Difference between revisions of "Language: A Yogācāra Explanation"
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| − | The {{Wiki|history}} of [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] is full of a variety of schools and [[traditions]] which contributed widely to [[philosophy]] in {{Wiki|Asia}}. One of the most [[debated]] topics in the {{Wiki|history}} of [[Buddhist philosophy]] has been [[language]]. Within [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] itself we can find many subtly different interpretations on the [[nature]] of [[language]] and how it works. In my article this week, I wish to provide a general outline of the [[philosophy]] of [[language]] in [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhism]]. | + | The {{Wiki|history}} of [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] is full of a variety of schools and [[traditions]] which contributed widely to [[philosophy]] in {{Wiki|Asia}}. One of the most [[debated]] topics in the {{Wiki|history}} of [[Buddhist philosophy]] has been [[language]]. Within [[Mahāyāna Buddhism]] itself we can find many subtly different interpretations on the [[nature]] of [[language]] and how it works. In my article this [[week]], I wish to provide a general outline of the [[philosophy]] of [[language]] in [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhism]]. |
[[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhism]] developed in [[India]] in around the 2nd century CE and its [[philosophy]] focuses on the central [[principle]] that [[reality]] is shaped by the [[mind]]. There is [[nothing]] that can be [[experienced]] without [[being]] processed by the [[mind]]. This {{Wiki|emphasis}} on the [[mind]] led to the [[development]] of incredibly sophisticated [[views]] on [[psychology]], [[perception]] and also [[language]]. In referring to the [[Yogācāra]] theories of [[language]], I primarily mean the works of [[philosophers]] such as [[Dignāga]], [[Dharmakīrti]], Saṅgharakṣita, [[Jñānaśrīmitra]] and [[Ratnakīrti]]. [[Dharmakīrti]] is perhaps best known among many [[Mahāyāna]] [[Buddhist]] [[traditions]] today. | [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhism]] developed in [[India]] in around the 2nd century CE and its [[philosophy]] focuses on the central [[principle]] that [[reality]] is shaped by the [[mind]]. There is [[nothing]] that can be [[experienced]] without [[being]] processed by the [[mind]]. This {{Wiki|emphasis}} on the [[mind]] led to the [[development]] of incredibly sophisticated [[views]] on [[psychology]], [[perception]] and also [[language]]. In referring to the [[Yogācāra]] theories of [[language]], I primarily mean the works of [[philosophers]] such as [[Dignāga]], [[Dharmakīrti]], Saṅgharakṣita, [[Jñānaśrīmitra]] and [[Ratnakīrti]]. [[Dharmakīrti]] is perhaps best known among many [[Mahāyāna]] [[Buddhist]] [[traditions]] today. | ||
| − | [[Non-Buddhist]] theories of [[language]] in {{Wiki|medieval}} [[India]], especially those connected with {{Wiki|Brahmanical}} [[Hinduism]], asserted that a [[word]] refers to an [[object]] through a positive connection and identification. For instance, the [[word]] “car” is connected to [[the object]] car by the positive [[assertion]] “that is a car”. The [[word]] “car” cannot refer to anything else. For instance, it is impossible to refer to a table as a “car” without [[knowing]] we are wrong. | + | [[Non-Buddhist]] theories of [[language]] in {{Wiki|medieval}} [[India]], especially those connected with {{Wiki|Brahmanical}} [[Hinduism]], asserted that a [[word]] refers to an [[object]] through a positive [[connection]] and identification. For instance, the [[word]] “car” is connected to [[the object]] car by the positive [[assertion]] “that is a car”. The [[word]] “car” cannot refer to anything else. For instance, it is impossible to refer to a table as a “car” without [[knowing]] we are wrong. |
[[File:Nairatmya150.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | [[File:Nairatmya150.jpg|thumb|250px|]] | ||
| − | The problem with this {{Wiki|theory}} for [[Buddhists]] is that [[Buddhists]] believe [[the object]] car is [[empty]] of [[inherent]] [[existence]]. For [[Buddhists]], what we call “car” is simply a collection of non-car parts such as [[wheels]], axles, paint, cogs etc. It is impossible to find “car” among its parts. Therefore, what does the [[word]] “car” actually refer to? Many of the non-Buddhists posited the [[existence]] of an [[entity]] “car-ness”, an abstract quality that all cars possess. They stated that it was this abstract [[principle]] to which the [[word]] “car” referred. The [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhists]] contended that such an [[essence]] does not [[exist]] and such a [[belief]] in the [[inherent]] [[existence]] of an [[object]] was an [[illusion]] of the [[mind]]. | + | The problem with this {{Wiki|theory}} for [[Buddhists]] is that [[Buddhists]] believe [[the object]] car is [[empty]] of [[inherent]] [[existence]]. For [[Buddhists]], what we call “car” is simply a collection of non-car parts such as [[wheels]], axles, paint, cogs etc. It is impossible to find “car” among its parts. Therefore, what does the [[word]] “car” actually refer to? Many of the non-Buddhists posited the [[existence]] of an [[entity]] “car-ness”, an abstract [[quality]] that all cars possess. They stated that it was this abstract [[principle]] to which the [[word]] “car” referred. The [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhists]] contended that such an [[essence]] does not [[exist]] and such a [[belief]] in the [[inherent]] [[existence]] of an [[object]] was an [[illusion]] of the [[mind]]. |
