terms of pleasurable or aversive qualities resldlng in the objects themselves, saying, for example, that one must keep these quallties fro¡n entering oners mfnd even as a city must guard Its gates against marauders. It was recognized, though, that such qualities have an internal origin. rn AKB 3.32cd IP 2.110f] we read: "Does nental satisfaction or equanlmlty reside perhaps 1n material obJects? (No,) it is defined by the personality- substratun, not by the objec¿."88 So it is that, as stated in AKB 1.zzbd lp 7.4zl,,,sorrowfuL feeìing becones pleasant feeling through the transformation of uneasiness by the lntentional factors. "

{2.6} In light of the association crucial, problem that must be deaLt with sciousness is constructed blr volition, seem to depend on effort. between voìition and effort, a is the fact that all conbut consciousness cioes not

Volitlon is lnvolved in every moment of consciousness for it is one eLenent that participates in associated causality and mutual causality. As a mutual cause, it is one leg of the tripod without which consciousness of an object could not stand. As an associated cause, all the factors that explicate consciousness, including volition, must address themseLves to the same object. Volitions role in

every moment of consciouseness is a constructÍve orr",69 consciousness knows the object as brue or yellow. This is what perceivlng means. Likewise, that same thing being the object, feeling arlses, perception discrimlnates, volitlon constructs, and so on.

It 1s true that not all of these factors need to be present in order 108 for consciousness to exist, for 1n hlgher leveLs of meditation they are gradually pared away. Yet, of aLl the thlngs that contribute to consciousness -- the feeling tone, the sensory information, the perceptual schemata manifest in perception, the organismic effort to be consclousness -- the latter, volitfon, is the most fundanental. rn AKB 1.22bd [P 1.43] we read that as one advances through levers of meditation, one leaves behind feeling and perception. rn the trance

state called "neither-perception-ncr-absence-of-perception" ( nal.vasaañJñã- asatñJñã\ -- a state of consciousness which attends to and is supported by no object/ quality, but manages to yet be conscious -- volition alone supports consciousness. When voLltion is transcended, one achieves the attainment of cessation, the cessation of consciousness; this state alone Ís unconstructed.

vorition is also involved in arnost every moment of consciousness as the factor that causes the nind to be an equivalent and imnediat. e cause. That is, it activates the generative potential of the mind so that it gives rise to a subsequent monent of consciousness. The onJ.y moment in which the mind lacks this activating factor is in the last moment of a saint's consciousness prior to the cessation of consciousness. Though the activating factor is said to be attention in the text, it has been noted that attention is a species of volition. ALso, as will be discussed shortly, it seems that ya6omitra was

using attention in the Vaibhãsika sense of the word. Clearly, if attention is not present in every moment of consciousness, as vasubandhu and the sautrãntika hold, then it wouLd make littte sense to conslder attention as the causal factor generating every monent of consclous. In spite of the fact that volition is involved in every noment 109

of consciousness, there are distinctions between moments of consclousness in that some are described as the product of effort (prayogika) and others are the product of repayment (vipãkaJal, which arises without effort. Since volition is characterized by effort, how can it be present in every moment of consciousness and yet consciousness be without effort? AIso, since vorition is characterized by desire (chanda), how can it be present in moments of conscÍousness such as equanimity (upekpa-) or the conscious state of Nirvãna (pratÍsaùkhya- ni.rodha), in both of which one is without desire?

I ¡.rould suggest that the problem can best be resolved by recognlzlng that not all volition operates at a conscious ìevel. The notivated effort manifest in the conscious application and/or direction of attention, which is contrary to equanimity, is relatively unsettJ.- ing. Consciousness becomes most stable when such conscious effort is lacking. Yet, even when conscious effort is lacking, consciousness stil-l i'efl.ects an underLying sublininaL notivated effort without which consciousness would cease. This motivated effort is not contrary to the conscious state of Nirvã4a. However, though this sublininal. effort is not unsettling, compared to the calm of the cessation of consciousness it is relatively unsettled.

I beìieve it is this phenomenological dlstinction bet¡^¡een conscious effort and subLiminal effort that led the sautrãntikas to distinguish attention as the conscious level of motivated effort. These levels are not senanticalry distinguished in the vaibhãsika system, which nakes it awkward for them to explain hor,l consciousness can be inclined and unincltned sinultaneously. Since aLL consciousness depends on volition and volition always asserts itself in a specific direction, how can it be reconciìed with the ]ack of incli- 110

nation which is equanirntty. The sautrãntikas r*rouLd be abÌe to say that equanimity and attention refer to the level of consclous effort. In the absence of attention, volition still maintains consciousness, but 1t is a consciousness devofd of conscious effort.

Describing consciousness as an effect of volition leads us to question the meaning of volition and effort, for certainly we do not experience consciousness as a product of conscious exertion. At this poÍnt one must acknowledge that the experience of voJ.untary, conscious effort is itself a fl.uid thing, which in part accounts for the difficulty in defining (operationally or otherwise) precisely what is meant when we speak of volition. For exanple, the more frequently we engage in iertain behaviours, the more rmechanical' they become until very complex behaviours can be performed without conscious effort,

attention to or even awareness of the action. Many behaviours associated with driving can become so mechanized that they are executed automatically. Do such unconscious behaviours lack voluntary effort or does one say that volition is what has become mechanÍzed? From the point of view refl.ected in thís study, the Buddhíst would prefer the latter description of the event.

