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Difference between revisions of "The Theory of Perception as propounded by Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara"

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Perception according to Dharmakīrti consists in the apprehension of an object in its own specific character (svalakṣaṇa) having nothing in common with other objects similar or dissimilar and is thus completely free from association with names and verbal expressions—an association which presupposes and is made possible by relational thought. The object of perception is the reality which is immediately revealed to the mind and not such other ideas as generality (sāmānya), quality (guṇa), action (kriyā), substratum (dravya), or name (nāman), which are not a part of the presented sense-data but are supplied by imagination (vikalpa). The criterion of reality from unreal creation of fancy or imagination is this: that which by its position of nearness or distance affects the presentative character of perception is alone real. Thus, a jug or rather its presentation is seen to vary as faint or distinct according to its situation in relation to the percipient. But ah idea, which is supplied by memory-association or conjured up in imagination, does not undergo any variation whether the object represented be situated near to or distant from the perceiving subject. This reality is alone endowed with practical efficiency (arthakriyā-kāritva) and not the fancied or inferred object, which is not presented through sense-medium. The test of reality therefore is practical efficiency alone and not any thing else.
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[[Perception]] according to [[Dharmakīrti]] consists in the apprehension of an [[object]] in its [[own]] specific [[character]] ([[svalakṣaṇa]]) having nothing in common with other [[objects]] similar or dissimilar and is thus completely free from association with names and [[verbal]] expressions—an association which presupposes and is made possible by relational [[thought]]. The [[object]] of [[perception]] is the [[reality]] which is immediately revealed to the [[mind]] and not such other [[ideas]] as [[generality]] ([[sāmānya]]), [[quality]] ([[guṇa]]), [[action]] ([[kriyā]]), [[substratum]] ([[dravya]]), or [[name]] (nāman), which are not a part of the presented sense-data but are supplied by [[imagination]] ([[vikalpa]]). The criterion of [[reality]] from unreal creation of fancy or [[imagination]] is this: that which by its position of [[nearness]] or distance affects the presentative [[character]] of [[perception]] is alone real. Thus, a jug or rather its presentation is seen to vary as faint or {{Wiki|distinct}} according to its situation in [[relation]] to the percipient. But [[ah]] [[idea]], which is supplied by memory-association or conjured up in [[imagination]], does not undergo any variation whether the [[object]] represented be situated near to or distant from the perceiving [[subject]]. This [[reality]] is alone endowed with {{Wiki|practical}} efficiency (arthakriyā-kāritva) and not the fancied or inferred [[object]], which is not presented through sense-medium. The test of [[reality]] therefore is {{Wiki|practical}} efficiency alone and not any thing else.
  
The Theory of Perception of Dharmakīrti, or of the Sautrāntika school for the matter of that whose system is expounded by Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu, is rather an intricate one. All existents being momentary in character, the thing that is in contact with the sense-organ at one moment is not contemporaneous with the idea that springs up in the mind at the second moment. Thus perception is impossible inasmuch as the mind cannot come in direct relation with the extra-mental reality but through the medium of sense-organs only. In view of this difficulty it has been postulated that a sense-object has the power to leave behind an impress of its image in the consciousness through the sense-channel. By virtue of this peculiar efficiency a sense-object is regarded as an object of perception.[1] What really is immediately perceived is not the external object but a copy or image of it imprinted on the consciousness. And this mental image is regarded as a faithful representation—an exact copy of the extramental reality existing in its own right. It is evident therefore that external reality can never be an immediate object of perception but can at best be mediately known—in other words, it can only be inferred by its supposed likeness presented in the idea. Perception of an external object is therefore only the perception of the idea believed to be a copy or picture of the same.
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[[The Theory of Perception]] of [[Dharmakīrti]], or of the [[Sautrāntika school]] for the {{Wiki|matter}} of that whose system is expounded by [[Dharmakīrti]] in his [[Nyāyabindu]], is rather an intricate one. All [[existents]] being momentary in [[character]], the thing that is in [[contact]] with the [[sense-organ]] at one [[moment]] is not contemporaneous with the [[idea]] that springs up in the [[mind]] at the second [[moment]]. Thus [[perception]] is impossible inasmuch as the [[mind]] cannot come in direct [[relation]] with the extra-mental [[reality]] but through the {{Wiki|medium}} of [[sense-organs]] only. In view of this difficulty it has been postulated that a [[sense-object]] has the power to leave behind an impress of its image in the [[consciousness]] through the sense-channel. By [[virtue]] of this peculiar efficiency a [[sense-object]] is regarded as an [[object]] of [[perception]].[1] What really is immediately [[perceived]] is not the [[external object]] but a copy or image of it imprinted on the [[consciousness]]. And this [[mental]] image is regarded as a [[faithful]] representation—an exact copy of the extramental [[reality]] [[existing]] in its [[own]] right. It is evident therefore that [[external reality]] can never be an immediate [[object]] of [[perception]] but can at best be mediately known—in other words, it can only be inferred by its supposed likeness presented in the [[idea]]. [[Perception]] of an [[external object]] is therefore only the [[perception]] of the [[idea]] believed to be a copy or picture of the same.
  
In this connection an interesting but extremely difficult question has been raised as to the immediate cause of perceptual knowledge (pramāṇa). Our consciousness is seen to be ever active varying with a constantly variable content. The conscious character is however common to all the different cognitions forming the sumtotal of consciousness, the differentiating factor being the varying contents. What is the cause of this variation of contents in consciousness? Certainly, the Sautrāntika observes, it is nothing but the objective reality lying outside the mind but coming in contact with it.
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In this [[connection]] an [[interesting]] but extremely difficult question has been raised as to the [[immediate cause]] of {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]] ([[pramāṇa]]). Our [[consciousness]] is seen to be ever active varying with a constantly variable content. The [[conscious]] [[character]] is however common to all the different [[cognitions]] forming the sumtotal of [[consciousness]], the differentiating factor being the varying contents. What is the [[cause]] of this variation of contents in [[consciousness]]? Certainly, the [[Sautrāntika]] observes, it is nothing but the [[objective reality]] {{Wiki|lying}} outside the [[mind]] but coming in [[contact]] with it.
  
