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Difference between revisions of "Bhāviveka Life"

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(Created page with " Bhāviveka (c. 490-570 CE), also known as Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka - was an Indian Buddhist philosopher and historian, and founder of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka School:...")
 
 
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Bhāviveka (c. 490-570 CE), also known as Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka - was an Indian Buddhist philosopher and historian, and founder of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka School:
+
[[Bhāviveka]] (c. 490-570 CE), also known as [[Bhavya]] or [[Bhāvaviveka]] - was an [[Indian Buddhist]] [[philosopher]] and historian, and founder of the [[Svātantrika-Madhyamaka]] School:
  
Born to a royal family in Malyara, in South India (although some Chinese sources claim it was in Magadha, in North India), Bhāviveka studied both sūtra and śāstra literatures during his formative years.
+
Born to a {{Wiki|royal}} [[family]] in Malyara, in [[South India]] (although some {{Wiki|Chinese}} sources claim it was in [[Magadha]], in [[North India]]), [[Bhāviveka]] studied both [[sūtra]] and [[śāstra]] literatures during his formative years.
  
Having excelled in the art of debate, especially against Hindu apologists of the Saṁkhyā School, he is said to have been the abbot of some 50 monasteries in South India.
+
Having excelled in the [[art]] of [[debate]], especially against [[Hindu]] apologists of the [[Saṁkhyā]] School, he is said to have been the [[abbot]] of some 50 [[monasteries]] in [[South India]].
  
His chief influences were the writings of Nāgārjuna (c. 150 – c. 250 CE), the founder of the Madhyamaka, and treatises on logic from the traditions of Buddhism (especially Dignāga’s works) and Hinduism (especially the Nyāyapraveśa).
+
His chief [[influences]] were the writings of [[Nāgārjuna]] (c. 150 – c. 250 CE), the founder of the [[Madhyamaka]], and treatises on [[logic]] from the [[traditions]] of [[Buddhism]] (especially [[Dignāga’s]] works) and [[Hinduism]] (especially the [[Nyāyapraveśa]]).
  
His chief philosophical contribution was his attempt at formulating a synthesis of Madhyamaka dialectics and the logical conventions of his time.
+
His chief [[philosophical]] contribution was his attempt at formulating a {{Wiki|synthesis}} of [[Madhyamaka]] [[dialectics]] and the [[logical]] conventions of his time.
  
As all of Bhāviveka’s works are lost in the original Sanskrit and preserved only in Tibetan translations, the scholarly world came to know of him only through Candrakīrti (c. 580-650 CE), who refuted Bhāviveka’s position in the 1st chapter of the Prasannapadā (Clear words).
+
As all of [[Bhāviveka’s]] works are lost in the original [[Sanskrit]] and preserved only in [[Tibetan]] translations, the [[scholarly]] [[world]] came to know of him only through [[Candrakīrti]] (c. 580-650 CE), who refuted [[Bhāviveka’s]] position in the 1st [[chapter]] of the [[Prasannapadā]] ([[Clear words]]).
  
It could therefore be argued that current understanding of the Madhyamaka in general has suffered from a one-sided perspective that relies solely on Candrakīrti’s rival school, the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka.
+
It could therefore be argued that current [[understanding]] of the [[Madhyamaka]] in general has [[suffered]] from a one-sided {{Wiki|perspective}} that relies solely on [[Candrakīrti’s]] rival school, the [[Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka]].
  
However, contemporary scholarship no longer neglects Tibetan sources, and thus a more balanced approach has ensued, one that reads Nāgārjuna’s seminal writings through the commentaries of both the Prāsaṅgikas and the Svātantrika.
+
However, contemporary {{Wiki|scholarship}} no longer neglects [[Tibetan]] sources, and thus a more balanced approach has ensued, one that reads [[Nāgārjuna’s]] seminal writings through the commentaries of both the [[Prāsaṅgikas]] and the [[Svātantrika]].
  