The only one who is truly in a positÍon to know whether an act or a betraviour is predicated by intentional effort is the one who has managed to stop exerting this effort and has seen that the behaviour also stops. Similarly the Buddhist knows consciousness to be sustaÍned by intentional effort, for its cessation comes about through the cessation of the constructive effort. For him the cessation of consciousness, the experience of Nirvãna, is the proof that it alone is unconstructed, absol.ute.

some may allow this as JustificatÍon for saying that conscious- 111

ness lnvolves subllmlnal effort, but can one justlfy labelllng this subliminaì effort 'voluntary'. The Buddhist might argue that if it were not voluntary, how could 1t be negated by volition. If consciousness is mechanically and autonaticaJ.ly produced without the involvement of volition, then how can one volurrtariìy stop the process? Volition, therefore, has a crucial role in sustainlng and constructing consclousness at alI tlmes. Even noments that are not structured by conscious effort and are without conscious motivation nevertheLess at a deeper level ¡nust lnvolve effort and motive. Consciousness

is a constructed (saaiskpta) thing. It exists by virtue of the fact that the organisn deslres to be and exerts itself to be conscious. Attention, for the sautrãntlka and Vasubandhu, is a nore conscious form of the consciousness-constructing volition. The conscious effort to direct attention, to attend thjs and not that or to attend this with a high degree of concentration, ls simply the consciousness- constructing rol.e of volition being consciously directed. At this point it should be noted that volition is not to be understood in the sense of free wi]I. rt is choice, but it is not necessarily conscious and it is for the nost part conditioned. one cannot simply will to be unconscious, for the whole weight of past conditioning through innumerable Lives predisposes one to consciousness. such conditioning is only gradually undon".70

The concept of consciousness as a 'construction' has emerged within contemporary psychology. A.J. MarceI's rejection of what he calìs the Identity Assumption is based on evidence that consciousness aü¡areness is constructed.Tl rhu rdentity Assumption ís that the representations constituting phenomenal experience are assumed to be 772

the same ones derlved from and used in sensory and cognltlve processing. That 1s to say, the only difference between a conscious percept and an unconscious one is the fact of consciousness itself. The difference between the two often depends on psycho-physical explanations, such as the energy of the stimulus required to cross the threshold of consciousness. Against this MarceL discusses clinical evidence that indicates differences between conscÍous and unconscious representationaL categories, by which data are coded and associated. VisuaL perception, for exanple, at a conscious revel is descrlbable

in terms of metric Euclidian geometry but this seems inadequate to account for the compJ.exity of the processes which must adjust to notlon, depth and viewpoint in order to naintain figural constancy, processes which are more econonically described by nonmetric, projective geometry. The representations utilized in rendering an interpretation conscious cannot be directry mapped onto those utilized subconsciously. The process of making subliminaL information conscious

is one of translation from one form to another; it is an imposition of a qualitatively different structural description upon nonconscious data.72 lt is this transLation process that, I would suggest, corresponds to the Buddhist idea of the intentional (though perhaps nonconscious) construction of consciousness. Thls interpretation can be supported by the Buddhist notion, seen at the end of chapter r, that the intentional construction of conscíousness is immediately contemporaneous with the consciousness it constructs, rather than being a process that requires time before it yields the conscious percept. According to Marce}'s theory, for the data to given a certain form or structure is for it to be conscious.

If this interpretation of the Buddhist concept of the construc- 113

tion of consciousness is correct -- i.e., that it can be understood in terns of Marceì's descriptíon of the process of constructing conscious awareness from nonconscious representations -- then it should follow that the Buddhist state of cessation of consciousness would not effect the automatic or non-intentional, subliminal interpretive processes. If the Buddhist saint stops just the rvoluntary' process of constructing consciousness, there is no reason that the subLiminal processes shouìd cease. Evidence that this is the case can be found in the Theravãdin Visuddimagga: the one who has entered the cessation of consciousness can be called out of this statu.?3 thi" clearly implies that the interpretation of environmental stinuli continues sublininalìy. consciousness ceases, but not the underlying processes from which it draws its information.

3. Conclusion

rt is evident fron the discussion in this chapter just how cent_ ral voLition is to consciousness,/perception in the Buddhist frame_ work. VoLition is equated with motivated effort, or effort that arises because of desire (chanda). All consciousness is constructed and so depends upon intentional effort, even though this intentionar effort nay be nonconscious, as it is in a state of equanimity or in the conscious state of Nirvã4a, the cessation that comes by wisdom. The way volition expresses itself is dependent upon the conditioning of the personal.ity-substratum, according to the conceptuar frameÍrork preferred by Vasubandhu and the Sautrãntikas. Volition is qualified or given form by desire and volition gives substance or efficacy to desire. This desire is in turn an expression of the conditioning of the personality-substratum. The substratun is condition- 774

ed by intentional effort, whether that effort be the making of a resolution or a specific act. It ls conditloned 1n both positlve and negative ways; the "seeds of liberation" are a form of intentional effort that lead the substratum to become calm, stabilized and progressing to liberation, s¿hiLe the 'impurities' or kte6ãþ lead it to be cognitively and affectively disturbed and disturblng. In either case, only intentional effort can cause such conditioning to occur.74 oa

the end of chapter r it was observed that when a touch and a taste sensation of equal intensity are contacted simultaneous]y, the desire for eating (bhoktu-kãaatã) causes the taste sensation to become conscÍous. This is a very sinple case of how the conditioning of the personality-substratum lnfluences the constructive activity of intentional effort. DesÍre can also play a more significant rore in the construction of conscious awareness, causing what should be seen as sorrow-causing to seem like it is a source of pleasure.

