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| − | <poem>
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| − | By Ivan Strenski
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| − | Ivan Strenski is an associate {{Wiki|professor}} in the Department of [[Religious]] Studies, Connecticut {{Wiki|College}}, New {{Wiki|London}}, Connecticut.
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| − | Note. This article was first read in another version at the International {{Wiki|History}} of [[Religious]] Congress, August. 1975 at the [[University]] of Lancaster, Lancaster, England. All references to the [[life]] [[Pali Canon]] are given in standard [[form]] and are quoted from the {{Wiki|translations}} of I. B. Horner, Middle Length Sayings, 3 volumes ({{Wiki|London}}: Luzuc, 1959. 1957, 1954).
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| − | [[Philosophy]] {{Wiki|East}} and {{Wiki|West}}
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| − | v.30 n.1 (January 1980) pp.3-20
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| − | Copyright 1980 by The [[University]] Press of Hawaii
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| − | source
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| − | In its {{Wiki|history}}, the [[scholarly]] study of [[meditation]] has been the preserve of [[orientalists]], {{Wiki|historians}} and phenomenologists of [[religion]], and, more recently, {{Wiki|psychologists}} of [[consciousness]]. These investigators have, on the whole, been [[mindful]] of philological, textual, and descriptive matters. Little [[attention]] has been given to [[philosophical]], {{Wiki|theoretical}}, or sociological aspects of [[meditation]]. In particular, the many possible connections between {{Wiki|characteristics}} of [[meditational]] [[practice]] and institutionalized theories of [[knowledge]], brought to [[light]] in other areas by the {{Wiki|sociology}} of [[knowledge]], have been ignored.
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| − | By way of innovation, I want to see how {{Wiki|epistemological}} perspectives might [[illuminate]] the shape of [[Buddhist]] attitudes toward the gradual or sudden [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]]. Using a modified and rather informal structuralism, I want to compare the structures of institutionalized theories of [[knowledge]] with the structures of [[meditational]] practices and [[beliefs]] to see whether one might understand the {{Wiki|characteristics}} of these practices and [[beliefs]] in terms of their underlying {{Wiki|epistemological}} structure. I want to argue that one can plot the salient {{Wiki|characteristics}} of [[meditational]] practices—here, whether [[enlightenment]] occurs gradually or suddenly—as symptoms of the presupposed structure of their institutionalized {{Wiki|theory}} of [[knowledge]].
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| − | But before embarking on the critical study of [[meditational]] practices we ought to first clarify just what the [[Buddhists]] themselves [[thought]] about gradual and [[sudden enlightenment]], and how they conceived the [[relation]] of these aspects of [[meditational]] [[practice]] to their [[beliefs]] about the acquisition of [[knowledge]].
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| − | I. APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF GRADUAL AND SUDDEN ENLIGHTENMENT: NATURALISM AND PHENOMENOLOGY
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| − | It is commonplace to read that [[Theravāda Buddhism]] teaches that [[nirvāna]] is attained gradually and that [[Chan]] or [[Zen Buddhism]] teaches 'sudden' [[enlightenment]]. Little is said about the bases for studying what such [[meditational]] claims mean, and less is said about the [[logical]] [[grammar]] of words as peculiar as 'gradual'. Typically, it is facilely assumed that this problem is merely a {{Wiki|factual}} [[matter]] about temporal duration. On this [[view]], to say [[enlightenment]] is 'gradual' usually means that it takes a long [[time]] for this quasi-mental state to occur. Such a claim does not seem [[logically]] different than saying that it took a [[person]] a long [[time]] to get 'dizzy' or 'drunk,' and so on. Now, to put a {{Wiki|factual}} [[stress]] on this [[matter]] should immediately strike anyone familiar with the {{Wiki|pragmatic}} [[attitude]] of (early) [[Buddhism]] as odd. Surely, it must have been unedifying for an early [[Buddhist]] to be concerned with rather speculative matters of fact. Is this just an example of 'corruption' in [[early Buddhism]], analogous to the storied {{Wiki|medieval}} {{Wiki|Christian}} {{Wiki|scholastic}} problem of {{Wiki|angels}} on the head of a pin? What could be the practical salvific value of talk of gradualism in various [[Buddhist]] contexts? What could have been the possible [[interest]] for an early [[Buddhist]] in saying that [[enlightenment]] was to be attained gradually?
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| − | Despite such considerations, [[scholars]] of [[meditation]] have persisted in treating [[meditational]] discourses as mere descriptive matters of fact. This is true, even though these [[scholars]] disagree implicitly about what counts as a 'fact', or, perhaps more accurately, [[stress]] different [[views]] about what counts as a fact. Basically, two such emphases seem current. As applied to my earlier example of dizziness, one may take the fact of dizziness to be an [[experience]] in which case one might term such an approach '{{Wiki|phenomenological}}.' However, one might [[feel]] required to seek facts in some supposedly underlying neurophysiological process, in which case one might term such an approach 'naturalist.' Although both naturalist and phenomenologist would agree that temporal duration was crucial to the meaning of 'gradual', they would not agree about the {{Wiki|nature}} of what endured in [[time]].
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| − | I am convinced both these approaches emphasize the wrong things about [[Buddhist]] gradualism—for whatever different [[reasons]]. Not only does the [[Pali Canon]] tell a more complete story, but another [[order]] of {{Wiki|analysis}} of the texts is required. Basically, I believe those tempted by either of these two approaches mistake a norm for a [[matter]] of fact, and that where a fact may be indicated, it tends more often to be a spatial fact, rather than a temporal one. Although the temporal and the {{Wiki|factual}} question may not be without [[interest]], it does not seem to be the chief [[concern]] of the [[Pali]] [[Suttas]]. Here, the [[Buddha]] recommends a particular mode of life—an issue which reads far [[beyond]] any such unedifying {{Wiki|factual}} [[matter]] of the speed of the [[attainment]] of [[nirvāna]].
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| − | Taking the temporal point first, it would seem important to note that the term 'gradual' is ordinarily used in two quite different ways: Insofar as 'gradual' is used factually, it may indeed mean something temporal, like 'slow.' But, it may also mean 'graded.' It may be a temporal [[word]] just as easily as it may be a spatial one. The same is true of the [[Pali]] term anupubba, as I shall show in the [[discussion]] of the [[Pali Canon's]] [[view]] of "gradual" [[enlightenment]]. Thus, "gradual' is like other words that play across the temporal and spatial [[conditions]] of [[experience]]. Does a 'dashing' man need to be fleet of foot? Does a 'snappy' dresser need to be quick with buttons and zippers? Although spatial and temporal uses of 'gradual' often coincide, they need not do so. Doing something gradually—by degrees, in stages—may take less [[time]] than trying to do the same task at one go. Gradual methods are, indeed, often devised to save time—say, in building a house, taming a [[horse]], [[writing]] a [[book]], or [[attaining]] nirvāna—especially when contrasted to available alternatives in achieving the same sophisticated result. Perhaps, part of the [[reason]] this spatial [[sense]] of 'gradual' escapes our [[attention]] may have something to do with the fact that the ordinary {{Wiki|English}} contrast [[word]], 'sudden,' does not seem to have a spatial [[sense]] at all. It only seems to have temporal uses, and thus by {{Wiki|analogy}}, we think of 'gradual' in the same way. [[Attention]] to the contexts of the discourses on gradualism tells another story.
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| − | As one might emphasize either temporal or spatial aspects of gradualism so also have [[scholars]] of [[meditation]] emphasized different [[senses]] in which [[meditational]] forces are facts. Through their reliance on {{Wiki|neurological}} research, the {{Wiki|psychologists}} of [[consciousness]] exemplify a {{Wiki|naturalistic}} approach. The question of gradual [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]] would become a question to be settled by [[measuring]] the duration of 'extent' of certain {{Wiki|neurological}} {{Wiki|processes}}. Now, the {{Wiki|psychologists}} of [[consciousness]] have not, to my [[knowledge]], dealt with our particular problem. Yet, it would seem important—at least in passing—to represent their increasingly popular work in this context— even if I am forced to extrapolate from their more {{Wiki|general}} work on [[meditation]]. They seem to exemplify an extreme contrast to the kind of {{Wiki|epistemological}} approach I advocate, since they seem to avoid the whole issue of the theory-ladenness of [[meditational]] "facts."