| − | Since the [[doctrine]] of [[emptiness]] meant that [[the object]] car did not [[essentially]] [[exist]], it was difficult for [[Buddhists]] to explain why the [[word]] “car” refers to [[the object]] car. The [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhist]] [[philosophers]], beginning with [[Dignāga]] in the 5th century, provided a very sophisticated explanation of how words refer to things. They began with the basic point that this [[idea]] of “car-ness”, the abstract quality belonging to all cars, did not [[exist]] outside of the [[mind]] and was in fact a construction of the [[mind]]. Therefore, words refer to [[objects]] only in the [[mind]] and not to anything outside of the [[mind]]. | + | Since the [[doctrine]] of [[emptiness]] meant that [[the object]] car did not [[essentially]] [[exist]], it was difficult for [[Buddhists]] to explain why the [[word]] “car” refers to [[the object]] car. The [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhist]] [[philosophers]], beginning with [[Dignāga]] in the 5th century, provided a very sophisticated explanation of how words refer to things. They began with the basic point that this [[idea]] of “car-ness”, the abstract [[quality]] belonging to all cars, did not [[exist]] outside of the [[mind]] and was in fact a construction of the [[mind]]. Therefore, words refer to [[objects]] only in the [[mind]] and not to anything outside of the [[mind]]. |
Even if we say that “car-ness” is merely a construction of the [[mind]], there is still the problem of how this [[idea]] was created. How can the [[mind]] create the [[idea]] of “car-ness” when, according to the [[Buddhists]], “car-ness” does not actually [[exist]] in [[reality]]? It was in discussing this problem that the genius of [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhism]] really becomes evident. The [[Yogācāra]] [[philosophers]] stated that, when we [[experience]] an [[object]], such as a car, the [[information]] that comes into our [[mind]] is simply the particular pieces that create the car. These pieces are not the [[wheel]] or axles etc. but the actual [[atoms]] that [[form]] [[the object]]. When all these minor [[characteristics]] and particulars are cognised the [[mind]] habitually compares this [[information]] with previous [[experience]]. | Even if we say that “car-ness” is merely a construction of the [[mind]], there is still the problem of how this [[idea]] was created. How can the [[mind]] create the [[idea]] of “car-ness” when, according to the [[Buddhists]], “car-ness” does not actually [[exist]] in [[reality]]? It was in discussing this problem that the genius of [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhism]] really becomes evident. The [[Yogācāra]] [[philosophers]] stated that, when we [[experience]] an [[object]], such as a car, the [[information]] that comes into our [[mind]] is simply the particular pieces that create the car. These pieces are not the [[wheel]] or axles etc. but the actual [[atoms]] that [[form]] [[the object]]. When all these minor [[characteristics]] and particulars are cognised the [[mind]] habitually compares this [[information]] with previous [[experience]]. | ||
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This collection of particular [[characteristics]] is separated from previous [[experience]] by [[difference]]. Everything that is not like this collection of particular [[characteristics]] is excluded until this [[body]] of particular [[characteristics]] appears to [[form]] a unitary thing in the [[mind]]. However, this unitary thing, for instance a car that now appears to positively [[exist]], is actually the {{Wiki|negation}} or exclusion of everything that does not share the particular [[characteristics]] of a car. In short, [[the object]] to which the [[word]] “car” refers is actually not-not-car, i.e. a {{Wiki|negation}} of everything that isn’t a car. | This collection of particular [[characteristics]] is separated from previous [[experience]] by [[difference]]. Everything that is not like this collection of particular [[characteristics]] is excluded until this [[body]] of particular [[characteristics]] appears to [[form]] a unitary thing in the [[mind]]. However, this unitary thing, for instance a car that now appears to positively [[exist]], is actually the {{Wiki|negation}} or exclusion of everything that does not share the particular [[characteristics]] of a car. In short, [[the object]] to which the [[word]] “car” refers is actually not-not-car, i.e. a {{Wiki|negation}} of everything that isn’t a car. | ||
