Uhuuuuuu
same, then we cannot differentiate between them. Yet, if our examination shows them to have inherent existence and to be different, then they will be completely unrelated, like a tree and a vase. But this is contradictory because compos ite and non-composite phenomena are known through their relation to each other and we cannot find a composite phenomenon with a self-sufficient existence which doesn't depend on non-composite phenomena. If the opponent accepts our argument up to this point, he may still assert that composite phenomena, at any rate, have inherent existence. Therefore we ask: within the context of your belief in inherent existence, does a composite phe nomenon arise which is already existent, or does a compos ite phenomenon arise which lacks existence, or does a composite phenomenon arise which is both existent and non-existent? If a composite phenomenon exists inherently, it would exist from the beginning, so it would have no need to arise. But if it doesn't exist inherently, then it couldn't come into existence because it would be non-existent for ever. Nor is it possible for a phenomenon to be both existent and non-existent as these are contradictory assertions in relation to a single object. Thus we have shown that all composite and non composite phenomena lack inherent existence, and since composite phenomena are compounded of parts and parti cles, all these must also lack inherent existence. STANZA 33 The opponent now offers reasons to prove that phenomena exist inherently. /bcom ldan bla mas las gnas dang/ /las bdag las kyi 'bras bu dang/ /sems can rang gi las dang nil /las rnams chud mi l )za bar gsungs/ l)D:bra Opponent: The Peerless Subduer has taught that
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Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas there is continuity in the flow of actions. Likewise, he has taught about the nature of actions and their results. He has also taught that the results of actions performed by an individual sentient being must be experienced by him and that whatever actions are performed 2)are certain to bear fruit. For these four reasons actions have inherent existence. 2)Lit: chud mi za bar, will not be wasted.
The opponent believes that because the Buddha spoke of a continuity in the flow of actions, this means that these actions endure and have inherent existence. Continuity in the flow of actions is understood to mean, for example, that whatever actions we perform to accumulate wealth will bear some fruit in the future, even though at death the wealth we have accumulated will have to be left behind. The opponent believes that this teaching of the Buddha shows that such actions must have the nature of inherent existence or else they could not endure into the future. Furthermore, the Buddha taught that there is certainty that the result of actions will have to be experienced by the one who per formed them. For example, if a person performs nonvir tuous actions and does not apply the four powerful anti dotes but continues to perform nonvirtuous actions, then it is certain that that person will experience bad consequences. Since the Buddha has taught about actions in these ways, the opponent takes this as a proof that actions must have inherent existence. STANZA 34 We agree with the opponent that Buddha taught about the law of action and result, but we disagree with him in that we believe that Buddha taught these things conventionally, but not ultimately. So where the opponent understands the Buddha's use of the term "existence" to mean inherent existence, we understand the Buddha to mean conventional existence. We point out that the Buddha taught that all
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composite or produced phenomena are impermanent. He also said that impermanent phenomena lack inherent exist ence. Because all actions are impermanent phenomena, so they must be devoid of inherent existence. If they did exist inherently then they couldn't be impermanent phenomena because phenomena which exist inherently should not undergo change. /las rnams rang bzhin med gsungs te/ /ma skyes gang de chud mi zal /de las kyang ni bdag 'dzin skye/ /de bskyed 'dzin de'ng rnam rtog las/ Reply: Buddha taught that actions do not exist in herently and so they cannot arise inherently . Although actions do not exist inherently, they will not be wasted but it is certain that they will bear fruit. From these actions arise consciousness, name and form, and the rest of the limbs of dependent origination. Conception of self l )is generated through focusing on the person who is merely imputed upon these dependent limbs. Also, it arisesfrom the precon ception which takes improper objects and overesti mates them. l)Lit: skye, arises. STANZA 35 /gal te las la rang bzhin yodl /de l)bskyed lus ni rtag par 'gyur/ /las kyang sdug bsngal rnam smin can/ /mi 'gyur de phyir bdag tu 'gyur/ l)D:bskyes
If actions were to have inherent existence then they would not be impermanent but would have the nature of permanence, and then the body which results from those actions would also be permanent. If actions were to be 2)permanent then they could not
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Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas give rise to suffering, which is the ripening of actions. If actions were non-changing then they would have the nature of permanence and then they would have self-existence. But then Buddha would not have taught about the lack of self-nature. 2)Lit: mi 'gyur, unchangeable.
There must be a correspondence between cause and re sult, which is why, for example, nonvirtuous actions give rise to suffering. Following this principle, if the opponent asserts that actions have inherent existence, then so must their results. This means that the body, which is the result of previous actions, would have to exist inherently. Moreover, if actions existed inherently, then they would be permanent, and so would their results, which means that the body would be permanent. This is clearly false. Also, if actions were permanent they could not give rise to suffering because permanent phenomena cannot give rise to results. This is because permanent phenomena do not change, but for there to be some arising there must be some change. Thus, actions cannot be permanent, because ac tions do produce suffering. The Buddha taught that all composite phenomena are impermanent, and whatever is impermanent has a suffering nature. Because whatever has a suffering nature lacks self existence, so actions must lack a self-nature. STANZA 36 In the previous stanza we proved that actions lack inherent existence by demonstrating the fallacies which result from such a view. Now, taking another reason, we will again prove that actions lack inherent existence. /las ni rkyen skyes yod min zhing/ /rkyen min las skyes cung zad 1 )min/ I'du byed rnams ni sgyu ma dang/ /dri za'i grong khyer smig rgyu mtshungsi 1)P,D:med
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If actions were to exist at the time of conditions, those actions could not arise from those conditions. And if conditions do not have the potential to give rise to actions, then actions cannot arise from condi tions because those conditions are similar to non conditions. Because actions cannot arise even slightly from non-conditions, so therefore all composite phe nomena are like an illusion, and a gandharva town and a mirage, and therefore they lack inherent ex istence. If actions exist inherently, do they arise from causes and conditions or not? If we answer that actions arise from conditions, then we must ask whether actions arise at the time of conditions or not. If an action does arise at the time of its conditions, then there is no need for the conditions, because the action is already existent at that time. If it doesn't, then the conditions have ceased when the action arises, so the conditions cannot serve their function in giv ing rise to the action. In this case, it is like a non-condition. It is impossible for actions to arise from non-conditions. Hence they lack inherent existence. All composite phe nomena are empty of inherent existence like illusions and mirages, etc. Here we are showing that actions lack inherent existence, but this does not mean that they are completely non existent. Rather, they are non-inherently existent, like illu sions and mirages. STANZA 37 /las ni nyon mongs rgyu mtshan can/ /nyon mongs 'du byed las bdag nyidl /lus ni lus kyi rgyu mtshan can/ /gsum ka'ng ngo bo nyid kyis stong/
Actions are caused by delusions. Our body arises from the nature of delusions and actions. Because the cause of the body is actions, and actions arise from delu-
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Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas sions, so therefore these three are devoid of inherent existence.