Nāgārjuna, especially as read through the commentaries of Buddhapālita (c. 470-550 CE),
+
[[Nāgārjuna]], especially as read through the commentaries of [[Buddhapālita]] (c. 470-550 CE),
  
was characterized by many Indian philosophers as a vaitaṇḍika, a nihilist who refused to assume any thesis (pratijñā) in the course of the on-going dialogue between Hindu thinkers of various schools and the Buddhists:
+
was characterized by many [[Indian]] [[philosophers]] as a vaitaṇḍika, a [[Wikipedia:Nihilist|nihilist]] who refused to assume any {{Wiki|thesis}} ([[pratijñā]]) in the course of the on-going {{Wiki|dialogue}} between [[Hindu]] thinkers of various schools and the [[Buddhists]]:
  
While Madhyamaka thought had not asserted any claim about ultimate truth/reality (param-ārtha-satya),
+
While [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]] had not asserted any claim about [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] truth/reality (param-ārtha-satya),
  
Bhāviveka’s independent reasoning (sva-tantra-anumāna) was applied to conventional truth/reality (saṁvṛti-satya)
+
[[Bhāviveka’s]] {{Wiki|independent}} {{Wiki|reasoning}} (sva-tantra-anumāna) was applied to [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] truth/reality ([[saṁvṛti-satya]])
  
as a means of rescuing logico-linguistic conventions (vyavahāra) from a systematic negation (prasaṅga) that opened the school to charges of nihilism:
+
as a means of rescuing logico-linguistic conventions ([[vyavahāra]]) from a systematic {{Wiki|negation}} ([[prasaṅga]]) that opened the school to charges of [[nihilism]]:
  
While Bhāviveka accepted the Madhyamaka view that ultimately (paramārthataḥ) no entities could be predicated with any form of existence,
+
While [[Bhāviveka]] accepted the [[Madhyamaka]] view that ultimately ([[paramārthataḥ]]) no entities could be predicated with any [[form]] of [[existence]],
  
he was willing to employ such predication on a conventional level:
+
he was willing to employ such predication on a [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] level:
  
In order to maintain the reality and utility of traditional Buddhist categories for talking about the path of spiritual growth while denying the ultimate reality of such categories,
+
In order to maintain the [[reality]] and utility of [[traditional]] [[Buddhist]] categories for talking about the [[path]] of [[spiritual]] growth while denying the [[ultimate reality]] of such categories,
  
he employed a syllogistic thesis (pratijñā),
+
he employed a {{Wiki|syllogistic}} {{Wiki|thesis}} ([[pratijñā]]),
  
a philosophic strategy that was nearly incomprehensible to scholars of the Madhyamaka, who knew this school only through Candrakīrti’s Prāsaṅgika systematization.
+
a [[philosophic]] strategy that was nearly incomprehensible to [[scholars]] of the [[Madhyamaka]], who knew this school only through [[Candrakīrti’s]] [[Prāsaṅgika]] systematization.
  
In order to affirm a thesis on the conventional level while denying it ultimately, Bhāviveka creatively reinterpreted the key Madhyamaka doctrine of the 2 truths (satya-dvaya):
+
In order to affirm a {{Wiki|thesis}} on the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] level while denying it ultimately, [[Bhāviveka]] creatively reinterpreted the key [[Madhyamaka]] [[doctrine]] of the [[2 truths]] (satya-dvaya):
  
 
In his Madhyam-ārtha-saṁgraha, he propounds 2 levels of ultimacy:
 
In his Madhyam-ārtha-saṁgraha, he propounds 2 levels of ultimacy:
  
1) - a highest ultimate that is beyond all predication and specification (aparyāya-paramārtha), in conformity with all Madhyamaka teachings, and
+
1) - a [[highest]] [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] that is beyond all predication and specification (aparyāya-paramārtha), in conformity with all [[Madhyamaka]] teachings, and
  
2) - an ultimate that can be inferred logically and specified meaningfully (paryāya-paramārtha);
+
2) - an [[Wikipedia:Absolute (philosophy)|ultimate]] that can be inferred [[logically]] and specified meaningfully (paryāya-paramārtha);
  
- this latter level was a bold innovation in the history of Madhyamaka thought.
+
- this [[latter]] level was a bold innovation in the history of [[Madhyamaka]] [[thought]].
  
Of course, such a distinction was operative only within the realm of conventional thought.
+
Of course, such a {{Wiki|distinction}} was operative only within the [[realm]] of [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] [[thought]].
  
Again one must employ Bhāviveka’s crucial adverbial codicil, paramārthataḥ, and follow him in claiming that such a distinction, like all distinctions, is ultimately unreal although conventionally useful.
+
Again one must employ [[Bhāviveka’s]] crucial adverbial codicil, [[paramārthataḥ]], and follow him in claiming that such a {{Wiki|distinction}}, like all {{Wiki|distinctions}}, is ultimately unreal although {{Wiki|conventionally}} useful.
  