But this objective reality lying outside the mind, cannot, as has been shown above, be directly cognised by the mind because of its momentary character. It is only the image or copy of it that is directly cognised and the supposed likeness of the percept, that is the idea in the mind, to the extra-mental reality is to be regarded as the cause and warrant of its validity (arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam, tadvaśād arthapratītisiddheh); and the cognition as such is regarded as the resultant of the same. Thus, the cognition of ‘blue’ has a particular form which is different from that of the cognition of ‘red.’ The conscient character is common to both; what varies is only the form, that is, the content. So the immediate cause of a particular cognition (pramāṇam) is the form or the likeness impressed on it and not sense-organs as supposed by the Naiyāyikas. It is the particular form or likeness which determines the character of a cognition and not sense-organ, which is common to cognitions of red, blue, white and so forth.[2]
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But this [[objective reality]] {{Wiki|lying}} outside the [[mind]], cannot, as has been shown above, be directly cognised by the [[mind]] because of its momentary [[character]]. It is only the image or copy of it that is directly cognised and the supposed likeness of the [[percept]], that is the [[idea]] in the [[mind]], to the extra-mental [[reality]] is to be regarded as the [[cause]] and warrant of its validity (arthasārūpyam asya [[pramāṇam]], tadvaśād arthapratītisiddheh); and the [[cognition]] as such is regarded as the resultant of the same. Thus, the [[cognition]] of ‘blue’ has a particular [[form]] which is different from that of the [[cognition]] of ‘[[red]].’ The conscient [[character]] is common to both; what varies is only the [[form]], that is, the content. So the [[immediate cause]] of a particular [[cognition]] ([[pramāṇam]]) is the [[form]] or the likeness impressed on it and not [[sense-organs]] as supposed by the [[Naiyāyikas]]. It is the particular [[form]] or likeness which determines the [[character]] of a [[cognition]] and not [[sense-organ]], which is common to [[cognitions]] of [[red]], blue, white and so forth.[2]
  
A difficulty has been raised in this connection by rival schools of thinkers. The cognition and its likeness (sārūpyam) are not two distinct things but one. So Dharmakīrti makes the same thing pramāṇa (cause of knowledge) and pramāṇaphala (the resultant cognition), which is absurd. Pramaṇa is the cause of cognition and the effect of it is the cognition itself revealing a particular object.[3] To make the same thing both cause and effect only betrays confusion of thought.
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A difficulty has been raised in this [[connection]] by rival schools of thinkers. The [[cognition]] and its likeness (sārūpyam) are not two {{Wiki|distinct}} things but one. So [[Dharmakīrti]] makes the same thing [[pramāṇa]] ([[cause]] of [[knowledge]]) and [[pramāṇaphala]] (the resultant [[cognition]]), which is absurd. [[Pramaṇa]] is the [[cause]] of [[cognition]] and the effect of it is the [[cognition]] itself revealing a particular [[object]].[3] To make the same thing both [[cause and effect]] only betrays [[confusion]] of [[thought]].
  
In reply to this objection Dharmottara says that the relation of pramāṇa and pramā is not a causal relation but one of determination. When in contradistinction to the perception of a red object we have a cognition of blue, we feel that the particular cognition refers to a thing which is different from the red that was perceived immediately before. What enables us to differentiate the cognition of blue from the cognition of red is the peculiar blue-form experienced in the percept. Thus the cognition is ascertained to be one of blue and not of any other, only when the particular likeness imprinted on it is perceived.[4]
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In reply to this objection [[Dharmottara]] says that the [[relation]] of [[pramāṇa]] and [[pramā]] is not a causal [[relation]] but one of [[determination]]. When in contradistinction to the [[perception]] of a [[red]] [[object]] we have a [[cognition]] of blue, we [[feel]] that the particular [[cognition]] refers to a thing which is different from the [[red]] that was [[perceived]] immediately before. What enables us to differentiate the [[cognition]] of blue from the [[cognition]] of [[red]] is the peculiar blue-form [[experienced]] in the [[percept]]. Thus the [[cognition]] is ascertained to be one of blue and not of any other, only when the particular likeness imprinted on it is [[perceived]].[4]
  
So the objection that the same cognition cannot be both pramāṇa and pramā has no force as the relation supposed is not one of cause and effect but that of determinant and determinable.[5] They are one as relating to one single cognition, but different only on account of one aspect having a determining force and the other being determined.[6]
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So the objection that the same [[cognition]] cannot be both [[pramāṇa]] and [[pramā]] has no force as the [[relation]] supposed is not one of [[cause and effect]] but that of determinant and determinable.[5] They are one as relating to one single [[cognition]], but different only on account of one aspect having a determining force and the other being determined.[6]
  
We have seen how the selfsame cognition can alternately discharge the dual function of pramāṇa and pramā, in other words, how a cognition can be both the condition and the result of itself. It is effected by a change of emphasis. Thus when the emphasis is laid upon the particular form of the cognition, the form is regarded as the condition of perceptual knowledge and when the emphasis is transferred to the quality of consciousness endowed with a particular content, the consciousness is said to be determined or conditioned by the likeness imprinted on it, which is thus regarded as the determining condition. The Buddhists had recourse to this rather cumbrous theory because they did not acknowledge the existence of a separate spirit-entity standing aloof behind the mental apparatus and illumining the psychical processes going on therein. The Jainas are at one in this respect with the Buddhists, as they also denied the existence of a spirit-entity as separate and distinct from the mind.[7] The logical consequence of this identification of consciousness with the varying mental states has been the doctrine of momentary consciousness—consciousness reduced to a series of transitory mental states in perpetual flux. The notion of continuity has been explained away as an illusion, being due to the homogeneity and the free unimpeded career of the conscious states. The Jainas have avoided this consequence by their peculiar doctrine of relativity (anekāntavāda), which possesses the miraculous efficiency of reconciling all contradiction.
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We have seen how the selfsame [[cognition]] can alternately [[discharge]] the dual function of [[pramāṇa]] and [[pramā]], in other words, how a [[cognition]] can be both the [[condition]] and the result of itself. It is effected by a change of {{Wiki|emphasis}}. Thus when the {{Wiki|emphasis}} is laid upon the particular [[form]] of the [[cognition]], the [[form]] is regarded as the [[condition]] of {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]] and when the {{Wiki|emphasis}} is transferred to the [[quality]] of [[consciousness]] endowed with a particular content, the [[consciousness]] is said to be determined or [[conditioned]] by the likeness imprinted on it, which is thus regarded as the determining [[condition]]. The [[Buddhists]] had recourse to this rather cumbrous {{Wiki|theory}} because they did not [[acknowledge]] the [[existence]] of a separate spirit-entity [[standing]] aloof behind the [[mental]] apparatus and illumining the psychical {{Wiki|processes}} going on therein. The [[Jainas]] are at one in this [[respect]] with the [[Buddhists]], as they also denied the [[existence]] of a spirit-entity as separate and {{Wiki|distinct}} from the [[mind]].[7] The [[logical consequence]] of this identification of [[consciousness]] with the varying [[mental states]] has been the [[doctrine]] of momentary consciousness—consciousness reduced to a series of transitory [[mental states]] in [[perpetual]] flux. The notion of continuity has been explained away as an [[illusion]], being due to the [[homogeneity]] and the free unimpeded career of the [[conscious]] states. The [[Jainas]] have avoided this consequence by their peculiar [[doctrine]] of [[relativity]] ([[anekāntavāda]]), which possesses the miraculous efficiency of reconciling all {{Wiki|contradiction}}.
  
The Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntists have avoided this pitfall by positing the existence of a spirit-entity standing aloof, detached and unaffected by the varying psychical processes though animating them all the while with the light of knowledge. The consciousness in the psychical states is only apparent; it is at best borrowed from the eternal spirit-entity (sākṣī). But with the Buddhists and the Jainas there is no soul distinct from the mind. Vijñānabhikṣu is very severe upon the Buddhists for their identifying consciousness with the passing psychical states with the result that consciousness has been reduced to a congeries of momentary conscious units having no real nexus between.[8]
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The [[Sāṃkhyas]] and the [[Vedāntists]] have avoided this pitfall by positing the [[existence]] of a spirit-entity [[standing]] aloof, [[detached]] and unaffected by the varying psychical {{Wiki|processes}} though animating them all the while with the {{Wiki|light}} of [[knowledge]]. The [[consciousness]] in the psychical states is only apparent; it is at best borrowed from the eternal spirit-entity (sākṣī). But with the [[Buddhists]] and the [[Jainas]] there is [[no soul]] {{Wiki|distinct}} from the [[mind]]. [[Vijñānabhikṣu]] is very severe upon the [[Buddhists]] for their identifying [[consciousness]] with the passing psychical states with the result that [[consciousness]] has been reduced to a congeries of momentary [[conscious]] units having no real {{Wiki|nexus}} between.[8]
  
Be that as it may, a question has been raised as to why a perception free from determination (nirvikalpa) is alone regarded as reliable evidence of reality, though it has no practical utility unless and until it is made determinate. It can be converted into useful knowledge only when determinative reflection (vikalpa) is brought to bear upon it and this determinative process is considered to be purely intellectual having nothing to do with reality proper. Indeterminate perception however has no practical value unless and until it is determined as perception of some thing. And this determination is rendered possible only by the reflective, intellectual activity, which certifies ‘it is blue that is perceived and not red or any other thing.’ Unless and until it is determined as such, the experience is as good as non-existent (asatkalpa), because it cannot lead to any activity and so there is no acquisition of any thing. As perception, determined by an intellectual activity is alone endowed with practical efficiency, it is determined perception (savikalpa pratyakṣa) that should alone be regarded as valid experience (pramāṇa)’, and if vikalpa is invalid by its very nature, how cau it refrain from infecting it with its own invalidity?[9]
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Be that as it may, a question has been raised as to why a [[perception]] free from [[determination]] ([[nirvikalpa]]) is alone regarded as reliable {{Wiki|evidence}} of [[reality]], though it has no {{Wiki|practical}} utility unless and until it is made {{Wiki|determinate}}. It can be converted into useful [[knowledge]] only when {{Wiki|determinative}} {{Wiki|reflection}} ([[vikalpa]]) is brought to bear upon it and this {{Wiki|determinative}} process is considered to be purely [[intellectual]] having nothing to do with [[reality]] proper. {{Wiki|Indeterminate}} [[perception]] however has no {{Wiki|practical}} value unless and until it is determined as [[perception]] of some thing. And this [[determination]] is rendered possible only by the reflective, [[intellectual]] [[activity]], which certifies ‘it is blue that is [[perceived]] and not [[red]] or any other thing.’ Unless and until it is determined as such, the [[experience]] is as good as [[non-existent]] ([[asatkalpa]]), because it cannot lead to any [[activity]] and so there is no acquisition of any thing. As [[perception]], determined by an [[intellectual]] [[activity]] is alone endowed with {{Wiki|practical}} efficiency, it is determined [[perception]] ([[savikalpa]] [[pratyakṣa]]) that should alone be regarded as valid [[experience]] ([[pramāṇa]])’, and if [[vikalpa]] is invalid by its very [[nature]], how cau it refrain from infecting it with its [[own]] invalidity?[9]
  
