Uhuuuuuu
/med phyir med 1 )pa skye ma yin/ /chos mi mthun 2)phyir yod med min/ /skye ba med pas gnas 'gag med/ 1 )P:pas 2)D:pyir Some assert that a result already exists inherently in the nature of its cause; but then it cannot arise because it already exists. Others assert that a result exists inherently but not in the nature of its cause; so it cannot arise because it is not in the nature of its cause. Yet others assert that a result both does and does not exist inherently in its cause; but then they are asserting contradictory views about an object be cause an object cannot simultaneously both exist and not exist. Because phenomena do not arise inherently so also they do not endure or cease inherently. Some persons assert that there are individualities or indi vidual things which have an existence which is independent of causes and conditions and that upon examination such independence can be found. They say that results have the same nature as their causes and that during the time of the existence of a cause, its result exists in the cause in the form of a potential which bears the same nature as the cause. Since the result exists within the cause at the time of the cause, they assert that the cause and the result must have the same nature, and that they are inherently existent. As their existence is thus not dependent on anything which is other than themselves, so they exist independently as indi vidual things. We refute that assertion by saying that if a result were inherent in the nature of its cause then because it would already exist in the cause at that time there would be no need for the result to arise from the cause at some future time. Some others respond to our refutation by asserting that even if the result is not inherent in the nature of its cause, still it does have an inherent existence which is independent of its cause. But we refute this because all results depend on
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causes, so how can they have independent, inherent exist ence? Any result which is asserted to be independent of a cause must be completely non-existent; like the horns of a rabbit, it is impossible for such a result to arise. A third kind of assertion is made by some which is a combination of the first two. They say that although a result does not exist in the nature of its cause as an entity, still it does exist as a potential. But this is also incorrect because they are asserting the simultaneous existence and non existence of a phenomenon before the time of its arising. It is not possible for a single phenomenon to simultaneously have two contradictory states of existence. For example, some people assert that a vase has two aspects: one aspect is the form of the vase which appears before our eyes, and the other aspect is the aggregation of the elements which we discover when we closely examine the vase. They say that the vase does not exist as an entity, but that it does exist as a term "vase" which is imputed on an aggregation of elements which actually exist. We say that the term vase is imputed on an aggregation of elements, but that if we were to examine those elements we would see that they are as unfindable as the vase; thus there is no contra diction in our assertions. But their assertions are contradic tory because they assert the existence of one aspect of a phenomenon and the non-existence of the other. Now these refutations may lead to some confusion about the occurrence of phenomena such as the person, and a question may be raised, does the person endure or not? We say that the person endures, but not inherently, because a person is a phenomenon which is produced and is com pounded. Produced and compounded phenomena do not have inherent existence, but they do exist conventionally as produced and compounded phenomena. In this manner they do arise, endure, disintegrate and cease and it is in this manner that when a phenomenon has newly arisen we say "the arising of a thing," "the enduring of a thing," and so forth.
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STANZA S Some people have the view that the composite things which arise, endure and disintegrate do have inherent existence. The following stanza refutes this view by showing its con tradictions. /gang zhig skyes de bskyed bya mini /ma skyes pa yang bskyed bya mini /l)skyes 2)pa dang ni ma skyes 3)ba'i/ /skye bzhin pa yang bskyed bya mini l)P:skyed 2)P,D:ba 3)P,D:pa'i
Whatsoever has already arisen will not be able to arise. Whatsoever has not arisen will not arise. Either a phenomenon has already arisen or else it will arise; there is no other possibility beyond these two. Whatever is in the process of arising should 4)have already arisen or else it will arise in the future. 4)Lit: bskyed bya min; is no future arising. A produced phenomenon, as we have already shown, does arise, but it does not arise with inherent existence. If it had inherent existence then it would be independent, so causes and conditions could not produce it and thus it could not arise. Now, a phenomenon must exist in either the past, pres ent or future. If it is said that some phenomenon with inherent existence had somehow been produced on some occasion in the past, then it could not be produced again on some future occasion because of its already having been produced. And if it is said that it could somehow be pro duced again then it would never become something not to be produced and so would never cease being reproduced. Thus it is said that whatever has not arisen will not arise. A phenomenon which has not yet arisen cannot be apprehended because it does not yet exist, so any state mtnts which are made about it are meaningless. Thus it is not possible to assert that certain things can act as its causes
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and conditions, for this would be to assert that a non existent phenomenon has causes and conditions. Moreover, such a non-existent phenomenon cannot provide a basis on which the activity of production could take place, so how could it ever be produced by causes and conditions? Thus it is said that whatever has not already arisen will not arise in the future. There are no other possibilities for phenomena beyond their having already arisen or having not yet arisen. If it is asserted as an alternative that a phenomenon with inherent existence is currently in the process of arising, then that phenomenon is being asserted to be partly arisen and partly non-arisen. The arisen portion must have arisen in the past, while the non-arisen portion would have to arise in the future. But it has already been shown that anything with inherent existence which has not yet arisen will not be able to arise in the present or the future because it has no basis on which causal activity can take place and that anything with inherent existence which has already arisen will not be able to arise again in either the present or the future. Therefore a phenomenon with inherent existence cannot be partly arisen and partly non-arisen, and so such a phe nomenon cannot be currently arising. What is being refuted here is the inherent existence of a presently arising phenomenon, not its conventional exist ence, which appears before one. For example, take the case of a green shoot which is asserted to have inherent existence and to be currently arising. Such a green shoot cannot be shown to arise from a cause because the shoot must have either already arisen or not arisen; it has already been demonstrated that there is no third case. If it is said that it has alr.eady arisen, then it can't be said that it is currently arising for that is contradictory. Nor can it be said that it has not yet arisen and will arise in the future because it is appearing before one in the present. Thus it is clear that a presently arising phenomenon with inherent existence is unfindable and the belief in such a phenomenon is based on
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fallacies and contradictions. STANZA 6 /'bras bu yod l)par 'bras ldan rgyu/ 2)/med de 3)la yang 4)rgyu min mtshungs/ /yod min med pa'ng min na 'gall /dus gsum rnams su 'thad ma yin/ l)P,D:pas 2)P and D interpolate an extra line here which is not found in Candrakirti; it reads /rgyu min dang mtshungs med pa *yangl (*P:pa'ng for D :yang). 3)P:la'ng 4)P:rgyun The cause of a result which already exists is similar to that which is not a cause. Also in the case where a result does not already exist, then its cause will be similar to that which is not a cause. A phenomenon should be either existent or non-existent but cannot be both non-existent and not-non-existent because these two are contradictory. Therefore it is not suit able to assert that there is either an inherently ex isting cause or an inherently existing result in the three times. The arguments which were previously applied to results can also be applied to causes and cause-effect relationships, demonstrating that they too lack inherent existence. The relationship between cause and effect can be sought in the past, the present or the future. Furthermore, in regards to that relationship, if there were a result with inherent exist ence, then that result should have been produced by a cause with inherent existence. If the relationship is asserted to exist in the past, then a result with inherent existence must have existed in a poten tial form at the time of its cause. We have already refuted this possibility when we examined results. Also, if we ex amine the cause, we find there is no need for a cause for the production of that result, for it already exists, so what is asserted to be a cause of a result does not have the character istics of a cause and is similar to that which is not a cause.