Though intentional effort participates in constructing every moment of consciousness, one can distinguish the basic effort by which consciousness is sustaÍned from the notivated effort by which one becomes conscious of particular things in particular ways. This latter forn of volition, according to Vasubandhu and the Sautrãntika, is called attention. Because mental consciousness alone is capable of initiating conscious notivated effort, it follows that attention must be associated with it. only mentaL consciousness is capable of being distorted because it constructs using conceptua.ì.ization; it constructs a representative or symboric awareness, which is more susceptible

to the distorting influence of impurity' and imagination. Therefore, attention, as the consciousness-constructing factor which nay be governed by elther'inpurity'or insight, is likely a product of 115

the motives origlnating in mental consciousness as well. as the means by whfch nental consciousness is constructed. The discussion of adhløukti-attention reveals which consciously-directed volltion can be involved extent to the process of

constructing consciousness. Attention is more than a sel.ective nechanism. A similar notion has been voiced ln U. Neisser's discussion of attention. For him attention constructs consciousness through a process of synthesizing the analysis of sensory data with information derived from past experienc".75 H. finds evidence of this constructive activity in the fact that the mechanisns of ínagination are continuous with those of perception.T6 rh" discussion of adåJnuktl would support such a view, but would emphasize the role of voLition in the process. One can assurne voluntary control over the constructive processes, giving a greater prlority to either the sensory data or the imaginative (top-down) Ínformation.

The fact that attentioll can be described as reaÌity-oriented or inagination-oriented shows that the constructed nature of consciousness does not necessarily impJ.y falslty. one may construct consciousness hoLding fast to the sensory data or one may inplicate inaginative components in it. In the discussion of dicernment (vitarka-vicãra) in the last chapter, the vyãkhyã on AKB 2.JJa [Dw 2o6f] expressed the notion that discernment depends on either insight (praJña-) or volition. Insight causes the process of discernment to be characterized by deduction or reasoning ( abhyúha). Vorition proceeds without this logic, being governed by whatever unsettling factor voLition expresses. Discernment relying on insight is certain].y not devoid of volition, upon which all consciousness depends. yet when insight is present, it qualifies and guides volition, even as desire, aversion the in

116 and ignorance are capable of qualifying guiding 1t. In concLuslon, Vasubandhu presents role of voÌition in perception as a crucial. one. It is volition or motivated effort, gulded by either 'impurity' or insight, that fundamentally deternines the kind of person one becomes. The kind of person one becomes in turn determines the direction of one's motivated effort. The construction of consciousness is one facet of that motivated effort; the world one sees is a product of what one has become, and what one has become is a product of one's intentional involvement with the world. It is not

just one's behavioural responses that are conditioned, but arso the cognitive 'behavioursr, the constructÍve processes that ,,create', the stimuli to which we respond. The Buddhist emphasis on insight, on seeing the world as it actually is, reflects the concern to undo the conditioning of perception as a ¡neans of undoing the kind of person one has become. The cycì.e of stimulus-response is broken by discovering the tr¡re nature of the stimulus to be one that evokes no disturbing response. Though one may not agree with the values which the Buddhist systen expresses, neverthel-ess it illustrates a practical therapy that acknowledges the radical scope of change available through the discipLine of attention and voluntary effort. and the

r17

Footnotes

1. Disposítlon suggests something innate, while conditioning suggests something ì.earned. Though ìearning and congenital endowment are not necessarily seen as continuous -- as evidenced by the history of the nature,/nurture dispute in philosophy and the social sciences -- the term anuSaya does imply both, seeing them as continuous. They become ingrained through the process of learning, yet De Silva (IBp, p.74\ notes that even in a baby these anusayãþ are "persistent traits coning down innumerable lives."'Ihe awkwardness of the both/and is alteviated when it is reaLized that that which is innate is sinply the product of conditÍoning in a previous life. Rather than there being a radlcal discontinuity between nature and nurture, the concept of the individual has a broader frame of reference which makes the tu¡o con- tinuous. Personall.y I beLieve such a perspective to be helpful one,

though I would set this continuity within the framework of sociobiology, which sees the biological continuum of the species/race/fanf1y as the broader frame of reference for the concept of the individual. Through the biological continuu¡n the Learning of the species becomes a part of our genetic inherÍtance/disposition. (It must be adnitted, however, that sociobiology has often been guilty of naintaining the nature,/nurture dispute because of the tendency of reductionists to interpret all socialization in terms of equipment that has evolved for the species' survival.. )

2. rãga, pratlgha, nâna, avidyã, d¡.pÉj, vÍnati. 3. Another example of 6aktJ is given in this context; anubhava-Jñãna sngty-utpãdana-saktl .... "knowledge derived fron experience gives rise to the capacity or power for the occurence of a menory . . . .,' one cannot remember that which one has not experienced, but once experienced there is a capacity to remember.

[Dw 1S?]: ã.Lanbane cetasa avarJanan.

5. This is not to say that equanimity is devoid of a feeì.ing tone, for there 1s a feeling that is produced ínternally and is not derived

fron or oriented to that which is experienced palpably or mentally. Lack of affect can be attended by different affective states; as a form of grief reactlon it may be characterized by a feeling tone of

melancholy, a sense of absence, a lack of hunger rather than a sense of fuLness. But the Lack of affect that is attained through nedita- tion is described as characterized by joy (prjtt). 6. [Dw 190] : anyatra-ãbhogaþ, anyatta-anãbhogaþ.

7. PsvchoLogv and Life, p. 191. The coincidence is onì.y partiar because, as we shal.l see, attention for the Buddhist is a species of voìition. Contemporary theories of attention, if they adnit voJ.untary involvement at all as a factor in their discussion of seLective attention, would J.ikely not equate attention and volition. [Dw 351 ] : cltta-abhisa¡rskãra Jatvãd-itÍ sanãpatti cttta-saøanantare. cf. AKB 2.72 [P 1.325] where anabhisa¡ñskãra is used to denote spon- 8. 118

taneity, without conceptual and volitiona.ì. involvement. The first passage uses this word to describe kinds of consclousness that spontaneously interrupt the norally pure processes (reflectton, etc. ), which require effort. Also cf. AKB 2.8cd [p 1.lls] where it describes bodily feellngs arising on account of the nature of the object and not by conscious effort (svarasena-anabhisaatskáre4a) .