To this Dharmottara says that there are two kinds of vikalpa and though both the varieties are equally unreliable and invalid by their very constitution, there is a vital difference in their functional character. There is a kind of vikalpa which interprets the perceptual experience and makes it clear and intelligible. It does not assert its independence but functions in the background. The other variety of vikalpa is pure imagination without any touch with external reality. This latter variety is absolutely unreliable as evidence of reality. But the reflective thought, which arises in the trail of perception and is generated under its influence (pratyakṣabalotpanna), stands in a different category. It does not assert its independence as pure imagination does, but only serves to determine the perceptual knowledge as knowledge of something. The nirvikalpaka perception is a simple, homogeneous, unitary cognition, in which the subject and the object, perception and perceptual matter, are not distinguished but given in a lump, as it were. But such knowledge is entirely useless and has no pragmatic value. It is only when perceptual knowledge is interpreted by a subsequent act of reflection, which analyses it into a subjective and an objective element and imposes a relation upon them, that it can be made useful in our practical life. It is however the primary, homogeneous experience (nirvikalpa pratyakṣa) that can be accepted as reliable testimony of the external reality and the reflective thought and the relational knowledge, which is the result of it, are purely subjective facts and are no index to the objective reality—the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa). But the purely subjective character of this reflective process, which is necessary for the interpretation of perception, does not in any way detract from or add to the evidentiary value of perceptual knowledge. The analytic-cum-synthetic process, which is involved in the reflective activity, gives us purely perceptual data and not imaginary things. It is perception all the while even when interpreted by reflective thought. This interpretation only serves to put the perceptual knowledge in a clear light and neither supersedes nor overshadows it. The contention that perceptual knowledge together with vikalpa should be held as valid testimony therefore falls to the ground. Vikalpa is purely subjective and though requisitioned to interpret perceptual experience does not enter into the composition of the perceptual data. The apprehension therefore that vikalpa should infect perceptual knowledge with its own invalid character is without a foundation and only betrays lack of clear vision. The vikalpa, which is imagination pure and simple, is absolutely without touch with reality. It only gives us purely fictitious data, in which our knowledge is of the form ‘I imagine the blue’ and not ‘I perceive the blue.’ It is not attended with that sentiment of belief and sense of security which invariably distinguish perceptual knowledge.[10] This distinction in this functional character is fundamental and must be kept in view for our proper understanding of Dharmakīrti’s theory of Perception.
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To this [[Dharmottara]] says that there are two kinds of [[vikalpa]] and though both the varieties are equally unreliable and invalid by their very constitution, there is a [[vital]] difference in their functional [[character]]. There is a kind of [[vikalpa]] which interprets the {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[experience]] and makes it clear and intelligible. It does not assert its {{Wiki|independence}} but functions in the background. The other variety of [[vikalpa]] is [[pure]] [[imagination]] without any {{Wiki|touch}} with [[external reality]]. This [[latter]] variety is absolutely unreliable [[as evidence]] of [[reality]]. But the reflective [[thought]], which arises in the trail of [[perception]] and is generated under its influence (pratyakṣabalotpanna), stands in a different category. It does not assert its {{Wiki|independence}} as [[pure]] [[imagination]] does, but only serves to determine the {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]] as [[knowledge]] of something. The [[nirvikalpaka]] [[perception]] is a simple, homogeneous, unitary [[cognition]], in which the [[subject]] and the [[object]], [[perception]] and {{Wiki|perceptual}} {{Wiki|matter}}, are not {{Wiki|distinguished}} but given in a lump, as it were. But such [[knowledge]] is entirely useless and has no {{Wiki|pragmatic}} value. It is only when {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]] is interpreted by a subsequent act of {{Wiki|reflection}}, which analyses it into a [[subjective]] and an [[objective]] [[element]] and imposes a [[relation]] upon them, that it can be made useful in our {{Wiki|practical}} [[life]]. It is however the primary, homogeneous [[experience]] ([[nirvikalpa]] [[pratyakṣa]]) that can be accepted as reliable testimony of the [[external reality]] and the reflective [[thought]] and the relational [[knowledge]], which is the result of it, are purely [[subjective]] facts and are no index to the [[objective]] reality—the [[thing-in-itself]] ([[svalakṣaṇa]]). But the purely [[subjective]] [[character]] of this reflective process, which is necessary for the [[interpretation]] of [[perception]], does not in any way detract from or add to the evidentiary value of {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]]. The analytic-cum-synthetic process, which is involved in the reflective [[activity]], gives us purely {{Wiki|perceptual}} {{Wiki|data}} and not [[imaginary]] things. It is [[perception]] all the while even when interpreted by reflective [[thought]]. This [[interpretation]] only serves to put the {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]] in a [[clear light]] and neither supersedes nor overshadows it. The contention that {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]] together with [[vikalpa]] should be held as valid testimony therefore falls to the ground. [[Vikalpa]] is purely [[subjective]] and though requisitioned to interpret {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[experience]] does not enter into the composition of the {{Wiki|perceptual}} {{Wiki|data}}. The apprehension therefore that [[vikalpa]] should infect {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]] with its [[own]] invalid [[character]] is without a foundation and only betrays lack of clear [[vision]]. The [[vikalpa]], which is [[imagination]] [[pure]] and simple, is absolutely without {{Wiki|touch}} with [[reality]]. It only gives us purely fictitious {{Wiki|data}}, in which our [[knowledge]] is of the [[form]] ‘I [[imagine]] the blue’ and not ‘I {{Wiki|perceive}} the blue.’ It is not attended with that sentiment of [[belief]] and [[sense]] of {{Wiki|security}} which invariably distinguish {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]].[10] This {{Wiki|distinction}} in this functional [[character]] is fundamental and must be kept in view for our proper [[understanding]] of [[Dharmakīrti’s]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[Perception]].
  
  
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       T. S. P., under śls. 2034-35.
 
       T. S. P., under śls. 2034-35.
  
Compare Dharmottara: “nīlanirbhāsaṃ hi vijñānaṃ yatas tasmād nīlasya pratītir avasīyate. yebhyo hi cakṣurādibhyo vijñānam utpadyate na tadvaśāt tajjñānaṃ nīlasya saṃvedanaṃ śakyate’vasthāpayitum. nīlasadṛśam tv anubhūyamānaṃ nīlasya saṃvedanam avasthāpyate.”
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Compare [[Dharmottara]]: “nīlanirbhāsaṃ hi [[vijñānaṃ]] yatas tasmād nīlasya pratītir avasīyate. yebhyo hi cakṣurādibhyo [[vijñānam]] utpadyate na tadvaśāt tajjñānaṃ nīlasya saṃvedanaṃ śakyate’vasthāpayitum. nīlasadṛśam tv anubhūyamānaṃ nīlasya saṃvedanam avasthāpyate.”
 