If a result does not currently exist and it and the causal relationship with it are in the future, then how can some thing be identified as causing it? Such a thing cannot act as a cause because no result exists. For example, yogurt is made from milk, not water. But without there being any yogurt we cannot say that this milk is a cause of yogurt whereas this water isn't, because neither of them have caus al properties in relation to some result for there is not yet any result to which they can be related as having causal properties. If it is said that the cause and effect relationship exists in the present, then both the cause and the effect must exist in the present. But this is contradictory and destroys the rela tion between cause and effect. For example, if it is said that a seed is the cause of a shoot with inherent existence in the present, then that seed must also have inherent existence, and then both seed and shoot would have to exist simul taneously, as things with inherent existence do not perish. But if they exist simultaneously, then no cause and effect relationship can be asserted between them. Thus no inherent existence can be found in the rela tionship of cause and effect in any of the three times. STANZA 7 Now, when some persons hear that it is not possible to assert the inherent existence of causes in the three times, they might wonder how this is possible because causes are numerous in number, so they should exist inherently. These persons further argue that it is not possible to refute the existence of causes because Buddha has enumerated many causes. Thus the causes must exist inherently because if they did not exist inherently how could Buddha have made enumerations of so many causes? For example, they say, how can we count the number of hairs on the back of a tortoise when there aren't any hairs on the back of a tor toise? Nagarjuna refutes this argument in the following stanza.
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/gcig med l )par ni mang 2)po dang/ /mang po med par gcig mi 'jug/ /de phyir rten cing 'brel 'byung ba'i/ /dngos po mtshan ma med pa yin/ l )P,D:bar 2)D:go
Without one there cannot be many and without many it is not possible to refer to one. Therefore one and many arise dependently and such phenomena do not have the sign of inherent existence. We refute their argument because the making of enum erations actually shows that causes do not have inherent existence. This is because when we enumerate many things we must first start counting with "one," and then we can go on to count the "many. " Because we must first have a "one" before we can have a "many" so the "many" are dependent on the "one. " Likewise, we cannot find a "one" without contrasting it with "many. " Thus one and many arise interdependently, and neither can be found to exist without the other. Since it is the case that the many arise in dependence on the one, so the Buddha's enumerating many causes demonstrates that causes arise in dependence, and as they arise in dependence, so they lack the sign of inherent existence, which is independence. The word "sign" (mtshan ma) has somewhat different meanings in different contexts. In some cases it refers to the aspects of phenomena, in other cases it refers to inherent existence and sometimes it refers to reasons. For example, the idea that all things have inherent existence is baseless and without reason. Here we say that they lack the sign of inherent existence and signlessness refers to the reason which is lacking inherent existence. Sometimes sign refers to the conventional mind. For example, if we bring two colors together such as yellow and blue, we say that they have different aspects or that they have different signs. A thing's sign allows us to differentiate that thing from another thing. But this is only so for the conventional mind
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which does not examine things in their ultimate nature. In the spirit of emptiness, which is the ultimate reality of things, we find that things lack different aspects, or that they have the same aspect, but to the conventional mind they have different aspects because that mind does not examine things in the spirit of emptiness. "Sign" should not be confused with "mark" (mtshan nyid), which refers to the nature or identity or definition of a thing. A mark helps us understand a particular thing with our mind. For example, arising, enduring and disintegrat ing are the marks of composite things. These are the charac teristics or the definition by which we understand that things are composite. When we do not find these marks, then we know that things are not composite. STANZA S In the previous stanza the opponent's view of the enumera tion of causes was refuted, and now he asserts that there should be causes with inherent existence because of the teaching of the twelve limbs of dependent origination. Nagarjuna now refutes that assertion by showing how this argument is based on an overestimation or superimposition on the twelve limbs. /rten 'byung yan lag bcu gnyis gang/ /sdug bsngal 1)'bras can de ma skyes/ /sems gcig la yang mi 'thad cing/ /du ma la yang 'thad ma yin/ 1 )P : bral The twelve limbs of dependent origination result in suffering: since the twelve limbs and suffering do not arise independently of each other, they don't exist inherently. Furthermore, it is not acceptable to assert that the twelve limbs are based on a single moment of a mind nor on successive moments of a mind, as such moments arise dependently and do not exist inherently.
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The twelve limbs start with ignorance and karmic forma tions and end with aging and death. They do produce suffering, but the very fact that they produce suffering proves that suffering is dependent on the twelve limbs. If suffering is dependent on the twelve limbs then it does not have a self-sufficient existence and so is without inherent existence. Moreover, the twelve limbs are a cause only in dependence on the production of the result of suffering, so they too, as a cause, do not have inherent existence because they are dependent on suffering. Furthermore, the twelve limbs need a mind basis on which their activity can occur. Such a mind basis must be either a single moment of mind or a succession of moments of mind, that is, a mind stream. It is not possible to assert that in a single moment of mind all twelve limbs occur simultaneously because that destroys the temporal cause and effect relation between the limbs. It is also not possible to assert that all twelve limbs occur simultaneously over many moments of a mind stream because this would mean that all twelve limbs and the mind stream would have a simultaneous cause and effect relationship. It is not possible to assert that in a single momertt of mind all twelve limbs occur sequentially because this destroys the meaning of "a moment," nor is it possible to assert that all twelve limbs occur simultaneously but over a sequence of many moments of mind because this destroys the meaning of "simultaneous. " Rather, both the twelve limbs and the mind basis must occur either simultaneously or sequentially, but this also cannot be used as an argument for the inherent existence of the twelve limbs. We have already shown how they cannot occur simultaneously but they also cannot occur sequential ly and have inherent existence. This is because such an argument would depend on either each moment of mind or the successive moments of the mind stream having inherent existence. But if each moment existed inherently we could not find the successive moments because succession re-
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quires that preceeding moments cease and this is contrary to the assertion of moments having inherent existence. But if there is no succession of moments with inherent existence so there can be no sequentiality for the moments and no sequential basis on which the twelve limbs can occur. Therefore, there is no way to argue that the twelve limbs have inherent existence and so they can not be used as a basis for arguing that their causes have inherent existence.