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| − | A [[characteristic]] of this loosely related group of writers is their reliance on quantitative {{Wiki|neurological}} [[investigation]] of [[meditation]]. Typical of this [[view]] is the work of Dan Goleman. Here, EEGs supposedly get the investigator behind "abstract concept"—'the [[realm]] of {{Wiki|discourse}}' (the [[beliefs]] and reports of [[meditators]]) to the "raw {{Wiki|data}}." [1] Conveniently, this move (if possible) {{Wiki|liberates}} the investigator from the need to deal with troublesome {{Wiki|institutions}}, [[beliefs]], theories, and critics! Thanks to the EEG one reaches the promised land-of-value-free inquiry. Consistent with this supralinguistic approach, no arguments will be found supporting such claims that a conceptually [[neutral]] [[realm]] has been reached. In their stead one finds pronouncements and decrees—poor surrogates for solutions to our awkward {{Wiki|epistemological}} position. But, instead of evading {{Wiki|epistemological}} issues, I believe we ought to face them squarely: What presuppositions, theories, [[beliefs]], and {{Wiki|institutions}} [[condition]] [[mystical]] or [[meditative]] [[experience]]? What [[sense]] can one make of [[truth]] claims made under such [[conditions]]?
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| − | It is to the phenomenologists of [[religion]], like Winston [[King]], however, that one must look for the most direct [[discussion]] of our problem. In a comparison of [[Theravāda]] and [[Zen]] [[meditation]], [[King]] concludes that there is really no difference between sudden and gradual attainments of [[enlightenment]]. As one might expect from a phenomenologist, [[King]] believes that there is in fact no difference, because there is no experiential difference between sudden and gradual [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]].
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| − | "suddenness" or "gradualness" of [[enlightenment]] ... appears to depend primarily upon emphasis and/or point of specification. One may choose to emphasize the prior preparation .. . and call it "gradual"; or one may [[stress]] the experiential breakthrough and call it "sudden." But in both [[Theravada]] and [[Zen]], there are development and pinpointed breakthrough.[2]
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| − | For [[King]], this virtually closes the case. If, however, one takes seriously the theory-ladenness of [[meditational]] [[experiences]], the hard questions just begin. Why, indeed, the differences in "[[stress]]," as [[King]] himself is compelled to ask? Why the {{Wiki|canonical}}, {{Wiki|commentarial}}, and {{Wiki|modern}} norm among [[Theravādins]] that [[nirvāna]] comes gradually? King's reply to his own question is couched in terms of "the [[Indian]] penchant for {{Wiki|classification}} and {{Wiki|analysis}}" versus the "Sino-Japanese impatience with [[metaphysical]] speculation and a fundamental reliance upon intuitional [[apprehension]] of existential [[truth]]."[3] One wonders what the [[Buddha]] would say to the implication that he was not impatient with [[metaphysical]] speculation. Or what the [[Hua-Yen]] [[philosophers]] would say to the implication that they were not among the most [[supreme]] speculative metaphysicians of all [[time]]. But, like many {{Wiki|cultural}} generalizations, King's also contains an unexpected germ of [[truth]]. Surprisingly, [[King]] drops the [[matter]] at this point. Yet, one should not be altogether puzzled, since King's approach will not let him push [[beyond]] the reports of [[experiences]] to levels of structuring which may give rise to these [[experiences]]. I want to suggest that an [[appreciation]] of fundamental attitudes toward [[knowledge]] may help stimulate [[understanding]] of these divergent [[views]] of what may or may not be identical {{Wiki|processes}} or [[experiences]]- In part, I [[aim]] to reinforce Jayatilleke's [[views]] about early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|empiricism}} by arguing that its underlying structural pervasiveness accounts for much of the [[character]] of early [[Buddhist]] [[belief]] in the gradual attainmentof [[nirvāna]].[4] Contrary to what [[Buddhist]] empiricists themselves might believe, I believe that their [[empiricist]] {{Wiki|epistemology}} is symptomatic of a deep yet compromised [[empiricist]] structure.
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| − | II. THE PALI CANON ON GRADUALISM
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| − | The classical and principal discussions of gradualism occur in four places in the [[Majjhima Nikāya]] (MN). In two condensed analogies, the [[Buddha]] teaches what has become known crudely as "gradual [[enlightenment]]." Both these analogies—taming a thoroughbred colt (MN 1.445-446; MN III.1-6) and mastering complex skills (calculating and archery: MN III.1-6)—indicate much of the [[character]] of gradualism, which I shall explain shortly. In MN 1 (480-481), the [[Buddha]] deals directly with gradual [[attainment]] of [[paññā]]. Contrary to popular misconception, this shows that the distinction between gradual and [[sudden enlightenment]] differs from the distinction between those who attain [[nirvāna]] by [[paññā]]. and the [[jhānas]], respectively. As the [[Buddha]] implies in MN I(478ff), the [[paññāvimutta]] seems to achieve [[nirvana]] immediately (in both spatial and temporal [[senses]]), because he has previously achieved those stages of sanctity which others may only now be set to achieve.
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| − | The compounds of the [[Pali]] anupubba (Skt., anu-pūrva) "gradual" are numerous, and occupy nearly three columns in Trenckner's Critical [[Pali]] {{Wiki|Dictionary}}.[5] For the purposes of this article, I shall treat only the relevant compounds and deal with the pertinent aspects of their [[logical]] [[grammar]]. This {{Wiki|pragmatic}} approach may leave the {{Wiki|linguistic}} survey of these compounds incomplete, but I believe I have covered all pertinent issues from the [[philosophical]] point of [[view]]. The compounds of anupubba have both broad and narrow references: they may refer to the entire [[effort]] of [[attaining]] [[enlightenment]] as well as to the stages of [[meditational]] [[attainment]] and pedagogical [[practice]]. Thus, terms like anupubba-kārana, "[[gradual training]]," anupubba-kiriyā, "gradual working," anupubba-patipadā, "gradual progress," anupubba-samā-patti, "gradual [[attainment]]," and anupubba-sikkhā, "[[gradual training]]" refer broadly to the systematic or successive [[character]] of the whole [[Buddhist]] way of [[life]], from first silas to final release. Considering the narrower context of the [[jhānas]], one completes a gradual [[cessation]] of [[consciousness]] ([[anupubba-nirodha]]), or one is said to come to dwell in certain graded levels of [[meditational]] [[abodes]] (anupubba-vihāra). Finally, one may speak about pedagogical matters, in what seems a prescriptive {{Wiki|epistemological}} way, about the [[Buddha's]] normative [[gradual method]] of instruction (anupubba-kathā) and its correlative, the student's [[gradual method]] of study or training (anupubba-sikkhā).[6]
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| − | Some of these notions need explaining. The early [[Buddhists]] held definite [[beliefs]] about the details and [[reality]] of the [[mental]] landscape. The [[meditator]] was [[thought]] to ascend a graded trail of {{Wiki|real}}, though [[impermanent]], [[mental]] steps ([[jhānas]]), one after another, until the [[summit]] of [[nirvāna]] was won. It is true that [[nirvāna]] is not itself another [[jhāna]] and, that, strictly speaking, is not necessarily 'won' by [[meditation]]: it is not the Wikipedia:Causality|causal product of the process of [[meditation]]. Yet, there is some [[relation]] between [[meditation]] and [[nirvāna]], although the precise {{Wiki|nature}} of it is often difficult to make out. More on this [[matter]] shortly. Moreover, the progress of the [[meditator]] through the [[jhānas]] was also [[thought]] to be open to precise location in terms of a [[psychological]] map of the {{Wiki|real}}, though [[impermanent]], [[mind]]. To follow the [[Buddha]] meant, in part, to accept his map of the mind—at least provisionally for the purpose of testing its accuracy and its utility for [[attaining]] release. In [[meditation]], these [[directions]] were, in turn, tested for their truth—although, of course, the question of vicious circularity is conveniently passed over by the [[Buddhists]]. One might also add that as the route to [[nirvāna]] by [[meditation]] was graded, so was the goal itself, in some [[sense]], graded. Early [[Buddhist]] notions of levels of [[accomplishment]], like "Streamwinner," "[[Once-returner]]," and so on, seem to point in the same [[direction]] of gradual-graded-attainment.
