Buddhist Psychology and Different Virtues

 Part 2. Reflections and notes on Damien Keown's The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, 1992.

Scholars have analyzed, contested and debated about the relationship between ethics and psychology and in many cases with reference to Abhidharma or Buddhist scholasticism. In terms of Buddhist psychology, the fundamental cause of suffering in life or living this “samsaric life” can be said precisely as the need to purify the mind (citta) whose real essence is pure but it is been contaminated by all sorts of different mental states (caitta) and destructive emotions (Keown, 1992, 57). the abhidharmic literature, it lies out the theory of dharmas of Buddhist philosophy: dharmas are basic and impartite constituents of reality, the ultimate reals or ontologically grounded existents.

Keown thinks that the nearest to a theoretical approach to moral philosophy within the Buddhist ethics is found in the abhidharma and therefore it is worth the attention to its analytic framework. He rejects King’s notion that abhidharmic ethical theory is meaningless and confounding for the western mind with its maze of Buddhist psychological terminology (Keown, 1992, 59). Keown argues that the difficulty of terminology cannot be good enough a reason to ignore what this tradition offers and sheds light on the nature of Buddhist ethics. He holds that abhidharmic ethical classifications are “readily intelligible” in terms of the one of the oldest and most influential concepts in western ethics, namely – the concept of virtues (59). According to abhidharma, enlightenment is achieved through purifying the personal continuum (santana) of all defilements (klesa).

So in the taxonomical traditions of the mind and mental states; in case of Theravada tradition, there are fifty-two different types of mental states or qualities and without understanding the ethical functions of these states; it is impossible to provide an analysis of sila at its most basic level. In Sarvastivada tradition, there are seventy-five dharmas and of which forty-seven are of psychological nature. Despite the variations in detail all schools acknowledge a similar classificatory rubrics, and the standard classification is four-fold: matter (rupa), mind (citta), mental states (caitta) and the unconditioned (nirvana). Only a third of these are related to ethics, which falls under the third category and its relation to the fourth. Citta is the center of subjective consciousness, which is viewed as an arsenal or storage of dispositional properties that take its form in mental predispositions. “It is the personal psychological factor responsible for the unity and continuity of the human being (61)”.

Keown point out that one important conclusion to be made from the abhidharma is that Buddhist ethics is naturalistic. Why? Because the abhidharmic analysis of vices and virtues – since there are dharmas – are objective and real. They are not part of our mental construction, but are actually found within the psyche (64). Now, the implication of this objectivisation is what Buddhist ethics necessarily rules out relativism: what is ultimately good or bad is not determined by accidental factors but grounded in human nature. The dharma-theory of abhidharma commands its authority on the nature of human mind and mental phenomena within which ethics resides.

         Keown finds it important to distinguish moral virtues as opposed to intellectual virtues to the study of concept of virtues in general, because virtues or vices may be either cognitive or non-cognitive. And he proceeds to do so though he designates chapter eight as where he engages with this in detail (64). The distinction he makes clear as intellectual vice is a form of “cognitive error” such as delusion or moha, while moral vices forms of non-cognitive errors such craving and hatred. However, Keown acknowledges about the difficulties of distinction between the affective and the cognitive in Buddhist psychology, because cognition and feeling are mental processes dependent on citta. The exact nature of their relationship (Vedana vs. Sanna) is troublesome (67).

Keown draws on western thinkers to see how the debate between moral and emotions has taken its route in the west, but argues that, contrary to Socrates (virtue is reducible to knowledge) and general belief about Buddhism, he posits that neither of the two: sila or panna are reducible to one another (72). Keown’s posits that the approach of reason-emotion bifurcation is artificial and seeks a “middle-way” between them. And that is the Aristotelian tradition that he finds most congenial to Buddhist ethics, i.e. they both view that reason and emotion are complementary rather than disjunctive (72). Keown doesn’t address this in detail here as reserves a whole chapter on that latter in the book, but it seems plausible to say that virtue ethics is nearest to Buddhist ethics. However, from a Buddhist perspective, even though the conclusions might look similar and somewhat compatible, the arguments leading to that conclusion may differ greatly: for instance, the assumptions about the nature of mind and human condition etc.

Note: [Chapter four addresses on the subject of transcendency hypothesis by King and Spiro to which Keown responses by arguing that the Raft Parable they are employing meant to prove or support their point about the position, their anthropological studies in Burma on Karmmatic and Nirvanic Buddhism is confounding. Keown tries to discredit their claim by arguing that sila and panna are essential in post-enlightenment existence, that they are not disassociated. I will address this raft parable in detail with Keown's detailed exposition on the entangled nature of prajna and karuna later. Chapter five follows on the same line about the role of ethics in Buddhist soteriological program as we discussed in the last meeting, “Nirvana and the Path lie in the same continuum”. ]

 Works Cited

Keown, Damien[[Wikipedia:|]].

    1992 The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, New York, Palgrave.