STANZA 9 In the preceeding stanza we have said that ignorance (the first limb) cannot exist inherently, but some understand this to mean that it does not exist at all. They say that this is wrong and that ignorance does exist inherently as a result of the mind misapprehending objects in four distorted ways. Nagarjuna agrees that an inherently existing ignorance could arise from the four distortions if they had inherent existence, but they don't, and he explains this below. /rtag min mi rtag min bdag dang/ /bdag min gtsang min mi gtsang mini /bde min sdug bsngal ma yin te/ /de phyir phyin ci log rnams med/ Because contaminated things arise in depend ence on one another they do not exist inherently as permanent phenomena nor do they exist inherently as impermanent phenomena; neither as phe nomena with self-nature nor without self-nature; neither as pure nor impure; neither as blissful nor as suffering. It is thus that the four distortions do not exist as qualities which inhere in phenomena, but rather are imputed to phenomena. The four distortions are four qualifications of composite and contaminated phenomena. The four distortions are the taking of impermanent phenomena as being permanent,
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impure phenomena as being pure, selfless phenomena as having self and suffering phenomena as being blissful. They are a misapprehension of an object through ignorantly over estimating its nature and superimposing characteristics on it. As it is often said that the root of ignorance is the mis apprehension of self-existence in phenomena, and that many things arise out of this misapprehension, so one might ask if the distortion of taking selfless phenomena as having self is more fundamental than the other three distortions. This is not correct, however, for these four distortions are coarse misapprehensions, and one is not more fundamental than the others. The belief in the inherent existence of a self-nature in phenomena which is the root of ignorance is a subtle misapprehension. Now, one might develop some understanding about the four distortions and thus conclude that if phenomena are not permanent, are not pure, are not blissful and have no self, that they must be inherently impermanent, impure, suffering and without self-nature. But this is also incorrect. Since phenomena arise in dependence on each other they lack inherent existence, and also lack inherently existing characteristics of their own; they only have those character istics which are imputed to them from our side. For exam ple, if one grasps at the contaminated aggregates as in herently existing impermanent phenomena, this is a subtler distortion than grasping at the contaminated aggregates as inherently existing permanent phenomena. Because if one understands that aggregates do not exist inherently as im permanent phenomena, in this case, one has to understand that the aggregates do not exist inherently. But if one understands that the aggregates are not inherently existing permanent phenomena, here one does not need to under stand that the aggregates do not exist inherently. An undis torted mind does not superimpose any properties on phe nomena and recognizes that not even emptiness or selfless ness arise from the side of phenomena but are superim-
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posed on them or imputed to them from the side of the mind. The opponent's error is in believing that freeing the mind from the four distortions has revealed true character istics which exist inherently and independently in the na ture of phenomena. In a conventional sense it is true that phenomena are impermanent, etc . , and thus in a conven tional sense ignorance does arise from the four distortions. But actually, because all phenomena arise in dependence on other phenomena, they do not have inherent existence and so neither do the characteristics which are attributed to them. Whether these characteristics are the four distortions or their opposites, they all are superimposed characteristics and these characteristics are devoid of inherent existence in the nature of those base objects. And, therefore, the ignor ance which conventionally arises from the four distortions must also lack inherent existence. STANZA 10 /de med phyi ci log bzhi las/ /skyes pa'i ma rig l)mi srid la/ /de med 'du 2)byed mi 'byung zhing/ /lhag ma rnams kyang de bzhin no/ l)D:min grid las 2)D:byid
There are no four distortions which exist inherently and thus there can be no ignorance arising from them. Because that ignorance does not exist inherently it cannot give birth to karmic formations, which means karmic formations will not arise and so also the remaining limbs too. If ignorance lacks inherent existence, then what is depen dent on it must also lack inherent existence. Thus karmic formations, which arise in dependence on ignorance, must lack inherent existence as do the other ten limbs, each of which in successive order is dependent on the preceeding limbs. There is a further problem with the opponent's position,
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for actually he is unable to account for the existence of the four distortions. He believes that characteristics such as impermanence, selflessness, suffering and impurity have inherent existence in the nature of phenomena and that a mind which knows phenomena to have these characteristics is an unmistaken mind. For there to be an unmistaken mind there must be an opposite mind which is mistaken. If an unmistaken mind were to know phenomena to have inherently existing characteristics such as impermanence and selflessness, then a mistaken mind would know phe nomena to have inherently existing characteristics such as permanence and self, etc . , which are the four distortions. However, we argue that what the opponent calls an unmis taken mind is actually mistaken, for no characteristics exist inherently in the nature of phenomena, and a mind which believes them to exist inherently in the nature of phe nomena is mistaken. Now if what the opponent calls an unmistaken mind is actually a mistaken mind, then what he calls a mistaken mind would be unmistaken, and he would be asserting that phenomena do have characteristics such as permanence and self. This is obviously incorrect. Thus both the mind which takes the four distortions to be in herently existing in the nature of phenomena and the mind which takes the opposite of the four distortions to be in herently existing in the nature of phenomena are mistaken and neither mind can be the basis for the arising of four distortions with inherent existence. STANZA 1 1 /ma rig 'du byed med mi 'byung/ /de med 'du byed mi 'byung zhing/ /phan tshun rgyu phyir de 1 )gnyis nil /rang bzhin gyis ni ma grub yin/ 1)P:nyid
Ignorance cannot originate as a cause except in de pendence on the karmic formations. Also, the karmic
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Niigiirjuna's Seventy Stanzas formations cannot originate except in dependence on their cause, which is ignorance. Because ignorance and karmic formations are interrelated as cause and effect so these two 2)are known by a valid cognizer not to exist inherently. 2)ma grub yin
The adherents of the Vaibha�ika school believe that ignorance and karmic formations are secondary minds or mental factors (sems 'byung) which simultaneously arise from the main mind (sems). Because ignorance and karmic formations simultaneously arise from the main mind, which is their cause, so ignorance cannot arise without depending on the simultaneous arising of karmic formations, and like wise karmic formations cannot arise without depending on the simultaneous arising of ignorance. Since these two are interdependent in this way, so each one is a cause for the other one, which is its effect. As they are each the simul taneous cause and effect of the other, so they cannot have inherent existence. This can also be known through another explanation. It is clear how karmic formations are dependent on their cause, which is ignorance, but ignorance, as a cause, is also dependent on karmic formations. This is because karmic formations result from ignorance, so ignorance is the cause of karmic formations, and thus without depending on the karmic formations we cannot say that ignorance is the cause of those karmic formations. Therefore, because they each have the relation of cause and effect to the other, so they are not independent of each other and so they cannot have inherent existence. An ordinary mind cannot come to an accurate conclusion about this, but a valid cognizer, which is an unmistaken mind investigating the ultimate nature of things, will not be able to find any inherent existence in ignorance or karmic formations.
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STANZA 12 /gang zhig bdag nyid rang bzhin gyis/ /ma grub de gzhan ji ltar bskyed/ /de phyir gzhan las grub pa yis/ /rkyen gzhan dag ni skyed byed mini
By itself none of the twelve limbs can originate in herently, but must depend on the remaining limbs. How then can one limb produce another limb? Moreover, because one limb has originated as a cause in dependence on the other limbs, so how can it act as a condition for the origination of results such as the other limbs? With the help of a valid cognizer we can understand how a thing doesn't exist inherently, and we say that such a thing "lacks inherent existence. " Now, the view of the opponent, who has not developed such a valid cognizer, is that if ignorance, for example, doesn't exist inherently then it must be a non-existent thing. But since he has asserted that one limb produces another so he would then be assert ing that a non-existent thing produces something. This would be like a son being born to a barren woman! For example, how can the limb of ignorance, which does not exist inherently, produce the other remaining limbs? This ignorance has arisen as a cause in dependence on other factors such as karmic formations, etc . , so how can that ignorance, which is not independent and has not arisen by itself, but is conditioned by those other factors, produce it's effects, which are the remaining limbs such as karmic formations, consciousness, etc . ? Clearly, as ignorance does not have inherent existence, so it cannot produce the other limbs as effects with inherent existence. And obviously a non-existent thing cannot produce an existent thing, so the opponent's position is refuted in either case. But there are other limbs which lack inherent existence. The twelve limbs arise in dependence on each other, so they lack inher ent existence, but they are not totally non-existent. Thus