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| − | Apart from these descriptive uses of the grades of [[attainment]], two aspects of the early [[Buddhist]] [[attitude]] to saving [[knowledge]] are also termed "gradual" although in a different [[sense]] than we have seen thus far. The context of this new [[sense]] of "gradual" is the classical [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|milieu}} of {{Wiki|learning}} and [[teaching]]. [[Gradual teaching]] or instruction (anupubba-kathā) refers to the [[Buddha's]] normative analytical and graded pedagogy.[7] This method of instruction exemplifies the [[Buddha's]] use of skill-in-means (upāya-kosalla) [8] which, as Jayatilleke has argued, encompasses a kind of [[openness]] to falsification and corresponding obligation for verification.[9] Because of his [[compassionate]] care and [[sympathy]] for [[humanity]] and its [[physical]] and [[intellectual]] [[suffering]], the [[Buddha]] prescribed [[teaching]] the [[dhamma]] in orderly and [[logical]] ways, tailored to the needs and capacities of his listeners, and open, in large [[measure]], to dispute and verification.[10] Although, at times he speaks in the {{Wiki|didactic}} mode, the [[Buddha]] eschewed an abrupt, {{Wiki|paradoxical}}, or [[esoteric]] mode, typical of the thwacks and slaps of some [[Zen]] [[Buddhist]] pedagogy and the later [[Mahāyāna]] uses of [[upāya]], respectively.
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| − | From the {{Wiki|perspective}} of the student, gradualism requires a correspondingly earnest methodical and analytic study of the [[dhamma]]. A student is responsible for testing and verifying the [[dhamma]] experientially. If one follows Jayatilleke here, {{Wiki|epistemological}} gradualism—this [[attitude]] of experiential scrutiny—applies to all aspects of the dhamma—both to preliminary matters as well as to those which arise at rarified [[meditational]] levels.[11]
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| − | One cannot then conclude that the gradual [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]] primarily meant that [[nirvāna]] came slowly, or that it was the norm of the slow-witted. This, at any rate, is not the [[view]] of the [[Pali Canon]]. For the early [[Buddhists]], gradualism was a complex notion, involving both the description of a graded model of the [[meditational]] and [[cognitive]] landscape, along with certain values or prescriptions about the proper {{Wiki|epistemological}} [[attitude]] of [[scrutiny]] and experiential testing needed at all levels of the [[teaching]] and {{Wiki|learning}} process of [[attaining]] release.
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| − | In another [[discussion]] on [[Theravāda]] [[meditation]], Winston [[King]] underscores this opposition of description and prescription by repeating it in terms of the contrast between [[jhānic]] and vipāssanic aspects of [[meditation]].[12] Although these two aspects are "set in tension with each other,"[13] they also complement each other.[14] Vipāssana ([[insight]]) supplies "critical [[awareness]]"[15] of the [[jhānic]] attainments, a "reviewing of the [[path]]."[16] The [[jhānic]] route thus describes a journey through a series of gradually ascending stages, while vipāssana censors and scrutinizes the quality of those achievements.
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| − | For [[King]], the {{Wiki|central}} question still {{Wiki|remains}} why these two [[disciplines]] are combined at all. What is achieved by their combination in the [[trance]] of [[cessation]] (nirodha-sampātti), or in the [[Theravāda]] [[tradition]] as a whole? Once again [[King]] couches his explanation in experiential or {{Wiki|phenomenological}} terms:
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| − | The [[jhānic]] [[discipline]] contributes [[meditational]] expertise, which may strengthen the [[concentration]] of the vipassanic [[meditator]] ... and very importantly gives a quality of depth and lastingness of experiential [[attainment]]... . On the reverse sides, vipāssana keeps the whole [[jhānic]] progression within [[Buddhist]] bounds so that none of its utterly [[peaceful]] states will be construed as the final goal of [[meditation]].[17]
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| − | Now,I do not wish to quibble with these admirable {{Wiki|conclusions}}. They strike me as sensitive and germane. Indeed. I should like to confirm them and also take them a step further [[beyond]] the {{Wiki|phenomenological}} level which they occupy. I am urging the reader to consider that there are deeper [[reasons]] behind this felicitous conjunction of [[meditational]] modes, which I, first of all, identify as {{Wiki|epistemological}} in {{Wiki|nature}}. My 'hunch' is that the {{Wiki|connection}} between the [[jhānic]] description of [[cognitive]] growth with the vipassanic {{Wiki|epistemological}} [[scrutiny]] suggests a fundamental {{Wiki|connection}} with a comprised [[empiricist]] syndrome recently spelled out by Ernest Gellner.[18] There are parallels to the specific conjunction of the [[jhānic]] and vipāssanic modes of [[meditation]] in similar conjunctions in the {{Wiki|general}} development of [[empiricist]] approaches to the growth of [[knowledge]]. [[Jhānic]] and vipāssanic modes of [[meditation]] are joined for the same [[reason]] similar aspects of the {{Wiki|general}} [[empiricist]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[knowledge]] are joined.
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| − | III. THE "GHOST" MEETS THE "MACHINE"
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| − | One can speak of an '[[empiricist]] syndrome' today largely because it has been the [[subject]] of intense [[debate]] by {{Wiki|modern}} epistemologists. This is perhaps especially true of {{Wiki|north}} Atlantic {{Wiki|analytic philosophy}}, although the ferment on the continent in Marxist and structuralist circles seems to focus on similar issues from the {{Wiki|opposite}} [[philosophical]] shore. Among [[philosophers]] of [[science]], Ernest Gellner has been particularly active in recent years in this area. Gellner believes one ought to distinguish two moments in the [[life]] of {{Wiki|empiricism}} as it has developed in certain favored contexts: {{Wiki|empiricism}} is both a description of how [[knowledge]] works and a prescription about what ought to count as [[knowledge]]. As a description, {{Wiki|empiricism}} offers a mere "toddler's toy" model,[19] far too crude and simple to reflect the complexity of [[cognition]]; but, as a prescription, it provides a useful "touchstone,"[20] admirably stating a clear normative [[attitude]] toward the limits of [[cognition]]. In this latter [[sense]], {{Wiki|empiricism}} actsas a "censor" or "selector,"[21] laying downtwo {{Wiki|imperatives}}: "Be sensitive to whether or not assertions are testable (in the specified approved [[manner]])! Spurn those which are not". [22] Gellner realizes that an [[empiricist]] would not typically [[recognize]] that {{Wiki|empiricism}} itself rests of prescriptions. Indeed, part of what {{Wiki|being}} an [[empiricist]] has meant in the past, has been bound up with the conviction that our [[cognitive]] situation is grounded in unbiased observations. But, for Gellner and any one of the numerous critics of {{Wiki|empiricism}} today, this is just not so.
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| − | As for the [[empiricist]] "toddler's toy" model, it can be summarized along the lines of an acquisitive enterprise. Beginning with an active {{Wiki|external}} [[world]] and a passive {{Wiki|internal}} one, the [[inner world]] of 'Wikipedia:concept|concepts' or '[[knowledge]]' is built up by accumulating sense-data. But, since all one '[[knows]]' consists of sense-data, the [[existence]] of a [[world]] behind sense-data becomes theoretically problematic, and unless something intervenes, one is led down the primrose [[path]] to phenomenalism and {{Wiki|nominalism}}. In this [[condition]] one can still 'generalize,' by assembling sense-data into complex '[[beliefs]]' or '[[ideas]]' by 'induction.' The [[truth]] of these [[beliefs]] is tested or verified by 'correspondence' with the facts of [[sense]] [[experience]]. This comparison of simple and complex is achieved through the process of 'analyzing' complex '[[beliefs]]' into their constituent sense-data. Normative statements analyzed in this fashion reveal no [[world]] of 'good' or 'bad,' but mere [[pleasures]], [[pains]], or [[emotions]]. [[Science]], especially in its reductionist and impersonalist moods, represents the kind of model explanation of the [[world]] of [[experience]] to which all other [[cognitive]] enterprises should aspire.