In the previous stanza we have seen that actions have non-inherent existence, a type of existence which is like a mirage. Now Niigarjuna shows us that these non-inherently existing actions are caused by delusions, and that these two are, in their turn, the cause of the body. Because body exists in dependence on actions and actions exist in depend ence o>J. delusion and because we have already seen that actions lack inherent existence, so all these three lack inher ent existence. This is because whatever exists in depend ence on something must lack independent, inherent exist ence. Applying this principle to the relation of delusion and action, it can be seen that since action lacks inherent exist ence, so too must its cause, delusion. STANZA 38 Our opponent says that actions are inherently existent be cause a person who is dominated by ignorance is the perform er of unmeritorious actions and accumulates them. As he exists, actions exist to produce results which would be experienced by him. /las med na ni byed po med/ /de gnyis med pas 'bras bu med/ /de med nye bar spyod l)po med/ /de bas dngos po dben pa yin/ l)D:pa, P:bo When actions do not have inherent existence there will be no person to perform actions. Because both of them do not exist, results do not exist. When there are no results there will be no person to experience those results physically and mentally. Because of that reason that actions do not exist inherently, so all phenomena are devoid of inherent existence. Since actions are devoid of inherent existence there can
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be no truly existent person to perform actions, but only an illusory, conventionally existent person (which is described in stanzas 40-42). The results of the actions of such an illusory person are also, still in a metaphoric sense, illusory; that is, they are devoid of inherent existence. As we have already seen, the body and the mind, which are interdepend ent, lack inherent existence, so there is no truely existent person having body or mind to experience the results of previous actions. But there is a conventionally existent per son having body and mind which does experience the con ventionally existent results of conventionally existent ac tions. STANZA 39 /las ni stong par yang dag 1)par/ /shes na de nyid mthong ba'i phyir/ /las 2)mi 'byung ste de med nal /las las 'byung gang mi 'byung ngo/ 1)D:pa'i 2)D:ni
understands how actions are 3)devoid of inher ent existence, then he sees the suchness of actions. When he has seen suchness he will have eliminated If one
ignorance and when there is no ignorance then the actions which are caused by ignorance cannot arise in him, and so 4)the results of actions such as conscious ness and so forth up to aging and death will not be experienced by him. When consciousness ceases to exist the dependent limb of aging and death cannot occur; thus he will attain the state of liberation free from aging and death. 3)Lit: yan dag; real or perfect. The real nature of actions is their being devoid of inherent exist ence. 4)Lit: las las 'byung gang; that which ori ginates from actions. Actions cannot arise without a cause, so when one has understood how actions are devoid of inherent existence
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and seen the suchness of actions, then meditating on it one can eliminate the ignorance of grasping at the inherent existence of actions and since this ignorance is the cause of contaminated actions, so then such actions cannot arise. When contaminated actions cannot arise then their results, such as consciousness and so forth up to aging and death, also cannot arise and in that case one has achieved libera tion. However, a person who achieves liberation does not be come absolutely non-existent. In fact, such a person will take rebirths in dependence upon his uncontaminated ac tions and thereby work for others. As he has abandoned delusive obscurations he won't be influenced by them in his activities. Therefore, his actions become virtuous. Any other view would be nihilistic because if one could not perform actions after attaining the liberation which comes from destroying ignorance, then one couldn't work for the benefit of others. Within the context of the twelve dependent limbs, the dependent limb of consciousness does not refer to con sciousness in general but rather refers specifically to the sixth, mental consciousness (yid kyi rnams par shes pa), which is associated with the mind sense organ. This con sciousness receives the imprints of virtuous and nonvir tuous actions and entering the womb of the mother is the source of the person who ages and eventually dies. STANZAS 40-41 /ji ltar bcom ldan de bzhin gshegs/ /rdzu 'phrul gyis ni sprul pa sprull /sprul pa de yis slar yang nil /sprul pa gzhan zhig sprul gyur pa /de la de bzhin gshegs sprul stong/ /sprul pas sprul pa smos ci dgos/ /gnyis po ming tsam yod pa yang/ / 1 )ci yang rung ste rtog pa tsam/ 1)D:gang ci 'ng
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Through his miraculous powers, Tathiigata the Sub duer emitted an emanation and that emanation emitted another emanation. As the emanation emitted by the Tathiigata is devoid of inherent existence, it is hardly necessary to say that the emanation emitted by the emanation is also devoid of inherent existence. When we say that these two emanations do not exist inherently, that does not mean that they are com pletely non-existent but rather that both of them, just like actions and the one who performs actions, merely exist through terms because they are separated from the nature of inherent existence. 2)They do exist, but merely through imputation by thought in a deceptive way. 2)Lit: ci yang rung; all that are existent. Stanzas 40 and 41 give examples whose meaning is given in stanza 42 . Though they constitute two separate stanzas, the Tibetan tradition is to explain them both at the same time. Though the stanzas end with the assertion "They do exist . . . ," this does not simply mean that only actions and the actor or the various emanations merely exist through im putation by thought, but that all phenomena merely exist through imputation by thought. This means that all phe nomena which conventionally exist have a deceptive appearance. It is possible to know the basis of imputation of phe nomena. For example, the five aggregates are the basis for imputing the existence of a person, and these aggregates are knowable. A person doesn't exist inherently from the side of his aggregates because he becomes unfindable under ultimate analysis, but he does exist conventionally by way of mere imputation by terms and concepts. Likewise, what you are now looking at is the basis for imputing the term "book," and when you see that the book is not inherently existent from the side of its basis of imputation, you have