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karmic formations, for example, arise in dependence on ignorance but do not arise inherently from ignorance. It is also like this with the rest of the limbs, from consciousness on to old age and death. STANZA 1 3 We have said that cause and effect are interrelated because it is not possible to establish a cause without an effect. We say that they are dependent arisings in mutual relation. Now when the opponent hears this, he thinks that this means that cause and effect must exist simultaneously like a father and son. This is refuted in the following stanza. /pha ni bu min bu pha min/ /de gnyis phan tshun med min la/ /de gnyis cig 1)char yang min ltar/ /yan lag bcu gnyis de bzhin no/ 1)P:car The father is not the son and the son is not the father. These two are mutually not non-existent and the two of them cannot arise simultaneously. It is likewise with the twelve dependent limbs. A father is the cause of a son, so he is not that son. A son is the result of a father, so he is not that father. Thus it is established that the father is not the son and that the son is not the father. Because the father has produced the son, so he is called a father, but if he had not produced a son, then he could not be called a father. Now, both of them cannot arise simultaneously because then we could not establish a relationship of cause and effect between them. This would be like looking at the two horns on the head of a cow, which have arisen simultaneously, and saying that the right horn has caused the left horn. The example of the father and the son is similar to the case of the twelve limbs of dependent origination; they have the same sort of relationship. Because they arise in depend-
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ence on each other they can't arise simultaneously, nor can they be mutually non-existent, nor can they arise without depending on each other, nor can they be nondifferent. Now, one may wonder why we make this sort of argu ment, such as when we show how a cause can only arise in dependence on an effect. After all, we are not arguing that a particular cause is totally non-existent but rather that it can only exist as a cause in dependence on something else, in this case, a result. One might say that this is just arguing about definitions and terms such as "cause" and "effect." We say that there are differing levels of subtlety used in conveying the teaching of dependent arising. That which is produced in dependence on its causes and conditions is a coarse form of dependent arising. This law mostly applies to composite phenomena. But a phenomenon which is evolved in dependence on its parts and particles is a subtler form of dependent arising. This fact can be established on all phenomena. However, a phenomenon which comes into being merely through the imputation of those terms and concepts which are its designators is the subtlest form of dependent arising. It pervades each and every phe nomenon. All objects of knowledge can be analyzed in accordance with the reasoning which we are setting forth here, which shows how all things come into being in dependence on a basis of imputation and in dependence on terms and con cepts. Thus, in order to understand how an object of know ledge, such as a thing, arises one must understand how an imputed phenomenon is imputed upon a basis of imputa tion. To understand this one must be able to separate the imputed phenomenon from the basis of imputation. For example, a person is merely imputed on his basis of imputa tion - the aggregates - but there is no person who does exist or evolve from the side of the aggregates which are his basis of imputation. In the preceeding stanzas we have shown that all bases of imputation lack inherent existence and having established
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this we have also shown how terms and concepts lack inherent existence. STANZA 14 In the preceeding stanza we talked about the lack of inher ent existence and dependent arising, saying that dependent arisings do not exist inherently but do exist conventionally. In the next stanza this is shown through the use of a metaphor. /ji ltar rrni 1)lam yul brten pa'i/ /bde sdug 2)de yi yul med pa/ /de bzhin gang zhig la brten 3)nas/ /gang zhig rten 'byung dang 'di 4)med/ 1 )P,D:las 2)D:dang de'i yul 3)P,D:na 4)D: 'd med
Just as in a dream, happiness and suffering depend on dream objects and upon awakening these objects are known not to actually exist, likewise any phe nomenon which arises in dependence on another de pendent phenomenon should be known not to exist in the manner of its appearance. When we are dreaming, the various objects in our dreams and the feelings which arise in dependence on them seem real, but when we awaken we know that they were not actually there. For example, in a dream we may smell the odor of a flower garland worn by an attractive woman and derive some feelings of pleasure from the odor. If when we awaken we try to find out about the nature of the attractive ness of the woman in the dream and whether she really has an attractive nature we cannot find such a nature because in our waking state she is no longer there. When we are awake we know that the woman and the flower garland, etc . , which appeared in the dream are devoid of being a real woman or a real flower garland. Likewise, all dependently arising phenomena do not exist in the way in which they
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appear to be; thus, they are false. Similarly, when we see and examine the twelve depend ent limbs we can come to understand that they do not exist inherently. For example, ignorance, which causes the aris ing of karmic formations, doesn't exist inherently and it doesn't give rise to karmic formations inherently. There fore, the karmic formations have not arisen inherently from the cause of ignorance. It is just as with the objects in a dream: upon awakening it can be understood that they do not exist as they had appeared to exist during the dream. So we can come to understand that these limbs, such as ignor ance, do not exist in the manner in which they appear to exist. This means that they do not exist inherently, which is how they appear to exist to the ordinary person, nor do any of the things upon which they depend. To return to our previous example, a woman in a dream does not exist as a real woman, although she appears to, but she does exist as a dream woman. Similarly, all dependent arisings do not exist inherently, as they appear to, but they do exist nominally. STANZA 1 5 Taking dreams as an example, we have illustrated how all things do not exist inherently, but our opponent misunder stands the point of our example and makes the following statement. /gal te dngos rnams rang bzhin gyis/ /med 1)na dman mnyam khyad 'phags dang/ /sna tshogs nyid ni mi 'grub cing/ /rgyu las kyang ni mngon 'grub min/ 1)D:dan man Vaibha�ika: If you assert that phenomena don't exist inherently then you are asserting that they don't exist at all. So how can you make distinctions like inferior, middling and superior or that there are different beings in the six realms of existence? How then can
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Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas you assert the manifestation of a result which arises from causes?
Our opponent has misunderstood our example, and thinking that when we say that phenomena don't actually exist we mean that they don't exist at all, he accuses us of nihilism. He says that if we assert that things don't exist, then we can't make distinctions among those non-existent things since those things are like a flower in the sky or the horns on the head of a rabbit. Also, he says, we cannot say that composite things arise from causes and conditions; yet we can see how composite things do arise from causes and conditions. For example, there are beings in the six realms of existence, and we can see some of them, they manifest before our eyes. But, he says, if things didn't exist then we couldn't make distinctions such as the six realms, and there could be no manifestation of results from causes, so there would be no transmigration through the six realms. If man ifest things such as persons or animals were not able to arise from causes, then how would we account for the beings of the six realms which we can see? STANZA 16 We answer our opponent's charges in the following way. /rang bzhin grub 1 )na rten 'byung gil /dngos po med 2)'byung ma brten na/ /rang bzhin med par ga la 'gyur/ /dngos po yod dang dngos med kyang/ 1 )P:da 2)D:'gyur Response: When you assert that phenomena exist inherently you are asserting that they do not originate in dependence on causes and conditions and thus that phenomena actually do not exist. For if phenomena do not depend on causes and conditions, then they should have independent existence throughout the three times. Therefore there cannot be any inherent existence for functional phenomena which arise from
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causes and conditions or non-functional phenomena which do not arise from causes and conditions, and there cannot be any third mode of existence for phenomena. When the opponent asserts that phenomena exist in herently he is claiming that they have independent, self sufficient existence, which means that such phenomena are not dependent on causes and conditions for their existence. Thus the opponent is stating that there are no dependently arising phenomena. But if phenomena do not arise depend ently, then how can they ever cease to exist? So then they must exist over the three times. But this is clearly not the case because phenomena, such as beings, are not perma nent. If they were permanent then they would be independ ent throughout the three times, but this would contradict the teaching of the manifestation of results from causes and of the transmigration of beings through the six realms (be cause the differing destinies of beings in the six realms and their alterations in form are the results of the accumulating of causes). Since such permanent unchanging phenomena are not to be observed, so phenomena must arise in depend ence, which means that they are not self-sufficient and that they lack inherent existence. This applies both to functional phenomena, which result from causes and conditions and are themselves the causes and conditions for other phenomena, as well as to non functional phenomena, which do not result from causes or conditions and are themselves not the causes or conditions for other phenomena. There is no third alternative, so no phenomenon has an inherent existence and no non-existing phenomenon has an inherent lack of existence. STANZA 17 /med la rang dngos gzhan dngos sarnl /dngos med 'gyur ba ga la zhig/ /de na rang dngos gzhan dngos dang/ /dngos med phyin ci log pa yin/
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Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas Opponent: If phenomena do not exist inherently, how can you use terms to refer to their own charac teristics or their characteristics in relation to other phenomena or non-functional phenomena? Response: Although phenomena lack inherent existence, still we can use terms like own-characteristics, other characteristics and non-functional phenomena for although these are unfindable upon analysis, still, like the objects of a dream they appear to have existence to ordinary perception. So the way they exist and the way they appear are different and these conventional existences are called distortions or false.