       N. B. T., p. 19.
 
       N. B. T., p. 19.
  
 
[2]:
 
[2]:
  
See Pt. I, pp. 78-9. Dharmakīrti in the Nyāyabindu and so also Dharmottara emphatically maintain the possibility of sense-perception of an objective reality. The mental likeness is regarded as the means of objective perception and not as the object or its substitute. In fact if the objective reality were deemed to have only an inferential status as in Cartesian or Lockian epistemology, the division of perception into sense-perception, etc., would be unmeaning. Dharmakīrti’s theory of sense-perception in my judgment seems to have greater affinities with that of the Critical Realists of America than with the naīve realism of the Cartesian school. This is evident from the emphasis laid by Dharmakīrti on the mediumistic character of the psychical content.
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See Pt. I, pp. 78-9. [[Dharmakīrti]] in the [[Nyāyabindu]] and so also [[Dharmottara]] emphatically maintain the possibility of [[sense-perception]] of an [[objective reality]]. The [[mental]] likeness is regarded as the means of [[objective]] [[perception]] and not as the [[object]] or its substitute. In fact if the [[objective reality]] were deemed to have only an inferential {{Wiki|status}} as in [[Cartesian]] or Lockian epistemology, the [[division]] of [[perception]] into [[sense-perception]], etc., would be unmeaning. [[Dharmakīrti’s]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[sense-perception]] in my [[judgment]] seems to have greater affinities with that of the Critical [[Realists]] of [[America]] than with the naīve [[realism]] of the [[Cartesian]] school. This is evident from the {{Wiki|emphasis}} laid by [[Dharmakīrti]] on the mediumistic [[character]] of the psychical content.
  
 
Cf. arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇaṃ, tadvaśād arthapratītisiddheḥ.
 
Cf. arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇaṃ, tadvaśād arthapratītisiddheḥ.
  
Here the objective likeness of the mental content is regarded as the medium or instrument of perception and not as the object, exactly in the same fashion as sense-organ is regarded as the instrument by the upholders of the presentative theory of perception. The difference lies in this: the mental likeness is substituted for the sense-organ as the instrument or medium of perception, but the instrumental character is never lost sight of. That wo are in direct touch with the objective reality lying outside is apparent from the text of Dharmakīrti himself, where he speaks of the object of perception as the self-characterised unique real (svalakṣaṇa), whose proximity or distance causes variation in tbe presentative character of perceptual knowledge. This text would be reduced to nonsense if the object of perception be believed to be the mental content. This fact distinguishes Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception from that of Kant, who believes the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa of Dharmakīrti) to be unknown and unknowable and from that of the naïve realists, who makes human knowledge a closed circle out of all touch with external reality. I have therefore not hesitated to characterise the realism of Dharmakīrti’s school as Critical Realism in contra-distinction to tbe naīve Realism of the Cartesian school. In fact the theory of perception of the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta schools too should be believed to be presentative, as direct contact with reality is emphasised. If and how far this theory of perception can be logically justified is a different question, which cannot be discussed in the present context.
+
Here the [[objective]] likeness of the [[mental]] content is regarded as the {{Wiki|medium}} or instrument of [[perception]] and not as the [[object]], exactly in the same fashion as [[sense-organ]] is regarded as the instrument by the upholders of the presentative {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]]. The difference lies in this: the [[mental]] likeness is substituted for the [[sense-organ]] as the instrument or {{Wiki|medium}} of [[perception]], but the instrumental [[character]] is never lost [[sight]] of. That wo are in direct {{Wiki|touch}} with the [[objective reality]] {{Wiki|lying}} outside is apparent from the text of [[Dharmakīrti]] himself, where he speaks of the [[object]] of [[perception]] as the self-characterised unique real ([[svalakṣaṇa]]), whose proximity or distance [[causes]] variation in tbe presentative [[character]] of {{Wiki|perceptual}} [[knowledge]]. This text would be reduced to nonsense if the [[object]] of [[perception]] be believed to be the [[mental]] content. This fact distinguishes [[Dharmakīrti’s]] {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] from that of {{Wiki|Kant}}, who believes the [[thing-in-itself]] ([[svalakṣaṇa]] of [[Dharmakīrti]]) to be unknown and unknowable and from that of the naïve [[realists]], who makes [[human]] [[knowledge]] a closed circle out of all {{Wiki|touch}} with [[external reality]]. I have therefore not hesitated to characterise the [[realism]] of [[Dharmakīrti’s]] school as Critical [[Realism]] in contra-distinction to tbe naīve [[Realism]] of the [[Cartesian]] school. In fact the {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] of the [[Sāṃkhya]] and [[Wikipedia:Vedanta|Vedānta]] schools too should be believed to be presentative, as direct [[contact]] with [[reality]] is emphasised. If and how far this {{Wiki|theory}} of [[perception]] can be [[logically]] justified is a different question, which cannot be discussed in the {{Wiki|present}} context.
  
  
Line 59: Line 59:
 
[4]:
 
[4]:
  
sadrśam anubhūyamānaṃ tad vijñānaṃ yan nīlasya grāhakam avasthāpyate niścayapratyayena tasmāt sārūpyam anubhūtaṃ vyavasthāpanahetuḥ, niścayapratyayena ca taj jñānam avasthāpyamānaṃ vyavasthāpyam.............................. vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpapratyayaḥ pratyakṣabalotpanno draṣṭavyaḥ.
+
sadrśam anubhūyamānaṃ tad [[vijñānaṃ]] yan nīlasya grāhakam avasthāpyate niścayapratyayena tasmāt sārūpyam anubhūtaṃ vyavasthāpanahetuḥ, niścayapratyayena ca taj jñānam avasthāpyamānaṃ vyavasthāpyam.............................. vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpapratyayaḥ pratyakṣabalotpanno draṣṭavyaḥ.
 
       N. B. T., p. 19.
 
       N. B. T., p. 19.
  
 
[5]:
 
[5]:
  
nā’sato hetutā nāpi sato hetoḥ phalātmatā |
+
nā’sato hetutā nāpi [[sato]] hetoḥ phalātmatā |
 
iti jaomani doṣaḥ syād vyavasthā tu na doṣibbāk ||
 
iti jaomani doṣaḥ syād vyavasthā tu na doṣibbāk ||
 
       P. Mīm., 1.1.35.
 
       P. Mīm., 1.1.35.
Line 75: Line 75:
 
[7]:
 
[7]:
  
The Jainas hold that all knowledge exists in an accomplished state in the soul and it becomes manifest only when the veil of passion is removed from it. The veil of passion envelops the soul and not the mind, as the soul and mind are not distinct but identical;
+
The [[Jainas]] hold that all [[knowledge]] [[exists]] in an accomplished [[state]] in the [[soul]] and it becomes [[manifest]] only when the [[veil]] of [[passion]] is removed from it. The [[veil]] of [[passion]] envelops the [[soul]] and not the [[mind]], as the [[soul]] and [[mind]] are not {{Wiki|distinct}} but [[identical]];
  
cf. “nā’pi manasas tair āvaraṇam ātmavyatirekeṇā’parasya manaso niṣetsyamānatvāt.”
+
cf. “nā’pi manasas tair āvaraṇam ātmavyatirekeṇā’parasya [[manaso]] niṣetsyamānatvāt.”
 