Bhāviveka’s 2 main philosophic contributions –
+
[[Bhāviveka’s]] 2 main [[philosophic]] contributions –
  
- his affirmation of a thesis on a conventional level and
+
- his [[affirmation]] of a {{Wiki|thesis}} on a [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]] level and
- his reinterpretation of the 2-truths doctrine
+
- his reinterpretation of the 2-truths [[doctrine]]
  
- are evaluated diversely by contemporary scholars.
+
- are evaluated diversely by contemporary [[scholars]].
  
Those unsympathetic to him see his work as an unhappy concession to the logical conventions of his day, a concession that dilutes the rigor of the Madhyamaka dialectic.
+
Those unsympathetic to him see his work as an [[unhappy]] concession to the [[logical]] conventions of his day, a concession that dilutes the rigor of the [[Madhyamaka]] [[dialectic]].
  
Those with more sympathy see his contributions as a creative surge that rescued Buddhist religious philosophies from those dialectical negations that threatened the integrity of the Buddhist path itself.
+
Those with more [[sympathy]] see his contributions as a creative surge that rescued [[Buddhist]] [[religious]] [[philosophies]] from those [[dialectical]] negations that threatened the [[integrity]] of the [[Buddhist path]] itself.
  
Within the evolved Tibetan Buddhist tradition, Bhāviveka is especially known for 2 other contributions:
+
Within the evolved [[Tibetan Buddhist tradition]], [[Bhāviveka]] is especially known for 2 other contributions:
  
His refutations of the rival Yogācāra School are considered to be among the clearest ever written:
+
His refutations of the rival [[Yogācāra School]] are considered to be among the clearest ever written:
  
The 5th chapter of his Tarka-jvālā, the “Yogācārattvaviniścaya,” refutes both the existence of the absolute and the non-existence of the conventional, both seminal Yogācāra positions.
+
The 5th [[chapter]] of his Tarka-jvālā, the “Yogācārattvaviniścaya,” refutes both the [[existence]] of the [[absolute]] and the [[non-existence]] of the [[Wikipedia:Convention (norm)|conventional]], both seminal [[Yogācāra]] positions.
  
He is also the forerunner of the literary style known as siddhānta, which became enormously popular within Tibetan scholarly circles:
+
He is also the forerunner of the {{Wiki|literary}} style known as [[siddhānta]], which became enormously popular within [[Tibetan]] [[scholarly]] circles:
  
A siddhānta text devotes ordered chapters to analysing the philosophic positions (siddhāntas) of rival schools, both Buddhist and Hindu.
+
A [[siddhānta]] text devotes ordered chapters to analysing the [[philosophic]] positions ([[siddhāntas]]) of rival schools, both [[Buddhist]] and [[Hindu]].
  
His Tarka-jvālā (Blaze of Reasoning) contains systematic critiques
+
His Tarka-jvālā (Blaze of {{Wiki|Reasoning}}) contains systematic critiques
  
of the positions held by the Hīnayāna and the Yogācāra, both Buddhist schools, and the Saṁkhyā, Vaiśeṣika, Vedanta, and Mīmāṁsā schools of Hindu philosophy.
+
of the positions held by the [[Hīnayāna]] and the [[Yogācāra]], both [[Buddhist schools]], and the [[Saṁkhyā]], [[Vaiśeṣika]], [[Vedanta]], and [[Mīmāṁsā]] schools of {{Wiki|Hindu philosophy}}.
  
Bhāviveka was also a keen historian:
+
[[Bhāviveka]] was also a keen historian:
  
His Nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna remains one of the most important and reliable sources for the early history of the Buddhist order, and for information on the schisms within its ranks.
+
His Nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna remains one of the most important and reliable sources for the early history of the [[Buddhist order]], and for [[information]] on the {{Wiki|schisms}} within its ranks.
  
  

Latest revision as of 16:55, 4 February 2020




Bhāviveka (c. 490-570 CE), also known as Bhavya or Bhāvaviveka - was an Indian Buddhist philosopher and historian, and founder of the Svātantrika-Madhyamaka School:

Born to a royal family in Malyara, in South India (although some Chinese sources claim it was in Magadha, in North India), Bhāviveka studied both sūtra and śāstra literatures during his formative years.

Having excelled in the art of debate, especially against Hindu apologists of the Saṁkhyā School, he is said to have been the abbot of some 50 monasteries in South India.

His chief influences were the writings of Nāgārjuna (c. 150 – c. 250 CE), the founder of the Madhyamaka, and treatises on logic from the traditions of Buddhism (especially Dignāga’s works) and Hinduism (especially the Nyāyapraveśa).