Now the opponent asks how can we even charaterize phenomena when they lack inherent existence? We answer that phenomena do appear to ordinary perception and so they can be characterized using various terms. This is simi lar to talking about the objects of a dream. Upon awakening they are known to be illusions and not to actually exist, yet we can use various terms to characterize them. So in regards to phenomena that lack inherent existence, we say that they have a conventional mode of existence which is how they appear to a nonanalytical mind but which is different than their actual mode of existence, and we refer to this conven tional appearance as being false or distorted. Here the term "distortion" refers to the objects of perception, not the mind which is perceiving them. These objects of perception are characterized in depend ence on their own natures or other natures. For example, fire is not different than heat because fire has the nature of heat. So we say that fire has its own characteristics in dependence on heat. Now when we compare fire to water we find that it is quite different, that it has a different nature than water, so it has other characteristics than water. And water, as compared to fire, has other characteristics, but as compared to its own nature, it has its own character istics.
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STANZA 18 /gal te dngos po stong yin na/ /'gag pa med cing skye mi 'gyur/ /ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa la/ /gang la 'gag cing gang la skye/ Hinayanist: If phenomena are devoid of inherent ex istence then they will be completely non-existent like the horns of a rabbit, and so there can be no occurrence of their arising or their cessation. As Bud dha has spoken about arising and cessation, they must exist, so how can things be devoid of 1 )inherent existence? 1)ngo bo nyid This opponent has also misunderstood our teaching a bout phenomena being empty of true existence or inherent existence. He mistakenly believes that when we say that phenomena lack inherent existence we mean that they lack any existence at all and that our view is that phenomena are completely non-existent. So he asks how can a non-existent phenomenon arise or cease? He goes on to refute our view by asserting that arising and ceasing must exist because Buddha has used these terms. We answer in the next stanza. STANZA 19 /dngos dan dngos med cig car med/ /dngos med med na dngos po 1 )med/ /rtag tu dngos po'ng dnos med 'gyur/ /dngos med med par dngos mi sridl 1 )P:min Response: An object cannot simultaneously arise as a functional phenomenon and cease as a non-functional phenomenon. If a non-functional phenomenon does not exist then a functional phenomenon cannot exist be cause an object cannot arise and endure as a func tional phenomenon without depending on its cessa-
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Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas tion as a non-functional phenomenon, or else it would exist at all times. If a non-functional phenomenon which is different from a functional phenomenon does not exist then it is impossible for a functional phenomenon to exist.
Functional phenomena are produced by causes and con ditions, and are themselves the causes and conditions for other phenomena. Non-functional phenomena are not pro duced by causes and conditions and are not themselves the causes and conditions for other phenomena. Thus it would be contradictory to say that a phenomenon can simul taneously arise as a functional phenomenon and cease as a non-functional phenomenon. Rather, a phenomenon must sequentially arise as a functional phenomenon and cease as a non-functional phenomenon. For this to be the case, func tional phenomena and non-functional phenomena must be different and must exist in mutual dependence because if a phenomenon does not arise as a functional phenomenon, it could not have been produced by causes and conditions and could not produce results. Yet, if it does not cease as a non-functional phenomenon, it will never cease producing results and will be permanent. Thus a functional phe nomenon cannot exist without a non-functional phe nomenon and a non-functional phenomenon cannot exist without a functional phenomenon; they are mutually de pendent, but different. Since they occur at different times, they cannot arise simultaneously but must arise sequential ly, and they must lack inherent existence. This is because phenomena that exist inherently exist independently, so if they had inherent existence and arose simultaneously, then they would exist permanently at all times, which is impossi ble. If they had inherent, independent existence and arose sequentially, then they would be two different things with out relationship. Thus no phenomenon can have inherent existence, but phenomena must arise and cease without inherent existence, and so Buddha spoke of arising and ceasing.
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What do we mean by arising, enduring, disintegrating and ceasing? These refer to four characteristics of a compos ite thing. Arising or production means the fresh arising of an identity of a thing from causes and conditions . Enduring refers to the abiding of the former continuity of a thing. Disintegrating refers to that which does not abide in the second moment of the time of its formation. Ceasing refers to the initial moment of a thing changing into the subse quent moment of a thing. When the process of disintegra tion has reached completion and the initial moment of a thing has changed into the subsequent moment of a thing, then the thing has ceased; it has gone beyond the limit of the original moment. STANZA 20 /dngos po med par dngos med mini /rang las l)min zhing gzhan las mini /de lta bas na de med nal /dngos po med cing dngos med 2)med/ l)P ,D:med 2)D:na If there is no arising and enduring, which are func tional phenomena, then there can be no disintegration or cessation, which are non-functional phenomena; so the latter would be completely non-existent. If a phenomenon were to exist inherently it must have arisen from its own nature or from some other na ture, but it cannot arise from its own nature and because a phenomenon cannot have a different na ture than its cause, so it cannot arise from some other nature which has inherent existence. Because of that, a functional phenomenon cannot exist inherent ly and because a functional phenomenon cannot exist inherently, so a non-functional phenomenon cannot exist inherently. Functional phenomena and non-functional phenomena are mutually dependent on each other for their existence,
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which means that they do exist conventionally. This is because arising is the characteristic of functional phe nomena, while complete disintegration and cessation are the characteristics of non-functional phenomena. If a phe nomenon didn't arise, how could it disintegrate completely and cease? Thus, without functional phenomena, non functional phenomena would be completely non-existent. Likewise, we have already shown how the existence of functional phenomena is dependent on the existence of non-functional phenomena; thus they are mutually depend ent for their existence, and since they are not independent so they cannot have inherent existence. If someone were still to assert that a functional phe nomenon could exist inherently, then we would have to investigate whether it had arisen from its own nature or from another nature. Nothing can arise out of itself, so no phenomenon can arise from its own nature. However, no phenomenon can have a nature which is different than its cause, so it could not arise from some other nature which had inherent existence. So in neither case can a functional phenomenon exist inherently, and because non-functional phenomena exist in dependence on functional phenomena, so non-functional phenomena must also lack inherent exist ence. STANZA 2 1 /yod pa nyid na rtag nyid dang/ /med na nges par chad nyid yin/ /dngos po yod na de gnyis 'gyur/ /de phyir dngos po khas blangs mini
If a phenomenon were to exist inherently it should be pennanent. If a phenomenon were to !)disintegrate completely then you must accept the annihilationist view. If a phenomenon were to exist inherently it would either exist permanently or else undergo complete disintegration: it cannot occur in a way
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which is different than these two. Therefore one should not assert that a phenomenon has inherent ex istence. l )Lit: med; not exist. Phenomena which exist inherently cannot undergo change. Thus, over the three times a phenomenon with inherent existence must either remain permanent or else be completely non-existent. These are the only two possibili ties for an inherently existing phenomenon, because if it can't change it must either remain the same at all times, i.e. , be permanent, or else have disintegrated completely, i.e. , become completely non-existent. The former is the eternalist view and the latter is the annihilationist view. Since these logical consequents are both extreme views, one should not assert that phenomena have inherent existence. If we perform this type of analysis through reasoning, we will come to understand that all phenomena lack inherent existence and with this understanding we will be able to eliminate the ignorance of grasping at the true existence of all things. The ignorance of grasping at the true, inherent existence of things is different than the ignorance of grasp ing at the two extreme views about things, which are the overestimation of the nature of a thing, i.e. , that it exists permanently, or the underestimation of the nature of a thing, i.e. , that it is completelly destroyed or doesn't even exist conventionally. The two extreme conceptions are not directly contradicted in their apprehension of the object by the mind which understands that the referent object of the ignorance of grasping at true existence does not exist. But if through meditation we familiarize ourselves with the mind which understands the lack of inherent existence of things, then we will later be able to eliminate the mind which grasps at those two extremes of overestimation and under estimation. STANZA 22 The opponent makes his answer in the next stanza, arguing