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| − | For Gellner, {{Wiki|empiricism}} tends toward {{Wiki|solipsism}} and eventually idealism—as long as it {{Wiki|remains}} [[pure]]. After all, [[experience]] is just my [[experience]]. My [[experience]] is composed of private sense-data, and the [[existence]] of the {{Wiki|external}} [[world]] is necessarily left in [[doubt]]. Yet, historically and, in Gellner's [[view]], happily, {{Wiki|empiricism}} did not in every case actually retain its [[purity]] and develop into {{Wiki|idealism}} and {{Wiki|solipsism}}; Bishop {{Wiki|Berkeley}} was not the sole heir to the [[empiricist]] [[tradition]]. The Utilitarians, Locke, Russell, and others, claim this birthright as well. Their [[thought]] [[embodies]] a salutary convergence of {{Wiki|empiricism}} and materialism—the "[[ghost]]" and the "machine," in Gellner's words. These thinkers sought a "{{Wiki|stable}}, recognisable structure that could somehow be reached through the qualitative sense-data available to the [[ghost]]."[23] Because of their [[confidence]] in [[knowing]] the [[world]], they also believed that the [[world]] was improvable, and that {{Wiki|analysis}} and [[scrutiny]] were both worthwhile and [[appropriate]] [[activities]] for [[human beings]].
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| − | IV. EARLY [[BUDDHIST]] EMPIRICISM AND MEDITATION
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| − | Gellner's [[myth]] about this compromised {{Wiki|empiricism}} fits remarkably well with K.. N. Jayatilleke's account of early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|theory}} of knowledge—especially in the way it resists {{Wiki|idealism}} (as later [[Buddhist]] [[thought]] does not) and allies itself with {{Wiki|materialism}}.[24] [[Early Buddhism]] populates the {{Wiki|vacuum}} between [[experience]] and the otherwise noumenal [[world]] with {{Wiki|real}}, though [[impermanent]] and [[causally]] [[conditioned]], [[causally]] agent, {{Wiki|material}} sense-data. These sense-data, in turn, activate the [[causally]] passive (initially, at any rate) and {{Wiki|material}} [[mind]], producing '[[knowledge]]' of the [[world]]. For both Gellner and [[early Buddhism]] this convergence of "[[ghost]]" and "machine" reinforces the [[characteristic]] [[empiricist]] {{Wiki|epistemological}} [[attitude]] of {{Wiki|analysis}}.[25] This analytic spirit—like perhaps the "[[spirit]]" of {{Wiki|Protestantism}} or capitalism in Weber—fits with the [[spirit]] of the development of [[traditional]] {{Wiki|empiricism}} and [[early Buddhism]]. Both take the [[world]] seriously, because it is not [[illusory]]; both exhibit a "salutary censoriousness" which "seems only to come when [[cognitive]] {{Wiki|hope}} and [[confidence]] have already been raised high."[26] This is why both Gellner's compromised {{Wiki|empiricism}} and [[early Buddhism]] (surprisingly and in different ways to be sure) lead to "puritanical orderly world-reform and [[cognitive]] exploration," rather than to Schopenhaurian [[pessimism]], aestheticism, and [[mysticism]], on the one hand, or to indulgent hippie grooviness, on the other.[27]
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| − | To those who [[imagine]] [[Buddhism]] to be Schopenhaurian, {{Wiki|pessimistic}}, [[mystical]], and so on, this claim will come as a shock. And, it is true that much of the [[Buddhist tradition]] has been all these things. Yet, Jayatilleke's research, for one, has done much to rectify this {{Wiki|image}} of Buddhism—at least as it seems to have taken shape in the [[Pali Canon]]. The Utilitarians, for example, "took the [[world]] seriously." But, this meant [[attention]] to {{Wiki|political}} reform, technological development, and [[cognitive]] exploration in the natural {{Wiki|sciences}}. With the early [[Buddhists]], this earnest [[spirit]] took the [[form]] of {{Wiki|individual}} [[ethical]] and [[psychological]] reform, the establishment of an alternative model society—the [[Buddhist]] [[monastic community]], the Sangha—cognitive exploration and therapy aimed at seeking the [[psychological]] [[roots]] of [[suffering]] morein the style of {{Wiki|Freud}} and the {{Wiki|psychotherapists}}.[28]
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| − | This is not to deny the differences between Gellner's compromised {{Wiki|empiricism}} and early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|empiricism}}; it is only to show that they are not differences of "[[spirit]]." Moreover, in some ways, [[early Buddhism]] is evenmoreoptimistic than its counterparts in European {{Wiki|empiricism}}. It stands for the possibility of the radical development of [[human]] [[cognitive]] potentials: Men can know the {{Wiki|real}} {{Wiki|nature}} of the [[world]] and [[nirvāna]]. This enlarges the range of experiential [[knowledge]], taking in [[meditational]] states, kinds of ESP, and states [[transcendental]] to the [[ordinary man]].[29]
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| − | The [[cognitive]] {{Wiki|optimism}} of [[early Buddhism]] rests, in turn, on the presuppositions underlying the {{Wiki|theory}} of [[meditation]] outlined earlier. The [[Buddhists]] [[thought]] they knew how the [[mind]] worked and what techniques would best serve to enable it to work for [[human]] [[happiness]]. Insofar as early [[Buddhist meditation]] methods are concerned, they are specific to the compromised [[empiricist]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[knowledge]] spelled out by Gellner. One can, in fact, generate the model of early [[Buddhist meditation]] merely by reversing the [[order]] of the [[empiricist]] model of critical [[accumulation]] of sense-data. As one had gradually accumulated sense-data and passed them before the inner censor, the "[[ghost]]," before risking knowledge-claims, so also in [[meditation]] one gradually surpasses classes of sense-data [[experience]] and [[knowledge]]. Urged on by vipāssana [[criticism]], the [[meditator]] presses along the [[jhānic]] route to higher [[meditational]] levels, completely stripped of sense-data [[information]].
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| − | Thus, reliable ordinary [[knowledge]] as well as [[nirvāna]] require gradual, diligent, and critical attention—analytic care in sifting our [[perceptions]] and [[beliefs]]. In [[meditation]], this becomes even more severe as the [[meditator]] empties the [[mind]] of these {{Wiki|data}}, noting their content and [[form]] as they are transcended until [[nirvāna]] itself is attained. One is not typically encouraged to leap to {{Wiki|conclusions}} (or [[nirvāna]]) in [[early Buddhism]]. One is invited to analyze and verify the [[dhamma]] experientially and ultimately in [[meditation]]. The [[meditator]] initiates a relentless and deliberate selection process, which seeks to liberate the {{Wiki|perceiver}} from the bondage of the inward flowof [[causally]] agent [[sensations]]. In [[meditation]], a [[Buddhist]] tries to understand sense-data, and therefore [[knowledge]], in their own terms, and declare them for what they are.
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| − | All this makes for a measured and certain {{Wiki|optimism}} about man's potential for {{Wiki|salvation}} unaided by [[occult]] [[power]] or [[cosmic]] [[fate]]. In the context of this analytic, trial-and-error [[cognitive]] quest, one is advised not to expect rapid results, although these could, of course, occur. The early [[Buddhists]] encouraged persistence. [[Effort]] brought results. The point was to keep at it, to [[form]] the [[habits]] of [[mind]] and [[action]] which would surely (but not automatically) bring results.