10. [Dw 18?] cetanã clttãbhisaùskãro øanaskarna.

11. [Dw 3?0]t anyonya-anantarañ clttânâm-utpãdaþ. tânÍ ca panaskarava6ãd- utpadyante lty-ato sanaska-ra-upakçepai. The actual text reads utpadyanta for utpadyante but this anornalous form is ìikely a typographical error. The transration above is not verbatim; the inltiaL sentence, "consciousnesses emerge immediately after one another" would be awkwardly wooden.

72. II, cf. pp.

the discusslon of equivalent and innediate causality in ch. 57f . 13. Cf. AKB ?.13a [P 5.31ff]l for a compìete list of the sixteen Facets.

14. The Vyãkhyã [Dw 895] explains adhinukt|-nanaskãra as "attentÍon applying convi ction/imaginati on " ( adhinukt 7 -pradâno-, yatit øanasikãra¡). 15. Quoting ScrÍpture (identified by Poussin as Safryutta Nikaya 15.18): ãrya-€râvakasya duþkhañ vã duhkhato nanaslkurvataþ ... anãsravena nanasikã,re4a saøprayukto dharnã4ãrñ vicayaþ. [Dw 926] 16. [.Dw 72o]: ayonyã anyãyena klesa-yogena yaþ pravptto nanaskã.rah ... 17. This vasubandhu is not necessarily the author of the text. ya5oniti'a lefers to a Sthavira Vasubandtru, teacher of naster Manoratha. rt is uncertain whether this is the same vasubandhu who wrote the Ko5a.

18. IDw 829] : tad-yathã -- rãga-anuéayo-'prahr4o bhavaty-aparÍjñãtaþ kãøa-rãga-paryavasthãn1yãs-ca dharnã ãbhãsagatã bhavanti. tatra caayonl6o panaskãra evatñ kãna-rãga utpadyate. tany-etânÍ yathâkranait hetu-viçaya-prayoga-balãnl. "The disposition for attachment is present (unabandonned) and not understood (seen through); dharnãþ that elicit an attachment to pleasure come within range. rn such circunstances (there is) superficial attention, and attachment to pleasure arises. These forces are, respectivery, cause, object and means." (cf. AKB 6. s8 [P 4.263] ) 19. This is the Vvãkhyã's explanation; [Dw 260]: ã6rayaø-ãtøo-utpattyanukülañ karoti. "It makes the personality-substratum amenable to the production (of impurities'). Vasubandhu says simpty (and cryptically), "it transforms the field" (kgetraø-ãpãdayayati) . 20. An exceLlent dlscussion of this can be found 1n Ir{.W. Padmasiri de silva's "Emotions and Therapy: Three paradigmatic Zones", Jn Buddhist and Western Psychology, Nathan Katz, ed., Boulder: prajñã press, 119

1983. 21. [Dw 18?] : tad-ãraøbanasya gu4ato-'vadhãra4aø. rucir-rty-anye. yathã-nlscayatù dhâra4a-ltl yogãcãra-ctttãþ.,'It (ascertainment) is the determination of an obJect in accord with tts properties. others say it is desire,/pleasure. tt¡ith respect to yogic states of consciousness it is possessing (the object) in the rtray one chooses.', Though 'others' define adhjøuktt in the sense of pleasure (rucJ), Vasubandhu

and Ya6omitra also uses it in this sense ocasionally. lt is used in this way in ABK 7.29ab [p 5.?0] where one of the classes of knowledge listed is the knowledge of "diverse desires" (nãna-adhtøukttyaþ). The vyãkhyã [Dw 10s9] offers "desires, pleasures,' (rucayaþ) as a synonym. Cf. also ABK ?.34 [p S.84, Dw 1099]. 22. [Dw 370] : aíubhâ-pranã4ã-arupya-vløokça-abhibhvãyatãna-kftsnãyatana- ãdÍçu. The Fornless Meditations are left out in poussin's transla- tion [P 1-326] probably because they are a subset of the Llberation

Exercises and, therefore, redundant. 23. [Dw 1181f] ãlanbana-abhlbhavanan; yatheçfan-adhiøokçãt ... 24. IDw 1182] : yatheçlañ taiþ-nÍra-plta-ãdi-adhtnokgãt kça4ena nLl.an, kça4ena pÌtan-itÍ-ãdÍ . 25. [Dw 1173] tattva-nanaskãre4a ht kJeça-prahãnan. 26. [Dw 895] : adhiauktt . . . nanasfkãratvãd-aíubhayà na kle€a-prahâ4aúr viçkanbha4atñ tu.

27 . [Dw 985] adhlnokça-Jñãna-pratlçedha-arthait Jñãnan-ftJ. poussin [p 4.247) also interprets this statenent in this sense. 28. [Dw 11?1f] santu-Íti-abhlprâyãt. ãsayasya-avlparrtatvãt vã; adhtnukti- satñjñanãt. It is interesting to note that what is achieved is also calLed a wish. Poussin transLates the verbaL root of adhipukti, adhÍnuc, in this context of the unlimited Meditations as ,'to nake a wish". (AKB 8.31c [p b.201]: "rl forme la voeu que tous Les êtres ob- tiennent cette fêlicité.") Poussinrs translation seems to be governed bv the fact that the instruction takes the form of a wish. ( [Dw tt74] sattvãnã¡it tat-sukhaø-adhlnucyate evañ sukhatã vata santu itÍ. ,,He

applies himself the joy of such beÍngs, saying'may they certainry be happy'.") The fact that it is called u p""cepiion ( sanÍña,l implies that the happiness of all beings is not just a thing wished, Ëut also a thing seen. The integration of the wishing and perceiving can be found in Ya5omitrars definition: 'the ascetic possesses the object as he wills it to be. The wish deternines how the belngs are perceived.