       P. M. S. Laghu-Vṛtti of Anantavīrya, p. 19 (A.S.B. En.).
 
       P. M. S. Laghu-Vṛtti of Anantavīrya, p. 19 (A.S.B. En.).
  
 
Also cf. ‘cittavyatirekeṇā’tmano’niṣṭatvāt.’
 
Also cf. ‘cittavyatirekeṇā’tmano’niṣṭatvāt.’
       Kamalaśīla, T. S. P., p. 119.
+
       [[Kamalaśīla]], T. S. P., p. 119.
  
 
[8]:
 
[8]:
  
Cf. Vijñānabhikṣu—
+
Cf. [[Vijñānabhikṣu]]—
 
“naivā’lpamatinā śakyo viveko vṛttibodhayoḥ |
 
“naivā’lpamatinā śakyo viveko vṛttibodhayoḥ |
 
tārkikā yatra saṃmūdhāḥ Sāṃkhyānāṃ śreṣṭhatā yataḥ ||
 
tārkikā yatra saṃmūdhāḥ Sāṃkhyānāṃ śreṣṭhatā yataḥ ||
Line 94: Line 94:
 
[9]:
 
[9]:
  
nanu nirvikalpakatvāt pratyakṣam eva nīlabodharūpatvenā (na)’tmānam avasthāpayituṃ śaknoti. niścayapratyayenā’vyavasthāpitaṃ sad api nīlabodharūpaṃ vijñānam asatkalpam eva. tasmān niścayena nīlabodharūpaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ vijñānaṃ nīlabodbātmanā sad bhavati tasmād adhyavasāyaṃ kurvad eva pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam bhavati............ yady evam adhyavasāyasahitam eva pratyakṣam pramāṇaṃ syān na kevalam.
+
nanu nirvikalpakatvāt pratyakṣam eva nīlabodharūpatvenā (na)’tmānam avasthāpayituṃ śaknoti. niścayapratyayenā’vyavasthāpitaṃ [[sad]] api nīlabodharūpaṃ [[vijñānam]] asatkalpam eva. tasmān niścayena nīlabodharūpaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ [[vijñānaṃ]] nīlabodbātmanā [[sad]] bhavati tasmād adhyavasāyaṃ kurvad eva pratyakṣaṃ [[pramāṇam]] bhavati............ yady evam adhyavasāyasahitam eva pratyakṣam pramāṇaṃ syān na kevalam.
 
       N. B. T., p. 20.
 
       N. B. T., p. 20.
  

Latest revision as of 05:08, 4 February 2020



Perception according to Dharmakīrti consists in the apprehension of an object in its own specific character (svalakṣaṇa) having nothing in common with other objects similar or dissimilar and is thus completely free from association with names and verbal expressions—an association which presupposes and is made possible by relational thought. The object of perception is the reality which is immediately revealed to the mind and not such other ideas as generality (sāmānya), quality (guṇa), action (kriyā), substratum (dravya), or name (nāman), which are not a part of the presented sense-data but are supplied by imagination (vikalpa). The criterion of reality from unreal creation of fancy or imagination is this: that which by its position of nearness or distance affects the presentative character of perception is alone real. Thus, a jug or rather its presentation is seen to vary as faint or distinct according to its situation in relation to the percipient. But ah idea, which is supplied by memory-association or conjured up in imagination, does not undergo any variation whether the object represented be situated near to or distant from the perceiving subject. This reality is alone endowed with practical efficiency (arthakriyā-kāritva) and not the fancied or inferred object, which is not presented through sense-medium. The test of reality therefore is practical efficiency alone and not any thing else.

The Theory of Perception of Dharmakīrti, or of the Sautrāntika school for the matter of that whose system is expounded by Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu, is rather an intricate one. All existents being momentary in character, the thing that is in contact with the sense-organ at one moment is not contemporaneous with the idea that springs up in the mind at the second moment. Thus perception is impossible inasmuch as the mind cannot come in direct relation with the extra-mental reality but through the medium of sense-organs only. In view of this difficulty it has been postulated that a sense-object has the power to leave behind an impress of its image in the consciousness through the sense-channel. By virtue of this peculiar efficiency a sense-object is regarded as an object of perception.[1] What really is immediately perceived is not the external object but a copy or image of it imprinted on the consciousness. And this mental image is regarded as a faithful representation—an exact copy of the extramental reality existing in its own right. It is evident therefore that external reality can never be an immediate object of perception but can at best be mediately known—in other words, it can only be inferred by its supposed likeness presented in the idea. Perception of an external object is therefore only the perception of the idea believed to be a copy or picture of the same.

In this connection an interesting but extremely difficult question has been raised as to the immediate cause of perceptual knowledge (pramāṇa). Our consciousness is seen to be ever active varying with a constantly variable content. The conscious character is however common to all the different cognitions forming the sumtotal of consciousness, the differentiating factor being the varying contents. What is the cause of this variation of contents in consciousness? Certainly, the Sautrāntika observes, it is nothing but the objective reality lying outside the mind but coming in contact with it.

But this objective reality lying outside the mind, cannot, as has been shown above, be directly cognised by the mind because of its momentary character. It is only the image or copy of it that is directly cognised and the supposed likeness of the percept, that is the idea in the mind, to the extra-mental reality is to be regarded as the cause and warrant of its validity (arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇam, tadvaśād arthapratītisiddheh); and the cognition as such is regarded as the resultant of the same. Thus, the cognition of ‘blue’ has a particular form which is different from that of the cognition of ‘red.’ The conscient character is common to both; what varies is only the form, that is, the content. So the immediate cause of a particular cognition (pramāṇam) is the form or the likeness impressed on it and not sense-organs as supposed by the Naiyāyikas. It is the particular form or likeness which determines the character of a cognition and not sense-organ, which is common to cognitions of red, blue, white and so forth.[2]

A difficulty has been raised in this connection by rival schools of thinkers. The cognition and its likeness (sārūpyam) are not two distinct things but one. So Dharmakīrti makes the same thing pramāṇa (cause of knowledge) and pramāṇaphala (the resultant cognition), which is absurd. Pramaṇa is the cause of cognition and the effect of it is the cognition itself revealing a particular object.[3] To make the same thing both cause and effect only betrays confusion of thought.

