Transcendence and Soteriology

 Part 1. [Reflections and notes on Damien Keown's The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, 1992.]

Ethics in Buddhism is psychological analysis and mind control, not a search for a foundation of ethical principles, a hierarchical arrangement of ethical values, or an enquiry into their objectivity (12). The chief reason why Buddhist ethics doesn’t have autonomy as in the West as an independent philosophical disciplines is: because Buddha taught his teachings, dhamma, a detailed and systematic exposition of normative ethical principles in terms of which the noble life should be led. The urgency now is for implementation rather than further speculation (12). Therefore, Buddhists have shown little interest or initiative in developing and refining the tools of ethical analysis, because it assumes that ethical dilemmas or problems will be solved or dissolved in the pursuit of a religious life, as one’s spiritual training toward enlightenment progress – ethical problems or choices will be become clear and unproblematic (12).

It begs the question of what is the relation of ethics to the structure of Buddhist doctrine and practice? Or, what is the effect of nirvana-karma polarity of emphasis upon ethical values? More practically, how does Buddhism practically and specifically analyze ethical goodness or badness in the sphere of concrete action? These are the questions Keown attempts are to address in this book. Specifically, he asks what does sila or right conduct meanin context of the eightfold path?In other words, what is the role of ethics in the Buddhist soteriological program? This has become a subject to scholarly debates. Jayatilleke posits “Buddhist ethics as a form of enlightened egoism or enlightened altruism, which can be best characterized as an ethical universalism, while rejecting absolutism and recognizing relativism, the objectivity of moral values is not denied, but he thinks Buddhist ethics is “teleological rather than deontological” in character (7). He argues that Buddhist ethics contain “a factual component and an emotive-prescriptive component.” While others like Premasiri, following a detailed analysis and evidence from Pali Cannon, concludes that Buddhist ethics is “objectivist and naturalist”.

            These debates seem to be stemming from the fundamental difference in the soteriological goal of these different traditions. It is the questions of relationship of Buddhist ethics and its doctrines and practice, relationship between ethics, knowledge and summum bonum, or in Buddhist terminology; sila, panna and nibbana. The question remains; how do Buddhist moral and intellectual goods relate to one another within the framework of Buddhist soteriology? The common view is that sila is instrumental to knowledge (panna) and then realize the latter, nibbana. In which case, Nibbana is essentially in procession of certain kind of knowledge and it becomes the intellectual goal and the role of sila remains simply instrumental. In terms of the eightfold path, morality is viewed as preliminary stage and a stepping-stone to intellectual goal of knowledge. Thus, sila leads to samadhi or meditation that leads to panna. The role of sila is provisional.

This, however, assumes that enlightenment is a statement of moral transcendence. i.e. nibbana is amoral or supramoral. So ethics is extrinsic to nibbana, dispensable and subsidiary to knowledge. On the contrary, another position is that ethics and knowledge can co-exist in post-enlightenment. Keown’s own view is that they can co-exist and there is no superiority of one over the other, their co-existence makes enlightenment possible. That is why there is a huge emphasis on both karuna and panna (wisdom and compassion) in attaining nibbana. Ethics is intrinsic to nibbana, essential and equal in value to knowledge.

The former position seems to be coming from Theravadin traditions,utilitarians make reference to the Parable of Raft, which is interpreted to mean that ethical considerations are ultimately to be transcended, “morality is to be left behind, like a raft once the crossing over has been safely accomplished”, Arahatship is beyond good and evil. The implication is that it is not a morality at all, just a form of philosophical egoism, subjectively amoral. Let me put it this way for clarity and I will expand on them in later posts of this series:

    Refutation: contraindications to the utilitarian presumption include the tendency among Buddhists to regard precepts as moral absolutes, that ethics is an end in itself as noted by King.
    Misra argues that Buddhist ethics is intuitionistic, Kantian. Keown thinks Misra is right about the proximity of Buddhism to Kantianism as opposed to utilitarianism.
    Dharmasiri claims that Buddhist ethics a form of ideal utilitarianism, of rule-utilitarian sub-class. He qualifies this by adding that Buddhism embraces deontology and teleology only eventually transcends them both. (17)
    Rahula argues for the importance both karuna and panna on the path of perfection.

Work Cited:

Keown, Damien.

1992 The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, New York, Palgrave.

Source

emptinez.me