29. [Dw 237] : ãrya-nãrga-bãlena ca-utpãdanat, dpçfa-dharma-nlrvã4asya tad-adhlnuktltaþ .

30. [Dw 431]: alpesãkhyasya tãvat sattvasya nâtuþ kukgrañ pravÍsataþ evañ viparrtau sañjnãdhtøokgau pravarttete -- vãto vãti, devo r'arga- ti' srtañ durdanatñ øahato vã janakâyasya korãhulan, hanta tp4aghapaùt

vã pravl6ãnÍ vanagaha4arñ vã ... , tlçfhato-,4yeçu tfçftranr-tl nigkrãnato' 4yebhyo niryãnrtl. "As soon as a being of little merit enters a 120

mother's wonb a false notlon and false certainty arlse: "The wind blows, it is raining, it ls coLd and stormy, and peopJ.e are making a hubbub; behoìd I am entering a grass thicket, a dense thlcket ,,; resting there he thinks "I am resting in this other place [the thicketl." and leaving he thinks "I am going elsewhere." so Ít ts that he has no cLear thought as to what 1s happening, unlike the one who is aware that he is entering a womb. 31. Bhadantãcariya Buddhaghosa, The Path of Purification (Visudclhimagggl-, (Bhikku Nyã4amol.i, trans.), Boulder: Shambhala pubtications Inc. , 1976, vol. 2, p. 527 .

32. So sannf!fhana-Jakkha4o, (Buddhaghosa, Visuddhinagga of Buddhaghosãcarlya, H.C. Warren, ed. & revised by D. Kosanbi, Cambridge: Harvard Unlversity Press, 1950.), p. g9S. 33. It should be noted certain as much as it 1n the fact that it is assertion". It is even is said "Its function ness . "

that adåJøukti is not the process of becoming is the state of being certain. This is evident defined as avadhãra4a, "affírnation, positive ¡nore evident in Visuddhimagga XIV.151 where it is not to grope. It is manifested as decisive-

34. It is probably in this sense that we shoul.d also understand the magicaJ. use of adhlnuktÍ. Though adhl.nuktÍ-nanaskãra is primarily related to asserting a convincing perception, the distinction between perception and reality was not as conclusively drawn in Buddhist thought. There was a thin line between being able to controL one's consciousness of an object and the magical ability to control external reaJ.ity. In AKB 7.48 [P 5.113f] one of the supernatural powers

attained through meditation is said to be "moving". Ther.e are three kinds: "carrying movement" (gatt vãhÍni\ or levitation, "moving at the speed of thought" (nano-java-ganapa) or instantaneous projection of oneself to a different place, and "inaginatÍve movement" gati ãdhlnokçÍkr. The latter is caLLed thÍs "for one moves with a horses speed by 'asserting oneseLf to perceive convincingly' something that is far as being near." [Dw 111sf] z durasya-asanna-adhtnokçe4a-asvãgananãt. What one imagines intently becomes actually realized.

35. Quoted from Sañyutta Nikãya 3.87. saaaskptaa-abhlsañskarotl tasnãt sa¿rska-rã (sic. ) upãdãna-skandaþ ity-ucyate. 36. [Dw 66]: sukhã-apl hi vedana sa.óskãra-vipari4ãna-duþkhatayã duþkhâ.

37. sarñyutta Nikãya 3.60. Poussin [P 3.2] does not find 'volitlon' to be a fully satisfying translation of cetanã. He cites one reason for this: the "tri-temporal" nature of cetanã. rn AKB 4.4ab [p 3.22] the text speaks of murder being com¡nitted by virtue of a tri-temporal volition: "I will kill, I am kiìJ.ing, I have killed.,, The notlon of a subsequent cetana, "I have kil]ed", suggests to poussin that voÌition is not whoJ.ly suitable. There is no reason to believe, however, that the thought "I have killed" is a subsequent reflection on a deed accompJ. ished in the rel,atively distant past. when one intends some- thing, the motive (the willing) endures until the mo¡nent of acconpli- 121

shment, at which polnt the motive ceases. The thought,,I have kiìled', can be understood as refLecting the moment of perceptlon that the volitlon has been accomplished. 38. [Dw 49]: 'evatñ ca-eva¡ñ ca syãø' Íty-abhJsadskarane pradhãnalt; "karwa-hetu-upapattayaþ" iti vacanat.

39. AKB 4.1 [P 3.1]: karøaJañ loka-vaicitryañ, cetana tat-kptañ ca tat. 40. Vvãkhyã on AKB 1.1sab [Dw a9]: chanda-prãptyã-dayastu cetanã-anuvtdhãyltvãt ... saaiskãra-skandha eva veditavyãþ. ,'But desire, possession, etc., because of their conformity to volition, are recognlzed as (belonging to) the conditioning component . . . . " Here desire and possession represent, respectively, the mental factors (catttãItl associated ( saøprayukta) and unassociated (vlprayukta) with consciousness. 41. AKB 3.2? [P z.?g, Dw 448] : sarva-cetanãnãdt svaJakga4an-abhtdhyotayann- ãbhisa¡¡ska-rJkayã-tt7-ãha, sã åJ vipãka-ãbhJsa¡nskara skalrikã, tayâ cetltatvãt pra4lhltatvãt. 4ãd-ãbhlsañ- devo bhaviçyãni, øanuçyo bhavÍçyãni-

itÍ-evan-adJ. This discussion occurs in the context of how the vaibhãçikas, who berieve in the present existence of past and future dharnãþ (just as on a notion picture reel the future and past frames exist though the present frame al-one is manifest), can consider such future dharnaþ to be conditioned. They are conditioned ',because they are wllled by a preparatory volition." ([Dw aas]: ãbhlsafitskãrfkayã cetanayã. cetltatvãt.)