In reply to this objection Dharmottara says that the relation of pramāṇa and pramā is not a causal relation but one of determination. When in contradistinction to the perception of a red object we have a cognition of blue, we feel that the particular cognition refers to a thing which is different from the red that was perceived immediately before. What enables us to differentiate the cognition of blue from the cognition of red is the peculiar blue-form experienced in the percept. Thus the cognition is ascertained to be one of blue and not of any other, only when the particular likeness imprinted on it is perceived.[4]

So the objection that the same cognition cannot be both pramāṇa and pramā has no force as the relation supposed is not one of cause and effect but that of determinant and determinable.[5] They are one as relating to one single cognition, but different only on account of one aspect having a determining force and the other being determined.[6]

We have seen how the selfsame cognition can alternately discharge the dual function of pramāṇa and pramā, in other words, how a cognition can be both the condition and the result of itself. It is effected by a change of emphasis. Thus when the emphasis is laid upon the particular form of the cognition, the form is regarded as the condition of perceptual knowledge and when the emphasis is transferred to the quality of consciousness endowed with a particular content, the consciousness is said to be determined or conditioned by the likeness imprinted on it, which is thus regarded as the determining condition. The Buddhists had recourse to this rather cumbrous theory because they did not acknowledge the existence of a separate spirit-entity standing aloof behind the mental apparatus and illumining the psychical processes going on therein. The Jainas are at one in this respect with the Buddhists, as they also denied the existence of a spirit-entity as separate and distinct from the mind.[7] The logical consequence of this identification of consciousness with the varying mental states has been the doctrine of momentary consciousness—consciousness reduced to a series of transitory mental states in perpetual flux. The notion of continuity has been explained away as an illusion, being due to the homogeneity and the free unimpeded career of the conscious states. The Jainas have avoided this consequence by their peculiar doctrine of relativity (anekāntavāda), which possesses the miraculous efficiency of reconciling all contradiction.

The Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntists have avoided this pitfall by positing the existence of a spirit-entity standing aloof, detached and unaffected by the varying psychical processes though animating them all the while with the light of knowledge. The consciousness in the psychical states is only apparent; it is at best borrowed from the eternal spirit-entity (sākṣī). But with the Buddhists and the Jainas there is no soul distinct from the mind. Vijñānabhikṣu is very severe upon the Buddhists for their identifying consciousness with the passing psychical states with the result that consciousness has been reduced to a congeries of momentary conscious units having no real nexus between.[8]

Be that as it may, a question has been raised as to why a perception free from determination (nirvikalpa) is alone regarded as reliable evidence of reality, though it has no practical utility unless and until it is made determinate. It can be converted into useful knowledge only when determinative reflection (vikalpa) is brought to bear upon it and this determinative process is considered to be purely intellectual having nothing to do with reality proper. Indeterminate perception however has no practical value unless and until it is determined as perception of some thing. And this determination is rendered possible only by the reflective, intellectual activity, which certifies ‘it is blue that is perceived and not red or any other thing.’ Unless and until it is determined as such, the experience is as good as non-existent (asatkalpa), because it cannot lead to any activity and so there is no acquisition of any thing. As perception, determined by an intellectual activity is alone endowed with practical efficiency, it is determined perception (savikalpa pratyakṣa) that should alone be regarded as valid experience (pramāṇa)’, and if vikalpa is invalid by its very nature, how cau it refrain from infecting it with its own invalidity?[9]

To this Dharmottara says that there are two kinds of vikalpa and though both the varieties are equally unreliable and invalid by their very constitution, there is a vital difference in their functional character. There is a kind of vikalpa which interprets the perceptual experience and makes it clear and intelligible. It does not assert its independence but functions in the background. The other variety of vikalpa is pure imagination without any touch with external reality. This latter variety is absolutely unreliable as evidence of reality. But the reflective thought, which arises in the trail of perception and is generated under its influence (pratyakṣabalotpanna), stands in a different category. It does not assert its independence as pure imagination does, but only serves to determine the perceptual knowledge as knowledge of something. The nirvikalpaka perception is a simple, homogeneous, unitary cognition, in which the subject and the object, perception and perceptual matter, are not distinguished but given in a lump, as it were. But such knowledge is entirely useless and has no pragmatic value. It is only when perceptual knowledge is interpreted by a subsequent act of reflection, which analyses it into a subjective and an objective element and imposes a relation upon them, that it can be made useful in our practical life. It is however the primary, homogeneous experience (nirvikalpa pratyakṣa) that can be accepted as reliable testimony of the external reality and the reflective thought and the relational knowledge, which is the result of it, are purely subjective facts and are no index to the objective reality—the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa). But the purely subjective character of this reflective process, which is necessary for the interpretation of perception, does not in any way detract from or add to the evidentiary value of perceptual knowledge. The analytic-cum-synthetic process, which is involved in the reflective activity, gives us purely perceptual data and not imaginary things. It is perception all the while even when interpreted by reflective thought. This interpretation only serves to put the perceptual knowledge in a clear light and neither supersedes nor overshadows it. The contention that perceptual knowledge together with vikalpa should be held as valid testimony therefore falls to the ground. Vikalpa is purely subjective and though requisitioned to interpret perceptual experience does not enter into the composition of the perceptual data. The apprehension therefore that vikalpa should infect perceptual knowledge with its own invalid character is without a foundation and only betrays lack of clear vision. The vikalpa, which is imagination pure and simple, is absolutely without touch with reality. It only gives us purely fictitious data, in which our knowledge is of the form ‘I imagine the blue’ and not ‘I perceive the blue.’ It is not attended with that sentiment of belief and sense of security which invariably distinguish perceptual knowledge.[10] This distinction in this functional character is fundamental and must be kept in view for our proper understanding of Dharmakīrti’s theory of Perception.