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that in his view about objects there is no danger of falling into the extreme views of eternalism or nihilism. /rgyun l )gyi phyir na 'di med de/ /rgyu 2)byin nas ni dngos po 3)'gag/ /sngar bzhin 'di yang ma grub cing/ /rgyun chad par yang thal bar 'gyur/ l)D:gyis 2)D:pyin 3)P: 'ga' Opponent: Because of continuity there is no danger of the two extreme views. Acting as a cause of another causal phenomenon the original causal phenomenon ceases to exist. Reply: As explained before, the cause and the result, like a functional phenomenon and a non-functional phenomenon, cannot arise with in herent existence either simultaneously or sequen tially. In your view their lack of inherent existence makes them completely non-existent, in which case you cannot assert their continuity or that of the mo ments between them. Therefore the faults of the two extremes remain in your view. The opponent is asserting that one can find many mo ments of the existence of a thing and that a continuity is maintained over these moments of a thing. He argues that because a continuity is maintained, so the extremes are avoided. For example, in the case of a seed producing a shoot, a continuity of the first moment of a seed is main tained over the moments between the cause, the seed, and the result, the shoot. He explains that because the shoot in its turn can serve as the cause of something else in a mo ment subsequent to it, so a continuity of the initial moment of the seed is thus maintained. This is because when the subsequent moment of the shoot arises the initial moment of the seed has ceased, but since the seed has produced something, its continuity is maintained upon that. Thus there is a continuity maintained between cause and result and since the initial moment has ceased and then the subse-
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quent moment has arisen, so permanence is not being asserted and there is no danger of eternalism. Also, the second moment will give rise to a third moment, so there is no danger of the extreme of nihilism because although the second moment does cease, a third moment does arise and a continuity is maintained. We refute this argument in the following way. If a cause and a result existed inherently, as the opponent maintains, then there would be no connection between them. This is because inherently existing things would be permanent, so one could neither assert their sequential arising and cessa tion, nor could one assert their simultaneous arising, be cause if they arose simultaneously, then they would lose their cause and effect relationship. Since inherently existing causes and effects can neither arise simultaneously nor se quentially, so it is impossible to say that a continuity of a cause is maintained in a result. Moreover, if it were to be asserted that somehow an inherently existing cause were to disintegrate completely, then how could one find its con tinuity with a result, because it has become non-existent? Therefore, in your assertion the faults of the two extreme views cannot be avoided. STANZA 23 /skye 'jig bstan phyir sangs rgyas kyi/ /lam bstan ma yin stong nyid phyir/ /'di dag phan tshun bzlog pa ru/ /mthong ba phyin ci log las yin/ Opponent: When Buddha explained the path to lib eration he spoke about arising and disintegration, so they must have true existence. Response: It is true that Buddha spoke about arising and disintegration, but they are devoid of inherent existence. For that reason the way they appear and the way they exist are dissimilar, and they appear in a deceptive way to the world.
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This statement of our opponent is incorrect because the way arising and disintegration appear to ordinary percep tion is distorted. Because we have distorted perceptions, so arising and disintegration appear to ordinary perception as if they had inherent existence, but actually they lack inher ent existence. So just because the Buddha spoke about arising and disintegration, that does not mean that he spoke about their having inherent existence. STANZA 24 /gal te skye 'gag med yin na/ /ci zhig 'gags pas mya ngan 'das/ /rang bzhin gyis ni skye med cing/ I'gag med gang de thar min narnl Opponent: If arising and disintegration do not exist then suffering can not exist, so what cessation will bring forth nirviitJa? But because nirviiQa can be attained that means there is suffering which has inherent existence and therefore there is arising with inherent existence and disintegration with in herent existence. Response: NirviiQa refers to that state where suffering does not arise with inherent ex istence and does not cease with inherent existence. Don't we call that state the !)naturally abiding nir ViiQa? Therefore arising and disintegration do not exist inherently. l)Lit: thar; liberation. Our opponent believes that arising and momentary disin tegration ['gag as it is used here is the same as 'jig in stanza 1] have inherent existence and are impermanent, so they lead to suffering. He believes that when this suffering is eliminated and completely ceases ('gags) one attains the state of liberation. He argues that arising, disintegration, suffering and nirviiQa must have inherent existence, be cause if arising and disintegration didn't have inherent ex istence, they would be completely non-existent, in which
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case there would be no suffering which could result from them. And without suffering there would be nothing to free oneself from and no nirviiQ.a to be attained. But, he argues, because nirviiQ.a can be attained, this proves that suffering, arising and disintegration all exist inherently. Nagarjuna responds that all composite things, such as suffering, disintegrate, but that does not mean that libera tion is attained. It is asserted in the system of the Lower Vehicle that nirviiQ.a or liberation means the extinction of suffering or its continuity through the application of anti dotes; however, the nirviiQ.a mentioned here at this point, according to Mahayanists, is not the one that the Hinayan ists are asserting but it has reference to the extinction of the inherent production and cessation of phenomena. In other words, phenomena are empty of inherent production and cessation; this is naturally abiding nirvana or intrinsic li beration. Conventionally, suffering can be extinguished by the power of antidotes, but in an ultimate sense, it can not be extinguished. Prasaiigika Madhyamikas assert that all com posite phenomena are in the nature of the extinction of inherent existence. The emptiness of inherent existence of all phenomena is the naturally abiding nirviiQ.a which can be seen directly by a person on the Path of Seeing. Thus the terms "natmally abiding nirviiQ.a" and "emptiness" are synonymous. When through repeated meditation one ac quaints oneself with this mental state and abandons all the delusions, then one attains the state of liberation according to the greater vehicle system. STANZA 25 The opponent, however, does not accept our assertions about the state of liberation because he does not accept that arising and disintegration lack inherent existence. So Nagarjuna continues to show the fallacies in his view. /gal te l )'gags las 2)mya ngan chad/
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Niigiirjuna's Seventy Stanzas /gal te cig shos ltar na rtag/ /de phyir dngos dang dngos med dag/ /mya ngan 'das par 3)rung ma yin/ l)D: 'gag 2)P:myang 'das 3)P,D:ru ngam You have accepted that the extinction of the con tinuation of suffering is nirviirJa, in which case you have held an annihilationist view . And if you 4)modify your position and assert that nirvai].a is a state where suffering has inherent existence and has not been extinguished, then you accept permanent suffering which even includes the state of nirvai].a, which is an eternalist view. Therefore you cannot assert that nirvai].a refers to a state where suffering is a non-functional phenomenon which has been ex tinguished nor can you assert that nirval].a refers to a state where suffering is a functional phenomenon which has not been extinguished. These two asser tions about nirviirJa are not appropriate. Therefore nirvai].a refers to that state where suffering does not arise with inherent existence and does not cease with inherent existence. 4)Lit: cig shos ltar na; in the other way.