42. "zeal" ("ardour, intensity") is another possible transl-ation of chanda. r have opted for desire, for this seens more appropriate ín the majority of the passages to be considered.

43. [Dw 18?] cetana ctttãbhÍsañskaro nanaskarna.

44. [Dw 1229]: snytiJo hÍ chandaþ, chandãd vitarkaþ, vitarkat prayatnaþ, prayatnãd-vãyuþ, tataþ karna-iti

45' [Dw 361] : durbala-anabhtsaitskãra-vãhitvãc-caittani na prayogikaanukûlãnf.

46. Vvãkhvã on AKB 1.37bc [P 1.69f, Dw 98]: ,sabdo ne syãt' lti-lcchayã sabda pravartate, anÍcchayã na pravartate. vtpãkaJaÉ-ca dharno-,nicchato-' pÍ pravartate. tasnan-na vtpâkaJaþ sabdalt. "sound occurs by the wish for sound to arise; it does not occur unintentionalLy. How- ever, a dharøa arising from repayment occurs unintentionally. Because of this sound is not a product of repayment."

47. [Dw 323] : chando-'nâgate-'rthe prãrthanâ, rãgas-tu prãpte-'rthe- 'dhyavasãnan. 48. AKB 1? . 13a [P 5.34 , Dw 10s9] (citing Sariryutta Nikãya 3 . 1o0 ) : ir,e pañc a-up ãdãna- skandhã s - chanda-nu f akã É - chanda - s anudaya 5 - chanda - J ãt r - yãs-chanda-prabhavãþ. "The five personaJ.ity aspects charcterized by

'lmpurities' have desire as their root, their aggregating cause, their originating cause, and as the basis of the causaL chain of which it t22 is a part. " The Vyãkhyã gives åetu as a synonym for øula.

49 . [Dw 1059] : (1 ) asøf-fty-abhedena-ãtpa-bhãvac-chandaþ. (2) syalø- 7ty-abhedena punar-bhãva-cchandaþ [vyãkhyã : punar-bhâva-øãtraprãrthanã, na v[Éesa-ru?ã prãrthanã.) (g) ittha¡ù syãø-iti bhedena punar-bhavac-chanda{r. prat-fsandhl-bandhac-chandaþ. (4) karøaaöÌ¡ Jsa¡rskarac-chandaþ vã. Ivyakhyã: karna4o vã-abhisaaiskãraf, tatra chandaþ -- evatñ ca-evañ ca dãnan da-syaarf-JtI.l

50. As such it is reminiscent of systems such as Adavaita vedanta, which affirms: "The various objects of enjoyment, from life down to wealth, are objects of varying degrees of love proximity accordlng to their to the seLf. (pañcada6i xrl.59. AtL of chapter xII ls an exposition of this thene.) The centrality of self-Iove in motivation is a common theme even in ïlestern science, and one which has taken on new dimensions wlth the socÍobioLogical assertion of "genetic aLtruism", in which the "self" is inplicated in the famity/race/species.

51. [Dw 11s9]: ... ãtna-grâha-prabhavã6-ca kie6â iti. ",rmpurities' are caused by the belief in a self." cf. candrakrrti's Madhyã¡nakaãvatãra 6.120: "seeing by means of wisdom that every impurity (kresa¡ and every aversion (dosa) comes about by the bel.ief in a self (satkãyal, and understanding that the basis of this idea is the soul (ãtnan), the ascetic denies the existence of the souL.,,

52. In contrast to this the Vaibhãsikas prefer to think in terms of a dharna becoming aquired by one's 'series,. The ¡nechanisn by which this happens is that one gets a "possession-dharna" (prâpti-dharna), which acts as a kind of glue to keep other dharnâþ within the individual 'series' . There are many kinds of possession-dåaraa,þ, each func- tioning to retain a specific dharna. Each possession-dlrarna can be

couteracted by a "foss-dl¡arp,a" (aprãptt-dharna), which acts like a solvent to release a specific dharna from the series. (cf. AKB 2.36bcd [P 1.1?9-186]. Also E. conze has a valuable dÍscussion of the differences between Sautrãntika ans Vaibhãsika thought on this point in Buddhist rhought in rndia, Ann Arbor: u. of Michigan press, 1962, pp. 13e-142. )

53. [Dw 588] : ã€ayalz prã4ãtlpãta-ãdy-akara4a-ãsayaþ sraddha-ãdy-aíayo vã. ã6raya ãSraya-parãvpttlþ.

54. IDw 746]: cetanã yayã karna-patharùt nlç!ãpayati. ã6ayas-tad-abhtprayaþ -- tevañ ca-evatñ ca kuryãat, 'evatñ ca-evañ ca na karlçyanil ÍtÍ. "Volition: by it the path of action is accomplished. Intention: this is a purpose, as when one says, for example, rsuch and such must

be doner, 'I will not do such and such.," Here intention corresponds to sa¡ikaJpa-cetanã in contrast to volition, which corresponds to kriya-cetanã.