FOOTNOTES AND REFERENCES:
[1]:

bhinnakālaṃ kathaṃ grāhyam iti ced grāhyatāṃ viduḥ |
hetutvam eva ca vyakter jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam ||
      Quoted in S. D. S., p. 16 and Tāt. tī., p. 153.

Cf. na hi mukhyato yādṛśaṃ jñānasyā’tmasaṃvedanam tādṛg evā’rthasye’stam, kiṃ tarhi svābhāsājñānajanakatvam evā’rthasya saṃvedyatvam.

(also,) ’sākārajṅānapakṣe ca tannirbhāsasya vedyatā |’
      T. S. P., under śls. 2034-35.

Compare Dharmottara: “nīlanirbhāsaṃ hi vijñānaṃ yatas tasmād nīlasya pratītir avasīyate. yebhyo hi cakṣurādibhyo vijñānam utpadyate na tadvaśāt tajjñānaṃ nīlasya saṃvedanaṃ śakyate’vasthāpayitum. nīlasadṛśam tv anubhūyamānaṃ nīlasya saṃvedanam avasthāpyate.”
      N. B. T., p. 19.

[2]:

See Pt. I, pp. 78-9. Dharmakīrti in the Nyāyabindu and so also Dharmottara emphatically maintain the possibility of sense-perception of an objective reality. The mental likeness is regarded as the means of objective perception and not as the object or its substitute. In fact if the objective reality were deemed to have only an inferential status as in Cartesian or Lockian epistemology, the division of perception into sense-perception, etc., would be unmeaning. Dharmakīrti’s theory of sense-perception in my judgment seems to have greater affinities with that of the Critical Realists of America than with the naīve realism of the Cartesian school. This is evident from the emphasis laid by Dharmakīrti on the mediumistic character of the psychical content.

Cf. arthasārūpyam asya pramāṇaṃ, tadvaśād arthapratītisiddheḥ.

Here the objective likeness of the mental content is regarded as the medium or instrument of perception and not as the object, exactly in the same fashion as sense-organ is regarded as the instrument by the upholders of the presentative theory of perception. The difference lies in this: the mental likeness is substituted for the sense-organ as the instrument or medium of perception, but the instrumental character is never lost sight of. That wo are in direct touch with the objective reality lying outside is apparent from the text of Dharmakīrti himself, where he speaks of the object of perception as the self-characterised unique real (svalakṣaṇa), whose proximity or distance causes variation in tbe presentative character of perceptual knowledge. This text would be reduced to nonsense if the object of perception be believed to be the mental content. This fact distinguishes Dharmakīrti’s theory of perception from that of Kant, who believes the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa of Dharmakīrti) to be unknown and unknowable and from that of the naïve realists, who makes human knowledge a closed circle out of all touch with external reality. I have therefore not hesitated to characterise the realism of Dharmakīrti’s school as Critical Realism in contra-distinction to tbe naīve Realism of the Cartesian school. In fact the theory of perception of the Sāṃkhya and Vedānta schools too should be believed to be presentative, as direct contact with reality is emphasised. If and how far this theory of perception can be logically justified is a different question, which cannot be discussed in the present context.



[3]:

‘pramāṇasya phalam arthaprakāśaḥ arthasaṃvedanam’—Hemacandra’s Pramāṇamīmāṃsā, 1.1.35.

[4]:

sadrśam anubhūyamānaṃ tad vijñānaṃ yan nīlasya grāhakam avasthāpyate niścayapratyayena tasmāt sārūpyam anubhūtaṃ vyavasthāpanahetuḥ, niścayapratyayena ca taj jñānam avasthāpyamānaṃ vyavasthāpyam.............................. vyavasthāpakaś ca vikalpapratyayaḥ pratyakṣabalotpanno draṣṭavyaḥ.
      N. B. T., p. 19.

[5]:

nā’sato hetutā nāpi sato hetoḥ phalātmatā |
iti jaomani doṣaḥ syād vyavasthā tu na doṣibbāk ||
      P. Mīm., 1.1.35.

[6]:

ekajñānagatatvena pramāṇaphalayor abhedaḥ, vyavasthāpyavyavasthāpakatvena tu bhedaḥ.
       Ibid, under 1. 1. 38.

[7]:

The Jainas hold that all knowledge exists in an accomplished state in the soul and it becomes manifest only when the veil of passion is removed from it. The veil of passion envelops the soul and not the mind, as the soul and mind are not distinct but identical;

cf. “nā’pi manasas tair āvaraṇam ātmavyatirekeṇā’parasya manaso niṣetsyamānatvāt.”
      P. M. S. Laghu-Vṛtti of Anantavīrya, p. 19 (A.S.B. En.).

Also cf. ‘cittavyatirekeṇā’tmano’niṣṭatvāt.’
      Kamalaśīla, T. S. P., p. 119.

[8]:

Cf. Vijñānabhikṣu
“naivā’lpamatinā śakyo viveko vṛttibodhayoḥ |
tārkikā yatra saṃmūdhāḥ Sāṃkhyānāṃ śreṣṭhatā yataḥ ||
jñānātmatvaśrutau mūḍhā ime bauddhāṣ tamasvinaḥ |
vṛttibodhāvivekena menire kṣaṇikām citim ||”
      Sāṃkhyasāra, Ch. III. śls. 16-17, uttarabhāga.

[9]:

nanu nirvikalpakatvāt pratyakṣam eva nīlabodharūpatvenā (na)’tmānam avasthāpayituṃ śaknoti. niścayapratyayenā’vyavasthāpitaṃ sad api nīlabodharūpaṃ vijñānam asatkalpam eva. tasmān niścayena nīlabodharūpaṃ vyavasthāpitaṃ vijñānaṃ nīlabodbātmanā sad bhavati tasmād adhyavasāyaṃ kurvad eva pratyakṣaṃ pramāṇam bhavati............ yady evam adhyavasāyasahitam eva pratyakṣam pramāṇaṃ syān na kevalam.
      N. B. T., p. 20.

[10]:

Op. cit., p. 20. 11. 7 et seq.



Source

[1]