| − | Through this explanation [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhists]] were able to explain how words refer to [[objects]] in the [[mind]], without relying on a {{Wiki|theory}} that would posit an [[essence]] or an [[inherent]] [[existence]] in things. The ramifications of this viewpoint extend far beyond [[language]] and I will develop next week on how this {{Wiki|theory}} contributed to certain [[logical]] proofs for the [[existence]] of [[rebirth]]. | + | Through this explanation [[Yogācāra]] [[Buddhists]] were able to explain how words refer to [[objects]] in the [[mind]], without relying on a {{Wiki|theory}} that would posit an [[essence]] or an [[inherent]] [[existence]] in things. The ramifications of this viewpoint extend far beyond [[language]] and I will develop next [[week]] on how this {{Wiki|theory}} contributed to certain [[logical]] proofs for the [[existence]] of [[rebirth]]. |
</poem> | </poem> | ||
{{R}} | {{R}} | ||
[http://newlotus.buddhistdoor.com/en/news/d/20239 newlotus.buddhistdoor.com] | [http://newlotus.buddhistdoor.com/en/news/d/20239 newlotus.buddhistdoor.com] | ||
[[Category:Yogacara]] | [[Category:Yogacara]] | ||
Latest revision as of 20:46, 21 November 2020
By Alastair Gornall
The history of Mahāyāna Buddhism is full of a variety of schools and traditions which contributed widely to philosophy in Asia. One of the most debated topics in the history of Buddhist philosophy has been language. Within Mahāyāna Buddhism itself we can find many subtly different interpretations on the nature of language and how it works. In my article this week, I wish to provide a general outline of the philosophy of language in Yogācāra Buddhism.
Yogācāra Buddhism developed in India in around the 2nd century CE and its philosophy focuses on the central principle that reality is shaped by the mind. There is nothing that can be experienced without being processed by the mind. This emphasis on the mind led to the development of incredibly sophisticated views on psychology, perception and also language. In referring to the Yogācāra theories of language, I primarily mean the works of philosophers such as Dignāga, Dharmakīrti, Saṅgharakṣita, Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti. Dharmakīrti is perhaps best known among many Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions today.
Non-Buddhist theories of language in medieval India, especially those connected with Brahmanical Hinduism, asserted that a word refers to an object through a positive connection and identification. For instance, the word “car” is connected to the object car by the positive assertion “that is a car”. The word “car” cannot refer to anything else. For instance, it is impossible to refer to a table as a “car” without knowing we are wrong.
The problem with this theory for Buddhists is that Buddhists believe the object car is empty of inherent existence. For Buddhists, what we call “car” is simply a collection of non-car parts such as wheels, axles, paint, cogs etc. It is impossible to find “car” among its parts. Therefore, what does the word “car” actually refer to? Many of the non-Buddhists posited the existence of an entity “car-ness”, an abstract quality that all cars possess. They stated that it was this abstract principle to which the word “car” referred. The Yogācāra Buddhists contended that such an essence does not exist and such a belief in the inherent existence of an object was an illusion of the mind.
Since the doctrine of emptiness meant that the object car did not essentially exist, it was difficult for Buddhists to explain why the word “car” refers to the object car. The Yogācāra Buddhist philosophers, beginning with Dignāga in the 5th century, provided a very sophisticated explanation of how words refer to things. They began with the basic point that this idea of “car-ness”, the abstract quality belonging to all cars, did not exist outside of the mind and was in fact a construction of the mind. Therefore, words refer to objects only in the mind and not to anything outside of the mind.
Even if we say that “car-ness” is merely a construction of the mind, there is still the problem of how this idea was created. How can the mind create the idea of “car-ness” when, according to the Buddhists, “car-ness” does not actually exist in reality? It was in discussing this problem that the genius of Yogācāra Buddhism really becomes evident. The Yogācāra philosophers stated that, when we experience an object, such as a car, the information that comes into our mind is simply the particular pieces that create the car. These pieces are not the wheel or axles etc. but the actual atoms that form the object. When all these minor characteristics and particulars are cognised the mind habitually compares this information with previous experience.
This collection of particular characteristics is separated from previous experience by difference. Everything that is not like this collection of particular characteristics is excluded until this body of particular characteristics appears to form a unitary thing in the mind. However, this unitary thing, for instance a car that now appears to positively exist, is actually the negation or exclusion of everything that does not share the particular characteristics of a car. In short, the object to which the word “car” refers is actually not-not-car, i.e. a negation of everything that isn’t a car.
Through this explanation Yogācāra Buddhists were able to explain how words refer to objects in the mind, without relying on a theory that would posit an essence or an inherent existence in things. The ramifications of this viewpoint extend far beyond language and I will develop next week on how this theory contributed to certain logical proofs for the existence of rebirth.