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| − | V. GRADUAL AND SUDDEN ENLIGHTENMENT: HISTORIC DEBATES 1: CHINA
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| − | Thus far, I have tried to [[illuminate]] the {{Wiki|nature}} of early [[Buddhist meditation]] and the [[belief]] in gradual [[enlightenment]] by appealing to the notion of early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|empiricism}}. In a nutshell, I have argued that early [[Buddhist meditation]] {{Wiki|theory}} is imbedded in a compromised [[empiricist]] {{Wiki|epistemology}} and, as such, will reflect salient {{Wiki|characteristics}} of this {{Wiki|epistemological}} syndrome. Even though ordinary [[knowledge]] requires accumulating sense-data, both {{Wiki|processes}} occur by 'gradual' means—in both the descriptive and prescriptive [[senses]] of that term. As a structuralist, I have shown that Gellner's compromised version of {{Wiki|empiricism}} is homologous to early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|empiricism}} in both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions. [[Meditation]] in [[early Buddhism]] constitutes a counterpoint variant of this common theme, seeming for the most part a structural inversion of the [[empiricist]] statement about ordinary acquisition of [[knowledge]].
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| − | The critical reader will want some test of this thesis. And, if structuralism is not to become just another occasion for clever [[dialectical]] shenanigans, structuralists must offer some check on their own method. The perfect test of this thesis would be a [[debate]] between a proponent of early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|empiricism}} who held the gradualist position, and another kind of [[Buddhist]] who held the sudden position—typically a [[Rinzai]] [[Zen]] [[Buddhist]]. The {{Wiki|nature}} of the test would be to see if one could correlate opposed [[beliefs]] about the [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]] with opposed {{Wiki|epistemological}} beliefs—understanding all the while that both kinds of epistemologies may operate in these contexts in compromised [[forms]].
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| − | In the {{Wiki|history}} of [[Buddhism]], the issue of gradual and [[sudden enlightenment]] has arisen on two conspicuous occasions: the eighth-century controversies between the Northern and Southern schools of [[Ch'an Buddhism]] in [[China]], and between the [[Indian]] and {{Wiki|Chinese}} parties at the {{Wiki|Council}} of bSamYas (792-794) (the so-called {{Wiki|Council}} of {{Wiki|Lhasa}}) in [[Tibet]].[30] Of the two, the {{Wiki|Chinese}} controversy gives fullest treatment to the sudden position. Indeed, the focus classicus of the sudden [[view]] {{Wiki|remains}} the [[Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch]], attributed to the 'victor' of the [[debate]] and founder of the Southern school of [[Ch'an]], Hui-Neng (638-713). Thanks to Yampolsky's recent research of this text and its historical context,[31] much has become clear. For one, Yampolsky argues that one should attribute the authorship of the [[sūtra]] to Shen-hui, one of Hui-Neng's [[disciples]], rather than to the [[sixth patriarch]] himself. Together with Dumoulin's work in this area, one can be reasonably certain in correlating Hui-Neng's sudden {{Wiki|theory}} of [[enlightenment]] with a certain epistemological-cum-ontological position opposed to that of [[early Buddhism]].
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| − | We know that Hui-Neng (Shen-hui)[32] taught the "sudden" [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]] against the celebrated [[Ch'an]] [[teacher]], and [[sixth patriarch]] according to the [[Northern school]], [[Shen-hsiu]]. But, what did he mean? Dumoulin claims that Hui-Neng even makes it the sole criterion for {{Wiki|orthodoxy}}![33] What can be contained in this cryptic claim to [[merit]] such importance? And what can explain the fierce attacks Hui-Neng aimed at [[Shen-hsiu]]? Well, Hui-Neng most certainly did not mean [[enlightenment]] was "easily obtainable" or even quickly won," [34] although these were not ruled out. Like the early [[Buddhists]], Hui-Neng had higher purposes in [[mind]]. Both were concerned to make certain points about [[human]] {{Wiki|psychology}} and [[knowledge]], using the idioms of temporal duration and spatial levels when these suited their purposes. Both seem to insist, quite often without apparent purpose, that [[enlightenment]] occurred in a way harmonious with their practices and basic [[views]].
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| − | Dumoulin[35] and Yampolsky agree that the [[belief]] in [[sudden enlightenment]] has two sides. Negatively, it denies that the goal, [[prajñā]], can be produced by a "step-by-step process of [[meditation]],"[36] dhyāna—odd, one would have [[thought]], for the [[Dhyāna]] school ([[Ch'an]]) to assert. Positively, it was a way of asserting the [[truth]] of a priori nonduality—that [[prajñā]] is "something possessed from the outset by everyone."[37] The point is to realize the imminent a priori {{Wiki|nature}} of [[enlightenment]] and to let it shine through. [[Meditation]] cannot effect [[enlightenment]] because, strictly speaking, [[meditation]] and the [[passions]] it seeks to purge are {{Wiki|ontologically}} [[empty]] and [[illusory]].
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| − | Thus, at bottom, the [[doctrine]] of [[sudden enlightenment]] is a way of denying the jhanās and of asserting the a priori {{Wiki|nature}} of [[enlightenment]] in the idiom of [[meditational]] [[practice]]. As the early [[Buddhists]] set out to operationalize early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|empiricism}} with the descriptive and prescriptive [[senses]] of gradualism, so also does Hui-Neng seem intent on operationalizing his own [[philosophical]] position in the sudden [[view]] of the [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]]: there are no real—even impermanent—grades of [[enlightenment]]; thus there is no need to test for a priori [[enlightenment]], since all [[beings]] are [[enlightened]] by {{Wiki|nature}}.
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| − | One will recall that the [[Pali Canon]] would certainly tell another kind of story. Although [[meditational]] progress through the jhanās does not [[causally]] produce [[nirvāna]] on the early [[Buddhist]] [[view]], in conjunction with vipāssana, it is one important way to attain it. However [[impermanent]] they may be, one seeks to transcend the constraints of {{Wiki|real}} (though [[impermanent]]) [[mind]] and [[world]]. [[Impermanence]] itself signals that progress can be made. But, early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|soteriological}} {{Wiki|optimism}} could not lead to the seemingly exaggerated {{Wiki|optimism}} [[embodied]] in the [[belief]] in a priori enlightenment—that the battle was already won, or that virtually no battle needed to be fought. [[Nirvāna]], on the other hand, transcends [[experience]] without {{Wiki|being}} prior to [[experience]]. It is not, strictly speaking, posterior to [[experience]] either, since it is not, as it were, an inductive, [[empirical]] generalization, or [[caused]] by [[meditation]]. If I may be permitted a neologism, the [[word]] 'transposterior' (to [[experience]]) may capture the flavor of the relationship of [[nirvāna]] to ordinary [[experience]]. By this I mean that [[nirvāna]] is not a priori, and only can be said to be a posteriori if one stipulates that it is held to transcend [[experience]].[38] Historically, this position may have arisen from conflict with {{Wiki|brahminical}} rationalists, if we follow Jayatilleke's[39] suggestion. What {{Wiki|remains}} important is the early [[Buddhist]] [[aversion]] to apriorism—even if it meant constructing an {{Wiki|empiricism}} which finally may have (to put it charitably) transcended itself in the special case of the {{Wiki|nature}} of [[nirvana]]. Hui-Neng and the Southern school of [[Ch'an Buddhism]] felt no such [[aversion]] for the a priori. In fact, they celebrated it, and consequently [[thought]] that it merely had to be seen beneath the surface of an already [[illusory]] [[world]]. [[Enlightenment]] was 'sudden' because it was a priori and without even {{Wiki|ontological}} competition from an [[impermanent]] [[world]].
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| − | VI. GRADUAL AND SUDDEN ENLIGHTENMENT: HISTORIC DEBATES II: TIBET
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| − | The second classic locus of this [[debate]] is the late eighth-century controversy which occasioned the {{Wiki|Council}} of bSam Yas (so-called {{Wiki|Council}} of {{Wiki|Lhasa}}). Here, the [[Indian]] [[Mādhyamika]] logician, [[Kamalaśīla]] (742-804) argued a gradualist position against a {{Wiki|Chinese}} [[Ch'an]] [[teacher]], Hva San, and his [[Tibetan]] allies, the rDzogs-chen. Far more importance is [[attached]] to this [[debate]] than may seem warranted. Yet, the issue was clearly [[thought]] to have been {{Wiki|central}} to the subsequent development of [[Buddhism]] in [[Tibet]]. Our accounts of the [[debate]] records the point of [[view]] of the victor, in this case [[Kamalaśīla]] in his own Bhāvanākrama.We learn little of the [[views]] of Hva-San and his company from this text and are thus led to speculate about their fuller [[form]] and the possible relationship with the earlier teachings of Hui-Neng and his school. Although the connections between these two are not certain, many similarities of points of [[view]] can be established, which in themselves may point in the [[direction]] of relationship.