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understood its emptiness of inherent existence. Because the book exists merely through the imputation of words and concepts that is indicative of its conventional existence. Thus it is said that the world which we see merely exists through words and concepts and that there is no other world which exists except that world which exists through words and concepts. However, the imputations can be re moved and the six sense organs can know the basis of imputation as it actually is. STANZA 42 /de bzhin byed po sprul dang mtshungs/ /las ni sprul pas sprul dang mtshungs/ /rang bzhin gyis stong gang cung zad/ /yod pa de dag 1 )rtog pa tsam/ 1)P:ni
The person who performs actions is said to be similar to the emanation emitted by the Tathiigata because he is led by ignorance. And so his actions are said to be similar to the emanation emitted by the emanation. All of these are devoid of inherent existence, though they do have a slight existence as mere imputations supported by terms and concepts. Without the Tathagata there could be no existence of the Tathagata's emanation. Similarly, both the person who per forms actions and his actions cannot come into existence without there being the ignorance which leads that person. As both of the emanations, being dependent on the Tatha gata, lack inherent existence, so also do the person who performs actions and the actions which are performed lack inherent existence, for they depend on ignorance. Though the person who performs actions and the actions which are performed lack inherent existence, they are said to "have a slight existence. " The meaning here is that they have an existence through mere terms and concepts, that is, they exist conventionally. If this were not the case, then
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Nagarjuna would b e arguing from a nihilistic extreme, asserting the actual non-existence of phenomena. (On this point, cf. stanza 44. ) STANZA 43 /gal te las kyi rang bzhin yod/ /myang 'das byed po la$ kyang med/ /gal te med na las bskyed pal /'bras bu sdug dang mi sdug med/
If actions were to have the nature of inherent existence, then they would be permanent. But if actions were permanent then they would not depend on a per son, and if there were no person to perform actions, then actions would not exist. In that case, nirvii'f)(l, which is the state of cessation of delusions and actions, could not be attained. If actions did not exist through mere terms and concepts then their ripening results such as happiness and suffering could not arise. If actions are inherently existent they should be perma nent and unchanging phenomena. In that case, nirvaq.a, which refers to the state of extinguished contaminated ac tions and delusions, could not be achieved. Moreover, such actions would be causeless as they could not depend on a person led by ignorance as their cause. But this is not appropriate. Also, if actions exist inherently they cannot have imputed existence, which means that happy and suf fering results will not arise from them. But this is not true, as we can see how happy and suffering results occur from virtuous and nonvirtuous actions. This clearly speaks to the fact that they exist merely through the imputation of terms and concepts. In other words, they exist conventionally. STANZA 44 In this stanza Nagarjuna clarifies the language he uses when discussing extreme views about existence which may be held by various opponents.
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Nagarjuna's Seventy Stanzas /yod ces pa 1 )dang yod med ces/ /yod dang med ces de yang yod/ /sangs rgyas rnams kyi dgongs pa yis/ /gsungs pa 2)rtogs par 3)bla ma yin/ 1)D:yod med ces yod 2)P:rtog 3)P:sla Whatever is said by the Buddha has the two truths as its chief underlying thought; it is 4)hard to understand and must be interpreted in this light. When the Buddha says "existence" his chief underlying thought is conventional existence; when he says "non-existence" his chief underlying thought is non inherent existence; when he says "existence-and-non existence" his chief underlying thought is conven tional-existence-and-non-inherent-existence as a mere object of examination. 4)Lit: rtogs par bla ma; not easily understood.
Nagarjuna himself must use predicates such as "exists" in his discourse, but, like the Buddha, he does so only for the purpose of instructing the ignorant who need to develop a mental (generic) image of emptiness. He himself main tains the correct view as his chief underlying thought. In order to argue against the extreme of nihilism he uses the term "exists," thereby establishing conventional existence. Then, at the next level, he says "does not exist" in order to argue against the extreme of permanence, thereby estab lishing non-inherent existence. Finally, he says "exists-and does-not-exist" to show the middle view which is free from both of these extremes. This is his real goal, the demonstra tion that things are actually mere objects of examination upon which we impute extreme views. With this realization we cease grasping at the supposed true existence of objects. In regards to the topic under discussion, the nature of actions, the Buddha has made what appear to be contradic tory statements, even though his chief underlying thought has remained the same. This is because although his audi ence consistently held the view that actions exist inherently,
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at different times the Buddha wished to refute different errors connected with this view. When the Buddha said that "actions exist" he meant that they exist conventionally, but not inherently. He knew that if he said that actions did not exist inherently his auditors would misunderstand him and take non-inherent existence to mean actual non-existence. To preserve them from this extreme nihilistic view which leads to the three lower realms he therefore said "actions exist. " At other times the Buddha told the same audience that "actions do not exist," by which he meant that they do not exist inherently. Here his purpose was to counter the eter nalist extreme that actions exist inherently and thus per manently, for unless his auditors discarded this extreme view they could not become free of cyclic existence. At yet other times the Buddha said that actions "exist and do not exist," by which he meant that actions exist conven tionally and non-inherently. In this third case his intention was to eliminate both extremes of nihilism and eternalism at the same time. STANZA 45 1)/gal te 'byung ba'i rang bzhin gzugs/ /'byung las gzugs ni 'byung ba min/ /rang las 'byung min gzhan las kyang/ /'byung min di phyin med min narnl 1)The wording of stanza 45 in the root text differs quite markedly from the wording of stanza 45 in the Candrakirti commentary, though there is no difference in meaning. We prefer the wording in the Candrakirti version, which is given above. The version in the root text is given below. /gal te gzugs ni rang 'byung bzhin/ /gzugs de 'byung las 'byung ma yin/ /rang las 'byung min ma yin narnl /gzhan las kyang min de med phyir/
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Niigiirjuna's Seventy Stanzas Neither does inherently existent form, having the nature of elements, arise from elements nor from itself and not even from others. Therefore, it does not exist, does it?