55. [Dw 584] i ... dãtfnãút tad-alaabana-dâna-cetana-parlbhãvitãh santatayah íûkçaaú parl4ãna-vl€eçañ prãpnuvanti, ,, . . . the substrata of the donors, pervaded (or saturated) by the volitÍon to give a gift

with that object, achieve a particular subtle transformation." 56. [s 585] : abhrk€rtatit tad-ãlanbana-cetanã-abhyãsã.t svapneçv-api tã 723

anugadg:a?yo bhavantT. "Perpetually, because of the repeated volltion with (the Tathãgata and the S¡¿y¿kas) as one's obJect, those volitions continue in succession even when asleep. " The vyãkhyã clarifies that the Tathãgata and the 5rãvakas are the object referred to.

5?. IS 921] kraøe4a hl santãnasya-asyãrit dharnatãyã¡it-avatãra-parlpâkavieuktayo bhavantl-ltl. "GraduaJ.j.y, in this standard teachÍng, the descent, rnaturity and liberation of the personality-continuum occur." The vv-ãkhyã explains that the "descent" comes about by the seed of liberation in the first life, the maturity comes about by the neans of insight or penetration (nirvedha-bhãeIya) and the liberation by

the Noble Path. 58. [S 921f]: tr141 karøã41, prâdhãnyena tu øanas-karøam. tatpranldhãna- parlgrahât-tu kãya-vãk-karna-api aokça-bhãglyaù bhavatl. ka€cid-eka-öåIkpãø-apl dattvã, eka-67kçãø-apl ca-ãdaya aokgaabh I I a ça- ba I a- ãdhãnaln-øokça - bhãgl ya- anya * ak ç i pa tJ " Thre e ( k Í nds o f ) action (comprise the seeds of Liberation), but mainly thought action.

But because bodily or vocal. actlon is enconpassed by the strong desire of that (volition), it is al.so a seed of l-iberation. Whoever gives alms or observes a rule sows another seed of liberation because of the mediating force of the desire for liberation." 59. Vyãkhyã [S 589]: yadÍ sã. cetanã. saúvaraþ, tasnãc-cetanã-cittãdanya- citto na saûvytaþ syãt.

60. This trans.Lation is a synthesis of the BhãSya and Vyãkhyã. The Bhãçya reads [S 589]: tad-bhãvanayã. kriya-kale snaratalt tat-pratyupasthãnãt setu-bhãvaþ ... "By a change in that there exists a state of restraint which is remembered in a time of activity because of that adhering . .. " The Vyãkhyã makes the foLlowing qualifications and explanations. The change is "in the nental series" (cjtta-sañtãnabhãvanaya). The time is qualified as "when a thought of murder, etc.

is at hand" (prã4ãtipãta-ãdi-cltte pratyupasthite). The binding is remembered "because of the memory being on hand, which says, tI an resistant to murder, etc.r (ahatñ pra4ãttpãta-ãdibhyaþ pratÍvarata ltÍ pratyupasthita-snptel-l). "Because of that adhering" is expanded: "because of the opposition of that volition by which it (the restraint) controls bodily and vocal acts" (yayâ cetanayã. kãyavacau sañvg4oti, tasyãþ sannukhi-bhãvãt) .

61. The strength of this answer in the context of the argument with the Vaibhãsikas is that it relies on nenory as a crucial link in the process of discipline. If unmanifest action does exist and operates unconsciously without the mechanism of memory, then even the one whose memory is faulty (kaícit mugfta-smftJà) would be incapable of sin.

62. IS 622] i sa eva tu pãpa-krlya-abhisañdhir-asañvaraþ. sa-anubandha yataþ ku6ala-cltto-' pl tadvãn-ity-ucyate ; tasya-anlrãkptatvãt. "But rather lack of discipJ.ine is deliberate intention to commit sin. Such a person is called'with consequence' (characterized by a basic tendency to sin) even when he has a pure moment of consciousness, because of not counteracting it." The Vyãkhyã explains sa-anubandha 124

as a synonym for sa-yãsana. He goes on to explain that the habltual inclÍnation is not counteracted "because 1t is mitlgated by a contrary volition" ( tad viruddhayã cetanayâ-anupahatatvâd-lty-arthaþ.1 63. Cf. AKB 4.78 [3.169] where Vasubandhu notes the Sautrãntika faiìure to explain how this view can be held in light of Scripture. 64. [S 674] : cetanãyãs-tan-nukhena (Vyãkh:¡ã: abhldhyã-ãdl-mukhena) pravgttfþ .... So we see that these roots condition volltion. 65. [S 695]: tat-sañprayogllti hÍ cetanã teçãñ vãhena vahatl, tega-d gatyã gacchatT, tad-va6ena tatha-abåJsa¡nskã'ranãt. With respect to the last phrase Ya6omitra offers this explication: yasnãd-abhtdhyã-ãdî.nãñ yathãkranañ s akt 7 -prat 7kû I a-n I thyã-ni t Í ra4ã-kãrã4ãtit vaÉena. tadanurûpã cetanã-abhJsamskarotJ. "According to desire, aversion and ignorance -- which express themselves as addiction, opposition, and false decision, respectively. Volition, conforning to these, constructs.

66. [S 66] : nÍtya-ãdika-annlnitta-udgraha4a.

67. [S 66] | ... sadsãre str.l-puruça anyonyañ rupa-abhirãaãIt, te ca vedanã.-svada-garddhãt, tad-garddhaþ sañjñã-vÍparyãsãt, tad-vlparyãsnþ kleíalþ, cittañ ca tat-saû1r.l1ç!an-ltÍ yathã-saikle6aú ca kranaþ. "... in the realm of transmigration, men and r.vomen delight in one another's body (i.e., naterial aspect). They do so because of the desire to savour feeling, the desire for which exists because of a recognition error. That error comes about by disturbing factors. Thus consciousness is said to be disturbed, for in this way the dsturbance comes about. "

68. [S a82]: klnastl rûpañ yat saunanasya-sthânlyan-eva syãt yâvadupekçä- sthânÍyan-eva? astl sañtana¡ñ nÍyanya, na tva-aLanbanan. A simiLar theme is ennunciated in AKB 3.3 L2.71 [S 386] where Sãriputra is quoted as saying, "It is not the manifold things in the world that are pleasures but the clinging that comes from one's Ímagination." (na te kãnã yãnl citrânÍ Loke saikalparãgal.t puruçasya kãnaþ.) Otherwise, "even a monk seeing delightful objects will necessarily be an enjoyer of pleasure. " (ååjkSur-bhaviçyaty-api kãnabhogÍ dgçfvalva rúpãni nanornã4i.)