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| − | The [[interesting]] thing about [[Kamalaśīla]] is that he seems to argue a gradualism similar to what we have discovered in early [[Buddhist meditation]] but, at first [[sight]], without sufficient {{Wiki|theoretical}} basis to do so. His [[philosophical]] position, as best one can make out from the often conflicting accounts of it, is exceedingly rich and complex. He seems at once a Svatāntrika Mādhyamakin,[40] Śūnyavādin, as well as logician and pragmatist in the [[tradition]] of [[Dharmakīrti]].[41] {{Wiki|Historians}} of [[Indian philosophy]] have also identified him as a critic of the [[Yogācārins]].[42] [[Kamalaśīla]], himself,[43] seems to [[recognize]] that these [[philosophical]] positions produce in him a certain amount of [[intellectual]] and practical tension. This is so especially in {{Wiki|connection}} with his [[desire]] both to [[acknowledge]] the [[transcendent]] primacy of [[Śūnyavāda]] {{Wiki|monism}}, along with the rather [[mundane]], though nonetheless wholehearted, devotion to the [[bodhisattva ideal]] of [[compassion]] and [[meditation]]. What makes [[Kamalaśīla]] [[interesting]] then, is his conviction that [[enlightenment]] comes gradually and that one should press on with [[dhyāna]] and [[karunā]], despite the awkward higher [[truth]] of the [[Śūnyatā]].[44]
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| − | This cannot have been a [[concern]] original to [[Kamalaśīla]]. Other [[Mādhyamikas]] must have shared it. But, it must have been especially acute in th like Hui-Neng, taught [[sudden enlightenment]] in the [[sense]] that [[meditation]] in the progressive [[manner]] was unnecessary.[45] Perhaps reflecting the supposed [[Yogācāra]] background of [[Ch'an]], Hva-San teaches the idealist [[view]] that [[thought]] is at the [[root]] of all se face of Hva-San's idealist monistic teachings which reflected no such qualms about pressing on with the [[worldly]] exercises of [[dhyāna]] and karūna. One need merely stop [[thinking]] to stop [[suffering]]. And [[thinking]] could be stopped suddenly—without progress through the [[jhānas]] or bodhisattvabhūmis.[46] In this way a priori [[enlightenment]] simply shines through. Hva-San {{Wiki|sounds}} very much the Yogacārin or close [[relative]] of Hui-Neng's [[Ch'an Buddhism]] in this passage:
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| − | [We] ourselves [are] coessential with the [[Buddha]], and all {{Wiki|representations}} which constitute the [[world]] {{Wiki|being}} [[illusory]] or a [[magic]] play of the [[Absolute]].... What we need is only to jump ... from the plane of {{Wiki|representations}} into that [[Buddhahood]], our [[true nature]], by sudden elimination of those [[mental]] {{Wiki|representations}}. We must arrest the play of their [[emanation]], stop our [[mind]], and see into our own {{Wiki|nature}}.[47]
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| − | But, what is it about having the [[Buddha-nature]] within us that requires a sudden interpretation of the [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]], along with the rejection of the [[jhānas]], {{Wiki|analysis}}, and the [[compassion]] of the [[bodhisattva]]? Except for the [[doctrine]] of a priori [[enlightenment]], grounded in the possession of the [[Buddha-nature]], [[Kamalaśīla]] and Hva-San would seem to share at least the [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|monism}}, [[characteristic]] of both [[Śūnyavāda]] and [[Yogācāra]], respectively. One will, of course, want to make [[appropriate]] qualifications for differences in these {{Wiki|characteristics}} of the [[Absolute]]. Yet, in [[spite]] of that, one wonders how and why [[Kamalaśīla]] can commit himself so thoroughly to the [[worldly]] practices of [[dhyāna]] and karūna, [[knowing]] full well that these are onto-logically insubstantial? Has not Hva-San really drawn the natural consequences of [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|monism}}? Is not [[Kamalaśīla]] quixotically supporting some [[venerable]], but outmoded, [[tradition]] of the [[sūtras]], which by some kind of [[intellectual]] {{Wiki|inertia}}, now soldiers on without adequate {{Wiki|theoretical}} basis?
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| − | Tucci is one of the few [[scholars]] to have appreciated the awkwardness and poignancy of [[Kamalaśīla]] position.[48] But, his rather oblique solution to Kamalaśīla's quandry only precipitates a puzzle of his own. Speaking first of Hva-San, Tucci claims the [[sudden enlightenment]] [[doctrine]] follows from the simultaneous granting of {{Wiki|ontological}} {{Wiki|status}} to both abhūtapariikalpita ("[[power]] of subjective [[representation]]") and [[Śūnyatā]]. By contrast, [[Kamalaśīla]] then would be said to hold gradualism because he maintains loyalty to [[Śūnyavāda]] {{Wiki|monism}} by refusing to grant {{Wiki|ontological}} {{Wiki|status}} to anything but the [[Absolute]].
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| − | Yet, it seems Wikipedia:Coherentism|incoherent of Tucci to say that it is Hva-San's simultaneous admission of {{Wiki|ontological}} {{Wiki|status}} to both these {{Wiki|principles}} which breaks "the {{Wiki|monism}} of [[Mahāyāna]],"[49] causing [[meditation]] to recede into the background and dictating a subitist [[view]] of the [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]]. If anything, the {{Wiki|opposite}} should occur; if one breaks the {{Wiki|monism}} of the [[Mahāyāna]] into such a [[dualism]], how then can either of these [[realities]] pass away suddenly? If the abhūtapariikalpita is [[empowered]] to project the [[world]] of [[representation]], how does it also pass away in the face of sūnyatā which Tucci implies is {{Wiki|ontologically}} {{Wiki|distinct}}? It seems that either the "{{Wiki|monism}} of [[Mahāyāna]]" is not really broken, in which case Tucci's solution does not even get started, or that it is broken, in which case one is not yet [[enlightened]], because one has not yet penetrated into sūnyatā. Either way, Tucci does not seem to have succeeded in his [[aim]]. Moreover, in the fact of his own supposed {{Wiki|monism}} Kamalaśīla's gradualism becomes all the more mysterious, and not less so.
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| − | I would merely point out that the text of the [[Bhāvanākrama]] gives no indication that Hva-San is any kind critic of {{Wiki|monism}}. And, if he were, he would probably prefer gradual [[enlightenment]] over the sudden [[view]]. [[Kamalaśīla]], on the other hand, does give indications of having watered down the [[transcendental]] {{Wiki|monism}} one might expect him to have observed.
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| − | This stems from Kamalaśīla's [[philosophical]] indebtedness to [[Bhāvaviveka]] and [[Dharmakīrti]] through his [[teacher]], Sāntaraksita. Potter[50] and Warder[51] argue independently that Kamalaśīla's [[thought]] represents a partial synthesis of the {{Wiki|epistemological}} [[traditions]] of the Pramānavarttikam of [[Dharmakīrti]] and the Svatāntrika Mādhayamaka of [[Bhāvaviveka]]. Taken together, these [[influences]] seem to confirm Kamalaśīla's [[belief]] in the worth of [[logic]] and {{Wiki|analysis}},[52] against what Potter believes to have been the [[Yogācārin]] attempt to downgrade them.[53] [[Bhāvaviveka]] is said to have made this kind of point by advancing the unique [[view]] of graded levels of [[truth]] within sūnyatā—as well as within the [[empirical]] [[realm]].[54] If this be {{Wiki|monism}}, it is certainly highly modified. To admit grades of {{Wiki|being}} is virtually to admit kinds of {{Wiki|being}}, which is really to break the purer [[forms]] of the {{Wiki|monism}} of [[Mahāyāna]]. For [[Dharmakīrti]], the {{Wiki|ontological}} basis of his positive [[attitude]] toward [[reason]] seems to be a certain {{Wiki|materialist}} or physicalist—tending convictions. Against the [[Yogācārins]], [[Dharmakīrti]] argued the "[[relative]] independent [[reality]] of [[objects]],"[55] and that [[reality]] has "arthakryātra, the [[character]] of doing something ... of making a difference."[56] [[Empirical]] [[perception]] (pratyakna) is therefore a [[pramāna]] (a means of [[knowledge]]), and '"effect of [[reality]]"' and not an [[illusion]].[57] In this way [[Dharmakīrti]] undercuts any attempt to empower [[thought]] alone to make {{Wiki|real}} changes in the {{Wiki|status}} of a [[person]] seeking [[enlightenment]].