When we say that form lacks inherent existence the oppo nent argues that this is wrong because the Buddha has said that form arises from the four elements. This statement of the Buddha expresses clearly how form lacks inherent exist ence because of its arising in dependence upon the ele ments. Also, we argue that if inherently existing form has arisen from the four elements, then we must consider whether or not form has the same nature as the four ele ments. If it is said that form has the same nature as the four elements then it would have arisen by itself. But here form refers to the material body (whereas in other cases form refers to shape and color), which can be seen, while the four elements can be experienced by the body sense but not seen, so these must be different. Because they are different they cannot have the same inherent nature, so then in herently existing form cannot have arisen by itself. Also, if the four elements have a different nature then the inherent ly existing form, in that case, after eliminating them, form should still be existent, but this is not the case, so form does not exist inherently other than the elements. As form is dependent on the four elements, then it exists conventional ly but not inherently. STANZA 46 /gcig la bzhi nyid yod min cing/ /bzhi la'ng gcig nyid yod min pas/ /gzugs ni 'byung ba chen po bzhil /rgyur byas nas grub ji ltar yodl
A form cannot have the fourfold nature of the ele ments because if the form has four elements then it will be fourfold and the four elements cannot have a singular form or else they will become one like form,
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so how can form arise from the four great elements as its cause? Here again, form refers to the body. The question is, how can the four great elements be the cause of the body? There are two reasons why this is not possible. If form depends upon the nature of the four inherently existing elements then it should be like the four elements, that is, it should have a fourfold nature. Alternatively, the four inherently existing elements would have to have a singular nature, like form. But because form doesn't have a fourfold nature like the elements, and because the elements do not have a singular nature like form, therefore, how could form arise from the four inherently existing elements as its cause? In fact, form exists conventionally through a dependent relationship with the four elements. STANZA 47 In the previous stanzas we have refuted the inherent exist ence of form, but now the opponent asserts that form must have inherent existence because it can be apprehended by a mind. Nagarjuna answers: /shin tu mi 'dzin phyir de med/ /rtags las she na l )rtags de'ng med/ /rgyu dang rkyen las skyes pa'i phyir/ /2)rtags med par yang mi rigs so/ l )P:rtag 2)P:rtag Form is not apprehended as inherently existing, so therefore the form does not exist inherently. If it is said that the inherent existence of form is under stood 3)by the mind which apprehends it, then such a mind does not exist inherently because it has arisen from causes and conditions so it cannot be used as a reason for proving the inherent existence of a form. 3)Lit: rtags las; from a mark. If, says Nagarjuna, a form were to be perceived or
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apprehended, then, as you assert, that form should have inherent existence. But it is not apprehended at all, so form lacks inherent existence. What reason could you put forth to prove that the inherent existence of form can be apprehended by mind? The opponent answers that we know something is a form because we first perceive it as a form and then we can get an image of a form in our mind and we can think "that is a form." So, says the opponent, unless we can perceive a form we cannot think "it is a form" and with this reason we can understand how form is per ceived, and since it is perceived, it has inherent existence. But, says Niigiirjuna, what lacks inherent existence can not be used as a proof of something else having inherent existence. Since the mind which is doing the apprehending lacks inherent existence because it is dependent on causes and conditions so too must the form which is apprehended by that mind lack inherent existence. Moreover, the reasons put forth by that non-inherently existing mind must also lack inherent existence, so they too are not suitable for proving an argument about the inherent existence of some thing. Therefore, because the mind does not apprehend the form as inherently existing, so it does not exist inherently. STANZA 48 Again, refuting the assertion of the opponent that if a mind apprehends a form then the form must exist, Niigarjuna says: /gal te blo des gzugs 'dzin na/ /rang l )gi rang bzhin la 'dzin 'gyur/ /rkyen las skyes pas yod min pas/ /yang dag gzugs med ji ltar 'dzin/ l)P:gis
If a mind apprehends a form with inherent existence then the mind will apprehend its own nature. Such a mind has arisen from causes and conditions, so it is a dependent arising which lacks inherent existence. In
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the same way, form does not exist truly, so how can that mind apprehend a form with true existence? If a mind which apprehends form were to exist inherently such a mind and its object - form - will have the same inherent nature and the mind would apprehend its own nature. If mind apprehends its own nature it would follow that the subjective mind and its object become inseparably one and we cannot find the distinction between the two: one as perceiver and the other as that which is perceived. But if such a mind does not apprehend itself then how can it apprehend another? It will be like a stone or vase which does not apprehend an other as it cannot apprehend itself. Because mind is a dependent arising, how can it apprehend an inherently existing form; in fact, it cannot. STANZA 49 Although we have explained how the mind which apprehends and the form apprehended do not exist in herently, still the opponent maintains that a person can apprehend a form with true existence because in the Siitra PiJaka it is explained how in the three times forms can be apprehended. Thus, says the opponent, form must exist. We agree that form may be apprehended, but not inherent ly existing form, while the opponent asserts that inherently existing form can be apprehended. Nagarjuna then argues as follows: /ji skad bshad gzugs skyes 1 )pa'i blo'i/ /skad cig skad cig gis mi 'dzin/ /'das dang ma 'ongs 2)pa gzugs kyang/ /de 3)yis ji ltar rtogs 4)bar 'gyur/ 1 )P:pa 2)D:gzugs kyi ni 3)P:yi 4)D:ngar
The kind ofform, which has arisen but not ceased to exist, that I have explained is not apprehended by each moment of the mind in the present. Therefore, how can such a mind apprehend forms of the past and also the future?