In general, a mere extinction of the continuation of suf fering is neither permanent nor impermanent; it has be come absolutely non-existent, therefore, how can it be a nirvai].a? In fact, it can not be a nirvai].a. A view based on such an assertion is a nihilistic view. If suffering doesn't exist, what liberation can be achieved by meditating on paths? If the opponent now sees that such a view is fallacious, and modifying his position, argues that sufferings exist inherently and are not extinguished, then there is a new fallacy. In his modified assertion, the opponent has stated a view which is at the extreme of eternalism for he is asserting that sufferings are functional phenomena with a permanent existence, which means that they must remain as suffering
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phenomena even in the state of liberation. This is contradic tory because liberation is a state which is free from suffer ing. Such a view also implies that one could not hope to attain a state of liberation because there is no way to extin guish a permanent phenomenon. Moreover, such an asser tion contradicts the Buddha's teaching that the cessation of suffering is the state of liberation. In our system, we assert suffering as being free from inherent production and cessation, thus we do not have the faults of eternalism or nihilism. Suffering exists conven tionally but not inherently; its emptiness is the naturally abiding nirvaQa, a kind of nirvaQa explained here. STANZA 26 In the previous stanza Nagarjuna has refuted the oppo nent's assertions that suffering exists permanently or that it ceases to exist and is without continuity. So the opponent now comes to the conclusion that cessation is something which is different from a functional thing (which is a com posite phenomenon which gives rise to sufferings). Nagar juna now refutes that belief. /gal te 'gog pa 'ga' gnas na/ /dngos po las gzhan de yod 'gyur/ /dngos po med phyir 'di med la/ /dngos po med phyir de las med/
If you assert a cessation that is different than a func tional phenomenon then you are asserting a cessation which does not depend on a functional phenomenon and which exists inherently and permanently. Be cause we have refuted the inherent existence of a functional phenomenon and also the inherent exist ence of a non-functional phenomenon which depends on a functional phenomenon, so here a cessation can not have independent existence and so it cannot exist inherently or permanently. If the opponent asserts that cessation is different than a
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functional phenomenon, then he is asserting that it is a phenomenon, and a phenomenon must be either functional or non-functional. We have shown that non-functional phe nomena depend on functional phenomena, and vice versa but if the opponent asserts that cessation is different than a functional phenomenon, then such a cessation will be a phenomenon which does not depend on a functional phe nomenon and does not arise and cease; that is, it will be permanent. And since it does not depend on a functional phenomenon, so it will also be independent, and being independent it will have inherent existence. However, we have already shown that it is impossible for a phenomenon to have inherent existence, or be independent or permanent inherently. In a general way we do accept that cessation is a perma nent phenomenon, but this should not be confused with the opponent's view about permanent phenomena. He asserts a cessation which exists inherently and differently from func tional phenomena: so it should have independent existence and should exist permanently. We do accept a kind of permanence, but it is a permanence that does not depend on any conditions or factors and which lacks inherent exist ence. No doubt we accept cessation as an existent phe nomenon, i.e. , a phenomenon which is permanent and doesn't depend on causes and conditions, but not as in herently existent. STANZA 27 The opponent now asserts that nirvaq.a must have inherent existence because it has a definition. Nagarjuna refutes this assertion in the following way. /mtshan gzhi las gzhan mtshan nyid las/ /mtshan gzhi grub par rang ma grub/ /phan tshun las kyang ma grub ste/ /ma grub ma grub sgrub byed mini Without depending on the defined one cannot estab-
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lish a definition and without considering the defini tion one cannot establish the defined. As they depend on each other, they have not arisen by themselves, so therefore the defined and the definition are devoid of inherent existence and also they do not exist in herently in a mutually dependent way, so none of them can be used to establish the inherent existence of another one. "Defined" refers to the resultant establishment and "de finition" refers to the causal establishment of the identity of a phenomenon. Thus they are mutually dependent on each other which proves that neither the "defined" nor the "de finition" exist inherently. Since these two arise in depend ence on each other, they have not arisen on their own, and so they are not independent and therefore cannot have inherent existence. This is also proved in another way: if something were to exist inherently then there would be no need for it to depend on its characteristics or definition, but since the defined arises in dependence on its definition so it exists in dependence on its definition. This reasoning also applies to the definition, for if it existed inherently then there would be no need for it to depend on what it defines. Now Nagarjuna's argument convinces the opponent that the defined and the definition (or the object and its charac teristics) exist interdependently, but he still believes that they exist inherently. This is refuted in the second half of the stanza. If the defmed existed inherently then it would exist without depending on the definition, and likewise if the defmition existed inherently then it would exist without depending on the defined. But since they are interdepend ent they must lack inherent existence. Also� their mutual interdependence itself lacks inherent existence. This is so because it cannot be asserted that things exist inherently in a mutually interdependent way when the objects which are mutually interdependent themselves lack inherent exist ence. For example, a characteristic or definition of an object
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Niigiirjuna's Seventy Stanzas
(such as impermanence) cannot arise with its own identity without depending on an object (which is defined as im permanent). This is because we know an object through the perception of its characteristics and we know the character istics through perception of the object. This being under stood, we can see how it is incorrect to use something which lacks inherent existence as a reason or as proof or as evi dence for demonstrating that something else has inherent existence, and if neither of them separately has inherent existence how could they jointly be used as a basis for proof that they exist inherently in a mutually dependent way? STANZA 28 I' dis ni rgyu dang 'bras bu dang/ /tshor dang tshor ba po 1 )sogs dang/ /lta po 2)blta bya 3)sogs 4)ci'ng rung/ /de kun ma lus bshad pa yin/ l)D:scogs 2)P:lta 3)D:scogs 4)P,D:ca'ng Following the logic of this explanation of mutually dependent origination one cannot use the cause of a result to prove that the result has inherent existence because the cause of the result originates in depend ence on the result and so is devoid of inherent existence. The same applies to all the pairs such as feeling and the one who feels or seeing and the seer, and so forth. Taking these as examples one should understand how all the pairs are explained as being devoid of inherent existence because they originate in mutual dependence. Following the logic of the argument just given at the end of the explanation of the previous stanza we can see how causes and results lack inherent existence. For a thing to be called a cause of another thing, it needs to come into rela tionship with that specific other thing. For example, for a man to be a father, that man must have a child. Not any
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child will do, but there must be a specific child who exists in dependence on a specific father. On this basis, we can call a man a father. We say that a father is the cause of a child, yet because that man can only be called a father in dependence on the existence of that particular child, so we see how the existence of a father arises in dependence on the existence of a child. The same logic applies to the child, which can only arise as a child in dependence on the exist ence of a father. The father and the child exemplify the situation for all causes and results. A thing can only become a cause in relation to the specific result which it produces, and a thing can only become a result in relation to the specific cause which produced it. Thus cause and result arise in mutual dependence. As the logic of the previous stanza demon strates, this means that they must both lack inherent exist ence, and that although they both have arisen in a mutually dependent way we cannot say that they have inherent exist ence in a mutually dependent way, and also that we cannot say that the relationship of mutual dependence has inherent existence. Furthermore, because each member of the cause and effect pair lacks inherent existence, it cannot be used to prove the inherent existence of the other. Thus one cannot use the cause of a result as a means of proving that a result has inherent existence. This argument applies to all mutually dependent pairs of phenomena. Just as a cause is regarded as the producer of a result which is its product, so feeling is the experience of the one who experiences and seeing is the experience of the one who sees. In this way, the one who sees or feels exists in mutual dependence on seeing or feeling, and seeing or feeling exist in mutual dependence on the one who sees or feels. All such pairs therefore lack inherent existence. Furthermore, following the logic which we have demon strated, no one of them can be used to prove that another exists inherently.