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| − | The [[views]] of [[Bhāvaviveka]] and [[Dharmakīrti]], then, seem remarkably similar to Kamalaśīla's conviction, throughout the [[Bhāvanākrama]], that the [[world]] and ordinary [[knowledge]] could not merely be [[thought]] away, but had to be undermined by serious [[meditative]] and analytic praxis. [[Dharmakīrti]] even explicitly holds this [[view]]. In Potter's words, "one obtains [[yogic]] [[insight]] ... by sharpening one's [[understanding]] or [[insight]] by [[meditation]] and [[dialectic]],"[58]
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| − | For both [[Dharmakīrti]] and [[Kamalaśīla]] this seemed also to mean that testing and a [[spirit]] of censoriousness (Gellner) become important. In classic [[empiricist]] style, [[Dharmakīrti]] believed a {{Wiki|theory}} of [[knowledge]] ought to stand the test of [[experience]]" and "[[practice]]."[59] Quite probably reflecting this influence while quoting the [[sutras]] in his Nyāyabindupūrvapaksasanksipiti, [[Kamalaśīla]] reports the [[Buddha]] saying: " 0 Brethern! . .. never do accept my words from sheer reverential [[feelings]]! Let learned [[scholars]] test them... ."[60]
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| − | In the [[Bhāvanākrama]], [[Kamalaśīla]] himself brings [[meditation]] into play with experiential testing: " Having thus ascertained [[reality]] by means of [[gnosis]] consisting in [[investigation]], in [[order]] to make this evident, one should have recourse to the [[gnosis]] consisting in {{Wiki|contemplation}}. .. ."[61]
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| − | [[Kamalaśīla]] even seems to share the [[view]] of [[King]] about the complementary roles of the [[jhānas]] and vipāssana in [[Theravāda Buddhism]]. Here speaking of the [[jhānas]] in terms of [[samādhi]], [[Kamalaśīla]] seems to repeat the division of labor between these two branches of [[meditation]] which I also linked with Gellner's claims about the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of {{Wiki|empiricism}}: " ... when his [[mind]] has been taken hold of by the hand, as it were, of [[samādhi]], the [[yogin]], by using the sharper weapon of [[gnosis]] should [[root]] out the [[seeds]] of false [[imagination]]. .. ."[62]
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| − | In these ways, [[Kamalaśīla]] seems to conform to much of the empiricist-cum-materiahst [[spirit]] of [[early Buddhism]] through the influence of [[Bhāvaviveka]] and [[Dharmakīrti]]. To the extent that these [[empiricist]] and {{Wiki|materialist}} tendencies inform Kamalaśīla's [[thinking]] about [[meditation]] one would explain Kamalaśīla's [[teaching]] of the [[doctrine]] of gradual [[attainment]] of [[enlightenment]] on the same grounds as I have tried to do with the early [[Buddhists]].
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| − | VII. CONCLUSION: BELIEF, PRACTICE, AND STRUCTURE
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| − | To gain a unifying structural [[insight]] into Kamalaśīla's situation I want to conclude this [[discussion]] by pushing [[beyond]] the rather straightforward [[discussion]] of the {{Wiki|history}} and content of Kamalaśīla's [[thought]]. Granted that [[Kamalaśīla]] was influenced by both [[Bhāvaviveka]] and [[Dharmakīrti]], one might go on to ask what [[conditions]] of Kamalaśīla's practical situation reinforced his adherence to an [[empiricist]] and materialist-tending [[tradition]]? Here, I want to suggest that Kamalaśīla's practical [[discipline]] of {{Wiki|analysis}} and [[compassion]] may have 'fit' better with the world-view he inherited from [[Bhāvaviveka]] and [[Dharmakīrti]], and thus that, in consequence, it was favored. [[Kamalaśīla]] could not have been a [[pure]] Śūnyavādin Absolutist without [[suffering]] substantial disharmonies in his overall approach to the [[world]]. [[Kamalaśīla]] may have [[thought]] and taughtmore like an empiricist-cum-materialist early [[Buddhist]], partly because he also acted like one. In taking the [[world]] of [[thought]] and {{Wiki|being}} as at least provisionally {{Wiki|real}} in [[meditation]], {{Wiki|analysis}}, and [[compassionate]] {{Wiki|behavior}}, [[Kamalaśīla]] may very well have come to think about the [[appropriate]] means of release as gradual—much as did the early [[Buddhists]].
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| − | I am suggesting that Kamalaśīla's [[belief]] in gradual [[enlightenment]] may have been connected to his [[practice]] in somewhat the same way some [[beliefs]] might be said to be induced by certain practices. In the [[Buddhist tradition]] one [[thinks]] of the [[belief]] in the [[transcendental]] [[Buddha]] as having possibly been induced by the [[practice]] of buddhapūjā, which does not in itself require such a [[transcendental]] objectof {{Wiki|worship}}. Although buddhapūjā is, strictly speaking, an act of remembrance, such practices tend, quite often, to induce a [[belief]] in the [[existence]] of their [[object]]. Gombrich suggests that in {{Wiki|modern}} [[Theravādin]] countries one can [[observe]] this {{Wiki|movement}} from mere [[recollection]] of the exemplary [[earthly]] [[life]] of the long-deceased [[historical Buddha]] to the [[belief]] in the [[transcendental]] [[existence]] of the [[Buddha]], now [[thought]] to be available to [[human]] entreaties.[63]
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| − | I do not believe these {{Wiki|processes}} happen mechanically or through Wikipedia:Causality|causal connections, as typically conceived. [[Human]] {{Wiki|culture}} seems too intricate and [[human beings]] too {{Wiki|subtle}} for the mechanistic process to be the strongest candidate explanation here. A likelier model might be one which takes its rise from Levi-Strauss[64]: to the {{Wiki|degree}} one finds structural affinities between practices and [[beliefs]], perhaps one should consider such affinities either a working out of certain deep common structures, or perhaps related by a sort of formal or structural [[causality]]. Men often do things for structural reasons—whether the structures lie behind the things in question or whether they operate on the same level. In Kamalaśīla's case, he may have advocated the [[belief]] in gradual release and the [[practice]] of [[meditation]], {{Wiki|analysis}}, and [[compassion]] because of some deep common structure, or because either [[belief]] or [[practice]] were [[causally]] prior, and same in [[form]].
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| − | This speculation suggests that a kind of formal [[causality]] may be at work in the passage from deeper levels of {{Wiki|culture}} to other more accessible to {{Wiki|common sense}}, or between things on the same level of {{Wiki|culture}}. In the context of [[Buddhist meditation]] and theories of release, I offer that one does not [[practice]] analytic methods of [[meditation]] and painstaking [[human]] [[compassion]] for lengths of [[time]] without having something of those [[activities]] 'rub off' on other levels of life—in our case the gradualist {{Wiki|theory}} of the [[attainment]] of release. (The same also goes for the effect of [[beliefs]] on practices.) Among the things which 'rub off', I want to identify the notion of [[form]] or structure. Critical analytic [[meditational]] methods and serious [[concern]] for ordinary [[human]] well-being, conform to the gradual kind of [[enlightenment]], at once described as a graded route and prescribed as a critical, analytic censoriousness about claims to, [[knowledge]].
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| − | NOTES
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| − | [1]. D. Goleman, "Perspectives on {{Wiki|Psychology}}, [[Reality]], and the Study of [[Consciousness]]." Journal of {{Wiki|Transpersonal Psychology}} 4 (1974): 4.