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Both mind and form are momentary phenomena. Every moment of the mind (e.g. , eye consciousness) in the present is unable to apprehend a form which has arisen but not ceased because of its extremely short duration. If the oppo nent asserts that the passage of moments between the occurrence of the form and its apprehension by the eye consciousness is not a problem because the eye conscious ness can apprehend a form in the past or the future, we say that this is impossible because the form of the past has disintegrated and the form of the future is yet to arise. Thus both are non-existent at the time of the eye consciousness of the present, so how can they be apprehended? STANZA SO In the preceeding stanzas we explained how form doesn't exist inherently. Now the opponent argues that since the form entrance (i.e. , form as an object of perception) exists, so form should exist. Moreover, he says, form exists in herently because color and shape exist inherently. Niigiir juna refutes this assertion beginning from the position that the form entrance is coordinated to color and shape and cannot be identified individually if the color and shape of forms are excluded. If color and shape lack inherent exist ence, so must form and then so must the form entrance. /gang tshe nam yang kha dog dang/ /dbyibs dag tha dad nyid med pas/ /de dag tha dad 'dzin yod mini /gzugs de gcig tu'ng grags pa mini
In all times color and shape do not exist as two different things. If they were to exist as two different things then a mind could apprehend shape without con sidering color or color without considering shape. Because these two do not exist as two different things, so therefore there is not a mind which apprehends l)shape without taking color into consid eration nor color without taking shape into consid-
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eration. 2)/n the world, a form is known to be singular; if its shape and color were to exist as two different things then the form would appear to the world as two instead of one. l)Lit: tha dad; distinction, difference, separated ness. 2)Lit: grags pa min; isn't known. Form refers to shape and color. If it exists inherently, does it exist as one with shape and color or different from them? If they exist as one, in that case both shape and color would mean the same thing, which means shape and color become undifferentiable. But if they exist differently, in that case also, form should exist individually after excluding its shape and color. An eye consciousness should be able to perceive a form without considering its shape just as we see a vase without depending on a pillar or woolen cloth for seeing it. But that is not the case. Therefore, form cannot exist inherently, so also its shape and color. Doesn't the world know that a form is singular? If it exists inherently, either its shape and color must be one, as it is, or it should be two, as are its shape and color. In reality, they are mutually dependent on each other and thus lack inherent existence. STANZA S ! The opponent now asserts that form exists inherently be cause an eye can perceive it. Nagarjuna refutes this by asking, does the subject have eye consciousness or does the object have eye consciousness? /mig blo mig la yod min te/ /gzugs la yod min bar na med/ /gzugs dang mig la brten nas de/ /yongs su rtog pa log pa yin/ The eye has no consciousness because the eye is a form but eye consciousness is formless and that which is formless cannot adhere to form. In the same way
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Niigiirjuna's Seventy Stanzas the form which is observed has no eye consciousness, nor is it between eye and form. Because eye con sciousness is generated in dependence on eye and form, if it is apprehended as having inherent exist ence, that is a mistaken conception.
If form is inherently existent, does the eye sense or the form have eye consciousness? Also, does eye consciousness exist in between the eye sense and form? If form as an object has eye consciousness it means eye consciousness cannot be formless because of its being inseparably one with the in herently existing form. This is incorrect. But now if it is different from form that means there is no relationship at all between the two. Obviously it cannot exist between the eye sense and the form. Because of their mutual dependence, eye sense, form and eye consciousness are empty of inher ent existence and apprehending them to exist inherently is a mistaken conception. STANZA 52 /gal te mig bdag l )mi mthong na/ /2)des gzugs mthong bar ji ltar 'gyur/ /de phyir mig dang gzugs bdag med/ /skye mched lhag ma'ng de bzhin no/ l)P,D:mig 2)D:de
When the eye does not see itself, how can it see forms? Therefore the eye and the forms do not have self existence and the remaining entrances should be understood in the same way. If an eye could perceive a form with inherent existence then, as we have previously shown, it would be able to perceive itself. This does not mean that the eye sense organ should be able to perceive itself as an object which is an eye sense organ. Rather, this means that if the eye could per ceive a form with inherent existence then it too would have inherent existence and could therefore perceive its own
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inherent existence. By this we mean that if the eye existed inherently it would not need to depend on any other factor or thing in order to perceive its object. Since it wouldn't need to depend on any other factor or thing it would be able to perceive itself. However, it can't perceive itself, so it is non-inherently existent, and by this logic it also can't per ceive the inherent existence of any other object. Because perception, eye and object are mutually interdependent it means they lack inherent existence, and whatever depends on something non-inherently existent must also be non inherently existent. For our opponent, lack of inherent existence means non-existence. So from the perspective of his assertions, the eye would not be able to perceive form at all. However the eye does, as we know, perceive form. If it is not perceiving inherently existing form then it must be perceiving non-inherently existing form, and since the one depends on the other, so both eye and form lack inherent existence or self-existence. The same logic can be applied to the remaining five entrances and prove their non-inherent existence. STANZA 53 /mig ni rang bdag nyid kyis stong/ /de ni gzhan l)bdag gis kyang stong/ /gzugs kyang de bzhin stong pa ste/ /skye 2)mched lhag ma'ng de bzhin no/ l)P:dag 2)P:de ched The eye is devoid of its own self-existent nature. It is also devoid of the self-existent nature of an other. In the same way, form is devoid of its own self-existent nature as well as that of another. And it is the same with the rest of the entrances. When it is said that eye and form are devoid of the self-existent nature of another, this refers to the fact that consciousness, eye and form arise together and the "other"