His chief philosophical contribution was his attempt at formulating a synthesis of Madhyamaka dialectics and the logical conventions of his time.

As all of Bhāviveka’s works are lost in the original Sanskrit and preserved only in Tibetan translations, the scholarly world came to know of him only through Candrakīrti (c. 580-650 CE), who refuted Bhāviveka’s position in the 1st chapter of the Prasannapadā (Clear words).

It could therefore be argued that current understanding of the Madhyamaka in general has suffered from a one-sided perspective that relies solely on Candrakīrti’s rival school, the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka.

However, contemporary scholarship no longer neglects Tibetan sources, and thus a more balanced approach has ensued, one that reads Nāgārjuna’s seminal writings through the commentaries of both the Prāsaṅgikas and the Svātantrika.

Nāgārjuna, especially as read through the commentaries of Buddhapālita (c. 470-550 CE),

was characterized by many Indian philosophers as a vaitaṇḍika, a nihilist who refused to assume any thesis (pratijñā) in the course of the on-going dialogue between Hindu thinkers of various schools and the Buddhists:

While Madhyamaka thought had not asserted any claim about ultimate truth/reality (param-ārtha-satya),

Bhāviveka’s independent reasoning (sva-tantra-anumāna) was applied to conventional truth/reality (saṁvṛti-satya)

as a means of rescuing logico-linguistic conventions (vyavahāra) from a systematic negation (prasaṅga) that opened the school to charges of nihilism:

While Bhāviveka accepted the Madhyamaka view that ultimately (paramārthataḥ) no entities could be predicated with any form of existence,

he was willing to employ such predication on a conventional level:

In order to maintain the reality and utility of traditional Buddhist categories for talking about the path of spiritual growth while denying the ultimate reality of such categories,

he employed a syllogistic thesis (pratijñā),

a philosophic strategy that was nearly incomprehensible to scholars of the Madhyamaka, who knew this school only through Candrakīrti’s Prāsaṅgika systematization.

In order to affirm a thesis on the conventional level while denying it ultimately, Bhāviveka creatively reinterpreted the key Madhyamaka doctrine of the 2 truths (satya-dvaya):

In his Madhyam-ārtha-saṁgraha, he propounds 2 levels of ultimacy:

1) - a highest ultimate that is beyond all predication and specification (aparyāya-paramārtha), in conformity with all Madhyamaka teachings, and

2) - an ultimate that can be inferred logically and specified meaningfully (paryāya-paramārtha);

- this latter level was a bold innovation in the history of Madhyamaka thought.

Of course, such a distinction was operative only within the realm of conventional thought.

Again one must employ Bhāviveka’s crucial adverbial codicil, paramārthataḥ, and follow him in claiming that such a distinction, like all distinctions, is ultimately unreal although conventionally useful.

Bhāviveka’s 2 main philosophic contributions –

- his affirmation of a thesis on a conventional level and - his reinterpretation of the 2-truths doctrine

- are evaluated diversely by contemporary scholars.

Those unsympathetic to him see his work as an unhappy concession to the logical conventions of his day, a concession that dilutes the rigor of the Madhyamaka dialectic.

Those with more sympathy see his contributions as a creative surge that rescued Buddhist religious philosophies from those dialectical negations that threatened the integrity of the Buddhist path itself.

Within the evolved Tibetan Buddhist tradition, Bhāviveka is especially known for 2 other contributions:

His refutations of the rival Yogācāra School are considered to be among the clearest ever written:

The 5th chapter of his Tarka-jvālā, the “Yogācārattvaviniścaya,” refutes both the existence of the absolute and the non-existence of the conventional, both seminal Yogācāra positions.

He is also the forerunner of the literary style known as siddhānta, which became enormously popular within Tibetan scholarly circles:

A siddhānta text devotes ordered chapters to analysing the philosophic positions (siddhāntas) of rival schools, both Buddhist and Hindu.

His Tarka-jvālā (Blaze of Reasoning) contains systematic critiques

of the positions held by the Hīnayāna and the Yogācāra, both Buddhist schools, and the Saṁkhyā, Vaiśeṣika, Vedanta, and Mīmāṁsā schools of Hindu philosophy.

Bhāviveka was also a keen historian:

His Nikāya-bheda-vibhaṅga-vyākhyāna remains one of the most important and reliable sources for the early history of the Buddhist order, and for information on the schisms within its ranks.



Source

[1]