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STANZA 29 Because we have refuted the inherent existence of phe nomena, the opponent thinks that phenomena don't exist, in which case the three times wouldn't exist. But, he argues, because the three times do exist, so functional phe nomena must also exist. We agree that if the three times were existent then functional phenomena would exist, but the three times do not exist inherently. /gnas med phan tshun las grub dang/ /'chol phyir rang nyid ma grub phyir/ /dngos po med phyir dus gsum nil /yod pa ma yin rtog pa tsam/ Time does not exist inherently because the three periods of time do not maintain continuity by them selves, but are dependent on each other. If the three times were to have inherent existence in a mutually dependent way, then we could not make distinc tions between them, but because we can make dis tinctions so time itself cannot be established as having inherent existence. Because time does not have inher ent existence, the functional basis on which the three times is imputed cannot have inherent exist ence, so therefore the three times do not have inherent existence and are merely imputed by concepts. Time does not exist inherently because there is no cogniz er which cognizes the inherent existence of time and also because there is no cognizer which cognizes its continuity. The opponent believes that such a cognizer exists because we understand how hours are formed into days and how days are formed into months; thus, he says, we cognize the continuity of time. However, this is conceptual, it is not a direct cognition of the gross flow or continuity of time, which is its apparently enduring nature. We cannot directly cognize the continuity of time, so how can we assert that time has continuity? Since we cannot assert any continuity
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of time, then how can we assert there is any actual time, so, following the argwnent in stanza 27, it is impossible to actually make divisions in time, such as past, present, and future, except by way of their mutual dependence. Without their depending on each other we cannot identify them, so therefore they lack inherent existence, as must a supposedly existing continuity of time which is derived from them, as well as the functional basis on which we impute the three periods of time. The three periods of time also cannot depend on themselves, rather, the three periods of time depend on each other. If it were argued that the three periods of time existed inherently in a mutually dependent way, then they should be mutually dependent in all times. But then we could not make distinctions between them and they would be all entangled. For example, the past would exist in the present. Moreover, if the three times existed inherently in a mutual ly dependent way then they would always remain the same, and we could, for example, find the present and the future in the past. But if these two exist inseparably from the past in the past time, then we couldn't make distinctions in the three times. But we can make distinctions, so this is incor rect. Because of these fallacies the three periods of time cannot exist inherently in a mutually dependent way but are merely imputed by concepts on a functional basis and this also lacks inherent existence. The functional basis on which time is imputed has the nature of time but lacks inherent existence. This functional basis is unknowable when analyzed ultimately but must have some sort of existence in order for us to impute the qualities of time on it. If we do not understand this and we ask the question, is this functional basis in the past, present or future, we cannot answer this question. For example, take the case of a vase. The three times can be known with reference to it. The past of a vase is its cause. The future of a vase is its result. The present of a vase is its having existence. But it is different when we talk about a future
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vase (i. e . , a vase in the future) at the time of its cause: it will be in the present when its whole identity is accomplished and it will be in the past after its identity is lost. STANZA 30 /gang phyir skye dang gnas dang 'jig /'dus byas mtshan nyid 'di gsum med/ /de phyir 'dus byas nyid ma yinl /'dus ma byas la'ng cung zad med/ Following the reasoning just given, the three charac teristics of a composite phenomenon which are arising, enduring and ceasing are unfindable upon ultimate analysis even for you, so then a functional phe nomenon which is characterized by these three attributes is also unfindable, in which case the func tional basis of a composite phenomenon becomes unfindable. So when a composite phenomenon cannot exist inherently, how can a non-composite phe nomenon which depends on a composite phe nomenon have inherent existence in the least. If you perform a careful analysis you will conclude that there is a basis upon which terms are imputed but that this basis cannot be found. If such a basis existed inherently it should be findable, but because it cannot be found, so it cannot exist inherently. If this reasoning is applied to com posite phenomena, we realize that ultimately they are un findable, so they must lack inherent existence. Therefore, non-composite phenomena, which depend on composite phenomena, must also be unfindable and lack inherent existence. For example, space is a mere negation of obstruction and contact. It is a permanent phenomenon merely imputed by terms and concepts on its basis of imputation: clear in termediate vacuity visible to the eyes, which is a composite thing. As they are mutually dependent on each other and cannot exist without the other, that means they are empty
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of inherent existence. Furthermore, how can we establish non-composite phe nomena without depending on composite phenomena? For example, by abandoning the objects of abandonment we can obtain cessation, which is a permanent phenomenon. So in this case, cessation, which is permanent and non composite, is obtained in dependence on abandoning com posite phenomena. STANZA 3 1 Composite phenomena are said to disintegrate momentarily (that is, they disintegrate over a period of successive mo ments) and this entire process can be characterized as the arising, enduring and cessation or complete disintegration of a phenomenon. Now if a phenomenon is asserted to exist inherently, then certain fallacies will result when we care fully analyze any single moment in one of these three periods of time and attempt to find the characteristics which are said to inhere in that phenomenon. /ma zhig mi 'jig zhig pa'ng min/ /gnas pa gnas pa ma yin te/ /mi gnas 1 )pa yang gnas ma yin/ /skyes pa mi skye ma skyes mini l)P:la'ng At the point of its complete disintegration does a phenomenon disintegrate which has already disinte grated or at that point does a phenomenon disinte grate which has not yet disintegrated? In the first case the process of disintegration is complete, so this cannot be accepted. In the second case it is free from the function of disintegration, so this cannot be accepted. The same applies to enduring and arising. If a phenomenon were to endure at that point when it has already endured then the process of enduring is complete and we cannot say that it is enduring at that point. And a phenomenon which
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Niigiirjuna's Sevenly Stanzas has not endured cannot be accepted as enduring at that point because it is free from the function of enduring. If a phenomenon were to arise at the point of arising which has already arisen then the process of arising is already complete, so this cannot be accepted. And if a phenomenon were to arise at that point which has not arisen then that case is not acceptable, because it is non-existent.
STANZA 32 I'dus byas dang ni 'dus ma byas/ /du ma ma yin gcig ma yin/ /yod min med min yod med min/ / l)mtshams 'dir sna tshogs thams cad 'dus/ l )P:mtshan If we examine composite phenomena and non composite phenomena then we cannot find them as one, because then we cannot differentiate between these two types of phenomena, and we cannot find them as many, because then these two would be completely unrelated. If a composite phenomenon is asserted 2)to exist, then it cannot arise because it is already existent and if it is asserted not to exist, then it cannot arise because it is non-existent. If it is asserted to be both existent and non-existent, this is not possible because such a state is contradictory. Every different type of phenomenon is included with in this criterion of non-inherent existence. 2)Lit: not non-existent. It is the view of the opponent that composite phenomena and non-composite phenomena have inherent existence, but Niigiirjuna shows that if we examine these phenomena from the standpoint of their having inherent existence, then certain fallacies are found. Composite and non-composite phenomena must be either the same ("one") or different ("many"). But if our examination shows them to be the