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referred to are consciousness and eye in the case of form, and consciousness and form in the case of the eye. STANZA 54 In the previous stanza we showed how eye consciousness and form do not have inherent existence. The opponent, however, still asserts that they exist inherently because eye consciousness does arise in dependence on the contact of eye and form. /gang tshe gcig reg lhan cig 'gyur/ /de tshe gzhan rnams stong pa nyid/ /stong pa'm mi stong mi l)bsten la/ /mi stong pa yang 2)stong mi brten/ l)D:stong 2)P:brten, D:rten
When any of the six internal entrances arises simul taneously with contact, at that time the rest of the entrances will be devoid of the nature of contact. The rest of the entrances which are devoid of the nature of contact do not depend on the nature of contact. That which is not devoid of the nature of contact will not depend on that which is devoid of the nature of contact. Only one of the entrances at a time can arise simul taneously with contact; at that moment the rest of the entrances are not in contact with their objects. Now, if it is asserted that contact has inherent existence, then that which depends on it, the eye entrance, must also have inherent existence. In this case the eye entrance and contact have the same nature, which is their inherent existence, and these two would be inseparable. The other five entrances have not, at this moment, arisen and each of them is different than the eye entrance. For example, the eye entrance and the ear entrance are differ ent. Now if the eye entrance arises with contact and has inherent existence, then the other five entrances which are
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different than the eye entrance and have not arisen at that moment (and so are devoid of the nature of contact) must lack inherent existence, for what does not have the nature of contact does not depend on what has the nature of contact. But what has inherent existence must exist inherently at all times, so these five entrances can never exist inherently. But since this example could have been used for the ear entrance, then in that case the eye entrance would lack inherent existence! So this shows that the argument is falla cious and neither the entrances nor contact exists in herently. STANZA SS /ngo bo mi nas yod min pas/ /gsum 'dus pa yod ma yin no/ /de l )bdag nyid 2)kyi reg med 3)pas/ /de 4)tshe tshor ba yod ma yin/ l )P:dag 2)D:gyis 3)D:nga 4)P:che, D:cha The eye, eye consciousness and its object arise and immediately disintegrate, so they cannot exist as abiding in their natures and so those three cannot assemble. S)When these three cannot assemble, con tact cannot exist and if contact cannot exist, so there cannot be feeling. S)Lit: de bdag nyid kyi, by those (having no) self-nature. If an eye consciousness were to exist inherently, in that case, it might be possible for the three - eye, eye con sciousness and its object - to have an assembled nature from which contact could arise. But eye, eye consciousness and object are all momentary phenomena without self nature. Since they disintegrate immediately after they arise there is not time for the three of them to assemble and for contact to occur between them. Also, since they do not have their own natures a� existing by themselves, how could they come together and have an assembled inherent nature?
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If these three cannot assemble in this way, then how can there be any contact with a nature of inherent existence? Since feeling depends on contact, so feeling must also lack inherent existence. STANZA 56 /nang dang phyi yi skye mched la/ /brten nas rnam par shes pa 1 )'byung/ /de 2)lta has na rnam shes nil /smig rgyu sgyu ma bzhin du stong/ 1 )P: 'gyung, D:'gyur 2)P:ltang, D:ltar
Consciousness arises in dependence on internal and ex ternal entrances. Because consciousness arises in de pendence on the entrances, so it is like a mirage and an illusion which are devoid of inherent existence. Still, the opponent asserts that the entrances do exist inherently because consciousness arises in dependence on those entrances. We argue, however, that if consciousness were to exist inherently then it could not arise in depend ence on internal and external entrances, because what is inherently existent must be independent. As consciousness only arises in dependence upon external entrances such as form and internal entrances such as an eye, it is clear that it is empty of inherent existence. It is like a mirage which appears as water or a magician's illusion which appears as horses and elephants. Because consciousness lacks inherent existence it is like a mirage, which is something which exists, but not in the way it appears to exist. It is this very mode of the appearance of an object to our eye consciousness which is the thing which Niigarjuna wishes to refute. STANZA 57 /rnam shes shes bya la brten 1)na/ /'byung la shes bya yod ma yin/
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/shes bya shes pa med pa'i phyir/ /de phyir shes pa po nyid med/ l)D:nas
Consciousness cannot arise without taking its object, so it depends on the object of knowledge. The object of knowledge cannot arise without depending on the consciousness which apprehends it, and therefore because they exist in a mutually dependent · way both of them lack inherent existence. The object of knowledge and the apprehension of the object do not exist inherently, therefore the person who knows the object does not exist inherently. Now, the opponent still believes that even though the object of knowledge and the apprehension of the object don't exist inherently, since there are persons who know the object, therefore these persons do have inherent existence. We argue that if the obj ect of knowledge and the apprehension of the object of knowledge don't exist in herently, how can the person who knows the object exist inherently? STANZA 58 /thams cad mi rtag yang na ni/ /mi rtag pa yang rtag pa med/ /dngos l )po rtag dang mi rtag nyid/ I' gyur na de lta ga la yod/ l)D:bo Buddha has seen no essence in composite phe nomena with inherent existence so he said that all composite phenomena are impermanent, so therefore they are devoid of inherent existence, or because he said that all composite phenomena are impermanent, so how could they 2)exist inherently in the nature of permanent phenomena? If phenomena were to have inherent existence they should either be permanent
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Niigiirjuna's Seventy Stanzas or impermanent: how can there be phenomena which are both permanent and impermanent at the same time? 2)Lit: rtag pa med; do not exist permanently.