69. Vyãkhyã on 2.34, [S 209]. Cf. chapter II, fn. 26.

70. It may be possible to transpose this way of thinking from the framework of reincarnation to that of sociobioLogy, in which the conditioning of the individual bears the weight of innunerable generations being conditioned and 'seÌected for' by evolutionary processes.

71. "Conscious and unconscious perception: an approach to the reLations between phenomenal experience and perceptuaJ. processes", Cognitive Psychology, 15 (1983), pp. Zg8-300. 72. Ibid., pp. 254-2s8. 125

?3. Visuddimagga 23.4I: "As soon as the monk stands within hearing and merely says, 'The master calls the venerable one', he emerges from cessation. "

74. Ornsteln (Psychology of Consciousness, pp. 61f. ) notes an experiment by Rlchard Held ("Plastlclty in Sensory Motor Systems", Scientific American, Nov. 1965, pp. 84-94.) in which it was demonstrated that cats raised largely in the dark and only exposed to a llghted environment in a passive condition never learned to see, Ín contrast to those that were allowed to activeìy interact with the ì"ighted environment. This suggests that intention does play a significant role in conditioning the organism's ability to perceive. The Buddhist goes one step further in saying that the nature of the intentÍon determines the way. in which one comes to perceive. 75. Cognitive Psychoiogy, New York: AppJ.eton-Century-Crofts, 1967, chap. 4. He notes (p. 94) that the idea of perception being a constructive act goes back to Brentano, Bergson and James. 76. Ibid., p. 95.

726 Appendix A: The Interrelation of the MentaL Factors I ndef I ni te ( an iyata) Ever present according to species of thought Present in every consclous noment ( nahabhùn ika) t- I pure (ku6aJa- I nahãbhunikal t-- fai th ( Sraddhã) careful concern ( apranãda) confidence ( praSrabdhi) equanimity ( upeksã) respect ( åri) shame ( apatràpya) non-injury ( avihiñsâ) energy, endurance (virya) / / cons ci ousness ( citta) defiled (kJe5anahãbhúnÍka) ígnorance, confusion (noha) careless indifference (pranada) sloth ( kausidya) doubt ( ã6raddhya) torpor ( styana) dissipation ( auddhatya) impure (a*usalr |l nahabhúnikal I { di srespect ( ahrtkya) shanel essness ( anapatrãpya) repentance languor i nvest i gat i on judgrnent kaukrtya) niddha) vitarka) vi cãra\ I I + T I I + volition perception des i re contact insíght memory attention \ conviction \ concentration nanaskãra) adhinukti) sanadhi) vedanã) cetanã) saùjñã) chanda) sparSa) ( nat i) ( smrti) I </poem> According to the sarvãstivãdin there are six categories of men- tal factors. The most basic are the universal mental factors (nahabhúmika caittãþ), which exist in every consciousness moment. There are four other categories of mentaL factors that are present onJ.y in / feeìing 727

the four speclfic kinds of consclousness: pure (kuÉa)a-nahãbhunika), impure (akuêa1a-nahabhunika), defiled (kJesa-nahabhünÍka), and lesser deflled (parltta-kle5a-nahãbhunika). Here again the designation nahãbhünika denotes universality, for each of the mental factors in these four categories are found in every moment of pure, impure, defiled, and 'lesser defiìed' consciousness, respectiveìy. The 'ìesser defired' factors (AKB 2.27 [P 1.165f]) are those whtch involve ignorance but not desire. They receive less attention in the text than do the others. rlesser for unlike the other three categories the KoSa's list of clefiled'factors is not exhaustive nor does the Bhãsya make any attenpt to define their meanings. For this reason and for the sake of economy they are left out of the chart below. The sixth category of merrtal factors comprises those considered indefinite (aniyata), which is to say that they may or may not occur in any of the four kinds of consciousness netioned above; they are not necessarily pure, impure, etc.

The only significant item nissing from this ìist that is discussed in the paper is conceptualization (vtkalpa), which is not treated in the Buddhist lists as a nental- factor. Conceptualization is identified in AKB 1.33 [P 1.60] with vitarka-vicara. one can assume, therefore, that they represent conceptualization within this list. 728

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VITA David J. F. Steenburg was born in Picton, Ont., in 1954. Raised in the contemporary seni-nomadic urban lifestyle, his migrations were transformed into a pilgrimage through the revelation of God's love for him. He received a Bachelor of Theology degree from Ontario Bible College, Toronto, Ont., Ín 1977. Subsequently he worked as a child therapy counselor for the Governnent of Alberta, developÍng and implementing treatment prograns for delinquent and emotionally-disturbed

wards of the province. Further studies at North American BaptÍst College and Newman Theological Coì. lege, both in Ed¡nonton, A,lta. , Ied to a Master of Christian Studies degree at Regent College, Vancouver, 8.C., in 1983. DesÍring to nove from biblical studies into world z'eligions, further studies at the University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Man., gave him the opportunity to study Buddhism, receiving B.A. in 1984 and an M.A. in 1987. Currently he is pursuing doctoral studies in theology at lvlcMaster University, Hamilton,