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| − | [2]. W. [[King]], "A Comparison of [[Theravāda]] and [[Zen]] [[Meditation]]." {{Wiki|History}} of [[Religions]], (1969); 310.
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| − | [3]. Ibid., p. 311.
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| − | [4]. K. N. Jayatilleke, Early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|Theory}} of [[Knowledge]] ({{Wiki|London}}: George Alien and Unwin, 1963). See also D. [[Kalupahana]], "A [[Buddhist]] Tract on {{Wiki|Empiric}} ism," [[Philosophy]] {{Wiki|East}} and {{Wiki|West}} 19, N6. 1 (1969). and [[Causality]]: The {{Wiki|Central}} [[Philosophy]] of [[Buddhism]] (Honolulu: {{Wiki|University of Hawaii}}, 1975) and [[Buddhist Philosophy]] (Honolulu: {{Wiki|University of Hawaii}}, 1976).
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| − | [5]. V, Trenckner, A Critical [[Pali]] {{Wiki|Dictionary}}, Volume 1 (Copenhagen: {{Wiki|Royal}} Danish {{Wiki|Academy}} of {{Wiki|Sciences}} and Letters. 1924-1948): 201-202.
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| − | [6]. T. Rhys-Davids and W. Stede, eds., [[Pali]] Text Society's [[Pali]] {{Wiki|English}} {{Wiki|Dictionary}} ({{Wiki|London}}: Luzac, 1966): 39.
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| − | [7]. Ibid., pp. 39,101. [[Nyanatiloka]], [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|Dictionary}} ({{Wiki|Colombo}}, [[Sri Lanka]]: Frewin, 1972): 17.
| |
| − | [8]. Jayatilleke, Early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|Theory}} of [[Knowledge]], p. 40.
| |
| − | [9]. Ibid., chap. 8.
| |
| − | [10]. Ibid.,p- 277.
| |
| − | [11]. Ibid., p. 466.
| |
| − | [12]. W, [[King]], "The Structure and [[Function]] of the [[Trance]] of [[Cessation]] in [[Theravada]] [[Meditation]]," {{Wiki|manuscript}} read at Annual Meeting of the American {{Wiki|Academy}} of [[Religion]], {{Wiki|Chicago}}, November, 1975.
| |
| − | [13]. Ibid., p. 4.
| |
| − | [14]. Ibid., p. 11.
| |
| − | [15]. Ibid., p. 7.
| |
| − | [16]. Ibid., p. 8.
| |
| − | [17]. Ibid,, pp. 14f.
| |
| − | [18]. E. Gellner, Legitimation of [[Belief]] ({{Wiki|Cambridge}}: {{Wiki|Cambridge}} [[University]] Press, 1974).
| |
| − | [19]. Ibid., p. 36.
| |
| − | [20]. Ibid.
| |
| − | [21]. Ibid., pp. 32f.
| |
| − | [22]. Ibid., p. 38.
| |
| − | [23]. Ibid., p. 115.
| |
| − | [24]. Ibid., chaps. 5, 6.
| |
| − | [25]. Ibid., p. 124.
| |
| − | [26]. A. K.. Warder, "[[Early Buddhism]] and Other Contemporary Systems," Bulletin of the School of {{Wiki|Oriental}} and African Studies, 17 (1956); 43-63.
| |
| − | [27]. Gellner, Legitimation, p. 120.
| |
| − | [28]. P. De Silva, [[Buddhist]] and Freudian {{Wiki|Psychology}} ({{Wiki|Colombo}}: Lake House, 1974).
| |
| − | [29]. R. Johanssen, The {{Wiki|Psychology}} of [[Nirvana]]. ({{Wiki|London}}: Alien and Unwin, 1969).
| |
| − | [30]. P. Demieville, Le Concile du {{Wiki|Lhasa}} ({{Wiki|Paris}}: Imprimerie Nationale, 1952). E. Obermiller, "A [[Sanskrit]] Ms. from Tibet—Kamalasila's Bhavana-krama," Journal of the [[Greater]] [[India]] {{Wiki|Society}} 2(1935): 1-11. G. Tucci, trans., Minor [[Buddhist Texts]], Part 11. The First Bhavana-Krama of [[Kamalasila]], Serie Orientale 9 (2) ({{Wiki|Rome}}: Institute Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, 1958).
| |
| − | [31]. P. Yampolsky, trans.. The [[Platform Sūtra]] of the [[Sixth Patriarch]] ({{Wiki|New York}}: Columbia [[University]] Press, 1967).
| |
| − | [32]. For "Hui-Neng" one may therefore read "Shen-hui," the historical proponent and/or source of the [[teaching]] attributed to Hui-Neng.
| |
| − | [33]. H. Dumoulin, {{Wiki|History}} of [[Zen Buddhism]], P. Peachev, trans., ({{Wiki|New York}}: {{Wiki|Pantheon}}, 1963), 87.
| |
| − | [34]. Yampolsky. [[Platform Sūtra]]. p. 116.
| |
| − | [35]. Dumoulin, {{Wiki|History}} of [[Zen]], p. 95.
| |
| − | [36]. Yampolsky. [[Platform Sutra]], p. 116.
| |
| − | [37]. Ibid..p. 115.
| |
| − | [38]. G. Dharmasiri, A [[Buddhist]] Critique of the {{Wiki|Christian}} {{Wiki|Concept}} of [[God]] ({{Wiki|Colombo}}, [[Sri Lanka]]: Lake House. 1975), pp. 199ff.
| |
| − | [39]. Jayatilleke, Early [[Buddhist]] {{Wiki|Theory}} of [[Knowledge]], chap. 5.
| |
| − | [40]. Obermiller, "A [[Sanskrit]] Ms.." p. 5.
| |
| − | [41]. A. K. Warder, [[Indian Buddhism]] ({{Wiki|Delhi}}: {{Wiki|Motilal Banarsidass}}, 1970). pp. 467f.
| |
| − | [42]. Ibid.,pp.477ff.
| |
| − | [43]. Tucci. Minor [[Buddhist Texts]], pp. 173-175.
| |
| − | [44]. Ibid., pp. 175f.
| |
| − | [45]. Ibid- p. 60.
| |
| − | [46]. Ibid.. p, 105.
| |
| − | [47]. Ibid., pp. 64. 103', 104-111.
| |
| − | [48]. Ibid., pp. 104-111.
| |
| − | [49]. Ibid.. p. 105.
| |
| − | [50]. K, Potter, Presuppositions of India's [[Philosophies]] (Englewood Cliffs, {{Wiki|New Jersey}}: Prentice-Hall. 1963),pp.239f.
| |
| − | [51]. Warder, [[Indian Buddhism]], pp. 476f.
| |
| − | [52]. Tucci, Minor [[Buddhist Texts]], p. 160.
| |
| − | [53]. Potter, Presuppositions, p. 233.
| |
| − | [54]. Ibid., p. 240.
| |
| − | [55]. Ibid., p. 233.
| |
| − | [56. Ibid., p. 141.
| |
| − | [57]. Warder, [[Indian Buddhism]], p. 468.
| |
| − | [58]. Potter, Presuppositions, p. 194. Also [[Kalupahana]], [[Buddhist Philosophy]], pp. 138f., that [[Kamalaśīla]] held the [[principle]] of [[causality]] to be {{Wiki|central}} to [[Buddhist]] conceptions of [[reality]].
| |
| − | [59]. Warder, [[Indian Buddhism]], p. 468.
| |
| − | [60]. T. Stcherbatsky, [[Buddhist Logic]], 2 volumes ({{Wiki|New York}}: Dover, 1962 of original 1930), 1: 76f.
| |
| − | [61]. Tucci, Minor [[Buddhist Texts]], p. 477.
| |
| − | [62]. Ibid., p. 170.
| |
| − | [63]. R. Gombrich. [[Precept]] and [[Practice]]. (Oxford: Oxford [[University]] Press, 1971), pp. 121f.
| |
| − | [64]. C. Levi-Strauss, Structural {{Wiki|Anthropology}} ({{Wiki|New York}}: Doubleday, 1967), chaps. 1-4, 11,15, 16.
| |
| − | </poem>
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| − | {{R
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| − | Category:Zen
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