Because Buddha has seen reality he has said that all composite things are impermanent. The opponent mis takenly believes that this means that impermanence has inherent existence. We refute this. Because all composite things are impermanent, they lack inherent existence. When Buddha says that all composite things are impermanent he also implies that permanent phenomena lack inherent existence. STANZA 59 /sdug dang mi sdug phyi ci log/ /rkyen las chags sdang gti mug dngos/ /'byung phyir chags sdang gti mug dang/ /rang bzhin gyis ni yod ma yin/ Through superimposition one develops the three distorted preconceptions toward pleasing, repulsive and neutral objects, which respectively cause attach ment, hatred and closed-mindedness. Because they arise in dependence on these conditions, the ! )essential nature of attachment, hatred and closed mindedness is without inherent existence. 1 )rang bzhin. Superimposition (sgro 'dogs) is an imposition or imputa tion of an extreme conception upon a basis of imputation, which is a supposed object. It is actually a process of over estimating the nature of such a basis in either of two ex treme directions. An example would be the seeing of permanence in what is actually a transitory phenomenon. Out of this superimposing process we develop attachment for what appears to be pleasing, hatred for what appears repulsive, and closed-mindedness or confusion for what
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appears to be neutral. Such preconceptions (pleasing, re pulsive, and neutral thoughts and feelings) are mere im putations without inherent existence, because they arise in dependence on the condition of superimposition. STANZA 60 /gang phyir de nyid la chags shing/ /de la she sdang de la rmongs/ /de phyir rnam par rtog pas bskyed/ /rtog de'ng yang dag nyid du med/ A pleasing object does not exist inherently because some persons develop attachment towards it, others develop hatred towards it, and still others develop closed-mindedness towards it. Therefore such qualities of the object are merely created by preconceptions, and these preconceptions also l)do not exist inherently because they develop from superimposition. l)Lit: yang dag nyid du med; do not truely exist. Here Nagarjuna carries the argument in the previous stanza a step further. At a given moment three different observers may demonstrate the three distorted preconcep tions towards the same object. This shows that the qualities associated with an object do not inhere in it, but are im puted to it through the power of the preconceptions. For instance, an attractive thing does not exist inherently be cause its quality - attractiveness - is fabricated by a concept. Whatever is imputed upon it lacks inherent exist ence as it is created by a thought (a preconception). Such a preconception has to be empty of inherent existence be cause of its dependent arising. From that it also follows that the three poisonous delusions (attachment, hatred and ignorance) which are produced by such distorted precon ceptions lack inherent existence and so do the actions moti vated by them. Also, if a pleasant thing exists inherently it should be seen as pleasant by all people, which does not stand true as some see it as repulsive and generate hatred
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towards it, whereas some others see it neither as pleasant nor as unpleasant and maintain a neutral feeling. If this object lacks inherent existence, so must the thought consciousness which imputes qualities to it, for they both arise in dependence, as Nagarjuna states in the next stanza. STANZA 6 1 /brtag bya gang de yod ma yin/ /brtag bya med rtog ga la yodl /de phyir brtag bya rtog pa dag /rkyen las skyes phyir stong pa nyid/
Whatever may be an object of examination does not exist inherently. As that object of examination does not exist inherently, how can the thought-consciousness of that non-inherently existing object exist inherently? Therefore, because the object of examination and the thought-consciousness arise from causes and conditions, they are empty of inherent existence. STANZA 62 Having demonstrated in the previous stanza that thought consciousness itself is without inherent existence, Nagar juna now turns to the heart of his discourse, which is its implications for liberation. 1de nyid rtogs l )pas phyin ci log /bzhi las byung ba'i ma rig medl /de med na ni 'du byed rnams/ /mi 'byung lhag ma'ng de bzhin no/ l)P:ba'i The mind which directly understands emptiness is an unmistaken mind which eliminates the ignorance that arises from the four evil preconceptions. Without that ignorance the karmic formations will not arise, and so neither will the remaining limbs.
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When the mind directly sees the lack of inherent exist ence both of things and of itself (that is, their emptiness), then it is unmistaken. Such an unmistaken mind eliminates ignorance arising from the preconceptions by seeing the ultimate nature of things, thereby preventing the arising of new karmic formations, and so freeing one from the cyclic existence whose arising is described by the twelve limbs of dependent origination. Reasoning, such as that employed in the Seventy Stanzas on Emptiness, is a necessary step in developing an unmis taken mind. This is because although one can directly per ceive the gross nature of an object, one must first reason about the subtle nature of the object, which is its lack of inherent existence, before one can develop the direct per ceiver which directly perceives this subtle nature of an object. A thought-consciousness which correctly analyzes the subtle nature of an object is converted through medita tion into an unmistaken direct perceiver which knows the subtle nature of an object, which is a mere vacuity: The conversion of thought-consciousness into an unmis taken direct perceiver can only be accomplished through meditation. This meditation must follow the earlier reason ing about the subtle nature of an object, for this has shown the practitioner what is to be meditated upon. A two-step process is being described here which a metaphor will help to clarify. Suppose a magician were to come to a crossroads and, setting up some sticks which were found there, magi cally convert them into horses and elephants. Attracting an audience, he bids the animals to do tricks for the entertain ment of the onlookers. When the crowd disperses, the magician goes on his way, leaving the sticks behind. If some person were now to pass by the crossroads he would know nothing of the earlier performance, and would simply see some sticks at the crossroads. In this metaphor, the magician sees a mere appearance of horses and elephants but does not cling to them as horses and elephants for he knows that he created them. Similarly,
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the practitioner who has understood emptiness through modes of profound reasoning does not cling to phenomena as having true existence although they appear to exist tru ly. Ordinary people hold things to exist truely and phe nomena appear to them in such a manner. This is similar to the type of appearance and the perception of people who watch the magic illusion. Now as to the one who has elimin ated ignorance and sees emptiness directly, things neither appear to him as truly existent nor does he cling to them as having true existence. His position is similar to that of the person who has not watched the magic illusion, he won't see either the appearance of illusory horses and elephants or have any clinging to them as horses and elephants. The magician is also analogous to the practitioner who has entered the Path of Accumulation (tshogs lam). He gains his understanding through hearing and contempla tion, using a mental image of emptiness. Then, entering the Path of Preparation, he utilizes meditation in order to prog ress through four levels, successively removing the mental image at each level. When it is completely gone and the practitioner perceives emptiness directly, he has entered the Path of Seeing (mthong lam) and is called an "Arya. " What he sees and the state he has attained is indicated in the next stanza. STANZA 63 /gang gang la brten skye ba'i dngos/ /de de med pas de mi skye/ /dngos dang dngos med 'dus byas dang/ /'dus ma byas 'di mya ngan 'das/
Anything which arises in dependence on any causes will not arise without those causes. Hence, functional things in the form of produced phenomena and non functional things as unproduced phenomena would be empty of inherent existence which is the natural state of nirviit)ll .
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Ignorance as a cause produces karmic formations and so forth, which are functional things, but these cannot arise without that ignorance. When such functional things do not exist, their opposite nature, non-functional things, cannot exist. Therefore functional things in the form of composite phenomena and non-functional things as non-composite phenomena are devoid of an inherently existent nature; this is known as natural nirvaQ.a. If a person develops the wisdom which understands this and acquaints himself more and more with this wisdom, assisted by the method of repeated meditation, he or she can attain the state of non abiding nirvaQ.a which is free from the extremes of cyclic existence and solitary peace. The two extremes of eternalism and nihilism do not exist but there are people who fall on these extremes. However, the two extremes of cyclic existence and solitary peace which are posited from the conventional point of view are existent and also there are people who fall on these ex tremes. The nonabiding nirvaQ.a of the Mahayana Vehi· :e is free from these extremes. STANZA 64 /rgyu rkyen las skyes dngos po rnams/ /yang dag nyid du rtog pa gang/ /de ni ston pas ma rig gsungs/ /de las yan l)lag bcu gnyis 'byung/ l )P:yag
The Teacher, Buddha, said that the conception of true existence of functional things which arise from causes and conditions is ignorance. From this ignorance arise the twelve dependent limbs. Things which are produced by causes and conditions do not exist truly or inherently. The conception of the self of phenomena refers to the ignorance of grasping at the true existence of aggregates contaminated by actions and delu sion. The twelve dependent limbs arise from this ignorance.
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STANZA 65 /dngos po stong par de rtogs l )na/ /yang dag mthong phyir rmongs mi 'gyur/ /de ni ma rig 'gog pa yin/ /de las yan lag bcu gnyis 'gag/ l)D:nas
Understanding the non-inherent existence of things means seeing the reality [i.e., emptiness] which elim inates ignorance about the reality of things. This brings about the cessation of ignorantly grasping at an apparently true existence. From that the twelve limbs of dependent origination cease. In this and the previous stanza we have Nagarjuna's restatement of the four noble truths. The twelve limbs are suffering existence. Their source is ignorant grasping. Suf fering ceases when ignorant grasping ceases. Seeing reality is the path. The reality of things is then described in the next stanza in terms familiar to us from the MUlamadhyama kakiirikii and the Perfection of Wisdom sfltras.
STANZA 66 /'du byed dri za'i grong l)khyer dang/ /sgyu ma 2)smig rgyu skra shad dang/ /dbu 3)ba chu bur sprul 4)pa dang/ /rmi lam mgal me'i 'khor lo mtshungs/ l)D:khyeng 2)P:mig 3)D:pa 4)P:ma
Produced phenomena are similar to a village of gan dharvas, an illusion, a hair net in the eyes, foam, a bubble, an emanation, a dream, and a circle of light produced by a whirling firebrand. A less metaphoric description of the reality of things is found in the next two stanzas.
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STANZA 67 /rang bzhin gyis ni 'ga' yang med/ /'di la dngos po med pa'ng med/ /rgyu dang rkyen las skyes ba yi! /dngos dang dngos med stong ba yin/ There is nothing which exists inherently. In that fashion even non-functional things do not exist. There fore, functional things which arise from causes and conditions as well as non-functional things are empty of inherent existence. STANZA 68 /dngos kun rang bzhin stong l )pas na/ /de bzhin gshegs pa mtshungs med pas/ /rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba 'dil /dngos po rnams su nye bar bstan/ l)D: has
Because all things are empty of inherent existence the Peerless Tathiigata has shown the emptiness of inher ent existence of dependent arising as the reality of all things. Stanza 67 lays the logical groundwork for stanza 68, but it does seem rather superfluous, as stanza 63 has already made the same argument. Indeed, although this stanza appears in the root verses and in the "autocommentary, it is missing from both the Candrakirti and Parahita commen taries, suggesting that it may be an interpolation. At any rate, stanza 68 is very interesting because it is such a clear statement of the actual nature of the reality whose conven tional aspect was metaphorically described in stanza 66. As we see, it is quite free from extremes. By asserting depend ent arising, nihilism is avoided, and by asserting the emptiness of inherent existence, eternalism is avoided. The reality revealed by the Buddha in the middle view is the empty nature of dependent arising. Its reverse face is the "
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conventional appearance of things. In a certain sense the two complement each other, like concave and convex, be cause they are two aspects of one reality. In the next stanza this complementarity is implied by the postulating of a single limit for all reality. This naturally leads to a further discussion of the Buddha's use of conventional expressions when teaching about this reality. STANZA 69 /dam pa'i don ni der zad de/ /'jig rten ngor byas tha snyad dag/ /sna tshogs thams cad rdzogs sangs rgyas/ /bcom ldan 'das kyis l )bden brtags mdzad/ l)D:brten brtag
Ultimate reality is contained within the limit of the non-inherent existence of a thing. For that reason, the Accomplished Buddha, the Subduer, has imputed various terms in the manner of the world through comparison. Reality is not beyond the limit of what is known by a valid direct perceiver. This limit must also subsume con ventional reality. Within this limit the Buddha makes two kinds of comparisons. One is to examine the various things of conventional reality, to determine whether the names used to designate these objects are actually suitable for this purpose. In the second case, he compares the different aspects of an object to each other and to their names. These comparisons require that the Buddha utilize the different conventional terms used by the people of the world in order to examine the objects which they believe to exist. This process will eventually lead to the creation of a mental image of emptiness whose actual limit corresponds to that of reality. But in this process some people may become confused and, not understanding that the Buddha only uses these conventionalities for the sake of comparison, may take them to be realities, though actually they are merely im-
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